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THESIS

WHY MID-GRADE SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS
ARE RESIGNING FROM THE NAVAL SERVICE,

by

10, James Robert/Howell

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Why Mid-Grade Surface Warfare Officers
are Resigning from the Naval Service

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Cameron College, 1974

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

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ABSTRACT

✓ This thesis addresses the reasons for mid-grade (O-2 to O-4) Surface Warfare officer resignations. It makes recommendations that would possibly increase retention for the mid-grade Surface Warfare Officer Community. Statistical analyses were performed upon data from post-resignation questionnaires. A list of the ten most reported reasons for resigning was then compiled. A series of recommendations which might have a positive effect upon retention were then derived.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The objectives of this thesis are: 1) to determine the reasons officers of the Surface Warfare Community in paygrades 0-2 through 0-4 leave the Naval service; and 2) based upon these reasons, develop recommendations that might enable Navy management to develop effective action plans to encourage Surface Warfare Officer retention. The need for increasing Surface Warfare retention is discussed in the following section.

A. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER RETENTION

Information provided by OP136D2 (Officer Resignation section) indicated that a retention rate of 40% to 45% for Surface Warfare officers is necessary to meet the manning needs for that community. The January/February 1980 issue of Perspective (a newsletter for Navy officers published by the Naval Military Personnel Command) reported that Surface Warfare Officer retention declined to 31% in FY79 from 38% in FY78. The March/April 1980 issue of Perspective reported a projected retention rate of 41% for the Surface Warfare Community. The actual retention rates for FY78 and FY79, along with the projected 41% retention rate and a stated goal of 40% to 45%, indicated that retention, and perhaps manning, within the Surface Warfare Community, were inadequate.

At the time of the published reports in Perspective, retention rates were calculated on a minimum service requirement (MSR) plus two years. MSR is the initial service obligation incurred by an officer. Once fixed by commissioning and initial training, an officer's MSR does not change. The typical MSR for a Surface officer who was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Commissioning program is three years, whereas, a Surface officer who graduated from the Naval Academy has an MSR of five years. In the case of a Naval Aviator, initial flight training modifies the aviator's MSR to 4.5 years after designation as a Naval Aviator (i.e., successful completion of initial flight training), regardless of commissioning source. Specifically, retention is the ratio of the number of officers onboard at MSR+2 years to the number onboard at MSR-1 year. Basing retention rates on the MSR calculation did not take into account those officers who were past the MSR+2 year point. For the Surface Warfare Community, this group of officers would most likely be post or senior department head Lieutenants. By not keeping account of those officers past the MSR+2 point, the Navy was not getting a true picture of its officer manning needs so that retention rate figures were of limited value. However, on 1 September 1980, the method of calculating retention was changed. The new method consisted of year group tracking by warfare designator past the 11 year point for a cohort of officers. The new method allows for better personnel

management. As can be concluded from examining Table 1.1, the MSR+2 method of calculating retention rates would not reveal shortages in cohorts of officers beyond MSR+2. A shortage of mid-grade (O-2 to O-5) officers has occurred in the Surface Warfare Community.

Table 1.1

Surface Warfare Officer Inventory vs
Programmed Authorizations (as of 1 July 1980)

	<u>Number of Officers by Rank</u>				
	CAPT & Above	CDR	LCDR	LT	LTJG
Required	771	1804	2258	2485	1756
Inventory	741	1738	2168	2218	2989
Deficient (-) or surplus (+)	- 30	- 66	- 90	- 267	+ 1233

A slight increase in the number of resignations by O-3 and O-4 Surface Warfare officers is shown in figure 1.1. The resignations depicted by figure 1.1 are a comparison of resignations by O-2 to O-4 officers with a Surface Warfare designator (1110, 1160, 1115, 1165) in FY79 and FY80. Resignations for the period October to August of FY80 are compared to resignations from October to August of FY79.

No explanation was apparent for the decrease in the number of O-2's (as seen in figure 1.1) resigning in FY80 as compared to O-2's resigning in FY79.




Figure 1.1. Surface Warfare Officer Resignations
FY80 vs (FY79)

As computed by the MSR+2 method, the retention rate for Surface Warfare officers in FY80 was 39% compared to the predicted 41%. Once again, retention within the Surface Warfare Community fell below the needed 41% to 45%.

While the mid-grade shortage of Surface Warfare officers is not as severe as for pilots (2256 personnel) or submariners (600 personnel), it still poses problems for current and future surface ship manning. The 1979 Unrestricted Line Officer Study reported that "the shortages that exist in the Surface Warfare Community have serious implications, both for Surface Warfare officers and for the Navy at large. Our officers will spend more time at sea ..." and "The only way the community can become healthy is through a dramatic improvement in retention." A recent study [Alden, 1980], concluded an increase of 21% in the number of surface combatant platforms could be expected by 1990. This increase in the number of ships will bring a corresponding increase in Surface Warfare officer manning levels. Alden showed the total number of surface officer billets in 1978 to be 4,970; by 1990 he projected 6,052 billets. This would mean a 21.8% increase in the number of surface officer billets from 1978 to 1990. If the present trend in Surface Warfare officer retention continues, the operational capability of the Surface Navy and, possibly, the national security of the United States will be degraded. The early identification of factors affecting retention, coupled with vigorous measures designed to deal

with those factors, could do much to prevent the current Surface Warfare officer shortage from becoming a crisis in the future. This thesis is intended to be a step towards that prevention.

B. SURVEY OF LITERATURE

In order to discover what areas of officer retention had already been studied and which organizations or individuals had performed those studies, two computer-based literature searches were made. The first of these computer searches was done through the Defense Documentation Center. The second search was done on the holdings of the Naval Postgraduate School Library, Monterey, Ca. The material held in the Postgraduate School Library consisted of previous theses and various technical reports. The time period covered was from 1964 to the present (1 November 1980). The review of past studies dealing with officer retention provided considerable insight into current knowledge concerning approaches to solving personnel turnover and retention problems. Relevant studies drawn from the survey of literature will be discussed in the following section of this thesis.

In order to provide some logical order to the review of those previous studies pertaining to officer retention, the studies are discussed in chronological order (from the earliest to the most recent).

In a thesis [Fitzgerald, 1964] completed at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., the author points out

that the then current method of determining the reasons for junior officer resignations was not accurate and valid. In his thesis, Lt. Fitzgerald recommended the application of utility theory to develop a model for determining the reasons for junior officer resignations. His belief was, that given accurate resignation information, Navy management would be able to solve the junior officer retention problem. This researcher believes Lt. Fitzgerald's thesis was one of the first attempts to develop a method for collecting and analyzing officer resignation data.

A comparative analysis of retention and junior Naval officers and retention of junior executives within the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Organization was done in 1965 by Lieutenant Commanders Fawcett and Skelton. In their thesis, the areas of salary structure, retirement, fringe benefits, promotion opportunity, permanency of location, level of responsibility and specialization, prestige, job satisfaction, security, and education were used to compare the Navy with Pacific Telephone and Telegraph. The retention rate at the time of that thesis for junior Naval officers was 8.8%, while the retention rate for Pacific Telephone and Telegraph was 64%. These retention rates were based upon retention 10 years after initial employment. The differences in retention rates were attributed to disparities in the above mentioned areas. In addition, a prime factor contributing to low retention rates within the Navy and not experienced by

the junior executives of Pacific Telephone and Telegraph was identified. This factor was the long period of time spent at sea and the associated additional cost of maintaining a household while at sea. Recommendations based upon the disparities discovered by Lcdr's Fawcett and Skelton included increased pay (both base and sea pay), increased fringe benefits, better medical care, and efforts to increase time with families while inport.

A study [Harsh, 1965] was conducted for the Chief of Naval Operations to explore factors of personal background and Navy experience which might be related to officer retention and to estimate the possible effectiveness of various benefits and policies for encouraging longer active duty careers. The data base for the study by Harsh was a questionnaire mailed to a stratified random sample of 9980 Navy officers of all designators in ranks from Ensign (O-1) through Captain (O-6). A return rate of 93% resulted in 9137 questionnaires being available for analysis. Recommendations based upon Harsh's study included revised selection criteria for future officer candidates and for certain retention incentives. Among active duty officers, retention was found to be related to such objectives as seeking responsibility, advanced education, job security, challenge and risk; by wanting to serve the country, to belong to a high-principled group, to have respected co-workers, and to have fair treatment. The researcher concluded, if such objectives and social

attitudes could be screened for in young officer candidates at the time of their selection, then those candidates would have a higher probability of retention than those then being selected under the then current procedures.

The following (in order of importance in effecting retention) are Harsh's recommendations for retention incentives: a 20% pay raise, compensation equal to civil service employees, scholarships of \$1000 per dependent child per college year, sea and shore specialization, improved BOQs/Navy housing, and a 4-6 year homeport continuity. Harsh's study used data from officers on active duty, whereas, this thesis used questionnaire results obtained from officers who had actually resigned.

A most exhaustive study of officer retention was done by the Secretary of the Navy's Task Force on Navy/Marine Corps Personnel Retention. This study was conducted from December 1964 until February 1966. The mission, as set forth in the charter of the Task Force, was to:

1. Identify and examine the major factors bearing on retention of high quality officers and enlisted personnel.
2. Develop a plan for attacking those retention problems, which was to include:
 - a. specific recommendations
 - b. a program to implement the recommendations
 - c. identification of the specific Government officials or agencies who were empowered to implement such actions.

The results of the study are contained in eleven volumes. Because of the mass of information, this researcher will only point out certain findings and recommendations that were found to be relevant to Naval officer retention. The Secretary of the Navy's Task Force identified officer promotion opportunities, officer distribution and management, officer education and training, living conditions afloat and ashore, dependent medical care, and pay/fringe benefits as areas having a negative impact upon officer retention.

SECNAV NOTE 5420, dated 14 February 1966, listed 82 separate recommendations from the task force that were approved by the Secretary of the Navy. These 82 recommendations contained items which dealt with both officer and enlisted retention. Some of the specific recommendations for improving officer retention included: the establishment of an Officers Career Planning Board, development of an updated and fully integrated computer-assisted Personnel Distribution and Management System, establishment of a Surface Combatant School Course (currently the Surface Warfare Officers School), resumption of funding for the Habitability Improvement program, modification of the Dependent's Medical Care Act, and the provision of sea pay to both officer and enlisted men in an amount adequate to recognize the unique personal and family living conditions that characterize sea duty. This study seems to have been the beginning of major attention being given to officer retention by top Navy management.

The relationship between career values and junior officer retention was explored in Naval Personnel and Training Research Laboratory research report SRR 72-2 [Neumann, et al., 1972]. A Career Value Questionnaire was given to a sample population of 488 NROTC officers, all commissioned prior to 1962. The sample was categorized on the basis of career status. The low tenure group included 26% of the sample (N = 126) who left the Navy after serving less than five years active duty. The high tenure group consisted of 362 officers who remained on active naval duty from five to ten years beyond their date of commission. The researchers found that high and low tenure officers tended to agree on the importance of various career values, and differences existed on how the two tenure groups perceived the obtainability of those values. Low tenure officers considered four items "extremely important" or "somewhat above average in importance" and the probability of obtaining those rewards in the Navy either "not very likely" or "very unlikely". Those four items were:

- Full use of abilities
- Satisfactory home life
- Success through ability alone
- Work under consistent and intelligent personnel policies

Neumann, et al., concluded that, in some cases, there was the possibility of irreconcilable differences between an individual's career values and those offered by the Navy.

The researchers stated that improved selection procedures seemed to be the best method of avoiding such problems. The report concluded that further research was indicated in order to determine whether high school seniors were able to express their "career needs" prior to selection for an officer commissioning program.

There was only one study [Lopez, 1973] found in the survey of literature which dealt specifically with Surface Warfare officers. In Lopez's study, 162 Surface Warfare officers (O-1 through O-4) who were enrolled as students at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., during March/April 1973, were included in the sample. A questionnaire was developed around two basic questions. The questions were, "What aspects of the Surface Navy or the Navy in general make it attractive as a career?" and "What aspects make it unattractive?" From those two questions, a fifty-two item questionnaire dealing with career intentions was developed and administered to the sample of 162 Surface Warfare officers. Responses having the strongest stated effect upon career intentions included: Basic Allowance for Quarters for all afloat officers, better medical benefits, orders for postgraduate education, and sea pay. Those responses found to have the strongest negative effect upon career intentions included new retirement proposals, peacetime budget constraints, time away from homeport, and unexpected deployment or orders. Based upon the results of the

questionnaire, a list of 19 recommendations were made. The list of recommendations included sea pay as a retention incentive, payment of BAQ to all officers afloat, retention of the Spot Promotion Program, and a minimum four-year tour length for any CONUS area. While the above study identified areas having either a strong positive or a strong negative stated effect upon Surface Warfare officer career intentions, it did not identify reasons given by those Surface Warfare officers who had actually resigned from the Naval service.

In a study of Unrestricted Line Naval officers (from five commission sources) who were assigned to surface ships or shore installations for their first assignment, it was found that both the type of first assignment and the college education major, as well as the commission source itself, were associated with officer retention [Robertson & Ross, 1979]. It was assumed by the researchers that retention could be increased by determining the retention outcomes for various assignment patterns and then using this information in future officer allocation. A particular difficulty in evaluating alternative allocation strategies was found to stem from the instability of the obtained retention proportions for source-to-assignment patterns containing few or no officers. In trying to find a more accurate and stable estimator of retention for source-to-assignment patterns containing few or no officers, an evaluation of three estimation modes was

performed at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca., [Weitzman and Robertson, 1979]. Of the three Structural Pattern Analysis (SPA) models evaluated, true-score, linear-covariance, and independence, the third one was found to be the most accurate and stable. The independence model also provided more stable values than did calculations based on actual retention outcomes. Weitzman and Robertson concluded that the Independence SPA model would provide stable estimates of personnel-retention proportions. Those estimates could then be possibly used with linear-programming algorithms in a source-to-assignment matrix to minimize personnel losses.

The most current (January, 1980) study of junior officer retention listed in the literature was entitled: "Junior Officer Retention: Another Perspective." This study was sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, Organizational Effectiveness Research Program and was conducted by C. Brooklyn Derr. This study addressed six issues most frequently associated with junior officers resigning their commissions. Those issues were:

- Poor Career Benefits
- Family Separations
- Loss of Esteem for the CO Role
- Perceived "Greener Pastures"
- Bad Working Conditions
- Money

Derr applied findings from previous studies, Marriage/Family Issues and Wife Styles across Naval Officer Career Stages [Derr, 1979] and More on Career Anchor Concepts [Derr, 1979] to those six issues. The study concluded that the Navy needed to develop new creative and fundamental career development policies.

The survey of literature uncovered a number of studies on officer retention. However, only one such study (Lopez, 1973) specifically addressed retention within the Surface Warfare Community. No study was found that used post-resignation data (data from officers who had actually resigned) in analyzing reasons why officers left the Navy. Based upon the findings of the literature survey, this researcher decided to analyze post-resignation questionnaire data, and to make recommendations based upon that analysis. The research objectives, methodology and procedures used in this thesis are discussed in the following chapter.

II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURES, AND SPINOFF

The research objectives determined the approach utilized in this study. The approach combined survey research with various statistical analysis techniques. An effort is made to describe the various analytical techniques in the methods and procedures sections. Analyses which require a knowledge of statistical techniques are included in the appendix section (Appendix A). Attitudes, opinions, and comments of the respondents to the Officer Separation Questionnaires (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 and Rev. 4-79) (Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3) were the source of the raw data used for various statistical analyses. The results of the analyses were then compared to similar results produced by OP 136D2 (Officer Resignation section).

A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

A major objective of this study was to determine the reasons for leaving the Naval Service given by officers of the Surface Warfare Community in paygrades O-2 through O-4. Another objective was to take these reasons and to develop suggestions that might enable Navy management to develop effective action plans aimed at having a positive effect upon Surface Warfare officer retention.

In order to accomplish those objectives, a content analysis of the Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3

Rev. 1-73) (Figure 2.1) was to have been performed. While this investigator was gathering data for the content analysis, the Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) revised the survey instrument used to gather officer separation information. This change was the result of the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center's (NPRDC) Special Report 79-15 (Navy Officer Exit Statement Analysis). This study was done by Dr. William H. Githens of NPRDC in response to a request from the Chief of Naval Personnel for an evaluation of Navy officer motivation and retention.

The objectives of NPRDC's research were to identify the reasons officers give for separating from the Naval service and to develop an improved method of obtaining this information.

A new survey questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (Figures 2.2 and 2.3) was the end result of the NPRDC study. A survey instrument was now available providing data to which computerized statistical analysis techniques could be applied. Given the development of the new separation questionnaire, this investigator decided to obtain an additional data base using results obtained from the new format. OP136D2 (Officer Resignation section) agreed to forward completed copies of the new questionnaire as they were received. Considerable attention was given by OP136D2 to insure the confidentiality of the survey respondents before the survey forms were forwarded to this investigator.

FROM: (Activity Title)

TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (PERS-842)

RANK	NAME (Last, First, Middle)	SSN/FILE NO./DESIGNATOR
------	----------------------------	-------------------------

YOUR REASONS FOR LEAVING THE NAVY IN ORDER OF PRIORITY (USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY).

WERE THERE ANY ACTIONS WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO MAKE THE NAVY YOUR CAREER?

☐ YES (Please specify).

☐ NO

COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT MEASURES COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INFLUENCE OFFICER TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY.

Signature

Figure 2.1. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (in use from
January 1973 until April 1979)

OFFICER SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Under the authority of 5 USC 301 regulations, information is solicited from all separating officers. Information furnished will not be used for any administrative action concerning you specifically and will not be made a part of your permanent record.

The questionnaire is required from all officers separating from the Navy and solicits their views on Navy life. The data obtained from this form and others serves as a basis from which management initiatives are derived. Your candid comments are appreciated. Additional comments are requested on the back of this form.

INSTRUCTIONS

Please use soft lead pencil to darken responses (one response per item).

QUESTION

If you are voluntarily separating, how important has each of the following been in your decision to separate? If you are involuntarily separating, how important has each of the following been in its influence on you?

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER:

0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

RESPONSES

1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Important
4. Of some importance
5. Not true or not important

	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
1. Better civilian employment opportunities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	16. Poor utilization of skills, education, abilities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Dislike of military life-style, rules and regulations.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	17. Not selected for desired specialty/designator change.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Poor promotion opportunities and policies.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	18. Lack of concerned, knowledgeable guidance/advice.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Possible erosion of benefits.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	19. Billet, task or job dissatisfaction.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. Insufficient technical knowledge of superiors.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	20. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Lack of a career for given specialty/designator.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	21. Lack of command opportunity.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. Long hours and work pressure.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	22. Long or extended deployments.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. Too much family separation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	23. Problems with detailing or assignments.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. Lack of sufficient fringe benefits.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	24. Manpower/supplies/financial support problems.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. Lack of responsibility and authority.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	25. Too much crisis management.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	26. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12. Poor quality of living quarters/BAQ inequities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	27. Geographic instability/transient nature of Navy.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
13. Insufficient pay.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	28. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
14. Not selected/not given opportunity to attend PG school.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	29. Unsatisfactory officer evaluation system.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
15. Type of education or training desired is not provided.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	30. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Figure 2.2. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Front). (In use from April 1979 until October 1980)

COMMAND/ACTIVITY		
RANK	NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)	DESIG

PLEASE EXPAND AS DESIRED ON YOUR INDICATED RESPONSES FOR LEAVING THE NAVY:

PLEASE INDICATE ANY ACTION WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO REMAIN IN THE NAVY:

COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO INFLUENCE THIS OFFICER TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY:

Figure 2.3. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Back). (In
use from April 1979 until October 1980)

B. METHODOLOGY

In view of the availability of responses to the revised Officer Separation Questionnaire, this researcher decided to perform various statistical analyses upon the data available from the revised questionnaires (figures 2.2 and 2.3). These analyses were to be the mainstay of this study. They were supported by a limited content analysis of the previously collected older surveys. The individuals in the sample used for this study were Surface Warfare officers in the paygrades of 0-2 through 0-4. The label Surface Warfare officer, as used in this study, includes the following designators:

<u>Officer Designator</u>	<u>(Designator Code)</u>
1. Surface Warfare Qualified, Regular Navy	(1110)
2. Surface Warfare Qualified, Reserve	(1115)
3. Surface Warfare Trainee, Regular Navy	(1160)
4. Surface Warfare Trainee, Reserve	(1165)

The total sample (N = 281) was composed of 148 respondents to NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (Figure 2.1) and of 133 respondents to NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). A more detailed breakdown of the sample is shown in Table 2.1. This sample represents responses from approximately 400 separated Surface Warfare officers who could have responded during the period the data were collected. This quantity was derived from the use of an estimate of a 70% return rate for the questionnaires. The sample is believed to be a valid

Table 2.1

Officer Separation Survey
(Demography of Total Sample, N = 281)

NAVPERS 1920/3 (Rev. 1-73)

RANK	N =
LTJG	16
LT.	105
LCDR	<u>27</u>
Total	148

WARFARE DESIGNATOR	N =
1110	134
1115	13
1160	0
1165	<u>1</u>
Total	148

NAVPERS 1920/3 (Rev. 4-79)

RANK	N =
LTJG	23
LT.	100
LCDR	<u>10</u>
Total	133

WARFARE DESIGNATOR	N =
1110	95
1115	14
1160	21
1165	<u>3</u>
Total	133

representation of attitudes, opinions and comments of Surface Warfare officers at the time of their resignations from the Naval service. The time period covered by these questionnaires was from late 1978 until 1 November 1980. The November 1980 cut-off date was established due to time requirements involved in completing this thesis.

C. PROCEDURE

For the readers who might not have had a recent exposure to the various statistical terms used in this section, Appendix A lists the relevant terms and their meanings.

The questionnaire labeled NAVPERS 1920/3 (Rev. 4-79) (Figure 2.2) has thirty items dealing with reasons for separating from the Naval service. Each respondent was asked to mark each item on a Likert scale as to how important that particular item was in the respondent's decision to separate. The scale and the assigned numerical values are shown below:

1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Important
4. Of some importance
5. Not true or not important

To keep count of the ranks and warfare designators of the respondents, the following codes were assigned: (7) LTJG, (8) LT., (9) LCDR, (1110) Surface Warfare Qualified, Regular Navy, (1115) Surface Warfare Qualified, Reserve, (1160) Surface

Warfare trainee, Regular Navy, (1165) Surface Warfare trainee, Reserve. Each questionnaire with its responses was encoded onto a punch card for subsequent batch processing.

Subprogram FREQUENCIES from the SPSS package was selected as the primary means of statistical analysis of the data. The first analysis done on the data was a separate frequency table for each of the thirty items on the questionnaire. The SPSS program produces the absolute frequency, the relative frequency in percent, the adjusted frequency in percent and the cumulative adjusted frequency in percent. Also included in the table are missing values (if any) for each response item on the questionnaire.

The second analysis performed upon the data using subprogram FREQUENCIES, was the development of histograms for all responses to each item. Included with each histogram were the mean, skewness, standard deviation and kurtosis. A complete reproduction of those results is available in Appendix B.

The items were then ranked in increasing order of their mean values. (This is the same ranking method used by OP136D2.) The lower the value of the mean, the greater the degree of reported importance that particular item from the questionnaire had in the average respondent's decision to separate from Naval service. The top ten items in ranking were then compared to the ten items produced in a report done by OP136D2. The ranked list was then compared with

responses from all Navy officers, Unrestricted Line Officers (URL), and Surface Warfare officers. The results of this ranking and comparison are discussed in the next chapter.

One reason for conducting analyses on data from a survey, apart from the accumulation of information on simple variables, is to make comparisons between two or more variables and to draw conclusions about their relationships.

The analysis of the data indicated that the primary reason Surface Warfare officers reported for leaving the Naval service was too much family separation (Question 8). To this investigator, there seemed to be three other items in the questionnaire that might be related to the family separation item. These items, in order of their mean values, from most important to least important, were:

Q22 - Long or extended deployment (Mean = 2.470)

Q30 - Demands of Navy impinging on personal life (Mean = 2.863)

Q27 - Geographic instability/transient nature of the Navy
(Mean = 3.351)

In order to test the possible interrelationships of those items, Pearson's r 's and Kendall's Tau B's were computed. The results of that analysis are discussed in the next chapter.

D. SPINOFF

In March of 1980, this investigator visited Dr. William Githens of Navy Personnel Research and Development Center. The purpose of the appointment was to discuss certain aspects of this study. While doing initial data collection and

preliminary content analysis, it became obvious that the questionnaire in present use (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3) could be improved. The most obvious improvement would be in the area of processing the responses to the separation questionnaire. The Enlisted Separation Questionnaire, OPNAV 1910/1 (7-79) (shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5), already in use, utilized an optical-scan form. The optical-scan form allows data to be read directly into the computer and eliminates the need for keypunching. By eliminating the punched cards, processing man-hours and other associated costs are reduced.

The Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (Figures 2.2 and 2.3) asked questions about why an officer was separating, but did not provide data about the officer as an individual. e.g., source of commission, formal education, situation concerning resignation, type of duty last assigned, sex, and marital status, to name a few. This led to the inclusion of a demographic data section on the front section of the new questionnaire [OPNAV 1910 (7-80)] (Figure 2.6). With the use of a demographic section on the new questionnaire, Navy management could, over a period of time, begin to look for trends in the demographics of separating officers. These possible trends, combined with item responses, could allow Navy management to focus attention in a more precise manner to areas that have a negative effect upon officer retention.

11PMAY 1914 11/29/1151

Your sincere responses to the following questions are needed to help improve decisions affecting Navy personnel. Use a soft lead pencil to indicate your responses and be sure to blacken in the spaces completely.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Under the authority of 5 USC 301 regulations you are requested to complete this questionnaire. Information furnished will be used for statistical studies to help the Navy improve policies and procedures. It will not be used for any administrative action concerning you specifically and will not be made part of your permanent record. No adverse actions will be taken if you decide not to furnish the requested information.

**THIS SECTION FOR
OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

1. DATE OF SEPARATION			9. LAST NAME (or first 9 letters)												F	M	10. SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER												11. SPECIAL ANSWER SECTION											
Day	Month	Year																																						
Jan.	Feb.	Mar.																																						
Apr.	May	Jun.																																						
Jul.	Aug.	Sep.																																						
Oct.	Nov.	Dec.																																						
0	1	2																																						
3	4	5																																						
6	7	8																																						
9	0	1																																						
			4. Number of Times You Re-enlisted												12. NEC												13. Completion Check													
			(Count extensions of two years or more. Do not count first enlistment or short extensions.)												Primary												Secondary													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Verified													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9												Declined													
			0 1 2 3 4 5 6												0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9																									

Figure 2.4. Sample Enlisted Separation Questionnaire
OPNAV 1910/1 7-79 (Front). (In use from
July 1979)

IF YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING, how important has each of the following been in your decision to separate?
 IF YOU ARE BEING INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATED, how important has each of the following been in its influence on you?

	EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	VERY IMPORTANT	IMPORTANT	OF SOME IMPORTANCE	NOT TRUE OR OF NO IMPORTANCE
1. Working hours are too long	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Fear of losing more fringe benefits	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Senior officers don't care about enlisted people	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Not being treated with respect	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. Poor berthing areas afloat	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Poor quality of dental care	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. Too many petty regulations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. Work I'm assigned doesn't use my educational skills	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. Poor leadership of my work center supervisor	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. Little freedom to use non-work hours as I want	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. Pay is too low	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12. Lack of recognition for doing a good job	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
13. Dislike wearing of the uniform	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
14. Fear of losing retirement benefits	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
15. I want to live someplace permanently	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
16. Dislike family separation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
17. Can't get the education or skills that I want	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
18. Too much unfair treatment	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
19. Poor quality of Commissary/Exchange	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
20. Can't get into the rating I want	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
21. Poor quality of medical care	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
22. Not enough chance to do job my way	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
23. Dislike sea duty	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
24. Navy housing not available or of poor quality	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
25. Can't get the detailing desired	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
26. Dislike the kind of people I must work with	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
27. I want to be able to quit anytime I want	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
28. Regulations keep me from advancing faster	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
29. To keep from losing GI benefits	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
30. Not enough chance to do more interesting/challenging work	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Figure 2.5. Sample Enlisted Separation Questionnaire
 OPNAV 1910/1 7-79 (Back). (In use from
 July 1979)

During the aforementioned visit, Dr. Githens remarked that the Navy Military Personnel Command (NMPC) had already tasked him to create a new questionnaire. He planned to convert the questionnaire then in use to a form that could be optically scanned and that included a demographic data section. This investigator was invited to submit recommendations for the new form to NPRDC. This was done.

The new form (shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7) went into use 1 October 1980. It is believed by this investigator that its use will result in more useful data and in more efficient data collection. It is also felt by this investigator that it will aid Navy management in easing the officer retention problem.

OPNAV 1910 (7-80) (TEST)

**YOUR SINCERE RESPONSES TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
ARE NEEDED TO HELP IMPROVE DECISIONS AFFECTING NAVY
PERSONNEL.**



- DO NOT USE INK OR BALLPOINT PENS.
- BLACKEN THE BUBBLE COMPLETELY.
- MAKE NO STRAY MARKS.
- ERASE COMPLETELY ANY RESPONSE YOU WISH TO CHANGE.

Under the authority of 5 USC 301 regulations you are requested to complete this questionnaire. Information furnished will be used for statistical studies to help the Navy improve policies and procedures. It will not be used for any administrative action concerning you specifically and will not be made part of your permanent record. No adverse actions will be taken if you decide not to furnish the requested information.

Figure 2.6. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
OPNAV 1910 7-80 (Front). (In use from
1 October 1980)

IF YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING, HOW IMPORTANT HAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEEN IN YOUR DECISION TO SEPARATE?

IF YOU ARE BEING INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATED, HOW IMPORTANT HAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEEN IN ITS INFLUENCE ON YOU?

	NOT TRUE OR OF NO IMPORTANCE	OF SOME IMPORTANCE	IMPORTANT	VERY IMPORTANT	EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
1. Loss of GI Bill benefits	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Dislike of military lifestyle/restricting rules and regulations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Poor promotion policies and opportunities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Possible erosion of benefits (retirement, commissary, etc.)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. Insufficient technical knowledge of superiors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Lack of career for given specialty/designator	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. Long hours and work pressure	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. Too much family separation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. Lack of sufficient fringe benefits (recreation, commissary, etc.)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. Lack of responsibility and authority	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12. Poor quality of living quarters/BAQ inequities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
13. Insufficient pay	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
14. Lack of opportunity to attend postgraduate school	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
15. Navy housing not available or of poor quality	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
16. Poor utilization of abilities, skills, education	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
17. Not selected for desired specialty/designator change	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
18. Lack of performance appraisal/career guidance in counseling by seniors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
19. Job dissatisfaction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
20. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
21. Lack of command opportunity	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
22. Lack of adequate dependent medical care	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
23. Problems with assignment/detailing	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
24. Manpower/supplies/financial support problems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
25. Too much crisis management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
26. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
27. Geographic instability/transient nature of Navy	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
28. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
29. Unsatisfactory officer evaluation system	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
30. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

PLEASE CHECK TO BE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY ITEM ON FRONT AND BACK OF THIS FORM. IF THE ITEMS ABOVE DO NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECT YOUR REASON FOR SEPARATING, PLEASE STATE YOUR REASON *WITHIN* THE BOX AT THE TOP OF THIS SIDE OF THE FORM.

Figure 2.7. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
OPNAV 1910 7-80 (Back). (In use from
1 October 1980)

III. RESULTS OF SURVEY ANALYSES

As was stated in the procedures section of Chapter II, this chapter discusses the results of the analyses conducted upon data obtained from Officer Separation Questionnaires (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (Figure 3.1) and NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). The first analysis to be discussed is the ranking by mean value of the thirty items on the front page of Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (shown in Figure 3.2). The second analysis, that is discussed, is the comparison of results of this thesis with the results of a similar study by OP136D2 (Officer Resignation section). The last section contained in this chapter discusses the results and conclusions drawn from an item intercorrelation study.

A. RESULTS OF RANKING OF SURVEY RESPONSE ITEMS BY MEAN VALUE

The responses of 133 officers to the Officers Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) were analyzed. The 133 officers (all with Surface Warfare designators) were O-2's, O-3's, and O-4s who had resigned during the time period April 1979 through 1 November 1980. The mean was computed for each of the thirty items on the questionnaire (Figure 3.2). The items were then ranked in order of their mean values, from the lowest value to the highest value. Reproductions of the computer printouts

FROM: (Activity Title)

TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (PERS-B42)

RANK	NAME (Last, First, Middle)	SSN/FILE NO./DESIGNATOR
------	----------------------------	-------------------------

YOUR REASONS FOR LEAVING THE NAVY IN ORDER OF PRIORITY (USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY).

WERE THERE ANY ACTIONS WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO MAKE THE NAVY YOUR CAREER?

☐ YES (Please specify).

☐ NO

COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT MEASURES COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INFLUENCE OFFICER TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY.

Signature

Figure 3.1. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (in use from
January 1973 until April 1979)

OFFICER SEPARATION QUESTIONNAIRE

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Under the authority of 5 USC 301 regulations, information is solicited from all separating officers. Information furnished will not be used for any administrative action concerning you specifically and will not be made a part of your permanent record.

The questionnaire is required from all officers separating from the Navy and solicits their views on Navy life. The data obtained from this form and others serves as a basis from which management initiatives are derived. Your candid comments are appreciated. Additional comments are requested on the back of this form.

INSTRUCTIONS

Please use soft lead pencil to darken responses (one response per item).

QUESTION

If you are voluntarily separating, how important has each of the following been in your decision to separate? If you are involuntarily separating, how important has each of the following been in its influence on you?

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: _____

0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

RESPONSES

1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Important
4. Of some importance
5. Not true or not important

	1	2	3	4	5		1	2	3	4	5
1. Better civilian employment opportunities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	16. Poor utilization of skills, education, abilities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Dislike of military life-style, rules and regulations.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	17. Not selected for desired specialty/designator change.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Poor promotion opportunities and policies.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	18. Lack of concerned, knowledgeable guidance/advice.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Possible erosion of benefits.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	19. Billet, task or job dissatisfaction.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. Insufficient technical knowledge of superiors.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	20. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Lack of a career for given specialty/designator.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	21. Lack of command opportunity.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. Long hours and work pressure.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	22. Long or extended deployments.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. Too much family separation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	23. Problems with detailing or assignments.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. Lack of sufficient fringe benefits.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	24. Manpower/supplies/financial support problems.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. Lack of responsibility and authority.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	25. Too much crisis management.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	26. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12. Poor quality of living quarters/BAQ inequities.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	27. Geographic instability/transient nature of Navy.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
13. Insufficient pay.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	28. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
14. Not selected/not given opportunity to attend PG school.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	29. Unsatisfactory officer evaluation system.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
15. Type of education or training desired is not provided.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	30. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Figure 3.2. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Front). (In use from April 1979 until October 1980)

COMMAND/ACTIVITY		
RANK	NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)	DESIG

PLEASE EXPAND AS DESIRED ON YOUR INDICATED RESPONSES FOR LEAVING THE NAVY:

PLEASE INDICATE ANY ACTION WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO REMAIN IN THE NAVY:

COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO INFLUENCE THIS OFFICER TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY:

Figure 3.3. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Ref. 4-79 (Back). (In
use from April 1979 until October 1980)

providing the item means are found in Appendix B of this thesis. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the results of this ranking by mean value.

With Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73) (Figure 3.1), the only method available for the officer separating from Naval service to express reasons for resignation was to write down answers to open-ended questions, e.g., "State your reasons for leaving the Navy in order of priority" or "Were there any actions which the Navy could reasonably have taken which would have influenced you to make the Navy your career?" Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (Figure 3.3) also provided for this method of responding. In addition to the written responses, a section (Figure 3.2) of Likert scaled items was included on NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79.

Utilizing data gathered from both NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 and NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Figure 3.1, 3.2, 3.3), a list of ten Likert scaled reasons for resigning along with written comments was constructed by this researcher. These ten items from Table 3.1 were those ten having the lowest means. This listing (Table 3.2) of ten Likert items is in order of mean values where the lower the mean value, the more important the item was as a reason given by 0-2 to 0-4 Surface Warfare officers for resigning from Naval service. After each Likert item, a few of the responses from the written response section of NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (Figure

Table 3.1

Ranking of Survey Responses of Mid-Grade (0-2 to 0-4)
Surface Warfare Officers by Mean Value (N = 133)

Response Scale: 1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Important
4. Of Some Importance
5. Not true or not important

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Mean Value</u>	<u>Item #</u>	<u>Item</u>
1	2.143	Q8	Too much family separation
2	2.436	Q13	Insufficient pay
3	2.462	Q25	Too much crisis management
4	2.470	Q22	Long or extended deployments
5	2.863	Q30	Demands of Navy impinging on personal life
6	3.008	Q4	Possible erosion of benefits
7	3.083	Q11	Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation
8	3.115	Q26	Lack of recognition for accomplishments/ self respect
9	3.153	Q28	Unable to sufficiently plan and control career
10	3.323	Q20	Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors
11	3.328	Q19	Billet, task or job dissatisfaction
12	3.338	Q16	Poor utilization of skills, education, abilities
13	3.351	Q27	Geographic instability/transient nature of Navy
14	3.379	Q24	Manpower/supplies/financial support problems
15	3.383	Q9	Lack of sufficient fringe benefits
16	3.391	Q7	Long hours and work pressure
17	3.477	Q23	Problems with detailing or assignments
18	3.534	Q29	Unsatisfactory officer evaluation system
19	3.538	Q12	Poor quality of living quarters/BAQ inequities
20	3.639	Q3	Poor promotion opportunities and policies
21	3.664	Q18	Lack of concerned, knowledgeable guidance/advice
22	3.812	Q1	Better civilian employment opportunities

Table 3.1 (Cont.)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Mean Value</u>	<u>Item #</u>	<u>Item</u>
23	3.947	Q10	Lack of responsibility and authority
24	3.992	Q5	Insufficient technical knowledge of superiors
25	4.060	Q2	Dislike of military lifestyle, rules and regulations
26	4.060	Q6	Lack of a career for a given specialty/designator
27	4.083	Q15	Type of education or training desired is not provided
28	4.348	Q17	Not selected for desired specialty/designator change
29	4.417	Q21	Lack of command opportunity
30	4.439	Q14	Not selected/not given opportunity to attend PG school

Table 3.2

Table of the Ten Most Important Reasons Given by Mid-Grade
(0-2 to 0-4) Surface Warfare Officers for Resigning
(with Amplifying Comments) (N = 281)

- Response Scale:
1. Extremely important
 2. Very Important
 3. Important
 4. Of Some Importance
 5. Not True or Not Important

1. Too much family separation. (Mean value = 2.143)

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 1110 LCDR | Too many family separations. In this day and age, children need a fulltime father. |
| 1110 LT | I'm a family man, I like the idea of my family having roots, vice being shuffled around. Long hours with deployments makes being a good father rather tough. (Better dependent bennies) |
| 1110 LT | Practically all my reasons for leaving the Navy are related to lengthy family separations. In all other respects I have been quite happy with Navy life. |
| 1110 LT | By far my most important reason for leaving the Navy is the long family separations. I could see nothing ahead but many more long months a year away from home. |
| 1110 LT | The extended family separations (deployments) require a certain personal sacrifice of all family members that I feel my family does not wish to endure anymore. |

2. Insufficient pay. (Mean value = 2.436)

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 1110 LCDR | Pay and benefits are better all the way around on the outside and getting better every day. |
| 1110 LCDR | Primarily, geographic/financial stability for myself and my wife. |
| 1110 LT | Military pay scales are not commensurate with the hours and responsibilities required to adequately perform one's job. |
| 1110 LTJG | My average work day was 12 to 16 hours per day on the ship. For an 0-2 over 3 that works out to about \$3.50 to \$4.30 per hour, including BAQ and BAS. |

Table 3.2 (Cont.)

3. Too much crisis management. (Mean value = 2.462)

- 1110 LT Nomadic lifestyle and direction by crisis management.
- 1110 LT Crisis management is the rule rather than the exception in the Fleet. There is dissatisfaction at all levels, with very few exceptions.
- 1110 LTJG On my ship, crisis management was the rule rather than the exception. Everything was due in "yesterday".
- 1110 LTJG Never ending crisis management in the Navy's inspection oriented environment.

4. Long or extended deployments. (Mean value = 2.470)

- 1110 LCDR The amount of sea duty and thus family separation and turmoil associated with making 0-5 no longer made a Navy career attractive.
- 1110 LT The extended periods away from my family has caused excessive tension on my marriage.
- 1110 LT Extended deployments, crisis management, and lack of support all led to job dissatisfaction.
- 1110 LTJG Extended I.O. deployments are not why I joined the Navy.

5. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life. (Mean value = 2.863)

- 1110 LT Divorce resulting from deployments--something I don't care to experience again.
- 1110 LT Main reason for separation is personal family problems resulting from long at sea periods.
- 1110 LT Sea duty, regardless of whether or not the ship is deployed, is not compatible with a stable family life.
- 1110 LT Family problems caused by absence.

6. Possible erosion of benefits. (Mean value = 3.008)

- 1110 LCDR I am leaving the Navy because I feel I receive inadequate pay, I perceive an erosion of benefits, and I am separated from my wife and two children an unacceptable amount of time.
- 1160 LT Medical coverage and quality of services provided to dependents is poor and unsatisfactory. Long waiting periods for appointments, cursory exams and poor staffing. I cannot best serve my Navy, if I am not sure my family is living well and properly cared for.

Table 3.2 (Cont.)

- | | |
|-----------|--|
| 1110 LT | Shrinking fringe benefits, shrinking economy and shrinking desire to be away from spouse and daughter cause the untimely exit of the individual mentioned above. |
| 1110 LTJG | Erosion of benefits and pay not comparable with civilian pay. |
7. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation.
(Mean value = 3.083)
- | | |
|-----------|--|
| 1110 LCDR | Lack of positive environment that is conducive to positive personal growth. |
| 1110 LTJG | Suppressed initiative/creativity. I have been told I am not supposed to have an opinion. |
8. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect. (Mean value = 3.115)
- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 1110 LT | There is a marked lack of recognition for a job well done, but if you ever make a mistake you can rest assured that it will never be forgotten. |
| 1115 LT | In general, I found all sea duty commands to which I was attached, quick to pay lip service to the cause of J.O. retention but in its application, they were woefully inadequate. |
| 1110 LTJG | In 3 1/2 years on a DDG, not once did I see an officer commended, not once did I receive adequate career counselling, not once did the CO/XO really talk to their officers. |
| 1160 LTJG | Generally the basic reason can be summed up as: too much frustration and not enough personal satisfaction or recognition. |
9. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career (Mean value = 3.153)
- | | |
|---------|--|
| 1110 LT | After my first tour, I lost control of my career and became a body to fill in manning voids rather than a well planned career pattern and my professional development suffered accordingly. |
| 1110 LT | My primary reason for leaving the Navy is the inability to plan my own career and the lack of advancement opportunities if I deviate from designated "career paths". |
| 1110 LT | The availability of a career path allowing specialization in small craft warfare, tactics and development would have been an extremely attractive alternative for me personally and of much advantage to the Navy. |

Table 3.2 (Cont.)

1160 LTJG Often juniors are convinced that decision they are making will result in a desired career pattern, but it doesn't, and there is no guidance to indicate a poor choice.

10. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors.
(Mean value = 3.323)

1110 LTJG Because managerial and leadership qualities of my superiors on the ship were so poor, crisis management was the rule rather than the exception.

Note: The above was the only written response out of 281 questionnaires that specifically addressed insufficient managerial or leadership qualities of superiors. This could very well be due to the section on the back of either revision that asks for Commanding Officers assessment. An officer would be very hesitant to make critical comments concerning his superiors when he knows that those same superiors were going to review those comments. The situation could be particularly bad if the resigning officer had some length of time left to serve in that command.

The questionnaire (OPNAV 1910(7-80), shown in Figures 3.4 and 3.5) that became effective 1 October 1980 deletes the Commanding Officers assessment section. This deletion may promote more comments concerning insufficient managerial or leadership qualities of superiors.

3.1) are given to provide insight as to why a particular Likert response was given. The written response is prefaced by the designator and rank of the Surface Warfare officer who provided the response. In table 3.2, the mean values fall between a range of 1 to 5, where a value of 1 is "extremely important" and a value of 5 is "not true" or "not important."

The ten reasons shown in table 3.2 represent areas on which top level Navy management should focus attention in trying to solve the Surface Warfare officer retention problem. Recommendations dealing with these issues are given in Chapter IV of this thesis.

B. THESIS RESULTS COMPARED WITH OPNAV RESULTS

In July of 1980, OPNAV 136D2 (Officer Resignations section) produced and distributed a memorandum of Officer Separation Questionnaire survey results. The time period of officer resignations covered in that memorandum was from January 1980 through June 1980. Research results from this thesis were compared with the results presented in the OPNAV memorandum. This comparison of Surface Warfare officers against other designators was done to determine if reasons given for resigning differed among various designators. Both OPNAV 136D2 (Officer Separation section) and this investigator utilized data obtained from Officer Separation Questionnaire (NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79) (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).

This investigator collected data from January 1980 until 1 November 1980. OPNAV 132D2 (Officer Resignations



USE NO 3 PENCIL ONLY

- DO NOT USE INK OR BALLPOINT PENS.
- BLACKEN THE BUBBLE COMPLETELY.
- MAKE NO STRAY MARKS.
- ERASE COMPLETELY ANY RESPONSE YOU WISH TO CHANGE.

Under the authority of 5 USC 301 regulations you are requested to complete this questionnaire. Information furnished will be used for statistical studies to help the Navy improve policies and procedures. It will not be used for any administrative action concerning you specifically and will not be made part of your permanent record. No adverse actions will be taken if you decide not to furnish the requested information.

[illegible]

Figure 3.4. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
OPNAV 1910 7-80 (Front) (in use from
1 October 1980)

IF YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING, HOW IMPORTANT HAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEEN IN YOUR DECISION TO SEPARATE?

IF YOU ARE BEING INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATED, HOW IMPORTANT HAS EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEEN IN ITS INFLUENCE ON YOU?

	NOT TRUE OR OF NO IMPORTANCE	OF SOME IMPORTANCE	IMPORTANT	VERY IMPORTANT	EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
1. Loss of GI Bill benefits	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
2. Dislike of military lifestyle/restricting rules and regulations	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
3. Poor promotion policies and opportunities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
4. Possible erosion of benefits (retirement, commissary, etc.)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
5. Insufficient technical knowledge of superiors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
6. Lack of career for given specialty/designator	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
7. Long hours and work pressure	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
8. Too much family separation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
9. Lack of sufficient fringe benefits (recreation, commissary, etc.)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
10. Lack of responsibility and authority	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
11. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
12. Poor quality of living quarters/BAQ inequities	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
13. Insufficient pay	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
14. Lack of opportunity to attend postgraduate school	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
15. Navy housing not available or of poor quality	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
16. Poor utilization of abilities, skills, education	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
17. Not selected for desired specialty/designator change	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
18. Lack of performance appraisal/career guidance in counseling by seniors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
19. Job dissatisfaction	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
20. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
21. Lack of command opportunity	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
22. Lack of adequate dependent medical care	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
23. Problems with assignment/detailing	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
24. Manpower/supplies/financial support problems	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
25. Too much crisis management	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
26. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
27. Geographic instability/transient nature of Navy	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
28. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
29. Unsatisfactory officer evaluation system	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
30. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

PLEASE CHECK TO BE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY ITEM ON FRONT AND BACK OF THIS FORM. IF THE ITEMS ABOVE DO NOT ADEQUATELY REFLECT YOUR REASON FOR SEPARATING, PLEASE STATE YOUR REASON WITHIN THE BOX AT THE TOP OF THIS SIDE OF THE FORM.

Figure 3.5. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
OPNAV 1910 7-80 (Back) (in use from
1 October 1980)

section), on the other hand, used in their memorandum data collected from 2 January 1980 until 30 June 1980. This resulted in an added four month period of data gathering by this researcher. The data for the comparison portion of this thesis were from 133 Surface Warfare officers of ranks 0-2 to 0-4, while the data base for the OPNAV study was 321 Naval officers of various ranks and designators.

All of the 133 officer's questionnaires used by this researcher were completed by officers having the Surface Warfare designator. While the 320 respondents used in the OPNAV study had various warfare designators. Within the 321 respondents providing data for the OPNAV study were 72 officers with Surface Warfare designators. The added four month collection period used by this researcher allowed for the collection of data from 51 more Surface Warfare officers than were available for the OPNAV study.

Three comparisons were made. The first was a comparison of data from 321 resigning Navy officers in the OPNAV sample with data from the 133 Surface Warfare officers in the thesis sample. This comparison is shown in Table 3.3. The second comparison was URL (Unrestricted Line) officers (OPNAV study) with Surface Warfare officers (thesis sample). Table 3.4 illustrates the URL officer vs. Surface Warfare officer comparison. The last comparison was made between Surface Warfare officers (OPNAV study) and Surface Warfare officers (thesis research). Data from the final comparison is shown in table 3.5.

Table 3.3

Comparison of Officer Separation Questionnaire Responses Ordered by Mean Value

AL- NAVY (OPNAV) (Jan 1980-June 1980)		vs.	SWO (THESIS) (Jan 1980-Nov 1980)	
1. Insufficient pay			1. Too much family separation	
2. Too much family separation			2. Insufficient pay	
3. Too much crisis management			3. Too much crisis management	
4. Possible erosion of benefits			4. Long or extended deployments	
5. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation			5. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life	
6. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career			6. Possible erosion of benefits	
7. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life			7. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation	
8. Poor utilization of skills, education and abilities			8. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect	
9. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors.			9. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career	
10. Manpower/supplies/financial support problems			10. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors	

N = 321

N = 133

Table 3.4

Comparison of Officer Separation Questionnaire Response Ordered by Mean Value

ALL URL (OPNAV) (Jan 1980-June 1980)	vs.	SWO (THESIS) (Jan 1980-Nov 1980)
1. Insufficient pay		1. Too much family separation
2. Too much family separation		2. Insufficient pay
3. Too much crisis management		3. Too much crisis management
4. Possible erosion of benefits		4. Long or extended deployments
5. Long or extended deployments		5. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life
6. Suppressed initiative, creativity and professional stimulation		6. Possible erosion of benefits
7. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career		7. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation
8. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life		8. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect
9. Billet, task or job dissatisfaction		9. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career
10. Poor utilization of skills, education and abilities		10. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors

N = 204

N = 133

Table 3.5

Officer Separation Questionnaire Responses

SWO (OPNAV) (Jan 1980-June 1980)		vs.	SWO (THESIS) (Jan 1980-Nov 1980)	
1. Insufficient pay	1. Too much family separation			
2. Too much family separation	2. Insufficient pay			
3. Too much crisis management	3. Too much crisis management			
4. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation	4. Long or extended deployments			
5. Long or extended deployments	5. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life			
6. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life	6. Possible erosion of benefits			
7. Possible erosion of benefits	7. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation			
8. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors	8. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect			
9. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect	9. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career			
10. Poor utilization of skills, education, abilities	10. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors			

N = 72

N = 133

The top ten most important reasons (determined by mean value) for resigning from the Naval service of all Naval officers (OPNAV study) were compared with the top ten most important (also determined by mean value) reasons given by Surface Warfare officers (thesis research). The Surface Warfare officers indicated two reasons for resigning that were not found among the top ten reasons given by the OPNAV all officer group. These two reasons were Long or extended deployments (Q22) and Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect (Q26). The OPNAV all-officer group thought Manpower/supplies/financial support problems (Q24) were important enough to be among the top ten reasons, whereas the Surface Warfare group did not. With the exception of the above mentioned three items, all of the top ten reasons for resigning were the same. The only difference in these other items was the degree of importance placed on them by the surveyed groups. Table 3.3 illustrates the differences in ranking of importance.

The results (shown in table 3.4) of the comparison between URL officers and Surface Warfare officers were similar to the results of the comparison between all Navy officers and Surface Warfare officers. There were again two items thought to be more important for resigning by the Surface Warfare officer group than by the all-URL group. These two particular items were lack of recognition for accomplishments/self-respect (Q26) and insufficient managerial/leadership

qualities of superiors (Q20). There were also two items in the list of top ten reasons given by the URL officer group which were not found in the Surface Warfare officer's group of "top ten." These were billet, task or job dissatisfaction (Q19) and poor utilization of skills, education and abilities (Q16). Once again, the only difference between the remaining "top ten" items on the two lists was in the order of importance.

The final comparison (shown in Table 3.5) was made between the responses of the two Surface Warfare officer groups, the OPNAV study group and the thesis research group. It should be pointed out that some (at most 72) of the 321 questionnaires analyzed in the OPNAV study were included in the 133 questionnaires analyzed by this researcher. The sample of Surface Warfare officers used in this thesis included only one response in their "top ten" list that was not also found in the OPNAV Surface Warfare officer's top ten list. This single response was "Unable to sufficiently plan and control career" (Q28). The OPNAV Surface Warfare officers had one reason not found in the top ten list of the thesis Surface Warfare officers. This reason was "Poor utilization of skills, education, abilities" (Q16). The other items found in the top ten were identical for both groups. The only difference was the order of their ranking.

C. ITEM INTERCORRELATION STUDY

As was mentioned in the procedure section of Chapter II of this thesis, this investigator hypothesized a relationship between Q8 (too much family separation) and: Q22 (Long or extended deployments), Q30 (Demands of Navy impinging on personal life), and Q27 (Geographic instability/transient nature of Navy). Kendall's Tau B and Pearson's r were calculated to test those hypotheses.

The results of those tests are summarized in Table 3.6. The correlations are presented in order of the value of Kendall's Tau B and Pearson's r between Q8 and the other items (from the highest positive values to the lowest positive values). When responses to Q8 (too much family separation) was correlated with responses to Q22 (Long or extended deployments), values of .65 for Kendall's Tau B and .74 for Pearson's r were found. Both Kendall's Tau B and Pearson's r had a statistical significance of $< .001$. These values indicate a very strong positive relationship between responses Q8 and Q22.

A value of .41 for Kendall's Tau B and a value of .47 for Pearson's r was found between Q8 (Too much family separation) and Q27 (Transient nature of the Navy) and the significances for both tests were $< .001$. These values show a strong positive relationship between Q8 and Q27.

While the correlation of the responses Q8 (Too much family separation) with the responses to Q30 (Navy impinging

Table 3.6

Summary of Item Intercorrelation Study

	8. Too much family separation.	22. Long or extended deployments.	27. Geographic instability/transient nature of Navy	30. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life.
8.	—	—	—	—
22.	(.65) [.74] **	—	—	—
27.	(.41) [.47] **	(.37) [.41] **	—	—
30.	(.33) [.41] **	(.35) [.43] **	(.40) [.47] ***	—

(Kendall's Tau B) ** p < .01
[Pearson's r]

on personal life) showed the lowest numerical value of any of the correlations (Kendall's Tau B = .33 and Pearson's $r = .41$), these values still indicated a fairly strong positive relationship between Q8 and Q30.

The results of the items intercorrelation study supports the hypothesis of this investigator. Possible significance of these results for Navy management are discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. For the benefit of the reader, a reproduction of the printout from the correlation analysis is given in Appendix C.

IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Utilizing the results described in Chapter III of this thesis, of the analyses upon data obtained from officer Separation Questionnaires NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 and NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3), a determination of the reasons given for resigning from the Naval service by O-2 through O-4 Surface Warfare officers was made. This determination of reasons satisfied the first research objective described in Chapter II of this thesis. Another objective of this thesis was to take those reasons and develop recommendations that might enable Navy management to develop action plans aimed at having a positive effect upon Surface Warfare officer retention. The remainder of this chapter summarizes the research findings and provides conclusions and recommendations based upon those research findings.

A. SUMMARY

The importance of the increasing trend (as described in Chapter I) of Surface Warfare officers to resign from Naval service cannot be overemphasized. The possible negative impact on fleet readiness and the associated impact upon national security caused by the failure of the Surface Warfare community to meet needed retention goals (40% to 45%) must continue to draw top Navy management attention. Failure

FROM: (Activity Title)

TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL (PERS-B42)

RANK	NAME (Last, First, Middle)	SSN/FILE NO./DESIGNATOR

YOUR REASONS FOR LEAVING THE NAVY IN ORDER OF PRIORITY (USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY).

WERE THERE ANY ACTIONS WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO MAKE THE NAVY YOUR CAREER?

☐ YES (Please specify).

☐ NO

COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT MEASURES COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO INFLUENCE OFFICER TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY.

Signature

Figure 4.1. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (in use from
January 1973 until April 1979)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

Under the authority of 5 USC 301 regulations, information is solicited from all separating officers. Information furnished will not be used for any administrative action concerning you specifically and will not be made a part of your permanent record.

The questionnaire is required from all officers separating from the Navy and solicits their views on Navy life. The data obtained from this form and others serves as a basis from which management initiatives are derived. Your candid comments are appreciated. Additional comments are requested on the back of this form.

INSTRUCTIONS

Please use soft lead pencil to mark responses (one response per item).

QUESTION

If you are voluntarily separating, how important has each of the following been in your decision to separate? If you are involuntarily separating, how important has each of the following been in its influence on you?

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: - - - - -

0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

RESPONSES

1. Extremely important
2. Very important
3. Important
4. Of some importance
5. Not true or not important

1. Better civilian employment opportunities.	1	2	3	4	5	16. Poor utilization of skills, education, abilities.	1	2	3	4	5
2. Dislike of military life-style, rules and regulations.						17. Not selected for desired specialty/designator change.					
3. Poor promotion opportunities and policies.						18. Lack of concerned, knowledgeable guidance/advice.					
4. Possible erosion of benefits.						19. Billet, task or job dissatisfaction.					
5. Insufficient technical knowledge of superiors.						20. Insufficient managerial/leadership qualities of superiors.					
6. Lack of a career for given specialty/designator.						21. Lack of command opportunity.					
7. Long hours and work pressure.						22. Long or extended deployments.					
8. Too much family separation.						23. Problems with detailing or assignments.					
9. Lack of sufficient fringe benefits.						24. Manpower/supplies/financial support problems.					
10. Lack of responsibility and authority.						25. Too much crisis management.					
11. Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation.						26. Lack of recognition for accomplishments/self respect.					
12. Poor quality of living quarters/BAQ inequities.						27. Geographic instability/transient nature of Navy.					
13. Insufficient pay.						28. Unable to sufficiently plan and control career.					
14. Not selected/not given opportunity to attend PG school.						29. Unsatisfactory officer evaluation system.					
15. Type of education or training desired is not provided.						30. Demands of Navy impinging on personal life.					

Figure 4.2. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Front) (in use from April 1979 until October 1980)

COMMAND/ACTIVITY		
RANK	NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)	DESIG

PLEASE EXPAND AS DESIRED ON YOUR INDICATED RESPONSES FOR LEAVING THE NAVY:

PLEASE INDICATE ANY ACTION WHICH THE NAVY COULD REASONABLY HAVE TAKEN WHICH WOULD HAVE INFLUENCED YOU TO REMAIN IN THE NAVY:

COMMANDING OFFICER'S ASSESSMENT OF REASONS AND OPINION OF WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO INFLUENCE THIS OFFICER TO REMAIN ON ACTIVE DUTY:

Figure 4.3. Sample Officer Separation Questionnaire
NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (Back) (in use
from April 1979 until October 1980)

to do this might result in a future crisis in Surface officer manning levels.

The review of the literature showed that retention of Naval officers in all warfare designators has been viewed by some as a problem since the late 1950's [Fitzgerald, 1964]. Many studies have been conducted upon various (e.g., Sub-surface, Surface, Aviation) warfare specialities, and many different facets of the retention problem have been addressed. A few of these facets are: Commission source and first/second duty assignments [Weitzman, et al., 1979], the relationship between career values and retention [Neumann, et al., 1972], marriage/family issues and wife styles [Derr, 1979], job proficiency and organizational climate [Lassiter, et al., 1976]. In spite of all these studies, retention of Naval officers remains a problem.

The conclusions and recommendations which follow apply specifically to Surface Warfare officer retention, but in many respects may also apply to all other warfare designators. This researcher hopes that these conclusions and recommendations will be useful in resolving the Naval officer retention problem.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions reached in this section are the results of analysis of 281 officer Separation Questionnaires. The sample was composed of responses to 133 NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3) and responses to 148

NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (shown in Figure 4.1). These questionnaires were completed by 0-2 to 0-4 Surface Warfare officers who had resigned from Naval service during the period, late 1978 to 1 November 1980. Responses to Likert scaled items along with written comments provided the data upon which this investigator did the research. On the basis of the results of the research, five basic conclusions were reached. They were as follows:

Conclusion 1: In terms of importance for resigning, Surface Warfare officers reported too much family separation as their number one reason.

Conclusion 2: There exists a strong inter-relationship between responses "too much family separation" and the responses to; "long or extended deployments," "Navy impinging on personal life", and "geographic instability/transient nature of the Navy."

Conclusion 3: The second most important stated reason for resigning was insufficient pay.

Conclusion 4: The major reasons given by the officers in the OPNAV and thesis data base were similar: different warfare designators responded similarly to the items on the questionnaire. The major difference among reasons given for resigning was in the degree of importance placed on those reasons by individuals in the different warfare designator groups.

Conclusion 5: Major studies done on Naval officer retention since 1964 (Secretary of the Navy's Task Force

on Navy/Marine Corps Personnel Retention) have outlined the basic reasons for Naval officer resignations, but a Naval officer retention problem still exists.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based upon responses drawn from the "top ten" list of most important reasons given by Surface Warfare officers for resigning. In addition, one recommendation is based upon written responses found on Officer Separation Questionnaires NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 (Figure 4.1) and NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79 (shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3). Another recommendation comes from the result of the item intercorrelation study described in the results section of Chapter III. This researcher developed four basic recommendations. Two of those recommendations each contain two parts. Those recommendations are:

- Establish Family Support Centers specifically designed to meet the needs of a family with a deployed member.
- Continue effort on the part of top level Navy management to achieve equitable compensation for sea-going officers.
- Establish an Officer Retention Ombudsman program.
- Conduct study to ascertain the underlying factors (if any) causing the relationships among too much family separation (Q8) and: long or extended deployments (Q22), demands of Navy impinging on personal life (Q30), geographic instability/transient nature of Navy (Q27).

Each of the specific recommendations will now be discussed. These discussions are for the purpose of providing the reader with the reasoning used by this investigator to arrive at those specific recommendations.

Recommendation: Establish Family Support Centers.

The most important reason given by Surface Warfare officers for resigning from the Navy was too much family separation. Taken on its face value, this reason is a contradiction of logic. When an officer elects to become a Surface Warfare officer, that officer presumably knows that he or she will have to go to sea to become a Surface Warfare specialist. Why should a person select such a designator, if too much family separation was going to bother them? This investigator believed that too much family separation was not precisely descriptive of the real reason for resigning, just the closest reason available on the survey. The following comments were taken from an 1110 Lieutenant's Separation Questionnaire. These comments seemed to give some of the underlying reasons behind the selection of "too much family separation" as the most important reason for leaving the Naval service. "I cannot best serve my Navy if I am not sure my family is living well and is properly cared for. I could cope with long separations if the Navy would provide better family services." The commanding officer's comments about the above officer were in part, "an excellent performer...he is definitely the kind of officer we need to retain."

Based upon the above comments, and others of a similar nature, found throughout the comment section of the survey questionnaires, this investigator interviewed sixty students in attendance at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca. The interviews were conducted during October 1980. All of these students were O-3 to O-4 Surface Warfare officers with families. They were all asked if too much family separation was a problem for them. If they answered "yes", they were then asked to describe what factor of family separation was their major concern. All of those interviewed answered that family separations were a problem for them. The major concern expressed was worry about the quality of services being provided to their families by the Navy. These services included dependent medical care, legal assistance, counseling, etc.

Thesis research conducted by LCDR Bonnie Scott, USN (a student at the Naval Postgraduate School) uncovered a problem area in services being provided to Navy families. LCDR Scott found that most Navy child care centers are not meeting the childcare needs of Navy parents.

The establishment of Family Support Centers specializing in the needs felt by families with deployed members might do much to ease the concern about family treatment felt by deployed officers.

An additional recommendation dealing with too much family separation is now discussed. In order to provide a basis for

this recommendation, the following assumptions are made by this researcher. These assumptions are based on an unpublished study done by Dr. Donald Perry (Director of Social Services, S.B. Hayes Hospital, Ft. Ord, Ca.) during a three year time span from 1975 until 1978.

1. Separation of family members due to deployments and extended unaccompanied tours is stressful to those family members.
2. Individual family members are subjected to different worries, fears and anxieties before, during and after these separations.
3. The family roles played by wives with children are subjected to somewhat similar stresses during those separations (and when the officers return home).

Given the above assumptions, the officer and his family need to be aware of the problems likely to arise as a result of a separation and to prepare for those problems.

LCDR Don Curran (USN, (a student at the Naval Postgraduate School) developed a Family Separation workshop to attempt to fulfill those family needs. The goals of LCDR Curran's workshop were to make the officer and his family aware of the problems which are likely to be encountered by all concerned and to help prepare the officer and his family to deal with those problems, thereby improving that families ability to cope with the problems and stresses of separation.

Several Fleet units already employ such a workshop for the entire crew. This workshop is usually given prior to

a deployment. However, Family Separation workshops are not given Navy wide. Within the Navy system, the Human Resource Centers and Detachments have the resources and trained facilitators available to design and administer a Navy wide, standardized, and high quality workshop dealing with family separation. The recommendation of this investigator is that the Navy Human Resource System design and implement such a workshop. This would benefit not only the officers and their families, but the enlisted crew members and their families as well. The effectiveness of such pre-deployment activities has not been tested.

Recommendation: Increased Compensation for sea-going officers.

While this thesis research was underway (November 1979 to 1 November 1980), several increases to military compensation were enacted. These pay increases (effective 1 October 1980) include an 11.7% across the board pay increase, the raising of travel allowance to 18.5¢ per mile, and the establishment of VHA (Variable Housing Allowance) for high cost living areas. Top level Navy management should monitor officer compensation and continue to press for future pay increases when they are needed.

An additional recommendation in the compensation area is made for Surface Warfare officers. This researcher feels that sea pay for sea-going officers would have a positive effect upon retention. Presently the Surface Warfare community is the only warfare community that does not have some type

of special pay associated with its warfare specialty. The aviators receive flight pay and the submariners receive sub pay. The payment of sea pay to Surface Warfare officers would not only be a recognition of the hardships of sea-duty but would also assist sea-going officers in the defrayment of unusual expenses incurred because of that sea-duty (e.g., car storage, repairs around home that could have been done if at home, added childcare cost, etc.).

Recommendation: Establish an Officer Ombudsmen

Retention Program

Comments extracted from the written response sections (Figures 4.1 and 4.3) of the Officer Separation Questionnaires NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 1-73 and NAVPERS 1920/3 Rev. 4-79, indicated a perceived lack of interest on the part of the Navy in regards to the resignation of its Surface Warfare officers. While only about 10% (~30) of the questionnaires analyzed specifically mentioned this perceived lack of interest, many more questionnaires alluded to this feeling. A few of those comments are provided as illustrations of this perception. The following comments are prefaced by the designator and rank of the officer making that particular comment.

1110 LT I was surprised that absolutely no effort was made by any Surface Warfare officer to "ship me over".

1110 LT No one at my command ever discussed my resignation with me.

1110 LT When I submitted my resignation, if the Navy would have shown even a remote interest in why I was leaving, I was prepared to reconsider. The Navy just did not care that I was leaving.

1160 LT Senior officers never counseled or even asked about my Naval career plans. No one asked me to stay in the Navy.

1160 LT No one asked me to stay in the Navy.

1110 LTJG The expression "The Navy takes care of its own" is a lie. I honestly feel that no one cares. This (questionnaire) is the closest anyone has come to asking my opinion of Navy life in four years. If someone had shown more interest in me, I would have stayed in.

The above comments, and similar other ones made by resigning officers, led this investigator to the belief that had the "Navy system" responded to the individuals making those types of comments, many of those same officers could have been retained. This investigator acknowledges the reality of the Navy trying to retain only those officers who are good performers. It is simply not in the best interest of the Navy to try to retain all resigning officers. It is, however, in the best interest of the Navy to properly manage its scarce human resources. To aid in this management, an officer retention ombudsman program should be established. The mainstay of this program would be O-5's from each warfare specialty. Each of these warfare specialty representatives would have a strong working knowledge of the Navy personnel "system" (e.g., detailing process, assignment desk process, etc.). Their function would be to screen the records of the

officers who have submitted letters of resignation. If the screening determined that it would be in the Navy's best interest to retain that individual, the Ombudsman would then contact the individual submitting a resignation. This contact would be to provide counseling and possible assistance in "ironing out" problems causing the resignation. The Ombudsman program would give disgruntled officers a point of contact within the Navy bureaucracy. This program would, at a minimum, indicate that someone within the Navy bureaucracy cares. These ombudsmen would, of course, need to have the authority to cut across different areas of responsibility within the Navy personnel management system.

Recommendation: Conduct a Study to Determine Possible
Underlying Causative Factors Leading
Officers to Leave the Navy.

The category "Too much family separation" is much too encompassing to have much real meaning. This is also true of "Long or extended deployments", "Geographic instability/transient nature of the Navy", and "Demands of Navy impinging on personal life." Further studies should be done to pin down the reasons why these responses were selected by resigning officers.

An interim report produced at the Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California [Derr, 1977] suggests research instruments that would be useful in accomplishing the task of ascertaining the real "whys" of selecting particular responses.

Once the underlying causative factors were identified, Navy management could develop action plans to solve or alleviate those factors, thereby increasing officer retention.

The recommendations presented in this thesis were not meant to be exhaustive. Instead, they were meant to be a starting point for Navy management in the development of action plans designed to increase Surface Warfare officer retention.

APPENDIX A

Glossary of Statistical Terms


- Absolute Frequency - Number of respondents who selected that answer.
- Adjusted Frequency Pct - Percent of respondents who selected that answer, excluding missing data.
- Cumulative Frequency Pct - Adds the adjusted frequency for each code, as codes are listed. Allows quick response to question about the number of people who responded below (and equal to) a certain response value.
- Histogram - A graphical display of data.
- Kendall's Tau B - A nonparametric statistical test for measuring the correlation of ranked ordinal data.
- Kurtosis - Measure of the relative peakedness or flatness of the distribution curve for an item. Normal distribution curve kurtosis is equal to 0. Peaked curve kurtosis greater than 0, flat curve kurtosis less than 0.
- Mean - Arithmetic average of values on a variable.
- Missing value coding - A method of dealing with an item which was left unanswered. This coding allows the computer program to take null responses into account when computing various statistical analyses.
- N - The number of responses for a given item or the number of individuals surveyed.
- Pearson's r - A measure of the overall strength of linear relationship between two variables. Values range from -1 to +1; the closer to +1, the greater is the linear relationship.

- Population - The totality of units under study.
- Relative Frequency Pct - Percent of the total number of cases who selected that answer.
- Sample - A part of the population in which the population characteristic is studied so that inferences may be made from the sample study about the entire population.
- Significance of Chi Square - The probability of obtaining by chance a Chi Square as large as that found from the data.
- Skewness - A positive value indicates that the cases are clustered more to the left of the mean. A negative value indicates clustering to the right.
- Standard Deviation (s) - Determines amount of variability in a set of data; in a normal distribution -
 - $\pm$ one s from the mean contains 68% of the responses.
 - $\pm$ two s from the mean contains 95% of the responses.
 - $\pm$ three s from the mean contains 99% of the responses.

APPENDIX B

Frequencies and Histograms

Q1 BETTER CIV EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES




MEAN	3.812	STD DEV	1.315	KURTOSIS	-0.418
SKEWNESS	-0.964				
VALID CASES	133	MISSING CASES	0		

Q1 BETTER CIV EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSCLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	12	9.0	9.0	9.0
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	12	9.0	9.0	18.0
IMPORTANT	3.	21	15.8	15.8	33.8
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	32	24.1	24.1	57.9
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	56	42.1	42.1	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q2 DISLIKE MIL LIFESTYLE ALLES REGS

CODE



MEAN 4.060 STD DEV 1.160 KURTOSIS 0.859
 SKEWNESS -1.273
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q2 DISLIKE MIL LIFESTYLE ALLES REGS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	8	6.0	6.0	6.0
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	7	5.3	5.3	1.3
IMPORTANT	3.	16	12.0	12.0	23.3
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	40	30.1	30.1	53.4
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	62	46.6	46.6	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q3 POOR PRGM OFF AND POLICIES

CODE

```

1. ***** ( 17)
   EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2. ***** ( 15)
   VERY IMPORTANT
3. ***** ( 24)
   IMPORTANT
4. ***** ( 20)
   OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5. ***** ( 57)
   NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPL
0.....1.....4.....6.....8.....100
   FREQUENCY


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MEAN 3.639 STD DEV 1.448 KURTOSIS -1.025
 SKEWNESS -0.609
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q3 POOR PRGM OFF AND POLICIES

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	17	12.8	12.8	12.8
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	15	11.3	11.3	24.1
IMPORTANT	3.	24	18.0	18.0	42.1
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	20	15.0	15.0	57.1
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	57	42.9	42.7	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q4 POSSIBLE EROSION OF BENEFITS




MEAN 3.008 STD DEV 1.317 KURTOSIS -1.138
 SKEWNESS -0.014
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q4 POSSIBLE EROSION OF BENEFITS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	21	15.8	15.8	15.8
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	30	22.6	22.6	38.2
IMPORTANT	3.	30	22.6	22.6	60.9
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	31	23.3	23.3	84.2
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	21	15.8	15.3	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

05 INSUFF TECH KNOWLEDGE CF SUP

CCDE



MEAN 3.992 STD DEV 1.240 KURTOSIS -0.281
 SKEWNESS -0.978
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

05 INSUFF TECH KNOWLEDGE CF SUP

CATEGORY LABEL	CCDE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	6	4.5	4.5	4.5
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	17	12.8	12.8	17.3
IMPORANT	3.	15	11.3	11.3	28.6
CF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	29	21.8	21.8	50.4
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC	5.	66	49.4	49.4	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

06 LACK OF A CAREER IN SPEC OR DESIG

CODE

```

1. ***** ( 14)
   EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2. ***** ( 11)
   VERY IMPORTANT
3. ***** ( 12)
   IMPORTANT
4. ***** ( 12)
   OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5. ***** ( 84)
   NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC
0.....1.....1.....1.....1.....1
  20      40      60      80     100
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN 4.060 STD DEV 1.418 KURTOSIS -0.117
 SKEWNESS -1.191
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

06 LACK OF A CAREER IN SPEC OR DESIG

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	14	10.5	10.5	10.5
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	11	8.3	8.3	18.8
IMPORTANT	3.	12	9.0	9.0	27.8
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	12	9.0	9.0	36.8
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC	5.	84	63.2	63.2	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q7 LONG HOURS AND WORK PRESSURE

CODE

```

1. ***** ( 19)
   EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2. ***** ( 21)
   VERY IMPORTANT
3. ***** ( 21)
   IMPORTANT
4. ***** ( 33)
   OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5. ***** ( 39)
   NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC
0.....1.....1.....1.....1.....1
  FREQUENCY 10 20 30 40 50

```

MEAN 3.391 STD DEV 1.419 KURTOSIS -1.179
 SKEWNESS -0.397
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q7 LONG HOURS AND WORK PRESSURE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	19	14.3	14.3	14.3
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	21	15.8	15.8	30.1
IMPORTANT	3.	21	15.8	15.8	45.9
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	33	24.8	24.8	70.7
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPL	5.	39	29.3	29.3	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q8 TOO MUCH FAMILY SEPERATION

CODE

```

1. ***** ( 64)
   EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2. ***** ( 26)
   VERY IMPORTANT
3. ***** ( 16)
   IMPORTANT
4. ***** ( 14)
   OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5. ***** ( 13)
   NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC
0.....1.....1.....1.....1.....1
  FREQUENCY 20 40 60 80 100

```

MEAN 2.143 STD DEV 1.377 KURTOSIS -0.532
 SKEWNESS 0.905

VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q8 TOO MUCH FAMILY SEPERATION

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	64	48.1	48.1	48.1
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	26	19.5	19.5	67.7
IMPORTANT	3.	16	12.0	12.0	79.7
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	14	10.5	10.5	90.2
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	13	9.8	9.8	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q9 LACK OF FRINGE BENEFITS

CODE

```

1. ***** ( 17)
   EXTREMELY IMPORTANT

2. ***** ( 25)
   VERY IMPORTANT

3. ***** ( 15)
   IMPORTANT

4. ***** ( 42)
   OF SOME IMPORTANCE


5. ***** ( 34)
   NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO
   0.....1.....1.....1.....1.....1
     10.....20.....30.....40.....50
   FREQUENCY
  
```

MEAN 3.383 STD DEV 1.380 KURTOSIS -1.149
 SKEWNESS -0.421
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q9 LACK OF FRINGE BENEFITS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	17	12.8	12.8	12.8
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	25	18.8	18.8	31.6
IMPORTANT	3.	15	11.3	11.3	42.9
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	42	31.6	31.6	74.4
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	34	25.6	25.6	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q10 LACK OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTH



MEAN 3.947 STD DEV 1.448 KURTOSIS -0.492
 SKEWNESS -1.017
 VALID CASES 131 MISSING CASES 2

Q10 LACK OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTH

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM. FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	15	11.2	11.5	11.5
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	12	9.0	9.2	20.6
IMPORTANT	3.	14	10.5	10.7	31.3
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	14	10.5	10.7	42.0
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPL	5.	76	57.1	58.0	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	2	1.5	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	131	100.0	100.0	

Q11 SUPPRESSED INIT CREATIVITY PROFF STIM

CODE	
1.	***** (30) EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2.	***** (20) VERY IMPORTANT
3.	***** (30) IMPORTANT
4.	***** (15) OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5.	***** (38) NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC
	1.....1.....1.....1.....1
	0 10 20 30 40 50
	FREQUENCY

MEAN 3.083 STD DEV 1.523 KURTOSIS -1.424
 SKEWNESS -0.037
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q11 SUPPRESSED INIT CREATIVITY PROFF STIM

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	30	22.6	22.6	22.6
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	20	15.0	15.0	37.6
IMPORTANT	3.	30	22.6	22.6	60.2
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	15	11.3	11.3	71.4
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	38	28.6	28.6	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q12 QUAL CF QTRS CR BAO INECLITIES

CCDE	
1.	***** (20) EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2.	***** (16) VERY IMPORTANT
3.	***** (23) IMPORTANT
4.	***** (19) OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5.	***** (54) NOT TRUE CR NOT IMPC
6.	** (1) MISSING VALUE
(MISSING)	
	0.....20.....40.....60.....80.....100
	FREQUENCY


MEAN 3.538 STD DEV 1.495 KURTOSIS -1.200
 SKEWNESS -0.506
 VALID CASES 132 MISSING CASES 1

Q12 QUAL CF QTRS CR BAO INECLITIES

CATEGORY LABEL	CCDE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	20	15.0	15.7	15.2
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	16	12.0	12.1	27.3
IMPORTANT	3.	23	17.3	17.4	44.7
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	19	14.3	14.4	59.1
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	54	40.6	40.7	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	1	0.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q13 INSUFFICIENT PAY

CODE



MEAN 2.436 STD DEV 1.494 KURTOSIS -1.075
 SKEWNESS 0.630
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q13 INSUFFICIENT PAY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	51	38.3	38.3	38.3
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	31	23.3	23.3	61.7
IMPORTANT	3.	15	11.3	11.3	72.9
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	14	10.5	10.5	83.5
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	22	16.5	16.5	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q14 NOT SELECT PG SCHCOL

```

CODE
1. *** ( 8)
   EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2. ** ( 5)
   VERY IMPLRTANT
3. **** ( 10)
   IMPORTANT
4. *** ( 7)
   OF SCME IMPORTANCE
5. ***** ( 102)
   NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC
6. (MISSING) ( 1)
   MISSING VALUE
0.....1.....1.....1.....1.....1
  FREQUENCY 40      60      120     160     200

```

MEAN 4.439 STD DEV 1.167 KURTOSIS 2.735

SKEWNESS -2.000

VALID CASES 132 MISSING CASES 1

Q14 NOT SELECT PG SCHCOL

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	8	6.0	6.1	6.1
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	5	3.8	3.8	9.8
IMPORTANT	3.	10	7.5	7.6	17.4
OF SCME IMPORTANCE	4.	7	5.3	5.3	22.7
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC	5.	102	76.7	77.3	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	1	0.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q15 TYPE OF ED OR TRAIN DESIRED NOT PROVIDED

CODE

1. ***** (14)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT

2. ***** (11)
VERY IMPORTANT

3. ***** (10)
IMPORTANT

4. ***** (12)
OF SOME IMPORTANCE

5. ***** (85)
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO

6. (1)
MISSING VALUE

(MISSING)

0 20 40 60 80 100
FREQUENCY

MEAN 4.083 STD DEV 1.420 KURTOSIS -0.029
SKEWNESS -1.238

VALID CASES 132 MISSING CASES 1

Q15 TYPE OF ED OR TRAIN DESIRED NOT PROVIDED

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	14	10.6	10.6	10.6
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	11	8.3	8.3	18.9
IMPORTANT	3.	10	7.6	7.6	26.5
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	12	9.0	9.1	35.6
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	85	63.9	64.4	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	1	0.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q16 POOR UTIL OF SKILLS ED CR ABILITIES

CCDE	
1.	***** (27) EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2.	***** (16) VERY IMPORTANT
3.	***** (22) IMPORTANT
4.	***** (21) OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5.	***** (47) NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO
	0.....10.....20.....30.....40.....50 FREQUENCY

MEAN 3.338 STD DEV 1.552 KURTOSIS -1.399
SKEWNESS -0.335

VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q16 POOR UTIL OF SKILLS ED CR ABILITIES

CATEGORY LABEL	CCDE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	27	20.3	20.3	20.3
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	16	12.0	12.0	32.3
IMPORTANT	3.	22	16.5	16.5	48.9
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	21	15.8	15.8	64.7
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	47	35.3	35.3	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q17 NON SELECT FOR SPEC OR DESIG CHANGE

```

CODE
1. ***** ( 15)
   EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2. ** ( 5)
   VERY IMPORTANT
3. ** ( 4)
   IMPORTANT
4. ** ( 3)
   OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5. ***** ( 105)
   NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC
6. (MISSING) ( 1)
   MISSING VALUE
0.....1.....1.....1.....1.....1
  40.....80.....120.....160.....200
FREQUENCY

```

MEAN 4.348 STD DEV 1.376 KURTOSIS 1.547

SKENNESS -1.812

VALID CASES 132

MISSING CASES 1

Q17 NON SELECT FOR SPEC OR DESIG CHANGE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	15	11.3	11.4	11.4
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	5	3.8	3.9	15.2
IMPORTANT	3.	4	3.0	3.0	18.2
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	3	2.3	2.3	20.5
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	105	78.9	79.5	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	1	0.8	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

018 LACK OF CONCERNED GUIDANCE OR ADVICE

CODE
 1. ***** (16)
 EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
 2. ***** (10)
 VERY IMPORTANT
 3. ***** (28)
 IMPORTANT
 4. ***** (25)
 OF SOME IMPORTANCE
 5. ***** (52)
 NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO
 6. ** (2)
 MISSING VALUE
 (MISSING)
 0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9.....10
 0.....20.....40.....60.....80.....100
 FREQUENCY

MEAN 3.664 STD DEV 1.385 KURTOSIS -0.760
 SKEWNESS -0.682
 VALID CASES 131 MISSING CASES 2

018 LACK OF CONCERNED GUIDANCE OR ADVICE

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	16	12.0	12.2	12.2
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	10	7.5	7.6	19.8
IMPORTANT	3.	28	21.1	21.4	41.2
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	25	18.8	19.1	60.3
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	52	39.1	39.7	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	2	1.5	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q19 BILLET JCB CR TASK DISSATISFACTION

CCDE

1. ***** (27)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT

2. ***** (19)
VERY IMPORTANT

3. ***** (18)
IMPORTANT

4. ***** (18)
OF SOME IMPORTANCE

5. ***** (49)
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC

6. *** (2)
(MISSING) MISSING VALUE

0.....1.....1.....1.....1.....1
FREQUENCY 10 20 30 40 50

MEAN 3.328 STD DEV 1.506 KURTOSIS -1.492
SKEWNESS -0.297

VALID CASES 131 MISSING CASES 2

Q19 BILLET JCB CR TASK DISSATISFACTION

CATEGORY LABEL	CCDE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	27	20.3	20.6	20.6
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	19	14.3	14.5	35.1
IMPORTANT	3.	18	13.5	13.7	48.9
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	18	13.5	13.7	62.6
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	49	36.8	37.4	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	2	1.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q20 INSUFF MANAGERIAL OR LEAD OF SUPERICRS


CODE	
1.	***** (24) EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2.	***** (20) VERY IMPORTANT
3.	***** (25) IMPORTANT
4.	***** (17) OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5.	***** (47) NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC
	0.....10.....20.....30.....40.....50 FREQUENCY

MEAN 3.323 STD DEV 1.525 KURTOSIS -1.406
 SKEWNESS -0.263
 VALID CASES 133 MISSING CASES 0

Q20 INSUFF MANAGERIAL OR LEAD OF SUPERICRS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	24	18.0	18.0	18.0
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	20	15.0	15.0	33.1
IMPORTANT	3.	25	18.8	18.8	51.9
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	17	12.8	12.8	64.7
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	47	35.3	35.3	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q21 LACK OF COMMAND OPPORT



MEAN 4.417 STD DEV 1.105 KURTOSIS 3.159
SKEWNESS -2.023
VALID CASES 132 MISSING CASES 1

Q21 LACK OF COMMAND OPPORT

CATEGORY LABEL	CCDE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	7	5.3	5.3	5.3
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	5	3.8	3.8	9.1
IMPORTANT	3.	7	5.3	5.3	14.4
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	20	15.0	15.2	29.5
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	93	69.9	70.5	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	1	0.9	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q23 DETAILING OR ASSIGN PROBLEMS

CODE
 1. ***** (26)
 EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
 2. ***** (13)
 VERY IMPORTANT
 3. ***** (20)
 IMPORTANT
 4. ***** (18)
 OF SOME IMPORTANCE
 5. ***** (55)
 NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC
 6. ** (1)
 MISSING VALUE
 (MISSING)
 0 20 40 60 80 100
 FREQUENCY

MEAN 3.477 STD DEV 1.575 KURTOSIS -1.330
 SKEWNESS -0.481
 VALID CASES 132 MISSING CASES 1

Q23 DETAILING OR ASSIGN PROBLEMS

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	26	19.5	19.7	19.7
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	13	9.8	9.8	29.5
IMPORTANT	3.	20	15.0	15.2	44.7
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	18	13.5	13.6	58.3
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	55	41.4	41.7	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	1	0.8	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q24 MANPOWER SUPPLY FINANCIAL SUPPORT PRGB


CCDE	
1.	***** (21) EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2.	***** (21) VERY IMPORTANT
3.	***** (20) IMPORTANT
4.	***** (27) OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5.	***** (43) NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPL
6.	***** (1) MISSING VALUE
(MISSING)	
	0.....10.....20.....30.....40.....50 FREQUENCY

MEAN 3.379 STD DEV 1.475 KURTOSIS -1.298
 SKEWNESS -0.360
 VALID CASES 132 MISSING CASES 1

Q24 MANPOWER SUPPLY FINANCIAL SUPPORT PRGB

CATEGORY LABEL	CCDE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	21	15.8	15.9	15.9
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	21	15.8	15.9	31.8
IMPORTANT	3.	20	15.0	15.2	47.0
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	27	20.3	20.5	67.4
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	43	32.3	32.6	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	1	0.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q25 TOO MUCH CRISIS MANAGEMENT



MEAN 2.462 STD DEV 1.373 KURTOSIS -1.100
 SKEWNESS 0.431
 VALID CASES 132 MISSING CASES 1

Q25 TOO MUCH CRISIS MANAGEMENT

CATEGORY LABEL	CCDE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	47	35.2	35.6	35.6
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	24	18.0	18.2	53.8
IMPORTANT	3.	27	20.3	20.5	74.2
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	21	15.8	15.9	90.2
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	13	9.8	9.9	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	1	0.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	133	100.0	100.0	

Q26 LACK OF PERSONAL RECOGNITION

```

CODE
1. ***** ( 24)
   EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2. ***** ( 29)
   VERY IMPORTANT
3. ***** ( 20)
   IMPORTANT
4. ***** ( 24)
   OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5. ***** ( 34)
   NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPC
6. *** ( 2)
(MISSING) MISSING VALUE
0.....1.....2.....3.....4.....5
FREQUENCY 10 20 30 40 50

```

MEAN 3.115 STD DEV 1.476 KURTOSIS -1.427
 SKEWNESS -0.055
 VALID CASES 131 MISSING CASES 2

Q26 LACK OF PERSONAL RECOGNITION

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	24	18.0	18.3	18.3
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	29	21.8	22.1	40.5
IMPORTANT	3.	20	15.0	15.3	55.7
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	24	18.0	18.3	74.0
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	34	25.6	26.0	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	2	1.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

027 TRANSIENT NATURE OF NAVY

CODE

1. ***** (23)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT

2. ***** (23)
VERY IMPORTANT

3. ***** (18)
IMPORTANT

4. ***** (19)
OF SOME IMPORTANCE

5. ***** (48)
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO

6. *** (2)
(MISSING) MISSING VALUE

0.....10.....20.....30.....40.....50
FREQUENCY

MEAN 3.351 STD DEV 1.544 KURTOSIS -1.457
SKEWNESS -0.289
VALID CASES 131 MISSING CASES 2

027 TRANSIENT NATURE OF NAVY

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	23	17.3	17.6	17.6
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	23	17.3	17.6	35.1
IMPORTANT	3.	18	13.5	13.7	48.9
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	19	14.3	14.5	63.4
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	48	36.1	36.6	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	2	1.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q28 UNABLE TO SUFF PLAN AND CONTRCL CAREER

CODE

1. ***** (21)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT
2. ***** (29)
VERY IMPORTANT
3. ***** (24)
IMPORTANT
4. ***** (23)
OF SOME IMPORTANCE
5. ***** (34)
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO

(MISSING)

6. *** (2)
MISSING VALUE


0.....10.....20.....30.....40.....50
FREQUENCY

MEAN 3.153 STD DEV 1.438 KURTOSIS -1.358
SKEWNESS -0.067
VALID CASES 131 MISSING CASES 2

Q28 UNABLE TO SUFF PLAN AND CONTRCL CAREER

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	21	15.8	16.0	16.0
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	29	21.8	22.1	38.2
IMPORTANT	3.	24	18.0	18.3	56.5
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	23	17.3	17.6	74.0
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	34	25.6	26.0	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	2	1.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

Q29 UNSAT OFFICER EVALUATION SYSTEM



MEAN 3.534 STD DEV 1.459 KURTOSIS -1.336
 SKEWNESS -0.416
 VALID CASES 131 MISSING CASES 2

Q29 UNSAT OFFICER EVALUATION SYSTEM

CATEGORY LABEL	CCOE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	1.	14	10.5	10.7	10.7
VERY IMPORTANT	2.	28	21.1	21.4	32.1
IMPORTANT	3.	15	11.3	11.5	43.5
OF SOME IMPORTANCE	4.	22	16.5	16.3	60.3
NOT TRUE OR NOT IMPO	5.	52	39.1	39.7	100.0
MISSING VALUE	6.	2	1.5	MISSING	100.0
TOTAL		133	100.0	100.0	

APPENDIX C

Item Intercorrelation Printouts

***** C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N *****
 Q8 TGG MUCH FAMILY SEPERATION BY Q22

		Q22					ROW TOTAL
COUNT		EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	VERY IMPORTANT	IMPORTANT	OF SOME IMPORTANCE	NOT TRUE OR NOT	
Q8		1	2	3	4	5	
	1	45	11	5	2	1	64
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT							48.5
	2	5	10	4	4	3	26
VERY IMPORTANT							19.7
	3	2	3	6	3	1	15
IMPORTANT							11.4
	4	0	1	2	4	7	14
OF SOME IMPORTANCE							10.6
	5	0	1	0	1	11	13
NOT TRUE OR NOT							9.8
COLUMN TOTAL		52	26	17	14	23	132
		39.4	19.7	12.9	10.6	17.4	100.0

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.64914. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

PEARSON'S R = 0.74401 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1

***** C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N *****
 Q8 TOO MUCH FAMILY SEPERATION BY Q27

		Q27					ROW TOTAL
COUNT		EXTREMELY IMPORTANT	VERY IMPORTANT	IMPORTANT	OF SOME IMPORTANCE	NOT TRUE OR NOT	
		1	2	3	4	5	
Q8	1	20	15	9	5	15	64
	EXTREMELY IMPORTANT						48.9
	2	2	5	7	4	7	25
	VERY IMPORTANT						19.1
	3	0	0	2	7	6	15
	IMPORTANT						11.5
	4	1	2	0	3	8	14
	OF SOME IMPORTANCE						10.7
	5	0	1	0	0	12	13
	NOT TRUE OR NOT						9.9
	COLUMN TOTAL	23	23	18	19	48	131
		17.6	17.6	13.7	14.5	36.6	100.0

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.41441. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

PEARSON'S R = 0.47357 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 2

***** C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N *****
 Q8 TOO MUCH FAMILY SEPERATION BY Q30

COUNT		Q30					ROW TOTAL
		EXTREMELY IMPORANT 1	VERY IMP ORTANT 2	IMPORANT 3	OF SOME IMPORANT 4	NOT TRUE OR NOT 5	
Q8	1	22	14	15	8	5	64
	EXTREMELY IMPORANT						48.9
	2	8	4	4	5	4	25
	VERY IMPORTANT						19.1
	3	1	2	4	4	4	15
	IMPORTANT						11.5
	4	2	3	1	5	3	14
	OF SOME IMPORTANT						10.7
	5	1	1	0	2	9	13
	NOT TRUE OR NOT						9.9
	COLUMN TOTAL	34 26.0	24 18.3	24 18.3	24 18.3	25 19.1	131 100.0

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.32895. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000
 PEARSON'S R = 0.41304 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 2

***** C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N *****
 Q22 LONG OR EXTENDED DEPLOYMENTS BY Q27 *****

COUNT		Q27					ROW TOTAL
		EXTREMELY IMPOR	VERY IMPORTANT	IMPORTANT	OF SOME IMPORTANCE	NOT TRUE OR NOT	
		1	2	3	4	5	
Q22							
	1	16	14	7	6	9	52
EXTREMELY IMPOR							40.0
	2	3	3	4	6	9	25
VERY IMPORTANT							19.2
	3	1	3	5	1	6	16
IMPORTANT							12.3
	4	0	2	1	4	7	14
OF SOME IMPORTAN							10.8
	5	3	1	1	1	17	23
NOT TRUE OR NOT							17.7
COLUMN TOTAL		23	23	18	18	48	130
		17.7	17.7	13.8	13.8	36.9	100.0

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.36643. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

PEARSON'S R = 0.40828 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3

***** C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N *****
 Q22 LONG OF EXTENDED DEFLCYMENTS BY Q30

		Q30					ROW TOTAL
Q22	COUNT	EXTREMELY IMP	VERY IMP	IMP T	OF SOME IMP	NOT TRUE OR NOT	
		1	2	3	4	5	
EXTREMELY IMP	1	22	10	11	4	5	52 40.0
VERY IMP	2	5	6	7	4	3	25 19.2
IMP	3	3	4	2	3	4	16 12.3
OF SOME IMP	4	2	1	2	7	2	14 10.8
NOT TRUE OR NOT	5	2	3	1	6	11	23 17.7
COLUMN TOTAL		34 26.2	24 18.5	23 17.7	24 18.5	25 19.2	130 100.0

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.35427. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000
 PEARSON'S R = 0.42654 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 3

*** Q27 *** TRANSIENT NATURE OF NAVY C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N I
 *** C *** BY Q30 ***

		Q30					ROW TOTAL
COUNT		EXTREMELY IMP	VERY IMP	IMP PORTANT	OF SOME IMP	NOT TRUE OR NOT	
		1	2	3	4	5	
Q27	1	12	4	4	2	1	23
EXTREMELY IMP							17.6
	2	9	5	4	5	0	23
VERY IMPORTANT							17.6
	3	4	5	6	2	1	18
IMPORTANT							13.7
	4	3	5	3	6	2	19
OF SOME IMP							14.5
	5	6	5	7	9	21	48
NOT TRUE OR NOT							36.6
COLUMN TOTAL		34 26.0	24 18.3	24 18.3	24 18.3	25 19.1	121 100.0

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.39924. SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000
 PEARSON'S R = 0.47172 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 2

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