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
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THE NEED FOR A BALANCED CURRICULUM AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE

by

Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Ekman, IN
Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Nobles, FA



US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER <u>16</u>	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. <u>AD-A103 239</u>	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) THE NEED FOR A BALANCED CURRICULUM AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE.		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED <u>9</u>
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC Michael E. Ekman, IN LTC Charles S. Nobles, PA		8. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17007		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE 27 May 1981
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 132 140
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The authors examine the AWC curriculum and mission from a historical perspective and in light of current challenges and requirements. The objective of the study was to present to the Commandant of the Army War College an independent view of the curriculum. It is the authors' opinion that the current curriculum is too broad and too much oriented on national security policy formulation. More focus should be on Army doctrine, strategy, war planning, and conduct of war. Additionally, economies could be attained through restructuring the academic year into a trimester system.		

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE NEED FOR A BALANCED CURRICULUM AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE

A GROUP STUDY PROJECT

BY

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27 May 1981

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Study Advisor: Dr. Don Penner

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FORMAT: Group Study Project

DATE: 27 May 1981

PAGES:

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

DE QUOI, S'AGIT-IL? -- WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT?

When Major General Emory Upton submitted his report, The Armies of Asia and Europe, to the War Department in 1878, he observed:

... notwithstanding the superior preparatory education [USMA] we have secured to a portion of our officers, we have not as yet, except in artillery, provided for them the means for acquiring a theoretical and practical knowledge of the higher duties of their professions.¹

In the intervening century the Army established a school system (at the apex of which is the Army War College (AWC)) to provide for the higher military education of its Officer Corps. Since its founding in 1901, the overriding mission of the AWC has been to prepare selected senior Army officers for high command and staff duty in the Army and the defense establishment through an advanced course of professional study with the ultimate aim to train officers to command men in war.

Across the years, the AWC has fulfilled this purpose well, providing the main ingredient to the professionalization of the United States Army in the pre-World War I era, and in providing the highly qualified military leadership that commanded the Armies of the United States in two World Wars and through the dangerous post-World War II era.

Although few thoughtful persons would challenge the need for War Colleges, there has been recurring, thoughtful, honest concern within the Army, as well as by other observers regarding the War College's proper end; and the quality, adequacy, and currency of the means to that end. There are disturbing indications that the senior commanders and senior staff officers, graduates of the Army War College, may not be as well-equipped

professionally as their pre-World War II mentors. The post-Korean War record speaks for itself. As Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles observes in his 1979 landmark Military Power in a Free Society:

A study of the past 25 years reveals patterns of repeated violations of sound principles. This repetition has been costly in both direct and indirect effects.²

The effects of what Eccles calls the "Vietnam Hurricane" have had significant impact on the Army, the military, and the Nation at large. In the uncountable postmortems of that sad episode, the central issues were centered about the faulty assumptions underlying initial decisions which placed the US in Vietnam, a failure of our high command to understand the basic dimensions of that revolutionary war, a lack of integrity of command in our civilian leadership and a loss of integrity among many military commanders, and the military's inability, or reluctance, to take decisive action to redress these issues.

Could the underlying cause for these professional failures be somehow related to the professional education these senior officers received? Is what Edward Katzenbach called the "demotion of professionalism" at the War Colleges resulting from a lack of service orientation³, related to the pattern of repeated violation of principles we have witnessed time and time again since the late 1950's? This analysis, while not focused primarily on this issue, provides the reader with some detailed insight that would suggest that there is, in fact, a relationship between senior officer professional education and the quality of the professional decisions and security policies developed during the 1960's and 1970's in the United States.

The Army's institutional concern for these issues is evidenced by the many officer education review boards established since the Second World War.

No less than six formal review panels, numerous civilian committees and advisory boards, and yearly institutional faculty review boards have deliberated on the proper War College purpose, curriculum, and direction. Each of the six formal Army educational review boards have generally affirmed the College's increasing trend from a curriculum focused primarily on the Army, and preparation of selected officers for command of large formations and as staff officers on the Army staff; to one which has emphasized the Army's role in defense and national security policy formulation, and the national and international security environment. Except for the Haines Board (1966), the boards believed that the Army needed to produce "soldier-statesmen" to cope with the complex modern problems of the military in general, and the Army in particular.

As impetus for a fundamental reevaluation grows from within the Army, we, the authors, have become increasingly concerned about the quality of the AWC curriculum content and structure, and teaching methods. This concern is also shared by many members of the Class of 1981. During the academic year we have been exposed to a strong political and international relations curriculum at the apparent expense of military science and art, doctrine, history, strategy, mobilization, logistics, planning and operations. While we recognize that these are value judgements, the evidence seems compelling. Notwithstanding the issues of content, the AWC appears to have sacrificed reasonable depth for breadth; and appears to have only skimmed the surface of key issues of the course offerings -- except for the electives in the advanced studies program. In our view, there are too many lectures, and too little time for quality committee and individual work. The student role is a passive one, in general; and despite statements to the contrary, instead of a true graduate-education environment, the student finds himself

overscheduled and insufficiently challenged intellectually. While the above views are general propositions which need to be qualified, this is our overall "feel" of the War College.

As such, we remain convinced that our line of inquiry is appropriate and that our independent review may add some light to these recurring questions: What's it all about? What is the purpose of the AWC? Are we studying the right things the right way? Have we strayed from the basic purpose of a War College in the three decades following World War II in our quest for the "soldier-statesman"? If so, then what should the bedrock purpose of the War College be and how best can it attain those ends? How, if it should, does the War College evaluate the degree to which it succeeds in gaining those objectives? The answers to these and other related questions are at the core of this inquiry.

PURPOSE OF STUDY

The overall purpose of this study is to determine if the Army War College mission, objectives, curriculum content and structure, and teaching methodology should be revised to prepare graduates better for service in higher positions of responsibility within the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, and other governmental agencies.

STUDY METHODOLOGY

This study is based on research of unclassified resources available in the Army War College Library and in the Military History Institute Library and Archives, Carlisle Barracks. A deductive/inductive model was used to derive conclusions. Chapters II, III, and IV establish the conditions of contemporary senior Army officer qualifications, the development of the

college curriculum, and provide comments regarding the purpose and curriculum of a War College as viewed by contemporaneous students of the military field. To broaden the inquiry, U.S. senior service college educational systems and selected foreign equivalent institutions were examined (Appendixes 1 and 2). Based on the results of the information collected and evaluated in these previously cited chapters, a proposed general philosophy for the AWC is outlined in Chapter V. This philosophy includes a mission statement, supporting educational philosophy, and a description of a proposed curriculum for the AWC. The study concludes with some recommendations which are derived from the proposed curriculum.

SCOPE OF STUDY

The major thrust of this study is to establish the primary purpose of and curriculum for the AWC by studying and reviewing the AWC's functions and roles of the eras considered. Mission, educational philosophy, and curriculum are the central focus of the study. Interwoven into the study are recommendations for some changes in general procedures and practices as they affect the educational process; ideas on the restructuring of the curriculum to increase effectiveness and efficiency of method; and suggestions regarding faculty development.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

1. MG Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe, p. 362.
2. RADM Henry E. Eccles, Military Power in a Free Society, p. 1.
3. Edward L. Katzenbach, "Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges," US Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1965, p. 34.

CHAPTER II

MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE MODERN ERA

The first essential in war can only be assured by training. Without training, a soldier is not worth what it takes to put him in to position, an officer is useless, an army is a rabble in arms.

- Author unknown

THE ARMY AND PROFESSIONALISM - THE BASELINE

Our consideration of the rise of the Army's professionalism is aimed at three basic questions, the answers to which will set the philosophical and conceptual framework for determining the purpose of the Army War College:

- What is the Army's basic purpose which, if unfulfilled, negates the Army's utility to the nation?
- How has past experience affected Americans' attitude toward the military and war in general and the Army in particular?
- Is there a discernable pattern of national attitudes; and if so how does it impact on the Army's notion of current professional requirements?

NATIONAL PURPOSE AND THE ARMY

The central aspects of United States¹ national purpose, from which the United States Army's mission is ultimately derived, were formed in the Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution. As a sovereign nation our national purpose reflects those documents: to maintain a national will to enhance and safeguard our way of life by promoting our prosperity, providing for the nation's security, protecting the well-being and rights of our citizenry, and assuring our freedom of action in

international affairs in pursuance of our legitimate goals.

This purpose, in turn, provides the thrust and scope for US contemporary national security policies and strategy, as well as shaping the Army's purpose as a part of the nation's armed forces in support of these security policies. Over US history, the general terms of the nation's security objectives have been to:

- Maintain national strength and purpose
- Maintain national sovereignty
- Deter war; and if war should occur, to reduce risk (to our nation).
- Provide the means, when required, to support and attain national policy objectives.
- Assist in fostering a world environment conducive to stable, peaceful international relations and not inimical to US interests.¹

This is the context within which the United States maintains military forces. Military power is a reflection of the nation's economic, social, moral, political strength and collective will of the people and leadership. In short, the military is the final protector of the country's independence and security.

The Army's fundamental irreducible purpose is to fight and win the nation's land wars.² The function of the officer corps is to equip, train, support and direct such combat forces as authorized by law in peace and war within constitutional limits and in accordance with the policy of superior authority. Ultimately, the Army's ability to conduct successful combat operations, however defined, rests squarely on the quality of the officers and men of the force. This professional dimension provides the true measure of combat worthiness and readiness. Lacking a fully developed

professional leadership, the force will fall short of their full potential - a flaw which could spell national disaster in today's world.

As evolved in the United States, the American professional military ethic demands that the military be subordinated to the constitutional purposes and the will of the people. To attain this end

the entire profession and military force ... must be constituted as an effective instrument of state policy ... For the profession to perform its function, each level ... must be able to command the instantaneous and loyal obedience. Without these relationships military professionalism is impossible. ... loyalty and obedience are the highest military virtues ... "the ones ... upon which all the others depend ..."³

These aspects of professionalism, then, set out the general parameters for the professional military of the United States. They frame the outline of the TASK, STANDARDS and CONDITIONS of the Army's professional services to the nation, and provide the answer to the question of the Army's purpose.

The remainder of the chapter will address the impact of the nation's historical military experience on the Army and the Army's reaction to national attitudes towards war.

"THE OLD ARMY"

Prior to World War II, most officers spent most of their careers in assignments traditional to the military profession.⁴ In this sense there was little difference in the perception of traditional professional interests - dominated by a keen interest in military science and art, war planning, tactics, doctrine, history, and the interest in the narrower conception of the profession - of the small Regular Army of 1870, 1901, and 1940, the year of the last pre-World War II Army War College class.

Faced with few threats to the nation's security, the pattern of civil-military relations during the period between the Civil War until the beginning of World War II was antimilitary in its extreme form, and indifferent at best. The Civil War had settled the fate of Southern Conservatism. After 1865, liberalism - and its hostile, static and dominant approach to military affairs - reigned unchallenged on the American scene, save for a brief neo-conservative period at the turn of the century.⁵ The period was marked by a populace with essentially a hostile anti-military ideology, low military political leverage, and the development of a highly professional military.⁶ The essential conservatism of the professional military outlook caused mainstream American liberalism simplistically to identify the military and military professionalism as elitist and an enemy of the liberal philosophy.⁷ Awash in this generally hostile environment, the Army turned inward. This isolation, rejection and reduction of the armed services after the Civil War, while described by some historians as the low point of American military history, actually provided the conditions for development of a professional military.⁸

Huntington points out that

... the very isolation and rejection which reduced the size of the services and hampered technological advance made these same years the most fertile, creative, and formative in the history of the American armed forces. Sacrificing power and influence, withdrawing into its own hard shell, the officer corps was able and permitted to develop a distinctive military character.⁹

Huntington continues: "The American military profession, its institutions and its ideals, is fundamentally a product of these years."¹⁰ The shape of the American military mind and profession was decisively shaped during this period. Isolation and lack of a security threat were requisites for

this practical, professional reform. "Paradoxically ... the dark ages of military political influence were the golden ages of military professionalism.¹¹

In practical terms, Weigley offers some additional insights with respect to this period:

It may be that again the Army's very necessity to turn inward upon itself gave some stimulus to the officers to seek their own professional improvement ... Also, the officers remained sufficiently in touch ... with the world, to know of the spectacular Prussian victories in the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71 and of the military innovations that contributed to them.¹²

These developments involved breech-loading infantry rifles and cannon; introduction of a conscript army thoroughly organized for war; rapid mobilization plans based on railroad nets (which the Prussians learned to appreciate from their observers' reports of our Civil War); a professionally educated general staff to direct and control the army; and a body of professional knowledge developed by Clausewitz and Jomini to form a true basis for military science and art.¹³ Moreover, during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief, General William T. Sherman, encouraged professional development of the officer corps. He established the Army's system of post-commissioning service schools in which the officer could develop branch skills and higher command and staff skills.¹⁴ Sherman also actively encouraged self-study and writing for publication in the newly established professional journals of the day, such as the Cavalry Journal (1888), and the United Service journal (1879). He supported Major General Emory Upton's tactical innovations and investigations into the military policy of the United States. In this regard Sherman, attracted to Upton's innovative intelligence, named Upton to head a three man

commission to visit the armies of Asia and Europe "to seek out military lessons for the United States".¹⁵ Upton's The Armies of Asia and Europe and his unfinished manuscript, The Military Policy of the United States (published in 1904 some twenty years after his death) were to have lasting impact on the Army. Elihu Root's reforms of the post-Spanish-American War era were based on Upton's philosophy and concepts of professionalism.

Despite the emerging professional awareness of the American Army officer, the small conservative officer corps remained essentially isolated from the liberal American mainstream. Save for the First World War, most officers prior to World War II continued to spend most of their careers in traditional assignments in an almost monastic austere existence. The small posts of the constabulary army remained self sufficient social communities relying on their own resources for most amenities and satisfaction. As Masland and Radway point out, using today's jargon:

Interservices, interagency, and intergovernmental contacts were uncommon; and only rarely did they involve issues of overriding importance ... Ritual and rectitude were the order of the day, and the immaculate technique was the prized partner of the immaculate uniform. All was on a miniature scale.¹⁶

By 1904, a small regular Army of 5000 officers and 50,000 men was stationed at some forty posts, camps and stations in the United States and overseas.¹⁷ Even in 1936, the eve of World War II, the General Staff could count only upon the Regular Army for early mobilization - an austere and scattered 110,000 men.¹⁸

THE ROOT REFORMS

By the turn of the century the groundwork laid by Sherman and Upton, the growing professional awareness within the Army officer corps, and the

impact of the mobilization problems encountered by the military in the Spanish-American War came into confluence; and set the stage for Secretary of War Elihu Root's reforms. The war with Spain had uncovered systemic faults with military preparedness and war planning. Root was convinced - given the United States' newly acquired world power status - this needed to be corrected to protect American interests abroad. His initiatives to broaden senior officer education, to establish a coordinated service school system for the higher professional education of the officer corps, and to establish a General Staff under the War Department were aimed at improving Army readiness in four key areas:

- Improving mobilization planning
- Upgrading war planning
- Providing military advice to civilian authorities in national defense matters
- Formalizing joint Army - Navy planning as bases for national security planning.¹⁹

The unique aspect of the Army reforms of the period prior to World War I was that the initiative for change was primarily the work of civilian outsiders rather than the product of the Officer Corps.²⁰ Prior to his appointment as Secretary of War in 1899, Elihu Root knew very little about military affairs; however, he vigorously applied himself to the task.²¹ He was impressed by the German General Staff system; appreciated Upton's vision and concepts; and recognized the linkage between professional education and organizational reforms needed to obtain the control necessary to correct deficiencies discovered during the Spanish-American War. The creation of the Army War College in 1901 as a surrogate "general staff"

and the establishment of the General Staff brought Root's theories closer to fruition. The General Staff Act of 1903 also established the primacy of the Secretary of War as the chief executive of the War Department, a fundamental organizational principle that has marked the military departments ever since, and settled the key question of civil-military relationship: loyalty.

Corollary to these developments was the emergence by the late 19th century of a general acceptance by the American military that war was a distinct field of study in and of its own right. The science and art of war was the central focus of professional military interest - spurred by the establishment of the Army school system and military journals of the period.²²

During this period the American military establishment separated the science of war into its permanent and variable elements for study and application.²³ Another key doctrinal idea emerging from this era was the idea that the practice of the science of war was the sole purpose of military forces. "The Army and Navy existed to fight, not for any other reason." "Efficiency in combat" was the single driving purpose of the military; that everything should be subordinate to that end; organization, education, training, planning. For the first time, American officers saw themselves as a "learned profession" - a view rooted in the newly discovered science of war.²⁴

FIRST WORLD WAR

The military reforms of the early twentieth century paid significant dividends during the First World War. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War during that conflict, cited the Root reforms "as indispensable to the

prosecution of that war".²⁵ During the war, the nation rapidly mobilized on a scale unimagined or even possible had not the ground work been laid and taken hold in the decade preceding U.S. entry into the war. Additionally, military officers were forcibly reinvolved with the mainstream America as the prewar Army burgeoned from a regular Army strength of 5200 officers and 103,000 enlisted to 421,500 officers and men in 1916 (Mexican Punitive Expedition); to 130,500 officers and 2,650,000 men at the height of the mobilization in 1918.²⁶ For the first time in our history senior officers found themselves deeply involved in all sectors of the government and economy.²⁷ Afterwards, the occupation of the Rhineland by the American Army brought additional civil-affairs and military government duties to the Army. Rapidly demobilized, the Army returned to its pre-war size and preoccupations with several notable exceptions. The most significant of these were the establishment of the Assistant Secretary of War (ASW) to preserve the lessons of World War I mobilization, and the practice of assigning officers to civilian agencies; establishing, however tentatively, "numerous precedents for use of officers in functions not closely related to combat operations."²⁸

THE INTRAWAR YEARS

After World War I, the American military initially made strong efforts to maintain its wartime popularity with the public. This was particularly so with the Army, which saw an opportunity to establish a new era of civil-military relations.²⁹ On the surface, the National Defense Act of 1920 gave senior officers of the Army much to be hopeful about. Abandoning Upton's prescription for a military organization based on a large standing Regular Army supported by the Reserves and National Guard, the Army

supported the politically acceptable traditional army cadred by a small but rapidly expandable regular force. The new law, all-in-all, laid impressive foundations. It, the Army Chief of Staff said, "... provides that our traditional citizen army be organized in time of peace instead of being extemporized, as in the past, after the danger has actually come".³⁰

But, as Weigley observes, Americans in the 1920's were disenchanted with things military. Neo-isolationism, and the pacifist movement were running high. The postwar antimilitarism movement gained strength. Because of Americans' natural apathy, their dislike for war, and the linking of the military with the war coupled with their faith in the ongoing peace processes,³¹ the public rejected the military. Faced with mounting opposition in government and throughout our country, there was nothing for the military to do but to retreat back to their prewar isolation and find interest³² and satisfaction in the mundane duties of their profession.

As hostilities erupted in Asia in the early 1930's and tensions rose in Europe with the rise of Facist regimes in Germany, Italy and Spain; as the ineffectual League of Nations lost its grip, and as an increasingly demoralized West attempted to ignore the war clouds on the horizon, the number of U.S. officers who were assigned to activities in "the twilight zone of strategic planning and foreign affairs increased."³³ Increased joint Army-Navy war planning and war gaming at both the Army and Naval Colleges laid the foundation for the expansion of the services in the last half of the decade.

The rapidly escalating events of the late 1930's brought together the Anglo-American alliance and saw increased involvement of military officers in all aspects of war preparation. In this regard, two major policies were to have significant impact after America's entry into World War II in 1941:

cooperation with Britain; and the decision to prepare for the eventuality of a two front war in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

The U.S. and British military established contacts in late 1937, formulated the mechanisms for future close cooperation, and laid the basis for military, economic, political and policy cooperation between the two countries. By early 1939, the Rainbow Series War Plans emerged from the US Joint Board to deal with a two front war. For the first time, because of peacetime staff work, a series of joint war plans were in place before the³⁴ start of hostilities. By mid-1941, steps were taken to place the American economy on a mobilization footing, the U.S. - British Combined Chiefs of Staff was established, and the basic decisions which were to impact for the duration of the war had been taken: Lendlease, naval construction, aircraft³⁵ production, munitions production, industrial conversion.

By Pearl Harbor, essentially all the major aspects of U.S. national security, that is to say joint and combined strategy, international affairs, economic mobilization, foreign aid, science research and development, were³⁶ well within the control of senior military career officers. The impact of these shifts would fundamentally alter American conceptions of military professionalism after the war.

WORLD WAR II

The second World War accelerated this trend. As the war progressed and victory came closer, it became more difficult to draw a clear boundary³⁷ between the military and civilian spheres. Paradoxically, hastily commissioned officers executed duties formerly those of Regular Army career officers as the Army prepared for war; and Regular officers assumed roles of diplomat, economist, scientist and general managers in all corners of

the world, and in all spheres of American life.³⁸ Some examples will serve to illustrate this aspect:³⁹

- Army reorganization in the winter of 1942 brought technical services under Army Service Forces and gave virtual autonomy to the Army Air Force.
- The old Army-Navy Joint Board grew into a highly complex JCS structure with elements to deal with current and future war plans, logistics, intelligence, munitions allocation, transportation and communications.
- The Combined (Anglo-American) Committee of the CCS was organized similarly to the JCS, and eventually all major overseas commands were organized likewise to cover these areas: ocean shipping, land transportation, ports, civil defense, industry relations, public affairs, strategic intelligence, psychological warfare, allocation and scheduling, manpower; and eventually, military government.
- A Department of State - military coordination system was established in December 1944 (State War Navy Coordinating Committee - SWNCC).
- Closely following the SENCC the War Department created politico-military coordinating element in the General Staff Operation and Plans Division to evaluate SWNCC papers.
- The military aid programs (lend lease) increased military participation in economic aid to foreign governments. This accelerated especially after Congress began to make the authorizations directly to the War and Navy Department. Thus, a structure within the War Department was established to manage these programs directly by military officers under General Somerville. Later the War Department purchased and distributed supplies in occupied areas, accenting the need for increased military management in an area normally reserved for State.
- The Army again, as in World War I, found itself involved in military government in occupied territories owing to default by the State Department.
- Military officers were also deeply involved in the Quebec, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. The General Staff was preparing papers for the Army's position on blatantly political issues such as Japanese surrender terms, the U.S. policy towards Indo-China after the war, the impact of Soviet expansion in the Far East.

- The military, particularly the Army, had a powerful voice in foreign affairs policy because of the sheer size of the services' presence overseas; Army officers were deeply involved in international matters. This was markedly so in the European arena.

These changing patterns of military responsibility evolving from our experience of 1941-1945 were to have a lasting impact on the Army's concept of military professionalism and officer education.

1945 - 1973

During the months following the German and Japanese surrenders,

the Army like the nation did not direct its conduct mainly to the dangers posed by Soviet Power and the ... atom. All hoped that life would now proceed into the broad uplands /of true peace^{7.40}

The Army intelligently and successfully administered a vast system of military government in occupied territories of the defeated Axis powers. Under the tutelage of emergent "soldier - statesmen" such as General J.T. McNarney, General Lucius D. Clay, and General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the American occupation forces helped Germany and Japan shake the legacies of the past, recover their economies and self-respect, and reestablish parliamentary government over the ensuing six years. Beyond this, however, Weigley observes, "the Army turned, as though World War II had indeed been merely an Indian raid writ large, to its accustomed postwar tasks of demobilization and reorganization for peace".⁴¹ But despite the intentions based on the World War I experiences to return to the pre-1941 model, he continues, "the advent of peace did not permit officers to withdraw from⁴² their diversified policy-level positions".

One reason this was not possible was, as already cited, the reluctance of some civilian agencies to assume many of the Army's postwar roles which had been traditionally civilian functions.

Thus, by default, many quasi-military duties fell to the military, the foremost of which was the interim administration of foreign countries, which in addition to Germany and Japan, included Austria, Korea, Trieste, many Pacific islands and Okinawa. These responsibilities increased with the Truman Doctrine of 1947. Because of Army involvement in wide areas of

the world, and owing to the services' experiences in World War II foreign aid management, the military participated in all aspects of postwar foreign aid programs in concert with the Department of State and other agencies. Moreover, in military matters the Anglo-American discussions on allied security problems set the framework for what was to become the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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Owing to these new roles and functions, American Army officers necessarily maintained closer relations with other governmental agencies to administer the billions of dollars of military and foreign aid. Additionally, MAAGs were formed overseas as part of the State Department's "country teams"; and to support these functions, officers were assigned to procurement and other logistics duties on an unprecedented scale in peacetime. The genesis of the so-called "military-industrial" complex - wherein the military was increasingly involved in major aspects of the peacetime economy, industry and essential service - has its roots in this period.

The immediate postwar period also saw increased military involvement in national security planning and policy formulation. The government, concerned to learn by past mistakes, finally "unified" the military services under the National Defense Act of 1947. It, along with its several evolutionary revisions over the following three decades, established the organization and processes designed to assure a proper military role in national defense policy formulation. The creation of the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Resources Branch, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense organization as members of a "National Military Establishment" was an attempt to link this Establishment to the formulation of national policy at large.

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This Act in itself assured a wider scope of military participation in

arenas normally the preserve of other governmental agencies. In this manner over the subsequent years,

not only did officers acquire the responsibilities throughout the world; they also performed important and increasingly complex national security functions at the seat of government.⁴⁵

A third key factor in the growing military influence in American policy making was the persistent, growing Soviet threat. Given the legacy of World War II, the security responsibilities acquired by default vis à vis a prostrate Europe, and the Soviet challenge; the United States was forced to maintain levels of preparedness which were unprecedented in American peacetime history.⁴⁶

From 1950, the perceived Soviet threat and the World Communist movement to national security required the nation to divert an increasingly larger proportion of the nation's wealth to defense and para-military matters. Large standing conscript defense forces and an immense military procurement program to support service requirements and military security assistance programs set the stage for permanent officer involvement in all sections of society. And yet, except for Korea and Vietnam, this military power was not actually committed to major combat operations. The new security environment, in which incremental challenges were not viewed in themselves as significant enough, save in Korea and Vietnam, to commit large U.S. military forces confused and blurred security issues. In the "old days" war was war, peace was peace. Now things were different:

In World War II, national security planners ... measured their success largely by the progress of the field forces. Now ... national objectives were less simple and the method for attaining them more complex. They were pursued by diplomatic action, by trade and aid policies, by propaganda, by strategic maneuvers, and by

sustained technological and industrial development. Military officers were ... forced to pay closer attention to the political, economic and scientific aspect of national security matters than ever before.⁴⁷

Moreover, the advent of nuclear weapons and missiles demanded an integrated approach to national defense to assure national security on the one hand; and to prevent world disaster on the other through miscalculation. And because the increased cost of this huge defense structure was no longer a miniscule line in the budget congressional interest increased. No longer
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did Congress approach military questions casually. Rather,

... The importance of [defense matters] was pressed upon [military leaders] at every turn by official boards, by congressmen, by community leaders, and by authors of innumerable critiques and post mortems on the conduct of World War II.⁴⁹

A very significant aspect of the period, was the assignment of officers to non-traditional functions come to be regarded as a more or less permanent feature of the American government.
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Concurrently, these functions became more complex, more diverse and harder to define. With the National Security Act of 1947, defense decision-making machinery became more elaborate and centralized. Budget controls added to the complexity of the national security decision-making processes and indeed, given the hindsight from 1981, was probably the most significant aspect of postwar development. In short, national security became a government-wide function during the 50's and 60's. These shifts in emphasis from traditional military and Army concerns - that is, doctrine, military history, strategy, tactics, war planning, etc. - were quickly reflected in the Army War College curriculum, especially after 1958. But we shall return to this later.

THE ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY

1973 - ?

Today, Army officers are enjoined to be prepared to recognize and deal intelligently with a wide range of issues, many of which are not strictly military in nature. The Vietnamese War and subsequent events have not altered this imperative for the "all-around officer". This new environment requires military officer participation in formulation and execution of the most diverse national policies and programs to attain national policy objectives. Additionally, the nuclear factor requires the close coordination of political-diplomatic-military effort; these weapons must be tightly coordinated to limit conflict. As a consequence, military action or inaction must be coordinated in political bargaining, policy statement, alliances, economic policy, propaganda, and foreign relations.

These are the imperatives of our times. Emerge the "generalist" - exceptional military officers who possess intelligent conceptions of the "big picture" as they conduct the business of their duty within the Department of the Army, Defense, and elsewhere.

But there may be some shortcomings in this conception, especially as it affects the education of the senior military officer. While it is correct that national security is indeed a "government-wide function" requiring officers who understand "the big picture", and who can function in many roles intelligently to play a responsible part in policy formulation; the All Volunteer Army fundamentally changed the relationships which were extant from the Korean War until the end of the draft in 1973. Without conscription, the Army overnight returned to the "constabulary mold". All the assumptions regarding manpower, national willingness to support the military were skewed. Also the unpopular war in Vietnam

alienated the military from the public and almost "wrenched the guts out of the Army." Yet as an institution, the Army still tended to focus on manpower issues and moved to adjust to the new conditions as best it could. But Army leadership, and the institution itself, apparently did not recognize the resolution of our problems is not basically a "people problem" in the sense of MANNING AND RETAINING THE FORCE. The core issue, given the current conditions and our potential adversary, is the Army capable of fulfilling its fundamental purpose: win America's land wars? Doctrine, organization, planning, tactics are the real issues. And these areas seem to be little emphasized in the education of today's "soldier-statesman-generalist".

Reduced to a regular volunteer establishment with the end of the draft in 1973, the Army, despite the current (1981) blush of popular concern for our defense posture, finds itself an essentially conservative force in a very liberal society of a maritime nation. While it has much larger overseas commitments than found at the turn of the 19th Century, the Army of the 1980's is not too dissimilar to the Army of 1900.

However, unlike the Army of that distant era, today's Army does not have the luxury of waiting for a Root or Wood to force internal reforms to correct shortcomings. The Active Army has to be ready to fight on short notice without significant reinforcement. A small army faced with a larger, well-trained, well-equipped, disciplined force, as represented by the Soviet Union and her allies, cannot afford to be anything but lean and mean; and outstandingly technically and tactically proficient. There is no room for error. The traditional American way of war - commit regulars, mobilize militia behind regular screen and over ocean barriers, mobilize industry and economy to harness our almost self-reliant natural

resources to build our war machine, then deploy and overwhelm our enemies in an attritive campaign in coalition with our friends - no longer obtains. We do not enjoy the time and space to trade while the Regular Army buys time. No longer do we enjoy a strong economic and industrial base in our service-oriented society; and no longer are we self-sufficient in raw material and petroleum on which we could base a mobilization. The Volunteer Army readiness problem cannot be resolved through Personnel policies alone. The Army must adapt to the new circumstances doctrinally, organizationally, tactically, strategically and logistically - or face risk of defeat at the outset of any major conflict, especially one involving the Soviet Union on the Eurasian land mass. Moreover, there are profound implications of such a change relating to those larger professional issues of ethics and expertise which bedevil the Army of 1981. The issue devolves to one of professional education.

SUMMARY

From the foregoing discussion, it seems clear that there is a relationship between the national environment, the effectiveness of the Army as an institution, and the professionalism of the Officer Corps. Contemporary American attitudes and beliefs concerning the military are deeply rooted in the political system, the geo-strategic situation, and past experiences. These attitudes, in turn, have directly influenced the professional dimensions of the US military and shaped the boundaries within which the military operates today. Regardless of the parameters assigned, however, the fundamental irreducible task of the Army is to plan and to conduct successful combat operations in support of national policy and strategy. Owing to this last all important fact, the ultimate aim of all Army training

and education programs must be to assure that the Army is using the valuable time during peacetime to prepare for war. In the final analysis it is the quality of the Officer Corps that sets the tone for the rest of the Army. Within the Officer Corps, the direction is set by senior leadership. For this reason, we will now turn to the examination of the role of the Army War College in the development of the senior military leaders of the Army.

CHAPTER II

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CHAPTER III

ARMY WAR COLLEGE HISTORY AND MISSIONS

War, like most other things,
is a science to be acquired
and perfected by diligence,
by perseverance, by time,
and by practice.

- Alexander Hamilton¹

THE FOUNDATIONS: 1794 - 1899

The roots of the American system of military instruction and education can be properly traced to the establishment at West Point of a "school for the regiment of artillerist and engineers" in 1794.² The conservative Federalists headed by Washington and Hamilton saw the need for a professional army based on the European model.³ Hamilton also foresaw the need for a "hierarchy of military schools ascending from those concerned with technical and tactical studies to those dealing with the higher theory and philosophy of war".⁴

These views did not stand unchallenged. The liberal Jeffersonian faction reflected the general American distaste of "things military". Americans - steeped in the liberal traditions inherited from the English ideals of the British philosopher John Locke⁵, and the experiences of the Revolutionary War - only begrudgingly came to agree with James Madison's reluctant position that a standing force is a "dangerous but necessary evil".⁶ Perhaps Samuel Adams expressed this pervasive American sentiment best:

a standing army, however necessary it may be sometimes,
is always dangerous to the liberties of the people ...
[and] should be watched with a jealous eye.⁷

This view accurately characterizes the mainstream of American liberalism which has dominated the nation's political life ever since.⁸ Throughout American history the military, and by relation officer military education, reflected the basic tension of the American body - politic which was built into our system of government. This fundamental "ideological constant" is what Huntington calls the outstanding historical fact of American civil-military relations: "the extent to which the liberal ideology and the conservative Constitution combined to dictate an inverse relation between political power and military professionalism ... which together ... delayed the professionalization of officership in America".⁹

These tensions notwithstanding, even Thomas Jefferson, an avowed opponent of a standing army, recognized the necessity to provide for the national defense. By the time he ascended to the Presidency, Jefferson - always the realist - agreed that America needed an army. And barring the practicality of an armed militia disciplined to government control, the nation, he conceded, would have to settle for a small, well-disciplined and controlled standing military obedient to the central civil authority.¹⁰ To attain the control he desired and to improve the military's usefulness, he also foresaw the need for "intelligent and educated officers".¹¹ With these concepts in mind, Jefferson took the first halting step in developing a hierarchy of military schools which would eventually culminate in the establishment of the Army War College: on 16 March 1802, in concert with Congress, the United States Military Academy was created as a technical school for the Corps of Engineers.¹²

Throughout the remainder of the 19th Century, the Army school system was slowly set into place; accelerating after the Civil War under the leadership of Grant, Sherman, Root and Wood. Philosophically and pedagogically,

the curricula of these several schools were, like West Point's, narrowly focused on branch or service specific knowledges and skills. In fact, given the perspective of 1981, military officer education (to include that obtained at the War College) reflected this emphasis in "technical knowledge relevant to military operations and the skills and attitudes expected of a military leader"¹³ up through America's entry into the Second World War. Although the "generalist school" of military education did not gain dominance until the mid-1950's, the professional horizons gradually and perceptively broadened after the Civil War, and accelerated with the Root Reforms of the early 1900's. Generally this included the requirement for a greater understanding of the relationship between the military and the other aspects of national power and societies.¹⁴

This trend accelerated and paralleled the expanding profesionalization of the Army's officer corps following the Civil War. For example, the 1898 Spanish-American War accented the need for higher professional education.

Thus:

The first, halting period of Army school activation, which had occupied nearly a century and a quarter in evolving the concept that at least some military skills were better learned in the classroom than in the field, ended abruptly in 1898. When the United States, proud of its size, wealth, and industrial strength, entered the stage of world power politics through its war with Spain, victory over a very weak and unready opponent came in just 100 days. However, after the period of self-congratulation which followed the end of hostilities, many thoughtful Americans, aware of the confusion, the bungled tactics, the lack of knowledge of amphibious warfare, and the disgracefully bad logistics - although the term was not then in use - recognized the complete unreadiness of the United States Army to meet any powerful opponent beyond our borders, and demanded measures of reform. While the brief conflict indicated that, in general, Army officers in the lower echelons were fairly competent, it was apparent that those in positions at the higher levels were almost completely unprepared to handle the problems of sudden mobilization, training, and the widespread deployment of military forces.

In response to the failures of the War with Spain, Secretary of War Root, in November 1901, formulated a progressive scheme of instruction for all Army officers, and directed the establishment of a War College Board. Simultaneously with the opening of the new Army War College, modeled upon the war colleges of the major European military powers, the formation of the War Department General Staff, in 1903, justified the emphasis placed by the new school on the academic consideration of large-scale tactics and national strategy. While the Army War College was not destined to produce a Clausewitz or a Mahan, it was able, during its first ten years of life, to create a solid core of American Army officers capable of understanding the problems and responsibilities of the new mass warfare which was forecast by the great armies of the European powers, and to establish doctrine which did much to prepare the Army for its role in World War I.¹⁵

Thus for the first time, a post graduate military college and an orderly system of command and staff training appeared in the United States.

THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE - 1899 - 1917

In its original state, the Army War College was both an operational and an educational institution. Initially it was heavily involved in General Staff functions, especially war planning for the War Department pending Congressional approval of a General Staff. In November 1899, Secretary of War Elihu Root recommended the establishment of an Army War College. Such an institution was necessary, he wrote, "to the efficiency of the Army, as through it officers ... should become familiar with the movement of large bodies of troops under conditions approaching very nearly those of actual war".¹⁶

In February 1900, Root convened a board of officers under BG William Ludlow "to consider regulations with a view to the establishment of a war college for the Army".¹⁷ Such an institution would be established, the board was told, to

further the higher instruction of the Army by developing, organizing, and systematizing the existing means of professional education and training, and to serve as an authoritative coordinating agency through which military information may be always at the disposal of the War Department.¹⁸

By the fall of 1900, the Ludlow Board completed its deliberations and recommended that the Army War College be established to provide advanced military education, training in high command; and to be the agency constituted to perform general staff duties.¹⁹ Over the next year, the board recommendations were refined and improved. War Department General Order 155, 27 November 1901, established the Army War College for the advanced study for Army officers. Pappas notes that in its final form, the orders emphasized the education purpose not the general staff functions.²⁰ The course of instruction at the War College was to include the higher branches of professional studies, the heart of which was "to train officers to command in war".²¹

As a practical matter, however, the Army War College was not organized and functioning until November 1903. In his annual report dated 11 November 1903, BG Tasker Bliss discussed the educational function of the War College in these terms: that the specific duty should be to assist the Chief of Staff and General Staff in preparation of plans for national defense; that "no one was to receive academic instruction at the college, but everyone was to learn things by doing things".²² Bliss went on to point out that in this regard the "college" is used in its old Latin sense of *collegium* - a body of men associated together by a community of interest and object to do something rather than learning how to do it. Under this concept, learning was a by-product to active participation.²³

The War College concept, which was to set the tone for the course of

instruction for the first 10 years, was maturing. In his address commemorating the laying of the Army War College building corner stone on 21 February 1903, Root observed that the College would be a "post-graduate course ... to study and confer upon the great problems of national defense, of military science, and of responsible command."²⁴ Root believed that only an institution such as the War College "perpetual but always changing in its individual elements ... can perpetuate the results of individual effort, secure the continuity of military policy, and command ... authorized conclusive expressions of military judgment upon military questions".²⁵

Beginning in 1907, with the completion of permanent building at Washington Barracks, now Fort McNair, course emphasis shifted from general staff work to that of instruction.²⁶ The 1907 academic year included instruction and practical application in decision-making, map problems, map maneuvers and war gaming.²⁷ While there were no examinations, the instructional methodology, the so-called "applicatory system of instruction", required active student participation rather than the study only of theory or principles. The map maneuvers and war games built upon previous instruction, lectures and discussions on decision making, war planning, and map problems; and provided practice in issuing, interpreting and executing orders as well as provided a forum to apply the principles of strategy and tactics.²⁸

In keeping with the post-graduate philosophy of the War College, students were treated as mature men, well versed in their professions ... ²⁹ Moreover, the curriculum was designed to give "all officers ... a reasonable opportunity for mind broadening study, for independent and original investigation".³⁰

Prior to United States entry into the First World War, the curriculum

evolved into three distinct phases: a pre-course preparatory phase in which students reviewed fundamental planning and tactical concepts. This was followed by a preparation of war phase beginning in November with the formal course of instruction, and lasting until April during which military history, military situations and campaigns were analyzed from the viewpoint of what changes in tactics and strategy would be required if modern weapons and conditions had prevailed. Additionally, March was devoted to "large force operations", using primarily brigade sized forces since there were no divisions in the United States Army. The final course phase was termed conduct of war phase - the aim of which was to apply techniques and principles to the ground through map exercises and tactical rides using the Civil War campaigns as models.³¹

During this period the War College also shifted curricular emphasis from operational problems to one calling for more theory and doctrine.³² This trend was accelerated with the passing of the National Defense Act of 1916, which formally separated the War College from any association with the General Staff. By the time the War College classes were suspended for the duration of the War in April 1916, instructional methods were well-established. These methods included continued emphasis on the "applicatory" method of instruction which stressed learning by doing;³³ provided the conference technique as the best way "to build up a consistent and reasonable rule of thought"³⁴, and stressed the value of developing doctrine so as to

make so clear the lines /of thought/ under which ... officers will work that their acts in time of war can be predicted with the same certainty as that of the players in a game of football.³⁵

It is clear that the officers of this period appreciated the central role and importance of military doctrine. In 1915, for example, Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Knox provided some thoughts which are appropriate for our consideration even today:

The chief difficulty encountered in the exercise of command is that resulting from a critical situation which imposes upon subordinate commanders the necessity of deciding for themselves the action to be taken, and of carrying their decision into execution, before reference can be made to higher authority. Under these circumstances any system is severely tested, and is sure to break down unless it provides adequately for them.³⁶

Knox stressed how theory, undergirded by knowledge and appreciation of the Act of War (the central business of a war college), provides the process by which control can be imposed on the conduct of operations. He argued that

subordinates cannot be depended upon to comprehend the wishes of the commander ... with respect to situations confronting them, unless they have guide/s/ ... chief among which is a proper preparation of the minds of the ... officers ... by education in the art of war ...³⁷

Doctrine is the governing ideas that have been reasoned from principles and are intended as general guides to the application of mutually accepted principles and provide a practical basis for coordination in combat.³⁸ As such, doctrine is key to successful combat because it is the only way to obtain the synergistic effect of teamwork in war and avoid stultifying overcentralization.

Knox's lament that "the American Navy ... and the American Army, have never seriously endeavored to indoctrinate their officers and thus to furnish a basis for harmonious decisions during hostilities" is still appropriate in today's Army.³⁹ To some degree, our present problems with

overcentralization, perceived loyalty problems and trust within the officer corps and in the chain of command may well spring from this lack of emphasis on theory and doctrine in officer education.

In any case, the shift in the War College curriculum by 1916 which called for "greater attention to theory and doctrine" recognized this important basic relationship. BG William W. Wotherspoon, War College President in 1910 observed:

the object is to develop a school of safe leadership for officers ... in this way the War College will formulate a consistent and reasonable habit of looking on military operations and that will build up a system which ... will guide our officers to those principles ... which should govern our armies.⁴⁰

In his annual report of 1910, Wotherspoon also warned against the extremes of specialization and generalization. "We must keep clear of too close a technical and scientific matters and seek out appropriate middle ground between the extremes ..."⁴¹ As always a balance was the quest.

During the period 1910 - 1917, the evolved War College mission was simple and direct - well reflecting the central purpose of the institution:

to prepare a limited number of selected officers for the higher duties of command both in war and in peace while preparing for war.⁴²

THE INTRAWAR YEARS

1919 -1940

The War College was reopened in June 1919 as the "General Staff College". After a two year trial, in 1921, this name was dropped in favor of the "Army War College". Whereas the pre World War course was greatly influenced by the Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, and the Spanish-

American War; the World War greatly influenced the course of study during the intrawar years. The curriculum developed by MG J. W. McAndrew, the first postwar Commandant, was essentially unchanged through 1940.⁴³ In the early postwar years, the College curriculum was expanded to include courses on mobilization and the studies of economic aspects of logistics and industrial activities necessary to modern war.⁴⁴ McAndrew was convinced that the most effective manner of educating and training "selected officers for duty on the General Staff and for high command was to approach the curriculum by staff functions".⁴⁵

Under this formulation, the Class of 1920 began their course of instruction on 1 September 1919, with a seven part curriculum which **parallel**ed General Staff functions. The G2 course began 2 September and ran until 11 November, and focused on the international situation inherited from the War; emphasized the economic, political and military changes proposed by the draft treaties; and provided for committee analysis of the international situation. The G2 course laid the basis for the follow-on courses.

From mid-November to 12 January 1920, the students participated in Operations and War Plans, wherein they studied the main war plan for the defense of the United States and its phases. This study constituted the basis for the next three courses (Personnel, Supply and Training) -- using the war plan model, it addressed the question of how does the country and the military man equip, sustain and train the Army? The Personnel course lasted one month, followed by a month each for Supply and Training. In the supply course students studied Theater Army and War Department level logistical planning and operations, and each wrote a monograph on a logistical problem. Training focused on the problems of large unit and

mobilization training associated with what and how to train, as well as training management. These courses were followed in May and June by war games and a strategic ride to apply the instruction, plans, and concepts developed over the previous eight months in class studies.⁴⁶

In restructuring the course, McAndrew broadly interpreted the purpose of the entire military establishment in a political sense to be one of "defense". He also viewed the War Department's role loosely to include "preparation in time of peace for defensive war as well as the conduct of war once hostilities commenced".⁴⁷ Under this wider conception, higher professional education was expanded to encompass not only military training, but also international affairs and analyses of political, economic, social, and psychological factors as they relate to war.⁴⁸

While the experiences of World War I and the curriculum foundation laid during McAndrew's tenure as Commandant from 1919 to 1921 provided for the central thrust of the College through 1940, the College was not without change at the margin and curricular structures to improve the course. In his annual report of 1926, MG H.E. Ely noted that the curriculum was altered to improve the study of problems of resource management during war-time mobilization; and to improve joint Army-Navy planning, coordination and execution for war and national defense.⁴⁹ During Ely's tenure, the practice of exchanging student officers, instructional staff, and lectures between the Army and Naval War Colleges was formalized to foster intra-service understanding and appreciations, a practice which has continued on an expanded basis between all the senior service colleges.⁵⁰

By the 1925-26 course year, the course was divided into two parts. Part I, the Informative Period, covered some six months and was devoted to developing the students' basic understandings and knowledge of war preparation based on the McAndrews General Staff Model. The second part

was called the War Plans Period and covered the last five months of the academic year.

The Informative Period, September through February, exposed students to the functions and organization of the General Staff War Plans Division - including the study of type war plans, defense project, type naval plans, joint plans, and the Joint Army-Navy War Plan, and methodology of War Planning. This section was followed by a Mobilization, G1 (Personnel), G3 (Operations), G4 (Logistics) and G2 (Intelligence/Estimates) courses. The G3 course focused on the military situation of the United States, its military systems, organization and equipment, comparative organizations, air service organizations, General Staff Organization, Training, Plans and Operations, The G4 logistics course viewed the Army from the aspect of general industrial mobilization, strategic raw materials, the economy, and Army logistics. The final course, G2, studied U.S. and foreign intelligence systems as well as surveyed the international situation and the war making power of leading industrial nations from economic, political, social and military views.⁵¹ In summary, the Informative Period provided the essential information for the follow-on War Plans period.⁵² Part II, the War Plans period, lasted from early February until graduation in late June. It focused on the actual preparation of war plans against certain potential adversaries.⁵³ February and March were devoted to specific study and development of war plans. During April and May, the plans developed in the initial part of the War Plans Period were tested and applied, to include war gaming the Joint War Plan. June saw a map maneuver and FTX, followed by a command reconnaissance (tactical/staff ride) in Vermont to test the plans on the actual ground; a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) in today's jargon.

During AY 1927-28, Part I of the course was changed to correct a perceived deficiency caused by an overemphasis on preparation for war at the expense of the conduct of war. This resulted in a significant increase in the number of tactical and strategic situations, and the two parts of the curriculum were renamed "Preparation for War Period" vice "Informative Period" and "Conduct of War" vice "War Planning Period". Included in the curriculum was the class preparation of a mobilization war plan to provide opportunity to study all aspects of war planning in depth. For this war planning exercise, the class was organized along the line of a General staff. The class also participated in a two-sided maneuver and a field reconnaissance exercise. All these features were retained for the next twelve years until the College was closed for World War II in 1940.

By 1939-40, the College curriculum had attained a stability of purpose and content. To paraphrase Captain William Whitson's excellent analysis and summary of that last year:

The last prewar academic year began on 15 September 1939. Part I lasted until 30 March 1940, and was divided into two sections. The first, entitled Preparation for War Period, included a G3 course lasting one month, a month long G4 course, a mobilization course of two weeks, and a G2 course of one month. Throughout this period two periods a week were devoted to current affairs updates. The second section of Part I, from February through March, was entitled "Conduct of War Period" and consisted of a month's course in "Analytical Studies" and a month long "Command Course". Part II of the curriculum lasted about two months, was devoted to a "War Plans Course" under the general title "Preparation for War Period Part II". This was followed by the "Conduct of War Period, Part II" which consisted of a two week Command Post Exercise and a two week

Historical Ride, the latter of which was cancelled because of the emergency.⁵⁵

The content of the 1939-40 curriculum was aimed at preparing officers for service on the General Staff. As Whitson points out, not beset with the problems spawned by World War II and the postwar era of combined and joint staffs, military assistance advisory groups, service unification, the National Security Council, Department of Defense, the institutional focus of the War College curriculum was a relatively obvious "given", a reference point that influenced all major decisions on scope, perspective and content of all courses. Additionally, the concept of general war was relatively clean and free of controversy, undisturbed by interservice controversy, technology, and the atomic bomb. World War I formed the basis for military science and art.⁵⁶

The curriculum in that last year before U.S. entry into war rested on two broad premises of General Staff roles and general "conventional war", and constituted a structure of professional military problems associated with the high level management of resources for the prosecution of a general war along the lines of the World War I model.⁵⁷ The G1 course investigated eight problem areas: Utilization of Manpower, Enlisted procurement, Morale, Military Government and Control of Civil Population, Personnel Classification, Reclassification and Assignment, Replacements and Peacetime Promotion and Separation.⁵⁸

The G4 course also investigated eight problem areas: Organization of the War Department for Supply, Hospitalization and Transportation; Requirements for Supply; Hospitalization, and Transportation; Economic and Industrial Support for War; War Reserves; Supply and Transportation in the Zone of the Interior; Hospitalization and Shelter in the Zone of the

Interior; Organization and Methods of Supply; Transportation and Evacuation in a theater of Operations; and Transportation in Peace and War. The 1939-40 Mobilization Course was essentially a student analysis of War Department, Corps Area and Overseas Department problems of manpower mobilization.⁵⁹

During Part I of the Pre-war curriculum the G2 course contained most of the material that might now be classified as both "non-military" in content and "policy-level" in perspective. It was anticipated that the class would prepare data on the war-making capability of certain powers to be used later in the Analytical Studies and War Plans courses. Such data was collected on geography, population, social conditions, political problems, economic problems, and military power in each subject country. This approach was closely related to the current "International Environment, I.S Strategy and Supporting Program" in Part II, *Common Overview of the War College*. In this effort, committee work was required to estimate the relative power of each to carry out its policies and to draw conclusions to the probable intentions of each as they affected the U.S.⁶⁰

To teach rapid dissection of newspapers and brief oral presentations, students twice weekly (to include Saturday nights) during Part I of the curriculum were each allowed three minutes to summarize a personal interpretation of news pertaining to each of five areas of the world. (The class was reassigned periodically during Part I to assure equal exposure of all students to the five areas. War Department intelligence source materials were heavily used during the G2 course.

The Analytical Studies Course sought to establish a broader perspective and to develop an understanding of government organization and problems.⁶²

Following a month Command Course devoted to the organization of a theater of operations, the War Plans Course was designed to acquaint the

students with important overseas terrain features. It was seen as the climax of the curriculum encompassing lessons derived from all previous studies.⁶³

As seen from the perspective of today's world and the current curriculum, the War College curriculum of the prewar years may appear to be too tightly focused on the Army, and related issues. But on the other hand, the officers who studied at the War College from 1904 to 1940 under this "narrow" conception won their wars. Perhaps there is merit in developing one's professional expertise along so-called narrow lines not unlike that described by Dudley Knox, Liddel Hart, Fuller, Eccles, et.al. The record, as Whitson suggests, cannot be denied.

On 11 June 1940, War College educational functions were suspended for the duration of World War II.

THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE 1945 - 1955

After their World War II experiences, senior military officers were convinced that an officer's professional education should include far more emphasis on joint operations and procedures than had been the case in the pre-war period.⁶⁴ This view was most strongly held in the Army. The Army's 1947 Gerow Board, for an example, envisioned a joint educational system in which the senior level of professional military education would be provided by a National Security University (NSU).⁶⁵ Under this conception there were to be five separate colleges within the NSU system to provide joint education in political, military, intelligence, economics and logistics, and management fields of discipline respectively. While the Army approved the Board recommendations and in keeping with this spirit did not reopen the AWC, the basic plan was scuttled by the Navy's

lukewarm acceptance and the establishment of the Air Force as a separate service.⁶⁶

With this failure of the joint educational proposal, the Army began to restudy the problem under LTG Haislip (1947) and MG Bull (1948); each of whom recommended the reestablishment of the Army War College. Bull's recommendation led to the establishment of another Education Review board headed by LTG M. Eddy in 1949. The "Eddy Board" recommendations were approved essentially intact, which among many things, provided for the reestablishment of the Army War College as the "apex of the Army Educational System".⁶⁷ While endorsing the National War College, the Eddy Board noted that its concentration on global strategy and related political and economic affairs provided insufficient time to teach officers the details of their own services.⁶⁸ The Eddy Report argued that more time and emphasis was needed to indoctrinate future Army leaders in **factual** principles, tactical problems and administrative problems peculiar to Army Group, Theater Army, Zone of Interior and Headquarters, Department of the Army.⁶⁹ The Board also observed that

... the capabilities and limitations of the land component, the organization, the technical problems of administration ..., tactical and strategical powers of Army forces ..., how to make necessary Army plans which can be fitted into the overall joint plans ..., [in effect] the basic material which the Army student [at State Department, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff level] can contribute to his student associates from the other services in their common solution of military problems of national and international scope.⁷⁰

Implicit in the Eddy Board study is the assumption, regardless of the scope of any course developed, that the primary emphasis of the Army War College curriculum should provide an officer with a broad knowledge of his service. Without it, an Army officer would be "unable

to make his full contribution to the common solution of military problems of national security and international scope.⁷¹ This perspective undermined the Board's recommendations to reestablish the Army War College.

In June 1950, LTC J.M. Swing, the first postwar Commandant, assembled a faculty from Command and General Staff College staff and faculty, and proceeded to prepare a curriculum which implemented the newly assigned War College mission:

To prepare selected officers for duty as commanders and general staff officers within the headquarters of the Army group and corresponding communications zone activities, the Theater Army, the Theater, the Zone of Interior Army, and the Department of the Army, with emphasis on Headquarters, Department of Army.⁷²

Under General Swing, the only faculty and staff member who was a graduate of the pre war AWC, a three part curriculum was developed - Phase I, The Army and its Relationship to National Security, was aimed at expanding "the officer's knowledge of United States national security organization with emphasis on Department of Army organization, through the study of national policies, plans and objectives, particularly international aspects of national policies in which students would study national security policy problems, and the Defense Department and the JCS."⁷³

Phase II, Current Army Problems, had two prime objectives: familiarize students with current Army problems, programs, policies and operations (similar to the Informative Period of the Pre-World War II era), and develop a student's analytical capability so they could prepare and present solutions to Army problems. Phase III, War Planning, increased a student's knowledge of the techniques of war planning and improved his ability to solve planning problems.⁷⁴

General Swing also insisted on an extensive lecture program and

committee groups to provide a forum for intelligent discussion and consideration. These formed the basic instruction methodology, as opposed to the standard Army platform lecture techniques.⁷⁵

To support this curriculum, 195 lectures were scheduled for 1950-51. The lectures were designed to cover a wide spectrum of topics appropriate to the three course phases. Committee Problems analyses, solution and presentations, written and oral, supplemented each course. Also, students were required to perform individual research, topics for which were selected from a suggested list which were military in nature and emphasized Army requirements.⁷⁶

Most of the philosophy, methodology and processes General Swing instituted in the first two years of the post-war era are still in use today. These include small student seminar/committee groups as the principle forum for exchanging ideas, addressing broad problems and preparing group reports under the direction of a faculty instructor; a broad lecture program to provide direct communication of authoritative and diverse opinions by eminently qualified individuals in many fields; after-lecture discussion periods within the seminars to discuss issues raised by the guest speaker; a non-attribution policy in the lecture program to allow for freedom of expression; academic freedom of discussion; and seminar and individual problems.⁷⁷ Additionally, Swing revived the pre-war College's "post-graduate/collegiate" approach to studies instead of the standard military MOI approach used in the rest of the Army School System.⁷⁸

For the first five years of its post-war existence, the mission and curriculum established under General Swing remained relatively unchanged. Mission wording varied some from year to year, but the intent and interpretation of that intent remained unchanged. Essentially, the curricular

thrust was very similar to that of the pre-war era: a focus on things predominantly military. Not surprisingly, well over 85 percent curricular time was devoted to military concerns, mainly in Parts II and III of the course. Phase I, (which is similar to today's "Common Overview"), covered international affairs and issues, U.S. National policy, national security organization; and provided appropriate perspectives and background information for an intelligent study and consideration of land warfare and joint operations.

THE JOHNSON YEARS

1955 -1958

When MG M.S. Johnson assumed command of the War College in the fall of 1955, AY 55-56 was well underway. Although during his first year as Commandant, he did not make any major changes in the curriculum or course content, he brought to his position a concern that the College curriculum was not in step with the educational requirements of the times. Means to improve the College procedures and methodology were topics of almost constant discussion. Faculty discussions focused on four fundamental questions regarding the ends and means of the College:

What is the nature of the problem the graduate may be required to handle:

At what staff levels may he expect to operate?

Broadly, what roles can he expect to play on those levels?

What other missions should the War College have?⁷⁹

As Pappas observes, "almost every change made to the curriculum, every variation attempted in ... procedures, every effort made to obtain approval for projects ... was based on an effort to arrive at a solution

to these problem areas."⁸⁰ In this regard, there was a perceived, growing asymmetry between senior officers professional expertise required in an increasingly complex American national security policy world, and the relatively unsophisticated preparation they received at the War College to deal with these emerging cold war relationships at the highest levels of security policy and decisionmaking. The continuous discussions among the faculty concerned, as it does now, depth and breadth, generalist and specialist, and methodology to improve the institution to meet professional needs of its graduates.

Additionally, in 1955, the College mission was expanded from the 1950 version, which required a curriculum to prepare officers, for highest Army command and staff positions, to also include "such high level positions within the Department of Defense as the Army might be called to fill".⁸¹ To resolve these demands, General Johnson instituted a formal internal curriculum review which significantly altered the course of instruction and brought the War College into a period concerned predominantly with the role of the Army in supporting the national strategy⁸², as opposed to the previous curricular concept which emphasized heavily the higher professional technical and tactical skills senior Army officers needed to execute Army operations in support of national strategy and policy.

In the sense that World War II was a watershed in the military's concepts of professionalism in which

... the varied role of the Army officer as a security policy-maker must include not only military security, but to national security as a whole. In this sense he must consider himself responsible and accountable for the political and economic as well as the military implications of his recommendations on any policy issue, whether on "cold war" or actual warfare ...⁸³

So, too, was the ultimate impact of the "Johnson Reformation" of 1956-58. World War II and the postwar era brought and demanded senior officer participation into a wide range of governmental functions and roles, nationally and internationally, which were theretofore outside of the professionals' domain. The Johnson curricular changes merely recognized this fact of life, and shifted to meet the realities of this situation. After a decade of internal debate, the War College "reforms" acknowledged this broader scope of military professionalism. In fact, Army "survival" in the era of "more bang for the buck" dictated such a change. This shift has been reflected increasingly in every curriculum change subsequent to the Johnson-era.

The shift intensified during Secretary Robert MacNamara's reign as Secretary of Defense in the 1960's as the Army attempted to regain control of its destiny by developing insights and improving its influence over resource allocation, programs and policies within DOD. In effect, Army senior officer expertise needed at high levels of command moved from "leadership on the battlefield" to "leadership in the conference room". The former required one set of technical expertise dealing with tactical and operational matters - the traditional military field of knowledge, rather narrow, concrete; the latter required a relatively broad, more abstract knowledge, rather narrow, concrete; the latter required a relatively broad, more abstract knowledge of military management systems, policy, programming and budgeting more closely associated with industrial management. In short, the ideal War College graduate was to be a "man for all seasons", the renaissance man, the soldier-statesman.

This shift in emphasis was also supported by Civilian Advisory Boards as well as Masland and Radway's famous "Dartmouth Study", - the basis for their Soldiers and Scholars.

The first Civilian Advisory Board reported in January 1952 that more time should be devoted to civil-military relations.⁸⁴ The 1954 Civilian Advisory Board suggested increased emphasis on the fundamental values by which a future high-level commander should be guarded in "adjusting his military responsibilities to the political".⁸⁵ Further, it was thought that a graduate should develop a deep sense of history from which to develop a broad and deep philosophy of the meaning and direction of the tendencies of world history and the role of our nation in that stream.⁸⁶ Masland and Radway also place heavy stress on civil-military relations, the need for historical perspective, the nature and characteristics of American democracy, "to its historical, ethical, spiritual, philosophical or psychological roots", and the need to broaden the horizons of officers to avoid service parochialism and orthodoxy.⁸⁷ The impact of these views on the curricular development under General Johnson are direct and obvious today.

The 1958-59 course was divided into two phases - "The United States and Its National Policy" and "Military Doctrine, Strategy and Readiness". Ten courses were scheduled within this framework, with the National Security Seminar capping the course in June. The first three courses - "National Interests and the National Power of the U.S. and USSR", "International Relations and US Foreign Policy" and "Strategy and Policy Formulation" - were designed to develop fuller understanding of national and international affairs and associated problems with developing a national strategy. After studying the strategy of the U.S., students compared the national interests and power of the U.S. with that of the USSR. This provided background for a study of U.S. international relations and

foreign policy. In the second part of the course, the emphasis changed to military topics associated with the development of a military program for the U.S. to meet the country's security needs for the next decade. Courses included "The Army in Combat" - stressing key factors likely to affect organization and employment of the Army in coordination with the other armed services in future combat. One week was devoted to war games, after which students studied Theater, Theater Army, and Army Group Operations. The following five weeks were devoted to "military strategy" - included study of DA and JCS guidance needed in furtherance of national objectives. The last course was "Military Readiness" - and consisted of a review of the Nation's readiness to provide for its security; with the Army's role emphasized. The National Security Seminar climaxed the course in which students prepared national strategies and presented them to the College.⁸⁸

Save for minor changes to reflect current "hot" areas of concern, the Johnson curriculum concept has remained essentially intact through the 1980-81 academic year.

THE WILLIAMS BOARD

The DA officers Education and Training Review Board headed by LTG E.T. Williams in 1958 affirmed this "generalist approach ... wherein academic preparation for high duty is accomplished by study of strategic problems".⁸⁹ The Williams Board also discussed what it saw in two conflicting schools of thought regarding War College purpose: The first school believed the College should be strongly oriented towards Army problems, and national strategy and international affairs should be subordinate; the second school professes the conviction that the College

should be primarily oriented to national strategy problems and the Army's role therein, and secondary emphasis on Army operations. The Williams Board found the second "school" a "sound translation of the College mission as long as the study of the role and mission of the Army received major emphasis within the study of national strategy",⁹⁰ and further recommended correlating the AWC course with a graduate course at a recognized civilian university for a Master's Degree in an appropriate field.⁹¹

Reflecting the Williams Boards recommendations, the College instituted a graduate degree program in cooperation with George Washington University in 1959. The program brought inherent problems associated with attempting to meet requirements of two demanding courses simultaneously. This problem was never resolved to the satisfaction of either institution.⁹²

The War College curriculum was sufficiently settled by 1962 to lead MG William Train to compare the curriculum of 1910 to that of 1962. He said:

both missions appear broad in concept. The [1962] mission certainly implies that the orientation of the curriculum must be toward the future ... that the studies are national in scope and transcend the interests of any one military service. It dictates broad education encompassing more than the military, as to training for a narrow, specific purpose of duty ... no longer can strategy be "expressed solely in terms of military power - must consider political, social, economic and military.

... some officers feel that "if we make our professional officers part-time statesmen, they can no longer perform their primary role of protecting the country ... But, military responsibilities have expanded greatly in the past few generations ... Officers must be more broadly trained than in 1900 ... many fields are so vital to military planning that a professional must know something about them to carry out his duties in the National Security arena."⁹³

THE HAINES BOARD

During the 1966 academic year, a DA Board headed by LTG R.E. Haines was appointed to review the Army system of education. It was useful because it provided outside perspective to complement an internally directed curriculum review known as the AWC 70 Study;⁹⁴ and more fully evaluated the College's position in the overall Army school system.

There can be little doubt that the Haines Board was more conservative than previous panels since the Eddy Board and that its findings and recommendations were provocative given the more "liberal" climate of those times. The Board observed that the War College, as the capstone of the military education system in the art of land warfare that the "Army War College should be focused on the Army's role, doctrine, and operations, in the context of national strategy and the joint and international environment".⁹⁵

The Board also reexamined the generalist-specialist debate which still smoldered, and found that "certain aspects of both concepts have merit and that it is possible to combine both in the same program".⁹⁶ Since the Board determined that the Army's role, doctrine and operations should comprise the primary theme of the course, against an appropriate background of national strategy and the joint and international environment, specialization could be centered in an elective program.⁹⁷ Also of note was the Board's criticism that the College over-relied on outside guest speaking to support their courses. "Their employment in large numbers poses a real problem in achieving continuity in a subject coverage."⁹⁸ The Board also suggested that additional time be provided for faculty research to investigate areas of College interest and to develop military case studies and curriculum content,⁹⁹ and applauded the student research

program which provides a unique "opportunity to investigate and make a contribution on an important military or national security topic."¹⁰⁰ Other key conclusions were:¹⁰¹

- The mission of the Army War College should be revised to read essentially as follows:

to provide resident and nonresident instruction for senior officers of the Army and other Services in the exercise of command and in the execution of key staff responsibilities at major military and departmental headquarters; to advance the art and science of land warfare in the joint and combined environment; to develop concepts and doctrine for heater army operations; and to assist in development of Army concepts for terraspatial operations.

- The objective of the Army War College resident course was reformulated as follows:

To enhance the competence of selected officers, with high general officer potential, to assume command responsibilities and to function in key staff assignments in major Army, joint, and combined headquarters and in planning and policy-making positions at the seat of government; to stress Army doctrine and operations against an appropriate background of national strategy and the joint and international environment; and to provide intellectual challenge and an opportunity for individual contribution to the advancement of the art and science of land warfare through student research.

- The curriculum of the Army War College should continue to be military-oriented, with increased emphasis on the Army's role, strategic concepts, and doctrine. The individual research papers should be limited to military subjects of direct interest to the Army.
- The Army War College should employ the case study method on an expanded basis in the course curriculum, with particular reference to committee problems in which group decisions derive from its use.
- The Army War College faculty should be augmented with several professors on sabbatical leave from their colleges or by contract arrangements with local civilian institutions. These professors, in conjunction with the military faculty, should be used to give a portion of the Army War College lecture program and assist in conducting an elective program.

- As a general rule, officers should not be assigned to the Army War College faculty unless they have had an intervening tour of duty after graduating from a senior service college.
- The military faculty at the Army War College should include officers who are specialists in such areas as research and development, logistics, operations research/systems analysis, and project management.
- The Army War College should establish an appropriate local elective program as part of the curriculum in the academic year 1967-68.
- The Army War College should initiate an extension course program by the academic year 1968-69 and be provided with the additional resources required.
- Unless appropriate modification can be made which will eliminate the conflict between the Army War College course and the George Washington University program without any compromise of the curriculum, the graduate study program at the Army War College should be discontinued.

One recommendation implemented in 1967-68 was the Elective Program, with curious effect over the following years. Designed to provide students the opportunity to tailor the curriculum to meet individual professional needs by a more detailed investigation (depth versus breadth of core curriculum) of military subjects. Over the intervening years, the program has grown apace. However, scheduling has gone through some interesting changes which impacted on the other courses. From AY 67-68 to AY 73-74, electives were scheduled throughout the year in two sessions supportive of the regular course. In AY 74-75, the electives were treated as a part of the regular course and were inserted as a bloc running from early January to late March. In AY 75-76, the bloc was shifted to the spring, and retitled "Advanced Courses". The effect of treating the elective

program as an instructional bloc was to compress the rest of the curriculum - one already time constrained. The problem remains today.

GENERAL DEWITT SMITH

1974 - 1980

LTG Dewitt C. Smith, Jr., served as Commandant of the War College from 1974 - 1977, and after serving a year as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, from 1978 - 1980. His five years as Commandant exceeds that of all previous holders of this position. His tenure and personal professional philosophy on the College are clearly stamped on the course of instruction. General Smith is a "Renaissance-man". In 1975, after his first year as Commandant, he reviewed his conception of what the War College should be about during informal remarks to the faculty:

Ours is a military college, but it's broadly military, not narrow and we must keep it broad, and we must keep it relevant to the things which confront us as professionals, and as human beings, in 1975.¹⁰²

In his address to the 1975 National Security Seminar, he explained his conception of the College's purpose :

This College is not a 'trade school', dealing with techniques and mechanics and training, important as they are. Neither is it a graduate institution in international affairs, important as that field is ... It is not now an extension of the general staff, although it was so in the very beginning.

Rather, the Army War College is dedicated to the highest professional military education ... The academic discipline underlying our programs derives from our purpose and mission. It incorporates studies in those fields of academic and practical endeavor which constitute the military profession ... It is comprised of interdisciplinary studies of the development, operation, and support of military forces in peace and war;

the interrelationship of the military, economic, political, social, and psychological factors which bear upon the broad field of national security ...¹⁰³

In his view, the purpose of the College was to, as all advanced educational disciplines should, help military officers

develop specific habits of thought, analysis, and problemsolving, special forms of discipline, and trained professional responses to issues affecting the national defense and national security.¹⁰⁴

General Smith's words speak for themselves. Articulate, humane, intellectual; he established a less structured, more liberal academic approach to the study of national security affairs, which when combined with the Johnson curriculum of 1958, essentially describes the course of instruction for the 1980-81 academic year.

During General Smith's second tour as Commandant, the last major external review of the Army War College was conducted by the Department of the Army - the 1978 Review of Education and Training of Officers (RETO-78). Although RETO-78 recommendations appear to have minimal impact on the College compared to the remainder of the Army Schools System, a review is useful to complete our survey of the College history.

RETO-78

Designed as a top to bottom review of the Army's education system to accommodate the Army's OPMS program, it had very few findings and recommendations which affected the College. In this regard RETO-78 recommended the College:¹⁰⁵

- Develop a short mobilization course to support requirements of total mobilization or of some unforeseen order of magnitude.

- Continue to develop instructional methods and curriculum content to enable direct and duty-related student involvement in the learning process. Opportunities should be available for students to gain command of acquired skills in command, staff and executive management and to apply these skills in the formulation and exercise of strategic and tactical decisions. Competence will be demonstrated ... by development of concepts and associated rationale in seminars.¹⁰⁶

- Develop and fund increased war gaming capability at AWC.
- Develop curriculum based on stated Army requirements, mission, and objectives as well as DA guidance.
- Revised AWC mission statement and objectives to reflect increased instructional emphasis on land warfare to include essential aspects of joint and combined strategy and operations.

Most of these recommendations, as they affect the War College curriculum, have been or are in the process of being implemented. Yet, they seem to fall short of the mark because they do not explicitly address the specific issues that seem germane to the root problem. The guidance is too general, and allows for a too broad interpretation of the mission for it to translate to courses that meet the criteria listed above. Even the most experienced officers will have difficulty in agreeing on the purpose, scope, and method of military subjects related to the vast field of national strategy.

SUMMARY

The history of the Army War College can be divided into four distinct periods: The Beginning, 1899-1917; the Interwar Years, 1919-1940; the Post World War II Era; and the "Soldier-Statesman" Era, 1960-1981. In

"The Beginning", the War College mission and curriculum was, by today's standards, narrow in scope, focusing on the fundamentals of planning and tactical concepts in the preparation for and conduct of war. In addition, the War College was required to perform General Staff functions for the War Department until 1916, when the National Defense Act separated the War College from any association with the General Staff. Following World War I, the War College curriculum was expanded to include courses on mobilization and the studies of the economic aspects of logistics and industrial activities. The teaching philosophy was focused on the student understanding the details of the General Staff functions as they applied to the preparation for and conduct of war.

Subsequent to World War II, the experiences of that war and the impact of the post war era nationally and internationally on the perceptions of Army leaders seemed to suggest a broader role at higher levels of government for senior officers. These events led to a reinterpretation of the War College mission and role to provide for a broad military education instead of the more "Narrow" pre-war focus. By 1958, the essential feature of the current philosophy of a broad education and a supporting curriculum were in place. As the War College has proceeded through the "Soldier-Statesman" Era, the curriculum has continued to de-emphasize military, Army, and War Planning matters, and to focus on national-international affairs, with consideration of "how to operate and fight an Army" clearly in the lee. The one strong stand made against this drift was the Haines Board (1966); but few of its recommendations were approved and implemented.

Today, the climate may be changing. RETO-78 and new emphasis on "things military" from within the military hierarchy suggest that the pendulum may be swinging back to the right towards a more balanced curriculum.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. Weigley, p. 88.
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6. Weigley, p. 74.
7. Ibid., p. 95.
8. Huntington, p. 143.
9. Ibid.
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11. Ibid.
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13. Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars, p. 105.
14. Ibid.
15. Human Resources Research Office, Proceedings of the United States Army Military Educational Advisors Conference. p. 29. (emphasis added)
16. LTC George P. Ahern, A Chronicle of the Army War College 1899-1919, p. 1.
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28. Ibid.
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32. CPT William W. Whitson, The Role of the United States Army War College in the Preparation of Officers for National Security Policy Formulation, p. 149.
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40. Ahern, p. 127.
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44. Ibid., p. 90.
45. LTC Hjalmar Erickson and LTC Alexander M. Miller, Chronical of the Army War College 1919/1920 - 1930/1931, p. 2.
46. US Army War College, Reports of Operations Army War Collete 1920-1940. See Report - General Staff College, "1919-1920," by MG James W. McAndrew, Comdt.
47. Ibid., p. 93.
48. Ibid.; and Erickson and Miller, pp. 24-29. Emphasis added.
49. Army War College Operations Reports, 1920-1940. See "Report of Operations of the Army War College, 1925-1926," July 15, 1926, by MG H. E. Ely, Cmdt.
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52. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
53. Ibid., pp.97.
54. Whitson, pp. 150-155.
55. Ibid., p. 150.
56. Ibid., p. 151.
57. Ibid., p. 152.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., pp. 152-153.
60. Ibid., p. 154.

61. Ibid.
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CHAPTER IV

WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT - OTHER VIEWPOINTS

The War College marks a great change in the thinking ... the formal education of officers in our armed forces. Formal education up to the time of the War College concerned techniques, tactics, logistics of battle, of campaigns with their preparation and operations of troops. Now you are thinking about war, about victory in war, keeping us out of war. ... It was the one year that was set aside completely for the study of our profession.

- Eisenhower, August 1966

REVIEW

In our considerations we have outlined the history of American military professionalism; and traced the role of the Army War College in response to the needs of senior officer professional education. The War College history can be divided into roughly two periods. The first covered the period 1899-1956, in which the College curriculum focused principally on educating senior Army officers to command large formations in combat, and perform duties as staff officers at all levels. The other social sciences were recognized as important as they related to a fuller appreciation of the higher aspects of national power, and the military science and art of war. It was in this context that war and the other disciplines were studied. The object of the study was application of forces in the conduct of war. The Army War College reflected closely Upton's view that "a general does not much regard the causes of war; his duty is to be familiar with military history and to know the details and principles upon which successful war is conducted".¹

The post-World War II era witnessed the rise of the generalist school of senior Army officer education in an effort to adjust to post-

war realities which had blurred the traditional military-political boundaries, in which military and political policy were closely woven, difficult to distinguish between the military and political functions at high government levels. These facts demanded a merger of political-military functions. It followed that military leaders should incorporate political, economic and social factors into their thinking; and condemned "narrow-minded" military mechanics, and praised "broad-minded military statesmen" whose perspectives transcended the purely military sphere.² The establishment of the Defense Department created a need for emphasis on management in combined, joint and general staff procedures. As LTG Arthur S. Collins said, "The Army War College curriculum, perhaps in an effort to match the prestige of the National War College, seemed to be designed to develop military statesmen for the NSC, future SACEUR, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."³

Paradoxically, the shift from the traditional narrow professional focus on war demanded by our liberal society and civilian superiors in the government prior to 1940, save for national emergencies, has been widely supported and applauded by the postwar military scholars, academia, industry businessmen, the government and the military itself. The current wisdom suggests that the best way to assure proper subordination of the military to the State is to involve it closely in all aspects of defense policy, program and strategy formulation at the highest levels of government. A highly professional, small, isolated military characteristic of most of the Nation's history is seen as a serious threat to a democracy, especially in this post-World War II era because the American Armed Forces required to secure the country were no longer inconsequential in terms of cadre, size and budget. This, coupled with the ever-increasing

military involvement in, or affect upon, almost every aspect of the nation's life has formed a potential power base that was seen by many to be historically significant. The MacArthurs, Walkers and Singlaubs "proved" that this potential does exist. The military presents an ever present internal threat to the democracy unless it is tightly controlled and fully integrated into the mainstream of American thought and life. The solution to this modern dilemma of civil-military relations lies in civilianizing the military. In reality, the problem lies in striking a proper balance which will assure civilian control of the military while still providing a combat-ready military capable of providing for the Nation's security.

The debate continues. The tensions of that debate are reflected in the current round of discussions concerning the direction and purpose of the War College. We have been down that road before - quality versus quantity. Shortly after the disastrous battle at Camdem, Washington wrote to the President of Congress, "What we need is a good Army, not a large one".⁴ In a word, Washington's comment frames our current dilemma.

THE GENERALIST SCHOOL

Regarding senior officer education, current wisdom is clearly in favor of a broad education which includes the mastery of all the complexities of modern defense and an understanding of all fields into which defense now extends.

Sir William Robertson, Chief of the British Imperial Staff in the First World War said that the "military chief must be prepared to expand and justify lucidly and patiently, the plans for which he seeks sanction and he must also be prepared to explain and substantiate his objections to such alternate plans as (civil authorities) may suggest". General von

Seeckt after the German defeat in 1918, believed that Germany's disaster emanated from the German Officer Corps' narrow professional schooling that failed to prepare them to take into account the impact of military decisions on political, economic and social spheres. Thus, he sought to inculcate in the postwar German Officer Corps a wider knowledge and understanding of social and political life. Thus, he felt "Officers must be trained to have an eye to broad issues."⁵ In our times, this view has been shared by an increasingly wider circle of thoughtful people representing many disciplines and professions.

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, probably one of the keenest observers of the profession, writes that the military officer "must intuitively understand the interweaving of policy, strategy, logistics, and tactics and the complex problems of civilian-military relationships that come into terrible focus in the decisions concerning nuclear strategy".⁶ "Senior military men must appreciate both the military implications of political decisions and events."⁷

Military commentator Donald F. Bletz suggests that professional military officers are expected "to perform and be educated so that they can range beyond their narrow technical military profession into other areas". The modern major general, he continues, "must understand the society he serves if he is to be in any way professional in the application of military force as an instrument of foreign policy."⁸

William W. Whitson echoes these thoughts. "The military planner at high staff levels has ... been expected to understand and consider more than superficially a wide variety of non-military data before making recommendations which may have a significant impact on the national economy as well as the national defense ... and that instead of the narrow

competence of specialist professional soldier, policy planning [demands] the 'generalist' - people who could understand and support intricate organized efforts".⁹

Similarly, James R. Golden urges the military professional to acquire skills which will enable him to deal with his civilian counterparts and superiors. Moreover, in his view, the professional must become proficient in explaining options and justifying decisions. Such skill is essential not only to provide highly competent military advice, but also to understand the civilian decision-making process and to present the supporting arguments and analyses most useful in that process.¹⁰

In their studies of the U.S. military education system, Soldiers and Scholars, perhaps the contemporary authority on this subject, Masland and Radway concluded that to attain national strategy objectives without resort to war requires a national strategy in which the disposition of military forces is integrated with political bargaining, policy statements, alliances, foreign economic policy, propaganda and any and all measures that may foster the growth of friendly elements within foreign governments. In either case they are the future role of the military officer as even less conventional than his past role.

In a 1950 memorandum regarding qualifications which he felt officers of the three services should possess, General Eisenhower stressed abilities in leadership and knowledge of techniques of modern warfare. As such they should have a background of general knowledge similar to that possessed by graduates of our leading universities, and have a firm grasp of the particular role of the military within a democratic society. They also must be aware of the major problems of the Nation they serve, and appreciate the relationship between military preparedness and all

the other elements of real national security. Finally, he observed, the Officer Corps must be imbued with the concept of the national defense establishment and with a keen sense of teamwork. This must exist if the three services are to complement each other effectively in carrying out their joint and separate missions in a unified defense structure.¹²

Our research indicates that these views, and variants thereof, are widely shared by most observers of the military scene. But do they represent the correct one? Have we lost our sense of proportion? In our attempt to satisfy the recognized requirements for a broad military education to train senior military officers for high command and staff positions, has the War College course become too broad, too oriented on general qualifications? Have we tended to develop officers who bear little resemblance to the professional fighting man? Have we in our emphasis on the "soldier-statesman" overlooked that the first military qualification must be professional competence?

In this regard, we agree with General Arthur Collin's position. Furthermore, we believe an analysis of the War College curriculum supports this hypothesis.

IN SUPPORT OF A BALANCED CURRICULUM

In our view the first qualification of a professional officer is competence! This term includes the distinctive knowledge and skills traditionally expected of a military professional as well as the special knowledge and skills that he is expected to have based on his branch, specialty and arm. It also includes technical knowledge about military functions, organizations, doctrine, equipment and employment thereof in peace and war; as well as a broad knowledge of the policies and functions

of the organization that an officer may represent to the outside world.¹³ Such competence is fundamental to military participation in policy formulation in a democratic society. Such participation is grounded in the assumption that the military has a distinctive expertise which qualifies leaders to provide critical and necessary inputs to the national security which would not be available otherwise. In this light the consequences of professional incompetence are so dire and visible that the military, the Army, must always place "an extraordinary premium on the acquisition and preservation of basic knowledge and skills within its ethic".¹⁴

At the War College level, while emphasis should be placed on the skills and knowledge useful at higher command and staff levels in policy roles, the primary focus of the War College should be on military competence in high command and staff.

Although LTG Ace Collins in his book, Common Sense Training, focuses his remarks on the practical aspects of training the Army; he lays the Army's current training problems at the feet of our senior leadership. Their failure to recognize that whatever else we may be called upon to do, we have no higher requirements in peace than to prepare our Army competently for war. Yet he observes, despite all the gimmickery and pronouncements, our training in general is poor. We believe our current problems began after World War II when we began to lose touch with the basics. Changes in our service schools did little to enhance training in the 1950's, and the "War College tended to look at distant horizons as it adjusted to the U.S. shift from pre-World War II isolationism to its role of free world leader. The roles that a few senior service commanders filled during and just after the War [Eisenhower, Marshall, MacArthur, Clay] provided the rationale for increased emphasis [for everyone] on

international affairs and national strategy in the War College curricula".¹⁵ The College tendency, in Collins view, is to cover many subjects that are not particularly pertinent to the Army's business. If the College devoted more time and emphasis on teaching future Army leaders about complex systems-logistics, maintenance, personnel and how they affect Army operations, War College graduates would be bringing more "know-how" to their jobs.¹⁶

"Just as realism is needed in the conduct of training, realistic policy is needed in the management of training. Demands have been all out of proportion with people and resources available. We seldom adjusted goals that had been established prior to reductions in force and budget cuts. The missions, exercises, and tests were left on the books. Too many 'can do' commanders at brigade and above tried to do them all. Only great sacrifices and hard work by battalion commanders and below kept the units working. Most units barely survived."¹⁷ Thus, realistic training policies are more essential when budgets are lean and unexpected commitments for national security are placed on the services. During peace the development of junior NCO's and officer qualities is paramount so they can take on greater responsibilities when emergencies arise. You need a steady-state policy, not quick fixes. You have to go with what you have.¹⁸

The highest leadership needs to appreciate these factors; and the War College (and Leavenworth) needs to educate its graduates in these matters. The top chain of command responsibility is to create an atmosphere in which effective training can take place. This means senior officers must become more familiar with weapons, troops and the factual environment, and recognize the difference between form and substance. Training must be the number one priority in peacetime.¹⁹

Collin's continues. The true worth of a fighting force is measured in its ability to perform as an effective combined arms team. In this regard the Army, service schools, and the War College had better give special attention to the fundamentals by giving officers a better appreciation of the complexity and demands of modern warfare.²⁰

General Collins' view is shared by Admiral Stansfield Turner. Though his remarks were made in 1972, they still are relevant to the Army War College: "... there has been a creeping intellectual devitalization in all of our War colleges since World War II ... and (they) have succumbed to the temptation to add piecemeal to the curriculum in a fruitless quest to cover everything of relevance".²¹

Col Peter M. Dawkins also took issue with the proposition that generals should be generalists and that narrowly-based functions and experience are not a sufficient foundation for making judgements in areas outside that field of experience. In form, Dawkins observes, "the idea is sound and persuasive. Unfortunately, from it has derived the widespread and spurious belief that what is called for in elevating officers from operational specificity to that of managerial responsibility is broadening exposure to a wide range of military, national and world issues."²² Dawkins continues,

While this is useful, it is a mistake to conclude that what changes a draftsman to an architect is a brief exposure, no matter how earnestly taken to a constellation of broad issues. The more likely outcome is dilettantism.²³

Samuel Huntington viewed the proper professional military perspective to be concerned solely with the "professional military function"; that is, advising on the military implications and requirements of a proposed

policy, representing the interests and the viewpoint of the "military" in the policy process; and directing the operations of military forces in the field in implementation of policy.²⁴ Generals Bradley and Ridgeway seemed to support this general conception.²⁵

Edward L. Katzenbach, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education in the Kennedy Administration, a former member of the Board of Visitors to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and a member of the National War College Board of Consultants in the 1960's, was also concerned with the education officers received at the SSCs. In his view, in

... the war colleges, both the Services and National, the sense of military professionalism has been on the wane ...

The curriculums of the Naval, Army, Air and National War Colleges are not designed to alleviate this decline in professionalism, for they are not military service-oriented. The curriculums cover political factors covering U.S. strategy, broad national and technological trends, and intra-governmental affairs.

... The curriculums lack context.²⁶

In the same vein, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, former professor at the Naval War College in the mid-1970's subsequent to the "Turner revolution" of 1972-1974, questioned the validity of the SSC's missions, curricula and methods of teaching. With the Naval War College as a model, Kirkpatrick agreed with Admiral Turner's philosophy that graduates of war colleges should have acquired the "vital intellectual tools required to make them effective in any environment when their future careers may assign them".²⁷ In Kirkpatrick's view,

the war colleges should be tough to get into (entrance exams); more difficult to graduate from (academically rigorous); and only those who attend should make flag rank except for the most unusual circumstances.²⁸

More recently, others have joined the fray in questioning the direction in which the SSC's are moving. Getler wondered whether or not the Army War College had any new Marshalls or MacArthurs among the officer-students. He believed that "there are reasons to doubt it". His view is that the senior Army leadership should "be capable of thinking broadly and deeply ... able not only to lead armies but help shape wise national strategy in a world where future battlefields are increasingly hard to predict ... "²⁹ One Army War College lecturer suggested that his studies have **led** him to conclude that the U.S. Army combat doctrine--which he describes as an attrition doctrine--is a prescription for disaster in Central Europe against the Soviet Union; and that the senior leaders of the Army do not even recognize that we have a problem because we do not seriously and objectively study theory, military history, military science and art, doctrine, strategy, operations, tactics, and our potential enemy. We thereby, in his view, are consigning ourselves to the very same course the French took leading to the debacle of 1940. Another lecturer, swings the debate to the other end of the spectrum. As we interpret his remarks given in a talk on national security decisionmaking in September 1980, he would place greater emphasis on military involvement in the national security policy decisionmaking arena through improving officers' **abilities to communicate more effectively with their civilian mentors and thereby increasing the Services' "substantive" clout.** He suggests that **the real payoff is in military readiness because high-level** policy and budget decisions made in DOD and NSC ultimately shape our strategy. He feels we are not adequately prepared by our higher military professional education for the Washington arena. Our inability, he said, to express ideas in plain English, written or spoken, confuse both our

proponents and opponents alike. There is, he indicated, a "great reluctance for the military to negotiate".

Collins, et al., clearly prefer the more narrowly defined traditional scope of professional military competence. General Collins senses that our fighting capability is suspect owing to a lack of appreciation by senior officers regarding the central and overriding importance of training; and their pre-occupation with "higher" security issues. Dawkins best summarizes the collective view of this minority opinion - that brief exposure to many subjects and a broad scope runs the risk of undercutting the professional foundation by creating, instead of a professionally competent general staff officer or commander, a "dilettant", a "professional-amateur": the worst of all worlds.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS

We believe that each position has its merits, and any war college level course must reflect the security "facts of life" as they exist and as they are forecasted to be. One gains little by retreating to the "good old days" of the less complex prewar era. We also recognize that the worth of either of the views, generalist or specialists, is ultimately a value judgement. But experience and the lessons of the past suggest that "balance" is the best path to assure success. Extreme positions usually self-destruct, or lead to the destruction of the individuals or organizations which ignore this eternal verity. We, as already developed, sense that the Army War College curriculum has moved out of "balance" because it is too broad and generalized, and has failed to give sufficient emphasis to its primary purpose: training officers to become proficient in the use of military forces.

To test our hypothesis we borrowed a technique used by William Whitson.

THE WHITSON MODEL

In his superb doctoral thesis on the College curriculum, Whitson developed a useful procedure to gage the relative effort and weight devoted to various course subject material over the school year during the period 1950-58. Reviewing catalogues, he catagorized course offerings into three main groupings for analytical purposes:

. NON-MILITARY: Concepts and problems associated with three major staff levels of security policy - national level (Presidency, NSC, Congress, DOD, JCS), DA level, and overseas command.

. MILITARY: Primarily Army perspectives, concepts and problems associated with each of the three levels.

. WAR PLANNING: Specific problems of war planning at the three levels of War College forces.³⁰

Using Whitson's procedures, we reviewed in so far as practicable, all postwar curricula using the curricular syllabuses and curricula calendars to break out each year into these three categories. In trying to "fit" all course offerings into Whitson's model we ran into some difficulty, particularly in the 1975-79 period because courses were not taught in distinct blocs as in previous years. However, since a reasonable approximation of the general trend was our goal, we believe the analyses did produce a trend line useful to this review. Table 1 graphically depicts the results of this analysis.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Non-Mil</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>War Plans</u>	<u>Adv Crs</u>
1950	25%	75%	yes	no
1956	33%	67%	yes	no
1957	50%	50%	yes	no
1963	56%	44%	no	yes
1981	69%	31%	no*	yes

Table 1. Comparison of the shift in the Army War College curriculum from Military to Non-military courses from 1950 to 1981. Calculations on percent of time devoted were based on days allocated during the Academic Year out of total days possible. Holidays were deleted from calculations. While in 1981 War Games were reemphasized, Gaming does not substitute for War Planning. War Games are models to evaluate war plans.

The trend supports our hypotheses that the War College curriculum has moved significantly away from the study of the traditional, relatively narrow professional focus of the military of preparation for war and conduct of war. The College now provides a generalist education to develop the military equivalent of the "renaissance-man" whose focus is increasingly that of the joint and national security level, and above. If time devoted to courses is a valid measure of this trend, then the College has clearly shifted.

The 1950 curriculum, devoted three-fourths of the academic year to the military bloc war planning matters, while only 25% was "non-military". In 1956, the percent of military to non-military was 66% to 33%. By 1957, it was almost an even split. In 1963, we see some 56% of the curriculum devoted to non-military aspects of national security. In the 1980-81 academic year the only "hard-core" planning and operations course at the theater army and CINC levels was the five week war plans,

perations and war game course. If one counts command management, only nine of the 29 total academic weeks in the Common Overview, or 31%, focused on the Army specifically. And although the Advanced Courses provide a unique opportunity to delve deeper into a wide variety of operational, strategic, logistical, tactical, management, and intelligence issues at the national, joint, and Department of the Army levels, it is difficult to classify them because of the randomness of student selection, and focus of course content. While a valuable adjunct to the overall curriculum, the Advance Course period hardly provides the instruction envisioned for all student-officers by the Haines Board, for example.

Hypotheses confirmed.

SUMMARY

The traditional distinction between military and civilian roles in American life has become blurred, particularly since the end of World War II. Today, many senior military leaders are called upon to work closely in many fields not formerly considered part of the military purview. The resulting problems of educating and training military leaders in defense policy, civil-military relations and military affairs are formidable. Since Elihu Root's reforms of the early 1900's - initiatives designed to broaden high level military education - the face of the Army has changed many times. But the basic line of thought remains the same as we study "how to prepare the Army's leadership better for their duties in positions of high staff and command responsibility?"

Yet for all the changes in the name of improvement, the overriding purpose of training and education of senior Army leaders may have been lost in the shuffle. As more and more emphasis was placed on broadening the education of War College students to allow them to recognize and to

interact intelligently with the many issues not strictly military, the educational system lost its sense of proportion and balance by shifting to non-military courses. The College curriculum has shifted over the past 25 years and that shift has blurred the very reason for its existence:

... such an institute was necessary to the efficiency of the Army, as through it, officers ... should become familiar with the movement of large bodies of troops under conditions approaching very nearly those of actual war.³¹

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. MG Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, p. xii.
2. Huntington, pp. 350-351.
3. LTG Arthur S. Collins, Common Sense Training, p. 14.
4. Upton, p. vii.
5. Correlli Barnett, "The Education of the Military Elite," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol 2, No 3, June 1967, p. 29.
6. RADM Henry E. Eccles, Military Power in a Free Society, p. v.
7. Ibid., p. vi.
8. Lawrence J. Korb, ed., The System for Educating Military Officers in the United States, p. 3.
9. Whitson, p. ii, iv.
10. James R. Golden, "The Future Demands of Military Professionalism: The Views of an Army Major," in The Changing American Military, ed. by Franklin D. Margiotta, p. 408.
11. Masland and Radway, p. 26.
12. Ibid., p. 28.
13. Ibid., p. 30.
14. Ibid., p. 31.
15. Collins, p. 14.
16. Ibid., p. 28.
17. Ibid., p. 39.
18. Ibid., p. 39-40.

19. Ibid., p. 213.
20. Ibid., p. 155.
21. Walter E. Hines, III, A Survey of Attitudes Towards the Systems Approach to Curricular Development at the Five Military War Colleges, p. 3.
22. COL Peter M. Dawkins, "Some Issues Involved in the Education of Officers," in The System for Educating Military Officers in the United States, ed. by Lawrence J. Korb, p. 160.
23. Ibid., Emphasis Added.
24. Huntington, p. 428.
25. Whitson, p. 22.
26. Edward L. Katzenbach, "The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges," US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol , No , March 1965, p. 34.
27. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, "The War Colleges, Education for What?" in The System for Educating Military Officers in the United States, p. 118.
28. Ibid., p. 124.
29. Michael Getler, "College for Generals: Can It Shape Thinkers?" The Washington Post, Sunday, 20 April 1980, pp. D1 and D5.
30. Whitson, pp. 248-267.
31. Ahern, p. 1.

CHAPTER V
PROPOSED ARMY WAR COLLEGE CURRICULUM
GENERAL PHILOSOPHY

Despite the tremendous political, social, economic, and technological changes of the past eight decades and their significant impact on the Army and on military science and art; despite the greater involvement, on a scale unimagined prior to 1941, of senior military officers in political, economic, diplomatic, scientific, commercial and social affairs; and despite the need for broadly educated senior military officers able to work effectively in today's expanding civil-military environment; the

... distinctive task of military organizations is to plan and conduct military operations. The irreducible function of an officer corps is to train and direct combat forces ... (and) for securing the equipment and supplies necessary to support operating forces.¹

Prior to 1940, Service educational philosophy was greatly influenced by the military's perception of and reaction to the nation's generally anti-military attitude. Equally important, the impact of Western European military thought - especially the late 19th Century German interpretation and Clausewitzian model - turned the Services inward during the period 1875-1940. During this period, the American military developed a highly professional Regular Force that strictly interpreted its role in pure military terms. Officer education was technical and Service-oriented.

After World War II, the trend in the Army clearly moved from a specialist to a generalist philosophy of officer education. The prewar study of the political, social, and economic factors as they related directly to military considerations was shifted to a scheme of senior officer education which was highly biased towards the highly political arenas of national policy and security policy formulation.

As the Army moved from the study of traditional military concerns, the Army began to suffer increasingly from a distinct decline in professionalism in direct proportion - a decline well-documented elsewhere.² This is to say, the more "political" we become, the less professional we are. There is a trade-off and a balance must be struck. The authors sense the Army is far left of center on the political-military continuum in this regard. Clearly, if the Army cannot perform key traditional functions, then it cannot fulfill its constitutional mission. Perforce, the War College mission and curriculum should focus on training senior leadership in war preparation and war fighting. This is central to all military training and education. All other aims are but corollary to this fundamental purpose.

The remainder of this chapter outlines some proposals which the authors believe address these issues and restore a proper balance to the War College Curriculum.

PURPOSE/MISSION

In 1901, Secretary of War, Elihu Root, provided the

necessary direction for the Army War College by stating its purpose.

Not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression ...³

The true meaning of these words is reflected in Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders 155, dated 27 November 1901, which was signed by Secretary Root and established the basis for the educational philosophy for the College:

... It should be kept constantly in mind that the object and ULTIMATE AIM OF THIS PREPARATORY WORK IS TO TRAIN OFFICERS TO COMMAND MEN IN WAR. Theory must not, therefore, be allowed to displace practical application.⁴

The authors are convinced that Secretary Root's guidance remains appropriate and are convinced that the mission of the Army War College should be simple and to the point, e.g.:

To educate selected senior officers in the art and science of war, and to prepare them for high level command and staff in the Army and Defense establishments.

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

The basic premise on which an educational philosophy is built to achieve the above mission, is that the officers selected for attendance at the Army War College have been very productive in diversified assignments during their military careers. This individual momentum should not be curbed for a one year "rest" or "sabbatical" period. To the contrary, it

should be nurtured during this school year by continuing to challenge the students while at the same time preparing them for the next ten years of military service. The basic elements of this philosophy are as follows:

- Graduate Level Atmosphere

- Conducive to learning.
- Minimum amount of distractions.
- An ideal environment for the family in which the family is supportive of the student's efforts.
- Contains the necessary data for student in-depth analysis and research.
- Assumes that the student officer is a mature human being and a highly intelligent person in which complete trust is placed to allow completion of requirements given the time and academic freedom.

- Balanced Core Curriculum

- Balanced between Militar, Science and Political Science.
- Teaches the Art and Science of War.
- Emphasizes the improvement of management/leadership skills.
- Starts with theory and proceeds to practical exercises
- Focuses on current key issues in-depth
- Uses faculty expertise as primary teachers with guest lectures as supplementary instructors.
- Uses case studies where possible.

- Diversified Advanced Courses/Research Program

- Designed to complement core program.
- Allows students to focus on individual areas of interest.

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- .. Requires students to address current problems facing the Army and/or Department of Defense by producing quality papers which can be forwarded to the appropriate agencies.
- .. Advanced Courses should be offered during each phase of the Core Program.

PROPOSED CURRICULUM STRUCTURE

The proposed curriculum structure was developed to support the educational philosophy using information from the curriculums of US and selected foreign senior service colleges, where appropriate (See Appendix I and Appendix II for detailed data). This proposal would have to be refined with other subjective factors considered, such as the service experience of the students, before a final curriculum could evolve. For example, since 1971 the service experience of the students has changed in several respects.⁵

- . Students who had completed Battalion Command or higher decreased from 222 - 150.

- . Students with no Battalion Command or higher increased from 27 - 46.

- . Students with Dept Hq, DOD or equivalent decreased from 197 - 107.

- . Students with combat experience decreased from 210 - 177.

These changes must be considered, especially the decrease in high level staff experience and combat experience, in order to have a viable curriculum.

The proposed curriculum structure is composed of six major parts:

● Pre-Course Preparatory Phase. Prior to the actual start of the resident course valuable time is available to acquaint the selected student officers with the resident course. This time should be used to forward necessary information to these officers without requiring them to spend alot of time from their current jobs. This pre-school packet should include:

●● A listing of on post activities (to include times), such as scouts, church organizations, athletics, clubs, etc. to include dates and times of meetings and requirements for student's participation, i.e. Scout master, coaches, umpires, mixed league bowling (Wednesday), men's bowling (Tuesday), etc.

●● An overview of the Core Curriculum with Advanced courses and research topics.

●● Career Planning Workbook. This is part of the self-assessment program and should be completed prior to the start of the residence course. Based on post activities, Core Curriculum, individual interests and goals, the student selects a program of study for the upcoming year (NOTE: National War College uses this method.)

●● Reading List of major books which will be used in Core Curriculum.

● Orientation Week. The purpose of this phase is to further acquaint the student with the academic environment and educational program.

●● Keynote address by Chief of Staff of the Army should lay the framework for the year. The focus in this speech should be to stress the importance of continuing to be productive officers while having the time to enjoy the many fringe benefits of the War College year. Do not

mention a "sabbatical" year, for this immediately places the student in a passive mode. The Army needs to educate the students for its future requirements.

- Familiarization briefings on the post, curriculum, and administrative services available.

- Students meet with counselors to discuss study programs and Career Planning Workbooks.

- Core Program. The Core Program is the basic academic effort undertaken by all students. It is designed to focus initially on individual skills and techniques while describing the Department of Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. The program then transitions into National Strategy and a detailed historical study of military strategy followed by regional assessments. The Core Program concludes with a study of military operations to include contingency planning using case studies.

- Command/Management/and Decision Making (Aug-Nov)

- Complete self-assessment testing and finalize Career Planning Workbook (goals, objectives, values, etc). Start Coronary Risk Appraisal (mandatory for students, voluntary for spouses).

- Effective writing and speaking courses should also be mandatory and provide to students the techniques for writing and speaking at the executive level.

- Professionalism/Leadership should be discussed within student groups to identify characteristics of professionalism, military leaders (using Case Studies) and then formulating how this professional development can be imparted into younger military officers.

- Strategic Decision Systems with emphasis on a

detailed analysis of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) used within the Department of Defense. This section is most important for it sets the framework for the rest of the Core Program. Subordinate command interface in these systems with the understanding of the key dates is most essential for all student officers.

●● National Strategy (Dec-Feb).

●●● This phase of the curriculum starts with a study of the components of National Strategy (Political, Economical, and Military).

●●● Domestic issues are identified by student groups.

●●● International issues are analyzed through the eyes of the military strategist. The committees discuss military strategy drawing on historical examples and detailed analysis of the evolution of strategy and the history of warfare.

●●● This phase culminates with each student committee building regional assessments. This is a classified study with the Threat discussed and used in detail. Identification of the elements of military strategy should be the objective of this subphase. Force structuring need not be included.

●● Army Operations (Mar-May).

●●● This phase of the Core Program is divided into two distinct areas; "Preparation for War" and "Conduct of War."

●●● In the "Preparation for War" subphase the students gain further understanding of Strategic Planning process by becoming familiar with actual war plans to include strategic planning documents used in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

●●● Other sub areas fall under Army planning and

include logistics, mobilization, training, exercises, and readiness.

●●● Under the "Conduct of War" phase, students use "Case Studies" to better understand concepts and how operations are actually conducted. This phase deals with primary Theater level operations and Joint Crisis Action Contingency operations e.g. Lebanon, Mayaguez, Desert I, etc.

●●● The conclusion of the Core year is used for war games and Politics/Military Simulations exercises implementing plans and operations developed by the students.

● Advanced Studies Program. This program is designed to complement the Core Program by offering challenging courses during each semester.

●● The courses are selected by students when individual programs are finalized during the start of the resident study.

●● Courses address issues in-depth and require written and oral presentations by students.

●● Students are required to take one elective each trimester.

● Research Program. This is a separate program from the Advanced Courses.

●● Students are required to prepare a paper to be presented to a "Review Committee".

●● Format of the paper should be standardized, however offering the student a choice of writing options, such as:

●●● Article for Publication

●●● Decision Memorandum

●●● "Think" Piece

●● Subject of each paper must be approved by the faculty.

●● Quality papers should be recognized by the AWC and forwarded to the appropriate agency within DOD.

● National Security Seminar (NSS). The National Security Seminar as currently designed accomplishes a most useful purpose. These few changes are recommended to improve on the overall product.

●● Reschedule NSS week at the end of the National Strategy semester. More appropriate since students have just completed discussions on domestic and international issues. Reduces the activity during the week of graduation, i.e. NSS week (Monday-Friday), Graduation Formal (Sat), and Graduation Day (Monday), is very crowded.

●● Time should be allocated to discuss "Army Issues" in seminar groups. Either have guests arrive a day earlier or remain a day longer.

●● Following NSS week, students need at least one day to discuss/critique the week's activities in which the key points are summarized.

GENERAL TEACHING METHODOLOGY

● The general teaching methodology is described best by examining Table 2, page 97.

●● Open time for research, individual studies, and post activities.

●● Committee meetings scheduled twice a week in the AM for the faculty to teach material and students to present, as required. NOTE: Committee Terminology is used instead of Seminar (Committee connotes persons meeting together to be taught something; whereas, seminar means more of a meeting between "learned" people to discuss issues).

●● Lectures on Core related subjects can be scheduled once a week (Wednesday, AM) and presented by faculty members with some outside lecturers.

●● Advanced Courses are scheduled for either Tuesday or Thursday PM.

●● Voluntary courses can be scheduled for once a week as required. These courses would include:

●●● Economics

●●● International Law

●●● Financial Management

●●● Political Parties and respective movements

●●● Case Study of Vietnam

●● Special lectures and programs scheduled for one evening a week, Wednesday, (Abrams, Root, Somervell, Military Leaders, etc.).

●● Table 3 expands the Core Model by focusing on the Command/Management/Decisionmaking semester. During this period the students are formed into four groups for the purpose of receiving the instruction as shown. There is no requirement for the students to receive the instruction in any set order, therefore, maximum use is made of faculty expertise (one or two instructors for each block of instruction) to teach the entire class. Instructors not involved in these Core subjects are involved in advanced/voluntary courses and/or preparation for the next semester.

	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
AM	Committee Meetings	Open	Lecture	Open	Committee Meetings
PM	Open	Elective	Open	Electives/ Voluntary Courses (short)	Open
Evening Session	Open	Open	Special Program (Scheduled Lectures)	Open	Open

Table 2. Typical Week

Group	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
I	Self Assessment				Self Assessment
II	Writing/ Speaking				Writing/ Speaking
III	Profes- sionalism				Profes- sionalism
IV	Decision- Making				Decision- Making

Table 3. Core Model Expanded

- Role of International Fellows.

- Include on each committee so that benefits can be gained by all students in this interaction.

- During classified phases regroup International Fellows forming one committee.

- Do not allow the presence of International Fellows to dictate the subject material. Consider cancelling the International Fellows program before eliminating the classified portions of Core Program.

- The only scheduled class trip should be to Washington, D.C. following the Decisionmaking subcourse:

- Include a visit to Congress and various sub-committees.

- Include a visit to the Pentagon with briefings from the Army Staff and OJCS.

- Schedule trip so that only a small portion of the class goes at one time.

CONCLUSIONS

One point seems clear. Given the Army's current situation, it needs Warrior-Thinkers: not Soldier-Statesmen. Those few exceptionally talented officers who will be needed to fulfill roles similar to those of Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Marshall will come to the fore in time of need. But the vast majority of senior officers - those who direct peacetime preparations of the force for war and then direct it in combat must know their profession in great detail; and must thoroughly master all aspects of the art and science of war. This cannot be learned on the battlefield. Against an adversary such as the Soviet Army, there is no room for error given our current circumstances.

To fight and win, the American Army must be absolutely professional in the strictly military sense of that word. The Army will not gain this end, much less shake the malaise of the 1970's, by educating the vast majority of its senior officer leadership in "things socio-political" without at least a concomitant effort to mastering the profession of arms. Therefore, based on the data contained in this study together with the authors' personal beliefs and biases the following conclusions are formed:

- A highly professional officer corps well grounded in all aspects of military science and art is required to prepare and lead the U.S. Army of today and the future.

- The curriculum of the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, has changed from strong emphasis on military and war planning matters (prior to World War II), to emphasis on National-International affairs.

- A reorientation in the curriculum is warranted to move the focus from "the generalist" approach to more balanced training for the students. The Army needs to build a cadre of strategists, logisticians, mobilization experts, joint planners, and operators.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In support of these conclusions, the authors make the following recommendations:

- Transition to a Balanced Curriculum. An immediate change in overall philosophy of the AWC is necessary to balance the curriculum between political science and Army matters. Specific recommendations are contained within the proposed curriculum outlined previously in this chapter.

- Reorganization of the AWC Staff and Faculty. A follow-on study is warranted to determine the appropriate organization of the staff and

faculty to support and operate under the conditions outlined in the proposed curriculum.

- Identify specific courses and subcourses and determine the teaching methodology. If larger student groups (committees) are used for part I, then less faculty instructors will be needed.

- Identify specific billets which hold the same tenure as a permanent professor in a graduate university.

- Consider filling some billets with quality retired officers who have special qualifications i.e., military strategist, authority on military leadership, nuclear weapons expert, etc.

- Reduce the current practice of filling faculty billets with members of the graduating classes. Graduates of the AWC should return to the Army before being considered for an assignment of the faculty.

- Formation of a Permanent Curriculum Review Board at the AWC.

- To maintain close liaison with the Department of the Army and other senior service colleges to insure policy guidance is received and appropriately acted upon; and new concepts and ideas are studied before implementation.

- To closely monitor the curriculum by insuring all proposed changes are approved before added or subtracted from the current curriculum.

- Consider appointing a retired military officer as the head of the Board.

- All members of the Board should be very familiar with all aspects of the evolution of the AWC and the changes through the years.

- Develop a System to Monitor AWC Graduates. The selection for the AWC should be based on the number of quality officers the Army requires to fill specified billets within the overall military structure.

●● MILPERCEN should be tasked to identify all SSC positions throughout the Army.

●● SSC students should be programmed for their remaining 10 years of service at the 0-6 level (30 year mandatory retirement) based on each student's expertise and the Army's needs.

●● Selection for the SSCs should not be based on quotas each year and should be based on quality and vacancies for SSC graduates within the Army. Selectees for all SSCs should attend in the year selected to insure the high quality of the student body.

● Central Agency to Monitor All SSCs.

●● Insure policy guidance is formulated by one agency.

●● Insure continuity in SSCs curriculums.

●● Insure continuity in the selection process for attendance

●●● Age/years of service for selectees.

●●● Completion of SSC is recognized the same by all

Services.

●● Address the question of accreditation.

In addition to these recommendations, there are three items which should be considered for immediate adoption, regardless of the changes made to the curriculum.

● Add a Military Book Store to the AWC (Root Hall) for students to purchase the tools of their trade.

● Complete the coronary risk program by adding a stress test w/ tread mill (Check with the National War College on their program).

● Re-do the Pre-Course Preparatory Phase to include the items identified in the proposed curriculum structure.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. Masland and Radway, p. 3.
2. See Study on Military Professionalism, US Army War College, 30 June 1970 for incisive view of this issue.
3. US Army War College, Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1981, Carlisle Barracks, PA, p. 1.
4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, General Orders 155, Washington, D.C., 27 November 1901.
5. US Army War Co-lege, USAWC Statistical Data, AY 81 with 10 year comparison AY 71-AY 80.

APPENDIX I

CONTEMPORARY U.S. SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES

General

To gain a better understanding of U.S. senior service colleges, selected information was gathered on the Air, Army, National and Naval War Colleges. This data is contained in this appendix and includes the respective missions, objectives and curricular highlights for each college. Table 1-6 contains a comparison summary of selected data.

Air War College¹

The mission of the Air War College is to prepare select officers for key command and staff assignments where they have responsibility for developing, managing, and employing airpower as a component of national security. In support of this mission an important objective of the Air War College is to enhance each student's appreciation of the attitudes, values, and ethics of the professional military officer. Additionally, each graduate should be able to:

- . Understand the evolutionary development and utility of military strategy and doctrine.
- . Understand contemporary international political and security systems and analyze the interrelationships among US global security interests.
- . Understand national security policy formulation and the relationship of DOD to other executive departments, the White House, and Congress.
- . Understand and evaluate the concept of deterrence and articulate its relationship to national security policy.
- . Evaluate the role and limitations of the use of force or the threat of force in seeking the resolution of national security issues.

- . Know and assess the role of the USAF in the attainment of US national security objectives.
- . Know the current and future military capabilities and limitations of the United States, with emphasis on airpower. Know the capabilities and limitations of selected US allies.
- . Know and assess the current and potential military threats to the United States and its allies, including knowledge of the expected employment concepts of adversaries.
- . Formulate and evaluate alternative employment concepts for the application of airpower to counter the threat at any level.
- . Understand the political, economic, and military realities in various areas of the world and assess options for the use of airpower to support national security objectives.
- . Know the management systems of the Air Force from an executive perspective. Analyze the issues and problems addressed by these systems. Synthesize ideas concerning the effectiveness of these systems in contributing to the employment of airpower.

Curriculum Highlights (Air War College)
(Table I-1)

The Core Program contains three courses: Military Employment, National Security Affairs, and Leadership and Management.

- . The primary course is Military Employment which extends over the total academic year. Approximately one-half the total academic hours are devoted to this course with lectures and seminar/discussion being the primary modes of teaching.
- . National Security Affairs is the second course which runs concurrently with Military Employment from mid-August to mid-December. The focus in this course is to understand the national and international factors which affect the security of the United States.
- . The Leadership and Command Course is a pot pourri of subcourses which include analyzing the command and management systems of the Air Force, understanding the challenges of leadership in today's environment, and understanding the concept of military professionalism and analyze the values, attitudes, and ethical considerations appropriate to the professional officer in the Air Force. This course also runs concurrently with the Military Employment course during the January to May time frame.

The enhanced Electives Program provides a supplementary learning program designed to enable students to expand their knowledge of core curriculum

	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
ORIENTATION	I									
CORE PROGRAM										
I. Military Employment -- Military Strategy Soviet Military Studies General Purpose Force Employment Strategic Force Employment, Space and the Future										
II. National Security Affairs -- National Security Environment National Security Policy Studies Regional Assessments										
III. Leadership and Management -- Strategic Decision Systems Acquisition and Logistics Management Personnel Management Systems Officership										
ENHANCED ELECTIVES PROGRAM										
RESEARCH AND TUTORIAL PROGRAM										
OTHER EVENTS										
	Christmas									
	Graduation									

subjects and to pursue studies in areas of personal interest.

- .. Elective courses consist of 11 two-hour classes in each of three terms: Term I, 12 Sep-19 Nov; Term II, 3 Dec-18 Feb; Term III, 27 Feb-1 May. Each student must complete a five-point program (one point for each elective). Electives are usually scheduled one day a week (Wednesday p.m.).

The Research Program provides an opportunity for students to participate in research projects that are both timely and relevant. Students explore current and potential problems of relevance to the Air Force and the Department of Defense. The objectives of the program are:

- .. To increase the professional knowledge of the student.
- .. To contribute to the solution of Air Force and Department of Defense problems.
- .. To enhance analytical competence.
- .. To improve individual familiarity with information retrieval techniques.

The student receives from one to five points credit for his major research project. All students are required to write as a minimum a 10-12 page paper during the course of the year.

The tutorial option is a learning methodology in which a qualified faculty member instructs an individual student on a specific dimension of a mutually-agreed-upon topic.

During the course of the year, students take eight tests. This system provides feedback to the faculty and allows students to receive graduate and/or undergraduate credits for advanced/additional degrees. The office on educational credit of the American Council on Education recommends the following academic credits for the Air War College course:

- . Graduate credit - Six semester hours in international relations, six semester hours in management, and zero to nine semester hours based on the research paper and electives.
- . Undergraduate credit - Thirty semester hours in international relations, political science, economics, management, and research.

US Army War College²

The mission of the Army War College is twofold:

- . To provide a course of study which will prepare graduates for senior leadership positions in the Army, Defense, and related departments and agencies by professional military education in national security affairs with emphasis on the development and employment of military forces in land warfare.
- . To conduct strategic studies on the nature and use of the US Army during peace and war; support Army participation in joint arenas with respect to broad issues of national security; address major concerns for which an independent, internal study capability is needed; and contribute independent studies and analyses on issues of current and future import to the Army.

The following objectives support the above mission:

- . Provide the learning environment and educational opportunities essential to cultivate personal development and growth; and promote continuing habits of objective analysis, self-assessment and independent judgment among students with varying backgrounds.
- . Examine the roots and dimensions of the military profession in our constitutional democracy and the dynamic set of personal skills, knowledge, attitudes, and values required of senior military leaders to deal with the uncertain future.
- . Examine the national and international factors that constitute national power and the processes of policy formulation within our national government, and within alliances, as they influence national security policies and priorities.
- . Understand the historical aspects of warfare that influence the development of US military strategy and forces, and current issues in the design and employment of military forces within unilateral, joint, and combined environments, now and in the future.
- . Understand the dimensions of defense organization and management systems, and the application and limitation of analytical techniques in the decisionmaking process.
- . Advance the body of knowledge concerning land warfare--raising, equipping, training, employing, and maintaining the US Army as an instrument of national policy in coordination with air, sea, and allied forces.

Curriculum Highlights (Army War College)
(Table I-2)

The curriculum of the Army War College is comprised of four major segments: Orientation and Self Assessment; Common Overview; Advanced Courses and Studies; and National Security Seminar.

The purpose of the Orientation and Self Assessment phase is to acquaint the student with the academic environment and the educational program. Additionally, students are provided an opportunity to increase their individual awareness of personal strengths, characteristics, and values while examining their professional, family, personal, and community life goals. Included in this self assessment program is a very detailed health examination for each student along with a voluntary similar type program for the spouses.

The Common Overview phase is the heart of the curriculum and contains four parts:

- . Part I, The National Environment and the Evolution of Military Strategy includes an examination of the domestic environment and those factors which influence the determination of US national priorities. Simultaneously, a study of the evolution of, and basis for contemporary military strategy is undertaken. A two-day trip to Washington, D.C. involves students with current concerns of Congress and the views on national policy issues of selected officials in the Executive and Legislative branches.
- . Part II, The International Environment, US Strategy and Supporting Programs course addresses the international system in broad terms and identifies those factors which influence the role of the United States in that system. Students assess the mid range political/military situations in key global regions. This part concludes with each seminar preparing a mid range document which contains a national and military strategy with a recommended program force. A New York City trip provides first-hand observation of the United Nations, urban affairs, and the roles in the domestic and world environments of a variety of public and private enterprises located in the area.
- . Part III, Command and Management Course, addresses this subject with respect to the US Army in general terms. As a result of this instruction, each student prepares a 10-page paper on his Philosophy of Management/Leadership while acting as the Chief of Staff of the Army.

- . Part IV, Military Plans, Operations and War Games Course has the primary objective of providing the student with a better understanding of the contemporary military situation facing commanders charged with the defense of Western Europe, the defense of Korea, and worldwide contingency missions. Included in this part is the application of gaming procedures to a NATO theater level environment.

Phase III, Advanced Courses, provides an opportunity for students to tailor the curriculum to meet individual professional needs. Specifically, it provides for:

- . Detailed academic investigation in selected subjects germane to the military profession.
- . Concentrate study on particular subjects in the Common Overview.
- . Study in areas related to certain officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) advanced specialties.
- . Reading, inquiry, and reflection independent of the study required for the Common Overview courses.

Students are required to take four advanced courses for credit and may audit other courses. Usually, courses will meet once each week for approximately three hours, morning or afternoon (Monday p.m., Tuesday a.m./p.m., Wednesday p.m., Thursday a.m./p.m., and Friday a.m.).

Phase III continued, Military Studies Program is a voluntary program which provides students with the opportunity, working individually or as a member of a group, to conduct research on subjects approved by the faculty. A unique opportunity exists for a small number of students to participate in the Oral History Program. Advanced Course credit is received for participation in the Military Studies Program.

Phase IV, National Security Seminar phase is the culmination of the academic year. Students' views on the selected domestic, international, and defense issues are exposed to critical discussions and review with selected National Security Seminar guests representing a cross section of American leadership, institutions, and interests.

National War College³

The mission of the National War College is to conduct a senior level course of study and research in the development and implementation of national security policy and strategy and the application of military power in support thereof; so as to enhance the preparation of selected personnel of the Armed Forces, the Department of State, and other US government departments and agencies for the exercise of joint and combined high-level policy, command, and staff functions in the planning and implementation of national strategy.

In support of the above mission the objective of the resident program is to foster the development of the following professional qualities:

- . Professional skills in leadership, management, and decision-making; and the motivation to establish and pursue personal goals in continued executive development.
- . The ability to identify and analyze factors underlying the policies of foreign states that impact on US national security interests.
- . The capacity to determine trends which could affect the security of the United States, and to analyze critically national security issues and questions of military strategy.
- . Comprehension of major national security policies, and the process by which they are developed and implemented.
- . Knowledge of modern management and organizational techniques, to include the utility and limitations of quantitative and qualitative analysis as aids to examining security issues and reaching decisions.
- . An appreciation for the importance of differing views and perceptions within a democratic society and the role of advocacy with regard to national interests.
- . Confidence to function effectively in a complex, ambiguous, and uncertain environment.
- . The ability to speak, read, write and edit well.

Curriculum Highlights (National War College)
(Table I-3)

- . Several months prior to reporting to the NWC, each student completes a Career Planning Workbook which consists of a series of exercises designed to stimulate student thoughts about career, professional and personal growth and activities to facilitate further growth.
- . Shortly after arrival, each student has the opportunity for individual assessment and subsequent counseling with a faculty adviser.
 - .. Student selects an approach to the academic year (chart 1-4).
 - .. Student's goal may be to broaden or deepen knowledge in specialized fields or to engage in independent study under qualified supervision.
- . The Core Program is designed to provide each student with a thorough understanding of the development and implementation of national security policy and strategy. Core program is closely integrated and consists of: three major academic units, a Core writing requirement, and a foundation course in "Quantitative Methods for Policymaking."
 - .. Major academic units include: US National Security Policy Formulation; National Strategy Issues; and Military Strategy Issues.
 - .. The Core Writing requirement consists of a 20-25 page paper on some aspect of national security policy formulation and implementation.
 - ... Paper should focus on an important national security issue or problem suitable for publication in a professional journal.
 - ... Paper may satisfy the writing requirement in those elective courses requiring papers.
 - ... Core writing requirement is waived for those students opting to write 2-6 credit elective research papers (to be discussed).
 - ... All papers are started in the fall and completed by 1 May.
 - .. Core program follows the Department of Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting Systems by starting with policy and progressing through National Strategy and terminating with military strategy.
 - .. "Quantitative Methods for Policymaking" is a foundation course for all students except those who have previous education or experience in quantitative methods.
 - ... The course provides sufficient background to permit students to effectively use analysts and the products of analysis in their future decisionmaking roles.

- ... Course uses one or two case studies requiring students to address a major current defense issue, review existing quantitative analyses, and prepare and defend a policy recommendation.
- .. The Elective Studies Program (ESP) consists of four reinforcing parts which make up one-third of the entire year's curriculum:
 - ... Elective Courses offered during fall and spring semesters can be tailored to follow one of five themes: International Politics and Economics; Strategy and Security Studies; US Politics and Domestic Processes; Regional and Area Studies; and Management and Policy Formulation. Courses run once weekly (Tuesday, Wednesday, and/or Thursday) for 14 two-hour sessions.
 - ... Research and Writing Projects, Tutorial Reading, and special projects are available for students to do independent work and receive respective elective credit.
 - ... Each student must satisfactorily complete a minimum of six units of elective credit prior to graduation. This is done by enrolling in a combination of courses/projects which carry the following unit values:

	<u>Credit(s)</u>
Elective Courses	1 per semester course
Tutorial Reading Program	1
Student Research and Writing Projects	2-4
Associate Research Fellow	6

[illegible]

Table I-3. The National War College (AY81)




Table I-4. The National War College Approach

Naval War College⁴

The mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in both command and management positions, and to conduct research leading to the development of advanced strategic and tactical concepts for the future employment of naval forces. Important objectives to support this mission are to:

- . Acquaint the officer with the fundamentals of military strategy and foreign policy and the interrelationships between them.
- . Acquaint the officer with the political uses of military power, and with the roles of both military and political leaders in policy formulation, military planning and the conduct of war.
- . Expand each officer's personal philosophy of what constitutes an integrative, balanced military executive point of view.
- . Equip the student with an understanding of the strategic as well as the tactical dimensions of naval planning and operations.

Curriculum Highlights (Naval War College) (Table I-5)

- . The core program contains three primary courses: Strategy and Policy, Defense Economics and Decisionmaking, and Naval Operations.
 - .. The Strategy and Policy course places this subject in the historical perspective, explaining the evolution of strategic thought and practice, and describing the recurring problems that have taxed the genius of soldiers and statesmen throughout history.
 - .. The Defense Economics and Decisionmaking Course is based on the premise that an effective defense executive is required to balance many disciplines and points of view in meeting the external and internal demands of senior command and staff assignments. The integrating themes of the course are: decisionmaking, uncertainty, and resource allocation.
 - .. The Selection and Application of Naval Forces Course reviews the fundamental factors governing strategic and tactical planning; principles of war; relationships between policy, strategy, and tactics; technological determinants of forces and plans; and the commander's personality and intellect. The course then acquaints the student with the specific tactical elements available for application to strategic problems.

- . The Electives Program permits students to devote a reasonable percentage of their total academic effort to areas of their own choosing. All US students are required to select one 10-week elective for credit each trimester. All electives are conducted at the graduate level and demand a keen academic effort.
- . Each year carefully selected students perform research in the Advanced Research Associate Program. This research must be approved by the President of the College, and if approved, students are reassigned from the regular course for a specific period of time, usually one trimester.
- . The office on educational credit of the American Council on Education recommended in March 1976 that graduate credit be granted for a maximum of nine semester hours for the Strategy and Policy Course, and a maximum of twelve semester hours for Defense Economics and Decisionmaking.
 - .. Letter grades are awarded in each of the three prescribed courses and in the electives.
 - .. Grades are based on written work, examinations, essays and term papers as well as oral work, reports, and class participation.

	AIR WAR COLLEGE	ARMY WAR COLLEGE	
PRE-COURSE PREPARATORY PHASE	Administrative Requirements	AY81-82: Read Clausewitz On War and write 1000-1200 word essay	S
SELF-ASSESSMENT/MEDICAL ASSESSMENT/	Pilot Program AY81-82 "Executive Development" Voluntary (36 students) -No medical assessment.	-Individual mandatory Self-Assessment Program -Medical assessment with coronary risk profile (no stress test)	-
CORE PHASES (AY80-81)	-Military employment (Aug-May) -National Security Affairs (Aug-Dec) -Leadership/Management (Jan-May)	-National environment/ Evolution of military strategy (Aug-Oct) -International environment/ US strategy/supporting programs (Oct-Dec) -Command and Management (Jan) -Military plans/operations/ war games (Feb)	-
ELECTIVES/ADVANCED COURSES	-Tri-Semester Elective Program (Sep-May) -5 Elective points (1 point for each course) required	-One phase Advanced Course (Mar-May) -4 courses required	
RESEARCH PROGRAMS	-Voluntary/approved by faculty -Can receive 1-5 points of elective credit	-Voluntary/approved by faculty -Can receive credit for 1-4 advanced courses	
REQUIREMENTS	-10-12 page paper -Periodic exams -Class standing	-Two 10-page papers -No exams -No class standing	
ACCREDITATION	YES	NO	
RESIDENT SEMINARS	Air War Symposium (Mar) National Security Forum (May)	National Security Seminar (Jun)	
POLICY DIRECTION (CHAIN OF COMMAND)	Commander, Air Training Command	ODCSOPS, DA	

Table I-6. Comparison Summary of US Senior Service Coll

	ARMY WAR COLLEGE	NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE	NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
	AY81-82: Read Clausewitz On War and write 1000-1200 word essay	Start Career Planning Workbook	Read Thucydides' "The Peloponnesian War"
	-Individual mandatory Self-Assessment Program -Medical assessment with coronary risk profile (no stress test)	-Complete Career Planning Notebook and identify study program -Voluntary medical assessment (includes stress test)	Identify individual behavior electives -No medical assessment
rs	-National environment/ Evolution of military strategy (Aug-Oct) -International environment/ US strategy/supporting programs (Oct-Dec) -Command and Management (Jan) -Military plans/operations/ war games (Feb)	-US National Security Policy Formulation (Aug-Oct) -National Security Affairs (Nov-Feb) -Military Strategy Issues (Feb-Jun)	-Strategy and Policy (Aug-Dec) -Defense Economics and Decisionmaking (Dec-Apr) -Selection & Application of Naval Forces (Apr-Jun)
int ed	-One phase Advanced Course (Mar-May) -4 courses required	-Bi-semester Elective Program (Sep-May) -6 courses required	-Tri-semester Elective Program (Sep-Jun) -One course each semester required
	-Voluntary/approved by faculty -Can receive credit for 1-4 advanced courses	-Voluntary/approved faculty -Can receive 1-6 credits for electives	-Voluntary/approved by faculty -Research in lieu of resident instruction
	-Two 10-page papers -No exams -No class standing	-One 20-25 page paper -No exams -No class standing	-Several papers -Periodic exams -Class standing
	NO	NO	YES
	National Security Seminar (Jun)	Distinguished American Seminars (DAS) (3-4 times/year)	Total Forces Week (Aug)
	ODCSOPS, DA	OJCS, J-5	CNO

APPENDIX I

FOOTNOTES

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2. US Army War College. Curriculum Pamphlet, Academic Year 1981, pp. 1-9, 13-16, 21.
3. National Defense University. The 1981 Curriculum Guide of the National War College, pp. I-1, I-3-I-9, II-1-II-8, III-1-III-4, IV-1-IV-8, V-1.
4. Department of the Navy. The Naval War College Catalog, 1980-81, pp. 2, 9-12, 14-21, 22, 34.

APPENDIX II

CONTEMPORARY FOREIGN SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOLS

GENERAL

This appendix contains information on the senior military officer education systems in Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Israel, United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist¹ Republics (USSR). Table II-1 contains a comparison summary using selected data.

CANADA

Selected Colonels and Brigadier Generals are eligible for attendance at the National Defense College (NDC), which offers a joint 47 week course designed to prepare senior officers for appointments to the highest strategic positions of the Canadian Armed Forces. The course includes, in addition to armed forces officers, high ranking civilian and foreign guests. The course provides lectures, group discussions and individual research under the following topics:

- . Internal Canadian Scene
- . External Influences
- . Strategies of Nations
- . Final Review and Final Problem (which includes considerations of leadership, management, forecasting methods, computer concepts, planning, budgeting and systems analysis).

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

No senior service colleges exist in the FRG, although among the many short courses offered by the Fuehrungsakademie are several which are

attended by senior officers. One such course -- a 6-week Overall Defense Course -- may serve as a base for a future war college level course.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Advance training for selected senior officers, Colonels and above, recently began at Engels Academy. Special courses in at least the following subject areas are now provided to senior officers who need updating or refresher training:

- Leadership Procedures
- Socialist Military Science
- Cybernetics/Operations Research
- National Defense
- Automation of Command Procedures

It should be noted that several GDR colonels and generals have attended the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow.

ISRAEL

For senior officers there is a brigade commander's course. The highest level of formal military education, however, occurs at the National Defense College (NDC). Promotable colonels and brigadier generals, as well as some high-ranking civilians attend this one year course. The purpose of the NDC, within the framework of overall training and education for IDF military officers, is best stated in the "National Defense College Information Sheet":

- The educational and training system of the IDF commander, from officers' school through Command and Staff College, is "programmed" for war -- and rightfully so. The result of this training route, and the way

of life in the IDF -- of the multiplicity and complexity of problems, of pressures of time and of current security burdens -- is that a generation of officers growing up in field units and echelons are unacquainted with the security problems in their overall context and with the network of considerations at the General Staff level. IDF generals will continue to grow up and be forged in the "university" of reality -- in which they confront the daily problems of the battlefield; while the NDC will enable commanders to take a year's sabbatical from their work to devote thought and study to the compendium of security problems that extend beyond their narrow military experience.

The NDC course of study is composed of three major courses:

- General Background and National Security Studies
- Study and Debate of Tangible Security Problems
- Individual Research in Selected Security Subjects

The academic program is supervised by the University of Tel Aviv and cooperative degree programs with the university are available.

UNITED KINGDOM

A highly select group of British field grade officers attends the National Defense College (NDC) in Latimer. The NDC provides 27 weeks instruction in:

- UK Defense Policy, Structure and Resources
- Strategic Studies and Defense in NATO
- Political and Economic Background to Defense
- Defense Management Techniques and Writing Skills

The aim of this course is to prepare officers for key positions in Joint, Minister of Defense (MOD), and Allied headquarters. Officers in the rank

colonel or higher are eligible to attend the Royal College of Defense Studies (RCDS) in London. This is the highest educational institution in the British forces. It is attended by selected officers of all UK services, as well as by high ranking officers and civilians from certain foreign countries. The aim of this 11 month course is to give selected senior officers and officials of the UK the opportunity to study, with representatives of other nations, the problems of defense related to international relations and public policy with emphasis on the strategic aspects. Subjects in the course are:

- Elements of Power
 - Super Powers and Other Centers of Power
 - Strategy
 - Economics
 - Management
- Contemporary Environment
 - Britain and Contemporary Society
 - Subversion and Revolutionary Conflict
 - Science and Technology
- Area Studies
 - Middle East
 - Africa
 - Canada, Latin America, and Caribbean
 - Asia and Australia
- European Security

UNION of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR)

A very few highly successful senior officers (colonels and one star generals in their mid to late 30s) will attend the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow. The objectives of this two year, joint service course are to:

- Prepare senior officers to assume the highest and most responsible positions in the Soviet armed forces.

- Use these officers to take the lead in theoretical efforts aimed at developing strategic and tactical doctrine.

Students and faculty members work closely with the Soviet General Staff on current problems and during the MOD sponsored command post exercises and maneuvers. Classes at Voroshilov are small and graduation from the General Staff Academy is a virtual guarantee of promotion to general. Selection procedures for attendance at Voroshilov are not known, except that recommendations from high level officers are believed to be the most important factor. It is one example of the significance attached to the Soviet military "patronage" system. Patronage begins when senior officers seek outstanding young field grade officers soon after graduation from branch academies. By all indications, this patronage system is based on actual performance and has no apparent relationship to family affiliation. Voroshilov students are observed very closely by members of the Soviet General Staff. Whereas earlier military schooling was oriented toward branch tasks, the Voroshilov curriculum is oriented almost exclusively toward combined arms. Officers who have been in tank or artillery units all their careers may become, if they perform well enough at Voroshilov, combined arms commanders/Soviet general staff officers, and rise to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Other students will return to command

branch specific units for the remainder of their careers, some rising to the rank of 3-4 star general or possibly, to Marshal of Tank or Marshal of Artillery. Voroshilov, as well as some lower staff academies offer "Higher Military Courses" for updating or retraining general officers. These courses usually last from 2-4 months.

SUMMARY (See Table II-1)

The comments contained in this summary include only those foreign countries discussed in this chapter and reflected in the attached chart.

- Senior officer resident instruction is provided for selected officers in all armies except that of the FRG.

- These institutes (National Defense Colleges) focus primarily on national/international strategic studies.

- There is Joint Service attendance at these institutes.

- The U.S. is the only country with Service affiliated War Colleges. These Service institutes are described and analyzed in detail in Appendix I.

- Selection for attendance varies from a central selection process for most of the western countries to a more subjective system found in the eastern bloc countries.

- Attendance at a foreign country SSC is usually reserved for senior colonels and brigadier generals. Attendance within the U.S. SSCs is limited to officers (LTCs and COLs) in their 15-22 year of military service.

- All countries' SSCs have the primary goal of preparing selected officers for positions of higher responsibility within the Defense establishment.

	CANADA	FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	ISRAEL	UNITED KINGDOM	SOVIET UNION	USA
SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE(S)	National Defense College (NDC) One Year/Joint	None	Engels Academy and/or Voroshilov General Staff Academy (Moscow) Unknown - Two Years/Joint	National Defense College (NDC) One Year/Joint	National Defense College (NDC) 27 weeks/Joint Royal College of Defense Studies (RCDS) 11 months/Joint	Voroshilov General Staff Academy Two Years/Joint	National Defense University (NDU) - National War College - Industrial College of the Armed Forces Collocated/Ten months/ Joint Service War Colleges 10 months/Joint Central Board
SELECTION PROCESS	Central Board	—	—	Central Board	Central Board	Recommendation by High Ranking Generals Exams may be in use.	
RANK OF STUDENTS	Colonels and Brigadier Generals	—	—	Colonels and Brigadier Generals	NDC-Senior Field Grade Officers RCDS-Colonels and Brigadiers	Young Colonels and one-star Generals	Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels
GOAL OF SSCs	Prepare Officers For Highest Positions In Canadian Armed Forces	—	—	Study of Security Problems	NDC-Prepare officers for key positions in Joint, MOD, and Allied HQS. RCDS-Strategic Studies	Prepare officers for Soviet General Staff/ Highest levels of Command	In general, all SSCs prepare students for highest level staff positions

Table 11-1. Comparison Of Foreign and US Senior Service Schools

¹ There are several short courses at the General Staff College available to Senior Officers.

APPENDIX II

FOOTNOTES

1. US Department of the Army, Review of Education and Training of Officers
(RETO). Vol III, pp. H-1-26 -- H-1-63.

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