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GUERRILLA WARFARE: CAUSE AND CONFLICT (A 21ST CENTURY SUCCESS S--ETC (1))
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Guerrilla Warfare

Cause and Conflict

Walter "R" Thomas

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**GUERRILLA WARFARE: CAUSE AND
CONFLICT**
(A 21st Century Success Story?)

by

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Captain Walter R. Thomas US Navy
Senior Research Fellow

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(It starts) **FOREWORD** *(This essay)*

Guerrilla forces have conducted irregular warfare—with varying degrees of intensity and success—in all ages and all regions of the world, from biblical times to the present. ~~Captain Thomas~~ contends that this spectre will haunt the world even more menacingly in the twenty-first century. ~~He~~ believes that an overpopulated earth, combined with the failure of governments to meet the social needs of their people, is driving the disillusioned and despairing ever more rapidly toward active participation in, or support of, guerrilla organizations.

Although this essay is oriented toward the year 2000 and beyond, the author notes that the “emotional forces which ignite conflicts” already exist in most of the underdeveloped nations and soon will jolt more advanced societies as well. Actions that national leaders might take to lower the threshold of threat and to deter the growth of guerrilla organizations are suggested, together with the observation that many of the deterrents would be difficult to implement within democratic societies.

The National Defense University circulates these ideas as part of our new Essay Series, which provide a vehicle for commentary on issues of concern to those interested in US national security.

R. G. Gard, Jr.

R. G. GARD, JR.
Lieutenant General, USA
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Captain Walter "R" Thomas, USN, wrote this essay while a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University. He received a Bachelor's degree in Naval Science from the United States Naval Post-Graduate School and a Master's degree in International Affairs from George Washington University. He also is a graduate of the Naval School of Command and Staff, the US Naval War College, and The National War College. A naval aviator, Captain Thomas has served in numerous flight units, including assignments as Commanding Officer of Reconnaissance Squadron Four and Operations Officer of the helicopter carrier, USS OKINAWA (LPH-3) in Vietnam. His shore duty has included an assignment as Professor of Naval Science at the University of Nebraska and Washington assignments in the US Navy's Human Goals Program, Congressional Liaison, Politico-Military Affairs and, most recently, as Assistant Chief of Information. He is the author of two books, *From a Small Naval Observatory* and *The Compleat Pentagon Capers*, as well as numerous articles in *Navy Times*, *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, and the *Naval War College Review*. His *Essays on War* was published by the National Defense University Press in January 1981.

**“GUERRILLA WARFARE—Irregular warfare carried out
by independent bands.”**

—Webster's Third New International Dictionary

I. SYNOPSIS

We have learned the mistake of intervention in the internal affairs of others when our own vital security interests were not directly involved.¹

—President James Earl Carter

But have we learned? And what have we learned?

As predator and primate, mankind has joined in *symbolic groups*, not only to protect his "own vital security interests," but specifically to "intervene in the internal affairs of others." Often this intervention occurred only after national flags, religious banners, tribal customs, ideological charters, and language commonalities were adopted selectively by these symbolic groups to define their personal, geographic, economic, political, and ethnic boundaries. Thus the basically homogeneous species, *homo sapiens*, was divided into *competitive clans*. The great universal family of man never appeared.

In the twenty-first century, as the world's population explodes in geometric progression, the dispirited, desperate, and disenfranchised seem destined to breed a quantum increase in their clan numbers; and this population explosion will occur at a time when a resource poor world can offer only an ever smaller percentage of mankind any hope for a life of rising expectations.

As human beings overpopulate the earth, first by one and then by two billion more people per decade, the real Malthusian struggle to survive might bind clans more closely to their symbols—for in despair only symbols and ideologies may seem to embody the imperatives that are worth fighting for when living standards universally decay.

What form might this struggle for survival take? Perhaps the rise of well armed guerrilla bands, a frequent occurrence during the last half of the twentieth century, might set the course for future conflicts. Guerrilla warfare, under the control of militant clan leaders, often has been waged successfully.

Guerrilla warfare, bullet for bullet, man for man, and yard for yard may be the most effective type of clan warfare ever waged. Its goals are simple, its targets limited, its terrain familiar, its results immediate, and its satisfactions personal. It contains a sense of adventure, a spirit of devotion, and the thrill of the hunt. The guerrilla can see and feel and savor his individual victory in a way organized combatants seldom know.

Although often conducted by poorly trained, irregular native groups, guerrilla warfare always has had a demoralizing and destabilizing influence on structured military forces. Guerrillas are the bane of the professional soldier. Guerrillas are the faceless death encountered where hazard no longer should exist—the already conquered terror that approaches stealthily again and again after it has been judged fairly subdued in combat.

Advancing armies, seasoned by frontal attacks, are conditioned to enjoy their victories once the field has been won. The presence of guerrillas never permits this sense of fulfillment, this permanent security, this finality of battle to prevail. There can be neither rest nor relaxation for the conqueror in a land where guerrillas roam.

It is worthwhile to examine briefly the history of guerrilla warfare, as well as the success rate for modern guerrillas against standing military forces, before projecting the future for this type of warfare in the twenty-first century—for it is through their favorable encounters that guerrillas are encouraged to pursue their goals—and it is their successes that inspire other symbolic clans to adopt their methods and emulate their tactics.

With this latter proposition in mind, it seems desirable to analyze

recent editorials, news stories, comments, observations, and opinions concerning issues and events which might encourage guerrilla warfare, to determine if a world pattern seems to be emerging as the twenty-first century approaches. If the past be prologue, then the present may be even more valuable in forecasting the immediate future.

It also is important to review the goals of modern guerrillas. Are their goals economic, territorial, ideological, political, or religious? Often guerrilla goals are a combination of these factors—although the initial impetus for their group to form may have been solely emotional. Guerrilla *causes* can ignite *conflicts* from sparks of oppression, hatred, jealousy, belief, or greed. Although guerrillas sprouted from such varied emotional seeds throughout history, today's guerrilla crop is more likely to be politically oriented, striving for both international recognition and legitimacy.

On occasion guerrillas have gained such legitimacy when reconstituted as government forces. This transfiguration occurred with the Red Units in the Soviet Union after World War I, and with Castro's mountain bands in Cuba more recently. Guerrillas also can be designated unilaterally as armies under the auspices of bitter political opponents. One example occurred in Chad in 1980 when "The fighting renewed between the private armies of President Goukouni Oueddi and Defense Minister Hisssein Habre as warring factions broke a cease fire just hours after it was signed."²

Whether private armies, mercenaries, terrorists, militants, liberationists, revolutionaries, freedom fighters, irregulars, gangs, or gunmen, all such groups seem to have two guerrilla characteristics—they advocate a *cause* and introduce a *conflict* into a world already disordered.

Why might it be anticipated that an overpopulated earth will entertain many more guerrilla organizations in the future? Part of the answer is that the proliferation of automatic weapons and other sophisticated tools of lethality are currently more readily available to those who believe themselves to be either politically disenfranchised or unfairly shorted of resources in an affluent world. The use of modern weapons might become an attractive method for clan leaders to adopt to redress their grievances, both real and imagined.

Another concern is that governments may find themselves ever less able to govern; that is, they may not be able to meet their

economic commitments to their own societies or even fund the forces necessary to maintain control when discontent is twinned with expanding populations. An increase in the intensity of internal problems such as political dissension, economic dissatisfaction, massive urban growth, widespread unemployment, government sponsored brutality, or the presence of new immigrant herds also may provide an impetus for guerrilla bands to form.

These are the issues that will be examined in the following sections to ascertain whether guerrilla warfare is a worthwhile issue to address in the twenty-first century.

NOTES

1. "Right Man for the Long Pull," *The Washington Post*, 20 December 1979, p. A15.
2. "Heavy Firing in Chad Stalls U.S. Evacuation," *The Washington Post*, 24 March 1980, p. A24. The report added that the "latest clashes were believed to have caused many civilian African casualties—as the two sides turned the city into a battle zone." This lack of control often is indicative of the guerrilla's contempt for the rules of warfare with regard to civilians. On the same day it also was reported that irregular forces "killed 25 peasants 40 miles north of the capital of San Salvador." (With regard to Central America, *Time* magazine (18 August 1980) described the entire area as "The Land of the Smoking Gun.")

II. HISTORICAL AZIMUTH

Successful guerrilla movements are characterized by support from rural populations, a sense of unity in a common cause, and a broad area of operations in the interior of the country which is difficult to traverse.¹

Major R. D. Paprowicz

In the fourteenth chapter of Genesis, "the interior of the country which is difficult to traverse" is the Vale of Siddim where slimepits bogged down the armies of Sodom and Gomorrah. Before they were halted, however, those armies had captured many Israelite prisoners, including Lot, the nephew of Abram who was a tribal leader. Using guerrilla tactics, Abram subsequently armed his rural kinsman and servants, followed the enemy and when the opportunity arose, "attacked by night and smote them, and brought [back] Lot, and his goods, and the women also."²

Historians relate many similar instances of Biblical leaders gathering their own familial forces, together with the poor and discontented around them, to form guerrilla bands to redress personal or political wrongs. Guerrilla warfare has thus ever seated itself in the councils of conflict.

Guerrilla activities merely jogged along the historical path from Biblical times to World War II. The Maccabees harassed the Syrian

army, the Roman irregulars raided Hannibal's troops, the Germanic tribes overran the Roman outposts, and the ubiquitous Vikings pillaged European seacoasts. Robin Hood, perhaps the most dramatized leader of guerrilla bands, even bestowed an aura of splendor and grace on what is fundamentally a most vicious enterprise.

In earlier days, the line between politics and property was often thinly drawn. Many feudal lords, citizens' bands, and Crusader Knights who armed for cause, settled for plunder. The predatory raids of nobles often were as vicious as those of marauders and pirates—and attacks against merchants, villagers, river settlers, and coastal citizens in Europe 1,000 years ago were strikingly similar to the guerrilla tactics used today.

Guerrilla forces, or bands of brigands as they often were labeled after the Middle Ages, harassed national armies for centuries in Wales, Scotland, Ireland, Sicily, Greece, Germany, Switzerland, Hungary, Croatia, and Russia. Indeed, the history of Eastern and Western Europe, depicted typically by Wat Tyler's earlier peasant rebellion in England in 1381, reflected the succusatory tension and economic oppression that often resulted in European insurrections. Guerrilla warfare, then as now, often seemed to flow from the torrent of the occasion.

From the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries, mounted mercenaries, often with loose allegiances to crowns and countries, frequently used guerrilla techniques when operating widely in both Europe and Asia while—during the latter period—American Indians (often hired by the British and French) massacred white settlers and enemy tribes alike in guerrilla-like excursions. In fact, guerrilla warfare in the form of feudal rebellion, terrorism, mercenary employment, and banditry afflicted a good part of the world as formless violence progressively invented the longbow, crossbow, rifle, and cannon to express its lethal fervor.

Prior to World War II, guerrilla tactics were exceptionally primitive. Sometimes the guerrilla fought for his freedom or that of his clan members, but more often he battled for gain, survival, or revenge. His real objective, in most early instances, was merely to prosper. His political concerns were thought of—if they were thought of at all—as localized opportunities to unseat the immediate tyrant, usually the feudal lord or master of the manor. The availability of weapons that

could be combined with the impulse of indignation to overthrow national governments was yet to come.

During the American Revolution, as individual arms became more sophisticated, groups such as Morgan's Rifles and the Swamp Foxes (under Francis Marion), using more accurate "squirrel" guns, were two of the more successful guerrilla groups assisting the Continental Army in the war for independence. Shortly thereafter the peasants of Paris, though less well armed, also banded together in 1789 as the Americans had done earlier to demonstrate how irregulars could overthrow the forces of empire as the world entered the nineteenth century.

Napoleon, generally considered a master strategist, neglected to absorb the lessons of guerrilla warfare. Spain, and later Russia, were clouds whose opacity darkened Napoleon's military brilliance. When his troops invaded Spain, Napoleon relearned that road blocks, raids, assassinations, and flank attacks could drain the incentive from a national army. His forces in Iberia operated in a land where "small armies would be beaten and large armies would starve." The Spanish, although well assisted by Wellington's army, gradually attrited Napoleon's forces by denying them local provisions and killing French soldiers whenever they deployed in small groups. The Peninsula War had taken a shapeless form.³

In 1804 another decisive guerrilla victory over French forces in Haiti by native Haitians and slaves helped that nation to achieve an early independence from European power in the new world. Once again, guerrilla tactics, together with the inhospitable climate and difficult terrain, weakened the will of the French forces until they withdrew their control from the island. In Europe, Christian guerrillas overthrew their Islamic governors in Serbia (1815), Greek insurgents defeated the Turks (1829), and throughout the nineteenth century the Tyrolean mountaineers maintained their independence by using guerrilla tactics, despite major initiatives to subdue them.

In each of these instances the guerrillas found a *cause* to guide them and conditions of *conflict* favorable for their struggle. From the time of the American Revolution onward, hatred of foreign domination seemed to become the cohesive force which sustained several ragged guerrilla forces through the savagery of irregular war. Guerrilla successes, of course, led to the development of antiguerrilla tactics.

Further on into the nineteenth century, according to Lewis Gann, a student of partisan conflicts, "Algeria became the nursery for French antiguerrilla warfare experts." In retrospect, the French actually seem to have reverted to Roman tactics of crop destruction and reprisal to defeat Algerian tribesmen, rather than to have developed any new techniques of antiguerrilla warfare. Similar antiguerrilla methods also were later employed by the British against the Boers in South Africa, for it was, in the end, the destruction of the Boer farms and the incarceration of the Boers in prison camps that helped the British to achieve their victory.⁴

Meanwhile, during the nineteenth century, Chinese war lords, Algerian nomads, South American natives under Simon Bolivar, and various African tribes also were waging guerrilla wars against European masters with as much primitive skill, imagination, cunning, and weaponry as they could muster. Often harsh terrain, debilitating climate, surprise, mobility, native support, good intelligence on enemy movements, and the guerrilla ability to select the time of *conflict* aided the cause. The "dispersal tactic"—the capacity to dissolve into the population instantly—was then, and is now, an incalculable strength for the guerrilla warrior.

This symbolic strength, perhaps more than any other characteristic, has sustained guerrillas from the pre-Christian era of Judas Macabbaeus to the atomic age. With the sufferance of the people with whom they live, and often for whom they fight and die, this "breed of men who cannot come to terms with peace," live literally in and on the land.⁵

This "breed of men" also usually follow those basic rules of engagement outlined in Sun Tzu's ten commandments for guerrilla warfare, written about 600 B.C. Of course, modern-day guerrillas also have adopted political restraints and coercive diplomacy in dealing with their foes. Additionally, in the past few decades, many academic check lists have been published for successful guerrilla warfare, including the rules set down by Che Guevara (Latin America) and Vo Nguyen Giap (Vietnam). Nevertheless, the guidelines of Tzu, established over 2,500 years ago, still seem to remain as the basic tenets of successful guerrilla operations.

All warfare is based on deception. When capable, pretend incapacity. When active, feign inactivity. When close at hand, make it appear you are far away, when far away, that you are near. Offer

the enemy bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. While he concentrates, prepare against him; whenever he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally forth when he does not expect you.⁶

The low-intensity warfare guerrillas wage requires them to husband their strength until the time, the objective, the anticipated loss rate, and the support of the populace present them with the best odds for victory. Given contemporary advantages in communications, weapons, food supplies, and transportation, guerrillas have proliferated during the post-World War II years to a degree that they first helped to expunge the stain of colonialism from the carpet of history, and are now starting to turn their efforts toward establishing governments that they may rule. But their earlier struggles against foreign domination were not as favorably concluded.

As the twentieth century opened, the jungle fighters of the Philippines under Don Emilio Aguinaldo initiated a style of guerrilla warfare against American occupation troops that the forces of the United States would struggle against frequently in Latin America in the 1920s and in Vietnam in later years. Aguinaldo shipped his weapons from place to place in caskets and hearses, dressed his urban terrorists in women's clothing, disguised his warriors as peasants, burned Filipino crops and villages to prevent their capture by American forces, and tortured prisoners as a common practice. The Philippine Insurrection terminated when Aguinaldo was captured in 1902.

During the period of American domination over the Philippines, excellent medical programs and new industries were introduced into Philippine society. However, American governors never attempted to enhance the quality of native life by redistributing the land held by absentee landlords. As a result, guerrilla warfare has never ended there. Today the situation may be even more aggravated, since foreign ownership of choice Philippine farmland actually has doubled since 1930. As in other areas of the world, guerrilla warfare in the Philippines over foreign land holdings is not likely to be resolved peacefully. Additionally, President Marcos still has to subdue the Moros, Muslims, and New People's Army, who exacerbate an already volatile society.

The struggle for native ownership of land always has been one of the elements that instigates guerrilla wars. During this century the

landless warriors of Zapata in Mexico, Sandino in Nicaragua, Abdel Krim in North Africa, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, and of at least ten other guerrilla leaders in Latin America today have adopted "land and liberty" as their shibboleth. In fact, in May 1980, one of the first declaratory acts of the new revolutionary government in El Salvador was to distribute land to the campesinos in 14-acre parcels.

Slogans such as "living room," "land, bread, and peace," and "one land, one church, one tongue" historically have served both dictatorial and guerrilla causes and stirred the populace to conflict. Perhaps this is because those who work the soil resent landlord profits. There seems to be such a personal risk and challenge in the annual battle with the earth that those who toil are reluctant to share their agricultural victory with those whom they consider to be monetary vultures. This close association with the land may be one of the reasons that forced collectivization, and even corporate farming, has never proved as productive as the land cultivated and tended by its owners—and why the promise of "land for all" is the Holy Grail which often sustains guerrillas in their quest.

The battle for land and liberty continues. Absentee landlords and corporate owners actually have increased their holdings in many nations. For example the once bubbling spirit of Camp David lost its effervescence when the Israeli government, in March 1980, expropriated 1,000 acres of land in East Jerusalem, 68 percent of it owned by Arabs. In general, truly free societies have not evolved in the latter part of the twentieth century, despite the demise of European and American influence over Latin American, African, and Asian nations. The result of all too many independence movements has been to install as leaders native totalitarian rulers who have dispensed neither land nor liberty. Political expediency has written sorrowful legends in the underdeveloped areas.

Guerrilla warfare may be expected to continue with more intensity, in more areas, and for more reasons than ever before. Regarding the effect of guerrilla activity on the developed nations, it might be worthwhile to recognize that massive emigration, both legal and illegal, already has begun to encumber the more Elysian empires—as the recent influx of immigrants into the United States and the Western European nations tends to confirm.

Will the more affluent nations always be capable of suppressing guerrilla activities? Recently, former President Richard Nixon stated:

One characteristic of advanced civilizations is that as they grow richer and fatter, they become softer and more vulnerable. Throughout history the leading civilizations of their time have been destroyed by barbarians, not because they lacked wealth or arms, but because they lacked will.⁷

In the future the lack of will, or even the understandable inability of industrialized countries to satisfy the rising expectations of immigrants and minority groups, may spawn new discontented bands that, in turn, are likely to generate guerrilla-like conflicts. Such a scenario most probably will occur in advanced nations when twenty-first century demographic growth becomes a socially insoluble problem and hunger becomes an international catastrophe. It is then that the regularity of misery may make chaos groan.

Of course, political and economic vulnerabilities exist within *new* governments as well, many of which have come into power in the past decade. Additionally, oppressive measures and personal greed also are characteristics embraced by the leaders of some recently structured nations. When viewed from a historical azimuth many internal disputes tend to indicate—all too often—that revolutions rotate 360 degrees.

NOTES

1. Major R. D. Paprowicz, ACSC, "Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders," (Washington, D.C.: SAFOI, the Pentagon, August 1976), p. 31.
2. Genesis 14:15.
3. Lewis Gann, *Guerrillas in History* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 17. Gann adds that organized armies are subject to morale problems as they bog down in poverty-stricken countries—an observation which is also made by writers who analyzed the problems of front line soldiers in Vietnam.
4. Ibid, p. 35.
5. Irwin R. Blacker, *Irregulars, Partisans, Guerrillas*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 2. Blacker notes that guerrilla warfare has been

revolutionized by three new developments—the radio, airplanes, and efficient weapons.

6. Carleton Beals, *Great Guerrilla Warriors* (New Jersey Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 8.

7. Richard Nixon, "An Elite Without Will Threatens America's Future." *The Washington Post*, 20 April 1980, p. D1. (He added that, "in the West the leaders of intellectual fashion were so infatuated with the romance of guerrilla revolution that they closed their eyes to its gore and saw only its glory.")

III. THE DEMISE OF DEMOCRACY'S DYNASTIES

The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.

—George Washington

Earth's many societies, still so often viewed in terms of "animosity or affection" by the superpowers, are fast becoming inured to the operative threats and blandishments of both the United States and the Soviet Union—not because of those societies' immunity to such pontifications, but because they seem to have little meaning. Perhaps, in a world of increasing poverty, uncontrolled birth rates, and diminishing resources, many small countries realize that their close affiliation with Gulliver does not seem either to endanger or enhance lives within their Lilliputian communities.

Conversely, throughout most of the nineteenth century, and until World War II, the major powers often were the sole influence on the societies of underdeveloped areas, many of which were still colonies or mandates. During most of that period, the French dominated about 70 percent of Africa, parts of the Middle East, and much of Indo-China; the British controlled almost the rest of the Middle East, Malaysia,

sections of Africa, and all of India; and, the United States, after the Spanish-American War, ruled the Philippines and had considerable leverage in the Caribbean and in Central America. However, *before* World War II, guerrilla bands lacked the mobility, weaponry, and communications to challenge foreign domination forcefully. The colonialists also divested the colonies of leadership as the most competent natives were recruited as civil servants or indigenous troops within the forces of the controlling nation.

The proposed solutions of colonial rulers in their confrontations with nationalistic guerrilla leaders *after* World War II were, too often, based on the above assumptions; but the assumptions were no longer as valid as they had been in earlier years. What had changed the concepts of guerrilla warfare?

In Africa, *prior* to World War II, French forces and weapons were sufficient to quell rebellions, pacify tribes, construct bridges and highways, and clear the path for expansion in much the same way as the US Army had helped to colonize the western United States. According to Colonel Pons, a student of Algerian guerrilla warfare who is currently on active duty with the French Army, the tactics developed by the French troops in Algeria helped to set the pattern for similar situations around the world.

Basically, it consisted of establishing a network of strong points on carefully selected sites in order to control the activities of the most turbulent tribes, to offer logistical support of mobile troops, and to permit the safe implantation of prosperous colonization villages.'

The French program could not be implemented without bloody conflict, and the native tribes, as with the American Indians, fought many guerrilla-like battles which were doomed to defeat because of the lack of weapons, unity, and external support.

After World War II, the proliferation of weapons, together with the proclaimed ideologies of democracy and communism, and the heralded principles of self-government and independence, generated impatience among the native leaders and educated elite throughout the colonial world. For France this dissatisfaction was exemplified in the formation of the "Front de Liberation Nationale" (FLN) in Algeria and the "Viet Minh" in Tonkin and Hue. These groups initiated two decades of guerrilla warfare that might be viewed historically as the decolonization period of the French Empire.

In Algeria, guerrilla bombings, assassinations, and raids were conducted by FLN leaders who were now well armed, organized and trained. By 1950, the FLN represented by a favorable eight-to-one ratio over European settlers a native people whose culture, religion, and standard of living were far removed from that of the European settlers who had come to regard Algeria both as their homeland and private preserve.

As guerrilla activities expanded, despite the pacification programs initiated by French political and military leaders, the final outcome was determined when the Arab nations threw their support to the FLN in 1954. Eventually, the French were forced into massive military operations which were financially impractical. When President de Gaulle approved the Evian Agreements in 1962, "Afrique du Nord Francaise" was free.

In Indo-China the first major attacks by Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas were launched against French garrisons throughout Vietnam in 1946. Once again the French attempted to use pre-World War II anti-guerrilla tactics. They planned to isolate and destroy guerrilla sanctuaries, pacify the countryside, and enlist friendly natives in the "battle against communism." Although some of these objectives were achieved, Chinese support for the Viet Minh guerrillas (as with Arab support for the Algerians) influenced the outcome.

Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas not only could blend in with the population, but they also had military training, substantial amounts of modern weapons, financial support from neighboring states, familiarity with munitions and explosives, knowledge of the harsh terrain, prepared sanctuaries, good communications equipment, adequate food supplies, and enough transportation to provide the mobility needed in their strikes. They also had a *cause* which had nurtured them during years of foreign domination by the Chinese, Japanese, and French; so their fight for self-government was a *conflict* which they were determined to win regardless of the time involved.

Although the natives rejoiced in Algeria and Indo-China once the colonial era was over, their guerrilla heroes soon imposed dictatorial and oppressive measures on their own citizens, for whom the guerrilla revolutions were waged. As poverty levels remain stagnant, as populations expand, as starvation claws through the land, as torture becomes commonplace, and as free expression is constrained, it is likely that some of these new leaders will discover that the tactics

which brought them to the peak will be used to push them off the precipice.

The major nations should have learned from the French experiences that guerrilla warfare is no longer a matter of putting down a minor insurrection of ill-equipped, poorly trained, and disorganized irregulars. In Algeria and Vietnam guerrilla warfare became a matter of confronting an ever increasing mass of externally supported and determined armies of the night, capable of using the finest weapons available in the world today. Of France's ventures against guerrillas from 1946 to 1964, Colonel Pons stated:

It demonstrated the vanity of the use of force without real determination, or alternative plan, the fragility of alliances, the emergence of new powers, and the importance of international consensus.²

After World War II, the British also tried to counter the new style of guerrilla war in Africa and Asia. However, unlike the French forces in Algeria and Indo-China, British troops did not usually construct fortified outposts throughout the countryside to await assaults. The tactics of employing far-ranging army patrols, used a century earlier to put down revolts on the Northwest Frontier and in the Sudan, were more successful methods for countering provincial chaos. Additionally, the British use of native troops (at least until the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in 1952), had assured internal security reasonably well against guerrilla attacks during the period between the two World Wars.

The British also operated with the view that early disengagement dilutes disasters. They withdrew from Aden, Oman, Palestine, Singapore, and Malaysia before most of the post-World War II guerrilla activities evolved. This policy helped to avoid protracted conflicts where the British might have been required to commit their army in force or, at the very least, to extricate troops from untenable positions. Of course, their efforts at peacekeeping in Cyprus and Northern Ireland were not as successful because the British, as with the French in Indo-China, lacked terminal objectives.

In Kenya, and later in Malaya (after the newly independent Malayan government requested assistance), the antiguerrilla tactics the British employed included close control over food supplies, as well as the creation of psychological and physical barriers between the

guerrillas and the native population. Dennis Duncanson, an author of guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia, in his paper on "The British Experience," presented at Loyola University in 1979, noted:

In Malaya, sections of the rural population were required to pull down their scattered huts and rebuild them closer together behind barbed wire; they then were subjected temporarily to a strict regime of food control, prohibited from taking food to work in a field, plantation or mine lest, out of sight, it might be appropriated by guerrillas, and even in the village there would be a communal kitchen and a ban on cooking at home.³

Similar control measures were used in Kenya against the Mau Mau, although it may be worthwhile to note that the cruelty and torture practiced as a matter of course by the Mau Mau were matched in terroristic intensity by local antiguerrilla forces. This policy of brutal intimidation might not have been tolerated by British political leaders if it had been portrayed by television reporters. Roving electronic eyes later accentuated American activities in Vietnam.

Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands also retained colonies in Africa and other areas until World War II. Since the natives lacked weapons, education, communications, mobility, military training, and unity of purpose, the Europeans had no difficulty in supervising those African peoples, who were often and incorrectly referred to as "the white man's burden." In light of the influential bloc vote which African nations control in the General Assembly of the United Nations today, one may forget that, until 1957, there were only four independent countries south of the Sahara—South Africa, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sudan.

The involvement of the United States in colonialism, though not extensive, proved neither profitable nor satisfying. Although the Philippines remained quiescent under the blanket of the American flag, the generations which followed Aguinaldo forever revered his name and his fight for independence. His guerrilla warfare against the United States is considered an honorable phase of Philippine history. Had the United States not adopted the British tactic of withdrawing in peace and granting that long-promised independence, it would have unleashed a brutal period of guerrilla war throughout the archipelago after World War II.

Other campaigns involving guerrilla skirmishes for the US Army and Marine Corps took place in Latin America between World War I

and World War II, but in every instance the United States withdrew after achieving its limited objectives. In truth, the US military had little experience with the type of massive guerrilla confrontations that it was to face in later years in Vietnam.

During the colonial period, the world's democracies seemed to impose their rule with serious attention to the human rights of the people they controlled. Perhaps native historians, writing of that era, will disagree vehemently; but, the medical, religious, educational, and public welfare projects initiated by the advanced nations in their overseas possessions were well intentioned. It also seems apparent that today's world is not as ready to confront the question of human rights as formidably as did many colonialist governments.

Today, former guerrilla chiefs in the guise of political leaders impose the most inhumane acts on native populations. In almost every area of the world there are those native guerrillas in control of governments who have appointed themselves to positions as lifetime emperors. Such regimes, after achieving independence, have too often replaced benevolent colonialism with blanket cruelty. However, as in Equatorial Guinea, El Salvador, Uganda, and Afghanistan, the resolute repression imposed on their people by such leaders provides the tinder for the firebox of new internal conflagrations.

As such unstructured conflicts continue, it also is likely that some of the more stable societies, which consider themselves among the more urbane members of the world community, will be challenged by those who were long thought to be docile outcasts of civilization. One example of an area where change is likely to occur through guerrilla warfare is in the Union of South Africa. The Boer Empire is slipping glacier-like into the black sea of African independence. Early in the twenty-first century the native majority should comprise over 90 percent of the population of South Africa. Under these projected circumstances, regardless of Afrikaner determination and superior weaponry, the white rulers may be doomed to experience what Swinburne termed "the divine right of insurrection." Here, most certainly, guerrilla warfare has become obligatory for black Africans.

Unless the South African government soon actively pursues a Rhodesian-like solution, which is anathema to many white South Africans, the rise and effect of future guerrilla activities might force a decision on political leaders that could have been better adopted voluntarily. More and more, black Africans who are not equally

represented in African governments soon will become equally armed. The other consideration is that the guerrillas are likely to be sponsored and supported financially by communists who are well aware of the mineral riches in South Africa, not to speak of its superior strategic position at the world's petroleum crossroads.

If the South African government topples in an Algerian-like disintegration of its transferred culture, all of Southern Africa may be subjected to guerrilla warfare. Coups and countercoups may permeate the continent for decades. Such confrontations there, as well as in the Middle East, surely will result in competitive support for guerrilla activities by the United States and the Soviet Union, together with those nations allied with the superpowers. Under these circumstances, the intensity of guerrilla warfare, fueled by weapons from the industrialized nations, rising populations, debilitating poverty, massive unemployment, and institutionalized injustice might flame out of international control. Frank Trager, Professor of International Affairs at New York University, noted in his 1979 writings on communist-inspired guerrilla wars that:

The only difference between high and low intensity warfare is the means, both qualitative and quantitative, employed to achieve the intended goal. Both types of war require analysis and forecasting, both require volumes of preparation of varied manpower and material, both require the political sagacity to acquire and hold allies and friends so that the obvious preponderance of one's own side hopefully acts as a deterrent to any combination in opposition.⁴

However, since guerrilla warfare is often considered "low intensity" conflict, it is questionable whether any "deterrent" policy can be constructed which might be universally applicable. In a world where future shocks are initiated not by the major powers, but by the volcanic eruptions of over one hundred smaller nations venting discontent, the demise of democracy's dynasties may have accounted for both the end of colonization and the beginning of habitual guerrilla war.

NOTES

1. Jacques L. Pons, Colonel, French Army, "The French Experience," an unpublished paper presented at Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, 16 November 1979, p. 7. (In personal conversation, Colonel Pons indicated that both the French and the Belgians plan to use intervention forces staged from Europe to protect their interests and overseas residents in Africa. He also notes in his paper that about "1,000 modern weapons were captured" in the 1979 Zaire operation).
2. Ibid., p. 27.
3. Dennis Duncanson, "The British Experience," an unpublished paper presented at Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, 17 November 1979, p. 31. (Reminiscent of Laotian sanctuaries used by the Viet Cong against US forces, Mr. Duncanson noted that "unless a guerrilla enemy employing Leninist tactics from a cross-frontier sanctuary can be wiped out in his base area, he cannot be deterred by losses to his fully expendable front-line forces").
4. Frank Trager, "Low Intensity Conflict: U.S. and Soviet Responses," an unpublished paper presented at Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, 18 November 1979, p. 37.

IV. MERCHANDISING GUERRILLA WARS

Give arms to all men who offer an honest price for them without respect for persons or principles—to capitalist and socialist, the Protestant and Catholic, to burglar and policeman, to black man, white man and yellow man, to all sorts and conditions, all nationalities, all faiths, all follies, all causes and all crimes.¹

—George Bernard Shaw

Arms sales often are in the van of the American Friendship Train as it crosses the frontiers of other nations. John Hamer, writing on weapons purchases in his book *World Arms Sales* stated: "From 1950 to 1975, about 41 percent of all American military exports were weapons and ammunition."²

High industrial employment at home, favorable political relations, and a positive trade balance provide much of the rationale for these US arms sales. Negative arguments to this trade, while ethical, do not substitute for the economic and foreign policy benefits believed to accrue.

The United States is far from alone. Competition in arms sales is fierce among all industrial nations. Both overt and covert deals are made with the Third World by democracies, dictatorships, and communist states to influence neutral nations favorably or to assure that a friendly government in power remains in power.

How extensive are arms sales? The World Bank has estimated that global arms expenditures in 1977 were about \$400 billion. How does this relate to guerrilla warfare?

There is always the risk that in selling weapons to friendly leaders they will be overthrown and that all arms will fall into the hands of either unfriendly guerrilla forces or newly installed, antipathetic governments. Indeed, the discouraging regularity of such events has allowed some very sophisticated weapons to reach guerrillas in many regions. As an example, the Soviet AK-47 automatic rifle, always a hot sales item, has become the international Saturday Night Special, with about 55 million of them now loose in an overstimulated world. On 18 July 1980, *The New York Times* reported:

"There's never been a rifle as widely used as this one," a Beirut arms dealer said, patting the butt of a Kalashnikov (AK-47). "And with good reason; nothing beats it for reliability." The Kalashnikov assault rifle has become the favorite weapon of guerrilla movements the world over since it was first adopted by the Soviet Army in 1947.³

Further, no one who has read *Armada* or *International Defense Review* could miss the attractive advertisements for Swiss anti-aircraft guns, Italian helicopters, Czechoslovakian automatic rifles, Polish tanks (on surplus sale) or Sweden's Saab aircraft—and these nations are relatively minor contributors to the arms trade. John Hamer further noted:

The Czechs are widely regarded as perhaps the most ruthless arms salesman. Their government-sponsored company, Omnipol, will sell arms to terrorists, guerrillas or almost anyone else who can pay the price.⁴

Is it surprising, with the profits to be made, that bribery, secret bank accounts, special commissions, political corruption, and middle-man payoffs have attracted international criminals who buy and sell arms indiscriminately in the world marketplace? Arms sales competitiveness among entrepreneurs is not likely to be less pathological than the competition for arms purchases which exists among the distinguished members of the United Nations.

The world's leaders have not yet demonstrated a humane urge to join in an arms sales moratorium, thus any hope of controlling the flow of weapons to guerrillas may be illusory. The future danger is in the

advanced weapons that are proliferating. Antiaircraft and antitank missiles have appeared in the caches of irregular forces in many volatile areas; and, since every society has its tinkerers, the innovative construction of similar arms could become a cottage industry in the next few decades. Therefore, if national leaders are to remain secure in the twenty-first century, their internal security forces might have to confront technically advanced guerrillas who have the wizardry to wage limited warfare with weapons yet unborn.

If guerrilla bands are solely cash-oriented, banks, businesses, and industries might require massive protection. The use of arms by guerrillas for economic enterprises should not be expected to be less chaotic than the world trade in them. Conversely, advocates of global arms trade, one of the largest and most profitable businesses that exist today, argue that new arms permit underdeveloped nations to protect themselves from external aggression, maintain internal security, and assure government stability. But do they?

There may be equally valid counterarguments that arms sales to weaker nations do little for them except to provide prestige for their political leaders and supply rolling stock for military reviews. Weapons purchases by the poorer countries also may generate competition and trigger neighborhood conflicts, for once arsenals and armies are on hand, the impulse to use them becomes all too attractive. Moreover, from an economic viewpoint, many smaller nations may have enjoyed about as much armed prestige as their budgets can stand.

Another concern is that arms and munitions have a way of leeching into the foothills. The most modern weapons materialize in guerrilla inventories worldwide. Rebellions and insurrections in many parts of Africa, Latin America, and Asia are examples of locales where those who believe that their cause is just are using the newer weapons to wage guerrilla warfare against their unjust fellows.

As one example, the New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines has been harassing the government of President Marcos with modern weapons for the past decade (1970-1980). Henry Bradsher, writing in *The Washington Star-News* in 1974 stated that "A map of the Philippines marked with NPA appearances looks like measles."⁵

Recently, in 1980, *The Washington Post* reported from Johannesburg:

Guerrillas attacked a police station causing heavy damage. South African police sources said the station house, in a white suburb, was hit by rocket grenades and raked by automatic weapons.⁶

Where do guerrillas obtain the sophisticated arms to sustain themselves, or conduct raids on established law officials? How is it that modern arsenals are stocked by the Irish Republican Army, the Sandanistas, the Polisarios, the NPA, the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Brigade, the PLO, the Colombian terrorists, the Japanese Red Army, and the Iranian militants? Perhaps it is relevant that the weapons they are using are seldom home grown. They are the purchased, stolen, traded, or recovered-from-the-dead implements which were produced originally for government forces through international trade—a trade which is both legitimate and ever more lucrative.

Further, modern weapons have become the pride of the guerrilla—the clan symbols which help to entice supporters to a professed *cause* and then involve them in subsequent *conflict*. The “merchants of death,” the Zaharoffs and Bannermans of yesteryear, at least claimed to have restricted their sales to nations. Their successors have not been as discriminate. Arms are available today to guerrilla lodges worldwide and, in future years, the earth may well be transformed by charismatic clan leaders who can link guerrilla bands into a chain of primordial power. How may these leaders obtain modern weapons?

The most direct method that accounts for arms availability worldwide is the foster-parent relationship which stimulates developed nations to the point where they itch to supply military protection to their less developed client states. As an example of what often results from national good intentions, Harald Malmgren, former US assistant special representative for arms trade negotiations, recently stated:

We intended to build independent, strong allies. We're now in a position of parents who have realized that our children have grown up.⁷

Unstated is the eventual recognition that, in their post-puberty, many developing countries have sold, traded, or allowed their lethal toys to drift into guerrilla hands through theft, carelessness, or as a result of internal conflict. Significantly, as in the case of Iran or Egypt,

sometimes the entire national arsenal has fallen under the control of a government that is no longer allied with its original supplier. Many weapons also fall under the control of various groups which are not even subject to the dictates of a central government. Such distribution, usually unforeseen, has occurred in a number of areas, including many countries formerly sponsored by both democratic and communist regimes.

Nevertheless, as crises occur, the industrial nations still seem quick to act as patrons of Pandemonium. In March 1980 the United States rushed military aid to Honduras in an effort to check the spread of violence in that nation, which was allegedly generated by its Central American neighbors. This contribution to Western Hemisphere chaos included helicopters, M-16 and M-14 rifles, grenade launchers, mortars, and other assorted producers of mayhem. At the same time:

State and Defense Department officials in congressional testimony, also asked for military aid to help El Salvador's army fight left and right wing terrorism.⁸

Such short-term programs, in the long run, beget nebulous consequences. Instant involvement in client-state politics sprinkles more and more effective weapons into troublesome areas. This may encourage guerrilla groups with potential causes to generate future conflicts in Latin America.

Almost all the underdeveloped Asian and African nations also are now the recipients of someone's lethal largesse (despite Pakistan's leader, General Zia, describing a 1980 US offer of \$400 million in arms support as "peanuts"). Currently, in the Western Sahara, Morocco has been very receptive to any support, and the United States has responded:

Concerned by the threats to Morocco, the Carter administration recently agreed to sell Hassan \$250 million worth of military equipment.⁹

This direct method of mainstreaming arms from developed nation to underdeveloped nation often seems to cause tributarial flooding in the arroyos of guerrilla warfare. For example, weapons formerly provided to Algeria and Libya by the Soviet Union suddenly appeared in the desert camps of the Polisario guerrillas who are challenging Moroccan soldiers in a Saharan war. Further, in true

contributory form, arms furnished to Saudi Arabia are rumored to have drifted into King Hassan's encampments. Another example of this proxy parentage was reported in June 1980:

Moslem insurgents in Afghanistan have started receiving modern weapons from donors outside the Soviet-occupied country The new arms may include armor-piercing artillery able to bring down Soviet helicopter gunships.¹⁰

Thus original nation to nation arms shipments, through sympathetic osmosis, often appear on either side of political membranes. This transfusion of weapons has strengthened immensely the blood lines of guerrilla movements.

Developed countries also should analyze more pragmatically their military assistance and training programs for foreign personnel. While most highly industrialized democratic and communist nations have instituted military education and advanced weapons courses to train foreign military specialists in many fields of advanced warfare, these programs may be antiproduative for the sponsors. Although one objective of these efforts is to inculcate favorable attitudes toward the host nation, the subsidiary results of such training may be to blanket the world with expertise in the use of sophisticated arms.

Consequently, the anticipated political benefits may not always be the end result—or at least not the *only* end result. For example, the techniques of warfare taught to the Chinese and the Egyptians by the Soviet Union, or to the Ethiopians and the Iranians by the United States, seem to have affected negatively the long-range security interests of the sponsoring superpower in those particular nations.

In merchandising war, nations also must consider that, in some small part, the sophisticated tactics developed for combat are contained in the minds of foreign students—and the containers may be porous. Additionally, much of the unclassified and perhaps some of the classified material used in training programs, is more likely to be adopted in a way which is suitable to the recipient rather than in a way which is intended by the sponsoring nation—and this may include the use of force against a native society. A US Army War College Study, published in 1980, noted this dilemma:

Security Assistance is a poor instrument for encouraging change in basic societal values such as democracy or human rights. . . . Security Assistance cannot assure any long term success of US programs.¹¹

What, then, might be said of arms shipments, foreign training programs, and military sales? Perhaps, with over 160 nations in the world today, the compelling urge to merchandise war in the latter half of the twentieth century may be remembered as the catalyst for world-wide guerrilla conflicts, for an overpopulated earth in the twenty-first century might spawn Spartans who have the arms to rectify both real and perceived injustices against their own societies. President Eisenhower when he addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1953 may have predicted the real effect of merchandising guerrilla wars:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed. . . . It is humanity hanging on a cross of iron.¹²

NOTES

1. George Bernard Shaw, *Major Barbara*, 1905.
2. John Hamer, *World Arms Sales*, (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, D.C., August 1976), p. 4.
3. "Me and My Kalashnikov," *The Washington Post*, 18 July 1980, p. A11. The article added that "The rifle's popularity for guerrilla warfare and urban fighting is based on its dependability in harsh conditions and its easy maintenance. A Kalashnikov changes hands at up to ten times its Beirut price, according to arms trade sources."
4. Hamer, *World Arms Sales*, p. 10.
5. "The New People's Army," *The Washington Star-News*, 2 December 1974, p. 24.
6. "South African Police Station Attacked," *The Washington Post*, 31 March 1980, p. A11.
7. "Storm Over the Alliance," *Time*, 28 April 1980, p. 13.
8. "U.S. Is Rushing Arms to Honduras," *The Washington Star*, 31 March 1980, p. A12.
9. "Saharan War Sustains, Weakens Hassan," *The Washington Star*, 30

March 1980, p. F3.

10. "Weapons Reach Afghans," *The Washington Star*, 3 June 1980, p. A18.
11. "Effectiveness of US Security Assistance in Acquiring and Retaining Friends and Allies," *Final Report* (US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 1980), p. 94.
12. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech before the American Newspaper Editors, Washington, DC, 16 April 1953.

V. MODERN GUERRILLA DIPLOMACY

If it is ever possible to characterize something so vast and complex as the world political order, a good argument can be made for the word "instability."

—Hoyt Gimlin

"Instability," quite often, *is* the news. "Ethiopia in Turmoil—Chronology of a Coup—Ireland in Crisis—Philippine Insurrection Widens—Africa in Armed Transition—Bengalis Attack Assamese—Arms for Honduran Guerrillas—Ethnics May Revolt in Yugoslavia—Rebels Cease Negotiations in Colombia—Haitians Flocking to Florida—Thai Border Feuds Among Cambodian Warlords—Ulster on the West Bank—Explosions Rock Syrian City—Saharan War Weakens Hussein—New Europe Tactics in Terrorism." That is a *one week* resume of headlines in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in 1980.

Despite almost universal condemnation, neither superpower influence, nor diplomatic will, nor forceful communications compelled Iranian militants to release American hostages—even to Iranian government leaders in Tehran. These three formerly effective elements of international intercourse neither made an impression on guerrillas nor affected world stability favorably. It may be time to recognize that there are rumpus-rooms of the world where even the

most developed nations can no longer play. Italy's Robert Ducci, retiring as Rome's ambassador to Great Britain, stated in early 1980:

My slowly creeping doubt is that we may be contemplating the beginning of the end of diplomacy—not as an art, which we will always need, but as an institution.²

As embassies are viewed more and more as targets of opportunity by guerrillas—or in whatever form terrorists may cloak themselves—the role of ambassadors is being played in the theater of the absurd. Specifically, the assassination of national representatives or their capture as hostages has become a tactic that might be expected to gain ever increasing favor as guerrillas find that this bargaining technique gains immediate attention to their demands, and world-wide press coverage for their cause. With a minimum of *conflict* guerrillas are demanding ever higher ransom. Increasingly, it is being paid.

A resume of a few of these successes, as well as the hazards encountered in embassy employment during the past decade, may better illustrate how guerrillas have turned these former sanctuaries into communities of terror.³

- December 1972. "Black September" terrorists (PLO guerrillas) take over Israeli Embassy in Bangkok.
- March 1973. PLO guerrillas sieze Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum.
- September 1973. Arab guerrillas hold hostages in Saudi Arabian Embassy in Paris.
- February 1974. PLO terrorists sieze Japanese Embassy in Kuwait.
- September 1974. Japanese terrorists take over French Embassy in The Hague.
- April 1975. Baader-Meinhof gang holds West German Embassy in Stockholm.
- September 1975. Palestinian guerrillas take over Egyptian Embassy in Madrid.
- December 1975. Molluccan terrorists sieze the Indonesian Consulate in Amsterdam.

- June 1977. Croatian nationalists capture Yugoslavian Mission in New York.
- July 1978. Arab terrorists hold Iraqi Embassy in Paris.
- March 1979. Palestinians storm Egyptian Embassy in Kuwait—and Arab students capture Egyptian Ambassador's residence in Bangladesh.
- May 1979. Guerrillas hold Venezuelan, French and Costa Rican Embassies in San Salvador.
- July 1979. PLO gunmen sieze Egyptian Embassy in Ankara.
- January 1980. Guerrillas hold Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City.

These incidents, in addition to the seizure of the hostages in Iran (1979) and Colombia (1980), and the attacks on American Embassies in Libya and Pakistan (1980), may be indicative of emerging *guerrilla diplomacy*. How successful has this tactic been?

Although guerrilla objectives have not always been achieved, guerrilla terroristic tactics have freed some political prisoners, gained at least two ransom payments of over a million dollars each, permitted guerrillas to escape to safety in more tolerant nations, and cost the lives of many embassy employees. Further, one indication that guerrillas increasingly recognize the value of these operations is that during the first three months of 1980, terrorists stormed eight embassies in Latin America alone.

The rewards of modern guerrilla diplomacy seem to have exceeded the penalties imposed on the few guerrillas who have been captured; therefore, the future hazards of embassy employment are not likely to encourage occupational fervor.

Another traditional demarcation line, crossed only on rare occasions, is the honored presumption that each country shall protect the sanctity of foreign diplomats. This vault-like premise has become unhinged. In too many instances, and in too obvious circumstances, certain governments have been dilatory in using their forces to relieve embassies under attack by native militants. It may be unfair to indict the leadership of some host nations as instigators of such perfidious acts; it is not unjust to condemn their acquiescence.

These attacks often are led by well-armed, organized groups. How and why are they allowed to participate in this activity? It could be alleged that such spare-time indulgences are methods used by the leaders of some countries to articulate hatreds and express frustrations against "economic imperialism." Such deviousness (as viewed by the more advanced nations) might be no more than a logical extension of guerrilla diplomacy. These tactics, which violate the strict diplomatic practice and custom of nations, may seem, in the minds of many newly crowned heads of state, merely a subdued means of displaying their anger toward a more affluent world. The symbol of a United States Embassy may appear as the most tempting target of opportunity when it is necessary to divert an economically frustrated society from its domestic problems.

While artfully choreographed attacks on embassies have become too common a method of expressing rage by both militant groups and government-sanctioned mobs, guerrilla diplomacy in its earlier, pregovernment stages, lacks all such subtlety. There seems to be no act of guerrilla brutality too gross for adoption. Perhaps success through terrorism is a reason why, after attaining power, some former guerrilla leaders often impose a severe internal security system within their own countries. To shield their regencies against the very forces which brought them to the throne, new leaders often authorize and encourage inhumane acts against their own people which they formerly employed against enemies.

The more democratic nations abhor such tactics. This humanity may have accounted for some of the failures in both diplomatic and limited-conflict circumstances with guerrillas that have beset the advanced societies. Part of the problem is that many countries have not recognized that in dealing with hostage situations diplomatically, there is no labyrinth as complex as the guerrilla mind.

It also is appropriate to recognize, without moral comment, that a set of dual international standards seems to exist whereby the free world press often abides the horror of guerrilla cruelties, but castigates such practices editorially when they are inflicted by anti-guerrilla forces. Public reaction to stories of terror and torture by government troops is so vehement that legal safeguards exist among the developed countries to prevent their military personnel from using certain methods of intimidation or interrogation. As an example of

strictly monitored detention limitations, the following concern was noted in May 1980:

Amnesty International accused West Germany of holding suspected and convicted terrorists in conditions that inflict serious physical and psychological damage. Prisoners convicted of crimes are routinely put in solitary confinement or in small group isolation. Douwe Korff, a Dutch researcher assigned to the study for two years admitted that some West German extremists inflict injuries on themselves for propaganda value. But he said Amnesty International believes even difficult prisoners should be treated humanely.⁴

Media and judicial indignation, while morally admirable, may be a disadvantage to the security of many nations as political, business, and military personnel worldwide are threatened, tortured, maimed, kidnapped, wounded, or killed—for these are the intelligence gathering, ransom raising, and morale destroying techniques guerrilla bands adopt as standard procedures. Further, as many guerrillas view conflict, when a captive is shot, the legality of the prisoner's status becomes moot.

What are these guerrilla acts of terrorism, and how are some of them effective diplomatically? An article in *The Washington Star* on 13 May 1980 noted:

The head of the antiterrorist police in the Venice region, Alfredo Albanese, was ambushed and shot dead by terrorists yesterday in Mestre. Albanese's principal task in recent weeks had been the search for members of Prima Linea (Frontline), a smaller and newer terrorist group.⁵

Two days later, *The New York Times* reported:

Gunmen wounded four French police guards outside the Iranian Embassy in Paris today in a bomb and submachine gun attack from a moving car. Separatists of the Corsican Liberation Front took responsibility for the early morning raid and telephoned to say that it had been directed against the oppressors of the Corsican people, not the Iranian Embassy.⁶

Similarly, a month earlier, *The Washington Post* revealed:

Armenian terrorists waiting in ambush yesterday wounded the Turkish ambassador to the Vatican. It was the *ninth* attack by the Armenian group in the capital (Rome) this year.⁷

In the case of the assassination of Alfredo Albanese, the Red Brigade was quick to claim credit for the attack, as they have been for similar acts throughout Italy, including "kneecappings," murders, and kidnappings. Their terroristic actions, while not always directed toward discrete diplomatic ends, have usually been carefully organized operations against business, political, and internal-security leaders throughout Italy. Perhaps, if one is to be successful in Italy, it would be wise to espouse the guerrilla's cause publicly. It certainly does not seem productive to oppose guerrilla bands on behalf of either the Italian government or from personal conviction.

The Corsican guerrillas, who have submachine guns, fragmentation bombs, and other modern weapons, always seem most anxious to assure the Islamic world that their attacks meticulously avoid injury or damage to any Arab persons or property. Perhaps this indicates a relationship between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Corsican guerrillas, or an affiliation accounting for weapons transfers among the PLO, communists, and the plethora of independent guerrilla movements in Europe.

In each instance, including the Armenian attack near the Vatican, weapons from Eastern Europe, either stolen, purchased, or donated by the PLO, feed successful guerrilla enterprises. That the attackers were neither captured nor injured in these three incidents tends to recommend these tactics to others as a relatively inexpensive means of *conflict* to assure that their *cause* gains considerable publicity—particularly among the colleagues of those who were the objects of guerrilla attention.

Terrorism then, albeit tangentially, is a favored tactic in guerrilla diplomacy. At a lesser level than assassinations, the resort to kidnapping, torture, and maiming are selective measures of coercion used by guerrillas to gain support, remove opposition, or impress their cause on others.

For example, when the Viet Cong cut off the arms of some Vietnamese children who had been inoculated by American medical personnel, it became apparent that neither the parents nor the children would ever again seek medical support or fraternize with Americans. Today, in other parts of Asia, as well as in Europe, Africa, and Latin America, similar mutilation and torture have been used to influence the populace to support the guerrillas. The method is brute fear—a

fear that some governments often try to match in intensity in order to at least neutralize guerrilla influence.

How is such inhumanity to be confronted successfully? The answer in the modern age of terrorism is, as diplomatic answers often are, ambivalent. Fundamentally, any nation's homage to human rights would include concern for both those held hostage by guerrillas and the guerrillas as well. This stance may be perceived by guerrillas as solely a Christian aberration, and by other nations as catering to blackmail. In viewing the world as it is, rather than as it should be, most recent arbitration efforts with guerrillas have failed. Antiguerilla diplomacy has included either the use of counterforce, with coincident danger to the hostages; acceding, at least partially, to guerrilla demands; or, a stern refusal to negotiate at all. Significantly, in recent years, consistency has not been the benchmark of any nation's policy. Let us examine three inconsistent British policies. Henry Brandon, writing in *The Washington Star* in May 1980, reported:

When the British ambassador to Uruguay, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, was captured by a local guerrilla group, the British government refused to discuss ransom. Eight months later he was released for no consideration whatsoever.⁸

Yet, Donald Robinson noted in his book *The Dirty Wars*, after the Irgun had captured three British officers in retaliation for the conviction and intended hanging of two Irgun members in 1946:

High Commissioner Cunningham granted them amnesty. After this declaration by the government, the Irgun released the British in a manner which precluded discovery of their place of detention.⁹

More recently, the British Special Air Service (SAS) in May 1980, responded to the guerrilla attack on the Iranian Embassy in London much more formidably, according to *Time* magazine (19 May 1980):

They carried submachine guns, pistols and stun grenades whose "thunderflash" blinds and deafens its victims for several seconds. They threw grenades through the back windows. Then they leaped in after the explosion.¹⁰

Perhaps, at least from analyzing the British point of view, a theorem might be derived such as "intercession in hostage situations with adequate counterforces is the best course of action on your *home*

territory." The converse corollary would be that "antiterrorist operations *abroad* against native guerrilla forces may be nonproductive." However, as previously mentioned, nations have failed to adopt any consistent diplomatic or military format for antiguerrilla tactics either at home or abroad.

The successful antiguerrilla raid by the Israelis at Entebbe airfield may have falsely encouraged other nations to plan ventures distant from their home territories. If so, the aborted long-range attempt staged by the United States to rescue the American hostages in Iran failed to endorse the overseas intercession unconditionally.

Each nation must initially determine how to confront its internal and external guerrilla problems more professionally. If twenty-first century nations are likely to be greeted with a variety of guerrilla organizations determined to overthrow societal structures, then many advanced nations may have to plan their strategies for both diplomatic and military response more considerably than they have in the past. Modern guerrilla diplomacy is a misunderstood art.

NOTES

1. Hoyt Gimlin, *Political Instability Abroad* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., August 1976), preface.
2. "Diplomacy's Dark Hours," *Time*, 24 March 1980, p. 28.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
4. "Rights Group Says Germans Isolating Terrorists in Jails," *The Washington Star*, 29 May 1980, p. C12. (The European Commission on Human Rights looked into the treatment given the late Baader-Meinhof terrorists, Andreas Baader and Gundrun Esslin, during their imprisonment in July 1978. In regard to their treatment the commission found neither the European Rights Convention nor West German law had been violated).
5. "Italian Terrorists Kill Police Official," *The Washington Star*, 13 May 1980, p. A9.
6. "Corsican Gunmen on Paris Street," *The New York Times*, 15 May 1980, p. A17.
7. "Armenian Terrorists Wound Turk in Rome," *The Washington Post*, 18 April 1980, p. A8.
8. Henry Brandon, "An Age of Terrorism," *The Washington Star*, 14 May

1980, p. A11.

9. Donald B. Robinson, *The Dirty Wars* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1968), p. 71. (Mr. Robinson also quotes General Sir John Glubb who formed the Arab Legion as declaring, "Guerrilla warfare is the logical answer to the wholesale lethal weapons of today. I do feel that our leaders have never taken this job seriously enough.")

10. "Britain's S.A.S.," *Time*, 19 May 1980, p. 43.

VI. DEMOCRACIES AND DICTATORSHIPS

Support of a dictator brings an overwhelming anti-American backlash when the dictator is overthrown.¹

—Jack Anderson

Inasmuch as the mantle of leadership is often woven from the threads of conflict, the power guerrilla leaders attain is not surrendered willingly. Human beings, as with other species of the animal kingdom, often strive fiercely to become and remain the foremost member of their troop.

Similarly, such leaders retain power only as long as they demonstrate forcefully they can maintain control—and not one moment longer. The blooded veldt bears the same witness as the warrior's Valhalla.

Leadership, then, often is a euphemism for strength. In democracies, political strength is maintained for limited periods through elective processes. Under dictatorships, the rule of the jungle is more apparent. In each system leaders maintain their positions by the means available, individual attributes of statesmanship notwithstanding.

The tendency to retain power as long as possible may be an understandable trait but it is an unacceptable one to others who

believe they are more qualified to lead kin or kind to better pasture. For political confrontations, democratic societies have produced sensible solutions: elections, by-elections, resignations, votes of "no confidence," and peaceful abdications. Conversely, more extreme measures have been adopted by guerrillas to remove dictators: assassinations, revolutions, and rebellions. Unfortunately, neither peaceful nor violent methods of solving problems now seem to contain the economic ingredients for feeding poverty-stricken nations. Haynes Johnson, in a recent *Washington Post* editorial, noted:

Another act in the old story unfolds in the Caribbean—accounts of refugees turning up on alien shores, each telling an emotional tale of suffering, of being forced to eat cats and dogs, of families broken and homes abandoned, of risks and daring. And all in the name of freedom. Cuba Libre 1980. On and on, worse and worse. The point is not which regime becomes the more barbarous, but how such actions form the incendiary material of the next revolution.²

Thus, the myth of a free Cuba is revealed as a fabrication, wherein democratic processes have been checked, private-land ownership has been denied, poverty is rampant, the economy is in chaos, and freedom is stifled.

Is the difference between democracy and dictatorship (including communism) merely one of political degree? It is important to note that generalities do not generate guerrilla wars; that is, there is no automatic support for government change because people "must abhor dictatorships" any more than people "will support democratic governments." Franco in Spain, Tito in Yugoslavia, and innumerable dictators in Latin America (and now Africa) exemplified autocratic leaders who solved internal conflicts and controlled dissension. Timing is more important than the type of government, according to Arthur Campbell, in his book *Guerrillas*:

Given a cause and suitable geography, the revolutionary must base his decision on the right moment to strike in the light of the strengths or weaknesses of the government opposed to him. If it is strong, the revolutionary might well have to wait until some event or crisis weakens it.³

Therefore, the vulnerability of a society subjects it to guerrilla warfare, not its political structure. The loss of strong leadership, poverty, unemployment, corruption, injustice, a weak economy,

government-sponsored oppression, or even widespread dissatisfaction can cause incipient discord. Where have these nocuous events recently occurred, and where have they encouraged guerrilla-like activities.

First, it is worthwhile to examine some of the once real, or ostensibly real, Third World *democracies*. In truth, many of those which exist or seem to exist in Africa, Asia, and Latin America now are under military rule. Examples of 1980 life in a few of these areas follows:

- Argentina is suffering from not two, but three-digit inflation, and a 1980 report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission accused Argentine security forces of torturing and executing thousands of political opponents.
- Bolivia, despite repeated attempts to stabilize its government since World War II, is pounded by waves of guerrilla bombings. As many as seven explosions occurred in La Paz on one day alone in May 1980.
- Brazil's vigilantes, the Mao Branco and Black Hand, reportedly operating with the tacit approval of security officials, carry out grisly killings with impunity.
- Colombian guerrillas, particularly after their successful capture of ambassadors in the Dominican Republic's Embassy at Bogota, are increasing their demands for release of other political prisoners.
- Egypt has found it necessary to ban ecclesiastical militants. Nevertheless, Egypt's 35 percent inflation rate, together with the problem of controlling 42 million citizens who exist on a per capita income of about \$300 per year, is an invitation to chaos.
- India's major problem, and southern Africa's, is birth control. For all intents and purposes it is nonexistent. Additionally, political violence, combined with the high unemployment rate among the well educated, bodes ill for the newly elected government. The voting toll in June 1980 included 54 dead and over 2,000 injured.
- Israel has intensified its always explosive confrontation with guerrillas, both on the Lebanese border and on the Israeli-occupied West Bank.
- Japan's Prime Minister Ohira was toppled in a surprise vote in May 1980 as charges of government corruption, reckless inflation, and needless defense spending were lodged against him.
- Liberia's economic woes of 1979 resulted in bloody riots that claimed 41 lives. Yet, less than one year later, diplomats and

intelligence specialists said that the 1980 coup by the Army Redemption Council was a complete surprise.⁴

- South Africa, now surrounded by native governments, has banned the African National Congress. Additionally, after the \$8 million bombings of two synthetic petroleum plants and the country's largest oil refinery in June 1980, the nation has put further repressive measures into effect rather than demonstrate any accommodation to black dissidents.
- South Korean provinces are displaying their discontent against the government's increased oppression, martial law, and obvious drift toward tight military control, through open rebellions. Thus, yet another nation seems to be confusing military order with political reason.
- Zimbabwe's white population has inundated the new democracy with requests to leave the country. Transport agents cannot handle the warehouses full of furniture. Such mass emigration could be fatal, as those who could help to strengthen that nation's economic base choose, instead, to return to Europe.

Nor is the situation in some representative dictatorships any more stable:

- Afghanistan, subjected to varying pressures by the Soviet Union for years, is now a nation fully in the throes of guerrilla warfare. Only the harshest repressive measures keep the Afghans under some semblance of political control.
- Ethiopia, one of the early independent nations of Africa, has established prison camps and, with the aid of the Soviet Union, is fighting a guerrilla war, and a battle with Somalia simultaneously.
- Haiti, a nation of endemic poverty, is now becoming a problem for the United States as an estimated 30,000 Haitians have entered the country illegally, many by way of the Bahamas which deports them as fast as possible.
- Iran, the world's leading theocracy, has been charged by Amnesty International with gross violations of human rights. According to the report, torture and executions are proceeding with increased vigor and exceed the repression which occurred under Shah Pahlevi.
- Saudi Arabia, supposedly a benevolent religious monarchy, now is facing increased pressures for change from both its educated elite and Islamic radicals. Here, the Western World

has more than a philosophical interest in the survival of the present government.

- South Yemen, subject to yet another coup in 1980, has become an embarrassment to many Arab nations because of both its Marxist beliefs and its support of the Dhofar guerrillas in neighboring Oman.
- Vietnam, where crop failures, staggering inflation, decreasing production, and enduring militarism are stifling the nation, now practically depends on the Soviet Union and COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) for its economic survival.
- Zaire's President Mobutu, who has only a tenuous hold on his nation, is confronted by a 50 percent unemployment rate, uncontrollable inflation, and widespread corruption. During one of the more dangerous periods, Mobutu was forced to hide in a white man's cellar to avoid assassination by his African brothers.⁵

Thus, Arthur Campbell's premise that conditions, rather than politics, are likely to generate guerrilla wars seems valid. Even in the most developed nations, it often seems that only the ability to maintain a strong internal security force prevents guerrillas from achieving many of their goals. Yet the forces of discontent, already endangering the Third World, but now only threatening the major powers, may someday engulf them as well. For the remainder of this century, it is not expected that the minorities of the United States, the *Parti Quebecois* of Canada, the disenfranchised Indians of southern Mexico, the Red Brigade of Italy, the Basques of Spain, the distressed minorities in the Soviet Union or the Irish Republican Army in Great Britain will overthrow their political leaders. Nor is it foreseeable that the varied hues bedecking guerrilla flags of other European nations soon will replace the banners which symbolize the strength of their host governments.

Nevertheless, all nations—democratic, socialist, communist, theocratic, and dictatorial—must consider whether the frailty of the world is likely to be further attenuated in the twenty-first century. If, as Andrew Scott contends in his book *The Revolution in Statecraft*, "instability in the international system is promoted by the emergence of new states that make excellent targets for attack,"⁶ then the susceptibility of such societies to guerrilla warfare is understandable. With about 160 nations now extant, the "instability in the international system" may degenerate, within two decades, into an ungovernable morass within both democracies and dictatorships.

NOTES

1. Jack Anderson, "Philippines: Another Iran?" *The Washington Post*, 20 April 1980, p. D7.
2. Haynes Johnson, "Libre," *The Washington Post*, 21 April 1980, p. A3. (Mr. Johnson adds that, "these episodes strike a familiar chord—the tragedy (in Cuba) of great hopes dashed, the affirmation of the human will to resist oppression.")
3. Arthur Campbell, *Guerrillas* (New York: The John Day Company, 1968), p. 288. (Mr. Campbell notes that, "The under-developed country is more exposed to prolonged guerrilla warfare because the administrative facilities so essential to the efficient operating of counter-guerrilla forces just do not exist.")
4. "Liberia President Is Killed," *The Washington Star*, 13 April 1980, p. A14.
5. William F. Buckley, "The Awful Distress of Zaire," *The Washington Star*, 1 June 1980, p. F3. (In Zaire, 1980 inflation was running at 200 percent. A quart of milk cost about \$6.00.)
6. Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 164.

VII. POVERTY'S PILGRIMAGE

The end product of endemic malaria among our people is malarial government.

—Rafael Arevalo

There are over one hundred nations now plagued with malarial governments. Poverty, pestilence, and starvation have always stalked mankind, and are rapidly gaining on their prey. As a result, Latin American, African, and Asian peoples may regard their current lives as relatively acceptable when their future becomes even more desolate and bleak. Their populations are expanding, their food supplies are dwindling, and their faint hopes are diminishing. To become enveloped in guerrilla combat may seem but another—and perhaps more endurable—threat to their existence. One indication of the increasing acceptability of rebellion as an alternative, according to Carleton Beale who examined the statistics of guerrilla warfare in his book *Great Guerrilla Warriors* (1970), is that:

Prior to World War II there were only fifteen Little Wars starting with that of Aguinaldo. Since then, a hundred and fifty coups have been wrought by guerrilla movements.¹

Easier access to modern weapons has certainly abetted recent guerrilla actions—and there have been qualitative improvements in

weaponry as well as a rampant increase in guerrilla activities since 1970. These developments, together with economic desperation and political disillusionment, have been woven into a tapestry that threatens to shroud much of mankind.

The impetus for guerrilla warfare arises from absentee ownership of arable land, governmental corruption, increased population growth, lack of food, inadequate housing, unavailable health care, injustice, oppression, torture, disease, unemployment, and casual executions. Under such conditions, guerrilla warfare may appear to be more of a mandate than an alternative. Are there alternatives?

One escape for mankind has been emigration, but this avenue has almost been choked off to human traffic. For example, the United States officially accepted only 220,000 Indochinese, Russian, African, Eastern European, Latin American, and Middle Eastern political immigrants in 1980. Western Europe also has invoked strict 1980 quotas. Yet, riots against even such modest "foreign incursions" now are taking place in developed nations.²

In 1980, the relief train feeding Cambodia has been derailed; China is being further inundated by its overseas residents escaping from Indochina; Pakistan is overwhelmed by Afghan refugees; Latin American citizens are more frequently encountering guerrilla warfare in their native lands; and, the problem of illegal immigration has become almost unsolvable in the advanced countries.

Poverty and hunger are pursuing the earth's wretched bands interminably. Although the relative affluence of the United States, Canada, and Western Europe represents economic ecstasy to the world's destitute, there is little indication that shortages of food, shelter, and clothing are likely to be remedied by the international elite. As the twenty-first century approaches, the demarcation of resources, becoming more distinct each year, will not long be accepted docilely. The widespread deprivation that even now exists is the marinade for guerrilla conflict. Perhaps it is time for mankind to examine more microscopically the kind of warfare it is engaged in.

An international vocal war is already underway. It may well be time to listen to a few of the world's more moderate *1980 complaints*:

From Africa:

—The shortages here are very, very substantial. Twenty million

people could be classified in the critical starvation category. Even with all scheduled efforts, more than 200,000 will die by September.³

From Brazil:

—Pope John Paul II said that Latin America must divide its wealth more equitably and that its inhabitants had to decide *now* whether that change would be peaceful or violent.⁴

From Cambodia:

—The level of relative health and normality to which our country now aspires is one of gross poverty and deprivation.⁵

From China:

—If both husband and wife are working, leaving early and coming back late at night, then you just don't expect anything to eat. You just bear the hunger.⁶

From Cuba:

—Many times we went hungry. Three-quarters of a pound of meat per person every nine days. Five pounds of rice per month. They kill ambition. One has to live in misery. I just couldn't live there any more.⁷

From El Salvador:

—We have to destroy the oligarchy. We know this brings suffering, but it is a price people are willing to pay. We're fighting for people who have nothing to lose.⁸

From Haiti:

—Those people keep coming in. The average Haitian earned \$212 in 1978. There is poverty over there; they are hungry; they don't have work.⁹

From Iran:

—If we do not start an economic recovery within six months, we

shall be in a very dangerous situation—politically as well as economically. Our behavior today is, more than ever before, a reflection of our weakness. We resemble a drowning man who grasps at a straw.¹⁰

From Ivory Coast:

—There will be no new airport for the capital. The town of Yamoussoukro will not get a new hospital, and Abidjan will not get a new bridge. Television will not be expanded. What it all means is that economic troubles rampant in the rest of the world have reached the Ivory Coast. Africa's greatest success story. Ten ambitious projects have been shelved.¹¹

From Nicaragua:

—Widespread unemployment and food shortages have provided fertile ground for extreme leftists, who have sponsored illegal takeovers of our private farms and factories and who, at one point, organized 30 simultaneous strikes.¹²

From Peru:

—A prolonged drought, combined with the disruption of the hacienda system, led to scarcities of our agricultural products in the cities while deepening rural poverty and intensifying the migration of peasants to the cities. Unable to find employment, the provincial migrants have turned this once-elegant center of Lima into a grimy carnival of street peddlers, performers and petty thieves.¹³

From Scotland:

—According to the Department of Unemployment, 201,067 Scots were unemployed in April 1980, the highest figure in 47 years.¹⁴

From United States:

—The unemployment rate for young blacks is estimated to be as high as 60 percent. We're passing from one generation to another a group of people who are hopelessly locked into a permanent underclass. I see these guys standing around doing nothing. I feel so helpless and hopeless.¹⁵

From USSR:

—The amount of bribery of public officials is enormous. If they tried to shut down every illegal activity, the economy would come close to collapsing and the party would face serious problems of public disorder.¹⁶

From Zimbabwe:

—The new minimum wage policy sets pay levels *below* those of workers now striking for *more* money.¹⁷

This economic litany of universal poverty now is being proclaimed worldwide, and neither businessmen, politicians, nor economists have addressed forcibly enough the long-term monetary solutions which might prevent worldwide guerrilla warfare in the next century. It is not only the currently destitute who are to be feared, but also those who already anticipate joining them—the world's middle class who are besieged by inflation, taxes, high interest rates, and unemployment. These ever increasing burdens, insurmountable in many developing nations, may shatter the social stability of even the most advanced countries within one or two generations.

Many nations are battling triple-digit inflation, including Argentina, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, and Zaire. New books, which prophesy the coming world economic crash, are best sellers. In many advanced nations productivity and economic growth figures have declined significantly while government spending, as a percent of the Gross National Product, has increased. Alan Greenspan, former economic adviser to President Ford, noted:

For the first time, huge numbers of people throughout the Western World have built some affluence and created some assets for themselves. Now they see inflation eroding those assets.¹⁸

If such apprehension exists within the most successful capitalistic nations, what hopes and aspirations can be generated among the disenchanted peoples of the world? Most societies already have doubts about the ability of the world's leaders to respond to problems of economic retrogression? Many now cynically view the work ethic as a propaganda tool of government, even in the Soviet Union where economic growth in 1979 was a meager .7 percent, the

lowest since the 1930s. Pranay Gupte, writing for *The New York Times*, related an anecdote which reflects this attitude of personal discouragement:

A grizzled old Ethiopian businessman was ambling along Churchill Avenue when he spotted a colorful wall poster, "Work hard to produce more," the poster said in Amharic, Ethiopia's main language. "Produce for what?" the merchant hissed. "Everything we produce is taken by them." The reference, in caustic tone, is to the hundreds of Soviet military advisers and the 13,500 Cuban soldiers who have been invited here by the administration.¹⁹

If despair and aggravation become the mortar and pestle of future guerrilla warfare, then weapons availability and population growth might be the powders which provide the explosive mixture. There is little indication that birth control, either voluntary as in most nations, or monetarily induced as in China, has a significant impact on family growth; therefore, it is likely that discontent will infest the earth's warrens more contagiously in the twenty-first century. According to *The Washington Star*:

World population continues to grow, especially in Africa, the Census Bureau reported yesterday. [8 July 1980]. The growth rate for Africa increased from 2.5 percent to 2.9 percent, highest in the world. By comparison, Latin America had a 2.4 percent growth rate in the 1975-79 period, while the rate was 1.9 percent in Asia.²⁰

With approximately six billion people in the world by the end of this century, the earth will be harvesting nearly one hundred million new souls each year, or one billion per decade. At least mathematically, the growth rate could increase to about two billion per decade by the year 2020. For years, optimists have been predicting that such a rate would not continue. But, it *is* continuing, as the latest Census Bureau statistics verify. More importantly, it is highest in those areas of the world where the only escape for progeny often is either emigration or violence. That the most prolific breeding grounds have already spawned most of the guerrilla activities is not unexpected—merely a forewarning for the perspicacious.

But what of the possibility that future cooperative enterprises may ameliorate the earth's hunger, discourage guerrilla conflict, and raise the standard of living worldwide? The poor of the world seldom

have benefited economically from post-World War II grand alliances, treaty organizations, trade unions, or military pacts. Indeed, the affluent nations have found that such internationally purchased friendships often were investments in resentment. Leaders of both democratic and communist societies who believed that they had purchased such friendships later came to realize that they had only rented them—briefly. With the advent of such international disillusionment, it is more likely that the major nations will be discouraged from continuing even their past, meager efforts to halt poverty's pilgrimage.

The sea swell of flotsam in a world of plenty during the twenty-first century may inundate not only the infant arks of newer nations—but also those stable ships of state that may have less depth to their economic keels than they imagine.

NOTES

1. Carleton Beale, *Great Guerrilla Warriors* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p.4.
2. "Funding Sought to Admit Refugees," *The Washington Post*, 19 April 1980, p. A9.
3. "African Drought Killing 250,000 People," *The Washington Star*, 20 June 1980, p. A7. Mr. North added that, "The shortages are very very substantial. Twenty million people could be classified in the critical starvation category."
4. "Pope Says Latins Must Share Wealth," *The Washington Star*, 7 July 1980, p. A1.
5. "Cambodia Struggles Back," *The Washington Post*, 28 May 1980, p. A18.
6. "Passages From a Chinese Diary," *The Washington Post*, 28 May 1980, p. A14. A young Chinese added, "There's been a short supply of vegetables in the market, so ordinary Chinese don't get to eat vegetables anymore."
7. "The Flotilla Grows," *Time*, 12 May 1980, p. 38.
8. "Ferment in Central America Adds to the Woes of the Region's Poor," *The New York Times*, 8 July 1980, p. 1. The article continued: "In Guatemala, they have burned crops, kidnapped industrialists and assassinated farm administrators."
9. "Haitians Flocking to Florida," *The New York Times*, 27 March 1980, p. A22.
10. "The Islamic Revolution," *Time*, 24 March 1980, p. 32.

11. "Economic Ills Finally Reach Ivory Coast," *The Washington Star*, 27 May 1980, p. A14.
12. "Sandinistas Look More Radical Than Some Backers Had Hoped," *The Washington Star*, 27 May 1980, p. A8.
13. "Peru Much Changed Since First Regime of New President," *The Washington Star*, 27 May 1980, p. A6. The junta under General Bermudez which overthrew the Valesco government in 1975 instituted new development programs. "However, these improvements came at the expense of the poor. Government austerity measures aimed at reducing inflation also reduced real wages and increased unemployment. Strikes were severely repressed."
14. "Scotland's Clyde," *The New York Times*, 15 May 1980, p. A3. David Basnett, General Secretary of the General and Municipal Workers Union said that things were rapidly approaching the flash point. He forecast a beleaguered Britain, with three million jobless and added that, "it does put a great deal of pressure on normal civilized social behavior."
15. "I feel So Helpless. So Hopeless," *Time*, 16 June 1980, p. 20.
16. "Living Conveniently on the Left," *Time*, 23 June 1980, p. 50.
17. "Zimbabwe Established New Minimum Wage," *The Washington Star*, 29 May 1980, p. A7.
18. Alan Greenspan, "Of Course, but—," *Time*, 21 April, 1980, p. 43.
19. Pranay B. Gupte, "Ethiopian Civil War Hurts the Economy," *The New York Times*, 10 July 1980, p. A4. The article added that, "Ethiopia was to have started payments [to the Soviet bloc] in 1978 on the 1.5 billion worth of arms it acquired from the Soviet Union, but it did not have the cash, and so an undisclosed amount of its coffee crop was bartered. . . . Nearly 30 percent of the country's \$1.2 billion budget goes toward military spending . . . the annual per capita income is barely \$105, [and] the inflation rate will be about 20 percent this year."
20. "World Population Up," *The Washington Star*, 9 July 1980, p. A8. In a subsequent article, "Report Predicts Large Increases In Unemployment Around World," *The Washington Star*, 31 August 1980, p. A9, it was reported that, "Worldwide unemployment will continue to worsen over the next 15 years as the number of people seeking jobs will grow. . . . The Environmental fund predicted that the labor force in Latin America will grow to 179.7 million (from 79.2 million in 1965) and to 248.1 million in Africa (from 122.8 million in 1965)." the Fund also predicted that between 1965 and 1995 the world labor pool will have increased by about one billion—once again, almost the entire population of the earth only a century ago.

VIII. THE VULNERABILITY OF SOCIETY

The new philosophers are as antagonistic to existing liberal democracies as they are to the totalitarian systems of the Soviet Union or China.¹

—Michael Sodaro

Within many nations malcontented groups have formed that are "as antagonistic to existing liberal democracies as they are to the totalitarian systems"; that indeed, are antagonistic to the philosophical concepts of *any* modern government. Often such groups express their distaste for authority through violent anti-political acts. In response, nations are expending their resources prodigally to investigate bombings, quell riots, prevent political assassinations, negotiate kidnappings, ransom hostages, or guard against other protrusile attacks by varied bands of believers and opportunists. This incremental resort to terrorism could affect the survival of nations in the next century if earth's discontented population grows by quantum numbers unless, simultaneously, the security forces necessary to protect targets from attack are heavily augmented.

Societies' targets of opportunity—targets which can affect the industrial, economic or political base of nations—are seldom unassailable. For example, in April 1980 according to *The Washington*

Post, just one explosive charge cut off all the electrical power in Puerto Rico:

Governor Carlos Romero Barcelo declared a state of emergency, placing the island's 7,000-member police force on alert. . . . The governor said there was a grave suspicion that the blackout was the work of terrorists.²

Is this likely to become a common method of airing political differences? If so, then a widespread loss of respect or faith in the ability of central governments to solve domestic problems may stimulate even more guerrilla activities in the future. Furthermore, if such anti-governmental attitudes are nourished by inflation, depression, or mass unemployment, a large segment of the world's population may be converted into looters of their nations' legacies.

In the future the security forces necessary to protect the electrical and nuclear plants, power dams, industrial assembly lines, radio and television stations, banks, bridges, grain elevators, railroad lines, chemical plants, ocean drilling rigs, pipe lines, and port facilities of many nations could overtax a country's capabilities. This security burden might become particularly pertinent when future guerrilla clans have not only unlimited targets, but also technical competence, advanced weapons, unprecedented mobility, and the sympathy of their fellow men.

The threat is becoming more lucid as additional material is published, both overtly and covertly, on weapons and munitions assembly. Books and pamphlets on the construction of almost every type of lethal hardware are available to those who wish to challenge established order.

Additionally, in democratic nations, easy access to private and commercial air transportation makes travel to and from the scene of activity almost instantaneous. Conversely, T. E. Lawrence's Arab guerrillas in World War I would have been impotent if the Turks had possessed aircraft or motor transport to pursue his nomadic forces.

Lewis Gann, in his book *Guerrillas in History* also stated that guerrillas now are, "forever elusive, without front or rear. They will always be able to get the better of a regular force."³ Post World War II examples of the value of modern mobility would include Latin American, Asian, and African independence movements, as well as the

successes of the Haganah in Israel, and the IRA in Northern Ireland. The leaders of these organizations not only proved that they could move their forces almost without constraint, but that they could also travel abroad, raise money, purchase arms, gain adherents for their causes, and engage in *conflicts* over a wide area. Given the advantages of modern transportation, guerrillas today are not only mobile, but also migratory.

This is not to say that guerrilla causes always will succeed; however, they threaten to endanger society even when their aims are less expansive than the overthrow of the government in power. Indeed, their goals often may be social reform, rather than revolutionary changes in leadership. Tax benefits, better housing, fuller employment, favorable racial and ethnic programs, improved food distribution, political concessions, and economic stability might become the major guerrilla demands of the twenty-first century. Governmental failure to attend to such societal needs during a period of massive population growth and increasing life spans could spawn frustrated generations of guerrillas who choose to wage warfare on their own societies for either real or symbolic reasons.

Such conjecture presupposes that, in the twenty-first century, the environment in many developed nations will encourage unrest because many governments will fail to meet the demands of their own professed economic programs—most particularly those programs that have evolved for the care of the populace. Many nations have bestowed benefits on their societies that future generations will expect as a right of citizenship. Any breakdown of the human-support structure, such as social security systems or medical care, might be followed by a collapse in national morale. If this occurs in tomorrow's overpopulated world, any bankruptcy of a nation's social plan would embolden guerrilla clans. Robert Rowan, in a *Washington Post* editorial in June 1980, believes that such a monetary time bomb is already ticking:

This is a subject nobody likes to talk about; the possible financial collapse of one of the major countries that borrows heavily in international markets. This could set off shock waves transforming a global recession into a global depression. For example, Brazil and Mexico together account for more than 30 percent of the indebtedness of the developing countries to the international private banking system. There are other trouble spots—Turkey, Zaire, Jamaica, Argentina, Thailand, and the Philippines.

Every time you ask, "Where are they going to get the money to pay," everybody falls silent. Brazil alone owes \$55 billion, including \$9 billion just for interest payments on the total debt. This problem of worldwide debt has so far been brushed under the rug.⁴

Monetary catastrophes are most likely to be localized and relatively rare in the next two decades—certainly not threatening to most well-established governments—however, the activities of guerrillas might be expected to become more widespread in later years as national debts increase beyond the bounds of financial credibility. (See Appendix A, The World Bank and International Monetary Fund.)

Most major nations now can fund emergency support for food, housing, security, and social programs not only for themselves, but also for friends, allies, client states, and refugees. But this reservoir of prosperity is drying up as parched billions draw from its sources. A 1980 *New York Times* editorial noted that:

The \$200 million that the United Nations raised last year to help keep Cambodia from dying has run out. The land, the people, their leaders and the powers around them all seem poised to let the country fall back into the pit The nations wanting to help again were asked for \$262 million to feed Cambodia for the rest of the year.⁵

Pragmatically, as economic solutions show few signs of universal effectiveness, the number of "pits" throughout the world seems to be pock-marking the earth with financial potholes.

Also, in every society there seems to be a self-fulfillment virus afflicting the educated—and an advanced plague of literacy is now rampant worldwide. Unfortunately, self-fulfillment is challenged by widespread unemployment. This situation could result in the formation of more groups of radical elite, eager to lead guerrilla bands in well-organized attacks on institutions within the societies that educated them. Such defection has occurred in many nations, and is an apparent threat in others.

Guerrillas, however, are more likely to pester a stable society than to change its complexion—at least wherever central governments retain some measure of political support. Demolishing

municipal structures, killing innocent civilians, and destroying utilities are acts that will not be suffered silently. Therefore, while urban guerrillas may obtain support for their popular *causes* which would redound to the benefit of the citizenry, their *conflicts* have to be carefully selected in order that they do not antagonize the populace. Their attacks also must be translatable into results having a positive economic, political, or social impact, for guerrillas will be held as responsible for their actions as are those who establish the policies the guerrillas are attempting to change. For example, the railroad explosion in Bologna, Italy, in August 1980 resulted in mass anti-terrorist protests by about 40,000 people.

Then, the prevalent dissatisfaction in a nation, not ungovernable terrorism, tends to be conducive to urban guerrilla warfare in general, and the overthrow of political leaders in particular. Thus it has been *gestalt* tactics, not mindless violence, which have generated governmental changes by guerrillas in many Asian, African, and Latin American nations since World War II; yet, it is noticeable that neither political nor economic stability has resulted from these upheavals. Perhaps, then, even further disintegration, rather than social equilibrium, is the more likely prognosis, not only for the revolutionary governments recently come to power, but for even the more advanced societies if guerrilla activity becomes universally contagious.

The spread of any social disease which encourages guerrilla warfare must, of course, have a carrier. If international population growth, widespread unemployment, and national bankruptcies are the growth cultures, then the inability to satisfy rising expectations might be the definitive contaminating agent.

One prominent indication of future contamination is that the children of the middle class, who are usually better educated than their parents, are discovering that they cannot hope to find employment in their societies which will provide them with the income, job satisfaction, or welfare benefits that accrued to the generation from which they sprang. In the twenty-first century, the aggravation of this condition has every possibility of becoming internationally explosive.

Perhaps, for the more advanced countries, the dissatisfaction of the middle classes surfaces from a peculiar combination of their advanced education, chronic unemployment, affluent boredom, and

perceived injustice. An example occurred in Fort Worth, Texas, in May 1980, when teenagers from well-to-do families engaged in extra-curricula high school activities:

Police arrested three 16-year olds believed responsible for a string of crimes, including burglary, extortion and weapons dealing. Among the weapons the police seized were a Thompson submachine gun, a .357 Magnum and a .45 caliber pistol Police also collected a quantity of explosives.⁶

This incident is significant only in indicating that the affluent youth of advanced countries can also obtain and use modern weapons for antisocial activities. Similar behavior often had been addressed previously as a cause-and-effect phenomenon affecting only the educated radical elements of less developed nations. A more likely environment for such incitement than Texas is Morocco:

Morocco's schools have been producing thousands of graduates who cannot find jobs because economic growth is lagging behind education. Many of these youths are radicals, and their agitation could trigger ferment in the abysmal shantytowns that plague every Moroccan city. . . . Hassan repeatedly promises improvements. But he has done little except raise expectations that he has been unable to fulfill, and that may augur trouble.⁷

Morocco's problems are reflected in Peru, India, the Ivory Coast, and, generally, in almost every Third World nation where there exists the mirror image of Morocco's exploding population, urbanization, increased literacy, weapons availability, guerrilla uprising, and a burdened economy. Perhaps the lack of a diverse industrial base, more than other factors, exposes the vulnerability of these developing societies. It results in less and less opportunity for high school and college graduates to find employment. This postindependence factor in Asia and Africa is now affecting Latin America as well, and is rapidly becoming an insoluble problem for the developed nations.

Countries long considered stable such as Sweden, where nationwide strikes in 1980 paralyzed the entire economic base of the socialist system, and the United States and Europe, where race riots and extremist activities have dire implications, demonstrate the tenuous grip which even the best intentioned leaders may have on their societies. This tenuous grip also is apparent in nations such as Korea and the Philippines where the democratic, academic, and

economic pretensions of those governments are frequently cloaked in martial law. Stanley Karnow, reporting in *The Washington Star* stated:

KWANGJU, South Korea—Thousands of government troops clamped tight martial law on Kwangju today [27 May 1980] after retaking the provincial capital from rebellious crowds in a three-hour battle.—Government troops wrested control of the city of 800,000 from student-led rebels who had held it for about six days.⁸

Could the world be sliding out of control? Haynes Johnson's contention, expressed in his 1980 book, *In the Absence of Power*, is: "In the last decades of the twentieth century the United States has become a nation in danger of being unable or unwilling to govern itself."⁹

Mr. Johnson's assertions seem extreme when applied to the United States; however, he may have developed an accurate forecast for much of tomorrow's world. If some of today's leaders are not able or willing to govern effectively, what is the prognosis for the future? Will there be, in fact, any government that is not susceptible to internal rebellion, or any society that will not be vulnerable to guerrilla warfare in the twenty-first century?

NOTES

1. Michael Sadaro, "The New French Philosophers," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1979, p. 51.
2. "Group Says It Caused Puerto Rico Power Failure," *The Washington Post*, 13 April 1980, p. A22.
3. Lewis Gann, *Guerrillas In History* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 17.
4. Robert Rowen, "Monetary Time Bomb," *The Washington Post*, 5 June 1980, p. A19.
5. "Seeding Cambodia," *The New York Times*, 27 March 1980, p. 27. (The article added that "None of this will restore peace and humane rule to Cambodia.")
6. "Bored Teen Agers Suspected in String of Crimes in Texas," *The*

Washington Post, 6 May 1980, p. A3.

7. Stanley Karnow, "Saharan War," *The Washington Star*, 30 March 1980, p. F3.

8. "Korean City Retaken By Government," *The Washington Star*, 27 May 1980, p. A1.

9. Haynes Johnson, *In the Absence of Power* (New York: Viking Press, 1980), p. 2.

IX. THE WORLD IN ORBIT

In medieval theory wars that were not declared by a prince were not properly wars. But who was a prince?'

—Anthony Mockler

The shores of civilization often seem to be eroding under waves of extremist violence. Since 1970 this violence has occurred with increasing regularity as new leaders of myriad radical organizations, many with a proclivity for messianic leadership, cry out for war against the prevailing social order. But are their acts justified, their means excusable, and their ends noble? Who is a prince?

Guerrilla leaders, often abetted by the favorable laws existing in democratic nations for freedom of expression, objective judicial process, the right of assembly, political asylum, student and worker immigration, weapons purchases, unrestricted travel, and a free press, often have catalytically converted discontent into dementia. It is no longer possible for the stable forces of social order to identify all the multifarious leaders of the hundreds of guerrilla movements, or even to discern all of their motives and objectives. They are princes in their own mind, and their numbers are legion.

If there is any certainty in statistics, it may be significant to note in passing that, from 1970 to 1978, Risks International, Incorporated

(RII) listed 5,529 terrorist incidents worldwide, reporting 217 extremist groups in Europe alone. Ominously, RII pointed up the fact that the "incident level" is doubling each year.² Just in the month of March 1980, there were 241 guerrilla incidents in 31 countries—and over one quarter of these were assassinations.³

Grim warnings of every nature have become too familiar. Everyone seems to know that by the twenty-first century the world will be widely polluted, unemployed, ecologically unstable, overcrowded, much poorer, urbanized, and more predisposed toward guerrilla violence. Despite this knowledge, the threat of global calamity, as with predicted earthquakes, seldom stimulates human action. The Club of Rome's 1972 doomsday forecast, *The Limits of Growth*, projected mass starvation and absolute human catastrophe after the year 2000. That study sired lengthy and contradictory attacks upon its conclusions—but trifling action on its recommendations. It may be easier for the world to write than reform.

In a parallel US effort to stir a somnolent nation into vigilant attention, the President's Council on Environmental Equality in 1980 issued an 800-page study, *The Global 2000 Report to the President*. Although its size and title alone seem ominous, it was not quite as pessimistic in its conclusions as the Rome study. Nevertheless, it addressed deforestation, disappearing topsoil, vanishing plant and animal species, diminishing water supplies, and extensive poverty with a portent that, if not apocalyptic, is at least thought provoking. It states, almost nonchalantly:

The number of malnourished will rise from an estimated half-billion to 1.3 billion by the year 2000. Starvation will claim increasing numbers of babies born in less developed countries, and many of the survivors will grow up physically and mentally stunted.⁴

This is choice grist for the guerrilla mill where discontented groups can examine statistics and publicize them for their own purposes. Today's guerrilla leaders are both competent analysts and public relations specialists—no longer part of the shoeless, rural, illiterate poor. United Nations Ambassador Gale McGee noted in 1980:

The world is fast approaching an era where three-fourths of its people will be literate, two-thirds will live in urban areas, and almost all will have access to radio or television communications.⁵

Most guerrilla leaders today also are exceptionally well educated and technically trained, eager to share their education and training with others. To use the Palestine National Liberation Organization (PLO) as an example, their leader, Yassar Arafat, studied civil engineering at the University of Cairo and attended the Egyptian military college. His predecessor in the hierarchy, Ahmed Shukeiri, was a lawyer (LLD), educated at the American University in Beirut. Additionally, the PLO has about six affiliated organizations of varying violent hue, headed by former doctors, generals, philosophers, and professors.

While such leadership is not unique in today's guerrilla movements, the PLO also has extensive facilities in other countries, financial support from many Islamic nations, and ties with outside guerrilla groups. These affiliated organizations obtain arms from the PLO and use the many PLO training camps to update their terrorist techniques. PLO beneficence extends to many diverse guerrilla groups worldwide, for instance, the Irish Republican Army—and, if PLO relationships need to be further exemplified through remote bonding, the Canary Islands Liberation Party.⁶

This sharing of extremist knowledge by the PLO is terrifying. Many guerrilla organizations motivated to violence now have learned to forge passports and identification papers, handle sophisticated arms and munitions, and successfully challenge the internal security forces of most businesses, industries, and governments. Their activities have become so widespread that they should constitute a cause for more cooperative international concern. What are the predictions for the twenty-first century?

The most gloomy scenario is that guerrillas of some fantastic ilk will obtain and threaten to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The British terrorist expert, Walter Laquer, reported in 1977:

Within ten to fifteen years terrorists will have all ultra-violent weapons at their disposal. At that moment one person will perhaps be able to coerce a whole town or area.⁷

This forecast is alarming, but it is not beyond the realm of probability and suggests that a political matrix for antiguerrilla activities soon should be prepared. This is not to suggest that most nations will rejoice over any proposed cooperative efforts to spike

guerrilla operations because, as parochial perceptions go, one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. However, the democratic nations *certainly can* adopt some stringent policies to deter guerrillas. Thus far the policies existing in most developed countries seem to permit guerrilla activities to be promoted with a minimum of risk. A Central Intelligence Agency report which reviewed terrorist activities by guerrilla groups from 1970 to 1975 revealed the following data:

They have an 87 percent chance to capture hostages.

They have a 79 percent chance to escape.

They have a 40 percent chance that their claims will be granted.

They have a 29 percent chance for complete success.

They have an 83 percent chance for free retreat.

They have a 67 percent chance to gain asylum.⁸

They also seem to have a 100 percent chance of gaining the inordinate amount of publicity that has become one of their main objectives. The age of TV satellites has, ironically, placed the world's problems in orbit.

How can a democratic nation hamper and foil guerrilla operations? Should the limits of immigration be constricted to deter the genesis of guerrilla roots? From a selfish point of view, it does not seem too callous to demand that both resident and nonresident aliens desist from political activities in a host nation. The munificence of Western countries, though admirable, often is paid back in malevolent coin. Neither has the principle of political asylum been strictly observed; indeed, it often seems as if the emigre's simple claim of persecution becomes the criteria for asylum.

A severe limit on immigrant workers and student visas also should be established. In the latter case, educational institutions should be required to report when foreign students no longer meet academic standards, or when they are disenrolled. The claim that this information is sacrosanct is a disservice to the host nation involved and becomes a threat to internal security. If foreign students or immigrant workers no longer fulfill their contracts, the consequences should be explicit. A weakness in this system was reported by *The New York Times* when Iranian protestors were released in August 1980:

Several United States immigration officers who interviewed Iranian demonstrators jailed at Otisville, NY, said today (6 August 1980) that many of the 171 Iranians there had been released prematurely, before their names and legal status could be verified. "We did not check the schools where the students were supposedly enrolled. We did not check with the district offices where they should have registered," one immigration officer who was at Otisville said.⁹

The morass that impedes US immigration is caused not only by politically active foreign students, but also by the widely publicized and unprosecuted avalanche of illegal Caribbean and Latin American immigrants who mingle with their compatriots and blend into the populace. It is estimated that there now are seven to ten million illegal immigrants in the United States. Nor is this problem peculiar to North America alone, for in many West European nations, illegal immigration has become even more severe.

Further, democratic nations should forbid the personal possession of firearms, munitions, or explosives by alien workers and students. As with political activities, deportation or criminal penalties should be imposed on violators. Once deported, subsequent illegal entry should carry ever increasing jail terms before the next deportation action is initiated.

Is such a drastic program necessary? Of the 5,529 terrorist incidents previously listed which took place between 1970-1978, 3,197 of them, (58 percent), occurred in the democratic nations of Europe, Canada, and the United States. The United States and Canada soon may become the preferred havens for guerrilla activities, for European nations now have become more restrictive in their immigration policies and operationally alert to terrorist operations. *Time* magazine (28 July 1980) reported:

Last week the Bundesrat [upper house of the West German parliament] passed a tough new set of regulations on asylum applications. Asylum seekers will not be eligible for work permits during their first year in West Germany, nor will family-support payments be made.¹⁰

West Germany also has set up a refugee camp in Bavaria to prevent the assimilation of asylum claimants from overburdening its economy. Similarly, in African, Middle Eastern, Asian, and Latin

American nations, refugee camps are blossoming as legal and illegal immigrants seek to escape war, poverty, unemployment, and oppression.

In many nations, as in the United States where, in 1980, over 100,000 Cuban refugees arrived in massive spurts across the Florida Strait, the answer lies in selective immigration. Although the large scale incorporation of aliens into developed nations now is only burdensome, by the twenty-first century alien nonconformables may provoke a new era of clan warfare. What indications already exist that this might come to pass?

By 1980, in the United States alone, foreign oriented Puerto Rican, Croatian, Iranian, Serbian, Cuban (anti-Castro), Armenian, Colombian, Irish (IRA), Palestinian, German, Jewish, and Japanese (Red Army) guerrilla groups had been violently active—together with *native* US Marxist, prison-based, and other home-brewed social revolutionary organizations. Are their terrorist activities significant? Although the assassinations of prominent foreign individuals in Washington, DC, such as a former Chilean diplomat (Letelier) and an anti-Khomeini Iranian (Tabatabai) received the most media attention, there were about 50 other assassinations and 450 bombing incidents attributed to guerrilla operations in the United States from 1970 to 1978."

Stricter immigration laws, supervised foreign student attendance, rigorous law enforcement, and more severe legal penalties probably would deter the future growth of guerrilla organizations. Democratic nations also need to assign larger counter guerrilla forces to the task of internal security. The fight against terrorism, the core of guerrilla activities, has never been formulated as a distinct national priority. Nevertheless, innovative policies and specially trained counterforces should be programmed, particularly since the world will soon harbor well over six billion people—many still imbedded in their own cultures—though far removed from their homelands. Their perceptions of inequality and injustice still may fester in their adopted countries. Under these circumstances guerrilla sirens may beckon them toward revolution. When may this occur?

Although many guerrilla activities since World War II may be viewed as only a flash in the murk, it is unlikely that nations can achieve social stability in the twenty-first century unless the many

causes which create guerrilla organizations are addressed. Considering the present forces the free world has thus far committed to counter guerrilla operations, any hope for a tranquil society is patently illusive.

NOTES

1. Anthony Mockler, *The Mercenaries* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 33.
2. *Regional Risk Assessment, Europe* (Alexandria, Virginia: Risks International, Inc., 1979), p. 2
3. *Quarterly Risk Assessment, Worldwide*, (Alexandria, Virginia: Risks International, Inc., April 1980), January-March 1980 update, p. 11. While the 1970-1978 figures average about 700 "incidents per year, the projected 1980 figures, based on the January-March statistics, indicate that there will be about 2,500 terrorist operations by the end of the year."
4. "Toward a Troubled 21st Century," *Time*, 4 August 1980, p. 54.
5. The Honorable Gale W. McGee. Excerpts from a dinner speech at the National Defense University, 22 July 1980.
6. *Regional Risk Assessment, Middle East—North Africa*, (Alexandria, Virginia: Risks International, Inc., 1979), pp. 8-16.
7. Lieutenant Colonel Willy Demeuleveere, US Army, "Terrorism: An Actual Phenomenon," an unpublished paper presented at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 24 July 1978, p. 5.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
9. "Iranian Students Freed Improperly, Some Officers Say," *The New York Times*, 8 July 1980, p. A1.
10. "Closing the Door on Refugees," *Time*, 28 July 1980, p. 45. Earlier in July the Mayor of Frankfurt, Germany, Walter Wallman, refused to accept 200 Afghans and Ethiopians who arrived at Frankfurt airport.
11. *Regional Risk Assessment, North America*, (Alexandria, Virginia: Risks International, Inc., 1979), pp. 3-5.

X. THE CRUSADE SPIRIT

The more complex and interdependent the system, the easier it is for crude violence to bring the system to a halt.¹

—Francis T. Underhill

The inexorable process of modernization sometimes seems to depersonalize society, induce boredom, alienate the citizenry, increase ethnic and racial pressures, frustrate ambition, produce tension, emphasize the gulf between rich and poor and, ever more frequently, produce violence. Even basic governmental institutions such as the *military*, the *judiciary*, and the *legislature* often are viewed as vestigial appendages which have become costly, ineffective, and burdensome. For many, these three democratic Princes of Serendip no longer appear to play their heroes' roles: sallying forth to protect the nation, levying harsh penalties on the criminal, or righting the wrongs of society through legislative wisdom. They are perceived, more often, as three pustules on the body politic.

Yet, if there is indeed a revolutionary danger infecting modernized societies, what chance is there that the underdeveloped world will ever be immunized from the more basic plagues of guerrilla warfare? In brief, what are the bacilli, and how do guerrilla movements germinate?

To date, excessive attention may have been paid to the colorful history, combatant rules, legal ramifications, academic composition, organizational format, terroristic techniques, and statistical data relating to guerrillas. Though these factors provide valuable insights and are unavoidable in any presentation of the subject, including this one, the more empathetic relationships encouraging guerrilla activities—the basic human elements of desperation and despair—seldom have been as thoroughly diagnosed.

This is not to maintain that other goads to guerrilla growth are not vital, including anger, enmity, greed, ideology, jealousy, and power; but, merely to stress that these six deadly sins are likely to afflict guerrilla leaders more substantively than those basic human elements of desperation and despair which entice their followers. As a result, it is often the *causes* of a dynamic few that can incite a demoralized society to expend the lives of many in *conflict*.

Demographers also anticipate that urban chaos soon will enhance the guerrilla cause in the less developed countries. To mention but three of their many examples: by 1995 Mexico City is expected to expand from 10 to 30 million people, with Calcutta and Cairo increasing to about 20 million each. In fact, as of 1980, Cairo already had about 10 million people—the entire population of Egypt about 1900. (See Population Projections—Appendix B). Yet Egypt, which consists of over 95 percent desert lands, has less arable soil today, despite the Aswan Dam, than it had in 1900. The thousands of tons of fish once taken from the Nile Delta have almost disappeared since the dam was built. As Aswan reminds us, man often finds it easier to formulate plans than to deal with consequences.

Similar increases, estimated from 50 to 200 percent, probably will take place in the major cities of all African, Asian, and Latin American nations, and in many European cities as well. It may be portentous that the monumental growth rates in Managua, Nicaragua; Tehran, Iran; and San Salvador, El Salvador in the past few years have helped to spawn 30 percent unemployment, 60 percent inflation, political confusion, and vehement clan warfare. In Africa and the Middle East, rapid urbanization, controversial national boundaries, ethnic and cultural animosities, and xenophobic tribalism act as spurs to prod guerrilla wars. Colin Legum, in his studies of Africa, wrote:

The clans and tribes see themselves as minorities defending their separate interests against the dominant national groups. There is a transitory nature to virtually *all* the present regimes.²

The basic social problems accompanying mass urbanization are unemployment, poverty, inadequate housing, hunger, disease, and crime. Where tribalism and clan loyalties exist—and they are becoming more prevalent in even the most advanced nations—it becomes difficult to structure any stable governments, particularly democratic ones. As such changes occur in cities throughout the world, traumatic clashes are likely to emanate as discord leads to dispute, and dispute to devolution. Urbanization also has been accompanied by decreasing mortality and increasing life expectancy worldwide, led by Sweden with only 8 infant deaths per thousand, and Iceland with an astounding life expectancy average of 76 years.³

With India fast approaching a population of one billion, and China already there, the pressures on the world's food supplies soon will become enormous. Indonesia and Brazil are fast accumulating 150 million people each, many housed in slums and shantytowns; and, the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union each have about 250 million residents. Though Malthusian projections are not always comparatively valid, it is interesting to note that just 300 years ago the United States had only about a half-million people, and Europe at that time had merely an estimated 35 million.

When contemplating a world of one billion people as mankind approached the twentieth century, some attention should be riveted on conditions other than lower infant mortality and longer life expectancy that produced a world population of four billion in 1980, and which is expected to exceed six billion by the year 2000. Enormous advances in medicine and hygiene, increases in agricultural production, and national commitments to health, education, and welfare are affecting this impressive growth exponentially.

Concurrently, however, mankind obdurately refuses to adopt birth control and, despite the progress of science, seems to be sliding persistently toward mass starvation, political chaos, and revolutionary catastrophe. Certainly, the plethora of riots, insurrections, independence movements, and guerrilla operations now extant bears some witness to the fact that many are repelled by their own societies. They often feel a compunction to strike out against conditions they

perceive to be intolerable. Guerrilla warfare provides an outlet for such passion.

Guerrilla movements in some countries today are no longer merely bothersome, but often threatening to national stability. Though news reports are not sufficient vindication of a clear and present danger, a random sample of *one day's* guerrilla activities reported in *The New York Times* (8 August 1980) reveals a few political perturbations. None of these articles, incidentally, were considered worthy of front page coverage:⁴

Colonel Luis Arce Gomez, [Bolivia's] security chief, said that political dissidents would be formed into work gangs to prevent guerrilla activity, and sent to Bolivia's eastern jungles to build roads.

The guerrillas [in Burma] are estimated to number 14,000, a number that is believed to have doubled since 1975.

A time bomb was found in front of the Libyan Arab Airlines office by the police today.

South Korea's martial law authorities said today that they arrested 16,599—as part of an effort to eliminate social evils.

The [West German] guerrilla activities have not been eliminated, according to Bonn's Minister of the Interior. As a result, government officials say they expect a major attack on a public official in the near future.

The apparent aim of the Neo-Fascist guerrillas is the same as that of the extreme leftists: to revolutionize Italian society and pave the way for their own kind of revolution.

Where else do such immediate dangers abound? In 1980, major guerrilla operations already are underway in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; therefore, it might be expected that contagious shocks will jolt North America and Europe in the coming years. They may arise from either left or right wing extremist organizations. An additional possibility is that discontented minority and ethnic groups will form guerrilla bands demanding full employment and justice—two commodities that seem to be in shorter supply in most areas of the world than the beleaguered are willing to abide.

Overall, there seems to be a trend toward internationalizing chaos. One indication of this trend is that the social behavior of the well educated now often appears directed *against* political authority and *toward* those who contest it. This favorable public disposition for those who challenge the government is a characteristic usually present whenever guerrilla groups operate successfully. Such attitudes may become more prevalent in the next few decades as even the advanced nations find the domestic problems unsolvable.

To combat the genesis of guerrilla warfare, it may be valuable to propose measures that could be adopted to halt or at least diminish the possibility of facing guerrilla confrontations. This is particularly important when one reviews the sizable number of recent guerrilla activities. (See Regional Review—Appendix C). Many of these proposals, of course, are particularly difficult to implement in democratic nations.

1. Laws on illegal immigrants need to be severely enforced, together with stricter immigration rules, tighter regulations on political asylum, more stringent prohibitions against political activities by resident aliens, and more rapid judicial processing of violators for incarceration or deportation.

2. Heavier penalties for those committing terroristic acts, need to be imposed together with a prohibition against the personal possession of weapons, munitions, and explosives by resident and nonresident aliens, as well as those citizens convicted previously of criminal activities.

3. Extensive counter guerrilla organizations need to be formed that are capable of both covertly infiltrating guerrilla groups and operating with international security specialists in antiguerrilla operations across national boundaries.

4. Counterterrorist training needs to be conducted on a massive scale for free world businesses, industries, and government internal security forces.

5. Antihijacking agreements should be negotiated among nations, perhaps even at the United Nations level, and security measures must be tightened at airports worldwide.

6. Intelligence networks, similar to Interpol, could be organized specifically to combat guerrilla activities in the free world.

7. Policies should be developed to be used in hostage situations as necessary, particularly if they are accompanied by the training of specialized rescue forces for use when a hostage situation occurs *within* a nation's border.

8. Restrictions on media publicity for terroristic acts should be imposed.

9. Amnesty to guerrillas might be a worthwhile government endeavor in some nations, when the goal of amnesty is to form a more stable and socially democratic country.

10. Limitations on arms sales by the developed nations to the underdeveloped ones is a meaningful policy, long overdue, that may lessen the probability of extensive guerrilla warfare throughout the world.

None of these proposals will prevent guerrilla organizations from rising up against their twenty-first century societies as long as the human *causes* which generate *conflicts* continue to exist. However, unless there is a concerted effort to confront, defuse, and suppress guerrilla activities, it is doubtful that many of the younger nations ever will be able to structure their civilizations progressively. When countries are fighting for their survival against internal guerrilla forces, fewer and fewer assets are available for nation-building.

The possibility that guerrilla warfare may become a twenty-first century success story also is based on the supposition that regimes of every stripe do not yet seem dedicated to a political, economic, and social order which can sustain some direction for long-term human solutions. There may be, as many leaders declaim interminably, no easy solutions; however, mankind is no longer susceptible to platitudes, promises, and patience. There also are statistics indicating that many are choosing more violent and compulsive responses to political incompetence. For these, the rebellious alternative of guerrilla warfare in the twenty-first century might seem preferable. If there is any doubt that a crusade spirit is difficult to exorcise, it should be recalled that Garibaldi set out to free Italy with only seven men and a mule.

NOTES

1. Francis T. Underhill, "Modernized Societies and the Uses of War," *The Future of Conflict* (Washington, DC: The National Defense University Press, 1979), p. 20. Ambassador Underhill noted that men turn persistently to violence, "generation after generation, to conserve, acquire, destroy, or change."
2. Colin Legum, et. al., *Africa in the 1980's: A Continent in Crisis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 28.
3. "World Population Grows," *Parade*, 27 July 1980, p. 8.
4. "Bolivian Rivals, One in Hiding, Assert Right to Lead," p. A6. "Rebels in Burma Keep Fighting," p. A2. "Bomb Found on Malta," p. A7. "16,599 South Koreans Arrested," p. A9. "Terrorist Act Imminent, Bonn Fear," p. 10. "Italy's Neo-Fascists Prefer a Massacre," p. A12. *The New York Times*, 8 August 1980.

APPENDIX A.

THE WORLD BANK AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

The World Bank lends about \$12 billion a year to help countries strengthen their economies through construction of irrigation works, power stations, port facilities, and other such projects. Recently the World Bank has also been lending increasingly to improve housing, education, water, and food resources to meet human needs.

The International Monetary Fund provides shorter term loans to countries that have balance-of-payments difficulties. That includes just about all countries of the Third World expected as a group to record a deficit in trade and services in 1980 of more than \$70 billion.

The Fund, because it applies conditions of belt-tightening for the loans it grants, is far less popular in the Third World than the Bank. The austerity—reduced consumption that can often be socially explosive—is intended to help countries “put their house in order”—the phrase used by economists to signify efforts to become self-supporting again.

World Bank numbers demonstrate what is likely to lie ahead. From 1980 to 1985, these show the average annual growth of developing countries at 1.8 percent, compared with 2.7 percent over the last decade, and 3.1 percent in the 1960s.

More depressing still is the outlook for the 1.1 billion people who live in the poorest countries. Their already low per capita income of less than \$220 a year is likely to grow by no more than 1 percent a year—an average of only \$2 or \$3 for each individual.

According to the *New York Times* (1 October 1980, page 1), World Bank President, Robert S. McNamara warned that, despite advances of the last quarter-century, 600 million people were likely to be living in absolute poverty by the year 2000.

APPENDIX B. POPULATION PROJECTIONS

Table 1

Population Projections for World, Major Regions, and Selected Countries

	1975	2000	Percent Increase by 2000	Average Annual Percent Increase	Percent of World Popu- lation in 2000
millions					
World	4,090	6,351	55	1.8	100
More developed regions	1,131	1,323	17	0.6	21
Less developed regions	2,959	5,028	70	2.1	79
Major regions					
Africa	399	814	104	2.9	13
Asia and Oceania	2,274	3,630	60	1.9	57
Latin America	325	637	96	2.7	10
USSR and Eastern Europe	384	460	20	2.7	7
North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand	708	809	14	0.5	13
Selected countries regions:					
People's Republic of China	935	1,329	42	1.4	21
India	618	1,021	65	2.0	16
Indonesia	135	226	68	2.1	4
Bangladesh	79	159	100	2.8	2
Pakistan	71	149	111	3.0	2
Philippines	43	73	71	2.1	1
Thailand	42	75	77	2.3	1
South Korea	37	57	55	1.7	1
Egypt	37	65	77	2.3	1
Nigeria	63	135	114	3.0	2
Brazil	109	226	108	2.9	4
Mexico	60	131	119	3.1	2
United States	214	248	16	0.6	4
USSR	254	309	21	0.8	5
Japan	112	133	19	0.7	2
Eastern Europe	130	152	17	0.6	2
Western Europe	344	378	10	0.4	6

Source: Global 2000 Technical Report, Table 2-10.

Table 2
Estimates and Rough Projections of Selected
Urban Agglomerations in Developing Countries

	1960	1970	1975	2000
	millions of persons			
Calcutta	5.5	6.9	8.1	19.7
Mexico City	4.9	8.6	10.9	31.6
Greater Bombay	4.1	5.8	7.1	19.1
Greater Cairo	3.7	5.7	6.9	16.4
Jakarta	2.7	4.3	5.6	16.9
Seoul	2.4	5.4	7.3	18.7
Delhi	2.3	3.5	4.5	13.2
Manila	2.2	3.5	4.4	12.7
Tehran	1.9	3.4	4.4	13.8
Karachi	1.8	3.3	4.5	15.9
Bogota	1.7	2.6	3.4	9.5
Lagos	0.8	1.4	2.1	9.4

Source: Global 2000 Technical Report, Table 13-9.

APPENDIX C. REGIONAL REVIEW

Operations

Behind Europe and Latin America, North America stands third among the six world regions in regard to the incidence of terrorist activity. Although far behind those two very active areas in total incident count, North America does lead the world—as might be expected—in the number of terrorist operations targeting US business (see Table 3). Also unique to the North American region is the fact that virtually all terrorist activity within the area since 1970 has taken place in a single nation—the United States. Of the 590 total terrorist incidents recorded in the Risks International, Inc., data base for the period 1 January 1970 through 31 December 1978, 582 incidents occurred in the United States and only 8 in Canada.

Within the past 9 years (1970-78), 55 terrorist groups were involved in the 590 incidents which took place during this period. All of these groups, with the exception of one in Canada (the Quebec Liberation Front), operated in the United States. By way of comparison, for the same time period 41 terrorist organizations were active in Latin America and 217 in Europe.

Table 3
Terrorist Activity in North America

	Worldwide 1970-1978	North America 1970-1978	North America 1976-1978
Total Terrorist			
Incidents (all types)	5,529	590	197
Nr. Successful	5,051	497	141
% Successful	91%	84%	72%
Nr. Killed ¹	3,024	73	9
Nr. Injured ¹	4,691	226	38
Nr. Hostages ²	5,738	13	6
Incidents Targeting			
Business	2,427	298	103
Incidents Targeting			
US Business	626	266	88
Total Dollar Losses³	\$516,505,102	\$16,000,810	\$3,036,200
Total US Business			
Dollar Losses	\$87,868,868	\$4,521,050	\$1,587,500

Source: Risks International, Inc.

¹Accurate death/injury data and dollar losses are available in a very limited number of cases. Only verified data are reported here. Accordingly, the actual death/injury count and dollar loss figures undoubtedly are much higher.

²These totals include hostages taken in facility attacks, kidnappings, and hijackings.

³Includes ransoms paid in kidnappings and hijackings; damage to plants, facilities, equipment and aircraft in bombings, facility attacks and hijackings; and funds taken in robberies.

Note. North America, for purposes of this Regional Risk Assessment, covers only Canada and the *continental* United States.

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