


LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970s



AD-A100222

USAWC STUDY OF LEADERSHIP FOR THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER

- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- ABBREVIATED REPORT
- ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
- APPENDICES

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

IN REPLY REFER TO:

8 July 1971

STUDY ON LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970'S

PREFACE

This study on Leadership for the 1970's was conducted by the US Army War College at the direction of the Chief of Staff. The study directive was received from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel on 21 January 1971. All agencies and installations that were asked to contribute to the data base for the study gave this project their immediate and enthusiastic support.

Our study undertook an analysis of current leadership principles and techniques with a view to determining the type of leadership that would be most appropriate as the Army's personnel sustainment procedures change from reliance on periodic draft calls to reliance on volunteer accessions. This involved critical examination of the appropriateness of the Army's institutional concept of leadership. The data base for our study was developed across a wide base of Army leadership. The ultimate purpose of the Army--success in combat--remained the overriding consideration throughout the study.

In accordance with our guidance from General Westmoreland, we have attempted to produce a utilitarian report which can help commanders identify and diagnose leadership problems, and discover ways whereby leadership climate can be improved. We offer no panacea, nor do we ignore the fact that there are other ingredients than leadership in the formula for long-term effectiveness of the Army. The central theme of our study is that both the Army and the soldier must see themselves as parties to an informal contract. In this informal contract, the Army expects proficiency and disciplined response from the soldier. The soldier, on the other hand, expects fairness, worthwhile work, and sufficient pay from the Army. If each party to this informal contract meets the expectations of the other, a mutually satisfactory relationship will exist--a relationship which will create the loyalty and dedication which are the cornerstones of true discipline.

Franklin M. Davis, Jr.
FRANKLIN M. DAVIS, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

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In addition to the above, invaluable assistance was given the study group by the following civilian authorities in the field of leadership behavior and related areas:

Doctor David G. Bowers
Doctor Thomas O. Jacobs
Doctor Rensis M. Likert
Doctor Charles R. Moskos
Doctor Donald R. Penner
Doctor Ralph M. Stogdill
and others

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY--LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970's

Beginning in January 1971, the US Army War College, at the direction of General Westmoreland, conducted a study to determine the type of leadership that would be appropriate as the Army approached the zero-draft conditions of the Modern Volunteer Army.

Using a carefully selected research team composed of staff, faculty, and students with appropriate leadership experience and academic expertise, the US Army War College designed the study on the proposition that the type of leadership appropriate for the Modern Volunteer Army (or for today's Army, for that matter) would be leadership which, at all levels and in all processes, would recognize and honor the terms of the "informal contract" that comes into being between the Army and the individual when the professional soldier dedicates his life effort to an Army career. This difficult and idealistic commitment, on the part of the organization and the individual, would require each to know and attempt to fulfill the legitimate expectations of the other--the Army in terms of worthwhile work, a sufficiency of pay, and fair and honest treatment; and the individual in terms of task proficiency, disciplined response to direction, and full support of assigned missions. This reciprocity of professionalism was seen as the critical essential under those conditions where the long term effectiveness of the Army depended upon the existence of a satisfactory relationship between the Army as an organization and the professional soldier as an individual. Army leadership was viewed as the mediating influence--the context within which and by which the informal contract is supported or negated.

The 18-man research team, using a scientifically designed questionnaire and group interview techniques, collected data from 1,800 individuals, representing a broad base of Army leadership up to and including 8-10 percent of the Army's general officers. The data, analyzed quantitatively by computer and qualitatively by content analysis techniques, spoke significantly in terms of the expectations of the organization and the individual, represented respectively by the perspectives of superior and subordinate.

The findings show dramatically that the Army's time-honored Principles of Leadership are accepted overwhelmingly by leaders at all levels as appropriate for the coming decade. The data show further, however, that there are serious deficiencies in the application of the principles--deficiencies which, through the study findings, can be identified precisely by grade level, by perspective, and by specific kinds of leadership behavior; and which evidence unrecognized failures by one or both parties to meet the expectations of the informal contract. The same data, reciprocally, using satisfaction with Army leadership as a criterion, identify with identical precision the leadership behavior necessary to produce a condition wherein

the legitimate expectations of the organization and the individual are perceived as being fairly met--this condition being the essential prerequisite to a satisfactory relationship between the Army and the professional soldier.

A listing of abbreviated statements of findings and abbreviated statements of solution concepts follow:

ABBREVIATED STATEMENTS OF FINDINGS
OF USAWC LEADERSHIP STUDY

1. THE STUDY METHODOLOGY IS A RELIABLE DEVICE FOR MEASURING LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS AND DIAGNOSING PROBLEMS.
2. DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP VARIES SIGNIFICANTLY BY GRADE LEVEL (HIGHER GRADE, HIGHER SATISFACTION), VARIES ONLY SLIGHTLY BETWEEN COMBAT AND NONCOMBAT CONDITIONS, AND DOES NOT VARY BY RACIAL GROUP; *and*
3. IN GENERAL, SOLDIERS ARE SATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP IN BASIC TRAINING AND DISSATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP IN ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. (SOLDIERS ARE DISAPPOINTED IF HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE ARE NOT SET AND MAINTAINED.)
4. OUR LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES (AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT THEY EXPRESS) ARE VALID, AND APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1970'S.
5. THE PERCEPTION OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES VARIES AMONG GRADE LEVELS.
6. THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES IS DEFECTIVE IN SEVERAL RESPECTS WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY GRADE LEVELS AND PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SUBORDINATE, SELF) IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR.
7. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP IS THE FREQUENT MISPERCEPTION OF HOW WELL ONE'S OWN LEADERSHIP IS MEETING THE LEADERSHIP EXPECTATIONS OF SUPERIOR AND/OR SUBORDINATE (INDIVIDUALS CONSISTENTLY PERCEIVE THEIR OWN SHORTFALLS AS LESS THAN SUPERIORS OR SUBORDINATES PERCEIVE THEM TO BE).
8. CERTAIN ITEMS OF LEADER BEHAVIOR FOR EACH GRADE LEVEL HAVE HIGH POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN OVERALL LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS IN RETURN FOR A SMALL IMPROVEMENT IN THE PARTICULAR BEHAVIOR.
9. SEVERAL FACTORS WERE FOUND TO BE COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP:

- A. LEADERS' PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE AS IMPEDING THEIR ABILITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS.
 - B. DIVERSION OF SOLDIERS FROM PRIMARY DUTIES BY DETAILS AND LEVIES.
 - C. MISUSE OF SOLDIERS' TIME.
 - D. LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE WITH TIME OFF.
 - E. FEELING BY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND JUNIOR NCO'S WITH PRIMARILY VIETNAM EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED FOR PEACETIME LEADERSHIP.
 - F. APPARENTLY WIDE VARIATION IN THE STANDARDS BY WHICH GENERAL OFFICERS MEASURE LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES.
 - G. SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS (LACK OF COMMUNICATION, INATTENTION TO HUMAN NEEDS, ETC.) IN THE PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE CORROBORATING FINDINGS OF OTHER PERTINENT RECENT STUDIES OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION.
10. THE OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MVA CONCEPT WAS MODERATELY FAVORABLE ALTHOUGH THERE WERE WIDE VARIATIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN GRADE LEVELS.

ABBREVIATED STATEMENTS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS
OF USAWC LEADERSHIP STUDY

- 1. USE THE MAIN FEATURES OF THIS STUDY ON AN ARMY-WIDE SCALE TO PROVIDE:
 - A. THE INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH.
 - B. DIAGNOSTIC INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.
 - D. A BROADENED DATA BANK OF INFORMATION TO BE USED BY ARMY PLANNERS, EDUCATORS, AND RESEARCHERS.
- 2. MAKE WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED PORTIONS OF THIS STUDY AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING, BY LEVEL, DIAGNOSES OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.
- 3. CONDUCT SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE ATTITUDES, VALUES, AND CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP HELD BY OFFICERS AT O6 AND HIGHER GRADES.
- 4. REVISE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION CONCEPTS WITHIN THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO THIS SUBJECT ARE BEING EXPLOITED.

5. ESTABLISH AN EXTENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM OF ACADEMIC AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION FOR CAREER NCO'S.
6. BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM OF "COACHING" DESIGNED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN SUPERIOR AND SUBORDINATE.
7. PROVIDE STAFF MEMBERS (MILITARY) WHO ARE FORMALLY TRAINED IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS TO ALL ARMY SCHOOLS AND STAFF SECTIONS DEALING WITH THEORETICAL OR PRACTICAL LEADERSHIP EDUCATION OR TRAINING.
8. PRECLUDE EVOLUTION OF AN "ANTI-LEADERSHIP" SYNDROME BY ENSURING QUALITY CONTROL OF LEADERSHIP STUDY ACTIVITIES THROUGH CENTRALIZED COORDINATION OF FIELD SURVEY OPERATIONS.

The support for each finding and the rationale for each solution concept are explained in detail in the accompanying abbreviated report.

ABBREVIATED REPORT
LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970's

INTRODUCTION

In January of this year, General Westmoreland asked the Army War College to undertake a study of the validity of the Army's concept of leadership for the years ahead--particularly in light of the move toward a zero-draft environment. The Chief of Staff approved the study design in March. The major findings of the study were presented to the Chief of Staff on 3 June, and to the Secretary of the Army and the Army Policy Council on 16 June. This Abbreviated Report provides the highlights of the AWC Leadership Study--the methodology employed, the principal results obtained, and the action concepts whereby the results can be used to the benefit of Army leadership.

The study was conducted by a selected team of AWC students and faculty members. Over 60 students volunteered to assist in the project, and the 18 selected represented a wealth of enthusiastic talent in terms of recent practical leadership experience as well as education in the variety of academic disciplines specifically required for conduct of the study.

From the outset of the study effort, the team kept in close touch with elements of the Army which have a major continuing interest in the practical and theoretical study of leadership. The United States Military Academy, the Infantry School, and the Leadership Research Unit of the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) were among these agencies. Additionally, the study team sought the advice of civilian scientists recognized in the academic community as authorities in the investigation of leadership and related areas: D. R. Penner, R. M. Likert, R. M. Stogdill, D. G. Bowers, C. R. Moskos, T. O. Jacobs, and others.

As the study progressed and its potential utility became clear, close liaison was established and maintained with the CONARC Leadership Board, organized at Fort Bragg in May at the direction of General Westmoreland. The CONARC Leadership Board, headed by Brigadier General Henry C. Emerson, has incorporated the method and findings of the AWC study into its seminar program. This program will send carefully selected and trained leadership seminar teams to posts Army-wide during the summer and early fall of 1971, the idea being to ask Army leaders to reflect upon the specific problems and opportunities of leadership as the Army moves toward a zero-draft condition.

This Abbreviated Report, then, is designed to provide insight into a carefully controlled, scientific study of the concepts, problems, and opportunities of contemporary Army leadership--problems and opportunities whose precise delineation can be a major asset in the Army's continuing effort to provide the soldier with the best possible leadership.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE.

The research objective in the AWC study was to determine the type of leadership that would be most appropriate as the Army's personnel sustainment procedures changed from reliance on periodic draft calls to reliance on volunteer accessions. Inasmuch as Army leadership policy and practice have developed for almost 20 years in an environment where personnel sustainment was insured by conscription, there was good reason to believe that a "zero-draft" condition would present leadership challenges sufficiently different to warrant some modifications of existing leadership practices. Accordingly, a derivative objective of the AWC study was to assess the validity of the Army's institutional concept of leadership, reflected in the commonly accepted 11 Principles of Leadership, and, should this concept and these principles appear inappropriate or to some degree deficient to the leadership requirements of a zero-draft condition, to determine the concept and principles that would be appropriate. The ultimate purpose of the Army--success in combat--remained the single overriding consideration in both study design and execution.

CRITICAL QUESTIONS

- ★ WHAT KIND OF LEADERSHIP IS APPROPRIATE FOR MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY?
- ★ TO WHAT EXTENT WILL EXISTING PRINCIPLES MEET REQUIREMENTS?
- ★ WHAT GROUP OF LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES AND BEHAVIORS WILL MEET REQUIREMENTS?

METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

- CONDUCT STUDY ACROSS A WIDE BASE OF ARMY LEADERSHIP...
- EMPLOY THE METHODOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONALISM STUDY...
- PRODUCE A UTILITARIAN REPORT.

FIGURE 1. CRITICAL QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

GUIDANCE.

The Chief of Staff provided certain guidance for the conduct of the study. First, the study was to be conducted across a wide base of Army leadership. Second, the study was to employ the methodology of the Professionalism Study--an introspective study of Army officer values and standards directed by General Westmoreland and completed by the US Army War College in the summer of 1970--which used both objective and subjective methods of data generation. Finally, the study was to produce utilitarian results which could be applied readily to Army leadership without the requirement for additional studies or extensive interpretation of theoretical findings.

RESEARCH STRATEGY.

The overall design or research strategy for the study was built upon two principal concepts or ideas: the "informal contract" and "leadership climate." Both concepts have been and are the focus of extensive research and theory by those scientists engaged in the study of large organizations.

The Informal Contract. The idea of the informal contract addresses the relationship between the organization and the individual who is a member of that organization. The organization has certain needs or expectations of the individual. It expects, for example, job proficiency and disciplined response. The individual has expectations as well. He expects, for example, sufficiency of pay, worthwhile work, and respect for his dignity as an individual. Both parties must pay off on the contract--each in terms of what the other expects. If both parties participate fairly in stating and meeting the terms of the contract, then a satisfactory relationship will exist between the two. Without this satisfactory relationship, and without such external options as conscription or detention, the individual--the lifeblood of the organization--can be neither attracted nor retained. Thus the informal contract appears to be an especially pertinent factor as the Army moves to a zero-draft environment. The concept is by no means a new one, and it has always been a feature of Army leadership; its significance for leadership in the 1970's, however, is increased vastly by a zero-draft condition.

Leadership Climate. Army leadership can be viewed as the organizational mechanism which mediates the informal contract. Army leadership must represent both parties to the contract--the organization and the individual, the superior and the subordinate, the accomplishment of the mission and the welfare of the men. Army leadership, functioning in this sense throughout the entire organization and at all levels, must therefore be viewed in its entirety--all of its levels and all of the

processes which interconnect those levels: authority, communication, discipline, loyalty, direction, and dedication, to name a few. This view of leadership as a totality can be represented by the term "leadership climate," and it is within the context of this leadership climate that the informal contract is supported or negated.

Central Theme. By utilizing the two organizational concepts of informal contract and leadership climate, it was possible to derive a central theme or hypothesis which would serve as the basis for the detailed design of the study. This theme or hypothesis answered tentatively the primary research objective of the study and can be stated as follows:

THE LEADERSHIP MOST APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1970'S IS
THAT WHICH PRODUCES A TOTAL LEADERSHIP CLIMATE
CHARACTERIZED BY RECOGNITION AND FULFILLMENT OF
THE INFORMAL CONTRACT IN ORDER TO INSURE MISSION
ACCOMPLISHMENT OVER THE LONG TERM.

RESEARCH DESIGN.

To achieve the research objective, the study was designed to employ the organizational concepts just discussed as well as adhere to the guidance given by the Chief of Staff. An understanding of two of these design features is essential to understanding the findings of the study and the methodology employed.

Leadership Behavior. In treating the subject of leadership, the study utilized a more specific description of leadership than that represented by statements of the 11 principles. In the middle 1950's, some milestone academic research at Ohio State University succeeded in isolating and describing in detail those things that an individual does which constitute actual leadership behavior. The original research listed approximately 150 items of human activity that represented leadership behavior. Subsequent research validated these early findings, reduced the list to fewer items, and showed conclusively that, using the proper methods, it was possible to separate observable human behavior into leadership and nonleadership activities. The study was repeated and the results held across many different organizational environments: academic, military, industrial, and governmental. To provide a working description of leadership, and a means of representing the application of leadership principles, the USAWC team employed a list of 43 items of leadership behavior, derived from the research just discussed, and adapted to the military environment. (These items will be discussed in detail in a subsequent section.) This design feature reduced considerably the generality and subjectivity normally associated with the study of leadership and provided a commonly understood operational definition of leadership for collection of data and analysis of results.

Perspectives of Leadership. Considerable research establishes the fact that the impact and effectiveness of leadership vary greatly as a function of the perspective from which leadership is viewed. The company commander's view of the leadership of the platoon leader may differ markedly from that of the men of the platoon. And the platoon leader's view of his own leadership may differ even further. Each perspective has its own inherent bias. The superior is predisposed to look for results, for mission accomplishment. The subordinate, on the other hand, is particularly sensitive to leadership practices which affect, or appear to affect, his own welfare. And the leader himself, viewing his own leadership, has the natural human tendency to overlook or rationalize his own weaknesses and errors. These common, normal facts of human perception dictated that the study design employ a "tri-focal" view of leadership in order to obtain a complete and useful picture of leadership at any selected level. This tri-focal view, then, could provide a combined description and assessment of leadership from the viewpoints of three individuals: the individual responsible for the results of the leadership (the superior); the individual who was the recipient of the leadership process (the subordinate); and the individual who was actually applying the leadership process (the leader himself). In application, the results of this three dimension view would enable the leader to see himself as others see him. A moment's reflection will show that this tri-focal view also can give a valid representation of the two principal features of the Army's institutional concept of leadership: the accomplishment of the mission, and consideration of the welfare of the men. Further, this tri-focal view is essential to an objective study of the terms and execution of the informal contract previously discussed.

DATA BASE.

Documentary Research. Development of the data base for this study began with the initiation of a comprehensive survey of existing literature. This documentary research effort covered military publications, periodicals, and the literature of the pertinent academic disciplines. This effort continued throughout the duration of the study. The annotated bibliography (Annex A) contains a carefully selected list of documents, each of which is concisely summarized, and each of which contributed in some measure to the total study effort. Two of the references are of central importance both to this study and to the study of leadership in general: DA Pamphlet, 600-15, Leadership at Senior Levels of Command; and Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations, written by Dr. T. O. Jacobs of Fort Benning's Leadership Research Unit (HumRRO) and based upon an exhaustive survey of much of the leadership research of the past 25 years.

Field Survey. The second major input to the data base was the information collected by an 18-man field survey team. Members of this team visited 17 posts throughout CONUS and obtained both quantitative and qualitative data from a group of approximately 1800 individuals of all grade levels from private to general officer.




FIGURE 2. FIELD SURVEY: DATA COLLECTION

Data were obtained by two means: questionnaire and group interview. The questionnaire was carefully designed and pretested and was administered not by uncontrolled random questionnairing, but by team members

who personally explained the questionnaire to each respondent group, then remained on hand to answer questions as the individual completed the items. The questionnaire collected quantitative data in five major areas: demographic characteristics of the individual; relative importance of the principles of leadership; attitude toward the Modern Volunteer Army concept; satisfaction with Army leadership; and detailed description of leadership in the individual's last duty assignment. For this last major area, three different versions of the questionnaire were employed. All versions asked the same questions about leadership in the last assignment, but each of the three versions asked the respondent to assume one of three perspectives in describing leadership. Of the 1800 respondents, one-third answered questions regarding the leadership behavior of their immediate superior in their last assignment, one-third their immediate subordinate (neither the best nor the worst, but one they knew well), and one-third their own leadership in their last assignment. The data thus obtained provided the tri-focal view of leadership mentioned earlier.




FIGURE 3. FIELD SURVEY: QUESTIONNAIRE

Members of the survey team who had been trained in interview techniques conducted group interviews with approximately 450 of the individuals who completed the questionnaires, with each of the three perspectives being equally represented. These group interviews were "focused interviews" in that a common agenda was employed:

1. What are the leadership problems at your grade level?
2. What do you expect of the leadership of your immediate superiors? Your immediate subordinates? Your contemporaries and yourself?

In essence, the questionnaire provided quantitative data that could be studied by computer--by descriptive and analytical statistics. The interview, based upon the same research design, provided qualitative, subjective information which added additional meaning to the quantitative, statistical data.




FIGURE 4. FIELD SURVEY: GROUP INTERVIEWS

In addition to administering the leadership questionnaire and conducting group interviews, the field survey team conducted two secondary research projects: an investigation (interviews and observation) of the leadership climate within a TOE Army division; and an investigation (interviews) of the new soldier's perception of the informal contract.

Adequacy of the Data Base. The data obtained by the field survey team are broadly representative of the leadership of the Army, but with somewhat heavier representation than a purely random sample would provide of those who have demonstrated effective leadership. This "quality loading" comes about as a result of obtaining most of the data from individuals in the Army school system. The school environment is by no means representative of the Army's "real world," and in recognition of this, questionnaires and interviews were focused on leadership in the individual's assignment immediately prior to his entry into the school. Since previous assignments had been Army-wide, the geographic and organizational diversity of experience among the respondents can be considered sufficiently representative of the Army as a whole.

The sample size (approximately 1800) is relatively large compared to most previous academic and controlled research efforts in this area. The sample size is much more representative in the higher grade levels than in the lower enlisted grades. Subgroup or "cell" sizes are generally adequate for statistically significant sampling within the key demographic variables used in the analyses. A larger sample would, of course, allow finer discrimination as well as analysis based upon compound characteristics; however, the nature of the research objective did not require the extremes of sampling care needed in, say, such sensitive efforts as public opinion polling wherein the views of a minute but highly selected group may be extrapolated to depict the overall population.

The adequacy of the data base is supported by two prime factors: first, the high degree of internal consistency between the quantitative and qualitative results which were analyzed thoroughly but separately; and second, the favorable comments of respected professionals who have examined the data base in detail.

LEADERSHIP IN OVERALL CONTEXT.

There are of course other ingredients than leadership in the formula for long-term effectiveness of the Army. The missions assigned the Army; the resources allocated for national defense; the political, technological, and psychological factors at home and abroad--all influence operational capabilities of the Army. Optimum leadership is not sufficient to ensure mission attainment by troops who are ill-equipped in weaponry, or long divorced from popular support of their operational goals. On the other hand, immense resources of manpower, material, and national will can go for naught in the absence of the control, coordination, and consideration that are the hallmarks of effective leadership.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

1 **FINDING**

THE STUDY METHODOLOGY IS A
RELIABLE DEVICE FOR MEASURING
LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS AND
DIAGNOSING PROBLEMS.

DISCUSSION. The internal consistency of the study in terms of data complementarity, with quantitative and qualitative results affording similar insights after independent analyses, provides assurance that the study concepts and methods are sound. Competent academicians--statisticians and behavioral scientists--who have examined the design and findings have commented favorably on the theoretical background and the techniques of data manipulation.

Equally important in regard to eventual utility and acceptability of the study is the consistent mode of comparability between the study findings produced by rigorous analytical techniques and the intuitive judgments of experienced military professionals.

The study design permits duplication of the sampling and analysis techniques on an Army-wide scale. It also provides a convenient method for isolating problems unique to a particular location or major unit (preferably of division or larger size). The individuals who participated in the study were enthusiastic about their role as contributors to a program to improve leadership practices. Also, the participants indicated that the necessary self-appraisal and evaluative processes involved in completing the questionnaire and following the discussion agenda prompted both healthy introspection and a convenient review of leadership education.

The data base has great potential for further exploitation. Time has so far permitted analysis of only that portion of the data necessary to answer the major questions derived from the mission assigned to the study group. Many important demographic variables (level of education, age, branch of service, etc.) have not yet been used. Further, there are a number of promising statistical manipulations which have not yet been completed. (Several of these more detailed examinations will be in the final report, which is scheduled for publication in early fall of 1971.)

2 FINDING


DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP VARIES SIGNIFICANTLY BY GRADE LEVEL (HIGHER GRADE, HIGHER SATISFACTION), VARIES ONLY SLIGHTLY BETWEEN COMBAT AND NON-COMBAT, AND DOES NOT VARY BY RACIAL GROUP.

DISCUSSION. "Satisfaction with leadership" was used as a subjective overall assessment of individual leader effectiveness. (See page B-20 of Annex B, Sample Questionnaire--Evaluation of Subordinate Version.) It was employed as a criterion measure in order to examine patterns of leader behavior which resulted in perceptions of differing degrees of leader effectiveness. The level of satisfaction on a scale from "totally pleased in all respects" down to "totally disappointed in all respects" was determined by compilation of questionnaire results from the perspectives of subordinate, self, and superior.

Figure 5 represents overall satisfaction with leadership as expressed by the different grade levels in the study. Circled numbers are percentages. The top segments show percentages within the respective grade levels who indicated they were displeased to some degree; the bottom segment, those who were pleased to some degree; and the middle segment, those who were undecided. These percentages are the result of the summation of expressed satisfaction with the overall leadership of superior, self, and subordinate. (Effective leadership was defined in the study as that which was satisfactory to both the superior and the subordinate.)

The grade level subdivisions used in the diagram and throughout the study are: JR NCO: E-4 through E-6 with less than five years' service; SR NCO: E-6 with five or more years' service through E-9; JR CO GR: O-1; SR CO GR: O-2, O-3; JR FLD GR: O-4, O-5; SR FLD GR: O-6; GEN OFF: O-7 and higher.

SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP



Note: The top segment of each bar is "Disappointed." The middle segment is "Undecided." The bottom segment is "Pleased."

FIGURE 5. SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

The study design permits depiction of relative satisfaction by perspective (superior, self, subordinate) as well as by grade levels. As shown in the following figure (Figure 6) the Senior NCO is least satisfied with his subordinate's leadership, more satisfied with the leadership of his superiors, and most satisfied with his own leadership.

SR NCO'S SATISFACTION WITH LEADERSHIP




FIGURE 8. SENIOR NCO'S SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

The next figure (Figure 7) shows that there was only slight, although statistically significant, variation between degree of satisfaction in combat compared to satisfaction in noncombat situations. In general, the leader must perform slightly better in combat in order to maintain the same degree of satisfaction he

delivers in noncombat. These data were generated by asking those respondents who were describing performance in a noncombat situation to describe their level of satisfaction had the situation been combat.




FIGURE 7. VARIATIONS IN SATISFACTION WITH ARMY LEADERSHIP

As further illustrated by the preceding figure (Figure 7), the 124 blacks in the sample showed little variation from the overall sample in terms of their satisfaction with leadership. Blacks in general were slightly more pleased with leadership than were the participants in the overall sample population.

3 FINDING

IN GENERAL, SOLDIERS ARE SATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP
IN BASIC TRAINING AND DISSATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP
IN ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. (SOLDIERS ARE
DISAPPOINTED IF HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE
ARE NOT SET AND MAINTAINED.)

DISCUSSION. These data were obtained primarily through the group discussions held at three basic training centers (Fort Ord, Fort Jackson, Fort McClellan) and at other posts visited. Responses regarding this aspect of the Army's meeting the expectations of the informal contract (in BCT) and perceived failure to meet the terms of the informal contract (in AIT) were similar at all posts. Drill sergeants were generally thought to be competent and fair. However, the leaders in AIT were frequently seen as impersonal and lax, neither setting nor maintaining sufficiently high standards.

4 FINDING

OUR LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES (AND THE INSTI-
TUTIONAL CONCEPT THEY EXPRESS) ARE VALID,
AND APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1970'S.

DISCUSSION. This finding is a major finding of the study. Three factors establish the validity and acceptability of the Army's time-honored "Principles of Leadership." First, the study group found that

the Principles of Leadership were fundamental to leadership instruction across all Army schools charged with a leadership development mission. Further, the other services, and at least four other nations, use either the Army's principles or a close approximation thereof in their own leadership instruction. Second, the participants in the study, when asked to select the most and least important of the principles, were reluctant to put any principles in the latter category--it was difficult for them to consider any principle as "least important."

Final support for the validity of the principles comes from a free response questionnaire item which asked for proposed changes to the list of principles. Content analyses of this questionnaire item revealed that, of the 1800 respondents, only two or three individuals recommended any substantial change. The vast majority commented that the principles in their present form were sound and appropriate, and that leadership deficiencies derived not from the principles, but from the manner in which these principles were applied.

The principles vary in terms of their perceived relative importance. Figure 8 below shows the frequency with which each principle was listed




FIGURE 8. PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP--MOST AND LEAST IMPORTANT

as "most important" and "least important" by the total group of 1800 respondents. From this analysis, based on the views of a cross-section of Army leadership at all levels, the most important principle is "Be Technically and Tactically Proficient"; least important is "Employ Your Command in Accordance With Its Capabilities." When the data are analyzed by grade level, a different picture emerges and is the basis for another major finding.

5 FINDING

THE PERCEPTION OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES VARIES AMONG GRADE LEVELS.

DISCUSSION. The significance of this finding is that, even at the level of leadership generality represented by the Principles of Leadership, each level has a different view of the requirements of leadership. To look at the data another way, this finding says that the pattern of importance assigned among the principles by a given grade level defines, in a sense, how that grade level views the leadership situation. In Figure 9, for example, when the relative importance of a given principle

DEVELOP A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AMONG SUBORDINATES




FIGURE 9. IMPORTANCE OF A PRINCIPLE BY GRADE LEVEL

is analyzed by grade level, the principle "Develop a Sense of Responsibility Among Subordinates" receives the highest number of "least important" ratings from the Senior NCO's. At successively higher grade levels, the importance increases, until at general officer level, this principle is obviously among those considered most important by leaders at that level.

This variation in perceived relative importance of principles by different grade levels is related closely to attempts in the past to distinguish among processes of leadership, commandership, and generalship. The data of the present study draw this distinction clearly and more precisely in terms of the patterns of relative importance assigned by each grade level. Figure 10, for example, illustrates the relative importance of the Principles of Leadership as seen by the Senior NCO. This pattern will differ for each grade level.




FIGURE 10. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLES: SENIOR NCO

6
FINDING

THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES
IS DEFECTIVE IN SEVERAL RESPECTS WHICH
HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY GRADE LEVELS AND
PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SUBORDINATE, SELF)
IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR.

DISCUSSION. The data presented thus far support the idea that, while the relative importance of the leadership principles may vary, they are accepted by Army leadership as valid and appropriate. The problems of leadership appear to lie not in the principles themselves, but rather in the application of these principles.

The study design can identify defective application with considerable precision. It can identify defects by specific grade level. It can identify also defects by perspective, i.e., the degree to which the defect is evident to superior, subordinate, or the leader himself. And finally, the study design can identify defects in application not in terms of generalities of leadership, but rather in terms of specific items of leadership behavior.

In the middle 1950's, scientists at Ohio State University working for the Office of Naval Research succeeded in isolating a list of human activities which, in a sense, represented or described relatively pure leadership behavior. This list distinguished between those things that a man does that are leadership activities and those things that are unrelated to leadership. These findings are generally regarded as a milestone in leadership research because they gave definition in an area which previously had been highly subjective. Extensive follow-on research established the validity of these items of leadership behavior. Selected items of leadership behavior from the Ohio State research were adapted to the military environment and used in the USAWC study as an operational definition of leadership which, for purposes of the study, represents the application of leadership principles.

The specific items of leadership behavior and their mode of use in the data collection effort are shown in the questionnaire at Annex B. Examples of the list of 43 items are:

- He Was Technically Competent to Perform His Duties.

- He Was Approachable.
- He Knew His Men and Their Capabilities.
- He Let the Members of His Unit Know What Was Expected of Them.
- He Rewarded Individuals For a Job Well Done.

The questionnaire asked the respondent three questions about each of the 43 items of leadership behavior: how often the behavior occurred; how often it should have occurred; and how important it was to the respondent. A numerical response scale for each of these questions permitted the respondent to record his answers quantitatively. Figure 11 illustrates how one of these items appeared in the questionnaire.

► "HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES"

<u>HOW OFTEN DID HE?</u>		<u>HOW OFTEN SHOULD HE HAVE?</u>		<u>HOW IMPORTANT WAS THIS TO YOU?</u>	
A GREAT DEAL	7	A GREAT DEAL	7	CRITICAL	7
USUALLY	6	USUALLY	6	VERY IMPORTANT	6
MOST OF THE TIME	5	MOST OF THE TIME	5	IMPORTANT	5
NOW AND THEN	4	NOW AND THEN	4	SOMETIMES IMPORTANT	4
HARDLY EVER	3	HARDLY EVER	3	SELDOM IMPORTANT	3
RARELY	2	RARELY	2	RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT	2
NOT EVER	1	NOT EVER	1	UNIMPORTANT	1

FIGURE 11. QUESTION DESIGN

To illustrate the nature of the information generated by this particular question design, assume that the respondent is answering that version of the questionnaire which asks questions about the leadership behavior of the respondent's immediate superior in the

respondent's last assignment. In describing this behavior, the respondent notes that his superior communicated effectively with his subordinates "most of the time" (5). However, the respondent feels that his superior should have done this even more--he should have done it "a great deal" (7). At this point, the question has identified a performance shortfall; in this case, a performance shortfall in the degree to which the superior is not meeting the expectations of the subordinate with regard to one particular item of leadership behavior.

It is logically necessary to also consider the relative importance of the shortfall. A small shortfall with respect to adherence to ethical standards, for example, could be of far greater significance to the respondent than a much larger shortfall with respect to handling administrative details. The third scale for each item of leadership behavior (the importance scale in Figure 11) was designed to measure this relative importance dimension. By first determining performance shortfall, then multiplying this by the importance score, a "weighted" performance shortfall value was obtained. Since there were three versions of the questionnaire (superior, subordinate, and self descriptions), it was possible to compute a weighted performance shortfall for each item of leadership behavior from each of three perspectives: the leader as seen by his immediate subordinate; as seen by his immediate superior; and as seen by himself.

Data thus organized, and then grouped by grade level, gave a unique tri-dimensional or tri-focal view of leadership as seen simultaneously by the leader's superior, subordinate, and by the leader himself (Figure 12).

● DIAGNOSTIC DESIGN

● BY PERSPECTIVE




FIGURE 12. TRI-FOCAL VIEW OF LEADERSHIP

This diagnostic design made it possible to determine the degree to which leadership at any selected level was or was not meeting the expectations of the three people most closely involved with the leadership process, i.e., the leader's superior (with responsibility for results); the leader's subordinate (as the recipient of the leader's actual leadership); and the leader himself (with the capability of introspection). When the weighted performance shortfalls as seen from each of the three perspectives are combined or added together, the result can be expressed numerically (in total "units of weighted shortfall") or graphically to show the degree to which any given level of leadership is not meeting the expectations of superiors, subordinates, and self. This computation can be made for any of the 43 items of leadership behavior and for any of the six grade levels used in the study.

Figure 13 shows, numerically and graphically, the degree to which a selected level (the Senior NCO in this case) is not meeting the combined expectations of superiors, subordinates, and self with respect to

➤ "HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES"




FIGURE 13. PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: ONE ITEM OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

one of 43 items of leadership behavior--in this example, effective communication with subordinates. A zero value in total performance shortfall would represent that hypothetical condition where all leaders at a given

level were meeting completely the expectations of superiors, subordinates, and self. Since this condition is highly improbable, there will be, almost without exception, some degree of performance shortfall for any given leadership behavior at any given grade level.

The identification of performance shortfall is only part of the diagnostic problem. Another and major facet of the overall problem of defects in the application of leadership principles is the degree to which performance shortfall is recognized by the leader himself. Examination of the data shows that, true to human nature, leaders deceive themselves with respect to their own leadership effectiveness.

7 **FINDING**

A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP IS THE FREQUENT MISPERCEPTION OF HOW WELL ONE'S OWN LEADERSHIP IS MEETING THE LEADERSHIP EXPECTATIONS OF SUPERIOR AND/OR SUBORDINATE (INDIVIDUALS CONSISTENTLY PERCEIVE THEIR OWN SHORTFALLS AS LESS THAN SUPERIORS OR SUBORDINATES PERCEIVE THEM TO BE).

DISCUSSION. The same data used to derive perceived performance shortfall can also be used, with a different statistical manipulation, to determine the degree to which leaders at a given level are unaware that they are not meeting the expectations of superior and subordinate.

Study of the data from the self-description version of the questionnaire shows that leaders at all levels recognize their own performance shortfalls to some degree for every item of leadership behavior. In virtually all cases, however, they see their own performance shortfall as less than that of their superiors and subordinates. There is a difference between the leader's perception of his own performance shortfall and his immediate superior's perception. There is also a difference between the leader's perception of his own shortfall and his immediate subordinate's perception of that shortfall. These two difference scores, added together, permit quantitative expression of the degree to which the leader is unaware of his own performance shortfalls as seen by his

superiors and subordinates. This datum can be termed a perception shortfall, or an "index of self-delusion." In terms of practical utility, this index gives the leader the opportunity to see himself as others see him--the "others" being the two parties closest to and most concerned with his leadership, i.e., his immediate superior and immediate subordinate.

As was the case with performance shortfall, perception shortfall can be expressed quantitatively or graphically. Figure 14 illustrates perception shortfall, and shows how measures of both performance and perception shortfall can be combined using a common zero value baseline.

➤ "HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES"




FIGURE 14. PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: ONE ITEM OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

The bar in Figure 14, then, is a composite depiction of defects in the application of leadership principles--for a given grade level (Senior NCO), and for a given item of leadership behavior. The portion of the bar to the right of the zero value baseline shows the degree to which the leader at this level is not meeting the expectations of superior,

subordinate, and self. The portion to the left of the baseline shows the degree to which the leader is unaware that he is not meeting these leadership expectations.

At this point, the theoretical concept of leadership climate can be brought to bear to aid in the diagnostic task. When the data are organized so that performance and perception shortfalls are computed for all six grade levels, then plotted on a common zero baseline, interlevel comparisons can be made for any given item of leadership behavior.

Figure 15 shows how all levels compare with respect to performance and perception shortfalls on one item of leadership behavior. The bar for the Senior NCO in this figure is the same as that described in the




FIGURE 15. PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: ALL GRADE LEVELS

previous illustration. Examination of the data depicted in Figure 15 shows that, for this item of leadership behavior, performance shortfall is greatest for the Senior NCO level; least for the Senior Field Grade level. Perception shortfall is greatest for the Senior NCO level; least for the Junior Company Grade level. In a composite sense, the data would indicate that the greatest problem in the application of leadership

principles with respect to this particular item of leadership behavior lies at the Senior NCO level.

The dashed, vertical lines in Figure 15 have been added to provide further diagnostic assistance. These lines are control lines. When they intersect a horizontal bar, they identify the largest 10 percent of performance shortfalls and the largest 10 percent of perception shortfalls--considering all grade levels and all items of leadership behavior. The control lines provide a means for determining which shortfalls are at a "critical" stage. By the same token, an additional set of control lines could be computed and plotted to identify the 10% least critical shortfalls. (The selection of 10% as a level of criticality is discretionary, and is used here only for illustration.)

The figures which follow (Figures 16 through 20) show interlevel comparisons on a number of items of leadership behavior, and illustrate a variety of combinations of performance and perception shortfalls at different grade levels. The data base includes similar graphic displays for all 43 items of leadership behavior. Partial interpretations of the figures used for illustration are outlined in subsequent paragraphs to indicate the type of information that can be obtained from these interlevel comparisons.




FIGURE 16. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: AWARENESS OF MORALE

➤ HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES
EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES




FIGURE 17. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: FREEDOM TO FAIL

➤ HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT
MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR




FIGURE 18. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: LOYALTY TO SUBORDINATE

➤ HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND




FIGURE 19. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: EASY TO UNDERSTAND

➤ HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT




FIGURE 20. INTER-LEVEL COMPARISON: OVERLY AMBITIOUS BEHAVIOR

• Figure 16. Three grade levels at a critical state in terms of not meeting expectations of superiors and subordinates for this item of behavior. The three grade levels are those normally in closest contact with the individual soldier. One of the three grade levels is critically unaware of its own problem in this area.

• Figure 17. One critical problem in awareness. First Lieutenants and Captains have the least problem of all levels on this item, in terms of both performance and perception shortfall. (This relatively "good" condition of Senior Company Grade leadership is found in most of the 43 interlevel comparisons.)

• Figure 18. One grade level in much better shape than the others. Junior NCO's and Colonels critically unaware that they are not standing up for their subordinates to the degree expected by their subordinates and combined.

• Figure 19. One grade level falling critically short in meeting expectations of superiors and subordinates. Could illustrate either a communication problem between 2d Lieutenant and Senior NCO, or may reflect the 2d Lieutenant's problems in becoming adjusted to the Army. All levels relatively well aware that they are not as easy to understand as their superiors and subordinates expect them to be.

• Figure 20. Majors and Lieutenant Colonels demonstrate overly ambitious behavior far more than their superiors and subordinates think they should. Majors and Lieutenant Colonels have a greater problem than any other level on this negative item of leadership behavior--in terms of negative performance as well as awareness of how superiors and subordinates view this performance. Could be a graphic illustration of "ticket-punching" syndrome.

The data used to compute and plot the interlevel comparisons can be manipulated in a different manner to provide a comprehensive diagnosis of the leadership problems at any selected level of leadership. This mode of data organization depicts, for a given grade level, performance and perception shortfalls (representing defects in the application of leadership principles) for each of the 43 items of leadership behavior. Figure 21 on the following page illustrates this particular diagnostic capability.

In Figure 21, the selected grade level is the Junior NCO. Performance and perception shortfalls for each of the 43 items of leadership behavior can be computed and plotted as shown by the heavy bars. Figure 21, for purposes of illustration, includes only seven of the 43 items. Vertical control lines, discussed earlier, have been omitted for clarity. The items shown are rank-ordered in terms of "improvement opportunity," which will be explained in a subsequent section.

PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP JR NCO (E-4-6)




FIGURE 21. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: JR. NCO

Some of the problems illustrated in Figure 21 might be termed "simple," others "compound." Item 2, for example, shows considerable shortfall in meeting expectations (right side of bar), but the Junior NCO's are relatively well aware of this (left side of bar). They recognize that they are not meeting expectations, and in this regard, the problem is comparatively simple. A compound problem is illustrated by items 1 and 6. In these instances, there is considerable shortfall in meeting expectations, plus considerable unawareness that this shortfall exists. These data suggest, then, that in helping the Junior NCO improve his leadership in these two illustrative items of leadership behavior, efforts to teach him to communicate better or to be more considerate of others will be of limited value unless he is first made aware that he has significant leadership difficulties in these two areas.

Figure 21, and the figures which follow (Figures 22 through 26) depict the extent and complexity of the first seven leadership problems for each of the grade levels used in the study.

PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP **SR NCO (E-6-9)**




FIGURE 22. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: SR. NCO




FIGURE 23. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: JR. CO GRADE

SR CO GR (0-2,3)

(ARRANGED IN ORDER
OF IMPROVEMENT
OPPORTUNITY)
↓




FIGURE 24. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: SR. CO GRADE

JR FLD GR (0-4,5)

(ARRANGED IN ORDER
OF IMPROVEMENT
OPPORTUNITY)
↓




FIGURE 25. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: JR. FLD GRADE

SR FLD GR (0-6)




FIGURE 26. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: SR. FLD GRADE

Comparison of these figures shows that the items of leadership behavior listed appear in a different rank-order for each grade level. This phenomenon is explained in the next major finding.

8
FINDING

CERTAIN ITEMS OF LEADER BEHAVIOR FOR EACH GRADE LEVEL HAVE HIGH POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN OVERALL LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS IN RETURN FOR A SMALL IMPROVEMENT IN THE PARTICULAR BEHAVIOR.

DISCUSSION. Findings 6 and 7 illustrated the diagnostic capability of the study design. By using the same raw data with different statistical manipulations, then combining the results with measures of satisfaction with leadership, the prescriptive capability of the study design can be demonstrated.

For purposes of the present study, effective leadership at a given level is operationally defined as leadership which is simultaneously satisfactory to both superior and subordinate. As discussed under a previous finding, the questionnaire generated data which provided measures of satisfaction with leadership. Finding 8 is derived from the results of a statistical analysis procedure (linear regression analysis) which examined the relationship between two factors or variables: the items of leadership behavior, and satisfaction with leadership.

In essence, this statistical examination shows that satisfaction with leadership is affected more by certain items of leadership behavior than by others. Viewed positively, this says that small improvements in some items of leadership behavior will produce far more satisfaction with leadership (in the eyes of both superiors and subordinates) than will improvements in other items. When these more sensitive, more powerful items of leadership behavior are identified, they represent opportunities for improvement of leadership. The analytical procedure identifies these opportunities, and provides the information necessary to arrange them in rank-order, beginning with the item of leadership behavior which offers the greatest opportunity for increasing satisfaction with leadership. Figure 27 on the following page illustrates this prescriptive capability.

The overall ranking in the left-hand column of Figure 27 shows the 10 most "powerful" items of leadership behavior in terms of the opportunity they offer for increasing superior and subordinate satisfaction with leadership. The relation between the Principles of Leadership and the 43 items of leadership behavior (the items hypothetically representing the application of the principles) is evident in the comparison of the most important principle (discussed previously under Finding 4) and the most "powerful" item of leadership behavior, shown in Figure 27.

The overall ranking of opportunity is computed from the data of all 1800 respondents, without regard to grade level. Finding 5 established that the relative importance of principles of leadership varies by grade level. The same is true of the relative opportunities offered by the items of leadership behavior. The right hand columns of Figure 27 show the improvement opportunity rank-order positions when the data are analyzed by grade level. The item that is number 1 (i.e., offers greatest opportunity for leadership improvement) for leaders overall is number 2 for the Junior NCO, 2 for the Senior NCO, 6 for the Junior Company Grade, and so on. (The procedure for determining these rank-order positions is based upon 5 separate statistical analyses--rank-order positions for all grade levels combined will not "average out" to equal the overall ranking.)

OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT

OVERALL RANKING ↓		JR NCO	SR NCO	JR CO GR	SR CO GR	JR FLD GR	SR FLD GR
1	HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES	2	2	6	8	3	2
2	HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND	4	5	7	2	4	12
3	HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES	1	1	24	1	5	9
4	HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES	16	8	1	5	10	5
5	HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER	3	3	32	4	1	8
6	HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS	12	16	2	12	6	4
7	HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY	10	12	4	6	8	16
8	HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE	25	14	9	11	2	1
9	HE WAS APPROACHABLE	14	4	16	14	18	3
10	HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES	11	7	20	19	9	6

FIGURE 27. IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES: ALL GRADE LEVELS

In terms of practical utility, the variation in rank-order positions by grade level permits the establishment of priorities in efforts to improve leadership--and the priorities can be "tailored" to fit each grade level. Figure 27 includes only those items of leadership behavior which were in the top 10 in terms of improvement opportunities for all grade levels combined. The data base for the study can provide the improvement opportunity rank-order for all 43 items of leadership behavior for each grade level.

SEVERAL FACTORS WERE FOUND TO BE COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP:

9
FINDING

- A. LEADERS' PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE AS IMPEDING THEIR ABILITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS.
- B. DIVERSION OF SOLDIERS FROM PRIMARY DUTIES BY DETAILS AND LEVIES.
- C. MISUSE OF SOLDIERS' TIME.
- D. LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE WITH TIME OFF.
- E. FEELING BY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND JUNIOR NCO'S WITH PRIMARILY VIETNAM EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED FOR PEACETIME LEADERSHIP.
- F. APPARENTLY WIDE VARIATION IN THE STANDARDS BY WHICH GENERAL OFFICERS MEASURE LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES.
- G. SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS (LACK OF COMMUNICATION, INATTENTION TO HUMAN NEEDS, ETC.) IN THE PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE CORROBORATING FINDINGS OF OTHER PERTINENT RECENT STUDIES OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

DISCUSSION. This finding presents recurring themes derived from the qualitative data (interviews). The qualitative data analyzed consisted of the detailed notes of the field survey teams, the recorded debriefings of field survey team members (audiotape: 20-25 hours), and the recorded interviews with the general officers who participated in the study (audiotape: 20-25 hours). The data were analyzed by various content analysis procedures over a three-week period. The themes thus derived represent a condensation of the composite replies of leaders at all grade levels to the common interview agenda:

- What are the leadership problems at your particular level?
- What sort of leadership behavior do you expect from your immediate superiors? Your immediate subordinates? Your contemporaries and yourself?

The themes represent factors of the overall organizational climate which make it difficult to apply correctly the principles of leadership, irrespective of the leader's effectiveness. The factors are seen, at this time at least, as negative aspects of the "system." Amplifying comment for each of these factors is provided in the paragraphs which follow.

A. LEADERS' PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE AS IMPEDING THEIR ABILITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS. Particularly at the lower enlisted grade levels, there was strong and pervasive animosity toward what some individuals referred to as "those long-haired junior JAG officers." Leaders at company commander level felt that their range of options for handling leadership problems was restricted severely by current developments in the application of military justice. Many NCO's saw this condition as a lack of downward loyalty by the chain of command.

B. DIVERSION OF SOLDIERS FROM PRIMARY DUTIES BY DETAILS AND LEVIES. This historical source of complaint by leaders at many echelons further compounds the already epidemic problems created by personnel turbulence.

C. MISUSE OF SOLDIERS' TIME. The lower grade levels are apparently far more sensitive to the use and misuse of their time than is commonly realized by leaders at all echelons. It is in regard to this item that many young soldiers first see the organization beginning to default on the terms of the informal contract. An irritant of perhaps unrecognized importance, the misuse of soldier's time, particularly in Advanced Individual Training, exacts a heavy price in terms of satisfaction with Army leadership.

D. LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE WITH TIME OFF. NCO's, in particular, felt that if they were to be held responsible for "getting the job done," then, reciprocally, they should be trusted with the authority to control this simple reward. At all levels, "a little time off" and "a pat on the back now and then" were seen as the best rewards that a superior could give--overall, far more significant than awards, letters, plaques, office ceremonies, and the like.

E. FEELING BY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND JUNIOR NCO'S WITH PRIMARILY VIETNAM EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED FOR PEACETIME LEADERSHIP. The junior officers and NCO's, trained for the Vietnam War, recognized that leadership in a peacetime, garrison situation was more complex than in combat. Many wanted (and expected) the Army to help them become better leaders.

F. APPARENTLY WIDE VARIATION IN THE STANDARDS BY WHICH GENERAL OFFICERS MEASURE LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES. In view of the visibility and strong downward influence exerted by those at the upper echelons, this factor affects the entire leadership climate of the Army since it impacts directly on the organization's formal and informal systems of reward and punishment.

G. SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS (LACK OF COMMUNICATION, INATTENTION TO HUMAN NEEDS, ETC.) IN THE PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE CORROBORATING FINDINGS OF OTHER PERTINENT RECENT STUDIES OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION. Almost without fail, when professionals talk about professionalism, there is the recurring theme of the "ambitious, transitory commander--marginally skilled in

the complexities of his duties--engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates." This recurring theme was brought to light more than a year ago in a study of officer values. Despite concerted efforts to remedy much of the non-professionalism illustrated by the theme, the theme persists. This cautions patience, and illustrates the snail pace of organizational change when that change affects the attitudes, values, and standards of the members of the organization.

10

FINDING

THE OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA CONCEPT WAS
MODERATELY FAVORABLE ALTHOUGH THERE WERE
WIDE VARIATIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN GRADE
LEVELS.

DISCUSSION. This finding was the result of ancillary research conducted as part of the overall USAWC Leadership Study. Since "Leadership for the 1970's" could be equated with Leadership for the Modern Volunteer Army, interpretation of data and implementation of proposals might be offset badly if the respondents held a strongly biased overall attitude toward the Modern Volunteer Army concept.

A group of questionnaire items was designed to examine the respondent's attitude toward the concept (Part V, Annex B). To preclude contamination of the leadership data, the MVA questions were administered separately, after the respondent had completed all other parts of the questionnaire. The principal result of the analysis of the MVA questions is shown in Figure 28 on the following page.

Figure 28 depicts overall attitude toward the MVA concept among all 1800 respondents. The figures in circles are percentages. The question shown is essentially the same as the primary MVA item in the questionnaire. Approximately three-quarters of the respondents approved the concept; one-quarter disapproved. The question design permitted further analysis of the intensity of approval or disapproval.




FIGURE 28. OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA

Since grade level had proven to be a major variable in other analyses, its effect on overall attitude toward the MVA concept was examined. The data appear in Figure 29 on the following page. In general, they show that within NCO and officer categories, the higher the grade level, the less the approval of the concept. The exception to this general rule is the Senior Field Grade level (Colonel). Although the data in this case were not examined in detail, a

tentative conclusion regarding this grade level's relatively greater approval is that it is an effect of leadership climate, i.e., it might be the result of an influence process moving downward from the upper echelons.

HOW DO YOU PERSONALLY FEEL ABOUT THE MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY IDEA?




FIGURE 29. ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA: BY GRADE LEVEL

Examination of the quantitative MVA data and the interview content indicates that attitudes toward the MVA did not contaminate the leadership data (the subject came up only infrequently in the leadership discussions). Depending upon the method used, implementation of proposals resulting from this study should encounter "normal" organizational resistance to change in accordance with the general proposition: "the higher the grade, the greater the resistance."

FINDINGS--SUMMARY DATA TABLES

The following tables, extracted from the data base, provide additional diagnostic and prescriptive information related to Findings 6, 7, and 8.

GRADE LEVEL SUMMARIES (Tables 1-6). These tables present the highlights of diagnostic and prescriptive information for each grade level. They list (in rank-order) the first five items of leadership behavior in various functional categorizations used in the study.

RANK-ORDERINGS OF ITEMS OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR (Tables 7-9). Tables 7-9 list the rank-orders for all 43 items of leadership behavior in terms of performance shortfall, perception shortfall, and opportunities for improvement. Tables are organized to present the rank-orders for all respondents combined, as well as the rank-orders for each grade level. Asterisks indicate the first five items in each rank-ordering.

JUNIOR NCO LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Was Selfish.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Resisted Changes In Ways of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.
He Was Thoughtful And Considerate Of Others.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Treated People In An Impersonal Manner--Like Cogs In A Machine.
He Failed To Show An Appreciation For Priorities Of Work.
He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All
Circumstances.
He Stood Up For His Subordinates Even Though It Made Him Unpopular
With His Superior.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Stifled The Initiative Of His Subordinates.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Hesitated To Take Action In The Absence Of Instruction.

TABLE 2

SENIOR NCO LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Was Approachable.
He Was Easy To Understand.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Stifled The Initiative Of His Subordinates.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Demanded Results On Time Without Considering The Capabilities
And Welfare Of His Unit.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Fought The Problem.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Counseled, Trained, and Developed His Subordinates.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All
Circumstances.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Was Selfish.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Fought The Problem.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Was Easy To Understand.

JUNIOR COMPANY GRADE LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.
He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Distorted Reports To Make His Unit Look Better.
He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Was Selfish.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Saw That Subordinates Had The Materials They Needed To Work With.
He Expressed Appreciation When A Subordinate Did A Good Job.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.
He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Was Easy To Understand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Fought The Problem.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All
Circumstances.
He Counseled, Trained, And Developed His Subordinates.
He Failed To Show An Appreciation For Priorities Of Work.
He Set High Standards Of Performance.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.

TABLE 4

SENIOR COMPANY GRADE LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL
PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP
BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Draw A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE
SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Draw A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All Circumstances.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Treated People In An Impersonal Manner--Like Cogs In A Machine.
He Was Approachable.
He Expressed Appreciation When A Subordinate Did A Good Job.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Sought Additional And More Important Responsibilities.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Fought The Problem.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.

TABLE 5
JUNIOR FIELD GRADE LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL
PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP
BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Set High Standards Of Performance.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE
SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Was Easy To Understand.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Fought The Problem.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could To Make It High.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Was Willing To Support His Subordinates Even When They Made Mistakes.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Sought Additional And More Important Responsibilities.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.

TABLE 6
SENIOR FIELD GRADE LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL
PERCEPTION OF QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP
BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Set High Standards Of Performance.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Was Approachable.
He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Fought The Problem.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE
SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Was Easy To Understand.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could
To Make It High.
He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT
BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Was Willing To Make Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Hesitated To Take Action In The Absence Of Instruction.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Stood Up For His Subordinates Even Though It Made him Unpopular
With His Superior.
He Counseled, Trained, And Developed His Subordinates.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Was Willing To Support His Subordinates Even When They Made Mistakes.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Was Willing To Make Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Fought The Problem.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.

TABLE 7
STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE)
AMONG 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR O1	SR CO GR O2,3	JR FLD GR O4,5	SR FLD GR O6
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	1*	2*	1*	1*	5*	6	4*
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	2*	12	3*	2	1*	3*	3*
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	3*	1*	2*	4*	6	8	17
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	4*	3*	8	10	9	7	6
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	5*	11	24	5*	2*	1*	1*
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	6	5*	5*	3*	5*	13	11
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	7	19	6	12	4*	2*	2*
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	7	10	11	13	3*	4*	7
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	9	16	10	14	8	5*	5*
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	10	15	9	7	12	12	10
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	11	8	4*	9	13	9	32
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND B.D., UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	12	7	7	6	16	21	19
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	13	6	27	17	10	14	13
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	14	9	16	15	11	20	20
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	15	28	13	8	14	16	15
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.	16	4*	14	18	18	22	21
HE WAS SELFISH.	17	17	23	11	21	19	9
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	17	31	21	20	17	10	16
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	19	14	12	22	15	35	31
HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	20	23	32	24	20	18	8
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	21	13	28	10	25	17	27
HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	22	20	17	21	22	32	33

TABLE 7 (Continued)

		JR NCOs <u>E4,5,6</u>	SR NCOs <u>E6,7,8,9</u>	JR CO GR <u>01</u>	SR CO GR <u>02,3</u>	JR FLD GR <u>04,5</u>	SR FLD GR <u>06</u>
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	23	26	15	23	19	29	24
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	24	18	18	19	24	28	29
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	25	21	29	25	32	23	12
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	26	35	31	28	26	15	14
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	27	22	26	26	29	26	25
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	28	36	38	30	28	11	18
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	29	30	22	34	27	27	28
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	30	32	36	29	23	31	22
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	31	27	30	32	37	24	23
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	32	25	39	31	30	30	34
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTION.	33	34	20	27	31	37	43
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	34	24	19	33	33	42	42
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	35	37	37	36	36	36	26
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	36	38	25	38	34	35	39
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	37	42	40	35	33	38	35
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	38	33	34	43	42	34	37
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	39	39	33	39	40	33	40
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	40	29	42	40	38	41	36
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	41	40	35	41	39	40	41
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	42	41	43	37	43	43	30
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	43	43	41	42	41	39	38

TABLE 8
STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)
AMONG 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS

	ALL	JR NCOS R4,5,6	SR NCOS R6,7,8,9	JR CO GR Q1	SR CO GR Q2,3	JR FLD GR Q4,5	SR FLD GR Q6
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	1*	3*	3*	1*	1*	10	17
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	2*	5*	9	5*	24	1*	5*
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	3*	32	2*	6	2*	9	3*
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	4*	22	4*	8	8	2*	10
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	5*	33	1*	2*	10	12	2*
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	6	15	8	12	12	21	9
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	7	4*	31	13	28	6	1*
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	8	7	25	32	6	1*	13
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	9	9	24	30	4*	12	6
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	10	15	10	18	14	13	16
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	11	1*	30	26	3*	22	7
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	12	21	15	10	38	5*	4*
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	13	19	13	4*	16	31	12
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	14	10	27	15	5*	18	21
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	15	11	11	22	11	35	11
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	16	30	5*	25	9	26	14
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	17	14	6	39	19	15	20
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	18	20	19	29	13	32	19
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.	19	6	12	38	21	20	32
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	20	18	17	35	18	23	18

TABLE 8 (Continued)

		JR NCOs E4,5,6	SR NCOs E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS SELFISH.	21	31	39	16	7	14	23
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	22	3*	23	23	27	24	33
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	23	24	20	9	17	28	39
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	24	34	33	17	36	11	8
HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	25	36	37	7	15	21	24
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRE- CIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	26	2*	34	3*	37	38	29
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPA- BILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	27	16	38	27	20	19	35
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	28	40	22	36	29	17	22
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	29	8	7	31	25	16	30
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	30	17	26	28	22	39	40
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	31	41	21	19	34	25	25
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	32	27	40	40	43	4*	27
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	33	25	28	33	32	37	26
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	34	26	32	14	30	40	41
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	35	42	18	43	23	43	15
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTION.	36	43	16	20	35	34	36
HE BOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	37	23	14	37	39	42	31
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	38	35	43	21	26	36	28
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	39	28	42	11	42	41	37
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	40	29	29	41	40	27	34
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	41	12	41	24	41	43	42
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	42	38	35	34	31	33	43
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBOR- DINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	43	37	36	42	33	30	38

TABLE 9
STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE OPPORTUNITIES
(SENSITIVITY TO PERFORMANCE CHANGE) DETERMINED BY REGRESSION OF LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE
OF 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS AGAINST OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH LEADERSHIP

	ALL	JR NCOB E4,5,6	SR NCOB E6,7,8,9	JR GO GR 01	SR GO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	1*	2*	2*	6	8	3*	2*
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	2*	4*	5*	7	2*	4*	12
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	3*	1*	1*	24	1*	5*	9
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	4*	16	8	1*	5*	10	5*
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	5*	3*	3*	32	4*	1*	8
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	6	12	16	2*	12	6	4*
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	7	10	12	4*	6	8	16
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	8	25	14	9	11	2*	1*
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	9	14	4*	16	14	18	3*
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	10	11	7	20	19	9	6
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	11	8	17	3*	15	25	7
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	12	20	15	18	10	16	11
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	13	9	13	38	7	11	13
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTION.	14	24	19	11	18	13	19
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	15	27	18	35	3*	7	18
HE WAS SELFISH.	16	5*	11	5*	23	32	34
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	17	19	22	10	21	19	20
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	18	15	9	40	20	22	14
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	19	26	6	26	22	15	27
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	20	33	29	17	9	17	21
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	21	18	10	35	16	30	17
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSID- ERATE OF OTHERS.	22	6	20	31	24	26	23

TABLE 9 (Continued)

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	23	22	28	12	33	28	10
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	24	29	26	14	26	20	35
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	25	34	30	22	31	12	22
HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	26	31	23	23	30	14	30
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	27	13	24	28	34	21	31
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	28	32	39	19	17	31	15
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	29	7	31	8	32	39	37
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	30	17	21	41	25	23	28
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	31	37	36	27	13	24	26
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	32	28	35	15	36	34	25
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	33	30	32	30	29	27	32
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	34	21	33	33	27	33	33
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	35	36	27	25	33	36	29
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	36	42	38	13	37	37	24
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	37	39	40	21	28	35	40
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	38	23	25	34	42	42	38
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	39	38	34	29	38	29	39
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	40	35	37	37	39	40	36
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	41	40	41	39	41	41	42
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	42	41	42	42	43	38	41
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	43	43	43	43	40	43	43

SOLUTION CONCEPTS

The AWC Leadership Study does not provide specific recommendations. It seeks instead to offer broader "solution concepts" which will serve to create in time an Army-wide leadership climate characterized by recognition and fulfillment of the informal contract. Each solution concept is related directly to some facet of the study itself, and each is sufficiently nonspecific to permit the exercise of ingenuity and the application of expertise by those responsible for implementation. The solution concepts and amplifying discussions are presented in the paragraphs which follow.

1. USE THE MAIN FEATURES OF THIS STUDY ON AN ARMY-WIDE SCALE TO PROVIDE:
 - A. THE INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH.
 - B. DIAGNOSTIC INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.
 - C. A BROADENED DATA BANK OF INFORMATION TO BE USED BY ARMY PLANNERS, EDUCATORS, AND RESEARCHERS.

DISCUSSION. A strong and positive effect is created within the individual and the unit as a result of participation in a project whose potential impact in improving the Army is obvious to both. The concept of the informal contract, which is a central theme of the questionnaire and the group interview, represents the individual and the organization. If both are given feedback on the results of their contribution, the contribution gains significance and importance in their eyes--the individual and the unit have been recognized by the larger entity of which they are a part. At every installation, the field survey team found strong and positive interest in the study and its evident potential.

This survey team also found that, because of the content of the questionnaire and the interview agenda, participation as a respondent

constituted unique and provocative instruction in the process and problems of leadership. The survey team reported numerous requests, at all levels, for more information on the study, its data and its concepts. Group interviews were joined frequently by volunteer respondents far in excess of the number specified, and on several occasions, the group interview sessions continued (in accordance with the respondents' wishes) for several hours beyond the scheduled time. In one case, at Fort Benning, student officers, of their own volition, actually gathered in the mess hall after the evening meal to continue the discussion of leadership begun earlier during the group interview sessions. At the more senior levels, completion of the questionnaire and subsequent discussion brought to mind leadership principles, problems, examples, and techniques that had not been considered for years.

Another advantage of an Army-wide repetition of the study is that this will provide a far more sensitive and responsive data base. With this enlarged data base, it would be possible, for example, to furnish a major unit commander with comprehensive diagnostic and prescriptive information for studying and improving the leadership of his command. Additionally, a larger and more sensitive data base can give more accurate prescriptions for specific individuals or groups of individuals. The greater the number of respondents, the greater the number of statistically significant comparison groups that can be derived.

Academic professionals who have studied the data of the present study are impressed favorably by the potential the data offer. Depending upon how the data are organized and analyzed, the data base can answer leadership-related questions which arise in the formulation of personnel policies, in the development of educational programs, and in the academic study of organizational leadership. A ten-fold increase in the size of the data base (which could result from Army-wide repetition) would give the Army a potential for the study of leadership largely absent in current military or academic research. There would be, conservatively, enough information and enough worthwhile research objectives to keep a reasonably staffed "Institute of Leadership" fully and gainfully employed for several years. At the present time, there is still an enormous wealth of untapped information in the design and data base--information which could have powerful implications for Army leadership. In terms of both scientific progress and potential application, there is a pressing need for continuation of this research effort by an adequately staffed agency.

2. MAKE WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED PORTIONS OF THIS STUDY AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING, BY LEVEL, DIAGNOSES OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.

DISCUSSION. As noted in the findings, it is possible to generate, for any grade level, a rather detailed and rank-ordered listing of the leadership problems at that level. The data base can also point up specific areas where efforts at leadership improvement can be most profitable. Further, part of the prescription generated by the data provides the information necessary to establish an order of priority among efforts at improvement. A school charged with the development of leadership at a particular level could build an entire course of leadership instruction around a detailed study of the problems and prescriptions for a given grade level. Additionally, such a course might well include insight into the problems and prescriptions for the immediate superiors and subordinates of a given grade level. Such a multilevel approach has obvious implications for facilitating mission accomplishment and improving interlevel communications.

Further, a detailed analysis of leadership at a given level has applicability extending well beyond school situations alone. Through officer calls, noncommissioned officer calls, or counseling programs, a unit commander could use the analysis to better fulfill his responsibilities for the development of subordinates. Finally, in some cases the analysis might be used by the individual determined to apply the second principle of leadership: "Know yourself and seek self-improvement."

3. CONDUCT SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE ATTITUDES, VALUES, AND CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP HELD BY OFFICERS AT O6 AND HIGHER GRADES.

DISCUSSION. The concept of leadership climate is strongly supported by extensive research which shows conclusively that the attitudes and values of those at the upper level permeate the entire organization, filtering down to all subordinate levels. This scientific and common sense phenomenon is recognized by the professional soldier in the often-heard comment: "If you want to do anything about leadership

problems, you've got to start at the top." The upper levels set the example, be it good, bad, or something in between.

The Army's studies of the attitudes and values at the upper levels of leadership have been mostly subjective or autobiographical. It is difficult, therefore, to identify and control for bias, to isolate variables, or to study the effects of those variables. A carefully controlled, tightly disciplined study of these most visible, most influential levels could provide information of great value in officer selection, appraisal, and development, as well as in understanding of the role of the officer and many phenomena of the Army's leadership climate.

4. REVISE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION CONCEPTS WITHIN THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO THIS SUBJECT ARE BEING EXPLOITED.

DISCUSSION. Within the past 30 years, there has been a major growth in the academic study of leadership. In many cases, this research has been supported and furthered by large organizations when it was determined that the research results could be applied to increasing organizational effectiveness. A survey of leadership instruction throughout the Army school system, conducted as a part of the USAWC Leadership Study, indicated that (with the exception of significant input from HUMRRD) much of our leadership instruction was behind the times in terms of method and content.

A need exists for an integrated, sequential approach to leadership development throughout the Army school system. However, an even greater need exists for each echelon of the school system to know and take advantage of scientifically valid leadership research with proven applicability in increasing the effectiveness of practical organizational leadership.

5. ESTABLISH AN EXTENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM
OF ACADEMIC AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION FOR CAREER
NCO'S.

DISCUSSION. When comparing all levels of the Army's leadership climate in terms of the relative amount, complexity, and severity of leadership problems, the Senior NCO level appears to be the one in greatest need of help and leadership maintenance. Many of the problems at this level are related directly to difficulties in communicating effectively--communicating with immediate superiors as well as with immediate subordinates. At a deeper level, a root cause of this communication difficulty is not the traditionalism or obstinacy of the Senior NCO; indeed, there is probably no level more loyal or more concerned with the Army's future effectiveness. Rather, the difficulty appears to lie in the Senior NCO's relative lack of education, both academic and technical. In interlevel communication, this relative lack of education makes it difficult for the Senior NCO to establish the common or shared frame of reference which is critical to effective communication. The Senior NCO has been fulfilling his role as "backbone of the Army." Over the years, he has been the doer, and the price exacted has been in terms of his progressive professional development. In the planning stages, programs exist (e.g., the Noncommissioned Officer Education System) which are designed to enhance the development of the career noncommissioned officer. In light of the Army's reliance on this grade level, and the severity of the leadership problems which apparently exist therein, plans for the professional development of the career noncommissioned officer should be expanded, intensified, and accelerated.

6. BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM OF "COACHING" DESIGNED
TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC
EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN SUPERIOR AND SUBORDINATE.

DISCUSSION. Many of the leadership problems identified earlier in this report are reflections of inadequate communications between levels. The "perception shortfalls" discussed in the Findings are themselves proof positive of poor interpersonal communications, irrespective of the grade levels involved. Further, the need for improved interpersonal communications is a principal recommendation of many of the studies of the pressing personnel problems of today's Army (retention, race, drugs, dissent). Counseling may be the answer--but there are sizable problems involved.

A review of Army publications, school curricula, and the limited in-house research done in this area shows an incompleteness in the overall approach to counseling, as well as several general misconceptions which impede seriously an effective counseling program.

Within the Army's existing leadership climate, counseling is viewed largely in two respects: as advice for career progression and assignments; or as a corrective, quasi-punitive measure taken by a leader when a subordinate has done something wrong. These views are respectively incomplete and incorrect. In terms of mission accomplishment and job satisfaction, by far the most important type of counseling is that which deals with day-to-day performance on the job. Further, experts in the field of counseling state unequivocally that this type of counseling--performance counseling--is just as essential (perhaps even more so) for the successful, experienced subordinate who has done an excellent job as for the new, inexperienced subordinate who has done poorly.

Army leadership should view counseling more in terms of "coaching"--needed frequently by the best player as well as the worst, and directed toward the success of the team through development of the individual members. If "performance coaching" can become a normal and frequent feature of the senior-subordinate relationship, there can only be improvement in the interlevel communication (both directions) of what is expected and of the degree to which these expectations are being met.

7. PROVIDE STAFF MEMBERS (MILITARY) WHO ARE FORMALLY TRAINED IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS TO ALL ARMY SCHOOLS AND STAFF SECTIONS DEALING WITH THEORETICAL OR PRACTICAL LEADERSHIP EDUCATION OR TRAINING.

DISCUSSION. Leadership is a highly complex dimension of human behavior which, beginning in the early 1950's, has become a major area of interest in the field of social psychology. Social psychology can be viewed as the scientific study of man in interaction with others. As an academic discipline, social psychology includes the study of leadership as well as other subfields which are closely related to leadership--e.g., interpersonal relations, attitudes, group dynamics, and decisionmaking. As a science, this field has much to offer to Army leadership.

The Army's institutional concept of leadership, not formally spelled out, has two principal components which are understood by every Army leader: mission accomplishment and welfare of the men. The Army has applied academic expertise to the mission accomplishment component. The findings of the scientific study of management are used frequently at all levels, and major staffs and Army schools have numerous individuals assigned who are formally trained in theory and techniques of management (to include comptrollership and systems analysis).

The Army's approach to the other component of leadership, welfare of the men, is by no means as thorough. Academic expertise and scientific research are applied to the meeting of the soldier's physical needs, but in the far more significant aspect of his welfare, that which comes from interaction with others, there is hesitancy, even resistance, among professional soldiers in applying the scientific approach. This accounts in part for many of today's serious "people" problems. It accounts in part also for the need to go to someone other than the professional soldier in order to develop policy and procedures for training the Army leader (HumRRO), or to investigate major leadership problems such as junior officer retention (Franklin Institute) and personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel (Research Analysis Corporation task, ODCSPER "American Soldier in the 70's" study).

As the methodology for this study was formulated, as the data were gathered, and as the initial results were compiled, the study team visited and talked with leaders of every echelon at various posts, camps, and stations. The team found a wealth of experience in virtually every type of leadership problem, and they found brilliance in some of the intuitive approaches to these problems, but the other essential dimension of problem-solving, i.e., the application of scientific knowledge and fact, was largely nonexistent in the area of leadership. The team visited numerous leadership departments and other agencies and individuals charged with the development of Army leadership. Nowhere, except at the US Military Academy, did they find professional soldiers with formal training in the scientific study of leadership. The relative newness of leadership as an area of scientific endeavor, no doubt, accounts for this phenomenon, but it is essential that the Army establish its requirements for officers formally trained in the scientific study of leadership and enlarge the advanced degree program in this area without delay.

8. PRECLUDE EVOLUTION OF AN "ANTI-LEADERSHIP" SYNDROME
BY ENSURING QUALITY CONTROL OF LEADERSHIP STUDY
ACTIVITIES THROUGH CENTRALIZED COORDINATION OF FIELD
SURVEY OPERATIONS.

DISCUSSION. The positive value of "participative research" as a means of developing a sense of commitment and contribution among the members of an organization has been discussed elsewhere in this report. Further, there is substantial organizational research to show that, when organizational change is planned (as is the case in the Army's move toward a zero-draft), participation by the members beforehand in formulating the method of change makes it far easier for the members to accept the change, or at least to consider it objectively with a minimum of unfounded bias. Evidence of both of these good effects was noted when a USAWC briefing team presented the results of the study at various Army schools to classes whose members had participated in the field survey.

These good potential effects can be negated if efforts to study leadership and to implement change are not derived from a common objective and a coordinated program. A multitude of disparate surveys and seminars on the subject of leadership could create, in the field, a feeling that the Army, aware of a need but lacking a specific sense of purpose, was "shotgunning" efforts to improve Army leadership.

An earlier solution concept noted the need for a progressive and sequential approach to leadership development in the Army school system. The same need for coordination applies to data collection and dissemination/application of results. Ideally, leadership research and the application of this research should be managed centrally.

SUMMARY COMMENT

This study can be of assistance to leadership in today's Army as well as to an Army which must rely for personnel sustainment upon its own ability to attract and retain. The potential of the study lies not so much in its findings alone as in its emphasis upon the requirement for Army leadership to recognize fully and fulfill wholeheartedly the terms of the "informal contract." The Army and the professional soldier both recognize that periodic breaches of the contract occasioned by situational factors are unavoidable. Both can accept this, but neither

the organization nor the individual can, will, or should accept a long-term condition where one party to the contract consistently fails to participate fairly.

Like it or not, the Army's lifeblood and continued existence are directly dependent upon the youth of this nation--a youth whose educational level is increasing rapidly; a youth driven not by the physical needs of bygone eras, but rather by the quest for fulfillments of human values.

The task for Army leadership, then, is to insure that, in all his interactions and relationships with the Army, the professional soldier--in light of his background, values, and expectations--will view his relationship with the Army as one which is supportive and which builds and maintains his sense of personal worth and importance. He is a party to the contract--and the Army's investment in the interests of his human values will, in time, create the loyalty and dedication which are the cornerstones of true discipline, and which will lead the soldier to sacrifice his own needs on those few critical occasions where there must be a showdown between mission and men.

ANNEX A

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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II Management, Organization, and Human Relations	A-5
The study seeks to take advantage of recent developments in the behavioral sciences. Research, findings, and applications have been increasing exponentially in this rapidly developing scientific area.	
III Leadership Principles and Concepts	A-15
Doctrine and educational developments in the Army, the other Services, and allied nations were examined. The views of military practitioners and civilian behavioral scientists were incorporated in the study.	
IV Leadership Climate	A-22
Actions of leaders affect the behavior of subordinates and determine the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of expectations. Results determine the leadership climate.	
V Volunteer Forces	A-28
The feasibility or desirability of a zero draft was not an issue in the study, but documents addressing volunteer forces provided relevant material. These included the pro and con considerations and related topics; official, unofficial, empirical, and practical views.	
VI Studies and Surveys--Procurement and Retention	A-33
These documents provided an understanding of the attitudinal backdrop for the entire study. They surfaced major issues at many levels and were an opportunity to consider and incorporate the views of as much of the Army as possible.	

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VII Miscellaneous	A-41
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INTRODUCTION

This annotated bibliography was compiled as the basis for the US Army War College study, Leadership for the 1970's, June 1971. The number of books and other documents published on leadership is more than abundant, and no attempt has been made to make the bibliography all-encompassing.

The items were selected from the libraries at the US Army War College and Headquarters, Department of the Army; the Library of Congress; and several college and university libraries. Other important sources were study projects by various government and civilian agencies, individual and group research efforts, screening and review of periodicals, and recommendations from study group participants.

While the study was in progress, this was a "working" bibliography. It was used to educate the study group, for internal coordination of team efforts, and for external coordination with other agencies. When appropriate items were identified, abstracts were prepared and circulated as the study proceeded.

The addendum provides items annotated after final preparation of the study was begun.

SECTION I

METHODOLOGY

1. Festinger, Leon, and Katz, Daniel, ed. Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. (H61 R4)*

(This reference contains basic and current information on research methods. The chapters are concerned with sample surveys, field studies, experiments in field settings, laboratory experiments, sample selection, methods of data collection, analysis of data, and the application of findings. Many of the leading behavioral science researchers have written chapters on their individual expertise. The behavioral scientist could, by following the logic in the chapters, design, administer, and analyze data for a typical research program. The book is keyed to the "normal" situation, the usual problem, and a survey where the population is somewhat simplistic. The chapters on theory and methods of social measurement are excellent.)

2. Moroney, M. J. Facts from Figures. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1951. (HA29 M68 1965)

(The reader is shown the statistician's tools and machines, their purpose, and how they operate. After this workshop tour in print, he is encouraged to try for himself. The aim of the book is not to be exhaustive, but to give enough information in a simple manner that the novice can learn something. It is a highly readable book on statistical methods that takes the reader from zero upward many levels.)

3. Stogdill, Ralph M., and Coons, Alvin E., ed. Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1957. (BF637 L4 S71)

(This book contains nine monographs by various leaders in the field of leadership behavior and measurement and represents many years of research. It is a valuable book on leader behavior and was the basis for the development of the methodology of the US Army War College leadership study.)

* The call numbers used in this bibliography refer to the USAWC Library Collection.

SECTION II

MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND HUMAN RELATIONS

4. Argyris, Chris. Personality and Organization: The Conflict Between System and the Individual. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. (HF5549 A89)

(An objective of this book is to gain insight into why people behave as they do in organizations. The author finds that incongruency exists between the needs of the individual and the requirements of the formal organization, resulting in frustration, failure, narrow perspective, and conflict. These conditions increase under certain circumstances. The desire among subordinates to advance causes competition, hostility, and a tendency to focus on the individual's own area rather than the organization as a whole. This impedes integration with the formal organization. The increase of directive leadership, management controls, and pseudo human relations programs compounds antagonisms. The author suggests ways management can decrease incongruency between the individual and the organization. Guideposts are given for developing executive behavior. The description of an authoritarian personality is revealing.)

5. Bellows, Roger. Creative Leadership. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959. (HM141 B4)

(This book provides a complete foundation in the theory of creative leadership. The author tells what creative leadership is, what part it plays in our society, and what training is necessary to practice it successfully. He explains that a creative leader is one who can assess a situation, balance the varying personalities and requirements within a group, and direct individual activities and needs toward goal accomplishment. The book also covers two-way communication, improving teamwork, selecting and training, overcoming tensions and conflicts, and counseling and guidance.)

6. Blau, Peter M. "Interaction: Social Exchange." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7, 1968, pp. 452-458. (Ref H41 E41 V.7)

(This is a concise explanation of the theory of social exchange. It includes definition, basic assumptions, comparison to economic transactions, and the reward and power that are derived from use of the theory. It also includes a bibliography.)

7. Brown, F. A. C. The Social Psychology of Industry. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954.

(This book, written by an M.D. specializing in psychiatry, is basically concerned with the emotional aspects of human behavior and interpersonal relationships. The book is general in nature and explores such subjects as management and organization, psychology, anthropology, economics, and history. The chapters on attitudes and opinion surveys and leaders and leadership were particularly useful summaries. The latter chapter approaches the problem from a socio-psychological view.)

8. Cassileth, Barrie. Reinforcement Management: An Approach to Motivating Army Trainees. Alexandria, Virginia: Human Resources Research Office, November 1969. (HumRRO TR 69-17)

(This report examines reinforcement (contingency) management as a means of motivating military trainees; specifically, clerk-typists in self-paced advanced individual training at Fort Knox. Points were awarded for speedy learning and could be exchanged for rewards (time off). Results appear to have dissatisfied the researcher. Trainees with high entering skills were motivated effectively; lower skilled trainees showed no significant differences from control classes. The author concludes the training system itself would need to be changed to realize the full potential of contingency management.)

9. Davis, Keith, and Scott, William G., ed. Readings in Human Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. (HF5549 D3)

(This text contains 63 contributions from leading authorities in human relations. Among the general topics covered in detail are the philosophy of human relations; employee morale and motivation; formal organization; informal organization and management roles; change and participation; leadership and supervision; human relations training and development; communication; and trends in human relations.)

10. Elliott, John D., MAJ. "A New Thinking Plateau." Military Review, Vol. 50, October 1970, pp. 68-73.

(Individuals are the key element in transition to the author's new thinking plateau, since it is the individual who functions within the group. The individual must risk expressing himself in favor of innovative change. The author agrees with Samuel Huntington that success in an organization requires the individual to subordinate his will to that of the group, but he says group will must be correct. Innovation can be "professional suicide." The author gives

three ways to achieve a new thinking plateau: (1) establish a principle of innovative thinking that will challenge youth desiring a military career; (2) remove personnel whose decision-making is inadequate (eliminate "yes" men); (3) develop closer working relationships between military planners and the National Security Council.)

11. Gouldner, Alvin W., ed. Studies in Leadership. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. (HM141 G6)

(This is a lengthy, diverse book containing contributions on leadership by 35 social scientists. The comprehensive introduction includes discussion on leadership as a social problem, approaches to leadership, leadership traits and the inadequacies of the trait approach, situations and groups, group needs and integration, and personality characteristics of leaders. The analyses by the contributors are grouped generally under types of leaders, leadership and its group settings, authoritarian and democratic leaders, and the ethics and technics of leadership.)

12. Hays, Samuel H., COL, and Thomas, William N., LTC. Taking Command. Harrisburg: Stackpole Company, 1967. (UB210 H33)

(This book examines interpersonal relations and describes the integrated concept of leadership: the leader, the led, and the situation. It includes situational studies and an extensive bibliography. The authors were assigned to the United States Military Academy Office of Military Psychology and Leadership.)

13. Homans, George C. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961. (HM291 H6)

(This book presents a set of general propositions on social behavior as human exchange. Summarized briefly, the author says if an individual takes part in a situation where he feels rewarded, in future similar situations he is more likely to behave as he did under the rewarding conditions. If an individual's actions reward another, the recipient will repeat his actions more often; similarly, the donor will more often emit the action. However, the more often a person receives a rewarding action, the less valuable further like actions become to him. (The more help he asks for and receives, the less he needs.) There are costs and profits involved with rewards. Exchange ceases when both persons are not making a profit, and the individual who feels unrewarded displays anger or guilt. Members of a group conform to the group's norms in order to be rewarded by the others' approval or for protection from management. The more valuable an individual's actions are to the group, the higher his esteem, but there is less to be distributed for the other members. Authority results from esteem, and a man can acquire it by rewarding others.)

14. Horton, George C., LTC, and O'Mary, Paul R., LTC. Survey of Officer Professionalism . . . Generalization . . . Specialization. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 30 November 1969. (AWC Z-H68)

(This study correlates the results of two questionnaires. The first was sent to 48 general officers with command experience in Vietnam; the second to 130 general officers representing a cross section of the Army. Subject areas covered were (1) officer training for today's environment; (2) differences in attributes required for commanders, staff officers, and specialists; (3) performance records of specialists as opposed to generalists; (4) training in and expansion of the specialist program; (5) utilization of specialists. A combat arms officer should not be promoted to general officer until he has proved he can command at field grade level. Many general officers agree the "Peter principle" is not a myth. Inability to command should not make an officer a failure.)

15. Jordan, Harold K., COL, USAF. Leadership in the Tactical Squadron--A Challenge of the 70's. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-J66)

(This is a discussion in general terms of the value of young crew members to the Air Force. It presents changing management concepts with examples, good and bad, of recent application. The report recommends that current and future leaders be aware of changing techniques of management. The intelligent application of these techniques may determine their success as leaders while developing the potential of the young crew members. There is a short discussion of the chain of command and successful superior-subordinate relationships. Both must be properly used.)

16. Likert, Rensis. New Patterns of Management. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. (HD31 L46)

(This book summarizes management principles and practices which have proved to be effective and proposes a management system based on them. Discussion covers communication, motivation, attitudes, behaviors, and loyalties. Described are the integrating principle, the principle of supportive relationships, and the properties and performance characteristics of highly effective groups.)

17. Likert, Rensis. The Human Organization: Its Management and Value. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. (HD31 L45)

(This book describes a workable management system which can be used by any enterprise to achieve high productivity, financial success, and improved labor relations. The author has substituted a systems approach for piecemeal methods usually employed in efforts to improve an organization. The result is a highly effective management system whose parts are naturally compatible.)

18. McKelvey, William W. "Expectational Noncomplementarity and Style of Interaction Between Professional and Organization." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 14, March 1969, pp. 21-32.

(This study focuses on the question, "How does a professional react when he perceives that his career expectations are not being fulfilled by the organization employing him?" Results were twofold: (1) The perception of exceptional unfulfillment (noncomplementarity) was highly correlated with cynicism (loss of control over career advancement) and activity (rejection of conformity in favor of changing the organization's expectations). (2) Cynical active professionals (called insurgents) received the lowest promotion eligibility rankings from their superiors. In contrast, idealistic, passive professionals (called ritualists) tended to receive the highest promotion eligibility rankings.)

19. Morris, Jud. The Art of Motivating. Boston: Farnsworth Publishing, Inc., 1968. (HF5549 M6)

(This book is "a guide to getting more accomplished better through others." It is really a "how to" motivational cookbook oriented primarily towards industry and office worker relationships. As opposed to other more theoretical works which can be applied to the Army, this book is useful mainly as background. The author lists 11 "Fundamental Principles of the Art of Motivating" which by themselves are not nearly as helpful as the accompanying discussion and the many concrete examples based on office/industry situations. Although these situations are in many cases peculiar to industry, the leadership techniques applied (theoretically) by the author can be extrapolated into Army usage and the development of specific techniques.)

20. Moskos, Charles C., Jr. The American Enlisted Man. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1970. (UB323 M6)

(This book is an account of the norms, attitudes, and styles of life of the enlisted culture. The author shows what life is like for the man in combat, with the prospect of loss of life and limb. He describes the soldiers' commitment to service, their political attitudes, and their relation to American society. He traces the changes in the portrayals of enlisted men in the mass media, plays, and novels over the past decades and reveals the strain within ranks arising from class differences among enlisted men. The author believes that the convergence of the military with society which began in World War II has been reversed and that the military is becoming increasingly isolated.)

21. Preston, Harley O. The Development of a Procedure for Evaluating Officers in the United States Air Force. Pittsburgh: American Institute for Research, 7 July 1948. (UG633 P7)

(This is a study conducted by the American Institute for Research for the United States Air Force to determine a more effective means of evaluating their officers. The purpose was to devise a system or means to identify more quickly the promising, effective officer. A basic approach of the study was to attempt to establish facts as to what really makes an effective officer. An extensive list of critical requirements was found by an analysis of over three thousand descriptive incidents of how effective or ineffective officers had acted in particular military situations. These incidents were obtained from AF personnel through field interviews with 640 officers. This study resulted in the establishment of a new personnel management system for officers in the USAF.)

22. Rehm, Thomas A., LTC. "Ethics and the Military Establishment." Military Review, Vol. 50, September 1970, pp. 9-14.

(The author suggests various problems affecting the military, lowering its ethical standards, and casting doubts on whether it is in fact a profession. He states the Services are no longer able to police themselves--a function necessary to a profession. Size, complexity, participation in control of civil disturbances, and procurement activities all contribute to the problem. The author states three solutions: (1) A professional code of behavior which will establish in the broadest sense what is "conduct unbecoming"; (2) inform all levels of what constitutes professional conduct and devote more time to this in the service schools; (3) reinforce emphasis on ethics. Expand the area of professional life to provide better scrutiny by promotion boards. Have peer ratings in addition to efficiency reports.)

23. Roberts, Ernest E., LTC. Increased Leadership Effectiveness. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, April 1968. (AF-AU AWC TH-R533)

(Leadership and management are closely related disciplines. The Army has translated this into a requirement to train officers to be both leaders and managers. The present education and training program does not appear to produce the required skills. The author suggests modifications to the program as a means of increasing leadership effectiveness throughout the Army.)

24. Smith, Patricia Cain; Kendall, Lorne M.; and Hulin, Charles L. The Measurement of Satisfaction in Work and Retirement. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969. (HF5549.5 J6385)

(This is a scholarly and carefully researched description of a 10-year program directed to the study of job satisfaction. The single most valuable feature of this work is the job descriptive index--an instrument which provides a valid measurement of job satisfaction, applicable to most levels in most organizations. The instrument is easy to understand, easy to complete, and easy to score and interpret. Authors have provided an extensive series of narrative tables for a wide variety of demographic variables.)

25. Stogdill, Ralph M., et al. Aspects of Leadership and Organization. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1953. (VB200 O 28)

(This report is a collection of papers which represents a series of briefer studies on problems related to leadership and organization. It is basically a study of leadership in naval organizations from which all pertinent data are obtained. Some of the more interesting papers include: "Personal vs Situational Determinants of Leadership"; "Differences Between Military and Industrial Organizations"; "Responsibility and Authority Relationships"; and "Leader Behavior and the Operational Readiness of Ships.")

26. Stogdill, Ralph M., and Shartle, Carroll L. Methods in the Study of Administrative Leadership. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Bureau of Business Research, 1955. (HM141 S8)

(This is a monograph which details research into the problem of attempting to establish valid norms for the evaluation of administrative performance. The methods reported in the monograph were designed for the study of leadership in terms of status, interactions, perceptions, and behavior of individuals in relation to other members of the organized group. It was the primary aim of the research to produce theory, methodology, and information which might serve as a basis for the development of improved and more effective techniques in the fields of organization analysis, position analysis, and personnel placement. The work is still research and cannot be applied with validity to administrative performance or operation.)

27. Tannenbaum, Robert, et al. Leadership and Organization. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. (HM141 T3)

(Part One of this book, "Leadership and the Influence Process," is the most relevant portion for this study. In particular, chapters on "The Process of Understanding People" and "How to Choose a Leadership Pattern" provide a good summary of the subjects rather than the elaborate and detailed treatment which exists in many other works. The latter chapter presents a range of seven possible leadership

behaviors and the factors a leader should consider in deciding which one to use in leading. Sections on "Sensitivity Training: A Personal Approach to the Development of Leaders" and "Studies in Organization" provide some background, although the former promises more than it delivers for purposes here.)

28. US Department of the Army. Army Regulations 600-20: Army Command Policy and Procedures. Washington, 31 January 1967.

(This regulation establishes policy and prescribes certain procedures relative to the basic aspects of command within the Army. It states that the chain of command is the most fundamental and important organizational technique used by the Army. It clearly establishes the premise that every commander (or leader) has two basic responsibilities in the following priority: Accomplishment of his mission and the care of his personnel and property.)

29. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Department of the Army Military Personnel Management Teams Project Findings. Washington, July-September 1970. (UB339 A41 JY/SEP 70)

(In its visits to various posts during the reporting period, the personnel management teams found deficiencies in the following areas: (1) Use of college graduates and their civilian acquired skills; (2) status of staff and faculties at Army service schools; (3) the lack of junior officer retention counseling; and (4) proper assignment and movement of enlisted personnel.)

30. US Department of the Army. US Army Combat Developments Command. Man and the 1990 Environment. Vol. 1, Draft Summary Report. Vol. 2, The 1990 U. S. Environment. Fort Belvoir, 20 April 1970 (Vol. 1) and 6 July 1970 (Vol. 2). (Army CDC DO ME)

(This is an in-house study to determine what human behavioral factors and environmental conditions might be expected to impact on the design of future Army organizations. Scenarios projecting technological, economic, social, and political environments in 1990 surface many implications for the Army. Leadership styles are addressed.)

31. US Department of the Army. US Military Academy. Leadership in the Post-70's. Report--A Leadership Workshop Conference. West Point, June 1969. (UB210 L43 1969)

(This conference was held at West Point for the purpose of looking at the leadership that would be required in the rapidly changing environment of the 1970's and beyond. Major conclusions of the different working groups included: (1) changing value systems and environmental conditions require leaders who have analytical problem-solving skills and sensitivity to the value systems of their

followers; (2) more emphasis should be placed on the development of "management" skills as opposed to "inspirational" techniques of leadership; (3) the military must provide for a sense of participation and involvement of individual members; and (4) further investigation should be made of such organizational behavior and problems as upward communication, relationship between leadership style and the soldier's commitment to the military, objective evaluation of leadership ability, and fitting the right leader to the right job. The report includes papers presented for discussion.)

32. Vietnamese Leadership Research and Training Development. Prospectus.

(In this prospectus on leadership training for the Vietnamese, it is pointed out that the leader needs to know how he can use his leadership position to accomplish the important goals assigned him by his own seniors, and also to recognize the conflicting demands placed on him by seniors and subordinates, and how to balance these in order to be effective in acting for both groups to which he is responsible.)

33. Wakin, Malham M., COL, USAF. "The American Military--Their to Reason Why." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 54, March 1971, pp. 54-58.

(In discussing discipline and obedience to orders, the author indicates that society today is changing and it is clear that unquestioning obedience is a completely unacceptable, if not inappropriate, conception. Sophisticated, creative, dynamic men, whether in uniform or not, cannot be properly characterized as unquestioning. There is confusion among those inside and outside the military establishment as to whether discipline, creativity, and moral character exist in the Services. The author discusses discipline with responsibility and freedom and states that the proper balance must be struck.)

34. Wells, Warren K., COL. Better Human Engineering Is Needed. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 26 February 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This essay points out the differences between youth today and his counterpart of recent years. The author states the need for a better human relations climate in military organizations. He recommends the Services use the findings of human behavioralists to develop an understanding and appreciation of men and suggests ways for better utilization of personnel. He highlights self-actualization, organization culture, personal commitment, and the problem solving process. Changes must be made in order to recruit and retain the quality of men the Army needs.)

35. Wells, Warren K., COL. Participative Management for the Military. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 28 October 1969. (AWC IS-70)

(This essay describes management styles from autocratic to laissez-faire. The author highlights participative management and recommends its use in the military establishment. He points out potential problem areas and how to avoid them.)

36. Wermuth, Anthony L. The Impact of Changing Values on Military Organization and Personnel. Waltham, Massachusetts: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Advanced Studies Group, December 1970. (U21.5 W47)

(This monograph by a retired Army colonel examines the social and technological changes occurring in our society and discusses the deriving implications for the personnel and organization of the military establishment. The author foresees the military profession becoming more civilianized and military leaders more as military managers. Autocratic methods will further decline and members will protest vigorously if they are treated like a number. Individuals will achieve greater responsibility at younger ages, and specialists will look to professional associations for standards of performance and as the place for their loyalty. Military commanders may find a kind of ombudsman at critical points in the personnel system. The author believes the Services can adjust, but military values may change among themselves.)

SECTION III

LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

37. Canadian Forces Headquarters. Canadian Forces Pamphlet CFP 131 (1), Vol. 1: Junior Leaders Manual, 1 May 1966 and Canadian Forces Pamphlet CFP 131 (2), Vol 2: The Professional Officer, 30 Nov 70.

(These are two of a three volume set concerning leadership training in the Canadian Forces. CFP (1) is designed for NCO and officer cadet levels, and CFP (2) is for officers up to and including the rank of major and equivalent. Both are excellent efforts, based on the behavioral sciences, which provide a military "training package" at the designated levels.)

38. Delavan, Patrick N., COL. "Commander Speaks." 7th World, Vol. 3, November 1970, p. 2.

(7th World is a unit publication of the 7th Transportation Group (Terminal), Fort Eustis, Virginia. In this issue, the commander calls for an understanding by leaders of the need to balance individual needs and mission requirements in achieving success.)

39. Hays, Samuel H., COL (Ret). "What is Wrong with Induction Procedures?" Military Review, Vol. 50, May 1970, pp. 3-7.

(The author examines initiation procedures used in induction stations, Officer Candidate Schools, and service academies. He concedes these have been adequate in the past to meet the requirement to divest a new military member of his civilian orientation and make the transition to the military system. However, in our rapidly changing society, he advocates a reevaluation in order to meet the individual's expectations and to minimize loss of enthusiasm and motivation. Success, reinforcement, reward, and recognition should be emphasized--the positive approach. Leader training programs should prepare students and cadre to be supportive leaders.)

40. Hollander, Edwin P., and Julian, James W. Contemporary Trends in the Analysis of Leadership Processes. Technical Report. Buffalo: State University of New York, 1968. (BF637 L4H581)

(This report is an overview of several lines of development in the study of leadership up to and within the contemporary scene. These include: leadership as a process involving an inference relationship; the leader as one among other participants in this relationship; the transaction occurring between leaders and followers; the differential tasks or functions associated with being a leader; and the nature of leader effectiveness. Several implications are derived for further research: attendance to leadership as a property of the system of a group; recognition of the two-way influence characterizing leader-follower relations; the maintenance of leadership and the emergence

of those factors legitimizing the leader's position through the process of succession; leader effectiveness in terms of follower expectations and perceptions of him.)

41. Homans, George C. The Human Group. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950. (HM251 H6)

(This book uses the case method to study social behavior in small groups. The author sees the job of the group leader as twofold: (1) to accomplish the group mission and (2) to maintain an appropriate balance between reward and punishment. A successful leader keeps his group in a condition of "moving equilibrium." A social system is in moving equilibrium and authority exists when disobedience to the orders of the leader is followed by a tendency of the system to return to the state the leader desired. Eleven leader behaviors are given which should maintain moving equilibrium.)

42. Hull, Clark L. Principles of Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1943. (Library of Congress BF199 H77 1966)

(This book attempts to present in an objective, systematic manner the primary, or fundamental, molar principles of behavior. It was written on the assumption that all behavior, individual and social, moral and immoral, normal and psychopathic, is generated from the same primary laws; that the differences in the objective behavioral manifestations are due to the differing conditions under which habits are set up and function.)

43. Jacobs, T. O. Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations (Draft). Fort Benning, Georgia: Human Resources Research Organization, Division 4, 1971.

(This book, still in draft form, is based upon an exhaustive study of the leadership research and theory of the past 25 years and serves as the central reference for the Army War College study of Leadership for the 1970's. The author provides a narrow and precise definition of leadership, viewing it as an influence process distinguished from power and authority, then brings this "pure" leadership into contact with organizational realities to show that those in "leadership positions" within organizations actually do far less leading than is commonly supposed. A current and comprehensive bibliography accompanies each chapter.)

44. Krech, David, et al. Individual in Society. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

(This is a textbook on social psychology. Chapter 12, "Leadership and Group Change," provides information on the emergence of leaders and leadership functions. It discusses leader characteristics and behaviors. It examines what kinds of groups tend to change, under what conditions they change, and what the direction of change is likely to be. The followers' perception of the leader is also included.)

45. Lange, Carl J., et al. A Study of Leadership in Army Infantry Platoons. Washington: George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, November 1958. (GWU HRRO RR-1)

(This study provides information on leadership behaviors which distinguish between effective and ineffective infantry platoon leaders. Data was collected primarily through questionnaires administered to the platoon leaders' superiors and subordinates. It is also known as OFFTRAIN II.)

46. Menzies, J. G., CPT, Royal Australian Infantry. "Leadership." Australian Army Journal, Vol. 259, December 1970, pp. 27-36.

(This is a well-written article which discusses the objectives, ideals, and obligations of leadership. The author concludes that leadership is not a product of traits within an individual, concurring with many behavioral scientists in this respect. He offers a list of ten leadership principles for use by the Australian Army that are similar to those used by the US Army.)

47. Porter, Orland A., Jr., Lt Comdr. A Review and Evaluation of Leadership Concepts. Thesis. Monterey, California: US Naval Post Graduate School, May 1962. (NvPGS TH-P6)

(Although several concepts of the approach to leadership and the properties of leaders have been developed, there is confusion on which one is "the" concept. The author tries to determine if there is one universal approach by reviewing and evaluating a few of the concepts considered representative. He re-examines leadership in terms of group objectives or goals and the possible existence of more than one group leader. He further reviews the forces which influence a group and shape its leadership requirements.)

48. Ross, Murray G., and Hendry, Charles E. New Understandings of Leadership. New York: Association Press, 1957. (BF637 L4R6)

(This book is a review and summary of thinking and research on the nature and meaning of leadership. It is intended for leadership practitioners. Its contents include leadership theory; the characteristics the leader should have (relative to the leader, the led, and the situation); the functions of the leader; and group factors affecting leadership.)

49. Seabee, Edmund B., MG (Ret). Leadership at Higher Levels of Command as Viewed by Senior and Experienced Combat Commanders. Washington: George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, December 1961. (GWU HRRO RM LHLC)

(This research project was initiated at the request of the US Army Command and General Staff College to obtain information on the

following: (1) The respects in which higher level leadership varies from leadership below division level; (2) the knowledge of psychology or sociology required by higher commanders; (3) the importance of traits of the leader in the exercise of high level leadership; and (4) the impact of the group being led, and of the situation, upon the exercise of high-level leadership. Methodology used was personal letters to more than 100 senior officers (O-6 and above) posing questions and asking for information based on actual experience. The report includes results from the letters and comments by the author expressing his personal opinions. Further research is suggested.)

50. Selznick, Philip. Leadership in Administration. New York: Harper & Row, 1957. (H131 S4)

(This book addresses the concept of organization through leadership rather than authoritarian control. The author concludes that leadership transcends efficiency and human engineering. They may be a leadership goal, but leadership itself is a creative task of moulding perspectives and relationships. He states leadership goes beyond organization. Organizations are made up of "standardized building blocks" and adapt to their mission and role; leadership maintains the integrity of those blocks. In filling his creative role, the leader must be concerned with change and planning that will provide new capabilities to meet the needs and aspirations of the institution.)

51. Sipes, Joel D., Lt Comdr, comp. Leadership in Service of Country and Humanity. New London: US Coast Guard Academy, 1968. (UB210 S5)

(This is a basic text on leadership used at the US Coast Guard Academy. Its purpose is to provide the cadet with a foundation upon which to base his philosophy of military leadership. It is a collection of material which emphasizes the current trends from the behavioral sciences and the practical experiences of respected military and civilian authorities.)

52. Stogdill, Ralph M; Wherry, Robert J.; Jaynes, William E. Patterns of Leader Behavior: A Factorial Study of Navy Officer Performance. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Personnel Research Board, 1953. (VB200 03)

(This study is devoted particularly to naval leadership. The research was designed to test the hypothesis that patterns of leader behavior may differ in relation to differences in the positions occupied by leaders. Data were obtained from 470 naval officers who occupy 45 different positions. Three stated hypotheses were studied by means of empirical tests: (1) Leadership behavior is multidimensional. These dimensions are finite in number and can

be discovered by analysis of leader behavior. (2) The pattern of behavior along the different dimensions is affected in large part by the position or job to which the leader is assigned. (3) The pattern of behavior along different dimensions is affected as well by the type of organization to which the job holder is assigned.)

53. Taylor, Mervin M., COL, USAF. Leadership and National Security: A Case Study. Individual Research Paper. Washington: National War College, 1969. (NWC IS-1968/69 T3)

(This paper presents an overview of leadership recognition, evaluation, and development in the Air Force today. The author clarifies the term leadership and its recognition and includes information on its historical and psychological development. He examines the current system of officer efficiency reports and the resulting "pile-up of scores," "halo effect," and "quantification of subjective material." Similar problems in industry are also discussed. Leadership development programs in the USAF are compared with those in industry. The author concludes that the Air Force leadership program is effective, but there are inconsistencies which should be resolved and improvements which should be made in view of the demands placed on leaders today.)

54. US Air Force. Air Force Manual 50-3. Air Force Leadership. Washington, 1 August 1966.

(This manual provides basic guidelines to develop leadership within the US Air Force. Although written primarily for the junior officer, it is considered the primary text on leadership for all supervising levels in the Air Force. It provides an excellent compilation of material on leadership principles, functions, development, responsibilities, and indicators as they apply to Air Force leaders. The manual points out that the principles are only a guide list and should be added to by individuals when such additions are needed in a particular assignment.

55. US Department of Defense. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2: The Armed Forces Officer. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1950.

(This manual is a basic source for commissioned officers of all the military services on expected conduct and behavior. It is a comprehensive reference document for topics germane to commissioned leadership; e.g., responsibility and privilege, leaders and leadership, human and group nature, discipline, morale and esprit, counseling, and reward and punishment.)

56. US Department of the Army. Army Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership. Washington, 1 November 1965.

(This field manual provides an analysis of military leadership in the US Army, particularly below division level. It discusses the characteristics of military leadership, human behavior, leadership principles and traits, leadership problem areas, leadership in higher commands, and leadership in combat.)

57. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-303: The Challenge of Leadership. Washington, 27 May 1969.

(This Officers' Call presents some principles, types, and methods of leadership. None of them are new, but they have proved to be successful. The pamphlet is recommended for commanders' use in discussing leadership with junior officers and enlisted leaders.)

58. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-15: Leadership at Senior Levels of Command. Washington, October 1968.

(This pamphlet presents an analysis of leadership at senior levels of military command. Its purpose is to provide a systematic framework from which to approach the leadership problems faced by high-level commanders. According to the pamphlet, successful accomplishment as a leader depends upon two basic requirements: (1) The commander should have intimate, thorough knowledge of the kinds of people and the kinds of events with which he must deal as a leader, and (2) he must have an effective way of thinking about the people and events which he encounters.)

59. US Department of the Army. US Army Command and General Staff College. Reference Book 22-1: Leadership. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 15 August 1970. (CGSC RB 22-1 Aug 70)

(This reference book supports leadership instruction at the US Army Command and General Staff College. It includes discussions on military discipline, morale and esprit, motivation, efficiency, leadership climate, leadership techniques and guides, characteristics of the individual and the group, and the leadership environment. It also includes case studies and illustrative articles.)

60. US Department of the Army. US Military Academy. The Study of Leadership, Vol. I and II. West Point, 1970-71.

(These two volumes provide the bases for leadership instruction at the US Military Academy. Successively, the interacting elements of leader, group, and situation are isolated and studied in detail after an overview to emphasize the importance of the interaction. The academic course provides an excellent appreciation of the behavioral science theories related to leadership and how these theories apply in a military environment.)

61. US Marine Corps. Leadership. Quantico, Virginia: The Basic School, Marine Corps Base, September 1970.

(This is the leadership manual for the Marine Basic School for junior officers. It outlines the leadership instruction given to newly commissioned Marine officers with detailed readings regarding leadership problems at that supervisory level. A listing and explanation of basic leadership principles as they apply to the Marine officer are found in this manual.)

62. US Navy. Bureau of Naval Personnel. NAVPERS 15924A: Principles and Problems of Naval Leadership. Washington, 1964. (VB203 A314)

(This manual demonstrates the principles of effective naval leadership through the case study method. The cases and problems are actual ones and illustrate simple, realistic, and practical principles.)

63. US Navy. Bureau of Naval Personnel. NAVPERS 15934B: Leadership Support Manual. Washington, 1968.

(This manual gives the purpose, challenge, goals, and outline of the Naval leadership training program. The manual delineates between command, leadership, and management. It has checklists on leadership for: (1) all naval personnel; (2) commanding officer/executive officer; (3) department head/division officer; and (4) chief petty officers/petty officers. It also contains excellent outlines for a wide range of discussion topics on a variety of leadership problems.)

64. US Navy. Bureau of Naval Personnel. NAVPERS 92585D: Curriculum for Petty Officer Leadership Training. Washington, 18 May 1967.

(This curriculum provides a framework for a basic course of instruction in leadership knowledge, skills, and attitudes for petty officers. Also, the curriculum is adapted for sea or shore command leadership programs. Of particular interest in this document is the list of leadership principles. Nine of them correspond to the eleven basic principles in Army Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership. The following principle is added: "The leader should reprimand in private and praise in public (in most instances).")

65. US Navy. US Naval Institute. Selected Readings in Leadership. Annapolis, 1960. (VB203 A5 1960)

(As the name implies, this book deals mainly with naval leadership, but there are several articles dealing with the Marines, and there is one by an Army officer. The volume provides good guidelines for small unit leadership techniques. It should be useful in developing a set of "how to" guidelines.)

SECTION IV

LEADERSHIP CLIMATE

66. Boatner, Mark M. III, COL (Ret). "Seeing Ourselves as Others See Us . . . First." Army, Vol 21, February 1971, pp. 24-29.

(This article states the need for intelligent self-criticism by Army members. The appropriate medium is the professional journal. He believes if Army writers were encouraged and assisted we might solve some of our problems before they gain public attention. The author asserts that procedures for securing official clearance for publication are inhibiting.)

67. "Congressional Conundrum: How to Keep Up the Armed Forces?" Army, Vol. 21, February 1971, p. 10.

(This article states Representative F. Edward Hébert's view that discipline has been relaxed in trying to make Army life more attractive and to gain more volunteers.)

68. Fleishman, Edwin A. Leadership Climate, Human Relations Training, and Supervisory Behavior. Research Paper. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Personnel Research Board, 1951.

(Recent years have seen the establishment of an increasing number of leadership training courses for foremen in industry. This study attempted to evaluate a leadership training course for foremen after the foremen returned to the industrial situation. Measures of leadership behavior as well as leadership attitudes of these foremen were obtained. In addition, the effects of such training were evaluated with respect to the kind of "leadership climate" (leadership of the foreman's own boss) to which the foremen returned back in the work situation.)

69. Fleishman, Edwin A. The Relationship between "Leadership Climate" and Supervisory Behavior. Thesis. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1951.

(This dissertation investigated the relationship between how the foreman leads his group, and the leadership attitudes and behavior of those above him in the organization. Also investigated was the effectiveness of a leadership training course for foremen who operated under different kinds of "leadership climates" in the industrial situation. The foreman's description of his own boss's behavior, the foreman's perception of what his boss expected of him, what the boss said he expected, and the boss's own leadership

attitudes about leading foremen were considered aspects of "leadership climate" under which different foremen operate. The four groups of foremen were further stratified into those operating under different "leadership climates.")

70. Flint, Austin Whitcomb. Forecasting Leadership Potential Using an Objective Method of Interaction Analysis as a Scientific Test. Thesis. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, June 1957. (LSU 378.76 L930 C2)

(This thesis investigated the relationships between objective measures based upon performance in the leaderless group discussion and rated leadership in a military situation. The groups are considered leaderless in the sense that no leader is actually appointed. However, the assembly of individuals presented with problems requiring action for a group solution inevitably results in the emergence of leadership behavior by one or more members.)

71. Hackworth, D. H., COL. "Bluster, Insensitivity Cost Army Good Men." Army, Vol. 20, November 1970, pp. 56-58.

(This is an incisive article on why young men are leaving the service. The author submits that low pay, frequent short tours, and other disadvantages may be reasons, but the main reason is more fundamental and harder to quantify. He suggests that the senior ranks have forgotten that young leaders are people with feelings and pride, who make mistakes and can learn from their mistakes. They need the freedom to fail. The author summarizes the experiences of three young officers and their disappointment with seniors and the "Establishment." Poor leadership is vividly illustrated.)

72. Hauser, William L., LTC. "Professionalism and the Junior Officer Drain." Army, Vol. 20, September 1970, pp. 16-22.

(The author states that a lack of professionalism in career officers makes the military unappealing to others. The most obvious drawbacks to a military career, as seen by junior officers, are: (1) economic deficiencies; (2) low prestige; (3) lack of discrimination in career advancement; (4) low standard of living among senior grades; (5) stifled professionalism among senior grades; (6) a sense of non-productivity and a loss of job satisfaction, largely the result of attitudes among senior grades; (7) interference in personal life; (8) excessive subservience to rank. The author concludes that if the Army is to attract and retain high quality officers, it must re-create among its senior officers an attitude conducive to junior professionalism.)

73. Hays, Samuel H., COL (Ret). "The Growing Leadership Crisis." Army, Vol. 20, February 1970, pp. 39-43.

(Army leaders are more capable than ever, but techniques have not adjusted to today's demands. Three factors govern the resulting crisis: the system of values and professional ethics, the methods of selecting and developing leaders, and leadership in interpersonal communication. The author offers suggestions for meeting the current challenges to leadership.)

74. Howze, Hamilton H., GEN (Ret). "Military Discipline and National Security." Army, Vol. 21, January 1971, pp. 11-15.

(The author believes that discipline in the military forces has deteriorated dangerously and that the authority of the commander has weakened drastically. He attributes this to a lack of public support for the military services, a weakened military justice system, and a tendency by the Pentagon to forget the mission in favor of accommodation. He states that military leaders should determine a solution to the discipline problem and execute it without regard for public or congressional opinion.)

75. King, Edward L., LTC (Ret). "The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem." Army Times Family Magazine, 17 February 1971, p. 1.

(The author takes the Army severely to task for poor leadership, mismanagement, parochialism, lack of loyalty up and down, the ticket-punching system, and bureaucratic inertia. His solutions are: (1) admit and correct mistakes; (2) tell the truth; (3) reorganize for combat (eliminate unessential frills and benefits; (4) improve personnel management; (5) improve officer and enlisted education; and (6) practice positive leadership.)

76. Larson, Doyle E., COL, USAF. Impending Crisis in Air Force Leadership. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-L303)

(This paper notes the cultural changes occurring in society and their effect on the morals and attitudes of young people entering the USAF. The author discusses the factors causing differences in outlook between the older generations in the Air Force and the younger generation. He states inadequate training for junior non-commissioned officers is a major weakness which has caused a breakdown in middle management levels. He recommends an increase in the number of NCO Leadership Schools and improvements in course content if the Air Force is to meet the challenge of the younger generation.)

77. Lyon, Harold C., Jr., CPT. "The Courage of Your Convictions." Army, Vol. 15, July 1965, pp. 35-38.

(The author notes a lack of creative thinking in the Army today, particularly in the lower echelons. He attributes this to senior officers stifling the initiative of subordinates in the superiors' drive for high ratings. He encourages leaders at all levels to set an example of moral courage--to reward imagination and initiative, thereby improving training and development in subordinates.)

78. McCord, Robert E., COL. The Challenge to Military Professionalism. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 9 March 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(After an examination of the current status of the professional Army officer and how he views his profession, the author evaluates the degree of influence that the officer has exerted on making and executing national security policies. Major changes in the profession are analyzed and how these changes affect standards, ethics, rewards, and other aspects of Army life. The author concludes the professional officer exerts minor influence, that his ethics are challenged, and that rewards are out of balance with the rest of society. Corrective measures are offered to improve the status of the career Army officer.)

79. Nihart, Brooke. "Why Junior Officers Get Out." Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 107, 3 August 1970, pp. 22-30.

(This article highlights the factors bringing dissatisfaction to junior officers and tending to drive them out of the Service. The author identifies these factors as bad policy and administration; leadership (lack of professionalism, rapid rotation of commanders, poor guidance, over-supervision); unsatisfactory personal life; working conditions; status; and pay. All need improvement.)

80. Opinion Research Corporation. The Image of the Army. Princeton, New Jersey, August 1969. (UA25 057)

(This is an appraisal of the Army by 2,420 respondents composed of Army veterans, the general public, high school educators, and Vietnam Army veterans in college. The objective was to obtain opinions toward the Army as an institution and the benefits derived from Army service. It measured their experiences, impressions, feelings, and knowledge relating to the Army. Data were gathered by questionnaires and interviews. The report points out that quality of leadership is a weakness in the Army's image.)

81. Selvin, Hanan C. The Effects of Leadership. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960. (BF637 L454)

(This is a study of the effects of leadership--how the actions of leaders affect the behavior of their followers. The leaders in this study are the commissioned and noncommissioned officers of several Army training companies, and the followers are the men who received their basic training in these companies. This book reports the impact of different kinds of leadership on real groups. It is particularly concerned with the effects that variations in leadership have on the individuals' behavior outside the group atmosphere. In studying the complex effects of Army officers on subordinates of varied status, the author finds a pervading influence or "leadership climate" which he relates to legions of results in subordinates' behavior. The book also explores sociological and psychological aspects of the relationship between leaders and followers and sets forth new methods and techniques of analysis that are of general applicability.)

82. Stogdill, Ralph M. Leadership and Role Expectations. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1956. (VB203 S8)

(This report, based on a study of a Naval air development command, looks at differences in work-role expectations and work performance. Subjects were Navy officers and civilians in supervisory positions. Data were obtained on what the senior does, as described by himself and two of his juniors; what he ought to do, according to his own expectations and those of juniors; what the juniors do in their positions, as described by themselves; and what juniors ought to do according to their own expectations. The author used 45 descriptions of behavior of time devoted to various major responsibilities, to various aspects of work behavior with other persons, and to various kinds of individual effort. The descriptions also included frequency of participation in various respects of leader behavior and degree of responsibility, authority, and delegation of authority.)

83. Toner, James H., LT. "Leaders Must Reply When Soldiers Ask." Army, Vol. 20, August 1970, p. 56.

(LT Toner writes of the necessity for leaders to know better answers for questions being asked by our soldiers. He observes that emphasis has been on the training of our leaders on how something was to be done, not why it is done. Our leaders must be both educated and trained. The leaders must ask questions too and not simply accept things as they are. Discipline should be based on reason and conviction, not on fear or rank. Respect must be mutual and others recognized for their desire to learn and for their courage in their convictions. Leaders must begin to know more and begin to be better citizens.)

85. US Department of the Army. US Military Academy. Senior Conference on Changing Role of the Military in American Life, Final Report. West Point, 8 January 1971.

(This is the report of a conference held at West Point 11-13 June 1970 to take an inquisitive look at the probable resolution of forces in motion today in our society which will impact on the military and an informed search for unseen difficulties likely to plague the armed forces in the years ahead. Participants included Robert E. Osgood, Harry Gilman, Adam Yarmolinsky, Morris Janowitz, and Charles C. Moskos.)

86. Wren, Christopher S. "A West Pointer's Wild Preview of the Volunteer Army." Look, Vol. 35, 23 February 1971, pp. 24-27.

(This article addresses changes that have occurred at Fort Bragg and in the 82d Airborne Division as reasonable and needed for some time. LTC James D. Smith discusses the changes (haircuts, beer, race relations, drugs) and what is being done about them in his unit. Leaders must learn to understand. Older NCO's are concerned and trying to change, but some cannot. Colonel Smith indicates an officer must earn respect; he can no longer be aloof.)

SECTION V

VOLUNTEER FORCES

87. "Army Cutbacks--The Risks." US News and World Report, Vol. 67, 29 September 1969, pp. 66-71.

(In this wide-ranging interview, General William C. Westmoreland supports the concept of a volunteer force and believes it would be representative of the population. He states that, based on his experience in Vietnam, maintaining discipline in the Army today is not more difficult than in the volunteer Army of the 1930's.)

88. Binder, L. James. "The Now Is Very In at Fort Benning." Army, Vol. 21, April 1971, pp. 22-29.

(In this article explaining the VOLAR test at Fort Benning, the author states that much of the emphasis in the Modern Volunteer Army (VOLAR) test program has been on the removal of irritants in service life. Unnecessary and unreasonable things have been eliminated. Leaders today must understand young people. They must know they do not like authoritarianism but will go along with an action if they see a need for it. Leaders must be technically and professionally competent and have integrity. Leaders must be prepared to tell subordinates "why." The course at Fort Benning on "Enlightened Leadership" is discussed.)

89. Forsythe, George I., LTG. "Return . . . To Soldering." Government Executive, Vol. 3, February 1971, p. 23.

(As Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army, General Forsythe summarizes his job as, "To coordinate, expedite, and provide an idea bank for the Volunteer Army Program." He states we will have a smaller and better Army, irritants will be minimized, and requirements on the soldiers will be reasonable and necessary.)

90. "If U. S. Tries an All-Volunteer Army--Survey of Military Experts." U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 70, 1 March 1971, pp. 32-34.

(This article outlines congressional and military opposition to a volunteer force in light of the debate on the bill to extend the draft. Recurrent objections and counter arguments are given in the areas of recruiting problems for the combat arms; difficulties of maintaining quality people under present standards; the attraction of a volunteer Army for the poor and the blacks; and serious breakdowns of discipline on the battlefield due to actions taken to make Army life more attractive.)

91. Johnson, James H., LTC. An All-Volunteer Army--What Must Be Done? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 21 January 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This thesis identifies actions required to achieve a volunteer Army. The author analyzes the incentives and conditions which must be present to attract enlisted personnel to the Army. He describes the environment which should exist if the goal of a volunteer Army is to be met successfully.)

92. Lojek, Joseph M., LTC. An All-Volunteer Army and Its Impact on the Army Reserve Program. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 8 January 1971. (AWC NRI IRP 70-71 L65)

(A volunteer Army will have great impact on the Reserve program. The author foresees a serious recruiting problem for the Reserves without the draft as a motivating factor in enlistments. Under the volunteer concept a large, combat-ready Reserve force will have increased importance, and a draft may be necessary to maintain adequate Reserve strength.)

93. McCaney, Robert E., LTC, USMC. An All-Volunteer Force. Thesis. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-M255)

(This thesis recounts the basic considerations pertaining to the acquisition of manpower for national defense. The alternative methods of using volunteers, the draft, and universal military service are outlined and compared. Recent events, including and subsequent to President Nixon's decision to move toward a volunteer Armed Force, are summarized. A brief description of some of the major problems which must be overcome before a volunteer concept can become a reality is presented along with the author's opinions on the subject.)

94. McClanahan, Donald D., COL. The Future of the Army National Guard in an All-Volunteer Environment. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 29 November 1970. (AWC NRI IRP 70)

(This essay examines the viability of the Army National Guard in a volunteer Army environment. The author reviews procurement for the Guard since World War I and analyzes strengths and weaknesses. He proposes a program of incentives and actions to promote recruitment and discusses considerations affecting Guard readiness. He concludes the Army National Guard can be successfully sustained under the volunteer concept at a cost effective price.)

95. Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force.
Thomas S. Gates, Chairman. Washington; US Government Printing
Office, 1970. (UB343 A7)

(The Gates Commission found a volunteer force to be both feasible and desirable. It examined objections frequently heard and rejected their validity. Specific conclusions were: (1) the Nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force supported by a stand-by draft; (2) steps should be taken promptly to move in that direction; (3) a volunteer force will not jeopardize national security; (4) it will have a beneficial effect on the military as well as our society as a whole; and (5) the first step that must be taken to move in this direction is to remove the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in the Armed Forces.)

96. Smith, Lynn D., BG (Ret). "An All-Volunteer Army: Real Future Possibility or Impractical Dream?" Army, Vol. 19, April 1969, pp. 22-31.

(The author notes the insufficient quantity and poor quality in the Army during the period 1946-1950. He points out many disciplinary problems, poorly trained units, and the number of men who had to be taught to read and write. He is pessimistic on the quality of the men the Army would procure for a volunteer force today and states standards would have to be lowered to recruit the quantity required.)

97. Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force. Vol. 1 and 2. Washington: US Government Printing Office, November 1970. (UB343 A7a)

(These studies present statistics and background information used by the Gates Commission in preparing its report.)

98. Tax, Sol, ed. The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 7-22. "A Military View of Selective Service," by Colonel Samuel H. Hays. (UB340 D7)

(This chapter is a paper prepared for the Conference on the Draft held at the University of Chicago in December 1966. In it the author examines manpower requirements for the Armed Forces, procurement and retention, fluctuating force levels and deployments, the need for the Armed Forces to relate positively to society, equity and justice in the system of selection, and the use of the military services as a social rehabilitation agency for marginal personnel. He also discusses alternatives to the selective service system, including volunteer forces and national service. The author concludes the draft system should be retained with suggested improvements in efficiency, equity, and uniformity of criteria. An article drawn largely from this paper appeared in Army, Vol. 17, February 1967, pp. 31-41.)

99. "The Zero Draft and the National Guard." The National Guardsman, Vol. 25, March 1971, pp. 2-12.

(This article states recruiting/retention problems faced by the National Guard in view of the proposed zero Draft. Negative factors contributing to the problem of maintaining National Guard strength are pay, satisfaction of personal needs, influence of wives and employers, other outside influences (leisure-time activities), public image, demands on time, changing life styles and attitudes, economy pressures to reduce military forces, and irritating and unattractive aspects of Guard service. Since most DOD efforts and resources to plan a volunteer force are directed at the active Services, the Guard must develop its own recruiting/retention program using resources available. Among several courses of action recommended are better internal communication and an improved personal approach. Surveys of Guardsmen show improvements are needed in the awards and training programs and in personnel and administration management. There is too much "make work." Poor leadership must be eliminated. The Guardsmen want to be challenged and given opportunities to demonstrate leadership and initiative.)

100. US Department of the Army. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation. PROVIDE. Vol. 1, Summary Report. Vol. 2, SECRET, Supporting Analysis. Washington, 15 September 1969. (OO DA-G1 PROVIDE)

(This study provided the Chief of Staff with an in-depth analysis of a post-Vietnam volunteer Army. It includes discussion on the image of the Army, foreign experience with volunteer armies, recruitment and the recruiting system, compensation, incentives, and implications for the future. It contains recommendations and proposed time-phasing for their accomplishment.)

101. US Department of the Army. Office of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army. Master Program for the Modern Volunteer Army FY 1971 and FY 1972. Washington, 1 March 1971.

(This document outlines the US Army master program of actions and procedures which will qualitatively and quantitatively increase procurement and retention by improving professionalism and quality of life in the active Army and Reserve Components. Included in its 10 annexes are measures concerning funding, Project VOLAR, race relations, recruiting, information activities, and high impact actions necessary to achieve conditions conducive to a Modern Volunteer Army.)

102. Westmoreland, William C., GEN. Address to the Association of the United States Army. Washington, 13 October 1970. (U17 W47 V.5)

(In this speech before the annual meeting of AUSA, the Chief of Staff committed the US Army to an all-out effort to achieve a zero draft, a volunteer force. He outlined a four-point program to move in this direction: (1) Those in uniform must work with vigor, imagination, and dedication to the task of obtaining a volunteer force; (2) unnecessary irritants and unattractive features must be eliminated from Army life; (3) funds must be appropriated to increase pay, improve housing, and pay others to perform menial tasks, thereby freeing the soldier to do his primary job; (4) obtain the support of the American people.)

SECTION VI

STUDIES AND SURVEYS--PROCUREMENT AND RETENTION

103. Apgar, Mahlon IV, LT. "Why They Leave." Army, Vol. 16, March 1966, pp. 54-57.

(This article presents results of an informal, unofficial survey of 94 lieutenants leaving the Army. Dissatisfaction was caused principally by poor leadership by seniors, particularly the lower field grades. Also included were lack of common sense and planning, perennial flaps, misplaced priorities, unwillingness to listen to junior officers, "make" work, demeaning work, decline in fringe benefits. Pay was not a major factor.)

104. Crum, Suzanne. Proposals for an All Regular Officer Force as an Aid to Procurement and Retention of Qualified Personnel in the United States Air Force Career Officer Corps. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Pittsburgh University, July 1965. (UG641 C7)

(The thesis of this paper is that the Air Force retention problem can be alleviated by procurement and integration procedures which provide for an all-regular force and by a realistic program of indoctrination and motivation which encourages career commitment. The author examines the dual regular-reserve structure and concludes that: (1) the "career reservist" is considered the second team; (2) reserve status results in career insecurity; (3) the "career reservist" is an anomaly in that he is not a resource for rapid expansion; (4) Air Force ROTC should be eliminated; (5) the method of regular selection is not selective and discourages confidence in procedures; (6) pay, insecurity, and job dissatisfaction are the major deterrents to career motivation; and (7) the positive features of a military career must be stressed. The author's recommendations include: (1) legislation calling for an all-regular officer force; (2) expansion of the Air Force Academy and nationwide competition for appointments; (3) replacement of AFROTC with a scholarship program; and (4) stress on pride in profession and improvements in career security and job satisfaction.)

105. Elliott, James D., Comdr. The Inertial-Psychological Approach to Personnel Retention. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 21 February 1968. (AWC IS-68)

(The author examines the problem of retaining trained men after their first enlistment. A major obstacle is the reenlistment contract itself which, to the enlisted man, denies him his personal freedom for a long period. The primary group concerned is single

men in their early twenties. The author directed his observations to this group in particular and to human behavior in general. He surveyed 276 Navy enlisted men for the study. A pilot program is proposed for a four-year enlistment option that contains a provision that on or after his third anniversary the enlisted man could state his intent to terminate service by tendering one-year's notice. The result would be a man could remain for a career and never be more than a year from separation, should he desire it. Present options should be retained in addition.)

106. Fawcett, Craig R., Lt Comdr, and Skelton, Stuart A., Lt Comdr. A Comparative Analysis between Retention of Junior Officers in the Navy and of Junior Executives in Industry. Thesis. Monterey, California: United States Naval Postgraduate School, 1965. (NvPGS TH F3)

(This thesis compares the factors that affect retention of officers in the US Navy and junior executives in industry. Statistics were compared from the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Pacific Telephone Company. The authors analyze problems confronting these young men and conclude that the Armed Services should adopt "The Radical Approach." This approach would abolish major facets of military service, such as the present pay structure, fringe benefits, retirement program, and promotion criteria, and replace them with more civilian-oriented concepts; e.g., pay based on skill, a health plan similar to Blue Cross, selective-competitive promotions, leave and retirement plans identical to Civil Service, and lateral entry.)

107. Franklin Institute. Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior Officers' Duties. Vol. 1, Summary Report. Vol 2, Results of Questionnaire Analysis. Philadelphia: Systems Science Department of the Franklin Institute, 1968. (UB413 F68)

(The objective of this study was to identify factors influencing career decisions by junior officers. 4532 company grade officers were surveyed by questionnaires and interviews. A major conclusion is that poor leadership by senior officers is much too prevalent. Senior officers are disinterested in junior officers' problems; unit commanders seem unwilling to delegate authority and responsibility and to give junior officers "freedom to fail"; and senior officers lack confidence in junior officers and do not counsel them properly. There is a lack of communication.)

108. Head, Richard H., LTC, USAF. Feasibility of an All-Regular Officer Career Force. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, December 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-H3473)

(This essay discusses the present regular/reserve career officer force structure and the major disadvantages to having career reserve officers. The author concludes that reserve officers on active duty

are second class citizens with low morale and do not have the same promotion opportunities and job security as the regular officer. He proposes a solution that would eliminate the need for a career reserve officer force and then evaluates the solution against the present system. An outline is given for the manner of transition to an all-regular career force.)

109. Johnston, Jerome, and Bachman, Jerald G. Young Men Look at Military Service. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, June 1970. (UB323 M46)

(The purpose of this study was to examine, by questionnaires, the plans and attitudes toward military service of young men nearing high school graduation. It is part of a larger project, Youth in Transition, whose purpose is to study attitudes, plans, and behaviors of adolescents. In this phase 1799 young men were sampled; weighting procedures used to more nearly approximate a cross section of tenth grade boys resulted in 2058 cases. The authors found a lack of knowledge on conditions of military service, but a general belief that a military career provides an opportunity to serve, to become more mature and self-reliant, to achieve upward social and economic mobility for the underprivileged and the Negro. An attempt to gather data on a volunteer Army was "less than successful.")

110. Junior Officer Retention Study. Colorado Springs, Colorado: Headquarters, US Army Air Defense Command, undated.

(This study addresses the retention problem from the viewpoint of ARADCOM. The methodology not only surveyed over 500 junior officers, but also used junior officers on the study group. It is concluded that leadership is a salient factor in influencing young officers to remain in the Army or to leave. Pay, family separations, and mediocre personnel management were high on the list as retention factors. Incompetent superiors, lack of recognition, and fairness were also found to be important. Most of the respondents felt that tangible benefits would attract junior officers only if the human elements of leadership and competence were present. They were critical of cold, machine-like treatment and resented being deprived of the opportunity to exercise independent thought, action, and the opportunity to be innovative.)

111. Latham, Willard, COL. The Army as a Career. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 23 February 1968. (AWC IS-68)

(Since public opinion of the military profession derives from impressions obtained from the armed services, the perception of career Army officers that their way of life has declined in prestige and appeal may be a major cause of procurement and retention problems.

This study considers changes in the Army over the past 30 years and a large number of statistical surveys to determine the impact of these changes on the career attitudes of Army officers. The author concludes that: (1) the scope of an Army career has changed and life is not generally the way it is implied or expected; (2) the officer corps is not a true professional group; (3) the Army is not a full life work career for the majority of officers; and (4) there is an empathy gap between various officer grade levels in the Army.)

112. Liner, Thomas W., COL, USAF. Officer Commissioning Programs in a Volunteer Environment. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, December 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-L574)

(The author discusses present commissioning programs and states retention rates should determine whether a program is successful. He suggests that it might be profitable to provide junior officers their military training before their college education and outlines a new commissioning program. He states the lack of a college degree should not be a barrier to a commission but could be a bar to promotion beyond captain. The author concludes a volunteer environment will not affect the procurement of quality officers.)

113. McCord, Robert E., COL. The Army's Most Valuable Asset: Competent Personnel. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1 December 1969. (AWC IS-70)

(This essay analyzes the factors which influence individual career motivation. The impact of these factors is applied through the frames of reference of the various personnel categories in the Army. The author finds that most officers do not intend to serve for 30 years; the Army has been over-committed, resulting in reduced job satisfaction at all levels; the Army's image has suffered recently; and the Army's greatest internal asset is effective leadership. He recommends improvements in force levels, public relations and recruiting, housing, pay, and personnel stability.)

114. Morris, Emerson E., CPT. Motivation and Retention of the Military Executive. Thesis. University of Pennsylvania: Wharton School, 1958. (UB210 M57)

(The author concludes that two considerations govern the effective motivation of the commissioned officer: (1) The need to identify the officer's needs and goals and to follow this identification with status incentives; (2) the need to apply the incentives, by the military and the public, in a program which will improve the attractiveness of a military career.)

115. Nevins, Robert H., Jr., LTC. The Retention of Quality Junior Officers--A Challenge for the Seventies. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks; US Army War College, 4 March 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This thesis examines the career environment of the junior officer for the past 25 years and identifies major causes for the junior officer retention problem. Numerous statistical surveys from a variety of sources were analyzed. The author's major conclusions are that for an increasing number of junior officers: (1) the Army has been over-extended, resulting in a "mission unlimited" attitude among top political and military leaders and a turbulent career environment; (2) the status, prestige, and national support for the Officer Corps has diminished; (3) the civilian sector better fulfills the needs of the individual; and (4) an empathy gap exists between today's junior officer and a significant number of senior officers.)

116. Partlow, Robert G., Lt Comdr. "The Military Mind." US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 97, February 1971, pp. 81-82.

(The author speaks of the increasing difficulty in attracting potential career personnel, particularly officers, and the increasing reluctance of society to spend its resources on defense. He cites these two problems and presents proposals for their solution, stating his proposals are not an alteration of dedication, self-discipline, and personal sacrifice. His recommendations concern: (1) better post facilities, particularly housing; (2) remaining non-political but knowledgeable, even outspoken on contemporary problems; (3) promoting understanding by loaning officers and highly trained senior enlisted men and women to other Federal agencies or local governments; (4) reducing irritants; (5) increasing career status through education, promotion, and experience.)

117. Taylor, William W., Jr., LTC. Can We Hire Enough Fighters? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 25 February 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This paper discusses procurement problems and identifies factors influencing the individual in selecting a job or in choosing between the Army and civilian employment. Factors militating against Army service are examined to determine corrective action that could be taken. The author concludes that: (1) the disadvantages of Army life that cannot be significantly improved should be compensated for by pay; (2) the level of pay required to attract quality first term enlistees must be determined by trial and error; (3) strict personnel quality controls must be established; (4) a volunteer Army can be bought, but this is a function of how much the public is willing to pay.)

118. US Air Force. Air Force Human Resources Laboratory. Why Airmen Enlist. Lackland Air Force Base, August 1970. (UG633.6 A358 70-29)

(In their first week of training, over 40,000 basic airmen were administered questionnaires to determine reasons for enlistment. Reasons were further defined to determine variables among groups: socio-economic level, geographical origins, race, and education. Most frequently given reasons were education (31.6 percent), wide choice of assignments (13.5 percent), travel (9.1 percent). The variables provide interesting information on motivation of certain groups.)

119. US Department of Defense. Final Report--Ad Hoc Committee on Future Military Service as a Career That Will Attract and Retain Capable Career Personnel. Washington, 30 October 1953. (UB147 U5)

(In February 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense regarding concern for a growing lack of confidence among Armed Forces personnel in the military service as a profession. The stated problem was, "Why has military service lost much of its attractiveness as a lifetime career for inherently capable personnel and what corrective measures are necessary?" The report concludes that: (1) world commitments have burdened people with instability and abnormal hardship; (2) public respect for constituted authority has declined; (3) military authority and leadership have declined; (4) competition with industry for good men has increased; and (5) danger exists that budgetary considerations transcend combat effectiveness. The report deals with professional career officers and noncommissioned officers.)

120. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Junior Officer Retention. Letter from Chief, OPO, to the Commandant, US Army War College, 12 November 1970. (UB413 A5321 1970)

(This letter discusses the junior officer retention problem in the Army and areas needing improvement. Inclosures include retention statistics by branch, junior officer complaints, and actions completed and in progress designed to improve the retention rate.)

121. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Survey Estimate of Retention of Army Personnel. Washington, 31 May 1969. (UB339 A4966 45-69-E)

(This two-part survey of male officers and enlisted men presents statistics concerning all aspects of retention. It sampled over 5,000 officers (O-1 through O-6 and WO) and 21,000 enlisted men (E-1 through E-9) by grade and career and marital status. The report provides data on: (1) the question, "If you plan to leave

the Army, is there any action which the Army could reasonably take which would influence you to remain beyond your current term of service?"; (2) opinions concerning a large number of factors affecting retention; (3) a retention index associated with the retention factors; and (4) comparison of retention indexes among the selected officer/enlisted groups. Among company grade officers the four most influential retention factors were promotion opportunities, retirement benefits, medical benefits, and opportunities for leadership. Among the lower ranking enlisted men they were promotion opportunities, retirement benefits, educational opportunities, and medical benefits.)

122. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Survey Estimate of Selected Retention Data on Army Male Officers. Washington, 30 November 1969. (UB337 A4966 16-17-E)

(This OPO sample survey of military personnel (O-1 through O-6 and WO) is a seven-part report which provides data on: (1) utilization of education, training, and experience in making duty assignments for male officers who have college degrees; (2) utilization of education, training, and experience in making duty assignments; (3) time decision was made to leave the Army and return to civilian life as expressed by male officers who have made a decision to leave the Army; (4) career intentions of male officers upon entry into the Service; (5) present career intentions of male officers; (6) total months of active duty served in Vietnam; (7) total months served in short tour areas. The sample size varied from 2,300 to over 7,000, depending on the topic being surveyed. Detailed results for all categories and ranks are presented.)

123. US Navy. Naval Personnel Research & Development Laboratory. Fleet Attitude Status Report. Washington, July/August 1969. (VB258 A58 1970 No. 1)

(This personnel survey reflects questionnaire responses from over 15,000 naval officers and 16,500 enlisted men regarding career incentives, retention, education, personal services, and duties and conditions of Navy life. The 10 most influential factors for and against a naval career are given for officers, and the 10 most influential for and 6 against for enlisted men. Leadership and leadership opportunities are factors.)

124. US Navy. The Office of Naval Research. Conference on Personnel Retention Research. Washington, 1969. (ND C-PRR 1968)

(This conference, held in New Orleans in December 1968, brought together military personnel, naval in-house researchers, and university researchers in the behavioral sciences. Their purpose was to

discuss retention problems and approaches to retention research. This report of proceedings contains abstracts of presentations made by conference participants.)

125. Wieland, Kay L., LTC. Junior Officer Retention: The Army's Dilemma. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 31 March 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This thesis discusses three aspects of the junior officer retention problem: (1) Civilian-military relations of the psycho-social environment from which Army members are recruited; (2) factors motivating junior officers to choose the Army as a career; and (3) effectiveness of present efforts to improve the retention program. The author finds that low junior officer retention rates can be attributed generally to anti-military sentiment in the civilian community and the inability of the Army to offer balanced intrinsic and extrinsic rewards comparable to the civilian sector. He recommends action to insure that jobs are meaningful; elimination of distinctions between regular and reserve officers on active duty; and education of senior officers regarding leadership challenges created by junior officers and ways to meet the challenges successfully.)

SECTION VII

MISCELLANEOUS

126. Ballou, De Forrest, LTC. The Problem of the Military Dissident and How the Commander Can Deal with This Problem. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 20 November 1969. (AWC IS-70)

(This essay discusses dissidence in the Army and contributing problems. Present official guidelines relative to military dissidence are outlined. New recommended guidelines for commanders are presented and possible actions by Department of the Army to alleviate the problem are given.)

127. Finkelstein, Zane E., LTC. He Rolls the Distant Drum: Some Thoughts on Dissent in the Army. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 21 November 1969. (AWC IS-70)

(The author examines and compares the 1st Amendment freedoms and the realistic requirements of discipline. A further comparison is made between published guidelines for commanders on dissent, the 1st Amendment, and disciplinary needs. Guidelines for both the Department of Defense and Department of the Army grant greater license than is required by the Constitution or is within the scope of acceptable risk. The author suggests a means for correcting the deficiencies.)

128. Hays, Samuel H., COL. "Judge Not Lest Ye Be Judged." Military Review, Vol. 49, February 1969, pp. 3-10.

(The author examines the officer efficiency reporting system as it has evolved over the last 30 years and questions its effectiveness as a personnel management tool today. The present rating forms are not dependable or efficient for use in our selection system. They are inflated and are completed subjectively and using different standards among rating officers. The rating system causes excessive competition and a decline in moral courage, independent thinking, and innovations. The author concludes the importance of the efficiency report as a basis for selection should be reduced and a permanent solution found to the problem. Some areas suggested for investigation are bonus points for command time, peer ratings, and tests which measure attitudes, personality, and skill.)

129. Hays, Samuel H., COL. "Leadership for the Future--Campus Style." Military Review, Vol. 37, April 1957, pp. 53-62.

(This article discusses the ROTC program, its importance, organization, curriculum, and demands or lack thereof, on the cadet. Implications identified are: (1) branch schools and superiors must provide additional indoctrination and training in discipline, standards, customs of the service, and branch techniques; (2) only highly qualified officers should be selected for ROTC instructors; (3) administrative and training support for summer camps must adhere to high standards; and (4) support for the entire program should be adequate in amount and quality. Suggestions for improvement include: (1) initial motivation in secondary schools; (2) better selection methods for advanced students and Distinguished Military Graduates; (3) enhancement of status and content of military curriculum; (4) increased concentration on character and leadership training; and (5) higher standards of cadet performance.)

130. Hays, Samuel H., COL (Ret). "The Soldier's Rights in a Free Society." Army, Vol. 20, May 1970, pp. 28-33.

(The military establishment is the cornerstone of national security, and as such its requirements for group values and group cohesion force denial of inalienable rights to the serviceman. A high degree of authority, discipline, and teamwork is needed to insure solidarity and preparedness to perform assigned missions. Doctrine, rules, and prescribed procedures must direct the operation of the organization. The rights of the individual must be evaluated against these requirements, and the author sees them as having a lower priority than the security of society. In return the military institution must take care of the soldier's personal needs. In this time of rapid change, leadership may take different forms, but authority of command must be retained, and changes should be made through the chain of command.)

131. Hays, Samuel H., COL. "To Thine Own Self Be True." Army, Vol. 17, July 1967, pp. 78-80.

(This celebration concerns the necessity for the military profession to maintain its principles of honor and its ethics in the face of temptations to violate them. Modern technology increases this obligation. Minor violations are symptoms of larger ones and cast doubt on the basic integrity of the profession. The military ethic is different from general society's, and the officer corps must by example and instruction instill its high standards in young members entering the profession and insist that they strive to live up to them. The author concludes an individual can succeed in the Army without compromising his principles and ideals, but it is difficult if he loses sight of his moral beliefs and ethical standards.)

132. "How Two Allies Fare with Volunteers." U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 70, 1 March 1971, p. 35.

(This article examines Britain's and Canada's all-volunteer forces. It finds they must perform with fewer men, forces are expensive, and there is concern about getting the right men for today's specialized forces. In Britain, the minimum enlistment was lowered from six to three years. There is a military salary plan which is competitive with comparable civilian jobs. They have some problems with antimilitary sentiment, image, and standards set so high that 50 percent of the volunteers are rejected. Canada has integrated its small armed force into one uniform. There are four applicants for every job, but there is a lack of qualified applicants for the specialists ratings. Pay is high; the men may live off post; there is an opportunity to become a physician, dentist, etc., at government expense. The problem is retention of trained men.)

133. Knight, Leavitt A., Jr. "What the Army is Doing to Make Out Without the Draft." The American Legion Magazine, Vol. 90, April 1971, p. 4.

(This article examines measures taken recently by the Army to minimize irritating requirements and enhance Service attractiveness. It recognizes that these steps are not permissive, but give trust and dignity to enlisted personnel. It states men will take discipline when they see the reason for it, but a hard line must be drawn between "fair" and "soft." Army leadership, from noncommissioned officers up, faces a stern test in maintaining the proper balance between men and mission.)

134. Maloney, William R., LTC. Domestic Antimilitarism and Its Implications for the Officer Corps in the Seventies. Individual Research Paper. Washington: The National War College, 20 March 1970. (NWC IS-1969/70 M3142)

(This research paper examines domestic antimilitary sentiment, particularly on the college campus, and predicts the effect this climate will have on the attitudes and motivation of officers entering the service from colleges and universities in the 70's. The author sees antimilitarism as growing in strength and composed of four interwoven components: the Student, the Intellectual, the Politician, and the Popular. He suggests the military professional does not perceive the magnitude of campus antimilitarism. It is concluded the image of the military profession needs to be balanced and recommendations are made as to how this image can be enhanced.)

135. Newman, A. S., MG. "Duty-Honor-Country-Army." Army, Vol. 21, February 1971, pp. 47-48.

(General Newman explains and defends the honor system at West Point as a key fundamental in leadership training. Its basis is standards

expected of all officers. He advocates an Officer's Creed which would embody the principle, "for the good of the military service," and could be expressed in the motto Duty-Honor-Country-Army.)

136. Rhyne, Hal B., LTC. The Image of the Army in 1970. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 9 March 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This thesis examines public attitudes toward the Army as an institution and toward professional soldiering. It looks at the Army's image historically and isolates factors affecting our image. The author develops an image for 1970 and considers Army programs designed to influence public attitudes. He concludes that the current unfavorable image could be predicted from historic attitudes and offers means by which the Army can influence future attitudes.)

137. Rigg, Robert B., COL, (Ret). "Future Military Discipline." Military Review, Vol. 50, September 1970, pp. 15-23.

(The author writes about contemporary problems and events occurring in the Army that affect the ability to accomplish tasks. He states that disciplinary problems in the Armed Forces have reached a point where the junior officers and noncommissioned officers of today and the future will require the benefit of more formal training in order to cope successfully with them. This is particularly true of race relations. He indicates the Army must undergo change, just as the Nation is, and learn to understand and deal with the younger generation.)

138. Stogdill, Ralph M. Leadership: A Survey of the Literature. Greensboro, North Carolina: Smith Richardson Foundation, The Creativity Research Institute, July 1968.

(This document is a compilation of leadership research activities and bibliographic items in the following areas: Definitions of leadership; theories of leadership; types of leadership; situational determinants of leadership; leadership, social insight, and empathy; and the persistence and transfer of leadership.)

139. US Air Force. Air Force Human Resources Laboratory. Comparison of Self-Motivated Air Force Enlistees with Draft-Motivated Enlistees. Brooks Air Force Base, July 1970. (UG633.6 A358 70-26)

(This document gives statistical evidence on what the composition of a volunteer force may be. Over 2,000 basic trainees, draft-motivated and self-motivated, completed questionnaires on their backgrounds and attitudes. In comparison, self-motivated volunteers were less educated, proportionately more from minority groups, less affluent, lower in test scores, more positive in attitude.)

140. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Commander's Guide to the Retention of Junior Officers. Washington, undated. (UB413 A5331)

(This handbook was published on or about January 1970 and is to be used by field grade officers in counseling junior officers on the Army as a career. It gives the counselor's role and provides information on advantages of the military profession: education, promotion, pay, assignments, career programs, Regular Army. It includes a section on counseling techniques.)

141. US War Department. Bureau of Public Relations. Press Release on Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships. (Doolittle Board) Washington, 27 May 1946.

(This release contains comprehensive information on the Doolittle Board's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Causes of poor relationships between commissioned and enlisted personnel were found to be poor leadership by a small percentage of officers and a wide official and social gap between the two groups. Some leaders were unqualified or under-trained. Sweeping changes were made in the Army as a result of the board.)

ADDENDUM TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

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SECTION I

METHODOLOGY

142. Kahn, Robert L., and Cannell, Charles F. The Dynamics of Interviewing: Theory, Techniques, and Cases. Second Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960.

(This comprehensive book on the theory and practice of interviewing was written for both students and practitioners in many diverse fields. Topics covered include (1) The Interview as Communication, (2) The Psychological Basis of the Interview, (3) Techniques for Motivating the Respondent, (4) The Formulation of Objectives, (5) The Formulation of Questions, (6) The Design of Questionnaires, (7) The Interview as a Method of Management, (8) Probing to Meet Objectives, and (9) Learning to Interview. Illustrative interviews are also included.)

143. Payne, Stanley L. The Art of Asking Questions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. (LB1027 P3)

(This highly readable book contains practical knowledge on how to make surveys. Subject matter includes consideration of the three basic types of questions, 1,000 "problem" words, the "loaded" question, and the influences of punctuation. Also included is a checklist of 100 items to consider in preparing survey questions.)

SECTION II

MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND HUMAN RELATIONS

144. Berelson, Bernard, and Steiner, Gary A. Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964. (HM51 B42)

(This book states and summarizes related research in 1045 findings by social scientists concerning human behavior. Some of the major topics covered are behavioral development, perception, learning and thinking, motivation, relations in small groups, organizations, institutions (including military), ethnic relations, and attitudes. Pertinent findings on the military institution include: (1) the prestige of a military career is less than a comparable civilian occupation; (2) the complexities of warfare and the cold war have lessened authoritarianism and centralized control; (3) peer pressures in basic training reinforce organizational requirements for adjustment to Army life; (4) adjustment is better for recruits who are better educated, scable, healthy, young, single, and have fewer family contacts; (5) liking and respect for the officer promotes good relationships, group cohesiveness, high morale, and efficiency.)

145. Blau, Peter M., and Scott, W. Richard. Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962. (HD31 B45)

(In this book the authors have used empirical research and studies to attain their theoretical objectives of explaining the "structure and dynamics" of organizations. Chapter headings include (1) The Nature and Types of Formal Organizations, (2) The Organization and Its Publics, (3) The Social Structure of Work Groups, (4) Processes of Communication, (5) The Role of the Supervisor, (6) Managerial Control, (7) The Social Context of Organizational Life, and (8) Organizational Dynamics.)

146. Coates, Charles H., and Pellegrin, Roland J. Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life. University Park, Maryland: The Social Science Press, 1965. (U21.5 C6)

(This comprehensive book is a summary and interpretation of a wealth of materials on American military institutions presented in a sociological frame of reference. The numerous topics and sub-topics include (1) Social Change and Military Institutions, (2) Formal Military Organizations and Status Hierarchies, (3) Military Organizations as Informal Social Systems, (4) Military

Management and Military Leadership, (5) The Meaning of Professionalism, (6) The Status of Military Professionalism, (7) Military Honor and Ethics, (8) Socialization in the Military Profession, (9) Officer-Enlisted Man Relations, (10) Transition from Civilian to Military Life, (11) The Dynamics of Military Group Behavior, and (12) The Future of the Military Profession and Military Institutions.)

147. Davis, James H., LT, et al. "Social Change: A Necessary Variable in Army Planning." Army, Vol. 21, May 1971, pp. 32-35.

(This article was written by five lieutenants in the Social Systems Division, Institute of Land Combat, Combat Developments Command. It discusses previous Army examination of the relationship between human social behavior and Army organizations and missions and states the conclusion that the soldier's social needs must be considered in Army planning. The result was termed the "Whole Man Concept." Further research was embodied in a study, Man and the 1990 Environment, in which it was predicted that organizations in the next 20 years will become more informal and diverse. The Army should continue its interest in social and behavioral research and invest the results in planning for that environment.)

148. Katzell, Raymond A., and Barrett, Richard S. Impact of the Executive on His Position. Washington: US Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory, January 1968. (UB337 A4712 No. 1154)

(A major objective of this study was to determine whether differences in job content and performance are associated with personal characteristics of the civilian executive, the work setting, or a combination of the two. Questionnaires were completed by 193 Department of the Army executives, GS-13 to -17, and 76 of this group were interviewed. Each executive's immediate supervisor completed a questionnaire and a performance appraisal on incumbents. Results of the study indicate: (1) there is disagreement between incumbents and supervisors on job requirements and how they are fulfilled; (2) communication needs improvement; (3) changes in job content normally originate at the top, while recommended changes by the incumbent are resisted; (4) there is a critical problem in implementing decisions due to deficiencies in personnel and teamwork.)

149. Merrill, Harwood F., and Marting, Elizabeth, eds. Developing Executive Skills. New York: American Management Association, Inc., 1958. (HD31 M39 1958)

(This publication of AMA advocates systematic programs of management development. The essentials of such programs are a plan, sound

organization, definitive standards of performance, the right climate, support of top management, objective evaluation, and an array of methods for training and implementation. The concluding chapter, "Developing Tomorrow's Leaders," presents some lessons learned from successful programs. Among the "do's" are: (1) beginning at the top, improve relationships between superior and subordinate; (2) every manager should know the capabilities, potential, and manner of performance of subordinates; (3) management development programs should consider the needs of the individual and the organization; (4) every management position should have clear, current standards of performance; (5) the differences between performance, potential, and personality should be recognized; and (6) every possible opportunity for leadership development should be offered.)

150. Nelson, George W., Jr., MAJ. "The Trouble with Snake Oil." Army, Vol. 21, May 1971, pp. 55-58.

(This article warns against time-worn "sure cures" for managerial and leadership ailments: sweeping and unnecessary reorganizations; procedural changes to assembly line methods which result in unconcerned workers and customer dissatisfaction; and over-reliance on information systems and sophisticated office machines. Success does not come from "snake oil" but from preventive medicine--leadership. The author concludes that austere funding can be healthy if it turns the attention of leaders to their basic function of motivating people to achieve through leadership and integrity.)

151. Newall, William E., LTC, USAF. Effecting Improvements in Job Satisfaction in the Military. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-N433)

(The purpose of this paper is to provide information on behavioral science theories which can be used in conjunction with a previous Air Force study. The previous study correlated Frederick Herzberg's Human Motivation and Dissatisfaction Theory with factors which motivated or dissatisfied junior officers. The author's objective is to give guidelines and suggestions which will improve job satisfaction and personnel retention. He examines Herzberg's theory, A. H. Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs, Douglas McGregor's Theory-X and Theory-Y, Clark Caskey's Continuum of Managerial Types, and George S. Odiorne's The Manager of the Situation. He concludes "the manager of the situation" must understand behavioral science, and recommends that all Air Force managers be made knowledgeable of present behavioral science thinking.

152. Olmstead, Joseph A., et al. Goal-Directed Leadership: Superordinate to Human Relations? Alexandria, Virginia: The George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, March 1967. (GWU HRRR PP-11-67)

(This document consists of four professional papers presented at a symposium on leadership in hierarchical organizations. Each paper addresses a different level in the military structure: senior level, infantry rifle platoon, the rifle squad, and training for potential leaders just completing basic training. HumRRO research and findings in each area are presented, as well as valuable review and reference to previous leadership research done by others. Taken as a whole, it was the symposium's position that human relations are an important part of leadership training, but more important is the need for realistic, practical instruction which provides the student knowledge and understanding of the demands of the situation or environment and how to satisfy these demands.)

SECTION III

LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

153. Flint, Roy K., LTC. "Army Professionalism for the Future." Military Review, Vol. 51, April 1971, pp. 3-11.

(The author sees present criticism of the military establishment after 20 years of unparalleled prestige as a return to conditions which historically are normal. Military leaders must concern themselves with their interactions with the civilian element at DOD level and with their relationships with the men they lead. While leaders should recognize attitudinal changes in today's soldiers, effectiveness, discipline, and efficiency must be preserved. The Armed Forces must identify with the American people and present an image of integrity and competence. Quality performance with fewer resources is essential. Leaders must provide the kind of leadership which will reward and challenge subordinates. Policies and procedures should be reasonable and efficient and enhance combat effectiveness. Leadership training for junior leaders should stress honor, skill, civil-military relationships, the mission, resourcefulness, justice, and physical and moral strength.)

SECTION IV

LEADERSHIP CLIMATE

154. Cameron, Juan. "Our Gravest Military Problem Is Manpower."
Fortune, Vol. 83, April 1971, p. 61.

(This article discusses discontent of all ranks and ages in the Armed Forces and the resulting retention problem. Personnel turbulence is a major source of the difficulty, along with poor personnel management and leadership, antimilitary sentiments, and inequitable pay. The author states the turbulence is caused in large part by the "two worst decisions of the (Vietnam) war": failure to call up the reserves and the 12-month tour. Another cause is manpower cuts. He concedes changes made to improve service attractiveness and improve race relations are a move in the right direction, but additional major changes are required before a volunteer force can be attained. Pay, promotion, and retirement systems must be reformed, military life will have to be much further improved (cut down PCS moves, provide better housing, abolish menial tasks, and provide interesting and challenging work.)

SECTION V

VOLUNTEER FORCES

155. Killebrew, Robert B., CPT. "Volunteer Army: How It Looks to a Company Commander." Army, Vol. 21, March 1971, pp. 19-22.

(The author discusses his unit's retention problem and the reasons for it; pay, administrative red tape, malassignments, lack of pride and identification are mentioned. To improve the status and amenities of service, he recommends: (1) fewer restrictions on freedom of action; (2) better billets and clubs; (3) reduced income taxes (except officers); (4) unit stability; (5) better uniforms (includes more utilitarian fatigues. ". . . there's no correlation between starch and combat effectiveness."); (6) a military justice code and system that provides for quick, effective punishment; and (7) speedy elimination of misfits.)

156. Kim, K. H.; Farrell, Susan; and Clague, Ewan. The All-Volunteer Army: An Analysis of Demand and Supply. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. (UB343 K5)

(This book is a revised and edited version of a report prepared for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in October 1969 for the purpose of assisting the Army with its recommendations to the Gates Commission. The study focuses on personnel requirements to sustain a volunteer Army and the rate of compensation necessary to attract sufficient volunteers. Emphasis is on procurement of enlisted men, though there is some data on officers. The authors identified and analyzed factors which influence procurement and retention, applying the concept of demand and supply; the Army's requirements being demand, and young men from the civilian manpower pool who are willing to enlist being the supply. A major conclusion is that increased compensation will attract enough volunteers to meet requirements "up to a point." However, after reaching that point, the cost is so prohibitive the volunteer force is not feasible.)

157. Smith, Louis J., COL, USAF. Validity of Arguments Against the All-Volunteer Armed Force. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC Th-S4823)

(This report reviews three arguments frequently raised against a volunteer military force: patriotism, mercenary implications, and civilian control. Agreeing with the Gates Commission, the author finds them invalid. He concludes that: (1) the basic strength of the country comes from all areas of employment, not just the military (the real issue is procuring qualified, committed personnel

for the Services); (2) men do not choose a military career for pay alone; and (3) military leaders in a volunteer force will continue to subject themselves to civilian control, as they have throughout our history.)

158. Westmoreland, William C., GEN. "Straight Talk from the Chief on the Modern Volunteer Army." Army, Vol. 21, May 1971, pp. 12-17.

(In this article the Chief of Staff responds to 12 questions from Army editors concerning the Army's position on some significant issues raised by the volunteer Army efforts. He states a volunteer Army will be a better Army with high standards of order and discipline and will not be permissive. The removal of irritants and other policies not contributing to combat effectiveness shows trust for the soldier's maturity and judgment and allows him to concentrate his efforts on those duties essential to mission accomplishment. To create an environment in which young men and women will find job satisfaction and feel pride in service, three policies are vital: decentralization of authority and responsibility, improvement and stabilization of leaders, and increased resources for units.)

SECTION VI

STUDIES AND SURVEYS--PROCUREMENT AND RETENTION

159. Haas, William E., LTC. "Indicators of Trouble." Military Review, Vol. 51, April 1971, pp. 20-24.

(This article states that surveys concerning junior officer retention should be selective; they should seek to learn why men with high potential leave the service--not the average officer. The author believes the former is interested principally in good leadership, responsibility, and an atmosphere of integrity. He thinks part of the retention problem is unwise use of and over-emphasis on management indicators, such as morale, discipline, training, and maintenance. He agrees the indicators can be used soundly, but sees problems in that they can result in false reports and emphasis only on what the higher commander is stressing. The author suggests as a solution that commanders exercise caution in analyzing indicators and in how they are used with subordinates. Second, when faced with injudicious application of indicators, intermediate commanders must act with wisdom and responsibility to subordinates.)

160. Johnson, Keith B., LTC, USAF. Improving Retention of Enlisted Personnel in the Military. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, December 1970. (AF-AU AWC Th-J583)

(The author examines the retention problem in the Armed Forces and identifies the principal sources as pay, promotions, and housing. Less frequently named are assignments, poor leadership, lack of freedom, and menial tasks. He concludes that, outside of pay and housing, effective leadership provides the solution. He calls for sincere personal involvement by commanders at all levels, an understanding of the individual and his attitudes, communication up and down the chain, and respect for human dignity.)

161. Kagerer, Rudolph L. Analysis of Junior Officer Comments on Early Army Experience: Research Study 65-1. Washington: US Department of the Army, US Army Personnel Research Office, March 1965. (UB337 A4712b Index 1964/65)

(This analysis was part of research to develop improved techniques for assigning officers. An attitude questionnaire was administered to 150 junior officers, one portion of which concerned career intentions. The main reason respondents gave for leaving the service was lack of job satisfaction. Forty-eight percent expressed concern over inadequate use of abilities and training. One-half of these intended to leave the Army. Twenty-three percent wanted a voice in their assignments. About 23 percent said pay was too low.)

162. US Department of the Army. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.
Why They Leave: Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966.
Washington, 6 July 1970.

(The purpose of this study was to determine the causes of the higher than usual resignation rate for the US Military Academy class of 1966, and to furnish recommendations for improving retention rates of quality junior officers. Methodology consisted of the chronological reconstruction of the records of 100 resignees, to include civilian and military background and future potential; a questionnaire to resignees concerning expectations, satisfiers, dissatisfiers, and recommendations for improving service attractiveness; and in-depth interviews of 10 resignees conducted at West Point. In general, the study found that: (1) retention studies need a taxonomy which will assure that corrective actions are targeted on the groups the Army is most desirous of retaining; and (2) principal dissatisfiers relate to excessive family separations and the prospects of another tour in Vietnam. There are 18 recommendations; 13 concerning policy matters, and 5 dealing with operating procedures.

163. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Survey Estimate of Opinions on the Image of the Army as Expressed by Army Personnel. Washington, 31 May 1970. (UB337 A4966 12-71-E)

(This OPO sample survey of male officers (O-1 through O-6 and WO) and enlisted men (E-1 through E-9) by grade and career and marital status is a three-part report concerning: (1) liking for Army life; (2) opinion on whether the security of the Nation is currently seriously threatened; and (3) military service recommended to young men of draft age. Results are given in percentages; numbers of individuals surveyed is not given. Selected results on part I: 25.5 percent of 2LT's, 26.5 percent of 1LT's, and 13.4 percent of CPT's dislike Army life. 42.4 percent of E-1's, 51.3 percent of E-2's, 59.2 percent of E-3's, and 62.2 percent of E-4's dislike it. Part III: 15.4 percent of 2LT's, 13.6 percent of 1LT's, and 10.6 percent of CPT's would not recommend military service. 27.7 percent of E-1's, 28.4 percent of E-2's, 37.7 percent of the E-3's, and 37.1 percent of the E-4's would not recommend it.)

SECTION VII

MISCELLANEOUS

164. Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957. (JK558 H8)

(This book presents a theory of civil-military relations as an aspect of national security policy. The author begins by defining and discussing professionalism (expertise, responsibility, and corporateness) and the military ethic (realistic and conservative). He advocates an equilibrium of civil-military relations, termed "objective civilian control," in which military professionalism is maximized, thereby reducing the political power of the military and increasing security. He contrasts this to "subjective civilian control" in which conflicting civilian groups attempt to control the military as a means of enhancing their own power. He uses the Japanese and German officer corps to demonstrate his theory.)

165. Jahoda, Marie, and Warren, Neil, eds. Attitudes. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966. (BF323 C5J3)

(This book includes readings from over 40 authors which examine some of the conceptual issues of attitude research. Topics covered include (1) The Concept of Attitude; (2) Research in Attitudes with focus on content, origins, change, and behavior; and (3) Theory and Method. Information is largely of an empirical nature.)

166. Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960. (UB147 J31)

(This book is an objective, scientific study of the factors shaping and influencing the military profession over the last 50 years and the profession's relationships to America's society and political institutions. The author bases his analysis on five hypotheses, which are discussed in detail in succeeding chapters. The first is that changes in technology and warfare, and the resulting need for highly skilled and motivated soldiers, has caused the basis of authority and discipline to shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on persuasion and group consensus. Second, the skill differential between the civilian and military elites has narrowed. Third, officer procurement has shifted from a narrow base, relatively high in social status, to a broader base more representative of the population. Fourth, career patterns are significant to the attainment of a position in the "military elite." Fifth, the growth of the military establishment's managerial and political responsibilities has resulted in strain on traditional

military concepts. The author sees the Armed Forces evolving into a constabulary which is more concerned with maintaining peace than in waging war.)

167. Malone, Paul B. III. The Impact of the Current Age of Dissent on the Future of the U. S. Military Establishment. Individual Research Paper. Washington: The National War College, March 1970. (NWC IS-1969/70 M3141)

(This comprehensive, detailed paper includes an examination of the relationship of the military establishment to society; the domestic issues affecting the nation's climate; youth attitudes; problems in the military; the future outlook; and possible courses of action. The author concludes that: (1) personnel stability must be achieved as soon as possible; (2) personnel management must meet the expectations of the individual; (3) ethics and professionalism must meet the highest standards; (4) unnecessary irritants must be eliminated while retaining outstanding leadership and a high state of discipline; (5) the Armed Forces should become more involved in social problems on and off base; and (6) the image of the military establishment should be enhanced. Specific recommendations are made in each area.)

168. Porter, Lyman W., and Mitchell, Vance F. "Comparative Study of Need Satisfaction in Military and Business Hierarchies." Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 51, 1967, pp. 145-151. (Reprint File)

(Over 700 commissioned officers and 590 noncommissioned officers serving in the Air Force completed a questionnaire measuring need fulfillment and satisfaction. The results for three levels of the commissioned officers were compared to previous results for comparable civilian managers (BG and COL to vice presidents; LTC and MAJ to upper middle managers; CPT and LT to lower middle managers). While military officers were less fulfilled and less satisfied, fulfillment and satisfaction did increase in relation to military rank, the same as for civilian managers. An interesting additional finding was that higher-ranking noncommissioned officers reported more fulfillment but less satisfaction than lower-ranking commissioned officers.)

169. Tyler, James W., MAJ. A Study of the Personal Value Systems of US Army Officers and a Comparison with American Managers. Thesis (Unpublished). University of Minnesota, August 1969. (UB413 T95)

(Using a questionnaire, the author measured the value systems of 235 Army officers (general officers, lieutenant colonels, captains, and ROTC cadets) and compared them to previous samples of 1051

managers. He concludes that: (1) there are major differences between managers and Army officers, but they are basically similar; and (2) Army officers are generally pragmatic in their orientation with a strong secondary orientation which is ethical and moralistic. The primary orientation is moderated by age and higher education.)

170. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 16-9: Character Guidance Discussion Topics: Duty-Honor-Country. Washington, 26 June 1968.

(This pamphlet was prepared as source material for instruction in the Army's Character Guidance Program. This document contains lesson plans and texts for discussions on courage, integrity, the home, gratitude, clean speech, and right (as opposed to rights).)

171. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 16-11: Character Guidance Discussion Topics: Duty-Honor-Country. Washington, 25 April 1969.

(This pamphlet was prepared as source material for instruction in the Army's Character Guidance Program. This document contains lesson plans and texts for discussions on sacrifice, personal freedom, patience, setting the example, practical wisdom, and reputation.)

172. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-301: Standards of Conduct. Washington, 15 February 1963.

(This brief publication concerns the importance of integrity to the Officer Corps. It is drawn in broad terms from AR 600-50, Standards of Conduct for Department of the Army Personnel, and discusses the code of the officer and guidelines for the acceptance of gratuities.)

173. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-302: The Profession of Arms. Washington, 17 November 1966.

(This is a series of three lectures given in 1962 at Trinity College, Cambridge, by General Sir John Winthrop Hackett. He traces the origin and development of the profession of arms from Sparta to the present and then discusses the profession today and in the future. He sees an environment that will always have tension and a degree of conflict, if not total war, and in which heavy demands will be placed on the armed forces to exercise the appropriate degree of response, thereby deterring general war. The military establishment will continue to be a reflection of society and must accommodate changing patterns. The young officer will have heavy demands on him in relations with his men. He should be consistent, firm, and sincere, while maintaining the appropriate degree of detachment and discipline. Leadership will be more manipulative than authoritarian.)

174. US Department of the Army. US Army Combat Developments Command. Personnel Offensive (Phase I): Interim Report of Research Findings. Fort Benjamin Harrison: Personnel and Administrative Services Agency, 29 March 1971.

(This three-volume report is one of three substudies which comprise the DA Priority Study, "American Soldier in the 70's." The assigned task was to review available research findings to determine factors influencing individual performance in combat and probable personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel during the 70's. Factors influencing combat performance are categorized as motivational (13, including discipline, leadership, recognition, and pride), stress (11, including fear, moral code, constraints, and drugs), and support (8, including living and working conditions, food, and administration). In determining probable personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel, youth norms were used rather than individual characteristics. Twelve factors were researched among which were demographic, dress and grooming, mental and physical fitness, drug use, concept of self, leisure time, and group values. Predictions are made concerning each factor.)

175. US Department of the Army. US Military Academy. Essays on American Military Institutions. Part I and Part II. West Point, 1969. (UA23 A1A38 1969)

(These volumes contain 32 essays used in a course in American Military Institutions at the US Military Academy. Broad topics covered in detail are (1) The Military Organization as a Social System, (2) Military Institutions and National Objectives, (3) Social Impact of Military Support Systems, (4) Organization and Control, (5) Recruitment and Personnel Management, (6) Assimilation of Military Roles, and (7) The Institution and Its Members. There is an extensive bibliography.)

176. Whiting, Frederick D., LTC. The Soldier and Individual Rights. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC Th-W4583)

(The author reviews the history of individual rights for the soldier, examines the evolution of military law, and discusses the impact of selected court decisions on the military justice system. He finds that the rights of today's soldier are protected, consistent with the need for a degree of discipline and order which provides for mission accomplishment. To insure an understanding of this by all military members, the author suggests emphasis on the subject in command information programs and maximum personal freedom for the soldier with an acceptable degree of discipline. Knowledge of and

respect for individual rights is a command responsibility which should be exercised with the proper degree of interest, emphasis, and action.)

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ANNEX B


SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

(NOTE: Three forms of the questionnaire were administered. Each individual completed only one form of the questionnaire.

Individuals answered the questions from one of three perspectives concerning his last duty assignment:

One, description of his own Leadership behavior; or two, description of his immediate superior's Leadership behavior; or three, description of one of his subordinate's Leadership behavior. Individual was instructed to select one immediate subordinate whom he knew well, preferably neither his best nor poorest.)

LEADERSHIP IN THE 1970'S



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

CONTROLLED HANDLING

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

LEADERSHIP IN THE 1970's

We are asking your help in a study which seeks to determine the attitudes and opinions of members of the United States Army with respect to leadership. We need your personal opinions. We plan to gather data through your answers to these questions and through later interviews with some of you. The results of this study will be provided to all levels of Army leadership, including the highest, and may become the basis for improved leadership throughout the Army. The answers you give in this study will be entirely confidential and your signature or identification is not required. Your cooperation and frank response will be a major contribution in identifying leadership problems and potential solutions.



LEADERSHIP STUDY

Part I of this study requests data concerning yourself. Most of the questions in this study are answered by circling an appropriate response number, as illustrated by the example below. Please respond to every question in all parts of the study.

EXAMPLE:

SEX (circle)
1. Male
2. Female

PART I

1. AGE (circle)

1. 17-21
2. 22-28
3. 29-35
4. 36-45
5. Over 45

2. SEX (circle)

1. Male
2. Female

3. GRADE (circle)

1. E1
2. E2
3. E3
4. E4
5. E5
6. E6
7. E7
8. E8
9. E9
10. I am a Warrant or Commissioned Officer

4. GRADE (circle)

1. W1 or W2
2. W3 or W4
3. O1
4. O2
5. O3
6. O4
7. O5
8. O6
9. O7+
10. I am an Enlisted Man

5. TOTAL YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE (circle)

1. Under 2
2. Over 2 but less than 5
3. Over 5 but less than 10
4. Between 10 and 20
5. Over 20

6-7. BRANCH (circle)

- | | | |
|----------|----------|--|
| 1. ADA | 8. FC | 15. OrdC |
| 2. AGC | 9. INF | 16. QMC |
| 3. ARMOR | 10. JAGC | 17. SigC |
| 4. CH | 11. MC | 18. TC |
| 5. CMLC | 12. MI | 19. WAC |
| 6. CE | 13. MPC | 20. I am an Enlisted Man
or Aviation Warrant
Officer |
| 7. FA | 14. MSC | |

8. PMOS

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| 1. _____ (Enlisted Men Only) | 3. Does not apply--I am an
Aviation Warrant Officer |
| 2. Does not apply--I am an Officer | |

9. RACE (circle)

1. American Indian
2. Caucasian (White)
3. Negro (Black)
4. Oriental
5. Other

10. MARITAL STATUS (circle)

1. Single
2. Married
3. Separated
4. Divorced
5. Widow(er)

11. WHERE DID YOU LIVE MOST OF YOUR LIFE PRIOR TO ENTERING THE ARMY? (circle)

1. Farm
2. Small town (under 5,000 people)
3. Small city (5,000-75,000 people) or suburb of small city
4. Medium city (75,000-500,000 people) or suburb of medium city
5. Large city (over 500,000 people) or suburb of large city

12. IN WHAT PART OF THE COUNTRY DID YOU LIVE MOST OF YOUR LIFE PRIOR TO ENTERING THE ARMY? (circle)

1. Northeast
2. North Central
3. South
4. Midwest
5. Southwest
6. Far West
7. Other

13. WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE ANNUAL INCOME OF YOUR FAMILY (OR PRINCIPAL MEANS OF SUPPORT) BEFORE ENTERING THE ARMY? (circle)

1. Less than \$3,000
2. \$3,000 to \$5,000
3. \$5,000 to \$8,000
4. \$8,000 to \$12,000
5. Over \$12,000
6. I don't know

14. WHAT IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF CIVILIAN EDUCATION YOU HAVE COMPLETED? (circle)

1. Eight years or less
2. Completed some high school
3. Graduated from high school
4. Completed some college
5. Graduated from college
6. Masters degree or higher

15. HOW DID YOU ENTER THE ARMY? (circle)

1. Volunteer
2. Draftee
3. Does not apply--Entered the Army as an officer

16. WHAT WAS THE SOURCE OF YOUR COMMISSION? (circle)

1. USMA
2. ROTC
3. OCS
4. Direct
5. Other
6. Does not apply--I am an Enlisted Man

17. This study will ask some of you to think about your past Army career. Consider the many different units in the Army. Based on recent assignments and experience, IN WHAT ONE OF THESE UNITS DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF TO BE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE? (circle only one)

1. Squad or equivalent
2. Platoon or equivalent
3. Company or equivalent
4. Battalion or equivalent
5. Brigade or equivalent
6. Division
7. Corps or higher
8. Not applicable to me
9. I am not knowledgeable in any of the above

PART II

The following series of questions relate to the actions of one of your immediate subordinates in the assignment, immediately prior to your current one. Please exclude interim or temporary duty type assignments. For this part of the study, try as nearly as possible to recall the situation and conditions as they existed and answer the questions to the best of your ability. Please select one immediate subordinate whom you knew well, preferably neither your best nor your poorest, and answer all questions with that one subordinate in mind. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are interested in your opinions and ideas.

Section I requests some basic data relating to your prior unit, your duty assignment, and to your subordinate in that assignment.

Section I.

1. My last duty assignment was with (type of unit; for example, infantry company, artillery battery, corps headquarters, etc.) _____

2. Type and location of unit. (circle)

1. Vietnam (combat)
2. Vietnam (combat support and combat service support)
3. Other overseas
4. Europe (TOE-operational unit)
5. Europe (other)
6. CONUS (TOE-operational unit)
7. CONUS (training base)
8. CONUS (other)

3. The rank of my immediate subordinate was: (circle)

1. Sergeant or below
2. Sergeant First Class or Staff Sergeant
3. Sergeant Major or First Sergeant
4. Warrant Officer
5. Lieutenant or Captain
6. Major or Lieutenant Colonel
7. Colonel or above

4. The position of my subordinate was (Platoon Sergeant, Battery Commander, Battalion S1, Brigade Signal Officer, etc.) _____

Section II.

This section consists of a series of statements which indicate in one way or another the leadership abilities and personality of the subordinate you selected in Section I. For each statement you are asked to answer three (3) questions: (1) the frequency with which your subordinate actually accomplished the action indicated; (2) the frequency with which you think your subordinate should have accomplished the action indicated; and (3) how important the action was to you.

Please circle the number opposite the word or phrase under each question which most closely reflects your opinion or attitude. BE SURE TO ANSWER ALL THREE QUESTIONS AFTER EACH STATEMENT.

EXAMPLE: ► "HE WAS COURTEOUS IN HIS ACTIONS."

(1) <u>How often was he?</u>	(2) <u>How often should he have been?</u>	(3) <u>How important was this to you?</u>
Always 7	Always 7	Critical 7
Almost Always 6	Almost Always 6	Very Important 6
Frequently 5	Frequently 5	Important 5
Sometimes 4	Sometimes 4	Sometimes Important 4
Infrequently 3	Infrequently 3	Seldom Important 3
Almost Never 2	Almost Never 2	Relatively Unimportant 2
Never 1	Never 1	Unimportant 1

► "HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM."

(1) <u>How often did he?</u>		(2) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(3) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND."

(4) <u>How often was he?</u>		(5) <u>How often should he have been?</u>		(6) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Without Exception	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once In Awhile	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not At All	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM."

(7) <u>How often did he?</u>		(8) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(9) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Not At All	7	Never	7	Critical	7
Seldom	6	Almost Never	6	Very Important	6
Once In Awhile	5	Infrequently	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Often	3	Frequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Quite Often	2	Almost Always	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Without Exception	1	Always	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB."

(10) <u>How often did he?</u>		(11) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(12) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Without Exception	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once In Awhile	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not At All	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS."

(13) <u>How often was he?</u>		(14) <u>How often should he have been?</u>		(15) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN."

(16) <u>How often did he?</u>		(17) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(18) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Not Ever	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1
Rarely	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Hardly Ever	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Usually	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
A Great Deal	7	Always	7	Critical	7

► "HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS."

(19) <u>How often was he?</u>		(20) <u>How often should he have been?</u>		(21) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Without Exception	7	A Great Deal	7	Unimportant	1
Quite Often	6	Usually	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Often	5	Most of the Time	5	Seldom Important	3
Occasionally	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once In Awhile	3	Hardly Ever	3	Important	5
Seldom	2	Rarely	2	Very Important	6
Not At All	1	Not Ever	1	Critical	7

► "HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS."

(22) <u>To what extent did he do this?</u>		(23) <u>To what extent should he have done this?</u>		(24) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Unimportant	1
Usually	6	Usually	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Important	5
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Very Important	6
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Critical	7

► "HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES."

(25) To what extent did he do this?		(26) To what extent should he have done this?		(27) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	Without Exception	7	Unimportant	1
Usually	6	Quite Often	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	5	Often	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Once in Awhile	3	Important	5
Rarely	2	Seldom	2	Very Important	6
Not Ever	1	Not At All	1	Critical	7

► "HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE."

(28) How often did he?		(29) How often should he have?		(30) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	7	Unimportant	1
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Seldom Important	3
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Important	5
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Very Important	6
Never	1	Never	1	Critical	7

► "HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES."

(31) How often was he?		(32) How often should he have been?		(33) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Critical	7
Usually	6	Usually	6	Very Important	6
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Important	5
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Seldom Important	3
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER."

(34) How often did he?		(35) How often should he have?		(36) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not at All	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE."

(37) <u>How often did he?</u>	(38) <u>How often should he have?</u>	(39) <u>How important was this to you?</u>
Without Exception 7	Without Exception 7	Unimportant 1
Quite Often 6	Quite Often 6	Relatively Unimportant 2
Often 5	Often 5	Seldom Important 3
Occasionally 4	Occasionally 4	Sometimes Important 4
Once in Awhile 3	Once in Awhile 3	Important 5
Seldom 2	Seldom 2	Very Important 6
Not at All 1	Not at All 1	Critical 7

► "HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS."

(40) <u>To what extent did he?</u>	(41) <u>To what extent should he have?</u>	(42) <u>How important was this to you?</u>
A Great Deal 7	A Great Deal 7	Unimportant 1
Usually 6	Usually 6	Relatively Unimportant 2
Most of the Time 5	Most of the Time 5	Seldom Important 3
Now and Then 4	Now and Then 4	Sometimes Important 4
Hardly Ever 3	Hardly Ever 3	Important 5
Rarely 2	Rarely 2	Very Important 6
Not Ever 1	Not Ever 1	Critical 7

► "HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES."

(43) <u>How often was he?</u>	(44) <u>How often should he have been?</u>	(45) <u>How important was this to you?</u>
Without Exception 7	Without Exception 7	Critical 7
Quite Often 6	Quite Often 6	Very Important 6
Often 5	Often 5	Important 5
Occasionally 4	Occasionally 4	Sometimes Important 4
Once in Awhile 3	Once in Awhile 3	Seldom Important 3
Seldom 2	Seldom 2	Relatively Unimportant 2
Not at All 1	Not at All 1	Unimportant 1

► "HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES."

(46) <u>To what extent did he?</u>	(47) <u>To what extent should he have?</u>	(48) <u>How important was this to you?</u>
Without Exception 7	Without Exception 7	Critical 7
Quite Often 6	Quite Often 6	Very Important 6
Often 5	Often 5	Important 5
Occasionally 4	Occasionally 4	Sometimes Important 4
Once in Awhile 3	Once in Awhile 3	Seldom Important 3
Seldom 2	Seldom 2	Relatively Unimportant 2
Not at All 1	Not at All 1	Unimportant 1

► "HE WAS APPROACHABLE."

(49) <u>How often was he?</u>		(50) <u>How often should he have been?</u>		(51) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Always	7	Always	7	Unimportant	1
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Seldom Important	3
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Important	5
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Very Important	6
Never	1	Never	1	Critical	7

► "HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE."

(52) <u>How often did he?</u>		(53) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(54) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR."

(55) <u>To what extent did he?</u>		(56) <u>To what extent should he have?</u>		(57) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Without Exception	7	Without Exception	7	Unimportant	1
Quite Often	6	Quite Often	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Often	5	Often	5	Seldom Important	3
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Once in Awhile	3	Important	5
Seldom	2	Seldom	2	Very Important	6
Not at All	1	Not at All	1	Critical	7

► "HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISION MAKING."

(58) <u>How often did he?</u>		(59) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(60) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Critical	7
Usually	6	Usually	6	Very Important	6
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Important	5
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Seldom Important	3
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Unimportant	1

► ► REMINDER

- You are still answering these questions in terms of performance of your immediate SUBORDINATE in your last duty assignment, as indicated in Section I of Part II.

► "HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL."

(61) How often did he?	(62) To what extent should he have?	(63) How important was this to you?
Without Exception 7	A Great Deal 7	Critical 7
Quite Often 6	Usually 6	Very Important 6
Often 5	Most of the Time 5	Important 5
Occasionally 4	Now and Then 4	Sometimes Important 4
Once in Awhile 3	Hardly Ever 3	Seldom Important 3
Seldom 2	Rarely 2	Relatively Unimportant 2
Not at All 1	Not Ever 1	Unimportant 1

► "HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH."

(64) To what extent did he?	(65) To what extent should he have?	(66) How important was this to you?
A Great Deal 7	A Great Deal 7	Unimportant 1
Usually 6	Usually 6	Relatively Unimportant 2
Most of the Time 5	Most of the Time 5	Seldom Important 3
Now and Then 4	Now and Then 4	Sometimes Important 4
Hardly Ever 3	Hardly Ever 3	Important 5
Rarely 2	Rarely 2	Very Important 6
Not Ever 1	Not Ever 1	Critical 7

► "HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS."

(67) How often did he?	(68) How often should he have?	(69) How important was this to you?
Without Exception 1	Without Exception 1	Critical 7
Quite Often 2	Quite Often 2	Very Important 6
Often 3	Often 3	Important 5
Occasionally 4	Occasionally 4	Sometimes Important 4
Once in Awhile 5	Once in Awhile 5	Seldom Important 3
Seldom 6	Seldom 6	Relatively Unimportant 2
Not at All 7	Not at All 7	Unimportant 1

► "HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE."

(70) How often did he?	(71) How often should he have?	(72) How important was this to you?
A Great Deal 7	Always 7	Critical 7
Usually 6	Almost Always 6	Very Important 6
Most of the Time 5	Frequently 5	Important 5
Now and Then 4	Sometimes 4	Sometimes Important 4
Hardly Ever 3	Infrequently 3	Seldom Important 3
Rarely 2	Almost Never 2	Relatively Unimportant 2
Not Ever 1	Never 1	Unimportant 1

► "HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES."

(01) <u>How often did he?</u>		(02) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(03) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Unimportant	1
Usually	6	Usually	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Important	5
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Very Important	6
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Critical	7

► "HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES."

(04) <u>How often did he?</u>		(05) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(06) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Not Ever	7	Not Ever	7	Unimportant	1
Rarely	6	Rarely	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Hardly Ever	5	Hardly Ever	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	3	Most of the Time	3	Important	5
Usually	2	Usually	2	Very Important	6
A Great Deal	1	A Great Deal	1	Critical	7

► "HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES."

(07) <u>How often did he?</u>		(08) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(09) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS."

(10) <u>How often did he?</u>		(11) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(12) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Not Ever	7	Not Ever	7	Unimportant	1
Rarely	6	Rarely	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Hardly Ever	5	Hardly Ever	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	3	Most of the Time	3	Important	5
Usually	2	Usually	2	Very Important	6
A Great Deal	1	A Great Deal	1	Critical	7

► "HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH."

(13) <u>How often did he?</u>		(14) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(15) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE WAS SELFISH."

(16) <u>How often was he?</u>		(17) <u>How often should he have been?</u>		(18) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Not Ever	7	Always	1	Unimportant	1
Rarely	6	Almost Always	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Hardly Ever	5	Frequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	3	Infrequently	5	Important	5
Usually	2	Almost Never	6	Very Important	6
A Great Deal	1	Never	7	Critical	7

► "HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES."

(19) <u>How often did he?</u>		(20) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(21) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Without Exception	7	Without Exception	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Quite Often	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Often	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Once in Awhile	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Seldom	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not at All	1	Not at All	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE."

(22) <u>How often did he?</u>		(23) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(24) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Not at All	7	Not at All	7	Unimportant	1
Seldom	6	Seldom	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Once in Awhile	5	Once in Awhile	5	Seldom Important	3
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Often	3	Often	3	Important	5
Quite Often	2	Quite Often	2	Very Important	6
Without Exception	1	Without Exception	1	Critical	7

► "HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER."

(25) <u>How often did he?</u>		(26) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(27) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Not Ever	7	Never	7	Critical	7
Rarely	6	Almost Never	6	Very Important	6
Hardly Ever	5	Infrequently	5	Important	5
Now and Then	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	3	Frequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Usually	2	Almost Always	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
A Great Deal	1	Always	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS."

(28) <u>How often did he?</u>		(29) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(30) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7

► "HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES."

(31) <u>How often did he?</u>		(32) <u>How often should he have?</u>		(33) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Critical	7
Usually	6	Usually	6	Very Important	6
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Important	5
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Seldom Important	3
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES."

(34) <u>How often did he do this?</u>		(35) <u>How often should he have done this?</u>		(36) <u>How important was this to you?</u>	
Never	7	Never	7	Unimportant	1
Almost Never	6	Almost Never	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Infrequently	5	Infrequently	5	Seldom Important	3
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Frequently	3	Frequently	3	Important	5
Almost Always	2	Almost Always	2	Very Important	6
Always	1	Always	1	Critical	7

► "HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND."

(37) <u>How often did he?</u>	(38) <u>How often should he have?</u>	(39) <u>How important was this to you?</u>
Without Exception 1	Without Exception 1	Critical 7
Quite Often 2	Quite Often 2	Very Important 6
Often 3	Often 3	Important 5
Occasionally 4	Occasionally 4	Sometimes Important 4
Once in Awhile 5	Once in Awhile 5	Seldom Important 3
Seldom 6	Seldom 6	Relatively Unimportant 2
Not at All 7	Not at All 7	Unimportant 1

► "HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES."

(40) <u>How often did he?</u>	(41) <u>How often should he have?</u>	(42) <u>How important was this to you?</u>
Without Exception 7	Without Exception 7	Unimportant 1
Quite Often 6	Quite Often 6	Relatively Unimportant 2
Often 5	Often 5	Seldom Important 3
Occasionally 4	Occasionally 4	Sometimes Important 4
Once in Awhile 3	Once in Awhile 3	Important 5
Seldom 2	Seldom 2	Very Important 6
Not at All 1	Not at All 1	Critical 7

► "HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT."

(43) <u>How often was he?</u>	(44) <u>How often should he have been?</u>	(45) <u>How important was this to you?</u>
Not at All 7	Not at All 7	Unimportant 1
Seldom 6	Seldom 6	Relatively Unimportant 2
Once in Awhile 5	Once in Awhile 5	Seldom Important 3
Occasionally 4	Occasionally 4	Sometimes Important 4
Often 3	Often 3	Important 5
Quite Often 2	Quite Often 2	Very Important 6
Without Exception 1	Without Exception 1	Critical 7

► "HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY."

(46) <u>How often did he?</u>	(47) <u>How often should he have?</u>	(48) <u>How important was this to you?</u>
Always 7	Always 7	Critical 7
Almost Always 6	Almost Always 6	Very Important 6
Frequently 5	Frequently 5	Important 5
Sometimes 4	Sometimes 4	Sometimes Important 4
Infrequently 3	Infrequently 3	Seldom Important 3
Almost Never 2	Almost Never 2	Relatively Unimportant 2
Never 1	Never 1	Unimportant 1

► "HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK."

(49) To what extent did he?		(50) To what extent should he have?		(51) How important was this to you?	
Always	1	Always	1	Critical	7
Almost Always	2	Almost Always	2	Very Important	6
Frequently	3	Frequently	3	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	5	Infrequently	5	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	6	Almost Never	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	7	Never	7	Unimportant	1

► "HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT."

(52) To what extent did he do this?		(53) To what extent should he have done this?		(54) How important was this to you?	
Not at All	7	Not at All	7	Critical	7
Seldom	6	Seldom	6	Very Important	6
Once in Awhile	5	Once in Awhile	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Often	3	Often	3	Seldom Important	3
Quite Often	2	Quite Often	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Without Exception	1	Without Exception	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS."

(55) To what extent did he do this?		(56) To what extent should he have done this?		(57) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	1	Always	1	Unimportant	1
Usually	2	Almost Always	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	3	Frequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	5	Infrequently	5	Important	5
Rarely	6	Almost Never	6	Very Important	6
Not Ever	7	Never	7	Critical	7

PART II

SECTION III

1. Looking back, how do you personally feel about the overall performance of the SUBORDINATE you have used as a reference in this study? Please circle the response number which most nearly reflects your feelings.

3 SOMEWHAT
DISAPPOINTED

5 SOMEWHAT
PLEASED

2 HIGHLY
DISAPPOINTED

4 LUKEWARM--
NO STRONG
FEELINGS

6 HIGHLY
PLEASED

1 TOTALLY DIS-
APPOINTED IN
ALL RESPECTS

7 TOTALLY PLEASED
IN ALL RESPECTS

2. WAS THIS IN A COMBAT SITUATION? (Circle)

1 YES

2 NO

3. If the answer to the above question was "NO," answer Question No. 4 below. If your answer was "YES," skip Question No. 4 and go on to the next part.

4. If you had been in a combat situation, how do you think you would have felt about the overall performance of this SUBORDINATE? Please circle the response number which most nearly reflects your feelings.

3 SOMEWHAT
DISAPPOINTED

5 SOMEWHAT
PLEASED

2 HIGHLY
DISAPPOINTED

4 LUKEWARM--
NO STRONG
FEELINGS

6 HIGHLY
PLEASED

1 TOTALLY DIS-
APPOINTED IN
ALL RESPECTS

7 TOTALLY PLEASED
IN ALL RESPECTS

There will continue to be many varied leadership challenges in the Army. Although there have been numerous changes of values and customs within our society, the principles of leadership listed below have been guides for many years.

1. Be technically and tactically proficient.
2. Know yourself and seek self-improvement.
3. Know your men and look out for their welfare.
4. Keep your men informed.
5. Set the example.
6. Insure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.
7. Train your men as a team.
8. Make sound and timely decisions.
9. Develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates.
10. Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities.
11. Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.

This part of the study pertains to the relative importance and application of the principles of leadership IN YOUR LAST ASSIGNMENT. We realize that all of the principles are important; however, depending on the situation, some may not be as important as others. Further, this item does not attempt to evaluate the techniques of application. We appreciate the interrelationship between the principles, but ask you to recall your LAST ASSIGNMENT and list the numbers of the three principles that WERE THE LEAST IMPORTANT TO YOU in the spaces provided below.

THREE LEAST IMPORTANT:

▶ _____
▶ _____
▶ _____

Please choose three principles that were the MOST IMPORTANT TO YOU IN YOUR LAST ASSIGNMENT and place their numbers in the spaces provided.

THREE MOST IMPORTANT:

▶ _____
▶ _____
▶ _____

COMMENTS

[The page contains faint horizontal lines suggesting ruled paper.]

13-22

PART V

MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY

Based upon what you have recently heard, seen, and read, what is your overall attitude toward the Modern Volunteer Army idea? How do you personally feel about it? (Circle appropriate response number.)

6	5	4	3	2	1
HIGHLY APPROVE	APPROVE	SLIGHTLY APPROVE	SLIGHTLY DISAPPROVE	DISAPPROVE	HIGHLY DISAPPROVE

Some volunteer military organizations have been effective forces: for example, our own Army at various periods in our history, the present British and Canadian Armies, etc. Some have been ineffective: for example, our Army after World War II and the Russian Army during the 1920s.

Bearing in mind that there are two sides to most questions, we would like your personal opinions about some ideas associated with a Modern Volunteer Army. Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement by circling the appropriate response number.

1. The soldiers of the Modern Volunteer Army will draw further and further apart from American public.

1	2	3	4	5	6
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

2. Living conditions for soldiers of all ranks and grade levels and their families will be much improved in the Modern Volunteer Army.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

3. Congress will provide sufficient money to attract and support a Modern Volunteer Army in a post-Vietnam peacetime environment.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

4. Job satisfaction (e.g., working conditions and opportunities) will be high among soldiers of your grade in the Modern Volunteer Army.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

5. The Modern Volunteer Army will be less disciplined than today's Army.

1	2	3	4	5	6
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

6. Standards of performance and unit effectiveness (ability to perform basic mission) will be lower in the Modern Volunteer Army.

1	2	3	4	5	6
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

7. Racial tension will not be a problem in the Modern Volunteer Army.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

8. Military Justice will be rapid and effective in the Modern Volunteer Army.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

9. Personnel in the lower ranks of the Modern Volunteer Army will have sufficient intelligence to perform their duties effectively.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

10. Considering what you know of conditions in today's Army and what you think conditions will be in the Modern Volunteer Army, how would you feel about serving in the Modern Volunteer Army? (circle)

6	5	4	3	2	1
HIGHLY PLEASED	PLEASED	SLIGHTLY PLEASED	SLIGHTLY DISPLEASED	DISPLEASED	STRONGLY DISPLEASED

11. If given a choice between today's Army and your idea of the Modern Volunteer Army, which would you prefer? (circle)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY PREFER TODAY'S ARMY	PREFER TODAY'S ARMY	SLIGHTLY PREFER TODAY'S ARMY	NO PREFERENCE	SLIGHTLY PREFER MVA	PREFER MVA	STRONGLY PREFER MVA

Thank you very much for your assistance. We realize that your time is valuable and very much appreciate your cooperation.

