Progress Report and Topical Survey, 1980-1981.
Abstract
The work at the Center on game-theoretic models of multiperson decision problems has strengthened the analytical tools available to study the phenomena of organizations. There are bright prospects that several of the more intractible topics can be addressed a new with better chances of clear-cut resolution. To take a specific example, we are particularly interested in developing the theory of bargaining modeled as a dynamic game with incomplete information. That is, bargaining or negotiations are typically affected by incomplete information about each other's preferences, resources, and opportunities. At the same time, bargaining is inherently a dynamic process of offers and counteroffers, perhaps interrupted by combative tactics (strikes, lockout, 'war'). It seems clear that the analysis of such a model can proceed smoothly along the lines developed in work to date.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1981
- Accession Number
- ADA105117
Entities
Organizations
- Stanford University