

AD-A104 593

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

F/G 3/1

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND TRAINING (LMET) EFFECTI--ETC(U)
JUN 81 D L VANDOVER, J P VILLAROSA

JUN 81 D L VANDOVER, J P VILLAROSA

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

1. 2
AC
A. O. S. 2. 2

அ. ப. சுவாமி

A. O. S. 12. 19.

②

LEVEL

11

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

AD A104593



DTIC
ELECTE
SEP 28 1981
S B D

THESIS

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND TRAINING [LMET]

EFFECTIVENESS: A PILOT STUDY FOR EVALUATION

by

David L. Vandover
and
John P. Villarosa

June 1981

Thesis Advisor:

Reuben T. Harris

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

DTIC FILE COPY

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
	AD A104593	9
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
(6) Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET) Effectiveness: A Pilot Study for Evaluation		Master's Thesis, June 1981
7. AUTHOR(s)		8. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
(10) David Lee Vandover and John Poteat/Villarosa		
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		(11)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		June 1981
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES
		143
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		Unclassified
(12) 144		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)		
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
Leadership and Management Education and Training [LMET], Pilot Study, Interviewing, Effectiveness, Leadership Management Training, Program Evaluation.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
This report describes the design and use of the pilot study concept as a preliminary step in directing Navy program evaluations. This methodology focused specifically upon the Navy Leadership and Management Education and Training Program [LMET] to identify relevant effectiveness issues to provide program managers necessary guidance for overall program evaluation. Interviews of a cross-section of 51 LMET graduates, their immediate supervisor and subordinate were conducted in an effort to determine leadership/management		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

Accession For

NTIS GRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification _____	

Pw _____
Dw _____

AUG 1987

DW 1

A

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Leadership and Management Education and Training [LMET] Effectiveness:

A Pilot Study for Evaluation

by

David L. Vandover
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1971

and

John P. Villarosa
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., University of North Carolina, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June 1981

Authors:

David L. Vandover John P. Villarosa

Approved by:

Reuben T. Harris
Thesis Advisor

Phillip Neal Butler
Second Reader

D. E.
Chairman, Department of Administrative Sciences

W. M. Woodruff
Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

This report describes the design and use of the pilot study concept as a preliminary step in directing Navy program evaluations. This methodology focused specifically upon the Navy Leadership and Management Education and Training Program [LMET] to identify relevant effectiveness issues to provide program managers necessary guidance for overall program evaluation. Interviews of a cross-section of 51 LMET graduates, their immediate supervisor and subordinate were conducted in an effort to determine leadership/management improvement. Results indicate specific recommendations concerning; the use of pilot studies, the interviewing process and LMET evaluation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	11
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NAVY LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING.....	16
A. Historical Review of Navy Leadership.....	16
B. Development of Navy Leadership Training.....	18
1. The 1950's.....	18
2. The 1960's.....	19
3. The 1970's.....	20
C. Leadership and Management Education and Training [LMET]....	24
1. The Navy LMET Plan.....	24
2. Theoretical Basis for LMET.....	25
3. LMET Study for the Navy.....	29
4. The LMET Competencies.....	32
5. LMET Structure.....	35
6. LMET Instruction.....	36
7. Future for LMET.....	37
D. Need for LMET Evaluation.....	38
III. CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGN OF AN EVALUATION OF LMET:	
GUIDELINES FOR A PILOT STUDY.....	43
A. Rationale for a Pilot Study.....	43
B. Evaluation Design Considerations.....	45
C. Guidelines for an LMET Pilot Study.....	48
D. Summary.....	55

IV. LMET PILOT STUDY DESIGN: A DESCRIPTION.....	56
A. Preparation.....	56
B. A Plan Develops.....	57
C. The Plan.....	61
D. The Interview Process.....	67
V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS.....	73
A. Interview Analysis.....	73
1. Interviewing: A Time Consuming Process.....	73
2. Indepth Process Analysis: The LMET Interview.....	75
a. Interview Flexibility.....	76
b. Interview Schedule.....	77
c. Interview Environment.....	79
d. Interviewer: Military vs Civilian.....	81
e. Need for Interview Introduction.....	82
3. Interview Remarks.....	82
B. Findings Concerning LMET.....	82
1. Reactions.....	84
a. LMET Viewed as Necessary.....	84
b. Why LMET?.....	86
2. Knowledge-Content.....	87
a. LMET Knowledge.....	87
b. Setting Goals and Performance Standards.....	87
3. Behavior.....	88
a. Seniority Among LMET Graduates.....	92
b. Weak Communications.....	95
c. Rewarding and Discipling Performance.....	99

d. Increased Awareness.....	103
4. Results.....	104
a. Job Performance Changes.....	104
b. Job Satisfaction Changes.....	106
c. Retention Aspects of LMET.....	107
d. Developing Healthy Climates.....	107
e. Handling Newly Reported Personnel.....	109
f. LMET Reinforcement.....	111
C. Summary of LMET Findings.....	114
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.....	116
A. Pilot Study Conclusions.....	116
1. Efficiency.....	118
2. Effectiveness.....	118
3. Definitive Results.....	119
4. Education and Learning.....	119
5. Future Pilot Studies.....	120
B. Recommendations Concerning LMET Evaluation.....	120
1. Who.....	120
a. LMET Graduates.....	121
b. Chain of Command.....	122
c. Operational Commands.....	122
d. Evaluators.....	122
2. Where.....	123
3. How.....	124
a. Use of Interviews.....	124
b. Use of Surveys.....	124

c. Mechanics of Interviewing.....	125
4. What.....	128
a. Level of LMET Graduate's Knowledge.....	128
b. LMET Graduate Self-Awareness.....	129
c. Cause and Effect Relationships.....	129
d. LMET Graduate Communication Skills.....	130
e. Graduate Use of LMET Student Journal.....	131
f. Retention.....	131
g. Reinforcement of LMET Competencies.....	132
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS.....	133
APPENDIX A.....	135
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	139
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	141

LIST OF TABLES

Table Number	Title	Page No.
Table 1	LMET Competency Clusters.....	33
Table 2	Sample Interview Schedule.....	65
Table 3	Pilot Study Sample.....	71
Table 4	Reasons for Attending LMET School.....	85
Table 5	Goal Setting by LMET Graduates.....	89
Table 6	Setting Performance Standards by LMET Graduates.	90
Table 7	Exhibited Behavioral Change of LMET Graduates...	93
Table 8	LMET Graduate Self-Report on Influencing.....	96
Table 9	LMET Graduate Self-Report on Advising and Counseling, and Rewards and Discipline.....	100
Table 10	Change in LMET Graduate's Work Group Performance and Satisfaction.....	105
Table 11	Indication of Healthy Work Groups of LMET Graduates.....	108
Table 12	LMET Graduate Self-Report on Handling Newly Reported Personnel.....	110
Table 13	LMET Graduates Self-Report on Use of Student Journal.....	112
Table 14	Sample Items for Management Behavior Questionnaire.....	126

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors are indebtedly grateful to the officers and enlisted personnel of the 13 Navy commands interviewed who gave their time and energy so that this research project could be completed. While everyone deserving of recognition can not be listed, special thanks are due to the following commands and individuals for their assistance throughout the duration of the study: CAPT L. Bibby, USN [Commanding Officer, HRMC Pearl Harbor], CDR J. Ibach, USN [Officer in Charge, HRMD Alameda], and CDR J. O'Brien [Assistant Officer in Charge, HRMC Alameda] , CAPT P. Butler, USN, and Professor C. Eoyang for thier efforts in reviewing the final report.

The authors are most grateful to Professor R. Harris, without whose untiring guidance and direction this project would have never been undertaken much less completed. Finally, a special recognition goes to Ms. Terry Vandover, whose special care in proofreading and typing and concern for detail made the work a reality.

I. INTRODUCTION

In late 1978, the U. S. Navy adopted a massive training program for its personnel in leadership and management. The program is planned to systematically replace all existing leadership-management courses of instruction. Its implementation was Navy-wide with first priority for school quotas given to personnel assigned to operational fleet units. As the only leadership-management program in the Navy, it was large and applied to all Naval levels of command. Due to its widespread application, the program required large resource expenditures in time, manpower and money. Manpower requirements were expended in students attending the ten day course as well as instructor and administrative time. The overall goals of the program known as Leadership and Management Educating and Training [LMET] were:

To provide a formal and systematic training program for professional development of Navy leaders at critical points in their careers, based on research of effective Navy leadership.

To train officers and petty officers in the specific leadership and management skills needed to perform effectively at their level in the chain of command.

To conduct ongoing evaluation for improving and updating these programs.

To encourage Navy leaders to take personal responsibility for implementing effective leadership skills, by means of an educational approach that emphasizes individual initiative and accountability for effective performance as a Navy leader.
[HRMC,N.D.,p.7]

The cost of the program was to be offset through "increasing the Navy's ability to achieve its overall mission by increasing the effectiveness

of Navy leadership across all levels of the chain of command."

[CNET,N.D.,p.5]

The Navy has, and continues to invest time, manpower resources and money into this program. Yet, there has been to date little effort devoted to evaluation of its effectiveness or results. The question of where does the program stand today, remains unanswered. Recent comments of LMET instructors concerning the course vary, typically:

The course is not fun to teach.....the [teacher] burnout ratio is high.

It will raise the average guy or top performer....it won't work for the below average performer, we've lost some.

It is a seed planting evolution with attempts at behavioral change.....

You have to sacrifice one [student] for the good learning of twenty-eight others.

You can't tell a student he is wrong....[You can] hope to make him see what his affect is on others.

Additionally, the question arises, what is the perceived value of the LMET Program to managers and leaders? Recently interviewed graduates of the LMET course had these remarks concerning their training:

Before LMET I didn't know which way to go.....LMET produces immediate results.....it really helped me.

LMET probably helped this guy more than any other professional school in his career.....

If the decision was mine I wouldn't send anybody to it [LMET School].....

It [LMET School] showed me things that were not clear before.....it helped me to understand myself.

If the command doesn't support the training [LMET School] the man receives then I wouldn't send anyone else.....that is more detrimental than not sending the guy at all.

Clearly, there is disagreement among those teaching and implementing, as well as those receiving the training.

The Navy in the late 1960's and early 1970's was confronted by a number of contemporary problems that were indicative of the turmoil within society as a whole. These problems included drug and alcohol abuse, high rates of absenteeism, low retention rates of skilled technicians, high attrition of newly recruited personnel, and an atmosphere of crisis management. It was difficult to link any given problem to a simple cause and effect relationship. Rather, the problems appeared to be intertwined around the issue of ineffective leadership and management at all levels within the chain-of-command. It was imperative that action be taken to reverse this situation and it was to that end that the Navy turned to the LMET Program.

It is now mid-1981 with the LMET Program ending its third year. As with any large program, LMET was designed to achieve certain goals while solving specific problems. In order to determine if LMET has done this, that is to judge its effectiveness, it is necessary to evaluate it. Such an evaluation would determine if the program is accomplishing its stated goals. In fact, one of the goals of the program specifically called for ongoing evaluation and updating. [CNET,N.D.] The developer of the program, McBer and Company, also recommended an on going evaluation. With an evaluation, Navy leaders could assess its health thereby assuring that it remain an ongoing program, meeting its goals within the Navy. This evaluation is especially important to program managers to enable them to judge its cost effectiveness during these times of austere funding. Determining whether the LMET Program is "increasing the effectiveness of Navy leaders is, however, no simple task.

Evaluation of any large, Navy-wide program, such as LMET, is in itself an expensive undertaking in terms of budgetary considerations as well as time and manpower requirements. For this reason the results must be valid and relevant to the program being evaluated. Before embarking upon such a task as program evaluation, decision makers need some assurance that the evaluation will in fact provide relevant data about the program under examination. In addition, the necessity to conduct an efficient yet thorough evaluation further compounds the decision maker's dilemma. One method of beginning such an evaluation is through the use of a pilot study. The concept is basically for an organization, such as the Navy, to use some of its own assets to conduct a mini-evaluation of the program. This Pilot Study could test the hypothesis, questions, and methodology with which a larger, full scaled evaluation may be conducted. In evaluating the pilot study outcome, revisions or changes can be made prior to commencing the much costlier evaluation.

This then is the focus of this research, to conduct a pilot study of the Navy's LMET Program, thereby assisting in the development of a larger, full scale evaluation. The pilot study was undertaken by two Naval officer graduate students using a design technique and strategy developed with the assistance of McBer and Company and past experience. Data from the study was used to provide a rough, first-cut evaluation of the LMET Program and more importantly, an evaluation of the methodology used. This information can then be applied by the sponsor of this study to design a full scale evaluation of the LMET Program.

The thesis is divided into six major chapters; the first chapter is the introduction. The second is a brief history of the evolution of leadership philosophy and development within the Navy, with specific background on the development of the Navy LMET Program. Emphasis is placed on Dr. D. McClelland and McBer and Company's concepts on motive acquisition and competency identification. The LMET Program is detailed with additional thoughts offered on the need for its evaluation. The third chapter discusses those issues and problems anticipated in the design of the pilot study itself including the methodology that was used. Next is a description of the actual pilot study that was conducted, including a discussion on preparations for data gathering, pre-arrangements conducted with respondents and the method used to analyze data. In simple terms it is what happened and when, during the pilot study. The fifth chapter is the analysis and findings of the Pilot Study research. It is divided into two major areas, that of the interview methodology [process] and a rough analysis of the data [content] as it applies to LMET specifically. The final chapter is an assessment of the Pilot Study concept, with recommendations directed toward a full scale LMET evaluation.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NAVY LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING

A. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF NAVY LEADERSHIP

Since the birth of the United States Navy, senior officers have recognized the ability of certain skilled leaders to motivate subordinates in achieving seemingly unattainable goals. These were the leaders who were called upon in time of need for accomplishment of those tasks to which others had failed. They were the ones called upon when certainty of the outcome was more than desirable, but rather a necessity. Using these leaders as shining examples of what a good Naval leader should be, the Navy ingrained in its leaders the "tradition" of outstanding leadership, laced with names such as John Paul Jones, Truxtun, Bainbridge, Porter, Perry, Farragut, Taussig, Halsey and Nimitz. In order to be a really great leader one had only to emulate these fine examples, the Great Man concept. The traits that great leaders viewed as being desirable were obviously the traits that would create good leaders. Hence, John Paul Jones' thoughts in "Code of a Naval Officer", were memorized by midshipman as the proper conduct for a Naval officer. Pleble's emphasis on discipline and drilling was the gospel on the training of subordinates, while Farragut's disregard of "Torpedoes" was an example of leader courage. Additionally, what was left unsaid but amply demonstrated, was that good leaders would inevitably become famous for their abilities. Hence, an end means inversion occurred developing the notion that, if one were well known or famous, then one must surely be a great leader.

Until World War II, this idea of a tradition bound leader was the most prevalent view held throughout the Navy. During WW II with the large influx of personnel due to a quickly expanding Navy, leaders not ingrained in tradition were introduced. This large influx of leaders at all levels could not be assimilated into this tradition bound leadership style. Success or failure of their personal leadership styles were based largely on the end results achieved, which may or may not have been steeped in tradition. Since on-the-job leadership training was not practical, it was viewed that some rudimentary training in leadership could avoid the pitfalls of this trial and error method of leadership. Leadership training would improve the performance of those born leaders as well as those less capable personnel occupying leadership positions.

Since World War II, the Navy has emphasized its training at the beginning of a person's military service with such programs as boot camp, Officer Candidate School, and "Plebe" summer at the Naval Academy. Occupational training is generally given immediately after boot camp and prior to the assignment to his permanent unit. Contained within these programs were included some aspects on "leadership" training as well as "discipline". For the enlisted personnel the emphasis was on discipline, the necessity of promptly obeying lawful orders with adherence to organizational norms in the form of Naval regulations. For the officer the emphasis was on the basic responsibilities as a leader and the rudimentary skills needed to direct the efforts of others. Leadership continued to remain a near sacred term, steeped in tradition and assumed to be something a person was born with or without. Until the 1950's, leadership training within the Navy was not viewed with any serious

concern for modification. New management ideas developed by the civilian sector were largely ignored and not incorporated within any Naval training. In a Navy where disciplinary standards were well established; manpower supplies were adequate to sustain manning levels; and training costs for necessary skills were not out of control, there was no perceived need for further leadership training.

B. DEVELOPMENT OF NAVY LEADERSHIP TRAINING

1. The 1950's

With the introduction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ] into the Navy in 1951, the nation's concern for the individual rights of soldiers and sailors became evident. This necessitated an examination of the traditional leadership style then practiced throughout the Navy. Soon this concern became focused on symptoms that were viewed as evidence of poor or misdirected leadership. Sources for this concern included: responses from two thirds of a sample of 10,000 U. S. Navy sailors who perceived that their officers and petty officers were not interested in them as human beings; a brig population that had grown equal in size to the entire U. S. submarine force; and, the shocking information that some 70 percent of the U. S. prisoners of war in Korea had actively collaborated with their captors.[HUBBELL,1960]

Under this pressure and influence, line officers along with civilian leaders began to take a closer look at leadership training within the Navy. On May 17, 1958, General Order 21 was issued by the Secretary of the Navy to all commanding officers to integrate leadership training into the technical training of their men.[CNP,1963] The result of this order was a succession of haphazard training efforts that

lacked any clear purpose, theoretical basis, method or goal. Individual training programs reflected each commanding officer's own ideas, educational background and knowledge of leadership, as well as how to best teach it. Regardless of the ineffectiveness of General Order 21, it did demonstrate a commitment to leadership training from the upper echelon of the Navy. However, changing emphasis in programs reflected a continuing frustration at not achieving the hoped for levels of productivity, conformity and retention from its personnel.

2. The 1960's

General Order 21 did not meet with its intended success. The initial acclaim and status that the leadership training program gained as a separate division in the Bureau of Naval Personnel was lost, as hopes faded with a lack of tangible results. Reissuance of the order in 1963 did nothing to alleviate the situation. In 1966, Naval leadership training was incorporated into the broader program of General Military Training [GMT].[PARKER,1980] Leadership training requirements in GMT were reduced from previous levels. Commanding officers were committed to train their enlisted personnel ten hours per year in subjects such as leadership style, the chain-of-command and authority, responsibility and accountability.[AUDEL,1975]

Individual commanding officers, still responsible for implementing the training, saw little evidence of clear purpose or benefit from the program. The leadership training was typically delegated to a less capable or already overburdened junior officer. The decline of this leadership program marked the last time operational commanding officers would be entrusted with any formal leadership training program.

Succeeding programs would be centrally controlled and conducted by the Navy training establishment. The decline and replacement of this program typifies the course of such efforts within the Navy. As one analysis suggests, "The leadership program fell victim to its own frills and was downgraded by Navy Institutionalists, because it was an [Secretary of the Navy] intervention without sufficient input from line managers." [AUDEL, 1975]

3. The 1970's

The Navy in 1970 was in a state of rapid change. Society's problems had spilled over into the Navy while the Vietnam conflict had severely tarnished the military image. The traditional character and structure of the Navy was coming under question. Drug and alcohol abuse as well as racial problems were spreading. Imminent conversion to an all volunteer force promised only additional problems for Navy leaders. Amid this social upheaval and pressure for change, a relatively young and unconventional Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. assumed command. In his first year, only nine and one-half percent of eligible personnel re-enlisted, far below the number required to maintain mandated personnel strength levels.[PARKER, 1980] The new recruits necessary to reduce this shortage would ensure that societal problems would continue to infiltrate and dominate the military scene. ADM Zumwalt expressed his leadership philosophy in the following terms:

...The style of leadership that accorded best with my own inclinations and operational efficiency was one of treating subordinates with consideration and respect. I had not found that a 'tight' ship had to be an 'uptight' ship and I had hoped that sooner or later the Navy would give institutional recognition to this principle....by overhauling such of its procedures and jettisoning such of its traditions as encouraged martinetism and

martinets.....I am certain that what finally decided Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, and the Secretary of the Navy, John Chaffe, to risk jumping me into the position of Chief of Naval Operations over the heads of thirty-three of my seniors was my advocacy of rapid and drastic changes in the way the Navy treated its uniformed men and women.[ZUMWALT,1976,p.167-169]

Using a group of hand picked senior officers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, ADM Zumwalt tried to establish new philosophies and procedures. Intending to bring dignity, pride and self-esteem to sailors and to end the "Mickey Mouse" rules, ADM Zumwalt commenced reformulating Navy personnel management policies with his infamous "Z-Grams".¹ Training programs in the areas of drug and alcohol abuse, race relations, overseas diplomacy and leadership were established. The entire effort was labeled as the Human Goals Plan.

One of the most controversial and opposed aspects of the Human Goals Plan was its top-down, OMBUDSMEN-like feature. For example, Headquarters "...program managers had wide latitude to intervene at any level in the Navy organization with stringent requirements for individual ship participation..."[AUDEL,1975] This feature was deeply resented by many senior Navy officers and petty officers. They claimed Human Goals mandated actions eroded discipline, took too long, ignored operating requirements, and resulted in a loss of the immediate superior's credibility.[AUDEL,1975] Thus, ADM Zumwalt's view of an urgently needed effort to rid the Navy of rigidity, conflicted with his opponent's views of a breakdown in discipline in working outside of the chain of command.

¹Z-Gram was a phrase used to denote ADM Zumwalt's CNO policy memorandums. Sent simultaneously to all levels of command, this rapid distribution resembled the sending of a telegram, hence the phrase, Z-Gram.

Opposition to ADM Zumwalt's approach and its unworkability resulted in a structural change in late 1972. The program continued, with an effort to return it back under the chain-of-command. "The entire effort had grown quickly, contained many unqualified people in important jobs and lacked the necessary objectives and assessment machinery to demonstrate what, if anything, was being accomplished." [PARKER, 1980, p.7] However, responsibility and reporting arrangements were not the only problems. "The vague goals of bringing equity, developing management skills and improving personnel performance were well-intended, but uncoordinated, unevenly managed, and generally ineffective." [PARKER, 1980, p.7] The problems were compounded by a lack of evaluation to determine its progress or overall success.

The new program, Human Resources Management [HRM], represented more of a change in name and structure rather than content. Fleet commanders and other line managers were delegated the responsibility of continuing these programs. The leadership training program continued basically unaltered with the exception of a new name, Leadership and Management Training [LMT]. LMT consisted of a ten day course attended by personnel in the top four enlisted pay grades and the lower four officer pay grades. Like those programs that preceded it, LMT lacked clear objectives, theoretical basis, and a plan for evaluating its effectiveness. [PARKER, 1980] In addition, each school developed its own curriculum and style resulting in wide differences between schools as to what was actually being presented.

Racial incidents in 1972 onboard the aircraft carriers Kitty Hawk and Constellation, and the fleet oiler Hassayampa, created opposition to ADM Zumwalt's programs from outside the Navy. Many placed the blame on "permissiveness" resulting from ADM Zumwalt's humanistic policies.[PARKER,1980] A special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee headed by Representative Floyd V. Hicks, in calling for greater emphasis on leadership training in the Navy, released the following statement:

"One of the most alarming features of the investigations was the discovery of lack of leadership by middle management in the Navy. It became apparent that while junior officers, chief petty officers and senior petty officers were performing their technical duties in a proficient manner there was a lack of leadership in dealing with seamen."[HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,1973]

In mid-1974 ADM Zumwalt was replaced as CNO with ADM James R. Holloway, III, a more conventional leader in terms of Navy leadership. ADM Holloway was concerned with the seeming lack of discipline, lost pride, and absence of leadership especially within the ranks of the Navy's middle managers. As CNO, he set as one of his primary goals, the improvement of senior petty officer and junior officer leadership performance. As a result, on 28 August 1974 a study was undertaken to determine the cause of the lack of leadership. More importantly, the study would assess the needs of the Navy in terms of leadership training and design improvements necessary to upgrade LMT to meet these needs. This action would ultimately lead to the development of the Navy's Leadership and Management Education and Training Program [LMET], but would not actually commence for another four years.

C. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AND TRAINING [LMET]

In early 1975 the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], ADM James L. Holloway, III, and top Navy leaders found themselves in a dilemma. A comprehensive review and examination of existing leadership and management training had revealed 58 formal training courses and 11 correspondence courses costing 12.8 million dollars a year.[AUEL,1975] Nevertheless, contemporary Navy problems such as high attrition, low retention, absenteeism, substance abuse and crisis management among its personnel were continuing to be cited as major problems. In an effort to rectify the situation, after internally generated Navy studies had produced no conclusive results, several civilian contractors were asked to submit training proposals and McBer and Company, a Boston-based research and development firm, was chosen to develop a program to address the Navy's leadership and discipline problems. The Navy continued with its broad based leadership training [LMT], with emphasis on general knowledge of management concepts and theories until McBer could develop the proposed skill acquisition program of job relevant, specific practices and techniques.

1. The Navy LMET Plan

The Navy's plan under McBer would be to develop Naval personnel at each level of competence required by their jobs. In doing so, the new program's mission would be "to increase the Navy's ability to achieve its overall mission by increasing the effectiveness of Navy leadership across all levels of the chain-of-command."[CNET,N.D.,p.5] The endeavor would be a systematic training program, researched based upon Navy situations aimed at specific billet levels, emphasizing

individual initiative and accountability. Specifically, its goals would be:

To provide a formal and systematic training program for professional development of Navy leaders at critical points in their careers, based on research of effective Navy leadership.

To train officers and petty officers in the specific leadership and management skills needed to perform effectively at their level in the chain-of-command.

To conduct ongoing evaluation for improving and updating these programs.

To encourage Navy leaders to take personal responsibility for implementing effective leadership skills, by means of an educational approach that emphasizes individual initiative and accountability for effective performance as a Navy leader. [HRMC,N.D.,p.7]

The formal Navy training plan was issued in February 1979, several months after the commencement of LMET course training. That plan addressed the results expected:

Improved leadership and management competence on the part of the Navy's officers, petty officers and civilian personnel will enhance the Navy's performance in all mission areas, and may well provide the margin of superiority at sea that the Navy can achieve over any potential future adversary. It will also aid in the resolution of contemporary Navy problems involving retention, crisis management, disciplinary rates, attrition, working conditions, etc. LMET is designed to improve and maintain the requisite level of leadership and management competence through the Navy total force. [CNO,1979]

2. Theoretical Bases for LMET

Leadership and Management Education and Training [LMET], the Navy's sole integrated approach to the leadership training problem was developed by McBer and Company. McBer and Company was set up in 1970 by Harvard professor David C. McClelland and psychologist David Berlew - hence the name McBer.

McClelland, an eminent clinical psychologist, is well known for his research on power and achievement motives. [GOLEMAN, 1981, p.35] In his book, The Achieving Society, he discusses research which sought to isolate certain psychological factors, particularly the need for achievement and to assess their impact upon the economic growth and decline of societies. Using scientific, quantitative methods, coupled with the psychological knowledge of human motivation, he demonstrated how the need to achieve motive influenced economic development, which, more importantly, could better equip man to shape his own destiny. [McCLELLAND, 1961]

Convinced of the achievement motive, McClelland undertook research in the area of motive acquisition. Both behavior theory and psychoanalysis agree that stable personality characteristics, like motives, are laid down in childhood and difficult to change. McClelland's attempt to somehow change these motives in adults raised problems of both an ethical as well as a methodological nature. Clearly there were processes in the past which had successfully altered personality change - most notably devout missionaries. [McCLELLAND, 1965, p.322] Using empirical information from behavioral learning experiments, a strategy was set up in an attempt to change or promote the achievement motive, thereby improving entrepreneurial performance of businessmen.

McClelland's motive development program was centered around twelve propositions of motive acquisition, notions mostly backed by empirical information or research from various studies. The training program was designed for small groups [under 25] to be taken voluntarily over a short duration of time [1-3 weeks]. The educational design of the course used various methods of content and process presentations to

achieve the overall goal. The course normally ended with each participant preparing a written document outlining his goals and life plans for the next two years. McClelland states, "The participants were to regard themselves as "in training" for those next two years, in that 10-14 days is obviously too short a time to do more than conceive a new way of life: it represents the residential portion of the training only." During these two years, questionnaires would be sent out each 6 months to remind them of the issues discussed and to give them information to help determine how well they were progressing on achieving their self made goals.[McCLELLAND,1965,p.329]

After repeatedly giving the course both at home and abroad, McClelland's data seemed to suggest that one third of the people remained relatively unaffected while the other two thirds represented a doubling of the normal rate of unusual entrepreneurial activity.[McCLELLAND,1965]

McClelland's propositions were stated generally enough so that other terms such as "attitude" or "personality characteristics" could be substituted for the term "motive". In this way he believed the propositions would also hold true for other personality variables.[McCLELLAND, 1965,p.332]

As a final note on his motive development program of training McClelland wrote, "...rather than developing "all purpose" treatments, good for any person and any purpose, it [psychotherapy] should aim to develop specific treatments or educational programs built on laboriously accumulated detailed knowledge of the characteristic to be changed." [McCLELLAND,1965,p.333] McClelland's motive development program was to be a significant building block in what would become the Navy's LMET Program.

In early 1971, McClelland [McCLELLAND,1973], criticized the intelligence or aptitude testing movement in a public lecture given at the Educational Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey. McClelland criticized the intelligence tests just as he had done 15 years earlier, on the grounds that while they may predict good grades in school they have little effect in predicting good life outcomes. His own research supports this notion. Good test scores allow people to get into better schools, however, after graduation the significance ends - good test score and bad test score graduates both succeed and fail. McClelland argues that a much wider array of talents or competencies should be assessed to determine college entrance, with an emphasis on "grades in life" and not "grades in school".[McCLELLAND,1973,p.7] Good grades in school falsely lead people to believe that they are more competent and therefore more likely to do well in life.

McClelland listed six principles as paramount in his alternative approach, competency testing, to traditional intelligence testing. Of the six, two are particularly significant in understanding overall LMET development.

The first principle concerns criterion sampling. Criterion sampling means observing people in the field and analyzing their performance. A test that is directed at the components of this performance would be the best test. McClelland states, "If you want to test who will be a good policeman, go find out what a policeman does. Follow him around, make a list of his activities, and sample from that list in screening applicants."[McCLELLAND,1973,p.7] General intelligence and the ability to play word games may not be the best test in determining

who to hire as a policeman - a movement toward behavioral analysis is required.

The second principle concerns the ability to assess competencies involved in clusters of life outcomes. While criterion sampling can be used to identify occupational competencies unique to a special job or task it is also necessary to identify social competencies that contribute to successful performance. McClelland writes that, "Some of these competencies may be traditional cognitive ones involving reading and writing. Others should involve what traditionally have been called personality variables, although they might better be considered competencies." [McCLELLAND, 1973, p.10] McClelland gives four illustrations of these social competencies, each with supportive research for both its significance as well as insights into its measurement, they are; communication skills, patience, moderate goal setting, and ego development. [McCLELLAND, 1973]

3. LMET Study for the Navy

Using McClelland's research and conceptual ideas on job competency, McBer and Company, working in close cooperation with the Navy's Bureau of Personnel [BUPERS], began developing LMET in 1976. Similar methods and techniques used during the past decade in civilian organizations were adapted for the Navy's overall LMET design. The first task was to identify what Navy leaders, particularly superior Navy leaders actually do in handling leadership and management tasks. As Dr. D. G. Winter explains:

The traditional way of answering the question, "What makes a good Navy leader?", is to ask people what personal qualities and skills they believe are important for leadership and management in a particular job.

Putting together the answers of people actually in the job, the answers of superiors [or supervisors], and the answers of their subordinates [or clients] ought to give us a collective theory of what that job requires. In fact, however, this procedure is likely to give us a mixture of highly specific job tasks and vague platitudes about personal qualities, while neglecting the qualities that are crucial for excellent or superior performance.[WINTER,1979,p.2]

McBer believes that it is more accurate and relevant to find out who are the superior and average leaders from the personnel working closest with them, and then identify what distinguishes them from each other.

Using Navy commands in San Diego, California and Norfolk, Virginia, McBer asked commanding officers to identify superior and average leaders at eight career points: division officer, department head, executive officer, and commanding officer for commissioned officers, and petty officer, leading petty officer, leading chief petty officer, and master chief petty officer of the command for non-commissioned officers. In this way, 51 people [30 superior, 21 average] were identified from the Pacific Fleet and 78 people [38 superior, 40 average] from the Atlantic Fleet. Most combinations of warfare community and career points were represented in this total sample of 129 officers and enlisted.[WINTER,1979]

The personnel were interviewed individually and asked to relate three incidents in which they felt they did very well, and then three incidents in which they did not feel very successful in their present jobs.² The interviews were recorded almost verbatim and analyzed

²The McBer approach is not unique in all respects. The critical incident interview was developed by psychologist John Flanagan during WW II.[GOLEMAN,1981,p.39] McBer calls his data gathering technique behavioral event interviews [BEI].

carefully to determine what similarities superior Naval leaders had shown that average leaders failed to show. The interviews of 36 of the Pacific Fleet sample were used to create a series of 27 competency elements, grouped into 5 clusters. When scored on the whole sample of 51 Pacific Fleet interviews, most of the 27 competency elements differentiated the 2 groups.[WINTER,1979]

To validate their findings, McBer first used the Atlantic Fleet sample scored by interviewers who did not know if the person was "superior" or "average". Additionally, a second validation technique was used involving a new, much larger sample. An extensive battery of paper and pencil tests was developed and administered to over 1,000 Navy personnel from petty officer through commanding officer, in the 3 warfare communities from both fleets. Interviews which could be scored for competency elements were available on 61 of these persons.[WINTER,1979] Further analysis was conducted using 220 persons from the larger sample size predominately in determining variations of leadership and management skills on a hierarchial level.

Once a competency element derived from the original interviews with the sample of Pacific Fleet personnel had been validated by either of those two procedures, it was considered to be a competency that is associated with superior leadership and management performance in the Navy. Sixteen of the original 27 elements were validated in this way.³ [WINTER,1979] Those 27 initially identified elements served as the basis for original LMET curriculum design.[PARKER,1980,p.15]

³For a more indepth description of competency identification and validation the reader should consult the Winter Report [WINTER,1979] on LMET theory and research.

These 16 validated competencies are at the core of the LMET Program. The basic premise of LMET is that increases in any or all of those competencies will be associated with improved leadership performance in the Navy.[WINTER,1979] Today, the 27 competency elements have subsequently been reduced to 16 competencies which are grouped into 5 competency clusters for training purposes.⁴

4. The LMET Competencies

A competency is any knowledge, skill, attitude or value which can be shown to distinguish reliably between effective and less effective job performance. As Richard Boyatzis, President of McBer and Company explains, "Competencies are not aspects of a job, but rather characteristics of the people who do the job best." [GOLEMAN,1981,p.40] In other words, a competency is what superior performers do more often, in more situations, for better results than do average performers.

The first competency cluster is a concern for efficiency and effectiveness, paraphrased as "doing things well, and wanting to do better." [HRMC,N.D,p.11A] Major components of this group include setting goals and performance standards, and taking initiative, with the concern for achievement as an underlying thought.

The second competency cluster is the skillful use of influence or "using influence in a positive fashion...not as a personal end, but toward Navy goals and effectiveness." [HRMC,N.D.p.12A] Major components include influences, team building, development of subordinates and self-control, with the concern for influence as an underlying thought.

⁴A complete list of the 5 competency clusters is contained in Table 1.

TABLE 1
LMET COMPETENCY CLUSTERS

1. Efficiency and Effectiveness - "Doing things well, and wanting to do better." Components include:
 - * Setting goals and performance standards
 - * Taking initiative
2. Skillful Use of Influence - "Using influence in a positive fashion,... not as a personal end but toward Navy goals and effectiveness..." Components include:
 - * Influences
 - * Team builds
 - * Develops subordinates [coaches]
 - * Self-control
3. Advising and Counseling - "Advise and counsel personnel in order to improve their performance on the job." Components include:
 - * Positive expectations
 - * Realistic expectations
 - * Understanding
4. Management Control - "Optimizing people and resources to the task." Components include:
 - * Plans and organizes
 - * Optimizes use of resources
 - * Delegates
 - * Monitors results
 - * Rewards
 - * Disciplines
5. Conceptual Thinking - "Applies concepts to a job situation." Components include:
 - * Conceptualizes

Reference: U. S. Navy Human Resource Management Center, LMET Overview Brief, no date.

The third competency cluster is that of advising and counseling, further amplified as to "advise and counsel personnel in order to improve their performance on the job." [HRMC,N.D.,13A] Major components of this group include positive expectations, realistic expectations and understanding.

The fourth competency cluster is that of management control or to "optimize people and resources to the task." [HRMC,N.D.,14A] Major components are plans and organizes, optimizes use of resources, delegates, monitors results, rewards and disciplines.

The final competency cluster is that of conceptual thinking or "identifying and organizing relevant facts to gain a clear understanding of the situation before acting on it." [HRMC,N.D.,15] The only component of this cluster is that of applying concepts to a job situation.

In addition to the five competency clusters, the McBer study identified six basic categories of leadership styles used by the officers and petty officers interviewed, they are:

- a. Coercer - all stick and no carrot
- b. Authoritarian - firm but fair
- c. Affiliator - people first, task second
- d. Democrat - participative manager
- e. Pace Setter - do it myself
- f. Coach - Management by Objectives [MBO] Manager

McBer found that superior leaders tend to be more skilled in several styles, recognizing which style fits a given situation. LMET encourages situational leadership with the development of a larger repertoire of leadership styles.[HRMC,N.D.,p.16]

5. LMET Structure

LMET is now the formally approved model for Navy leadership training, although it is not yet completely implemented. To achieve standardized implementation of the program throughout the Navy, the Chief of Naval Education and Training [CNET], has been designated training agent.

The first LMET classes opened in 1978, and the program has expanded rapidly. Projected yearly outputs for fiscal years 80-84 are 4,840 officers and 12,242 enlisted based upon the number of school quotas available.[HRMC,N.D.] There are currently five levels of LMET with special emphasis on fleet personnel attending first. These levels include; commanding officer/executive officer, department head, division officer, chief petty officer and petty officer. Officer LMET is further subdivided with separate classes for aviation, submarine, and surface ship officers.[HRMC,N.D.] Personnel returning to the fleet normally receive LMET enroute to their new permanent duty station. School quotas can also be obtained by Navy commands for personnel already at their command on a temporary duty basis. However, these quotas are extremely difficult to obtain and are offered only on a space available basis.

LMET is now taught at existing Navy training centers. Sites on the east coast include: Memphis, Tennessee; Little Creek, Virginia; New London, Connecticut; Mayport, Florida; Pensacola, Florida; Newport, Rhode Island; and Charleston, South Carolina. Sites on the west coast are: Coronado, California; San Diego, California; Bangor, Washington; Treasure Island, California; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

6. LMET Instruction

All classes last 10 working days, except for the 12 week LMET instructor course taught at Memphis, Tennessee. Instructors are deemed to be the key to success of the program. Accordingly, instructors have been selected against rigorous criteria and trained in LMET concepts and methods by the program designers. No one is allowed to teach LMET who is not a graduate of the 12 week LMET instructor course.[OLMSTEAD, 1980]

LMET class sessions are team-taught by two or three instructors, with officers teaching officer courses and senior petty officers teaching equivalent enlisted personnel. Reportedly, classes generally consist of 20-24 students.

Each LMET course is based around the competency notion and the five competency clusters. The training sequence for each competency consists of lectures to identify and assess how the competency applies in the Navy. Through self-analysis exercises and pretesting, students discover how they learn, as well as the type of management styles they possess. Skill acquisition and practice are developed through games, role-play exercises and case studies. Finally, through various processes the students learn to apply the competencies to tasks similar to those which will be encountered in their new job assignment.

The personal comprehensive plan is the final activity in all LMET courses. It is a statement of personal goals, shaped to the concepts and language of the leadership competency model. Participants are encouraged to formulate and describe realistic yet challenging goals that are appropriate to their Navy leadership situations, to become aware of difficulties and obstacles to these goals, and to write out specific action steps to overcome the obstacles and attain the goals.

A distinctive feature of LMET courses is the personal student log, which the participant retains as a written record of the LMET experience. It contains his or her self-assessment, life situation, and goals - all phrased in terms of the competency language.[WINTER,1979,p.11-12]

Differences [PARKER,1980] between classes for higher or lower ranking personnel are found primarily in the content, setting, and cast of characters used in the role-play situations, case studies and general class discussions. Chief petty officer and petty officer courses have the same level of emphasis, differing primarily in the seniority of instructions that teach the two levels.

The LMET classes are reportedly [PARKER,1980] well-paced, shifting from lecture to discussion to small group activities in a fashion intended to maintain student interest, to provide frequent opportunities for students to express feelings and opinions in a supportive environment, and to trade ideas with their peers. In actual practice LMET courses may differ slightly from location to location and class to class as instructors seek to motivate and influence each particular group. Student critiques completed at the end of the course indicate that students like LMET.[PARKER,1980]

7. Future for LMET

As mentioned earlier, LMET has not yet been completely implemented. Planning through fiscal year 84 will include courses for more junior petty officers as well as shore commands, Navy civilians, and Naval Reserve personnel, with the overall goal of training everyone in a Navy leadership position. The cost of LMET during 1980 was 17 million dollars; for 1982-86, the projected cost is slightly more than 29 million dollars per year.[PARKER,1980]

Curriculum modification, concentrated at the LMET Instructor School in Memphis, has gone on almost continuously since the problem began. Efforts to improve the program are concentrated in Memphis under the direction of CNET. Over and above internal course improvement and development, however, LMET has three longer-range goals:

a. Additional research is planned to provide further validation and cross-validation of the competencies themselves. Of particular concern here is pinpointing in greater detail the relative importance [and hence the appropriate instructional weighting] of each competency at a few "key" Navy billets - for example, at the commanding officer level and at the petty officer level.

b. The test battery will be revised and expanded, in order to provide instruments and procedures that can be used to assess individual standards of performance against the competency profile of superior Navy leaders. When available, such instruments could also be used before and after courses, as measures of the immediate effectiveness of a person's participation in LMET.

c. The LMET program will be evaluated. Short-term, internal course evaluation will provide an immediate indication of the effects of LMET. Most important, however, is the more difficult long-term external evaluation. Do LMET graduates perform at significantly higher levels of leadership than non-graduates? Does the LMET program have a measurable impact on standard Navy indicators of leadership and management performance, as well as on newer indicators that will be developed as a part of LMET itself? [WINTER, 1979, p.12-13]

D. NEED FOR LMET EVALUATION

LMET will soon begin its fourth year with graduates continuing to be dispersed throughout the entire Navy community, limited only by cost considerations and the sheer numbers of quotas available annually. Plans to continue LMET implementation on a more widespread basis are ongoing with the full backing of the CNO. The implication is that LMET has become a

solution, in great part, to the Navy's overall leadership and discipline problem. Most people feel good about the direction of LMET and its results, however, elaborations are few and comments are less than specific.

Just how good is LMET? Is LMET producing the desired results or changes? Unfortunately, those questions remain unanswered. It is difficult to identify what is meant by "improving" effectiveness. Efficiency can usually be measured in terms of cost and time. Defining effectiveness requires a detailed understanding of the variables that affect performance.

Several prominent industrial psychologists express doubt about the prospect of meaningful evaluations of methods like McBer's. It is simply too difficult to identify the qualities of good managers, they say, let alone measure their validity as predictors of performance. [GOLEMAN,1981,p.46]

Neither McBer nor its clients have so far produced much empirical proof that their method does, in fact, lead to demonstrable improvements in job performance. There are few published studies of the effectiveness of competency-based selection and training as practiced by McBer. [GOLEMAN,1981]

Much of McBer's work is too recent for meaningful evaluation. Except for end of course critiques by students and informal comments by commanding officers, LMET falls into this category.

However, the honeymoon for LMET is beginning to end. Researchers are starting to question the McBer approach as unvalidated theory, ignoring a host of pet factors, such as situational leadership or content verses process leadership, to name only two. Some claim the data gathering and analysis are not particularly impressive. Others insist that

the sample size to base this magnitude of a program on was just too small. [PARKER,1980]

Additionally, there exists a very real need for all levels of Navy managers to know the degree to which the LMET Program is effective. Optimum use of scarce resources is a major concern to all managers, and the LMET Program continues to make demands for both manpower and money without proven justification. This concern should question whether the ten days at LMET school is in fact improving individual effectiveness as a leader, and hence worthwhile. If LMET is only a nice-to-know management course, producing few measurable results, then there would be a strong argument that those resources could be better allocated. On the other hand, if LMET graduates are more effective leaders and managers in directing the manpower resources available to them, then the program should be valued. The bottom line is that Navy managers have a real need for an LMET program evaluation to determine if the current level of support is warranted.

An evaluation would also provide LMET program managers with feedback as to its effectiveness. It would identify areas that require further emphasis as well as identify deficiencies if they exist. The fact that continued evaluation of the program is a stated goal [WINTER,1979] further highlights this need.

Perhaps more importantly, an evaluation can provide future direction for the program. This aspect can keep the LMET program ahead of, or at least, on top of emerging problems, thereby assuring it remains viable and healthy. With this forward looking attitude the program can become one of action vice reaction to the needs of the Navy.

The list continues on and so does the need for LMET evaluation. As with any program in times of austere funding, LMET will sooner or later come under careful scrutiny as to its cost effectiveness. The Naval Audit Service has already expressed an interest in examining LMET results.[PARKER,1980] The Navy can little afford not to evaluate the program.

As discussed at length above, the need for an evaluation of the LMET program is quite clear. Yet, the question of how to conduct this evaluation remains. How to best evaluate a system-wide program as extensive as LMET within the Navy is not readily apparent. The number of proposed methods would likely equal the number of people queried. System-wide surveys, periodic graduate questionnaires, unit reports on overall readiness vs number of graduates onboard, spot interviews, etc., are all possible approaches to evaluation complete with strong arguments both for and against their use.

In deciding on the issue of how best to evaluate, one should consider what is being evaluated. LMET, as well as any program's effectiveness, is not easily measured. There are few clear cut effectiveness indicators, no impeccable standards, and no completely reliable method of measuring effectiveness as has been discussed earlier.

Another concern is the cost of any evaluation in terms of time, manpower and money. All three constraints further confuse the issue of how to best evaluate the LMET Program while optimizing these resources.

This research is intended to provide program managers and decision makers with a practical method to answer the very question of how. This method of initial evaluation, in the form of a Pilot Study can test hypotheses, evaluate a methodology, uncover relevant issues while

providing data concerning the actual evaluation of a major program. This thesis will attempt to demonstrate the value and usefulness of the Pilot Study concept as related to a preliminary program evaluation.

It is under this context that this research on LMET effectiveness was undertaken. The thrust of the work is twofold, first to try to shed some light on LMET effectiveness. Second and possibly more important, to demonstrate the practical value of a pilot study to help identify the relevant issues, evaluate methodology, and test hypotheses prior to committing extensive resources to a full scale evaluation.

III. CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGN OF AN EVALUATION OF LMET: GUIDELINES FOR A PILOT STUDY

A. RATIONALE FOR A PILOT STUDY

With the need for an evaluation firmly established, there remains at least two critical questions to be answered; who is to conduct the study and how? Let us briefly examine the who question first. There is logical support for McBer and Company to evaluate the LMET Program, since they are intimately familiar with its designed structure and theoretical basis. However, there exists a possible conflict of interest whereby the credibility of results could be in jeopardy. This in essence would be a form of self-evaluation, open to criticism as being favorably biased, regardless how fair or objective it was in reality.

CNET is another possible choice for conducting the evaluation. CNET has familiarity with course content, teaching techniques, as well as easy access to graduates both before and after the training. Again for many similar reasons, the outcome of such an evaluation might be suspect. As part of the Navy bureaucracy, CNET would be placed in an untenable situation of evaluating a program that it administers. Any such evaluation would probably be subject to close scrutiny, regardless of the actual quality. Clearly, there is a need for an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of this program to insure a relatively unbiased outcome.

This leads to a third alternative, that of an independent outside contractor with no vested interest in the outcome. Yet even this alternative has considerable drawbacks. The cost of an evaluation would be

high, especially for a contractor who is unfamiliar with the program. It would be necessary for the contractor to expend a considerable amount of time, manpower and money in studying the program prior to commencing the evaluation. Even after that initial familiarization phase, there exists a very real possibility that the program could be misinterpreted, resulting in an inappropriate direction for data collection. This could result in an evaluation that uncovers nothing meaningful, or worse, mis-evaluates the program, causing additional expenditures to correct non-existent problems as well as creating the need for another evaluation.

The need for an evaluation by a knowledgeable but independent third party having no career-crucial or monetary interest in the outcome points to yet another alternate approach. An independent contractor working with only a sketchy concept of the program and little inside knowledge may not be a good solution. However, if that same contractor were provided with some meaningful and concise direction for the evaluation, then the study could be conducted more efficiently with the necessary credibility. One method to provide this guidance is through a pilot study. The pilot study, conducted by personnel knowledgeable of the organization and the program being evaluated, could identify issues, develop hypotheses, and even test an evaluation methodology. By conducting a pilot study prior to the full-scale evaluation, information could be uncovered that would provide the program manager and/or contractor with the needed direction and relevant issues to effectively conduct a valid evaluation. Manpower needs for such a pilot study are minimal with a variety of possible sources such as CNET, HRMC's or, as in this case, Naval Post-graduate students working on their master's degree thesis.

It was with these thoughts in mind that a pilot study of the Navy's LMET Program was undertaken by two Naval Postgraduate students. The study commenced in mid-December 1980 and was completed in mid-June 1981, a period of approximately six months.

B. EVALUATION DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Having decided who should conduct the pilot study, the remaining question was how to evaluate the program and from there design the pilot study. The ideal design would have been to establish a control group of non-LMET graduates and compare their leadership/management practices with LMET graduates to see if there were any recognizable differences. Then, compare the non-LMET group with the LMET group to determine which command was in fact, best managing those problem areas which LMET was intended to alleviate. These would include areas such as drug and alcohol abuse, retention, crew morale, unit readiness and material condition, and command climate. Such an approach to evaluating a program would be very scientific and lend itself in establishing the effectiveness of a particular program. The problem with implementing this approach is twofold. First, no such control group was established when LMET was started. As a result every command in the Navy has some LMET graduates on board. Secondly, there is the problem of determining if a command's management of those problem areas was in fact due to LMET training, some other factor, or more likely, a combination of more than one factor.

Lack of a control group does not mean that a useful evaluation can not be accomplished. It does, however, lend support to conducting a pilot study in order to test an evaluation method prior to committing

scarce resources to a full scale evaluation. If unable to compare two groups such as, LMET and non-LMET graduates, then the next logical step is to compare individual performance before and after LMET training. By collecting behavioral data on managers before LMET school and comparing it to behavioral data gathered sometime after LMET school, changes in leadership/managerial behavior could be detected. The implication is that if the desired change is evident then the LMET training, hence the program can be surmized as being effective. There is at least one concern about this approach. That is, the LMET graduate needs to have had sufficient time after completion of the training to have developed a leadership/management behavior pattern. If conducted too soon after graduation the result may well be a parroting of LMET training with no real demonstrable behavioral changes. This need for a delay or time gap between data gathering necessitates an evaluation that could be quite lengthy in time.

While this time gap may suffice for a full scale evaluation, it would, if used for a pilot study, create problems. By extending the length of time to conduct a pilot study its usefulness to a program manager is diminished. In a dynamic program such as LMET, an evaluation needs to be as timely as possible in providing information. If the pilot study is overly lengthy, the insights provided concerning program evaluation may no longer be applicable when presented to the program manager.

If due to insufficient time, a before and after data gathering approach is impractical, then another method must be employed, that of the follow-up or post-test data collection. Using this method the intent is to gather behavioral data after completion of the school to determine if the students behavior matches that which the program is designed to

produce. This follow-up or post-test method while the least rigorous of those mentioned lends itself quite well to a pilot study. It can provide sufficient data to identify issues, test hypotheses and evaluate a methodology for conducting a full-scale evaluation. In addition, this approach is not time constrained, is extremely flexible and easily adapted to the resources required for a pilot study. A drawback to this approach is that data gathered from a student in a program, such as LMET, may be highly opinionated and not necessarily indicative of actual behavior, in essence only a self-report. This problem can be overcome by validating the subjects' self-reported data with additional information gathered from persons who have the opportunity to closely observe the subjects' behaviors. Supervisors, subordinates and peers are all potential sources of this validating data.

One additional consideration deals with sample size. A full-scale evaluation in order to be considered valid needs to be a random sample of the population. Such a random sample can then be assumed to statistically represent the whole population. When considering a major program, such as LMET, this random sample may need to be quite large. A pilot study, on the other hand, is not intended to be a substitute for a full-scale evaluation and need not use a random sample in order to be useful. A sample that includes a cross section of affected people from the program is all that is necessary. The intent is to not bias the pilot study results with data that applies to only a small segment or portion of the program population. The sample size for a pilot study, when possible, should provide a broad snapshot covering the entire spectrum of the program under evaluation.

C. GUIDELINES FOR AN LMET PILOT STUDY

The need for an evaluation of the LMET Program has been established. Furthermore, the arguments in favor of conducting a pilot study in order to provide guidance, as to how to conduct that evaluation have been presented. The remaining action is to formulate the guidelines necessary to conduct the LMET Program pilot study.

The first concern was who should be included in the sample? Obviously, in order to conduct this LMET pilot study, information needs to be gathered on LMET school graduates as to behaviors they exhibit after the LMET training. This then identified the study sample, LMET graduates. However, any data collected on the graduates which came from the graduates themselves would need to be validated as discussed earlier. This need for validating data also directed emphasis towards an LMET graduates immediate supervisor and subordinate. The basic data package would be gathered from LMET graduates, with validating data gathered from their immediate supervisors and subordinates.

Ideally, a graduate who attended LMET school after arriving at his present command would potentially provide the best behavioral change data. Unfortunately graduates in this category were expected to be difficult to find due to the programs scheduling. This scheduling established the normal routine of attending LMET school via Permanent Change of Station orders [PCS], that is before arriving at their command and not via returnable-quota, Temporary Additional Duty orders [TAD]. As a result of this procedure, most graduates would be expected to have attended LMET prior to reporting to a command, hence eliminating the "before" data.

Another issue in this question of who to interview was, which graduates? The LMET Program covers eight general management levels, they are: CO/XO, Department Head, Division Officer, Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command, Leading Chief Petty Officer, Chief Petty Officer, Leading Petty Officer and Petty Officer. These levels could be further grouped into CO/XO, Department Head, Division Officer, Chief Petty Officer and First Class Petty Officer which follows the normal Navy chain of command. Among these groups the lower 3 levels of Division Officers, Chief Petty Officers and First Class Petty Officers are the most numerous aboard any command, hence most promising as to accessability, thereby further defining the pilot study sample.

Limited interviewer resources as well as time constraints limited the chance of obtaining what could even be remotely labeled a representative sample. However, it needs to be emphasized that this was not to be an actual evaluation, but rather a pilot study. Therefore a non-random, cross section of these LMET graduates would be sufficient. In this way it would serve to evaluate methodology, identify key issues as well as provide some crude insights into LMET effectiveness. What now became important would be sampling a sufficient number of different commands as well as a variety of billets within those commands. Since operational commands had been given number one priority [OLMSTEAD,1980] for LMET school quotas it was possible to further restrict the sample to these commands. The most likely evidence of change would be among those commands which had the highest degree of exposure to the LMET Program.

Due to the physical location of the Naval Postgraduate School on the west coast, a practical consideration was given to concentrate on west coast commands. Time was a major issue with travel costs providing an

additional incentive to remain on the west coast. With the standardization of the LMET curriculum under CNET, it was felt that any general conclusions reached using west coast commands would most likely apply to east coast commands as well. With the geographic location narrowed down, type of commands on which to concentrate [operational i.e., air, surface, subsurface, amphibious, service force], and target billets identified [Division Officer, CPO, PO1] the remaining question was how large of a sample would be necessary? The issue now became one of sampling a sufficient number of different operational commands [air, surface, submarine] as well as a variety of billets within those commands, within the limited time available. The aim was to minimize any biases peculiar to either type of command [surface, submarine, aviation]; billet position such as Division Officer, Leading Petty Officer or Chief Petty Officer; geographic location such as San Diego; or specialty area [weapons, engineering, supply, etc.]. This cross-sectional sample would be sufficient to draw conclusions and to provide certain guidance for a future full-scale evaluation. It is imperative that the limitations of this "non-random cross-sectional sample" be appreciated so as to prevent this research from being mistaken as a program evaluation.

That leaves the remaining question of how to best gather the data. The choice of methods focused on two possible methods, interviewing or survey questionnaire. The collection of data, regardless of method, involves three elementary forms of human activity: observation, participation and empathy. As best stated by R. L. Gorden:

From these three activities all of the methods for studying human behavior are derived. Within this framework, interviewing is seen as one specific form of empathizing, participating and observing which takes place between two people... in this context the questionnaire [survey] is seen....simply as a technique for extending the interview in which the researcher participates by constructing the questionnaire.
[GORDEN,1980,p.5]

Empathy is referring to feelings with another person or understanding how that person feels about something. Participation refers to doing something with another person in their regular ongoing activities. When taking on a participatory role one is in a vantage point from which it is possible to either observe another's activity or to introspectively note one's own thoughts and feelings as related to that situation. Observation includes any sensory perception, not only visual, of cues which help a person understand human behavior. With these three concepts in mind let us examine these two data gathering methodologies.

The first of the two methods is the survey questionnaire. Observer participation in a survey with the respondent can only be dealt with during the survey construction phase. Actual interaction between observer and respondent is extremely limited. During the construction phase it is possible to interject ones own thoughts as to what is important, what needs to be asked or which issues are relevant. Once constructed and administered, no further participation is available to the "observer". This inflexibility is a major weakness of a survey especially in a pilot study where the meaningful issues may not be known. Observation for a survey consists of looking at and examining responses written on the survey form. While perhaps easily quantifiable data may be gathered, data that can be easily analyzed, using computer programs, the observations are limited. The circumstance under which the answers

were written, such as, the respondents emotional level, reaction to the survey, workload and many other factors are lost to a survey administrator. There is also the concern of whether each item asked on the survey was fully understood by the respondent. Educational and cultural background, socio-economic considerations, as well as the environment all have influence on the person participating in a survey. There is the argument that this prevents the observer from biasing the data. Yet in actuality the interviewers biases are permanently ingrained in the survey itself with no way of adjusting to different respondents short of re-writing the survey. By not viewing the respondent the interviewer loses that personal aspect of data collection. Any empathy must be transmitted via the survey instrument which is certainly difficult at best.

All this is not to say that a survey does not have distinct advantages. A survey can be administered to a very large sample in a relatively short period of time at a low cost. It also lends itself well to computer analysis. For data that is easily quantifiable into yes/no responses or to scales of like/dislike, a survey is especially appropriate. However, when gathering data on a highly opinionated subject where there are no obvious choices or a potentially wide variety of responses a survey can be useless.

Another consideration is that survey construction is an exacting evolution. A good survey may take considerable time in constructing, testing and revising. The problem is once administered it is difficult to change so it must be correct the first time. It is this very inflexibility that limits the usefulness of a survey in conducting a pilot

study, especially for a program where the real issues may not yet be known.

The second method considered was the interviewing process. One obvious advantage to this method is the opportunity to gather data from multiple sources. Not only are there the verbal responses of the respondent but also non-verbal signals such as facial expressions, hand and body motions and tone of voice to name only three. All of these observations can be used by the interviewer to gain a deeper insight into the responses to the interview questions. This multiple observation capability can be enhanced by team interviewing, where one person questions and concentrates on verbal responses, maximizing the flow of data while the other person concentrates on note taking and non-verbal responses.

Participation in the interview is another advantage over surveys. The observer is able to explore fully the responses given to questions by soliciting further clarification or in asking additional questions. This flexibility allows the interviewer to fully explore issues as they surface while ensuring that it is completely understood. This specific aspect fits the concept of a pilot study, especially the added flexibility of exploring new issues.

Empathy can add to the quality of the data gathered via interviewing. The interviewer in being able to develop empathy for the respondent during the course of an interview can anticipate probable reactions to questions and sense how the respondents feel about the events they are relating. This can add a qualitative aspect to what is actually being stated thereby further enriching the data.

All of this is not to say that interviewing does not have drawbacks. It is a time consuming process and costly in terms of money and manhours expended. There is a very real danger of the interviewers distorting the data with their own biases, perhaps unknowingly. Additionally, it takes a certain skill to establish a good rapport with the respondent. Without it, a free flow of information is not possible.

The very flexibility of the interview poses another problem in that it is very easy to get sidetracked into irrelevant issues or redundant detail to a response. The interviewing procedure is dependent on the free flow of information between respondent and the interviewer.

The interview process itself can inhibit this very flow of information. Interviewing with two interviewers on one respondent may in fact be intimidating to the respondent. If a tape recorder is used to record the verbal data it may similarly intimidate the respondent.

An additional obstacle may be that of the actual person, officer or civilian, used in conducting the interview, especially for enlisted respondents discussing their supervisors. The Navy officer may have an advantage of being an insider to the organization, who understands the language and jargon and can probably empathize easily with the respondent. If in uniform he will present a familiar, possibly non-threatening appearance due to the respondents everyday interface with officers. A civilian on the other hand may hinder the flow of communication by having to have everyday situations and acronyms explained. There is also the possibility of misunderstanding a word or phrase that is Navy jargon.

On the other hand the civilian interviewers may be less threatening in that they do not represent members of higher Navy management. For the Navy respondent, there may be less reluctance to voice a negative opinion about a Navy program to an outsider of the organization.

D. SUMMARY

These preceding considerations and issues concerning a pilot study for a major program, such as LMET, form the preliminary step in its overall evaluation process. While not all encompassing, each of these specific issues were addressed in formulating an LMET pilot study design. Any major program requiring evaluation could use this or a similar approach in order to develop an appropriate direction for a full scale evaluation. The pilot study design can provide decision makers with the relevant issues and guidance to better optimize their resources.

IV. LMET PILOT STUDY DESIGN: A DESCRIPTION

A. PREPARATION

As in any research study, a pilot study being no exception, a plan of attack must be developed before one packs his bags and heads out to gather "data". The question of what one wants or seeks to find, should be clearly established from the start. Without this being established it is difficult, if not impossible, to best determine the course of action to take. Once the problem identification and statement is complete, a methodology and overall design strategy for the study can be formulated.

An overall evaluation of LMET effectiveness would serve nicely as a problem statement for the proposed research. After all, the LMET Program had not been evaluated and effectiveness as related to improved student performance could provide a suitable criteria for measurement purposes. However, this was not to be the case for at least two major reasons, that of a time constraint and previously noted difficulties in measuring effectiveness.

First, the two graduate students selected would have only 6 months to complete the study, from December through June. While sufficient time to commence an evaluation presented no major problems through June, both were scheduled to graduate at that time and would subsequently receive separate Navy orders based upon service needs. Since no other

graduate student assets were available with sufficient background experience and time to conduct the evaluation it was agreed to conduct a pilot level study rather than a major overall evaluation of LMET effectiveness.

The second area of concern centered around the notion of effectiveness. Previous effectiveness studies, especially in the area of leadership training, in both the civilian and military sectors are few in number, yielding inconclusive results as a whole. It has been difficult at best to measure situational performance of personnel, let alone attempt to measure an improvement or increase in this performance and relate that to a specific training program to determine its overall effectiveness. The difficulty in determining effectiveness would only be compounded by the aforementioned insufficient time. The probability of obtaining an outcome would be low and any results obtained would lack credibility.

For these very reasons among others it was decided to conduct a smaller scale pilot study using interview techniques to gather data. The hope of the study would be to obtain useful data on LMET effectiveness to better design a much larger overall LMET evaluation.

B. A PLAN DEVELOPES

In December 1980, a recommended study design was received from McBer and Company based upon the pilot level study concept.⁵ McBer

⁵In the letter McBer and Company reiterated support for efforts to conduct an LMET evaluation. [McBER AND COMPANY, 1981]

recommended the strategy of a combination of open-ended interview questions with a survey instrument to be completed by the respondent immediately after each interview. Interviews were to be conducted with LMET graduates, two of their subordinates and an immediate supervisor. Suggested sample questions to be asked for each level [graduate, subordinate and supervisor] were included from McBer. The questions were designed to concentrate on behaviors [has their behavior changed?] and results [does it make any difference to bottom line measures?], rather than reactions [how do people like the course?] and knowledge - content [what did they learn?].⁶ In this way, the in depth interviews probing for specific, behavioral examples from the LMET graduates could be validated by their subordinates and supervisor in an effort to obtain more meaningful data. McBer also mentioned a suggested coding scheme for the interview data which had been used to evaluate their own business leadership training program. McBer recommended that the graduate students be trained in interview skills as well as an LMET coding scheme for scoring interview responses. Their final recommendation was to send both researchers through the LMET course itself, before conducting the study.

Through December and January the pilot study preparations continued. During this pre-interview phase the major task would be to

⁶McBer states, "... 'Reactions' are best addressed immediately after the course [which is indeed happening] and 'knowledge - content' is currently being evaluated immediately after the course in response to requests from CNET."

improve interview techniques of the two graduate students as well as to develop a knowledgeable background on LMET and general Navy leadership training.

In the area of interview techniques, the graduate students relied on a variety of sources to further develop their skills. Both graduate students were surface warfare, line lieutenant commander with similar experience in management practices developed in at-sea operational environments for a combined total of nearly 20 years in the Navy. Additionally, both were pursuing Master of Science degrees in Management, specifically Human Resource Management [HRM] with an emphasis in Organizational Development [O.D.]⁷. Their experience as Naval officers as well as their knowledge of applied and theoretical concepts of management would serve as a substantial foundation in developing interviewing skills.

Prior to interviewing both graduate students attempted a 2 day workshop conducted by Captain Phillip Butler, USN, on interviewing.⁸ The workshop concentrated on developing and planning an overall interview strategy. Stressing the biases of this form of social

⁷The Human Resource Management curriculum at the Naval Post-graduate School consists of core courses in Economics, Operations Research, Systems Analysis, Management, Accounting, Computers and Statistics followed by sub speciality courses in Organizational Theory, Educational Design, Labor Relations and Personnel Management, Organizational Development, Individual and Group Processes as well as Public Administration.

⁸Captain Butler holds a Doctorate in Sociology from the University of California, San Diego. He is well known for his active use of interviewing as a viable means of gathering data in both military and civilian organizations. He was a co-advisor for the pilot study.

inquiry, he introduced specific interview methods and skills available as well as thoughts on their effective use. At the conclusion of the workshop participants were given the opportunity to team interview on a variety of subjects with subsequent feedback on their effectiveness. Using the concepts developed from this workshop, actual interviews were conducted for practical experience.⁹ The next area of concern was now turned towards the LMET concept and the actual course. Research on the development of Navy leadership training, Dr. McClelland's concepts of achievement and competency notions, McBer's LMET study, and course content of LMET [all previously mentioned], were undertaken to formulate a satisfactory base of knowledge. While there was no time to actually attend the LMET course due to other graduate course requirements, a trip was made to the LMET School in Coronado, California. During that visit both graduate students were allowed to sit in on the various levels of classes as well as talk to the curriculum director and a number of LMET instructors. Literature on course content, sample course schedules as well as general LMET information was obtained and later reviewed. In mid January, the research background on LMET as well as the interview training was completed, a meaningful plan of attack could now be developed complete with a schedule of milestones.

⁹LCDR D. Vandover, one of the two pilot study researchers, using interview concepts from CAPT Butler's workshop as well as additional research, designed and conducted a 1 day interview workshop which was given to a class of graduate students at the Naval Postgraduate School. Later both students received practical training in conducting interviews while involved in consulting with a local business in Monterey, California. These interviews were conducted with eighteen owners/employees with wide educational backgrounds, and included grouping, categorizing and analyzing a large amount of data.

C. THE PLAN

A plan to conduct the pilot study was proposed to and approved by Dr. Reuben Harris. Interviews were to commence later in January and continue through the end of March, with the hope of obtaining at least 20 sets of interviews. April was to be set aside to analyze the data while May was to be used to write the final report. The major sections of McBer's recommended pilot study design, including the questions,¹⁰ would be utilized with three exceptions: first, the survey after the interview would not be used. Next, McBer's coding scheme for the interview data would not specifically be employed, thereby eliminating this additional training requirement; and finally, the graduate students would not attend the ten day LMET course.¹¹

Dr. Harris obtained a point of contact to assist the graduate students in scheduling the commands to be interviewed using the Human Resources Management Center [HRMC] in San Diego, California, and the Human Resources Management Detachment [HRMD] in Alameda, California, for the commands in those areas respectively. It was left up to the graduate students to contact the center and detachment to work out the final details. Additionally, the cognizant officer on the staff of the

¹⁰A list of the actual questions used during the study is contained in Appendix A.

¹¹All three design recommendations appeared to be good suggestions, however, the report was not received until mid January. This left insufficient time to fully develop a survey, arrange for additional training in McBer's coding scheme and attend two weeks of LMET school. In addition, due to the small sample size, it was felt that the survey would provide little additional insight to this particular study. All three recommendations deserve thoughtful consideration as part of a large scale evaluation.

Commander, Pacific Fleet, [CINCPACFLT], was notified of details concerning the study. The types of commands and levels of LMET graduates to be interviewed were not specified and were left to the judgment of the graduate students.

It was decided by the graduate students to try to interview a wide-ranging sample of operational [as opposed to shore and support] commands in terms of warfare specialties; that is air, submarine and surface, with emphasis on the latter due to their familiarity and experience. Since the emphasis would be on surface ships the sample would be further divided into carriers, cruisers and destroyers, amphibious, auxillary support and miscellaneous. Each of the three major Pacific Fleet geographical areas would be sampled, San Diego, California; Alameda, California; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Among the selected commands, it was decided to interview LMET graduates in three specific billet levels, each corresponding to LMET levels of petty officer [E-6], chief petty officer [E-7 thru E-9], and division officer [O-1 thru O-4]. Department head graduates as well as executive and commanding officers would not be interviewed, except as immediate supervisors to the LMET graduates. On January 29, 1981, the first interviews for the pilot study were conducted onboard a surface ship in Alameda, California. Nearly two months later the last interview would be completed onboard another surface ship in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Actual selection of the commands to be interviewed was left to the discretion of the HRMC and HRMD. The only guidance given was that the wider the variety of operational commands the better. Undoubted a major consideration was which commands were inport. Any other criteria that

the HRMC/D considered in selecting commands is not known, however, there remains a possibility that other selection criteria may have been used and may affect the data.

One to two weeks prior to the interviews the point of contact in the desired area was called and asked to nominate or identify a command for each of the two days the interviewers were planning to be in the area. Once the commands had been identified, [points of contact at the command and telephone numbers were supplied by the HRMC and HRMD], the interviewers would contact the command, usually through the executive officer, to explain the proposed visit and confirm a date and the commands actual location. This selection procedure continued smoothly throughout the interview phase with relatively few problems. It was easy to tell if the HRMC or HRMD had actually contacted the units or just identified them based upon an employment schedule, commands personally contacted by the HRMC and HRMD were far more enthusiastic about the proposed visit than were those not contacted. While a considerable amount of extra time was necessary to "convince and sell the visit" to unaware commands, no one ever refused to visit.

The initial telephone contact with the commands by the interviewers generally lasted 15-30 minutes. This was a sufficient length of time to explain the specific details of the visit. The visit was explained as a study on LMET effectiveness for the specific purpose of completing a Masters Thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School. Upon realizing that the interviewers were Navy surface warfare officers, instant credibility seemed to be established, resulting in an informal, open door policy for the visit. One executive officer remarked, "Hey,

anything you guys need....it's good to see the Navy using its own like this." The executive officers were informed of the desire to interview 3-5 LMET graduates [within the three levels previously discussed], along with their immediate supervisor and two subordinates.¹² They were told that the interviews for the LMET graduates would last approximately one hour, while subordinate and immediate supervisor interviews would only take a total of 30 minutes.¹³ Initially, the executive officers were allowed to set up their own schedule for the days interviewing. However, as the study progressed a schedule developed by one of the commands became the recommended example that executive officers were encouraged to follow.¹⁴ The only requirements stipulated by the interviewers was the need for two separate spaces or rooms [relatively quiet if possible], which would be used to actually conduct the interviews. The executive officer was then informed of the interviewers desires to wear civilian clothes as part of the study, when applicable, no one refused:

Actual selection of the LMET graduates at each command was left to the discretion of the executive officer. It is not known how the selection process actually occurred in each instance, however, it is known that some graduates volunteered while others "were volunteered"

¹²After interviewing at several commands the two subordinate requirement was changed to include only one immediate subordinate. This resulted in a time savings.

¹³McBer had suggested 1.5 hours for LMET graduates and 45 minutes for subordinates and supervisors. As the study progressed, actual interview times for LMET graduates rarely lasted 60 minutes, with subordinate and supervisor interviews easily completed within 15 minutes.

¹⁴The sample schedule used is contained in Table 2.

TABLE 2
SAMPLE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The following personnel are scheduled for interviews on (date) at the indicated times. Interviews will be held in the following two locations:

Time	LMET Graduates (names)	Interviewers (Active/Passive)
0800-0900 #1		LCDR Vandover/LCDR Villarosa
0900-1000 #2		LCDR Villarosa/LCDR Vandover
1000-1100 #3		LCDR Vandover/LCDR Villarosa
1100-1200 #4		LCDR Villarosa/LCDR Vandover
1230-1330 #5		LCDR Vandover/LCDR Villarosa

Time	Supervisor/ Subordinate (name)	Interviewer	Supervisor/ Subordinate	Interviewer
1330-1345 #1		LCDR Vandover #2		LCDR Villarosa
1345-1400 #1		LCDR Vandover #2		LCDR Villarosa
1400-1415 #3		LCDR Vandover #4		LCDR Villarosa
1415-1430 #3		LCDR Vandover #4		LCDR Villarosa
1430-1445 #5		LCDR Vandover		
1445-1500 #5		LCDR Vandover		

to participate. The executive officer was not requested to specifically nominate certain levels of individuals since the totals among the three levels remained fairly equal throughout the entire study.

Several days prior to the actual visit the commands were again contacted to remind them of the time and date of the visit as well as to recheck the actual location of the ship. While problems were few and far between, they were all resolved during this final contact. On one occasion, a forced cancellation by a command was required due to an upcoming inspection. Using personal contacts by the interviewers, another command was substituted causing no problems.

All interview visits except one were scheduled during the normal work week, with the vast majority occurring on Thursdays and Fridays. While the weekends were certainly more convenient to the interviewers due to graduate course studies, they were incredibly inconvenient for the commands for obvious reasons. The one exception occurred through special arrangement over a weekend after it was learned that a satisfactory sample [five graduates, supervisors, and subordinates], could be obtained within the duty sections over a two day period.

Arrival at the commands on the day of the interviewing was usually between 0745-0815. Although the individual commands generally start their work day earlier, it was felt that it would be more convenient and less hectic to arrive after officer's call, giving the executive officer as well as the ship a chance to start their day before our intrusion - the commands agreed unanimously. On every occasion the quarterdeck watch had expected the arrival and the interviewers were taken to the executive officer. After introductions and the

interviewing plan had been discussed the executive officer would typically ask, "...So what have you found out about LMET that we should know?" On several occasions the interviewers were asked to meet the commanding officer where he also expressed an interest in learning what had been found to date.¹⁵

D. THE INTERVIEW PROCESS

Interviews were first conducted with the LMET graduates using both interviewers. One interviewer would question the respondent while the other interviewer would passively take notes as well as handle the tape recorder. The respondent was introduced to the interviewers and made to feel relaxed. He was told specifically about the study and assured of confidentiality concerning his responses.¹⁶ He was told that if he was to be quoted there would be absolutely no mention of either his name or his command. His permission was solicited to allow the use of the tape recorder during the interview. Without exception, permission was always received, allowing for a complete taping of all interviews.¹⁷ He was further asked not to mention any names of individuals during the interview.

¹⁵ Commanding officers and executive officers of the commands interviewed were generally interested in any information concerning LMET. The interviewers were careful to avoid any evaluative remarks under the guise that it would not be known until all interviews had been completed with the data analyzed.

¹⁶ All 51 interviewed LMET graduates were male except in one exception a female division officer. The use of the masculine pronoun throughout the research denotes the entire sample including this exception.

¹⁷ All tapes contain an interview number as well as the commands name. Respondents are identified only as to their LMET level [petty officer, chief petty officer or officer] as well as their relationship [graduate, subordinate or supervisor].

The graduates were all asked the 17 questions [Appendix A] originally recommended by McBer.¹⁸ Additionally, they were asked the following four questions:

1. How long ago did you graduate from LMET school?
2. Did you attend LMET school prior to arriving at this command?
3. Would you send anyone to LMET school? Why?
4. Is there anything else you would like to tell us concerning LMET?

The interviews with the graduates proceeded smoothly. The only minor problem was a confusion between LMT and LMET. Seven respondents identified by their commands as LMET graduates had actually attended LMT school. These interviews were not included in the study results reported and were terminated as soon as this fact was uncovered.

Interviews with the graduates immediate subordinate and supervisor were conducted after the graduate's interview, usually later that afternoon. In this way they could be used to validate the graduates remarks. Interviews were conducted by a single interviewer, with two interviews ongoing simultaneously in separate rooms. Identical introductions were made as had been done with the LMET graduates. Confidentiality was promised and respondents were asked to omit names using only "him" or "he" to identify the graduate. Permission was obtained in every case to record the interviews on tape.

¹⁸In some instances several LMET stimulus questions were specifically omitted if the interviewers believed they had already been answered in discussing previous questions.

The subordinates as well as the supervisors were all asked the four questions recommended by McBer. Additionally, they were asked the following four questions [note the difference in questions 2 and 3 depending upon the respondent]:

[Both] 1. What do you like or admire most about his [the graduates] performance onboard?

[Subordinate] 2.a Would you work for him again? Why?

[Supervisor] 2.b Would you work for him [if roles were reversed]? Why?

[Subordinate] 3.a Would you like to go to LMET school? Why?¹⁹

[Supervisor] 3.b Would you send anyone to LMET school? Why?

[Both] 4. Is there anything else you would like to say concerning this individual or LMET school?

In some of the earlier interviews with these individuals it was noted that they did not proceed as smoothly as had the graduates interviews. There was a tendency on the subordinates part to remain introverted and to assume that the interviewers were trying to personally grade or evaluate the graduate. Their perception seemed to be that their information could have detrimental consequences on either themselves or the LMET graduate. Once this was noticed, early in the study, an effort was made prior to the interview to explain to them that the information they would give would be used only to categorize the LMET graduate among other LMET graduates. Interviews with supervisors proceeded smoothly with no problems.

¹⁹If it was found that the subordinate had gone to LMET school, then question 3.b. was substituted.

At the conclusion of the day, after all interviews had been completed, the interviewers then met to discuss the days events. Preparations for the next interviews were begun using any new lessons learned from that days activities.

The interview process as discussed above was repeated through March in a fairly methodical fashion. In the end, the pilot study sample size consisted of 51 LMET graduate interviews evenly divided among the three junior levels of LMET training [LPO, CPO and DO]. The sample represented 13 operational commands within the 3 warfare areas in three Pacific Fleet geographical locations.²⁰

During the next four weeks the tedious process of analyzing the data was undertaken. Responses to each question were carefully analyzed using the notes and tapes taken during the interviews. All data was team analyzed using both students rather than each separately analyzing the data twice. A coding scheme was developed for each question prior to analyzing the data, in an attempt to categorize the data into a somewhat more usable format. Although extremely time consuming, the interviews analyzed using the LMET [McBER] competencies produced an enormous amount of information concerning both the LMET program in general as well as specifics on LMET graduates.

²⁰Summary results of the sample are contained in Table 3.

TABLE 3
PILOT STUDY SAMPLE

I. BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE BY COMMAND LOCATION

Type of Command	Location	Graduate Rate/Rank	Interviewer's Appearance
Service Force Ship [AFS]	Alameda	SK1/ENS/BM1/RM1	Civilian*
Amphibious Ship [LPD]	Alameda	LTJG/ET1/ENS/SKC	Civilian
Nuclear Submarine [SSN]	San Diego	RMC/ST1/IC1/MMC/ETCS	Civilian
Small Craft Unit	San Diego	BMC/SK1/BM1/HM1/ENCS	Civilian
Service Force Ship [AOR]	Alameda	MSC/RMC/EMC/LTJG/HTC	Uniform
Service Force Ship [AFS]	Alameda	ENS/DP1/QMCS/RMC	Uniform
Submarine Rescue Ship [ASR]	San Diego	LT/ENCS/EN1	Uniform
Aviation Squadron [RVAN]	San Diego	LT/LCDR/LT/ENS	Uniform
Aircraft Carrier [CV]	Alameda	MM1/ENS/AG1	Uniform
Tender [AR]	San Diego	BM1/HTC/ET1/BM1/HTC	Uniform
Destroyer [DD]	San Diego	DS1/GMGI/OSC/GSEC/ENS	Civilian
Fast Frigate [FF]	Pearl Harbor	ENS/ENS	Uniform
Cruiser [CG]	Pearl Harbor	ENS/LT	Uniform

*23 interviews in civilian clothes, 28 in uniforms

II. BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE BY PAYGRADE

Paygrade of LMET Graduate (Rank)	E6	E7	E8	E9	O1	O2	O3	O4
TOTALS	PO1 18	CPO 13	SCPO 4	MCPO 0	ENS 9	LTJG 2	LT 4	LCDR 1

LMET Level of Graduate Number in Sample (%)	E6 18 [35.3]	E7-E9 17 [33.3]	O1-O4 16 [31.4]
---	-----------------	--------------------	--------------------

TABLE 3 [con't]

III. BREAKDOWN BY WARFARE SPECIALTY/RATE

- 11 Surface Warfare Officers
- 1 Supply Corp Officer
- 3 Aviation Officers
- 1 Aviation Maintenance Officer

Supply Dept.	Medical	Weapons/Deck	Aviation	Engineering	Operations
3 SK's	1 HM	5 BM's	1 AG	1 IC	4 RM's
1 MS		1 ST		2 MM's	3 ET's
1 DP		1 GM		3 EN's	1 QM
				1 EM	1 DS
				3 HT's	1 OS
				1 GSE	
5	1	7	1	11	10

IV. BREAKDOWN BY TIME SINCE GRADUATION FROM LMET SCHOOL

	Officer	CPO	PO1	
Less than 6 mo.	4	6	9	19 [37.3%]
6-12 mos.	5	7	3	15 [29.4%]
1-2 years	7	4	4	15 [29.4%]
Over 2 years	0	0	2	2 [3.9%]
				51 [100.0%]

V. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The data gathered from the pilot study can be grouped into two broad areas. First is the data indirectly gathered through observing and participating in the interview process, that is, information on and resulting from the methodology used. Second is the actual content of the interviews, that is, data concerning the LMET graduate to the LMET Program. These data findings can be used to judge the value of the pilot study technique as a preliminary evaluation plan for major program, specifically LMET in this case, prior to committing extensive resources towards a full-scale evaluation.

A. INTERVIEW ANALYSIS

Before discussing actual interview content and LMET findings, let us look first at the process used to specifically gather this information. There exists many advantages as well as disadvantages [discussed earlier], in using interviews to gather data. The quality of data [both in depth and range] obtained from interviews is normally offset by the amount of time required in using this method. Once the interview method has been examined in relation to this study, the LMET content findings will be presented.

1. Interviewing: A Time Consuming Process

The interviewing process was extremely time consuming, substantiating previous research claims to this fact. Each LMET graduate was team interviewed for approximately 45 minutes by an active and passive observer for a total expenditure of 2.25 man-hours. Each,

immediate subordinate and supervisor to the LMET graduate was interviewed for approximately 15 minutes, one-on-one for a total expenditure of 1.0 man-hour. A simple arithmetic computation reveals that 3.25 man-hours were expended per LMET graduate set of interviews. Theoretically, this times the 51 interview sets equals a total of 165.75 man-hours. In actuality, due to interviews lasting longer than 45 minutes, approximately 180 man-hours were expended in data collection. This only accounts for actual time expended in interviewing and does not include any travel, or set-up time for the interviewers nor time spent arranging for the interviews. It is worthy to mention that considerable time and travel money was conserved through interviewing several graduates per command [3 to 6 graduates with 5 the ideal number for 1 day].²¹

This lengthy expenditure of time in having the respondents full attention was a primary advantage in obtaining a wide range and depth of information. It allowed ample opportunity to exploit the respondents' desire to voice their own feelings concerning the LMET training, as well as specifically, how LMET was seen to be emphasized at that command. Those respondents that were extremists towards the training were quick to point out its weaknesses or strengths while those that were neutral presented a more toned down version. The end result was a good overall picture of how LMET graduates behaved and felt about their training within the sample.

²¹A sample interview schedule is contained in Table 2.

2. In Depth Process Analysis: The LMET Interview

This section contains general remarks on the LMET interview process followed by examining five specific areas concerning: interview flexibility, the interview schedule, the interview environment, the issue of military vs civilian interviewers, and finally comments concerning interview introduction. The data consists of 69.25 hours of taped conversation in a leading question, free answer format. As such, the information is considered to be soft data, in that it is difficult to quantify. Often it was seen that two people can use very similar terms to describe the same subject yet mean very different ideas. Non-verbalized expressions such as tone of voice, hand and body movements, and facial expressions served to emphasize points and at times contradict what was actually being stated. This caused the interviewer to explore deeper while taking written notes concerning the respondent's attitude and behavior. This resulted in data consisting of not only the taped conversations, but also the notes and feelings of the interviewers. Even after 51 interviews it was still possible to vividly remember each respondent and their general attitude while listening to the tapes as much as four months after the interview. In addition to the interview questions, the respondent was given the opportunity to make any additional comments that might be pertinent or of felt importance. This resulted in a sizable amount of not easily categorized responses that added to the total information obtained.

The subjectiveness of this soft data was further accented by the interviewer's own biases towards the LMET Program. This bias tended to cause an interviewer to probe deeper into certain areas where the

respondent was reinforcing the biases of the interviewer and perhaps cutting off or playing down other those in opposition. As the interviewing progressed, the interviewers started to observe what were thought to be trends and may have tended to guide respondents into confirming those ideas or trends. Opposing these tendencies were the interviewer's knowledge of their own biases and a professional interest in suppressing them as much as possible.

a. Interview Flexibility

One of the early advantages that became apparent in using the interview, as opposed to a survey, was its flexibility in gathering data. The interviewer was able to control the direction of the information flow through questions and requests for clarification of statements. It quickly became obvious that the interview questions had a natural progression that made asking some unnecessary as the answer would be given in discussing a previous question. This resulted in rearranging the questions in this natural order and merely encouraging the respondent to continue until all of the desired data had been obtained. In not breaking the respondent's train of thought, the interviewing process progressed smoothly and quickly, allowing ample opportunity for the respondents to voice their thoughts on any given topic or question. While this did allow for the respondent to answer each question fully, it also led to some detailed examples and explanations.

The opportunity of interaction between interviewer and respondent ensured that the interviewer was correctly interpreting responses. In rephrasing further questions, and asking for clarification of specific responses, the interviewer had ample opportunity to clear up any misconceptions or hazy areas identified by the respondent during the interview. Similarly a distinct advantage of the interview was the ability to rephrase questions to ensure the respondent understood what was being asked. This exchange of ideas led to the rewriting of several questions that were ambiguous or unclear as to what they were asking. It was discovered that what seemed to be a perfectly clear question to either interviewer was often not understood by a respondent of a different educational or cultural background.

As a final note on this subject, the very flexibility of the interview process required the undivided attention of the interviewer. This results in a tendency of the interviewer to "burn out" after several consecutive days of interviewing. The interviews were conducted weekly over a two day period, normally a Thursday and Friday. If a full five days of interviewing were conducted there may have been a difficulty for interviewers to maintain their interest and enthusiasm for the project. The consequence is obviously a risk of gathering lower quality data at the end of a week as compared to the beginning.

b. Interview Schedule

An interviewing schedule was developed and used soon after the data gathering phase had begun. For the first two commands no schedule was provided, only a description of what was necessary,

namely to interview four to six LMET graduates as well as an immediate subordinate and supervisor for each. The first command devised and promulgated a schedule [as well as a Plan of the Day [POD] note], that worked so well [see Table 2] that it was recommended for use to all subsequent commands. The use of this standardized schedule allowed the interviewers to develop a routine that minimized wasted time, and increased efficiency in conducting the interviews. Additionally, most command XO's appeared grateful to receive a schedule format in which they could merely insert names. It reduced the administrative burden to the commands as well as completely satisfying the interviewer's needs. The sample schedule also minimized disruptions for their crew by promulgating beforehand, an interview schedule complete with interview location and time.

The schedule that was developed by the first command had all of the LMET graduates interviewed first, in the morning, followed by their supervisors and subordinates in the afternoon. The outcome could not have been better planned. Through interviewing all of the LMET graduates first, the interviewers formed a crude idea of the command's attitude towards the LMET Program. It also allowed the interviewers to categorize each LMET graduate as to their degree of adoption to the LMET competencies. Seldom did the LMET graduate interviews exceed the allotted 60 minutes which allowed the interviewers [active and passive] to quickly exchange impressions on each interview while still fresh in their minds.

The most beneficial aspect of interviewing the LMET graduate first was the detailed data on behavior gained, which could later be validated by their supervisor and subordinate. In a few cases, when the supervisor or subordinate was interviewed first, only general responses could be solicited in the hope that they would in fact substantiate what the graduate would say. The interviewing process operated best as a validation of behavior when conducted in the order of LMET graduate, then either subordinate or supervisor.

c. Interview Environment

All interviews for this pilot study were conducted either onboard the unit or working spaces and areas under the direct control of the command. This kept the respondent on familiar ground, in what could be termed as "home territory". However, whenever possible a neutral zone or area was used in order to remove any feelings of "big brother watching you". For enlisted personnel this seemed to mean any space where officers did not have ready access and included such areas as unoccupied officer staterooms, unit commander's offices [unit commander not embarked], and recreation rooms or librarys. In one instance the wardroom was used with obvious detrimental effects. Enlisted respondents appeared to be uneasy and nervous, and stopped talking to look and see who entered every time the door opened. For officer personnel, any place appeared to be sufficient. In remaining onboard the command while conducting the interviews it appeared to be less disruptive and more likely for personnel to respond promptly to the promulgated time schedule. In fact, throughout the study, interviewers seldom had to wait more than a few minutes and respondents

seldom had any wait at all. The smoothness with which the schedule operated was in no small part responsible for the large number of interviews that were able to be conducted.

All interviews were tape recorded instead of depending entirely on written notes. The reason for the use of the tape recorder and the confidentiality of the interview were carefully explained to the respondent prior to each interview. After obtaining the respondent's permission to tape the interview an identification statement was made on the tape. The statement specifically did not include the respondent's name or rate to reverify the confidentiality that had been promised. With this formality over, the interview proceeded with little or no attention placed on the tape recorder. It did not appear to inhibit any person from expressing their opinions. The tape recorder could be slightly disruptive however, if a tape ended in the middle of an interview. The respondent would normally stop talking until a new tape was started even when the interviewer insisted that he continue and not worry about the tape.

Maintaining the neutrality of the interviewing environment is extremely important as was demonstrated during the course of two interviews in which the supervisor was nearby. In one instance, the supervisor was at his desk on the other side of an equipment rack, and in the other, he was actually being interviewed simultaneously across the room. In both instances, the respondent's reactions were very similar. The respondents appeared to be nervous and continuously glanced in the direction of their supervisor. One respondent's replies to questions seemed to be for the benefit of his supervisor. The

respondents seemed to realize that the confidentiality of what was being said could not be guaranteed under these circumstances.

d. Interviewer - Military vs Civilian

Concerning the issue of military versus civilian interviewers, a couple of points are of note. In 23 interview sets civilian clothes instead of military uniforms were worn to see if that had any effect upon responses. It appeared to the interviews that the wearing of uniforms was optimal over civilian clothes. Instant establishment of credibility as a person knowledgeable in Navy matters existed when wearing a uniform that seemed to increase the information flow. When civilian clothes were worn there was a noticed tendency for the respondent to explain routine procedures, Navy acronyms, and common programs, that were not done when interviewing in uniform. In both cases, using familiar vocabulary and Navy jargon greatly assisted in conducting the interviewing process. Additionally, a feeling of empathy for each others position was quickly established when in uniform. The rank and age of the interviewers also seemed to facilitate the entire process. Lieutenant or lieutenant commander is sufficiently senior to develop good rapport with senior petty officers and chief petty officers, while a fairly youthful appearance [age 30-31, one interviewer with a beard] reduced the "generation gap" that might have inhibited discussion with younger officers and enlisted personnel. The fact that enlisted personnel are quite used to interfacing with officers but not with civilians in an official capacity probably had a positive impact on interviewing in uniform.

e. Need for Interview Introduction

A final issue that surfaced during the interviewing process was that of the purpose. Some subordinates seemed reluctant to talk about their supervisor despite assurances of confidentiality. At one point an interview was briefly stopped and it was explained carefully to the respondent that the intent of the questions and study was not to evaluate his supervisor's performance in itself, but rather to evaluate a program of leadership/management techniques. With these assurances the interview resumed in a much more relaxed and co-operative atmosphere. After this incident, subordinate interviews were begun by including this performance concept as part of the overall interview introduction with good results.

3. Interview Remarks

The interview process provided an excellent method for gathering data from the respondents. Primarily through its flexibility, the researchers were afforded the opportunity to explore relevant areas of interest as well as uncover tangential issues of concern. Concluding interview remarks concerning a future full-scale evaluation are contained in the next chapter. The remainder of this chapter concerns the specific LMET content information derived from the interviews themselves.

B. FINDINGS CONCERNING LMET

The findings of this study concerning LMET must be viewed with full recognition of the limitations of the sample. The sample included only 51 LMET graduates selected from 13 operational commands in

three west coast geographical areas. Furthermore, the sample was not random and therefore cannot be said or alluded to be truly representative of the Navy. However, the sample did contain a wide variety of warfare specialties, ranks, rates and operational commands, and does provide a good insight to LMET's influence, particularly on the sample population.

The method of describing the LMET findings which will be addressed in this analysis is using the Kilpatrick paradigm consisting of four levels or domains of learning. These levels are:

1. Reactions [How do people like the course?]
2. Knowledge-content [What did they learn?]
3. Behavior [Has their behavior changed?]
4. Results [Does it make any difference to bottom line measures?] [McBER,1981]

The level of "reaction" is the subjective opinion of the LMET graduate towards the overall course usefulness. This data can be gathered at any time, but is probably best addressed immediately after the course [this is done via a feedback survey completed upon completion of LMET training]. "Knowledge-content" concerns the level of retaining information, ideas and concepts. It also is best measured immediately upon completion of the LMET training [which is occurring in response to CNET requests]. "Behavior" is the level in which the instruction is actually practiced on the job by the LMET graduate. This is the level in which the pilot study interview method was focused upon in attempting to measure LMET effectiveness. The final area of "results" concerns that level where the changed behavior of the LMET graduate does in fact bring about the changes within the system which are desired. This is in the realm of a cause and effect relationship and amounts to a prime indicator of the effectiveness of the LMET Program.

1. Reactions

The first of the four levels to be examined is that of reactions. While it was not the intent of the study to explore this level, responses were obtained that provide some insight into the LMET graduate's "reactions" to their training.

a. LMET Viewed as Necessary

When queried as to whether an LMET graduate would send his personnel to the school, the responses were positive [only one negative officer] with three general response areas given most often. First, was the desire to increase knowledge in the area of leadership theory and to increase learning and vocabulary in the field of management. Second, was the idea of personal improvement through a further awareness, either to "get-well" or to make good leaders better. Third, is that individuals are required to go through LMET school via PCS orders, that is, it is an expected training evolution for career personnel. To discuss these three areas in more detail, the data [see Table 4] indicates that an overwhelming majority of sampled graduates view LMET school as a useful training evolution. Specifically, the training was reported to provide a general background of leadership/management theory complete with a specific vocabulary. This new vocabulary allows the graduate to be able to converse easier with supervisors and subordinates and often times provides names and labels to leadership styles and managerial techniques which they have already been practicing. The next perception held by graduates, appears to be that LMET training can provide poor leaders with the tools necessary to become good leaders while good leaders can become even better. Behind

TABLE 4
REASONS FOR ATTENDING LMET SCHOOL

Main Interview Reasons Given	LMET Graduate OFF/CPO/PO1/Totals				Supervisor (Totals)	Subordinate (Totals)
Acquire management techniques	5/	6/	5/	<u>16</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>5</u>
Learn different leadership styles	2/	3/	1/	<u>6</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>
Increase "self-awareness"	4/	0/	3/	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>
Better leadership skills or to "get well"	1/	2/	1/	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
Learn how to "get along" with people	0/	0/	1/	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
Learn how to influence people in a positive manner	1/	0/	0/	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Build self-confidence	0/	0/	1/	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Other*	2/	6/	6/	<u>14</u>	--	--

Additional Respondent Comments:

- 3 LMET Graduates, 6 Supervisors and 2 Subordinates stated that some form of LMET training should concentrate on E-4 and above instead of E-6 and above.
- Officer LMET Graduates had the widest range of remarks as seen below:
 - "....it [LMET School] was of little practical value."
 - "....a ticket punch."
 - "....a waste of time."
 - "....can't change behavior."
 - "....need some shipboard experience first."
 - "....it was a good experience."
 - "....prepared me for a leadership role."
 - "....I now understand people better."
 - "....I learned how to organize my time."
 - "....it was good background enrichment."
 - "....it points out strengths and weaknesses."

*Comments in this category varied and were generally favorable toward LMET School. Total does not include 1 Commissioned Officer who voiced a negative opinion. Supervisor/Subordinate columns will not sum to 51 due to the wide variety of responses received and not included in the table.

this notion may be a feeling of inadequacy or lack of time in which fleet managers and leaders feel unable to provide on-the-job leadership/management training. The final perception was that LMET training is a promotion hurdle that has to be passed, that is, the training is career enhancing.

b. Why LMET?

In addition to questioning the graduates, supervisors and subordinates were similarly questioned as to what their thoughts were concerning their desire to attend LMET. Most of the responses from individuals that had not attended the LMET training concerned perceptions about what LMET could do for them. The first of three general perceptions was a feeling of inadequacy in non-LMET personnel [especially junior enlisted] to assume positions of leadership and management without formal training. Second, was the feeling of needing additional ideas on how to lead and manage others, that is, their actual skills needed expanding. The third impression was that LMET training would provide the "right way" to lead and manage others. While they were not able to relate these ideas to the LMET school curriculum itself, it does imply the type of reputation that the program possesses. Fleet personnel look upon the LMET training in a positive light. They expect LMET to improve their leadership/management skills as well as to be provided with the "right way" to lead and manage others. In summary, the reaction to LMET training seems to receive favorable considerations from both graduates and non-graduates alike. As stated by one respondent, "It [LMET training] certainly can't hurt!"

2. Knowledge-Content

The second level or domain to be addressed is that concerning what the LMET graduates actually learned. They are tested on this level prior to leaving the school and the interview process did not specifically seek data on it, nevertheless several insights were revealed.

a. LMET Knowledge

For those graduates who had been away from the school for a length of time [6 months or longer], there were indications that they had forgotten some of the specific content-knowledge of their LMET training. However, as the interview progressed, they tended to recall some of these specifics and began to respond to interview questions using the LMET school vocabulary. The actual interviews appeared to surface training concepts which initially appeared to have been forgotten.

b. Setting Goals and Performance Standards

Of the five competency clusters taught during LMET school, the data indicates that the competency group of efficiency and effectiveness seems to be the least understood and practiced. Concerning efficiency and effectiveness, it can be paraphrased as, "Doing things well, and wanting to do better". [HRMC,N.D.] It includes setting goals and performance standards.

Behaviors demonstrated by one who sets goals and performance standards include the following:

- *Establishes specific work goals
- *Is concerned for standards of task performance
- *Revises goals to make them realistic
- *Sets deadlines for task accomplishment [HRMC,N.D.]

As indicated in Table 5 and 6, LMET graduates expressed adequate knowledge concerning goal setting, establishing performance standards for subordinates and clarifying evaluation standards. However, when specifically asked whether they in fact practiced these behaviors the response was negative as also validated by their subordinates. The implication is that this competency cluster remains at the knowledge-content domain. It would appear from the sample that LMET graduates do not routinely practice setting goals and performance standards for their subordinates. Additionally, LMET graduates sampled do not seek clarification from their supervisors as to goals and expectations that apply to themselves. As best expressed by an LMET petty officer graduate "....I guess I don't really tell them what I expect...I know I should."

In summary, the data analyzed from the interviews within the 13 commands indicates that sampled LMET graduates are knowledgeable concerning the content of their training. However, there appears to be a lack of application in certain areas. A lack of application that some freely admit.

3. Behavior

The pilot study research was directed specifically at this third domain - the behavioral level, that is, whether the LMET graduates exhibit any behavioral changes. Overall, there were no systematic behavioral changes that ran across the sample. However, there were isolated behavioral changes which were clearly the result of LMET training. For those several cases where a sharp and drastic change

TABLE 5
GOAL SETTING BY LMET GRADUATES

The question asked to LMET graduates was, "What goals did you set in LMET school? Follow-up questioning and probing attempted to determine if goal setting was used routinely as a management tool.

Response to Initial Question	Officer	CPO	P01
1. Measurable goal dealing with immediate future leadership/management position	4	7	8
2. Personal goal	2	5	5
3. Vague goal involving some phase of leadership [i.e. "achieve good leadership", "improve leadership style", "become a better manager"]	2	4	3
4. Forgot/don't remember	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTALS	16	17	18

Follow-up question results:

	Officer	CPO	P01
Number of LMET graduates who have established work group goals[%]	9/16 [56]	16/17 [94]	16/18 [89]
Number of LMET graduates setting measurable goals[%]	4/16 [25]	8/17 [47]	9/18 [50]
Number of LMET graduates setting goals with time frames[%]	0/16 [0]	3/17 [18]	6/18 [33]

TABLE 6
SETTING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS BY LMET GRADUATES

The question concerning performance measures was, "How is your performance on the job measured?" Additional probing was aimed at establishing specific measures. A rephrasing of the question to, "How do you know when you're doing a good job?", was particularly effective.

I. LMET Graduate Self-Report Response*

Performance Measurements	OFF	CP0	P01
Task accomplishment ["get the job done"]	13	13	14
Technical proficiency in rate or specialty	4	6	3
Manage the work group [emphasis on smoothness of operation]	1	5	3
Do not know	2	2	4
Amount of feedback provided supervisor	4	4	1
Effective training program	1	2	1
Establishing good inter-personal relationship with subordinates	2	0	1
Goal setting	2	0	0
Prioritizing workload properly	2	3	0
Keep supervisor out of trouble	1	1	2
Appearance of workgroup personnel	1	1	1
Material Resource Management	1	1	1
Morale of work group personnel	2	1	0
Keeping up with administration [paper work]	2	0	0
Amount of flexibility	1	0	2
Monitoring work group	0	2	1
Work group planning	0	3	1

*Columns may total to more than the number of graduates due to multiple responses.

TABLE 6 [con't]

II. Validated LMET Graduate Performance Measurements*

	<u>Supervisor Validation</u>		<u>LMET graduates not knowing</u>
	<u>Agree with graduate</u>	<u>Disagree with graduate</u>	
Officer	9	3	2
CPO	10	3	2
PO1	9	4	4
Totals:	28	10	8

III. PERCEIVED PERFORMANCE STANDARDS OF SUBORDINATES TO LMET GRAUDATES

	Do not know	Task Accomplishment	Others
Officer	4	7	1
CPO	4	9	4
PO1	3	12	2
Totals:	11	28	7

*This tabulation presents the LMET graduates perceived performance measurements as opposed to the immediate supervisor's stated performance measurements. Totals may not equal number of graduates due to supervisor or subordinate not interviewed for this question.

took place the personnel were clearly looking for help.²² They attended LMET school as a "get well" measure with a substantial felt need to improve. In general, those that exhibited the hoped for behaviors or competencies indicated that they did so prior to LMET school, while those not exhibiting the behaviors desired did not see the value of those competencies, feeling they were not applicable in their specific situation.

a. Seniority among LMET Graduates

The data seemed to indicate that there may be a correlation [negative] between seniority and extent of behavioral change. As Table 7 seems to indicate, chief petty officers are less affected by LMET training as far as changing their behavior. While there is some subjective indication that they in fact can better appreciate what is being taught and how it applies due to their experience, it seems that they tend to be more skeptical towards new ideas. The tendency seems to be, to use the LMET training as a reinforcement of their own leadership/managerial style by adhering to those competencies that reflect their own style. The notion of more senior LMET graduates using LMET to reinforce past behavior, thereby reducing the likelihood of behavioral change is reflected in the following chief petty officer's comments:

...not really, [no change] I found that what they brought out in LMET was basically what I was doing before I went.

...you might be able to modify a man but you can't change his behavior.

...I don't think so...[behavioral change] there are some things they pointed out that I do use...the way I handle the men is the same.

²²The behavior change was validated by supervisors and subordinates who observed the subjects before and after LMET school.

TABLE 7
EXHIBITED BEHAVIORAL CHANGE OF LMET GRADUATES

	Yes [A great deal of change]	Yes [Minimum Change]	Yes/No* [Disagreement between graduate & supervisor/ subordinate]	No [little change if any]	No [Definately None]
Officer	2	5	2/	3	4
CPO	3	2	2/0	0	10
PO1	6	1	7/1	0	3
Total	<u>11</u> [21.6%]	<u>8</u> [15.7%]	<u>11/1</u> [21.6%/1.9%]	<u>3</u> [5.9%]	<u>17</u> [33.3%]
		<u>19</u> [37.3%]	<u>22</u> [23.5%]	<u>20</u> [39.2%]	

*In this column "Yes" means the graduate states there has been a change and supervisor/subordinate state no change. A "No" means the graduate believes there has been no change while supervisor and subordinate say there has been a behavioral change.

I can't say that [leadership style] has really changed...basically I am the same person, the way I lead my people.

No, I think LMET made me realize some of my strengths and weaknesses so far as leading men, however, I thought I had more strengths than weaknesses.

The more junior officers and petty officers seem to view LMET as a valuable and much needed training program. Among first class petty officers in particular, LMET training seems to provide the leadership/management theories and tools with which they are able to do their jobs. Additionally, this group has had sufficient experience to appreciate the curriculum structure and content. The data seems to indicate that first class petty officers are the most affected group of the 3 sampled levels and exhibit the greatest potential for behavioral change. For sampled junior officers, especially ensigns, there seems to be less indication of any behavioral change [for new ensigns this is primarily due to a lack of experience in not knowing how they led and managed others prior to LMET]. While these junior officers express a great felt need for the LMET training with its role in preparing them to assume their duties, their behavior does not indicate that they readily apply the competencies. Perhaps as was suggested by the junior officers themselves, LMET school [as presently scheduled], sandwiched between Surface Warfare Officer School and other specific training schools [Communication Officer, DCA School, Electronic Warfare, etc.], loses its impact by the time the officers reach the fleet. Then in the rush to fit into their operational command and specific billet the LMET training seems to get lost and forgotten, perhaps due to their inexperience causing a lack of appreciation for the course content.

b. Weak Communications

Of the five competency clusters taught during LMET school, two are particularly dependent upon good communication flow. The first cluster concerns the skillful use of influence and is paraphrased as: "Using influence in a positive fashion...not as a personal end-but towards Navy goals and effectiveness." [HRMC,N.D.] Components of this competency cluster include, influences, team builds, developes subordinates and self-control. The thread that runs throughout this competency is communication. The analysis of data gathered during the study [Table 8] seems to indicate that sampled LMET graduates do not apply this competency to its fullest extent due to poor communications.

A lack of communication, specifically in feedback concerning performance, was sited throughout the interviews of both graduates and their subordinates and supervisors. Interestingly, it included both the lack of positive as well as negative feedback, but especially emphasized the notion of positive feedback. This lack of positive feedback among those interviewed indicated that a substitute for positive feedback became the very lack of any feedback. When queried as to how they knew when they were doing a good job, a common response from sampled graduates and subordinates was: "I really don't know, if I don't hear anything then I must be doing all right." This substitution of a lack of any communication for actual positive feedback appeared to be a common occurence among respondents.

Other indications of poor communication involved a lack of including subordinates in the planning stages of task accomplishment [Table 8]. When the subordinate's opinions were solicited they were

F/G 5/1

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

$$\hat{c}_n = 2$$

2

FND

DATE _____

64 501 0

08

DTIC

TABLE 8
LMET GRADUATE SELF-REPORT ON INFLUENCING

This data was gathered during the course of answering three related questions concerning the process used to accomplish a newly assigned task, assigning duties and responsibilities to subordinates and the handling of roadblocks. Respondents were encouraged to site specific examples. The analysis rated the answers on a scale of 1-5 within the four relevant competency clusters.

Officer LMET Graduates

	Low or No Use of LMET Competency			High Use of LMET Competency	
	1	2	3	4	5
Efficiency & Effectiveness	0	1	4	8	3
Skillful Use of Influence	1	2	5	4	4
Management Control	0	0	2	6	8
Conceptual Thinking	0	1	3	3	9
OVERALL:	1	4	14	21	24

TABLE 8 [con't]

Chief Petty Officer LMET Graduate	Low use of LMET Competency			High use of LMET Competency	
	1	2	3	4	5
Efficiency & Effectiveness	0	0	2	3	12
Skillful use of Influence	0	2	3	5	7
Management Control	0	2	0	5	10
Conceptual Thinking	0	2	0	6	9
OVERALL:	0	6	5	19	38

First Class Petty Officer LMET Graduate	Low use of LMET Competency			High use of LMET Competency	
	1	2	3	4	5
Efficiency & Effectiveness	0	1	2	6	9
Skillful use of Influence	1	4	2	4	7
Management Control	0	1	2	3	12
Conceptual Thinking	0	2	3	5	9
OVERALL:	1	8	9	18	36

Additional data on the "Skillful Use of Influence" competency cluster was gained by asking the graduate, "How do you go about getting someone to buy your ideas about a better way of doing things?"

	Officer	Chief Petty Officer	First Class Petty Officer	TOTAL
Do nothing unless asked	0	0	2	2
Order it done	3	1	2	6
Argue that is the way it has always been done or you have seen it done this way before. If accepted fine.	1	7	4	12
Trial and Error Approach	2	0	4	6
Argue strongly in its favor, pointing out strengths, make it stand on its own merit.	10	9	6	25

often rejected with little to no explanation, or without trying them out. A common practice seemed to be not consulting with subordinates at all.

"Advising and Counseling" is the second competency cluster affected by a weakness in communications and includes the components; positive expectations, realistic expectations and understanding. This competency group places particular emphasis on the communication aspect under the component of expectations. Realistic expectations include:

- *A realistic concern that instructions will be followed or carried out effectively by others.

- *Open acknowledgement of negative expectations about the shortcomings of others.

- *A willingness to express displeasure, disappointment, and concern about the shortcomings of an individual's performance.
[HRMD, N.D.]

Again, communication is seen as an integral part of this competency.

The interviews seem to indicate that in this area there is a great deal of communication between graduates and their subordinates. However, the emphasis appears to be only on the negative aspect while ignoring the other components of positive expectations and understanding. As Table 9 indicates, supervisors are quick to provide verbal feedback and counseling for poor performance. Yet for good performance, none of the sampled LMET graduates indicated they would specifically counsel their subordinates. However, verbal feedback in the form of a "job well done" was given. The indication seems to be that the sampled LMET graduates view counseling as a tool for correcting poor performance with much less emphasis on good performance.

c. Rewarding and Disciplining Performance

The fourth competency cluster taught during LMET school is that of "Management Control", which includes the following six components:

- *Plans and Organizes
- *Optimizes use of resources
- *Delegates
- *Monitors results
- *Rewards
- *Disciplines [HRMC,N.D.]

The first four components of this competency appears to be used with varying degrees of success as indicated by the data [Table 8]. While sampled LMET graduates did not always indicate they involved others in the planning, they certainly made efforts to optimize resources and delegate tasks to a lower level. The last two components, rewards and disciplines, did not appear to be integrated into the sampled LMET graduates behavior.

As indicated in Table 9, the use of rewards was substantially limited to three areas, verbal recognition [formal and informal], time off from work, and written evaluations. Of these three responses, written evaluations may be downplayed, as few respondents suggested special or commendatory evaluations but rather indicated good performance would be noted on formal, periodic written evaluations. Since the Navy evaluation process expects or insists supervisors do this, it cannot be truly viewed as much as a reward as something earned. This feeling was best expressed by LMET subordinates, one who remarked, "He didn't give me a good evaluation, I earned it!" The other two major types of rewards were verbal rewards and time off from work, with both more heavily relied upon by the first class petty officers. Again, these rewards have come to be so

TABLE 9
LMET GRADUATES SELF-REPORT ON ADVISING AND COUNSELING,
AND REWARDS AND DISCIPLINES

This data was gathered from responses to two related questions,
"What do you do if the work of a subordinate is: worse than expected?
Better than expected?"*

Officer	No or Low use of LMET Competencies			High use of LMET Competencies	
	1	2	3	4	5
Efficiency & Effectiveness	1	1	3	5	6
Skillful use of Influence	0	2	6	2	6
Advising and Counseling	3	0	1	3	9
Management Control	0	3	3	3	7
OVERALL:	4	6	13	13	28

Chief Petty Officer	1			2	
	1	2	3	4	5
Efficiency & Effectiveness	0	0	1	8	8
Skillful use of Influence	0	1	5	5	6
Advising and Counseling	0	1	1	6	9
Management Control	0	1	4	7	5
OVERALL:	0	3	11	26	28

*This Table was prepared using the LMET graduate's responses from the interview tapes. The scale was developed as a convenient method of presenting the data.

TABLE 9 [con't]

First Class Petty Officer	1	2	3	4	5
Efficiency & Effectiveness	0	0	1	8	9
Skillful use of Influence	0	1	7	3	7
Advising and Counseling	1	1	0	7	9
Management Control	0	1	6	5	6
OVERALL:	1	3	14	23	31

Specific responses to the two queries follow:

"If work is worse"

	Counsel	Verbal Reprimand	Re-Do Task	Extra-Military Instruction[EMI]	Formal Punishment	Reassign Task
Officer	13	8	3	2	3	2
CPO	15	12	6	0	3	0
P01	15	10	5	5	4	0

"If work is better"

	Verbal Reward	Physical/Material Award [Buy a coke, handshake, pat on back, etc.]	Time-Off	Written Evaluation Recommendation for advancement	Formal Award Commendation
Officer	11	4	10	6	6
CPO	15	4	10	9	8
P01	16	6	16	11	4

institutionalized as to almost lose their status as rewards. Personnel who work late, especially hard or do a job particularly well expect to be rewarded both verbally and with time off. To not give these rewards seems to be viewed as a form of punishment. In addition, all three of these rewards require only a small amount of effort for the supervisor, hence, the propensity towards their use. The fact that chief petty officers and officers are reluctant to give time off as compared to petty officers may be indicative of their view of the organization, the amount of work to be completed as well as more direct pressure from seniors to account for absent personnel. Written awards, commendations and recommendations for medals was given a lower priority as a means of rewarding personnel for good performance for a variety of reasons. Most common seemed to be the concept that good performance was expected, hence not worthy of such a "high" reward. Yet few graduates were able to verbalize what sort of performance did deserve such an award. It was the interviewer's perception that the problem was not the level of the award but the amount of personal involvement needed to give such an award.

The last component, discipline, seemed to share the same sort of priorities as rewards. That is, disciplinary actions that involved a substantial amount of interaction with the supervisor were avoided. As Table 9 indicates, counseling [negative feedback] and verbal reprimands were the most commonly cited means of disciplining. It is perhaps no coincidence that these forms involved the least amount of a supervisor's effort. Even "counseling" can be conducted with little preparation and informally so as to be very efficient from a time perspective. Redoing the task and Extra Military Instruction [EMI] both

involve a high degree of interaction with the supervisor in the form of close monitoring and instruction. Both methods were shunned as indicated by the data, especially at the officer/chief petty officer level. Actual punitive measures such as non-judicial Captain's Mast were viewed by those respondents who mentioned it as a last ditch effort, only to be used when all else failed. What is significant is the relatively few respondents that even mentioned it. A final note should be made concerning the officers who would reassign a task improperly completed to another person who could be relied upon to get it completed. This would seem to indicate an extreme propensity for task accomplishment at any cost, and if so, would be highly divergent to the LMET approach to leadership.

d. Increased Awareness

A final area of behavioral change concerns overall change, perhaps better called an awareness or attitudinal change. That is, the graduate's awareness towards, leadership/management as well as his affect on other people has increased which is manifested in some behavioral changes. Table 7 indicates that approximately two thirds [61%] of the sampled graduates expressed either a change in their leadership style or in adopting a leadership philosophy more closely in line with LMET. Of these graduates, half have in fact changed or adopted an LMET approach as validated by their supervisors and subordinates. One third of the total sample have exhibited no change as validated by their supervisors and subordinates. This means about one fourth [23.5%] of all graduates believe they have changed yet this change is not validated. The significance of this data seems to be that behavioral change brought about by LMET varies greatly, based upon a

variety of factors. However, it does seem clear that behavioral change as a specific result of LMET school is not at all assured.

4. Results

The last domain or level to be examined is that of results, which in fact is what an evaluation of the entire LMET Program should most likely explore. The priority question is whether the program does in fact result in real changes to the bottom line measures. This pilot study was not designed to definitively address the specific domain of "results". Without a control group of non-LMET graduates to compare against, and the numerous non-LMET related factors that affect productivity [e.g., technical training, size of work group, imagination, etc.] there may be no satisfactory method of determining the cause and effect relationship between LMET and "results" outcomes. Despite these difficulties and recognizing the limitations of the sample itself, some indications of the effect of LMET on bottom line measurements were uncovered.

a. Job Performance Changes

First, most sampled LMET graduates reported that job performance measures had increased or remained high in their work groups [this was validated by both subordinates and supervisors] since their completion of training [see Table 10]. Of particular interest is that first class petty officers report lower perceived impact on work group performance than do the chief petty officers or officers. This may reflect the first class petty officer's perception that being lower in the chain of command affords them less chance to influence the system. The relatively high percentage of officers [63%] that saw an increase

TABLE 10

CHANGE IN THE LMET GRADUATE'S WORK GROUP PERFORMANCE AND SATISFACTION

Perceived Performance Changes:

	Yes, major increase	Yes, minimum increase	No, remained high	No	No, remained low	Yes, Minor decrease	Yes, major decrease
Officer	6	4	1	3	0	1	1
CPO	4	7	3	3	0	0	0
P01	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
OVERALL:	14	17	5	12	1	1	1

Perceived Satisfaction Changes

Officer	7	2	0	5	0	1	1
CPO	1	7	4	2	3	0	0
P01	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
OVERALL:	11	16	5	13	4	1	1

may well reflect a willingness on their part to experiment with leadership/managerial styles as well as use of their relative position of higher influence. Chief petty officers may also enjoy a position form which it is easier to influence improved performance. This hypothesis is supported by a comment from one subordinate who stated, "We got a chief so things got better."

b. Job Satisfaction Changes

As for satisfaction measures within a work group [increased retention, less non-judicial punishments, less sick calls and absenteeism], there was no consistent pattern of change across the entire sample which could be attributed to LMET. While Table 10 seems to indicate some positive changes in satisfaction, the respondents credited most change to environmental changes [e.g., return from deployment, finishing shipyard overhaul, etc.] or to the personality [e.g., nice person, good conversationalist, easy going, etc.] of the LMET graduate and not so much to the leadership style. However, the interviews seemed to indicate that when LMET graduates did infact involve subordinates in the decision making process and opened clear lines of communication that job satisfaction did increase. Of particular note was the case of two petty officers who did a complete turnaround in leadership/management styles after LMET [attended on a TAD basis]. In their cases the change was clearly noticable to supervisors and subordinates and in fact resulted in measureable increases in both job performance and satisfaction measures.

c. Retention Aspects of LMET

Concerning retention, the data do not indicate any systematic cause and effect relationships between retention and LMET training. However, there were specific cases in which there appeared to be an LMET influence toward increased retention within the work group. The graduates themselves indicated that LMET training had little effect on their own career plans. This is perhaps not surprising when examining who is actually attending LMET school. Chief petty officers and first class petty officers tend to be career oriented personnel or have at least made definite plans concerning re-enlistment. Regardless, they tend to be a tough group to sway one direction or the other. Junior officers on the other hand, while more undecided about their careers, appear to be unwilling to make a career commitment based solely upon a positive LMET experience.

LMET graduates on the other hand, did have some positive effect on retention within their work groups. Several subordinates readily admitted that the actions of their LMET graduate boss had in fact been the determining factor in their re-enlistment decision. One LMET graduate had a 100 per cent re-enlistment rate [supervisor-reported]. However, the question still remains as to whether this was all or even in part due to LMET. At least one certainty can be stated, that is that no respondent indicated they were leaving the Navy as a result of LMET.

d. Developing Healthy Climates

With respect to developing healthy organizations or work groups, LMET graduates seemed to give this a high priority and are in fact successful as indicated in Table 11. The majority of the sampled

TABLE 11
INDICATION OF HEALTHY WORK GROUPS OF LMET GRADUATES

This data was gathered on the question, "What happens to your work center when you are not there?"

	1 Things fall apart	2 Just enough is done to stay out of trouble	3 Major jobs continue, some minor ones don't	4 All work done, accept supervisors	5 All work gets done including supervisor
Officer*	1	1	4	7	2
CPO	1	1	7	3**	5
PO1***	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>9</u>
OVERALL:	3	2	15	13	16

*One officer was not asked this question as he was in the process of relieving the old division officer.

**These chief petty officers all specified that only the division officers collateral duties would not get done.

***One PO1 was not asked this question due to his newness to the work group.

LMET graduates stated that they had in fact trained their subordinates to take over in their absence. There was some question as to how well their work group would function [quality of performance], but not whether it would function. In those few instances when the LMET graduate indicated that the work group would not function at all or at a level to barely get by, the LMET graduate appeared to not practice the LMET competencies, especially skillful use of influence. The overall indications were that LMET graduates who practiced what was taught, tended to create healthy organizations by training subordinates to take on increased responsibility, delegating decisions to lowest possible levels, encouraging communication up and down the chain of command and using their influence to positively motivate their subordinates.

e. Handling Newly Reported Personnel

A related area to retention and building a healthy work group is how new personnel are integrated into the work group. Table 12 indicates that LMET graduates tend to concern themselves with a new persons first impression. Most graduates stressed the use of the reporting aboard interview as a means of explaining where the new person fits within the organization as well as his importance to the organization. The interview was also used to inform the new individual of promotion plans, career development, training programs, and daily routines/standard operating procedures. This interview stressed the necessity of discussing any personal problems that might prevent easy transition into the work group. The one subject that was not discussed tended to be the expected performance or goals for the newly reported person. Most respondents stated it was expected that this information

TABLE 12

LMET GRADUATE SELF-REPORT ON HANDLING NEWLY REPORTED PERSONNEL

	1 [Nothing done personally]	2	3 [Administrative business only]	4	5 [Full welcome aboard brief & interview]
Officer ¹	0	3	4	3	4 ²
CPO	1	1	3	7 ³	5
P01	<u>2</u> ⁴	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u> ⁵	<u>2</u>	<u>7</u> ⁶
OVERALL:	3	5	13	12	16

¹Two officers not asked this question

²"....Royal Red Carpet Treatment." - Division Officer

"....Like to find out what they expect from the Navy to help satisfy their need." - Division Officer

³"I don't want him to do the shit jobs right off the bat." - CPO

"I let him play pigeon for a few days." - CPO

⁴"I just put them straight to work....the first day they come to me, I give them a chipping hammer and a wire brush and away they go." - P01

⁵"I see all personnel for administrative purpose only." - P01

⁶"....I guess I don't really tell him what I expect...I don't express it.. I assume he will talk to his co-workers." - P01

would be picked up from peers. This idea was best stated by an LMET first class petty officer, "I guess I don't really tell him what I expect...I don't express it...I assume he will talk to his co-workers."

Aside from the reporting aboard interview, LMET graduates expressed a wide variety of methods for handling newly reported personnel as indicated in the following interview remarks:

I don't want him to do the shit jobs right off the bat...CPO

...let him play pigeon [running-mate concept] for a few days - PO1

...I like to find out what he expects from the Navy to help satisfy his needs - Div Off

...I just put him straight to work...The first day they come to me I give them a chipping hammer and a wire brush and away they go - PO1

...I give them the royal red carpet treatment for a few days - Div Off

The LMET graduates that tended to place less emphasis on smoothly integrating personnel into their work groups more consistently were those that had the least healthy organizations.

f. LMET Reinforcement

Another aspect of the "results" level was briefly discussed earlier within the knowledge-content domain. It concerns the LMET graduates unmindful disregard of LMET concepts and vocabulary at the beginning of the individual interviews with a noticeable improvement as the interview progressed. It appeared that the graduate had totally forgotten some of the LMET issues and language of the training. As Table 13 indicates, 61% of the graduates never used their student journal after completing the LMET training. More significantly, only

TABLE 13

LMET GRADUATE'S SELF-REPORT ON USE OF THE STUDENT JOURNAL

The initial question for this data was, "Have you ever used the student journal." In some cases the response was "Yes" but not for reasons dealing with the LMET competencies. Yes answers reflect both aspects.

	YES	NO
Officer	7 ¹	9
Chief Petty Officer	5 ²	12
First Class Petty Officer	<u>8</u> ³	<u>10</u>
TOTALS [%]:	20 [39]	31 [61]

¹Of these seven, 4 used it for reasons related to LMET.

²Of these five, 3 used it for reasons related to LMET.

³Of these eight, 7 used it for reasons related to LMET.

27% of the sample actually used the journal as a reference or guide to a problem they were encountering. This is inspite the fact that the manual's intended use is as a guide and reference list for the LMET competencies. Additionally, it is designed to be used in helping to establish and track self-improvement goals in leadership and management development for each graduate. The indication seems to be that by not actively using the student journal, LMET graduates are not keeping the competencies foremost in mind as tools for leadership and management.

A last general observation, based on responses to the query as to whether they had anything else they would like to mention, was that if a command explicitly or implicitly discouraged the use of the LMET situational approach to leadership and management, a very high level of frustration developed within the graduate. Graduates that expressed having experienced this problem seemed to use three different techniques to cope with their anxiety. First, there were those who continued as taught through LMET and just lived with the frustration. This, of course, led to high dissatisfaction towards their job and sometimes created conflicts within their work groups. The second approach seemed to be that of doing the exact opposite of what LMET taught. For example, using the authoritarian approach to its extreme. Interestingly, these graduates viewed themselves as using the "old Navy" approach and felt they were completely in line with recent CNO policy statements concerning "pride and professionalism". The third method seemed to be the development of a more passive existence through the removal of oneself from the active chain of command, becoming more

of a bystander [especially in one instance with an LMET chief petty officer]. Apparently the graduate felt a loyalty towards the LMET training but could not handle a situation when the supervisor did not exhibit any support. Again, these were exceptions to most graduates experiences as expressed in the interviews, but may nonetheless indicate a strong need for external support mechanisms in order for LMET to succeed.

C. SUMMARY OF LMET FINDINGS

Again, the findings concerning LMET must be strictly viewed within the context of the limitations of a non-random sample. The issues identified and the points raised should be considered hypotheses which need to be resolved through either further study, or within a more complete full-scale evaluation to test their actual validity. However, the following general comments, while not all inclusive, are felt to be indicative of the pilot study sample and are therefore included as a convenient summary.

Reactions of personnel interviewed concerning LMET were upbeat, with the majority of respondents in agreement as to its necessity and usefulness. LMET was viewed as a positive experience which seems to have affected graduates in differing degrees. The actual knowledge of LMET training, while not always initially evident, appeared good. While systematic behavioral changes linked directly to LMET were not uncovered, there were specific examples and indications that behavioral changes had taken place.

LMET program strengths such as graduate increased awareness, the fulfillment of manager's training needs in the areas of management/ leadership, developing a positive framework for healthy work groups, among others were notably in evidence. Several areas of concern were identified and require further investigation to determine their validity. Among these issues were the following four:

Communication Aspects of Rewarding and Disciplining

The Setting of Goals and Performance Standards

Feedback Concerning Performance

The LMET Student Journal

It is unclear to the extent in which the LMET pilot study findings are generalizable to the entire population. They nevertheless represent new avenues to explore in developing a comprehensive evaluation plan for LMET.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter contains the conclusions concerning the usefulness of the pilot study concept as well as recommendations concerning a future overall evaluation of the LMET program. As such, the chapter emphasizes an overview of three general areas of concern; the pilot study concept, particularly as applied to the evaluation of LMET; the interview as a data gathering methodology; and relevant issues requiring further investigation in developing an evaluation plan for the Navy's LMET program. These three areas of concern are divided into two sections for presentation; first, the pilot study conclusions and second, the recommendations concerning an LMET evaluation.

A. PILOT STUDY CONCLUSIONS

The central theme throughout this research has been the pilot study concept. Although previously stated, it is of sufficient importance to re-emphasize that the data sample for this study was neither random nor representative of the Navy's LMET graduates. The 51 LMET graduates that were interviewed contained a cross-section of various operational commands, billets, rates, ranks, warfare specialties and geographic locations from the west coast. However, the data was sufficient for this pilot study in attempting to identify issues, test hypotheses, and evaluate a methodology pertaining to the future overall evaluation of a major Navy program such as LMET. In no way has this pilot study eliminated the need for an LMET evaluation, rather it reinforces that need.

An important question that remains unanswered and requires further examination is, how should effectiveness of LMET or any similarly large program be measured? This pilot study concentrated on individual behavioral changes in leadership/management after LMET graduation. Other effectiveness criteria for the LMET program could include, but are not limited to: individual command effectiveness, reduction of selected Navy-wide problems or concerns [e.g. retention, substance abuse, etc.], and knowledge/behavior of graduates 6 months after LMET training. The underlying issue is determining what is the actual purpose or goal of the Navy's LMET program. Once that is clearly defined, then an evaluation of its progress towards achieving that goal can more easily be conducted.

The continued emphasis on the limitations of this pilot study is not intended to diminish its usefulness to LMET program managers and decision makers. Rather, it is to keep the pilot study results within their proper perspective, that of providing preliminary guidance towards a full-scale LMET evaluation. This study did examine the LMET training with the stated objective of providing substantive recommendations for conducting a full-scale evaluation of the program. The beneficial accomplishments derived from the pilot study concept as related to general program evaluation fall into four categories; efficiency, effectiveness, definitive results, and participant education and learning.

1. Efficiency

The first accomplishment, that of efficiency, can be examined from three different resource perspectives: minimum manpower, low cost, and short duration. This pilot study was conducted by two lieutenant commander, Naval Postgraduate School students in working on their master's degree thesis. Their time was already committed to some form of thesis work, and in undertaking a pilot study of the Navy's LMET program, they, as well as the Navy, were able to benefit in "killing two birds with one stone". While it may not always be easy to find such an efficient situation, the fact of the matter is that two Navy personnel conducted the study, which underscores the efficiency of this approach. Further emphasizing efficiency is the pilot study's relatively low cost. Only \$10,000 was allocated for this research, which, when compared to an overall program evaluation, seems well worthwhile to insure the usefulness of the full evaluation. Finally, there is the timeliness aspect of the pilot study, 6 months from start to finish. It should be noted that this was accomplished in addition to regular ongoing classes and studies.

2. Effectiveness

The next accomplishment of the pilot study is in the area of effectiveness. When this pilot study commenced, the problem that was most difficult to ascertain was how to measure effectiveness of such a large program. It was not clear at the outset exactly what to measure or how. The flexibility afforded by only two people

undertaking such a study was another primary cost savings. As issues were identified, questions developed, and the evaluation method formalized, the two researchers were able to easily adjust and proceed with few problems. This very flexibility permitted the gathering of an enormous amount of high quality information on a complex, dynamic Navy-wide system.

3. Definitive Results

The third major accomplishment of this pilot study is that it produced definitive results. It did develop issues and recommendations on how to conduct a full-scale evaluation of the LMET program. These findings, issues, and recommendations can be used by program managers and decision makers in developing a plan for the further evaluation of this program with a certain amount of assurance that they are indeed proceeding in a relevant direction.

4. Education and Learning

The final accomplishment, that of education and learning, while not an intended goal, further establishes the value of a pilot study. In order to develop a pilot study design for the LMET program, it was necessary to first learn about the program. The background research conducted resulted in insights into the overall LMET program, from theoretical conception to development through implementation. Additionally, a feeling for and an understanding of the program, as it is now administered, was gained by the researchers. The implication is that these two researchers may be as knowledgeable, if not more so, than the actual program managers of LMET. This educational feature of the pilot study process is a prime argument for program managers to become intimately involved.

5. Future Pilot Studies

With these four considerations in mind let us now briefly examine the future potential of pilot studies within the Navy. On the surface it appears that the benefits far outweigh the costs of a pilot study completed prior to a comprehensive program evaluation. If more program evaluations were designed with a pilot study as their first step, program managers by involving themselves, could feel more confident in directing the full-scale evaluation. A pilot study can examine relevant issues such as who, how and what to evaluate. Program managers using this approach can gain valuable insight and direction for their program evaluations, thereby making better decisions. The pilot study concept can be viewed as another tool that managers and decision makers can use to improve the quality and timeliness of their decisions.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING LMET EVALUATION

This section addresses some definitive recommendations concerning a future full-scale evaluation of LMET. These recommendations are organized to answer four central questions concerning that evaluation: who?, where?, how?, and what? While not all inclusive, it is felt that these insights will provide sufficient guidance to LMET program managers to develop a useful evaluation plan.

1. Who

The first question concerning the evaluation plan is who, and can be further divided into four topical areas; the individual LMET

graduate, the chain of command, operational commands, and evaluators. All of these areas when viewed together shed light on the who question.

a. LMET Graduates

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the LMET program it is necessary to collect data from those individuals most affected by the training, which in this case are the graduates. Behavior modification or improvement in the area of leadership/management is one of the goals of the program. In order to collect relevant data which reflects the extent of this improvement [as well as a possible cause and effect relation to the training], a sufficient amount of time after graduation must have elapsed in order for the graduate to have developed his operating style. It is recommended that data be collected from LMET graduates who have been out of LMET school for a minimum of 6 months. However, as time increases from graduation, a cause and effect relationship may become contaminated due to other factors. In addition, due to the multi-levels of training as well as the number of graduates, data collection should concentrate specifically on middle managers, such as: department heads, division officers, chief petty officers [CPO] and first class petty officers [PO1]. In comparing the responses of department heads/CPO's with division officers/PO1's the issue of seniority as compared to changes in behavior can be further explored. Realizing that data collected from graduates [self-report] may be suspect, it is further recommended that a validation procedure be implemented. The validation process used in the pilot study of collecting additional data on the graduate from his immediate supervisor and subordinate would work quite well.

b. Chain of Command

An issue that surfaced as a result of the pilot study, was the effect that the chain of command had on a graduate towards applying the training. By collecting data on the entire chain of command, the effect of command support for the graduate can be further explored. Additionally, as time permits, indications of whether the graduate is considered an average or superior performer should be sought to assist in confirming the graduates self-reported information, as well as a first step in revalidating the competencies on a hierarchical basis.

c. Operational Commands

Since the LMET program has been initially directed at operational commands, the greatest impact, hence potential for change, would be expected to occur there. As such, operational commands should be the specific targets of the evaluation. One additional consideration is in the choice of which graduates to specifically emphasize. Since leadership/management behavior [change or improvement] is the emphasis of the evaluation, only graduates in this role should be considered. Air squadrons for example, have many junior officer [ENS, LTjg] graduates who do not hold active leadership/management positions and would therefore provide little substantive data.

d. Evaluators

The final issue is who should conduct the evaluation - civilians or Navy personnel? Constraints of sample size, time and manpower availability may be the deciding factors of actually who will conduct the evaluation, civilian or military personnel. However, one issue is clear, that the program managers should take an active role

in order to educate themselves on the LMET program. The issue of whether to employ civilian or military evaluators hinges to a great extent on the data collection method used. If interviewing, Navy personnel may have an edge, as insiders to the organization. However, properly trained civilians, skilled in areas of behavioral psychology, may be able to quickly overcome that advantage due to their insights on human behavior. Additionally, Navy personnel may be more willing to express negative opinions on the LMET program to civilians. Obviously, using both types of personnel, exploiting their strengths would most likely provide "the best of both worlds".

2. Where

The next major question to be addressed is where to conduct the evaluation. To reinforce an issue discussed earlier, the evaluation should not be conducted at the LMET school. Here graduates will most likely provide insights of their knowledge and not behavior. Onboard individual commands appears to be the most ideal location to gather behavioral information. In this way the respondents can remain within familiar, more comfortable [psychologically] surroundings. It is also less disruptive to individual command's work schedules, hence more likely to gain their acceptance and support. The specific concern is that it be conducted in a neutral zone within the command where the respondent will be less pressured by the internal environment. One issue that did surface during the pilot study is that of the command's environment. A cross-section of environments should be included within the evaluation sample. There was an effort during the pilot study to concentrate on commands with easy access [i.e. inport within the 3

geographical areas], hence, a tendency to evaluate graduates on commands in the shipyards, undergoing heavy inport maintenance programs or training programs. Commands in all phases of employment should be considered such as in shipyards, in homeport, deployed, during overseas work-up exercises, and on overseas standdowns, so as to not bias the data due to any unknown external environmental effects.

3. How

The third question, that of how, concerns the methodology to use in conducting the evaluation. This section is further divided into three areas of concern which are: use of interviews, use of surveys, and mechanics of interviewing.

a. Use of Interviews

The pilot study used interviews as the primary data collection method. It was found to be an effective means of gathering data concerning non-quantifiable, behavioral-oriented responses. The LMET Stimulus Questions provided by McBer and Company were particularly useful in exploring these areas. When the desired data is directed towards actual behavior with the multitude and variety of responses possible, interviewing seems to be the best method. While straight forward questions seeking limited responses, factual and quantifiable data are more efficiently collected using methods other than interviews.

b. Use of Surveys

Surveys, as opposed to interviews, are better suited toward easily quantifiable responses, factual data, and limited responses. Straight forward questions that are less affected by the

respondents personal opinions and more directed at specific answers and ranges of occurrences are more efficiently contained in a survey. The survey can encompass a larger sample size quickly within the limitations previously discussed in earlier chapters. McBer's "Management Behavior Survey" [partially contained in Table 14] is an example of how to gather data on the graduate's usage of LMET competencies. When asking straight forward questions such as these on the competencies, the resulting data is sufficient for a broad general overview of implications. If such a survey is administered to only the graduates, it takes on the characteristics of an unvalidated self-report and may therefore indicate knowledge and opinion rather than actual behavior. Through a validation process with supervisor and subordinate input, such a survey could provide insights into a graduates behavior.

c. Mechanics of Interviewing

Since interviewing was the primary data gathering method for this pilot study, it is appropriate to mention some of the lessons learned to assist in using this method within a full-scale evaluation. The presentation is sub-divided into four general areas of: training, interview introduction, methodology and tools.

First, the training necessary to successfully conduct interviews is minimal. While there are numerous references, R. L. Gorden's book Interviewing: Strategy, Techniques and Tactics provides a useful background on interviewing. A seminar or workshop on interviewing as applied to the LMET evaluation process should provide interviewers with sufficient skills to grasp the basic techniques. With additional practice and critiquing most individuals should be able to develop into skilled interviewers.

TABLE 14

SAMPLE ITEMS FOR MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR QUESTIONNAIRE

Circle the number which best represents where the ratee's behavior falls relative to the two statements provided. [For example, circling 2 would indicate a greater tendency to behave in accordance with the statement on the left; circling 4 would indicate that both statements are equally descriptive of his or her behavior.]

Sets goals and performance standards:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. He/She sets clear specific goals. | He/She sets vague goals. |
| 1 2 3 4 | 5 6 7 |
| 2. He/She will change the goals to make them realistic. | He/She will keep trying to reach a goal even if it does not appear realistic. |
| 1 2 3 4 | 5 6 7 |
| 3. He/She sets milestones when assigning a task and checks to see if things are on schedule. | He/She gives out a task and checks back about the time it should be done. |
| 1 2 3 4 | 5 6 7 |

Takes Initiative:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 4. He/She initiates action rather than waiting to react as situations develop. | He/She takes appropriate actions to handle situations as they develop. |
| 1 2 3 4 | 5 6 7 |
| 5. He/She experiments with and introduces innovative work procedures. | He/She uses traditional, well-established work procedures. |
| 1 2 3 4 | 5 6 7 |
| 6. He/She spends unusually long hours on tasks when they require it, whether, he/she is asked to do so or not. | He/She will work regular hours on a task and if it takes longer than that to complete will come back to it later. |
| 1 2 3 4 | 5 6 7 |

Second, the introduction to the interview is a key to establishing good rapport with the respondent, thereby ensuring a good flow of information. A good introduction needs to stress the confidentiality of the interview and emphasize that its overall intent is to evaluate a program and not the individual. Putting the respondent at ease initially is important and can be assisted by beginning the interview with easier "warm-up" questions. A final point, is that most groups of related questions have a natural flow, which should be identified and followed. This will assist in guiding the interview process and in fact eliminate the need to ask certain questions as they may be answered before they arise.

The next issue is that of the interview method, and specifically concerns interviewer/respondent interaction. The purpose of the interviewer is to guide the conversation in the desired direction without stifling the information flow. Respondents will normally use the interview as a means to voice their opinion in unrelated areas, hence they may ramble or get off onto tangents. Firm direction from the interviewer can keep it both healthy and on track. However, one should not get so locked into a rigid process as to miss the surfacing of relevant issues. These areas should be explored fully to uncover any new areas of concern.

The final area concerns the interviewing tools available. A variety of "tools" are available for conducting interviews, each with definite advantages and disadvantages. The final decision on using a tool is how it will assist in the interviewing process. If it does not

provide advantages or specific assistance to the interviewer its use should be carefully reconsidered. Some "tools" available for use by the interviewer include tape recorders [should have tape counter for indexing], coded answer sheets, and preformatted interview schedules. This last item was found to be a valuable tool in conducting the pilot study, in that it assisted the interviewers in standardizing their daily routine while providing the command with clear guidance as to how to schedule their personnel.

4. What

The final question, that of what, concerns issues which should be considered in an evaluation of the LMET program. The pilot study surfaced certain issues which require further investigation in the course of a full-scale evaluation. These findings should be considered unvalidated hypotheses that require further study or additional testing within an overall evaluation process. There are seven major issues that will be discussed: graduate's knowledge level, increase in self-awareness, cause and effect relationships, communication skills, use of the journal, retention, and reinforcement of behavior.

a. Level of LMET Graduate's Knowledge

While not specifically the emphasis of the pilot study, certain levels of knowledge exhibited by LMET graduates became evident. Further evaluation of the LMET program should in fact try to determine the level or degree to which LMET knowledge is retained after graduation by examining the extent to which their vocabulary and concepts conforms to the LMET competency based model. In addition, the ability to discuss techniques actually practiced can be compared with course

instruction to provide some insight into how well the competency model is understood. This data may also provide insight as to the effectiveness of the classroom instruction at the school.

b. LMET Graduate Self-Awareness

The pilot study data do indicate that graduates have a heightened sense of awareness on how their actions effect others as well as how the actions of others effect them. This issue deserves further investigation, in that this increased self-awareness could be the first step in a more definative behavior change in leadership and mangement style. While admittedly a self-report, if it is supported by indications of a behavioral change then LMET should be credited for beginning the trend towards modification of leadership/management skills towards the competency based model.

c. Cause and Effect Relationships

The pilot study data do not support any systematic cause and effect relationship between LMET graduates and increased performance. There were, however, at least two cases [validated by supervisor and subordinate] where the LMET training resulted in a complete and highly visible turnaround in a managers behavior and performance. However, both cases involved managers who were considered marginal performers and were sent to the school as a last improvement effort. The important issue that remains to be determined is: does LMET school improve leadership/management behaviors, hence increase managerial performance? A side issue seems clear, in that no cases were uncovered showing any decrease in performance after LMET school. There appears to be a definate need for further evaluation on this

subject, to determine if LMET training alone can bring about managerial behavior change or improvement resulting in increased performance. If LMET school itself is not sufficient, what if any additional support is needed?

d. LMET Graduate Communication Skills

LMET graduates overall demonstrated a noticeable weakness in the use of communication skills and techniques in their leadership/management roles, as supported by the pilot study data. The issue of communication skills needs to be further investigated in order to identify specific areas that may need additional emphasis during the LMET training. Of the sixteen LMET taught competencies, four were identified as specific concerns from the data. These were: a lack among LMET graduates in setting performance standards; a lack of goal setting, both personal and workgroup; limited use of rewards and disciplines, coupled with a lack of flexibility for different situations; and the use of advising and counseling for correcting poor performance only. Each of these specific competencies can be treated as a separate issue for further examination and evaluation. However, they should be recognized as related by a common thread as forms of managerial communication.

The perception that LMET graduates seem unclear or do not know what is expected [performance] of them, as well as their subordinates' similar concerns, may have implications beyond LMET. This hypotheses should be a first priority to test, using either additional research or in the evaluation plan. While it may only be conjecture, this and other communications concerns may well hold a key to increased performance and satisfaction within Navy commands.

e. Graduate Use of LMET Student Journal

This issue is two-fold in nature depending upon the determination of the first concern, which is, what is the purpose of the student journal? LMET designers would contend that the student journal is a tool to be used by the graduate to help evaluate and reinforce actual leadership performance and self-made goals outside of the classroom. Additionally, it could serve to rearouse the LMET competencies. As such it should reinforce skills and behaviors that exemplify the LMET competencies while helping to correct those that do not. Dr. Winter further explains that the student journal and its personal student log, is the personal written record of an individual's strengths and weaknesses, set against the Navy's standard competencies that are associated with excellence and superior leadership performance.[WINTER,1979,pp.11-12] The first issue, then would be, to explore the purpose of the LMET student journal. If it is determined to be a beneficial tool to be used by the graduate, then, the second issue would be to determine when, why, and how is it used. The data do indicate that student use of the journal is minimal.

f. Retention

The issue of retention is of obvious importance to the Navy, but also pertains to LMET. This issue involves two underlying thoughts. The first is, does LMET training have any effect on the graduate's retention? The seniority aspect of this may involve an examination of LMET's effect on junior personnel [division officers, and first class petty officers] as opposed to its effect on more senior

personnel [chief petty officers and department heads]. Should further investigation reveal that LMET training has a positive impact on retention, it may well indicate a need for increased emphasis on other levels of personnel. The second thought is investigating the effect of the graduates training on subordinates in relation to retention. Again, if further examination indicates a positive impact on retention by LMET graduates, it would assist in justifying the cost of the program.

g. Reinforcement of LMET Competencies

A final issue is the need for reinforcement of LMET competencies as perceived by the graduates. The pilot study data indicates that LMET competencies are more likely to be practiced when reinforced within the command [specifically by supervisors]. This issue of internal reinforcement was also evident from several LMET graduates who commented that active discouragement of LMET "new ideas" not only discouraged them, but frustrated their efforts in leadership and management. Internal reinforcement of the LMET competencies and the resultant effect on the graduate should be furthered explored.

An additional related area requiring research is in the area of external support for LMET training. This support or lack of support outside of a command may provide some insight into the notion that LMET ends upon graduation from the school. This hypothesis could be tested during the full-scale evaluation as to whether external support or lack of support in fact affects the application of LMET competencies by the graduate.

These seven issues, while not all inclusive, should provide sufficient guidance to program managers and decision makers to design and conduct a meaningful evaluation of the LMET program.

C. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This thesis has emphasized the central point that the pilot study was not an evaluation of the LMET program, but rather the preliminary step to overall program evaluation to determine relevant issues and investigate a methodology to confront them. As a result, it has uncovered issues that require further investigation through research or within a comprehensive full-scale evaluation.

Navy leaders and managers at all levels have a real need to know the effectiveness of the LMET program, that is, what it can or cannot do, as well as how to best support it. In times of austere funding and scarce resources, only those programs that can demonstrate their usefulness should justify the support of those in control. The clear way to demonstrate this usefulness is to conduct a program evaluation. This can identify weaknesses requiring correction as well as strengths that need re-emphasizing while justifying support for the program.

The pilot study concept is a useful tool for program managers and decision makers to employ prior to committing expensive resources to an overall evaluation. The measurement of effectiveness is at best a tenuous business. The pilot study has explored this issue to help develop a viable method to address effectiveness.

The flexibility afforded by a pilot study was evident in identifying relevant issues which were unknown. Insights gained on the LMET

program, as the pilot study progressed were used to update and modify its direction. In this way, new issues were explored for relevance almost immediately. A large scale evaluation would have found these constant changes to be very frustrating and costly. For the pilot study this flexibility was gained at no extra cost. The bottom line then becomes relevant issue identification at low cost. It must be remembered however, that issues identified by the pilot study should be considered unvalidated hypotheses to be further researched and explored or perhaps tested within an overall program evaluation.

A final aspect of the pilot study which cannot be over emphasized, is its potential as a learning device for program managers. If involved in the pilot study, program managers can not help but gain a sharp insight into their programs. This insight can help focus their attention onto the relevant issues that need to be addressed in a full-scale evaluation. Furthermore, the knowledge gained by program managers can make it easier to monitor the progress of the larger evaluation.

The pilot study provides a method whereby program managers can quickly and efficiently become aware of relevant issues. More importantly, it can be used to provide direction and guidance for a meaningful program evaluation, prior to committing extensive resources. An effective evaluation strategy is the key to healthy program development.

APPENDIX A

LMET GRADUATE SELF-REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AND RESULTS²³

1. How long ago did you attend LMET? Did you attend prior to the command?
2. Has there been any change in how you do your job, how you lead and manage others, after taking the LMET course? [Probe for specific examples]
3. Has there been any change in your own career or career plans after taking the LMET course? [e.g. promotion, schools, PQS, retention intentions] [Probe for specifics]
4. How is your performance on your job measured? [Probe for relevant indicies, rewards, task accomplishment, managerial ability, professional competence, etc.] Has there been any change in these job performance measures? What specifically?
5. Has there been any change in your unit?
 - In job performance measures (e.g. inspections passed, productivity indicies, PMS accomplishment rate, accidents, etc.). What specifically?
 - In satisfaction measures? [e.g. retention rates, NJP's, sick calls, UA's, etc.]
6. What goals did you set in the LMET course? How have you completed these goals? Progress? Action steps completed?
7. Have you ever used the student journal since you left the course? For what reason? [Probe for specifics]
8. What was your level of participation in the LMET course [low, medium, high]?
 - In class
 - Homework
9. Would you send anyone to LMET school?

²³The LMET graduate was asked these 9 questions. Questions 2-8 were provided by McBer and Company.

LMET GRADUATE STIMULUS QUESTIONS²⁴

1. When you are faced with a new task, how do you go about accomplishing it?
2. In your work center, how do you assign duties and responsibilities? What kind of paperwork do you do? [In relation to those assignments]
3. What type of roadblocks do you run into on your job, and what do you do about them?
4. What do you do if the work of your subordinates is worse than you expected?
5. What do you do if the work of your subordinates is better than you expected?
6. How do you go about getting someone to buy your idea about a better way of doing things?
7. Tell me of a time when you identified a problem before anyone else did? How did you do this?
8. How do you go about getting someone settled in who is new to the work center? [What is expected of him?]
9. What happens to your work center when you are not there? If you took two weeks of emergency leave what would you expect to find upon your return? Why?
10. How do you keep cool when someone is pulling your chain?

²⁴The LMET graduate was asked these 10 questions. All questions were provided by McBer and Company with the exception of part 2 to question 9.

SUPERVISOR QUESTIONS VALIDATING LMET GRADUATE'S ACTIVITIES

AND RESULTS ²⁵

1. Are you an LMET graduate? How long ago did you graduate?
2. How would you describe the way in which this subordinate [division officer, leading chief, work center supervisor] leads and manages others? Could you give me specific examples?
3. Has there been any change in your subordinates career [e.g. promotions, schools, PQS, accomplishments] or career plans [e.g. re-enlistment, extensions, service obligations] while under the supervision, leadership and management of this ---[division officer, leading chief, work center supervisor]? What specifically? What has he done?
4. How is your subordinate's [division officer, leading chief, work center supervisor] performance measured? [Probe for specifics] Have you changed any of these measures?
5. Has there been any changes in your unit as related to:
 - job performance measures [e.g. inspections, productivity, accidents, PMS accomplishments]
 - satisfaction measures [e.g. retention rates, NJP's, sick call, absenteeism] What, specifically? [Probe for examples]
6. What do you like or admire most about his performance onboard? Least? [Probe for specifics]
7. Would you work for him? Why or why not?
8. What would you change in him if you could? Why?
9. Would you send anyone to LMET school? Why?
10. Is there anything else you might like to add in regards to this individual or LMET?

²⁵The supervisor to the LMET graduate was asked those 10 questions. Questions 2-5 were provided by McBer and Company.

SUBORDINATE QUESTIONS VALIDATING LMET GRADUATE'S ACTIVITIES
AND RESULTS ²⁶

1. Are you a LMET graduate? How long ago did you graduate?
2. How would you describe the way in which your boss [division officer, leading chief, work center supervisor] leads and manages others? Could you give me specific examples?
3. Has there been any change in your own career [e.g. promotions, schools, PQS accomplishments] or career plans [e.g. re-enlistment, extensions, service obligations] while under the leadership and management of your boss [division officer, leading officer, work center supervisor]? What specifically? What has he done?
4. How is your performance on the job measured by your boss [division officer, leading chief, work center supervisor]? [Probe for specific indicies] Have you noticed any changes in these performance measurements?
5. Has there been any changes in your unit as related to:
 - job performance measures [e.g. inspections passed, productivity, accidents, PMS accomplishments]
 - satisfaction measures [e.g. retention rates, NJP's, sick calls, absenteeism] What, specifically? [Probe for examples]
6. What do you like or admire most about his performance onboard? Least? Can you give specifics?
7. Would you work for him again? Why or why not?
8. What would you change in him if you could? Why?
9. Would you like to attend LMET school if you could? What do you think you would get out of it? Why?
10. Is there anything else you would like to tell me in regards to your boss or LMET?

²⁶The subordinate to the LMET graduate was asked these 10 questions. Questions 2-5 were provided by McBer and Company.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Auel, D. Leadership and Management Education and Training Long Range Study Proposal, Report to Chief of Naval Operations prepared through Naval Education and Training Development Center, Pensacola, Florida, 4 February 1975.

Chief of Naval Education and Training, NAVEDTRA 38026, LMET Student Journal for Aviation Division Officers, n.d.

Chief of Naval Operations, Leadership and Management Education and Training Navy Training Plan, Washington, D.C., 12 February 1979.

Chief of Naval Personnel, Leadership Support Manual [NAVPERS 15934B], U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963.

Goleman, D. "The New Competency Tests: Matching the Right People to the Right Jobs", Psychology Today, p. 35-46, January 1981.

Gorden, R. L. Interviewing: Strategy, Techniques and Tactics, Dorsey Press, 1980.

House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U. S. Navy, Ninety Second Congress, Second Session, Washington, D.C., 2 January 1973.

Hubbell, J. "To Give Young Men a Goal", The Readers Digest, pp. 1-6, May 1960.

Human Resources Research Organization Report 80-2, Leadership Training: State of the Art, by J. A. Olmstead, p. 12, October 1980.

McBer and Company, Letter to Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, Subject: LMET Pilot Study Design, 8 January 1981.

McClelland, D.C. The Achieving Society, D. Van Norstrand Co., Inc., 1961.

McClelland, D. C. "Toward a Theory of Motive Acquisition", American Psychologist, v. 20, p. 321-333, 1965.

McClelland, D.C. "Testing for Competence Rather Than for Intelligence", American Psychologist, p. 1-4, January 1973.

Parker, Donald F. "Leadership Training in the Navy, unpublished draft for Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Michigan, 25 October 1980.

U. S. Navy Human Resource Management Center, Norfolk, Virginia, LMET Overview Brief, no date.

Winter, D. G. An Introduction to LMET Theory and Research, a paper prepared at McBer and Company, Boston, Massachusetts, 1979.

Zumwalt, E. On Watch, Quadrangle/New York Times Book Company, 1976.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314	2
2. Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
3. Department Chairman, Code 54Js Department of Administrative Sciences Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
4. Profesor Reuben T. Harris, Code 54He Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
5. Assistant for Analysis, Evaluation [NMPC-6c] Human Resource Management & Personal Affairs Dept. Navy Military Personnel Command Washington, D.C. 20370	1
6. Director, Human Resource Mgmt. Division [NMPC-62] Human Resource Management & Personal Affairs Dept. Navy Military Personnel Command Washington, D.C. 20370	3
7. Director for HRM Plans and Policy [OP-150] Human Resource Management Division Deputy Chief of Naval Operations [Manpower, Personnel & Training] Washington, D.C. 20370	3
8. Commanding Officer Human Resource Management School Naval Air Station Memphis Millington, Tennessee 38054	1

9. Commanding Officer 1
Human Resource Management Center London
Box 23
FPO, New York 09510
10. Commanding Officer 1
Human Resource Management Center
5621-23 Tidewater Drive
Norfolk, Virginia 23509
11. Commanding Officer 1
Human Resource Management Center
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 96860
12. Commanding Officer 1
Human Resource Management Center
Naval Training Center
San Diego, California 92133
13. Commanding Officer 1
Human Resource Management Center,
Washington, D.C.
Commonwealth Building, Room 1144
1300 Wilson Blvd.
Arlington, Virginia 22209
14. Officer in Charge 1
Human Resource Management Detachment
NAS Alameda
Alameda, California 94501
15. Commander in Chief, 1
U. S. Pacific Fleet
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 96860
Attn: HRM Representative
16. Mr. Edward Thomas, Code 307 1
Navy Personnel R & D Center
San Diego, California 92152
17. CDR L. Whitenhiller, [NMPC-62] 2
Navy Military Personnel Command
Washington, D.C. 20370
18. Doctor Phillip N. Butler 1
1330 Castro Court
Monterey, California 93940

19. LCDR David L. Vandover
Human Resource Management Division [OP-150]
Office of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
[Manpower, Personnel & Training]
Washington, D.C. 20370

2

20. LCDR John P. Villarosa
340 Formosa Drive
Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931

2

**DA
FILM**