

AD-A104 638


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
THE U.S. SECURITY INTEREST IN CHINA. (U)
SEP 81 P F LARSON

F/G 5/4

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

1 of 2
AD-A104 638



② LEVEL A

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

AD A104638



DTIC
ELECTE
SEP 28 1981
S B D

THESIS

THE U.S. SECURITY
INTEREST IN CHINA

by

Peter Francis Larson

September 1981

Thesis Advisor:

C. A. Buss

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

81 9 28 022

ENC FILE COPY

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The U.S. Security Interest in China		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; September 1981
7. AUTHOR(s) Peter Francis Larson		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE September 1981
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 110
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		16. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) National Interest Security Interest Balance of Power Nixon Doctrine P.R.C. China Card Parallel Strategic and Bilateral Interests Triangular Diplomacy		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Since 1969, relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States have improved dramatically. This phenomenon occurred primarily as a result of a reappraisal of national interests by both nations' policy makers. In terms of security, the United States and China now pursue parallel security interests. In doing so, the U.S. must enact rational policies to protect this interest, while recognizing those of China and others.		

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

The U.S. Security
Interest in China

by

Peter Francis Larson
Captain, United States Army
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1975


Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 1981


Author



Approved by:



Thesis Advisor



Second Reader



Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs



Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

Since 1969, relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States have improved dramatically. This phenomenon occurred primarily as a result of a reappraisal of national interests by both nations' policy makers. In terms of security, the United States and China now pursue parallel security interests. In doing so, the U.S. must enact rational policies to protect this interest, while recognizing those of China and others.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Avail and/or	
Dist	
A	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION- - - - -	6
I. HISTORICAL SUMMARY- - - - -	9
A. 1921 - 1937 - - - - -	9
B. 1937 - 1945 - - - - -	12
C. 1946 - 1949 - - - - -	16
D. 1949 - 1960 - - - - -	19
E. 1960 - 1968 - - - - -	26
F. 1968 - 1980 - - - - -	30
II. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE U.S. INTEREST IN CHINA - - - - -	38
III. RECENT U.S. POLICIES RELATIVE TO THE P.R.C. - - -	55
IV. COMPONENTS OF CHINA'S SECURITY PROBLEMS AND CAPABILITIES- - - - -	60
A. GEOGRAPHICAL COMPONENTS - - - - -	60
1. Sino-Soviet Border- - - - -	60
2. Sea Lane Security - - - - -	61
3. Other Neighbors - - - - -	62
4. Agrarian Fragility- - - - -	65
B. MILITARY COMPONENTS - - - - -	67
V. CONCLUSIONS - - - - -	79
FOOTNOTES - - - - -	102
BIBLIOGRAPHY- - - - -	107
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST - - - - -	110

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Quantitative Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Army - - - - -	41
2. Sino-Japanese Trade, 1958-1970- - - - -	49
3. Manpower, % Men 18-45 Yrs., Military Expenditures of P.R.C., U.S., U.S.S.R., N.A.T.O., and Warsaw Pact - - - - -	69
4. P.L.A. Force Distribution - - - - -	70
5. P.L.A. Structure- - - - -	70
6. P.L.A. Equipment (Quantity) - - - - -	71
7. P.L.A. Navy: Organization and Equipment - - - - -	73
8. P.L.A. Navy: Aircraft Quantity and Type- - - - -	74
9. P.L.A. Air Force: Aircraft Quantity and Type- - - - -	75
10. P.R.C. Nuclear Forces: Quantity, Type, Range and Propellant- - - - -	76

INTRODUCTION

For two hundred years, the United States has been interested in and curious about China. During this era, relations have often transformed reflecting differences in national interest and ideology.

The United States' national interest in China is primarily identified in three spheres: security, economic, and cultural. In terms of security, it is in the interest of the United States to pursue cooperative goals with the P.R.C. rather than those of an adversary relationship which were the case previously. This is especially relevant in light of the contemporary international environment. The economic aspect of the U.S. interest in China is one of opportunity for American businesses. In addition, it is important that cooperative economic and trade exchanges between the two countries will enable both to achieve a better level of prosperity for their peoples. In tangible terms, each hopes to trade those services, goods, and materials most needed by their respective economies. The cultural exchanges between the two countries are seen as in the mutual interest of both the United States and China. By better understanding each other's culture, the respective governments may be able to pursue policies devoid of conflict. It is a popular American notion that interaction with our culture and system will influence other nations not to want to fight

against us. This is seen as beneficial in the context that a country which understands us will not be willing to participate in any action intended to destroy us.

It is my hypothesis that U.S. policies relating to China have been designed to protect all three of the national interests, but particularly the security interest which must take precedence over the other two.

This thesis will investigate whether the policies adopted have actually accomplished their purpose. Upon my findings, I shall consider whether further security arrangements are necessary or advisable.

In order to make this investigation, a historical summary is provided to analyze U.S. policy in the environment in which it developed.

The work will then identify international and domestic factors which determine the nature and extent of the U.S. interests in China, as currently perceived.

Then, the recent policies relative to the P.R.C. will be identified.

Since the effectiveness of U.S. security policy will in part be determined by the capabilities of the P.R.C., the Chinese security capability will be analyzed.

In conclusion, those policies already enacted will be evaluated. Parameters will be suggested within which security policies must be similarly adjudged.

This study is worthwhile due to its timeliness and pertinence. Research sources concentrate on statements by

world leaders, official documents, and works of recognized authors. The goal of this study is to help shed light on the U.S. role in China and perhaps aid in future U.S. policies.

I. HISTORICAL SUMMARY

A. 1921 - 1937

The period 1921-1937 marks the start of this summary of U.S.-China relations. The period is significant not only because it marked the forming of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but the interstate political maneuverings in this period were a substantial factor in determining China's later alignment.

In the early years of the twentieth century, a nationalist fervor developed in politically active Chinese. Much of this feeling was derived from, as the Chinese saw it, the unequal treaties from and occupation by the imperialist powers (including Japan and the U.S.). From this standpoint, it is not difficult to see why the nationalists turned to the Soviet Union for help. "Agents of the Russian-dominated Communist International (Comintern) traveled to China in the early 1920's and there helped reorganize the nearly moribund Kuomintang Party (KMT) of Sun Yat-sen."¹ The object of this support was not so much to create a Communist China, but more importantly, a unified state that would expel imperialist powers.

The Comintern also supported the newly founded (1921) Chinese Communist Party which had its origins in Shanghai. In 1922, the Soviets insisted as leaders of the International Communist Movement that the CCP cooperate with and operate from within the KMT.

The alliance was justified as a tactically expeditious move to achieve unification and independence. Ideologically the Comintern explained to the CCP that China was not yet ready for a proletarian revolution. Thus, the KMT was deemed the leader of the bourgeois revolution which would transform China into a capitalist industrial state, a necessary prerequisite stage before the final leap into Communism. "The alliance was formally consummated in January 1924."² The tactical and strategic motives for allying the CCP and KMT were for the unification and independence of China.

Sun Yat-sen, founder of the KMT, died in 1925 while in Peking negotiating a settlement for the peaceful unification of China. After some intra-party maneuverings, Chiang Kai-shek gained control of the party, largely enabled by his control of the Russian-trained KMT Army. In 1926 he led this army north in an attempt to unify China militarily. During the northward march, serious splits occurred between the Communists and KMT, culminating in the Shanghai purge of Communists carried out by Chiang's forces in March of 1927. Subsequently the Soviet advisors were expelled from Canton, Hankow, Shanghai, Peking, and Mukden. This marked a decided shift in China's political orientation. She now appeared less suspicious to the U.S. (in spite of the Nanking incident when KMT soldiers attacked American residents) who in 1928 recognized Chiang's republic.

There is little difficulty in imagining the CCP's disillusionment with their Russian Comintern advisors after

experiencing near extinction in 1927. Remnants of the harangued party fled to and established themselves in the South-Central provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi. It is difficult to determine who controlled the CCP initially; however, Mao Zedong emerged here as a central party figure. The events and environment no doubt influenced Mao's perception of China and the world. The KMT purge of its CCP faction had been largely urban based. This, in addition to the ill advice from the Comintern, caused the party to stress self-reliance and use the rural areas as a base. The first order of business was survival. The Red Army, led by Zhu De, employed and perfected guerilla tactics in holding off the KMT Army. "Between 1930 and 1933, the Kiangsi central base alone was subjected to no less than four successive 'Extermination Campaigns.'"³ The fifth onslaught, in October, 1935, marked the abandonment of the Kiangsi base and the retreat known as "The Long March."

Less than 10% of the 100,000 Communists who fled completed the 6,000-mile circuitous trek to Yen-an. The Long March is regarded as a significant watershed in Chinese Communist history. During, or soon after completion of the march, Mao achieved effective control over the party apparatus. The sheer miracle of their survival helped form a psychological bastion in their minds. "It was the Long March -- and the legendary tales to which it gave rise -- that provided this essential feeling of hope and confidence, the faith

that determined men could prevail under even the most desperate conditions."⁴

The year 1937, the end-date of this segment of the historical summary, could be argued to be the turning point for the CCP. Some scholars have even referred to this date as one of the "accidents" in history. For without the Japanese invasion, it would be possible to argue that the KMT Army would have inevitably destroyed the remnants of the CCP in Yen-an. No longer could Chiang busy himself with some 8,000 revolutionaries hiding in a remote provincial wasteland.

The date not only supplied a breathing space for Mao, but it provided impetus to develop certain philosophical arguments. The invading Japanese were seen as the primary enemy.

In Mao's view, limited allies are temporary allies who may eventually become enemies again, but for limited periods they can be of critical importance in the balance of forces affecting the struggle for power.⁵

The United States, once identified as the primary enemy, was seen as a potential source of support in evicting the Japanese invasion forces. This philosophy was also applied to the KMT.

B. 1937 - 1945

For China, World War II began in 1931 when the Japanese Kuantung Army moved into Mukden. The year 1937 marked the date when their forces moved into China proper. This phenomenon provided the situation which in essence assured the survival of the CCP. Not only did the invasion provide the opportunity

to be relieved from KMT attacks, it enabled the Red Army to gain valuable military experience which would be of later use. In fact, Japanese attacks made little gains in areas controlled by the CCP. In 1941, when the U.S. entered the war, the Japanese lines with the Communists had not significantly altered since 1938. The CCP perfected insurgency operations in what Mao called "people's war." Some authors have described Communist operations of the Red Army moving literally under the Japanese Army. Not all of the CCP's gains were in Japanese territory. The Red Army quickly filled the vacuum created in the north and central sections of China by the retreating KMT Army. "As Japanese pressure increased, the Communists announced in September, 1937, their willingness to make peace with the Kuomintang,"⁶ under certain specified conditions. In reality, a unified front against the Japanese was in name only. The two Chinese factions refrained from open conflict with each other only while preoccupied with the Japanese forces.

Chiang's wartime policy has been depicted as a program to lose as few forces as possible to the Japanese. He "pursued a strategy of retreat, minimizing large-scale clashes and hoarding American aid for eventual use against the Communists."⁷ A similar strategy could be attributed to the CCP. Their conflicts with the Japanese were motivated as much by subverting their hold as by gaining a future source of peasant-soldiers to fight the KMT.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came as good news to Chiang. Now he could depend on the United States to rid the enemy from China while he bided his time for future elimination of the Communists. Despite a few American voices advocating support of the CCP, the U.S. cast its lot with the KMT nationalists. Throughout World War II, General Stilwell, Chiang's American military advisor, advocated a more aggressive, streamlined strategy for fighting the Japanese. The relationship between Stilwell and Chiang developed into a bitter rivalry. Finally, in September, 1944, Stilwell was given a letter by Roosevelt to deliver to Chiang. In essence, it was an ultimatum to give Stilwell command of the Chinese forces (including Communist) or American aid would terminate. At this point, it appeared that Chiang's stall was finished. However, Roosevelt changed his mind and ordered Stilwell's recall in October, 1944. This can be attributed to the work of Patrick Hurley, an emissary sent by Roosevelt the previous month. His reports not only portrayed Chiang Kai-shek as China's only hope for defeating the Japanese, but the only unifying force in the face of the CCP or the Soviet Union.

On September 24, 1944, Hurley joined Chiang and T. V. Soong in sending a message to FDR. All three agreed that the real problem in China was Stilwell. If only he were removed as a thorn in Chiang's side, the Kuomintang would be able to carry out everything Roosevelt desired of it.⁸

One can speculate that if Stilwell had formed a unified (CCP-KMT) Chinese Army, close association might have produced

future accommodation. In fact, during this period, the United States had observers (the Dixie Mission) in Yen-an with the CCP. A positive rapport developed with Mao advocating a conciliatory posture toward the U.S. Hurley destroyed any hopes of post-war accommodation between the two Chinese factions. In Yen-an, he proposed a coalition government which Mao accepted. Zhou En-lai traveled to Chungking to consummate this agreement and was surprised to learn Chiang's interpretation was not what had been discussed in Yen-an with his mediator, Hurley. The proposal was now that the CCP disband their armies and accept some minor posts in the KMT government. Hurley went back on his previous draft signed in Yen-an, for he too demanded Chiang's proposal as a criterion for coalition. Thus, all hopes of what may have developed into a unified China, or even a Communist China not antipathetic to the U.S., were dashed.

After the Japanese surrender, "the Americans airlifted Nationalist troops to key points in the east and north."⁹ The scenario in 1945 was significantly different than in 1937 in terms of territory held and in terms of popular base. The Communists had made significant gains in the north and central regions. The party had increased from 40,000 to more than a million. In contrast, the KMT had lost its appeal to the common Chinese by excessive taxes, corruption, and economic malaise. Thus, the stage was not set for the inevitable struggle for power that each faction had been waiting for since 1937.

C. 1946 - 1949

As stated previously, there appeared to be a possibility in late 1944 to form a coalition government. It is important to note that during this time, Mao appeared receptive to the United States. America's pro-Chiang policy, advocated by Hurley and accepted by Roosevelt, continued to hamper any possibility of an American initiative for peaceful resolution.

In late 1945, Truman sent General George Marshall in a further attempt to make peace. Now the impetus for unification was not to better enable the allies to defeat the Japanese. By this time, the fear was of Soviet expansion into a weak China. Again, neither the CCP nor the KMT could come to terms, and Marshall's orders were to support the KMT if this were the case. The U.S. mission was welcomed by the CCP, for "postponing civil war was clearly preferable to an immediate showdown with the better equipped and larger KMT armies."¹⁰

The efforts for peace were in vain. No longer did either party have a common enemy other than each other. From a military perspective, the Red Army brilliantly employed guerilla tactics, steadily increasing arms, equipment, and personnel. Their sources were: captured from the KMT, Soviet-captured Japanese supplies, and from the KMT defectors. The civil war was brief, 1947-1949.

It is not important to discuss the tactical intricacies which brought Communist victory in 1949. In terms of the

five crises of political development presented in the work entitled Crises and Sequences in Political Development, a construct may be developed which may provide a better explanation for Communist victory. In terms of the five crises (identify, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution), the CCP in 1945-1949 was much more adept in resolution than the KMT.

Identity: During the Japanese occupation and after, the Communists were able to expand their effective influence over vast expanses of rural areas. After the Japanese defeat, the CCP was already regarded as the appropriate government in its areas.

Legitimacy: During the occupation and after, the peasant population was more "in-tune" with the CCP policies vis-à-vis those of the KMT. By 1945-1947, the legitimacy of the Kuomintang was in question. It appeared that they were more interested in re-establishing the status quo than alleviating the rural and urban squalor existing throughout China.

Penetration: The KMT's sphere of control during the occupation diminished. In contrast, the CCP made significant progress in expansion of influence and control. The CCP was able to successfully maintain an "effective presence of a central government throughout a territory over which it... exercise(d) control."¹¹ This was not the case with the Nationalist regime. If the KMT Army was not in a vicinity, it would be safe to say that there was no effective KMT presence.

Distribution: The superior ability of the CCP to promise more equitable distribution was not only a function of their land reform promises. The Japanese and later the Nationalist government exploited the peasantry in typical Chinese tradition.

The Japanese allowed the gentry their traditional economic privilege of exploiting the peasantry. In such cases, the landlord appeared to the peasant not only in his old role as economic oppressor but also in the new role as national traitor.¹²

The KMT offered even less promise. After the Japanese occupation, the enacted policies offered little relief to the peasant population. "The old order of landlord control continued under the returned Kuomintang as it had under the Japanese."¹³ Thus, the CCP was able to offer a better "deal" to the preponderant peasant population in terms of distribution -- it promised land.

Participation: It has been implied in the above segment that one of the five facets assuring the CCP's success was its promise of better distribution. One cannot fail to agree that Mao's idea of peasant utilization played a major role in his party's ultimate victory.

Though they used old and tainted leadership at times, they created new organizations among the poorer peasants and even among the women, the most oppressed group in Chinese society.¹⁴

The participatory lure that the CCP offered the peasant was in joining the Red Army, the CCP itself, and most importantly in the Poor Peasants Associations. These institutions enabled the peasant to feel he had a sense of shaping his own

destiny, something he had never felt in Nationalist or Imperial China.

In this section of the historical summary, it should be pointed out that the American interest in China suffered. Also, a construct was developed which purports to show the Communists' inevitable victory by their superior ability to resolve crises.

D. 1949 - 1960

The years 1949 - 1960 are noteworthy in that it is in this period that China and the Soviet Union were, for practical purposes, aligned. It is also in this period that fears in the United States of a Communist monolith were their greatest.

On October 2, 1949, the Soviet Union officially recognized the People's Republic of China, one day after its proclamation. From a Soviet perspective, the ultimate victory of Mao had not seemed possible until 1948. Until this time, Moscow had not leaned significantly towards the CCP vis-à-vis the KMT.

After the military victories of 1948 gave the Chinese Communists possession of important urban and industrial centers, particularly in Manchuria, Mao Tse-tung appealed to the Soviet Union for trained technicians and engineers.¹⁵

As a result of this turn of events, the Soviet Union recognized the viability of the CCP. It is during this period that economic collaboration in the form of planning, trade agreements, and credit began. In December, 1949, Mao traveled to Moscow to begin negotiations. (It is interesting

to note that this was Mao's first trip outside China.) One source states that Mao had figured China's needs as being in the order of U.S. \$2 - 3 billion.¹⁵ Mao entered a seller's market in traveling to Moscow. During the time of his trip, any hopes of U.S. recognition of the PRC were eliminated. All American diplomatic personnel were withdrawn from Peking when the U.S. consular establishment was confiscated. This may have been a tactic to signal an anti-U.S./pro-Moscow posture. However, this in effect weakened China's position in negotiations. She now had no other alternative but to negotiate on Stalin's terms. Perhaps as a result of this, China did not fare as well as she had hoped.

In actuality, Russian financial aid was very limited, accounting for only 3 percent of total Chinese state investment for economic development during the period of the First Five Year Plan.¹⁷

The reaction in the United States to the "loss" of China was dramatic. It is during this period (1949 - 1955) that to have had associations with Communists was devastating. Senator McCarthy led a campaign to expose and ruin any American who had Communist sympathies. In this "Red Scare" atmosphere, "NSC-68 served as a 'call to arms,' a rallying cry for the U.S. and its allies to drastically increase their own military preparedness to resist a perceived Soviet threat."¹⁸ If there were any doubts in those privy to this study, Korea served to confirm its validity.

It is doubtful that Peking advocated the June, 1950, North Korean attack. One must not forget that the P.R.C. was less than one year old.

The Chinese leaders certainly could not have welcomed a war of potentially grave international consequences in a bordering land at a time when they were preoccupied with the internal consolidation of the new state, when they were beginning to demobilize much of the Red Army, at precisely the time their best military units were being deployed on the southern coast for the anticipated invasion of Taiwan, and when the opening of the land reform campaign just had been announced.¹⁹

Nevertheless, China, faced with an American force on its borders in November, 1950, felt compelled to attack. To the Chinese, it seemed imminent that not doing so would surely invite not only American forces, but a KMT invasion from Chiang's Taiwan as well.

In China, the war proved to be a valuable political victory. It served as a demonstration to the Chinese people that she had fought the major power in the world and, in her view, won. Economically, the costs of the Korean War were great. The 1950 treaty with the Soviet Union had shown its worth in the realm of military aid. But the war also may have planted the seed of rivalry between the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. Before the Korean War, the major foreign influence in North Korea was the Soviet Union. With the massive influx of Chinese soldiers, the P.R.C. changed this relationship. After the war, the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. granted North Korea U.S. \$250 and \$200 million, respectively.

It is significant that China granted a comparable amount in light of the fact that she was going into debt to the U.S.S.R. in her own reconstruction scheme.

As stated previously, the Korean War confirmed American anxiety about Communist intentions and, more specifically, it "created mutual suspicions and fears that were to poison Sino-American relations for most of the 1950's and 1960's, initiating two decades of open confrontation."²⁰ In 1955 and 1958, incidents over the Taiwan Straits between the U.S. and P. R. C. reinforced the confrontation between the two states. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was created in September, 1954. Not only did China feel encircled militarily; she was ostracized from the world community by being denied access to the United Nations. In addition, she had restrictive trade policies placed on her and witnessed the U.S. Asian allies receive large-scale economic and military assistance. This is not to blame the American policies exclusively for China's anti-U.S. posture. It can be argued, however, that the U.S. policies limited any options for rapprochement with the P.R.C.

While Sino-American relations were at odds, developments starting in the mid-1950's gave birth to Sino-Soviet tensions. Few Americans recognized this developing rift and the two countries were still considered inexorably linked. In 1956, Khrushchev delivered the famous de-Stalinization speech. In Peking it was viewed as a serious attack on the legitimacy of the ideological tenets of the entire Communist bloc. The

inferences against the Stalin "cult" of personality surely had implications of an insult to Mao. Most fundamentally, the speech proposed a more peaceful tone in dealing with the West. China had felt that the cause of World Communism should be aggressively pursued with the U.S.S.R. as the leader.

In November, 1957, Mao attended the Moscow conference of Communist Parties. (His second and last trip abroad.) Here Mao delivered his contribution to famous Communist speeches. It has commonly been referred to as the "east wind prevails over the west wind address."

This was generally interpreted at the time to mean the socialist camp was prevailing over the imperialists. But there were undertones of a different theme. . . there was here a distinct suggestion that by "East" was meant the underdeveloped countries of the Third World of which China was a part, whereas the term "West" embraced the industrialized countries of North America and Europe -- including the Soviet Union.²¹

The Mao speech can be regarded as a retort to the Khrushchev address the prior year. It signaled to the Soviet Union that China was not pleased with her world strategy and would increasingly act unilaterally in its actions. Thus the Soviet Union was no longer accepted by China as the authoritative ideological voice in the Communist bloc.

In addition to ideological and political differences, Mao failed at the conference to secure additional economic aid from the Soviet Union.

Mao in effect demanded that the European members of the bloc stop their own economic progress until they had raised the economically backward Asian sector to the same economic level, so that all socialist

countries might advance together into the state of Communism.²²

There is little wonder how this thesis was received in Moscow. The Chinese leader returned to Peking with only a promise from Moscow to provide nuclear weapons prototypes.

In February, 1958, China initiated The Great Leap Forward campaign. This was a clear break from the Soviet economic model for development. The Maoist version of achieving a Communist utopia no longer depended on passing through the industrialized capitalist phase (the antithesis) of social structure. Proper Communist forms of social organization were the precondition rather than a high level of productive forces. The "Great Leap" depended heavily on the voluntarism of the masses. The campaign was an economic disaster marked by food shortages, lack of planning, and an exhausted labor force. The overall analysis of the "Great Leap" indicates that it was an attempt by Mao not only to break with Moscow, but more importantly, to demonstrate the superiority of the Chinese "line." As a result of the failure, many top officials expressed grave doubts about Mao.

In the spring of 1959, Peng De-huai, the Minister of Defense, traveled to Moscow. "During the course of his travels, Peng expressed to Khrushchev and other foreign Communist leaders his displeasure (which coincided with Soviet displeasure) over the policies of the 'Great Leap' and the leadership of Mao."²³ After this trip, Peng openly criticized Mao over the futile "Great Leap" program. In

addition, Khrushchev announced that he would not deliver the nuclear weapons prototypes previously promised. It is clearly reasonable to understand Mao's suspicions of Peng's loyalty. The Peng-Mao confrontation came to a head at the Lushan Plenum in July, 1959. Essentially Mao presented a risky choice -- Peng or him. If the CCP wanted Peng, Mao said he would "go to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government."²⁴ Peng was promptly sacked, which obviously indicated that there still existed a schism between the Sino-Soviet leadership.

A factor further dividing China and the Soviet Union developed over the Sino-Indian border disputes in 1959. "Instead of exerting pressure on New Delhi, Moscow adopted a neutral stance and continued its economic aid to India."²⁵

The culmination of the Sino-Soviet split began in 1960 when China initiated a literary ideological attack on the U.S.S.R. The article, entitled "Long Live Leninism," accused the Soviet officials of bastardizing Leninist principles. The tactic, doubtlessly Mao inspired, was to exert pressure on Moscow to change her previously mentioned policies. Khrushchev's response was decisive. Not only were ideological counterattacks taken; all Soviet advisors and technical experts were recalled.

In summary, the period of 1949-1960 can be characterized initially by a P.R.C.-U.S.S.R alignment against the U.S. The Sino-Soviet split, from a Chinese point of view, can be attributed to Russia's niggardly aid program and softened

policy to the U.S. From a Soviet perspective, China appeared as a radical adolescent, breaking away from the ideological fold before she was ready. By 1960, the trilateral relationship (U.S. - U.S.S.R. - P.R.C.) had developed in varying degrees of mistrust between the three states.

E. 1960 - 1968

The years 1960 - 1968, the years of the Vietnam War, are best described as non-aligned for China. Whether this was perceived in the United States, the relationship among the three states had developed toward a triangular configuration. As the direct threat of the U.S. lessened after 1965, China's perception of the danger from the Soviet Union increased.

There are several important events/issues in the Sino-Soviet relationship which demonstrate this rift during this period. They are: North Korea, Albania, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam, India, Sino-Soviet border disputes, the Cultural Revolution, and Czechoslovakia.

In 1961, North Korea signed treaties with both the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. The contents of the script were remarkably similar. The significance is that it is viewed as a demonstration of the competition existing between the two states. The treaty with China, signed five days after the Soviet version, can be attributed to a Chinese desire not to allow the Soviets any advantage in the relationship with North Korea.

At the 22nd CPSU Congress in October, 1961, Khrushchev denounced Albanian behavior as similar to that of the P.R.C. He further called on both Albania and China to return to the true Communist path. Zhou En-lai, also attending the Congress, delivered an address giving China's support to the independent-minded Albanians. The result was that this had no help in thawing Sino-Soviet relations. For Albania's punishment, Khrushchev withdrew, as had happened a year prior in China, all advisors and technical experts.

In October, 1962, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. became embroiled in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This provided a splendid opportunity for Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's reckless adventurism by deploying missiles in Cuba. When the missiles were returned, China again grasped the occasion to state that Khrushchev had shown weakness in capitulation. There is little doubt that, while claiming he had accomplished what he had set out to do, Khrushchev had lost face in the eyes of the Chinese.

In 1961, the American presence in Vietman was being felt in China. This development seemed a viable threat to the P.R.C.

Given the debility of Ngo Dinh Diem's Saigon regime, it could safely be assumed that the United States would shortly assume the main burden of the war and greatly increase its military strength in that strategic area bordering on China.²⁶

Perhaps the potential situation was viewed in Peking as a possible repeat of the Korean War. An invasion of North Vietnam by U.S. forces would again put an aggressor on her

borders. The danger was real, exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet split which might have precluded Soviet support. In 1964-5, the U.S. significantly escalated its presence in Southeast Asia. Both the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. aided North Vietnam; however, neither could agree on a policy on how to do it. Fortunately, the U.S. sent numerous signals to China indicating no action would be taken to endanger her sovereignty. Both China and the U.S. exercised extreme caution and non-provocation in their unofficial communications and actions with each other. There is little question that either wanted a direct confrontation.

The Sino-Indian border clashes can be viewed as a tactical victory over India but a strategic loss for China. There had been a border dispute between the two regarding the areas in the extreme Northeast and extreme Northwest of India. The Chinese view their October, 1962, invasion of these regions as responses to Indian provocations. After inflicting heavy casualties on the Indian Army, China unilaterally withdrew its forces to areas considered theirs and demanded that India keep its forces 12.5 miles back from the "Chinese" border. Essentially India was presented with a fait accompli. The long-term impact was not so promising for China. The Indians, although claiming a non-aligned posture, have since tilted toward the U.S.S.R.

Since the early 1960's, the Soviets and Chinese have experienced their own border difficulties. "In 1962 they reached a point of high tension when thousands of Kazakhs

and Uighurs left China for the Soviet Union."²⁷ Since that time, border incidents between each country's soldiers have occurred on an irregular basis. These clashes reached a peak in 1969 when a serious military confrontation occurred at Chenpao Island on the Ussuri River. Several months later, another clash occurred in Sinkiang Autonomous region. Since that time, little has been accomplished to resolve the territorial disputes save defusing of an all-out war.

The Cultural Revolution of 1966-1968 did little to help Sino-Soviet relations. In fact, it was an extremely chaotic period where China had cut herself off from the world. During this period of extreme militancy, China did not enjoy good relations with most nations, including the Soviet Union. This phenomenon confirmed Soviet perceptions that Mao was truly mad and that China was a dangerous and unpredictable neighbor.

From a Chinese perspective the Soviets were equally as dangerous. This point was well demonstrated to Peking in 1968 with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. This action may have been viewed as a signal or precedent that greatly affected not only China's view of Russia, but the world as well.

In the period of 1960-1968, the lesson in this section of the summary is on gradually deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations based on ideological, political, and territorial issues. It

is during this time that official Chinese rhetoric included the U.S.S.R. with the U.S. as "enemies of the people." More tangible, the real threat lay in the steady Soviet military buildup along the northern frontier. Relations with the U.S. were without any major confrontations as was the case in the previous decade. This is the backdrop for the next period discussed.

F. 1968 - 1980

The most recent period discussed here contains a large number of events which significantly altered the U.S. - U.S.S.R. - P.R.C. trilateral relationship. As the period before this indicated, the links between the three had developed into three bi-lateral associations. These twelve years are especially important because of the continuous approach to a U.S. - P.R.C. rapprochement. Also during this period the U.S. - U.S.S.R. relationship continued to be one of maintaining the status quo. This section of the summary will chronologically outline those events and issues which demonstrate the above described relationships.

Before 1968, two events transpired that are useful to demonstrate the tone that was present when Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in 1969. In 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony from numerous scholars and Asian experts who argued that the U.S. had misinterpreted China since World War II. The picture painted was that China pursued its interpreted antagonistic course as a

result of the prevailing environment created by the outside powers (U.S. and U.S.S.R.).

In 1967, an article, authored by the soon-to-be President, appeared in Foreign Affairs. Nixon's tone differed little from his previous anti-communist inclinations. However, the article did leave a "bait" in reference to China. The "bait" was that the U.S. could perhaps alter its own policies toward China if she would reciprocate. Also, in 1968, Nixon reiterated this stance in an interview in U.S. News and World Report. No doubt these two new approaches were read in Peking. Evidence of the Chinese hierarchy's awareness of U.S. developments is provided by Henry Kissinger while in Peking in July, 1971. Zhou En-lai, during negotiations, presented Kissinger the text of a Nixon speech made several days prior in Kansas City. In his book, White House Years, Kissinger states that not only was he ignorant of the contents, but of the event as well.

Events in 1969 further broke ground for the U.S. - P.R.C. reconciliation. The most significant were: Nixon's Guam Doctrine and disengagement from Vietnam, Sino-Soviet border clashes, and China's hints at peaceful coexistence.

After the success of the Tet offensive (1968), when it was clear that America intended to pull out of Vietnam, the Chinese began to worry more about the Russians on the north and less about the Americans on the south.²⁸

The Nixon Doctrine, perhaps when first proclaimed in 1969, was not intended as a major foreign policy announcement. The tenets of the speech, later refined, were:

1. The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
2. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.
3. In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.²⁹

This clearly denoted a less activist tone in the sense that it implied we were not so apt to directly intervene in Asia and thus represented less of a threat to China.

In March, 1969, there occurred further border skirmishes between the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. The importance of this conflict outweighs those previous in that both powers significantly increased military forces along their mutual borders. With an increasingly hostile threat mounting to the north, it is not difficult to discern Peking's real-politik motives in seeking a less antagonistic posture toward the U.S. Several factors highlighted this new development. First, China has historically been invaded successfully from northern "barbarians." "The first aim of China's traditional foreign policy has therefore been defense against Inner Asia."³⁰ And second, the proximity of the Soviet threat, balanced against the inevitable U.S. disengagement from Vietnam, clearly provided an impetus for a Chinese foreign policy reappraisal.

As a result of the above scenario, the Chinese initiated their hints for a U.S. - P.R.C. reconciliation.

Soon after Nixon's election, Peking suggested publicly that "peaceful coexistence" should be pursued by America and China. Then, at a reception, a Chinese diplomat told an American that the two nations ought to resume their suspended ambassadorial discussions [in Warsaw].³¹

In 1970 a number of prodding events set the stage for the U.S. and P.R.C. to come together. The main events were: a Soviet suggestion for a pre-emptive strike on China, Nixon hints, and a conversation between Mao and Edgar Snow.

In July, 1970, a senior Soviet official at the SALT talks, reportedly broached the idea of a Soviet-American agreement to act jointly against unspecified Chinese provocations.³²

Evidence suggests that this Soviet feeler reached Peking which undoubtedly confirmed Chinese fears of the Soviet Union.

During 1970, the Nixon administration made numerous advances to China. In an October news conference, "Nixon made reference to the People's Republic of China. This marked the first time an American president had publicly used the real name of the Peking regime."³³ To further enhance the possibility of opening a dialogue, "between November 1969 and June 1970 there were at least ten instances in which United States officials abroad exchanged words with Chinese officials at diplomatic functions."³⁴

In August, Edgar Snow, author of Red Star over China and an acquaintance of Mao, interviewed the aging leader for a Life magazine article. In this interview, one statement

confirmed China's aspirations toward the United States. In essence, Mao indicated that he was willing to meet with Richard Nixon, as the President or as a tourist.

The year 1971 proved decisive in U.S. - P.R.C. relations. It marked the secret Kissinger trip to Peking and a resultant power struggle within the CCP.

In July, Henry Kissinger (at that time the President's National Security Advisor) secretly traveled to the Chinese capital to discuss prerequisite issues for the proposed Nixon visit. It proved, when announced in the U.S., an exciting development. This did not appear to be the case in China. So many years of ideological conflict with the United States could not easily be set aside. The radical element in the CCP, led by second-ranked Politburo member Lin Biao, vehemently opposed a detente with the U.S. The outcome of the Nixon trip and further U.S. - P.R.C. reconciliation denotes that the moderates, led by Zhou, prevailed. In September, the radicals' case was lost by virtue of Lin's purported plane crash while escaping to the U.S.S.R.

Late that year, the P.R.C. formally entered the community of nations by being admitted to the United Nations.

In 1972, the Nixon trip and the resultant Shanghai Communiqué of February 27, 1972, charted the new relationship between the two countries. Kissinger states that

...it would thus become a touchstone of the relationship between two countries whose diplomatic ties would remain unconventional as long as Washington continued to recognize Taipei as the seat of the government of all of China.³⁵

Only two significant developments between the P.R.C. and U.S. took place between 1973 and 1975. In May, 1973, both countries established liaison offices in each country. The issue thwarting full diplomatic recognition remained the status of Taiwan. In late 1975, President Ford traveled to the P.R.C. and later announced the Pacific Doctrine. The announcement in respect to China introduced nothing significantly new. It did, however, reaffirm both country's position on respect for sovereignty and peaceful coexistence. Ford also stated:

I reaffirmed the determination of the United States to complete the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis of the Shanghai Communiqué.³⁶

The years 1976 - 1980 also proved significant in the rapprochement. In 1976, Mao and Zhou both died. The intra-party power struggle that developed might have affected the outlook toward the U.S. It is significant to note that the moderate Deng Xiaoping was purged (not for the first time). Later that year, the "Gang of Four" was arrested. That signified a victory for the more moderate over the radical anti-U.S. elements in the Politburo. As can be expected, Deng reappeared in 1977 as a fully rehabilitated member of the Politburo.

The first two years of President Carter's administration marked no significant developments in the normalization trajectory. In December, 1978, he announced that the two countries would extend full diplomatic recognition to each

other as of January 1, 1979. The decision was based on Chinese compromise; they no longer called for liberation of Taiwan by any means. Also that month, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping visited the U.S., commemorating the full normalization of relations. The recognition of the P.R.C. now equalized the U.S. relationship with the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. On the surface, the relations of the two nations exemplified "evenhandedness."

The first test of this new reconciliation occurred barely two months after its inception. China invaded Vietnam supposedly to punish that country for its own invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia). Below the surface, an incentive must have been the Hanoi - Moscow Treaty of Friendship that was signed in November, 1978. The event did not appreciably alter the newly established U.S. - P.R.C. tie.

The events of 1980 have thrust the two countries closer than perhaps could have been previously imagined. The January Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the impetus of a more serious consideration of playing the "China Card." This concept suggests enhancing U.S. - P.R.C. relations as a means of thwarting the assumed expansionist Soviet Union.

Also in January, U.S. Defense Secretary Brown visited China. Even though the trip was claimed to have been arranged prior to Afghanistan, it clearly represented a signal on the eve of Russia's invasion. Also in that month, the P.R.C.

terminated talks with the Soviet Union regarding their differences, specifically on the border disputes. A further development that month was the granting to China the status of "Most Favored Nation" in trade by the United States.

Early in 1980, it appeared that, with the announced sale of U.S. "military related" technology to China and with the granting of most favored nation (MFN) status to her, in which neither case applies to the U.S.S.R., the United States had decidedly tilted toward Peking at the expense of Moscow.

II. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE U.S. INTEREST IN CHINA

This chapter shifts from the past to the contemporary and discusses international and domestic factors which determine the nature and extent of the U.S. interests in China. The full diplomatic recognition and granting of MFN trading status reflect that the U.S. perceives it still has a positive interest in China.

International factors, in its usage here, are defined as those external issues and events which have had impact on U.S. policy and action. The primary international factors which have significantly influenced the U.S. perception of interest in the P.R.C. are: the Sino-Soviet conflict, the growing Soviet threat worldwide, the domestic and foreign policies of the P.R.C, Sino-Japanese relations, and China's role with native insurgent Communist parties.

As stated previously, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated through the 1960's, culminating in border clashes in 1969 in Sinkiang and on the Ussuri River. The outcome of the territorial conflict has yet to be determined. It is important to note that "the Soviets had about 12 under-strength divisions for immediate operations against the Chinese in 1964... by the early 1970's nearly 45 divisions were stationed along the Soviet - Chinese border or in immediate reserve."³⁷ This development, exacerbated by the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia, had ominous

implications in Peking. From this period to the death of Mao and Zhou, China made gestures to Moscow suggesting reconciliation which to Peking no satisfactory response was reciprocated. After these deaths, power struggles within the CCP truncated any moves regarding Moscow. The emergent leaders, Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping, reiterated standard Maoist claims of Soviet socialist imperialism to tilt more toward Peking than Moscow.

In February, 1978, Hua set forth conditions for improving relations with the Soviet Union. Essentially he stated maintenance of the border, disengage military units, negotiate boundary questions, and Soviet troop withdrawal from Mongolia were the prerequisites for normalization. Some progress had been made in reducing tensions by initiating negotiations on October 17, 1979. However, the January, 1980, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan evoked cancellation of the talks. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said, "The invasion of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan threatens world peace and China's security. It creates new obstacles for normalizing relations between the two countries."³⁸

The vastly enlarged Soviet military posture on China's borders, inflamed by the recent use of Soviet military power in Afghanistan, has precipitated as an international factor that has had an impact in determination of the nature and extent of the U.S. security interest in China. Essentially, both nations share the perception of the U.S.S.R. as the primary adversary. China's antipathy to the U.S.S.R. is in

the interest of the U.S. in the context that China serves as an added security concern to the Soviet Union.

The second international factor affecting the U.S. interest in the P.R.C. is the growing threat of the technologically advanced Soviet military juggernaut. "The foreign policy of the Soviet state advances through both the presence and use of power."³⁹ No longer does the United States enjoy an unchallenged position as the world's primary military power. This is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. now have rough strategic weapons parity. The U.S.S.R. has a quantitative superiority in Warsaw Pact conventional forces. (A quantitative comparison between the U.S. and Soviet armies is provided in Table 1.) Not only do the numbers point this out; Russia has shown a greater tendency to project power through military means:

- 1975: U.S.S.R. intervenes in Angolan civil war via Cuban proxy army.
- 1977: U.S.S.R. intervenes in Ethiopia with Cuban proxy army.
- 1978: U.S.S.R. initiates significant arms transfers to Vietnam for use in Kampuchean invasion; concludes treaty of alliance with Vietnam.
- 1979: Soviet and Cuban advisors train and provide support for South Yemeni invasion of North Yemen.
- 1980: U.S.S.R. invades Afghanistan with 85 - 100,000 troops aimed at propping up pro-Moscow Marxist regime.⁴⁰

Asia has not been spared from the enhanced Soviet military capability. They perhaps do not have the necessary land forces to wage total defeat on China. However, the presence of the

TABLE 1

	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
PERSONNEL	750,800	1,825,000
ARMORED DIVISIONS*	4	47
MECHANIZED/MOTORIZED INFANTRY DIVISIONS	5	118
INFANTRY DIVISIONS*	5	0
AIRBORNE DIVISIONS	1	8
AIRMOBILE DIVISIONS	1	0
(*Data does not include 3 Armored Cavalry Regiments, 3 Independent Brigades for U.S.)		
TANKS	10,500	50,000
ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES	22,000	55,000
ARTILLERY PIECES	6,500	20,000

Source: The Military Balance: 1979 - 1980. London: The International Institute
For Strategic Studies, 1979.

45-odd divisions on China's frontier make possible something other than what is necessary for defense. It is feasible to suggest that the Soviet forces in the area could accomplish limited objectives in China beyond the Chinese capability to dislodge them. This is especially relevant when considered in the context that the Soviets may perceive their military advantage waning. A scenario could be a pre-emptive strike on China's nuclear missile sites followed by a rapid invasion and withdrawal from one of the Chinese outlying provinces, such as Sinkiang or Manchuria. "Humiliating China and discrediting its leadership might be seen as a catalyst to provoking a general realignment of international forces."⁴¹

Perhaps the most significant growth in Soviet military strength in Asia is in sea power. She now has a Pacific "blue water" navy which has the capability of cutting the major sea lanes. In a worst case situation, U.S. naval power could be denied access to Asia via the Pacific Ocean.

U.S. Naval Power is the central element, the linchpin, of any efforts to maintain sea lines open to Japan and allied East Asian states. Unfortunately, there is a growing concern over the U.S. Navy's ability to deal with any Soviet challenge in the East Asian area.⁴²

Japan and Korea, cut off not only from the United States, could be substantially cut off from Persian Gulf oil by successful blockage of the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits. This would, in essence, isolate all of East Asia. The ramifications on the resource-dependent economies of this region are significant. Would a nation like Japan risk economic

disaster and possible military conflict in supporting the United States in this scenario? It is likely that, under extreme pressure, these countries, faced with a successful Soviet naval expedition, would choose neutrality out of self-interest and survival.

In addition to the growing Soviet military force worldwide, she has a great capability to disrupt regional stability by providing native insurgents in large numbers and military equipment that no other state is either willing or able to provide.

As a result of this growing Soviet military threat, the P.R.C. is viewed in a new light vis-à-vis ten years ago. This phenomenon has had an impact on determination of the extent of U.S. security interests in China similar to that of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In the international system of one nation gaining military advantage over others to a degree that is perceived threatening, there has historically been a tendency to form alliances and agreements to balance against the threat. In the event of a shift of power in Northeast Asia, it is in the U.S. security interest to maintain alternatives. The P.R.C. is viewed in its contribution to maintaining U.S. security options in Asia. China fulfills the role of minimizing Soviet military power as well as providing a possible security partner in the event of U.S. - U.S.S.R. hostilities. In this role, she provides an alternative source of support for the U.S. in the event of the collapse of the existing U.S. defensive alliance system in Asia.

The third international factor influencing the American perception of interest is the domestic and foreign policies of China itself. After the fall of the radical "Gang of Four" in 1976, China has presented itself to the West as a more rational nation attempting to modernize its economy in a rational manner. The "Gang of Four" were four top party officials who were intent on maintaining a more militant line in internal and external affairs. Before their arrest, it was unclear what path China would follow upon the death of Mao in 1976. Their fall signaled the West that there was a good possibility of a stable China.

China has embarked on a development plan designed to achieve the "Four Modernizations" -- modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense. This is hardly the type of philosophy of Mao's "Great Leap" of over twenty years ago. China's domestic policies reflect an attempt "to build an economic system that combines central planning with a market system."⁴³ No doubt this "Yugoslavian" approach is intuitively pleasing to any American capitalist. China, now ostensibly conducting its economy based on pragmatic principles, appears more acceptable and compatible to the U.S. The American perception may not be totally correct. While it is true that the current regime espouses domestic policies that conform more to our belief of what is good, it is doubtful that China will abandon its long-range ideological goals. On June 18, 1979, Chairman Hua emphasized the CCP's

dedication to socialism in a speech delivered at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress.

Strengthening of our socialist democracy and socialist legal system is urgently needed for the sake of consolidating the socialist state system which is led by the working class and has as its masters the entire working people, for the sake of solidifying the political foundation on which the country can carry out socialist modernization in stability and unity.⁴⁴

There is a danger assuming there exists realism or idealism exclusively rather than a mixture.

All of this means that while the United States may welcome the triumph of pragmatism in China, this development will not automatically resolve China's domestic problems or clarify relations with the outside world.⁴⁵

Yet the fact remains that China has entered into a domestic economic program that reflects more of rational management than one based on ideological concerns. This pragmatic approach perhaps reflects a more stable China and thus a more reliable state to conduct relations with.

In addition to a more compatible economic policy, China also is currently engaged in providing a more democratic system for its population. This is not to be confused with democracy in the Western sense. The regime has initiated work on formulating a constitution which will possibly impact favorably on the average citizen. This document may provide a paper standard of laws that will provide a consistent code for defining what is legal and what is not. This is significant in that it allows the average citizen knowledge of his rights rather than being judged by the whims of officials. It is expected that this legal system will undergo difficulties

in enforcement and standardization. Since the early days of the P.R.C., the population has lived without this document. A period of transition from old to new will most likely witness instances of violation by officials who have grown accustomed to their role as interpreters of the law.

The foreign policies of China have also altered to a point that enabled a change in the U.S. perception of interest. As previously noted, the U.S. - P.R.C. normalization resulted from both nations reassessing their respective bi-lateral policies. Relations have improved steadily since the Nixon-Kissinger trips, largely a result of the common perception of the Soviet Union as the major world threat to peace. China since then has tapered its foreign policy in an appealing light. Stressing its support for the U.S. presence in Asia (and Europe), the P.R.C. has in essence reversed its previous anti-imperialism campaign aimed at the U.S.

Several actions taken by China support this point. Early in 1980, China allowed its thirty-year treaty with Moscow to lapse, thus indicating diplomatically an official split with the Soviet Union. Also, Chinese leaders have officially indicated their support for the U.S. presence in South Korea. This signal is representative of China's appreciation of the role the United States plays in the regional balance of power and addition to stability in Northeast Asia.

The compatibility of foreign policies can be described as the pursuance of harmonious objectives in Asia and the world. For China to achieve her new domestic goals, it is in her best interest to enhance peace and stability through her foreign policies. By indicating a pro-U.S. stance, China has provided a favorable international environment that has influenced the U.S. perception of interest in her.

The Sino-Japanese relationship must also be considered as a factor influencing the U.S. interest in China. Not until recently has there been a period of time when all three nations (U.S. - P.R.C. - Japan) have enjoyed friendly relations with one another. Prior to, and throughout World War II, the United States pursued policies aimed at insuring the security of China from Japan. Not long after the war, the relations of the U.S. with these two nations had essentially reversed. This was a function of the Communist victory in China in 1949 and the U.S. - Japan friendship resulting from the occupation and reconstruction.

On September 8, 1951, the United States and Japan signed a security treaty which gave the U.S. responsibility for Japanese security. From this time until the early 1970's, Japanese foreign policy toward China was congruous to that of the U.S. China, seen as a direct threat to Japanese security, influenced the government's position. Japan followed U.S. leadership in relations with Taiwan.

Even though the "official" policy portrayed the P.R.C. as a dangerous neighbor, Japan engaged in trade with her.

Under the restrictions of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Export Controls to Communist Countries), which the Japanese have scrupulously followed, only a highly selective list of "nonstrategic materials" could be exported to China.⁴⁶

Table 2 illustrates the importance of this factor to both the Japanese and Chinese economies. Japanese trade with the P.R.C. had conveniently been explained by their principle of economic and political separation.

Japan's reorientation of its relations with the P.R.C. can be attributed to the initial U.S. - P.R.C. overtures in the early 1970's. "...The international framework in which Japan live(d) (had) been fundamentally altered (in) 1971 by...the American opening to China...."⁴⁷ These initial probes conducted by the Nixon administration signaled Tokyo that the P.R.C. was no longer regarded by Washington as a dangerous enemy. Throughout the 1950's and 1960's, China had considered any friend of the U.S. an enemy. "Once Peking and Washington began to seek détente, however, Chinese policy changed nearly overnight."⁴⁸ Japan, witnessing the above phenomena of the U.S. and P.R.C. initiating improved relations and no longer itself being labeled an enemy by China, was stimulated to normalize relations with the P.R.C. On September 29, 1972, Japan officially recognized the People's Republic of China.

The Sino-Japanese rapprochement has influenced the American perception of interest in China. A possible obstacle of Japan protesting U.S. - P.R.C. normalization never materialized. Before 1972, their own détente with China encouraged the United States to seek good relations with the P.R.C. and thus

TABLE 2
Sino - Japanese Trade, 1958 - 70

Year	Japan's trade with China (\$ millions)			Per cent of total Japanese trade		Per cent of total Chinese trade	
	Exports	Imports	Total	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1958	50.6	54.4	105.0	1.8	1.8	2.8	2.8
1959	3.7	18.9	22.6	0.1	0.5	1.0	0.2
1960	2.7	20.7	23.4	--	0.5	1.0	0.1
1961	16.7	30.9	47.6	0.4	0.5	2.0	1.3
1962	38.5	46.0	84.5	0.8	0.8	3.0	3.9
1963	62.4	74.6	137.0	1.1	1.1	5.0	6.1
1964	152.7	157.8	310.5	2.3	2.0	12.6	15.4
1965	245.3	224.7	470.0	2.9	2.8	16.5	18.7
1966	315.2	306.2	621.4	3.2	3.2	18.2	18.2
1967	288.3	269.5	557.8	2.8	2.3	19.3	17.6
1968	325.5	224.2	549.7	2.5	1.7	16.9	29.5
1969	390.8	234.5	625.3	2.4	1.6	16.2	31.5
1970	568.9	253.8	822.7	2.9	1.3	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Japan and East Asia - The New International Order. Donald C. Hellman. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972.

provide an atmosphere of stability and cooperation in Asia by three of the major powers there. After 1972, the Japanese moved faster and farther in their good relations with China due to the radical shift in U.S. policy.

A fifth external factor in shaping U.S. policy toward China was the information on Communist supported insurgencies. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, U.S. governmental policy-makers became more concerned about the nature of indigenous insurgent movements throughout the world. It became apparent to them that these movements were not as they had been portrayed in the past. Previously, it had been thought that native Communist parties had received moral and material support from a unified Communist block. Support for insurgents was thought to be the one common interest between the Soviet Union and the P.R.C. maintained after the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.

In the U.S. Senate Hearings on U.S. Relations with the P.R.C. in 1971, evidence which cast doubt on the above assumption was presented by an array of witnesses. A similar message ran through most testimonies. Experts and scholars of China repeatedly stated that China is not motivated to expand its influence, that native Communist parties are motivated by internal conditions, and that Chinese support of insurgents was a second priority to their desire to have relationships with non-Communist governments.⁴⁹ The impact of these ideas is that a new image of China was being portrayed. The idea that the U.S. was not fighting proxy forces

in Vietnam but a nationalist movement on expelling a "colonial" power gained notice. This helped assuage the customary fears of a militant China fomenting anti-American sentiment throughout Asia. The new perception of China's relations with indigenous Communist parties was perceived as a much less threat to American interests. This constituted a positive factor enabling a more favorable perception of U.S. interest in the P.R.C.

In addition to the primary international factors influencing U.S. - P.R.C. policies, there are domestic factors in the U.S. that influence the interest in the P.R.C. The latter days of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam caused many Americans to question the policies involving our role in Asia. After the Tet offensive (1968), a reappraisal was in order. The Nixon Doctrine (1969) resulted in articulating a less overt military posture in that region. The inevitable American disengagement from Vietnam required that the Nixon administration accomplish something in Asia other than what some felt was a defeat. Perhaps Nixon "was sufficiently flexible to profit from the bitter aspects of the recent American experience in Asia, particularly Vietnam, and to seek victories where he had tasted defeats."⁵⁰ As a result, after the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, he took steps in 1971 and 1972 to lessen tensions with both the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. in the name of détente. The SALT negotiations and the U.S. - U.S.S.R. improved relations were not well received in Peking. It appeared to the Chinese leadership that the U.S. security

withdrawal in Asia had left a vacuum to be filled by the Soviet Union. In April, 1975, Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese armies. This phenomenon caused a reappraisal of the U.S. role in Asia. President Ford's response, the Pacific Doctrine, was not novel. Its value was its emphasis on continued normalization of relations with the P.R.C. and a pledge to respect sovereignty and peaceful co-existence. It also signaled a renewed interest in Asia.

Today the domestic political climate is not preoccupied with Vietnam or its aftermath. The primary issue regarding Asia appears to be our role with China interfaced with the perceived Soviet involvement there. The debate of how to employ U.S. assets to deter Soviet activities in Asia is a current sub-issue in policy formation. The advocacy of using China as a lever to manipulate Soviet policies has gained considerable notice in Washington. While initially professing an "evenhanded" approach to the Soviet Union and China, the current administration has come under pressure to tilt more toward Peking than Moscow.

There also appears to be an economic factor influencing the U.S. perception of interest in China. With repeated OPEC oil price hikes, growing dependence on sources from the unstable Persian Gulf, China is seen as a possible source alleviating the energy quandary. In addition, domestic corporations have built high hopes of penetrating China with their goods. A more tangible result in the "China market" has been in purchases of American grain to help feed their

burgeoning population. With the habitual U.S. grain surplus and the difficulties in improving the grain/population ratio in China, there appears to be a real and lasting market there for some time to come. Attention is drawn to economic factors because of their obvious connection with the security interest.

The primary domestic factors influencing the U.S. perception of interest are: the general desire on the part of one segment of the American public to compensate for the lessened American role in Asia, the perception of Soviet growth and influence, and economic opportunities.

A recent development on the issue of U.S. - P.R.C. relations is the Reagan platform in his candidacy for President. While a candidate, he has indicated that, if elected, he would strengthen relations with Taiwan. This was viewed by the Chinese as a policy proposal

...completely destroying the principle underlying the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, and relations between the two countries would retreat to a position the people of neither country would like to see.⁵¹

The dilemma facing Reagan was exactly that which faced Carter: how to build an expanding favorable policy with the P.R.C. while retaining good relations with Taiwan, considered by China as an outlying province. It was obvious that Governor Reagan's Taiwan comments were designed to solidify support from the right-wing Republican faction prior to the election but he was entirely aware of the necessity of continuing the normalization process inaugurated by President Nixon and carried forward by President Ford. He sent to China

his running mate, George Bush, with advisors Allen and Laird, to help him in any way possible to solve his dilemma. It was also expected that this trip would persuade the Chinese that Reagan, in spite of his well-known views, would act in a statesmanlike manner if he were elected.

The fact is undeniable that the U.S. has a national interest in the P.R.C. and has a significant role to play in Asia. This fact is unrelated to partisanship and permits partisan differences only as to methods by which agreed-upon objectives are to be achieved.

III. RECENT U.S. POLICIES RELATIVE TO THE P.R.C.

In the past two years, there has been substantial evidence indicating an enhanced U.S. interest in China. This evidence has appeared in tangible as well as in rhetorical forms. Despite previous mentioning, it is appropriate to list the significant developments involving the U.S. and P.R.C.

- 1 Jan 1979: U.S. grants full diplomatic relations to the P.R.C.
- Aug 1979: Secretary of State Vance signs legal documents certifying China as a "friendly" state. (Yugoslavia is only other communist state having this status.)
- 27 Aug 1979: Vice-President Mondale makes address broadcast nationwide at Beijing (Peking) University. States that China and the United States share parallel strategic and bilateral interests.
- 5 - 13 Jan 1980: Secretary of Defense Brown visits China for defense related discussions; public statements issued.⁵²
- 24 Jan 1980: U.S. grants most favored nation trading status to the P.R.C. (The U.S.S.R. desires but has been denied this status.)
- 25 - 29 May 1980: Vice-Premier Geng Biao visits the U.S. for military equipment sales talks. U.S. states that it will sell the P.R.C. dual-use items: transport aircraft, defense radar, and helicopters.
- 4 Jun 1980: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke makes speech entitled "China and the U.S.: Into the 1980's." It is important in emphasizing that the triangular diplomacy between the U.S. - U.S.S.R. - P.R.C. is no longer an adequate conceptual tool for conducting relations. (See Appendix A.)

The above events, in a relatively short period of time, show that the U.S. not only perceives but is pursuing good relations with China as a basic national interest.

In August, 1979, Vice-President Mondale delivered a speech in the P.R.C. at Beijing (Peking) University. It is significant in that it was the first speech by an American broadcast nationwide in the P.R.C. Mondale stressed the U.S. security interest in China by saying:

Thus any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests. This is why the United States normalized relations with your country, and that is why we must work to broaden and strengthen our new friendship.⁵³

As an example of the rapidity with which circumstances change, Carter informed Brezhnev in January, 1979, "that the United States has no plans to sell arms to China."⁵⁴ One year later, immediately following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary Brown

...informed the Chinese that the United States was now ready to move "from passive to more active forms of security cooperation" with Peking, and that this would include "complementary" and "parallel" actions "in the field of defense as well as diplomacy."⁵⁵

Four months later, "the administration offered to sell transport aircraft and helicopters, which could have military uses, to Peking."⁵⁶ This may not be in conflict to Carter's previous message to the Soviet leader; it signifies the Administration's willingness to interpret its position liberally. In May, 1980, Vice-Premier Geng Biao visited the U.S. to study military purchases. The result was that, in addition to approval of exporting transport aircraft and helicopters, the Administration

"approve(d) export licenses permitting American companies to ship advanced military equipment to China, including computers and air defense radar."⁵⁷

Other than military related sales, diplomatic recognition, and granting of MFN trade status, political rhetoric has indicated an increased interest in China by the U.S. Prior to the Afghanistan invasion, the official U.S. policy was one of exercising "evenhandedness" in relations with the P.R.C. and U.S.S.R. Normalization was justified by President Carter as a tack that

...would help move global politics away from a system dominated by two military giants, the United States and the Soviet Union, toward an international order composed of several major powers, including China.⁵⁸

In May, 1980, a U.S. official stated, in reference to the military equipment sales, "the Russians have to realize that what we have done thus far with China is a very small part, a very small fraction of what we could do."⁵⁹

In addition to rhetoric, the U.S. has announced recently a change in strategic plans which indicates increased military requirements in Asia.

President Carter agreed last month (April) to a new strategic plan that no longer commits Washington to send Pacific-based forces to Europe in the event of Soviet attack there, according to Government officials.⁶⁰

This is seen as a response in planning to the increased viability of Soviet Far East military forces. The abandonment of the "swing strategy," as the idea of reinforcing NATO with Pacific-based forces is called, results from the need of increased American naval presence in the Indian Ocean

as a response to the increased viability of the Soviet Far East military forces.

In June, 1980, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke addressed the National Council for U.S. - China Trade. His speech has since been published by the State's Bureau of Public Affairs as Current Policy No. 187. It is significant in that it stresses the importance of a stable China to the United States. The principles outlined in the speech that apply to U.S. policy toward China are:

1. The U.S. will develop relations with China on their own merits. Relations will not be a function of relations with the Soviet Union.
2. Relations with China will not be pursued at the expense of relations with other states.
3. Policies will reflect the U.S. interest in a friendly and successfully modernizing China.
4. The U.S. will pursue the interest of a strong, secure China. The existing international environment does not justify arms sales nor joint military planning. The U.S. will assist China's security improvements by permitting appropriate technology transfers.
5. The U.S. will adhere to normalization understandings with respect to Taiwan. The relations between Taiwan and the P.R.C. are for the two parties to settle.
6. The U.S. will pursue policies engaging Chinese involvement in solving global problems.

The Chinese have also provided rhetoric, usually in the form of soliciting increased U.S. interest in China. The methods employed have usually been in the form of warning of Soviet expansionism. An example of an official Chinese statement of Deng Xiaoping during Secretary Brown's visit is provided:

All countries in the world should unite and deal seriously with the Soviet policy of global expansionism. China and the U.S. should do something in a down-to-earth way so as to defend world peace against Soviet hegemonism.⁶¹

As noted above, there have been numerous indicators, in relations, military sales, strategic plans, and rhetoric, that highlight the fact that the U.S. perceives it has a greater interest in China than before. No longer is our interest served by China becoming less antagonistic and thus friendly to the United States. The tangible indicators are in essence the plans and policies that have been incorporated so as to achieve certain goals and objectives. Ultimately, accomplishing the above will secure a trajectory that insures the best probability for securing the American interests in China. At this point, the work has discussed events and issues that have already occurred. The purpose is to provide a reasonable interpretation of the present.

IV. COMPONENTS OF CHINA'S SECURITY PROBLEMS AND CAPABILITIES

In the following discussion, an attempt will be made to identify the components of China's security objectives and capabilities, particularly the geographic and military components. These components, when synthesized with the U.S. goals and objectives, will permit an analysis to be made of the U.S. security interest in China. In reviewing the actual policies incorporated in light of the above, we will be able to determine whether the U.S. has enacted rational plans so as to secure its interest. This will make it feasible to define more clearly the parameters within which future policies will be adjudged.

A. GEOGRAPHICAL COMPONENTS

1. Sino-Soviet Border

Perhaps the most significant geographical component of China's security capability is its immense border of over 4,500 miles with the Soviet Union. China presently perceives its primary security threat from these border areas. Aside from the U.S.S.R., no nation sharing borders with the P.R.C. possesses the capability or military posture indicating offensive tendencies. China's present security quandary to the north and the past border skirmishes there are not new phenomena. Historically the Chinese have experienced major invasions from generally the same area that it now perceives

a threat. The Mongols and Manchus both invaded and conquered China in the 13th and 17th centuries, respectively. The historical precedent, in a nation ultimately aware of its heritage, cannot be understated. In security matters, China's chief concern is, as in the past, from a threat of invasion from the north.

China also shares western borders in Sinkiang province with the Soviet Union. This area is inhabited both in the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. by Turkish minorities. China's concern is that this minority population can be exploited by Soviet propaganda designed to stir unrest and thus foment anti-government feelings.

The January, 1980, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan adds a further security concern to the P.R.C. From this region, it is possible to traverse the Aksai Chin to gain entry on an additional axis of advance into China.

2. Sea Lane Security

In addition to China's historical border threats, a new dimension has been added. With the quantitative and qualitative improvements in the Soviet Naval forces in the East Asia area, China, as well as Asia, faces uncertainty in maintenance of sea lanes in conflict situations. This situation must be considered in the overall context of American security interests in China. In a worst-case scenario, a world war, it is possible that the Russian fleet could insulate all of Asia from an American naval force. China's central location emphasizes its vulnerability from not only its

northern frontier, but from a Soviet sterilized maritime environment as well. It must be emphasized that the apocalyptic consequences of Soviet naval invincibility may be less than probable but are at least possible.

3. Other Neighbors

In terms of security, it is important to discuss those neighboring states, other than the U.S.S.R., that present a threat to the P.R.C. As stated previously, only the U.S.S.R. possesses the capability to constitute a real threat in terms of invasion. However, the actions of other states in collusion with the U.S.S.R. can be considered in a discussion of security problems. Today there are three neighbors of China that the Soviet Union exercises significant influence over: India, Vietnam, and North Korea. These three nations represent different security aspects for China and thus will be discussed separately.

India and China have not enjoyed consistent amiable relations, largely a result of border clashes. The major military confrontations occurred in 1962. The dispute had earlier origins, but it came into the open as early as 1959. The Soviet aspect is that in this year, they adopted a neutral stance regarding the territorial claims between China and India. When the border war erupted in 1962, the Soviets clearly supported India "through continued delivery of war material to New Delhi despite the Chinese - Indian clashes."⁶² In 1971, the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty with and also supported

India in its war with China's friend, Pakistan. The security aspect is that while India might not possess the military apparatus to pose a unilateral threat, its tilt toward Moscow represents its inclination. This added dimension signifies that India, on issues concerning China, will more than likely side with the Soviet Union. Also, in the scenario of a world conflict, India must be considered as a potential second front threat to China.

Vietnam has had no love historically for China. It has experienced numerous military invasions from China throughout the centuries. The Chinese regard this area as an extension of Sinic civilization and consider that, if outside influence is to be injected, it should be theirs. Influence by Moscow, in such close proximity, is clearly regarded as a threatening component of an encircling strategy. Events which emphasize this security threat are:

- Vietnam's admittance into COMECON (June 1978),
- The Hanoi - Moscow Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (November 1978), and
- Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) (December 1978).

China's anxiety over the above developments, exacerbated by Hanoi's discrimination on ethnic Chinese, precipitated the February, 1979, punitive expedition into Vietnam. Even though the attack was limited in terms of objectives, China sustained significant casualty figures which suggests that the expedition may not have accomplished its strategic objective. The Vietnamese are still close to Moscow, still have forces in

Kampuchea, and are still discriminating against their ethnic Chinese population

The Soviet Union has turned out to be the sole winner in the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. Moscow has gained a valuable ally on the southern flank of China.⁶³

The tangible aspects of Moscow's gains are that not only does it support a neighboring state that constitutes a viable threat to China; its predictable expanding use of Cam Ranh Bay will substantially increase the effectiveness of its naval arm. This would greatly enhance its prowess due to the alleviation of many of the logistic problems incurred in supporting a fleet from Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The naval aspect has greater implications than just one of Sino-Soviet hostility. The use of Vietnam as a Soviet naval facility has a vast impact on regional security as well. The already discussed scenario of a well equipped Russian navy insulating Asia from the U.S. is made more realistic by the use of Vietnam's port facilities. In a sense, Vietnam constitutes a Soviet threat on another front, verifying China's perception of Soviet motives.

North Korea represents a neighbor of both China and the Soviet Union. There is an element of uncertainty in the triangular relationship of these three countries in that both China and the U.S.S.R. compete for influence there. The Chinese perspective historically is that the Korean peninsula traditionally has been a route of entry into China and as an objective of invasion from China.

Korea represents as much a security issue for China as ever. It is widely known that Kim Il sung, the North Korean leader, has vowed to unify Korea through military means. Even though both China and the Soviet Union oppose any large-scale conflict there, and seek to restrain North Korea, it can be argued that Kim might try to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute to his advantage. From a Chinese viewpoint, if the U.S.S.R. chose to sanction a North Korean invasion, China would be in a precarious situation. Several questions arise from this scenario. Would China support North Korea as a fellow Communist nation and thus uphold its treaty obligation? Or would it remain outside the conflict so as to maintain its newly established ties with the West? Clearly the P.R.C. has a dilemma. It supports reunification by other than violent means, which at the present does not seem likely. Given the P.R.C.'s present program of modernization, it is doubtful that Peking will do anything to upset the status quo. China wants above all peace and stability in the region. Given the present situation in North Korea, exacerbated by the South's political turbulence, it is in order to suggest that Peking will attempt to increase its influence, vis-à-vis Moscow, over Pyongyang. This will enable her not only to sustain its position vis-à-vis Russia, but also to provide a restraint on Kim Il sung.

4. Agrarian Fragility

When considering geographical components in respect to China, one must not overlook the enormous role of agriculture

in Chinese life. Since this work deals with security, it is appropriate to discuss how China's agricultural system reflects on that issue.

Agriculture is the first priority in China's Four Modernizations scheme. It is important to note that 70% of the population, of roughly one billion, is engaged in agricultural pursuit where only 10% of the land is arable. This highlights the magnitude of agriculture in the Chinese life and economy. It is of utmost importance for the present Chinese leaders not to be a part of any policy that aids in disruption of the already strained food production system.

The production of the staple crop, grain, has barely kept pace with the population growth since 1949. Since this date, production has tripled from 111 million metric tons to 312 million metric tons. With population increasing in the same period from 538 million to almost one billion, the grain/population ratio has generally remained just under 300 kilograms per capita. The experience in the years 1959-61, when crop failures resulted in an average of 236 kilograms per capita, is a vivid memory in China. This period shows the fragility of the agricultural system. A reduction of 20% in grain production resulted in widespread famine. In the best years China maintains a subsistence level of grain production.

China's leaders state that

...we must maintain the political stability and unity for a long time to come. Unless we meet this prerequisite, the realization of the Four Modernizations,

including agricultural modernization, before the end of this century will be out of the question.⁶⁴

The normalization of relations with the West and Japan may have initially been a reaction to the growing Soviet threat. China is also reaping the rewards of trade with these nations by applying the benefits to modernization of the agricultural sector. Only the West can provide grain in the event of a climatic catastrophe in China. For the current regime, stability and security are the prerequisites to reaching the long-range goals. Any disruption of any magnitude could affect the present leaders' credibility and thus provide impetus to the now-dormant pro-Moscow cliques. The present regime in no way wants to return to the chaotic days of the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution. In a situation such as those, China would be vulnerable from external as well as internal sources.

China needs to enhance its relations with the West and Japan so as to develop substantial agricultural schemes incorporating efficient and mechanized farms. In respect to China's emphasis on stability and agricultural modernization, it is expected that the Chinese government will continue its current pragmatic policy.

B. MILITARY COMPONENTS

China's military apparatus is primarily a defensive-oriented ground conventional force. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) encompasses the air and naval arms as well as the ground combat units. In terms of manpower, she possesses

the largest defense establishment in the world with 4.36 million personnel on active duty.^{6 5} For comparative purposes, Table 3 sets forth relevant data on U.S., P.R.C., U.S.S.R., N.A.T.O (without U.S.), and Warsaw Pact (without U.S.S.R.) military establishments. All figures which follow are derived from The Military Balance, 1979-80, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

To describe the PLA, it is best to do so in terms of personnel, equipment, and support activities. Within each area, different aspects, such as quantity and quality, will be discussed.

- Conventional Forces

As stated above, the P.R.C. has the largest military force in the world. The PLA is divided into the ground, naval, and air arm. The quantity of personnel in each arm is shown in Table 4. Table 5 shows the structure of the P.R.C. Armed Forces (Army).

The deployment of these forces is divided into eleven Military Regions (MR) which are further divided into Military Districts (MD).

1. North and Northeast China (Shenyang and Peking MR): 52 MF DIVs, 29 LF DIVs.
2. North and Northwest China (Lanzhou and Xinjiang MR): 13 MF DIVs, 12 LF DIVs.
3. East and Southeast China (Jinan, Nanjing, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou MR): 32 MF DIVs, 26 LF DIVs.
4. Central China (Wuhan MR): 14 MF DIVs (incl 3 ABN DIVs), 7 LF DIVs.

TABLE 3

1. MANPOWER (in thousands) - in ARMED FORCES

U.S.	U.S.S.R.	P.R.C.	N.A.T.O.	Warsaw Pact
2022.0	3658.0	4360.0	2859.3	1105.0

2. FORCES AS % OF MEN 18 - 45 YRS.

U.S.	U.S.S.R.	P.R.C.	N.A.T.O.	Warsaw Pact
4.5	6.6	2.1	4.13	4.95

3. MILITARY EXPENDITURE - % of GNP

U.S.	U.S.S.R.	P.R.C.	N.A.T.O.	Warsaw Pact
5.0	11 - 14	10.0	3 - 4	3.4

TABLE 4

	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE
1. Number (thousands)	3,600	360	400
2. Percentage	82.5	8.25	9.25

TABLE 5

ARMY

MAIN FORCES (MF)	LOCAL FORCES (LF)
115 Infantry Divisions	85 Divisions
11 Armor Divisions	130 Independent Regiments
3 Airborne Divisions	
40 Artillery Divisions	
16 Rail & Construction Divisions	
150 Independent Regiments	

5. West and Southwest China (Chengdu and Kunming MR):
18 MF DIVs, 11 LF DIVs.

In terms of quality, the PLA soldier is regarded as a tough, disciplined fighting man. Given the Maoist philosophy of a "People's War," the PLA is capable of engaging most effectively in small unit operations. The most serious personnel shortfall in modernization is seen to be the peasant-soldiers' inability to operate the more sophisticated weapons systems. Table 6 lists the major equipment quantities of the ground forces in the PLA.

TABLE 6

11,000	- - - - -	TANKS
1,500	- - - - -	ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
16,000	- - - - -	ARTILLERY PIECES
32,000	- - - - -	MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, ANTI-TANK GUNS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

All of the above equipment is ten to twenty years out of date. Almost all tanks are of the Soviet model T-34 and T-54 which the Chinese have termed the T-34/85 and Type 59, respectively. The Type 62 tank is a Chinese-produced light tank used primarily for reconnaissance and where roads, bridges, and terrain are unsuitable for heavier vehicles. The Type 63 is a Chinese-produced amphibious tank copied from the Soviet PT-76 reconnaissance vehicle. It has been fitted with a larger gun and is used in similar roles as the Type 62.

Even though an adequate armored vehicle, the Chinese tank lacks the technological improvements that have been implemented on NATO and Warsaw Pact main battle tanks. There is a significant lack of such technical innovation as laser rangefinders, thermal imagery, and automatic loaders. To improve the PLA's effectiveness against the threat of a Soviet invasion, the number of tanks per Infantry Division increased (starting in 1969) from thirty to eighty.

The status of the artillery is similar to that of the armor. The standard howitzers in use are copies of Soviet models. While all of the pieces (57mm - 152 mm) are effective weapons, they have not been widely incorporated with modern technological innovations as computerized fire direction centers. The Chinese have recently developed a self-propelled artillery piece by outfitting a 122mm howitzer in a tracked vehicle resembling the indigenously designed and produced M-1967 armored personnel carrier. An (SP) artillery vehicle represents an indirect fire weapon that has the speed and mobility of a mechanized unit. The mechanization of an armed force is indicative of contemporary modernization efforts throughout the world.

As for rocket launchers, anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft guns, the PLA has also yet to incorporate those newest weapons that have appeared in NATO and Warsaw Pact. China possesses no wire or laser guidance systems which are the status quo in most modern armies.

The support activities of China's ground forces reflect the defense posture of the PLA. She "lacks facilities and logistic support for protracted large-scale operations outside China."⁶⁶ Table 7 shows the structure and equipment of the PLA Navy.

TABLE 7

NAVY

Organization:

- North Sea Fleet: Yalu River to south of Lianyungang
- East Sea Fleet: Lianyungang to Dongshan
- South Sea Fleet: Dongshan to Vietnamese frontier

Ships:

- 1 - - - - 'HAN' SSN (nuc. pwr.) submarine
- 1 - - - - 'GOLF' class submarine
- 91 - - - - Submarines (incl. 68 'ROMEOs', 21 'WHISKY',
2 'MING' class)
- 4 - - - - GORDY Destroyers (ex-Soviet, w/STYX SSM)
- 7 - - - - LUTA Destroyers (w/STYX SSM)
- 14 - - - - Frigates (w/STYX SSM or SAMs)
- 9 - - - - Patrol Escorts
- 120 - - - - Hydrofoil Patrol Craft
- 20 - - - - Large Patrol Craft (KRONSTADT)

The Naval Arm also incorporates its own air arm of about 800 shore-based aircraft integrated into the Air-Defense network.

TABLE 8

Aircraft (Navy)

150	- - - -	IL-28/B-5 (torpedo) and Tu-16/Tu-2 (light bombers)
575	- - - -	Fighters (Mig-17/F-4, Mig-19/F-6, and F-9)
50	- - - -	Helicopters (Mi-4/H-5)

The Chinese Navy operates, as does the ground force, without the most modern equipment. Compared with the recent past, China's naval capability is steadily increasing through modernization and growth. "Efforts are geared to the building of a coastal defense navy."⁶⁷ To emphasize the Chinese Navy's growth, she possessed 49 submarines in 1974 which is compared with 91 of the same type she has today.

In terms of capability, the naval forces are seen as an adequate force for coastal defense operations. She, at this moment, does not possess the capability to interdict sea lanes, conduct amphibious operations for more than 30,000 men, or operate for long durations without porting. These are the capabilities describing a "blue-water" navy.

Table 9 shows the equipment in the PLA Air Force. The significance of the equipment inventory given in this table is similar to that of the other two arms. While quite large, the Chinese Air Force possesses the qualitative equipment of that of the Korean War vintage. There is no long-range bomber capability which can be compared to that of the U.S. or U.S.S.R.

TABLE 9

AIR FORCE

Equipment:

Total Aircraft: 4,700

80 - 90	- - - -	Tu-16/B-6 BADGER bombers
300	- - - -	Il-28/B-5 BEAGLE bombers (light)
100	- - - -	Tu-2 BAT bombers (light)
500	- - - -	Mig-15/F-2, F-9 fighters
3,700	- - - -	Mig-17/F-4, F-5 & Mig-19/F-6 fighters
80	- - - -	Mig-21/F-8, F-9 fighters
500	- - - -	Transports (300 An-2/C-5, 100 Li-2, 50 Il-14/18, and some An-12/24/26, 18 TRIDENTS)
350	- - - -	Helicopters (Mi-4/H-5, Mi-8, and 13 SUPER FRLON)
500	- - - -	Aircraft available from civil aviation fleet

The 80 to 90 Tu-16's comprise the Chinese long-range bomber fleet.

The nuclear missile capability of the P.R.C. has been compared with that of France. However, with the May 18, 1980, testing of the CSSX-4 ICBM, capable of delivering at least a 3MT warhead, the P.R.C. can no longer be put in that category.

The

...successful firing has important strategic implications for China's defense against the Soviet Union... based on the test (the missile) could reach most of the Soviet Union, and possibly the western United States.⁶⁸

Before this development, China could only reach eastern parts of the U.S.S.R. with the CSSX-3 and the Tu-16 bomber with nuclear bombs. The P.R.C. has doubtfully deployed the first

TABLE 10
NUCLEAR MISSILE FORCES

Type	Quantity	Range	Propellant
CSSX-4 ICBM	?	6,000 - 8,000 NM	Liquid
CSSX-3 Limited Range ICBM	2 - 5	3,500 NM	Liquid
CSS-2 IRBM	35 - 50	1,500 NM	Liquid
CSS-1 MRBM	30 - 40	600 - 700 NM	Liquid

of the new missiles. The capability, demonstrated to the world, signifies China's growing deterrence capability.

The nuclear missile force of China has significant shortcomings other than limited quantity when compared to the U.S. and U.S.S.R. As of 1979, all missiles used liquid propellant. This characteristic represents a vulnerability in that there is a costly time factor required to fuel the missiles prior to launching. From normal readiness configurations, the missiles require several hours to fuel for the older CSS-1 and CSS-2 to a little less than an hour for the newer CSSX-3 and CSSC-4. Thus, were the Chinese nuclear force under attack, it is doubtful all of the missiles could be fueled in time to avoid destruction. It should be added that "China has one 'GOLF'-class submarine with missile launching tubes, but it does not appear to have missiles for it."⁶⁹

By way of summary, this work has concentrated on emphasizing the relative defensive nature of China's military establishment. She relies primarily on quantity rather than quality. This is not to say that China's leaders are satisfied with this arrangement. In ever-increasing frequency there have been reports of Peking's desire to purchase Western military hardware. Angus Fraser, in an article entitled "Military Modernization in China" in Problems of Communism, employed a unique approach to analyzing Peking's military modernization goals. He recorded the frequency of Chinese officials' expressions of interest in weapons, equipment, and technology. From viewing the capabilities of the items

referred to, he concluded that "more than half of the items look directly to defense against an invader."⁷⁰ Perhaps this indicates Peking's military objectives. Then again, the interest in defense technology may be a logical choice. It seems plausible that China will not ask for offensive items that would stand the chance of not being sold to them.

One cannot blame the Chinese leaders for seeking military modernization. The costs of making the PLA into an equipped force comparable to that of the U.S.S.R. are beyond the reach of the already shaky Chinese economy. Her best hope is to maintain a plan of development that will pose a significant enough force to provide a credible deterrent, conventional and nuclear. "Nevertheless, China must face the cruel truth that while it is moving forward, so are the superpowers."⁷¹

V. CONCLUSIONS

This work has discussed the events and issues that have spurred the normalization of U.S. - P.R.C. relations. The two countries have experienced a rather rapid movement from cold to warm. The purpose of this concluding chapter is to evaluate the current policies designed to protect the U.S. security interest in China. Considerations will be made regarding whether further security arrangements are necessary or advisable.

Several ideas warrant preliminary discussion. First, possible negative future developments must be postulated to serve as a "governor" on policy formulation. Second, analysis of the "China Card" strategy is pertinent in identifying and evaluating existing schools of thought. Third, the U.S. objectives in China's future international role must be identified. On the basis of these considerations, current security policies can be evaluated.

The security interest in China stems from her status of no longer being considered an adversary. With normalization, the doctrine and readiness of the U.S. military forces has been simplified by China no longer considered a threat to the U.S. or its allies. China, in shifting from adversary to friend, acts in a role compatible to U.S. interests by posing as a counterweight to the Soviet security threat in Asia.

In considering that China may continue to be considered as no threat contrary to U.S. interests in Asia, it is assumed

that the current regime there will not be replaced by a more radical segment. Recent developments in Chinese politics seem to indicate continued viability of the pro-U.S., pragmatist faction. Zhao Ziyang's succession to Premier is evidence of firm control of political influence by Deng Xiaoping, who champions pragmatic policies of the Four Modernizations and maintenance of friendly relations with the United States.

Despite recent successes in incorporation of labor incentives and wage increases, the prospect of economic failure of stagnation could produce internal opposition to the current regime. There are a significant number of party and government officials who came to prominence during the Cultural Revolution. This group has been thought to be more ideologically oriented and concerned than pragmatic. A catastrophic event, of which China is well experienced in, that acts detrimentally on the economy, could challenge the legitimacy of the present regime. If conditions deteriorated to a significant degree, the contemporaries of the "Gang of Four," who are now lying low, could emerge as a contending force on the ranks of the leadership. In an ideological battle, the evils of the moderates would certainly be associated with the "imperialist" ambitions of the United States. In furthering this scenario, a victory and subsequent purge of the moderates by the radicals would probably destroy the present status of U.S. - P.R.C. relations. It is feasible that the U.S. would be returned to be regarded as the number

one enemy of the people by the new regime. This worst-case scenario must be considered by policy makers as a possibility and thus must be used as a guide or parameter in policy formulation.

The intentions of the present Chinese regime must also be viewed in respect to China's new role as a U.S. friend. "American policy makers seem to believe that 'technology' can break down political restraints and that 'modernization' will make everyone like us."⁷² It must not be forgotten that the tenets of Communist ideology espouse the violent overthrow of our type of system. It can be speculated that, if China succeeds in its pursuit of modernization goals, they may be less apt to view the U.S. as a much needed friend. The post-World War II recovery of Japan and Western Europe provide an example of this phenomenon. Their policies today no longer are as America-oriented as was the case in the 1950's. China's development could be analogous if she gains the economic stature of these examples. In contrast, China's Communist ideology may regain its prominence as a compass for foreign policy formulation once goals dependent on the U.S. relationship are realized.

The American security interest in China is also derived from China's role in Asia. When viewed as a stabilizing force, the P.R.C. complements U.S. aspirations in Asia. China currently is pursuing policies of regional cooperation and self-determination. This contrasts with her past activity of supporting national liberation movements by exporting military

equipment and expertise. On the surface, the muting of these activities appears favorably when compared to the past. This change has serious connotations. China has no substitute for its past support of insurgent parties. The absence of this lever results in a vacuum that is willingly filled by a new donor -- the Soviet Union. Thus China's favorable role in fostering Asian stability has not eliminated the problem. It is doubtful that the P.R.C. is willing to donate its influence over the native Communist parties to the U.S.S.R. The vulnerability exists that this might occur if Moscow is able to successfully exploit Peking's current policy.

China's economic turn to the West could also have negative effects on the U.S. role in Asia. As Japan, Western Europe, and the U.S. increasingly invest development capital in China, other Asian nations may possibly be neglected or receive less than they would have before. For stability, all concerned have an interest in seeing that there is continued development in South Korea, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Taiwan. Thus, China's stability of her neighbors may be directly associated with the role she plays in the international trade and economic community.

The "China Card" strategy must be evaluated to determine its validity in protecting the U.S. security interest in China. This is

...a policy concept which can broadly be defined as one of strengthening United States - People's Republic of China (PRC) relations as a means of influencing Soviet policy and the development of United States - Soviet relations.⁷⁸

From this concept, the debate has resulted in three schools of thought, all concerning the impact of the "China Card" on the U.S.S.R. The schools and their positions are:

1. LOW-IMPACT: the point of view in this group is that U.S. relations with China are not going to affect the U.S.S.R. or the U.S. - U.S.S.R. bi-lateral relations.
2. MANIPULATIVE: this perspective is based on the premise that U.S. - P.R.C. relations do, in fact, affect the U.S.S.R. They do also think that this should be used to manipulate the U.S.S.R.
3. NON-MANIPULATIVE: this group also thinks that U.S. - P.R.C. relations affect the U.S.S.R. They differ in that they oppose any use of this fact as a lever to manipulate Soviet policies.

If one accepts the premise of Soviet intentions to gain influence throughout the world, the validity of the LOW-IMPACT philosophy comes under question. The Soviets, confronted with major adversaries in Europe and now Asia, certainly feel that a P.R.C. - U.S. - Japan - Western Europe consortium would not be in their best security interests. A China, made increasingly secure by Western arms and technology, signifies an increasingly credible threat to the U.S.S.R. One can wonder why the Soviet Union feels compelled to station over 45 divisions on the Chinese border if they are not concerned about U.S. - P.R.C. relations. There is little validity to the LOW-IMPACT school of thought.

In evaluating the MANIPULATIVE and NON-MANIPULATIVE perspective, it appears that both recognize the impact of U.S. - P.R.C. relations on the Soviet Union. One advocates an activist policy while the other advocates a less involved line.

Perhaps this divergence lies in the proponents' interpretation of the Soviet intentions. The activists' support of "tooling-up" China as a means of insuring the balance of power may provoke irrational Soviet behavior and thus be destabilizing. The NON-MANIPULATIVE school recognizes this aspect and it is for this reason it opposes using China as a lever.

Neither of these two schools tells the whole story. Policies designed to protect the U.S. security interest in China should not be formulated primarily for their effect on the Soviet Union. Policies should, however, be considered with their possible effects on the U.S.S.R. in mind. If there is any burden to be carried, U.S. leaders can place it on the Soviets by adoption of further security policies as a result of Soviet provocation. Knowing that, if they pursue policies irritating to the U.S., they risk further driving the P.R.C. and U.S. into each other's arms.

To evaluate and propose policies regarding China, U.S. policy makers must be cognizant of the objectives hoped to be achieved. A secure and stable China is seen as in the interest of the United States. Efforts which contribute to China's ability to defend herself appear to promote international peace and stability. An expanding Chinese role in the international community of nations also appears to insure a stable and developing China as a result of her increased investment in the system in which she operates. These appear to be the basic two objectives that all U.S. policy should be designed to achieve.

There exists no formal, written policy concerning U.S. - P.R.C. security ties. U.S. policies designed to bolster China's defense have been sales of military/civilian equipment. Also, President Carter has indicated that the current administration will make no attempt to limit or protest sales of military weapons and equipment to China from other nations. Any further U.S. action involving defense cooperation with China is not appropriate now. Sales of U.S. hardware, joint exercises, alliance-type agreements would appear to be designed specifically for countering Soviet power and influence. This, in itself, is not necessarily undesirable. But using China deliberately as a means of opposing the Soviet Union appears provocative and destabilizing. Policies enacted so far have resulted in no immediate Soviet reaction while at the same time have fostered closer relations with the Chinese. The above policies have acted in a positive manner regarding the U.S. security interest. The continued regime stability and pro-U.S. stance in the P.R.C. indicate that the positive trajectory has been maintained.

Any further considerations regarding further security arrangements with the P.R.C. must proceed on a careful course between the two Communist giants. Caution should be heeded to avoid rushing into a short-term solution to the overwhelming Soviet threat. Policy makers must recognize the possibility in getting caught up in the momentum of U.S. - P.R.C. relations. Each favorable China policy might not seem so significant when considered in a vacuum. But when viewed in its relationship

on the P.R.C. - U.S. normalization trajectory, each new policy can be assessed as an incremental shift within the larger context. Also policies enacted must be considered from a long-range point of view.

It is difficult to envision a U.S. administration backpeddling in this relationship without inflicting enormous implications on Peking. In conclusion, the writer would agree with Secretary Holbrooke in that U.S. policies with China need not be evenhanded as to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the U.S. should maintain a posture that allows good relations with both the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. The present U.S. - P.R.C. moves should be adequate to influence the U.S.S.R. to seek to improve U.S. - U.S.S.R. relations. No further actions by the U.S. in regard to its security interest in China are necessary at the moment. Soviet behavior should determine if further U.S. - P.R.C. ties are made. If this tack works, a Soviet initiative at lessening world tensions resulting from their actions is imminent.

APPENDIX A

Current
Policy No. 187

China and the U.S.:
Into the 1980s

June 4, 1980

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the National Council for U.S. - China Trade on June 4, 1980.

- - - - -

Less than a decade ago, after 20 years of doubt, hesitation, and often savage debate in this country, we began to move toward "normalizing" relations with the People's Republic of China. A little more than 500 days ago, we reached that historic goal.

It is difficult today to recall the controversy that surrounded the normalization process. The latest national polls show that two-thirds of Americans have favorable impressions of China, a stunning reversal of similar polls taken as recently as 1977. There is clearly a national consensus to continue to develop the close, friendly, and cooperative relationships we have already established with the Chinese people and their government.

The speed with which we have been able to develop our bilateral relations with China since January 1, 1979, has astonished the world. There is no need for me to detail the remarkable pace of developments in U.S. - China relations for this knowledgeable audience. In every area, we have established or are on the verge of establishing much the same framework for our relations that might have developed had recognition not been delayed for 30 years.

The fears and doubts that were expressed by opponents at the time of normalization have proven ill-founded. The high hopes that we held have been realized or surpassed. Let me briefly review for you what we have hoped to achieve by "normalization" and measure what has occurred against these objectives.

Objectives and Achievements

Recall the China we observed in the 1960s -- a nation in self-inflicted chaos, proclaiming its hope to extend revolutionary turmoil throughout the globe, actively supporting insurgencies in many areas, armed with primitive nuclear weapons, vulnerable to outside intervention, isolated and enraged by international denial of its legitimacy. It seemed then that China's inevitable entry onto the world stage could only be profoundly disruptive of world peace and threatening to our security and that of our friends and allies.

The objectives of this Administration have been clear from the outset, although they must have seemed to many to be overly ambitious. We wished:

- To facilitate China's full entry into the international community in a way that would contribute to world peace and stability, not threaten it;

- To acknowledge our national interest in the development of a strong, secure, prosperous, and friendly China that could play a legitimate and constructive role in the Asia - Pacific region and ultimately in the world;

- To defuse contentious issues dividing ourselves from China, such as the Taiwan issue, and eliminate the danger of possibly catastrophic miscalculation by an emerging nuclear and major regional power.

- To develop constructive patterns of consultation with the Chinese on international issues and build the friendly and cooperative economic, commercial, cultural, and other relationships with the Chinese necessary to sustain these ends.

These objectives have been or are being achieved under this Administration.

As for China itself, that nation is now beginning to enjoy the international status that long eluded it. The 1 billion people of China have begun to play a role in the maintenance of global peace and stability. The arc from Korea through Taiwan and the Philippines, at the very center of great power rivalry and instability for much of this century, is less subject to these strains today than at any time in well over 40 years. Longstanding tensions between China, Japan, and the United States have been replaced with true dialogue and consultation. For the first time in a century, our three

countries enjoy close and cooperative relations and share an interest in the independence, peace, and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

On the Southeast Asian mainland, the focus of bitter mutual hostility less than a decade ago, we now share many objectives in common with China, even though we sometimes still differ on the appropriate means by which they should be pursued. In Southwest Asia, we stand together in demanding Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a halt to Soviet southward expansion. We each place emphasis on bolstering the security of Pakistan and other neighboring states, while seeking to improve our respective relations with India.

Our own relations with China are good and steadily improving. Widespread fears about the implications of "normalization" for Taiwan and our flourishing private relationships with the people of that island have proven groundless. Although we no longer recognize the Taiwan authorities or maintain official relations with the island, nongovernmental relationships with Taiwan's dynamic society and people continue to prosper, as does Taiwan itself, despite some internal difficulties. Beijing's threats to "liberate" the island by force have been replaced with moderate policies that respect current realities in Taiwan. Beijing now seeks the re-establishment of economic, cultural, and other links between Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Tensions in the area are now demonstrably at an historic 30-year low.

Our bilateral relations with the Chinese have been rapidly consolidated and -- most important in our system of government -- institutionalized so that they are no longer dependent on a few individuals operating in secrecy, as was the case until the beginning of last year. Broad American interests are engaged; it would be difficult for any future Administration to reverse the trend.

By the end of this year we will have completed the construction of the basic legal and institutional framework within which economic, cultural, scientific, and technological relationships between the American and Chinese peoples can develop their full potential. That potential is already being realized. As many as 100 Chinese delegations now visit our shores each month. More than 60,000 Americans will visit China this year. Our trade -- which doubled last year over the previous year, reaching \$2.3 billion -- is continuing its rapid growth and should exceed \$3 billion this year. This first joint ventures are being concluded between American and Chinese businessmen.

Finally -- and of vital importance to the prospects for world peace and stability -- we have established a pattern of frequent and extremely useful consultation between our highest leaders and diplomats. A serious dialogue on international security matters is now taking place in an atmosphere of friendship and candor. This pattern was set in last year's historic visits of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and Vice President Mondale, whose personal direction and prodding of

our respective bureaucracies have played such an essential role in the extraordinary growth in our relations. It was advanced with Secretary of Defense Brown's trip to China in January, in last week's visit to Washington by Vice Premier Geng Biao, and in the regular cycle of diplomatic consultation initiated with the visit of Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin in March. Several of my colleagues and I will visit Beijing this summer to continue the dialogue.

The agenda for this period of reconstruction that is now nearing completion has been simple, virtually self-evident. We had to sweep aside the misunderstandings and debris of the past and to fill in the gaps in our relationships caused by the 30-year absence of normal ties. We are doing so to our mutual satisfaction.

The Future

But what of the future? Having laid in the 1970s the groundwork for a normal relationship, we now must ask ourselves what our hopes and objectives should be in the 1980s. We have only just begun to address this momentous issue. Let me share with you today some of our preliminary thinking.

Over the 80 years of this century there has been endless speculation about China's future. But virtually every prediction has been confounded by events, thus suggesting extreme caution to anyone making predictions even 5 -- still less 20 -- years ahead. Nevertheless, most of the best China experts I have consulted in the past year feel that China's leaders have some reason to be hopeful about their country's future.

It does not appear impossible that Chinese growth rates through the rest of this century will continue at 6% or perhaps even 7% annually. China's GNP is now about the size of ours as it was in the 1920s. Should growth continue at recent rates, by the year 2000 China's GNP will -- in real terms -- approach the size of U.S. GNP in the late 1970s. Given China's enormous population, this would, of course, translate into a standard of living more like America's in the early 20th century. Even so, this would be an impressive achievement.

Moreover, national power and influence are determined not by per capita GNP comparisons but by industrial, scientific, and technological prowess in the aggregate. A China with a GNP in the area of \$1.5 - 2 trillion will have a weight and presence in world affairs far beyond that at present. And, if China can overcome the bureaucratic inertia and difficulties inherent in managing the destinies of a billion or more people -- admittedly a very big "if" -- it will have achieved a degree of security and capacity for independent action that it lacks today.

The United States, our allies, and China's neighbors all have a vital interest in how China may choose to use its regained power and influence. For over a century, the world has speculated -- sometimes hopefully, sometimes fearfully -- about what the achievement of Chinese potential might portend. For over a century, the questions have been the same:

- Will the Chinese be comfortable with a world of independent, sovereign equal nation-states, or will they

revert to the view that others should bow to their centrality and superiority in a hierarchy of nations?

- Will China prove able to absorb the foreign ideas and techniques essential to its modernization without relapsing into xenophobia?

- And, will a wealthy and powerful China direct its immense energies within itself, or will it prove expansionist?

We cannot predict with certainty the answers to these difficult questions, any more than we can predict with certainty the outcome of the great effort now underway in China to make up for lost time. Some of the answers China's current leaders give are encouraging. China, they say, is devoted to a world of independent nation-states coexisting peacefully on terms of sovereign equality. China, they say, will modernize both by drawing on its own traditions and on foreign ideas. It will deal with foreigners -- and with its neighbors -- on the basis of friendship, equality and mutual benefit.

Such policies would obviously be in our national interest as well as China's. It is important that we encourage those trends that deepen China's involvement with the West and Japan. In short, our policies should seek to insure that China's answers to these questions continue to coincide with our own interests, preferences, and practices, and with those of our friends and allies.

U.S. Principles

The principles that will govern our China policy for the decades to come are therefore already clear.

First. We will develop our relations with China on their own merits. It is the business of diplomacy not only to gauge the reactions of our potential adversaries but also to measure policy with respect to the interests of our allies. We will enhance our nation's prosperity and security and that of our allies by developing our relations with China in a way that takes full and adequate account of all the external factors that are affected by them. While strategic factors remain a central consideration in our relations, the famous triangular diplomacy of the early 1970s is no longer an adequate conceptual framework in which to view relations with China. Broad American interests are engaged, as are those of allies and friends in a world of increasingly complex interplay among power centers such as Japan, the Association of South East Asian Nations, India, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and Western Europe.

We welcome the emergence of China on the world scene as an active participant in global and regional affairs, thus ending China's long isolation and relative noninvolvement in the international arena and multilateral diplomacy. China is beginning to play an important role in more and more issues -- more completely unrelated to security and strategic considerations.

AD-A104 638

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
THE U.S. SECURITY INTEREST IN CHINA. (U)
SEP 81 P F LARSON

F/6 5/4

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

2 of 2
40.1
1049A-



END
DATE
FILMED
10-81
DTIC

In short, relations with China are not a simple function of our relations with the Soviet Union, although the pace of their advance has been and will continue to be influenced by changes in the international environment. As Chairman Mao told us privately as early as 1973, the United States must not attempt to stand on China's shoulders to strike at the Soviet Union. His statement is true notwithstanding the fact that for China, as for ourselves, the question of how to deal with growing Soviet power and assertiveness in the world is, and will remain, a central issue of foreign policy. Each of us has other interests and is concerned with other issues as well. Our perspectives and our policies may be parallel from time to time; but they will rarely be identical. Our societies rest on quite different philosophic assumptions and our values and institutions diverge in many ways. In the absence of frontal assaults on our common interests, we will remain -- as at present -- friends, rather than allies.

Second. Our new friendship with China need not and will not be pursued at the expense of our relationships with others. On the contrary, the effectiveness of our China policy depends in part upon the enhancement of our role in the Asia - Pacific region, and that role is in turn strengthened by our growing, constructive ties with China.

Our recognition of China's importance in the Asia - Pacific region does not mean that we intend to default on our own role or to entrust it to the Chinese. There will be no "division of labor" with China in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. Each of

us has our own interests, as do Japan and other countries of the region. Our relations with China are founded on respect for this fact.

The United States will remain a major Pacific power, vitally interested in the stability of the western Pacific, of Northeast and Southeast Asia, and of other areas on the rim of China. We will maintain and enhance our already strong military, political, economic, and cultural presence in the area. Doing so is important to our Asian friends and allies, and should be welcome to the Chinese as evidence of our intention neither to pursue hegemony nor to permit others to pursue it in the Asia - Pacific region.

Third. We will continue to recognize our national interest in a friendly and successfully modernizing China. Our policies on technology transfer are evolving to reflect this interest.

China and the United States are both continental societies whose foreign policies are decisively influenced by our domestic political and economic situations. Should China relapse into economic stagnation, xenophobia, or ideological frenzy born of frustration, the consequences for world order would be profound. Should China be unable to maintain peaceful relationships of equality and mutual benefit with the nations of the region, its domestic aspirations could prove unattainable. Should China fall still further behind its more advanced neighbors, its role in the maintenance of global balance would be eroded, to the profound disadvantage not only of China but of

the United States and our allies as well. An economic or political vacuum in China has not served the interests of stability in the world in the past; it would not do so in future.

More positively, we -- and the world -- have much to gain from a revitalized China, not only in terms of trade and economic exchange but also in terms of scientific and technological interchange. The Chinese are a talented people who, in the broad sweep of world history, have often in the past led the advance in human knowledge and the quality of life -- and can do so again.

The very size of China makes its experiment in modernization unique and gives us all a special interest in the character of its success. To illustrate: Imagine the consequences for the quality of the environment in the northern hemisphere if a billion or more Chinese were to fail to learn from our mistakes and to industrialize to our levels without imposing pollution controls. Imagine the consequences for world energy supplies should a modernized China be forced to turn to massive imports to sustain its agriculture, industry, and commerce. Clearly, we have a stake not only in China's successful modernization but also in how it modernizes. Our rapidly developing scientific and technological exchanges with the Chinese reflect this interest. It should be a source of some satisfaction that China, in pursuing modernization, has asked us to play such an important supporting role.

Fourth. We will continue to pursue our interest in a strong, peaceful, and secure China. A China confident in its ability to defend its borders against foreign aggression enhances stability in the Pacific and on the Eurasian landmass and therefore contributes to our own security and that of our allies.

We do not sell arms to China or engage in joint military planning arrangements with the Chinese. The current international situation does not justify our doing so. Neither we nor the Chinese seek such an alliance relationship. Nevertheless, we can and will assist China's drive to improve its security by permitting appropriate technology transfer, including the sale of carefully selected items of dual use technology and defensive military support equipment. We have begun to do so.

We will continue to consider such transactions individually on their merits as they arise, taking into account our own security interests and those of others in the region. Vice Premier Geng Biao's visit to the United States this week and last has marked another step forward in this policy. His discussions with Defense Secretary Brown, with the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State have played a key role in defining what is now desirable and possible in terms of a modest American contribution to China's massive modernization needs.

Secretary Brown's and Vice Premier Geng's visits have also initiated a process of regular contact and dialogue between

our respective defense establishments. We expect these useful exchanges to broaden and grow in the years to come.

Fifth. We will continue to adhere scrupulously to our normalization understandings with respect to Taiwan. The past 18 months have shown that the full range of private American relationships with the people of Taiwan can prosper in the absence of any official U.S. relations with the island. The Taiwan Relations Act provides a firm grounding in our domestic law under which such unofficial relationships continue to flourish.

The act also establishes our concern for the continued peace and security of the Taiwan area. Our policy will remain consistent with the act and with our abiding interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the parties directly concerned.

Within this context, the nature and form of Taiwan's ultimate relationships with the mainland of China are for the Chinese on both sides of the strait to determine. It would be presumptuous for Americans to attempt to do so. Nor would we impede the process of their reconciliation.

Sixth. We will actively pursue our efforts to enlist the energies and talents of the Chinese people in global efforts to address the common problems of humankind. It is obvious that no such problem -- whether of the environment, of food and population, of global energy and resource management, of economic development, technology transfer or arms control -- can be successfully addressed without the positive participation

and contribution of China. We are encouraged by Chinese interest and cooperation with us on these vital issues in this initial period. We hope to work closely with the Chinese Government and people in the United Nations and in other international organizations and fora to insure continued progress toward a better quality of life for all on this planet.

In sum, the 1980s begin with Sino-American relations entering the stage of maturity. They are firmly grounded on both sides in enlightened self-interest and mutual respect. Sino-American normalization has worked. Its immense promise is now being realized.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

¹Michael Schaller, The U.S. and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1979), p. 38.

²Maurice Meisner, Mao's China (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 21.

³Paul H. Clyde and Burton F. Beers, The Far East (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 350.

⁴Meisner, p. 34.

⁵A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in Asia (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Inst., 1977), p. 163.

⁶Clyde and Beers, p. 377.

⁷Schaller, p. 57.

⁸Ibid., pp. 88-89.

⁹Clyde and Beers, p. 431.

¹⁰Schaller, p. 113.

¹¹Joseph LaPalombara, "Penetration: A Crisis of Governmental Capacity," in Crises and Sequences in Political Development, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1971), p. 207.

¹²Meisner, p. 40.

¹³Clyde and Beers, p. 437.

¹⁴Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 225.

¹⁵Edmund O. Clubb, China and Russia, the "Great Game," (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1971), p. 379.

¹⁶Clubb, p. 382.

¹⁷Meisner, p. 123.

¹⁸Schaller, p. 130.

¹⁹Meisner, p. 78.

²⁰ Barnett, p. 178.

²¹ Clubb, p. 421.

²² Ibid., pp. 423-424.

²³ Meisner, p. 244.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 254.

²⁵ Barnett, p. 37.

²⁶ Clubb, p. 454.

²⁷ Barnett, p. 42.

²⁸ Claude A. Buss, China: The People's Republic and Richard Nixon (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1972), p. 63.

²⁹ Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1971), pp. 224-225.

³⁰ John K. Fairbank, "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1979), p. 452.

³¹ Schaller, p. 167.

³² Steven I. Levine, "China and the Superpowers: Policies toward the United States and the Soviet Union," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Winter 1975-76), p. 640.

³³ Schaller, p. 168.

³⁴ Kissinger, p. 187.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 1074.

³⁶ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. President Ford's Pacific Doctrine, December 7, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 2.

Chapter II

³⁷ Asian Security in the 1980's: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition, ed. by Richard H. Solomon. A Report for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense - International Security Affairs, November 1979 (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation), p. 40.

³⁸"China Cancels Talks with Soviets on Improving Ties," The New York Times, 20 January 1980, p. A1.

³⁹Soloman, p. 54.

⁴⁰"How the Soviet Union Exploited Detente," U.S. News and World Report, Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 1, 14 January 1980, p. 19.

⁴¹William G. Hyland, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Search for New Security Strategies," Strategic Review, Vol. 7 (Fall 1979), p. 61

⁴²Donald C. Daniel, "Possible Implications of Soviet Naval Power in the Far East," (paper prepared for the Strategic Studies Society of Japan), p. 22.

⁴³"China's Slow Turn Toward a Free-Market System," Business Week, May 19, 1980, p. 46.

⁴⁴Hua Guofeng, "Speech to Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress," Beijing Review, No. 27 (July 6, 1979), p. 21.

⁴⁵Lucian W. Pye, "The Puzzles of Chinese Pragmatism," Foreign Policy, No. 31 (Summer, 1978), p. 136.

⁴⁶Donald C. Hellman, Japan and East Asia: The New International Order (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 92-93.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁸Thomas W. Robinson, "Political and Strategic Aspects of Chinese Foreign Policy," in China and Japan: A New Balance of Power. ed. by Donald C. Hellmann (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 217.

⁴⁹U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Relations with the People's Republic of China, S.J. Res. 48, S. Res. 18, S. Res. 37, S. Res. 82, and S. Rs. 139, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971.

⁵⁰Buss, p. 3.

⁵¹"The Clock Must Not Be Turned Back," Beijing Review, No. 25 (June 23, 1980), p. 8.

Chapter III

⁵²Beijing Review, No. 3 (January 21, 1980), p. 81. Statements follow: "China's view is consistent on the matter of global strategy. The Soviet Union is the main source of a

turbulent international situation and a threat to peace and security. The policies of hegemonism and global expansionism pursued by the Soviet Union will not change because of one factor or another. All countries in the world should unite and deal seriously with the Soviet policy of global expansionism. China and the U.S. should do something in a down-to-earth way so as to defend world peace against Soviet hegemonism." Deng Xiaoping, Vice-Premier and Chief of the General Staff of the P.L.A.

"I hope our global strategic relationship will broaden and deepen. I found that we share a similar assessment of the global strategic situation. The wide ranging and candid discussions we have held...will also help to ensure that our parallel actions will be mutually reinforcing." Harold Brown, U.S. Secretary of Defense.

⁵³U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. China: Looking to the Future, August 27, 1979 Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, (1979), p. 2.

⁵⁴Richard Burt, "Carter Tells Brezhnev U.S. Won't Sell China Arms," New York Times, 26 January 1979, p. A2.

⁵⁵Harry Harding, "Managing U.S. - China Relations," in Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for U.S. Policy Makers, ed. by Franklin D. Margiotta (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1980), p. 47.

⁵⁶Drew Middleton, "China's Strength: Arms Lag Still Apparent," New York Times, 3 April 1980, p. A10.

⁵⁷"U.S. Is Expected to Approve Military Goods for China," New York Times, 20 May 1980, p. A5.

⁵⁸Richard Burt, "U.S. Officials Expect China Move to Result in a Global Realignment," The New York Times, 17 December 1978.

⁵⁹"Chinese Official Visits U.S. to Study Military Purchases," Monterey Peninsula Herald, 26 May 1980, p. 3.

⁶⁰Richard Burt, "U.S. Strategy Focus Shifting from Europe to Pacific," New York Times, 25 May 1980, p. A3.

⁶¹"Talks between Chinese and U.S. Military Leaders," Beijing Review, No. 3 (January 21, 1980), p. 8.

Chapter IV

⁶²Barnett, p. 46.

⁶³Soloman, p. 160.

⁶⁴Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, CCP Central Committee's Decision on Agricultural Development. (Springfield, Va., Vol. I, No. 108, Supp. 032, 25 October 1979), p. 1.

⁶⁵The International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance - 1979-1980 (London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 97.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 60.

⁶⁷Francis J. Romance, "Peking's Counter-Encirclement Strategy: The Maritime Element," Orbis (Summer 1976), p. 452.

⁶⁸Fox Butterfield, "China Calls Its ICBM Test a Success," New York Times, 19 May 1980, p. A4.

⁶⁹Military Balance, pp. 79-80.

⁷⁰Agnus M. Fraser, "Military Modernization in China," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5, 6 (Sept - Dec 1979), p. 40.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 49.

Chapter V

⁷²Lucian W. Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," International Security (Summer 1979), p. 19.

⁷³U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Playing the China Card: Implications for United States - Soviet - Chinese Relations, report prepared for the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Session, 1979.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Asian Security in the 1980's: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition. A Report for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense - International Security Affairs. Richard H. Solomon, editor. Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, 1979.
- Barnett, A. Doak. China and the Major Powers in Asia. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1977.
- Beijing Review, No. 3 (January 21, 1980), 8. Statements by Deng Xiaoping and Harold Brown.
- Burt, Richard. "Carter Tells Brezhnev U.S. Won't Sell China Arms." The New York Times, 26 January 1979, p. A2.
- Burt, Richard. "U.S. Officials Expect China Move to Result in Global Realignment." The New York Times, 17 December 1978, p. A1.
- Burt, Richard. "U.S. Strategy Focus Shifting from Europe to Pacific." The New York Times, 25 May 1980, p. A3.
- Buss, Claude A. China: The People's Republic and Richard Nixon. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1972.
- Butterfield, Fox. "China Calls Its ICBM Test a Success." The New York Times, 19 May 1980, p. A4.
- "China Cancels Talks with Soviets on Improving Ties." The New York Times, 20 January 1980, p. A1.
- "China's Slow Turn Toward a Free-Market System." Business Week (19 May 1980), pp. 46-59.
- "Chinese Official Visits U.S. to Study Military Purchases." Monterey Peninsula Herald, 26 May 1980, p. 3.
- Clubb, Edmund O. China and Russia, The "Great Game," New York: Columbia U. Press, 1971.
- Clyde, Paul H., and Beers, Burton F. The Far East. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975.
- Daniel, Donald C. "Possible Implications of Soviet Naval Power in the Far East." Paper prepared for the Strategic Studies Society of Japan.
- Fairbank, John K. "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 1969), pp. 449-463.

- Fraser, Agnus M. "Military Modernization in China." Problems of Communism, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5, 6 (Sept - Dec 1979), pp. 34-49.
- Harding, Harry. "Managing U.S. - China Relations." Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for U.S. Policy Makers. Edited by Franklin D. Margrotta. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1980.
- Hellman, Donald C. Japan and East Asia: The New International Order. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972.
- "How the Soviet Union Exploited Detente." U.S. News and World Report, Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 1 (14 January 1980, p. 19.
- Hua Guofeng. "Speech to the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress." Beijing Review, No. 27 (July 6, 1979), pp. 19-25.
- Hyland, William G. "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Search for New Security Strategies." Strategic Review, Vol. 7 (Fall 1979), pp. 51-61.
- Kissinger, Henry A. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1979.
- LaPalombara, Joseph. "Penetration: A Crisis of Governmental Capacity." Crises and Sequences in Political Development. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1971.
- Levine, Steven I. "China and the Superpowers: Policies toward the United States and the Soviet Union." Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Winter 1975-76), pp. 637-658.
- Meisner, Maurice. Mao's China. New York: The Press Press, 1977.
- Middleton, Drew. "China's Strength: Arms Lag Still Apparent." The New York Times, 3 April 1980, p. A10.
- Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
- Pye, Lucian W. "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization." International Security (Summer 1969). pp. 3-19.
- Pye, Lucian W. "The Puzzles of Chinese Pragmatism." Foreign Policy, No. 31 (Summer 1978). pp. 119-136.
- Robinson, Thomas W. "Political and Strategic Aspects of Chinese Foreign Policy." China and Japan: A New Balance of Power. Edited by Donald C. Hellman. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1976.

Romance, Francis J. "Peking's Counter-Encirclement Strategy: The Maritime Element." Orbis (Summer 1976). pp. 437-459.

Schaller, Michael. The U.S. and China in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford U. Press, 1979.

"Talks between Chinese and U.S. Military Leaders." Beijing Review, No. 3 (January 21, 1980). p. 8.

"The Clock Must Not Be Turned Back." Beijing Review, No. 25 (June 23, 1980). p. 8.

The International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance: 1979-1980. London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1979.

U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Playing the China Card: Implications for United States - Soviet - Chinese Relations. 96th Cong., 1st Session, 1979.

U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Relations with the People's Republic of China. S.J.Res. 48, S. Res. 18, S. Res. 37, S. Res. 82, and S. Res. 139, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Vol. I, No. 208, Supp. 032. "CCP Committee's Decision on Agricultural Development," 25 October 1979.

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. China: Looking to the Future, August 27, 1979. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979.

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. President Ford's Pacific Doctrine, December 7, 1975. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.

"U.S. Is Expected to Approve Military Goods for China." The New York Times, 20 May 1980, p. A5.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314	2
2. Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
3. Department Chairman, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
4. Professor C. A. Buss, Code 56 Bx Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
5. Assoc Professor F. M. Teti, Code 56 Tt Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
6. CPT Peter Francis Larson 1277 Spruance Monterey, California 93940	2