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BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES:

TOWARD A NEW RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL JOHN A. CASH

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BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES:

TOWARDS A NEW RELATIONSHIP

by

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Cash
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Developed basically through library research, interviews with knowledgeable individuals, and the author's continuing interest in the subject as a Brazilian FAO since 1969, this paper examines US-Brazilian relations in light of the changing times we live in. Discussion includes an examination of the historical background of relations between both countries, and their foreign policy objectives relative to each other. The conclusion reached is that we must change our approach in our dealings with Brazil, recognizing her as an emerging world power. Specifically, the United States can lessen tensions between the two countries if the recommendations concerning the following points of frustration are dealt with: human rights, military-to-military relationships, trade and related economic matters, recognition of Brazil as a regional world power, and the question of nuclear energy. The major shortcoming of this paper is the dearth of Brazilian materials. However that disadvantage is offset somewhat by the author's familiarity with the subject. He lived in Brazil during the period September 1972 - February 1974 during which period he travelled to all but three of the country's states and attended the Brazilian Army's Command and General Staff College.

BACKGROUND

Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, Brazil and the United States enjoyed almost excellent relations, with the former long regarding the latter a natural ally. After independence in 1822 the Brazilians made unsuccessful overtures, and later showed their appreciation of American support of the new republic in the 1890's by making the 4th of July a national holiday.¹ During World War I, months after the United States declared war on the Central Powers, Brazil followed suit - although the only casus belli was the sinking of a lone Brazilian freighter in 1917.²

During much of World War II the Getulio Vargas Administration maintained a correct neutrality. But by 1944, following the country's entry into the war, the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) was fighting with the Allies in the Italian campaign. This was due largely as a result of American pressure for hemispheric solidarity and President Vargas' desire to do more than fulfill the passive role of supplying strategic materials and bases to the United States.³ The FEB fought well, earning the distinction of receiving the first surrender of a German combat division in Italy. For the first time in their histories the two countries had become working military allies, attaining a level of cooperation that would have an effect on Brazil well beyond the end of the war.⁴ As one observer put it:

Brazil always saw in the United States a nation friend...
a country with which it shared boundless solidarity and
friendship...⁵

In the post-1945 period, many of the leading military and political figures - very much influenced by the wartime FEB experience - identi-

fied closely with the United States and its foreign policy during the Cold War. Brazil supported American containment policies in the hemisphere and continued to refuse to deal with Russia or its Eastern satellites diplomatically. With Brazil in a dependent position to the United States for almost all of its industrial goods by this time, a close commercial tie had developed which kept both countries closely aligned.⁶

An abrupt shift developed between both countries in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Brazilians resented the Eisenhower Administration's failure to support the development recommendations of the U.S. - Brazilian Economic Development Commission made earlier in 1952, which suggested private capital rather than public and international investment programs as a panacea for the country's developmental problems. Furthermore, the United States' less than enthusiastic response to President Juscelino Kubitschek's 1958 recommendation that a "Marshall Plan", Operation Pan America, be instituted for the region, irked Brazil.⁷

The rising nationalism of the period influenced the Brazilians to aim for a more independent and stronger position in world affairs and at the same time, to oppose so-called American "imperialism". U.S. investment had risen steadily from \$28 million in 1914, to \$577 million in 1950, to \$1.5 billion in 1960, or more than half the total of foreign investment in the country.⁸ Economic nationalists wondered if Brazil's import substitution policies, the foundation of its industrial efforts since 1945, were relevant to the nation's needs. Perhaps full-scale economic development was in order, an endeavor that would necessitate a basic revamping of Brazilian economic and social structures.⁹

Under President João Goulart, an avowed leftist with populist leanings, relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate.

As foreign profits became an issue in the early 1960's, Brazil acted to restrict the remittance of those earnings. A state government nationalized three United States companies with compensation,¹⁰ and Brazilian nationalists demanded that mineral reserves be developed only by Brazilians¹¹.

Relations improved somewhat when, following Goulart's visit to the United States in 1962, President Kennedy agreed to use Alliance for Progress funds to support an emergency impact program in Brazil's drought-ridden Northeast. It called for \$131 million which, by raising the living standards of the people, would blunt the spread of communist-inspired dissension. Furthermore, both countries agreed to a loan of \$398.5 million to improve Brazil's balance of payments posture, with the United States viewing it as an incentive for the Goulart government to implement some of its proposed domestic reforms. However, when it became clear that Brazil was both unwilling and unable to meet its obligations for socioeconomic change, Washington released only \$84 million of the funds. Furthermore, President ^{Kennedy}/cancelled a proposed November 1962 visit to Brazil. By late 1963, following a trip to Brasilia by Attorney General Robert Kennedy which failed to convince Goulart of American concern about growing socioeconomic instability, the United States ceased dealing directly with the Brazilian government. It pursued, instead, an "island of sanity" policy which dictated the provision of economic aid - in the U.S. embassy's opinion - to those states in Brazil who would use the money responsibly.¹²

Alarmed at the country's flirtation with Communist states - diplomatic relations with Russia were established during this period, and Brazil

refused to participate in hemispheric efforts to isolate Cuba, with President Jânio Quadros even going so far as to decorate Che Guevara with Brazil's highest military award during his state visit to Brasília in 1961 - as well as the deterioration of relations with the United States, the Brazilian military elected the military coup option and ousted President Goulart in March 1964.¹³

While the new military-led junta was most certainly pro-American, it nevertheless continued to pursue the concept of an "independent" Brazil. Led by Marshal Humberto Castello Branco, who, along with his cadre had fought with the FEB (most were also graduates of United States military schools as well),¹⁴ Brazil reversed its stance on Cuba. In 1965 it endorsed the United States position on Vietnam and sent more than 1000 troops into the Dominican Republic as part of the Inter-American Peace Force. As one Brazilian officer put it:

The Armed Forces brilliantly stopped Communism from taking over Brazil. Another brilliant example is their participation in the Dominican Republic in the Dominican Republic in the operation initiated by the American marines, where they also stopped Communism from taking over the country.¹⁵

With the restoration of friendly relations between the two countries, foreign aid resumed, with U.S. grants and loans accounting for approximately 60% of the \$2.5 billion in economic assistance given to Brazil between 1962 and 1971. Food for Peace and Export-Import Bank loans represented the other 40%. The general thrust of these efforts after 1964 were as "program" loans geared toward restoration of Brazil's balance of payments position.¹⁶

By the 1970's, partially in response to growing economic autonomy, international economic conditions, and a continued desire on Brazil's part to

nursue an independent foreign policy, relations with the United States had become more complex. Brazil developed an increasingly active position for change in the international system, especially as a Third World spokesman. In 1972, as one of nine developing countries selected for the "Committee of Twenty" to engage in negotiations concerning the international monetary system, Brazil played an important role.¹⁷ A major irritant developed between Washington and Brasília when the former, concerned about its capacity to deliver nuclear fuel to Brazil, shifted some long-term fuel guarantees to "conditional" status in 1974.¹⁸ This had a detrimental effect on Brazil's reactor building program. At the same time, West Germany began bidding for Brazilian contracts which would include not only power reactors but also enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Since these procedures could produce nuclear explosives, the Nixon and later the Ford Administrations quietly attempted to dissuade Brazil and West Germany from reaching agreement, but to no avail. In June 1975, both countries signed an agreement.¹⁹

In its continuing efforts to promote non-proliferation, the Carter Administration's public diplomacy replaced the quiet persuasion of the Ford Administration. Through pressure on both Bonn and Brasília the United States continued unsuccessfully to press for a modus vivendi. By 1978 it was clear that compromise was difficult but not impossible, and the situation had become even more exacerbated because of American concern for human rights violations in Brazil, as well as continued trade and development issues.²⁰

NEW POWER REALITIES

If a better understanding of what has happened to Brazilian-American relations during the past two decades is to be achieved, a closer examination of the new realities of power is in order. In short, what are the underlying factors that have contributed to tensions between the two countries?

Simply stated, in a changing world, in its largely successful effort to achieve economic growth, Brazilian political power has increased substantially relative to that of the United States.

First of all, in terms of national growth, Brazil's commitment to development has yielded unprecedented rates, rendering it the economic success story of the less developed countries, at least until the 1973 oil crisis, and therefore less dependent on capital goods and imported manufactures.²¹ In the face of an average 2.8 population growth per year, Brazil's economic growth has moved much faster - averaging 10% a year during the period 1970-1973 - thus causing a drastic rise in per capita incomes. Industrial growth outstripped overall growth, approximating 15% by 1973. Exports have increased dramatically as well, growing four-fold during the period 1969-1979.²² Thus, by 1978, Brazil's average per capita income was \$1140, exceeded only by Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela,²³ placing it in the "middle income" category. The country is no longer totally dependent on United States financial aid for its development. In fact, loan repayment sums are now much larger than such aid.²⁴ And through its industrial growth Brazil has been able to vary its export products - it now surpasses the United States as the world's largest exporter of soybeans, for example,²⁵ and has gained the reputation as the "Detroit of

South America" with an average automobile production of more than one million units per year.²⁶ Accordingly, it has been rendered less vulnerable to world price vagaries of such single commodity products such as coffee.

Second, like many other Latin American countries, Brazil has been reaching out to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with other nations that has brought about a reduction of its reliance on the United States. The nuclear contract with West Germany is an example.²⁷ The country has extensive trade and diplomatic relations with other Western European nations²⁸, the Eastern Bloc countries²⁹, the Soviet Union³⁰, Japan³¹, China and the OPEC nations.³² In response to the 1967 congressional act that drastically restricted the sale of sophisticated weaponry to Third World countries, Brazil has long since turned to Western Europe for its armaments³³ and by 1977 had ended a formal military alliance with the United States that had lasted since 1942,³⁴ when the United States unsuccessfully attempted to tie it to Brazil's observance of human rights. Furthermore, Brazil has aspired ^{to} a NATO-like South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO) which would include South Africa, Argentina, and Uruguay to counter potential Soviet incursions in the South Atlantic sea lanes.³⁵

Third, behind a shield of "stability" and "security" provided by the military, the Brazilian developmental model, with broad power exercised by technocrats, calls for a much stronger national government than in the past. In 1979 its defense budget was in excess of \$2 billion for a military force of more than 281,000, both the largest in Latin America.³⁶ A paramount mission, rightly or wrongly, of these forces is the suppres-

ion of dissent in view of the need to enhance economic growth through a stable environment.³⁷ Such authoritarianism has caused some difficulty with the United States over the issue of human rights.³⁸ Brazilians acknowledge that there are inequities but consider them a necessary though temporary stage in the process of development which hopefully will be completed by the year 2000, when the country achieves the status of a fully mature society. A sharp and general alleviation of misery will result once this goal has been attained.³⁹ Furthermore, this stronger domestic position has enhanced Brazil's bargaining posture in its dealings with multinational business firms. Through joint ventures, expropriation, service contracts, and a variety of tax, pricing, and export regulations, Brazil has increased its derived benefits.

Fourth, Brazil has been moderately successful in its assumption of a position of Third World leadership, especially in Latin America. No longer considering itself a mere adjunct to United States policy, Brazil has shifted the orientation of her "buffer" states away from their historic leanings towards Argentina.⁴⁰ Many Brazilians believe that the traditional rivalry with Argentina is a thing of the past. Brasília has made recent strong overtures for an accord with its rival.⁴¹ At Itaipú, just inside Paraguay, a joint \$10.3 billion dollar hydroelectric project is being developed that will make electricity that country's largest export, supplying badly needed power to Brazil's industrial center-south region.⁴² Brazil provides substantial military assistance to Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay⁴³, and through its construction of the Trans-Amazonian Highway has generated fruitful economic and political interchange with its northern and western neighbors.⁴⁴

Brazilian influence was substantial in the establishment of the United

Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, and it continues its involvement in that and similar organizations⁴⁵, thus playing a major role in putting Latin American and other Third World issues under international scrutiny. While most of the Latin American regional and sub-regional economic efforts have yet to prove themselves, Brazil's role in them is substantial.⁴⁶

While not a major participant in the politics of Black Africa, leaders of those countries give serious thought to Brazil's opinions because of its growing capabilities and Third World identification. Through its admission as an observer to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its swift recognition of the revolutionary regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, Brazil underscored its commitment to this new phase of African relations.⁴⁷ As a multiracial society which supposedly practices racial democracy, with a large African element in its culture, Brazil has some justification for concluding that thus is the African-Brazilian detente enhanced.⁴⁸

ALTERNATIVES

In the face of these new realities, what alternatives confront the United States as it stands before a Brazil which has passed from a dependency, inward-looking phase of development to an export-oriented prosperous phase in which its international role is ever expanding?

An American attempt to preserve the status quo would only exacerbate relations between the two countries. To name but a few examples, tensions would likely increase over the nuclear energy issue, trade, the

200-mile limit⁴⁹, and human rights. In an economic, political, or even military "war" with Brazil - if it came to that - the United States, given the vast inequality of power would likely prevail, as the Dominican Republic experience of 1965 suggests. Still, Brazil would not be totally defenseless. As an "enemy", given its regional hegemony, Brazil could likely carry many Latin American nations into further Third World solidarity, a situation which would further militate against the effective conduct of American foreign policy.⁵⁰

What about a "special relationship"? In February 1976, Henry Kissinger visited Brasília and concluded an agreement of mutual consultation twice a year and continuing dialogue on international issues. Acknowledging Brazil's growing role in the world arena, he predicted a period of close collaboration between both countries⁵¹. However, President Carter's strong opposition to nuclear proliferation and human rights violations without any prior notice to Brazil during the 1976 presidential campaign deeply undercut this policy⁵². In reality, the Brazilians don't need a "special relationship" with the United States anyway in view of their country's extensive and growing political and economic links with the world at large. Thus, according to French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues; speaking to President Geisel in 1976:

I am thus convinced that Brazil will occupy in the world of tomorrow the place it deserves; i.e., a seat in the front row of the industrial powers of the world. Its political stability, its remarkable economic thrust, its potential as a young nation, joined to the wisdom of its leaders, all make of your country one of those forces whose emergence at the horizon of our century can tip the balance of world equilibrium one way or the other.⁵³

Many Brazilians have never forgotten the "special relationship" of World War II which, to them, meant that the United States bought Brazil's raw materials at very low prices while they did without scarce finished imports.⁵⁴ They also, perhaps, remember the postwar period when simultaneously while rebuilding Europe through the Marshall Plan, the United States insisted on relatively ineffectual private capital as the panacea for Brazilian economic ills.⁵⁵ Some Brazilian observers even believe that the United States and the Soviet Union both desire a "special relationship" with certain countries - especially those on the threshold of attaining world or middle power status - so as to freeze the worldwide distribution of power under detente.⁵⁶ It would appear, then, that a "special relationship" is an idea whose time has passed, one that wasn't even followed when it faced its first major test.

The most sensible United States approach in its dealings with Brazil then, should be one responsive to Brazil's dynamism but also fundamental to this country's interests. It should be a policy geared to lessening tensions, mature cooperation, and mutual respects, one in tune to the new realities of a changed world. A consideration of those issues where an impact can be made, keeping the aforementioned in mind, is in order.

A NEW APPROACH

First of all, the United States should consistently treat Brazil as a world power. After all, it is larger than the United States (if you leave out Alaska), has a common border with every South American

country except Ecuador and Chile, and in 1975 had the world's tenth largest GNP.⁵⁷ Part of our problem is Pan Americanism. In the past, when it has suited our short-range objectives, we have used a bilateral approach with Brazil, followed by an emphasis on multi-lateral Pan American relations. Brazilians have always resented being lumped along with such disparate entities as Costa Rica and Bolivia. One influential Brazilian newspaper, commenting on President Carter's proposed visit to Latin America in 1977, remarked that the trip:

...reveals the image that the United States has of the southern part of the hemisphere. It seems from the generalization that...leads them to face everything that they encounter south of the Rio Grande as a single reality...This generic vision of its southern neighbors has been responsible for some of the gravest deformities in Washington's analysis and interpretations of phenomena...that require a treatment based on more realistic and less preconceived premises...Above all, it is necessary that the North American leadership understand that Latin America does not exist.⁵⁸ (Italics added)

American statesmen do not speak of visiting Europe but France, England, or West Germany. Latin America should be treated in the same fashion, and the United States must cease making generalizations about some twenty or so different countries based on the superficial sameness of language (Spanish) and religion (Catholicism).⁵⁹

Because Brazil shows every indication of becoming a great and powerful country by the end of this century if not sooner, the United States should begin now to treat it as a respected world power, actively seeking its counsel in world affairs, especially in those matters dealing with the Third World. Other world powers have already accorded Brazil the status of a "...middle world power on the way up."⁶⁰ And the Brazilians themselves contribute to such a perception. As the eighth largest industrial power in the world, she recently elected to end

United States Peace Corps efforts there by early 1981, considering such endeavors "...a stigma...receiving a program usually associated with underdevelopment."⁶¹ By treating Brazil as a world power, the United States can do much to assist that country in keeping its lines open in the international arena.

Second, the United States should work towards strengthening military ties with Brazil. While there has been a demise in the American role as principle supplier of military materiel as well as abrogation of other long-standing military agreements, there is, nevertheless, every reason to believe that Brazil would be receptive to continued close security cooperation with this country⁶² but on a fundamentally different basis than in the past. As the paramount regional power⁶³ and because of the very trajectory of her development future relative to her neighbors, it is very likely that Brazil will exert growing influence on their affairs as a force for stability. Accordingly, we should try to reaffirm the military bond forged during the days of President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy and World War II, and subsequently.⁶⁴

A series of institution-to-institution liaisons should be increased. Such linkages are already operational at Leavenworth, West Point and elsewhere, and should be expanded to other service schools. A program should be established whereby junior officers would be exchanged on a unit-to-unit basis to do a tour of command duty in the other's army. The United States should continue such endeavors as the recent Southern Command-sponsored project that arranged for senior Brazilian

army officers to visit the NATO REFORGER exercise in late 1980.⁶⁵ Furthermore, we should go beyond simple participation in OPERATION UNITAS, the annual multinational joint naval task force effort in which along with Brazil and other Latin American nations we conduct antisubmarine and antiaircraft maneuvers and visit South American ports along both coasts of that continent. Instead, we should sponsor and participate in joint naval operations in the South Atlantic with Brazil geared towards the protection of strategic sea lanes in that region, given the geopolitical realities of the day.⁶⁶

Third, the United States should form an economic alliance with Brazil, taking advantage of that country's regional primacy. The East-West triangularism of the Carter Administration, seeking to unify the industrial countries in their dealings with the Third World was a policy fraught with danger, especially since the nations involved are all dependent on resources from countries like Brazil.⁶⁷ If it is to continue its development, Brazil must expand its import market and enhance its domestic purchasing power to extend its internal consumer market. By opening up to Brazilian products the United States can assist, even if it means doing so at the expense of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. Specifically, we need to bring order and equity to the policy of using countervailing duties against Brazilian export subsidy products, and tariffs on imported Brazilian finished goods should be reduced. While multinational corporations seem to be alive and well in Brazil, foreign policy makers here have too often overlooked the domestic consequences of the Brazilian developmental model, and have tended to support United States corporations with large investments in that country.⁶⁸ We must

work towards convincing the Brazilians to reform the social structure by extending educational opportunities, health care, decontrolling the unions, and incorporating more of its citizens into the market economy.⁶⁹

Because savings rates in Brazil are still relatively inadequate to meet the investment needs of continuing growth, and because exports as yet - though substantial - have failed to generate enough foreign exchange to pay for both debt service and required imports,⁷⁰ the United States must do all in its power to insure a continued flow of loan money on affordable terms. In June 1980, Brazil owed \$55 billion to its creditors, with \$37 billion of that promised to private banks in the United States and Europe,⁷¹ and was the fourth largest World Bank client⁷². Accordingly, it would serve Brazil's interests well - reduction of an inflation rate that has reached 109 percent and decrease of a perennial trade deficit of almost \$3 billion - if we would encourage Brazil's planners to submit her imbroglio to scrutiny under the International Monetary Fund (IMF). By its own account, Brazil, already a major borrower from both the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank must raise \$12 billion by 1981 to meet its financing needs, a sum which the IMF can help supply. As the chief backer of these international lending institutions, we must use our influence to convince Brazil that IMF efforts on her behalf would not be an admission of economic defeat or foreign manipulation of that nation's domestic policies.⁷³ Furthermore both countries have a stake in assuring future global demand as well as control of the unstable behavior of currencies and payment balances that have plagued the international monetary system during the past decade. The major industrialized countries, dissatisfied with the present decentralized system, have sponsored periodic economic summit


meetings in an attempt to coordinate policies. But as long as such gatherings exclude countries like Brazil, a permanent institutional framework can never be established.⁷⁴

Fourth, rather than work at cross purposes to prevent Brazil from developing it, we should sponsor and participate in a world or regional conference with her to deal with the problem of nuclear energy. Petroleum accounts for 49 percent of Brazilian energy generated there, and the country must import more than 80 percent of its oil needs. While hydropower is under development and sugarcane-derived "gasahol" use is on the increase, Brazil's ample coal resources are of low grade quality and need a great deal of processing. The nuclear option, then, especially in the face of continuing OPEC price hikes since 1973, is particularly appealing.⁷⁵

For those who argue that Brazil ultimately might want to build the bomb to enhance her position as the paramount Latin American nation vis-a-vis Argentina, the rationale simply isn't there - yet. Because of her power, Brazil is beyond conventional military threat from even a coalition of neighboring nations. It is difficult to see how building a bomb would accrue to Brazil political gains which it can't achieve through other sources of power. It is possible that - in the future - Brazil's desire to build a bomb may be influenced by international considerations, the gaining of recognition as an aspiring nation. A United States-sponsored conference as well as treatment of the country as a world power with acknowledgement of her regional prerogatives should influence Brazil to keep the false salvation of the nuclear option in its proper perspective.⁷⁶

Fifth, the Carter heavy-handed approach notwithstanding, it is imperative that the United States continue its concern for human rights in Brazil as an integral part of our foreign policy, for the following reasons. In the first place, we have been exporting concepts of liberty for over 200 years as a major tenet of the American tradition. Support for it is an essential component of our sense of purpose and self-esteem. There is no doubt that the policy commands the support of the American people and the Reagan Administration.⁷⁷ Second, continued assertion of such a policy would further the imperative in our foreign policy that Alexander Haig recently described as a "...reassertion of American relevance to global events."⁷⁸ Even Brazil would have to agree that human rights are not simply "internal" affairs but have become a central item on the global agenda as events in Afghanistan, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Poland, Iran, Cambodia, and the Soviet Union demonstrate. The United States must be responsive to aspirations of peoples around the world in identifying with leaders trying to improve their lot. Third, our security interests are served through an advancement of human rights. Experience has demonstrated that repressive nations are often unstable allies, as has been the case with Brazil in its sometimes xenophobic reaction to our criticisms. Furthermore, in terms of realpolitik, our concern for human rights is a powerful counter-argument to Communist expansion. The Brazilian charge that our policy has been inconsistent⁷⁹ is unwarranted. With certain countries it may have appeared so, where in reality we simply lacked the leverage (Russia, Cambodia, etc.) while in others military security (South Korea, Greece, Iran, etc.) took precedence. Its merit notwithstanding, consistency is rarely the ultimate objective. All governments, Brazil included, must choose from among competing interests, but the right choice must be made.

Finally, although repression remains rampant in Russia, Chile, Cuba, Argentina, Iran and elsewhere, our efforts towards human rights have enjoyed some success in Brazil.⁸⁰ President Figueiredo has continued the Geisel administration's policy of easing political repression, even allowing political exiles to return home, and many military commanders accused of allowing the torture of political prisoners have been removed. Furthermore, there has been a decrease in reports of police brutality and a decline in censorship, except in the electronic media.⁸¹ Carlos Calero Rodrigues, Brazil's current United Nations ambassador, currently serves as vice president of that body's Human Rights Commission,⁸² and Brazil leads Third World nations in the General Assembly in its condemnation of racism.⁸³ The country has also gone out of its way to take in Vietnamese "boat" people.⁸⁴ It is worth recalling that this country was never so powerful, respected, or admired as it was during the time of Woodrow Wilson and FDR, when it stood for something more than sheer power. If the United States is to aid Brazil in making the world a secure place for democratic nations it must continue to nurture a sense of common purpose based on respect for human rights.⁸⁵


JOHN A. CASH
LTC IN

FOOTNOTES

1. Frank D. McCann, "Brazil and the United States: A New Phase of the Relationship," p. 4.
2. Roger W. Fontaine, Brazil and the United States, pp. 20-27.
3. Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, pp. 128-174.
4. Frank D. McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 475-486, 483-486.
5. Frank D. McCann, "Brazil and the United States: A New Phase of the Relationship," p. 4.
6. Riordan Roett, Brazil-Politics in a Patrimonial Society, p. 158.
7. Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, p. 117.
8. E. Bradford Burns, Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey, p. 91.
9. Roett, p. 159.
10. Skidmore, p. 228.
11. John W.F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil, pp. 87-89.
12. Roett, p. 160.
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15. As quoted by a senior officer of the Brazilian Army in Burns, p. 122.
16. Roett, p. 160.
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22. "The United States and Latin America: Facing New Facts of Power," Great Decisions '79, p. 12.
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24. "The United States and Latin America: Facing New Facts of Power," p. 12.
25. Edward Wilborn, "What You Should Know About Your Biggest Soy-bean Competitor," The Brazilians, May 1976, p. 8.
26. Brazil's production of automobiles is exceeded only by the United States, Japan, West Germany, France, Great Britain, Canada, and Spain. Stephen Baker, "They've Got a Lot of Autos in Brazil," The Brazilians, March 1978, p. 6.
27. Norman Gall, "Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All," Foreign Policy, Summer 1976, pp. 155-201.
28. Wayne A. Selcher, Brazil's Multilateral Relations, pp. 23-28.
29. Boletim Especial Numero 100, 22 December 1980, (Brazilian Embassy Bulletin)
30. Boletim Especial Numero 68, 18 December 1978.
31. Boletim Especial Numero 83, 28 August 1979.
32. Selcher, pp. 14, 108-116.
33. William Perry, "The Brazilian Armed Forces Qua Armed Forces: The Military Policy and Conventional Capabilities of an Emerging Power," pp. 11-17.
34. McCann, "Brazil and the United States: A New Phase of the Relationship," p.1.
35. Selcher, p. 236.
36. The Military Balance 1980-1981, p. 97.
37. Peter L. Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change, pp. 138-150.
38. It has always been difficult to obtain accurate, up-to-date information concerning political prisoners in Brazil. In 1977, Amnesty International estimated that Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil combined held an estimated 30,000 political prisoners, with the smallest number in Brazil. "Human Rights: The Rest of the World Sees Them Differently," New York Times, 6 March 1977, p. 10.
39. This is the common refrain one hears from Brazilians as the author did when assigned as an in-country FAO student, attending the Brazilian Army's Command and General Staff College from September

1972 to February 1974. The author recalls discussions with officers who had participated in interrogation sessions with leftist dissidents where harsh means had been used.

40. Even though it has the second highest GNP in Latin America (after Venezuela), Argentina has had six different changes of government since the 1964 Brazilian Revolution (three civilian and three military) and its economy is stagnated. These factors have had a debilitating effect on the country's traditional foreign policy rivalry and have led to overtures towards accommodation rather than competition with Brazil.
41. "Brazil and Argentina: An End to the Rivalry?", New York Times, 18 May 1980, p. 3.
42. Boletim Especial Numero 100.
43. Interview with LTC Pericles Ferreira Gomes, Brazilian Army exchange faculty member, Department of Foreign Languages, United States Military Academy, 7 November 1979.
44. Brazil continues to maintain a dialogue with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela concerning joint development of the Amazon basin through a treaty that would permit the harnessing of its resources as well as protect the ecology. David Vidal, "Eight Nations Discuss Treaty on Amazon," New York Times, 28 November 1977, p. 12.
45. Selcher, p. 42.
46. "The United States and Latin America: Facing New Facts of Power", p. 13.
47. Selcher, p. 228.
48. Brazil's relations with South Africa - \$60 million imports and exports in 1975 - the largest in South America and the military accord desired by both parties complicates matters. But to date, Brazil manages the balancing act extremely well. For a thorough analysis see Ibid., pp. 324-23678.
49. Brazil, in light of its energy problems and control of its live and mineral resources, insists on sovereignty out to 200 miles. Ibid., pp: 70-81.
50. Abraham Lowenthal and Albert Fishlow, "Latin America's Emergence: Toward A U.S. Response," Headline Series 243, p.49.
51. Roett, p.161.
52. Saltzman, p. 36.
53. Selcher, pp. 27-37.
54. "O Poder da Vontade Nacional," Manchete, 5 July 1980, p. 13.

55. See footnote number 43.
56. Fontaine, p. 104.
57. Selcher, p. 13.
58. McCann, "Brazil and the United States: A New Phase of the Relationship," p. 6.
59. Typical of the wrong things we do was the recent decision to combine all Latin American FAO specialists (Southern South America, Northern South America, Mexico, Central America, Brazil, and the Caribbean) into one speciality, "Latin America, the assumption presumably being that if you know about one you know about the others.
60. Selcher, p. 31.
61. Peter Eisner, "Brazil: No Thanks to Peace Corps," Philadelphia Enquirer, 27 November 1980, p. 10.
62. Perry, p. 18.
63. Ibid., p. 9.
64. Aside from her participation in World War II, Brazil almost sent troops to participate as part of the United Nations contingent during the Korean Conflict. A total of 6,296 Brazilian students attended United States military schools during the period 1950-1969. Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, DOD Pamphlet, March, 1970, p. 17. The Brazilian Army War College, Command and General Staff College and Military Academy are each modeled after their American counterpart. In spite of a strong element of almost xenophobic nationalism, especially at the first two schools, pro-American feeling on a professional basis remains strong. Interview with LTC James Sivells, former Assistant Attache to Brazil, DCSOPS, 26 November 1980.
64. Interview with COL Peter Britenall, Brazilian FAO specialist, DOD, 8 December 1980.
66. Interview with LTC Herbert Huser, Department of Social Sciences, Assistant Professor, Latin American Politics, United States Military Academy, 26 November 1980.
67. We currently must import the following from Brazil: Sheet Mica-100%; Manganese - 99%; Tantalum-95%; Iron Ore-35%; Ben A. Franklin, "Shortages Are a Matter of Perspective," New York Times, 27 November 1977, p. 5.
68. Shelton H. Davis, Victims of the Miracle, p. 163.
69. Estimates vary but according to some experts almost one third of the country's 120 million-plus people do not participate in the market economy. See footnote number 21.

70. Lowenthal and Fishlow, p. 59.
71. "Brazil," Research Institute Recommendations, 20 June 1980, p. 3.
72. "Brasil Foi Este Ano O Quarto Cliente do Banco Mundial," The Brazilians, January 1978, p. 18.
73. Peter Eisner, "Brazil, In An Economic Crisis, Faces Tough Decisions," Philadelphia Enquirer, 14 December 1980, p. 25.
74. Lowenthal and Fishlow, p. 60.
75. Roett, pp. 161-162.
76. Stephen M. Gorman, "Security, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of Argentina and Brazil," Parameters, March 1979, p. 64.
77. "Soviet Union Violating Human Rights, U.S. Says," Philadelphia Bulletin, 28 January 1981, p. 8.
78. Jerome J. Shestack, "Let's Retain Human Rights," Philadelphia Enquirer, 30 December 1980, p. 11.
79. Robert M. Levine, "Brazil's Definition of Democracy", Current History, February 1979, p. 52.
80. Shestack, p. 11.
81. David Vidal, "Brazil Eases Political Repression," New York Times, 24 November 1978, p. 3.
82. Boletim Especial Numero 90. 20 February 1980.
83. Selcher, pp. 229-235.
84. Boletim Especial Numero 73. 9 February 1979.
85. "Pursuit of Human Rights Is Basic to U.S. Interests," Philadelphia Enquirer, 19 December 1980, p. 18.

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12. Eisner, Peter, "Brazil: No Thanks to Peace Corps," Philadelphia Enquirer, 27 November 1980.
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