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GOAL-DIRECTED DECISION STRUCTURING SYSTEMS.(U)

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
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GOAL-DIRECTED DECISION STRUCTURING SYSTEMS

Judea Pearl
Jin Kim
Robert Fiske

Technical Report covering the period 5/1/78 to 8/31/81

Work performed at Cognitive Systems Laboratory

School of Engineering and Applied Science

University of California, Los Angeles

Professor Judea Pearl, Principal Investigator

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GOAL-DIRECTED DECISION STRUCTURING SYSTEMS

by

Judea Pearl

Robert Fiske

Jin Kim

Abstract

The report summarizes the development and evaluation of computerized decision structuring systems based on a new representational structure which offers several advantages over the traditional decision-tree representation. The design and operating characteristics of GODDESS (A Goal-Directed Decision Structuring System) and several environment simulators used for evaluating decision aiding tools are briefly outlined. The main body of the report focuses on an experimental evaluation of the effectiveness of two structuring procedures: 1) decision-tree elicitation and 2) goal-directed structuring. The goal-directed procedure appeared superior in encouraging subjects to generate novel (non-habitual) sets of effective options. The tree-elicitation procedure, on the other hand, permitted subjects to articulate more valid judgments and assessments, which in turn facilitated a more accurate recognition of the best action among the options given. The combined use of goal-directed procedures for structuring problems and tree-elicitation for optimization promises to utilize the strengths of both methods.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTAL WORKS

2.1 GODDESS: A Goal-Directed Decision Structuring System

2.2 Environment Simulators for Evaluation Studies

2.3 Experiments in Judgment Validity

2.4 List of Publications, Reports and Presentations

2.5 Research Staff

3.0 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF GOAL-DIRECTED STRUCTURING PROCEDURES

3.1 Approach

3.2 Methods

3.3 Results

3.4 Conclusions

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the work performed toward the development and evaluation of Goal-Directed Decision-Structuring Systems during the period 5/1/78 to 6/30/81. The project was conducted under research contract N00014-78-C-0372 funded by the Engineering Psychology Programs Division of the Office of Naval Research. The research was performed at the Cognitive Systems Laboratory, University of California, Los Angeles, with Professor Judea Pearl as Principal Investigator.

The ultimate objective of this project has been to develop and evaluate a computerized decision structuring system based on a new and more effective representational structure which promises to offer several advantages over the traditional decision-tree representation. Our research followed two parallel avenues: 1) The development of computerized decision-structuring systems and tools for their evaluations, and 2) An experimental evaluation of the performance of the Goal-Directed Structuring approach. Since most of the development work is already documented in other reports, the focus of this report will be the evaluation phase. Section 2 will briefly summarize the highlights of the developmental works with references to the appropriate documentations. Section 3 will describe in detail the evaluation experiments conducted in the past six months and will state our conclusions.

2.0 SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTAL WORKS

This section contains brief highlights of three developmental works:

2.1 GODDESS: A Goal-Directed Decision Structuring System

2.2 Environment Simulators for Evaluation Studies

2.3 Experiments in Judgment Validity

The details of these developments are documented in other papers and reports, which are listed chronologically in Section 2.4. Reference numbers cited in Section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 refer to the list in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 contains a list of the research staff contributing to this project.

2.1 GODDESS: A Goal-Directed Decision Structuring System

GODDESS is an operational version of a computerized, domain-independent, decision structuring system based on a novel, goal-directed structure for representing decision problems. The structure allows the user to state relations among aspects, effects, conditions, and goals in addition to actions and states, which are the basic components of the traditional decision-tree approach. The program interacts with the user in a stylized English-like dialogue, starting with the stated objectives and proceeding to unravel the more detailed means by which these objectives can be realized. At any point in time, the program focuses the user's attention on the issues which are most crucial to the problem at hand.

The motivation for breaking away from the confines of decision-tree representations is elaborated in Ref. 3. It is based on the fact that the goal-directed structure is more refined and more compatible with the way people encode knowledge about problems and actions, and thus, enables the user to express judgments and beliefs which more closely represent the user's experience. Moreover, since action alternatives are evoked by first explicating the user's goals and intentions, the user may be guided toward the discovery of action alternatives he otherwise would not have identified.

The design principles of GODDESS, including its value-propagation procedures and dialogue management methodology, and a sample consultation are contained in Ref. 3. A more detailed account of GODDESS' latest implementation is provided by Ref. 12 "GODDESS Program Guide and User Manual", which is meant as a guide to those users who are considering implementing the system in their own computing environment. It also gives precise instructions for using GODDESS and highlights the options available to the user including modifications of query phrasings.

2.2 Environment Simulators for Evaluation Studies

Our approach for evaluating the merit of decision-aiding tools requires the development of computer-based systems for simulating a hypothetical decision-making environment. The essential features underlying this method are that operational tests are performed in an environment which is tightly controlled and thoroughly known to the evaluator, and that the merit of any decision plan enacted by the player is measured by an indisputable and computable 'ground-truth' performance criterion.

The subjects will first be trained to play the game and gain familiarity with the environment in which they operate. The training session is terminated when the performance score becomes constant over a significant length of time. At this point the Decision Support System will be turned on, and changes in the subject's performance will be monitored. The incremental improvement in the subject's score will provide one measure of the operational merit of the decision-aiding technique under study.

For the purpose of measuring the qualities of various decision strategies, we have built two simulated business games, whereby the player is instructed to accomplish certain objectives with limited resources and incomplete information. Several games in business environments have reached both a high level of popularity and a respectable status as faithful representations

of realistic decision-making environments.

Our major design goals for the first simulator were:

1. Realism - to make the game more challenging and to allow the player to exploit prior knowledge.
2. Real-time Response - to speed up the player's learning period.

In order to meet these two goals a sophisticated business game was developed. It is an adaptation of a popular game called "The Executive Game" by Henshaw and Jackson (Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1979) which requires the player to adjust eight decision variables with each move. In addition, it provides an elaborate report on the state of the firm at the end of each game period. The simulator is described in full detail in Ref. 4, "A Graphic System for Evaluating Decision Aids."

Although the use of graphic interface was effective in shortening the learning-time, this system was still too advanced for our purposes. The major shortcoming was its complexity, which prevented us from computing an optimal game-playing strategy and hence made it impractical for us to assign to each decision an objective figure of merit.

Our second simulator constitutes a compromise between the requirements of realism and simplicity. We limited the player's actions to only four decision variables and designed an artificial model of the competing firm to allow the computation of an optimal game-playing strategy. The availability of an optimal strategy allows us to assign to each state of the game an objective figure of merit simply by turning the game over to a "super businessman" who plays the optimal strategy and recording his accumulated score. The merit of every action, therefore, can now be measured by reference to this optimal score. The difference between the accumulated score achievable by the optimal strategy and that achievable from the state created by any given action is defined as the loss-of-opportunity (LOO) associated with that action.

The mathematics behind this business simulator and its operating characteristics are documented in Ref. 11. This system was finally used in the evaluation experiments described in Section 3.

2.3 Experiments in Judgment Validity

The set of experiments described in this section were designed to answer some basic questions regarding the rationale for decision-aiding systems. Most decision-support technologies are founded on the paradigm that direct judgments are less reliable and less valid than synthetic inferences produced from more "fragmentary" judgments. Therefore, the reliability of the systems inferences should be highly sensitive to the reliability of their constituent rules. The latter may vary with the mode of reasoning invoked during the elicitation process, i.e., with the format in which the queries are phrased.

The first set of experiments (see Ref. 5: "Experiments in Cognitive Decomposition") was devised to detect systematic asymmetries in human reasoning which affect judgment reliability. Asymmetries were hypothesized and tested in three types of relations: 1) cause-effect, 2) condition-action-effect, and 3) object-property. The results show only minor differences in accuracy between causal and diagnostic reasonings, and mixed differences in recall-proficiency for the condition-action-effect relationships. Positive evidence was obtained for asymmetries in processing the object-property relationships.

The lack of validity-differential for cause-effect relations was surprising and prompted a second set of experiments. In decision-analysis, judgments about the likelihood of a certain state of affairs given a particular set of data (diagnostic inferences) are routinely fabricated from judgments about the likelihood of that data given various states of affairs (causal inferences), and not vice versa. This study was designed to test the benefits of causal synthesis schemes by comparing the validity of causal and diagnostic judgments against

"ground-truth" standards (Ref. 2 "Evidential Versus Causal Inferences: A Comparison of Validity").

The results demonstrate that the validity of causal and diagnostic inferences are strikingly similar; direct diagnostic estimates of conditional probabilities were found to be as accurate as their synthetic counterparts deduced from causal judgments. The reverse is equally true. Moreover, these accuracies were found to be roughly equal for each causal category tested. Thus, if the validity of judgments produced by a given mode of reasoning is a measure of whether it matches the format of human semantic memory, then neither the causal nor the diagnostic scheme is a more universal or more natural format for encoding knowledge about common, everyday experiences.

These findings imply that one should approach the "divide and conquer" ritual with caution; not every division leads to a conquest, even when the atoms are cast in causal phrasings. Dogmatic decompositions performed at the expense of conceptual simplicity may lead to inferences of lower quality than those of direct, unaided judgments.

2.4 List of Publications, Reports and Presentations

2.4.1 Publications

1. Pearl, J. "Entropy, Information and Rational Decisions", International Journal of Policy Analysis and Information Systems, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 93-109, July 1979.
2. Burns, M., and Pearl, J. "Evidential Versus Causal Inferences: A Comparison of Validity" to be published in Organizational Behavior and Human Judgment, February 1982.
3. Pearl, J., Leal, A., and Saleh, J. "GODDESS: A Goal-Directed Decision Structuring System". Proceedings of the International Congress on Applied Systems Research and Cybernetics, December 12-16, 1980, Acapulco, Mexico. Also in the Proceeding of the Fourteenth Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, January 7-9, 1981, Honolulu, Hawaii. Also submitted for publication in the IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence.

2.4.2 Reports

4. Kim, J.H. "A Graphic System for Evaluating Decision Aids", UCLA-ENG-7915, March 1979.
5. Pearl, J. "A Goal Directed Approach to Structuring Decision Problems" A Progress Report (11-78 to 9/78), April 1979.
6. Burns, M. and Pearl, J. "Experiments in Cognitive Decomposition," UCLA-ENG-CSL-7951, August 1979.
7. Saleh, J., Leal, A., Kim, J., and Pearl, J. "Progress Toward a Goal-Directed Decision Support System, UCLA-ENG-CSL-7973, October 1979.
8. Saleh, J., Leal, A., Pearl, J. "Progress Toward a Goal-Directed Decision Support System, Progress Report (1-80 to 4/80), April 1980.
9. Burns, M. and Pearl, J. "On the Value of Synthetic Judgments," UCLA-ENG-CSL-8032, June 1980.
10. Pearl, J., Leal, A., and Saleh, J. "GODDESS: A Goal-Directed Decision Structuring System, UCLA-ENG-CSL-8034, June 1980.
11. Kim, J. "A Simulation Model for Evaluating Decision Support Systems" UCLA-ENG-81-23, February 1981.
12. Leal, A. and Bendifallah, S. "GODDESS: A Goal Directed Decision Structuring System, Program Guide and User Manual," UCLA-ENG-CSL-8103, April 1981.

2.4.3 Presentations in Conferences, Seminars and Symposiums

The Paper "GODDESS: A Goal-Directed Decision Structuring System" by J. Pearl,

A. Leal and J. Saleh was presented at the following meetings:

1. Seminar at the Johannes Kepler Universitat Linz, Linz, Austria, June 10, 1979.
2. Seminar at the Austrian Society of Cybernetic Studies, Vienna, Austria, June 21, 1979.
3. Military Operations Research Society 44th Symposium, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, December 4-6, 1979.
4. Seminar at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Luxemburg, Austria, July 7, 1980.
5. International Congress on Applied Systems Research and Cybernetics, Acapulco, Mexico, December 12-16, 1980.
6. Fourteenth Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Science, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 7-9, 1981.
7. The 17th Conference on Bayesian Research, Los Angeles, California, February 19-20, 1981.
8. Seminars at the Computer Science Departments, Rutgers University (April 2, 1981) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (April 3, 1981).

The Paper "Evidential Versus Causal Inferences: A Comparison of Validity" by M. Burns and J. Pearl was presented at the following meetings:

1. Seminar at the Computer Science Department, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 30, 1980.
2. Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behavior (AISB) Conference, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 2-5, 1980.
3. The International Congress on Applied Systems Research and Cybernetics, Acapulco, Mexico, December 12-16, 1980.
4. The 17th Conference on Bayesian Research, Los Angeles, California, February 19-20, 1981.

2.5 Research Staff

The research staff engaged in this project include:

Dr. Judea Pearl - Principal Investigator
Dr. Norman Dalkey - Faculty Associate
Dr. Semyon Meerkov - Visiting Associate Research Engineer
Dr. Antonio Leal - Visiting Associate Research Engineer
Dr. Joseph Saleh - Graduate Student, Engineering (Ph.D., 1979)
Jin Kim - Graduate Student, Engineering (MSC. 1979)
Tsui Lavi - Graduate Student, Engineering
Salah Bendifallah - Graduate Student, Engineering
Dr. Michael Burns - Graduate Student, Psychology (Ph.D., 1980)
Robert Fiske - Graduate Student, Psychology

3.0 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF GOAL-DIRECTED STRUCTURING PROCEDURES

3.1 Approach

One of the claims stated in favor of goal-directed structuring methods has been their promise to induce the user to consider a richer set of options than that induced by other structuring methods. This expectation stems from the fact that goal-directed structuring induces the decision-maker to first consider goals and intentions and only then to recall options available for furthering each goal separately. The main objective of the experiments reported in this document has been to submit this claim to a systematic and controlled test.

The basic hypothesis that goal-directed procedures induce a richer set of alternatives has already been given an empirical confirmation by Pitz et al. (Pitz, G.F., Sachs, N.J. and Heerboth, J., "Procedures for Eliciting Choices in the Analysis of Individual Decision", Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 26, P. 396-408, 1980). Of several candidate procedures tested for evoking a wider variety of choices, the one based on subgoal elicitation was found to be most effective. In these experiments, however, the degree of variety exhibited by a given set of choices, as well as their degree of relevance, were determined by the experimenter using subjective assessments. Our objective has been to give these notions more quantitative tests.

The notion of richness implies both diversity and quality. A set of wild, diverse, but obviously irrelevant or ineffective actions would hardly be categorized as rich. The reason that richness is a meritorious quality stems from the hope that a diverse set of alternatives is more likely to contain those choices which can solve the problem satisfactorily, in much the same way that scattered shots are more likely to hit an unseen target than shots aimed at the wrong direction.

These considerations lead to several methods of measuring richness. An indirect measure would simply focus on quality. Hopefully, a method which induces a person to consider a wider set of options would also make it more likely for that person to select an effective action from the set, and consequently, exhibit a higher overall performance. Thus, the overall performance score achieved by a game playing subject could constitute an indirect measure of the richness of alternatives considered by that subject. One may argue, however, that people often lack the insight or computational power necessary for identifying a good alternative, even when such is brought to their attention, so richness and performance would correlate only weakly.

A more direct way of testing for richness would be to examine the entire set of choices considered by the subject, select the one with the highest merit (assuming an objective figure of merit can be assigned to each choice) and take its merit measure to signify the richness of the set considered. In cases where the choices could be represented by points in some topological space a still more direct measure of richness can be devised. One could then obtain a direct measure of diversity (ignoring quality) by computing the mean inter-point distance.

In the experiments conducted at our laboratory we devised a test bed possessing the last two features. Subjects were motivated to master the playing of a computer-simulated business game. An objective measure of action quality was computable via the loss-of-opportunity criterion (see Ref. 11). Additionally, each action consisted of assigning numerical values to four decision variables and could, therefore, be represented as a vector in a four-dimensional space. These factors enabled us to compute several measures of richness and quality and to test whether goal-directed procedures induce substantially different choice sets than those induced by other structuring methods (such as decision-tree elicitation).

3.2 Methods

Subjects. Students were recruited in two ways: announcements were posted in the business school and an advertisement was placed in the campus' student newspaper. As subjects signed up, they were given an orientation which consisted of verbal and written descriptions of the logistics of the experiment and of the business game, as well as a demonstration of the game itself. Each subject was paid an hourly wage for his or her participation in the study. As an added incentive for learning the subtleties of the business game, the second phase of the experiment was organized as a contest. Specifically, the rank ordering of subjects in terms of accumulated profit of their fictitious businesses at the end of the experiment determined the size of each person's bonus award. The graduated series of bonus awards to be used in the contest was shown to subjects before the beginning of their involvement in the experiment. Fifteen students were signed up as bona fide subjects with an additional eight put on a waiting list. Despite this number of people, there was substantial attrition, such that a total of ten subjects completed both phases of the experiment.

Procedure. There were two phases in the experiment, in both of which subjects played the computer business game. The first of these consisted solely of training. Subjects were instructed to learn as much as they could about accumulating profit for their fictitious businesses without regard to the need to avoid errors. To assist them at this, the computer was programmed to provide them with the option of starting over (i.e., returning to the initial state at time period zero) each time they logged on. The first phase lasted for a minimum of five paid hours, after which subjects were told that they could continue training without pay as long as they wished before beginning the second phase. It was explained to them that it was desirable for them to learn as much about the game as they could, but our limited funds prevented us from paying for the extra training.

For the second phase of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (representing three kinds of questionnaires), henceforth referred to as the goal-directed (GD) condition, the tree-elicitation (TE) condition, and the control condition. During the second phase, subjects played one continuous game for forty business periods, without the option of starting over. Thus, the state of the simulated industry at the point at which each person logged off the computer was restored when he or she logged on again. The computer was also programmed to interrupt the play after the ninth, nineteenth, twenty-ninth and thirty-ninth periods were completed. It elicited from subjects their decisions regarding the action to be taken in the subsequent period, and then instructed them to fill out a questionnaire before proceeding with the game. They were not shown the outcome of the before-questionnaire action. After completing the questionnaire, they were allowed to revise the decisions they made just prior to filling out the questionnaires, and then the play resumed based on the revised action. The experiment concluded after each subject revised his or her decisions regarding period forty of the game.

Each subject participated independently of other subjects. There was one computer terminal available, and subjects reserved its use ahead of time on a sign-up sheet. Each student was encouraged to sign-up for two one-hour sessions per week. The average duration of the entire experiment for each subject was six weeks.

Materials. The problem solving environment in this study was a computer simulation of an industry consisting of two fictitious business firms. One firm was controlled by the subject while the other was controlled by a fixed computer algorithm that was part of the simulation. Subjects played independently of one another, that is, the course of one subject's game had no effect on those of the other subjects. Subjects were told that as temporary presidents


they were completely in charge of their firms, and that their task was twofold: 1) to accumulate as much profit as possible and 2) to leave the firm in the best possible condition for the return of the real president. The game is played as a series of business periods, and always starts from the same initial state in period zero. There are built-in pauses between periods in order to allow subjects to inspect a business report and to enter their decisions regarding the values of four decision-variables for the upcoming period. The four variables subjects were given authority to manipulate were unit price, marketing expenditure, proposed production volume and the amount of raw materials being purchased for the period - after - next.

Subjects were left to their own devices for discovering the optimal strategy for accumulating profit. The key to the optimal strategy rests in the fact that the price set by the competing firm tends to follow the subject's price by moving in small, discrete steps towards the price maintained by the subject's firm during the previous period. A subject who realizes this can maneuver the competitor's price into a region containing a critical price-level and maintain it at that level. At this critical level, the subject's firm can draw the maximum profit possible. Clearly, achieving the highest immediate profit would not lead to the optimal course of action. This is because maneuvering the competitor's price in an optimal fashion requires subjects to endure short-term losses for the good of long-term gains. Accordingly, the two measures devised for evaluating performance quality were -- Loss of Opportunity and the pricing profile.

The Loss of Opportunity (LOO) associated with the selection of action a_0 at state S of the game is the difference between the overall future earnings realizable from S by the optimal strategy, and that realizable from S by first enacting a_0 , then pursuing with an optimal strategy from the state which it

obtains. A L00 value is calculated and stored for any four-parameter action sequence that is implemented by the subjects.

The pricing profile was devised as an indicator of the quality of each subject's long-range strategy, specifically his or her understanding of the pricing relationships implicit in such a strategy. The pricing profile was administered to subjects in all conditions as the last item in every questionnaire. It consisted of graph paper on which each axis was labelled in price units of each of the two firms in the industry. Subjects were instructed to plot the price their firms would establish in response to every possible price established by the competitor. For example, the diagram below depicts a pricing profile designed to maneuver the competitor's price to the neighborhood of 32, and maintain it at that level. This happens to represent the optimal strategy; however, every curve on this diagram would represent an encoding of some well-defined strategy and can be assigned a figure of merit simply by monitoring the earnings accumulated by the associated strategy over a 40-period game.



Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions for the duration of the second phase of the experiment. The intervention in each condition was in the form of a questionnaire reflecting the structuring procedure being tested. Two such procedures were examined. In the GD-condition, subjects filled out a questionnaire directing them to list three objectives and two actions for accomplishing each (for a total of six actions). In the TE-condi-

tion, subjects were directed to list six mutually exclusive actions they were considering, and an exhaustive, mutually exclusive list of consequences that might possibly follow from each of them. For both conditions subjects translated the verbal description of each action into the four decision variables vector that corresponded with it. From these vectors it was possible to calculate the diversity and quality of the action set elicited by each questionnaire. Diversity was measured by the mean vectorial distance of the actions in each questionnaire. Quality was measured by the L00 of the objectively best action in the questionnaire.

Each questionnaire is also structured to elicit from subjects numerical estimates of the viability of each action they list. For each condition, two types of estimates are made. In the GD-condition subjects estimated on a scale from 0 to 10 the level of attainment of each objective given the enactment of each action, assuming an attainment level of five before such enactment. Additionally, they rated the degree of urgency they attached to each objective on a scale from 0 to 100. Subjects in the TE-condition estimated a dollar-value and the probability of occurrence of each possible consequence they listed. In both conditions, a simple rollback procedure was used to scale each action on the basis of these estimates, and the action with the highest rollback value was designated as the action recommended by the questionnaire.

To allow for the possibility that filling out questionnaires might be a contributing factor in an observed change in performance, a third group of subjects were given control questionnaires at the same phases of the game as in the other two conditions. These consisted of questions requiring open-ended written responses, such as, "What factors influence your pricing decisions?" While this questionnaire asked subjects to articulate how much they

understood in the business game, it did not require them to list either actions, goals, or possible consequences; nor to operationalize their answers in terms of business game parameters; nor to estimate decision-making parameters. These open-ended questions were not scored.

3.3. Results

Table 1 summarizes the background information collected on the eight men and two women who completed the experiment as well as their final rank ordering based on L00 measure and the number of hours spent in the experiment. The five subjects GD₁ to GD₅ were administered the GD questionnaire. TE₁, TE₂, and TE₃ were administered the TE questionnaire, and CT₁, CT₂ constituted the control group.

A few observations are worth noting prior to discussing the results. The levels of understanding of the game by the subjects, as noted by informal discussions with the experimentors after the training session, varied significantly; however, those who received high scores in the training session also obtained high ranks in the competition. Students majoring in Business/Economics were the most motivated and, indeed, captured the first four places in the group ranking.

While the quality of individual actions for any given subjects fluctuated widely from period to period, we had hoped that the quality of the pricing-profile drawn by the subjects would reflect more faithfully their understanding of the game and their long-range planning ability. Instead, the actual measurement turned out to be a disappointment in this regard. The subjects had difficulty translating their preferred game strategy into a pricing-profile. We found significant contradictions between the strategies portrayed in the pricing-profiles and the game strategies actually played by the subjects. It is evident that at


TABLE I

Subject Code	Level in School Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior Grad	Computer Experience	Geometry Algebra Calculus More than Calculus	Business-Management Experiences	GPA	Major Area of Study Engineering Economic- Business Math Theater Arts	Number of Hours Spent in Experi- ment	Final Ranking Based on LOO Measure
GD ₁	x	x	x	0	3.0	x	14	8
GD ₂	x	x	x	3	3.8	x	8	3
GD ₃	x		x	2	3.8	x	10	4
GD ₄	x		x	0	3.1	x	6	6
GD ₅	x	x	x	0	3.4	x	9	7
TE ₁	x	x	x			x	10	9
TE ₂	x	x	x	0	3.7	x	12	2
TE ₃	x	x	x	0	3.6	x	9	5
CT ₁	x	x	x	0	3.3	x	9	1
CT ₂	x	x	x	0	2.4	x	9	10
Frequency	0 2 1 2 5	8	0 0 5 5	5	9	2 5 2 1	9.6	
Mean					3.3			
Range					1.4		8	

least some of the subjects plotted their preferred price for the current period not, as we had intended, as a function of the competitor's last period price, but as a function of the competitor's price at the same period of the game. Since we were uncertain whether a given subject was plotting a price-profile with respect to the current price of the competitor or with respect to the previous price, an analysis was made under each assumption for every plot. Neither analysis, however, adequately reproduced the rank ordering of subjects that is shown in Table 1. Some subjects also followed very intricate strategies which could not have been captured by a single profile (although the optimal strategy can be expressed as a single plot). For instance, one subject seemed to follow the lower half of his profile while raising his price and the upper when lowering it, a distinction that can not be expressed by a single curve profile.

Although subjects were allowed upon completion of the questionnaire to revise the decisions they made prior to filling out the questionnaires, they generally showed reluctance to utilize this option. About half of those who did choose to revise their decision downgraded their choice. The overall effect of the questionnaires on the performance of the players can be represented by the difference $L(AFT) - L(BEF)$, where $L(AFT)$ stands for the L00 associated with the action selected by the subject after completing the questionnaire (i.e., the revised action) and $L(BEF)$ is the L00 associated with the last action chosen prior to filling out the questionnaire. In figure 1, this difference is depicted against the game's time period. Subjects under GD-conditions are represented by triangles $\triangle$, those under TE-conditions by circles $\bigcirc$, and control subjects are represented by crosses $+$. Note that an upgraded

Figure 1



decision is represented by a negative difference $L(AFT) - L(BEF)$. The respective percentages of downgraded and upgraded revisions are shown in the table below:

	GD		TE		Control	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
No Revisions	14	70	9	75	5	62.5
Upgraded Revisions	3	15	2	16.7	1	12.5
Downgraded Revisions	3	15	1	8.3	2	25
Total	20	100	12	100	8	100

Clearly no visible pattern emerges to distinguish any of these groups. In order to account for the possibility that subjects were not driven by long-range profit considerations (i.e., by the $L(G)$ measure which determined their monetary reward), but rather by short-range desire to optimize the immediate profit at any given period, we also monitored the actual immediate profit achieved by any given action. Figure 2 depicts the difference $P(AFT) - P(BEF)$ with regard to time. Clearly, the pattern is identical to that of Figure 1 save for the fact that a negative difference now means downgraded revision.

The failure of subjects to properly revise their actions is not indicative of a poor set of alternatives proposed by the questionnaire. Indeed, Figure 3, depicting the difference $L(BEST) - L(AFT)$, shows that in the majority of cases subjects could have improved their performance substantially had they possessed the insight to identify the best among the actions which they actually considered while filling out the questionnaire. Again, no clear distinction can be detected between the GD and TE groups.

Figure 2





Figure 3




The overall effectiveness of any decision-aiding tool can be expressed as the difference between the quality of actions recommended by that tool and the quality of action selected without administering the tool. Let $L(BY)$ stand for the L00 associated with the action recommended by a questionnaire on the basis of all parameters articulated by the subject. The negative of the difference $L(BY) - L(BEF)$ would, therefore, measure the economical merit of using that questionnaire. This difference is shown in Figure 4. Seven out of the twenty actions recommended by the GD questionnaire (35%) were actually better than those originally chosen by the subjects. The corresponding figure for the TE-questionnaire is four out of twelve (33%). However, eight of the twenty actions recommended by the GD-questionnaire were worse than those originally chosen by the subjects, while only one such case occurred for the TE-questionnaire. This indicated a performance edge by the decision tree elicitation procedure. The overall means are 4635 for the GD group and -1033 for the TE group. Thus a player who is forced to comply with the recommendation derived by the decision-making tool would gain an average of 1033 units of earning potential under the TE-procedure and would lose an average of 4635 units per move under the GD-procedure. These figures represent approximately +14% and -66%, respectively, of the difference between the earnings per move generated by the optimal strategy and those generated by a typical move of the subjects.

The superiority of the TE-procedure may be attributed to the following two factors:

- 1) Under TE-conditions subjects were encouraged to generate and consider a more effective set of options.

Figure 4




- 2) Under TE-conditions subjects were encouraged to articulate a more valid set of judgments, enabling the rollback procedure to select the most promising action from the input set of options.

An analysis of the data obtained tends to refute the first explanation and support the second. Figure 5 depicts the difference $L(\text{BEST}) - L(\text{BEF})$ versus the diversity of the input set of options as measured by the (normalized) mean vectorial distance. The difference $L(\text{BEST}) - L(\text{BEF})$ measures the maximum improvement in earning potential offered by a given set of options, assuming that the subject is capable of correctly identifying the best action from that set. Clearly the option sets generated under TE-procedures (represented by circles) do not appear to contain more effective actions than those generated under GD-procedures (represented by triangles). On the contrary, the options generated under GD-procedures offered an average earning improvement of 1920 units compared with the 1500 units offered by TE-procedures. In addition, the average diversity measures of the two groups are roughly equal.

Note, however, that in only four out of twelve cases did the options generated by TE-procedures include an action superior to that originally played by the subjects ($L(\text{BEST}) - L(\text{BEF}) < 0$), as opposed to nine out of twenty such cases for the GD-group. Moreover, in eight out of the twelve sets produced by the TE-subjects, the original action enacted before the questionnaire literally coincided with the best action generated ($L(\text{BEST}) - L(\text{BEF}) = 0$). This happened only in four out of the twenty sets produced by the GD-subjects.

This data supports the possibility that the two groups of subjects utilized two distinct processes for generation. The TE-subjects apparently

Figure 5




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began by copying down the action just enacted and then perturbed it in various ways until the list of six required options was filled. The GD-subjects on the other hand, seemed to be generating their options afresh, with less ties to motions conceived prior to the questionnaire filling session. The GD-procedure seems to unfreeze (or deanchor) the subjects from their previous behavior. Indeed, in more than seven of twenty cases these subjects did not even list their previous actions among the set of options required by the questionnaire and fell victims therefore to the risk of generating an inferior option set. No such case was recorded among the TE-subjects.

Figure 6 explains why the TE-subjects could gain more benefit from the questionnaire if allowed to follow its recommendations. Here $L(\text{BEST}) - L(\text{BY})$ is plotted against the diversity. The negative of this difference measures the penalty caused by the inability of the rollback procedure to identify the correct best action from a given set of options. It therefore reflects the validity (or error) of the judgment used by the players to articulate their preferences and situation assessments. Figure 6 shows that the judgments elicited by the TE-procedures were more valid than those elicited by the GD-procedures. In all but one case the TE-questionnaire successfully identified the objectively most effective action from the option sets. The GD-questionnaire selected inferior actions in more than 50% of the cases. It is significant to notice that correct identification of the best action also took place in those three cases where the previous action was inferior to the best action mentioned in the TE-questionnaires. These cases rule out the possibility that the subjects produced the option sets by a senseless perturbation around the

Figure 6



previously enacted decision, then attempted to ensure the selection of the previous decision by entering wild or overly negative judgments regarding the remaining options.

3.4 Conclusions

The experiments described in the previous paragraphs bear consequences on two different planes.

First, the methods used for evaluating the effectiveness of the two structuring procedures constitute, as far as we know, the first successful demonstration of the economical benefit associated with the use of any decision-aiding tool. The articulation of even a single level decision-tree was shown (Fig. 4) to improve the quality of decisions in a realistic, though simulated, environment. This improvement overrides the distortion which usually plagues the measurement of "objective" utility. Although the subjects were probably operating with very distorted views of the meaning of the loss-of-opportunity (LOO) measure by which they were judged, the TE-questionnaire was capable of assisting them to identify better actions than were otherwise chosen, "better" in an objective-LOO sense.

Second, our results highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the two decision-structuring methods. The goal-directed (GD) procedures exhibited superiority in setting subjects free from habitual patterns of behavior and in encouraging them to generate a novel set of options from fresh considerations. This guidance resulted in option sets which contained a higher potential for earnings improvement had the most effective action been correctly identified. The decision-tree elicitation (TE) procedure, on the other hand, permitted subjects to articulate more valid

judgments, using preference and likelihood relations, regarding the environment in which they operated. This improvement in judgment validity enabled the optimization algorithm under TE-conditions to identify the most effective action in the option set more often than the optimization algorithm under GD-conditions.

Assuming that these characteristics of the two decision-aiding processes remain the same over a wide variety of environments and planning tasks, these findings point to a method for combining the strengths of both procedures. A hybrid method utilizing the goal-directed procedure for structuring decision problems and the tree-elimination procedures for optimization would possess both merits -- the generation of novel alternatives together with a valid assessment of the environment.

We suggest, though, that the weakness in situation assessment exhibited by the GD-subjects is not characteristic of the procedure but rather that it is reflective of the unique features of the experimental environment. The goal-directed procedure and its condition-action-effect format for knowledge representation was devised to assist the structuring of long-range plans, where a long sequence of inter-related actions are to be synthesized to reach a satisfactory compromise between several objectives and requirements. None of the subjects participating in our experiments seemed to have been driven by such long-range considerations. Although the simulator was designed in such a way that the optimal strategy can only be arrived at by long-range planning sacrificing immediate profits in order to maneuver the competitor into a more desirable price range, this strategy was not discovered by any of the subjects. Instead they attempted to maximize the immediate profit, and were thus led toward reasonably profitable local maxima but prevented from realizing

the full earnings latent in the game. Consequently, these subjects could not exploit the full power of expression offered by the goal-directed representation; neither were they penalized by the inadequacies of the decision-tree representation in capturing complex plans. We believe that the superiority of the goal-directed approach, in both structuring and optimization, would surface in environments where the difference in performance between long-range and short-range planners is more strongly emphasized.

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