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

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

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ANNEX A. Annotated Bibliography A-1

Abstracts of 176 reference sources used in preparation of the study.

ANNEX B. Sample Questionnaire B-1

A 171-item questionnaire primarily designed to compare observed with desired leadership behavior of superiors, subordinates, and self.

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ANNEX D. Graphical Display of Performance and Perception Shortfall D-1

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



DEPARTMENT OF THE AR
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

IN REPLY REFER TO:

STUDY ON LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1

PREFACE

This study on Leadership for the 1970's was conducted by th tion of the Chief of Staff. The study directive was receive Personnel on 21 January 1971. The data base for our study w Army leadership. All agencies and installations that were a gave this project their immediate and enthusiastic support.

Our study undertook an analysis of current leadership princi determining the type of leadership that would be most approp sustainment procedures change from reliance on periodic draf accessions. This involved a critical examination of the Arm ship. *The ultimate purpose of the Army--success in combat-- tion throughout the study.*

In accordance with our guidance from General Westmoreland, w utilitarian report which can help commanders identify and di discover ways whereby leadership climate can be improved. W ignore the fact that there are other ingredients than leader effectiveness of the Army. Further, the study of leadership candid, objective, attuned to contemporary problems, and bas as on useful theory.

The central theme of our study is that both the Army and the parties to an informal contract. In this informal contract, disciplined response from the soldier. The soldier, on the worthwhile work, and sufficient pay from the Army. If each meets the expectations of the other, a mutually satisfactory tionship which will create the loyalty and dedication which discipline and professionalism.

As the foreword to this report we have selected a recent add College by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. His remarks today and inspiration for tomorrow. They represent another thoughtful analysis of a distinguished leader whose data bas fifty years of rugged experience and perceptive observation.

Frank

FRANKLIN M.
Major Genera
Commandant

OF THE ARMY
AR COLLEGE
PENNSYLVANIA 17013

20 October 1971

IP FOR THE 1970'S

FACE

ıcted by the US Army War College at the direc-
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f leadership must be a continuing effort:
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Army and the soldier must see themselves as
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a recent address delivered at the US Army War
His remarks on leadership contain wisdom for
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observation.

Franklin M Davis Jr.

FRANKLIN M. DAVIS, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

FOREWORD

ADDRESS BY
GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY
AT THE
U. S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA
7 OCTOBER 1971

All of you here this evening are leaders. I am pleased to meet you. What you do may well dignify the past, explain today, and secure for all of us--tomorrow.

Perhaps I can touch upon a few factors that will underscore the value of good leadership. Leadership is an intangible. No weapon, no impersonal piece of machinery ever designed can take its place.

This is the age of the computer, and if you know how to program the machine you can get quick and accurate answers. But, how can you include leadership--and morale which is affected by leadership--into your programming? Let us never forget the great importance of this element--leadership, and while we use computers for certain answers, let us not try to fight a whole war or even a single battle without giving proper consideration to the element of leadership.

Another element to be considered is the Man to be led, and with whose morale we are concerned. I am constantly reminded of this point by a cartoon which hangs over my desk at home which depicts an infantryman with his rifle across his knees as he sits behind a parapet. Above him is the list of the newest weapons science has devised and the soldier behind the parapet is saying: "But still they haven't found the substitute for ME."

Of course, with this particular group of service personnel, I am considering leadership as it applies to a military unit. However, having been associated with industry for some time now, I find it difficult to completely separate the principles of military and industrial leadership. They have much in common.

In selecting a company in which to invest our savings, we often give primary consideration to the company with good leadership. In similar manner, a military unit is often judged by its leadership. Good leadership is essential to organized action where any group is involved. The one who commands--be he a military officer or captain of industry--must project power, an energizing power which coordinates and marshals the best efforts of his followers by supplying that certain something for which they look to him, be it guidance, support, encouragement, example or even new ideas and imagination.

The test of a leader lies in the reaction and response of his followers. He should not have to impose authority. Bossiness in itself never made a leader. He must make his influence felt by example and the instilling of confidence in his followers. The greatness of a leader is measured by the achievements of the led. This is the ultimate test of his effectiveness.

Too frequently, we use the words leader and commander synonymously. We should not forget that there are far more staff officer assignments than there are command billets and a good staff officer can and should display the same leadership as a commander. While it takes a good staff officer to initiate an effective plan, it requires a leader to ensure that the plan is properly executed. That is why you and I have been taught that the work of collecting information, studying it, drawing a plan, and making a decision, is 10% of the job; seeing that plan through is the other 90%. A well-trained officer is one who can serve effectively either as a staff officer or as a commander.

I can recall a former vice president of one of the companies with which I am associated. He would formulate some good plans but never followed up to see that his plans got the expected results. I knew he had served in World War II so, out of curiosity, I looked into the nature of his service and found that his entire period of service was as a staff officer. He had never had the advantage of a command job, so his training was incomplete. Maybe if he had remained in the service longer, we could have developed his leadership qualities as well--and this man would still be with the company.

You may have heard this story about General Pershing in World War I. While inspecting a certain area, he found a project that was not going too well, even though the second lieutenant in charge seemed to have a pretty good plan. General Pershing asked the lieutenant how much pay he received, and when the lieutenant replied: "$141.67 per month, Sir," General Pershing said: "Just remember that you get "$1.67 for making your plan and issuing the order, and $140.00 for seeing that it is carried out."

I am not sure that I would go to that extreme. Certainly in these days, problems are complex and good staff work plays a large part in resolving them. I have known commanders who were not too smart, but they were very knowledgeable about personnel and knew enough to select the very best for their staffs. Remember, a good leader is one who causes or inspires others, staff or subordinate commanders, to do the job.

Furthermore, no leader knows it all (although you sometimes find one who seems to think he does!). A leader should encourage the members of his staff to speak up if they think the commander is wrong. He should invite constructive criticism. It is a grave error for the leader to surround himself with a "Yes" staff.

General George C. Marshall was an excellent exponent of the principle of having his subordinates speak up. When he first became Chief of Staff of the Army, the secretariat of that office consisted of three officers who presented orally to General Marshall the staff papers, or "studies" coming from the divisions of the General Staff. I was a member of that secretariat. We presented in abbreviated form the contents of the staff studies, citing the highlights of the problem involved, the various possible courses of action considered, and the action recommended.

At the end of his first week as Chief of Staff, General Marshall called us into his office and opened the discussion by saying: "I am disappointed in all of you." When we inquired if we might ask why, he said: "You haven't disagreed with a single thing I have done all week." We told him it so happened that we were in full agreement with every paper that had been presented, that we knew what he wanted, and that we would add our comments to anything that we considered should be questioned.

The very next day, we presented a paper as written and then expressed some thoughts which, in our opinion, made the recommended action questionable. General Marshall said: "Now that is what I want. Unless I hear all the arguments against an action, I am not sure whether I am right or not."

If you happen to be detailed to a staff, try to be a good staff officer and, if possible, avoid being a "Yes" man. I would suggest to all commanders that they inform the members of their staffs that anyone who does not disagree once in a while with what is about to be done, is of limited value and perhaps should be shifted to some other place where he might occasionally have an idea.

Of course, I am thinking about the decisionmaking process. After a decision is made, everyone must be behind it 100%. I thought the British were admirable in this respect during World War II. No matter how much discussion there had been on a subject, as soon as a decision was made you never heard any doubts expressed. You had to believe that everyone involved in making the decision had never entertained any ideas except those expressed in the decision.

I don't want to overemphasize leadership of senior officers. My interest extends to leaders of all ranks. I would caution you always to remember that an essential qualification of a good leader is the ability to recognize, select, and train junior leaders. . . .

* * * * *

Specialities dominate almost every problem faced today by the military leader or the business manager. This individual must get deeply enough into his problem that he can understand it and intelligently manage it, without going so far as to become a specialist himself in every phase of the problem. You don't have to be a tank expert in order to effectively use a tank unit of your command.

Thomas J. Watson of IBM once said that genius in an executive is the ability to deal successfully with matters he does not understand. This leads to another principle of leadership which I have often found neglected, both in the military and in business. While you need not be a specialist in all phases of your job, you should have a proportionate degree of interest in every aspect of it,--and those concerned, your subordinates, should be aware of your interest.

You must get around and show interest in what your subordinates are doing, even if you don't know much about the technique of their work. And, when you are making these visits, try to pass out praise when due, as well as corrections or criticism.

We tend to speak up only when things go wrong. This is such a well recognized fact that a "Complaint Department" is an essential part of many business firms. To my knowledge, no comparable facility exists anywhere to expedite the handling of praise for the job well done--it need not be extravagant.

We all get enough criticism and we learn to take it. Even Sir Winston Churchill, despite his matchless accomplishments, found occasion to say: "I have benefited enormously from criticism and at no point did I suffer from any perceptible lack thereof." But let us remember that praise also has a role to play. Napoleon was probably the finest exponent of this principle of recognition through his use of a quarter inch of ribbon to improve morale and get results.

Both mental and physical energy are essential to successful leadership. How many really good leaders have you known who were lazy, or weak, or who couldn't stand the strain? Sherman was a good example of a leader with outstanding mental and physical energy. I cite him with some trepidation because some of you may be from Georgia! However, during the advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta, he often went for days with only two or three hours sleep per night and was constantly in the saddle reconnoitering, and he often knew the dispositions and terrain so well that he could maneuver the enemy out of position without a serious fight and with minimum losses.

Conversely, a sick commander is of limited value. It is not fair to the troops under him to have a leader who is not functioning 100%. I had to relieve several senior commanders during World War II because of illness. It is often pointed out that Napoleon didn't lose a major battle until Waterloo where he was a sick man.

A leader should possess human understanding and consideration for others. Men are not robots and should not be treated as though they were machines. I do not by any means suggest coddling. But men are highly intelligent, complicated beings who will respond favorably to human understanding and consideration. By this means their leader will get

maximum effort from each of them. He will also get loyalty--and in this connection, it is well to remember that loyalty goes down as well as up. The sincere leader will go to bat for his subordinates when such action is needed.

A good leader must sometimes be stubborn. Here, I am reminded of the West Point cadet prayer. A leader must be able to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong. Armed with the courage of his convictions, he must often fight to defend them. When he has come to a decision after thorough analysis--and when he is sure he is right--he must stick to it even to the point of stubbornness. Grant furnishes a good illustration of this trait. He never knew when he was supposed to be licked. A less stubborn man might have lost at Shiloh.

Maybe you have heard the story of Grant in the Richmond Campaign when after being up all night making his reconnaissance and formulating and issuing orders, he lay down under a tree and fell asleep. Sometime later, a courier rode up and informed the General that disaster had hit his right flank and that his troops at that end of the line were in full retreat. General Grant sat up, shook his head to clear the cobwebs and said: "It can't be so," and went back to sleep--and it wasn't so. He had confidence in himself and in his subordinate leaders.

I do not mean to infer that there is always just one solution to a problem. Usually there is one best solution, but any good plan, boldly executed, is better than indecision. There is usually more than one way to obtain results.

Another quality of leadership that comes to mind is self-confidence. You must have confidence in yourself, your unit and your subordinate commanders--and in your plan. . . .

* * * * *

A leader must possess imagination. Whether it be an administrative decision, or one made in combat, the possible results of that decision must be plain to the one making it. What will be the next step--and the one after that?

While there are many other qualities which contribute to effective leadership, I will mention just one more--but it is a very important one--Character. This word has many meanings. I am applying it in a broad sense to describe a person who has high ideals, who stands by them, and who can be trusted absolutely. Such a person will be respected by all those with whom he is associated. And, such a person will readily be recognized by his associates for what he is.

Circumstances mold our character. These circumstances affect different people in different ways. From exactly the same set of circumstances one man may theoretically build a palace, while another may have difficulty building a lean-to.

It has been said that a man's character is the reality of himself. I don't think a man's strength of character ever changes. I remember a long time ago when someone told me that a mountain might be reported to have moved, I could believe or disbelieve it, as I wished, but if anyone told me that a man had changed his character, I should not believe it.

All leaders must possess these qualities which I have been discussing and the great leaders are those who possess one or more of them to an outstanding degree. Some leaders just miss being great because they are weak in one or more of these areas. There is still another ingredient in this formula for a great leader that I have left out, and that is LUCK. He must have opportunity. Then, of course, when opportunity knocks, he must be able to rise and open the door.

Some may ask: "Why do we talk about the qualities of leadership?" They maintain that you either have leadership or you don't--that leaders are born, not made. I suppose some are born with a certain amount of leadership. Frequently, we see children who seem inclined to take charge and direct their playmates. The other youngsters follow these directions without protest. But I am convinced, nevertheless, that leadership can be developed and improved by study and training.

There is no better way to develop leadership than to give the youngster, or other individual, a job involving responsibility and let him work it out. Try to avoid telling him how to do it. That, for example, is the basis of our whole system of combat orders. We tell the subordinate unit commander what we want him to do and leave the details to him.

I think this system is largely responsible for the many fine leaders in our services today. We are constantly training and developing younger officers and teaching them to accept responsibility.

However, don't discount experience. Someone may remind you that Napoleon led Armies before he was 30; and that Alexander the Great died at the age of 33. Napoleon, as he grew older, commanded even larger Armies. Alexander might have been even greater had he lived longer and had more experience. In this respect, I especially like General Bolivar Buckner's theory that "Judgement comes from experience and experience comes from bad judgement."

I have been asked to speak on leadership in the past. I have fairly well covered these same thoughts with other groups.

Somehow, however, at the moment, these thoughts take on added significance for me. You see, my first great grandson was born a year ago. We call him "Fat Henry." What happens to his life, and to the lives of his contemporaries, may well be in your hands.

Thank you.

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The final report was prepared by:

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LTC Dandridge M. Malone
Doctor Donald D. Penner
LTC Walter F. Ulmer, Jr.

☆ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY--LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970's

Beginning in January 1971, the US Army War College, at the direction of General Westmoreland, conducted a study to determine the type of leadership that would be appropriate as the Army approached the zero-draft conditions of the Modern Volunteer Army.

Using a carefully selected research team composed of staff, faculty, and students with appropriate leadership experience and academic expertise, the US Army War College designed the study on the proposition tnat the type of leadership appropriate for the Modern Volunteer Army (or for today's Army, for that matter) would be leadership which, at all levels and in all processes, would recognize and honor the terms of the "informal contract" that comes into being between the Army and the individual when the professional soldier dedicates his life effort to an Army career. This difficult and idealistic commitment, on the part of the organization and the individual, would require each to know and attempt to fulfill the legitimate expectations of the other--the Army in terms of worthwhile work, a sufficiency of pay, and fair and honest treatment; and the individual in terms of task proficiency, disciplined response to direction, and full support of assigned missions. This reciprocity of professionalism was seen as the critical essential under those conditions where the long-term effectiveness of the Army depended upon the existence of a satisfactory relationship between the Army as an organization and the professional soldier as an individual. Army leadership was viewed as the mediating influence--the context within which and by which the informal contract is supported or negated.

The 18-man research team, using a scientifically designed questionnaire and group interview techniques, collected data from 1800 individuals, representing a broad base of Army leadership up to and including ten percent of the Army's general officers. The data, analyzed quantitatively by computer and qualitatively by content analysis techniques, spoke significantly in terms of the expectations of the organization and the individual, represented respectively by the perspectives of superior and subordinate.

The findings show dramatically that the Army's time-honored Principles of Leadership are accepted overwhelmingly by leaders at all levels as appropriate for the coming decade. The data show further, however, that there are serious deficiencies in the application of the principles--deficiencies which, through the study findings, can be identified precisely by grade level, by perspective, and by specific kinds of leadership behavior; and which evidence unrecognized failures by one or both parties to meet the expectations of the informal contract. The same data, reciprocally, using satisfaction with Army leadership as a criterion, identify the leadership behavior necessary to produce a condition wherein

the legitimate expectations of the organization and the individual are perceived as being fairly met--this condition being the essential prerequisite to a satisfactory relationship between the Army and the professional soldier.

A listing of findings and solution concepts follow:

STATEMENTS OF FINDINGS OF USAWC LEADERSHIP STUDY

1. THE STUDY METHODOLOGY IS A RELIABLE DEVICE FOR MEASURING LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS AND DIAGNOSING PROBLEMS.

2. DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF ARMY LEADERS VARIES SIGNIFICANTLY BY GRADE LEVEL (HIGHER GRADE, HIGHER SATISFACTION), VARIES ONLY SLIGHTLY BETWEEN COMBAT AND NONCOMBAT CONDITIONS, AND DOES NOT VARY BY RACIAL GROUP.

3. IN GENERAL, SOLDIERS ARE SATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP IN BASIC TRAINING AND DISSATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP IN ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. (SOLDIERS ARE DISAPPOINTED IF HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE ARE NOT SET AND MAINTAINED.)

4. OUR LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES (AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT THEY EXPRESS) ARE VALID, AND APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1970'S.

5. THE PERCEPTION OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES VARIES AMONG GRADE LEVELS.

6. THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES IS DEFECTIVE IN SEVERAL RESPECTS WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY GRADE LEVELS AND PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SUBORDINATE, SELF) IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR.

7. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP IS THE FREQUENT MISPERCEPTION OF HOW WELL ONE'S OWN LEADERSHIP IS MEETING THE LEADERSHIP EXPECTATIONS OF SUPERIOR AND/OR SUBORDINATE (INDIVIDUALS CONSISTENTLY PERCEIVE THEIR OWN SHORTFALLS AS LESS THAN SUPERIORS OR SUBORDINATES PERCEIVE THEM TO BE).

8. CERTAIN ITEMS OF LEADER BEHAVIOR FOR EACH GRADE LEVEL HAVE HIGH POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN OVERALL LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS IN RETURN FOR A SMALL IMPROVEMENT IN THE PARTICULAR BEHAVIOR.

9. SEVERAL FACTORS WERE FOUND TO BE COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP:

A. LEADERS' PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE AS IMPEDING THEIR ABILITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS.

B. DIVERSION OF SOLDIERS FROM PRIMARY DUTIES BY DETAILS AND LEVIES.

C. MISUSE OF SOLDIERS' TIME.

D. LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE WITH TIME OFF.

E. FEELING BY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND JUNIOR NCO'S WITH PRIMARILY VIETNAM EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED FOR PEACETIME LEADERSHIP.

F. APPARENTLY WIDE VARIATION IN THE STANDARDS BY WHICH GENERAL OFFICERS MEASURE LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES.

G. SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS (LACK OF COMMUNICATION, INATTENTION TO HUMAN NEEDS, ETC.) IN THE PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE CORROBORATING FINDINGS OF OTHER PERTINENT RECENT STUDIES OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

10. THE OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MVA CONCEPT WAS MODERATELY FAVORABLE ALTHOUGH THERE WERE WIDE VARIATIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN GRADE LEVELS.

STATEMENTS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS OF USAWC LEADERSHIP STUDY

1. USE THE MAIN FEATURES OF THIS STUDY ON AN ARMY-WIDE SCALE TO PROVIDE:

A. THE INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH.

B. DIAGNOSTIC INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.

C. A BROADENED DATA BANK OF INFORMATION TO BE USED BY ARMY PLANNERS, EDUCATORS, AND RESEARCHERS.

2. MAKE WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED PORTIONS OF THIS STUDY AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING, BY LEVEL, DIAGNOSES OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.

3. CONDUCT SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE ATTITUDES, VALUES, AND CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP HELD BY OFFICERS AT O6 AND HIGHER GRADES.

4. REVISE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION CONCEPTS WITHIN THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO THIS SUBJECT ARE BEING EXPLOITED.

5. ESTABLISH AN EXTENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM OF ACADEMIC AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION FOR CAREER NCO'S.

6. BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM OF "COACHING" DESIGNED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN SUPERIOR AND SUBORDINATE.

7. PROVIDE STAFF MEMBERS (MILITARY) WHO ARE FORMALLY TRAINED IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS TO ALL ARMY SCHOOLS AND STAFF SECTIONS DEALING WITH THEORETICAL OR PRACTICAL LEADERSHIP EDUCATION OR TRAINING.

8. PRECLUDE EVOLUTION OF AN "ANTI-LEADERSHIP" SYNDROME BY ENSURING QUALITY CONTROL OF LEADERSHIP STUDY ACTIVITIES THROUGH CENTRALIZED COORDINATION OF FIELD SURVEY OPERATIONS.

The support for each finding and the rationale for each solution concept are explained in detail in the following report.

☆ LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970'S

LEADERSHIP FOR THE 1970'S

INTRODUCTION

In January of 1971, General Westmoreland asked the Army War College to undertake a study of the validity of the Army's concept of leadership for the years ahead--particularly in light of the move toward a zero-draft environment. The Chief of Staff approved the study design in March. The major findings of the study were presented to the Chief of Staff on 3 June, and to the Secretary of the Army and the Army Policy Council on 16 June. This report provides the methodology employed, the results obtained, and the action concepts whereby the results can be used to the benefit of Army leadership.

The study was conducted by a selected team of AWC students and faculty members. Over 60 students volunteered to assist in the project, and the 18 selected represented a wealth of enthusiastic talent in terms of recent practical leadership experience as well as education in the variety of academic disciplines specifically required for conduct of the study.

From the outset of the study effort, the team kept in close touch with elements of the Army which have a major continuing interest in the practical and theoretical study of leadership. The United States Military Academy, the Infantry School, and the Leadership Research Unit of the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) were among these agencies. Additionally, the study team sought the advice of civilian scientists recognized in the academic community as authorities in the investigation of leadership and related areas: D. D. Penner, R. M. Likert, R. M. Stogdill, D. G. Bowers, C. R. Moskos, T. O. Jacobs, and others.

As the study progressed and its potential utility became clear, close liaison was established and maintained with the CONARC Leadership Board, organized at Fort Bragg in May 1971 at the direction of General Westmoreland. The CONARC Leadership Board, headed by Brigadier General Henry C. Emerson, incorporated the method and findings of the AWC study into its seminar program. This program sent carefully selected and trained leadership seminar teams to posts Army-wide during the summer and early fall of 1971, the idea being to ask Army leaders to reflect upon the specific problems and opportunities of leadership as the Army moves toward a zero-draft condition.

This report, then, is designed to provide insight into a carefully controlled, scientific study of the concepts, problems, and opportunities of contemporary Army leadership--problems and opportunities whose precise delineation can be a major asset in the Army's continuing effort to provide the soldier with the best possible leadership.

☆ RESEARCH OBJECTIVE.

The research objective in the AWC study was to determine the type of leadership that would be most appropriate as the Army's personnel sustainment procedures changed from reliance on periodic draft calls to reliance on volunteer accessions. Inasmuch as Army leadership policy and practice have developed for almost 20 years in an environment where personnel sustainment was insured by conscription, there was good reason to believe that a "zero-draft" condition would present leadership challenges sufficiently different to warrant some modifications of existing leadership practices. Accordingly, a derivative objective of the AWC study was to assess the validity of the Army's institutional concept of leadership, reflected in the commonly accepted 11 Principles of Leadership, and, should this concept and these principles appear inappropriate or to some degree deficient to the leadership requirements of a zero-draft condition, to determine the concept and principles that would be appropriate. The ultimate purpose of the Army--success in combat--remained the single overriding consideration in both study design and execution.

CRITICAL QUESTIONS

★ WHAT KIND OF LEADERSHIP IS APPROPRIATE FOR MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY?

★ TO WHAT EXTENT WILL EXISTING PRINCIPLES MEET REQUIREMENTS?

★ WHAT GROUP OF LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES AND BEHAVIORS WILL MEET REQUIREMENTS?

METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

● CONDUCT STUDY ACROSS A WIDE BASE OF ARMY LEADERSHIP. . .

● EMPLOY THE METHODOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONALISM STUDY. . .

● PRODUCE A UTILITARIAN REPORT.

FIGURE 1. CRITICAL QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES

☆ GUIDANCE.

The Chief of Staff provided certain guidance for the conduct of the study. First, the study was to be conducted across a wide base of Army leadership. Second, the study was to employ the methodology of the Professionalism Study--a study of Army officer values and standards directed by General Westmoreland and completed by the US Army War College in the summer of 1970--which used both objective and subjective methods of data generation. Finally, the study was to produce utilitarian results which could be applied readily to Army leadership without the requirement for additional studies or extensive interpretation of theoretical findings.

☆ RESEARCH STRATEGY.

The overall design or research strategy for the study was built upon two principal concepts: the "informal contract" and "leadership climate." These two concepts, which will be explained in detail, appeared early in the problem definition phase as the two conceptual tools which had greatest potential for explaining and answering the main questions of the study. Neither concept is new. A discussion of the informal contract, for example, appears in the works of Aristotle under the heading of "reciprocity." Both concepts have been and are today the focus of extensive research and theoretical development by scientists engaged in the study of organizational leadership. (For source material relating to informal contract, see T. O. Jacobs, Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations; for leadership climate, see Tagiuri, R. and Litwin, G. H., Organizational Climate.)

The Informal Contract. The idea of the informal contract addresses the relationship between the organization and the individual who is a member of that organization. In this context, when the individual joins the organization (under whatever impetus), there comes into being a type of contract, with the individual and the organization as the two parties to this contract.

The contract has terms. Some are stated formally and legitimated by signature. Other terms are implied. Still others evolve over time, as a function of the individual's tenure or achievements, or as a function of changes in the organization's purpose or methods. Thus the contract can be viewed as "informal."

The contract, while "informal," is a very real and omnipresent mechanism governing the relationship between the individual and the organization. Both parties remain constantly sensitive to the terms of the contract, and each will react to violations of the terms by the other. The individual may complain or resign. The organization may withhold promotion or expel the individual. In either case, these actions are taken because the other party has been perceived as "unfair," with the measure of fairness being the terms of the contract as understood by the injured party.

The implied terms of the contract are fully as important to the individual-organization relationship as are those terms which are stated formally. The soldier perceives as "unfair," for example, a move by the Army to eliminate commissaries or post exchanges. The Army perceives as unfair a soldier's reluctance to keep physically fit. Neither commissaries nor physical fitness are included as explicit terms of any written agreement. Both, however, represent what the parties to the contract expect from each other, and therefore the informal contract is perhaps best explained as two sets of expectations--plus the degree to which each party perceives these expectations as being met by the other.

It is extremely difficult to delineate in any detail the specific expectations of the Army and of the soldier. The size and complexity of the Army as an organization and the attitudinal heterogeneity of a million soldiers are only two of many factors which confound any attempt to lay out with precision the expectations of the Army and of the soldier. And, because expectations are not laid out with precision by each party, these expectations (i.e., the terms of the contract) often are not understood clearly by the other party. It is for this reason that studies of many problems deriving from the individual-organization relationship urge "improved communication" as a central theme for solution.

The Army states its expectations through the mechanisms of regulations, policy directives, and orders. The soldier, on the other hand, has no such formal means for stating his expectations. He can indicate some of his expectations through attitude surveys, depending upon what questions are asked, and he can state his expectations through various councils; but his primary mechanism for stating his expectations is upward communication, written or verbal, through the chain of command.

The mechanisms whereby the Army and the soldier of today communicate their expectations are both inadequate. The volume of regulations and the perversity of the written word make it difficult for the Army to make its expectations known. And, for the soldier, communication of expectations upward through the chain of command means that he, the soldier, must act directly against the flow of power and authority coming down through the chain of command, i.e., he must "buck the current." Thus the difficulty in delineating the terms of the contract is compounded by the difficulty each party has in communicating the terms of the contract to the other.

In the formulation and execution of the informal contract, there is a need for a "go-between"--a mediator/arbitrator/negotiator who can most fairly represent both parties to the contract. It is at this point that leadership enters the picture. Leadership fulfills the go-between function.

Great efforts were made during the two decades prior to World War II to ascertain important "traits" of leadership. This "trait approach" to leadership lives on today, with the underlying assumption being that, if the traits can be identified, leadership becomes simply a matter of using the traits for selection criteria or developmental objectives.

Behavioral scientists engaged in the study of leadership have nearly abandoned the trait approach to leadership. In the careful leadership research of the 40's and 50's, significant leadership "traits" appeared to differ widely from situation to situation. Thus, leadership was not seen as a singular quality of an individual, but rather as an effect of the interaction of variables which are changing constantly.

What may have been the final blow to the trait approach to leadership occurred in research of the traits of leaders in formal organizations. The investigators demonstrated conclusively that the same trait which contributed positively to the effectiveness of a superior under one set of conditions could have negative impact on his effectiveness under a different set of conditions. Thus, we can say in summary that research of more than 40 years has failed to uncover any set of unique leadership traits or qualities (to include those listed on the OER) that are invariant from situation to situation. Leadership, as the school texts say, "depends upon the situation."

The same research effort which showed the futility of a "trait" concept of leadership did, on the positive side, show that the behaviors of a leader--i.e., the things he does when he "leads"--fall into two great categories or dimensions. These dimensions, developed by factor analytic studies of leadership in military and industrial settings, have been called "Consideration" and "Initiation of Structure." Almost all of the specific things a leader does when he leads will fall under the headings of either Consideration (defined as looking out for the welfare of the men) or Initiation of Structure (defined as specifying plans and objectives for accomplishing a task). Using these two dimensions, a leadership situation or leadership style can be defined in terms of its "loading" under each dimension.

Unit members generally want the leader to be high on Consideration, while the leader's superiors (representing the organization) want him to be high on Initiation of Structure. As might be expected, research using leadership behavior keyed to the two dimensions showed that units and organizations whose leaders were high on <u>both</u> dimensions were highest in overall effectiveness. Clearly, then, the successful Army leader must work toward the satisfaction of two different sets of requirements. One set consists of the Army's expectations and centers around mission accomplishment. The other set of requirements consists of the soldier's expectations, and these are centered around the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards of being a member of the Army and a human being. These two sets

of requirements correspond closely to the two sets of terms of the informal contract. The successful Army leader, then, as "go-between," must balance between the needs of the individual (Consideration) and the needs of the organization (Initiation), tipping the scales in one direction or the other, according to the situation, in such a manner that, in the long run, both parties view their total payoff as "fair." Almost by definition, a mutual perception of long-term fairness must be achieved if a volunteer force is to accomplish its assigned missions effectively.

In summary, then, the idea of the informal contract addresses the relationship between the organization and the individual who is a member of that organization. The organization has certain needs or expectations of the individual. It expects, for example, job proficiency and disciplined response. The individual has expectations as well. He expects, for example, sufficiency of pay, worthwhile work, and respect for his dignity as an individual. Both parties must pay off on the contract--each in terms of what the other expects. If both parties participate fairly in stating and meeting the terms of the contract, a satisfactory relationship will exist between the two. Without this satisfactory relationship, and without such external options as conscription or detention, the qualified individual--the lifeblood of the organization--can be neither attracted nor retained. Thus, the informal contract appears to be an especially pertinent factor as the Army moves to a zero-draft environment. The concept is by no means a new one, and it has always been a feature of Army leadership; its significance for leadership in the 1970's, however, is increased vastly by a zero-draft condition.

In order to bridge the gap between theory and real life, an ancillary research objective of this study was to illustrate that the informal contract exists. Rather than pursue the obvious (i.e., an eclectic or compendium approach to ascertain the terms of the contract as seen by the Army), the research team decided instead to attempt to spell out, at least tentatively, the terms of the informal contract as seen by the soldier. To do this, the team selected soldiers who had been in the Army only a short time, reasoning that, after the initial shock of orientation, the individual would begin to assess his personal military situation in terms of effort, payoff, rules of the game, and other contractual concepts. While his perception of the contract might not be overly precise at this early point in his Army service, it would nevertheless be relatively uncontaminated or uncolored by situational variables.

In their attempt to give substance to the informal contract, the research team interviewed five separate groups of enlisted personnel in basic combat training (BCT). Each group consisted of 15 individuals, selected at random from basic training companies. Representativeness was not seen as critical to this particular research task; however, a degree of representativeness was achieved by conducting the interviews at Forts Jackson, Ord, and McClellan. This selection gave a fair degree of representation of the views of men and women trainees, Eastern and Western United States, VOLAR and non-VOLAR environments.

The three interview teams followed a common general agenda in their efforts to ferret out perceptions of and attitudes toward the informal contract:

1. *What type of leeway do you expect in doing your job?*

2. *Do you feel that you could freely go to your leader with a problem?*

3. *Did you expect to have certain rights or opportunities that you find you do not have?*

4. *Do you think the Army has been fair to you?*

5. *What do you expect from your leader?*

6. *Are there traditions which--when explained--are unacceptable to you?*

7. *Do you understand the reasons for your duties, rules, and regulations?*

8. *Do you feel that people in authority have been honest with you?*

9. *What kind of recognition do you expect from the Army? Have you received any?*

The recorded comments from all group interviews were compiled, then analyzed for common themes or patterns. The procedures for sampling and qualitative analysis were by no means rigorously precise; nevertheless, in the analysis of responses, there was sufficient commonality of themes to suggest the "terms" of the informal contract as seen by the soldier who only recently has joined in the individual-organization relationship. The soldier:

1. Expects to work hard physically, but he expects the work to be meaningful and challenging.

2. Expects his leaders to be fair and honest.

3. Expects thorough traditional "discipline"; i.e., reprimands for slackers, punishment for violators.

4. Expects his leaders to be professionally competent.

5. Expects to maintain his own individual dignity.

6. Expects certain traditions, spit and polish, and military courtesy to be a normal part of everyday military life.

7. Expects his leaders to be concerned for his health and welfare.

8. Expects a decent living environment.

9. Expects adequate pay and security, vis-a-vis "the outside."

The interview data suggest strongly that in basic combat training these expectations are generally fulfilled. This appeared to be true at all three posts, i.e., for women as well as for men; and under non-VOLAR as well as VOLAR conditions and for recruits drawn from the Western as well as the Eastern United States. Further, the trainees were noticeably satisfied with the efforts of the Drill Sergeant--the "go-between," in basic training, for the Army and the soldier.

As a follow-on effort, derived serendipitously, the interview teams conducted similar interviews with advanced individual trainees (AITs) at the same posts. Their perception of fair participation in the informal contract by the Army differed markedly from that of the basic combat trainees. At all three posts, the informal contract in effect "went to hell" shortly after the soldier made the switch from BCT to AIT.

There were no further attempts to illuminate the terms or workings of the informal contract. The existence was demonstrated to the satisfaction of the research team. Theoretically, the contract, its terms, and a modal perception of its fulfillment exist for all grade levels and major situations. There are obvious implications for further research of this concept as the Army moves toward zero-draft sustainment.

Leadership Climate. If leadership is to serve a mediating function in the formulation and execution of the informal contract, there obviously must be some commonly understood set of parameters or type of framework which is known to all levels of leadership and which gives these levels general guidelines for mediating the contract. This set of parameters could be the principles of leadership which are established by the organization as general guidance for all levels of its leadership. The principles, however, are ideals, and there is considerable variation between the principles and the manner in which they are applied.

The mediating framework must derive from conditions as they exist in the organization or, more properly, conditions as perceived by the members of the organization. These conditions, collectively, are a reflection of the totality of the organization's leadership--the combined upward, downward, and horizontal effects of all levels of leadership. These conditions, which are essentially the prime product of organizational leadership, constitute the medium wherein or by which the informal contract is fulfilled or violated. The conditions, in total, can be conceptualized as "leadership climate."

Theoretically, then, within an organization, leadership climate mediates the informal contract. There are components or dimensions of leadership climate, all of which impact on the formulation, interpretation, and execution of the informal contract. The concept of leadership climate and its potential for mediating the informal contract are illustrated in the following listing of components of leadership climate.

Structure: The feeling employees have about the constraints in the work situation. The degree to which they feel there are many rules, procedures, or policies versus the degree of freedom they feel they have to do things as they wish.

Responsibility: The feeling of being one's own boss, not having to "run upstairs" every time a decision must be made.

Risk: The degree to which people feel they can take some risks in operating and improving their part of the overall mission.

Standards: The degree to which challenging goals are set for people. The emphasis people feel is being placed on doing a good job.

Reward: The degree to which people feel they are fairly rewarded for good work, rather than only being punished when something goes wrong.

Support: The perceived helpfulness of supervisors and associates in accomplishing important tasks.

Conflict: The feeling an employee has that his bosses want to hear different opinions--that the boss likes to get problems out in the open where they can be dealt with.

Warmth: The feeling of general "good fellowship" that prevails in the atmosphere.

Identity: The degree to which the individual feels that he is a member of the group and belongs to the organization. Such feelings are expected to stimulate individuals to make sacrifices for the group or the organization that otherwise would not be made.

Brief consideration of the elements or components listed above will show that these components are primarily the effects of an organization's composite leadership. The climate or component at any level reflects, to varying degree, the leadership at all successively higher levels. The leadership climate in a unit can vary considerably, according to what kind of leadership is stacked up above it. This phenomenon gives rise to the sound common-sense proposition which says that, "Any change or improvement must start at the top." The phenomenon also demonstrates a principal conclusion from the research on the development of organizational executive and supervisory skill, namely, that the leadership style of any one level in an organization is determined mainly by the leadership levels above. Development of a highly effective leadership style at any one level (i.e., through training and education) will have little permanent effect if the style conflicts significantly with that of higher levels. Any efforts to develop a leadership climate which effectively mediates the informal contract must be based upon a multilevel perspective and analysis.

In summary, then, Army leadership can be viewed as the organizational mechanism which mediates the informal contract. Army leadership must represent both parties to the contract--the organiztion and the individual, the superior and the subordinate, the accomplishment of the mission and the welfare of the men. Army leadership, functioning in this sense throughout the entire organization and at all levels, must therefore be viewed in its entirety--all of its levels and all of the processes which interconnect those levels: authority, communication, discipline, loyalty, direction, and dedication, to name a few. This view of leadership as a totality can be represented by the term "leadership climate," and it is within the context of this leadership climate that the informal contract is supported or negated.

Central Theme. By utilizing the two organizational concepts of informal contract and leadership climate, it was possible to derive a central theme or hypothesis which would serve as the basis for the detailed design of the study. Figure 2 illustrates this theme. This theme or hypothesis answered tentatively the primary research objective of the study and can be stated as follows:

> THE LEADERSHIP MOST APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1970'S IS THAT WHICH PRODUCES A TOTAL LEADERSHIP CLIMATE CHARACTERIZED BY RECOGNITION AND FULFILLMENT OF THE INFORMAL CONTRACT IN ORDER TO INSURE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT OVER THE LONG TERM.

☆ RESEARCH DESIGN.

To achieve the research objective, the study was designed to employ the organizational concepts just discussed as well as to adhere to the guidance given by the Chief of Staff. An understanding of two principal design features is essential to understanding the findings of the study and the methodology employed.

Leadership Behavior. In treating the subject of leadership, the study utilized a more specific description of leadership than that represented by statements of the 11 principles. In the middle 1950's, some milestone academic research at Ohio State University succeeded in isolating and describing in detail those things that an individual does which constitute actual leadership behavior. The original research listed approximately 150 items of human activity that represented leadership behavior. Subsequent research validated these early findings, reduced the list to fewer items, and showed conclusively that, using the proper methods, it was possible to separate observable human behavior into leadership and nonleadership activities. The study was repeated and the results held across many different organizational environments: academic, military, industrial, and governmental. To provide a working description of leadership, and a means of representing the application



FIGURE 2. CENTRAL THEME

of leadership principles, the USAWC team employed a list of 43 items of leadership behavior, derived from the research just discussed, and adapted to the military environment. This design feature reduced considerably the generality and subjectivity normally associated with the study of leadership and provided a commonly understood operational definition of leadership for collection of data and analysis of results.

Perspectives of Leadership. Considerable research establishes the fact that the impact and effectiveness of leadership vary greatly as a function of the perspective from which leadership is viewed. The company commander's view of the leadership of the platoon leader may differ markedly from that of the men of the platoon. And the platoon leader's view of his own leadership may differ even further. Each perspective has its own inherent bias. The superior is predisposed to look for results, for mission accomplishment. The subordinate, on the other hand, is particularly senstitive to leadership practices which affect, or appear to affect, his own welfare. And the leader himself, viewing his own leadership, has the natural human tendency to overlook or rationalize his own weaknesses and errors. These common, normal facts of human perception dictated that the study design employ a "tri-focal" view of leadership in order to obtain a complete and useful picture of leadership at any selected level. This tri-focal view, then, could provide a combined description and assessment of leadership from the viewpoints of three individuals: the individual responsible for the results of the leadership (the superior); the individual who was the recipient of the leadership process (the subordinate); and the individual who was actually applying the leadership process (self). In application, the results of this three dimension view would enable the leader to see himself as others see him. A moment's reflection will show that this tri-focal view also can give a valid representation of the two principal features of the Army's institutional concept of leadership: the accomplishment of the mission, and consideration of the welfare of the men. Further, this tri-focal view is essential to an objective study of the terms and execution of the informal contract previously discussed.



FIGURE 3. TRI-FOCAL VIEW OF LEADERSHIP

☆ DATA BASE.

Documentary Research. Development of the data base for this study began with the initiation of a comprehensive survey of existing literature. This documentary research effort covered military publications, periodicals, and the literature of the pertinent academic disciplines. This effort continued throughout the duration of the study. The annotated bibliography (Annex A) contains a carefully selected list of documents, each of which is concisely summarized, and each of which contributed in some measure to the total study effort. Two of the references are of central importance both to this study and to the study of leadership in general: DA Pamphlet, 600-15, Leadership at Senior Levels of Command; and Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations, written by Dr. T. O. Jacobs of Fort Benning's Leadership Research Unit (HumRRO) and based upon an exhaustive survey of much of the leadership research of the past 25 years.

Field Survey. The second major input to the data base was the information collected by an 18-man field survey team. Members of this team visited 17 posts throughout CONUS and obtained both quantitative and qualitative data from a group of approximately 1800 individuals of all grade levels from private to general officer.



FIGURE 4. FIELD SURVEY: DATA COLLECTION

Data were obtained by two means: questionnaire and group interview. The questionnaire was carefully designed and pretested and was administered not by uncontrolled random questionnairing, but by team members who personally explained the questionnaire to each respondent group, then remained on hand to answer questions as the individual completed the items. The questionnaire collected quantitative data in five major areas: demographic characteristics of the individual; relative importance of the principles of leadership; attitude toward the Modern Volunteer Army concept; satisfaction with Army leadership; and detailed description of leadership in the individual's last duty assignment. For this last major area, three different versions of the questionnaire were employed. All versions asked the same questions about leadership in the last assignment, but each of the three versions asked the respondent to assume one of three perspectives in describing leadership. Of the 1800 respondents, one-third answered questions regarding the leadership behavior of their immediate superior in their last assignment, one-third their immediate subordinate (neither the best nor the worst, but one they knew well), and one-third their own leadrship in their last assignment. The data thus obtained provided the tri-focal view of leadership mentioned earlier.



FIGURE 5. FIELD SURVEY: QUESTIONNAIRE

The specific items of leadership behavior and their mode of use in the data collection effort are shown in the sample questionnaire at Annex B. Five examples of the list of 43 items are:

- He Was Technically Competent to Perform His Duties.
- He Was Approachable.
- He Knew His Men and Their Capabilities.
- He Let the Members of His Unit Know What Was Expected of Them.
- He Rewarded Individuals For a Job Well Done.

The questionnaire asked the respondent three questions about each of the 43 items of leadership behavior: how often the behavior occurred; how often it should have occurred; and how important it was to the respondent. A numerical response scale for each of these questions permitted the respondent to record his answers quantitatively. Figure 6 illustrates how one of these items appeared in the questionnaire.

► "HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES"

HOW OFTEN DID HE?		HOW OFTEN SHOULD HE HAVE?		HOW IMPORTANT WAS THIS TO YOU?	
A GREAT DEAL	7	A GREAT DEAL	(7)	CRITICAL	7
USUALLY	6	USUALLY	6	VERY IMPORTANT	6
MOST OF THE TIME	(5)	MOST OF THE TIME	5	IMPORTANT	5
NOW AND THEN	4	NOW AND THEN	4	SOMETIMES IMPORTANT	4
HARDLY EVER	3	HARDLY EVER	3	SELDOM IMPORTANT	3
RARELY	2	RARELY	2	RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT	2
NOT EVER	1	NOT EVER	1	UNIMPORTANT	1

FIGURE 6. QUESTION DESIGN

To illustrate the nature of the information generated by this particular question design, assume that the respondent is answering that version of the questionnaire which asks questions about the leadership behavior of the respondent's immediate superior in the respondent's last assignment. In describing this behavior, the respondent notes that his superior communicated effectively with his subordinates "most of the time" (5). However, the respondent feels that his superior should have done this even more--he should have done it "a great deal" (7). At this point, the response to this particular question has identified a difference between expectation ("How often should he have?") and performance ("How often did he?") as perceived by the respondent. In this case, there is a raw numerical shortfall of two points (expectation of 7, performance of 5). This represents a measure of the degree to which the superior is not meeting the expectations of the subordinate in regard to this particular item of leadership behavior.

Additionally, it is necessary to consider the relative importance of the shortfall as seen by the respondent. Some of the 43 behaviors are of course seen as more important than others, depending on a number of situational and attitudinal variables. A small shortfall in those behaviors which are related to ethical standards, for example, could be of far greater significance to the respondent than a much larger shortfall in those behaviors related to technical or administrative performance. The third scale, the right-hand column in Figure 6, was designed to reflect the dimension of relative importance.

Members of the survey team who had been trained in interview techniques conducted group interviews with approximately 450 of the individuals who completed the questionnaires, with each of the three perspectives being equally represented (Figure 7). These group interviews were "focused interviews" in that a common agenda was employed:

1. What are the leadership problems at your grade level?

2. What do you expect of the leadership of your immediate superiors? Your immediate subordinates? Your contemporaries and yourself?

In essence, the questionnaire provided quantitative data that could be studied by computer--by descriptive and analytical statistics. The interview, based upon the same research design, provided qualitative, subjective information which added additional meaning to the quantitative, data.



FIGURE 7. FIELD SURVEY: GROUP INTERVIEWS

In addition to administering the leadership questionnaire and conducting group interviews, the field survey team conducted two secondary research objects: an investigation (interviews and observation) of the leadership climate within a TOE Army division; and an investigation (interviews) of the new soldier's perception of the informal contract.

Adequacy of the Data Base. The data obtained by the field survey team are broadly representative of the leadership of the Army, but with somewhat heavier representation than a purely random sample would provide of those who have demonstrated effective leadership. This "quality loading" comes about as a result of obtaining most of the data from individuals in the Army school system. The school environment is by no means representative of the Army's "real world," and in recognition of this, questionnaires and interviews were focused on leadership in the individual's assignment immediately prior to this entry into the school. Since previous assignments had been Army-wide, the geographic and organizational diversity of experience among the respondents can be considered sufficiently representative of the Army as a whole. For example, approximately 40 percent of the respondents described leaders in Vietnam, approximately 50 percent described leaders in CONUS, and the remainder described leaders in other oversea areas.

The sample size (approximately 1800) is relatively large compared to most previous academic and controlled research efforts in this area. The sample size is much more representative in the higher grade levels than in the lower enlisted grades. Subgroup or "cell" sizes are generally adequate for statistically significant sampling within the key demographic variables used in the analyses. A larger sample would, of course, allow finer discrimination as well as analyses based upon compound characteristics; however, the nature of the research objective did not require the extremes of sampling care needed in, say, such sensitive efforts as public opinion polling wherein the views of a minute but highly selected group may be extrapolated to depict the overall population.

The adequacy of the data base to support the research methodology and study objectives is suggested by: first, the high degree of internal consistency between the quantitative and qualitative results which were analyzed thoroughly but separately; and second, the favorable comments of respected professionals who have examined the data base in detail.

As is discussed in the section on further research implications and opportunities, comparable data are currently being collected at Army installations throughout the world. This effort will yield data from between 30,000 and 40,000 respondents. Needless to say this new data base will enable the examination among other things of the effects of many compound demographic classifications.

☆ STATISTICAL TREATMENT OF DATA.

The information from each respondent was keypunched into three cards which were verified and checked for gross error. The first stage of processing was a computer run on the GE-635 at the United States Military Academy which detail-edited the cards and loaded them onto a random-access disc file in an inverted (behavior-by-behavior rather than respondent-by-respondent) form. During this process, histograms were printed out showing for each of the three types of questionnaires the counts and percentages observed for each demographic and each miscellaneous response. These histograms are available for further analysis.

At the second stage of computer-processing, histograms and t-tests were computed for each of the 43 leadership behaviors. The histogram and t-test results were printed on sheets which contained 9 histograms. The 9 histograms were:

1. Importance of behavior.

2. Observed level of performance.

3. Desired level of performance.

4-9. Raw shortfall (difference between desired and observed performance) by cumulative importance grouping. [Histogram 4 was based on respondents who rated the importance of the behavior "critical" (scale value 7); Histogram 5 included those in Histogram 4 but added those who rated the behavior "very important"; Histogram 6 added those respondents who rated the behavior "important." This accumulating process was continued for subsequent histograms until Histogram 9 included all respondents.]

A sample page of histograms is included as Figure 8.

The program was arranged to provide such a page of 9 histograms for the all-respondents case and for any of approximately 150 basic demographic breakouts (values of demographic variables). Provision was also made for producing histograms for several composite demographic groups and for various composite demographic groups such as black enlisted men, black officers, etc. A t-test was automatically made for each demographic group comparing the group's responses to those for the same behavior in the all-respondents case. Frequency counts, percentiles, cumulative percentiles and averages were also computed and printed.

Since the amount of information available in 9 histograms of 160 demographic breakouts of 3 types of 43 behavioral characteristics (a total of 185,760 histograms) was more than could be usefully examined and consolidated within the time frame available, the decision was made to concentrate on those results derivable from grade-level analysis in the following levels:

a. Non-Leaders (E1, E2).

b. Leader Candidates (E3).

c. Junior NCO's (E4, E5, E6 with less than 5 years service).

d. Senior NCO's (E6 with 5 or more years service, E7, E8, E9).

e. Warrant Officers.

f. Junior Company Grade Officers (01).

g. Senior Company Grade Officers (02, 03).

h. Junior Field Grade Officers (04, 05).

i. Senior Field Grade Officers (06).

j. General Officers (07 and up).

Relevant information from the 10 pages of histograms representing the 10 grade levels from each behavior was transferred to a single worksheet per behavior (43 sheets in all). These worksheets are reproduced in Annex C.

Analysis of the data shown in the worksheets (Annex C) can be made in horizontal rows (one rank looking at superiors, self, or subordinates) or in diagonal rows (three levels looking at one rank, e.g., Junior NCO's looking at Senior NCO superiors, Senior NCO's looking at themselves, and Junior Company Grade looking at their Senior NCO subordinates). The diagonal analysis was chosen as more relevant to the present study. (NOTE: It was assumed, and verified by a spot check of demographic information on grade and position (Annex B, Questionnaire, p. B-3) that those personnel observed as "subordinates" or "superiors" were, as a group, also junior and senior, respectively, in rank to the rating group. This procedure was considered as introducing less conceptual bias than if the rank of the ratee were examined in each case for consistency with the grade-level categories listed above. In either case, of course, a specific individual is not viewed from all three perspectives, and the tri-focal perspective of a particular grade level is derived from composite data.)

Next, two basic indexes, <u>performance shortfall</u> and <u>perception shortfall</u>, were computed for each behavior for the overall sample and for each of the grade levels discussed above.

Raw performance shortfall is a measure of how well the observed performance agrees with desired or expected performance. Thus, it is a measure of how well the "informal contract" is being fulfilled. Computationally, raw performance shortfall for a particular leadership behavior as perceived by a particular individual equals the level of performance of the behavior desired by the individual, minus the level of performance of the behavior actually observed. Since a small performance shortfall of this type for a critically important behavior may be equal or greater

COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED SUBORDINATES

* * * * * A L L R E S P O N D E N T S * * * * *

```
                          0    2    5    7                          0    2    5    7
IMPORTANCE                0    5    0    5 OCCURANCE               0    5    0    5 DE
  #  C%  %                .................   #  C%  %              .................
139  20  20 CRITICAL      ,****             ,166  23  23 ALWAYS     ,*****          .22
300  62  42 V. IMPORTANT,********           , 93  36  13 ALMOST ALWAY,***            .27
153  83  22 IMPORTANT     ,****             , 94  50  13 FREQUENTLY  ,***            .13
 68  93  10 SOMEWHAT IMP,**                ,154  71  22 SOMETIMES   ,****           . 6
 29  97   4 SELDOM IMP   ,*                , 68  81  10 INFREQUENTLY,**             .
 10  98   1 REL UNIMP    .                , 89  93  13 ALMOST NEVER,***             .
  12100   2 UNIMPORTANT  .                , 47100   7 NEVER       ,*               .
AVE LEVEL =  5.5          .................AVE LEVEL =  4.5        .................AV
```

PERCIEVED DEVIATION OF OCCURANCE FROM DESIRED==BY CUMULATIVE IMPORTANCE GROUPING

```
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE (20%)                    VERY IMPORTANT OR HIGHER (62%)          IM
  #  C%  % LEVELS.....................         #  C%  % LEVELS.....................
  7   5   5      6 .*   2    5    7    1,     14   3   3      6 ,*   2    5    7    1,
 13  14   9      5 .**  5    0    5    0,     30  10   7      5 ,*   5    0    5    0,
  8  20   6      4 .*                  0,     37  18   8      4 ,**                 0,
 16  32  12      3 .**                 .      49  30  11      3 ,**                 .
 15  42  11      2 .**                 .      63  44  14      2 ,***                .
 17  55  12      1 .**                 .      59  57  13      1 ,***                .
 58  96  42      0 .********,.....     .     132  87  30      0 ,******.....        .   1
  4  99   3     -1 .*                  .      47  98  11     -1 ,**                 .
  0  99   0     -2 .                   .       5  99   1     -2 ,                  .
  1100   1     -3 .                   .       3100   1     -3 ,                  .
  0100   0     -4 .                   .       0100   0     -4 ,                  .
  0100   0     -5 .                   .       0100   0     -5 ,                  .
  0100   0     -6 .                   .       0100   0     -6 ,                  .
AVE LEVEL =  1.6.....................        AVE LEVEL =  1.5.....................  A

SOME IMPORTANCE OR HIGHER (93%)              SELDOM IMPORTANT OR HIGHER (97%)        WH
  #  C%  % LEVELS.....................         #  C%  % LEVELS.....................
 15   2   2      6 .    2    5    7    1,     15   2   2      6 ,    2    5    7    1,
 36   8   5      5 .*   5    0    5    0,     36   7   5      5 ,*   5    0    5    0,
 50  15   8      4 .**                 0,     50  15   7      4 ,*                  0,
 74  27  11      3 .**                 .      79  26  11      3 ,**                 .
 98  41  15      2 .***                .     102  41  15      2 ,***                .   1
109  58  17      1 .***                .     115  58  17      1 ,***                .   1
189  87  29      0 .******,.....       .     197  86  29      0 ,******,.....       .   2
 72  97  11     -1 .**                 .      76  97  11     -1 ,**                 .
 10  99   2     -2 .                   .      11  99   2     -2 ,                  .
  7100   1     -3 .                   .       8100   1     -3 ,                  .
  0100   0     -4 .                   .       0100   0     -4 ,                  .
  0100   0     -5 .                   .       0100   0     -5 ,                  .
  0100   0     -6 .                   .       0100   0     -6 ,                  .
AVE LEVEL =  1.3.....................        AVE LEVEL =  1.3.....................  A
```

FIGURE 8. SAMPLE HISTOGRAMS

```
 7                                  0    2    5    7
 5 DESIRED LEVEL                    0    5    0    5
......  # C%  %                     ..................
    .223 31 31 ALWAYS              .******          .
    .275 70 39 ALMOST ALWAY.*********             .
    .131 88 18 FREQUENTLY          .****            .
    . 60 97  8 SOMETIMES           .**              .
    .  8 98  1 INFREQUENTLY.                        .
    .  9 99  1 ALMOST NEVER.                        .
    .  5100  1 NEVER               .                .
......AVE LEVEL =  5.8              ..................
```

GROUPING--

IMPORTANT OR HIGHER (83%)

```
......    # C%  % LEVELS.......................
   1.   15  3  3      6 .*   2    5    7    1.
   0.   33  8  6      5 .*   5    0    5    0.
   0.   47 16  8      4 .**                 0.
    .   67 27 11      3 .**                  .
    .   86 42 15      2 .***                 .
    .   98 58 17      1 .***                 .
......  169 87 29      0 .******...............
    .   63 98 11     =1 .**                  .
    .    8 99  1     =2 .                    .
    .    6100  1     =3 .                    .
    .    0100  0     =4 .                    .
    .    0100  0     =5 .                    .
    .    0100  0     =6 .                    .
......  AVE LEVEL =  1.4.......................
```

WHOLE GROUP

```
......    # C%  % LEVELS.......................
   1.   15  2  2      6 .    2    5    7    1.
   0.   37  7  5      5 .*   5    0    5    0.
   0.   51 14  7      4 .*                  0.
    .   81 26 11      3 .**                  .
    .  105 41 15      2 .***                 .
    .  119 57 17      1 .***                 .
......  203 86 29      0 .******...............
    .   77 97 11     =1 .**                  .
    .   14 99  2     =2 .                    .
    .    8100  1     =3 .                    .
    .    1100  0     =4 .                    .
    .    0100  0     =5 .                    .
    .    0100  0     =6 .                    .
......  AVE LEVEL =  1.3.......................
```

in overall effect to a markedly larger shortfall in a less important behavior, the concept of weighted shortfall was adopted. Weighted shortfall for a behavior is obtained by multiplying the raw shortfall by the importance scale value given that behavior by the respondent. The performance shortfall for a group (e.g., Junior Field Grade Officers describing their own behavior) is the mean of the performance shortfalls of the members of the group. However, since three groups of respondents described behavior at each grade level, the performance shortfall for a particular grade level is the sum of the mean performance shortfalls for the three relevant groups--superiors, selves, and subordinates. Thus, performance shortfall, as used in this paper, refers to a composite index reflecting the perspectives of superiors, selves, and subordinates as they apply to the performance of a particular grade level.

Perception shortfall does not measure how well a grade level is performing. Instead, it measures differences between the perceptions of persons actually in a grade level and the perceptions of their superiors and subordinates regarding performance at that level. Perception shortfall is zero if these groups agree, no matter how good or how poor the performance is seen to be. Conversely, there will be a perception shortfall if the groups disagree, even if one group or the other or the average of the groups shows no performance shortfall.

Perception shortfall, as used in this study, is the sum of two components: (1) the difference between mean performance shortfall observed by superiors and the mean performance shortfalls of individuals describing their own behavior, and (2) the difference between mean performance shortfall observed by subordinates and the mean performance shortfalls of individuals describing their own behavior.

Perception shortfall might also be referred to as a "coefficient of self-delusion," since a large perception shortfall obtains only where individuals at a particular level report much less of a problem (i.e., smaller performance shortfall) in a particular behavior area than do their superiors and their subordinates.

A third index, the potential for inflated appraisal of a behavior by a superior, was computed but not dealt with in detail in this report. It is the difference between performance observed by superiors and performance observed by subordinates weighted by the superiors' importance rating.

A basic assumption of this study is that the practice of leadership behaviors is positively and causally related to perceptions of the overall performance of persons in leadership positions. Simple linear regression of the level of observed performance of each leadership behavior on the level of perceived overall performance of the leader is one method of evaluating this relationship. This was done for each of the 43 behaviors for the all-respondents case as well as for each grade level separately.

In each case, the regression of each behavior on the perception of overall performance yielded a highly significant ($p < .01$) F ratio, thus indicating the presence of a consistent relationship between each behavior and perceived overall performance. This finding also indicates that a relatively strong "halo" effect was also operating and that the various behaviors were not independent. Considering the above, it was felt that the most relevant component of the regression equation, "$\hat{Y} = a + bX$," was "b," the slope of the regression line.

Under the assumption of the existence of a causal relationship between each behavior and overall performance, the slope of the regression line is a measure of the sensitivity of perceived overall performance of a leader to changes in the level of his performance of the particular behavior on which the regression line was based. In other words, the greater the slope of the regression line, all other things being equal, the greater the change in perceived overall performance, given a unit change in the level of performance of the particular behavior under consideration. This measure (i.e., the slope of the regression line) was called "opportunity sensitivity," denoting the statistical sensitivity described above, with the interpretation being that the opportunity for increasing positive perceptions of overall performance through changing the specific behaviors of leaders is greatest for those behaviors where the slope is greatest.

Computationally, opportunity sensitivity is obtained by simple linear regression analysis, using observed performance of the individual leadership behavior as the independent variable (X) and satisfaction with overall performance as the dependent variable (Y). The slope (rate of change of $\hat{Y}$ with a change in X) was computed by separate regressions for observations of a given leadership level by superiors, subordinates, and self, giving separate opportunity sensitivity measures for each aspect of the tri-focal view depicted in Figure 3. The average of these three viewpoints is a convenient tri-focal measure of sensitivity of perceived overall performance to the particular behavior. Since it is the relative magnitude and ordering rather than the absolute magnitude of this coefficient which is significant, the sum of three components was used instead of the average, with somewhat lesser requirement for computation, and somewhat more convenient display of results.

It should again be pointed out that one should take care not to make the unwarranted assumption of independence of leadership behaviors or of their perception, and one should not assume an *a priori* linear relationship nor even an *a priori* cause-effect relationship of the kind or magnitude indicated by the regression analysis between changes in the individual behavior and changes in perception of overall performance. Nevertheless, it is known from the Ohio State University research mentioned earlier that each of the 43 leadership behaviors does have some direct cause-effect relationship upon perceived quality of performance. Therefore, when change in a particular behavior is viewed not as an isolated element but in the context of a broad program to improve all relevant

leadership behaviors, the association of items with large sensitivity (slope) with maximum opportunity is logical and meaningful, even if not mathematically rigorous.

The results of the various statistical manipulations applied to the data are presented in Annexes C, D, E, and F. Annex C, Summary Data Tables, presents in tabular form for each behavior, from each of the three perspectives, and for each grade level, mean values of importance, observed performance, desired performance, raw performance shortfall, and weighted performance shortfall, as well as perception shortfall and potential for inflated appraisal.

Annex D, Graphical Display of Performance and Perception Shortfall, presents bar charts showing for each behavior and grade level the magnitude of total performance and perception shortfall as well as the relative contributions to these indexes of superior, self, and subordinate points of view.

Annex E, Grade Level Summaries, presents for each grade level the highest five behaviors and lowest five behaviors in separate rank orderings of three categories. These categories are (1) opportunity sensitivity, (2) performance shortfall, and (3) perception shortfall.

Annex F, Rank Orderings of Items of Leadership Behavior, presents the rank orderings of all 43 behaviors for each grade level and for "all respondents" based on (1) performance shortfall, (2) perception shortfall, (3) opportunity sensitivity, and (4) potential for inflated appraisal.

☆ LEADERSHIP IN OVERALL CONTEXT.

There are, of course, other ingredients than leadership in the formula for long-term effectiveness of the Army. The missions assigned the Army; the resources allocated for national defense; the political, technological, and psychological factors at home and abroad--all influence operational capabilities of the Army. Figure 9 illustrates the role of leadership (and some pertinent contemporary issues in leadership application) as one of the three main contributing elements in long-term effectiveness of the Army. Optimum leadership is not sufficient to ensure mission attainment by troops who are ill-equipped in weaponry, or long divorced from popular support of their operational goals. On the other hand, immense resources of manpower, material, and national "will" can go for naught in the absence of the control, coordination, and consideration that are the hallmarks of effective leadership.



FIGURE 9. LEADERSHIP IN OVERALL CONTEXT

☆ FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION.

THE STUDY METHODOLOGY IS A RELIABLE DEVICE FOR MEASURING LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS AND DIAGNOSING PROBLEMS.

DISCUSSION. The internal consistency of the study in terms of data complementarity, with quantitative and qualitative results affording similar insights after independent analyses, provides assurance that the study concepts and methods are sound. Competent academicians--statisticians and behavioral scientists--who have examined the design and findings have commented favorably on the theoretical background and the techniques of data manipulation.

Equally important in regard to eventual utility and acceptability of the study is the consistent mode of comparability between the study findings produced by rigorous analytical techniques and the intuitive judgments of experienced military professionals.

The study design permits duplication of the sampling and analysis techniques on an Army-wide scale. It also provides a convenient method for isolating problems unique to a particular location or major unit (preferably of division or larger size). The individuals who participated in the study were enthusiastic about their role as contributors to a program to improve leadership practices. Also, the participants indicated that the necessary self-appraisal and evaluative processes involved in completing the questionnaire and following the discussion agenda prompted both healthy introspection and a convenient review of leadership education.

The data base has great potential for further exploitation. Time has so far permitted analysis of only that portion of the data necessary to answer the major questions derived from the mission assigned to the study group. Many important demographic variables (level of education, age, branch of service, etc.) have not yet been used. Further, there are a number of promising statistical manipulations which have not yet been completed.

2

FINDING

DEGREE OF SATISFACTION WITH THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF ARMY LEADERS VARIES SIGNIFICANTLY BY GRADE LEVEL (HIGHER GRADE, HIGHER SATISFACTION), VARIES ONLY SLIGHTLY BETWEEN COMBAT AND NONCOMBAT CONDITIONS, AND DOES NOT VARY BY RACIAL GROUP.

DISCUSSION. "Satisfaction with overall performance" was used as a subjective overall assessment of individual leader effectiveness. (See page B-10 of Annex B, Sample Questionnaire--Evaluation of Subordinate Version.) It was employed as a criterion measure in order to examine patterns of leader behavior which resulted in perceptions of differing degrees of leader effectiveness. The level of satisfaction on a scale from "totally pleased in all respects" down to "totally disappointed in all respects" was determined by compilation of questionnaire results from the perspectives of subordinate, self, and superior.

Figure 10 represents overall satisfaction with performance as expressed by the different grade levels in the study. Circled numbers are percentages. The top segments show percentages within the respective grade levels who indicated they were displeased to some degree: the bottom segment, those who were pleased to some degree; and the middle segment, those who were undecided. These percentages are the result of the summation of expressed satisfaction with the overall performance of superior, self, and subordinate. (Effective leadership was defined in the study as that which was satisfactory to both the superior and the subordinate.)

The grade level subdivisions used in the diagram and throughout the study are: JR NCO: E-4 through E-6 with less than five years' service; SR NCO: E-6 with five or more years' service through E-9; JR CO GR: O-1; SR CO GR: O-2, O-3; JR FLD GR: O-4, O-5; SR FLD GR: O-6; GEN OFF: O-7 and higher.

2



Note: The top segment of each bar is "Disappointed." The middle segment is "Undecided." The bottom segment is "Pleased."

FIGURE 10. OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE OF ARMY LEADERS

The study design permits depiction of relative satisfaction by perspective (superior, self, subordinate) as well as by grade levels. As shown in the following figure (Figure 11) the Senior NCO is least satisfied with his subordinate's performance, more satisfied with the performance of his superiors, and most satisfied with his own performance.



FIGURE 11. SENIOR NCO'S SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE

Figure 12 focuses on the Senior NCO's satisfaction with the overall performance of his superior and compares the data for all superiors to that of superiors postulated to be in combat situations (Annex B, Questionnaire, p. B-10, SEC III, items 2 and 3). It also presents a more detailed breakdown of the levels or degrees of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Probably the most outstanding datum presented in this figure is that over twice the percentage (14% compared to 6%) of Senior NCO's would have been totally disappointed with superiors had the situation been combat as opposed to situations in general.



FIGURE 12. SENIOR NCO'S SATISFACTION WITH LEADERSHIP OF SUPERIOR

The next figure (Figure 13) shows that in the overall sample there was only slight, although statistically significant, variation between degree of satisfaction in combat compared to satisfaction in noncombat situations. In general, the leader must perform slightly better in combat in order to maintain the same degree of satisfaction he delivers



FIGURE 13. VARIATIONS IN SATISFACTION WITH PERFORMANCE OF ARMY LEADERS

in noncombat. Again, these data were generated from respondents in noncombat situations and their assessment of their satisfaction had the situation been combat. (NOTE: It is also possible to compare responses of the more than 40 percent who were describing leaders in Vietnam combat, but this approach was not used. It would, however, provide interesting follow-on research.)

As further illustrated by the preceding figure (Figure 13), the 124 blacks in the sample showed little variation from the overall sample in terms of their satisfaction with performance. Blacks in general were slightly more pleased with leader performance than were the participants in the overall sample population.

3 FINDING

IN GENERAL, SOLDIERS ARE SATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP IN BASIC TRAINING AND DISSATISFIED WITH LEADERSHIP IN ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. (SOLDIERS ARE DISAPPOINTED IF HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE ARE NOT SET AND MAINTAINED.)

DISCUSSION. These data were obtained primarily through the group discussions held at three basic training centers (Fort Ord, Fort Jackson, Fort McClellan) and at other posts visited. Responses regarding this aspect of the Army's meeting the expectations of the informal contract (in BCT) and perceived failure to meet the terms of the informal contract (in AIT) were similar at all posts. Drill sergeants were generally thought to be competent and fair. However, the leaders in AIT were frequently seen as impersonal and lax, neither setting nor maintaining sufficiently high standards.

4 FINDING

OUR LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES (AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CONCEPT THEY EXPRESS) ARE VALID, AND APPROPRIATE FOR THE 1970'S.

DISCUSSION. This finding is a major finding of the study. Three factors establish the validity and acceptability of the Army's time-honored "Principles of Leadership." First, the study group found that

the Principles of Leadership were fundamental to leadership instruction across all Army schools charged with a leadership development mission. Further, the other services, and at least four other nations, use either the Army's principles or a close approximation thereof in their own leadership instruction. Second, the participants in the study, when asked to select the most and least important of the principles, were reluctant to put any principles in the latter category--it was difficult for them to consider any principle as "least important."

Final support for the validity of the principles comes from a free response questionnaire item which asked for proposed changes to the list of principles. Content analyses of this questionnaire item revealed that, of the 1800 respondents, only two or three individuals recommended any substantial change. The vast majority commented that the principles in their present form were sound and appropriate, and that leadership deficiencies derived not from the principles, but from the manner in which these principles were applied.

The principles vary in terms of their perceived relative importance. Figure 14 below shows the frequency with which each principle was listed



FIGURE 14. PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP--MOST AND LEAST IMPORTANT

as "most important" and "least important" by the total group of 1800 respondents. From this analysis, based on the views of a cross-section of Army leadership at all levels, the most important principle is "Be Technically and Tactically Proficient"; least important is "Employ Your Command in Accordance With Its Capabilities." When the data are analyzed by grade level, a different picture emerges and is the basis for another major finding.

5 FINDING

THE PERCEPTION OF RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES VARIES AMONG GRADE LEVELS.

DISCUSSION. The significance of this finding is that, even at the level of leadership generality represented by the Principles of Leadership, each level has a different view of the requirements of leadership. To look at the data another way, this finding says that the pattern of importance assigned among the principles by a given grade level defines, in a sense, how that grade level views the leadership situation. In Figure 15, for example, when the relative importance of a given principle



FIGURE 15. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF A PRINCIPLE BY GRADE LEVEL

is analyzed by grade level, the principle "Develop a Sense of Responsibility Among Subordinates" receives the highest number of "least important" ratings from the Senior NCO's. At successively higher grade levels, the importance increases, until at general officer level this principle is obviously among those considered most important by leaders at that level.

This variation in perceived relative importance of principles by different grade levels is related closely to attempts in the past to distinguish among processes of leadership, commandership, and generalship. The data of the present study draw this distinction clearly and more precisely in terms of the patterns of relative importance assigned by each grade level. Figure 16, for example, illustrates the relative importance of the Principles of Leadership as seen by the Senior NCO. This pattern will differ for each grade level.



FIGURE 16. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLES: SENIOR NCO

6

FINDING

THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES IS DEFECTIVE IN SEVERAL RESPECTS WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY GRADE LEVELS AND PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SUBORDINATE, SELF) IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC BEHAVIOR.

DISCUSSION. The data presented thus far support the idea that, while the relative importance of the leadership principles may vary, they are accepted by Army leadership as valid and appropriate. The problems of leadership appear to lie not in the principles themselves, but rather in the application of these principles.

The study design can identify defective application with considerable precision. It can identify defects by specific grade level. It can identify also defects by perspective, i.e., the degree to which the defect is evident to superior, subordinate, or the leader himself. And finally, the study design can identify defects in application not in terms of generalities of leadership, but rather in terms of specific items of leadership behavior.

As an example, Figure 17 shows, numerically and graphically, the degree to which a selected level (the Senior NCO in this case) is not meeting the combined expectations of superiors, subordinates, and self with respect to one of 43 items of leadership behavior--in this example, effective communication with subordinates. (The Senior NCO level was chosen as the example in this case because of an evident need for better communication at that level. Significant problems in leadership behavior were found at all levels used in the study.) A zero value in total performance shortfall would represent that hypothetical condition where all leaders at a given level were meeting completely the expectations of superiors, subordinates, and self. Since this condition is highly improbable, there will be, almost without exception, some degree of performance shortfall for any given leadership behavior at any given grade level.

"HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES"



FIGURE 17. PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: ONE ITEM OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

The identification of performance shortfall is only part of the diagnostic problem. Another and major facet of the overall problem of defects in the application of leadership principles is the degree to which performance shortfall is recognized by the leader himself. Examination of the data shows that, true to human nature, leaders deceive themselves with respect to their own leadership effectiveness.

7 FINDING

A MAJOR DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP IS THE FREQUENT MISPERCEPTION OF HOW WELL ONE'S OWN LEADERSHIP IS MEETING THE LEADERSHIP EXPECTATIONS OF SUPERIOR AND/OR SUBORDINATE (INDIVIDUALS CONSISTENTLY PERCEIVE THEIR OWN SHORTFALL AS BEING LESS THAN THAT OF THEIR SUPERIORS OR SUBORDINATES).

DISCUSSION. The same data used to derive perceived performance shortfall can also be used, with a different statistical manipulation, to determine the degree to which leaders at a given level are unaware that they are not meeting the expectations of superior and subordinate.

Study of the data from the self-description version of the questionnaire shows that leaders at all levels recognize their own performance shortfalls to some degree for every item of leadership behavior. In virtually all cases, however, they see their own performance shortfall as less than that of their superiors and subordinates. There is a difference between the leader's perception of his own performance shortfall and his immediate superior's perception. There is also a difference between the leader's perception of his own shortfall and his immediate subordinate's perception of that shortfall. As was discussed in the section dealing with statistical treatment of the data, these two difference scores, added together, permit quantitative expression of the degree to which the leader is unaware of his own performance shortfalls as seen by his superiors and subordinates. This datum can be termed a perception shortfall, or an "index of self-delusion." In terms of practical utility, this index gives the leader the opportunity to see himself as others see him--the "others" being the two parties closest to and most concerned with his leadership, i.e., his immediate superior and immediate subordinate.

As was the case with performance shortfall, perception shortfall can be expressed quantitatively or graphically. Figure 18 illustrates



FIGURE 18. PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: ONE ITEM OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

perception shortfall, and shows how measures of both performance and perception shortfall can be combined using a common zero value baseline. The bar in Figure 18, then, is a composite depiction of defects in the application of leadership principles--for a given grade level (Senior NCO), and for a given item of leadership behavior. The portion of the bar to the right of the zero value baseline shows the degree to which the leader at this level is not meeting the expectations of superior, subordinate, and self. The portion to the left of the baseline shows the degree to which the leader is unaware that he is not meeting these leadership expectations.

At this point, the theoretical concept of leadership climate can be brought to bear to aid in the diagnostic task. When the data are organized so that performance and perception shortfalls are computed for all six grade levels, then plotted on a common zero baseline, interlevel comparisons can be made for any given item of leadership behavior.

Figure 19 shows how all levels compare with respect to performance and perception shortfalls on one item of leadership behavior. The bar for the Senior NCO in this figure is the same as that described in the previous illustration. Examination of the data depicted in Figure 19



FIGURE 19. PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: ALL GRADE LEVELS

shows that, for this item of leadership behavior, performance shortfall is greatest for the Senior NCO level; least for the Senior Field Grade level. Perception shortfall is greatest for the Senior NCO level; least for the Junior Company Grade level. In a composite sense, the data would indicate that the greatest problem in the application of leadership principles with respect to this particular item of leadership behavior lies at the Senior NCO level. (For other leadership behaviors, other grade levels represent the "worst case.")

The dashed, vertical lines in Figure 19 have been added to provide further diagnostic assistance. These lines are control lines. When they intersect a horizontal bar, they identify the largest 10 percent of performance shortfalls and the largest 10 percent of perception shortfalls--considering all grade levels and all items of leadership behavior. The control lines provide a means for determining which shortfalls are at a "critical" stage. The fact that these control lines are at 20 units for performance shortfall and 10 units for perception shortfall is coincidental. The scale units are units of shortfall--not percentages.

The figures which follow (Figures 20 through 24) show interlevel comparisons on a number of items of leadership behavior, and illustrate a variety of combinations of performance and perception shortfalls at different grade levels. The data base includes similar graphic displays for all 43 items of leadership behavior. Partial interpretations of the figures used for illustration are outlined in subsequent paragraphs to indicate the type of information that can be obtained from these interlevel comparisons.



FIGURE 20. INTERLEVEL COMPARISON: AWARENESS OF MORALE



FIGURE 21. INTERLEVEL COMPARISON: FREEDOM TO FAIL



FIGURE 22. INTERLEVEL COMPARISON: LOYALTY TO SUBORDINATE



FIGURE 23. INTERLEVEL COMPARISON: EASY TO UNDERSTAND



FIGURE 24. INTERLEVEL COMPARISON: OVERLY AMBITIOUS BEHAVIOR

· Figure 20. Three grade levels at a critical state in terms of not meeting expectations of superiors and subordinates for this item of behavior. The three grade levels are those normally in closest contact with the individual soldier. One of the three grade levels is critically unaware of its own problem in this area.

· Figure 21. One critical problem in awareness. First Lieutenants and Captains have the least problem of all levels on this item, in terms of both performance and perception shortfall. (This relatively "good" condition of Senior Company Grade leadership is found in most of the 43 interlevel comparisons.)

· Figure 22. One grade level in much better shape than the others. Junior NCO's and Colonels critically unaware that they are not standing up for their subordinates to the degree expected by their subordinates and superiors combined.

· Figure 23. One grade level falling critically short in meeting expectations of superiors and subordinates. Could illustrate either a communication problem between 2d Lieutenant and Senior NCO, or may reflect the 2d Lieutenant's problems in becoming adjusted to the Army. All levels relatively well aware that they are not as easy to understand as their superiors and subordinates expect them to be.

· Figure 24. Majors and Lieutenant Colonels demonstrate overly ambitious behavior far more than their superiors and subordinates think they should. Majors and Lieutenant Colonels have a greater problem than any other level on this negative item of leadership behavior--in terms of negative performance as well as awareness of how superiors and subordinates view this performance. Could be a graphic illustration of "ticket-punching" syndrome.

The data used to compute and plot the interlevel comparisons can be manipulated in a different manner to provide a comprehensive diagnosis of the leadership problems at any selected level of leadership. This mode of data organization depicts, for a given grade level, performance and perception shortfalls (representing defects in the application of leadership principles) for each of the 43 items of leadership behavior. Figure 25 on the following page illustrates this particular diagnostic capability.

In Figure 25, the selected grade level is the Junior NCO. Performance and perception shortfalls for each of the 43 items of leadership behavior can be computed and plotted as shown by the heavy bars. Figure 25, for purposes of illustration, includes only seven of the 43 items. Vertical control lines, discussed earlier, have been omitted for clarity. The items shown are rank-ordered in terms of "improvement opportunity," which will be explained in a subsequent section.



FIGURE 25. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: JR. NCO

Some of the problems illustrated in Figure 25 might be termed "simple," others "compound." Item 2, for example, shows considerable shortfall in meeting expectations (right side of bar), but the Junior NCO's are relatively well aware of this (left side of bar). They recognize that they are not meeting expectations, and in this regard, the problem is comparatively simple. A compound problem is illustrated by items 1 and 6. In these instances, there is considerable shortfall in meeting expectations, plus considerable unawareness that this shortfall exists. These data suggest, then, that in helping the Junior NCO improve his leadership in these two illustrative items of leadership behavior, efforts to teach him to communicate better or to be more considerate of others will be of limited value unless he is first made aware that he has significant leadership difficulties in these two areas.

Figure 25, and the figures which follow (Figures 26 through 30) depict the extent and complexity of the first seven leadership problems for each of the grade levels used in the study.

PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP
SR NCO (E-6-9)



FIGURE 26. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: SR. NCO

JR CO GR (0-1)



FIGURE 27. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: JR. CO GRADE

SR CO GR (0-2,3)



FIGURE 28. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: SR. CO GRADE

JR FLD GR (0-4,5)



FIGURE 29. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: JR. FLD GRADE



FIGURE 30. PROBLEMS IN APPLICATION OF LEADERSHIP: SR. FLD GRADE

Comparison of these figures shows that the items of leadership behavior listed appear in a different rank-order for each grade level. This phenomenon is explained in the next major finding.

8

FINDING

CERTAIN ITEMS OF LEADER BEHAVIOR FOR EACH GRADE LEVEL HAVE HIGH POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN OVERALL LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS IN RETURN FOR A SMALL IMPROVEMENT IN THE PARTICULAR BEHAVIOR.

DISCUSSION. Findings 6 and 7 illustrated the diagnostic capability of the study design. By using the same raw data with different statistical manipulations, then combining the results with measures of satisfaction with leadership, the prescriptive capability of the study design can be demonstrated.

For purposes of the present study, effective leadership at a given level is operationally defined as leadership which is simultaneously satisfactory to both superior and subordinate. As discussed earlier, the questionnaire generated data which provided measures of satisfaction with overall performance. Finding 8 is derived from the results of a statistical analysis procedure (linear regression analysis) which examined the relationship between two factors or variables: the items of leadership behavior, and satisfaction with overall performance.

In essence, this statistical examination shows that satisfaction with overall performance is affected more by certain items of leadership behavior than by others. Viewed positively, this says that small improvements in some items of leadership behavior will produce far more satisfaction with performance (in the eyes of both superiors and subordinates) than will improvements in other items. When these more sensitive, more powerful items of leadership behavior are identified, they represent opportunities for improvement of leadership. The analytical procedure identifies these opportunities, and provides the information necessary to arrange them in rank-order, beginning with the item of leadership behavior which offers the greatest opportunity for increasing satisfaction with overall performance. Figure 31 on the following page illustrates this prescriptive capability.

The overall ranking in the left-hand column of Figure 31 shows the 10 most "powerful" items of leadership behavior in terms of the opportunity they offer for increasing superior and subordinate satisfaction with performance. The relation between the Principles of Leadership and the 43 items of leadership behavior (the items hypothetically representing the application of the principles) is evident in the comparison of the most important principle (discussed previously under Finding 4) and the most "powerful" item of leadership behavior, shown in Figure 31.

The overall ranking of opportunity is computed from the data of all 1800 respondents, without regard to grade level. Finding 5 indicated that the relative importance of principles of leadership varies by grade level. The same is true of the relative opportunities offered by items of leadership behavior. The right-hand columns of Figure 31 show the improvement opportunity rank-order positions when the data are analyzed by grade level. The item that is number 1 in the overall ranking in terms of opportunity for leadership improvement is for the Junior NCO number 2, for the Senior NCO number 2, for the Junior Company Grade number 6, and so on. (The procedure for determining these rank-order positions is based upon 7 separate statistical analyses--rank-order positions for all grade levels combined will not "average out" to equal the overall ranking.)

OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT

OVERALL RANKING ↓		JR NCO	SR NCO	JR CO GR	SR CO GR	JR FLD GR	SR FLD GR
1	HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES	2	2	6	8	3	2
2	HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND	4	5	7	2	4	12
3	HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES	1	1	24	1	5	9
4	HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES	16	8	1	5	10	5
5	HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER	3	3	32	4	1	8
6	HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS	12	16	2	12	6	4
7	HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY	10	12	4	6	8	16
8	HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE	25	14	9	11	2	1
9	HE WAS APPROACHABLE	14	4	16	14	18	3
10	HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES	11	7	20	19	9	6

FIGURE 31. IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES: ALL GRADE LEVELS

In terms of practical utility, the variation in rank-order positions by grade level permits the establishment of priorities in efforts to improve leadership--and the priorities can be "tailored" to fit each grade level. Figure 31 includes only those items of leadership behavior which were in the top 10 in terms of improvement opportunities for all grade levels combined. The data base for the study can provide the improvement opportunity rank-order for all 43 items of leadership behavior for each grade level.

(NOTE: Opportunities for leadership improvement for all grade level groupings for all 43 behaviors, as well as perception and performance shortfalls by grade levels for all 43 behaviors, are found in Annex F.)

9

FINDING

SEVERAL FACTORS WERE FOUND TO BE COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM OF APPLYING CORRECTLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP:

A. LEADERS' PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE AS IMPEDING THEIR ABILITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS.

B. DIVERSION OF SOLDIERS FROM PRIMARY DUTIES BY DETAILS AND LEVIES.

C. MISUSE OF SOLDIERS' TIME.

D. LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE WITH TIME OFF.

E. FEELING BY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND JUNIOR NCO'S WITH PRIMARILY VIETNAM EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED FOR PEACETIME LEADERSHIP.

F. APPARENTLY WIDE VARIATION IN THE STANDARDS BY WHICH GENERAL OFFICERS MEASURE LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES.

G. SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS (LACK OF COMMUNICATION, INATTENTION TO HUMAN NEEDS, ETC.) IN THE PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE CORROBORATING FINDINGS OF OTHER PERTINENT RECENT STUDIES OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

DISCUSSION. This finding presents recurring themes derived from the qualitative data (interviews). The qualitative data analyzed consisted of the detailed notes of the field survey teams, the recorded debriefings of field survey team members (audiotape: 20-25 hours), and the recorded interviews with the general officers who participated in the study (audiotape: 20-25 hours). The data were analyzed by various content analysis procedures over a three-week period. The themes thus derived represent a condensation of the composite replies of leaders at all grade levels to the common interview agenda:

· What are the leadership problems at your particular level?

· What sort of leadership behavior do you expect from your immediate superiors? Your immediate subordinates? Your contemporaries and yourself?

The themes represent factors of the overall organizational climate which make it difficult to apply correctly the principles of leadership, irrespective of the leader's effectiveness. The factors are seen, at this time at least, as negative aspects of the "system." Amplifying comment for each of these factors is provided in the paragraphs which follow.

A. LEADERS' PERCEPTION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE AS IMPEDING THEIR ABILITY TO ENFORCE STANDARDS. Particularly at the lower enlisted grade levels, there was strong and pervasive animosity toward what some individuals referred to as "those long-haired junior JAG officers." Leaders at company commander level felt that their range of options for handling leadership problems was restricted severely by current developments in the application of military justice. Many NCO's saw this condition as a lack of downward loyalty by the chain of command.

B. DIVERSION OF SOLDIERS FROM PRIMARY DUTIES BY DETAILS AND LEVIES. This historical source of complaint by leaders at many echelons further compounds the already epidemic problems created by personnel turbulence.

C. MISUSE OF SOLDIERS' TIME. The lower grade levels are apparently far more sensitive to the use and misuse of their time than is commonly realized by leaders at all echelons. It is in regard to this item that many young soldiers first see the organization beginning to default on the terms of the informal contract. An irritant of perhaps unrecognized importance, the misuse of soldiers' time, particularly in Advanced Individual Training, exacts a heavy price in terms of satisfaction with Army leadership.

D. LACK OF AUTHORITY TO REWARD GOOD PERFORMANCE WITH TIME OFF. NCO's, in particular, felt that if they were to be held responsible for "getting the job done," then, reciprocally, they should be trusted with the authority to control this simple reward. At all levels, "a little time off" and "a pat on the back now and then" were seen as the <u>best</u> rewards that a superior could give--overall, far more significant than awards, letters, plaques, office ceremonies, and the like.

E. FEELING BY JUNIOR OFFICERS AND JUNIOR NCO'S WITH PRIMARILY VIETNAM EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE ILL-PREPARED FOR PEACETIME LEADERSHIP. The junior officers and NCO's, trained for the Vietnam War, recognized that leadership in a peacetime, garrison situation was more complex than in combat. Many wanted (and <u>expected</u>) the Army to help them become better leaders. (NOTE: Although these and other comments refer to <u>NCO's</u>, the remarks also pertain to <u>Specialists</u> who have leadership responsibilities.)

F. APPARENTLY WIDE VARIATION IN THE STANDARDS BY WHICH GENERAL OFFICERS MEASURE LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES. Fifty-five general officers, most of them assigned in the Washington area, completed the questionnaire and forty-six of them were interviewed by members of the study team. The typical interview lasted approximately fifty minutes. The generals were candid, interested, and cooperative. Perhaps the most significant finding to emerge from a review of the entire interview series was that there apparently exists a wide range of attitudes toward several relatively fundamental concepts of leadership, personnel management, and command. While individual differences of personality and leadership techniques are obviously expected, the diversity of views appeared to extend beyond these variables and enter the more basic and important realm of individual value systems. A particular case in point was the difference in the standards by which these senior officers measure the leadership effectiveness of their subordinates. Examples of items wherein standards seemed to vary beyond the bounds of an appropriately uniform institutional policy are (1) the relative importance of off-duty conduct and (2) the criteria for and attitude toward relieving commanders for cause. In practical terms, if major disagreement on the standards exists among those who set the standards, there are practical difficulties in developing understanding of--and response toward--the expectations of the organization. The entire leadership climate of the Army is involved, particularly because of the strong link between the key role of general officers as evaluators of their subordinates and the organization's formal and informal systems of reward and punishment.

G. SIGNIFICANT DEFECTS (LACK OF COMMUNICATION, INATTENTION TO HUMAN NEEDS, ETC.) IN THE PROFESSIONAL CLIMATE CORROBORATING FINDINGS OF OTHER PERTINENT RECENT STUDIES OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION. Almost without fail, when professionals talk about professionalism, there is the recurring theme of the "ambitious, transitory commander--marginally skilled in the complexities of his duties--engulfed in producing statistical results, fearful of personal failure, too busy to talk with or listen to his subordinates, and determined to submit acceptably optimistic reports which reflect faultless completion of a variety of tasks at the expense of the sweat and frustration of his subordinates." This recurring theme was brought to light more than a year ago in a study of officer values. Despite concerted efforts to remedy much of the nonprofessionalism illustrated by the theme, the theme persists. This illustrates the need for patience, and also the snail's pace of organizational change when that change affects the attitudes, values, and standards of the members of the organization.

10

FINDING

THE OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA CONCEPT WAS MODERATELY FAVORABLE ALTHOUGH THERE WERE WIDE VARIATIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN GRADE LEVELS.

DISCUSSION. This finding was the result of ancillary research conducted as part of the overall USAWC Leadership Study. Since "Leadership for the 1970's" could be equated with Leadership for the Modern Volunteer Army, interpretation of data and implementation of proposals might be offset badly if the respondents held a strongly biased overall attitude toward the Modern Volunteer Army concept.

A group of questionnaire items was designed to examine the respondent's attitude toward the concept (Part V, Annex B). To preclude contamination of the leadership data, the MVA questions were administered separately, after the respondent had completed all other parts of the questionnaire. The principal result of the analysis of the MVA questions is shown in Figure 32 on the following page.

Figure 32 depicts overall attitude toward the MVA concept among all 1800 respondents. The figures in circles are percentages. The question shown is essentially the same as the primary MVA item in the questionnaire. Approximately three-quarters of the respondents approved the concept; one-quarter disapproved. The question design permitted further analysis of the intensity of approval or disapproval.



FIGURE 32. OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA

Since grade level had proven to be a major variable in other analyses, its effect on overall attitude toward the MVA concept was examined. The data appear in Figure 33 on the following page. In general, they show that within NCO and officer categories, the higher the grade level, the less the approval of the concept. The exception to this general rule is the Senior Field Grade level (Colonel). Although the data in this case were not examined in detail, a

tentative conclusion regarding this grade level's relatively greater approval is that it is an effect of leadership climate, i.e., it might be the result of an influence process moving downward from the upper echelons.



FIGURE 33. ATTITUDE TOWARD MVA: BY GRADE LEVEL

Examination of the quantitative MVA data and the interview content indicates that attitudes toward the MVA did not contaminate the leadership data (the subject came up only infrequently in the leadership discussions). Depending upon the method used, implementation of proposals resulting from this study should encounter "normal" organizational resistance to change in accordance with the general proposition: "the higher the grade, the greater the resistance."

☆ IMPLICATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.

The report represents only the first step of a major research effort concerning Army leadership. As a result of this initial study, the CONARC Leadership Board under Brigadier General Henry Emerson was established at Fort Bragg. As part of the task of this Board, data have been collected from over 35,000 individuals representing all major installations worldwide with the exception of Vietnam. These data are in essentially the same form as the data presented in this report. Needless to say, this huge data base presents many opportunities for much significant research. Some of the obvious opportunities are in the area of various demographic breakdowns of the data. For example, the data provide the opportunity to compare the leadership expectations of young black officers with those of young white officers or with more senior black officers. Obviously, the number of single and compound comparisons among the approximately 160 demographic classifications is very large. While many of these comparisons are not particularly meaningful, there are, without a doubt, a very large number of comparisons which would provide the Army with highly important and significant information needed in policy formation or personnel research.

This report has focused on shortfalls or problem areas as they are viewed by superiors, subordinates, and selves. Several other foci are quite appropriate both for the sample of 1800 reported here and for the 35,000 individual sample discussed above. The importance scale responses alone could answer any of the following questions:

1. What are the most important leadership behaviors for battalion commanders?

   a. From their own point of view?

   b. From their superior's and subordinate's points of view?

   c. In Europe as opposed to CONUS?

   d. In Armor as opposed to Infantry battalions?

   e. . . . .

   f. . . . .

2. Is "counseling, training and developing subordinates"* more important

   a. for Field Grade or for Company Grade Officers?

   b. for Combat Arms Officers or for Services Officers?

*Insert any of the 43 leadership behaviors used in the study.

c. for NCO's or for Officers?

d. . . . .

e. . . . .

f. . . . .

3. How important is "being counseled, trained and developed"* by one's superior to

a. black enlisted men?

b. white enlisted men?

c. black NCO's?

d. white NCO's?

e. enlisted men with college degrees?

f. officers without college degrees?

g. . . . .

h. . . . .

It would also be of value to focus on the expectation or "should" scale data. Using this expectancy data, a profile of leadership expectations can be prepared for any demographic group, or comparisons can be made among the leadership expectation profiles of different groups. Some important questions which might be answered through this type of analysis include:

1. What are the expectations of new officers vis-a-vis the leadership behavior of their superiors; their subordinates; themselves?

2. Are the leadership expectations of blacks different from those of whites?

3. Are there significant differences in the patterns of leadership behavior that ROTC and USMA graduates expect of their subordinates?

Obviously, a third major developmental effort should focus on observed performance. In this area at least one important type of question would take the form of comparing groups (e.g., rank, geographic, racial, branch, volunteer, etc.) in terms of the level of observed performance of various behaviors. Similar comparisons could also be made between perspective levels. Such questions might include:

1. Do infantry officers more often "set high standards of performance"* than signal corps officers?

a. From their own point of view?

b. From their superiors' point of view?

c. From their subordinates' point of view?

2. Is there a significant difference between the perceptions of superiors and the perceptions of subordinates as to the frequency with which Senior NCO's are "willing to support their subordinates even when the subordinates make mistakes."?*

3. Are there differences between recent USMA, ROTC and OCS graduates on the extent to which they are seen as being "technically competent to perform their duties."?*

a. As they see themselves?

b. As their superiors see them?

c. As their subordinates see them?

Other questions of great potential value to the Army which could be answered utilizing the larger data base might include:

1. How does the pattern or profile of performance, or expectations, or importance of leadership behaviors change

a. with increased length of service?

b. with grade?

c. with age?

d. with marital status?

2. Since the larger sample constitutes a fairly random sample of Army leadership, what is the general distribution of socioeconomic status (or any of 21 other demographic variables) within grade levels, within branches, etc.?

3. What are the problems (shortfalls) in actual leadership behavior facing individuals at a particular level--i.e., what shortfalls do they see in their superiors or subordinates to which they must adapt their own behavior?

4. Are there differences between subgroups (i.e., racial, grade, source of commission, geographic background, etc.) in terms of their satisfaction with the overall performance of

a. their superiors?

b. their subordinates?

c. themselves?

The answers to these questions are of interest to the Army. Additionally, many of these answers are also important for the general area of leadership research. The data of this study plus the CONARC Leadership Board data probably constitute the largest sampling of leaders ever made in a single large organization. Many of the findings are probably directly generalizable to other large organizations. In its own right, a study comparing these data to similar data collected in industry would be of great value in understanding the impact of mission and environment on the process of leadership.

While much of the diagnostic and prescriptive value of this study derives from the specificity of the individual behaviors included, its research and theoretic value might be enhanced through a factor analytic procedure in order to uncover the broader dimensions of behavior included in the questionnaire. It would also be extremely interesting to compare the factor structures of various grade levels, of the three perspectives, of blacks and whites, of expectations and observed performance, and so on.

One final area which, if implemented, would increase the value of the study immeasurably would be the establishment of a periodic readministration of the questionnaire to a carefully selected representative sample. This periodic or recurrent sampling would allow the assessment over time of longitudinal changes in the various factors discussed in this report. With this type of procedure, the study could be used not only for planning various programs and organizational changes but, perhaps more importantly, for evaluating the success of various programs in increasing the effectiveness of Army leadership.

In summary, a careful and well-supported program for extracting useful information from the data can be a major step in the Army's continuing efforts to enhance its professional leadership.

☆ SOLUTION CONCEPTS AND POSSIBLE SPECIFIC ACTIONS

SOLUTION

1

SOLUTION CONCEPT

- I. USE THE MAIN FEATURES OF THIS STUDY ON AN ARMY-WIDE SCALE TO PROVIDE:

  a. THE INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH.

  b. DIAGNOSTIC INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.

  c. A BROADENED DATA BANK OF INFORMATION TO BE USED BY ARMY PLANNERS, EDUCATORS, AND RESEARCHERS.

A strong and positive e
of participation in a projec
concept of the informal cont
group interview, represents
on the results of their cont
At every installation, the f
study and its evident potent

This survey team also f
interview agenda, participat
tion in the process and prob

Army-wide repetition of
base. With an enlarged data
commander with comprehensive
improving the leadership of
base can give more accurate
over time can provide inform
of leadership effectiveness.

Academic professionals
favorably by the potential
analyzed, the data base can
lation of personnel policie
academic study of organizat
enormous wealth of untapped
have powerful implications
potential application, ther
by an adequately staffed ag

* *Since completion of th
this report the CONARC Lead
Board, under the direction
leadership questionnaire on
input from the several thou
unit designation or locatio
respondents--to data proces
the two efforts, the report
is referenced on these page
necessarily in order of the
included in column 5 of the
reference between related p*

CONCEPTS AND

2

DISCUSSION

effect is created within the individual and the unit as a result
ect whose potential impact in improving the Army is obvious. The
ntract, which is a central theme of tne questionnaire and the
s the individual and the organization. If both are given feedback
ntribution, the contribution gains significance and importance.
field survey team found strong and positive interest in the
ntial.

found that, because of the content of the questionnaire and the
ıation as a respondent constituted unique and provocative instruc-
oblems of leadership.

of the study provides a far more sensitive and responsive data
ıta base, it is possible, for example, to furnish a major unit
ive diagnostic and prescriptive information for studying and
of his command. Additionally, a larger and more sensitive data
te prescriptions for subgroups of individuals. Collecting data
ormation on attitude changes and trends--if any--in perceptions
ss.

ıls who have studied the data of the present study are impressed
ıl the data offer. Depending upon how the data are organized and
an answer leadership-related questions which arise in the formu-
ies, in the development of educational programs, and in the
ational leadership. At the present time, there is still an
ed information in the design and data base--information which could
ıs for Army leadership. In terms of both scientific progress and
ere is pressing need for continuation of this research effort
agency.

the major portion of this study and prior to the preparation of
eadership Board was convened at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. That
on of BG Henry E. Emerson, conducted seminars and administered a
on a worldwide basis. The Board is currently transmitting the
ousand questionnaires--compiled strictly without reference to
tion in order to enhance candor and objectivity among individual
essing facilities. Because of the close interrelationship between
ort of the Board, Leadership for Professionals, *dated 30 July 1971,*
ges. Selected findings and recommendations of that report (not
their appearance in the CONARC Leadership Board report) have been
these right-hand pages in order to provide a convenient cross-
l proposals.

POSSIBLE SPECIFIC

3	4
POSSIBLE SPECIFIC ACTION	COMMENTS
1. MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE USAWC, USMA, USACGSC, AND OTHER INTERESTED SCHOOLS AND AGENCIES FOR APPROPRIATE STUDY AND COMMENTARY THE COMPILED QUESTIONNAIRE DATA RESULTS (IN SUCH FORMAT THAT THE CONTRIBUTING MILITARY UNITS AS WELL AS THE INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS REMAIN ANONYMOUS) OF THIS STUDY, THE CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD FIELD SURVEY, AND FUTURE SURVEYS BASED ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGNED FOR THIS STUDY.	
2. DURING THE LATTER HALF OF FY 73 MAKE A SURVEY OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN SELECTED ARMY UNITS (POSSIBLY DUPLICATING THE GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF THE CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD'S EFFORT DURING THE FALL OF 1971) USING THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND GROUP INTERVIEW TECHNIQUES DEVELOPED FOR THIS STUDY. MAKE THE LOCAL RESULTS AVAILABLE TO MAJOR UNIT COMMANDERS OF UNITS SURVEYED; AND ADD THE GLOBAL RESULTS TO THE BANK OF LEADERSHIP DATA OBTAINED BY THIS STUDY AND THE CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD.	
3. DEVELOP A QUESTIONNAIRE ON LEADER BEHAVIOR (POSSIBLY SIMILAR TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THIS STUDY) AND ADMINISTER THAT QUESTIONNAIRE OVER THE YEARS AT ADVANCED COURSES, CGSC, AND USAWC TO FORM A LONGITUDINAL DATA BASE CAPABLE OF DISCLOSING TRENDS AND CHANGES IN OFFICER PERCEPTION AND VALUES OVER TIME.	
4. ADMINISTER THE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THIS STUDY—OR A MODIFICATION OF IT—TO SELECTED OFFICERS IN DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, COMPILE THE RESULTS AND MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTICIPANTS IN A FORMAT SIMILAR TO THAT PROVIDED TO ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD.	
5. SELECT ONE OR TWO OF THE ARMY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES FOR ACADEMIC YEAR '73 FROM AMONG QUALIFIED OFFICERS WITH BACKGROUNDS IN BEHAVORIAL SCIENCE AND PROVIDE THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO UTILIZE THE LEADERSHIP DATA BASE GENERATED BY THIS STUDY AND RELATED FIELD SURVEYS IN THEIR RESEARCH EFFORT AT AN APPROPRIATE CIVILIAN INSTITUTION.	

32 (Continued)

ACTIONS

ENTS

5

CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD
RELATED FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDING 17: The data collected as a result of this project /the CONARC Leadership Board effort/ represents an unprecedented source of easily retrievable information on leadership. (p. 39) (Note: All page numbers in this column refer to the Report of the CONARC Leadership Board dated 30 July 1971.)

Recommendation: DA encourage use of this information by Army research agencies and service schools as well as selected civilian organizations and universities. (p. 39)

(Continued)

SOLUTION

1

SOLUTION CONCEPT

2. MAKE WIDE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED PORTIONS OF THIS STUDY AS A MEANS OF PROVIDING, BY LEVEL, DIAGNOSES OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS AND PRESCRIPTIONS FOR LEADERSHIP IMPROVEMENT.

As noted in the findings detailed and rank-ordered lis can also point up specific ar profitable. Further, part of tion necessary to establish a charged with the development course of leadership instruct for a given grade level. Add problems and prescriptions fo level. Such a multilevel app accomplishment and improving

Further, a detailed anal well beyond school situations or counseling programs, a uni sibilities for the developmer might be used by an individua "Know yourself and seek self-

CONCEPTS AND

2

DISCUSSION

indings, it is possible to generate, for any grade level, a rather
red listing of the leadership problems at that level. The data base
ific areas where efforts at leadership improvement can be most
part of the prescription generated by the data provides the informa-
blish an order of priority among efforts at improvement. A school
opment of leadership at a particular level could build an entire
nstruction around a detailed study of the problems and prescriptions
el. Additionally, such a course might well include insight into the
ions for the immediate superiors and subordinates of a given grade
vel approach has obvious implications for facilitating mission
roving interlevel communications.

led analysis of leadership at a given level has applicability extending
tuations alone. Through officer calls, noncommissioned officer calls,
s, a unit commander could use the analysis to better fulfill his respon-
velopment of subordinates. Finally, and importantly, the analysis
ndividual determined to apply the second principle of leadership:
ek self-improvement."

POSSIBLE SPECIFIC

3 POSSIBLE SPECIFIC ACTION	4 COMMENTS
6. SEND A COPY OF THIS STUDY TO ALL ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS AND TO ALL MAJOR ARMY COMMANDS.	
7. PUBLICIZE TO THE MILITARY COMMUNITY THE EXISTENCE, AVAILABILITY, AND POTENTIALITY OF THE LEADERSHIP DATA RESULTING FROM THIS STUDY AND RELATED FIELD SURVEYS (SUCH AS THE CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD WORLDWIDE EFFORT) THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION MEDIA SUCH AS THE ODCSPER PERSONNEL NEWSLETTER, TIPS MAGAZINE, SOLDIERS MAGAZINE, AND COMMANDERS DIGEST.	
8. ANNOUNCE THE SPECIFIC OFFICE IN DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS WHICH IS THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR ACTIONS RELATING TO THIS STUDY OR USE OF THE LEADERSHIP DATA RESULTING FROM THIS AND RELATED STUDIES OR SURVEYS.	
9. PREPARE A PAMPHLET (OR INSTRUCTIONAL MEMORANDUM) FOR ISSUE TO THE FIELD WHICH OUTLINES THE MAIN FEATURES OF THIS STUDY AND PROVIDES DETAILED TECHNICAL GUIDANCE ON METHODS FOR DIAGNOSING ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS THROUGH LOCAL APPLICATION OF A LEADERSHIP QUESTIONNAIRE SIMILAR (OR IDENTICAL) TO THAT USED IN THIS STUDY.	

ACTIONS

4 MENTS	5 CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD RELATED FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS

33 (Continued)

2

SOLUTION

1

SOLUTION CONCEPT

- 3. CONDUCT SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF THE ATTITUDES, VALUES, AND CONCEPTS OF LEADERSHIP HELD BY OFFICERS AT 06 AND HIGHER GRADES.

The significance of the c
research which shows conclusiv
permeate the entire organizati
and common sense phenomenon is
comment: "If you want to do a
top."

The Army's prior studies
have been mostly subjective or
and control for bias, to isola
carefully controlled, tightly
levels could provide informati
development, as well as in und
the Army's leadership climate.

CONCEPTS AND

2

DISCUSSION

ce of the concept of leadership climate is strongly supported by extensive
s conclusively that the attitudes and values of those at the upper level
organization, filtering down to all subordinate levels. This scientific
enomenon is recognized by the professional soldier in the often-heard
ant to do anything about leadership problems, you've got to start at the

or studies of the attitudes and values at the upper levels of leadership
bjective or autobiographical. It is difficult, therefore, to identify
s, to isolate variables, or to study the effects of those variables. A
d, tightly disciplined study of these most visible, most influential
e information of great value in officer selection, appraisal, and
l as in understanding of the role of the officer and many phenomena of
ip climate.

POSSIBLE SPECIFIC

3	4
POSSIBLE SPECIFIC ACTION	COMMENTS
10. SOMETIME IN CY 72 OR 73 CONDUCT A CAREFULLY DESIGNED LOW-KEY PILOT STUDY OF SELECTED ARMY COLONELS AND GENERALS TO DETERMINE THEIR ATTITUDES AND VALUES IN REGARD TO LEADER BEHAVIOR CONCEPTS, PATTERNS, AND STANDARDS AT THEIR LEVEL; AND DETERMINE THE ADVISABILITY OF CONDUCTING A SIMILAR STUDY ON AN ARMY-WIDE SCALE.	
11. EXPLORE THE PRACTICABILITY AND SUITABILITY OF USING THE LABORATORY FACILITIES AND BROAD EXPERIENCE OF THE CENTER FOR CREATIVE LEADERSHIP IN GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA TO DEVELOP SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES FOR ENHANCING THE CAPABILITIES OF SENIOR OFFICERS FOR ASSESSMENT OF THEIR OWN LEADERSHIP STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.	

34 (Continued)

ACTIONS

NTS	5 CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD RELATED FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS
	Recommendation: DA send selected brigadier general designees to the Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro, North Carolina, for "laboratory type" leadership training on a trial basis. (p. 32)

(Continued)

2

SOLUTION

1

SOLUTION CONCEPT

◆ 4. REVISE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION CONCEPTS WITHIN THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM TO ENSURE THAT CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO THIS SUBJECT ARE BEING EXPLOITED.

Within the past 30 years, leadership. In many cases, th zations when it was determined organizational effectiveness. school system, conducted as a exception of significant input the times in terms of method a

A need exists for an inte throughout the Army school sys of the school system to know a with proven applicability in i leadership.

CONCEPTS AND

2

DISCUSSION

t 30 years, there has been a major growth in the academic study of
y cases, this research has been supported and advanced by large organi-
determined that the research results could be applied to increase
ctiveness. A survey of leadership instruction throughout the Army
ucted as a part of the USAWC Leadership Study, indicated that (with the
icant input from HumRRO) much of our leadership instruction was behind
of method and content.

for an integrated, sequential approach to leadership development
school system. However, an even greater need exists for each echelon
m to know and take advantage of scientifically valid leadership research
bility in increasing the effectiveness of practical organizational

POSSIBLE SPECIFIC

3	4
POSSIBLE SPECIFIC ACTION	COMMENTS
12. REVISE AND UPDATE DA PAMPHLET 600-15, LEADERSHIP AT SENIOR LEVELS OF COMMAND, DATED OCTOBER 1968, AND FM 22-100, MILITARY LEADERSHIP, DATED NOVEMBER 1965; AND INCLUDE IN BOTH—TAILORED TO THE EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS AND PRACTICAL NEEDS OF THE USERS—THE CONCEPTS AND PERTINENT FINDINGS OF THIS AND RELATED STUDIES OF LEADERSHIP THEORY, LEADER BEHAVIOR, LEADERSHIP CLIMATE, AND DIAGNOSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS.	
13. INCLUDE IN LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION AT ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS THE SUBJECT OF "COACHING" (A TECHNIQUE WHEREIN THE SENIOR ROUTINELY EXPLAINS HIS EXPECTATIONS, ASSESSMENT, AND GUIDELINES REGARDING PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBORDINATE).	
14. REQUIRE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS/COLLEGES AND MAJOR HEADQUARTERS TO DETERMINE THEIR REQUIREMENTS FOR FACULTY OR STAFF MEMBERS WITH FORMAL EDUCATION IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (SPECIFICALLY IN THE FIELDS OF GROUP DYNAMICS, LEADERSHIP, INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS) AND INFORM DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS OF THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS IN TERMS OF GRADE, PREFERRED BRANCH, TYPE OF FORMAL TRAINING, PROPOSED UTILIZATION, AND POSITION TO BE HELD WITHIN THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION.	

ACTIONS

MENTS

5
CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD
RELATED FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDING 1: Leadership instruction in Service Schools is inadequate to meet current and future needs of the Army. (p. 24)

Recommendation: CONARC revise Regulation 350-1 to base leadership instruction on new programs of instruction (POI) that are progressive from one school level to the next and that include training in human behavior and contemporary leadership problems. (p. 25)

Recommendation: CONARC revise and update POI annually based on leadership surveys such as the AWC study, questionnaires sent to course graduates, and new knowledge of human behavior. (p. 25)

FINDING 2: Leadership instruction in Service Schools does not maximize learning through student involvement and corrective feedback to facilitate individual self-development. (p. 25)

FINDING 8: The Army should make greater use of leadership research and expertise from the civilian sector. (p. 31)

Recommendation: CONARC provide for periodic liaison with civilian agencies, for annual symposiums, and for purchase of new instructional materials. (p. 32)

Recommendation: CONARC task HumRRO to prepare case studies requiring maximum individual student involvement based on successful officer and noncommissioned officer leadership experiences and disseminate to Service Schools. (p. 27)

FINDING 12: The Leadership Manual, FM 22-100, needs to be revised. (p. 35)

5 (Continued)

2

SOLUTION

1

SOLUTION CONCEPT

➧ 5. ESTABLISH AN EXTENSIVE AND PROGRESSIVE PROGRAM OF ACADEMIC AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION FOR CAREER NCO'S.

When comparing all leve
amount, complexity, and seve
be the one in greatest need
this level are related direc
with immediate superiors as
cause of this communication
NCO; indeed, there is probab
effectiveness. Rather, the
education, both academic and
education makes it difficult
reference which is critical
his role as "backbone of the
exacted has been in terms of
beginning (e.g., the Noncomm
development of the career no
grade level, and the severit
plans for the professional d
expanded, intensified, and a

The career enlisted spec
should receive relatively eq
the demanding problems of mo
attention in the development
courses. The leader of an i
motivational task than the s
a data processing facility.
are relevant to all senior c
study regarding NCO's were d
pay grades as the primary cr

CONCEPTS AND

2

DISCUSSION

all levels of the Army's leadership climate in terms of the relative and severity of leadership problems, the Senior NCO level appears to est need of help and leadership maintenance. Many of the problems at ted directly to difficulties in communicating effectively--communicating riors as well as with immediate subordinates. At a deeper level, a root nication difficulty is not a traditionalism or obstinacy of the Senior is probably no level more loyal or more concerned with the Army's future her, the difficulty appears to lie in the Senior NCO's relative lack of demic and technical. In interlevel communication, this relative lack of difficult for the Senior NCO to establish the common or shared frame of critical to effective communication. The Senior NCO has been fulfilling ne of the Army." Over the years, he has been the doer, and the price terms of his progressive professional development. Programs now e Noncommissioned Officer Education System) are designed to enhance the career noncommissioned officer. In light of the Army's reliance on this e severity of the leadership problems which apparently exist therein, ssional development of the career noncommissioned officer should be ed, and accelerated.

isted specialist, being also involved in many aspects of leadership, tively equivalent leadership instruction. In fact, several facets of ems of motivating and leading skilled technicians should receive special velopment of programs of instruction designed for specialist training r of an infantry squad, for example, may have a somewhat less complex han the supervisor of an electronics repair crew or the shift leader at acility. In general terms, the findings of this study concerning NCO's senior career enlisted men, both NCO and specialist. (The data in the 's were derived from study of <u>both</u> NCO and specialist personnel, using rimary criteria for grouping the different levels.)

POSSIBLE SPECIFIC

3	4
POSSIBLE SPECIFIC ACTION	COMMENTS
15. DESIGN A CAREER PATTERN FOR NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS WHICH INCLUDES AND REWARDS PROGRESSIVE ACADEMIC AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION THROUGH ATTENDANCE AT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SCHOOLS, PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL ON AND OFF-DUTY CLASSES, AND ENROLLMENT IN CORRESPONDENCE COURSES.	
16. EXPLORE (AS ONE POSSIBLE INTERIM METHOD OF INCREASING THE FORMAL EXPOSURE OF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS TO CONTEMPORARY LEADERSHIP THEORIES AND PROBLEMS) THE PRACTICABILITY OF INSERTING LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION IN TECHNICAL AND SPECIALIST COURSES BEING ATTENDED BY NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND SENIOR ENLISTED SPECIALISTS.	
17. REQUIRE ALL SERGEANTS MAJOR TO COMPLETE A PRESCRIBED COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY LEADERSHIP THEORIES AND PROBLEMS BY A SPECIFIED DATE; AND IN THE FUTURE MAKE COMPLETION OF SUCH A COURSE A ROUTINE MATTER FOR SERGEANT MAJOR DESIGNEES.	
18. INCLUDE A PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPTS AND FINDINGS OF THIS STUDY AT THE NEXT CONFERENCE OF ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR IN WASHINGTON.	

ACTIONS

4 MMENTS	5 CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD RELATED FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS
	FINDING 9: Leadership training within major commands needs more emphasis. (p. 32) Recommendation: CONARC encourage the use of education centers to teach accredited courses in human behavior and contemporary problems. (p. 34) Recommendation: CONARC encourage divisions to conduct NCO academies. (p. 33) Recommendation: Extend training center leadership preparation courses (LPC) to incorporate instruction in human behavior and contemporary problems. (p. 28)

SOLUTION

1

SOLUTION CONCEPT

- 6. BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF A PROGRAM OF "COACHING" DESIGNED TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF SPECIFIC EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN SUPERIOR AND SUBORDINATE.

Many of the leadership pro
inadequate communications betwe
Findings are themselves proof p
of the grade levels involved.
is a principal recommendation o
today's Army (retention, race,
the answer--but there are sizab

A review of Army publicati
done in this area shows an inco
as several general misconceptio

Within the Army's existing
respects: as advice for career
punitive measure taken by a lea
are, respectively, incomplete a
satisfaction, by far the most i
day performance on the job. Fu
that this type of counseling--p
more so) for the successful, ex
the new, inexperienced subordin

Army leadership should vie
by the best player as well as t
development of the individual n
frequent feature of the senior-
the interlevel communication (b
which these expectations are b

CONCEPTS AND

2

DISCUSSION

the leadership problems identified earlier in this report are reflections of
mmunications between levels. The "perception shortfalls" discussed in the
themselves proof positive of poor interpersonal communications, irrespective
levels involved. Further, the need for improved interpersonal communications
ıl recommendation of many of the studies of the pressing personnel problems of
(retention, race, drugs, dissent). Traditional "counseling" may be a part of
ɔut there are sizable problems involved in the use of this term.

v of Army publications, school curricula, and the limited in-house research
area shows an incompleteness in the overall approach to counseling, as well
eneral misconceptions which impede seriously an effective counseling program.

the Army's existing leadership climate, counseling is viewed largely in two
s advice for career progression and assignments; or as a corrective, quasi-
sure taken by a leader when a subordinate has done something wrong. These views
ively, incomplete and incorrect. In terms of mission accomplishment and job
, by far the most important type of counseling is that which deals with day-to-
nce on the job. Further, experts in the field of counseling state unequivocally
pe of counseling--performance counseling--is just as essential (perhaps even
the successful, experienced subordinate who has done an excellent job as for
xperienced subordinate who has done poorly.

adership should view counseling more in terms of "coaching"--needed frequently
player as well as the worst, and directed toward the success of the team through
of the individual members. If "performance coaching" can become a normal and
ture of the senior-subordinate relationship, there can only be improvement in
el communication (both directions) of what is expected and of the degree to
expectations are being met.

2

POSSIBLE SPECIFIC

3	4
POSSIBLE SPECIFIC ACTION	COMMENTS
19. PREPARE AND ISSUE TO SERVICE SCHOOLS AND ORGANIZATIONS A DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET EXPLAINING THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, PRACTICAL BENEFITS, AND USEFUL TECHNIQUES OF "COACHING" SUBORDINATES IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES.	

37 (Continued)

ACTIONS

4 MMENTS	5 CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD RELATED FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS
	FINDING 11: The Army needs better counseling instruction in Service Schools and a practical counseling manual. (p. 34) Recommendation: CONARC adopt program developed by board for improved counseling training in Service Schools. (See Appendix I of the CONARC Board Study.) (p. 34) Recommendation: DA publish a counseling manual with content similar to that outlined in Appendix I (of the CONARC Board Study). (p. 35)

37 (Continued)

2

SOLUTION

1

SOLUTION CONCEPT

- 7. PROVIDE STAFF MEMBERS (MILITARY) WHO ARE FORMALLY TRAINED IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF LEADERSHIP AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS TO ALL ARMY SCHOOLS AND STAFF SECTIONS DEALING WITH THEORETICAL OR PRACTICAL LEADERSHIP EDUCATION OR TRAINING.

Leadership is a highly co
early 1950's, has become a maj
an academic discipline, social
other subfields which are clos
attitudes, group dynamics, and
offer to Army leadership.

The Army's institutional
principal components which are
and welfare of the men. The A
component.

The Army's approach to th
been as thorough. Academic e
of the soldier's physical need
that which comes from interact
in resorting to a scientific a

As the methodology for th
the initial results were compi
a number of posts. The team f
ship problem, and they found b
lems. However, the applicatio
nonexistent. The team visited
with the development of Army l
US Military Academy, did they
scientific study of leadership
for officers formally trained
advanced degree program in thi

- 8. PRECLUDE EVOLUTION OF AN "ANTI-LEADERSHIP" SYNDROME BY ENSURING QUALITY CONTROL OF LEADERSHIP STUDY ACTIVITIES THROUGH CENTRALIZED COORDINATION OF FIELD SURVEY OPERATIONS.

The positive value of "pa
commitment and contribution an
where in this report. Furthe
when organizational change is
draft), participation by the
it far easier for the members
with a minimum of unfounded bi

These good potential eff
implement change are not deri
multitude of disparate survey
in the field, a feeling that
purpose, was "shotgunning" ef
and the application of this re

CONCEPTS AND

2

DISCUSSION

a highly complex dimension of human behavior which, beginning in the
ecome a major area of interest in the field of social psychology. As
ine, social psychology includes the study of leadership as well as
ch are closely related to leadership--e.g., interpersonal relations,
namics, and decisionmaking. As a science, this field has much to
rship.

titutional concept of leadership, not formally spelled out, has two
s which are understood by every Army leader: mission accomplishment
men. The Army has applied expertise to the mission accomplishment

roach to the other component of leadership, welfare of the men, has not
Academic expertise and scientific research are applied to the meeting
ysical needs, but in the far more significant aspect of his welfare,
om interaction with others, there is hesitancy among professional soldiers
cientific approach.

logy for this study was formulated, as the data were gathered, and as
were compiled, the study team talked with leaders of every echelon at
The team found a wealth of experience in virtually every type of leader-
hey found brilliance in some of the intuitive approaches to these prob-
application of scientific knowledge in the area of leadership was largely
eam visited numerous leadership departments and other agencies charged
t of Army leadership doctrine and instruction. Nowhere, except at the
, did they find professional soldiers with formal training in the
leadership. It is essential that the Army establish its requirements
ly trained in the scientific study of leadership and enlarge the
gram in this area without delay.

alue of "participative research" as a means of developing a sense of
ribution among the members of an organization has been discussed else-
t. Further, there is substantial organizational research to show that,
change is planned (as is the case in the Army's move toward a zero-
on by the members beforehand in formulating the method of change makes
he members to accept the change, or at least to consider it objectively
nfounded bias.

ential effects can be negated if efforts to study leadership and to
e not derived from a common objective and a coordinated program. A
ate surveys and seminars on the subject of leadership could create,
ling that the Army, aware of a need but lacking a specific sense of
unning" efforts to improve Army leadership. Ideally, leadership research
of this research should be managed centrally.

POSSIBLE SPECIFIC

3 POSSIBLE SPECIFIC ACTION	4 COMMENTS
20. ESTABLISH A REASONABLY HIGH PRIORITY FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS WITH FORMAL TRAINING IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES TO ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS/COLLEGES, AND TO STAFF SECTIONS OF HEADQUARTERS WHICH SUPERVISE FORMAL LEADERSHIP TRAINING PROGRAMS.	
21. DESIGNATE AN AGENCY TO MONITOR AND COORDINATE LEADERSHIP STUDIES WHICH REQUIRE EXTENSIVE COLLECTION OF DATA BY FIELD SURVEY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, AND TO COORDINATE LEADERSHIP INSTRUCTION ARMY-WIDE, AND GIVE WIDE DISSEMINATION TO SUCH DESIGNATION.	

ACTIONS

ENTS

5
CONARC LEADERSHIP BOARD RELATED FINDINGS/RECOMMENDATIONS

FINDING 5: Increased emphasis on human behavior aspects of leadership requires that Service Schools have more leadership instructors trained in human behavior. (p. 28)

Recommendation: DA identify Service School requirements for personnel with graduate degrees in the behavioral sciences and fill them on a priority basis. (p. 29)

Recommendation: CONARC send several Service School instructors to the CCL training program, 15 September-24 December 1971. (p. 29)

Recommendation: CONARC survey civilian sector to ascertain other courses suitable for training Service School leadership instructors in human behavior. (p. 29)

FINDING 15: The Army needs to preclude an anti-leadership syndrome by ensuring quality control of leadership study activities through centralized coordination of field survey operations. (p. 36)

Recommendation: CG, CONARC designate on a full-time basis a single staff agency at directorate or higher level, to manage the entire CONARC leadership development program and to monitor leadership instruction in non-CONARC schools. (p. 38)

Recommendation: HQ, CONARC monitor and coordinate field leadership survey operations. (p. 37)

(Continued)

ANNEX A

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION A-3

SECTION

I Methodology A-4

Through field surveys using questionnaires and focused interviews, an extensive data base was built which measured leadership climate, attitudes, and expectations at levels throughout the Army.

II Management, Organization, and Human Relations A-5

The study seeks to take advantage of recent developments in the behavioral sciences. Research, findings, and applications have been increasing exponentially in this rapidly developing scientific area.

III Leadership Principles and Concepts A-15

Doctrine and educational developments in the Army, the other Services, and allied nations were examined. The views of military practitioners and civilian behavioral scientists were incorporated in the study.

IV Leadership Climate A-22

Actions of leaders affect the behavior of subordinates and determine the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of expectations. Results determine the leadership climate.

V Volunteer Forces A-28

The feasibility or desirability of a zero draft was not an issue in the study, but documents addressing volunteer forces provided relevant material. These included the pro and con considerations and related topics; official, unofficial, empirical, and practical views.

VI Studies and Surveys--Procurement and Retention A-31

These documents provided an understanding of the attitudinal backdrop for the entire study. They surfaced major issues at many levels and were an opportunity to consider and incorporate the views of as much of the Army as possible.

CONTENTS (Continued)

		PAGE
VII	Miscellaneous	A-41
	This section contains ancillary material not specific to the major topics covered in the other sections.	
VIII	Addendum	A-46
	Included here are items annotated after final preparation of the study was begun.	
IX	Author Index	A-64
	Bibliographic references are keyed to this index of behavioral scientists, policy makers, media experts, professional journal writers, practitioners, and others.	
X	Government and Civilian Agencies	A-66
	Documents prepared by government and civilian agencies are keyed to this section.	

INTRODUCTION

This annotated biblography was compiled as the basis for the US Army War College study, Leadership for the 1970's, June 1971. The number of books and other documents published on leadership is more than abundant, and no attempt has been made to make the bibliography all-encompassing.

The items were selected from the libraries at the US Army War College and Headquarters, Department of the Army; the Library of Congress; and several college and university libraries. Other important sources were study projects by various government and civilian agencies, individual and group research efforts, screening and review of periodicals, and recommendations from study group participants.

While the study was in progress, this was a "working" bibliography. It was used to educate the study group, for internal coordination of team efforts, and for external coordination with other agencies. When appropriate items were identified, abstracts were prepared and circulated as the study proceeded.

The addendum provides items annotated after final preparation of the study was begun.

SECTION I

METHODOLOGY

1. Festinger, Leon, and Katz, Daniel, ed. Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. (H61 R4)*

   (This reference contains basic and current information on research methods. The chapters are concerned with sample surveys, field studies, experiments in field settings, laboratory experiments, sample selection, methods of data collection, analysis of data, and the application of findings. Many of the leading behavioral science researchers have written chapters on their individual expertise. The behavioral scientist could, by following the logic in the chapters, design, administer, and analyze data for a typical research program. The book is keyed to the "normal" situation, the usual problem, and a survey where the population is somewhat simplistic. The chapters on theory and methods of social measurement are excellent.)

2. Moroney, M. J. Facts from Figures. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1951. (HA29 M68 1965)

   (The reader is shown the statistician's tools and machines, their purpose, and how they operate. After this workshop tour in print, he is encouraged to try for himself. The aim of the book is not to be exhaustive, but to give enough information in a simple manner that the novice can learn something. It is a highly readable book on statistical methods that takes the reader from zero upward many levels.)

3. Stogdill, Ralph M., and Coons, Alvin E., ed. Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1957. (BF637 L4 S71)

   (This book contains nine monographs by various leaders in the field of leadership behavior and measurement and represents many years of research. It is a valuable book on leader behavior and was the basis for the development of the methodology of the US Army War College leadership study.)

* The call numbers used in this bibliography refer to the USAWC Library Collection.

SECTION II

MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND HUMAN RELATIONS

4. Argyris, Chris. Personality and Organization: The Conflict Between System and the Individual. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. (HF5549 A89)

   (An objective of this book is to gain insight into why people behave as they do in organizations. The author finds that incongruency exists between the needs of the individual and the requirements of the formal organization, resulting in frustration, failure, narrow perspective, and conflict. These conditions increase under certain circumstances. The desire among subordinates to advance causes competition, hostility, and a tendency to focus on the individual's own area rather than the organization as a whole. This impedes integration with the formal organization. The increase of directive leadership, management controls, and pseudo human relations programs compounds antagonisms. The author suggests ways management can decrease incongruency between the individual and the organization. Guideposts are given for developing executive behavior. The description of an authoritarian personality is revealing.)

5. Bellows, Roger. Creative Leadership. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959. (HM141 B4)

   (This book provides a complete foundation in the theory of creative leadership. The author tells what creative leadership is, what part it plays in our society, and what training is necessary to practice it successfully. He explains that a creative leader is one who can assess a situation, balance the varying personalities and requirements within a group, and direct individual activities and needs toward goal accomplishment. The book also covers two-way communication, improving teamwork, selecting and training, overcoming tensions and conflicts, and counseling and guidance.)

6. Blau, Peter M. "Interaction: Social Exchange." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7, 1968, pp. 452-458. (Ref H41 E41 V.7)

   (This is a concise explanation of the theory of social exchange. It includes definition, basic assumptions, comparison to economic transactions, and the reward and power that are derived from use of the theory. It also includes a bibliography.)

7. Brown, F. A. C. The Social Psychology of Industry. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954.

(This book, written by an M.D. specializing in psychiatry, is basically concerned with the emotional aspects of human behavior and interpersonal relationships. The book is general in nature and explores such subjects as management and organization, psychology, anthropology, economics, and history. The chapters on attitudes and opinion surveys and leaders and leadership were particularly useful summaries. The latter chapter approaches the problem from a socio-psycholological view.)

8. Cassileth, Barrie. Reinforcement Management: An Approach to Motivating Army Trainees. Alexandria, Virginia: Human Resources Research Office, November 1969. (HumRRO TR 69-17)

(This report examines reinforcement (contingency) management as a means of motivating military trainees; specifically, clerk-typists in self-paced advanced individual training at Fort Knox. Points were awarded for speedy learning and could be exchanged for rewards (time off). Results appear to have dissatisfied the researcher. Trainees with high entering skills were motivated effectively; lower skilled trainees showed no significant differences from control classes. The author concludes the training system itself would need to be changed to realize the full potential of contingency management.)

9. Davis, Keith, and Scott, William G., ed. Readings in Human Relations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. (HF5549 D3)

(This text contains 63 contributions from leading authorities in human relations. Among the general topics covered in detail are the philosophy of human relations; employee morale and motivation; formal organization; informal organization and management roles; change and participation; leadership and supervision; human relations training and development; communication; and trends in human relations.)

10. Elliott, John D., MAJ. "A New Thinking Plateau." Military Review, Vol. 50, October 1970, pp. 68-73.

(Individuals are the key element in transition to the author's new thinking plateau, since it is the individual who functions within the group. The individual must risk expressing himself in favor of innovative change. The author agrees with Samuel Huntington that success in an organization requires the individual to subordinate his will to that of the group, but he says group will must be correct. Innovation can be "professional suicide." The author gives

three ways to achieve a new thinking plateau: (1) establish a principle of innovative thinking that will challenge youth desiring a military career; (2) remove personnel whose decision-making is inadequate (eliminate "yes" men); (3) develop closer working relationships between military planners and the National Security Council.)

11. Gouldner, Alvin W., ed. Studies in Leadership. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. (HM141 G6)

(This is a lengthy, diverse book containing contributions on leadership by 35 social scientists. The comprehensive introduction includes discussion on leadership as a social problem, approaches to leadership, leadership traits and the inadequacies of the trait approach, situations and groups, group needs and integration, and personality characteristics of leaders. The analyses by the contributors are grouped generally under types of leaders, leadership and its group settings, authoritarian and democratic leaders, and the ethics and technics of leadership.)

12. Hays, Samuel H., COL, and Thomas, William N., LTC. Taking Command. Harrisburg: Stackpole Company, 1967. (UB210 H33)

(This book examines interpersonal relations and describes the integrated concept of leadership: the leader, the led, and the situation. It includes situational studies and an extensive bibliography. The authors were assigned to the United States Military Academy Office of Military Psychology and Leadership.)

13. Homans, George C. Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961. (HM291 H6)

(This book presents a set of general propositions on social behavior as human exchange. Summarized briefly, the author says if an individual takes part in a situation where he feels rewarded, in future similar situations he is more likely to behave as he did under the rewarding conditions. If an individual's actions reward another, the recipient will repeat his actions more often; similarly, the donor will more often emit the action. However, the more often a person receives a rewarding action, the less valuable further like actions become to him. (The more help he asks for and receives, the less he needs.) There are costs and profits involved with rewards. Exchange ceases when both persons are not making a profit, and the individual who feels unrewarded displays anger or guilt. Members of a group conform to the group's norms in order to be rewarded by the others' approval or for protection from management. The more valuable an individual's actions are to the group, the higher his esteem, but there is less to be distributed for the other members. Authority results from esteem, and a man can acquire it by rewarding others.)

14. Horton, George C., LTC, and O'Mary, Paul R., LTC. Survey of Officer Professionalism . . . Generalization . . . Specialization. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 30 November 1969. (AWC Z-H68)

(This study correlates the results of two questionnaires. The first was sent to 48 general officers with command experience in Vietnam; the second to 130 general officers representing a cross section of of the Army. Subject areas covered were (1) officer training for today's environment; (2) differences in attributes required for commanders, staff officers, and specialists; (3) performance records of specialists as opposed to generalists; (4) training in and expansion of the specialist program; (5) utilization of specialists. A combat arms officer should not be promoted to general officer until he has proved he can command at field grade level. Many general officers agree the "Peter principle" is not a myth. Inability to command should not make an officer a failure.)

15. Jordan, Harold K., COL, USAF. Leadership in the Tactical Squadron--A Challenge of the 70's. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-J66)

(This is a discussion in general terms of the value of young crew members to the Air Force. It presents changing management concepts with examples, good and bad, of recent application. The report recommends that current and future leaders be aware of changing techniques of management. The intelligent application of these techniques may determine their success as leaders while developing the potential of the young crew members. There is a short discussion of the chain of command and successful superior-subordinate relationships. Both must be properly used.)

16. Likert, Rensis. New Patterns of Management. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. (HD31 L46)

(This book summarizes management principles and practices which have proved to be effective and proposes a management system based on them. Discussion covers communication, motivation, attitudes, behaviors, and loyalties. Described are the integrating principle, the principle of supportive relationships, and the properties and performance characteristics of highly effective groups.)

17. Likert, Rensis. The Human Organization: Its Management and Value. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. (HD31 L45)

(This book describes a workable management system which can be used by any enterprise to achieve high productivity, financial success, and improved labor relations. The author has substituted a systems approach for piecemeal methods usually employed in efforts to improve an organization. The result is a highly effective management system whose parts are naturally compatible.)

18. McKelvey, William W. "Expectational Noncomplementarity and Style of Interaction Between Professional and Organization." Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 14, March 1969, pp. 21-32.

(This study focuses on the question, "How does a professional react when he perceives that his career expectations are not being fulfilled by the organization employing him?" Results were twofold: (1) The perception of exceptional unfulfillment (noncomplementarity) was highly correlated with cynicism (loss of control over career advancement) and activity (rejection of conformity in favor of changing the organization's expectations). (2) Cynical active professionals (called insurgents) received the lowest promotion eligibility rankings from their superiors. In contrast, idealistic, passive professionals (called ritualists) tended to receive the highest promotion eligibility rankings.)

19. Morris, Jud. The Art of Motivating. Boston: Farnsworth Publishing, Inc., 1968. (HF5549 M6)

(This book is "a guide to getting more accomplished better through others." It is really a "how to" motivational cookbook oriented primarily towards industry and office worker relationships. As opposed to other more theoretical works which can be applied to the Army, this book is useful mainly as background. The author lists 11 "Fundamental Principles of the Art of Motivating" which by themselves are not nearly as helpful as the accompanying discussion and the many concrete examples based on office/industry situations. Although these situations are in many cases peculiar to industry, the leadership techniques applied (theoretically) by the author can be extrapolated into Army usage and the development of specific techniques.)

20. Moskos, Charles C., Jr. The American Enlisted Man. New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1970. (UB323 M6)

(This book is an account of the norms, attitudes, and styles of life of the enlisted culture. The author shows what life is like for the man in combat, with the prospect of loss of life and limb. He describes the soldiers' commitment to service, their political attitudes, and their relation to American society. He traces the changes in the portrayals of enlisted men in the mass media, plays, and novels over the past decades and reveals the strain within ranks arising from class differences among enlisted men. The author believes that the convergence of the military with society which began in World War II has been reversed and that the military is becoming increasingly isolated.)

21. Preston, Harley O. The Development of a Procedure for Evaluating Officers in the United States Air Force. Pittsburgh: American Institute for Research, 7 July 1948. (UG633 P7)

(This is a study conducted by the American Institute for Research for the United States Air Force to determine a more effective means of evaluating their officers. The purpose was to devise a system or means to identify more quickly the promising, effective officer. A basic approach of the study was to attempt to establish facts as to what really makes an effective officer. An extensive list of critical requirements was found by an analysis of over three thousand descriptive incidents of how effective or ineffective officers had acted in particular military situations. These incidents were obtained from AF personnel through field interviews with 640 officers. This study resulted in the establishment of a new personnel management system for officers in the USAF.)

22. Rehm, Thomas A., LTC. "Ethics and the Military Establishment." Military Review, Vol. 50, September 1970, pp. 9-14

(The author suggests various problems affecting the military, lowering its ethical standards, and casting doubts on whether it is in fact a profession. He states the Services are no longer able to police themselves--a function necessary to a profession. Size, complexity, participation in control of civil disturbances, and procurement activities all contribute to the problem. The author states three solutions: (1) A professional code of behavior which will establish in the broadest sense what is "conduct unbecoming"; (2) inform all levels of what constitutes professional conduct and devote more time to this in the service schools; (3) reinforce emphasis on ethics. Expand the area of professional life to provide better scrutiny by promotion boards. Have peer ratings in addition to efficiency reports.)

23. Roberts, Ernest E., LTC. Increased Leadership Effectiveness. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University, April 1968. (AF-AU AWC TH-R533)

(Leadership and management are closely related disciplines. The Army has translated this into a requirement to train officers to be both leaders and managers. The present education and training program does not appear to produce the required skills. The author suggests modifications to the program as a means of increasing leadership effectiveness throughout the Army.)

24. Smith, Patricia Cain; Kendall, Lorne M.; and Hulin, Charles L. The Measurement of Satisfaction in Work and Retirement. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969. (HF5549.5 J63S5)

(This is a scholarly and carefully researched description of a 10-year program directed to the study of job satisfaction. The single most valuable feature of this work is the job descriptive index--an instrument which provides a valid measurement of job satisfaction, applicable to most levels in most organizations. The instrument is easy to understand, easy to complete, and easy to score and interpret. Authors have provided an extensive series of narrative tables for a wide variety of demographic variables.)

25. Stogdill, Ralph M., et al. Aspects of Leadership and Organization. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1953. (VB200 O 28)

(This report is a collection of papers which represents a series of briefer studies on problems related to leadership and organization. It is basically a study of leadership in naval organizations from which all pertinent data are obtained. Some of the more interesting papers include: "Personal vs Situational Determinants of Leadership"; "Differences Between Military and Industrial Organizations"; "Responsibility and Authority Relationships"; and "Leader Behavior and the Operational Readiness of Ships.")

26. Stogdill, Ralph M., and Shartle, Carroll L. Methods in the Study of Administrative Leadership. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Bureau of Business Research, 1955. (HM141 S8)

(This is a monograph which details research into the problem of attempting to establish valid norms for the evaluation of administrative performance. The methods reported in the monograph were designed for the study of leadership in terms of status, interactions, perceptions, and behavior of individuals in relation to other members of the organized group. It was the primary aim of the research to produce theory, methodology, and information which might serve as a basis for the development of improved and more effective techniques in the fields of organization analysis, position analysis, and personnel placement. The work is still research and cannot be applied with validity to administrative performance or operation.)

27. Tannenbaum, Robert, et al. Leadership and Organization. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961. (HM141 T3)

(Part One of this book, "Leadership and the Influence Process," is the most relevant portion for this study. In particular, chapters on "The Process of Understanding People" and "How to Choose a Leadership Pattern" provide a good summary of the subjects rather than the elaborate and detailed treatment which exists in many other works. The latter chapter presents a range of seven possible leadership

behaviors and the factors a leader should consider in deciding which one to use in leading. Sections on "Sensitivity Training: A Personal Approach to the Development of Leaders" and "Studies in Organization" provide some background, although the former promises more than it delivers for purposes here.)

28. US Department of the Army. Army Regulations 600-20: Army Command Policy and Procedures. Washington, 31 January 1967.

(This regulation establishes policy and prescribes certain procedures relative to the basic aspects of command within the Army. It states that the chain of command is the most fundamental and important organizational technique used by the Army. It clearly establishes the premise that every commander (or leader) has two basic responsibilities in the following priority: Accomplishment of his mission and the care of his personnel and property.)

29. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Department of the Army Military Personnel Management Teams Project Findings. Washington, July-September 1970. (UB339 A41 JY/SEP 70)

(In its visits to various posts during the reporting period, the personnel management teams found deficiencies in the following areas: (1) Use of college graduates and their civilian acquired skills; (2) status of staff and faculties at Army service schools; (3) the lack of junior officer retention counseling; and (4) proper assignment and movement of enlisted personnel.)

30. US Department of the Army. US Army Combat Developments Command. Man and the 1990 Environment. Vol. 1, Draft Summary Report. Vol. 2, The 1990 U. S. Environment. Fort Belvoir, 20 April 1970 (Vol. 1) and 6 July 1970 (Vol. 2). (Army CDC DO ME)

(This is an in-house study to determine what human behavioral factors and environmental conditions might be expected to impact on the design of future Army organizations. Scenarios projecting technological, economic, social, and political environments in 1990 surface many implications for the Army. Leadership styles are addressed.)

31. US Department of the Army. US Military Academy. Leadership in the Post-70's. Report--A Leadership Workshop Conference. West Point, June 1969. (UB210 L43 1969)

(This conference was held at West Point for the purpose of looking at the leadership that would be required in the rapidly changing environment of the 1970's and beyond. Major conclusions of the different working groups included: (1) changing value systems and environmental conditions require leaders who have analytical problem-solving skills and sensitivity to the value systems of their

followers; (2) more emphasis should be placed on the development of "management" skills as opposed to "inspirational" techniques of leadership; (3) the military must provide for a sense of participation and involvement of individual members; and (4) further investigation should be made of such organizational behavior and problems as upward communication, relationship between leadership style and the soldier's commitment to the military, objective evaluation of leadership ability, and fitting the right leader to the right job. The report includes papers presented for discussion.)

32. Vietnamese Leadership Research and Training Development. Prospectus.

(In this prospectus on leadership training for the Vietnamese, it is pointed out that the leader needs to know how he can use his leadership position to accomplish the important goals assigned him by his own seniors, and also to recognize the conflicting demands placed on him by seniors and subordinates, and how to balance these in order to be effective in acting for both groups to which he is responsible.)

33. Wakin, Malham M., COL, USAF. "The American Military--Theirs to Reason Why." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 54, March 1971, pp. 54-58.

(In discussing discipline and obedience to orders, the author indicates that society today is changing and it is clear that unquestioning obedience is a completely unacceptable, if not inappropriate, conception. Sophisticated, creative, dynamic men, whether in uniform or not, cannot be properly characterized as unquestioning. There is confusion among those inside and outside the military establishment as to whether discipline, creativity, and moral character exist in the Services. The author discusses discipline with responsibility and freedom and states that the proper balance must be struck.)

34. Wells, Warren K., COL. Better Human Engineering Is Needed. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 26 February 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This essay points out the differences between youth today and his counterpart of recent years. The author states the need for a better human relations climate in military organizations. He recommends the Services use the findings of human behavioralists to develop an understanding and appreciation of men and suggests ways for better utilization of personnel. He highlights self-actualization, organization culture, personal commitment, and the problem solving process. Changes must be made in order to recruit and retain the quality of men the Army needs.)

35. Wells, Warren K., COL. Participative Management for the Military. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 28 October 1969. (AWC IS-70)

(This essay describes management styles from autocratic to laissez-faire. The author highlights participative management and recommends its use in the military establishment. He points out potential problem areas and how to avoid them.)

36. Wermuth, Anthony L. The Impact of Changing Values on Military Organization and Personnel. Waltham, Massachusetts: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Advanced Studies Group, December 1970. (U21.5 W47)

(This monograph by a retired Army colonel examines the social and technological changes occurring in our society and discusses the deriving implications for the personnel and organization of the military establishment. The author foresees the military profession becoming more civilianized and military leaders more as military managers. Autocratic methods will further decline and members will protest vigorously if they are treated like a number. Individuals will achieve greater responsibility at younger ages, and specialists will look to professional associations for standards of performance and as the place for their loyalty. Military commanders may find a kind of ombudsman at critical points in the personnel system. The author believes the Services can adjust, but military values may change among themselves.)

SECTION III

LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

37. Canadian Forces Headquarters. Canadian Forces Pamphlet CFP 131 (1), Vol. 1: Junior Leaders Manual, 1 May 1966 and Canadian Forces Pamphlet CFP 131 (2), Vol 2: The Professional Officer, 30 Nov 70.

(These are two of a three volume set concerning leadership training in the Canadian Forces. CFP (1) is designed for NCO and officer cadet levels, and CFP (2) is for officers up to and including the rank of major and equivalent. Both are excellent efforts, based on the behavioral sciences, which provide a military "training package" at the designated levels.)

38. Delavan, Patrick N., COL. "Commander Speaks." 7th World, Vol. 3, November 1970, p. 2.

(7th World is a unit publication of the 7th Transportation Group (Terminal), Fort Eustis, Virginia. In this issue, the commander calls for an understanding by leaders of the need to balance individual needs and mission requirements in achieving success.)

39. Hays, Samuel H., COL (Ret). "What is Wrong with Induction Procedures?" Military Review, Vol. 50, May 1970, pp. 3-7.

(The author examines initiation procedures used in induction stations, Officer Candidate Schools, and service academies. He concedes these have been adequate in the past to meet the requirement to divest a new military member of his civilian orientation and make the transition to the military system. However, in our rapidly changing society, he advocates a reevaluation in order to meet the individual's expectations and to minimize loss of enthusiasm and motivation. Success, reinforcement, reward, and recognition should be emphasized--the positive approach. Leader training programs should prepare students and cadre to be supportive leaders.)

40. Hollander, Edwin P., and Julian, James W. Contemporary Trends in the Analysis of Leadership Processes. Technical Report. Buffalo: State University of New York, 1968. (BF637 L4H581)

(This report is an overview of several lines of development in the study of leadership up to and within the contemporary scene. These include: leadership as a process involving an inference relationship; the leader as one among other participants in this relationship; the transaction occurring between leaders and followers; the differential tasks or functions associated with being a leader; and the nature of leader effectiveness. Several implications are derived for further research: attendance to leadership as a property of the system of a group; recognition of the two-way influence characterizing leader-follower relations; the maintenance of leadership and the emergence

of those factors legitimizing the leader's position through the process of succession; leader effectiveness in terms of follower expectations and perceptions of him.)

41. Homans, George C. The Human Group. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950. (HM251 H6)

(This book uses the case method to study social behavior in small groups. The author sees the job of the group leader as twofold: (1) to accomplish the group mission and (2) to maintain an appropriate balance between reward and punishment. A successful leader keeps his group in a condition of "moving equilibrium." A social system is in moving equilibrium and authority exists when disobedience to the orders of the leader is followed by a tendency of the system to return to the state the leader desired. Eleven leader behaviors are given which should maintain moving equilibrium.)

42. Hull, Clark L. Principles of Behavior. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1943. (Library of Congress BF199 H77 1966)

(This book attempts to present in an objective, systematic manner the primary, or fundamental, molar principles of behavior. It was written on the assumption that all behavior, individual and social, moral and immoral, normal and psychopathic, is generated from the same primary laws; that the differences in the objective behavioral manifestations are due to the differing conditions under which habits are set up and function.)

43. Jacobs, T. O. Leadership and Exchange in Formal Organizations (Draft). Fort Benning, Georgia: Human Resources Research Organization, Division 4, 1971.

(This book, still in draft form, is based upon an exhaustive study of the leadership research and theory of the past 25 years and serves as the central reference for the Army War College study of Leadership for the 1970's. The author provides a narrow and precise definition of leadership, viewing it as an influence process distinguished from power and authority, then brings this "pure" leadership into contact with organizational realities to show that those in "leadership positions" within organizations actually do far less leading than is commonly supposed. A current and comprehensive bibliography accompanies each chapter.)

44. Krech, David, et al. Individual in Society. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

(This is a textbook on social psychology. Chapter 12, "Leadership and Group Change," provides information on the emergence of leaders and leadership functions. It discusses leader characteristics and behaviors. It examines what kinds of groups tend to change, under what conditions they change, and what the direction of change is likely to be. The followers' perception of the leader is also included.)

45. Lange, Carl J., et al. A Study of Leadership in Army Infantry Platoons. Washington: George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, November 1958. (GWU HRRO RR-1)

(This study provides information on leadership behaviors which distinguish between effective and ineffective infantry platoon leaders. Data was collected primarily through questionnaires administered to the platoon leaders' superiors and subordinates. It is also known as OFFTRAIN II.)

46. Menzies, J. G., CPT, Royal Australian Infantry. "Leadership." Australian Army Journal, Vol. 259, December 1970, pp. 27-36.

(This is a well-written article which discusses the objectives, ideals, and obligations of leadership. The author concludes that leadership is not a product of traits within an individual, concurring with many behavioral scientists in this respect. He offers a list of ten leadership principles for use by the Australian Army that are similar to those used by the US Army.)

47. Porter, Orland A., Jr., Lt Comdr. A Review and Evaluation of Leadership Concepts. Thesis. Monterey, California: US Naval Post Graduate School, May 1962. (NvPGS TH-P6)

(Although several concepts of the approach to leadership and the properties of leaders have been developed, there is confusion on which one is "the" concept. The author tries to determine if there is one universal approach by reviewing and evaluating a few of the concepts considered representative. He re-examines leadership in terms of group objectives or goals and the possible existence of more than one group leader. He further reviews the forces which influence a group and shape its leadership requirements.)

48. Ross, Murray G., and Hendry, Charles E. New Understandings of Leadership. New York: Association Press, 1957. (BF637 L4R6)

(This book is a review and summary of thinking and research on the nature and meaning of leadership. It is intended for leadership practitioners. Its contents include leadership theory; the characteristics the leader should have (relative to the leader, the led, and the situation); the functions of the leader; and group factors affecting leadership.)

49. Sebree, Edmund B., MG (Ret). Leadership at Higher Levels of Command as Viewed by Senior and Experienced Combat Commanders. Washington: George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, December 1961. (GWU HRRO RM LHLC)

(This research project was initiated at the request of the US Army Command and General Staff College to obtain information on the

following: (1) The respects in which higher level leadership varies from leadership below division level; (2) the knowledge of psychology or sociology required by higher commanders; (3) the importance of traits of the leader in the exercise of high level leadership; and (4) the impact of the group being led, and of the situation, upon the exercise of high-level leadership. Methodology used was personal letters to more than 100 senior officers (O-6 and above) posing questions and asking for information based on actual experience. The report includes results from the letters and comments by the author expressing his personal opinions. Further research is suggested.)

50. Selznick, Philip. Leadership in Administration. New York: Harper & Row, 1957. (HD31 S4)

(This book addresses the concept of organization through leadership rather than authoritarian control. The author concludes that leadership transcends efficiency and human engineering. They may be a leadership goal, but leadership itself is a creative task of moulding perspectives and relationships. He states leadership goes beyond organization. Organizations are made up of "standardized building blocks" and adapt to their mission and role; leadership maintains the integrity of those blocks. In filling his creative role, the leader must be concerned with change and planning that will provide new capabilities to meet the needs and aspirations of the institution.)

51. Sipes, Joel D., Lt Comdr, comp. Leadership in Service of Country and Humanity. New London: US Coast Guard Academy, 1968. (UB210 S5)

(This is a basic text on leadership used at the US Coast Guard Academy. Its purpose is to provide the cadet with a foundation upon which to base his philosophy of military leadership. It is a collection of material which emphasizes the current trends from the behavioral sciences and the practical experiences of respected military and civilian authorities.)

52. Stogdill, Ralph M; Wherry, Robert J.; Jaynes, William E. Patterns of Leader Behavior: A Factorial Study of Navy Officer Performance. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Personnel Research Board, 1953. (VB200 03)

(This study is devoted particularly to naval leadership. The research was designed to test the hypothesis that patterns of leader behavior may differ in relation to differences in the positions occupied by leaders. Data were obtained from 470 naval officers who occupy 45 different positions. Three stated hypotheses were studied by means of empirical tests: (1) Leadership behavior is multidimensional. These dimensions are finite in number and can

be discovered by analysis of leader behavior. (2) The pattern of behavior along the different dimensions is affected in large part by the position or job to which the leader is assigned. (3) The pattern of behavior along different dimensions is affected as well by the type of organization to which the job holder is assigned.)

53. Taylor, Mervin M., COL, USAF. Leadership and National Security: A Case Study. Individual Research Paper. Washington: National War College, 1969. (NWC IS-1968/69 T3)

(This paper presents an overview of leadership recognition, evaluation, and development in the Air Force today. The author clarifies the term leadership and its recognition and includes information on its historical and psychological development. He examines the current system of officer efficiency reports and the resulting "pile-up of scores," "halo effect," and "quantification of subjective material." Similar problems in industry are also discussed. Leadership development programs in the USAF are compared with those in industry. The author concludes that the Air Force leadership program is effective, but there are inconsistencies which should be resolved and improvements which should be made in view of the demands placed on leaders today.)

54. US Air Force. Air Force Manual 50-3. Air Force Leadership. Washington, 1 August 1966.

(This manual provides basic guidelines to develop leadership within the US Air Force. Although written primarily for the junior officer, it is considered the primary text on leadership for all supervising levels in the Air Force. It provides an excellent compilation of material on leadership principles, functions, development, responsibilities, and indicators as they apply to Air Force leaders. The manual points out that the principles are only a guide list and should be added to by individuals when such additions are needed in a particular assignment.

55. US Department of Defense. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2: The Armed Forces Officer. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1950.

(This manual is a basic source for commissioned officers of all the military services on expected conduct and behavior. It is a comprehensive reference document for topics germane to commissioned leadership; e.g., responsibility and privilege, leaders and leadership, human and group nature, discipline, morale and esprit, counseling, and reward and punishment.)

56. US Department of the Army. Army Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership. Washington, 1 November 1965.

(This field manual provides an analysis of military leadership in the US Army, particularly below division level. It discusses the characteristics of military leadership, human behavior, leadership principles and traits, leadership problem areas, leadership in higher commands, and leadership in combat.)

57. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-303: The Challenge of Leadership. Washington, 27 May 1969.

(This Officers' Call presents some principles, types, and methods of leadership. None of them are new, but they have proved to be successful. The pamphlet is recommended for commanders' use in discussing leadership with junior officers and enlisted leaders.)

58. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-15: Leadership at Senior Levels of Command. Washington, October 1968.

(This pamphlet presents an analysis of leadership at senior levels of military command. Its purpose is to provide a systematic framework from which to approach the leadership problems faced by high-level commanders. According to the pamphlet, successful accomplishment as a leader depends upon two basic requirements: (1) The commander should have intimate, thorough knowledge of the kinds of people and the kinds of events with which he must deal as a leader, and (2) he must have an effective way of thinking about the people and events which he encounters.)

59. US Department of the Army. US Army Command and General Staff College. Reference Book 22-1: Leadership. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 15 August 1970. (CGSC RB 22-1 Aug 70)

(This reference book supports leadership instruction at the US Army Command and General Staff College. It includes discussions on military discipline, morale and esprit, motivation, efficiency, leadership climate, leadership techniques and guides, characteristics of the individual and the group, and the leadership environment. It also includes case studies and illustrative articles.)

60. US Department of the Army. US Military Academy. The Study of Leadership, Vol. I and II. West Point, 1970-71.

(These two volumes provide the bases for leadership instruction at the US Military Academy. Successively, the interacting elements of leader, group, and situation are isolated and studied in detail after an overview to emphasize the importance of the interaction. The academic course provides an excellent appreciation of the behavioral science theories related to leadership and how these theories apply in a military environment.)

61. US Marine Corps. Leadership. Quantico, Virginia: The Basic School, Marine Corps Base, September 1970.

(This is the leadership manual for the Marine Basic School for junior officers. It outlines the leadership instruction given to newly commissioned Marine officers with detailed readings regarding leadership problems at that supervisory level. A listing and explanation of basic leadership principles as they apply to the Marine officer are found in this manual.)

62. US Navy. Bureau of Naval Personnel. NAVPERS 15924A: Principles and Problems of Naval Leadership. Washington, 1964. (VB203 A51.)

(This manual demonstrates the principles of effective naval leadership through the case study method. The cases and problems are actual ones and illustrate simple, realistic, and practical principles.)

63. US Navy. Bureau of Naval Personnel. NAVPERS 15934B: Leadership Support Manual. Washington, 1968.

(This manual gives the purpose, challenge, goals, and outline of the Naval leadership training program. The manual delineates between command, leadership, and management. It has checklists on leadership for: (1) all naval personnel; (2) commanding officer/executive officer; (3) department head/division officer; and (4) chief petty officers/petty officers. It also contains excellent outlines for a wide range of discussion topics on a variety of leadership problems.)

64. US Navy. Bureau of Naval Personnel. NAVPERS 92585D: Curriculum for Petty Officer Leadership Training. Washington, 18 May 1967.

(This curriculum provides a framework for a basic course of instruction in leadership knowledge, skills, and attitudes for petty officers. Also, the curriculum is adapted for sea or shore command leadership programs. Of particular interest in this document is the list of leadership principles. Nine of them correspond to the eleven basic principles in Army Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership. The following principle is added: "The leader should reprimand in private and praise in public (in most instances).")

65. US Navy. US Naval Institute. Selected Readings in Leadership. Annapolis, 1960. (VB203 A5 1960)

(As the name implies, this book deals mainly with naval leadership, but there are several articles dealing with the Marines, and there is one by an Army officer. The volume provides good guidelines for small unit leadership techniques. It should be useful in developing a set of "how to" guidelines.)

SECTION IV

LEADERSHIP CLIMATE

66. Boatner, Mark M. III, COL (Ret). "Seeing Ourselves as Others See Us . . . First." Army, Vol 21, February 1971, pp. 24-29.

(This article states the need for intelligent self-criticism by Army members. The appropriate medium is the professional journal. He believes if Army writers were encouraged and assisted we might solve some of our problems before they gain public attention. The author asserts that procedures for securing official clearance for publication are inhibiting.)

67. "Congressional Conundrum: How to Keep Up the Armed Forces?" Army, Vol. 21, February 1971, p. 10.

(This article states Representative F. Edward Hébert's view that discipline has been relaxed in trying to make Army life more attractive and to gain more volunteers.)

68. Fleishman, Edwin A. Leadership Climate, Human Relations Training, and Supervisory Behavior. Research Paper. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University Personnel Research Board, 1951.

(Recent years have seen the establishment of an increasing number of leadership training courses for foremen in industry. This study attempted to evaluate a leadership training course for foremen after the foremen returned to the industrial situation. Measures of leadership behavior as well as leadership attitudes of these foremen were obtained. In addition, the effects of such training were evaluated with respect to the kind of "leadership climate" (leadership of the foreman's own boss) to which the foremen returned back in the work situation.)

69. Fleishman, Edwin A. The Relationship between "Leadership Climate" and Supervisory Behavior. Thesis. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1951.

(This dissertation investigated the relationship between how the foreman leads his group, and the leadership attitudes and behavior of those above him in the organization. Also investigated was the effectiveness of a leadership training course for foremen who operated under different kinds of "leadership climates" in the industrial situation. The foreman's description of his own boss's behavior, the foreman's perception of what his boss expected of him, what the boss said he expected, and the boss's own leadership

attitudes about leading foremen were considered aspects of "leadership climate" under which different foremen operate. The four groups of foremen were further stratified into those operating under different "leadership climates.")

70. Flint, Austin Whitcomb. Forecasting Leadership Potential Using an Objective Method of Interaction Analysis as a Scientific Test. Thesis. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, June 1957. (LSU 378.76 L930 C2)

(This thesis investigated the relationships between objective measures based upon performance in the leaderless group discussion and rated leadership in a military situation. The groups are considered leaderless in the sense that no leader is actually appointed. However, the assembly of individuals presented with problems requiring action for a group solution inevitably results in the emergence of leadership behavior by one or more members.)

71. Hackworth, D. H., COL. "Bluster, Insensitivity Cost Army Good Men." Army, Vol. 20, November 1970, pp. 56-58.

(This is an incisive article on why young men are leaving the service. The author submits that low pay, frequent short tours, and other disadvantages may be reasons, but the main reason is more fundamental and harder to quantify. He suggests that the senior ranks have forgotten that young leaders are people with feelings and pride, who make mistakes and can learn from their mistakes. They need the freedom to fail. The author summarizes the experiences of three young officers and their disappointment with seniors and the "Establishment." Poor leadership is vividly illustrated.)

72. Hauser, William L., LTC. "Professionalism and the Junior Officer Drain." Army, Vol. 20, September 1970, pp. 16-22.

(The author states that a lack of professionalism in career officers makes the military unappealing to others. The most obvious drawbacks to a military career, as seen by junior officers, are: (1) economic deficiencies; (2) low prestige; (3) lack of discrimination in career advancement; (4) low standard of living among senior grades; (5) stifled professionalism among senior grades; (6) a sense of non-productivity and a loss of job satisfaction, largely the result of attitudes among senior grades; (7) interference in personal life; (8) excessive subservience to rank. The author concludes that if the Army is to attract and retain high quality officers, it must re-create among its senior officers an attitude conducive to junior professionalism.)

73. Hays, Samuel H., COL (Ret). "The Growing Leadership Crisis." Army, Vol. 20, February 1970, pp. 39-43.

(Army leaders are more capable than ever, but techniques have not adjusted to today's demands. Three factors govern the resulting crisis: the system of values and professional ethics, the methods of selecting and developing leaders, and leadership in interpersonal communication. The author offers suggestions for meeting the current challenges to leadership.)

74. Howze, Hamilton H., GEN (Ret). "Military Discipline and National Security." Army, Vol. 21, January 1971, pp. 11-15.

(The author believes that discipline in the military forces has deteriorated dangerously and that the authority of the commander has weakened drastically. He attributes this to a lack of public support for the military services, a weakened military justice system, and a tendency by the Pentagon to forget the mission in favor of accommodation. He states that military leaders should determine a solution to the discipline problem and execute it without regard for public or congressional opinion.)

75. King, Edward L., LTC (Ret). "The Death of the Army: A Pre-Mortem." Army Times Family Magazine, 17 February 1971, p. 1.

(The author takes the Army severely to task for poor leadership, mismanagement, parochialism, lack of loyalty up and down, the ticket-punching system, and bureaucratic inertia. His solutions are: (1) admit and correct mistakes; (2) tell the truth; (3) reorganize for combat (eliminate unessential frills and benefits; (4) improve personnel management; (5) improve officer and enlisted education; and (6) practice positive leadership.)

76. Larson, Doyle E., COL, USAF. Impending Crisis in Air Force Leadership. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-L303)

(This paper notes the cultural changes occurring in society and their effect on the morals and attitudes of young people entering the USAF. The author discusses the factors causing differences in outlook between the older generations in the Air Force and the younger generation. He states inadequate training for junior noncommissioned officers is a major weakness which has caused a breakdown in middle management levels. He recommends an increase in the number of NCO Leadership Schools and improvements in course content if the Air Force is to meet the challenge of the younger generation.)

77. Lyon, Harold C., Jr., CPT. "The Courage of Your Convictions." Army, Vol. 15, July 1965, pp. 35-38.

(The author notes a lack of creative thinking in the Army today, particularly in the lower echelons. He attributes this to senior officers stifling the initiative of subordinates in the superiors' drive for high ratings. He encourages leaders at all levels to set an example of moral courage--to reward imagination and initiative, thereby improving training and development in subordinates.)

78. McCord, Robert E., COL. The Challenge to Military Professionalism. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 9 March 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(After an examination of the current status of the professional Army officer and how he views his profession, the author evaluates the degree of influence that the officer has exerted on making and executing national security policies. Major changes in the profession are analyzed and how these changes affect standards, ethics, rewards, and other aspects of Army life. The author concludes the professional officer exerts minor influence, that his ethics are challenged, and that rewards are out of balance with the rest of society. Corrective measures are offered to improve the status of the career Army officer.)

79. Nihart, Brooke. "Why Junior Officers Get Out." Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 107, 3 August 1970, pp. 22-30.

(This article highlights the factors bringing dissatisfaction to junior officers and tending to drive them out of the Service. The author identifies these factors as bad policy and administration; leadership (lack of professionalism, rapid rotation of commanders, poor guidance, over-supervision); unsatisfactory personal life; working conditions; status; and pay. All need improvement.)

80. Opinion Research Corporation. The Image of the Army. Princeton, New Jersey, August 1969. (UA25 057)

(This is an appraisal of the Army by 2,420 respondents composed of Army veterans, the general public, high school educators, and Vietnam Army veterans in college. The objective was to obtain opinions toward the Army as an institution and the benefits derived from Army service. It measured their experiences, impressions, feelings, and knowledge relating to the Army. Data were gathered by questionnaires and interviews. The report points out that quality of leadership is a weakness in the Army's image.)

81. Selvin, Hanan C. The Effects of Leadership. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960. (BF637 L454)

(This is a study of the effects of leadership--how the actions of leaders affect the behavior of their followers. The leaders in this study are the commissioned and noncommissioned officers of several Army training companies, and the followers are the men who received their basic training in these companies. This book reports the impact of different kinds of leadership on real groups. It is particularly concerned with the effects that variations in leadership have on the individuals' behavior outside the group atmosphere. In studying the complex effects of Army officers on subordinates of varied status, the author finds a pervading influence or "leadership climate" which he relates to legions of results in subordinates' behavior. The book also explores sociological and psychological aspects of the relationship between leaders and followers and sets forth new methods and techniques of analysis that are of general applicability.)

82. Stogdill, Ralph M. Leadership and Role Expectations. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, 1956. (VB203 S8)

(This report, based on a study of a Naval air development command, looks at differences in work-role expectations and work performance. Subjects were Navy officers and civilians in supervisory positions. Data were obtained on what the senior does, as described by himself and two of his juniors; what he ought to do, according to his own expectations and those of juniors; what the juniors do in their positions, as described by themselves; and what juniors ought to do according to their own expectations. The author used 45 descriptions of behavior of time devoted to various major responsibilities, to various aspects of work behavior with other persons, and to various kinds of individual effort. The descriptions also included frequency of participation in various respects of leader behavior and degree of responsibility, authority, and delegation of authority.)

83. Toner, James H., LT. "Leaders Must Reply When Soldiers Ask." Army, Vol. 20, August 1970, p. 56.

(LT Toner writes of the necessity for leaders to know better answers for questions being asked by our soldiers. He observes that emphasis has been on the training of our leaders on how something was to be done, not why it is done. Our leaders must be both educated and trained. The leaders must ask questions too and not simply accept things as they are. Discipline should be based on reason and conviction, not on fear or rank. Respect must be mutual and others recognized for their desire to learn and for their courage in their convictions. Leaders must begin to know more and begin to be better citizens.)

84. Not used.

85. US Department of the Army. US Military Academy. Senior Conference on Changing Role of the Military in American Life, Final Report. West Point, 8 January 1971.

(This is the report of a conference held at West Point 11-13 June 1970 to take an inquisitive look at the probable resolution of forces in motion today in our society which will impact on the military and an informed search for unseen difficulties likely to plague the armed forces in the years ahead. Participants included Robert E. Osgood, Harry Gilman, Adam Yarmolinsky, Morris Janowitz, and Charles C. Moskos.)

86. Wren, Christopher S. "A West Pointer's Wild Preview of the Volunteer Army." Look, Vol. 35, 23 February 1971, pp. 24-27.

(This article addresses changes that have occurred at Fort Bragg and in the 82d Airborne Division as reasonable and needed for some time. LTC James D. Smith discusses the changes (haircuts, beer, race relations, drugs) and what is being done about them in his unit. Leaders must learn to understand. Older NCO's are concerned and trying to change, but some cannot. Colonel Smith indicates an officer must earn respect; he can no longer be aloof.)

SECTION V

VOLUNTEER FORCES

87. "Army Cutbacks--The Risks." US News and World Report, Vol. 67, 29 September 1969, pp. 66-71.

(In this wide-ranging interview, General William C. Westmoreland supports the concept of a volunteer force and believes it would be representative of the population. He states that, based on his experience in Vietnam, maintaining discipline in the Army today is not more difficult than in the volunteer Army of the 1930's.)

88. Binder, L. James. "The Now Is Very In at Fort Benning." Army, Vol. 21, April 1971, pp. 22-29.

(In this article explaining the VOLAR test at Fort Benning, the author states that much of the emphasis in the Modern Volunteer Army (VOLAR) test program has been on the removal of irritants in service life. Unnecessary and unreasonable things have been eliminated. Leaders today must understand young people. They must know they do not like authoritarianism but will go along with an action if they see a need for it. Leaders must be technically and professionally competent and have integrity. Leaders must be prepared to tell subordinates "why." The course at Fort Benning on "Enlightened Leadership" is discussed.)

89. Forsythe, George I., LTG. "Return . . . To Soldering." Government Executive, Vol. 3, February 1971, p. 23.

(As Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army, General Forsythe summarizes his job as, "To coordinate, expedite, and provide an idea bank for the Volunteer Army Program." He states we will have a smaller and better Army, irritants will be minimized, and requirements on the soldiers will be reasonable and necessary.)

90. "If U. S. Tries an All-Volunteer Army--Survey of Military Experts." U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 70, 1 March 1971, pp. 32-34.

(This article outlines congressional and military opposition to a volunteer force in light of the debate on the bill to extend the draft. Recurrent objections and counter arguments are given in the areas of recruiting problems for the combat arms; difficulties of maintaining quality people under present standards; the attraction of a volunteer Army for the poor and the blacks; and serious breakdowns of discipline on the battlefield due to actions taken to make Army life more attractive.)

91. Johnson, James H., LTC. An All-Volunteer Army--What Must Be Done? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 21 January 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This thesis identifies actions required to achieve a volunteer Army. The author analyzes the incentives and conditions which must be present to attract enlisted personnel to the Army. He describes the environment which should exist if the goal of a volunteer Army is to be met successfully.)

92. Lojek, Joseph M., LTC. An All-Volunteer Army and Its Impact on the Army Reserve Program. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 8 January 1971. (AWC NRI IRP 70-71 L65)

(A volunteer Army will have great impact on the Reserve program. The author foresees a serious recruiting problem for the Reserves without the draft as a motivating factor in enlistments. Under the volunteer concept a large, combat-ready Reserve force will have increased importance, and a draft may be necessary to maintain adequate Reserve strength.)

93. McCamey, Robert E., LTC, USMC. An All-Volunteer Force. Thesis. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-M255)

(This thesis recounts the basic considerations pertaining to the acquisition of manpower for national defense. The alternative methods of using volunteers, the draft, and universal military service are outlined and compared. Recent events, including and subsequent to President Nixon's decision to move toward a volunteer Armed Force, are summarized. A brief description of some of the major problems which must be overcome before a volunteer concept can become a reality is presented along with the author's opinions on the subject.)

94. McClanahan, Donald D., COL. The Future of the Army National Guard in an All-Volunteer Environment. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 29 November 1970. (AWC NRI IRP 70)

(This essay examines the viability of the Army National Guard in a volunteer Army environment. The author reviews procurement for the Guard since World War I and analyzes strengths and weaknesses. He proposes a program of incentives and actions to promote recruitment and discusses considerations affecting Guard readiness. He concludes the Army National Guard can be successfully sustained under the volunteer concept at a cost effective price.)

95. Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. Thomas S. Gates, Chairman. Washington; US Government Printing Office, 1970. (UB343 A7)

(The Gates Commission found a volunteer force to be both feasible and desirable. It examined objections frequently heard and rejected their validity. Specific conclusions were: (1) the Nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force supported by a stand-by draft; (2) steps should be taken promptly to move in that direction; (3) a volunteer force will not jeopardize national security; (4) it will have a beneficial effect on the military as well as our society as a whole; and (5) the first step that must be taken to move in this direction is to remove the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in the Armed Forces.)

96. Smith, Lynn D., BG (Ret). "An All-Volunteer Army: Real Future Possibility or Impractical Dream?" Army, Vol. 19, April 1969, pp. 22-31.

(The author notes the insufficient quantity and poor quality in the Army during the period 1946-1950. He points out many disciplinary problems, poorly trained units, and the number of men who had to be taught to read and write. He is pessimistic on the quality of the men the Army would procure for a volunteer force today and states standards would have to be lowered to recruit the quantity required.)

97. Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force. Vol. 1 and 2. Washington: US Government Printing Office, November 1970. (UB343 A7a)

(These studies present statistics and background information used by the Gates Commission in preparing its report.)

98. Tax, Sol, ed. The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 7-22. "A Military View of Selective Service," by Colonel Samuel H. Hays. (UB340 D7)

(This chapter is a paper prepared for the Conference on the Draft held at the University of Chicago in December 1966. In it the author examines manpower requirements for the Armed Forces, procurement and retention, fluctuating force levels and deployments, the need for the Armed Forces to relate positively to society, equity and justice in the system of selection, and the use of the military services as a social rehabilitation agency for marginal personnel. He also discusses alternatives to the selective service system, including volunteer forces and national service. The author concludes the draft system should be retained with suggested improvements in efficiency, equity, and uniformity of criteria. An article drawn largely from this paper appeared in Army, Vol. 17, February 1967, pp. 31-41.)

99. "The Zero Draft and the National Guard." The National Guardsman, Vol. 25, March 1971, pp. 2-12.

(This article states recruiting/retention problems faced by the National Guard in view of the proposed zero Draft. Negative factors contributing to the problem of maintaining National Guard strength are pay, satisfaction of personal needs, influence of wives and employers, other outside influences (leisure-time activities), public image, demands on time, changing life styles and attitudes, economy pressures to reduce military forces, and irritating and unattractive aspects of Guard service. Since most DOD efforts and resources to plan a volunteer force are directed at the active Services, the Guard must develop its own recruiting/retention program using resources available. Among several courses of action recommended are better internal communication and an improved personal approach. Surveys of Guardsmen show improvements are needed in the awards and training programs and in personnel and administration management. There is too much "make work." Poor leadership must be eliminated. The Guardsmen want to be challenged and given opportunities to demonstrate leadership and initiative.)

100. US Department of the Army. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation. PROVIDE. Vol. 1, Summary Report. Vol. 2, SECRET, Supporting Analysis. Washington, 15 September 1969. (OO DA-G1 PROVIDE)

(This study provided the Chief of Staff with an in-depth analysis of a post-Vietnam volunteer Army. It includes discussion on the image of the Army, foreign experience with volunteer armies, recruitment and the recruiting system, compensation, incentives, and implications for the future. It contains recommendations and proposed time-phasing for their accomplishment.)

101. US Department of the Army. Office of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army. Master Program for the Modern Volunteer Army FY 1971 and FY 1972. Washington, 1 March 1971.

(This document outlines the US Army master program of actions and procedures which will qualitatively and quantitatively increase procurement and retention by improving professionalism and quality of life in the active Army and Reserve Components. Included in its 10 annexes are measures concerning funding, Project VOLAR, race relations, recruiting, information activities, and high impact actions necessary to achieve conditions conducive to a Modern Volunteer Army.)

102. Westmoreland, William C., GEN. Address to the Association of the United States Army. Washington, 13 October 1970. (U17 W47 V.5)

(In this speech before the annual meeting of AUSA, the Chief of Staff committed the US Army to an all-out effort to achieve a zero draft, a volunteer force. He outlined a four-point program to move in this direction: (1) Those in uniform must work with vigor, imagination, and dedication to the task of obtaining a volunteer force; (2) unnecessary irritants and unattractive features must be eliminated from Army life; (3) funds must be appropriated to increase pay, improve housing, and pay others to perform menial tasks, thereby freeing the soldier to do his primary job; (4) obtain the support of the American people.)

SECTION VI

STUDIES AND SURVEYS--PROCUREMENT AND RETENTION

103. Apgar, Mahlon IV, LT. "Why They Leave." Army, Vol. 16, March 1966, pp. 54-57.

(This article presents results of an informal, unofficial survey of 94 lieutenants leaving the Army. Dissatisfaction was caused principally by poor leadership by seniors, particularly the lower field grades. Also included were lack of common sense and planning, perennial flaps, misplaced priorities, unwillingness to listen to junior officers, "make" work, demeaning work, decline in fringe benefits. Pay was not a major factor.)

104. Crum, Suzanne. Proposals for an All Regular Officer Force as an Aid to Procurement and Retention of Qualified Personnel in the United States Air Force Career Officer Corps. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Pittsburgh University, July 1965. (UG641 C7)

(The thesis of this paper is that the Air Force retention problem can be alleviated by procurement and integration procedures which provide for an all-regular force and by a realistic program of indoctrination and motivation which encourages career commitment. The author examines the dual regular-reserve structure and concludes that: (1) the "career reservist" is considered the second team; (2) reserve status results in career insecurity; (3) the "career reservist" is an anomaly in that he is not a resource for rapid expansion; (4) Air Force ROTC should be eliminated; (5) the method of regular selection is not selective and discourages confidence in procedures; (6) pay, insecurity, and job dissatisfaction are the major deterrents to career motivation; and (7) the positive features of a military career must be stressed. The author's recommendations include: (1) legislation calling for an all-regular officer force; (2) expansion of the Air Force Academy and nationwide competition for appointments; (3) replacement of AFROTC with a scholarship program; and (4) stress on pride in profession and improvements in career security and job satisfaction.)

105. Elliott, James D., Comdr. The Inertial-Psychological Approach to Personnel Retention. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 21 February 1968. (AWC IS-68)

(The author examines the problem of retaining trained men after their first enlistment. A major obstacle is the reenlistment contract itself which, to the enlisted man, denies him his personal freedom for a long period. The primary group concerned is single

men in their early twenties. The author directed his observations to this group in particular and to human behavior in general. He surveyed 276 Navy enlisted men for the study. A pilot program is proposed for a four-year enlistment option that contains a provision that on or after his third anniversary the enlisted man could state his intent to terminate service by tendering one-year's notice. The result would be a man could remain for a career and never be more than a year from separation, should he desire it. Present options should be retained in addition.)

106. Fawcett, Craig R., Lt Comdr, and Skelton, Stuart A., Lt Comdr. A Comparative Analysis between Retention of Junior Officers in the Navy and of Junior Executives in Industry. Thesis. Monterey, California: United States Naval Postgraduate School, 1965. (NvPGS TH F3)

(This thesis compares the factors that affect retention of officers in the US Navy and junior executives in industry. Statistics were compared from the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Pacific Telephone Company. The authors analyze problems confronting these young men and conclude that the Armed Services should adopt "The Radical Approach." This approach would abolish major facets of military service, such as the present pay structure, fringe benefits, retirement program, and promotion criteria, and replace them with more civilian-oriented concepts; e.g., pay based on skill, a health plan similar to Blue Cross, selective-competitive promotions, leave and retirement plans identical to Civil Service, and lateral entry.)

107. Franklin Institute. Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior Officers' Duties. Vol. 1, Summary Report. Vol 2, Results of Questionnaire Analysis. Philadelphia: Systems Science Department of the Franklin Institute, 1968. (UB413 F68)

(The objective of this study was to identify factors influencing career decisions by junior officers. 4532 company grade officers were surveyed by questionnaires and interviews. A major conclusion is that poor leadership by senior officers is much too prevalent. Senior officers are disinterested in junior officers' problems; unit commanders seem unwilling to delegate authority and responsibility and to give junior officers "freedom to fail"; and senior officers lack confidence in junior officers and do not counsel them properly. There is a lack of communication.)

108. Head, Richard H., LTC, USAF. Feasibility of an All-Regular Officer Career Force. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, December 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-H3473)

(This essay discusses the present regular/reserve career officer force structure and the major disadvantages to having career reserve officers. The author concludes that reserve officers on active duty

are second class citizens with low morale and do not have the same promotion opportunities and job security as the regular officer. He proposes a solution that would eliminate the need for a career reserve officer force and then evaluates the solution against the present system. An outline is given for the manner of transition to an all-regular career force.)

109. Johnston, Jerome, and Bachman, Jerald G. Young Men Look at Military Service. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, June 1970. (UB323 M46)

(The purpose of this study was to examine, by questionnaires, the plans and attitudes toward military service of young men nearing high school graduation. It is part of a larger project, Youth in Transition, whose purpose is to study attitudes, plans, and behaviors of adolescents. In this phase 1799 young men were sampled; weighting procedures used to more nearly approximate a cross section of tenth grade boys resulted in 2058 cases. The authors found a lack of knowledge on conditions of military service, but a general belief that a military career provides an opportunity to serve, to become more mature and self-reliant, to achieve upward social and economic mobility for the underprivileged and the Negro. An attempt to gather data on a volunteer Army was "less than successful.")

110. Junior Officer Retention Study. Colorado Springs, Colorado: Headquarters, US Army Air Defense Command, undated.

(This study addresses the retention problem from the viewpoint of ARADCOM. The methodology not only surveyed over 500 junior officers, but also used junior officers on the study group. It is concluded that leadership is a salient factor in influencing young officers to remain in the Army or to leave. Pay, family separations, and mediocre personnel management were high on the list as retention factors. Incompetent superiors, lack of recognition, and fairness were also found to be important. Most of the respondents felt that tangible benefits would attract junior officers only if the human elements of leadership and competence were present. They were critical of cold, machine-like treatment and resented being deprived of the opportunity to exercise independent thought, action, and the opportunity to be innovative.)

111. Latham, Willard, COL. The Army as a Career. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 23 February 1968. (AWC IS-68)

(Since public opinion of the military profession derives from impressions obtained from the armed services, the perception of career Army officers that their way of life has declined in prestige and appeal may be a major cause of procurement and retention problems.

This study considers changes in the Army over the past 30 years and a large number of statistical surveys to determine the impact of these changes on the career attitudes of Army officers. The author concludes that: (1) the scope of an Army career has changed and life is not generally the way it is implied or expected; (2) the officer corps is not a true professional group; (3) the Army is not a full life work career for the majority of officers; and (4) there is an empathy gap between various officer grade levels in the Army.)

112. Liner, Thomas W., COL, USAF. Officer Commissioning Programs in a Volunteer Environment. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, December 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-L574)

(The author discusses present commissioning programs and states retention rates should determine whether a program is successful. He suggests that it might be profitable to provide junior officers their military training before their college education and outlines a new commissioning program. He states the lack of a college degree should not be a barrier to a commission but could be a bar to promotion beyond captain. The author concludes a volunteer environment will not affect the procurement of quality officers.)

113. McCord, Robert E., COL. The Army's Most Valuable Asset: Competent Personnel. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1 December 1969. (AWC IS-70)

(This essay analyzes the factors which influence individual career motivation. The impact of these factors is applied through the frames of reference of the various personnel categories in the Army. The author finds that most officers do not intend to serve for 30 years; the Army has been over-committed, resulting in reduced job satisfaction at all levels; the Army's image has suffered recently; and the Army's greatest internal asset is effective leadership. He recommends improvements in force levels, public relations and recruiting, housing, pay, and personnel stability.)

114. Morris, Emerson E., CPT. Motivation and Retention of the Military Executive. Thesis. University of Pennsylvania: Wharton School, 1958. (UB210 M57)

(The author concludes that two considerations govern the effective motivation of the commissioned officer: (1) The need to identify the officer's needs and goals and to follow this identification with status incentives; (2) the need to apply the incentives, by the military and the public, in a program which will improve the attractiveness of a military career.)

115. Nevins, Robert H., Jr., LTC. The Retention of Quality Junior Officers--A Challenge for the Seventies. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 4 March 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This thesis examines the career environment of the junior officer for the past 25 years and identifies major causes for the junior officer retention problem. Numerous statistical surveys from a variety of sources were analyzed. The author's major conclusions are that for an increasing number of junior officers: (1) the Army has been over-extended, resulting in a "mission unlimited" attitude among top political and military leaders and a turbulent career environment; (2) the status, prestige, and national support for the Officer Corps has diminished; (3) the civilian sector better fulfills the needs of the individual; and (4) an empathy gap exists between today's junior officer and a significant number of senior officers.)

116. Partlow, Robert G., Lt Comdr. "The Military Mind." US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 97, February 1971, pp. 81-82.

(The author speaks of the increasing difficulty in attracting potential career personnel, particularly officers, and the increasing reluctance of society to spend its resources on defense. He cites these two problems and presents proposals for their solution, stating his proposals are not an alteration of dedication, self-discipline, and personal sacrifice. His recommendations concern: (1) better post facilities, particularly housing; (2) remaining non-political but knowledgeable, even outspoken on contemporary problems; (3) promoting understanding by loaning officers and highly trained senior enlisted men and women to other Federal agencies or local governments; (4) reducing irritants; (5) increasing career status through education, promotion, and experience.)

117. Taylor, William W., Jr., LTC. Can We Hire Enough Fighters? Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 25 February 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This paper discusses procurement problems and identifies factors influencing the individual in selecting a job or in choosing between the Army and civilian employment. Factors militating against Army service are examined to determine corrective action that could be taken. The author concludes that: (1) the disadvantages of Army life that cannot be significantly improved should be compensated for by pay; (2) the level of pay required to attract quality first term enlistees must be determined by trial and error; (3) strict personnel quality controls must be established; (4) a volunteer Army can be bought, but this is a function of how much the public is willing to pay.)

118. US Air Force. Air Force Human Resources Laboratory. Why Airmen Enlist. Lackland Air Force Base, August 1970. (UG633.6 A358 70-29)

(In their first week of training, over 40,000 basic airmen were administered questionnaires to determine reasons for enlistment. Reasons were further defined to determine variables among groups: socio-economic level, geographical origins, race, and education. Most frequently given reasons were education (31.6 percent), wide choice of assignments (13.5 percent), travel (9.1 percent). The variables provide interesting information on motivation of certain groups.)

119. US Department of Defense. Final Report--Ad Hoc Committee on Future Military Service as a Career That Will Attract and Retain Capable Career Personnel. Washington, 30 October 1953. (UB147 U5)

(In February 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense regarding concern for a growing lack of confidence among Armed Forces personnel in the military service as a profession. The stated problem was, "Why has military service lost much of its attractiveness as a lifetime career for inherently capable personnel and what corrective measures are necessary?" The report concludes that: (1) world commitments have burdened people with instability and abnormal hardship; (2) public respect for constituted authority has declined; (3) military authority and leadership have declined; (4) competition with industry for good men has increased; and (5) danger exists that budgetary considerations transcend combat effectiveness. The report deals with professional career officers and noncommissioned officers.)

120. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Junior Officer Retention. Letter from Chief, OPO, to the Commandant, US Army War College, 12 November 1970. (UB413 A5321 1970)

(This letter discusses the junior officer retention problem in the Army and areas needing improvement. Inclosures include retention statistics by branch, junior officer complaints, and actions completed and in progress designed to improve the retention rate.)

121. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Survey Estimate of Retention of Army Personnel. Washington, 31 May 1969. (UB339 A4966 45-69-E)

(This two-part survey of male officers and enlisted men presents statistics concerning all aspects of retention. It sampled over 5,000 officers (O-1 through O-6 and WO) and 21,000 enlisted men (E-1 through E-9) by grade and career and marital status. The report provides data on: (1) the question, "If you plan to leave

the Army, is there any action which the Army could reasonably take which would influence you to remain beyond your current term of service?"; (2) opinions concerning a large number of factors affecting retention; (3) a retention index associated with the retention factors; and (4) comparison of retention indexes among the selected officer/enlisted groups. Among company grade officers the four most influential retention factors were promotion opportunities, retirement benefits, medical benefits, and opportunities for leadership. Among the lower ranking enlisted men they were promotion opportunities, retirement benefits, educational opportunities, and medical benefits.)

122. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Survey Estimate of Selected Retention Data on Army Male Officers. Washington, 30 November 1969. (UB337 A4966 16-17-E)

(This OPO sample survey of military personnel (O-1 through O-6 and WO) is a seven-part report which provides data on: (1) utilization of education, training, and experience in making duty assignments for male officers who have college degrees; (2) utilization of education, training, and experience in making duty assignments; (3) time decision was made to leave the Army and return to civilian life as expressed by male officers who have made a decision to leave the Army; (4) career intentions of male officers upon entry into the Service; (5) present career intentions of male officers; (6) total months of active duty served in Vietnam; (7) total months served in short tour areas. The sample size varied from 2,300 to over 7,000, depending on the topic being surveyed. Detailed results for all categories and ranks are presented.)

123. US Navy. Naval Personnel Research & Development Laboratory. Fleet Attitude Status Report. Washington, July/August 1969. (VB258 A58 1970 No. 1)

(This personnel survey reflects questionnaire responses from over 15,000 naval officers and 16,500 enlisted men regarding career incentives, retention, education, personal services, and duties and conditions of Navy life. The 10 most influential factors for and against a naval career are given for officers, and the 10 most influential for and 6 against for enlisted men. Leadership and leadership opportunities are factors.)

124. US Navy. The Office of Naval Research. Conference on Personnel Retention Research. Washington, 1969. (ND C-PRR 1968)

(This conference, held in New Orleans in December 1968, brought together military personnel, naval in-house researchers, and university researchers in the behavioral sciences. Their purpose was to

discuss retention problems and approaches to retention research. This report of proceedings contains abstracts of presentations made by conference participants.)

125. Wieland, Kay L., LTC. Junior Officer Retention: The Army's Dilemma. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 31 March 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This thesis discusses three aspects of the junior officer retention problem: (1) Civilian-military relations of the psycho-social environment from which Army members are recruited; (2) factors motivating junior officers to choose the Army as a career; and (3) effectiveness of present efforts to improve the retention program. The author finds that low junior officer retention rates can be attributed generally to anti-military sentiment in the civilian community and the inability of the Army to offer balanced intrinsic and extrinsic rewards comparable to the civilian sector. He recommends action to insure that jobs are meaningful; elimination of distinctions between regular and reserve officers on active duty; and education of senior officers regarding leadership challenges created by junior officers and ways to meet the challenges successfully.)

SECTION VII

MISCELLANEOUS

126. Ballou, De Forrest, LTC. The Problem of the Military Dissident and How the Commander Can Deal with This Problem. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 20 November 1969. (AWC IS-70)

(This essay discusses dissidence in the Army and contributing problems. Present official guidelines relative to military dissidence are outlined. New recommended guidelines for commanders are presented and possible actions by Department of the Army to alleviate the problem are given.)

127. Finkelstein, Zane E., LTC. He Rolls the Distant Drum: Some Thoughts on Dissent in the Army. Essay. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 21 November 1969. (AWC IS-70)

(The author examines and compares the 1st Amendment freedoms and the realistic requirements of discipline. A further comparison is made between published guidelines for commanders on dissent, the 1st Amendment, and disciplinary needs. Guidelines for both the Department of Defense and Department of the Army grant greater license than is required by the Constitution or is within the scope of acceptable risk. The author suggests a means for correcting the deficiencies.)

128. Hays, Samuel H., COL. "Judge Not Lest Ye Be Judged." Military Review, Vol. 49, February 1969, pp. 3-10.

(The author examines the officer efficiency reporting system as it has evolved over the last 30 years and questions its effectiveness as a personnel management tool today. The present rating forms are not dependable or efficient for use in our selection system. They are inflated and are completed subjectively and using different standards among rating officers. The rating system causes excessive competition and a decline in moral courage, independent thinking, and innovations. The author concludes the importance of the efficiency report as a basis for selection should be reduced and a permanent solution found to the problem. Some areas suggested for investigation are bonus points for command time, peer ratings, and tests which measure attitudes, personality, and skill.)

129. Hays, Samuel H., COL. "Leadership for the Future--Campus Style." Military Review, Vol. 37, April 1957, pp. 53-62.

(This article discusses the ROTC program, its importance, organization, curriculum, and demands or lack thereof, on the cadet. Implications identified are: (1) branch schools and superiors must provide additional doctrination and training in discipline, standards, customs of the service, and branch techniques; (2) only highly qualified officers should be selected for ROTC instructors; (3) administrative and training support for summer camps must adhere to high standards; and (4) support for the entire program should be adequate in amount and quality. Suggestions for improvement include: (1) initial motivation in secondary schools; (2) better selection methods for advanced students and Distinguished Military Graduates; (3) enhancement of status and content of military curriculum; (4) increased concentration on character and leadership training; and (5) higher standards of cadet performance.)

130. Hays, Samuel H., COL (Ret). "The Soldier's Rights in a Free Society." Army, Vol. 20, May 1970, pp. 28-33.

(The military establishment is the cornerstone of national security, and as such its requirements for group values and group cohesion force denial of inalienable rights to the serviceman. A high degree of authority, discipline, and teamwork is needed to insure solidarity and preparedness to perform assigned missions. Doctrine, rules, and prescribed procedures must direct the operation of the organization. The rights of the individual must be evaluated against these requirements, and the author sees them as having a lower priority than the security of society. In return the military institution must take care of the soldier's personal needs. In this time of rapid change, leadership may take different forms, but authority of command must be retained, and changes should be made through the chain of command.)

131. Hays, Samuel H., COL. "To Thine Own Self Be True." Army, Vol. 17, July 1967, pp. 78-80.

(This cerebration concerns the necessity for the military profession to maintain its principles of honor and its ethics in the face of temptations to violate them. Modern technology increases this obligation. Minor violations are symptoms of larger ones and cast doubt on the basic integrity of the profession. The military ethic is different from general society's, and the officer corps must by example and instruction instill its high standards in young members entering the profession and insist that they strive to live up to them. The author concludes an individual can succeed in the Army without compromising his principles and ideals, but it is difficult if he loses sight of his moral beliefs and ethical standards.)

132. "How Two Allies Fare with Volunteers." U. S. News and World Report, Vol. 70, 1 March 1971, p. 35.

(This article examines Britain's and Canada's all-volunteer forces. It finds they must perform with fewer men, forces are expensive, and there is concern about getting the right men for today's specialized forces. In Britain, the minimum enlistment was lowered from six to three years. There is a military salary plan which is competitive with comparable civilian jobs. They have some problems with antimilitary sentiment, image, and standards set so high that 50 percent of the volunteers are rejected. Canada has integrated its small armed force into one uniform. There are four applicants for every job, but there is a lack of qualified applicants for the specialists ratings. Pay is high; the men may live off post; there is an opportunity to become a physician, dentist, etc., at government expense. The problem is retention of trained men.)

133. Knight, Leavitt A., Jr. "What the Army is Doing to Make Out Without the Draft." The American Legion Magazine, Vol. 90, April 1971, p. 4.

(This article examines measures taken recently by the Army to minimize irritating requirements and enhance Service attractiveness. It recognizes that these steps are not permissive, but give trust and dignity to enlisted personnel. It states men will take discipline when they see the reason for it, but a hard line must be drawn between "fair" and "soft." Army leadership, from noncommissioned officers up, faces a stern test in maintaining the proper balance between men and mission.)

134. Maloney, William R., LTC. Domestic Antimilitarism and Its Implications for the Officer Corps in the Seventies. Individual Research Paper. Washington: The National War College, 20 March 1970. (NWC IS-1969/70 M3142)

(This research paper examines domestic antimilitary sentiment, particularly on the college campus, and predicts the effect this climate will have on the attitudes and motivation of officers entering the service from colleges and universities in the 70's. The author sees antimilitarism as growing in strength and composed of four interwoven components: the Student, the Intellectual, the Politician, and the Popular. He suggests the military professional does not perceive the magnitude of campus antimilitarism. It is concluded the image of the military profession needs to be balanced and recommendations are made as to how this image can be enhanced.)

135. Newman, A. S., MG. "Duty-Honor-Country-Army." Army, Vol. 21, February 1971, pp. 47-48.

(General Newman explains and defends the honor system at West Point as a key fundamental in leadership training. Its basis is standards

expected of all officers. He advocates an Officer's Creed which would embody the principle, "for the good of the military service," and could be expressed in the motto Duty-Honor-Country-Army.)

136. Rhyne, Hal B., LTC. The Image of the Army in 1970. Thesis. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 9 March 1970. (AWC IS-70)

(This thesis examines public attitudes toward the Army as an institution and toward professional soldering. It looks at the Army's image historically and isolates factors affecting our image. The author develops an image for 1970 and considers Army programs designed to influence public attitudes. He concludes that the current unfavorable image could be predicted from historic attitudes and offers means by which the Army can influence future attitudes.)

137. Rigg, Robert B., COL, (Ret). "Future Military Discipline." Military Review, Vol. 50, September 1970, pp. 15-23.

(The author writes about contemporary problems and events occurring in the Army that affect the ability to accomplish tasks. He states that disciplinary problems in the Armed Forces have reached a point where the junior officers and noncommissioned officers of today and the future will require the benefit of more formal training in order to cope successfully with them. This is particularly true of race relations. He indicates the Army must undergo change, just as the Nation is, and learn to understand and deal with the younger generation.)

138. Stogdill, Ralph M. Leadership: A Survey of the Literature. Greensboro, North Carolina: Smith Richardson Foundation, The Creativity Research Institute, July 1968.

(This document is a compilation of leadership research activities and bibliographic items in the following areas: Definitions of leadership; theories of leadership; types of leadership; situational determinants of leadership; leadership, social insight, and empathy; and the persistence and transfer of leadership.)

139. US Air Force. Air Force Human Resources Laboratory. Comparison of Self-Motivated Air Force Enlistees with Draft-Motivated Enlistees. Brooks Air Force Base, July 1970. (UG633.6 A358 70-26)

(This document gives statistical evidence on what the composition of a volunteer force may be. Over 2,000 basic trainees, draft-motivated and self-motivated, completed questionnaires on their backgrounds and attitudes. In comparison, self-motivated volunteers were less educated, proportionately more from minority groups, less affluent, lower in test scores, more positive in attitude.)

140. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Commander's Guide to the Retention of Junior Officers. Washington, undated. (UB413 A5331)

(This handbook was published on or about January 1970 and is to be used by field grade officers in counseling junior officers on the Army as a career. It gives the counselor's role and provides information on advantages of the military profession: education, promotion, pay, assignments, career programs, Regular Army. It includes a section on counseling techniques.)

141. US War Department. Bureau of Public Relations. Press Release on Report of the Secretary of War's Board on Officer-Enlisted Man Relationships. (Doolittle Board) Washington, 27 May 1946.

(This release contains comprehensive information on the Doolittle Board's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Causes of poor relationships between commissioned and enlisted personnel were found to be poor leadership by a small percentage of officers and a wide official and social gap between the two groups. Some leaders were unqualified or under-trained. Sweeping changes were made in the Army as a result of the board.)

ADDENDUM TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

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SECTION I

METHODOLOGY

142. Kahn, Robert L., and Cannell, Charles F. The Dynamics of Interviewing: Theory, Techniques, and Cases. Second Edition. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960.

(This comprehensive book on the theory and practice of interviewing was written for both students and practitioners in many diverse fields. Topics covered include (1) The Interview as Communication, (2) The Psychological Basis of the Interview, (3) Techniques for Motivating the Respondent, (4) The Formulation of Objectives, (5) The Formulation of Questions, (6) The Design of Questionnaires, (7) The Interview as a Method of Management, (8) Probing to Meet Objectives, and (9) Learning to Interview. Illustrative interviews are also included.)

143. Payne, Stanley L. The Art of Asking Questions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. (LB1027 P3)

(This highly readable book contains practical knowledge on how to make surveys. Subject matter includes consideration of the three basic types of questions, 1,000 "problem" words, the "loaded" question, and the influences of punctuation. Also included is a checklist of 100 items to consider in preparing survey questions.)

SECTION II

MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION, AND HUMAN RELATIONS

144. Berelson, Bernard, and Steiner, Gary A. Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964. (HM51 B42)

(This book states and summarizes related research in 1045 findings by social scientists concerning human behavior. Some of the major topics covered are behavioral development, perception, learning and thinking, motivation, relations in small groups, organizations, institutions (including military), ethnic relations, and attitudes. Pertinent findings on the military institution include: (1) the prestige of a military career is less than a comparable civilian occupation; (2) the complexities of warfare and the cold war have lessened authoritarianism and centralized control; (3) peer pressures in basic training reinforce organizational requirements for adjustment to Army life; (4) adjustment is better for recruits who are better educated, stable, healthy, young, single, and have fewer family contacts; (5) liking and respect for the officer promotes good relationships, group cohesiveness, high morale, and efficiency.)

145. Blau, Peter M., and Scott, W. Richard. Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962. (HD31 B45)

(In this book the authors have used empirical research and studies to attain their theoretical objectives of explaining the "structure and dynamics" of organizations. Chapter headings include (1) The Nature and Types of Formal Organizations, (2) The Organization and Its Publics, (3) The Social Structure of Work Groups, (4) Processes of Communication, (5) The Role of the Supervisor, (6) Managerial Control, (7) The Social Context of Organizational Life, and (8) Organizational Dynamics.)

146. Coates, Charles H., and Pellegrin, Roland J. Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life. University Park, Maryland: The Social Science Press, 1965. (U21.5 C6)

(This comprehensive book is a summary and interpretation of a wealth of materials on American military institutions presented in a sociological frame of reference. The numerous topics and sub-topics include (1) Social Change and Military Institutions, (2) Formal Military Organizations and Status Hierarchies, (3) Military Organizations as Informal Social Systems, (4) Military

Management and Military Leadership, (5) The Meaning of Professionalism, (6) The Status of Military Professionalism, (7) Military Honor and Ethics, (8) Socialization in the Military Profession, (9) Officer-Enlisted Man Relations, (10) Transition from Civilian to Military Life, (11) The Dynamics of Military Group Behavior, and (12) The Future of the Military Profession and Military Institutions.)

147. Davis, James H., LT, et al. "Social Change: A Necessary Variable in Army Planning." Army, Vol. 21, May 1971, pp. 32-35.

(This article was written by five lieutenants in the Social Systems Division, Institute of Land Combat, Combat Developments Command. It discusses previous Army examination of the relationship between human social behavior and Army organizations and missions and states the conclusion that the soldier's social needs must be considered in Army planning. The result was termed the "Whole Man Concept." Further research was embodied in a study, Man and the 1990 Environment, in which it was predicted that organizations in the next 20 years will become more informal and diverse. The Army should continue its interest in social and behavioral research and invest the results in planning for that environment.)

148. Katzell, Raymond A., and Barrett, Richard S. Impact of the Executive on His Position. Washington: US Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory, January 1968. (UB337 A4712 No. 1154)

(A major objective of this study was to determine whether differences in job content and performance are associated with personal characteristics of the civilian executive, the work setting, or a combination of the two. Questionnaires were completed by 193 Department of the Army executives, GS-13 to -17, and 76 of this group were interviewed. Each executive's immediate supervisor completed a questionnaire and a performance appraisal on incumbents. Results of the study indicate: (1) there is disagreement between incumbents and supervisors on job requirements and how they are fulfilled; (2) communication needs improvement; (3) changes in job content normally originate at the top, while recommended changes by the incumbent are resisted; (4) there is a critical problem in implementing decisions due to deficiencies in personnel and teamwork.)

149. Merrill, Harwood F., and Marting, Elizabeth, eds. Developing Executive Skills. New York: American Management Association, Inc., 1958. (HD31 M39 1958)

(This publication of AMA advocates systematic programs of management development. The essentials of such programs are a plan, sound

organization, definitive standards of performance, the right climate, support of top management, objective evaluation, and an array of methods for training and implementation. The concluding chapter, "Developing Tomorrow's Leaders," presents some lessons learned from successful programs. Among the "do's" are: (1) beginning at the top, improve relationships between superior and subordinate; (2) every manager should know the capabilities, potential, and manner of performance of subordinates; (3) management development programs should consider the needs of the individual and the organization; (4) every management position should have clear, current standards of performance; (5) the differences between performance, potential, and personality should be recognized; and (6) every possible opportunity for leadership development should be offered.)

150. Nelson, George W., Jr., MAJ. "The Trouble with Snake Oil." Army, Vol. 21, May 1971, pp. 55-58.

(This article warns against time-worn "sure cures" for managerial and leadership ailments: sweeping and unnecessary reorganizations; procedural changes to assembly line methods which result in unconcerned workers and customer dissatisfaction; and over-reliance on information systems and sophisticated office machines. Success does not come from "snake oil" but from preventive medicine--leadership. The author concludes that austere funding can be healthy if it turns the attention of leaders to their basic function of motivating people to achieve through leadership and integrity.)

151. Newell, William E., LTC, USAF. Effecting Improvements in Job Satisfaction in the Military. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC TH-N433)

(The purpose of this paper is to provide information on behavioral science theories which can be used in conjunction with a previous Air Force study. The previous study correlated Frederick Herzberg's Human Motivation and Dissatisfaction Theory with factors which motivated or dissatisfied junior officers. The author's objective is to give guidelines and suggestions which will improve job satisfaction and personnel retention. He examines Herzberg's theory, A. H. Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs, Doublas McGregor's Theory-X and Theory-Y, Clark Caskey's Continuum of Managerial Types, and George S. Odiorne's The Manager of the Situation. He concludes "the manager of the situation" must understand behavioral science, and recommends that all Air Force managers be made knowledgeable of present behavioral science thinking.

152. Olmstead, Joseph A., et al. Goal-Directed Leadership: Superordinate to Human Relations? Alexandria, Virginia: The George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office, March 1967. (GWU HRRO PP-11-67)

(This document consists of four professional papers presented at a symposium on leadership in hierarchial organizations. Each paper addresses a different level in the military structure: senior level, infantry rifle platoon, the rifle squad, and training for potential leaders just completing basic training. HumRRO research and findings in each area are presented, as well as valuable review and reference to previous leadership research done by others. Taken as a whole, it was the symposium's position that human relations are an important part of leadership training, but more important is the need for realistic, practical instruction which provides the student knowledge and understanding of the demands of the situation or environment and how to satisfy these demands.)

SECTION III

LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

153. Flint, Roy K., LTC. "Army Professionalism for the Future." Military Review, Vol. 51, April 1971, pp. 3-11.

(The author sees present criticism of the military establishment after 20 years of unparalleled prestige as a return to conditions which historically are normal. Military leaders must concern themselves with their interactions with the civilian element at DOD level and with their relationships with the men they lead. While leaders should recognize attitudinal changes in today's soldiers, effectiveness, discipline, and efficiency must be preserved. The Armed Forces must identify with the American people and present an image of integrity and competence. Quality performance with fewer resources is essential. Leaders must provide the kind of leadership which will reward and challenge subordinates. Policies and procedures should be reasonable and efficient and enhance combat effectiveness. Leadership training for junior leaders should stress honor, skill, civil-military relationships, the mission, resourcefulness, justice, and physical and moral strength.)

SECTION IV

LEADERSHIP CLIMATE

154. Cameron, Juan. "Our Gravest Military Problem Is Manpower." Fortune, Vol. 83, April 1971, p. 61.

(This article discusses discontent of all ranks and ages in the Armed Forces and the resulting retention problem. Personnel turbulence is a major source of the difficulty, along with poor personnel management and leadership, antimilitary sentiments, and inequitable pay. The author states the turbulence is caused in large part by the "two worst decisions of the (Vietnam) war": failure to call up the reserves and the 12-month tour. Another cause is manpower cuts. He concedes changes made to improve service attractiveness and improve race relations are a move in the right direction, but additional major changes are required before a volunteer force can be attained. Pay, promotion, and retirement systems must be reformed, military life will have to be much further improved (cut down PCS moves, provide better housing, abolish menial tasks, and provide interesting and challenging work.)

SECTION V

VOLUNTEER FORCES

155. Killebrew, Robert B., CPT. "Volunteer Army: How It Looks to a Company Commander." Army, Vol. 21, March 1971, pp. 19-22.

(The author discusses his unit's retention problem and the reasons for it; pay, administrative red tape, malassignments, lack of pride and identification are mentioned. To improve the status and amenities of service, he recommends: (1) fewer restrictions on freedom of action; (2) better billets and clubs; (3) reduced income taxes (except officers); (4) unit stability; (5) better uniforms (includes more utilitarian fatigues. ". . . there's no correlation between starch and combat effectiveness."); (6) a military justice code and system that provides for quick, effective punishment; and (7) speedy elimination of misfits.)

156. Kim, K. H.; Farrell, Susan; and Clague, Ewan. The All-Volunteer Army: An Analysis of Demand and Supply. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. (UB343 K5)

(This book is a revised and edited version of a report prepared for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in October 1969 for the purpose of assisting the Army with its recommendations to the Gates Commission. The study focuses on personnel requirements to sustain a volunteer Army and the rate of compensation necessary to attract sufficient volunteers. Emphasis is on procurement of enlisted men, though there is some data on officers. The authors identified and analyzed factors which influence procurement and retention, applying the concept of demand and supply; the Army's requirements being demand, and young men from the civilian manpower pool who are willing to enlist being the supply. A major conclusion is that increased compensation will attract enough volunteers to meet requirements "up to a point." However, after reaching that point, the cost is so prohibitive the volunteer force is not feasible.)

157. Smith, Louis J., COL, USAF. Validity of Arguments Against the All-Volunteer Armed Force. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC Th-S4823)

(This report reviews three arguments frequently raised against a volunteer military force: patriotism, mercenary implications, and civilian control. Agreeing with the Gates Commission, the author finds them invalid. He concludes that: (1) the basic strength of the country comes from all areas of employment, not just the military (the real issue is procuring qualified, committed personnel

for the Services); (2) men do not choose a military career for pay *alone*; and (3) *military leaders in a volunteer force will* continue to subject themselves to civilian control, as they have throughout our history.)

158. Westmoreland, William C., GEN. "Straight Talk from the Chief on the Modern Volunteer Army." Army, Vol. 21, May 1971, pp. 12-17.

(In this article the Chief of Staff responds to 12 questions from Army editors concerning the Army's position on some significant issues raised by the volunteer Army efforts. He states a volunteer Army will be a better Army with high standards of order and discipline and will not be permissive. The removal of irritants and other policies not contributing to combat effectiveness shows trust for the soldier's maturity and judgment and allows him to concentrate his efforts on those duties essential to mission accomplishment. To create an environment in which young men and women will find job satisfaction and feel pride in service, three policies are vital: decentralization of authority and responsibility, improvement and stabilization of leaders, and increased resources for units.)

SECTION VI

STUDIES AND SURVEYS--PROCUREMENT AND RETENTION

159. Haas, William E., LTC. "Indicators of Trouble." Military Review, Vol. 51, April 1971, pp. 20-24.

(This article states that surveys concerning junior officer retention should be selective; they should seek to learn why men with high potential leave the service--not the average officer. The author believes the former is interested principally in good leadership, responsibility, and an atmosphere of integrity. He thinks part of the retention problem is unwise use of and over-emphasis on management indicators, such as morale, discipline, training, and maintenance. He agrees the indicators can be used soundly, but sees problems in that they can result in false reports and emphasis only on what the higher commander is stressing. The author suggests as a solution that commanders exercise caution in analyzing indicators and in how they are used with subordinates. Second, when faced with injudicious application of indicators, intermediate commanders must act with wisdom and responsibility to subordinates.)

160. Johnson, Keith B., LTC, USAF. Improving Retention of Enlisted Personnel in the Military. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, December 1970. (AF-AU AWC Th-J583)

(The author examines the retention problem in the Armed Forces and identifies the principal sources as pay, promotions, and housing. Less frequently named are assignments, poor leadership, lack of freedom, and menial tasks. He concludes that, outside of pay and housing, effective leadership provides the solution. He calls for sincere personal involvement by commanders at all levels, an understanding of the individual and his attitudes, communication up and down the chain, and respect for human dignity.)

161. Kagerer, Rudolph L. Analysis of Junior Officer Comments on Early Army Experience: Research Study 65-1. Washington: US Department of the Army, US Army Personnel Research Office, March 1965. (UB337 A4712b Index 1964/65)

(This analysis was part of research to develop improved techniques for assigning officers. An attitude questionnaire was administered to 150 junior officers, one portion of which concerned career intentions. The main reason respondents gave for leaving the service was lack of job satisfaction. Forty-eight percent expressed concern over inadequate use of abilities and training. One-half of these intended to leave the Army. Twenty-three percent wanted a voice in their assignments. About 23 percent said pay was too low.)

162. US Department of the Army. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Why They Leave: Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966. Washington, 6 July 1970.

(The purpose of this study was to determine the causes of the higher than usual resignation rate for the US Military Academy class of 1966, and to furnish recommendations for improving retention rates of quality junior officers. Methodology consisted of the chronological reconstruction of the records of 100 regignees, to include civilian and military background and future potential; a questionnaire to resignees concerning expectations, satisfiers, dissatisfiers, and recommendations for improving service attractiveness; and in-depth interviews of 10 resignees conducted at West Point. In general, the study found that: (1) retention studies need a taxonomy which will assure that corrective actions are targeted on the groups the Army is most desirous of retaining; and (2) principal dissatisfiers relate to excessive family separations and the prospects of another tour in Vietnam. There are 18 recommendations; 13 concerning policy matters, and 5 dealing with operating procedures.

163. US Department of the Army. Office of Personnel Operations. Survey Estimate of Opinions on the Image of the Army as Expressed by Army Personnel. Washington, 31 May 1970. (UB337 A4966 12-71-E)

(This OPO sample survey of male officers (O-1 through O-6 and WO) and enlisted men (E-1 through E-9) by grade and career and marital status is a three-part report concerning: (1) liking for Army life; (2) opinion on whether the security of the Nation is currently seriously threatened; and (3) military service recommended to young men of draft age. Results are given in percentages; numbers of individuals surveyed is not given. Selected results on part I: 25.5 percent of 2LT's, 26.5 percent of 1LT's, and 13.4 percent of CPT's dislike Army life. 42.4 percent of E-1's, 51.3 percent of E-2's, 59.2 percent of E-3's, and 62.2 percent of E-4's dislike it. Part III: 15.4 percent of 2LT's, 13.6 percent of 1LT's, and 10.6 percent of CPT's would not recommend military service. 27.7 percent of E-1's, 28.4 percent of E-2's, 37.7 percent of the E-3's, and 37.1 percent of the E-4's would not recommend it.)

SECTION VII

MISCELLANEOUS

164. Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957. (JK558 H8)

(This book presents a theory of civil-military relations as an aspect of national security policy. The author begins by defining and discussing professionalism (expertise, responsibility, and corporateness) and the military ethic (realistic and conservative). He advocates an equilibrium of civil-military relations, termed "objective civilian control," in which military professionalism is maximized, thereby reducing the political power of the military and increasing security. He contrasts this to "subjective civilian control" in which conflicting civilian groups attempt to control the military as a means of enhancing their own power. He uses the Japanese and German officer corps to demonstrate his theory.)

165. Jahoda, Marie, and Warren, Neil, eds. Attitudes. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966. (BF323 C5J3)

(This book includes readings from over 40 authors which examine some of the conceptual issues of attitude research. Topics covered include (1) The Concept of Attitude; (2) Research in Attitudes with focus on content, origins, change, and behavior; and (3) Theory and Method. Information is largely of an empirical nature.)

166. Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960. (UB147 J31)

(This book is an objective, scientific study of the factors shaping and influencing the military profession over the last 50 years and the profession's relationships to America's society and political institutions. The author bases his analysis on five hypotheses, which are discussed in detail in succeeding chapters. The first is that changes in technology and warfare, and the resulting need for highly skilled and motivated soldiers, has caused the basis of authority and discipline to shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on persuasion and group consensus. Second, the skill differential between the civilian and military elites has narrowed. Third, officer procurement has shifted from a narrow base, relatively high in social status, to a broader base more representative of the population. Fourth, career patterns are significant to the attainment of a position in the "military elite." Fifth, the growth of the military establishment's managerial and political responsibilities has resulted in strain on traditional

military concepts. The author sees the Armed Forces evolving into a constabulary which is more concerned with maintaining peace than in waging war.)

167. Malone, Paul B. III. The Impact of the Current Age of Dissent on the Future of the U. S. Military Establishment. Individual Research Paper. Washington: The National War College, March 1970. (NWC IS-1969/70 M3141)

(This comprehensive, detailed paper includes an examination of the relationship of the military establishment to society; the domestic issues affecting the nation's climate; youth attitudes; problems in the military; the future outlook; and possible courses of action. The author concludes that: (1) personnel stability must be achieved as soon as possible; (2) personnel management must meet the expectations of the individual; (3) ethics and professionalism must meet the highest standards; (4) unnecessary irritants must be eliminated while retaining outstanding leadership and a high state of discipline; (5) the Armed Forces should become more involved in social problems on and off base; and (6) the image of the military establishment should be enhanced. Specific recommendations are made in each area.)

168. Porter, Lyman W., and Mitchell, Vance F. "Comparative Study of Need Satisfactions in Military and Business Hierarchies." Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 51, 1967, pp. 145-151. (Reprint File)

(Over 700 commissioned officers and 590 noncommissioned officers serving in the Air Force completed a questionnaire measuring need fulfillment and satisfaction. The results for three levels of the commissioned officers were compared to previous results for comparable civilian managers (BG and COL to vice presidents; LTC and MAJ to upper middle managers; CPT and LT to lower middle managers). While military officers were less fulfilled and less satisfied, fulfillment and satisfaction did increase in relation to military rank, the same as for civilian managers. An interesting additional finding was that higher-ranking noncommissioned officers reported more fulfillment but less satisfaction than lower-ranking commissioned officers.)

169. Tyler, James W., MAJ. A Study of the Personal Value Systems of US Army Officers and a Comparison with American Managers. Thesis (Unpublished). University of Minnesota, August 1969. (UB413 T95)

(Using a questionnaire, the author measured the value systems of 235 Army officers (general officers, lieutenant colonels, captains, and ROTC cadets) and compared them to previous samples of 1051

managers. He concludes that: (1) there are major differences between managers and Army officers, but they are basically similar; and (2) Army officers are generally pragmatic in their orientation with a strong secondary orientation which is ethical and moralistic. The primary orientation is moderated by age and higher education.)

170. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 16-9: Character Guidance Discussion Topics: Duty-Honor-Country. Washington, 26 June 1968.

(This pamphlet was prepared as source material for instruction in the Army's Character Guidance Program. This document contains lesson plans and texts for discussions on courage, integrity, the home, gratitude, clean speech, and right (as opposed to rights).)

171. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 16-11: Character Guidance Discussion Topics: Duty-Honor-Country. Washington, 25 April 1969.

(This pamphlet was prepared as source material for instruction in the Army's Character Guidance Program. This document contains lesson plans and texts for discussions on sacrifice, personal freedom, patience, setting the example, practical wisdom, and reputation.)

172. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-301: Standards of Conduct. Washington, 15 February 1965.

(This brief publication concerns the importance of integrity to the Officer Corps. It is drawn in broad terms from AR 600-50, Standards of Conduct for Department of the Army Personnel, and discusses the code of the officer and guidelines for the acceptance of gratuities.)

173. US Department of the Army. Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-302: The Profession of Arms. Washington, 17 November 1966.

(This is a series of three lectures given in 1962 at Trinity College, Cambridge, by General Sir John Winthrop Hackett. He traces the origin and development of the profession of arms from Sparta to the present and then discusses the profession today and in the future. He sees an environment that will always have tension and a degree of conflict, if not total war, and in which heavy demands will be placed on the armed forces to exercise the appropriate degree of response, thereby deterring general war. The military establishment will continue to be a reflection of society and must accommodate changing patterns. The young officer will have heavy demands on him in relations with his men. He should be consistent, firm, and sincere, while maintaining the appropriate degree of detachment and discipline. Leadership will be more manipulative than authoritarian.)

174. US Department of the Army. US Army Combat Developments Command. Personnel Offensive (Phase I): Interim Report of Research Findings. Fort Benjamin Harrison: Personnel and Administrative Services Agency, 29 March 1971.

(This three-volume report is one of three substudies which comprise the DA Priority Study, "American Soldier in the 70's." The assigned task was to review available research findings to determine factors influencing individual performance in combat and probable personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel during the 70's. Factors influencing combat performance are categorized as motivational (13, including discipline, leadership, recognition, and pride), stress (11, including fear, moral code, constraints, and drugs), and support (8, including living and working conditions, food, and administration). In determining probable personal and social characteristics of incoming personnel, youth norms were used rather than individual characteristics. Twelve factors were researched among which were demographic, dress and grooming, mental and physical fitness, drug use, concept of self, leisure time, and group values. Predictions are made concerning each factor.)

175. US Department of the Army. US Military Academy. Essays on American Military Institutions. Part I and Part II. West Point, 1969. (UA23 A1A38 1969)

(These volumes contain 32 essays used in a course in American Military Institutions at the US Military Academy. Broad topics covered in detail are (1) The Military Organization as a Social System, (2) Military Institutions and National Objectives, (3) Social Impact of Military Support Systems, (4) Organization and Control, (5) Recruitment and Personnel Management, (6) Assimilation of Military Roles, and (7) The Institution and Its Members. There is an extensive bibliography.)

176. Whiting, Frederick D., LTC. The Soldier and Individual Rights. Research Report. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, November 1970. (AF-AU AWC Th-W4583)

(The author reviews the history of individual rights for the soldier, examines the evolution of military law, and discusses the impact of selected court decisions on the military justice system. He finds that the rights of today's soldier are protected, consistent with the need for a degree of discipline and order which provides for mission accomplishment. To insure an understanding of this by all military members, the author suggests emphasis on the subject in command information programs and maximum personal freedom for the soldier with an acceptable degree of discipline. Knowledge of and respect for individual rights is a command responsibility which should be exercised with the proper degree of interest, emphasis, and action.)

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ANNEX B

SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

(NOTE: Three forms of the questionnaire were administered. Each individual completed only one form o

Individuals answered the questions from one of three perspectives concerning his last duty assignment:

One, description of his own Leadership behavior; or two, description of his immediate superior's Leade three, description of one of his subordinate's Leadership behavior. Individual was instructed to sele subordinate whom he knew well, preferably neither his best nor poorest.)

NAIRE

ompleted only one form of the questionnaire.

is last duty assignment:

mediate superior's Leadership behavior; or
I was instructed to select one immediate

LEADERSHIP IN THE 1970'S



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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LEADERSHIP IN THE 1970's

We are asking your help in a study which seeks to determine the attitudes and opinions of members of the United States Army with respect to leadership. We need your personal opinions. We plan to gather data through your answers to these questions and through later interviews with some of you. The results of this study will be provided to all levels of Army leadership, including the highest, and may become the basis for improved leadership throughout the Army. The answers you give in this study will be entirely confidential and your signature or identification is not required. Your cooperation and frank response will be a major contribution in identifying leadership problems and potential solutions.

LEADERSHIP STUDY

Part I of this study requests data concerning yourself. Most of the questions in this study are answered by circling an appropriate response number, as illustrated by the example below. Please respond to every question in all parts of the study.

EXAMPLE:

SEX (circle)
(1.) Male
2. Female

PART I

1. AGE (circle)

1. 17-21
2. 22-28
3. 29-35
4. 36-45
5. Over 45

2. SEX (circle)

1. Male
2. Female

3. GRADE (circle)

1. E1
2. E2
3. E3
4. E4
5. E5
6. E6
7. E7
8. E8
9. E9
10. I am a Warrant or Commissioned Officer

4. GRADE (circle)

1. W1 or W2
2. W3 or W4
3. 01
4. 02
5. 03
6. 04
7. 05
8. 06
9. 07+
10. I am an Enlisted Man

5. TOTAL YEARS ACTIVE SERVICE (circle)

1. Under 2
2. Over 2 but less than 5
3. Over 5 but less than 10
4. Between 10 and 20
5. Over 20

6-7. BRANCH (circle)

1. ADA	8. FC	15. OrdC
2. AGC	9. INF	16. QMC
3. ARMOR	10. JAGC	17. SigC
4. CH	11. MC	18. TC
5. CMLC	12. MI	19. WAC
6. CE	13. MPC	20. I am an Enlisted Man or Aviation Warrant Officer
7. FA	14. MSC	

8. PMOS

1. _____ (Enlisted Men Only)
2. Does not apply--I am an Officer
3. Does not apply--I am an Aviation Warrant Officer

9. RACE (circle)

1. American Indian
2. Caucasian (White)
3. Negro (Black)
4. Oriental
5. Other

10. MARITAL STATUS (circle)

1. Single
2. Married
3. Separated
4. Divorced
5. Widow(er)

11. WHERE DID YOU LIVE MOST OF YOUR LIFE PRIOR TO ENTERING THE ARMY? (circle)

1. Farm
2. Small town (under 5,000 people)
3. Small city (5,000-75,000 people) or suburb of small city
4. Medium city (75,000-500,000 people) or suburb of medium city
5. Large city (over 500,000 people) or suburb of large city

12. IN WHAT PART OF THE COUNTRY DID YOU LIVE MOST OF YOUR LIFE PRIOR TO ENTERING THE ARMY? (circle)

1. Northeast
2. North Central
3. South
4. Midwest
5. Southwest
6. Far West
7. Other

13. WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE ANNUAL INCOME OF YOUR FAMILY (OR PRINCIPAL MEANS OF SUPPORT) BEFORE ENTERING THE ARMY? (circle)

1. Less than $3,000
2. $3,000 to $5,000
3. $5,000 to $8,000
4. $8,000 to $12,000
5. Over $12,000
6. I don't know

14. WHAT IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF CIVILIAN EDUCATION YOU HAVE COMPLETED? (circle)

1. Eight years or less
2. Completed some high school
3. Graduated from high school
4. Completed some college
5. Graduated from college
6. Masters degree or higher

15. HOW DID YOU ENTER THE ARMY? (circle)

1. Volunteer
2. Draftee
3. Does not apply--Entered the Army as an officer

16. WHAT WAS THE SOURCE OF YOUR COMMISSION? (circle)

1. USMA
2. ROTC
3. OCS
4. Direct
5. Other
6. Does not apply--I am an Enlisted Man

17. This study will ask some of you to think about your past Army career. Consider the many different units in the Army. Based on recent assignments and experience, IN WHAT ONE OF THESE UNITS DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF TO BE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE? (circle only one)

1. Squad or equivalent
2. Platoon or equivalent
3. Company or equivalent
4. Battalion or equivalent
5. Brigade or equivalent
6. Division
7. Corps or higher
8. Not applicable to me
9. I am not knowledgeable in any of the above

PART II

The following series of questions relate to the actions of one of your immediate subordinates in the assignment immediately prior to your current one. Please exclude interim or temporary duty type assignments. For this part of the study, try as nearly as possible to recall the situation and conditions as they existed and answer the questions to the best of your ability. Please select one immediate subordinate whom you knew well, preferably neither your best nor your poorest, and answer all questions with that one subordinate in mind. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions. We are interested in your opinions and ideas.

Section I requests some basic data relating to your prior unit, your duty assignment, and to your subordinate in that assignment.

Section I.

1. My last duty assignment was with (type of unit; for example, infantry company, artillery battery, corps headquarters, etc.) _____

_____

2. Type and location of unit. (circle)

1. Vietnam (combat)
2. Vietnam (combat support and combat service support)
3. Other overseas
4. Europe (TOE-operational unit)
5. Europe (other)
6. CONUS (TOE-operational unit)
7. CONUS (training base)
8. CONUS (other)

3. The rank of my immediate subordinate was: (circle)

1. Sergeant or below
2. Sergeant First Class or Staff Sergeant
3. Sergeant Major or First Sergeant
4. Warrant Officer
5. Lieutenant or Captain
6. Major or Lieutenant Colonel
7. Colonel or above

4. The position of my subordinate was (Platoon Sergeant, Battery Commander, Battalion S1, Brigade Signal Officer, etc.) _____

_____

Section II.

This section consists of a series of statements which indicate in one way or another the leadership abilities and personality of the subordinate you selected in Section I. For each statement you are asked to answer three (3) questions: (1) the frequency with which your subordinate actually accomplished the action indicated; (2) the frequency with which you think your subordinate should have accomplished the action indicated; and (3) how important the action was to you.

Please circle the number opposite the word or phrase under each question which most closely reflects your opinion or attitude. BE SURE TO ANSWER ALL THREE QUESTIONS AFTER EACH STATEMENT.

EXAMPLE: ► "HE WAS COURTEOUS IN HIS ACTIONS."

(1) How often was he?		(2) How often should he have been?		(3) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	(7)	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	(6)
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	(4)	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM."

(1) How often did he?		(2) How often should he have?		(3) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND."

(4) How often was he?		(5) How often should he have been?		(6) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once In Awhile	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not At All	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM."

(7) How often did he?		(8) How often should he have?		(9) How important was this to you?	
Not At All	7	Never	7	Critical	7
Seldom	6	Almost Never	6	Very Important	6
Once In Awhile	5	Infrequently	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Often	3	Frequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Quite Often	2	Almost Always	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Without Exception	1	Always	1	Unimportant	1

► 'HE EXPRFSSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB."

(10) How often did he?		(11) How often should he have?		(12) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once In Awhile	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not At All	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS."

(13) How often was he?		(14) How often should he have been?		(15) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN."

(16) How often did he?		(17) How often should he have?		(18) How important was this to you?	
Not Ever	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1
Rarely	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Hardly Ever	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Usually	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
A Great Deal	7	Always	7	Critical	7

► "HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS."

(19) How often was he?		(20) How often should he have been?		(21) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	A Great Deal	7	Unimportant	1
Quite Often	6	Usually	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Often	5	Most of the Time	5	Seldom Important	3
Occasionally	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once In Awhile	3	Hardly Ever	3	Important	5
Seldom	2	Rarely	2	Very Important	6
Not At All	1	Not Ever	1	Critical	7

► "HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS."

(22) To what extent did he do this?		(23) To what extent should he have done this?		(24) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Unimportant	1
Usually	6	Usually	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Important	5
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Very Important	6
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Critical	7

► "HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES."

(25) To what extent did he do this?		(26) To what extent should he have done this?		(27) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	Without Exception	7	Unimportant	1
Usually	6	Quite Often	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	5	Often	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Once in Awhile	3	Important	5
Rarely	2	Seldom	2	Very Important	6
Not Ever	1	Not At All	1	Critical	7

► "HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE."

(28) How often did he?		(29) How often should he have?		(30) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	7	Unimportant	1
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Seldom Important	3
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Important	5
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Very Important	6
Never	1	Never	1	Critical	7

► "HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES."

(31) How often was he?		(32) How often should he have been?		(33) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Critical	7
Usually	6	Usually	6	Very Important	6
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Important	5
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Seldom Important	3
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER."

(34) How often did he?		(35) How often should he have?		(36) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not at All	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE."

(37) How often did he?		(38) How often should he have?		(39) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Without Exception	7	Unimportant	1
Quite Often	6	Quite Often	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Often	5	Often	5	Seldom Important	3
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Once in Awhile	3	Important	5
Seldom	2	Seldom	2	Very Important	6
Not at All	1	Not at All	1	Critical	7

► "HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS."

(40) To what extent did he?		(41) To what extent should he have?		(42) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Unimportant	1
Usually	6	Usually	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Important	5
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Very Important	6
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Critical	7

► "HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES."

(43) How often was he?		(44) How often should he have been?		(45) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Without Exception	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Quite Often	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Often	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Once in Awhile	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Seldom	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not at All	1	Not at All	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES."

(46) To what extent did he?		(47) To what extent should he have?		(48) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Without Exception	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Quite Often	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Often	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Once in Awhile	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Seldom	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not at All	1	Not at All	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE WAS APPROACHABLE."

(49) How often was he?		(50) How often should he have been?		(51) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	7	Unimportant	1
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Seldom Important	3
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Important	5
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Very Important	6
Never	1	Never	1	Critical	7

► "HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE."

(52) How often did he?		(53) How often should he have?		(54) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR

(55) To what extent did he?		(56) To what extent should he have?		(57) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Without Exception	7	Unimportant	1
Quite Often	6	Quite Often	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Often	5	Often	5	Seldom Important	3
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Once in Awhile	3	Important	5
Seldom	2	Seldom	2	Very Important	6
Not at All	1	Not at All	1	Critical	7

► "HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISION MAKING."

(58) How often did he?		(59) How often should he have?		(60) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Critical	7
Usually	6	Usually	6	Very Important	6
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Important	5
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Seldom Important	3
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Unimportant	1

► ► REMINDER

► You are still answering these questions in terms of performance of your immediate SUBORDINATE in your last duty assignment, as indicated in Section I of Part II.

► "HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL."

(61) How often did he?		(62) To what extent should he have?		(63) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	A Great Deal	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Usually	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Most of the Time	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Hardly Ever	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Rarely	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not at All	1	Not Ever	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH."

(64) To what extent did he?		(65) To what extent should he have?		(66) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Unimportant	1
Usually	6	Usually	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Important	5
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Very Important	6
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Critical	7

► "HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS."

(67) How often did he?		(68) How often should he have?		(69) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	1	Without Exception	1	Critical	7
Quite Often	2	Quite Often	2	Very Important	6
Often	3	Often	3	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	5	Once in Awhile	5	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	6	Seldom	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not at All	7	Not at All	7	Unimportant	1

► "HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE."

(70) How often did he?		(71) How often should he have?		(72) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Usually	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Most of the Time	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Now and Then	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Rarely	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not Ever	1	Never.	1	Unimportant	1

►"HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES."

(01) How often did he?		(02) How often should he have?		(03) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Unimportant	1
Usually	6	Usually	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Important	5
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Very Important	6
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Critical	7

►"HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES."

(04) How often did he?		(05) How often should he have?		(06) How important was this to you?	
Not Ever	7	Not Ever	7	Unimportant	1
Rarely	6	Rarely	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Hardly Ever	5	Hardly Ever	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	3	Most of the Time	3	Important	5
Usually	2	Usually	2	Very Important	6
A Great Deal	1	A Great Deal	1	Critical	7

►"HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES."

(07) How often did he?		(08) How often should he have?		(09) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

►"HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS."

(10) How often did he?		(11) How often should he have?		(12) How important was this to you?	
Not Ever	7	Not Ever	7	Unimportant	1
Rarely	6	Rarely	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Hardly Ever	5	Hardly Ever	5	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	3	Most of the Time	3	Important	5
Usually	2	Usually	2	Very Important	6
A Great Deal	1	A Great Deal	1	Critical	7

"HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH."

(13) How often did he?		(14) How often should he have?		(15) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Amost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

"HE WAS SELFISH."

(16) How often was he?		(17) How often should he have been?		(18) How important was this to you?	
Not Ever	7	Always	1	Unimportant	1
Rarely	6	Almost Always	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Hardly Ever	5	Frequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	3	Infrequently	5	Important	5
Usually	2	Almost Never	6	Very Important	6
A Great Deal	1	Never	7	Critical	7

"HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES."

(19) How often did he?		(20) How often should he have?		(21) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Without Exception	7	Critical	7
Quite Often	6	Quite Often	6	Very Important	6
Often	5	Often	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Once in Awhile	3	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	2	Seldom	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not at All	1	Not at All	1	Unimportant	1

"HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE."

(22) How often did he?		(23) How often should he have?		(24) How important was this to you?	
Not at All	7	Not at All	7	Unimportant	1
Seldom	6	Seldom	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Once in Awhile	5	Once in Awhile	5	Seldom Important	3
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Often	3	Often	3	Important	5
Quite Often	2	Quite Often	2	Very Important	6
Without Exception	1	Without Exception	1	Critical	7

2

► "HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER."

(25) How often did he?		(26) How often should he have?		(27) How important was this to you?	
Not Ever	7	Never	7	Critical	7
Rarely	6	Almost Never	6	Very Important	6
Hardly Ever	5	Infrequently	5	Important	5
Now and Then	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Most of the Time	3	Frequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Usually	2	Almost Always	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
A Great Deal	1	Always	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS."

(28) How often did he?		(29) How often should he have?		(30) How important was this to you?	
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7

► "HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES."

(31) How often did he?		(32) How often should he have?		(33) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	7	A Great Deal	7	Critical	7
Usually	6	Usually	6	Very Important	6
Most of the Time	5	Most of the Time	5	Important	5
Now and Then	4	Now and Then	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	3	Hardly Ever	3	Seldom Important	3
Rarely	2	Rarely	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not Ever	1	Not Ever	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES."

(34) How often did he do this?		(35) How often should he have done this?		(36) How important was this to you?	
Never	7	Never	7	Unimportant	1
Almost Never	6	Almost Never	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Infrequently	5	Infrequently	5	Seldom Important	3
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Frequently	3	Frequently	3	Important	5
Almost Always	2	Almost Always	2	Very Important	6
Always	1	Always	1	Critical	7

► "HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND."

(37) How often did he?		(38) How often should he have?		(39) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	1	Without Exception	1	Critical	7
Quite Often	2	Quite Often	2	Very Important	6
Often	3	Often	3	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	5	Once in Awhile	5	Seldom Important	3
Seldom	6	Seldom	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Not at All	7	Not at All	7	Unimportant	1

► "HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES."

(40) How often did he?		(41) How often should he have?		(42) How important was this to you?	
Without Exception	7	Without Exception	7	Unimportant	1
Quite Often	6	Quite Often	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Often	5	Often	5	Seldom Important	3
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Once in Awhile	3	Once in Awhile	3	Important	5
Seldom	2	Seldom	2	Very Important	6
Not at All	1	Not at All	1	Critical	7

► "HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT."

(43) How often was he?		(44) How often should he have been?		(45) How important was this to you?	
Not at All	7	Not at All	7	Unimportant	1
Seldom	6	Seldom	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Once in Awhile	5	Once in Awhile	5	Seldom Important	3
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Often	3	Often	3	Important	5
Quite Often	2	Quite Often	2	Very Important	6
Without Exception	1	Without Exception	1	Critical	7

► "HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY."

(46) How often did he?		(47) How often should he have?		(48) How important was this to you?	
Always	7	Always	7	Critical	7
Almost Always	6	Almost Always	6	Very Important	6
Frequently	5	Frequently	5	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	3	Infrequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	2	Almost Never	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	1	Never	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK."

(49) To what extent did he?		(50) To what extent should he have?		(51) How important was this to you?	
Always	1	Always	1	Critical	7
Almost Always	2	Almost Always	2	Very Important	6
Frequently	3	Frequently	3	Important	5
Sometimes	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Infrequently	5	Infrequently	5	Seldom Important	3
Almost Never	6	Almost Never	6	Relatively Unimportant	2
Never	7	Never	7	Unimportant	1

►"HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT."

(52) To what extent did he do this?		(53) To what extent should he have done this?		(54) How important was this to you?	
Not at All	7	Not at All	7	Critical	7
Seldom	6	Seldom	6	Very Important	6
Once in Awhile	5	Once in Awhile	5	Important	5
Occasionally	4	Occasionally	4	Sometimes Important	4
Often	3	Often	3	Seldom Important	3
Quite Often	2	Quite Often	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Without Exception	1	Without Exception	1	Unimportant	1

► "HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS."

(55) To what extent did he do this?		(56) To what extent should he have done this?		(57) How important was this to you?	
A Great Deal	1	Always	1	Unimportant	1
Usually	2	Almost Always	2	Relatively Unimportant	2
Most of the Time	3	Frequently	3	Seldom Important	3
Now and Then	4	Sometimes	4	Sometimes Important	4
Hardly Ever	5	Infrequently	5	Important	5
Rarely	6	Almost Never	6	Very Important	6
Not Ever	7	Never	7	Critical	7

PART II

SECTION III

1. Looking back, how do you personally feel about the overall performance of the SUBORDINATE you have used as a reference in this study? Please circle the response number which most nearly reflects your feelings.

3 SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED	5 SOMEWHAT PLEASED	2 HIGHLY DISAPPOINTED
4 LUKEWARM-- NO STRONG FEELINGS	6 HIGHLY PLEASED	1 TOTALLY DISAPPOINTED IN ALL RESPECTS
	7 TOTALLY PLEASED IN ALL RESPECTS	

2. WAS THIS IN A COMBAT SITUATION? (Circle)

1 YES
2 NO

3. If the answer to the above question was "NO," answer Question No. 4 below. If your answer was "YES," skip Question No. 4 and go on to the next part.

4. If you had been in a combat situation, how do you think you would have felt about the overall performance of this SUBORDINATE? Please circle the response number which most nearly reflects your feelings.

3 SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED	5 SOMEWHAT PLEASED	2 HIGHLY DISAPPOINTED
4 LUKEWARM-- NO STRONG FEELINGS	6 HIGHLY PLEASED	1 TOTALLY DISAPPOINTED IN ALL RESPECTS
	7 TOTALLY PLEASED IN ALL RESPECTS	

There will continue to be many varied leadership challenges in the Army. Although there have been numerous changes of values and customs within our society, the principles of leadership listed below have been guides for many years.

1. Be technically and tactically proficient.
2. Know yourself and seek self-improvement.
3. Know your men and look out for their welfare.
4. Keep your men informed.
5. Set the example.
6. Insure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished.
7. Train your men as a team.
8. Make sound and timely decisions.
9. Develop a sense of responsibility among subordinates.
10. Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities.
11. Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.

This part of the study pertains to the relative importance and application of the principles of leadership IN YOUR LAST ASSIGNMENT. We realize that all of the principles are important; however, depending on the situation, some may not be as important as others. Further, this item does not attempt to evaluate the techniques of application. We appreciate the interrelationship between the principles, but ask you to recall your LAST ASSIGNMENT and list the numbers of the three principles that WERE THE LEAST IMPORTANT TO YOU in the spaces provided below.

THREE LEAST IMPORTANT:

► _____

► _____

► _____

Please choose three principles that were the MOST IMPORTANT TO YOU IN YOUR LAST ASSIGNMENT and place their numbers in the spaces provided.

THREE MOST IMPORTANT:

► _____

► _____

► _____

PART IV

COMMENTS

The principles of leadership have been the same for many years. In this part of the study, we would like for you to think about the principles in the climate of today's society and our Army. Some changes may be appropriate. Perhaps we need to modify existing principles. Do we need to add or delete any? We realize that application of principles is an entirely different, but related, topic. We would appreciate your thoughtful comments on leadership principles.

Thank you for your help thus far. Please check the number on the front page of the study. If it is underlined in red, you have been selected to participate in a brief group discussion of leadership. Please turn in this study to the monitor and he will give you further instructions. If your study number is not underlined, please turn in this part of the study and the monitor will furnish you the last part.

PART V

MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY

Based upon what you have recently heard, seen, and read, what is your overall attitude toward the Modern Volunteer Army idea? How do you personally feel about it? (Circle appropriate response number.)

6	5	4	3	2	1
HIGHLY APPROVE	APPROVE	SLIGHTLY APPROVE	SLIGHTLY DISAPPROVE	DISAPPROVE	HIGHLY DISAPPROVE

Some volunteer military organizations have been effective forces: for example, our own Army at various periods in our history, the present British and Canadian Armies, etc. Some have been ineffective: for example, our Army after World War II and the Russian Army during the 1920s.

Bearing in mind that there are two sides to most questions, we would like your persona' opinions about some ideas associated with a Modern Volunteer Army. Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement by circling the appropriate response number.

1. The soldiers of the Modern Volunteer Army will draw further and further apart from American public.

1	2	3	4	5	6
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

2. Living conditions for soldiers of all ranks and grade levels and their families will be much improved in the Modern Volunteer Army.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

3. Congress will provide sufficient money to attract and support a Modern Volunteer Army in a post-Vietnam peacetime environment.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

4. Job satisfaction (e.g., working conditions and opportunities) will be high among soldiers of your grade in the Modern Volunteer Army.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

5. The Modern Volunteer Army will be less disciplined than today's Army.

1	2	3	4	5	6
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

6. Standards of performance and unit effectiveness (ability to perform basic mission) will be lower in the Modern Volunteer Army.

1	2	3	4	5	6
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

7. Racial tension will not be a problem in the Modern Volunteer Army.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

8. Military Justice will be rapid and effective in the Modern Volunteer Army.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

9. Personnel in the lower ranks of the Modern Volunteer Army will have sufficient intelligence to perform their duties effectively.

6	5	4	3	2	1
STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	SLIGHTLY AGREE	SLIGHTLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE

10. Considering what you know of conditions in today's Army and what you think conditions will be in the Modern Volunteer Army, how would you feel about serving in the Modern Volunteer Army? (circle)

6	5	4	3	2	1
HIGHLY PLEASED	PLEASED	SLIGHTLY PLEASED	SLIGHTLY DISPLEASED	DISPLEASED	STRONGLY DISPLEASED

11. If given a choice between today's Army and your idea of the Modern Volunteer Army, which would you prefer? (circle)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY PREFER TODAY'S ARMY	PREFER TODAY'S ARMY	SLIGHTLY PREFER TODAY'S ARMY	NO PREFERENCE	SLIGHTLY PREFER MVA	PREFER MVA	STRONGLY PREFER MVA

Thank you very much for your assistance. We realize that your time is valuable and very much appreciate your cooperation.

OCS candidates at Ft. Benning taking the questionnaire and participating in group discussion, March 1971.

ANNEX C

SUMMARY DATA TABLES

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 5.6	5.4	6.4	1.0	5.6	-NS 5.5	-S 4.5	-S 5.5	1.0		6.0	+PS 7.0	-PS 6.5	-.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-NS 5.5	-PS 5.3	6.4	1.1	6.0						6.0	-NS 3.0	+NS 7.0	+NS 4.0									-2.2
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.8	5.4	+PS 6.5	1.1	6.4	-NS 5.9	-NS 5.6	6.6	+NS 1.0	5.9	-NS 5.6	-NS 5.0	-NS 6.3	1.3	7.3	6.0	5.9	7.1	19.6	0.1	1.8	1.9	-1.2
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+PS 5.4	5.4	-PS 6.3	0.9	5.3	-PS 6.0	+S 6.2	6.6	-S 0.4	3.0	-NS 5.9	-NS 5.1	-S 6.4	+PS 1.3	7.7	6.4	3.0	9.0	18.4	3.4	6.0	9.4	-.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	-PS 5.6	+PS 5.5	-S 5.8	-PS 0.3	2.2	+PS 6.3	+S 6.4	-PS 6.5	-NS 0.1	0.6	-PS 5.7	-PS 5.2	-PS 6.5	1.3	7.4								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	+PS 6.0	+S 5.0	6.0	1.0	6.0	-PS 6.1	-NS 5.6	6.6	+S 1.0	6.1	6.0	-PS 5.3	+PS 6.8	1.5	9.0	5.3	6.1	6.2	17.6	-.8	0.1	0.9	1.2
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	+NS 6.2	5.4	+PS 6.9	1.1	6.8	+PS 6.3	+PS 6.0	+PS 6.7	0.7	4.4	+NS 6.2	+PS 5.6	6.6	1.0	6.2	6.0	4.4	6.1	16.5	1.6	1.7	3.3	6.6
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	-PS 5.3	5.3	6.2	0.9	5.2	+S 6.3	+NS 6.1	+PS 6.7	0.6	3.8	6.1	+NS 5.7	+PS 6.7	-PS 1.0	6.1	6.8	3.8	4.1	14.7	3.0	6.3	3.3	3.3
Colonels (O6)	+PS 5.9	+S 6.0	6.1	0.5	2.9	+S 6.5	+NS 6.4	+S 6.8	-PS 0.4	2.2	5.9	+NS 6.0	+PS 6.7	-S 0.7	4.1	5.2	2.2	3.7	11.1	3.0	1.5	4.5	5.6
Generals (O7 up)						6.3	+PS 6.3	6.8	0.5	3.1	+NS 6.2	+S 6.2	6.8	0.6	3.7	2.9	3.1		6.0	-.2		0.2	
All Subjects	5.8	5.4	6.4	1.0	5.8	6.2	5.9	6.6	0.7	4.3	6.0	5.4	6.6	1.2	7.2								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS	-S	-PS			+PS	-NS	+PS	+NS		-NS	+NS	+NS										

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR:

WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS 5.7	-S 5.1	-PS 6.4	1.3	7.4	+PS 6.5	-HS 4.0	+PS 7.0	+HS 3.0		-HS 5.5	+HS 6.5	+HS 7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-HS 5.2	-HS 4.4	HS 6.0	1.1	5.7						6.0	-HS 4.5	-HS 6.0	1.5									1.2
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.9	-PS 5.1	+S 6.7	+HS 1.6	3.5	-HS 6.0	5.8	-PS 6.7	0.9	5.4	-PS 5.9	-S 5.3	+HS 6.7	+HS 1.4	8.3	5.7	5.4	8.4	19.5	0.3	3.0	3.3	1.8
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+PS 6.0	5.3	6.5	1.2	7.2	-S 6.0	5.9	-HS 6.6	-S 0.7	4.2	6.0	-S 5.2	6.6	+HS 1.4	8.4	3.5	4.2	5.6	13.3	0.7	1.4	2.1	2.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	PS 5.6	+PS 5.6	S 6.3	0.7	3.9	6.2	+S 6.1	6.8	0.7	4.3	-PS 5.9	-PS 5.5	-PS 6.5	1.0	5.9								
Jr Co Gr (01)	+PS 6.0	+S 5.7	+PS 6.7	1.0	6.0	6.2	-HS 5.4	6.7	+HS 1.3	8.1	+PS 6.2	-PS 5.5	-PS 6.4	0.9	5.6	7.2	8.1	4.9	20.2	-.9	-3.2	4.1	3.1
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+HS 6.1	+PS 5.6	6.6	1.0	6.1	+S 6.4	+PS 5.9	+PS 6.9	1.0	6.4	+PS 6.1	+PS 5.8	6.6	-PS 0.8	4.9	6.0	6.4	4.9	17.3	-.4	-1.5	1.9	1.6
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+PS 6.0	+PS 5.5	-PS 6.4	-PS 0.9	5.4	+PS 6.3	+PS 5.9	6.8	0.9	5.7	+HS 6.1	PS 5.8	6.6	-S 0.8	4.9	6.1	5.7	3.6	15.4	0.4	-2.1	2.5	2.4
Colonels (06)	+PS 6.0	+PS 5.5	-PS 6.4	0.9	5.4	6.4	5.9	6.8	0.9	5.8	6.0	+PS 6.0	6.6	-PS 0.6	3.6	5.4	5.8	3.6	14.8	-.4	-2.2	2.6	3.6
Generals (07 up)						6.2	6.0	6.7	0.7	4.3	6.0	+PS 6.1	6.7	0.6	3.6	5.4	4.3		9.7	1.1		1.1	
All Subjects	5.9	5.3	6.5	1.2	7.1	6.2	5.8	6.8	1.0	6.2	6.0	5.6	6.6	1.0	6.0								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: FOUGHT THE PROBLEM

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.2	-NS 5.0	NS 2.0	-NS -1.0	-NS -5.2																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.9	-S 3.5	-NS 2.5	-1.0	-4.9																		3.3
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.2	-NS 4.1	-PS 3.7	-.4	-1.6	5.3	-NS 3.7	-NS 3.6	-.1	-.5	5.5	-S 4.2	-NS 4.3	0.1	0.6	-4.9	-.5	-5.2	10.6	-4.4	-4.7	8.8	4.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+NS 5.5	+NS 5.6	+NS 5.1	+NS +.1	-.6	5.3	+NS 5.3	+NS 5.3	0	-.5	+NS 5.8	-S 4.3	+PS 5.3	-NS 1.0	-5.2	-1.6	-.5	-2.8	4.9	-1.1	-2.3	3.4	-2.2
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.3	4.1	4.3	-.4	-2.1	+PS 5.3	4.4	4.2	-.2	-1.1	5.4	4.5	+PS 4.4	-.1	-.5								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	5.2	4.2	3.8	-.4	-2.1	+PS 5.5	-NS 3.9	-PS 4.0	+.1	-.6	5.5	-S 3.7	-NS 3.3	-NS -.4	-2.8	-.6	-.6	3.2	4.4	0	3.8	3.8	2.2
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	-PS 5.0	+NS 5.0	+NS 4.8	+PS -.2	-1.0	-PS 5.0	4.7	4.6	-.1	-.5	5.4	4.6	+S 5.3	+PS .7	3.2	-2.1	-.5	-.5	3.1	-1.6	-.0	1.6	4.5
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	4.9	+NS 5.5	+NS 5.2	-.3	-1.5	-PS 5.1	+NS 5.0	+PS 4.7	-.3	-1.0	-NS 5.0	+NS 5.1	5.0	-NS -.1	-.5	-1.0	-1.0	—	2.0	-.0	1.0	1.0	1.5
Colonels (O6)	5.2	+NS 5.5	+NS 5.0	-.5	-2.6	5.2	+NS 5.5	+S 5.3	-.2	-1.0	-PS 5.0	+S 5.3	5.3	0	—	-1.5	-1.0	-0.6	3.1	-.5	0.4	.9	2.8
Generals (O7 up)						5.2	-NS 2.0	2.2	0.2	1.0	5.5	-NS 6.0	5.8	-.2	-0.6	-2.6	1.0		3.6	3.6		3.6	
All Subjects	5.1	4.5	4.0	-.5	-2.6	5.2	4.6	4.5	-.1	-.5	5.4	4.7	5.0	0.3	1.6								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-S 5.4	NS 4.4	5.9	+NS 1.5	8.1	6.5	-NS 3.5	6.0	+NS 2.5		5.5	5.0	6.0	1.0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-NS 5.2	4.5	+PS 6.1	1.6	8.3						5.5	4.0	5.5	0.5									4.1
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	+PS 4.7	-PS 4.6	6.0	1.4	8.0	-NS 5.9	-NS 5.7	-NS 6.3	+NS 0.6	3.5	5.6	-NS 4.6	-PS 6.0	+PS 1.4	7.8	8.3	3.5	8.1	19.9	4.8	4.6	9.4	2.3
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+PS 5.8	+PS 5.1	PS 6.2	1.2	7.0	6.0	6.2	+S 6.7	+PS 0.5	3.0	5.8	-S 4.9	6.3	+NS 1.4	8.1	8.0	3.0	6.0	17.0	5.0	3.0	8.0	2.2

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-S	-NS 4.4	5.4	+NS 1.5	8.1	6.5	-NS 3.5	6.0	+HS 2.5		5.5	5.0	6.0	1.0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-NS -S	+PS 4.5	6.1	1.6	8.3						5.5	4.0	5.5	0.5									1.1
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	+PS	-PS 4.6	6.0	1.4	8.0	-NS 5.9	-NS 5.7	-NS 6.3	+HS 0.6	3.5	5.6	-NS 4.6	-PS 6.0	+PS 1.4	7.8	8.3	3.5	8.1	19.9	4.8	4.6	4.4	2.3
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	-PS	+PS 5.0	+S 6.2	1.2	7.0	6.0	6.2	+S 6.7	+PS 0.5	3.0	5.8	-S 4.9	6.3	+NS 1.4	8.1	8.0	3.0	6.0	17.0	5.0	3.0	8.0	2.2
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	+S 5.6	5.1	5.7	0.6	3.5	6.2	+PS 6.4	6.7	0.3	1.9	5.5	5.3	6.1	0.8	4.4								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	5.6	4.6	5.9	1.3	7.3	5.9	-PS 5.9	6.5	0.6	3.5	5.5	5.0	6.1	1.1	6.0	7.0	3.5	5.8	16.3	3.5	2.3	5.5	1.7
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	5.6	5.0	6.1	1.1	6.2	6.1	6.2	6.6	-PS 0.4	2.4	5.8	5.3	6.3	1.0	5.8	7.3	2.4	3.5	13.2	4.4	1.1	6.0	0.4
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	5.5	5.2	5.9	-NS 0.7	4.4	6.2	+NS 6.3	6.6	-S 0.3	1.9	5.8	+NS 5.7	6.3	-HS 0.6	3.5	6.2	1.9	1.6	4.7	4.3	-.3	4.0	4.5
Colonels (O6)	+S 5.7	5.6	6.0	+S 0.4	2.2	6.2	+S 6.5	6.7	-PS 0.2	1.2	5.6	+PS 5.8	6.1	-S 0.3	1.6	4.4	1.2	1.8	7.4	3.2	0.6	3.8	0.4
Generals (O7 up)						5.8	6.1	6.4	0.3	1.7	5.4	+HS 6.2	+PS 6.5	0.3	1.8	2.2	1.7		3.9	6.5		0.5	
All Subjects	5.6	4.8	6.0	1.2	6.7	6.1	6.1	6.5	0.4	2.4	5.8	5.3	6.2	0.9	5.8								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.1	4.3	5.3	1.0	5.1	5.0	3.5	4.5	1.0		5.0	5.0	5.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.3	4.1	4.5	0.4	1.7						5.0	3.5	5.5	2.0									4.2
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.0	4.2	5.0	0.8	4.0	5.2	5.3	5.4	0.1	.52	5.3	5.1	5.6	0.5	2.6	1.7	5.2	4.5	6.7	1.18	3.48	5.1	3.4
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.3	4.5	4.9	0.4	2.1	5.3	5.7	5.5	-.2	1.1	5.6	4.7	5.5	0.8	4.5	4.0	1.1	7.4	12.5	2.9	6.3	9.2	1.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.3	4.4	5.0	0.1	.53	5.0	5.4	5.3	-.1	-.5	5.4	5.2	5.4	0.2	1.1								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.3	4.1	5.3	0.6	3.2	5.3	5.4	5.4	0	0	5.7	4.4	5.7	1.3	7.4	2.1	0	3.2	5.3	2.1	3.2	5.3	2.7
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	5.3	4.7	5.1	0.4	2.1	5.4	5.6	5.6	0	0	5.4	5.0	5.6	0.6	3.2	3.2	0	1.1	4.3	3.2	1.1	4.3	3.2
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	5.1	4.4	5.1	0.2	1.0	5.5	5.7	5.7	0	0	5.4	5.3	5.6	0.3	1.1	2.1	0	1.6	3.7	2.1	1.6	3.7	3.7
Colonels (06)	5.1	4.7	5.2	0.5	2.5	5.3	5.5	5.4	-0.1	-.53	5.3	5.4	5.7	0.3	1.6	1.0	-.53	-0.6	2.1	1.53	1.13	2.6	5.0
Generals (07 up)						5.6	5.8	5.8	0	0	5.5	5.8	5.7	-0.1	-.6	2.5	0		2.5	2.5		2.5	
All Subjects	5.1	4.5	5.1	0.6	3.1	5.3	5.5	5.5	0	0	5.4	5.0	5.6	0.6	2.7								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	4.5	4.8	5.1	0.3	1.4	6.0	5.0	5.0	0		3.5	4.0	4.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.8	5.4	5.1	-0.3	-1.4						5.0	4.0	5.5	1.5									1.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	4.7	4.8	5.4	0.6	2.8	5.2	5.4	5.4	0	0	5.2	5.1	5.8	0.7	3.1	-1.4	0	5.4	6.8	-1.4	5.4	6.8	-3.2
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.4	5.2	5.1	0.5	2.1	5.5	6.0	5.7	-0.3	-1.6	5.4	4.8	5.8	1.0	5.4	2.8	-1.6	3.4	7.8	4.4	5.0	4.4	2.3
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.2	5.6	5.4	-0.2	-1.0	5.6	6.1	5.7	-0.4	-2.2	5.6	5.1	5.8	0.7	3.4								
Jr Co Gr																							

All Subjects																								
Civilians																								

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS 4.5	-HS 4.8	-HS 5.1	0.3	1.4	6.0	5.0	5.0	0		-HS 3.5	4.0	-S 4.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.8	5.4	5.1	-0.3	-1.4						5.0	4.0	5.5	1.5									1.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	NS 4.7	-S 4.8	5.4	0.6	2.8	-HS 5.2	-HS 5.4	-HS 5.4	-PS 0	0	-HS 5.2	5.1	5.8	0.7	3.1	-1.4	0	5.4	6.8	-1.4	5.4	6.8	-3.2
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+S 5.4	5.2	+S 5.7	0.5	2.7	5.5	6.0	5.7	-PS -0.3	-1.6	-HS 5.4	-HS 4.8	5.8	+HS 1.0	5.4	2.8	-1.6	3.4	7.8	4.4	5.0	4.4	2.3
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.2	5.0	5.4	-0.2	-1.0	5.6	6.1	5.7	-0.4	-2.2	5.6	5.1	5.8	0.7	3.4								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.2	5.2	5.5	0.3	1.6	5.6	5.4	5.6	+S 0.2	1.1	5.7	5.2	5.8	0.6	3.4	2.7	1.1	2.4	6.2	1.6	1.3	2.4	1.2
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+HS 5.4	5.3	5.5	0.2	1.6	5.7	+S 6.1	+PS 5.9	-0.2	-1.1	+HS 5.4	5.4	5.9	0.5	2.4	1.6	-1.1	1.2	3.9	2.7	2.3	5.0	2.9
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+HS 5.5	+HS 5.5	+HS 5.7	0.2	1.1	+HS 5.9	+HS 6.1	+HS 6.0	-0.1	-.6	+S 5.8	+HS 5.7	5.9	0.2	1.2	1.6	-.6	-1.2	3.4	2.2	-.6	2.8	5.4
Colonels (06)	5.4	5.4	5.4	0	0	5.8	+S 6.2	5.8	-PS -0.4	-2.3	+PS 6.0	+HS 6.2	6.0	-S -0.2	-1.2	1.1	-2.3	-1.4	4.8	-3.4	6.9	4.3	5.8
Generals (07 up)						5.8	+HS 6.6	6.0	-0.6	3.4	+HS 6.4	+HS 6.4	+S 6.3	-PS -0.1	-1.4	0	3.4		3.4	-3.4		3.4	
All Subjects	5.1	5.1	5.4	0.3	1.5	5.6	5.9	5.7	0.1	0.6	5.7	5.3	5.8	0.5	2.9								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.2	4.2	5.9	1.7	8.8	7.0	2.0	7.0	5.0		3.0	4.5	4.5	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.5	4.6	6.1	2.1	11.5						6.0	4.0	7.0	3.0									3.2
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.4	4.6	6.0	1.4	8.1	5.5	5.6	6.3	0.7	3.8	5.4	4.8	6.2	1.4	7.0	11.5	3.8	7.0	22.3	7.7	3.2	10.9	4.3
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.2	5.0	6.0	1.0	5.2	5.6	6.1	6.5	0.4	2.2	5.4	4.8	6.1	1.3	7.0	8.1	2.2	7.1	17.4	5.9	4.9	10.8	2.2
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	4.8	5.1	5.4	0.3	.96	5.4	6.1	6.2	0.1	.54	5.3	5.4	6.0	0.6	3.1								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.7	5.2	6.3	1.1	5.7	5.5	5.6	6.4	0.8	4.9	5.5	5.0	6.3	1.3	7.1	5.2	4.9	3.2	13.3	0.3	-1.7	2.0	1.0
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	5.3	4.9	5.9	1.0	5.3	5.7	5.7	6.3	0.6	2.8	5.4	5.3	5.9	0.6	3.2	5.7	2.8	2.2	10.7	2.9	-.6	3.5	3.2
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	5.3	5.3	6.0	0.7	3.7	5.6	5.8	6.3	0.5	2.8	5.4	5.8	6.2	0.4	2.2	5.3	2.8	1.1	9.2	2.5	-1.7	4.2	4.3
Colonels (06)	5.3	5.3	6.1	0.8	4.2	5.8	6.0	6.4	0.4	1.7	5.3	5.8	6.0	0.2	1.1	3.7	1.7	1.7	7.1	2.0	0	2.0	5.2
Generals (07 up)						5.9	6.3	6.6	0.3	1.8	5.8	6.2	6.5	0.3	1.7	4.2	1.8		6.0	2.4		2.4	
All Subjects	5.3	4.8	6.0	1.2	6.4	5.6	5.8	6.3	0.5	2.8	5.4	5.3	6.1	0.8	4.3								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	4.8	4.2	5.5	1.3	6.2	6.0	5.5	6.0	0.5		4.5	4.5	4.5	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.8	3.7	5.3	1.6	7.7						4.0	4.5	4.0	.5									2.5
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	4.8	4.2	5.5	1.3	6.2	4.9	5.4	5.9	0.5	2.5	4.9	4.7	5.4	0.7	2.0	7.7	2.5	6.6	16.8	5.2	4.1	9.3	4.1
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.2	4.6	5.8	1.2	6.2	5.0	5.8	6.0	0.2	1.0	5.1	4.5	5.8	1.3	6.6	6.2	1.0	8.0	15.2	3.2	-.6	12.2	-.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	4.9	5.1	5.5	0.4	2.0	5.2	5.4	5.0	-0.4	1.0	5.0	4.2	5.2	1.0	5.0								

Generals (07 up)						+HS 5.9	+HS 6.3	+HS 6.6	0.3	1.8	+S 4.8	+HS 6.2	+S 6.5	0.3	1.7	42	18		60	24		24								
All Subjects	5.3	4.8	6.0	1.2	6.4	5.0	4.8	6.3	0.5	2.8	5.4	5.3	6.1	0.8	4.3															
Civilians																														

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-PS 4.8	4.2	5.5	1.3	6.2	6.0	5.5	6.0	0.5		4.5	4.5	4.5	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.8	-PS 3.7	5.3	1.6	7.7						-PS 4.0	4.5	-PS 4.0	-.5									.25
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	4.9	4.2	5.2	1.3	6.2	-S 4.9	-PS 5.2	5.7	0.5	2.5	-PS 4.9	4.7	5.4	0.7	2.0	7.7	2.5	6.6	16.8	5.2	4.1	4.3	4.1
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+S 6.2	+S 4.6	+S 5.8	1.2	6.2	5.0	+HS 5.8	+PS 6.0	0.2	1.0	5.1	-PS 4.5	5.8	1.3	6.6	6.2	1.0	8.0	16.2	5.2	7.6	12.2	-1.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	4.9	+PS 5.1	5.5	0.4	2.0	5.2	5.4	5.0	-0.4	1.0	5.0	-PS 4.2	5.2	1.0	5.0								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	5.0	4.6	5.5	0.9	4.5	-PS 4.9	-HS 4.7	-S 5.3	0.6	2.9	5.3	-PS 4.0	5.5	1.5	8.0	6.2	2.9	4.1	13.2	3.3	1.2	4.5	0.0
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	5.1	+PS 4.7	5.4	0.7	3.6	5.1	5.3	-PS 5.5	0.2	1.0	5.1	4.7	5.5	0.8	4.1	4.5	1.0	2.7	8.2	3.5	1.7	5.2	.38
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	4.4	+S 4.8	5.4	0.6	2.9	+HS 5.4	5.5	+S 5.9	0.4	2.2	+HS 5.4	+HS 5.3	5.7	0.4	2.7	3.6	2.2	1.1	6.8	1.4	-1.2	2.6	.56
Colonels (06)	5.0	4.4	5.3	0.4	2.0	+HS 5.5	5.6	+S 5.5	-.1	-.6	5.1	+PS 5.4	5.6	0.2	1.0	2.9	-.6	1.0	4.5	3.5	1.7	5.2	.40
Generals (07 up)						5.4	+S 6.0	5.8	-.2	-.6	+S 5.7	+S 5.5	5.9	0.4	1.0	2.0	-.6		2.6	2.6		2.6	
All Subjects	4.4	4.5	5.4	1.0	4.9	5.1	5.4	5.7	0.3	1.5	5.2	4.8	5.6	0.8	4.2								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS 5.3	+HS 4.4	5.9	1.0	5.3	6.5	4.5	7.0	2.5		-S 4.0	6.5	6.0	-0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-HS 4.9	4.5	5.5	1.0	4.9						6.0	4.0	6.0	2.0									-1.7
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.5	-HS 3.4	5.8	1.9	10.5	-HS 5.4	-HS 4.6	-HS 5.5	0.9	4.9	-PS 5.6	-S 4.6	-HS 5.7	1.1	6.2	4.4	4.9	8.4	18.2	0	3.5	3.5	6.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.7	4.4	5.9	1.5	8.6	6.0	+HS 6.1	6.2	0.1	0.6	-PS 5.6	-S 4.6	6.1	1.5	8.4	10.5	0.6	9.4	22.5	9.9	8.8	18.7	4.7
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.6	4.6	5.6	1.0	5.6	6.2	PS 6.1	6.2	0.1	0.6	5.8	-PS 4.2	6.0	1.8	10.4								
Jr Co Gr (01)	+PS 5.8	+S 5.1	6.1	1.0	5.8	5.8	5.0	6.0	1.0	2.9	5.9	4.7	6.3	1.6	9.4	8.6	2.9	7.8	19.3	5.7	4.4	10.6	3.6
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+HS 6.0	4.6	+HS 6.0	1.4	8.4	6.0	+PS 5.8	6.2	0.4	2.4	+PS 6.0	4.9	6.2	1.3	7.8	5.8	2.4	4.2	12.4	3.4	1.8	5.2	2.4
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	5.5	4.4	5.1	1.3	7.2	+S 6.1	+HS 6.1	+HS 6.4	0.3	1.8	6.0	+HS 5.5	6.2	0.7	4.2	8.4	1.8	1.8	12.0	6.6	0	6.6	7.8
Colonels (06)	5.3	4.4	5.4	1.0	5.3	6.2	6.1	6.2	0.1	0.6	6.0	+HS 5.9	6.2	0.3	1.8	7.2	0.6	2.4	10.2	6.6	1.8	8.4	1.4
Generals (07 up)						5.8	5.8	6.0	0.2	1.2	6.1	+HS 6.1	+PS 6.5	PS 0.4	2.4	5.3	1.2		6.5	4.1		4.1	
All Subjects	5.6	4.6	5.5	1.3	7.2	5.4	5.6	6.1	0.5	3.0	5.8	5.0	6.1	1.1	6.4								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	HS 5.3	5.9	HS 6.3	-HS 0.4	2.1	7.0	6.5	7.0	0.5		-HS 3.5	7.0	7.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-PS 5.3	5.9	HS 6.8	S 1	5						6.5	4.5	7.0	2.5									-4.1
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.6	HS 6.3	5	+HS 1.2	6.2	-HS 5.9	-HS 5.1	-S 6.5	+HS 0.8	4.1	-HS 5.8	-S 5.2	-HS 6.4	1.2	7.0	5	4.1	6.5	11.7	-5.2	1.8	7.0	4.1
												HS											

(06)	5.5	5.4	5.4	1.6	0.3	6.2	6.1	6.2	6.1	0.6	6.0	5.9	6.2	0.3	2.4	7.2	6.2	2.4	4	6.1	1	5.4	1	1				
Generals (07 up)						5.8	5.8	6.0	6.2	1.2	6.1	+NS 6.1	+PS 6.5	PS 6.4	2.4	5.3	1.2		6.5	4.1		4.1						
All Subjects	5.4	4.6	5.5	1.3	1.2	5.4	5.6	6.1	6.3	3.0	5.8	5.0	6.1	1.1	6.4													
Civilians																												

1

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 5.3	5.9	-NS 6.3	0.4	2.1	7.0	6.5	7.0	0.5		-NS 3.5	7.0	7.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	PS 5.3	5.9	-NS 5.8	S 1	-.5						6.5	4.5	7.0	2.5									-.4
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	S 5.6	N. 5.3	5.5	+NS 1.2	6.2	-NS 5.9	-NS 5.1	-S 6.5	+NS 0.8	4.7	-NS 5.8	-S 5.2	-NS 6.4	1.2	7.0	.5	4.7	6.5	11.7	-5.2	1.8	7.0	-4.7
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+S 6.1	S 5.4	+NS 6.7	+NS 1.3	8.5	6.0	6.3	6.7	0.4	2.4	-NS 5.9	-NS 5.1	+S 6.9	-NS 1.8	6.5	6.2	2.4	4.3	17.9	3.8	6.4	10.7	-1.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	6.2	5.8	6.5	0.7	4.3	+PS 6.5	+S 6.6	+PS 6.9	0.3	1.9	6.4	5.6	6.6	1.1	7.0								
Jr Co Gr (01)	6.0	5.8	6.5	0.7	4.2	6.1	-NS 5.8	-S 6.4	0.6	3.7	6.2	5.0	6.5	1.5	9.3	8.5	3.7	7.0	19.2	4.8	3.3	8.1	1.4
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+NS 6.2	S 5.8	+PS 6.6	0.8	5.0	6.2	+PS 6.3	6.7	-PS 0.4	2.5	+NS 6.4	5.7	6.8	1.1	7.0	4.2	2.5	5.1	11.8	1.7	2.6	4.3	0.6
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	-NS 6.1	5.9	+S 6.7	0.8	4.3	+PS 6.3	+PS 6.3	6.7	0.4	2.5	+S 6.4	+NS 5.9	6.8	-S 0.9	5.1	5.0	2.5	3.1	10.6	2.5	0.6	3.1	2.5
Colonels (06)	5.9	6.0	6.4	0.4	2.4	+NS 6.3	+S 6.5	6.7	-PS 0.2	1.3	+S 6.3	+S 6.2	6.7	-S 0.5	3.1	4.3	1.3	3.3	8.9	3.0	2.0	5.0	3.3
Generals (07 up)						6.3	+S 6.6	6.8	0.2	1.3	+PS 6.6	+S 6.4	+PS 6.9	-PS 0.5	3.3	2.4	1.3		3.7	1.1		1.1	
All Subjects	5.8	5.7	6.5	0.8	4.6	6.1	6.1	6.7	0.6	3.7	6.2	5.6	6.7	1.1	6.8								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

2

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 5.6	6.7	-NS 6.4	0.7	3.9	6.5	6.6	7.0	1.0		6.0	7.0	-PS 7.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-NS 5.3	5.8	6.6	0.8	4.2						6.0	6.5	-PS 6.0	-0.5									1.5
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	-PS 6.6	5.6	6.5	0.9	6.0	-NS 6.1	-PS 6.0	-S 6.6	0.6	3.7	-NS 6.0	6.0	6.6	0.6	3.6	4.2	3.7	6.3	14.2	0.5	2.6	3.1	-1.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	6.2	5.8	6.5	0.7	4.3	6.3	+PS 6.3	6.8	0.5	3.2	6.3	-NS 5.7	6.7	+NS 1.0	6.3	6.0	3.2	6.0	15.2	2.8	2.8	5.6	0.7
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.9	5.7	6.5	0.8	4.1	+PS 6.7	+PS 6.4	6.8	-PS 0.4	2.0	6.6	6.4	6.6	0.2	2.0								
Jr Co Gr (01)	+NS 6.3	+NS 6.2	+S 6.8	0.6	4.4	6.3	NS 5.8	6.7	+S 0.9	5.7	+PS 6.7	5.7	6.6	0.9	6.0	4.3	5.7	3.2	13.2	-1.4	-2.5	3.9	2.6
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+NS 6.5	5.8	+NS 6.8	1.0	6.5	6.4	6.1	6.8	+PS 0.7	4.5	6.5	6.2	-PS 6.7	0.5	3.2	4.4	4.5	2.5	11.4	-.1	-2.0	2.1	0
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+NS 6.3	5.9	+PS 6.7	0.8	5.0	+PS 6.4	+PS 6.3	+PS 6.8	-PS 0.5	3.8	6.3	6.2	-PS 6.0	-PS 0.4	2.5	6.5	3.8	1.3	11.6	2.7	-2.3	5.2	5.3
Colonels (06)	6.3	6.1	6.5	0.1	4.4	6.3	6.2	6.6	0.4	2.5	+PS 6.6	+S 6.6	6.8	-PS 0.2	1.3	5.0	2.5	1.9	9.4	2.5	-.6	3.1	2.6
Generals (07 up)						6.4	+S 6.5	6.7	0.2	1.3	6.4	6.3	6.6	0.3	1.9	4.4	1.3		5.7	3.1		3.1	
All Subjects	6.6	5.8	6.6	0.8	4.8	6.3	6.1	6.7	0.6	3.8	6.4	6.1	6.7	0.6	0.4								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 5.3	-S 5.4	-NS 6.2	0.8	4.2	6.5	-PS 5.0	7.0	+S 2.0		6.5	-PS 6.5	7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-PS 5.3	PS 5.1	6.2	1.1	5.8	-					6.0	-PS 4.0	6.5	+PS 2.5									0
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.6	-S 5.4	6.5	+S 1.1	6.2	-S 5.8	-NS 5.6	-S 6.6	+NS 1.0	5.2	6.0	5.4	6.6	+PS 1.2	7.2	5.8	5.2	9.2	20.2	0.6	4.0	4.6	0.5
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.9	5.4	6.6	+S 1.2	6.5	6.1	6.1	+S 6.8	0.7	4.9	6.1	-NS 5.2	+S 6.7	+NS 1.5	9.2	6.2	4.9	11.4	22.3	1.3	6.3	7.6	2.5
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.5	5.9	6.6	0.7	3.3	6.2	+PS 6.3	6.8	0.5	3.1	6.0	5.4	6.6	1.2	7.8								
Jr Co Gr (01)	+NS 6.6	5.5	+S 6.1	0.9	4.8	-S 5.7	-S 6.1	6.7	1.0	5.1	6.2	-PS 5.0	6.8	+S 1.8	11.2	6.5	5.7	6.2	11.4	0.5	0.5	1.3	0.2

Civilians

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧

APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS 5.3	-S 5.4	-HS 6.2	0.8	4.2	6.5	-PS 5.0	7.0	+S 2.0		6.5	6.5	7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	+PS 5.3	+PS 5.1	6.2	1.1	5.8	-					6.0	-PS 4.0	6.5	+HS 2.5									C
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.6	-PS 5.4	6.5	+S 1.1	6.2	-S 5.8	-HS 5.6	-S 6.6	+HS 1.0	5.2	6.0	5.4	6.6	+PS 1.2	7.2	5.8	5.2	4.2	4.2	0.6	4.6	4.6	0.5
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.4	5.4	6.6	+S 1.2	6.5	6.1	6.1	+S 6.8	0.7	4.9	6.1	-HS 5.2	+S 6.7	+HS 1.5	9.2	6.2	4.9	1.1	4.2	2.3	1.3	6.3	7.6	2.5
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.5	5.4	6.6	0.7	3.3	6.2	+PS 6.3	6.8	0.5	3.1	6.0	5.4	6.6	1.2	7.8								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	+PS 6.0	5.5	+S 6.7	0.9	4.8	-S 5.7	-S 5.7	6.7	1.0	5.7	6.2	-PS 5.0	6.8	+S 1.8	11.2	6.5	5.7	6.2	17.4	6.5	6.5	1.3	1.2
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	+HS 6.6	5.6	+PS 6.6	1.0	6.6	+PS 6.1	6.0	6.7	0.7	4.3	6.2	5.6	6.5	0.9	6.2	4.8	4.3	3.1	12.2	6.5	7.2	1.7	1.2
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	+HS 6.1	+H 6.2	+PS 6.6	-HS 0.4	2.4	+PS 6.1	+HS 6.2	6.7	0.5	3.7	6.1	+HS 6.0	-S 6.5	0.5	3.1	6.0	3.7	2.4	12.1	2.3	1.3	3.6	4.3
Colonels (O6)	+PS 6.0	+S 6.2	6.5	-S 0.3	1.8	5.9	+PS 6.2	-PS 6.5	-HS 0.3	1.2	6.1	+HS 6.3	6.7	-S 0.4	2.4	2.4	1.2	0.6	4.2	1.2	0.6	1.8	3.2
Generals (O7 up)						6.1	6.5	6.7	0.2	1.2	+PS 6.4	+HS 6.7	6.8	-HS 0.1	0.6	1.8	1.2		3.0	0.6		0.6	
All Subjects	5.7	5.6	6.5	0.8	4.6	6.0	6.0	6.7	0.7	4.2	6.1	5.6	6.6	1.0	6.1								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 5.2	4.6	-NS 5.5	-S 0.9	5.2	6.5	-PS 4.0	7.0	+NS 3.0		-S 4.0	6.0	6.5	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.4	3.3	+PS 5.2	1.9	4.9						5.0	5.0	-NS 2.5	+NS 2.5									0.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.3	-PS 4.3	5.8	1.5	8.0	-NS 5.4	-NS 5.0	-S 5.8	+NS 0.8	4.3	5.6	4.7	-NS 5.4	-PS 0.7	3.9	4.9	4.3	7.4	16.6	0.6	3.1	3.7	1.1
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+PS 5.1	4.1	5.4	1.2	7.4	5.7	+NS 5.9	6.2	-S 0.3	1.7	5.7	-NS 4.5	-PS 5.7	1.2	7.4	8.0	1.7	12.2	21.9	6.3	10.5	16.8	-.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.4	+PS 5.2	5.5	-S 0.3	1.6	5.9	5.8	6.2	0.4	2.4	5.5	5.0	+PS 6.4	1.4	7.7								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.1	4.9	+PS 6.1	1.2	7.4	5.6	5.3	5.9	0.6	3.4	5.8	-PS 4.2	6.3	+S 2.1	12.2	7.4	3.4	7.0	17.8	4.0	3.6	7.6	1.2
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+PS 5.6	4.6	+NS 6.1	+PS 1.5	8.4	5.8	5.6	6.1	0.5	2.9	+PS 5.8	4.9	+PS 6.1	1.2	7.0	7.4	2.9	5.6	15.9	4.5	2.7	7.2	1.1
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	5.6	4.6	6.0	1.4	7.8	+PS 5.9	+PS 5.7	6.1	0.4	3.0	5.6	+PS 5.1	+PS 6.1	1.0	5.6	8.4	3.0	3.8	15.2	5.4	0.8	6.2	3.8
Colonels (06)	5.3	4.5	5.5	1.0	6.1	5.9	+PS 5.8	6.2	0.4	2.4	5.4	+PS 5.3	6.0	0.7	3.8	7.8	2.4	3.5	13.7	5.4	1.1	6.5	7.1
Generals (07 up)						-PS 5.4	5.6	5.9	0.3	1.6	5.9	+NS 5.8	+PS 6.4	0.6	3.5	6.1	1.6		7.7	4.5		4.5	
All Subjects	5.3	4.6	5.8	1.2	6.6	5.1	5.5	6.0	0.5	2.9	5.6	4.9	5.9	1.0	6.2								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-N 4.6	4.5	-NS 5.5	NS 0	0	6.0	5.5	6.0	0.5		-PS 4.0	6.0	6.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-N. 4.1	5.5	5.4	-.1	.41						4.5	-NS 2.5	-PS 4.5	+PS 2.0									-.31
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.0	5.5	+NS 6.0	+NS 0.5	3.0	-NS 5.0	-S 5.1	-S 5.8	0.1	.50	5.1	-NS 4.9	-NS 5.2	0.3	2.0	.41	.50	3.6	4.5	-.9	3.1	4.0	-1.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+NS 5.5	5.4	5.8	0.4	2.2	5.6	6.1	6.2	0.1	.56	5.2	5.2	6.0	0.8	3.6	3.0	.56	3.8	7.3	2.4	3.2	5.6	-1.1
Ldr Techs																							

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	+PS 5.9	+PS 5.7	6.1	0.4	3.0	5.6	+PS 5.1	+PS 6.1	[illegible]	5.6	8.4	3.0	3.8	[illegible]	[illegible]	0.8	6.2	3.3
Colonels (06)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1.0	6.1	5.9	+PS 5.8	6.2	0.4	2.4	5.4	+PS 5.3	6.0	0.7	3.8	7.8	2.4	3.5	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1.1
Generals (07 up)						PS 5.4	5.6	5.9	0.3	1.6	5.9	+HS 5.8	+PS 6.4	0.6	3.5	1.1	1.6		7.1	[illegible]		4.5	
All Subjects	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	6.6	5.1	5.5	6.0	0.5	2.9	5.0	4.9	5.9	1.0	6.2								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS 4.6	5.5	-HS 5.5	-HS 0	0	6.0	5.5	6.0	0.5		-PS 4.0	6.0	6.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-HS 4.1	5.5	5.4	-.1	.41						4.5	-HS 2.5	-PS 4.5	+PS 2.0									-3.1
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.0	5.5	+HS 6.0	+HS 0.5	3.0	-HS 5.0	-S 5.7	-S 5.8	0.1	.50	5.1	-HS 4.9	-HS 5.2	0.3	2.0	.41	.50	3.6	4.5	-.9	3.1	4.0	-1.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+HS 5.5	5.4	5.8	0.4	2.2	5.6	6.1	6.2	0.1	.56	5.2	5.2	6.0	0.8	3.6	3.0	.56	3.8	7.3	2.4	3.2	5.6	[illegible]
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.1	5.9	6.0	0.1	.51	5.1	5.6	5.6	0	0	5.4	5.4	5.8	0.4	2.1								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.2	5.7	5.9	0.2	1.0	5.3	-PS 5.6	6.0	+HS 0.4	2.1	5.5	5.7	6.5	0.8	3.8	2.2	2.1	3.2	7.5	0.1	1.1	1.2	[illegible]
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+PS 5.2	5.6	5.9	0.3	1.6	+S 5.7	+PS 6.1	+PS 6.2	0.1	.57	5.3	5.5	6.1	0.6	3.2	1.0	.57	2.7	4.2	.43	2.1	2.5	0
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+HS 5.3	5.5	5.8	0.3	1.6	5.6	6.0	6.0	-PS 0	0	+S 5.5	+S 5.7	+S 6.2	0.5	2.7	1.6	0	1.6	3.2	1.6	1.6	3.2	1.6
Colonels (06)	5.3	5.5	5.6	0.1	.53	+PS 5.7	6.1	6.1	0	.57	5.4	+PS 5.9	6.1	0.2	1.6	1.6	.57	1.2	3.5	1.03	.63	1.6	4.6
Generals (07 up)						-PS 5.0	-S 5.4	-S 5.3	-.1	-.5	5.8	+HS 6.3	+PS 6.5	0.2	1.2	.53	-.5		1.0	.58		0.6	
All Subjects	5.0	5.5	5.7	0.2	1.0	5.4	5.9	6.0	0.1	.54	5.3	5.4	6.0	0.6	3.2								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR:

WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)				POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.4	4.5	5.6	1.1	5.9	5.0	5.0	7.0	2.0		6.5	7.0	7.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.1	4.7	5.6	0.9	4.6						6.0	5.0	5.5	0.5									
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.8	4.7	5.1	0.4	2.3	5.7	5.5	5.8	0.3	1.7	5.8	4.9	5.7	0.8	4.6	4.6	1.7	5.6	11.9	2.9	3.4	6.8	1.4
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.5	4.8	5.5	0.7	4.0	5.9	6.1	6.1	0	0	5.6	4.8	5.8	1.0	5.6	5.8	0	4.6	10.4	5.8	4.6	10.4	0
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	6.1	5.8	5.8	0	0.1	5.6	5.6	5.8	0.2	1.1	5.6	5.4	5.8	0.4	2.2								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	5.1	4.2	5.5	0.4	2.3	5.1	5.6	5.7	0.1	1.1	5.2	4.8	5.7	0.9	4.6	4.0	1.1	3.4	8.5	2.4	2.8	5.2	2.8
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	5.5	4.4	6.1	1.2	6.2	6.1	6.0	6.2	0.2	1.1	5.5	5.3	5.9	0.6	3.4	2.3	0.1	5.5	13.4	1.7	6.2	2.3	3.5
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	6.0	5.1	5.8	0.8	4.8	6.1	6.2	6.3	0.1	0.1	5.5	5.8	6.0	0.2	1.1	7.2	6.1	5.4	18.3	6.6	1.7	1.3	3.4
Colonels (O6)	6.1	5.2	6.1	0.9	5.5	6.2	6.4	6.4	0	0	5.4	5.9	6.0	0.1	0.5	4.8	0	1.2	6.0	4.8	1.2	0.0	4.6
Generals (O7 up)						5.1	6.0	6.1	0.1	0.6	5.8	6.1	5.9	-.2	-1.2	5.5	0.6		6.1	4.9		4.9	
All Subjects	5.5	4.8	5.8	1.1	5.2	5.9	5.9	6.1	0.2	1.4	5.6	5.3	5.9	0.6									
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR:

KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)				POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.5	4.8	6.2	1.4	8.1	5.0	4.6	5.0	0.4		5.0	6.5	7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.6	4.5	6.3	1.8	10.6						6.0	5.2	7.0	2.0									
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	6.0	4.6	6.5	1.9	11.4	6.1	5.7	6.4	0.1	4.3	6.0	4.4	6.1	1.8	11.9	10.6	4.8	7.2	22.1	6.5	2.4	9.2	4.3
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	6.0	4.5	6.0	1.4	9.0	6.4	6.2	6.7	0.5	3.2	6.0	5.4	6.5	1.3	7.2	11.4	5.4	7.4	22.0	8.4	4.2	2.4	0.0
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	6.4	4.6	6.6	1.0	6.5	6.4	5.8	6.9	1.1	7.0	5.8	5.4	6.4	1.0	6.4								
Jr Co Gr																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERCEPTION OF SELF-ILLUSTRATED				PERCEPTION OF SELF (SELF-ILLUSTRATED)				
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.5	4.8	6.2	1.4	8.1	1.0	4.0	7.0	3.0		5.0	6.5	7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.0	4.5	6.3	1.8	10.6						6.0	5.0	7.0	2.0									.1
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	6.0	4.6	6.3	1.9	11.4	6.1	5.7	6.4	0.7	4.3	6.0	4.4	6.1	1.8	11.9	10.6	4.5	7.2	22.1	6.3	2.9	4.2	4.2
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	6.0	5.2	6.0	1.4	9.0	6.4	6.2	6.7	0.5	3.2	6.0	5.4	6.5	1.3	7.2	11.4	3.2	7.4	22.0	8.2	4.2	12.4	.5
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	6.4	5.6	6.6	1.0	6.5	6.4	5.8	6.9	1.1	7.0	5.8	5.4	6.4	1.0	6.4								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	6.1	5.3	6.4	1.1	6.7	6.4	5.6	6.8	1.2	7.7	6.2	5.4	6.5	1.1	7.4	4.0	7.1	4.3	21.4	1.3	3.4	4.7	.2
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	6.2	5.4	6.6	1.2	7.4	6.4	6.2	6.7	0.5	3.2	6.2	5.8	6.5	0.7	4.3	6.1	3.4	4.3	13.2	3.5	1.1	4.6	.4
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	6.4	5.0	6.5	0.9	5.6	6.4	6.2	6.7	0.5	2.6	6.2	6.0	6.6	0.6	4.3	11.4	2.6	1.9	11.9	4.8	.1	4.5	.5
Colonels (O6)	6.2	5.4	6.4	1.0	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.8	0.4	1.9	6.3	6.3	6.6	0.3	1.9	5.6	1.9	2.6	10.1	3.1	1.1	4.4	.4
Generals (O7 up)						6.1	6.1	6.5	0.4	2.4	6.5	6.3	6.7	0.4	2.6	6.2	2.4		8.6	3.8		3.8	
All Subjects	6.0	5.1	6.4	1.3	7.8	6.3	6.0	6.7	0.7	3.8	6.2	5.6	6.6	1.0	5.6								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧ **WAS APPROACHABLE**

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 5.5	-NS 5.3	6.4	+NS 1.1	6.0	6.5	4.5	7.0	2.5		-NS 4.0	6.0	7.0	1.0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.4	S 4.1	S 5.4	1.2	6.7						6.5	5.5	6.5	1.0									1.7
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	6.8	5.5	6.4	0.9	7.2	-PS 5.9	S 6.3	6.6	+S 0.3	1.8	-PS 5.6	-PS 5.6	6.5	+PS 0.9	5.0	6.7	1.8	6.5	15.0	4.9	4.7	9.6	4.1
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.9	5.0	6.5	0.9	4.7	6.0	6.5	6.7	0.2	1.2	5.9	-NS 5.5	+NS 6.7	+NS 1.2	6.5	7.2	1.2	3.4	11.8	6.0	2.2	8.2	1.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	6.0	+PS 6.3	6.5	PS 0.2	1.2	6.0	6.6	6.8	0.2	1.2	-S 5.3	5.7	6.6	0.9	4.8								
Jr Co Gr (01)	+PS 6.1	5.8	6.6	0.8	4.9	6.2	6.3	6.7	+PS 0.4	2.5	-PS 5.7	5.7	6.4	0.7	3.4	4.7	2.5	2.9	10.1	2.2	0.4	2.6	3.0
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+NS 6.2	5.7	6.5	0.8	4.3	6.1	+PS 6.6	6.6	-NS 0	0	+PS 5.9	6.1	6.5	0.4	2.9	4.9	0	1.1	6.0	4.9	1.1	6.0	2.3
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+S 6.1	+NS 6.1	6.5	-NS 0.4	3.0	6.0	6.5	6.6	0.1	0.6	5.8	+NS 6.2	6.5	-NS 0.3	1.1	4.3	0.6	2.4	7.3	3.7	1.8	5.5	3.0
Colonels (06)	+PS 6.2	6.2	6.4	0.4	3.1	6.3	+S 6.8	6.8	S 0	0	6.0	6.2	6.6	0.4	2.4	3.0	0	2.5	5.5	3.0	2.5	5.5	1.9
Generals (07 up)						6.1	+PS 6.8	6.7	0.1	-.6	+S 6.3	+NS 6.4	+PS 6.8	0.4	2.5	3.1	-.6		3.7	3.7		3.7	
All Subjects	5.4	5.6	6.4	0.8	4.1	6.1	6.5	6.7	0.2	1.2	5.8	5.9	6.5	0.6	3.4								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧ **GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE**

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	+NS 5.4	+NS 5.1	+NS 6.0	+NS 6.9	4.9	+PS 6.5	4.5	+PS 7.0	+NS 2.5		4.5	5.5	5.5	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.5	+PS 5.3	+S 5.9	6.1	3.9						6.0	4.0	+NS 7.0	+S 3.0									-1.2
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	+PS 5.3	4.1	+NS 5.9	+NS 1.1	5.8	+PS 5.4	+S 5.3	+NS 5.7	+NS 0.4	2.1	+S 5.8	4.9	+PS 5.9	+S 1.0	5.8	3.9	2.7	6.4	13.0	1.2	3.7	4.4	-1.7
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+S 5.4	4.7	+S 5.6	+PS 0.8	4.3	+NS 5.9	+NS 5.8	+NS 6.2	+S 0.4	2.4	+NS 6.8	5.0	+NS 6.1	+NS 1.1	6.4	5.8	2.4	6.2	14.4	3.4	3.8	7.2	.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	4.6	4.6	4.9	0.3	1.4	5.5	+PS 5.5	5.6	0.1	0.6	5.4	4.9	5.8	0.9	4.3								
Jr Co Gr																							

All Subjects	4.4	4.6	4.8	4.1		6.1	6.5	6.7	6.2	1.2	5.8	5.9	6.5	0.6	3.4										
Civilians																									

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	+HS 4.4	+HS 5.1	+HS 6.0	+HS 0.9	4.9	+PS 6.5	4.5	+PS 7.0	+HS 2.5		4.5	5.5	5.5	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-.5	+HS 5.3	+S 5.9	0.7	3.9						6.0	4.0	+HS 7.0	+S 3.0									-1.2
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	+HS 6.3	4.7	+HS 5.9	+HS 1.1	5.8	+HS 5.4	+S 5.3	+HS 5.7	+HS 0.4	2.1	+S 5.8	4.9	+PS 5.9	+S 1.0	5.8	3.9	2.7	6.4	13.0	1.2	3.7	4.4	-1.7
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+S 5.4	4.7	+S 5.6	+PS 0.8	4.3	+HS 5.4	+HS 5.3	+HS 6.2	+S 0.4	2.4	+HS 5.8	5.0	+HS 6.1	+HS 1.1	6.4	5.8	2.4	6.2	14.4	3.4	3.8	7.2	-
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	4.6	4.6	4.4	0.3	1.4	5.5	+PS 5.5	5.6	0.1	0.6	5.4	4.9	5.8	0.9	4.3								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.1	4.6	5.2	0.6	3.1	5.3	5.3	5.4	0.1	1.1	5.6	4.6	5.7	1.1	6.2	4.3	1.1	2.8	8.2	3.2	1.7	4.9	2.2
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	4.7	-S 4.3	-HS 4.2	-HS 0	0	-PS 5.1	4.9	-PS 5.0	0.1	0.5	5.5	5.1	5.6	0.5	2.8	3.1	0.5	0.5	4.1	2.6	0	2.6	2.6
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	-HS 4.6	-HS 3.9	-HS 4.0	-HS 0.1	0.5	-HS 5.0	-HS 4.6	-HS 4.5	-HS 0.1	-0.5	-HS 5.0	5.0	-HS 5.2	-HS 0.2	0.5	0	-.5	0.5	1.0	0.5	1.0	1.5	2.9
Colonels (06)	-HS 4.7	-PS 4.1	-HS 4.1	-PS 0	0	-HS 4.5	-HS 4.0	-HS 4.2	0.2	0.5	-S 4.9	4.9	-S 5.0	-PS 0.1	0.5	0.5	0.5	-.5	1.5	1.0	-1.0	2.0	-.5
Generals (07 up)						-HS 4.4	-HS 3.5	-HS 3.3	-0.2	-.9	5.0	-S 4.2	-HS 4.1	-S -0.1	-0.5	0	-.9		0.9	0.9		0.9	
All Subjects	5.1	4.6	5.2	0.6	3.1	5.3	5.1	5.2	0.1	1.1	5.4	5.0	5.6	0.6	3.2								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)											3.0	6.0	6.5	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)											5.5	3.5	3.5	0									
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)											5.6	4.4	5.9	1.5	7.8	9.4	2.7	6.8	18.9	6.7	4.1	10.8	4.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)											5.7	4.7	5.4	1.2	6.8	6.6	1.6	4.8	13.0	5.0	3.2	8.2	1.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)											5.8	4.3	5.3	1.0	5.3								
Jr Co Gr (01)											5.0	4.0	5.2	1.2	4.8	6.6	4.8	3.8	15.2	1.8	-1.0	2.8	1.6
Sr Co Gr (02-03)											5.1	4.8	5.6	0.8	3.8	4.9	5.7	2.0	7.5	4.5	1.4	5.9	3.6
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)											5.1	5.2	5.5	0.3	2.0	8.5	5.5	1.5	10.6	8.0	1.0	9.0	5.5
Colonels (06)											5.0	5.3	5.6	0.3	1.5	6.8	-5.6	2.3	4.7	7.4	2.9	10.3	5.2
Generals (07 up)						5.1	5.4	5.5	0.1	.51	5.8	5.4	5.9	0.5	2.3	7.0	5.1		7.5	6.5		6.5	
All Subjects											5.3	4.8	5.6	0.8	4.2								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)						6.0	5.5	6.0	0.5		6.0	5.5	6.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)											4.0	2.5	3.5	1.0									
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)						4.9	4.9	4.7	-.2	1.0	5.3	5.1	5.1	0	0	3.6	1.0	3.6	8.2	2.6	2.6	5.2	0.5
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)						5.3	5.2	5.3	0.1	5.3	5.2	4.6	5.2	0.6	3.6	5.1	5.3	3.3	9.5	5.2	2.8	8.0	
Ldr Techs (All WOs)						5.1	4.8	5.1	0.3	1.0	4.8	4.5	4.4	-.1	.48								
Jr Co Gr																							

(E-3)

Civilians

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧

LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.2	4.6	5.4	0.8	4.1	6.0	5.5	6.0	0.5		6.0	5.5	6.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.1	4.5	5.3	0.8	3.6						4.0	2.5	3.5	1.0									2.7
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.2	3.8	5.0	1.2	5.7	HS	4.9	4.7	-.2	1.0	5.3	5.1	5.1	0	0	3.6	1.0	3.6	8.2	2.6	2.6	5.2	0.5
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.2	4.6	5.0	0.4	2.1	5.3	5.2	5.3	0.1	.53	5.2	4.6	5.2	0.6	3.6	5.1	.53	3.3	9.5	5.2	2.8	8.0	
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.4	5.0	5.2	0.2	1.1	5.1	4.8	5.1	0.3	1.0	4.8	4.5	4.4	-.1	.48								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.1	4.6	4.9	0.3	1.5	4.9	4.3	4.3	0	0	4.7	3.8	4.5	0.7	3.3	2.1	0	4.9	2.6	2.1	4.9	2.6	.5
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	5.5	4.9	5.4	0.5	2.8	5.1	5.1	5.1	0	0	4.9	4.5	4.6	0.1	.49	1.5	0	1.0	2.5	1.5	1.0	2.5	2.2
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	5.5	5.2	5.5	0.3	1.7	5.4	5.3	5.4	0.1	.54	5.1	5.0	5.2	0.2	1.0	2.8	.54	4.9	3.8	2.3	1.1	2.4	2.5
Colonels (06)	5.4	4.8	5.3	0.5	2.7	5.5	5.7	5.7	0	0	4.9	5.4	5.3	-.1	.49	1.1	0	1.2	2.9	1.7	1.2	2.9	2.4
Generals (07 up)						5.1	5.7	5.1	0	0	5.4	5.6	5.8	0.2	1.2	2.7	0		2.7	2.7		2.7	
All Subjects	5.3	4.6	5.3	0.7	3.2	5.2	5.1	5.1	0	0	5.1	4.8	5.0	0.2	1.0								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	4.9	4.5	5.3	0.8	3.9	5.0	4.5	5.5	1.0		5.0	+S 6.5	6.5	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.7	4.2	5.2	1.0	4.7						4.5	4.0	4.0	0									1.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	-PS 4.8	-S 4.2	+PS 5.2	1.0	4.0	-PS 5.0	-PS 4.9	5.5	+S 0.6	3.0	+PS 5.2	4.8	5.0	-PS 0.2	1.0	4.7	3.0	2.6	10.3	1.7	0.4	2.1	0
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.0	4.6	-NS 4.7	-NS 0.1	0.5	5.3	5.0	5.3	0.3	1.6	+S 5.2	-S 4.2	-S 4.8	0.6	2.6	4.3	1.6	7.6	13.5	2.7	6.0	8.7	0
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.1	4.8	5.4	0.6	3.0	5.1	5.0	5.2	0.2	1.0	4.7	4.9	5.0	0.1	.47								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.1	4.8	5.4	0.6	3.0	5.3	5.0	+PS 5.7	+NS 0.7	4.2	5.1	4.2	5.6	+S 1.4	7.6	0.5	4.2	3.4	8.1	-3.7	-.8	4.5	-.6
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	5.0	4.7	5.2	0.5	3.0	5.1	5.1	5.4	0.3	1.5	-PS 4.8	4.5	5.2	0.7	3.4	3.0	1.5	2.4	6.9	1.5	0.9	2.4	-.5
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+PS 5.1	4.7	+PS 5.4	0.7	3.0	5.2	5.2	5.4	-PS 0.2	1.0	4.8	4.7	5.2	0.5	2.4	3.0	1.0	2.8	6.8	2.0	1.8	3.8	0
Colonels (06)	4.9	5.0	5.2	0.2	1.5	+PS 5.5	+NS 5.7	+PS 5.8	0.1	.55	4.7	4.7	5.3	0.6	2.8	3.0	.5	0.5	4.6	3.1	-.1	4.2	2.0
Generals (07 up)						5.1	5.4	5.7	0.3	1.5	5.1	+PS 5.1	5.2	0.1	0.5	1.5	1.5		3.0	0		0	
All Subjects	5.0	4.6	5.2	0.6	3.1	5.2	5.1	5.5	0.4	2.1	4.9	4.6	5.1	0.5	2.5								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.3	5.1	+PS 6.3	+PS 1.2	6.4	6.0	-PS 5.0	7.0	+NS 2.0		3.5	6.0	6.5	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.1	4.7	6.4	+PS 1.7	4.7						5.5	-NS 3.0	-PS 5.5	+S 2.5									0.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	+NS 5.7	5.0	+NS 6.4	+NS 1.4	8.0	5.6	-PS 5.9	6.5	+S 0.6	2.8	5.7	-S 5.2	6.5	+NS 1.3	7.4	9.7	2.8	5.4	18.4	6.9	3.1	10.0	4.1
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+S 5.7	5.1	6.2	1.1	5.7	5.8	6.2	6.5	0.3	1.7	5.9	-S 5.4	6.3	+PS 0.9	5.4	8.0	1.7	8.3	18.0	6.3	6.6	12.9	3.1
Ldr Techs				-PS																			

Colonels (06)	4.4	4.6	5.2	4.2	1.0	4.6	5.5	+PS	5.7	+HS	5.8	0.1	1.5	4.7	4.7	+PS	5.3	0.6	2.8	3.6	1.5	0.5	4.6	3.1	-.1	4.2	2.0			
Generals (07 up)							5.1	5.4	5.1	0.3	1.5			5.1	5.2	0.1	0.5	1.5	1.5		3.0	0		1					
All Subjects	5.4	5.2	6.2	1.0	5.4	5.7	6.1	6.5	0.4	2.3	5.8	5.7	6.4	0.7	4.6															
Civilians																														

1

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.3	5.1	+PS 6.3	+PS 1.2	6.4	6.0	-PS 5.0	7.0	+HS 2.0		3.5	6.0	6.5	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.7	4.7	6.4	+PS 1.7	9.7						5.5	-HS 3.0	-PS 5.5	+S 2.5									0.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	+HS 5.7	5.0	+HS 6.4	+HS 1.4	8.0	5.6	-PS 5.9	6.5	+S 0.6	2.8	5.7	-S 5.2	6.5	+HS 1.3	7.4	9.7	2.8	5.4	18.4	6.9	3.1	10.0	4.1
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+S 5.7	5.1	6.2	1.1	5.7	5.8	6.2	6.5	0.3	1.7	5.9	-S 5.4	6.3	+PS 0.9	5.4	8.0	1.7	8.3	18.0	6.3	6.6	12.9	3.0
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.4	5.5	5.8	-PS 0.3	2.2	5.6	6.1	6.4	0.3	1.7	5.7	5.5	6.4	0.9	4.6								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.4	5.1	6.1	1.0	5.4	5.7	5.9	6.4	0.5	2.4	5.9	5.5	+PS 6.8	+PS 1.3	8.3	5.7	2.9	2.9	11.5	2.8	0	2.8	4.6
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	5.3	5.2	6.1	0.9	4.8	5.8	6.0	6.5	+PS 0.5	2.9	5.8	+PS 5.9	6.4	+PS 0.5	3.9	5.4	2.9	3.5	11.8	2.5	6.6	3.1	4.6
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	-HS 5.0	5.2	-HS 5.8	-HS 0.6	2.5	5.6	6.1	-PS 6.3	-S 0.2	1.1	5.8	+P 5.9	6.4	-S 0.5	3.5	4.8	1.1	2.3	12.2	3.7	1.2	4.9	5.2
Colonels (06)	5.5	+PS 5.6	6.2	0.6	3.3	5.9	+HS 6.5	6.7	-S 0.2	0.6	5.8	+PS 6.1	6.5	-PS 0.4	2.3	2.5	0.6	1.1	4.2	1.4	0.5	2.4	5.1
Generals (07 up)						5.8	6.3	6.6	0.3	1.7	5.6	+PS 6.1	6.3	-S 0.2	1.1	3.3	1.7		5.0	1.6		1.6	
All Subjects	5.4	5.2	6.2	1.0	5.4	5.7	6.1	6.5	0.4	2.3	5.8	5.7	6.4	0.7	4.6								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

2

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	4.8	3.4 -NS	4.5 NS	0.6 +S	2.9																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.9	4.7	4.6	-.1	-.49																		2.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	4.7	4.3	5.0	0.7 +PS	3.8	4.7	4.9	5.1	0.2	.94	5.1	4.4	5.1	0.7	3.6	-.49	.94	5.1	1.65	1.4	4.2	5.6	1.9
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.0	4.7	4.8	0.1 -NS	-.50	4.5	4.8	4.9	0.1	.45	5.1 +PS	4.4	5.4 +S	1.0 +S	5.1	2.8	.45	6.4	9.6	2.4	6.0	8.4	2.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.0	4.0	4.5	0.5	2.5	4.9	4.9	4.9	0	4.9	5.1	4.4	5.5	1.1	5.6								
Jr Co Gr (01)	4.8	4.4 +PS	5.1	0.2	.96	4.6	5.0	5.1	0.1	.46	5.3	3.9	5.1	1.2	6.4	-.50	.46	3.4	.43	-.96	2.9	3.4	-1.5
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	4.8	4.6	5.0	0.4	1.9	4.5	4.9	5.1	0.2	.90	4.9	4.4	5.1	0.7	3.4	.96	.40	.94	2.8	0.1	.04	0.1	.5
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	4.5	4.9 +S	5.1 +S	0.2 -PS	-.96	4.7	4.8	4.8 -PS	0	0	4.1 -S	4.8 -S	5.0	0.2 -NS	.44	1.9	0	2.0	3.9	1.9	2.0	3.9	2.0
Colonels (06)	4.5	4.5	4.9	0.4	1.8	4.7	4.7	4.7	0	0	4.9	5.0 +PS	5.3	0.3	2.0	-.96	0	1.0	1.9	-.96	1.0	1.9	3.0
Generals (07 up)						4.5	2.4 -NS	2.4 -NS	0	0	5.0	5.5 NS	5.8 S	0.3	1.0	1.8	0		1.8	1.8		1.8	
All Subjects	4.9	4.4	4.8	0.4	1.9	4.6	4.8	5.0	0.2	.46	4.9	4.5	5.1	0.6	2.9								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.5	4.3 -NS	5.8	1.5 +NS	8.3	7.0	5.5	7.0	1.5 +S		5.0	6.5	7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.6	5.3	5.8	0.5	2.8						5.0	3.0 -S	6.0	3.0 +S									0.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.5	4.3 -NS	5.6 -S	1.3 +PS	1.2	5.5	5.5	5.9	0.4	1.1	5.6	4.4 -NS	5.5 -NS	1.1 +PS	6.1	2.8	1.1	1.8	12.5	1.1	6.1	7.2	3.5
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.6	5.1	5.9	0.8	4.4	5.9	6.0	6.4	6.4	2.4	5.6	4.6 -NS	6.0	1.4 +NS	7.8	7.2	2.4	7.1	17.3	4.8	5.3	10.1	2.2
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.5	5.2	5.9	0.1	3.9	5.8	5.8	6.3	0.5	3.5	5.4	4.8	5.3 -NS	0.5	2.1								
Jr Co Gr																							

Subjects																										
Civilians																										

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧ REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.5	-HS 4.3	5.8	+HS 1.5	8.3	7.0	5.5	7.0	+S 1.5		5.0	6.5	7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.6	5.3	5.8	0.5	2.8						5.0	-S 3.0	6.0	+S 3.0									
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.5	-HS 4.3	-S 5.6	+PS 1.3	7.2	5.5	5.5	5.9	0.4	1.1	5.6	-HS 4.4	-HS 5.5	+PS 1.1	6.1	28	11	78	123	11	6.1	17.2	-3.4
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.6	5.1	5.9	0.8	4.4	5.9	6.0	6.4	0.4	2.4	5.6	-HS 4.6	6.0	+HS 1.4	7.8	72	24	71	173	4.8	5.3	10.1	2.4
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.5	5.2	5.9	0.1	3.9	5.8	5.8	6.3	0.5	3.5	5.4	4.8	-HS 5.3	0.5	2.1								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	5.5	-PS 4.6	-S 5.5	0.9	4.9	5.4	PS 5.6	6.1	0.5	3.0	5.5	4.7	6.1	1.4	7.7	44	20	39	113	1.4	6.9	23	1.1
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	5.6	+PS 5.1	5.9	-PS 0.8	3.9	+S 6.1	6.0	6.3	0.3	1.8	5.6	5.3	6.0	0.7	3.9	49	18	29	96	3.1	1.1	4.2	7.6
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	5.6	+HS 5.3	+S 6.0	-PS 0.7	4.4	+S 6.1	+HS 6.2	S 6.4	0.2	1.8	S 5.8	+HS 5.8	+HS 6.3	-HS 0.5	2.9	39	18	6	57	2.1	-1.8	3.9	5.6
Colonels (O6)	5.6	+HS 5.7	+PS 6.1	-PS 0.4	2.2	6.1	+HS 6.4	S 6.6	0.2	1.2	5.5	+HS 6.0	6.0	-HS 0	0	44	12	6	56	3.2	-1.2	4.4	6.1
Generals (O7 up)						5.8	6.2	6.4	0.2	1.2	+S 6.1	+HS 6.3	6.3	0	0	22	12		34	1.0			
All Subjects	5.5	4.8	5.8	1.0	5.5	5.9	5.9	6.2	0.3	1.8	5.6	5.2	6.0	0.8	4.5								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

2

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 4.1	-NS 4.3	-NS 5.1	.8	3.3	6.5	6.0	6.5	0.5		-PS 4.0	6.5	+PS 7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.1	4.6	5.4	.8	3.3						-PS 4.0	-S 2.0	-NS 3.5	1.5									-.5
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	-PS 4.2	-NS 4.1	-PS 5.2	+NS 1.1	4.2	-NS 4.9	NS 5.0	5.7	+NS 0.7	3.4	-NS 4.8	-NS 4.2	-S 5.7	+S 1.5	7.2	3.3	3.4	9.2	15.9	-.1	5.8	5.9	-1.1
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	4.5	4.1	5.4	0.7	3.2	5.1	5.4	5.8	0.4	2.0	5.4	S 4.4	6.1	+NS 1.7	9.2	4.2	2.0	10.3	16.5	2.2	8.3	10.5	-2.0
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	4.8	+PS 5.4	5.4	-PS 0	-.5	5.4	5.4	5.4	0.5	2.2	5.2	-NS 3.8	-PS 5.5	+NS 1.7	8.8								
Jr Co Gr (01)	4.3	4.4	5.1	0.7	3.0	5.1	-NS 4.7	-S 5.5	+S 0.8	4.1	4.9	S 3.7	5.8	+S 2.1	10.3	3.2	4.1	5.4	12.7	.9	1.3	2.2	1.6
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	4.6	+PS 5.0	5.5	0.5	2.3	+PS 5.4	+PS 5.7	6.0	0.3	2.2	5.4	5.0	6.0	1.0	5.4	3.0	2.2	3.2	8.4	0.8	1.0	1.8	5.9
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+NS 4.9	+NS 5.4	+NS 5.3	-S 0.4	.2.0	+NS 5.5	+NS 6.1	+NS 6.3	-NS 0.2	1.1	+PS 5.4	+NS 5.5	+S 6.1	-NS 0.6	3.2	2.3	1.1	1.1	4.5	1.2	0	1.2	3.7
Colonels (06)	4.5	+S 5.3	+PS 5.7	0.4	1.4	5.1	5.6	-PS 5.5	-NS -.1	0.5	5.3	+NS 5.7	5.9	-NS 0.2	1.1	2.0	0.5	1.1	3.6	1.5	0.6	2.1	2.2
Generals (07 up)						5.0	6.0	5.9	-.1	-.5	5.5	+S 5.8	6.0	S 0.2	1.1	1.4	.5		1.9	1.9		1.9	
All Subjects	4.4	4.1	5.4	0.7	3.1	5.2	5.5	5.9	0.4	2.1	5.3	4.9	6.0	1.1	5.8								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 5.3	-NS 4.6	-NS 5.3	0.7	3.1																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-S 4.8	4.1	PS 5.1	0.4	1.9																		
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.4	4.9	+S 6.0	1.1	5.9	-NS 5.2	-PS 5.4	-S 5.8	0.4	2.1	-S 5.1	-S 4.7	-S 5.6	0.9	4.1	1.9	2.1	4.3	8.3	-.2	2.2	2.4	1.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.5	4.8	-S 5.4	0.6	3.3	5.6	5.1	6.0	0.9	1.7	5.4	5.0	-PS 5.1	0.7	4.3	5.9	1.7	6.1	13.7	4.2	4.4	8.6	-1.1

(07 up)						5.6	6.0	5.4	-.1	.5	5.5	5.8	6.0	.2	.11	1.4	.5	14	19	19								
All Subjects	5.4	4.7	5.4	.7	3.1	5.2	5.5	5.9	.4	2.1	5.3	4.9	6.0	.1	5.8													
Civilians																												

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS 5.3	-HS 4.6	-HS 5.3	0.7	3.7																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-S 4.5	4.1	P 5.1	1.0	1.9																		
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.4	4.9	+S 6.0	1.1	5.9	-HS 5.2	-PS 5.4	-S 5.5	0.4	2.1	-S 5.1	-S 4.7	-S 5.6	0.9	4.1	1.9	2.1	4.3	8.3	-.2	2.2	2.4	1.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.6	4.8	-S 5.4	0.6	3.3	5.6	5.7	6.0	0.3	1.7	5.4	5.0	-PS 5.7	0.7	4.3	5.9	1.7	6.1	13.7	4.2	4.4	8.6	1.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.5	5.3	5.9	0.6	3.3	5.7	5.6	-PS 5.6	0	-	5.3	5.1	6.3	1.2	6.4								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.5	+PS 5.3	+S 6.2	0.9	5.0	5.5	5.7	+PS 6.3	+PS 0.6	3.8	5.5	4.7	5.8	1.1	6.1	3.3	3.8	5.6	12.7	-.5	1.8	2.3	2.2
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+HS 5.8	4.9	+S 6.0	+PS 1.1	7.0	5.7	5.7	6.2	0.5	2.8	5.6	5.2	6.1	0.9	5.6	5.0	2.8	3.3	11.1	2.2	.5	2.7	1.6
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+S 5.7	+S 5.2	+S 6.1	0.9	5.1	5.6	5.5	6.0	0.5	2.8	5.5	+S 5.4	6.0	-PS 0.6	3.3	7.0	2.8	2.2	12.0	4.2	-.6	4.8	4.4
Colonels (06)	5.5	5.0	5.9	0.9	5.0	5.8	+PS 6.0	6.2	0.2	1.7	5.5	+PS 5.7	6.1	0.4	2.2	5.1	1.7	1.7	8.5	3.4	.6	3.4	3.5
Generals (07 up)						5.6	-PS 2.0	P 1.5	-.5	-2.8	+PS 5.8	+S 5.8	6.2	0.4	1.7	5.0	-2.8		7.8	7.8		7.8	
All Subjects	5.5	4.9	5.8	0.9	5.0	5.5	5.6	6.0	0.4	2.2	5.4	5.2	5.9	0.7	4.3								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)											6.0	6.5	7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)											6.0	3.5	6.0	2.5									-.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)						5.6	5.4	6.3	0.9	5.6	5.8	5.0	6.4	1.4	8.1	4.8	5.6	8.4	11.3	-.8	3.3	4.1	3.5
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)						6.0	6.0	6.6	0.6	3.0	5.4	5.0	6.5	1.5	8.9	8.4	3.0	12.4	23.8	5.4	4.4	14.8	-1.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)						5.9	5.9	6.5	0.6	3.5	5.8	4.6	6.5	1.9	11.0								
Jr Co Gr (01)						5.8	5.4	6.4	1.0	6.4	5.4	4.5	6.5	2.0	12.4	7.5	6.4	9.6	24.9	1.1	2.6	3.7	-.6
Sr Co Gr (02-03)						5.9	5.1	6.5	0.8	4.7	6.0	4.4	6.4	1.5	9.0	7.8	4.7	5.9	18.4	3.1	1.2	4.3	2.4
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)						5.9	5.1	6.5	0.8	4.7	5.9	5.4	6.4	1.0	5.9	7.0	4.7	3.4	15.1	2.3	1.3	3.6	3.5
Colonels (06)						5.5	5.8	6.5	0.7	4.1	5.6	5.8	6.4	0.6	3.4	7.0	4.1	2.4	13.5	2.9	-1.7	4.6	4.3
Generals (07 up)						5.1	5.8	6.5	0.7	4.0	6.1	5.9	6.3	0.4	2.4	5.2	4.0		9.2	1.2		1.2	
All Subjects						5.9	5.1	6.5	0.3	4.7	5.9	5.1	6.4	1.3	7.7								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)																							
Ldr-Cand (E3)																							
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)																							
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)																							
Ldr Techs (All WOs)																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR:

CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-SUBORDINATE)				
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	PERCEPTUAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (WRITES AS A SUPERIOR)
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS	-HS	-HS																				
Ldr-Cand (E3)			+HS																				
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)			+HS			PS	HS	PS															
Sr NCOs (E8-E9)	+S											-HS	+HS	+HS									
Ldr Techs (All WOs)		+S	+PS										-PS										
Jr Co Gr (O1)						PS	-HS																
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	-HS	+HS				HS		PS															
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)		+HS	+HS				+HS		-PS			+HS		-HS									
Colonels (O6)		+PS		-PS			+S					+HS		-HS									
Generals (O7 up)							-PS				PS	+S		-PS									
All Subjects																							
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧

WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)																							
Ldr-Cand (E3)																							
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)																							
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)																							
Ldr Techs (All WOs)																							
Jr Co Gr (O1)																							
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)																							
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)																							
Colonels (O6)																							
Generals (O7 up)																							
All Subjects																							
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧

WAS SELFISH

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)																							
Ldr-Cand (E3)																							
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)																							
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)																							
Ldr Techs (All WOs)																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: WAS SELFISH

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.6	5.2	5.9	0.7	4.0																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	6.4	5.8	5.7	0.9	4.0																		
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.2	5.0	6.4	0.9	4.1	5.5	5.4	6.3	0.9	4.0		5.2	6.2	1.0	5.1	4.0	5.0	7.8	16.8	-1.0	2.8	3.8	1.1
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.4	5.2	6.3	1.1	5.7	5.4	5.9	6.2	0.6	2.1		5.0	6.5	1.5	7.8	4.1	2.7	6.0	13.4	2.0	3.3	5.3	2.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.3	5.2	5.9	0.7	3.5	4.9	5.1	6.4	0.1	3.4	4.8	5.5	5.8	0.3	1.9								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	5.6	5.4	6.5	1.6	2.7	5.4	4.8	6.2	1.5	1.0	4.4	5.0	6.1	1.1	6.0	5.1	1.0	4.8	18.1	-1.4	-2.8	4.1	0.3
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	5.4	5.3	6.3	1.0	5.2	5.3	5.3	6.3	1.0	4.8	4.3	5.3	6.1	0.8	4.8	2.1	4.8	1.5	4.0	-2.1	-3.3	5.4	0.6
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	5.1	5.3	6.1	0.8	4.1	5.2	5.1	6.1	1.0	4.1	4.9	4.6	4.9	0.3	1.5	5.2	4.1	0.0	9.9	0.5	-4.7	5.2	2.0
Colonels (O6)	5.1	5.3	6.2	0.9	4.6	5.6	5.7	6.5	0.8	4.5	4.8	4.6	4.9	0.1	0.0	4.1	4.5	1.1	10.3	-0.4	-2.8	5.2	3.3
Generals (O7 up)						5.5	2.1	1.6	1.5	2.1	5.3	6.0	6.6	0.3	1.1	4.6	2.7		7.3	7.3		7.3	
All Subjects	5.1	5.3	6.2	0.9	4.6	5.4	5.4	6.3	0.9	4.9	4.4	4.6	4.9	0.3	1.2								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧ KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.1	4.1	5.4	1.3	10.3	6.0	4.5	6.5	2.0		6.0	6.5	7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.5	4.6	6.8	1.8	9.5						6.5	6.0	6.5	0.5								7.9	
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	6.1	4.1	6.5	1.8	11.0	6.0	5.7	6.2	0.5	3.0	6.1	5.4	6.4	1.0	6.1	9.5	3.0	8.8	21.3	6.5	5.8	12.3	7.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	6.3	4.3	6.6	1.3	8.2	6.1	6.2	6.5	0.3	1.8	6.3	5.2	6.6	1.4	8.8	11.0	1.8	9.0	21.8	9.2	7.2	16.4	3.2
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	6.3	4.7	6.5	1.6	3.8	6.3	6.1	6.3	0.2	1.3	6.5	5.4	6.8	1.4	9.1								
Jr Co Gr (01)	6.0	5.3	6.3	1.0	6.0	6.8	5.7	6.2	0.5	2.4	6.4	5.2	6.5	1.3	9.0	8.2	2.9	5.3	16.4	5.3	2.4	7.7	4.0
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	6.3	5.3	6.4	1.1	6.3	6.1	6.2	6.4	0.2	1.2	6.6	5.9	6.7	0.8	5.3	6.0	1.2	4.0	11.2	4.8	2.8	7.6	5.4
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	6.5	5.1	6.3	1.8	5.4	6.0	6.1	6.3	0.2	1.2	6.6	6.2	6.8	0.6	4.0	6.3	1.2	2.0	4.5	5.1	0.8	5.9	7.5
Colonels (06)	6.4	5.0	6.3	1.3	4.3	6.1	6.3	6.5	0.2	1.2	6.8	6.4	6.7	0.3	2.0	5.4	1.2	1.4	8.0	4.2	0.2	4.4	1.5
Generals (07 up)						6.2	6.5	6.5	0	0	6.8	6.6	6.8	0.2	1.4	4.3	0		4.3	4.3		4.3	
All Subjects	6.2	4.9	6.3	1.4	7.8	6.1	6.0	6.3	0.3	1.8	6.5	5.8	6.7	0.9	5.9								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧ TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	6.4	4.8	6.4	1.4	9.0																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	6.4	4.9	6.7	1.8	11.9																	5.6	
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	6.2	4.6	6.5	1.9	8.6	6.1	6.1	6.5	0.5	2.9	5.6	5.4	6.5	1.1	6.2	11.0	2.9	1.1	21.6	3.1	4.8	12.9	6.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	6.3	4.2	6.3	1.1	6.7	5.6	5.8	6.1	0.3	1.7	5.9	5.2	6.5	1.3	7.7	8.6	1.7	1.2	11.5	6.4	-0.5	14	5.8
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	6.4	5.0	6.4	1.4	9.0	6.1	6.1	6.6	0.5	3.1	6.2	5.9	6.5	0.6	3.1								
Jr Co Gr																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DESCRIPTION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACCEPTS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.4	4.8	6.4	1.4	7.6																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.1	4.7	6.1	1.4	7.1																		
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.7	4.6	6.5	1.9	8.6	5.1	6.0	6.5	0.5	2.4	5.6	5.4	6.5	1.1	6.2	11.6	2.7	11.2	4.6	3.1	1.8	12.9	
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.9	4.8	6.3	1.5	6.1	5.6	5.8	6.1	0.3	1.7	5.9	5.2	6.5	1.3	7.7	8.6	1.7	1.4	11.5	6.4	1.5	1.9	
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.4	4.8	6.4	1.6	7.6	6.1	6.1	6.6	0.5	3.1	5.2	5.4	6.5	0.6	3.1								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.7	4.9	6.3	1.3	7.4	6.0	5.9	6.4	0.5	3.6	5.8	6.0	6.2	0.2	1.2	6.1	3.6	4.1	4.4	2.5	1.1	3.6	
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	5.8	4.4	6.5	2.1	8.4	6.1	6.2	6.6	0.4	2.4	5.4	5.7	6.5	0.8	4.7	7.4	2.4	3.5	13.3	5.0	1.1	6.1	
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	5.8	4.4	6.3	1.9	7.3	6.0	6.1	6.6	0.5	3.0	5.8	6.0	6.6	0.6	3.5	6.4	3.0	2.4	11.8	3.4	2.6	6.0	
Colonels (06)	6.6	6.0	6.9	0.9	5.4	6.2	6.6	6.7	0.1	1.2	5.9	6.3	6.7	0.4	2.4	5.3	1.2	2.5	9.0	4.1	1.3	5.4	
Generals (07 up)						6.0	5.5	7.1	1.4	2.4	6.3	6.5	6.9	0.4	2.5	5.4	2.4		7.8	7.8		7.8	
All Subjects	5.6	4.7	6.5	1.2	6.7	5.9	6.1	6.5	0.4	2.4	5.8	5.7	6.5	0.8	4.6								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧ DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.1	5.5	5.4	0.4	2.6																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.7	4.9	5.2	0.3	1.4																		2.3
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.4	5.1	6.4	0.1	3.6	5.7	6.4	6.7	0.3	1.7	5.8	5.9	6.4	0.5	2.9	1.4	1.7	4.8	7.9	-.3	3.1	3.4	5.4
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.1	5.4	6.5	0.9	5.1	5.6	6.4	6.6	0.2	1.1	6.0	5.8	6.6	0.8	4.8	3.6	1.1	5.7	10.4	2.5	4.6	7.1	1.4
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	6.1	5.9	6.4	0.5	3.4	6.2	6.2	6.8	0.6	3.7	6.2	6.5	6.8	0.3	1.8								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	5.4	5.3	6.1	0.4	2.2	5.1	6.4	6.1	0.3	1.7	6.3	6.0	6.9	0.9	5.7	5.1	1.1	3.0	9.8	3.4	1.3	4.7	1.2
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	5.7	5.4	6.0	0.7	4.3	5.8	6.3	6.6	0.3	1.7	5.9	6.1	6.5	0.4	3.0	2.2	1.7	3.2	7.1	0.5	1.5	2.0	.6
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	5.3	4.7	5.6	0.9	4.7	6.0	6.5	6.3	0.3	1.8	6.4	6.2	6.8	0.6	3.2	6.3	1.3	3.2	11.3	4.5	1.4	5.9	6.1
Colonels (O6)	5.1	4.2	6.0	1.8	4.3	6.2	6.7	6.9	0.2	1.2	6.1	6.4	6.9	0.5	3.2	4.1	1.2	3.7	9.0	2.9	2.5	5.4	1.2
Generals (O7 up)						5.4	7.8	7.5	-.3	-1.7	6.1	6.1	6.7	0.6	3.7	4.3	-1.7		6.0	6.0		6.0	
All Officers	5.3	5.1	5.9	0.8	5.3	5.8	6.4	6.7	0.3	1.7	6.1	6.1	6.6	0.5	3.7								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧ STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.4	4.4	5.3	0.9	5.2	6.0	5.0	6.0	1.0		4.5	4.5	4.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.1	4.7	6.2	1.5	7.7						5.0	5.0	3.5	-1.5									2.8
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.6	4.8	5.6	0.8	4.5	5.5	5.2	5.5	0.3	1.7	5.6	4.4	5.1	0.8	5.0	7.7	1.7	6.2	15.6	6.0	4.5	10.5	
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.1	4.8	5.9	1.1	6.2	5.6	5.7	5.9	0.2	1.1	5.6	4.7	5.8	1.1	6.2	4.5	1.1	5.1	10.7	3.4	4.0	7.4	1.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.9	5.1	5.3	0.1	4.1	5.9	5.9	5.9	0	.59	5.2	4.6	5.5	0.9	4.7								

(07 up)																									
All Subjects																									
Civilians																									

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen by Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS	-HS	-HS						+PS		-PS		-S										
	5.4	4.4	5.3	0.9	5.2	6.0	5.0	6.0	1.0		4.5	4.5	4.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	-S												-HS	+S									2.8
	5.1	4.7	6.2	1.5	7.7						5.0	5.0	3.5	-1.5									
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)			-PS			-HS	-HS	-HS	+HS				-S	+PS									
	5.6	4.8	5.6	0.8	4.5	5.5	5.2	5.5	0.3	1.7	5.6	4.4	5.7	0.8	5.0	7.7	1.7	6.2	15.6	6.0	4.5	10.5	
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)						-PS						-HS		+HS									
	5.7	4.8	5.9	1.1	6.2	5.6	5.7	5.9	0.2	1.1	5.6	4.7	5.8	1.1	6.2	4.5	1.1	5.1	10.7	3.4	4.0	7.4	1.1
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.9	5.1	5.8	0.7	4.1	5.9	5.9	5.9	0	.59	-PS	-S											
											5.2	4.6	5.5	0.9	4.7								
Jr Co Gr (01)			-PS						+PS														
	5.6	5.4	5.7	0.5	2.8	5.7	5.7	6.0	0.3	1.7	5.7	5.0	5.9	0.9	5.1	6.2	1.7	2.2	10.1	4.5	0.5	5.0	3.2
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+HS		+HS	+PS			+PS		-PS		-PS												
	6.1	5.0	6.1	1.1	6.7	5.9	5.9	6.0	0.1	.59	5.4	5.4	5.8	0.4	2.2	2.8	.59	1.2	4.6	2.2	0.6	2.8	3.5
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+HS	+HS	+HS	-PS		+HS	+HS	+HS			+PS	+HS	+S	-HS									
	5.9	5.4	6.1	0.7	4.1	6.1	6.2	6.3	0.1	.61	5.8	5.8	6.1	0.3	1.2	6.7	6.1	1.2	8.5	6.1	0.1	7	5.1
Colonels (06)	+HS	+S	+S			+PS	+HS	+S	-S			+HS	+PS	-PS									
	6.2	5.6	6.3	0.7	4.3	6.1	6.4	6.4	0	0	5.7	6.0	6.2	0.2	1.2	4.1	0	0.6	4.7	4.1	0.8	4.9	4.9
Generals (07 up)											+S	+HS	+PS	-PS									
						5.6	6.1	6.0	-.1	-.6	6.1	6.2	6.3	0.1	0.6	4.3	-.6		4.9	4.4		4.4	
All Subjects	5.7	4.9	5.8	0.9	5.1	5.8	5.8	6.0	0.2	1.2	5.6	5.3	5.9	0.6	3.3								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.7	5.2	6.2	1.0	5.7	6.5	5.6	7.0	2.0		6.0	6.5	7.0	0.5									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.6	5.2	6.5	1.3	7.3						6.0	6.0	6.5	0.5								1.2	
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.9	5.1	6.5	1.4	5.3	6.2	6.1	6.6	0.5	3.1	6.0	5.4	6.4	1.0	6.0	7.3	3.1	7.7	18.1	4.2	4.6	8.8	0.6
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	6.1	5.5	6.6	1.1	6.7	6.1	6.4	6.7	0.3	1.8	5.9	5.3	6.6	1.3	7.7	8.2	1.8	4.1	19.2	6.5	7.3	13.8	2.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	6.1	5.5	6.6	1.1	3.1	6.3	6.3	6.8	0.5	3.2	6.0	5.5	6.5	1.0	6.6								
Jr Co Gr (01)	6.3	5.6	6.7	1.1	6.4	6.4	6.0	6.9	0.9	5.1	6.5	5.5	6.9	1.4	9.1	6.7	5.1	5.0	16.8	1.6	1.1	1.7	0.6
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	6.3	5.5	6.7	1.2	7.6	6.3	6.2	6.7	0.5	3.2	6.2	5.7	6.5	0.8	5.0	6.9	3.2	3.7	13.8	3.7	0.5	4.2	3.1
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	6.2	5.5	6.6	1.1	6.8	6.4	6.2	6.7	0.5	3.2	6.2	6.1	6.7	0.6	3.7	7.6	3.2	3.7	14.5	4.4	0.5	4.9	3.1
Colonels (06)	6.4	5.5	6.8	1.3	8.2	6.4	6.4	6.8	0.4	2.6	6.1	6.0	6.7	0.7	3.7	6.8	2.2	2.6	12.0	4.2	0	4.2	5.3
Generals (07 up)						6.2	6.2	6.9	0.7	4.4	6.6	6.3	6.7	0.4	2.6	8.3	4.4		12.7	3.9		3.9	
All Subjects	6.0	5.3	6.5	1.2	6.6	6.3	6.2	6.7	0.5	3.2	6.1	5.7	6.6	0.9	5.5								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.2	4.4	5.6	1.1	3.6																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.1	4.4	4.5	0.1	0.5																	3.7	
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.3	4.4	5.6	0.7	3.7	5.5	5.7	5.8	0.1	0.6	5.3	5.6	5.8	0.2	1.1	6.5	1.6	3.4	4.5	2.1	2.3	2.4	3.4
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.2	4.3	4.3	0	0	5.2	5.6	5.6	0	0	5.6	5.0	5.6	0.6	3.4	3.7	0	2.3	6.0	2.7	2.8	5.5	0
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.1	4.4	5.2	0.3	1.6	5.3	5.3	5.6	0.3	1.1	4.9	4.9	5.2	0.3	2.0								
Jr Co Gr (01)																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Subordinates	Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.2	4.9	5.6	0.7	3.6																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.1	4.4	4.5	0.1	0.5																		3.7
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.3	4.9	5.6	0.7	3.7	5.5	5.7	5.8	0.1	0.6	5.3	5.6	5.8	0.2	1.1	0.5	0.6	3.4	4.5	-.1	2.5	2.4	3.4
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.2	4.3	4.3	0	0	5.2	5.6	5.6	0	0	5.6	5.0	5.6	0.6	3.4	3.7	0	2.3	6.0	3.7	2.8	6.5	0
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.1	4.9	5.2	0.3	1.6	5.3	5.3	5.6	0.3	1.1	4.9	4.9	5.2	0.3	2.0								
Jr Co Gr (01)	4.2	5.6	5.4	0.3	1.6	5.6	5.3	5.6	0.3	1.7	5.5	4.9	5.4	0.5	2.8	0	1.7	1.0	2.7	-1.7	-.7	2.4	2.6
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	5.3	5.2	5.6	0.4	2.1	5.3	5.6	5.6	0	0	5.1	5.3	5.5	0.2	1.0	1.6	0	-1.0	2.0	-.6	-1.0	2.6	1.5
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	5.1	5.2	5.3	0.1	0.5	5.5	5.6	5.6	0	0	5.1	5.5	5.3	-.2	1.0	2.7	0	0	2.7	2.7	0	2.7	2.7
Colonels (06)	5.3	5.2	5.1	-.1	.5	5.7	5.9	5.4	0	0.6	4.9	5.8	5.7	-.1	0	0.5	0.6	1.1	2.2	-.1	2.5	2.6	4.6
Generals (07 up)						5.3	2.0	2.0	0	0	5.5	6.1	6.3	0.2	1.1	-.5	0		0.5	-.5		0.5	
All Subjects	5.2	4.9	5.4	0.4	2.1	5.4	5.6	5.7	0.1	0.5	5.2	5.3	5.5	0.2	1.0								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧ RULED WITH AN IRON HAND

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.1	3.8	4.1	0.3	1.5																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.5	3.1	3.4	0.8	4.1																		4.6
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.1	4.1	4.2	0.1	0.5	4.8	5.1	5.1	0	0	5.1	4.7	4.9	0.2	1.0	4.1	0	-5	4.6	4.1	-.5	4.6	10.4
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.2	4.5	4.2	-.6	3.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	0	0	5.2	5.1	4.7	-.2	-.5	0.5	0	-2.6	3.1	0.5	-2.6	3.1	0.5
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.1	4.2	4.3	0.1	0.5	5.4	5.3	5.4	0.1	0.5	5.1	4.7	3.6	-1.1	-5.6								
Jr Co Gr (01)	5.3	4.1	4.2	0.1	0.5	4.9	4.4	4.4	0	1.0	5.2	4.2	3.7	-.5	-2.6	3.1	1.0	2.0	6.1	2.1	-3.0	5.1	1.0
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	5.0	4.2	4.2	0	0	5.1	4.4	4.1	-.3	1.6	5.1	4.5	4.1	-.4	-2.0	0.5	-1.0	.9	2.4	1.5	0.1	1.6	3.8
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	4.5	4.3	3.9	-.4	1.9	5.0	4.2	4.3	0.1	0.5	4.7	4.7	4.5	-.2	-.9	0	0.5	-.4	0.9	-.5	-.9	1.4	2.4
Colonels (06)	4.1	4.1	4.2	0.1	0.5	4.6	4.1	4.7	-.2	-.9	4.2	4.3	4.4	0.1	.4	1.9	-.9	1.5	4.3	2.8	2.4	5.2	1.5
Generals (07 up)						4.3	2.6	2.7	0.1	0.4	5.1	4.6	4.9	0.3	1.5	0.5	0.4		0.9	0.1		0.1	
All Subjects	5.0	4.1	4.1	0	0	5.3	4.6	4.6	0	0	4.9	4.7	4.5	-.2	-1.0								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➧ DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	5.0	4.1	3.9	-.8	-4.0	2.5	6.5	2.0	-4.5		3.5	6.0	6.0	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.3	4.1	3.2	-.9	-3.9						5.5	5.0	4.5	-.5									5.1
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	4.7	4.1	4.1	0	0	4.9	3.2	3.5	0.3	2.0	5.1	3.7	3.3	-.4	-2.0	-3.9	2.0	-.2	6.4	-5.9	-1.5	7.4	1.0
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.1	4.6	3.9	-.1	0	4.2	3.9	3.8	-.1	-.5	5.2	3.8	3.8	0	0.5	0	-.2	8.1	3.6	-.2	3.6	7.2	3.2
Ldr Techs																							

Jr Fld Gr (04-05)																										
Colonels (06)																										
Generals (07 up)																										
All Subjects																										
Civilians																										

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)																							
Ldr-Cand (E3)																							
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)																							
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)																							
Ldr Techs (All WOs)																							
Jr Co Gr (01)																							
Sr Co Gr (02-03)																							
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)																							
Colonels (06)																							
Generals (07 up)																							
All Subjects																							
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 4.8	-PS 5.3	-NS 5.9	0.6	2.9																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	NS 3.7	5.3	-S 5.5	0.2	.74																		3.7
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.3	5.6	6.3	0.6	3.2	-NS 5.0	-S 6.0	-NS 6.3	0.3	1.0	5.4	5.8	-PS 6.4	0.5	2.7	.74	1.0	5.4	7.1	1.7	4.4	6.1	1.1
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	5.2	5.4	6.1	0.7	3.6	4.9	6.1	-PS 6.4	0.3	.98	5.4	-NS 5.5	6.6	+NS 1.1	5.4	3.2	.98	3.7	7.9	2.2	2.7	4.9	1.2
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.6	5.4	6.3	0.4	3.4	5.6	6.4	6.7	0.3	1.6	5.0	6.3	6.5	0.2	1.0								
Jr Co Gr (01)	+PS 5.6	+NS 6.3	+S 6.6	-S 0.3	1.6	5.4	-S 5.9	6.6	+NS 0.7	3.7	6.1	5.8	6.4	0.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	2.2	9.5	-.1	-1.5	1.6	5.0
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+NS 5.1	+PS 5.1	+NS 6.5	+NS 1.4	8.0	+S 5.7	6.3	+PS 6.7	0.4	2.2	5.5	+PS 6.3	6.6	0.3	2.2	1.6	2.2	2.2	6.0	-.6	0	0.6	-.6
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	5.4	5.5	6.3	0.8	4.3	5.5	+PS 6.4	6.7	0.3	1.7	5.5	+PS 6.2	6.7	0.5	2.2	8.0	1.7	2.3	12.0	6.3	0.6	6.9	7.4
Colonels (06)	+PS 5.7	5.2	+PS 6.6	+PS 1.4	7.4	+S 5.9	6.5	6.8	0.3	1.8	5.7	6.4	6.8	0.4	2.3	4.3	1.8	2.0	8.1	2.5	0.2	2.7	7.2
Generals (07 up)						5.6	-PS 1.4	-PS 1.1	-.3	-1.1	+NS 6.5	+PS 6.6	6.9	0.3	2.0	7.4	1.7		9.1	9.1		9.1	
All Subjects	5.2	5.5	6.2	0.7	4.2	5.4	6.2	6.5	0.3	1.9	5.4	6.1	6.6	0.5	2.7								
Civilians																							

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-NS 5.2	NS 4.9	-NS 6.1	1.2	6.2	1.0	4.0	7.0	+NS 3.0		6.0	7.0	7.0										
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.3	-PS 4.5	6.3	1.8	9.5						6.0	-PS 3.5	6.0	2.5									-1.7
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.5	N 4.8	6.4	+1 1.6	8.8	NS 5.7	-NS 5.4	-NS 6.6	+NS 1.2	6.3	-S 5.6	-NS 4.6	-NS 6.3	+S 1.7	9.5	9.5	6.3	11.2	27.0	3.2	4.9	8.1	1.8
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+NS 6.0	5.2	+PS 6.6	1.4	8.4	+PS 6.2	+S 6.2	+ 6.8	-PS 0.6	3.7	5.9	-NS 4.8	6.7	+NS 1.9	11.2	8.8	3.7	11.3	23.8	5.1	7.6	12.7	0.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.8	5.3	6.4	1.1	6.4	5.9	6.1	6.8	0.7	4.1	5.9	-PS 4.8	6.5	1.7	10.6								
Jr Co Gr (01)	+PS 6.0	5.6	+PS 6.1	1.1	6.6	5.9	-S 5.7	6.6	+PS 0.9	5.3	6.3	4.9	6.7	1.8	11.3	8.4	5.3	7.2	20.9	5.1	1.9	5.0	1.8

Generals (07 up)						5.0	+PS 1.4	+PS 1.1	-.3	1.1	6.5	6.6	6.9	0.3	2.0	7.4	1.7		9.1	9.1		9.1				
All Subjects	6.4	5.5	6.2	0.7	4.2	5.4	6.2	6.5	0.3	1.9	5.4	6.1	6.6	0.5	2.7											
Civilians																										

1

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS 5.2	-HS 4.9	-HS 6.1	1.2	6.2	7.0	4.0	7.0	+HS 3.0		6.0	7.0	7.0										
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.3	-PS 4.5	6.3	1.8	9.5						6.0	-PS 3.5	6.0	2.5									-1.7
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.5	-S 4.8	6.4	+HS 1.6	8.8	-HS 5.7	-HS 5.4	-HS 6.6	+HS 1.2	6.3	-S 5.6	-HS 4.6	-HS 6.3	PS 1.7	9.5	9.5	6.3	11.2	27.0	3.2	4.9	8.1	1.8
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+HS 6.0	5.2	+PS 6.6	1.4	8.4	+PS 6.2	+S 6.2	+ 6.8	-PS 0.6	3.7	5.9	-HS 4.8	6.7	+HS 1.9	11.2	8.8	3.7	11.3	23.8	5.1	7.6	12.7	0.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.8	5.3	6.4	1.1	6.4	5.9	6.1	6.8	0.7	4.1	5.9	-PS 4.8	6.5	1.7	10.6								
Jr Co Gr (01)	+PS 6.0	5.6	+PS 6.1	1.1	6.6	5.9	-S 5.7	6.6	+PS 0.9	5.3	6.3	4.9	6.7	1.8	11.3	8.4	5.3	7.2	20.9	5.1	1.9	5.0	1.8
Sr Co Gr (02-03)	+S 5.9	+HS 5.6	+S 6.6	1.0	5.9	+ 6.2	+PS 6.2	6.8	-PS 0.6	3.7	6.0	5.5	6.6	1.1	7.2	6.6	3.7	4.9	15.2	2.9	1.2	4.1	1.8
Jr Fld Gr (04-05)	+S 5.9	+HS 5.1	+HS 6.7	-PS 1.0	5.3	+PS 6.2	+HS 6.3	6.8	-HS 0.5	3.1	6.1	+HS 5.9	+PS 6.1	-HS 0.8	4.9	5.9	3.1	4.3	13.3	2.8	1.2	4.0	3.1
Colonels (06)	+S 5.1	5.9	6.7	0.8	4.3	6.1	+HS 6.5	6.9	-S 0.4	3.1	6.1	+S 6.1	6.8	-S 0.7	4.3	5.3	3.1	0	8.4	2.2	3.1	5.3	6.4
Generals (07 up)						6.2	+S 6.5	6.8	0.3	1.9	+S 6.4	+HS 6.7	6.8	-HS 0.1	0	4.0	1.9		5.9	2.1		2.1	
All Subjects	5.1	5.2	6.4	1.2	6.8	6.1	6.0	6.7	0.7	4.3	6.0	5.4	6.6	1.2	7.8								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

2

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➡ FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS 4.9	HS 4.6	-HS 4.8	0.2	1.0																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	4.6	5.5	4.4	-PS 0.6	2.8																		2.2
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.2	4.9	5.2	0.3	0.6	-HS 5.3	-HS 5.1	6.0	+S 0.9	4.2	-HS 5.4	-PS 5.0	-S 5.0	0	0	-2.8	4.2	-1.2	8.2	-7.0	-5.4	12.4	-1.8
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+HS 5.7	5.0	4.6	-HS 0.4	2.3	5.7	5.6	5.7	-HS 0.1	0.6	5.9	5.2	5.0	-HS -0.2	-1.2	1.6	0.6	6.3	8.5	1.0	5.7	6.7	1.3
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	5.6	5.1	5.4	0.3	1.7	5.7	5.8	6.3	0.5	2.3	5.6	4.8	5.9	+PS 1.1	5.6								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	5.2	5.3	+S 5.9	+PS 0.6	3.1	5.5	5.4	6.3	+S 0.9	5.0	+PS 6.3	5.1	6.1	+PS 1.0	6.3	-2.3	5.0	2.4	9.7	-7.3	-2.6	9.9	2.4
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	+HS 5.6	+HS 5.4	+S 5.6	0.2	1.1	5.6	5.6	6.2	0.6	3.4	5.9	5.4	5.8	0.4	2.4	3.1	3.4	1.8	8.3	-.3	-1.6	1.9	2.2
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	+HS 5.5	5.2	5.3	-.1	1.1	+HS 5.1	+S 5.5	6.1	-PS 0.3	2.3	5.9	5.5	5.7	0.2	1.8	1.1	2.3	1.2	4.6	-1.2	-1.1	2.3	1.2
Colonels (O6)	+HS 5.6	5.1	5.4	0.3	1.7	+PS 4.9	+S 6.0	+HS 6.5	0.5	3.0	5.8	5.6	5.8	0.2	1.2	1.1	3.0	2.3	6.4	-1.9	-.7	2.6	4.1
Generals (O7 up)						5.4	-PS 2.1	1.6	-.5	2.7	5.8	-PS 5.9	-PS 6.2	0.3	2.3	1.7	-2.7		4.4	4.4		4.4	
All Subjects	5.3	5.0	5.2	0.2	1.1	5.6	5.5	6.1	0.6	2.8	5.8	5.3	5.5	0.2	1.2								
Civilians																							

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LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: ➡ DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS 5.2	-HS 4.5	5.6	1.1	5.7																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.3	4.5	5.9	1.4	7.4																		5.4
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.5	5.0	+HS 6.6	1.0	5.5	-PS 5.4	+S 6.1	+S 6.4	0.3	1.6	5.4	5.5	6.1	+PS 0.6	3.8	7.4	1.6	3.4	12.4	5.8	1.8	7.6	3.0
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+HS 5.8	4.4	5.8	0.9	4.6	5.5	5.8	6.2	0.4	2.2	5.6	5.4	6.0	+PS 0.6	3.4	5.5	2.2	0	7.7	3.3	-2.2	5.5	4.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	+S 6.0	4.4	-PS 5.2	0.8	4.8	5.5	5.9	6.4	0.5	2.7	5.5	5.9	+PS 6.4	0.5	2.7								

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR: DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS -HS 5.2	4.5	5.6	1.1	5.7																		
Ldr-Cand (E3)	5.3	4.5	5.9	1.4	7.4																		5.4
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)	5.5	5.0	+HS 6.0	1.0	5.5	-PS 5.4	+S 6.1	+S 6.4	0.3	1.6	5.4	5.5	6.1	+PS 0.6	3.8	74	16	34	124	18	18	76	5.0
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+HS 5.8	4.4	5.8	0.9	4.6	5.5	5.8	6.2	0.4	2.2	5.6	5.4	6.0	+PS 0.6	3.4	55	24	0	79	33	-22	55	4.6
Ldr Techs (All WOs)	+HS 6.0	4.4	-PS 5.4	1.3	1.8	5.5	5.9	6.2	0.3	1.7	5.5	5.9	+PS 6.4	0.5	2.7								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	5.4	5.0	5.7	0.7	3.8	5.4	5.7	6.3	+S 0.6	3.2	5.7	5.8	5.8	0	0	46	24	19	89	1.4	2.1	3.5	4.4
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	5.6	5.0	5.8	0.8	4.5	5.7	5.9	6.1	0.2	1.1	5.5	5.7	5.9	0.2	1.1	38	11	11	60	2.7	0	2.7	3.3
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	+PS 4.3	+S 5.4	-HS 5.9	0.5	1.1	5.6	-S 5.7	-HS 5.9	0.2	1.1	5.5	5.6	5.8	0.2	1.1	45	11	0	56	34	-11	45	4.9
Colonels (O6)	+PS 5.3	5.0	5.8	0.8	4.6	5.7	5.9	5.9	-PS 0	0.7	5.4	5.9	5.9	0	0	11	24	18	35	0.5	1.2	1.7	3.6
Generals (O7 up)						-PS 5.6	-PS 1.7	PS 1.5	-.2	-1.2	+S 6.0	5.8	6.1	0.3	1.8	46	-12		5.8	5.8		5.8	
All Subjects	5.5	4.9	5.7	0.9	4.4	5.5	5.9	6.1	0.2	1.7	5.5	5.6	5.9	0.3	1.7								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR:

HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS

	DESCRIPTION OF SUPERIOR					DESCRIPTION OF SELF					DESCRIPTION OF SUBORDINATE					PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL				PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)			POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL OF THIS BEHAVIOR (ACTING AS A SUPERIOR)
	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Importance	Observed Occurrence	Desired Occurrence	Raw Shortfall (Desired-Observed)	Weighted Shortfall (Raw X Importance)	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Self	Seen By Superior	TOTAL	Seen By Subordinates	Seen By Superiors	TOTAL	
Non-Ldrs (E1, E2)	-HS	+HS	-HS								-HS												
	5.0	4.6	5.0	0.4	2.0	6.0	5.5	6.5	1.0		3.5	5.5	5.5	0									
Ldr-Cand (E3)		-PS																					
	5.1	4.3	4.9	0.6	3.1						6.0	5.5	6.0	0.5									1.1
Jr NCOs (E4-E6)						-HS	HS	+HS	S			-S		+PS									
	5.2	4.2	5.6	0.4	2.1	5.3	4.8	5.3	0.5	2.6	5.7	4.8	5.8	1.0	5.7	31	26	24	8.1	0.5	-2	0.7	4.7
Sr NCOs (E6-E9)	+PS					+PS	+HS	+S					-S										
	5.6	4.3	5.5	0.2	1.1	5.8	6.0	6.2	0.2	1.2	5.9	5.1	5.5	0.4	2.4	21	12	10.6	13.9	0.9	9.4	10.3	-4.7
Ldr Techs (All WOs)								-PS	PS			-S											
	5.5	4.5	5.6	0.4	2.1	5.9	5.6	5.3	-.3	1.8	5.5	4.5	5.4	0.9	4.9								
Jr Co Gr (O1)	-PS						HS	-PS	+HS			-PS		+S									
	5.6	5.3	5.6	.3	1.5	5.3	4.6	5.5	0.9	4.8	5.9	4.4	6.2	1.8	10.6	1.1	4.8	4.1	10.0	-3.7	-1	4.4	-6
Sr Co Gr (O2-O3)	+S																						
	5.5	5.1	5.6	0.5	2.7	5.6	5.7	5.9	0.2	1.1	5.8	5.2	5.9	0.7	4.1	1.5	1.1	3.0	5.6	0.4	1.9	2.3	1.2
Jr Fld Gr (O4-O5)	+HS		+PS			+HS		+PS			+PS	+S											
	5.4	5.5	5.6	0.1	5.4	5.7	6.0	6.1	0.1	5.7	6.0	5.5	5.4	0.4	3.0	2.7	5.7	6.8	4.2	1.5	5.7	2.7	5.2
Colonels (O6)	+PS					+HS	HS	+S				+HS		PS									
	5.3	4.6	5.1	0.1	2.6	5.8	6.4	6.3	-.1	5.8	5.8	6.0	6.0	0	0	1.4	5.8	6.1	4.1	1.1	5.8	1.7	4.3
Generals (O7 up)						-HS		-PS			+PS	+HS		-PS									
						5.6	4.7	4.8	0.1	0.6	6.2	6.4	6.4	0	0	5.6	6.1	4.2	1.2	5.5		5.5	
All Subjects																							
	5.4	4.5	5.4	0.3	1.6	5.6	5.5	5.8	0.3	1.7	5.9	5.2	5.8	0.6	3.5								
Civilians																							

1. The symbol "PS," "S," or "HS" and associated sign (+ or -) indicate that the cell entry in which the signed symbol occurs is significantly greater (+) or smaller (-) than the corresponding mean value for all subjects at the .10(PS), .05(S), or .01(HS) level of confidence.
2. All cell entries are mean values representing no fewer than 20 subjects except for some E1-E2 entries.

ANNEX D

GRAPHICAL DISPLAY OF PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION SHORTFALL

ANNEX D

GRAPHICAL DISPLAY OF PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION SHORTFALL

Pages D-2 through D-8 show the perception and performance shortfall: overall and by perspective (superior, self, subordinate) for all of the following grade levels except General Officer. General Officer data only reflects the perspective of self and subordinate and does not include superior.

Junior Noncommissioned Officers (E4, E5, E6 with less than 5 yrs svc)

Senior Noncommissioned Officers (E6 with 5 or more yrs svc, E7, E8, E9)

Junior Company Grade Officers (O1)

Senior Company Grade Officers (O2, O3)

Junior Field Grade Officers (O4, O5)

Senior Field Grade Officers (O6)

General Officers (O7 and up)

In addition to the above, at page D-9 is an interlevel comparison of perception and performance shortfall for all principal grades and all 43 items of behavior.

On pages D-2 through D-8 the colors used indicate the following:

- Represents Total Shortfall.
- Represents Superior Contribution to Shortfall.
- Represents Self Contribution to Shortfall.
- Represents Subordinate Contribution to Shortfall.

On page D-9 the colors used indicate the following grades:

- 06
- 04/05
- 02/03
- 01
- SR NCO
- JR NCO

PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: JR NCO (E-4, 5, 6) OVERALL AND BY PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SELF, SUBORDINATE)




8. HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.
9. HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.
10. HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.
11. HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.
12. HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.
12.3
13. HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.
12.9
14. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.
15. HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.
16. HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.
17. HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.
18. HE WAS SELFISH.
19. HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.
20. HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.
21. HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.



D-2 (Continued)


30. HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.
31. HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.
12.4
32. HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.
33. HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.
34. HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.
35. HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.
36. HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.
37. HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.
38. HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.
39. HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISION-MAKING.
40. HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.
41. HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.
42. HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.
43. HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.

PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: SR NCO (E-6, 7, 8, 9) OVERALL AND BY PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SELF, SUBORDINATE)




8. HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.
16.8
9. HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.
10. HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.
13.8
11. HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.
18.7
12. HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.
16.4
13. HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.
14. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.
15. HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.
16. HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.
17. HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.
12.9
18. HE WAS SELFISH.
19. HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.
20. HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.
21. HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.
12.2


22. HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.
23. HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.
24. HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.
25. HE WAS APPROACHABLE.
26. HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.
27. HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.
28. HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.
29. HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.
30. HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.
31. HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.
32. HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.
33. HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.
34. HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.
35. HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.
36. HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.
37. HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.
38. HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS

EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.

30. HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.

31. HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.

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37. HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.

38. HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.

39. HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISION-MAKING.

40 HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.

41. HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.

42. HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.

43. HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.



PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: JR CO GRADE (O-1) OVERALL AND BY PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SELF, SUBORDINATE)




10. HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.
11. HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.
12. HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.
13. HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.
14. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.
15. HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.
16. HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.
17. HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.
18. HE WAS SELFISH.
19. HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.
20. HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.
21. HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.



D-4 (continued)

30. HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.

31. HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.

32. HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.

33. HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.

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35. HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.

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43. HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.



PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: SR CO GRADE (0-2, 3) OVERALL AND BY PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SELF, SUBORDINATE)




9. HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.
10. HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.
11. HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.
12. HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.
13. HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.
14. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.
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18. HE WAS SELFISH.
19. HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.
20. HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.
21. HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.



D-5 (Continued)

D-5 (Continued)



PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: JR FIELD GRADE (0-4, 5) OVERALL AND BY PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SELF, SUBORDINATE)




9. HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.
10. HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.
11. HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.
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21. HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.


22. HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.
23. HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.
24. HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.
25. HE WAS APPROACHABLE.
26. HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.
27. HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.
28. HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.
29. HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.
30. HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.
31. HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.
32. HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.
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34. HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.
35. HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.
36. HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.
37. HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.
38. HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.

PRIORITIES OF WORK.

32. HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.

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38. HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.

39. HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISION-MAKING.

40 HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.

41. HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.

42. HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.

43. HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.



PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: SR FIELD GRADE (0-6) OVERALL AND BY PERSPECTIVE (SUPERIOR, SELF, SUBORDINATE)




11. HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.
12. HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.
13. HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.
14. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.
15. HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.
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19. HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.
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37. HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.

38. HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.



(continued)

30. HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.

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

PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL: GENERAL OFFICER (0-7 AND UP) OVERALL AND BY PERSPECTIVE (SELF, SUBORDINATE)



PERFORMANCE.

9. HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.

10. HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.

11. HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.

12. HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

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18. HE WAS SELFISH.

19. HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.

20. HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.

21 HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.





D-8 (Continued)

EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.

30. HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.

31. HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.

32. HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.

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

D-8 (Continued)

INTER-LEVEL COMPARISONS OF PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALLS



8. HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.

9. HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.

10. HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.

11. HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.

12. HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.

13. HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.

14. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.

15. HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.

16. HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.

17. HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.

18. HE WAS SELFISH.

19. HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.

20. HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.

21. HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.



22. HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.

23. HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.

24. HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.

25. HE WAS APPROACHABLE.

26. HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.

27. HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.

28. HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.

29. HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.

30. HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.

31. HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.

32. HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.

33. HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.

34. HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.

35. HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.

36. HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.

37. HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.

38. HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO



(1-9 Continued)

30. HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.

31. HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.

32. HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.

33. HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.

34. HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.

35. HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.

36. HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.

37. HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.

38. HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.

39. HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISION-MAKING.

40. HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.

41. HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.

42. HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.

43. HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.



ANNEX E

GRADE LEVEL SUMMARIES

The following seven tables, listed below, extracted from the data base, provide additional diagnostic and prescriptive information related to Findings 6, 7, and 8. The tables present the highlights of diagnostic and prescriptive information for each grade level. They list (in rank-order) the first five items of leadership behavior in various functional categorizations used in the study.

TABLE 1. JUNIOR NCO LEVEL

TABLE 2. SENIOR NCO LEVEL

TABLE 3. JUNIOR COMPANY GRADE LEVEL

TABLE 4. SENIOR COMPANY GRADE LEVEL

TABLE 5. JUNIOR FIELD GRADE LEVEL

TABLE 6. SENIOR FIELD GRADE LEVEL

TABLE 7. GENERAL OFFICER LEVEL

TABLE 1

JUNIOR NCO LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Was Selfish.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Resisted Changes In Ways of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could To Make It High.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.
He Was Thoughtful And Considerate Of Others.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Treated People In An Impersonal Manner--Like Cogs In A Machine.
He Failed To Show An Appreciation For Priorities Of Work.
He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All Circumstances.
He Stood Up For His Subordinates Even Though It Made Him Unpopular With His Superior.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Stifled The Initiative Of His Subordinates.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Hesitated To Take Action In The Absence Of Instructions.

TABLE 2

SENIOR NCO LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Was Approachable.
He Was Easy To Understand.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Stifled The Initiative Of His Subordinates.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could To Make It High.
He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Demanded Results On Time Without Considering The Capabilities And Welfare Of His Unit.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Fought The Problem.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Counseled, Trained, and Developed His Subordinates.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All Circumstances.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could To Make It High.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Was Selfish.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Fought The Problem.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Was Easy To Understand.

TABLE 3

JUNIOR COMPANY GRADE LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.
He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Distorted Reports To Make His Unit Look Better.
He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Was Selfish.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Saw That Subordinates Had The Materials They Needed To Work With.
He Expressed Appreciation When A Subordinate Did A Good Job.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could To Make It High.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.
He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Was Easy To Understand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Fought The Problem.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All Circumstances.
He Counseled, Trained, And Developed His Subordinates.
He Failed To Show An Appreciation For Priorities Of Work.
He Set High Standards Of Performance.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.

TABLE 4

SENIOR COMPANY GRADE LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Kept Me Informed Of The True Situation, Good And Bad, Under All Circumstances.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Treated People In An Impersonal Manner--Like Cogs In A Machine.
He Was Approachable.
He Expressed Appreciation When A Subordinate Did A Good Job.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Sought Additional And More Important Responsibilities.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Fought The Problem.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.

TABLE 5

JUNIOR FIELD GRADE LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Set High Standards Of Performance.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Let Subordinates Share In Decisionmaking.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Was Easy To Understand.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Fought The Problem.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could To Make It High.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Was Willing To Support His Subordinates Even When They Made Mistakes.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Sought Additional And More Important Responsibilities.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.

TABLE 6

SENIOR FIELD GRADE LEVEL

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Set High Standards Of Performance.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.
He Was Approachable.
He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Fought The Problem.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Was Easy To Understand.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Was Aware Of The State Of His Unit's Morale And Did All He Could To Make It High.
He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Was Willing To Make Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Resisted Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Hesitated To Take Action In The Absence Of Instructions.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Stood Up For His Subordinates Even Though It Made Him Unpopular With His Superior.
He Counseled, Trained, And Developed His Subordinates.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Was Willing To Support His Subordinates Even When They Made Mistakes.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Was Willing To Make Changes In Ways Of Doing Things.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Fought The Problem.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.

TABLE 7

GENERAL OFFICER LEVEL

(Based on Self and Subordinate Questionnaire Results)

ITEMS WITH MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY FOR IMPROVING OVERALL PERCEPTION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE BY CHANGE IN LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

He Set The Example For His Men On And Off Duty.
He Approached Each Task In A Positive Manner.
He Set High Standards of Performance.
He Distorted Reports To Make His Unit Look Better.
He Was Technically Competent To Perform His Duties.

ITEMS OF LOW OPPORTUNITY SENSITIVITY

He Saw That Subordinates Had The Materials They Needed To Work With.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.
He Constructively Criticized Poor Performance.
He Backed Up Subordinates In Their Actions.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (DESIRED PERFORMANCE-OBSERVED PERFORMANCE) WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE

He Communicated Effectively With His Subordinates.
He Was Easy To Understand.
He Saw To It That People Under Him Worked Up To Their Capabilities.
He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Knew His Men And Their Capabilities.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH AGREEMENT BETWEEN DESIRED AND OBSERVED PERFORMANCE

He Assigned Immediate Subordinates To Specific Tasks.
He Drew A Definite Line Between Himself And His Subordinates.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Gave Detailed Instructions On How The Job Should Be Done.
He Refused To Explain His Actions To His Subordinates.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH ESPECIALLY HIGH PERCEPTUAL SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION)

He Was Overly Ambitious At The Expense Of His Subordinates And His Unit.
He Stifled The Initiative Of His Subordinates.
He Treated People In An Impersonal Manner--Like Cogs In A Machine.
He Was Selfish.
He Criticized Subordinates In Front Of Others.

LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS WITH EXCEPTIONALLY LOW SELF-DELUSION

He Expressed Appreciation When A Subordinate Did A Good Job.
He Let The Members Of His Unit Know What Was Expected Of Them.
He Ruled With An Iron Hand.
He Hesitated To Take Action In The Absence Of Instructions.
He Criticized A Specific Act Rather Than An Individual.

ANNEX F

RANK-ORDERINGS OF ITEMS OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR

RANK-ORDERINGS OF ITEMS OF LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR (Tables 1-4). The following four tables, extracted from the data base, provide additional diagnostic and prescriptive information related to Findings 6, 7, and 8. The tables list the rank-orders for all 43 items of leadership behavior in terms of performance shortfall, perception shortfall, and opportunities for improvement. Tables are organized to present the rank-orders for all respondents combined, as well as the rank-orders for each grade level. Asterisks indicate the first five items in each rank-ordering.

TABLE 1. STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE) AMONG 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS.

TABLE 2. STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION) AMONG 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS.

TABLE 3. STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE OPPORTUNITIES (SENSITIVITY TO PERFORMANCE CHANGE) DETERMINED BY REGRESSION OF LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS AGAINST SATISFACTION WITH OVERALL PERFORMANCE.

TABLE 4. POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL BY SUPERIOR.

TABLE 1

STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF PERFORMANCE SHORTFALL (WEIGHTED BY IMPORTANCE) AMONG 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR O1	SR CO GR O2,3	JR FLD GR O4,5	SR FLD GR O6
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	1*	2*	1*	1*	5*	6	4*
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	2*	12	3*	2	1*	3*	3*
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	3*	1*	2*	4*	6	8	17
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	4*	3*	8	10	9	7	6
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	5*	11	24	5*	2*	1*	1*
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	6	5*	5*	3*	5*	13	11
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	7	19	6	12	4*	2*	2*
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	7	10	11	13	3*	4*	7
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	9	16	10	14	8	5*	5*
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	10	15	9	7	12	12	10
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	11	8	4*	9	13	9	32
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	12	7	7	6	16	21	19
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	13	6	27	17	10	14	13
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	14	9	16	15	11	20	20
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	15	28	13	8	14	16	15
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.	16	4*	14	18	18	22	21
HE WAS SELFISH.	17	17	23	11	21	19	9
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	17	31	21	20	17	10	16
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	19	14	12	22	15	25	31
HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	20	23	32	24	20	18	8
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	21	13	28	16	25	17	27
HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	22	20	17	21	22	32	33

TABLE 1 (Continued)

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	23	26	15	23	19	29	24
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	24	18	18	19	24	28	29
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	25	21	29	25	32	23	12
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	26	35	31	28	26	15	14
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	27	22	26	26	29	26	25
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	28	36	38	30	28	11	18
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	29	30	22	34	27	27	28
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	30	32	36	29	23	31	22
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	31	27	30	32	37	24	23
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	32	25	39	31	30	30	34
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.	33	34	20	27	31	37	43
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	34	24	19	33	35	42	42
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	35	37	37	36	36	36	26
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	36	38	25	38	34	35	39
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	37	42	40	35	33	38	35
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	38	33	34	43	42	34	37
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	39	39	33	39	40	33	40
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	40	29	42	40	38	41	36
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	41	40	35	41	39	40	41
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	42	41	43	37	43	43	30
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	43	43	41	42	41	39	38

TABLE 2

STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF PERCEPTION SHORTFALL (SELF-DELUSION) AMONG 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	1*	3*	3*	1*	1*	10	17
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	2*	5*	9	5*	24	3*	5*
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	3*	32	2*	6	2*	9	3*
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	4*	22	4*	8	8	2*	10
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	5*	33	1*	2*	10	12	2*
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	6	15	8	12	12	21	9
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	7	4*	31	13	28	6	1*
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	8	7	25	32	6	1*	13
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	9	9	24	30	4*	12	6
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	10	15	10	18	14	13	16
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	11	1*	30	26	3*	22	7
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	12	21	15	10	38	5*	4*
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	13	19	13	4*	16	31	12
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	14	10	27	15	5*	18	21
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	15	11	11	22	11	35	11
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	16	30	5*	25	9	26	14
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	17	14	6	39	19	15	20
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	18	20	19	29	13	32	19
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.	19	6	12	38	21	20	32
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	20	18	17	35	18	23	18

TABLE 2 (Continued)

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS SELFISH.	21	31	39	16	7	14	23
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	22	5*	23	23	27	24	33
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	23	24	20	9	17	28	39
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	24	34	33	17	36	11	8
HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	25	36	37	7	15	21	24
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	26	2*	34	3*	37	38	29
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	27	16	38	27	20	19	35
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	28	40	22	36	29	17	22
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	29	8	7	31	25	16	30
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	30	17	26	28	22	39	40
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	31	41	21	19	34	25	25
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	32	27	40	40	43	4*	27
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	33	25	28	33	32	37	26
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS AS HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	34	26	32	14	30	40	41
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	35	42	18	43	23	43	15
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.	36	43	16	20	35	34	36
HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	37	23	14	37	39	42	31
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	38	35	43	21	26	36	28
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	39	28	42	11	42	41	37
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	40	29	29	41	40	27	34
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	41	12	41	24	41	43	42
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	42	38	35	34	31	33	43
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	43	37	36	42	33	30	38

TABLE 3

STATISTICAL RANK-ORDER OF LEADERSHIP PERFORMANCE OPPORTUNITIES (SENSITIVITY TO PERFORMANCE CHANGE) DETERMINED BY REGRESSION OF LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF 43 LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS AGAINST SATISFACTION WITH OVERALL PERFORMANCE

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS TECHNICALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	1*	2*	2*	6	8	3*	2*
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	2*	4*	5*	7	2*	4*	12
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	3*	1*	1*	24	1*	5*	9
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	4*	16	8	1*	5*	10	5*
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	5*	3*	3*	32	4*	1*	8
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	6	12	16	2*	12	6	4*
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	7	10	12	4*	6	8	16
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	8	25	14	9	11	2*	1*
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	9	14	4*	16	14	18	3*
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	10	11	7	20	19	9	6
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	11	8	17	3*	15	25	7
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	12	20	15	18	10	16	11
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	13	9	13	38	7	11	13
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.	14	24	19	11	18	13	19
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	15	27	18	36	3*	7	18
HE WAS SELFISH.	16	5*	11	5*	23	32	34
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	17	19	22	10	21	19	20
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	18	15	9	40	20	22	14
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	19	26	6	26	22	15	27
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	20	33	29	17	9	17	21
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	21	18	10	35	16	30	17
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.	22	6	20	31	24	26	23

TABLE 3 (Continued)

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR 01	SR CO GR 02,3	JR FLD GR 04,5	SR FLD GR 06
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	23	22	28	12	33	28	10
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	24	29	26	14	26	20	35
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	25	34	30	22	31	12	22
HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	26	31	23	23	30	14	30
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	27	13	24	28	34	21	31
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	28	32	39	19	17	31	15
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	29	7	31	8	32	39	37
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	30	17	21	41	25	23	28
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	31	37	36	27	13	24	26
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	32	28	35	15	36	34	25
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	33	30	32	30	29	27	32
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	34	21	33	33	27	33	33
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	35	36	27	25	35	36	29
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	36	42	38	13	37	37	24
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	37	39	40	21	28	35	40
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	38	23	25	34	42	42	38
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	39	38	34	29	38	29	39
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	40	35	37	37	39	40	36
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	41	40	41	39	41	41	42
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	42	41	42	42	43	38	41
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	43	43	43	43	40	43	43

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TABLE 4
POTENTIAL FOR INFLATED APPRAISAL BY SUPERIOR

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR O1	SR CO GR O2,3	JR FLD GR O4,5	SR FLD GR O6
HE KEPT ME INFORMED OF THE TRUE SITUATION, GOOD AND BAD, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES.	1*	2*	5*	4*	4*	3*	3*
HE DEMANDED RESULTS ON TIME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE CAPABILITIES AND WELFARE OF HIS UNIT.	2*	5*	4*	3*	14	17	28
HE TREATED PEOPLE IN AN IMPERSONAL MANNER--LIKE COGS IN A MACHINE.	3*	3*	1*	8	6	12	6
HE CRITICIZED SUBORDINATES IN FRONT OF OTHERS.	4*	18	16	30	9	6	19
HE STOOD UP FOR HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN THOUGH IT MADE HIM UNPOPULAR WITH HIS SUPERIOR.	5*	30	19	6	13	7	19
HE WAS OVERLY AMBITIOUS AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS SUBORDINATES AND HIS UNIT.	5*	24	18	1*	41	4*	4*
HE KNEW HIS MEN AND THEIR CAPABILITIES.	7	11	2*	5*	10	7	21
HE RULED WITH AN IRON HAND.	8	1*	25	40	20	41	40
HE SAW THAT SUBORDINATES HAD THE MATERIALS THEY NEEDED TO WORK WITH.	8	12	6	2*	7	14	16
HE COUNSELED, TRAINED, AND DEVELOPED HIS SUBORDINATES.	8	26	3*	8	21	1*	1*
HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION WHEN A SUBORDINATE DID A GOOD JOB.	8	18	11	21	2*	19	9
HE WAS WILLING TO SUPPORT HIS SUBORDINATES EVEN WHEN THEY MADE MISTAKES.	12	14	25	11	14	10	21
HE WAS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSIDERATE OF OTHERS.	13	10	11	22	16	18	14
HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	13	16	19	12	16	24	16
HE BACKED UP SUBORDINATES IN THEIR ACTIONS.	15	8	35	24	12	9	14
HE DISTORTED REPORTS TO MAKE HIS UNIT LOOK BETTER.	16	4*	14	25	41	5*	42
HE COMMUNICATED EFFECTIVELY WITH HIS SUBORDINATES.	16	26	8	32	18	28	13
HE WAS AWARE OF THE STATE OF HIS UNIT'S MORALE AND DID ALL HE COULD TO MAKE IT HIGH.	16	32	14	15	3*	2*	2*
HE REWARDED INDIVIDUALS FOR A JOB WELL DONE.	19	42	11	30	1*	16	8
HE GAVE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW THE JOB SHOULD BE DONE.	20	39	27	17	24	31	40

TABLE 4 (Continued)

	ALL	JR NCOS E4,5,6	SR NCOS E6,7,8,9	JR CO GR O1	SR CO GR O2,3	JR FLD GR O4,5	SR FLD GR O6
HE WAS TECH CALLY COMPETENT TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES.	21	32	23	13	35	12	35
HE WAS EASY TO UNDERSTAND.	22	20	9	7	31	36	28
HE CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZED POOR PERFORMANCE.	23	24	31	25	30	23	5*
HE FAILED TO SHOW AN APPRECIATION FOR PRIORITIES OF WORK.	23	40	17	16	27	40	26
HE WAS APPROACHABLE.	23	6	19	8	23	30	39
HE OFFERED NEW APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS.	26	12	33	33	11	26	27
HE STIFLED THE INITIATIVE OF HIS SUBORDINATES.	26	23	33	17	31	20	30
HE REFUSED TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTIONS TO HIS SUBORDINATES.	26	16	27	13	38	31	16
HE SET THE EXAMPLE FOR HIS MEN ON AND OFF DUTY.	29	20	24	20	26	28	7
HE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL AND MORE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES.	30	34	38	22	4	24	37
HE TOOK APPROPRIATE ACTION ON HIS OWN.	30	41	10	25	19	10	10
HE FOUGHT THE PROBLEM.	30	8	40	43	8	39	34
HE LET SUBORDINATES SHARE IN DECISIONMAKING.	33	28	27	36	24	34	36
HE HESITATED TO TAKE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS.	34	6	43	38	27	14	24
HE SAW TO IT THAT PEOPLE UNDER HIM WORKED UP TO THEIR CAPABILITIES.	34	15	36	38	21	22	24
HE WAS SELFISH.	36	22	7	33	35	31	10
HE RESISTED CHANGES IN WAYS OF DOING THINGS.	36	36	39	40	38	37	33
HE CRITICIZED A SPECIFIC ACT RATHER THAN AN INDIVIDUAL.	38	30	27	36	38	42	38
HE APPROACHED EACH TASK IN A POSITIVE MANNER.	38	28	41	25	27	21	32
HE LET THE MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT KNOW WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM.	38	35	31	25	31	27	12
HE ASSIGNED IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES TO SPECIFIC TASKS.	41	37	19	33	35	38	21
HE SET HIGH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE.	42	43	37	19	31	34	31
HE DREW A DEFINITE LINE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND HIS SUBORDINATES.	43	37	42	42	43	43	43