Collaborative Development of Main Battle Tanks: Lessons from the U.S.-German Experience, 1963-1978.

Abstract

Examines the U.S.-West German effort to collaborate in the development of main battle tanks. The effort begain in 1963 with the MBT-70 program, an ambitious cooperative attempt to develop a single tank. Because the two armies could not reconcile their differing concepts of tanks and tank warfare, this effort produced a complex and expensive tank and increasing duplicative development work in each nation. In 1969 the program was abandoned and each nation set about developing its own tank. Collaboration was suggested again in 1973, this time as an effort either to sell West Germany's Leopard II to the U.S. Army or to trade components across ongoing national development programs. The latter effort produced an agreement to mount the German 102mm gun on later versions of the U.S. XM-1 tank, but this amount of collaboration succeeded only after substantial political debate in the Congress. The note discusses major impediments to collaboration in these cases, and suggests strategies for future collaboration on armored vehicles. (Author)

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Aug 01, 1981
Accession Number
ADA105123

Entities

People

  • Thomas L. Mcnaugher

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Ammunition
  • Anti-Tank Missiles
  • Armored Vehicles
  • Business Administration
  • Control Systems
  • Fire Control Systems
  • Governments
  • Lessons Learned
  • Management Personnel
  • Military Procurement
  • Military Requirements
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Organizational Structure
  • Personnel Management
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Distributed Systems and Data Platform Development
  • International Relations and European Studies
  • ballistics.