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
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Milan N. Vego

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**YUGOSLAVIA AND THE
SOVIET POLICY OF FORCE
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
SINCE 1961.**

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The ideas expressed in this paper are those of the author. The paper does not necessarily represent the views of either the Center for Naval Analyses or the Department of Defense.

The author, acting as an external consultant to CNA, based his research on documents entirely in the public domain and on his experience as an officer in the Navy of Yugoslavia. He was graduated from the Yugoslav Naval Academy in 1961 and resigned his commission in the rank of Lieutenant Commander in 1973. Mr. Vego holds a Ph.D. in history from the George Washington University (1981) where his dissertation was entitled "Anatomy of Austrian Seapower, 1904-1914."

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PREFACE

The USSR adopted a local war doctrine, as the foundation for a diplomacy of force in the Third World, at the turn of 1965-66. The first practical application of the new activist policy came in the Middle East in the June War of 1967. Yugoslavia then played a crucial role, and it continues to be an important element in the effective use of the Soviet policy of force in the Mediterranean. Moreover, some supporting aspects of Moscow's activities after 1967 could not have been carried out without Belgrade's cooperation. The Soviet ability to support clients in the Third World from the very beginning rested on two factors: their navy's presence in the conflict zone and their quick-reaction capacity exemplified by amphibious and, far more important, airlift capability. The politico-military confrontations in the Third World since 1967 have been first of all between client and client. The Soviet Navy possessed a capacity to protect shipments of arms and material by sea to client states. It also had an adequate deterrent posture to prevent U.S. intervention from the sea against a Soviet client. However, it has a limited power projection capability, though it may acquire one in the near future.

Yugoslavia has an important, although not a paramount, role in supporting the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, through granting Soviet combatants and auxiliaries access to its naval ship repair facilities. However, from the outset it played a crucial role, and still does, in the Soviet quick-reaction and crisis-related

airlift of arms and material over its territory. A cursory look at the map will suffice to show how important Yugoslavia is for Soviet military transport aircraft in reaching destinations in Northern Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although air routes over Turkey, Iran, or Afghanistan could be used by Soviet aircraft, they are not only markedly longer, but also, with the exception at present of Afghanistan, run over countries which may not be willing to allow a large-scale airlift when most needed. Yugoslavia offers not only the shortest route to potential crisis areas, but also and more important, Moscow has been able to count on Belgrade granting such overflight rights. Without Yugoslavia's advance assurance on this score, it is hard to see how the Soviet Union could have made any firm commitments to its clients in the Eastern Mediterranean or Africa. Moreover, it appears highly doubtful that Moscow would have embarked on a more activist policy in the mid-1960s and onwards in the Middle East and Africa without having arranged beforehand for the collaboration of some friendly countries in the Mediterranean area, particularly Yugoslavia.

It is the intention here to describe and analyze how politico-military cooperation between Belgrade and Moscow began and developed after 1961, when the matter of granting access to Yugoslav ports and ground air facilities and overflight rights was first raised. Also, changes over time will be explained and an analysis attempted of the similarity or identity of ideological, political, economic and military interests that made cooperation between Belgrade and Moscow and

other "progressive" Arab regimes. Some of the internal developments and crises in Yugoslavia that affected relations between Belgrade and Moscow will be described. Finally, the changing attitudes and policies of the Yugoslav leadership toward the Soviet and U.S./NATO military presence, respectively, will be discussed, because these implicitly justified Belgrade's support of Moscow's policy of force in the Mediterranean.

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INTRODUCTION

The presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean in the 1950s was tacitly accepted by Yugoslavia as a factor which indirectly enhanced its security. Belgrade, despite the fact that the threat of Soviet invasion receded after Stalin's death in 1953, still needed an effective NATO nuclear umbrella of which the Sixth Fleet was one component. Not until 1964 did Yugoslavia become openly critical of the U.S. and NATO presence in the Mediterranean and supportive of Soviet aims in that area. This policy shift was influenced by Yugoslavia's relations, first with Moscow, and second with the Arab world.

Moscow in 1961 initiated several moves aimed at the rapid improvement of its then very strained relations with Belgrade. Khrushchev's position at home was insecure because his "destalinization" campaign had generated strong opposition among the Soviet party hierarchy. Moreover, the Chinese party was challenging Khrushchev's policies in the world communist movement. Allegedly for these reasons Khrushchev is said to have needed Tito's support in order to strengthen his hand both at home and abroad. Although these factors might well have played a role in Moscow's decision to improve relations with Yugoslavia, they were not strong enough to cause such a significant shift of policy toward Belgrade. It was more likely that Soviet strategic interests in that part of Europe and the Mediterra-

nean in general exercised an overriding influence in Moscow's decision to begin the rapprochement with Belgrade.

A marked improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations came in the aftermath of the visit by a high-level Soviet delegation to Yugoslavia from September 24 to October 4, 1962, headed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev. The joint statement issued at the end of that visit emphasized that "great progress has been achieved in bilateral relations," creating the conditions for further "expansion of cooperation in the political, economic, scientific and cultural fields." Both Belgrade and Moscow agreed on most of the main international issues of the day. On the personal level, however, Brezhnev's visit was not very successful. He allegedly annoyed his hosts by repeated public denunciations of U.S. "imperialism" and NATO.

While Yugoslavia's ties with the Eastern bloc steadily improved after 1961, its relations with the West deteriorated. Belgrade became increasingly critical of U.S. policy on various international issues, for example, crises in the Congo, Cyprus, Indochina and Berlin, to name a few.

The improvement in Soviet-Yugoslav relations intensified in the course of 1963. There were numerous contacts between the various party and state bodies of the two countries. Particularly important were talks between Tito and Khrushchev and other high Yugoslav and

Soviet officials held in August 1963 at Brioni. The talks ended with agreements on highly important international and bilateral issues.

In October 1964 Belgrade was surprised by, and caught unprepared to deal with, the new leadership in the Kremlin, which took power following Khrushchev's dismissal. The ties between Belgrade and Moscow however were not affected by this change of leadership, although they lacked the intimacy of the Khrushchev era.

Tito headed a Yugoslav delegation to the Soviet Union in June 1965, where he met with First Party Secretary Brezhnev and other high Soviet leaders. At the end of the talk, on July 1, a joint communiqué issued in Moscow stated that the talks "confirmed the identity and great similarity of views between Belgrade and Moscow."¹ Both countries strongly condemned the U.S. action in Vietnam and demanded "an urgent withdrawal" of U.S. military forces from the Dominican Republic. The communiqué stated that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and the Soviet Communist Party shared the view that it was possible to wage a successful struggle against "imperialism" only by fighting consistently for the vital interests and historical aims of the working class by extending support to "liberation" movements.²

Relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were strengthened further in the course of 1966. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Marko Nikezich visited the Soviet Union in the period May 24 through 31.

Both sides agreed on many then-current international issues, including the situation in Vietnam, European security, the German problem, disarmament, and the role of the nonaligned nations.

Although the relations between the two countries recorded a steady improvement in all fields, ideological differences remained unresolved. The Russians had great misgivings concerning Yugoslav economic and social reforms initiated in 1963. After 1965 the influence of "liberal" and "technocratic-minded" party leaders had been increased. They wanted to turn Yugoslavia more toward Western Europe and to put limits on Yugoslav activities within the nonaligned movement. The "liberals" also favored less close relations with the Soviet Union and its East European allies. However, there was a strong opposition to domestic reform on the part of "conservative" and centralist-minded party officials led by the Vice President and former secret police chief, Aleksandar Rankovich. He was one of Tito's closest associates and widely viewed as his successor. Mr. Rankovich was then in charge of the LCY's organizational matters and still in effective control of the country's police apparatus. Through the combined efforts of "liberals" and Tito loyalists, Rankovich and several of his close associates were dismissed from their posts in the party and government at the Fourth Plenum of the CC of the LCY held in Brioni in July 1966. The Fourth Plenum also marked the beginning of the ascendance of "liberal" and "nationalist" leaders within the LCY and of a new "liberal" phase in the country's postwar development.

Rankovich's dismissal also had some repercussions on relations between Belgrade and Moscow. As a potential successor to Tito, with the reputation of a "conservative" and "centralist," he was known to be highly regarded by the Soviet leadership. Thus, Rankovich's sudden fall from power was very unsettling to the Russians.

The improvement in state and party ties between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and its allies after 1961 was preceded by an expansion of trade and the intensification of economic cooperation between the two countries. The Comecon countries shared in Yugoslavia's exports and imports in 1961 to the extent of 30.4 percent and 18.6 percent, respectively. By 1965 these figures had increased to 41.9 and 28.6 percent.

Shipping became an important aspect of Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations. The cooperation agreements covered a five-year period and coincided with the Soviet five-year economic plans (appendix A). They included not only the construction of merchant ships, but also ship repair and overhaul and joint scientific-technical research. The first construction program was adopted in 1961. It included delivery by Yugoslav shipyards, for the Soviet state shipping company "Sudoimport," of a total of 25 merchant vessels. The second construction program (1966 through 1970), signed in 1965, envisaged the construction of 32 vessels and 15 craft. The estimated charge for both programs was \$370 million.³

After 1961, when state and party relations began to improve again, the way was open for the renewal of military cooperation between Belgrade and Moscow which had been disrupted in 1948. By 1961, the Yugoslav armed forces needed to start a modernization program in order to replace their large inventories of obsolete heavy weapons and equipment. Soviet arms deliveries to Yugoslavia were said to have been discussed during negotiations on a five-year trade agreement signed in March 1961 in Belgrade. In any case, beginning in 1962-63 the Yugoslav air force and anti-aircraft defense began to receive Soviet MiG-21 fighter-interceptors, Mi-2/-4 helicopters, SAM Guideline, air search radars/Barlock/and other advanced equipment. The ground forces, at about the same time, began their long-positioned modernization program. The army received a large quantity of Soviet T-54/-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers (APC), guns, howitzers, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and heavy engineering equipment. Defense Minister General Ivan Gosnjak made a ten-day visit to the Soviet Union in September 1963, which resulted in an agreement for training Yugoslav military personnel. The first groups of Yugoslav officers were sent in 1964 to complete their higher military education or specialist training in the Soviet Union. Since then, an average of 10 to 15 Yugoslav officers of all three services have been sent annually to various Soviet military academies.⁴

Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky returned the visit of Gen. Gosnjak in May 1964. During the talks held then, the groundwork was apparently laid for long-term military cooperation

between the two countries. Modernization of the Yugoslav armed forces was accelerated. In the following year, the Yugoslav Navy received the first of ten Osa-class missile boats and the first of four Sher-shen-class torpedo boats scheduled to be transferred.

No other country even approximated the dominant position exercised by the Soviet Union prior to 1968 in Yugoslav arms supply, doctrine, and training. Such extensive cooperation and contacts led to the gradual establishment of close personal ties between the top Yugoslav and Soviet military officers. No less important was the fact that many of the Yugoslav officers who attended Soviet military academies returned to take important positions in their respective services.⁵

In addition, prior to 1968 most Yugoslav troops were deployed facing the NATO countries. It was considered that the main threat to the country's security would come from the West rather than the East. Soviet-Yugoslav military cooperation before 1968 was so close that even the Yugoslavia radar early warning system was integrated with that of the Warsaw Pact.⁶

Yugoslavia became deeply involved in forging new links with "socialist" and "neutralist" countries, such as Burma, Egypt, India, and Indonesia in the 1950s. The nonaligned group between 1954 and 1958 was small and without much influence in world politics. After 1958, Tito redoubled his efforts to win over Third World countries in Asia and Africa for the cause of "socialism" and "anti-imperialism."

By the end of the 1950s, Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt had clearly become the main pillars of the then growing nonaligned movement. Yugoslavia's close relations with Egypt took form in 1955 and 1956. At that time Western influence in the Arab world was being weakened by the combined attack of Arab nationalism led by Egypt and by the new and more active Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Yugoslavia strongly supported Egypt's position in the 1956 war. It urged in the United Nations that Israel, the U.K., and France terminate their military intervention against Egypt. Moreover, Belgrade in the post-1956 period approved almost every anti-Western action by Egypt.

The Yugoslav attitude toward Israel and the Palestinian question was more ambiguous. In 1948, when Israel became independent, Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union and its satellites, recognized the new state and supported its admission to the United Nations. After 1956, however, as its relations with Egypt warmed up, Belgrade began to openly support Cairo on the Palestinian question. Yugoslavia, jointly with Egypt, signed numerous declarations about Palestinian "rights."

There were several reasons why Yugoslavia after 1956 became closely associated with Nasser's Egypt and the Arab world in general. First, Egypt, and the "progressive" regimes in the Arab world that subsequently emerged, professed to be developing "Arab socialism." While Soviet theoreticians often ridiculed this concept, the Yugoslavs took it at face value, arguing that Nasser's socialism was best

suited to Egyptian conditions. Secondly, very strong ties of personal friendship developed between Tito and Nasser. They met on 17 different occasions between 1955 and 1966. Third, Yugoslavia's improved relations with the Soviet Union roughly coincided with the latter's determined effort to increase and strengthen its influence in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean. Fourth, Yugoslavia considered Palestinian resistance a "just" cause that ought to be supported.

Thus, ideological considerations largely determined Yugoslav policy toward Egypt and the Arab-Israeli dispute in general. The identical viewpoints held by Belgrade and Moscow on the Palestinian problem facilitated Yugoslavia's cooperative attitude toward Soviet policies in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Fifth, Yugoslav policies toward the Arab world in the 1960s gradually became more influenced by the country's economic interests in that region. Belgrade succeeded in exploiting strong political ties to further the country's economic interests. Trade was only one and not the most significant aspect of Yugoslav economic relations with the Arab countries. Because of very close political relations between Belgrade and "progressive" Arab regimes, Yugoslav firms were able to get lucrative contracts. By the end of the 1950s, Yugoslav enterprises had become involved in a large number of industrial construction programs in Egypt and Syria and after 1961, in Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. This economic cooperation was beneficial to both Yugoslavia and the Arab countries involved. The prospects for

further expansion of economic activity in the Third World countries, including the Middle East and North Africa, was of particular significance to Yugoslavia because its enterprises were hardly able to compete elsewhere with foreign firms.

To sum up, reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow after 1961 was made possible because both governments held identical or similar views on many international issues. The greatest similarity of views and policies, though, existed in the 1960s in their approach toward the Third World. By 1965 their policies in this respect were almost identical. The Yugoslavs agitated intensively among the less developed countries to accept their views on the most important international issues of the time. The general thrust of Belgrade's policies in the Third World, however, was anti-Western. The West, particularly the U.S., was consistently accused of "colonialism," "neocolonialism" and "imperialist" policies. These views, which effectively denigrated the West, de facto set the stage for the partial or outright acceptance of Soviet policies by a large number of newly independent Third World countries. This was the case particularly after 1961 when Belgrade began quite openly to praise the Soviet Union in its official pronouncements and in the country's media. Another very important aspect of Yugoslav policy in the Third World was its active support for various "liberation" movements. Belgrade invariably supported only those which were communist-led or Marxist-oriented. Yugoslavia also gave its full support to many "progressive" regimes. It was in these two areas where Belgrade and Moscow held almost

identical viewpoints. More important, as a small country, Yugoslavia was more easily accepted as a friend among the Third World countries than was the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia's anti-Western policies and rhetoric encouraged, and in some cases sustained, the hostilities of some Third World countries toward the United States and the West in general. Additionally, by accusing the West of responsibility for almost all of their ills, Belgrade in the early 1960s made Soviet foreign policies appear respectable in the eyes of many nonaligned countries. In this way Yugoslavia directly or indirectly contributed to the success of Soviet policies toward the Third World.

By the mid-1960s, however, thanks to the pressure by a "liberal-minded" leadership, Yugoslavia began to some extent to lose its former interest in the Third World. The Afro-Asian aspect of Yugoslav foreign policy was then weakened and more intensive activity toward Western Europe became apparent. This change was caused by the country's economic reforms which in turn required closer ties with Western industrial countries.

Hence there existed a seemingly contradictory trend in Yugoslav policies. While at home, the process of decentralization and "liberalization" was quickened, and economic ties with the Western countries had been expanded, foreign policies were becoming more closely akin to those of Moscow. If the "liberal-minded" leaders had had their way, Yugoslavia would have been most likely oriented to a greater extent toward Europe. There were several reasons why

Belgrade pursued such contradictory internal and foreign policies at that time. First, the party "liberals" were still not sufficiently strong to change the nation's foreign policy orientation and its economic and social policies. Many conservative leaders remained in positions of influence. However, the main reason was Tito himself, who was the arbiter in shaping and directing the country's foreign policy. Perhaps another reason for steering closer to Moscow was the Vietnam War. The U.S. military intervention in the Dominican Republic was also used by Tito to portray the U.S. as an aggressor and a power which was willing to use force in defense of its interests. Had the international situation been more peaceful, it is quite possible that Belgrade's differences with Moscow would have led to the gradual worsening of relations between the two countries earlier than proved to be the case. Be that as it may, by the end of 1966 Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were marching steadily on a parallel course on almost all main international issues.

NOTES

1. "Joint Statement on the Soviet-Yugoslav Talks," Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), 336-37 (July 5-20, 1965), p. 26.
2. Ibid.
3. "Relations between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. (1955-1969)," Yugoslav Survey (Belgrade), 3 (August, 1970), p. 146.
4. Yugoslav officers were sent to the following Soviet academies and higher military schools (incomplete list): "Frunze" (Moscow), "Timoshenko" (Moscow) Tank Academy (Moscow), Supply Service Academy (Moscow), Naval War College "M.V. Frunze" (Leningrad), Higher Naval Radio Electronics School "A.S. Popov" (Leningrad), Caspian Higher Naval School "S.M. Kirov" (Baku) Signal Units Academy (Kharkov).
5. It was always, and still is, far more preferable to have completed some higher naval school in the Soviet Union than a corresponding school in the country. Yugoslav officers who graduated from the Soviet academies also were more rapidly promoted than those of their colleagues who completed their higher military education and training in the country.
6. Friedrich Wiener, Die Armeen der neutralen und blockfreien Staaten Europas (Munich: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag 1972), p. 115.

II. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN (1962-1968)

Between 1962 and until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Soviet Union, after achieving a rapprochement with Yugoslavia and improved relations with Egypt, decided on a more active involvement in the Middle East. The growing politico-military cooperation along the triangle Moscow-Belgrade-Cairo after 1962 set the stage eventually for an effective implementation of the Soviet policy of force in the Mediterranean. The first practical test of the new Soviet strategy came in the June War of 1967. Then in the fall of that year followed the active Soviet support of the Republican faction in the Yemeni civil war. Yugoslavia played a crucial role in the first and most important case by granting Soviet military transport aircraft access to its airspace during their arms resupply effort on behalf of defeated Arab armies. In the aftermath of the June War, Belgrade became quite open in justifying and supporting the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean.

It was in the mid-1960s that Belgrade formalized the use of Yugoslav airspace by Soviet transport aircraft in crisis situations in the Middle East. The Russians also began their search for access to Yugoslav port facilities. However, this promising trend, from Moscow's viewpoint, was stopped abruptly as a result of its military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Following the reconciliation with Moscow in 1961-62, Belgrade became openly supportive of Russian policies in the Middle East. Relations between Cairo and Moscow at that time, however, were quite strained, owing to Nasser's persecution of Egyptian communists. Khrushchev, who was determined to repair relations with Cairo, initiated his first conciliatory moves toward Nasser only after the rapprochement with Belgrade was well underway. By 1963 Moscow's relations with both Belgrade and Cairo had improved to the point where the Russians were ready to further strengthen relationships with both countries. In June 1963 Moscow signed a large arms deal agreement with Cairo which in turn triggered a major arms race in the Middle East.

Moscow's success between 1961 and 1963 in effecting a rapprochement with Belgrade and repairing relations with Cairo appears in retrospect as a remarkable diplomatic feat that laid the groundwork for a more assertive Soviet role in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

The permanent deployment of Soviet naval forces began in June 1964, following the diplomatic visit of the heavy cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov to Split, Yugoslavia. The Soviet decision allegedly came in response to the U.S. announcement, in March 1963, that the first Polaris-armed SSBN was on patrol in the Mediterranean.

While the strategic-defensive character of the Soviet permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean should not be dismissed, it could be argued that the Moscow decision was primarily influenced by political considerations. The Soviet aim was to assert more forcefully influence in the Middle East by a stronger commitment to Egypt and other "progressive" regimes. In 1964 the Cyprus crisis had led to a further poisoning of relations between Greece and Turkey. There was also a growing internal instability in Italy and Greece. This perceived weakness of NATO's posture in the area prompted Moscow to exploit the situation and gain preponderant influence there. This in turn required a forward deployment of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. Moscow perhaps hoped that, at best, they would be able to force the Sixth Fleet to leave the Mediterranean. At worst, the Soviet naval forces, by their very presence, would be in a position to effectively challenge the hitherto undisputed control of the Mediterranean by the U.S. and NATO navies.

The initial reaction of Belgrade to the arrival of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean was officially one of silence. However, the Yugoslavs, seemingly echoing Soviet statements, began a media campaign against the U.S. and NATO military and naval presence in the Mediterranean. There is no conclusive evidence that Yugoslav attitudes toward the situation in the Mediterranean were formed under Moscow's influence or pressure since this was not needed. It was perhaps no coincidence that the change in Yugoslav policy occurred at the turn of 1963-64. This was shortly after the Soviet government

formally proposed, in May and December of 1963, that the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean be proclaimed atom-free zones. At the same time Moscow complained that the strengthening of the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean, as witnessed by SSBN patrols, represented a direct threat not only to the Warsaw Pact countries, but also to the Arab states as well. This theme was sounded also by the Yugoslav media in early 1964.

In the mid-1960s there were clear signs that the Soviet leadership had decided to take action in order to possess military forces armed and equipped for both general and limited nuclear war and for conventional conflicts. After Khrushchev's dismissal there was an increased emphasis on airborne operations and long-range airlifts.

It was also obvious to Soviet planners that if their naval forces were to be continuously deployed in the Mediterranean, access to naval facilities would be needed, not only in Arab Mediterranean countries but also in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, any rapid reinforcement of their Middle East and African clients with arms and equipment had to come by air. Hence, permission to use Yugoslav airspace and ground facilities was very important.

Up to 1965 there had been no provision in Yugoslav law for the use of the country's airspace by military aircraft of any foreign power. Then Moscow began to urge Belgrade to amend the law on civil

air traffic. The Yugoslav Federal Assembly adopted the new law, which came into force on March 24, 1965.¹

The law stipulated that landing and take-off by foreign aircraft could take place only at airports opened for international traffic. Permission for overflights has to be issued by the Yugoslav Federal Administration for civil air traffic, but only after reaching an agreement with the Defense Ministry (article 12). The law of 1965 made a distinction between "civilian" and "state" aircraft. In the latter category were military aircraft and those owned by the interior ministry and customs service (article 30).

The real significance of the air traffic law of 1965 was that it provided for the first time a legal basis for the use of Yugoslav airspace by military aircraft of another country. Of course the content of the law did not specify which country was to use Yugoslav airspace for military purposes. The circumstances which prevailed at the time and, more important, the events which followed clearly showed that Moscow had exercised its influence to amend the then existing Yugoslav law on civilian air traffic. Perhaps not by coincidence, the new law was adopted shortly after the beginning of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam. Most likely the Soviets argued that the U.S. action in Vietnam was not an isolated case, but one that might be repeated either in the Middle East or elsewhere in the Mediterranean. The Yugoslav government apparently agreed with the assessment, because its media played the same theme later in the year.

Meanwhile, the Russians intensified their campaign to get access to naval facilities in the Mediterranean. Admiral Sergei Gorshkov visited Egypt in March 1965, reportedly to gain permission for Soviet use of the Gulf of Sollum. Up to that time, Soviet ships relied on open anchorages elsewhere in the Mediterranean to rest their crews and effect minor repairs. In September 1965 Soviet warships paid their first diplomatic visit to Egypt in ten years. Although Soviet pressure for access elsewhere continued, there were no requests reported in regard to Yugoslavia.

After the summer of 1965, Moscow's propaganda campaign was intensified in order to justify the Soviet presence and to put more pressure on "progressive" Arab Mediterranean countries to provide access to their naval facilities. U.S. military actions in Indochina and the Caribbean were used to portray the United States, not as a power defending the status quo, but one attempting to change the balance of forces to its advantage. Moscow warned that such U.S. "aggressive" moves were to be expected in the Mediterranean. The Yugoslav press echoed the same arguments. After Egypt had come to view the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean as a threat to Arab nationalism in the spring of 1966, Yugoslavia took a similar view of NATO's presence in southern Europe. In 1966 the Yugoslav media attempted to convince its readers that U.S. policy in the Mediterranean had then become "aggressive" and "expansionist." The arrangements between the U.S. and its NATO Allies in southern Europe on stockpiling tactical nuclear weapons on their territories drew par-

ticularly sharp criticism from Belgrade. It charged that various speculations about the possibility of armed conflict on this peripheral theater of Europe are closely connected with the well-known American theory on "regional and universal escalation of war which is being so drastically applied in Vietnam and elsewhere." The U.S. presence was criticized also, allegedly because of Washington's "unconcealed support" to conservative regimes in the Middle East.

At the same time, the role of Moscow was positively appraised. The fact that the Soviet Union had assumed a more active role in an area "situated in the immediate proximity of its southern borders," in Belgrade's view, had forced the U.S. Government "to be much more cautious in its Middle Eastern policy than it was toward the countries of Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia." Belgrade charged that the U.S. Government was particularly aggressive in its dealing with the Arab countries in North Africa.²

The Yugoslavs viewed the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean as part of a wider plan to open up possibilities for "quick limited interventions by the U.S. armed forces, not only on the African continent and in the Middle East, but under certain specific conditions in southern Europe as well."³

The situation in the Middle East rapidly deteriorated in the spring of 1967. Then the Yugoslav media alleged that there were increasing signs that the "same U.S. policy which acts destructively

in Southeast Asia is on the offensive in this region (Southern Europe) too."⁴ Belgrade tried to portray Western concerns about the growing Soviet penetration in the Middle East as "fabrication." In its view, the real reasons for the U.S. "dramatization" of the situation in the Middle East was the "consistently independent position of Egypt, Syria, Algeria and other countries."⁵

The Yugoslav media, in numerous commentaries, charged that the Pentagon, because of the unfavorable military situation in Vietnam and the lessening of tensions in Europe, was looking for "soft spots" in order to start "aggressive" undertakings. Belgrade appeared to be particularly incensed by an alleged U.S.-instigated and -organized military putsch in Greece. Yugoslavia viewed all pro-Western countries in the Middle East as representing "an instrument of policy from the position of strength in this part of the world." The Yugoslavs ostensibly believed that NATO forces in southern Europe were to have a different role from NATO forces deployed on the Central and Northern front. While the latter were intended, in their opinion, for maintenance of the status quo, those in South Europe were essentially oriented toward a "violent change of the status quo" in regions that lay on the southern flank of NATO.⁶

The U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean was sharply attacked by the Yugoslav press in the spring of 1967. During NATO's combined naval maneuvers COWLICK, held between April 3 and 4, 1967, off Cape Tagliamento (northern Adriatic), Belgrade's media, echoing offi-

cial viewpoints, charged that the aim of the maneuvers "was an offensive rather than defensive operation in the immediate vicinity of Yugoslav borders."⁷ The COWLICK maneuvers were in fact an exercise in which only ASW aircraft and helicopters participated on the U.S. side.

Moscow's quest for access to naval facilities in the Mediterranean intensified in the spring of 1967. In March a five-ship Soviet naval squadron paid a four-day informal visit to Split, Yugoslavia. Then between April 18 and 24, Admiral Gorshkov made his first visit to Yugoslavia. He toured the main naval base at Lora, (Split) and some other naval installations along the Yugoslav coast. Gorshkov reportedly asked for access by Soviet naval vessels to Yugoslav port facilities, specifically the Bay of Cattaro. Belgrade rejected the Soviet request, however. Gorshkov's visit came at a time of heightened tensions in the Middle East, when Moscow had already made preparations for a significant increase in Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean.

During the final phase of the Middle East crisis leading to the June War, Yugoslavia supported without reservation Nasser's decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal to Israel's shipping. Belgrade approved these moves as representing the "logical and legitimate right" of the Egyptian government, which allegedly only reestablished the situation that had existed before the Suez War of

1956. The Yugoslavs accused Israel of being solely responsible for the permanent state of crisis in the Middle East.⁸

The Yugoslav media challenged the U.S. role as mediator in the crisis by saying that this dispute "cannot be within the competency of the U.S. or any other great or small power under any circumstances whatsoever."⁹ The Egyptian moves that had created the crisis were praised by the Yugoslav media as an action which "clearly open up prospects permitting Israel and its foreign advisors to seek, with the necessary amount of goodwill and realism, solutions which would be acceptable to both sides and which as such would guarantee permanent stability."¹⁰

Following the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War, Tito issued a statement on June 5, in which he said that "the Yugoslav government considers that the United Arab Republic, faced with a constant hostile attitude by Israel and exposed to continuous pressure by imperialists, had undertaken justified measures to protect her sovereign rights, territorial integrity and the security of her country."¹¹ In Tito's view, Israel assumed all responsibility for the outbreak of the war and "all the far-reaching consequences resulting from it for world peace."¹²

Four days later (June 9), Tito flew to Moscow where he attended a conference of the East European communist countries, which dealt with the situation in the Middle East. At the end of the meeting, a

statement was issued and signed by all participants which said that the crisis in the Middle East had been created "by the Israeli aggression, which is the result of a conspiracy of certain imperialist powers, the U.S. in the first place, against Arab countries."¹³ Moscow's statement at the time demanded that Israel cease immediately its military operations against "neighboring Arab countries and withdraw troops from their territories behind the armistice lines."¹⁴

The Yugoslav media interpreted Moscow's declaration as reflecting "the natural interest of all peaceful and progressive countries to see an end to any action and tendencies threatening to lead to disastrous consequences."¹⁵

Belgrade, evidently coordinating its actions with those of Moscow, handed a note to the Israeli government on June 11. It accused Tel Aviv of "calculated procrastination in complying with the ceasefire resolution of the U.N. Security Council, and an intention to annex occupied Arab territories."¹⁶ It demanded that Israeli troops withdraw from occupied territories to the positions held before the beginning of the attack on the neighboring Arab countries. Finally, the note warned that, if Israel were to refuse to withdraw its forces, "Yugoslavia will be forced to reexamine its relations with Israel."¹⁷ Two days later, the Yugoslav government broke off diplomatic relations with Israel.

In the aftermath of the war, Yugoslavia continued its cooperation with the Warsaw Pact countries on the Middle East crisis. Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, on his way to and from Cairo at the end of June, stopped at Brioni where he met with Tito. Tito and two other members of the Presidium of the LCY participated at the second meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries (except Romania), held on July 11 and 12 in Budapest. The conference was exclusively devoted to the crisis in the Middle East.

Belgrade's closeness to Moscow's policies and actions during the June 1967 War and its aftermath was illustrated by Tito's permission to the Soviet Union to use Yugoslav airspace and airfields for their resupply operations on behalf of the Arab armies. A massive Soviet airlift began about June 8. The correspondent of the Yugoslav News Agency (TANJUG) was the first to report from Cairo on June 15 that Soviet transport planes were landing on Egyptian airfields almost uninterruptedly. Reportedly, for the next few weeks thereafter Soviet An-12s landed at about the rate of one every 15 minutes.¹⁸

The Soviet airlift of heavy arms and equipment to Egypt and Syria continued on an intensive scale throughout most of the summer. During that period, some 350 flights of An-12s were recorded.¹⁹ A very small part of the airlift reinforcement was directed to Baghdad by overflying Iranian airspace. By far the major part of this effort was directed to Cairo, Damascus and Algiers. The Yugoslav government gave permission for overflights and refueling stops

for An-12s flying from Budapest. The An-12s were observed over Dubrovnik and the Bay of Cattaro after leaving Yugoslav airspace and heading for North Africa.

One report has it that the Soviet airlift began only after Nasser's urgent requests to Tito that Soviet transports be allowed to refuel in Yugoslavia. According to the same source, when the Egyptian Ambassador met at the end of the June War with Aleksei Kosygin and requested urgent military aid, the latter responded favorably. Kosygin noted, however, that the aid could not arrive rapidly unless Yugoslavia, which was allegedly maintaining its policy of nonalignment by denying any facilities for foreign military transports, was ready to allow overflight and refueling of the Soviet military aircraft.²⁰ Thereafter, Nasser was supposed to have informed Belgrade about Moscow's standpoint. Tito is said to have replied that Yugoslav airspace was to be opened at once to the unhindered passage of Soviet transports. He also reportedly gave the necessary instructions to all appropriate Yugoslav authorities for prompt execution of his orders. The entire arrangement allegedly took only three hours.²¹

This sequence of events seems, however, highly unlikely. It should be reiterated that the amendments to the Yugoslav air traffic law of 1965 were apparently effected for just such a contingency,

that is, the use of the country's airspace by Soviet military transport aircraft.

During the June War and its aftermath, the Yugoslav media tried to portray the Arabs as "victims" and Israel as the "aggressor." The Belgrade media, reflecting the official stand, termed the Arab defeat a catastrophe that had befallen "progressive" and independent states in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it admitted that the defeat came as a result of their failure to effectively resist the Israeli "aggressor." The Israeli victory was attributed to their being well equipped with Western arms and "flanked" by the presence of the Sixth Fleet.²² Belgrade also attempted to portray the United States as having chosen the Middle East as a place to make an aggressive move and thus to achieve its global objectives. Not only the U.S. but also all Western countries were blamed for a "state of crisis in the Middle East." Belgrade charged that arms deliveries by the West "have done much to increase tensions and military presence and their oil companies conveniently served as an effective instrument of pressure and blackmail."²³

In the aftermath of the war, there was much criticism in the Yugoslav press, reflecting Belgrade's displeasure with the failure of the U.N. to act on the recommendations of nonaligned countries for a solution to the Middle East crisis. Some unnamed nonaligned countries were also criticized for their failure to free themselves from the "theory of unconditional equidistance between the superpowers."

Such a policy was characterized as neutralism which might become a "dangerous isolationism."²⁴

In connection with the Middle East crisis, the Seventh Plenum of the CC of the LCY was held on July 1 in Belgrade. The statement issued at the end of this meeting approved all measures taken by Tito and other party and state bodies which dealt with the war in the Middle East. The CC of LCY approved Tito's participation at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries held in Moscow on June 9. It stated that Yugoslav participation at the meeting reflected the "principled positions of the country's foreign policy as well as the need for cooperation among socialist, nonaligned and other peaceminded countries and all progressive and democratic forces in the world in resisting aggressive imperialist actions."²⁵ The statement asserted that the war in the Middle East was linked with similar "imperialist" undertakings, especially the war in Vietnam, as a part of the "planned and long-range offensive strategy of imperialist forces in the world, particularly the United States."²⁶

The Yugoslav media, in the summer and fall of 1967, dwelled extensively on the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. The coup d'état in Greece in April and the policies of the new government evoked sharp Yugoslav criticism. Belgrade asserted that the U.S. had incited the "anti-communist and anti-Slav activities of the Greek military regime."²⁷ Moreover, press commentaries accused the U.S. of engineering the coup in Athens in order to use Greece as "a

geostrategic springboard in the Eastern Mediterranean offering possibilities for action toward North Africa, the Middle East, the Black Sea and the Balkan peninsula."

The series of routine NATO naval maneuvers held in 1967 in the Tyrrhennian, Ionian and Adriatic seas, the Italian land maneuvers in the Julian March (at the end of August), and the maneuvers of NATO mobile forces held in September in Northern Greece were all portrayed by Belgrade as part of the U.S. strategy of indirect approach. Allegedly, NATO's exercises aimed at demonstrating "military might along the borders of Southeast Europe's socialist countries." It was even charged that the "anti-Yugoslav aspect of NATO activities in the south is not only obviously present but even quite explicit."²⁸

At the same time, Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean and Western fears that it was linked with Moscow's broader strategic objectives was downplayed. The Soviet naval presence was justified as a defensive move in support of embattled "progressive" Arab regimes. Moscow's activities in the Mediterranean were viewed as legitimate, because they served the defensive needs of the Soviet Union, a country whose opponents "are constantly threatening with a tampon system of bases and a cordon sanitaire of multilateral and bilateral alliances."²⁹

The Soviet Union was portrayed repeatedly as "a country which, whenever and wherever possible, offers moral support to those who

defend their elementary right to freedom and independence from the encroachments ensuing from the U.S. strategy of indirect approach."³⁰ It was realized, however, that the appearance of the Soviet naval forces would not ensure a final settlement of unresolved problems in the Mediterranean. At the same time, Belgrade thought that the Soviet presence could force the other side to a "more cautious Mediterranean policy and strategy and to some extent improve the unfavorable balance resulting from Israel's aggression against the Arab states."³² In the Yugoslav view, a lasting settlement of acute problems "can only be resolved on the principle of recognizing and respecting the inalienable right of all the Mediterranean countries to decide their future freely and independently as envisioned by the universally accepted principles of international cooperation." If this principle was followed, the presence of foreign military forces in the Mediterranean would be unnecessary.³³

By the fall of 1967, the Yugoslav leadership had become quite convinced that, as a result of the Middle East crisis, NATO and the United States had shifted the focus of their strategic interests toward southern Europe. Israel's military action against the Arabs was linked with the coup in Greece. The plans for the reestablishment of NATO's Mediterranean multilateral naval forces were considered by Belgrade as part of the "Pentagon's general policy of instigating local wars to enable the U.S. to gradually acquire strategic positions around the world, while eliminating objectionable regimes one

after the other by pressure and force of arms."³⁴ Within the same context, the Yugoslav media charged that the Sixth Fleet, together with other U.S. and NATO mobile forces, "played" at the very least a "pilot" role during the June War.

Belgrade also accused the Greek ruling junta of trying to put an end to the independence of Cyprus with the help of the Sixth Fleet. Allegedly the U.S. was planning to use Greece as a base in the Balkan for implementation of its "aggressive tactics" in that region. The Yugoslav media portrayed events in the Middle East and the maneuvers held by NATO in the southern part of Europe as part of a "preconceived" plan by the United States.

Belgrade time and again tried to dismiss Western fears of Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean by assuring everyone that the Soviet Navy was "extremely cautious and far removed from any aggressive intentions." In Belgrade's view, the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean came as a consequence of "the aggressive policy of Israel and NATO in this region."³⁵

The growing power of the Soviet Navy and the Soviet long-range airlift capability was perceived by the Yugoslav media as an effort to counter the U.S. "imperialist" strategy of local and limited wars with creating similar capabilities.³⁶ It was estimated that the new Soviet military doctrine had already achieved some positive

results. The best illustration was that the Mediterranean had ceased being "the stomping ground of the American Sixth Fleet."³⁷

However, in the fall of 1967 there emerged some voices in Yugoslavia which, while justifying the Soviet naval presence, demanded that both the Sixth Fleet and Soviet naval units leave the Mediterranean, so that this region could become free of all "cold war elements and bloc competition."³⁸

During a meeting in Bologna in September 1967, representatives from Yugoslavia and from the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) proposed the idea of convening a Mediterranean conference to deal with the problem of foreign military presence in that region. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting said that the increase in tensions in the Mediterranean had been caused mainly by the policy of "imperialist" forces which, under the influence of the U.S., were trying to turn the Mediterranean into "a springboard of their world strategy." The communiqué stated that all participants at the meeting were in agreement on the need to coordinate the struggle of all "socialist, democratic and patriotic forces" by adopting a unified stand aimed at defeating "imperialism."³⁹

A second consultative meeting was held in Belgrade on December 17, 1967. It also included representatives from the ruling parties

and in Egypt, Syria and Algeria, from the French Communist Party, and from some left-wing opposition groups in Lebanon, Cyprus and Morocco.

A third preparatory meeting, at which 16 "progressive" countries participated, took place in Rome on January 21 and 28. Left-wing parties from Greece, Spain, and Turkey also attended. The French Communist Party participated only as an "observer." The main idea of the planned conference had been defined by the Yugoslavs as "an organized action by progressive forces against U.S. Atlantic policy in the Mediterranean."⁴⁰

The Yugoslavs viewed U.S. policy as a fundamental and principal cause of the difficulties which faced all the Mediterranean countries. They set, as a specific goal of the conference, the demand to transform the Mediterranean into a zone of peace, free of foreign military presence.⁴¹ The Yugoslavs argued that, although the Soviet naval presence could not be compared in terms of cause and effect with the presence of the U.S. armed forces and NATO policy in the area, the basic objective of progressive action in the Mediterranean is the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and peaceful cooperation. This can only be achieved by the removal of all foreign military forces in the region.⁴² In an evident attempt to allay Soviet fears that they had become less anti-U.S., the Yugoslavs took pains to emphasize that removal of all foreign presence did not imply any change in the "anti-imperialist" character of the proposed conference. They pointed out that this

demand was necessary in order to achieve a lasting and comprehensive solution in the Mediterranean.⁴³

By the time the third preparatory meeting convened, the Russians had already let their reservations on the entire project be known. French communists were also cautious and withdrew by taking part only in the status of observers at the Rome meeting. The more pro-Soviet parties had expressed a lack of enthusiasm for the proposed conference. Belgrade favored a broad non-ideological participation by all parties and movements in the Mediterranean countries. For example, the Yugoslavs, who sponsored the conference, were represented there by the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY), a mass communist-dominated organization, rather than by the LCY.⁴⁴ However, the Yugoslav conception of the conference proved difficult to realize. The French communists rejected the participation of the Gaullists. Similarly, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) did not want the participation of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). The Arab parties were against French Socialist attendance because of the latter's opposition to President De Gaulle's pro-Arab stance during the June War.⁴⁵ The Rome meeting ended with a communiqué which stated that the proposed conference was to rally "all the forces of the Mediterranean region ready to be engaged in the struggle against imperialism with the aim of turning the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and peaceful cooperation."⁴⁶

After the beginning of 1968 the Yugoslav media became increasingly preoccupied with the foreign naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Zagreb leading daily, Vjesnik, wrote on January 20, 1968 that it was encouraging to see the arrival of Soviet warships in the Mediterranean, since it then ceased to be "an exclusively American lake controlled by the Sixth Fleet." However, it expressed concern that the Soviet presence may signify the opening of a new arms race and transformation of the area into a new proving ground for tests of strength.⁴⁷ The paper concluded that whatever the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean might contribute to weaken American pressure and U.S. domination in the area, it would mean more if non-Mediterranean powers were to cease interfering in the affairs of that area.

The leading Belgrade paper, Borba, said on February 19, in a commentary on the platform for the then forthcoming Mediterranean conference, that although the tense situation came as a result of primarily U.S. "Atlanticist" activities, there was a need to "eliminate the military presence of any great power or remnants of bloc-ridden activity from the Mediterranean." Borba, however, stressed that the presence of both the U.S. and Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean could not be measured by the same yardstick. The newspaper said that Soviet naval vessels had appeared in the Mediterranean in recent months "bringing some new elements into the balance of power and the operational plans and capabilities of NATO, and above all into Pentagon calculations." Borba added that this provided no

grounds for the "formalistic and unfair conclusion that Soviet warships had extended the sphere of the two super-powers' cold war confrontation to the Mediterranean."

Although Belgrade in the spring of 1968 preferred that both the Sixth Fleet and Soviet naval forces withdraw from the Mediterranean, it continued to draw distinctions between the U.S. and Soviet presence in that region. The U.S. was perceived as a superpower whose global strategy was aimed at suppressing the struggle of any country for "progressive" development.

The presence of the Sixth Fleet was said to reflect "U.S. strivings for domination in the Mediterranean area and constituted an instrument of pressure on the Mediterranean countries and a source of increasing danger to their freedom and independence and to world peace."⁴⁸ The Soviet Union was consistently portrayed as "the only country capable of counterbalancing U.S. nuclear and conventional military strength and of curbing U.S. expansionist ambitions." Moreover, the Soviet Union was considered a power which did not threaten "the freedom and independence of the Mediterranean countries and which constitutes one of the most reliable strongholds of anti-imperialism in the present-day constellation of the world."⁴⁹ Consequently, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was viewed as an instrument of "anti-imperialist" policy and of direct and indirect support to Mediterranean countries in their efforts to preserve their freedom and independence.⁵⁰

Although recognizing that the newly created situation did not result in a decrease of tension, Belgrade clearly preferred such a state of affairs to the sole presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. At the same time, however, the Yugoslavs realized that the presence of both fleets in the area resulted in a dangerous increase in tensions in the area. In Belgrade's opinion, this was a natural consequence of American "imperialist" action and Soviet "anti-imperialist" counteraction. The Yugoslavs recognized, however, that the eventual confrontation between the two superpowers in the Mediterranean could set off the spark igniting a worldwide conflagration. According to Belgrade's line of reasoning at that time, a solution was not to be found in the departure of Soviet naval forces from the area, because it would give the U.S. a free hand to force the Mediterranean into a strategic stronghold of "imperialist" policy. Therefore, Belgrade wanted the U.S. Sixth Fleet to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean first. This, in turn, would eliminate the main reason for the presence of Soviet naval forces in the area and they would withdraw. Such reasoning was wishful thinking, because there was no doubt at that time that the Russians had come to stay in the Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, preparations for the proposed conference of Mediterranean countries entered into a final phase. A special organizational-technical meeting, in which SAWPY participated, was held on March 17 in Rome. The question of participants at the planned conference was raised again. The Yugoslav representative wanted "socialist,

progressive, popular and national parties in the Mediterranean, and especially European countries, to participate."⁵¹ Other organizers of the conference wanted only those parties with radical programs and clear anti-Western policies to participate. The SAWPY made formal reservations in regard to this question.

The first Mediterranean conference, represented by 16 "progressive" parties, including SAWPY, was held between April 9 and 11 in Rome. A draft of the platform submitted by the Yugoslav delegation, after reiterating the customary condemnation of U.S. policies, stated that the "presence of American military forces--as well as the function of NATO military systems and above all the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, were the mainstay and source of imperialist action endangering the security and independence of the Mediterranean peoples."⁵² In the Yugoslav view, the permanent task of "progressive" forces was to organize resistance to "imperialist" and bloc activities in the Mediterranean area.

As expected, there was no criticism or even any mention of the Soviet naval presence. Rather obliquely, the document said that the efforts to transform the Mediterranean into a zone free of nuclear weapons and foreign bases could pave the way for freeing the region from "unwanted political and military influences of non-Mediterranean origin"⁵³ [emphasis added]. The final resolution of the Rome conference, signed by all participants, including the Yugoslav delegation, stated that the Mediterranean, like Southeast Asia "is one of

the outposts of aggressive U.S. policy in its global strategy of domination."⁵⁴ It also accused Israel of serving "imperialist" aims toward its neighbors and cooperating with the U.S. in making it possible for the latter to dominate the Mediterranean. The resolution called specifically for the abolition of American and British bases in the Mediterranean, both those within NATO and others acquired under bilateral agreements with non-NATO countries, plus the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet. The document also called for the non-renewal of both the U.S.-Spanish Defense Treaty due to expire in September 1968, and of the NATO Alliance upon its expiration in 1969, because they were the basic instruments of American "aggressiveness" in the Mediterranean.⁵⁵

There was no direct or indirect demand that Soviet naval forces should withdraw from the area simultaneously with the Sixth Fleet. The conference evidently served Soviet political aims well.

In the late spring of 1968, some influential voices among top Yugoslav officials began to question the wisdom of unreserved support for Soviet positions on most international issues. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nikezich, in an interview published on April 20, 1968, took a more even-handed approach toward the situation in the Mediterranean than the Yugoslav media. He said that the cold war had been present in the Mediterranean for years, "just as it has been present in the other world areas."⁵⁶ This statement was opposite to what the Yugoslav media had been charging, namely that the NATO Alliance

had shifted its strategic interests toward the Mediterranean. Significantly, Nikezich did not openly blame the U.S. and the West for the deterioration of the situation in the Mediterranean, but observed that "such a concentration of power (NATO)...represents pressure on the policy of the countries in question."⁵⁷ He asserted that, because the U.S. and British fleets were already present in the Mediterranean, it was natural for Moscow, "given the existing ratio of forces in the world, to bring the Soviet fleet to the Mediterranean as well."⁵⁸

Nikezich's relatively moderate criticism of U.S. and Western policies, not only in regard to the Mediterranean, but also on other international issues as well, came as the result of growing ideological differences between Belgrade and Moscow. After the beginning of 1968, there was a gradual deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, caused mainly, but not exclusively, by their different attitudes toward internal developments in Czechoslovakia.

Tito with five other top Yugoslav officials visited Moscow from April 28 to 30, where they met with Brezhnev and other high Soviet officials. A joint communiqué issued at the end of the Moscow talks said that, in an "open" exchange of opinions, bilateral relations and current international problems had been discussed.⁵⁹ Although it was agreed to further strengthen bilateral relations, the Yugoslav leadership expressed sharp disagreement with Soviet handling of the situation in Czechoslovakia. Tito reportedly told Brezhnev and other

Soviet leaders that any attempt "to use force in the solution of problems in Czechoslovakia would have infinitely serious consequences, not only for Czechoslovakia, but for the Soviet Union itself and the international worker's movement in general."⁶⁰

The crisis in Czechoslovakia entered into its final and fateful phase in the summer of 1968. Belgrade became more supportive of the Czechoslovak leadership and thus came into open dispute with Moscow and all the other Warsaw Pact countries except Romania. Tito, in a symbolic gesture of support for the embattled Czechoslovak leadership, visited Prague between August 9 and 10. A few days before the invasion, Tito, in an exclusive interview with the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, declared that he did not "believe there are in the Soviet Union people so shortsighted that they would take the course of applying a policy of force to solve internal problems in Czechoslovakia."⁶¹ However, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21. This event also signified the end of one of the most promising phases in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

To conclude, triangular relations between Cairo-Belgrade-Moscow had the most decisive influence on Yugoslav policy and attitudes prior to the June War of 1967, especially in the case of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Although the strong personal ties between Tito and Nasser greatly facilitated relations between the two countries, it created problems as well. Tito in many ways became Nasser's hostage because while he might have had some doubts on

the wisdom of certain aspects of Egypt's policies toward Israel, there was little choice for him but to support Nasser. Similarly, Tito's strong concern for continued close relations with Moscow greatly narrowed the range of Belgrade's options.

Tito's participation at the Moscow conference in June 1967 in fact led Yugoslavia from the policy of nonalignment partially into the Soviet orbit. Although not perceived at that time, it was a rash move, made without awareness of its consequences for the country's security. Tito's decision, moreover, was made despite the opposition of "liberal"-minded Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac. There was no doubt that this event marked the beginning of a disastrous course, which ultimately led Yugoslavia into an uncertain and dangerous situation not unlike that of 1948.

It appears in retrospect that, if it had not been for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the close relations which existed between Belgrade and Moscow would have led to limited access by Soviet naval vessels to Yugoslav port facilities. At that time it might have been possible for Moscow to reach an agreement with Belgrade similar to that reached with Cairo in March 1968.* The invasion of Czechoslovakia in any case abruptly stopped Moscow's quest for limited access to Yugoslav port facilities. As a result of the Czechoslovakian events,

*This agreement gave the Russians four-year access to some of the Egyptian naval and ground air facilities.

Yugoslavia's security position sharply deteriorated. Although "non-aligned" and not a member of the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia found itself threatened by Moscow and in almost the same situation as Romania. This would not have happened if Belgrade had not become entangled in intra-bloc politics and had stayed free of involvement with Moscow during and after the June War of 1967.

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III. MOSCOW SUFFERED A SETBACK (1968-1971)

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the events which followed brought relations between Moscow and Belgrade to their lowest point after 1948. Yugoslavia for the first time since 1955 felt threatened by the Soviet Union and its allies. The chill in relations between the two countries lasted almost three years. Although Yugoslavia remained firm in its policy of support for "progressive" Arab regimes, its attitudes toward the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean gradually changed after August 1968. Belgrade became concerned with Soviet activities there and began to urge the removal of both the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Fifth Eskadra from the area. Yugoslavia in this period still never considered the U.S. naval presence as desirable, despite Belgrade's subjection to relentless Soviet pressure, which also had military overtones. Such a contradictory policy was largely conditioned by Belgrade's need to support Egypt and other Arab countries in their conflict with Israel, in which the Soviet Union was the only great power willing and capable of providing the necessary political and military support. To demand only the withdrawal of Soviet naval forces from the Mediterranean would have meant undermining Egypt's position and security. This in turn might have led Egypt to oppose Yugoslav activities within the nonaligned movement, the cornerstone of Belgrade's entire foreign policy. Obviously, the Yugoslav leadership was not willing to embark on such a tenuous path and thus chose a middle-road policy toward the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean.

Although the worsening of relations with the Soviet Union had the immediate effect of freezing high-level contacts between the Yugoslav and Soviet military, Moscow continued to use Yugoslav airspace for crisis-related airlift to the Middle East. This was exemplified by the relatively large Soviet airlift undertaken in the spring of 1970 to strengthen Egyptian defenses along the Suez Canal.

By the end of 1971, it had become apparent that both Belgrade and Moscow were ready to bury their differences over Czechoslovakian events and affect a new rapprochement.

The military action by five Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia had been strongly condemned by Belgrade. A session of the Presidium and the Executive Committee of the CC of the LCY chaired by Tito was held on August 21 at Brioni. The statement issued at the end of the meeting contended that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia "strikes a serious blow at socialist and all progressive forces in the world," and had "far reaching negative consequences for the entire development of international relations."¹ Two days later, the Tenth Plenum of the CC of the LCY was also held at Brioni. The resolution adopted at the end of the meeting said that the LCY does not recognize "the right of anyone to willfully interfere in the internal affairs of an independent country by recourse to military intervention or any other form of pressure."² Belgrade had a genuine fear that Yugoslavia was directly endangered because of its open support for Czechoslovakia. The resolution emphasized that Yugoslavia

was ready with all "forces and means to defend the country's independence," and called on all citizens to participate in strengthening national defense. Tepavac, a member of the Central Committee (CC) of the LCY, said that the Soviet Union, by its military intervention in Czechoslovakia, confirmed its willingness to "grossly, mercilessly, impose its brand of socialism on others as an instrument not only of ideological but of state domination." In unmistakable reference to Moscow, he warned that, if danger approached Yugoslav borders from any quarter whatsoever, the Yugoslavs would defend themselves. Tepavac added that "no one's tanks, either with stars or swastikas, will be allowed to drive around our streets undisturbed."³

The Yugoslav leadership, realizing the gravity of the Soviet action, initiated a wide range of military countermeasures. Already on August 21, the Yugoslav armed forces were put in a state of alert. Three classes of military reservists and a great number of army specialists and technicians were called up.⁴ Defense steps were undertaken in all the Yugoslav constituent republics and autonomous provinces. For example, in Croatia it was reported that some 110,000 youth had been organized in volunteer units.⁵

The military measures undertaken in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia at the same time revealed numerous deficiencies in the deployment and combat readiness of the Yugoslav armed forces. The partial mobilization was executed very slowly and many reservists lacked the proper arms and equipment. More serious was the fact that

the YPA had the bulk of its forces deployed to face potential threats from the West, and not from the East. The Czechoslovakian events had also revealed disunity among the top military leaders as to how real the Soviet threat was. Inspector General of the YPA and former Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Rade Hamovich (a Serb) was dismissed from his post. The reason given was that he refused to cancel his vacation and return to Belgrade when the invasion took place. He also ridiculed the threat posed by the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia's security.

Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries, except Romania, deteriorated sharply. The Belgrade media accused Bulgaria of becoming the pillar of Soviet strategy in the Balkan and therefore a threat to peace and security in the area. Moreover, it charged that both Moscow and Sofia were engaged in a war of nerves and had aggressive intentions, not only toward other communist countries in the Balkans, but also toward Turkey and Greece.⁶ More ominous for Belgrade were the series of articles in the Soviet press charging that the Western countries were trying to turn the Balkan area into a new arsenal against the "socialist camp."⁷ Then on September 11 Moscow's Pravda openly said that military intervention "for the sake of the protection of socialism in this or that country is neither an accidental nor isolated move, but the expression of a view and a lasting policy." This statement later evolved into the "limited sovereignty" theory, or the "Brezhnev doctrine." It claimed that the principles of international law cannot guide relations among the

communist countries and that the Soviet Union has to intervene if "a socialist state is endangered by internal and foreign enemies of socialism."⁸ Such statements were for Yugoslavia the most disturbing aspect of Soviet policy because, as Belgrade correctly perceived, it could someday be equally applied against Yugoslavia, even though it was not a member of the Warsaw Pact.

Foreign Minister Nikezich, in a speech at the session of the U.N. General Assembly, said that no "supposedly higher interest, no ideological or other loyalty can be superimposed upon the sovereignty of governments and other legitimate representatives whom their peoples have elected."⁹

The worsening of relations with Moscow in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia led to a slightly different interpretation of the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean. Belgrade now held the view that the security of the Balkan countries was endangered by the activities, not only of the NATO Alliance, but also the Warsaw Pact.

In the fall of 1968, the Yugoslavs perceived two main threats to the Balkan countries, one emanating from the Middle East through the Mediterranean and Greece and inspired by NATO, the other from the Warsaw Pact, as exemplified by the events in Czechoslovakia and by other "hegemonistic" undertakings.¹⁰ Also Belgrade for the first time was openly worried by the significant increase in the number of

Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean that took place in September 1968. Yugoslavs were disturbed by Moscow's attempt to justify this increase by alleged preparations of the NATO Alliance for "aggression" against the "socialist" countries.¹¹ At the same time, while accusing the Warsaw Pact of increasing tensions in southeast Europe, Belgrade was careful to emphasize that the NATO presence in the area was no more acceptable. It insisted that the United States and NATO presence was the main cause of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean.

At the same time, Belgrade criticized the Soviet approach, which urged a NATO disengagement from the area, but not the withdrawal of Soviet naval forces. Yugoslavia considered Soviet behavior to be not only intended to neutralize the alleged U.S. strategy of an indirect approach, but also aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of various countries.¹² Belgrade tried to demonstrate that both the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact had an equal interest in acquiring control over Yugoslav military facilities. Medjunarodna Politika on December 5 chose to emphasize that the Yugoslav Adriatic coast with its ports and naval bases could seriously influence the situation in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Yugoslavia's airfields could have "a major effect both on the southern land theatre of the Atlantic and Warsaw Pacts as well as on the Mediterranean naval theatre of NATO."¹³ It was clear that the commentary was referring to Soviet aims against Yugoslavia. It also implied what was made known confidentially to YPA's officers that Moscow had exercised pressure

in the past to get limited access to Yugoslav naval facilities and the use of its airspace.

By the end of 1968, Belgrade had become more worried because of intensified activities allegedly by both superpowers in the Mediterranean. The party weekly Komunist on December 12, commenting on a routine visit of U.S. destroyers into the Black Sea, said that it could be described only "as another impetus to the dangerous trend of accumulating and demonstrating force which, under the conditions of mutual pressures and counteractions, can by no means be useful to the cause of relaxing tension in the regions."¹⁴

Medjunarodna Politika, indicating a significant policy shift on December 18, urged a halt in the "further penetration into the Mediterranean and a gradual withdrawal of all foreign fleets [emphasis added] from Mediterranean waters."¹⁵ The paper argued that the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was undoubtedly a significant factor that had initially served to prevent further "aggressive" Israeli action against Arab countries and had contributed to the consolidation of the position of the Arab countries. It argued that the Soviet naval presence, which at the beginning was "restricted in scope and purpose," had been transformed gradually into the "lasting and long-term presence of the Soviet Union" and hence the original meaning of the Soviet presence was altered.¹⁶ Medjunarodna Politika noted with concern the various theories that had been advanced about the Soviet Union being "a Mediterranean

country" in order to "justify the presence of its fleet in the region."¹⁷

The Zagreb Vjesnik on December 2 took issue with Moscow's contention that the Soviet naval presence supported "national liberation tendencies in the Mediterranean."¹⁸ The paper accused Moscow of waging a propaganda campaign against those, like the Yugoslavs, who were against plans "aimed at turning the Mediterranean into a battleground of the two superpowers."

At the same time the Yugoslavs continued to argue against the U.S. naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Sixth Fleet was still perceived as the principal factor in the implementation of U.S. "hegemonistic" policies in the region. Belgrade charged that the U.S. Sixth Fleet was and "is a strong factor of threat and pressure against the emancipation of the Mediterranean countries and against their efforts to consolidate their own independence and the achievements of the struggle against colonialism."¹⁹

The Mediterranean problem continued to preoccupy Yugoslav attention in early 1969. Acting Foreign Minister Milan Pavicevich concluded that the main source of danger for Mediterranean countries came from the unresolved Middle East crisis, which in turn was primarily caused by "aggressive" Israeli policy. Similar views were expressed by a member of the Presidium of the CC of the LCY, Edvard Kardelj. In an interview with the Italian Communist Party weekly

Rinascita during his visit to Rome in February 1969, he said that if the deteriorating situation in the Mediterranean was not checked, it would transform the area into "a sphere of direct conflict between the two superpowers." Departing from the prevailing tone in the Yugoslav media, he attempted to justify the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean by saying that, "as long as the American fleet and other forces of the Atlantic Pact were there, nobody should wonder that the Soviet side has reacted." He also added that the Soviet naval presence was "one of the forms of assistance to the Arab countries in their resistance to Israeli aggression."²⁰

The Yugoslav media continued to voice concern over new developments in the Mediterranean, such as NATO's decision to create a separate multinational naval task force and a new command responsible for monitoring Soviet ship movements in the area. The Yugoslavs viewed the presence of both the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Fifth Eskadra as "champions and instruments of antagonistic aims" which were dictated by their respective national interests rather than the interests of the Mediterranean countries.²¹ It was also explicitly stated that the Soviet naval presence was "founded on a logic dictated by the interests of Soviet security." Allegedly, Moscow wanted to assert its interest in free navigation through the Straits and in the Mediterranean by its presence in the area. Belgrade questioned the validity of various Soviet theories maintaining that, because of its geographical position and strategic interests, the Soviet Union had emerged as "another Mediterranean power."²²

Yugoslavia apparently became increasingly concerned with the deteriorating situation in the Mediterranean during the summer of 1969. It began to press for the simultaneous withdrawal of both the U.S. and the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean. The Yugoslavs argued that, in order to counter effectively great power strivings in the area, it was essential that the Mediterranean countries demonstrate a readiness for settling their own disputes and thereby prevent the great powers from using these as a pretext for starting fresh conflicts in the Mediterranean region.²³

The Ljubljana daily, Delo, on April 10 criticized both the U.S. and the Soviet Union for constantly escalating their military presence in the Mediterranean, which amounts to "pressure of a sort on all the countries in that area."²⁴

By the end of the summer of 1969, however, both Belgrade and Moscow had expressed a desire to lessen the tensions between the two countries. It was agreed that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko would visit Belgrade between September 2 and 6. Talks between Gromyko and Tepavac dealt with the numerous bilateral issues, as well as some international problems. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the talks admitted that on some bilateral issues "both sides stand firmly on their own positions."²⁵ Belgrade and Moscow then still disagreed on the events in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, at a press conference held on October 4 at Kranj, Tito said that Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had "arrived at the common conclusion that it is

best to forget this and cooperate on those things which are of common interest." Therefore, "we leave aside the case of the CSSR." Belgrade agreed not to dramatize this question and told Moscow so. Although the speech was broadcast on radio Zagreb, curiously, not one Yugoslav newspaper published it.²⁶ In a speech on October 10 in Zagreb, Tito said that, in relations with the Soviet Union and other "socialist" countries, a "common course should be adopted aimed primarily at those things that truly tend to promote cooperation, while differences of view where they may appear should be discussed soberly and in a principled manner on the basis of equality and complete mutual respect."²⁷ He did not mention the events in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, Gromyko's visit represented more a truce than a peace between Moscow and Belgrade.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean continued to be of growing concern for the Yugoslav government. At the end of Tito's visit to Libya in February 1970, both governments agreed on the need for the Mediterranean to become a zone of peace and security and not a zone of direct confrontation between the two superpowers.²⁸ Foreign Minister Tepavac in an interview with Medjunarodna Politika, commenting on the U.S. and Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, emphasized that this situation was "an additional source of danger of a possible conflict between the two superpowers which could involve other Mediterranean countries as well."²⁹

The Yugoslavs also portrayed the situation in the Mediterranean as having negative repercussions on the security of the Balkan countries, particularly those like Yugoslavia and Albania which did not belong to any military grouping. Moscow was accused of exerting "military pressure in that area because of its attempts to change the balance of power there."³⁰

By the end of 1970, Belgrade had come to consider the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean as also having "offensive" aims in accordance with the new Soviet naval doctrine. The Russians in the Yugoslav view, by their presence in the area, intended "to establish a link with naval forces in the Atlantic, to conquer positions towards Africa and to ensure communications with the Indian Ocean."³¹ Moreover, Belgrade made no distinctions between the missions of the U.S. and Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean, as it had prior to August 1968. In fact, in accusing the U.S. of a policy of pressure and threats as exemplified by the presence of the Sixth Fleet, the Yugoslavs implied that both superpowers tended toward "a parallelism of behaviour and towards giving their presence a long-term character." Belgrade stressed that, regardless of the "momentary" behavior of each superpower, it was unacceptable that one fleet should go while the other remained--"it would be driving one devil out by another."³²

The Yugoslav media in the course of 1971 continued to comment on the naval situation in the Mediterranean. It was argued that the

Soviet naval presence in the area was primarily of a political nature. Although it was conceded that the Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean represented one of the most important factors for the security of the Arab countries, the Yugoslavs argued that it also created a number of problems and dilemmas. Belgrade tacitly admitted that the greatest beneficiary of current developments in the Middle East was precisely the USSR, because it thereby was realizing "one of the permanent Russian aims."³³ It argued that the Soviet presence in the Middle East was in direct proportion to the "threat" from Israel. Soviet long-term interests, it was alleged, coincided with the short-term aims of the Arab countries, which in turn "impose certainties, but also uncertainties in their mutual relations."³⁴

Defense Minister Gen. Nikola Ljubicich in a speech at the second session of the LCY Conference argued that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had "hegemonistic aspirations and interests...which clash in the Mediterranean and the Balkans." He said that "bloc forces" were undertaking various actions to fulfill their goals and to weaken the Yugoslav position.

Belgrade asserted indirectly that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, by their reliance on military power, had "usurped the rights of a certain number of countries in the Mediterranean basin in the resolution of problems which would be far more easily resolved without their interference." More important for Yugoslavia was the fact that both superpowers by their very presence in the region had "re-

duced the scope for activity of the independent and non-aligned countries."

The Yugoslavs in the fall of 1971 began to view the U.S. and NATO presence as more harmful for the security of the Mediterranean countries than that of the Soviet fleet. Belgrade charged that NATO activity in the area had been intensified and combined with the world strategy of the Pentagon, which regarded the Mediterranean as a zone of fundamental interest for the U.S. at the expense of independent countries. The best example, in the Yugoslav view, was NATO policy over the crisis in Cyprus. The U.S. action to defuse the crisis and prevent further estrangement between the two NATO partners, Greece and Turkey, was treated as the "machinations" of NATO strategists. Belgrade blamed both superpowers for trying to expand their bloc systems. Yugoslavia, together with other independent Mediterranean countries, favored the withdrawal of both U.S. and Soviet forces from the region. This in turn would lessen the possibility of war in the Middle East and reduce the tensions rooted in the presence of powerful U.S. and Soviet naval and air force units.³⁵

The deterioration of relations between Moscow and Belgrade following the invasion of Czechoslovakia affected military cooperation between the two countries. The program of educating and training Yugoslav military personnel in the Soviet Union and other East European countries continued, albeit on a smaller scale. There were few official contacts between the top Soviet and Yugoslav military in

this period. That Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia had come to consider the East rather than the West as a threat to its independence was clearly shown by the large-scale combined maneuvers (the first such since 1951)--Sloboda-71 (Freedom-71), held in October 1971.

The Soviet Union continued after 1968 to make periodic use of Yugoslav airspace despite the bad political climate prevailing between the two countries. In early 1970, during the War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel, Moscow undertook an effort to rebuild the Egyptian air defense system, which required 87 flights of An-12 transports originating in Budapest but with stopovers in Yugoslavia. In March 1971 approximately 33 flights with An-12 and An-22 were made for the same purpose. A small quantity of MiG-25 Foxbats and SA-6 SAMs were delivered to Egypt.³⁶

Economic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and other Comecon countries continued to expand despite the deterioration of political relations following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Under a new long-term agreement signed on February 10, 1971, it was envisaged that the trade turnover between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union would amount to some \$4 billion (clearing). An additional \$4 billion in trade was planned with other Comecon countries. In December 1971 a supplementary agreement for 1972 through 1975 was signed, which foresaw a trade in both directions of \$580 million. The five-year (1971 through 1975) agreement on the Yugoslav export of ships to

the Soviet Union arranged for the delivery of 59 ships and craft. The total value of orders was estimated at \$300 million. Similar to previous agreements, this one prescribed repair work on Soviet merchant vessels in Yugoslav ship repair facilities amounting to \$25 million.

By the end of the summer, Soviet-Yugoslav relations had taken a rather sudden turn for the better after the announcement that Brezhnev had accepted Tito's invitation to visit Yugoslavia in late September. At the end of Brezhnev's four-day visit, on September 25, a joint communiqué was published simultaneously in Belgrade and Moscow. Indicating that strong differences still existed between the two sides, it stated that talks were held in "a spirit of friendship, comradely frankness and mutual understanding." The talks in Belgrade also reaffirmed an identity of views between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union on various international issues of the day such as the Middle East, Indochina, and European security and disarmament. Both countries agreed that the achievement of a political solution to the crisis in the Middle East lay in easing tensions in the entire region and particularly in transforming the Mediterranean into "a sea of peace and friendly cooperation."³⁷ Although many ideological differences between Belgrade and Moscow remained unresolved, the talks in Belgrade were successful. Tito, however, did not get any written Soviet commitment to Yugoslavia's security; at best he may have gotten some oral guarantees. Although Brezhnev during the visit to Yugoslavia joked about the doctrine of "limited sovereignty," he

did not retract what he said on that topic at the Polish party congress in November 1968.

The end of 1971 also witnessed a serious internal crisis in Yugoslavia, which had significant repercussions on relations with the Soviet Union and its allies. After economic reforms were introduced in 1965, internal developments in Yugoslavia were marked by the growing influence of "liberal" party leaders. The liberal economic policies also led to very significant changes in the country's political life.

After 1968 there was increasing pressure by "liberal" leaders in several constituent republics, intended initially to loosen and ultimately to weaken the control and influence of federal institutions. This trend took a more extreme form in Croatia, where the party leadership had overwhelming popular support for policies aimed at acquiring greater autonomy within the Yugoslav Federation. The growing nationalistic feelings in Croatia encountered the equally strong opposition of "centralist-minded" Serbs and Montenegrins, who dominated the federal government, party and army.

The climax was reached in November 1971 when Zagreb University students called a general strike to extract favorable economic concessions for Croatia from the central government. This action proved to be fatal for the Croatian party leaders. Tito acted quickly to meet this new challenge. He summoned the entire Croatian leadership

to Karadjordjevo where their policies and actions were severely criticized. Thereafter, a session of the LCY's Presidium was held on December 1 and 2. The statement issued at the end of the 21st session of the LCY Presidium accused the Croatian leaders of "leaderism, factionalism" and a lack of vigilance "toward exponents of nationalism and opponents of self-management."³⁸ Thereafter, the top Croatian party leaders were removed from all their positions and wide-ranging purges of real and imaginary "nationalists" were conducted in Croatia.

The resolution of the crisis in retrospect marked perhaps an irreversible setback for "liberal-minded" leaders in Yugoslavia, whether "nationalist" or "centralist." It signified the beginning of the end of the "liberal" period in the country's internal development. Decentralization of the country's political life reached its high point in December 1971 and then a gradual recentralization began. Another effect of the crisis was that, not only hard-line Tito loyalists, but also many "neo-Stalinists," using the same slogans, saw their opportunity for a comeback.

Moscow had had the greatest misgivings over Yugoslav internal developments ever since 1965, and it became particularly alarmed by the growing disintegrative tendencies in that country during 1970-71, which in its view would ultimately jeopardize the country's "socialist" system. Moreover, all the "liberal" party leaders were arguing in favor of less-intimate ties with the Soviet bloc. Their opportu-

nity had come in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Tito had the same goal as they: to preserve the country's independence from the Soviet Union. But by 1970 Tito wanted another rapprochement with Moscow. The "liberals" were determined to slow down any attempt on his part to pursue such a course. Hence, it was no coincidence that the reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow gathered momentum only after the Croatian leaders were removed from power. Most likely there was an additional factor in Tito's action in December 1971--the fear that the Russians might intervene to establish order in the country, unless the growing discontent was curbed quickly.

NOTES

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4. "Yugoslavia Prepared to Wage All Out People's War in Case of an Attack," Radio Free Europe Research (Munich) (Yugoslavia/67), p. 3 (hereafter cited as Radio Free Europe).
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7. "Soviet Balkan, Mediterranean Interests Hit," Eastern Europe, September 27, 1968, p. I 1.
8. "Pravda Polemics Milder, Explains Czech View," ibid., September 12, 1968, p. I 5.
9. "Speech by Marko Nikezich in the U.N. General Assembly," Review of International Affairs, 446 (November 5, 1968), p. 10.
10. Ranko Petkovich, "The Balkan File," ibid. 447 (November 20, 1968), p. 12.
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13. Ibid.; "Guarantees," ibid. 448 (December 5, 1968), p. 23.
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15. "U.S., USSR Mediterranean Presence Evaluated," ibid., December 18, 1968, p. I 4.
16. V. Vladislavljevich, "Mediterranean Confrontation," Review of International Affairs, 449 (December 20, 1968), p. 3.

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23. Vlada Obradovich, "Mediterranean Topics," ibid. 458 (May 5, 1969), p. 21.
24. "Mediterranean Situation," Eastern Europe, April 11, 1969, p. I 4.
25. "Gromyko in Yugoslavia," Review of International Affairs, 467 (September 20, 1969), p. 5.
26. "How Friendly Is Yugoslav-Soviet Friendship," Radio Free Europe 0331 (October 4, 1969), p. 1.
27. "President Tito Speech at Meeting in Zagreb," Review of International Affairs, 469 (October 20, 1969), p. 17.
28. "Joint Communiqué on Yugoslav-Libyan Talks," ibid. 478 (March 5, 1970), p. 19.
29. Mirko Tepavac, "Active and All-Round Cooperation," ibid. 484 (June 5, 1970), p. 3.
30. Lj. Radovanovich, "The Balkans and the Mediterranean," ibid., p. 25.
31. Milojko Drulovich, "Mare Nostrum or a Mousetrap," ibid. 496 (December 5, 1970), p. 11.
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35. "Joint Yugoslav-Soviet Statement," *ibid.* 516 (October 5, 1971), p. 13.
36. William J. Durch et al., "Other Soviet Interventionary Forces - Military Transport Aviation and Airborne Troops" in Dismukes, McConnell (eds.), Soviet Naval Diplomacy, p. 340.
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IV. ON A PARALLEL ROAD AGAIN (1972-1973)

Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971 not only improved relations between Belgrade and Moscow, but also resulted in a significant lessening of tensions in the Balkans. Moscow had apparently decided to include that region in its policy of a gradual relaxation of tension in Europe. Thus, some of Belgrade's wishes were fulfilled. The lessening of tensions between the two countries was brought about at the price of many ideological concessions by Belgrade.

Thereafter followed a brief but ultimately ill-fated period when both Belgrade and Moscow exerted great efforts to achieve closer cooperation in all fields. Particularly significant were the results attained in the strengthening of economic and trade relations on a long-term basis between Yugoslavia and the Comecon countries. But the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement got underway only after Tito and his small group of loyalists in the top party leadership, with the support of the military, succeeded in purging Croatian "nationalist-minded" party leaders and the "liberal-technocratic" leadership in other republics. Only after the process of recentralization in Yugoslav internal politics had started in earnest did Moscow again envisage intensive cooperation with Belgrade.

The growing reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union after 1972 had an almost immediate effect on Belgrade's atti-

tude toward Moscow's policy of force in the Mediterranean. Yugoslavia again began to openly justify and support the Soviet military presence in the area. As time passed, Belgrade became virulently critical of U.S. and NATO policies for countering the growing Soviet influence in the Mediterranean. The period 1972-73 was, from Moscow's standpoint, one which offered perhaps the highest hopes for durable and effective politico-military cooperation with Belgrade. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 represented another peak in positive post-war relations between Belgrade and Moscow.

The rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow continued in 1972. Then, between June 5 and 10, Tito headed a large Yugoslav delegation to the Soviet Union. A joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit stated that talks had been conducted in "a cordial, open and friendly atmosphere in a spirit of mutual respect and equality."¹ The absence of the word "frank" indicated that existing differences in views were minor. Both sides reiterated the need for establishing economic cooperation on a long-term basis. Most significantly, Belgrade and Moscow agreed not only on a further expansion of contacts at the highest level, but also on strengthening cooperation between social, scientific and cultural organizations and promoting direct ties of business and friendship between individual republics, cities and enterprises of the two countries. In regard to the main international issues discussed--such questions as the war in Vietnam and European security--the two governments had identical viewpoints.

Moscow conceded to Belgrade by stating that it supported "the anti-imperialist policy line of the non-aligned countries."² Both governments pledged that they would work jointly to support "the peoples of all continents who have thrown off the chains of colonial oppression and who are fighting against imperialism and neocolonialism."³

Meanwhile, economic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were put firmly on a long-term basis. The Soviet Union in 1971 became one of Yugoslavia's biggest trading partners, holding third place after West Germany and Italy, in the total Yugoslav foreign trade turnover. Bilateral trade increased sixfold between 1961 and 1971, that is, from some \$83 million to \$549 million, respectively.⁴ The extent of the economic cooperation between the two countries was illustrated by the fact that, by 1972, some 50 Yugoslav enterprises and projects, including electrical power plants, iron and steel work, non-ferrous metallurgical, and machine building plants, had been built or were under construction with equipment supplied by the Soviet Union.⁵

The most significant event in relations between the two countries, apart from Tito's visit to Moscow, was an agreement signed on November 2, 1971, in Belgrade, by which the Soviet Union promised \$1.3 billion in credit to Yugoslavia. Belgrade reportedly asked for \$2 billion. The first installment of credit amounted to \$540 million, to be spent between 1973 and 1976 for the construction and

expansion of 38 industrial projects.⁶ An additional 11 projects valued at \$450 million were planned to start in 1976, and to be completed by 1984. While Tito welcomed the agreement, some party leaders reportedly feared too great a dependence on Moscow.⁷ The reasons for the Soviet decision to grant such a large credit to Yugoslavia were clearly political and had much to do with Moscow's satisfactory view of internal developments in Yugoslavia. This was implicitly confirmed by Kardelj, who in a speech in Mostar on September 12, said that "it is not accidental that for years we were unable to obtain credits from abroad at a time when we took an opportunistic stand with regard to nationalism and similar phenomena." This remark contributed much to Western fears that Soviet credits were granted partially in recognition of the purges of "liberal-minded" communist leaders.⁸

Parallel to the steady improvement in its relations with Moscow, Belgrade again began to view more favorably the Soviet presence and policy aims in the Mediterranean. A military commentary in the Zagreb Vjesnik in February 1972 stressed that the significance of the Mediterranean in global bloc strategy was constantly increasing, particularly since the Soviet Union "has shown a great interest in this region as well." The author underlined the view that the Soviet Union had "deployed a strong modern fleet of its own in the Mediterranean and extended its military and economic aid to Arab countries, which is of very great importance for their resistance to the aggressive threats of Israel."⁹

U.S. and Western policies were strongly attacked in the Yugoslav media in connection with the crisis between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The Belgrade Borba on February 7 implied that the activities of the illegal rightist organization on Cyprus, aimed at overthrowing President Archbishop Makarios, were accompanied simultaneously by activities by the NATO command, Greece and Turkey, the objective of which was to turn Cyprus into a strong military base in the service of NATO. The paper added that it was certainly not accidental that the pressure on Cyprus came at the time of U.S.-Greek talks aimed to reach the homeporting agreement for some units of the Sixth Fleet. Belgrade radio on February 7, referring to the same subject, said that at "a moment when the idea is being increasingly accepted that the Mediterranean should belong to the littoral states," it was learned that "the U.S. wants to install new naval bases in Greece" and NATO wants to "finally establish roots on Cyprus by changing its non-aligned status through the intervention of extreme right-wing Greek forces."¹⁰

By the end of 1972, Yugoslavia was trying to mobilize nonaligned countries for political action aimed at achieving a lessening of tensions in the Mediterranean. Belgrade became concerned "lest détente in Central Europe be achieved at the expense of a shifting of expansionist tendencies to the Mediterranean, which affects the Adriatic."¹¹ Yugoslavia charged that the "war and the Middle East crisis are for the moment two evident motives for the escalation in the Mediterranean." The Yugoslavs believed that a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis would be of vital importance, not

only for the Arab countries, but also for the creation of a "free and safe Mediterranean."¹²

As the improvement of relations with Moscow gathered momentum following Tito's visit, the Yugoslav media increasingly took a pro-Soviet line on the situation in the Mediterranean. This was particularly the case in commentaries that appeared in military journals, undoubtedly reflecting the viewpoints of high military leaders.

The U.S.-Greek homeporting agreement was especially singled out as a move which contributed to increased tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and reinforced the "pressure on independent and non-aligned Cyprus."¹³ Previous accusations that the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean had been followed by various pressures on littoral states and was one of the main causes of tension in this region were repeated time and time again. At the same time, Soviet efforts to establish its military presence in the region was said to "represent a new development which opened a new era in the development of international relations in the entire area."¹⁴ However, it was still admitted that, although the Soviet naval presence added to the support of Arab countries following the unsuccessful war with Israel, at the same time it was the beginning of the process of "direct confrontation between the nuclear fleets of the two-superpowers, which may endanger peace, not only in that area where our country is located, but in other areas as well."¹⁵

There were also some new explanations for the growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. The commentaries which appeared in military journals are of particular interest here because they may reflect Soviet views, bearing in mind the close connection between the armed forces of both countries at the time. The reasons for the Soviet presence, in Belgrade's view, were first of all to "cover the gray area against the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to support friendly Arab countries in their war with Israel." Second, Moscow's aim was to "strengthen the USSR-Mediterranean-Middle East-Indian Ocean-Pacific axis" and thus secure lines of communication through "free and warm seas with its Far East Provinces." It was said that the economy of the Far Eastern provinces of the Soviet Union was on the verge of a vigorous expansion and the USSR thus needed "secure sea lines of communication of unlimited capacity, with the Eastern Mediterranean as the base of such communications."¹⁶ Third, in a nuclear war, the Mediterranean would provide suitable bases for NATO attacks with nuclear weapons against targets in Eastern Europe. The threat of such operations was naturally one of the important reasons for the USSR's military presence in the Mediterranean.¹⁷ Moreover, it was explained that the permanent presence of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean was designed to counter the NATO naval presence on the southern flank of the Warsaw Pact. Another consideration was Moscow's intention to maintain its position in the Arab world, not only because of its general strategic importance, but also because it could furnish ports and air bases and thus permit the USSR to "challenge the superiority of the U.S. and NATO in the Mediterranean."

The Soviet aim was also to prevent Cyprus from becoming a base for the Sixth Fleet and other NATO forces.¹⁸

The Yugoslavs thought that there were fundamental differences in mission between the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Fifth Eskadra. While the Sixth Fleet was portrayed as an "external force with non-Arab links," which "objectively served as a reserve of imperialistic forces in the Levant," the Soviet naval presence was depicted as "a positive element" strengthening the security of the Arab countries against Israel.¹⁹

After President Sadat decided on July 29 to expel some 15,000 Soviet military advisors from Egypt, TANJUG commented that "there is no doubt that the increase in Egypt's military strength has been made possible primarily by the all-round and disinterested assistance of the Soviet Union which, judging by the available evidence, has sacrificed much, as far as its own interests are concerned, so Egypt could resist Israeli ambitions of settling disputes by force." TANJUG emphasized that "the appearance of the Soviet armed forces in the Mediterranean and the Middle East has objectively put an end to the absolute control of the U.S. in that part of the world."²⁰ Belgrade said that recent measures of NATO and the U.S. to consolidate their positions in the Mediterranean had the aim of exerting pressure on Cyprus. In Belgrade's view, it was impossible to overlook the connection between these events and the recent developments in Egypt.²¹ TANJUG concluded that, although it was difficult

to judge what had induced President Sadat to take such drastic steps, it was certain that "this move best suited American interests." Moreover, TANJUG charged that Sadat's move "may represent encouragement to the sympathizers of the imperialists in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East." President Sadat's decision had evidently surprised and baffled the Yugoslav government. It was unable to understand why Soviet military advisors should have been expelled at a time when the Arab-Israeli dispute was unresolvable on a political basis. Moreover, in Belgrade's view a military solution was inconceivable without Soviet assistance. Belgrade argued that, apart from the material and moral effects of Soviet assistance to Egypt, it also "represented a guarantee to Egypt that it would not fall victim to pressure by powers supporting Israel."²²

Throughout 1972 the internal situation in Yugoslavia was unpredictable after the purges of "liberal-nationalist" party officials and their supporters in Croatia. Tito and his small group of high party faithfuls embarked on the policies which led to settle old scores with the "liberal" party leadership in Serbia and Slovenia. In August, Tito convened a meeting of the Serbian party CC at which he strongly criticized its "liberal" leadership headed by former Foreign Minister Nikezich, Latinka Perovich and the then Foreign Minister Tepavac. Tito suffered a severe setback at the meeting, however, when his demand that the Serbian leadership resign was rejected by a majority of the CC members.

Shortly thereafter, on September 18, Tito and the LCY Executive Committee in an unprecedented move sent a letter to all party organizations in the country. This step violated even LCY's own statutes, which stipulated that the 52-member party Presidium and the republican and provincial leaderships were to be advised. The reason for Tito's action was that he felt that the majority of high party officials were not supportive of his policies at that time. Hence, they were not expected to approve the very action leading to their dismissals. Tito's letter, after citing examples of LCY's disunity, inconsistencies and ineffectiveness in the implementation of its own resolutions demanded a resolute elimination from LCY's ranks of all "corrupt individuals, advocates of bureaucratic arbitrariness, opportunists and careerists and others who by their behavior harm the reputation of the LCY."²³ The letter called for "determined opposition to any tendency conducive to ideological and political disintegration of the LCY through its transformation into a loose coalition of republican and provincial organizations and to the division of the working class according to national and republican criteria."²⁴

There was no doubt that Tito's action was primarily aimed at breaking the power and growing assertiveness of the republican party leaderships and then at reestablishing Tito's personal prestige and influence throughout the country. Tito's letter was followed by an intense propaganda campaign against those party officials branded as "anarcho-liberals" and "technocrats."

Tito, supported by "neocentralists" and the military, in October called a meeting with the Serbian party leadership in Karadjordjevo, where they were criticized for having fomented a factional party struggle and of tolerating "anarcho-liberal and conservative forces."²⁵ After the Serbian party leaders refused to relent, Tito, in the presence of YPA generals, openly threatened to use the army if they did not resign. Faced with this alternative, the Serbian leaders gave in and resigned on October 26. Their dismissal was formally announced at the Serbian party plenum held from November 9 to 11. It was known that dismissed Foreign Minister Tepavac had objected on various occasions to Tito's conducting policy with Moscow on his own without consulting the Foreign Ministry. He also favored closer ties with West Europe.

Similarly, pressure was exerted on the Slovenian party leadership headed by Stane Kavcich. At the 29th plenary session of the Slovenian CC, Kavcich and his associates were openly accused of "pro-Western deviations" and the intention of making Slovenia an "appendage of Central Europe."²⁶ Afterwards, Kavcich and several other Slovenian leaders were forced to resign from all their posts. Likewise, the replacement of high "liberal" officials was effected in other parts of Yugoslavia, notably in the Vojvodina and Macedonia.

In retrospect, the purges of 1971-72 represented a clear break in that process of liberalizing and democratizing Yugoslav internal political life initiated in the mid-1960s. Thereafter, a trend

toward recentralization set in. Reestablishment of the principles of "democratic centralism" in party life led to a more hardline approach in resolving domestic problems. There was little doubt that the purges of 1972 pleased Moscow and opened up new possibilities for closer relations with Belgrade. The "purges" conducted in the Yugoslav media were reflected in the commentaries on various foreign-policy issues. There was a distinct shift toward a more favorable tone in reporting on the Soviet Union and at the same time toward a highly polemical anti-U.S. stance.

The rapprochement between Belgrade and Moscow accelerated during 1973. Tito praised the Soviet Union in an interview given on February 5 to the Zagreb Vjesnik. He asserted that there was no difference in the attitudes of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union on non-alignment policy. In Tito's view, the Soviet leaders "consider this policy useful and realize it is praiseworthy that Yugoslavia has been among the non-aligned countries, because they know that Yugoslavia has conducted an unselfish policy."²⁷

Tito tried to dispel doubts raised in the West on the more evident pro-Soviet trend in Yugoslav foreign policy by saying that Moscow accepted Yugoslavia as "a non-aligned socialist country, which does not belong to the Warsaw Pact." The Yugoslav President remarked that the large Soviet credit was not free of charge and did not represent "any political concessions on the part of Yugoslavia."²⁸

He accused the U.S. of having military bases everywhere, at all strategic points in the world. Hence, in Tito's view "it is not logical to equate the USSR with the U.S." Tito asked rhetorically "should we equate the Soviet Union and the U.S. simply because they are both great powers, instead of paying attention to what each of these powers is doing, how they are behaving?" He added that "the Soviet Union is a socialist country, does not wage war against anyone, and is bent upon a policy of relaxation of tensions in the world."²⁹

The increasingly anti-Western attitude of Belgrade was evident in Tito's speech at the fourth conference of heads of state of the nonaligned countries held in Algiers between September 5 and 9, 1973. Tito said that "a policy of force and brutal interference in the internal affairs of other nations" was still present in such areas as Southeast Asia, the Middle East and in various parts of Africa and South America.³⁰

The situation in the Mediterranean and increased tensions in the Middle East continued to preoccupy the attention of the Yugoslav leadership and the country's media at the beginning of 1973. Belgrade's viewpoint regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict remained essentially unchanged, although its anti-Israel attitude hardened as tensions heightened toward the end of the year. Tito, in the aforementioned interview by Vjesnik, stressed that Israel should not be destroyed as a state, because it was recognized by "many countries and is a member of the United Nations." At the same time, he argued

that "Israeli aggression must not be paid for with Arab territories." Tito expressed concern over tensions in the Middle East and urged the U.S. to impose a solution on Israel if necessary, in order to resolve the difficult Palestinian problem. Tito confirmed that, during talks with Sadat in January 1973 at Brioni, he had suggested to the Egyptian President that the latter should "settle its relations with the Soviet Union." Tito stressed that it would be wrong if the Soviet Union was uninterested in events in the Middle East, because "it has the right to be interested." In addition Tito said "the Arab countries need further assistance."³¹

Belgrade continued in 1973 to view the security situation in the Mediterranean with growing concern. It renewed its accusations of Western responsibility for tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean; the alleged pressure by NATO aimed at attaining superiority in the Mediterranean against independent and "non-aligned" countries in the area. Yugoslavia warned that tensions in the Middle East might cause a world war.³²

The pro-Soviet attitude of the Yugoslav military was more pronounced than that of Yugoslav officials or the country's media. It was argued that the increased Soviet naval presence came as a consequence of the "strengthening of NATO forces, and the U.S. in the first place."³³ Furthermore, every increase in Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean was followed in the West by "propaganda articles, in which it was stressed that Western interests were

endangered."³⁴ It was charged that "leading business circles in the West, especially in the U.S., did not have any particular interest in resolving the crisis in the Middle East."³⁵ NATO and the U.S. were accused of exerting "pressure" by political and especially military "machinations" to soften the stands of nonaligned countries at the Algiers conference. Belgrade also implied that, according to "highly aggressive imperialist concepts," in southern Europe, where Yugoslavia is situated, "it is possible to wage a limited war in which all types of conventional and even tactical nuclear weapons may be used without any risk of a general thermonuclear war breaking out as a result."³⁶

Tensions in the Middle East resulted in a war which began with a combined attack by Egyptian and Syrian armed forces against Israel on October 6, 1973. After Israel's jets attacked targets in Damascus and elsewhere in Syria, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milos Minich, in a speech to the U.N. Security Council on October 7, accused Israel of aggression and "brazenly flouting the principles of international law" in mercilessly bombing settled areas and causing heavy casualties among the peaceful civilian population of the Arab countries.

The Yugoslav government, in a statement released the same day that completely misinterpreted events, said that the outbreak of the war was caused by Israel. The statement condemned most energetically Israel's "aggression" and pledged "resolute and full support to the just struggle of the Arab countries against Israel for the liberation of all occupied territories."³⁷

Minich, in his speech at the Security Council, charged that the "present escalation of military operations which directly threatens world peace has once again demonstrated the heavy responsibility of Israel and those supporting it in blocking ways to settle the Middle East crisis on the principles adopted by the United Nations."³⁸

The SAWPY's federal conference, in a statement released on October 9, blamed "Israeli imperialist and expansionist policies" and gave full support to the "just and legitimate struggle of the people of Egypt and Syria for the liberation of Arab territories." It further put the responsibility for the armed conflict on "reactionary and imperialist forces in the world whose support had enabled Israel to pursue its policy of annexation, aggression and force."³⁹ At no time did the Yugoslav government and media inform its own public that the Arabs, not the Israelis, were the aggressors.

The Yugoslav media, in describing the actual progress of war over-emphasized the extent and significance of Arab success. Israel's achievements on the other hand were attributed to its "aggressive" strategy in preparing and carrying out the pincer movement which led to the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Moreover, credit for Israeli military successes was given to the "all-out aid of imperialist forces to their exponents in the Middle East." They had given Israel "abundant war

equipment, including the most modern weapons, and sent soldiers with dual citizenship." The U.S. was accused of violating international law in this way. Reportedly, this was an important lesson for all "progressive, revolutionary and liberation forces in the world and for all peoples and nations faced with aggressive pressures and threats and forced to defend themselves from aggression."⁴⁰

Yugoslav support for the Arab cause in the October 1973 war went, however, far beyond mere rhetoric. On October 9 Tito received Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Stepanov. Although the topic of their meeting was not revealed, it presumably dealt with the Soviet request for overflight rights for a huge airlift to replenish the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. Tito immediately gave his approval. The Soviet airlift began on October 10 and ended 13 days later. This resupply operation included over 1,000 sorties of An-12 and An-22 transports to Syria and Iraq. The staging area was again Budapest, while Yugoslav airports at Chilipi, Dubrovnik and Tivat were used for refueling stops. It was the largest Soviet airlift ever undertaken. The flights over Yugoslavia were resumed on October 25 when MiG-25s and other arms and equipment were airlifted to Egypt. The U.S. made a strong protest to Belgrade over the permission given for the Soviet airlift. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly refused to meet with Foreign Minister Minich at the U.N. in New York.⁴¹

Yugoslavia also sent some military aid of its own to Algeria; this was confirmed by the fact that, during talks between Tito and Boumedienne in Belgrade on October 16, the Defense Minister Gen. Ljubicich and the Algerian Commander of the Third Military Region also attended.⁴²

Between October 10 and 29 the Russians had placed their seven airborne divisions on alert and redeployed them in readiness to intervene. The U.S. reacted on October 25 by placing almost all its armed forces in defense readiness condition (DEFCON) three. Specifically the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina and some other strategic forces were alerted. The Yugoslav media did not mention that the U.S. action was prompted by a Soviet note on October 24, which demanded that both countries jointly send troops to the Middle East to enforce the cease-fire between Israel and the Arabs. The Belgrade Borba on October 27 said that the U.S. move was "an act adding fuel to the fires of a grave war crisis which is weighing not only upon the Middle East, but the whole world."⁴³ The paper insinuated that the U.S. move coincided with the action of non-aligned countries for the stationing of special U.N. forces in the Middle East.⁴⁴ Belgrade's Medjunarodna Politika said that the real reason for the U.S. move was President Nixon's intention of diverting the public's attention from domestic problems. Allegedly, the U.S. in these circumstances scored some points, but in the long run it lost much prestige among the Arab countries, in Western Europe and in the world in general.⁴⁵

In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, the Russians reportedly seriously contemplated sending their combat troops to the Middle East. Brezhnev reportedly asked Tito during their meeting in Kiev on November 12 to allow an airlift of troops over Yugoslav territory. Tito, however, rejected Brezhnev's request.⁴⁶ This report may have been invented by the Yugoslavs, since there was no apparent intention on the Soviet side to unilaterally introduce troops into the Middle East at that time. Belgrade officials frequently leak the content of their talks with the Russians but in a way to show an alleged resistance to Moscow's demands.

The Middle East crisis was the main topic of discussions held between Brezhnev and Tito during their aforementioned meeting. In a joint statement released at the end of the talks, Belgrade and Moscow assailed Israel for its "aggressive" actions against the Arab countries and demanded its withdrawal from all occupied territories. The talks in Kiev also touched upon some problems i.e. the relations between Moscow and Belgrade, especially in the area of economic cooperation. By the end of 1973, for example, of \$540 million Soviet credits to Yugoslavia, only less than 10 percent had been utilized.

By the beginning of 1974, despite some problems and differences in approach, Belgrade was pleased with the development of its relations with Moscow and its allies. Yugoslavia professed to believe that its relations with the Soviet Union were based on the principle of "equality, independence, noninterference and respect for differ-

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
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ences in opinions."⁴⁷ Belgrade stressed that never after 1945 have Soviet-Yugoslav relations developed as dynamically and equitably since 1971.

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V. MOSCOW'S MISCALCULATION (1974-1976)

After the turn of 1973-74, the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union began, slowly at first and then rather rapidly, to deteriorate. The first signs of Belgrade's unhappiness with Moscow's policies came in spring 1974 after Yugoslavia artificially heated up its Trieste problem with Italy. As Belgrade saw it, there was a definite lack of support by Moscow over the Trieste issue. More significant was the Yugoslav discovery of Moscow's support for pro-Soviet elements in Yugoslavia itself in April 1974. This clumsy and inexplicable blunder on the part of Moscow was not immediately revealed by Belgrade. Perhaps Tito hoped that Moscow would admit its guilt and disavow the activities of its supporters in Yugoslavia. Only when the Russians evidently rejected any such thought did Belgrade decide to come out openly with its side of the story. Belgrade, in November 1974, raised an outcry over routine NATO naval maneuvers in the northern Adriatic allegedly as posing a threat to Yugoslav security and constituting a form of pressure against the country's foreign policy. The entire campaign in the press was pervaded with veiled warnings to Moscow not to interfere in Yugoslav internal affairs. Thus, Belgrade's increasingly insecure leadership used attacks against the U.S. and NATO as a smokescreen for signals to Moscow. In the course of 1975 and afterwards, more significant differences between Belgrade and Moscow arose over various ideological issues. As a result, Belgrade finally realized that its attempt after 1971 to achieve genuine reconciliation with Moscow had failed.

Thereafter, as relations with the Soviet Union began to cool off, Belgrade started to move closer to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and to improve its hitherto not-so-good relations with the United States.

Yugoslav policy toward the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean underwent changes only after 1975. Then Belgrade began again to champion the idea that both superpowers should withdraw from the area altogether. This policy in fact began to resemble the one Belgrade argued back in 1970-71.

At the beginning of 1974, relations between Yugoslavia and Italy suddenly worsened over the perennial Trieste problem. The crisis erupted following the Italian note verbale of February 15, communicated to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Rome. The Italian government protested the emplacement by the Yugoslav side of metal markers bearing the inscription of Yugoslavia/SR* Slovenia at three border crossings. Rome charged that the Yugoslav step "had no foundation in any agreement and is contrary to the treaty of peace with Italy and the London memorandum of understanding of October 5, 1954." According to the terms of the London memorandum, Yugoslavia acquired rights to administer Zone B, but not to exercise sovereignty there. The Italian note claimed that Yugoslav sovereignty never extended to the Italian territory designed at "Zone B of the unrealized free territory of Trieste." Belgrade considered the contents of the Italian

* SR = Socialist Republic.

note as an open territorial claim against Yugoslavia. It warned that the Italian stand on the issue meant that the thesis of the "irredentists and fascists had become a part of the Italian government's official policy and that it was bound to have incalculable negative consequences."¹ The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, in a note to the Italian Ambassador in Belgrade on March 15, considered the Italian complaint as "gross interference in Yugoslav internal affairs and an attack on its sovereignty and territorial integrity." The Italian government responded with a note on March 18, in which it reiterated its viewpoint by stating that the London memorandum contained no provision concerning any sovereign rights in Zone B and made "altogether groundless the interpretation given in the Yugoslav note of March 15."²

Belgrade sent another protest note on March 30, in which it rejected the Italian interpretation and reiterated that Yugoslav sovereignty over Koper and Buje "has been realized and can no longer be the subject of any further talks."³

The Yugoslav government, in response to the Italian government's complaint artificially instigated a crisis over the Trieste problem. Large-scale demonstrations were organized throughout the country. Tension with Italy was used to unite the country behind the Yugoslav leadership. Then in the midst of the crisis the planned NATO naval exercise DARK IMAGE was held in the Northern Adriatic between April 1 and 5. The purpose of the maneuvers was defense of the northeastern

part of Italy near Caorli. Following the exercise, two U.S. ships made a port visit to Trieste and an additional four went to Venice. The Italian government wanted to cool down the situation and had given assurances to Yugoslavia that the exercise was not connected with the dispute over Zone B. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav media used the NATO maneuvers in the Adriatic to further exacerbate tension with Italy. The military journal Front on April 5 said that "just these days we are witnessing the heating up of the whole problem (Trieste) and attempts to pressure us (Yugoslavs) even with the maneuvers of Italian-American forces."⁴

The U.S. embassy in Belgrade on April 3 issued a statement that small amphibious exercises had been long planned and the Yugoslav side informed well in advance. Five days later, the Italian government voiced its objection over a reported Yugoslav troop movement along the joint border and a buildup of armored units in the Koper area. Meanwhile, on April 5, a U.S. State Department spokesman in Washington said that the "U.S. did not support the claims of either Yugoslavia or Italy to territories under the sovereignty or administration of one or the other parties."⁵

Tito, in a speech on April 15 to political activists in Sarajevo, rejected any discussion with Italy over Zone B, saying that "this is our territory and there the matter ends." He charged that pressure was being brought against Yugoslavia by NATO, alleging that "it was not by coincidence that Americans held maneuvers in the

Adriatic before our very noses along our border." At the same time, he accused the West of trying to make "a bogeyman out of the Soviet Union" by constantly claiming that "great danger threatens us (Yugoslavs) from there." He added that the Yugoslavs certainly "do not need to fear the Soviet Union."⁶ Then the Belgrade Medjunarodna Politika on April 16 charged that the Italian verbal note and the U.S.-Italian maneuvers were in no way "accidental events." The paper claimed that the U.S.-Italian maneuvers were directed against "socialistic self-managing and nonaligned Yugoslavia" and were not an isolated act, but part of a sequence in the sophisticated "imperialistic" policy from a position of strength which was evident in many places in Africa, the Indian Ocean and Latin America. Moreover, it asserted that the maneuvers were "combined land, air and naval amphibious operations, typical of those of an offensive nature."⁷

During the Trieste dispute, Belgrade was upset by the lack of support from Moscow for its anti-Italian campaign. Zagreb radio on April 11 charged that except for Hungarian and Czech papers, which "correctly" informed their public about the Yugoslav-Italian dispute, "this cannot be said about the behavior of the Bulgarian, Romanian, Albanian, East German, Polish and Soviet press." It complained that "not a single paper in those countries has published any commentary on the Yugoslav-Italian dispute, let alone supported us and condemned Italian pretensions."⁸ Obviously in response to the Yugoslav criticism, the Soviet newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda on April 16 expressed in general terms Soviet support for Yugoslavia on the Trieste issue.

Most likely, the reason for the lack of Soviet support for Belgrade was twofold: a desire not to be involved in an artificially created problem and not to offend the Italian communists, which took an ambiguous stand during the crisis. The tensions between Belgrade and Rome over Trieste subsided gradually during the summer of 1974, largely because other more pressing internal and foreign policy issues preoccupied the attention of the Yugoslav leadership.

In 1974, Yugoslavia's hitherto close relations with Egypt gradually cooled off. The Israeli-Egyptian troop disengagement agreement achieved by the diplomatic initiative of U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger was not favorably received by Belgrade. In the Yugoslav view, the agreement was of no use because it was not conditioned on a total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territories.

The crisis over Cyprus, which erupted in July 1974 following the attempted coup d'état and subsequent Turkish military intervention on the island, evoked a sharp reaction from the Yugoslav government and the country's media. Belgrade condemned the Turkish intervention as an attack on the "independence, territorial integrity and constitutional system of a nonaligned country." At the same time, it blamed the Greek military regime for being responsible for provoking Turkey into military action. Yugoslavia was concerned with the possibility of armed conflict between the two NATO Allies and ordered an alert of its armed forces.⁹

The Belgrade media went further and in unmistakable terms blames the West for the Cyprus crisis. It said that the U.S. had an interest in establishing full control over Cyprus in order to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean, especially after the Suez Canal was opened. The alleged U.S. aim was to counter the growing Soviet naval presence, both in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Hence, the West did not accept the existence of Cyprus as a "nonaligned country."¹⁰ Tito in a speech to political activists in Jesenice (Slovenia) on September 12 accused the U.S. of an attempted coup d'état against President Archbishop Makarios. He asserted that the coup "was organized by the CIA, the Greek military junta and the Atlantic Pact," and aimed at murdering Makarios, ending the non-aligned status of Cyprus and turning the island into a NATO base. The goal, according to Tito, was to create "a base poised against both the Soviet Union and Syria."¹¹ Yugoslavia perceived events on Cyprus as part of a "devious" plan by the West, and the U.S. in particular, to weaken the policy of nonaligned countries. Belgrade stressed that "peace and security in Europe, in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East, which are of fundamental importance for peace and security in the world, are interconnected and cannot for long be strengthened or consolidated apart from each other."¹²

Commentaries in Yugoslav military journals concerning the Cyprus crisis were generally more anti-Western in tone. It was charged that, because of the growing influence and prestige of nonaligned countries, "some capitalist countries and particularly imperialist

forces in the U.S. became worried and organized aggressive counter-action." Allegedly, after the putsch in Chile, Cyprus was perceived as the most favorable target.¹³ The "imperialist" forces in the U.S. were assailed for exploiting "contradictions" between the two members of NATO (Greece and Turkey) and their diverse interests, in order to end the nonaligned status of Cyprus. The crisis over the island, and all previous crises in other parts of the Mediterranean after the end of World War II as well, were in Belgrade's view the result of the "neocolonial political and economic strategy of the imperialist forces of the West."¹⁴

The Yugoslav attitude toward the Western naval presence in the Mediterranean in the course of 1974 was highly critical in tone. The U.S. was accused of exerting increasing efforts to transform the entire Mediterranean into a base for "maneuvers by naval, air and other forces directed against socialistic countries of East Europe and the Middle East." It charged that such a policy was an expression of the "long-term regional strategy of imperialism" which had led to the resistance on the part of all "national-liberation and progressive forces in the Mediterranean" and ultimately to the confrontation with the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Belgrade asserted that the Mediterranean countries, especially those "newly liberated and non-aligned," had been for two decades under "economic political, psychological and military pressure," in the first place from the United States, with the Sixth Fleet playing a prominent role.¹⁶ The tasks of the latter's presence, in the Yugoslav view, were to re-

inforce the southern flank of NATO and to be ready for intervention everywhere the situation started to change adversely for U.S. "imperialistic policy." The presence of the Sixth Fleet was considered a factor which contributed greatly to the tensions in this part of the world and prevented the Mediterranean and the Adriatic from becoming "a sea of peace."¹⁶

In contrast, comments on the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean were very favorable, which in turn reflected the coincidence of policy between Moscow and Belgrade. The Yugoslavs maintained that the Soviet Union with its "impressive" war potential, and especially its naval forces, had real chance of seriously threatening opposing naval forces and also of interrupting Western SLOCs. It was assessed that, because of the Soviet naval presence, there was a growing importance of the marginal seas in the Mediterranean, and thus it became clear "why there is so energetic an engagement of the imperialistic powers in these local areas."¹⁷ The Yugoslavs thought that the forward deployment of Soviet naval forces illustrated the capability of its navy to protect worldwide interests of the USSR and the socialist countries (presumably also Yugoslavia), whenever needed.¹⁸

Belgrade strongly reacted to the joint NATO maneuvers in the Adriatic held between November 9 and 16. Assistant Foreign Minister Slavoljub Petrovich on November 15 summoned in separate audiences the Italian Ambassador, the U.S. Chargé d'affaires, and the British and

Turkish Ambassadors, and made a diplomatic protest on behalf of his government. He claimed that it was "the first time that exercises of the fleet of a military bloc have been held in the Adriatic" and that his government was decisively opposed "to attempts to turn the Adriatic into a military testing ground." He requested that the countries participating in the maneuvers "desist from this and similar actions in the future." NATO maneuvers were portrayed by Belgrade's Borba as an effort "to turn the Adriatic into a sphere of bloc competition, which directly threatens the independence of all countries in the Adriatic. Moreover, it charged that the exercises were a calculated political maneuver against the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment, to which the bloc forces have never become reconciled."¹⁹ TANJUG implied that the NATO exercise represented "clear and deliberate pressure" on the two independent Adriatic countries (Yugoslavia and Albania).²⁰

The Yugoslav anti-West campaign went so far as to charge that the maneuvers in the Adriatic "are an international event of major proportions" and that the conduct of these maneuvers can be characterized only as an "expressly negative act."²¹ Belgrade's weekly NIN said that "whatever the excuses may be for these maneuvers, they directly affect the vital interests of Yugoslavia and its territorial integrity."²² Belgrade radio on November 23 asserted that the maneuvers were aimed at drawing the Adriatic "into the sphere of growing tensions" and thus represented an "extension of efforts to worsen the situation in the Mediterranean."²³

The Yugoslavs' vehement protests over a routinely planned and executed naval maneuver, needless to say, was unwarranted. However, as usual they served domestic purposes well in rallying support around an insecure leadership. By voicing strong protests against the West and calling for increased vigilance, Belgrade in fact was warning Moscow not to interfere in its internal affairs.

Moscow meanwhile fumbled into extending and actively supporting Yugoslav neo-Stalinist elements, not only those active in West Europe, but in the country as well. In April 1974 the Yugoslav secret police discovered and arrested 32 Cominformists in Titograd (Montenegro) and Peć (Kosovo). They had held a party congress in Bar, with only 12 delegates attending. The resolution of the "congress" called for the overthrow of Tito and the country's leadership and for Yugoslavia's return to the Soviet orbit.

Following the incident, the Yugoslav leadership secretly requested an explanation from Moscow. The Soviet Politburo sent a letter to Belgrade on July 8 and another on August 19 in connection with the incident. This led to a rather sudden ten-day visit of Kardelj to Moscow on September 1. He obviously failed to extract any concessions from the Soviet leadership. Then, on September 12, Tito in his speech in Jesenice said that the arrested pro-Soviet group had attempted to create a new communist party "which disputes all our actions and successes...and entirely followed the Cominform's line." He demanded exemplary punishment for those arrested, so as to dis-

courage anyone who might want to start up something of this kind."²⁵ Although Belgrade officially tried to play down the incident, it secretly leaked the details to show a Soviet and East European connection with the plotters.²⁶

By the fall of 1974, serious ideological differences had also resurfaced between Moscow and Belgrade. This became public knowledge after a speech by the head of the Yugoslav party delegation, Aleksandar Grlichkov, at the consultative meeting of the 25 European communist parties held on October 17 in Warsaw. Mr. Grlichkov reminded Moscow that the LCY view was that, if any party imposed its experience and practices on others "in building socialism, it can only damage the further affirmation of it."²⁷ In short, the Yugoslav delegation rejected any discussion on ideological matters. Belgrade also strongly indicated that it would not sign any joint document at the planned conference of the European communist parties. The three-day consultative meeting in Warsaw had ended on October 18 with an agreement to hold another conference of 28 European communist parties in 1975 in East Germany.

Another consultative meeting of 25 European communist parties (three were absent) was held in December in Budapest, where the LCY representatives also attended. The Yugoslavs warned against any binding document or prescription regulating rules of behavior for the communist parties. The LCY representative at the meeting, Grlichkov, reaffirmed Belgrade's opposition to imposing the "viewpoints of one

party on others" and asserted that "any tutelage from one centre are alien to contemporary practice."²⁸.

As the relations between Belgrade and Moscow became tense, there was speculation in the Western press over the potential Soviet threat to Yugoslav independence. This provoked Tito, in his speech on February 25, 1975 at the second meeting of the CC of the LCY, to term Western fears on the future of Yugoslavia as a "campaign which has been going on...for years and it has been particularly intensified recently." He accused "reactionary circles" in the West of a wish to intimidate Yugoslavia and added that "we are convinced that the Soviet Union has not the slightest intention to attack nor should we be afraid of that."²⁹

A new controversy flared up between Belgrade and Moscow regarding the Yugoslav contribution to victory over the Axis powers in World War II. Both Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Grechko in the Czechoslovakian paper, Obrana Lidu, and the Warsaw Pact Commander Marshal Yakubovsky in Rude Pravo claimed that the Red Army had the main role in "liberation" of the East European countries, including Yugoslavia while the "liberation" movements played a secondary role.³⁰ The statement was significant because the Soviets, in de facto claiming that they had liberated Yugoslavia, were implying they had legitimacy there. Not surprisingly, articles provoked and alarmed the Yugoslav leadership. Tito, in his speech in Skopje on April 2, said that "we should not allow anyone abroad to belittle the

number of our war casualties without answering them back," and added "it would be a shame if our contributions were acknowledged in the West and not by some from the ranks of those who were our closest allies."³¹ The controversy ended in April following the visit of Yugoslav Prime Minister Djemal Bijedich to Moscow. Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin then publicly acknowledged that Yugoslavia had from the first day begun its resistance to the occupation, while Bijedich testified to the "decisive role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Fascism."³²

Relations between Moscow and Belgrade improved somewhat toward the end of 1975, after Pravda on November 27 disassociated itself from pro-Soviet elements by terming them conspiratorial sectarian groups in Yugoslavia "who represent no one but themselves." It also tried to put the whole blame on "reactionary circles in the West who want to discredit the Soviet Union by unveiling anti-Yugoslav activities and implicating the USSR in them."³³ Afterwards between December 8 and 11, Foreign Minister Minich visited Moscow. A joint statement issued at the end of the visit indicated strong differences, by characterizing the talks between Minich and Gromyko as having been held in "an atmosphere of friendship, mutual confidence and frankness."

Concurrently with the gradual deterioration of its relations with Moscow, Yugoslavia began to improve relations with the U.S. and the PRC. Prime Minister Bijedich met with President Gerald Ford in

March. Although the talks focused on various international issues, a great deal of attention was devoted to strengthening economic relations between the two countries. Both countries agreed to promote bilateral relations despite great differences of opinion on the main international issues.

Belgrade's decision at the end of 1974 to gradually improve its relations with the West, and the U.S. in particular, led to a somewhat less polemical tone toward Western policies and the U.S. military presence in the Mediterranean. Medjunarodna Politika on January 6 said that Yugoslavia has always supported "all initiatives which would lead to the Mediterranean being transformed into a sea of peace and eliminate the competition of superpowers in its waters and thus could lessen their mutual confrontation."³⁴

Yugoslav comments on the causes of the crisis over Cyprus also changed considerably. The U.S. and NATO were not directly blamed for the situation on the island, but rather the actions of the overthrown Greek military regime. Yugoslavia's concern for the situation in Cyprus was raised primarily because that country belonged to the non-aligned group. Belgrade also feared that, because of the strategic importance of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, a crisis could lead to a conflict not only between Greece and Turkey, but also involve the two superpowers. However, NATO was accused of treating Cyprus as an "internal" and not an international problem.³⁵

Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union continued to worsen in the course of 1976, due to the still unresolved issue of Soviet involvement in the activities of pro-Moscow elements within Yugoslavia and Belgrade's opposition to the aims of the planned summit conference of European communist parties. Thus, Yugoslavia came under intensified Soviet pressure.³⁶

In the spring of 1976, the Yugoslav media stepped up criticism of the Soviet concept of "internationalism" and its application by the Soviet bloc to the less developed countries. It charged that the strengthening of "socialism" in the world was being pursued not only by reinforcing military and political allegiance to the Warsaw Pact, but also by uniting the "socialist" economies more closely within the framework of Comecon. Allegiance primarily to the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon is considered a higher form of "proletarian internationalism" for which not only the new name--socialist internationalism--has been devised, but new forms of international law are being sought. The Soviet-bloc countries were said to regard the nonaligned movement as "a reserve detachment of the coordinated foreign policy of the socialist group."³⁷

In his speech on May 29 in Bar (Montenegro), Tito said, obviously referring to Moscow, that attempts were being made to divide the nonaligned countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and elsewhere by various machinations. He pledged that Yugoslavia would resist such

pressure and "fight against all attempts to disunite us."³⁸ He rejected Moscow's charges that Yugoslavia had "betrayed socialism" and was not in favor of "proletarian internationalism." Tito complained that there were some who "went so far as to omit any mention of Belgrade as being one of the main initiators of nonalignment."³⁹ Tito charged, with Moscow unmistakably in mind, that "pressure was being brought to bear against Yugoslavia in all respects, and some would like that nothing be known about us."⁴⁰

Secretary of the Executive Committee Stane Dolanc on October 16, in a speech at the meeting of the SAWPY's Presidium in Belgrade and apparently alluding to Moscow, said that certain political forces in the world "are attempting under cover of detente to interfere in the internal affairs of independent countries...aimed at disrupting internal stability...." He added that "there is even evidence of efforts to legitimize the right to intervene."⁴¹

A major event in the development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations was Brezhnev's three-day visit to Belgrade in November 1976. The joint statement released on November 17 said that talks were held in "an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding and a spirit of mutual respect," and reiterated Moscow's acceptance of Belgrade's viewpoint that bilateral relations were to be guided by the "strict observance of the principles of sovereignty, independence, equality and noninterference in internal affairs." Both sides hailed success-

ful development of economic relations between the two countries. They expressed an identity of views on the economic problems of less developed countries, convening a world disarmament conference, eliminating colonialism and "neocolonialism," and promoting security in Europe. With respect to the Middle East problem, Moscow had agreed that the nonaligned countries made "an active contribution...to the struggle against imperialism and all forms of domination and exploitation."⁴² Belgrade apparently accepted Moscow's view of "internationalism." Brezhnev's visit, however, resulted in only a temporary improvement in the relations between the two countries. The ideological differences described elsewhere remained wide and apparently irreconcilable.

Yugoslav policy toward the Middle East in 1976 remained unchanged, despite difficulties with Moscow and new developments in the region itself. President Sadat announced in April an abrogation of the 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow. Belgrade was disturbed because Sadat's move was hailed by the U.S. government, Saudi Arabia and other "conservative" Arab forces.⁴³

Yugoslavia's attitude toward the military presence of the superpowers in the Mediterranean remained ambiguous in 1976. Both Washington and Moscow were obliquely blamed for creating hotbeds of crisis "in the Western Mediterranean, Cyprus, the Middle East, Southern Africa, the Indian Ocean and Korea" where the naval presence and influence of the great powers were being strengthened.⁴⁴

Yugoslav criticism of the U.S. and NATO presence in the Mediterranean in 1976 was generally subdued and very moderate, particularly when compared with the previous years. The steady worsening of relations with Moscow and the perceptibly diminished danger of a new conflict in the Middle East was undoubtedly the main reason for the change in Belgrade's attitude. Although Yugoslavia continued to criticize "imperialist" forces (the West), it also charged an intention on the part of forces of "hegemony" (Moscow) to use all the means at their disposal to head off any changes in the Mediterranean. Rather than relying on the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean to strengthen the "progressive" forces, as had been argued so often in the past, Belgrade saw hope in the apparent growth of the influence of "Eurocommunism" and the activities of other "socialist" forces in the area. The Yugoslavs admitted that U.S. policy in the Middle East was successful in 1976, and while Moscow was able to "meet the needs of some Mediterranean countries in armament and military equipment," it was recognized that Soviet economic capabilities were much more modest and that Moscow was no "match for the extensive American or even West European involvement." However, Belgrade did not want to see any further strengthening of U.S. influence in the area. At the same time, it did not strongly object to the European Economic Community (EEC) becoming more involved, through economic and eventual military assistance, as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia feared that such trends would inevitably weaken regional initiatives, that is, the role and influence of the "nonaligned" Mediterranean countries, including Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia, together with other nonaligned Mediterranean countries, advocated transformation of the Mediterranean into "a zone of peace and cooperation." This entailed the closure of military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign fleets. By the end of 1976, Belgrade's policy toward security in the Mediterranean had made a full circle. It resembled the policy advocated in 1970.

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VI. SOVIET-YUGOSLAV MILITARY COOPERATION (1971-1976)

Following Brezhnev's visit in September 1971, Soviet-Yugoslav military cooperation was expanded rapidly and intensified. The Soviet Union and its allies remained the largest and the most important source of heavy advanced arms and equipment for the Yugoslav armed forces. The long-term military cooperation agreements were realized in the two 5-year (1971 through 1975 and 1976 through 1980) modernization programs of the YPA. Between 1971 and 1975, the Ground Forces, among other things acquired the Soviet Frog-7 missile, an item already sought in the mid-1960s, coastal Samlet SSMs, and Gainful and Grail SAMs. The Air Force received advanced Goa SAMs, a number of An-12 and An-26 transport aircraft, and a small quantity of Mi-8 and Ka-26 helicopters. The Navy received a dozen or so Soviet Mi-8 and Ka-25 Hormone helicopters. There were some serious problems with Soviet deliveries of arms and equipment to Yugoslavia, however. It was leaked that Belgrade met with considerable difficulties several times between 1972 and 1976 when additional orders for Soviet armament were placed. As a result, training for its MiG-21 aircraft was reduced.¹

The top Yugoslav military leaders after 1971 resumed the intensive contacts with their Soviet counterparts which had been interrupted following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Military cooperation between the two countries after 1971, judging by visits of high-level delegations, was far closer than in any period since 1948 (figure 1). the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko, paid a five-

FIGURE 1

OFFICIAL VISITS OF SOVIET AND YUGOSLAV HIGH-LEVEL
MILITARY DELEGATIONS, 1957-1979
(Incomplete List)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Delegations headed by</u>
Oct 1957	Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Georgi Zhukov
Sep 17-27, 1963	Yugoslav Defense Minister, Gen. Ivan Gosnjak
May 27-Jun 6, 1964	Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky
Feb 21-25, 1968	Yugoslav Defense Minister, Gen. Nikola Ljubicich
Apr 24-28, 1968 ? 1970	Soviet Navy Commander, Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov Gen. N. Ljubicich
Mar 27-Apr 1, 1972	Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko
Aug 24-?, 1972	Gen. Ljubicich
May 17-24, 1974	Gen. Ljubicich
May 8-?, 1975	Soviet Air Force Marshal, V.A. Sudets
Sep 15-23, 1975	Yugoslav Chief of the General Staff, Lt.Gen. Stane Potochar
Aug 18-25, 1976	Admiral Gorshkov
Feb 25-Mar 2, 1977	Yugoslav Interior Minister, Lt.Gen. Franjo Herljevic
Jun 20-25, 1977	Soviet Air Force, Marshal P.S. Khutakov
Jul 19-21, 1977	Yugoslav Navy Commander, Admiral Branko Mamula
Feb 21-26, 1978	Gen. Ljubicich
Jun 29-Jul 4, 1981	Admiral Gorshkov
Jul 6-10, 1981	Chief of Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, Gen. Aleksei A. Yepishev

day visit to Yugoslavia in March 1972. Later that year, in August, Defense Minister General Ljubicich spent his holidays in the Soviet Union. In fact, these "holidays" of the top Soviet and Yugoslav military became one of the most significant forms of cooperation. The usual pattern was that the Soviet Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Kulikhov, would spend part of his "holiday," accompanied by other Soviet high-ranking officers, as a guest of his Yugoslav counterpart, Lt. Gen. Potochar, at an army resort center on the Dalmatian coast, an ideal place for secret military talks. Moreover, such visits were usually not mentioned in either the Soviet or Yugoslav press. The growing ideological differences between the two countries in 1974-75 did not have any apparent effect on either the frequency of the visits or the close relations between top Yugoslav and Soviet military leaders. Yugoslav military representatives also attended, as observers, some of the military meetings of the Warsaw Pact. For instance, the meeting of civil defense commanders held on November 3, 1976, in Warsaw was attended by the Yugoslav military attaché.² Another, no less important, form of this cooperation was the frequent visits and close ties between Yugoslav and Soviet war-veteran organizations.

Although the topics of the talks between the highest Yugoslav and Soviet military leaders varied, the question of Soviet access to Yugoslav naval facilities and use of airspace was always present. Soviet pressure to gain access to Yugoslav naval facilities had increased by 1971.³

During meetings between Tito and Brezhnev, the question of overflights and continuous access to Yugoslav naval facilities was raised. By 1971, the Russians were only periodically allowed to use Yugoslav airspace for their airlift of arms and equipment to clients in the Middle East. Moreover, Moscow was obliged to make a specific request each time. A more unfavorable situation prevailed in regard to access to Yugoslav port facilities. Prior to 1974, on a few occasions Soviet ships were repaired in Tivat with special permission from the Yugoslav government. This did not represent, however, preferential treatment of Soviet vessels over other foreign warships. After 1971, the Russians continuously sought from Belgrade permanent rights to use Yugoslav airspace and naval facilities. Moscow promised generous economic aid and deliveries of the most advanced arms and equipment to the YPA, if Belgrade would make concessions in the matter. Reportedly, the Russians were interested in acquiring permanent rights to use the Bay of Cattaro as its naval base as well as the airbase at Mostar.

Persistent Soviet pressure resulted in amendments to the Yugoslav Air Traffic Law of 1965. The Belgrade Federal Assembly adopted amendments which came into force on June 14, 1973. The new law differed from the previous one on several important points. For example, it expanded the right of foreign aircraft to use not only those airports open for international traffic, but also "other airports on the basis of special permission issued by the Federal Administration for Air Traffic (FAAT) in an agreement with the Federal Customs Ser-

vice and the authorization of the Interior and Defense Ministries" (article 10).

The new air traffic law divided airports into civilian and military. The term "airports" also included that part of an airbase open to handle civilian air traffic on the basis of permission issued by the Defense Ministry (article 122).

The law of 1973 also stipulated that overflights of foreign aircraft were to be allowed by the Foreign Affairs Ministry in agreement with the Defense Ministry (article 14, point 2). The document to be issued was to indicate whether or not a foreign aircraft would overfly Yugoslav territory or land, and also which air corridor was to be used in entering and leaving the country's airspace. The law for the first time explicitly stipulated that foreign military aircraft, while overflying Yugoslav territory, were only to use the air corridors assigned to international traffic (article 16).

The new law stipulated that foreign aircraft were not to carry "actively charged rifle, missile or bomber armament" (article 21). One novelty was that air traffic "could be banned permanently above certain areas considered as off-limit zones." These zones would be determined by the Defense Ministry, which in turn was to inform the FAAT (article 19). It was further stipulated that all aircraft overflying Yugoslav airspace would be controlled by civilian air traffic. The law of 1973 stipulated that in order to ensure the safety of

aircraft or more groups of aircraft while flying in certain air corridors over Yugoslav territory, the FAAT could, on demand of the interested state organ, "temporarily ban flights of all other aircraft within that air corridor" (Article 116). A request for the ban was to be made no later than 30 hours before scheduled take-off. The FAAT was obligated to issue a public notice no later than 24 hours before the ban would come into effect.

Although the new law on air traffic clarified some points, it also left many ambiguities. For instance, there was no real distinction made between civilian and military aircraft or between civilian airports and airbases. The new law did not make clear whether foreign aircraft, while overflying Yugoslav territory, could carry only arms and equipment, or troops, or both. What came out unmistakably was the significantly strengthened influence of the Defense Ministry with regard to civilian air traffic. Perhaps most significant was article 116 of the new law, which enhanced the secrecy of any large-scale airlift over Yugoslav territory. There was no doubt that terms such as "groups of aircraft" referred to military transports. As in the case of the air traffic law of 1965, there was no public debate either preceding or following the adoption of the law. Moreover, the law was clearly geared to Soviet requirements, because no other country would conceivably want to use Yugoslav airspace for military purposes.

The law on air traffic, while not fulfilling all Soviet wishes, went very far in guaranteeing preferential treatment to Soviet military aircraft. It also greatly enhanced the secrecy of, and security for, any large Soviet airlift in a crisis situation. Perhaps of more importance, the law firmly seated the Yugoslav Defense Ministry in regulating flights of foreign military aircraft over the country's territory. This in turn significantly weakened the influence the Foreign Ministry had hitherto exerted in these matters. In another significant development, it was announced in September 1976 that Yugoslav civilian air traffic was to merge with that of the Air Force.⁴ In this was, military control over the country's air traffic became complete.

Soviet pressure towards getting, at least limited access to Yugoslav naval facilities was at last successful in April 1974, when the Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) Assembly adopted amendments to the law on the coastal sea. The new law, which replaced that of May 1965, came into effect on April 30. Compared to the law of 1965, it differed in two important aspects: first, in the number of foreign naval vessels which were allowed to stay in Yugoslav territorial waters; and second, for the first time, a legal basis for the repair and overhaul of foreign warships in the country's naval facilities was provided.

The law of 1965* had stipulated that the sailing of "foreign warships, public ships and fishing vessels through Yugoslav in-shore (unutrašnje) waters was prohibited" (article 7). Visits by foreign warships within Yugoslav inshore waters were not to exceed ten days. The law also stipulated that no more than three warships of the same navy could simultaneously visit and no more than three warships flying the same flag could sail through Yugoslav territorial waters (article 14). On the other hand, the Federal Executive Council (Cabinet) was empowered to permit, in exceptional cases, visits longer than ten days in duration and visits by a larger number of foreign warships. This article remained unchanged in the law of 1974.

The law of 1974 "liberalized" access for foreign warships to Yugoslav territorial waters and port facilities.⁵ Article 7, as amended, stipulated that foreign warships, public vessels and fishing vessels could sail into Yugoslav coastal waters if permission was given in advance by the Yugoslav Defense Ministry in agreement with the Foreign Affairs Ministry. A very significant change came in regard to article 7, point 3, where the words "three warships" were replaced by "three foreign combatants and two foreign auxiliary ships." This amendment, in effect, increased the number of foreign naval vessels of the same navy from three to five.

*Published in Službeni List (Official Gazette) 22, May 22, 1965.

The most significant change came with the addition of new articles into the law on the coastal sea. Thus, article 7A provided that repair and overhaul of foreign naval vessels could be carried out in Yugoslav ports. Permission for this was to be issued by the Defense Ministry in agreement with the Foreign Affairs Ministry. The law now stipulated that the overhaul of foreign warships could be carried out exclusively in "military repair yards," which were to be determined by the Defense Ministry. The law also limited the number of warships of a foreign navy to be overhauled in the same port simultaneously to two, and stated the duration of overhaul was not to exceed six months. Also, permission for overhaul was conditional on the existence of idle capacity in Yugoslav naval yards. The size of foreign naval vessels to be overhauled in Yugoslavia was limited to 4,000 and 10,000 tons for combatants and auxiliaries, respectively. Article 7A also said that, "having in mind the security of the country and the interests of world peace in this region, the authorized organ will not give permission for the overhaul of foreign warships which belong to a state participating in aggression against some other independent and sovereign country until that aggression ceases."

Another amendment (7b) regulated the technical conditions for overhauling foreign warships. It restricted the ship's crew to the number necessary for carrying out the overhaul but not to exceed more than one-third of the total. Also, it was stipulated that only domestically produced technical material and fuel was to be utilized

for the overhaul of foreign warships. During overhaul, the foreign ship was obliged to off-load all ammunition and "other lethal means" at a place determined by the Yugoslav navy yard commander, who was responsible for safeguarding the offloaded ammunitions.

The law of 1974, although applicable to any navy, was clearly drafted to suit Soviet requirements rather than those of any other country. For instance, the amendment which allowed the stay of three combatants and two auxiliaries corresponded to the Soviet pattern of naval visits to Yugoslav ports. The Russians usually sent one or two surface warships and submarines, but these were always accompanied by a submarine tender. Completely new was a provision envisaging the repair and overhaul of foreign warships in Yugoslav facilities. The condition that such work was to be carried out only in "military repair yards" meant in practice that only two yards, those in Tivat (Sava Kovachevich) and Šibenik (Velimir Škorpik) could be utilized. However, only the naval yard in Tivat had idle capacities, since the Šibenik yard largely carried out repair and overhaul of Yugoslav navy vessels. The limitations on ship displacement evidently were geared to suit Soviet naval vessels which were generally smaller than those of Western navies. The latter, however, were allowed to use Yugoslav repair facilities.

The restriction which forbade the use of foreign technical material for overhaul again favored the Russians, bearing in mind that Yugoslav submarines and missile-armed and torpedo-armed FPBs had

Soviet-made armament and equipment. Also, because of Yugoslavia's heavy reliance on the Soviet Union for arms imports, the necessary technical material, if not available in the country, could be formally purchased by the Yugoslav government and then treated in the overhaul process as coming from "domestic" sources.

Belgrade, sensing that controversy would be generated both within the country and aboard as to the real reasons behind the amendments to the coastal sea law, went to great lengths to explain them. An article published in the official Navy bimonthly journal Mornarički Glasnik (Naval Herald) perhaps in the summer of 1974 throws some light on these reasons.⁶ Colonel Novakovich, the author of the article, tried to convince his readers that the reasons for the amendments "lie exclusively in the economic needs" of the Yugoslav shipbuilding industry, especially in the areas of a better exploitation of the capacities of military repair yards and a steadier employment of the work force on projects, for which they "already had offers." The author found that "any reason of a political or military nature which would violate the independent and non-aligned policy of our country" was excluded. Colonel Novakovich also explained that only overhaul, not reconstruction, could be effected on foreign warships, a point not mentioned in the text of the law as amended. The author contradicts himself in stating that "in recent times, however, the governments of some foreign countries have placed demands (zahteve) [emphasis added] to allow the overhaul of their ships in our ports."⁷ Novakovich in fact admitted that pressure had been

exercised by some unnamed foreign governments to gain access to Yugoslav naval facilities. There could be no doubt, bearing in mind the constant requests prior to 1974 and the events which followed, that Moscow was behind these "demands." The Yugoslav argument that the amendments were primarily necessitated by economic factors was only a rationalization for this rather significant change in the country's practices. Although the Yugoslav shipbuilding industries did have a large surplus capacity at that time, the law of 1974 stated that only navy yards were to carry out the overhaul of foreign warships. Of the latter, only one (Sava Kovachevich) was in practice available. Regardless of how large an economic impact the full activity of the naval yard in Tivat would have on the local economy, it certainly did not require the amendments to the law on the coastal sea that put in doubt the country's nonaligned status.

The amendment to the law on the coastal sea also came at a propitious moment for the Yugoslav leadership, i.e., during the renewed crisis with Italy over the perennial Trieste problem. Hence, the SFRY Assembly adopted the law rather quickly. Although the Russians did not get all that they wanted, that is, unrestricted permanent access to Yugoslav naval facilities, the 1975 amendments to the law on the coastal sea served as the first opening through which additional concessions were later to be extracted from Belgrade.

After the amendments to both the law on air traffic and the coastal sea were adopted in 1973 and 1974, respectively, the Soviet

Union extensively exploited their provisions for use by its air and naval forces. Apart from the huge airlift undertaken over Yugoslav territory during and after the Yom Kippur War described elsewhere, the Soviet Union undertook large airlifts during the Angolan Civil War. Some five An-12 flights from Budapest, passing over Yugoslavia, were undertaken in March 1975. An additional 70 flights were made between October 1975 and April 1976, using both Yugoslav and Turkish airports. Due to the great distances involved, mostly long-range An-22 were used, although a small number of An-12 also participated in the effort. It was estimated that approximately 3,000 tons of arms and equipment were transported, including light tanks and MiG aircraft for use by MPLA forces and Cuban troops.⁸

Yugoslavia also actively participated in the Soviet sealift effort to replenish the MPLA forces. The news agency Reuter, on November 20, 1975, reported that "a Congolese, a Czechoslovak and a Yugoslav ship have successfully unloaded cargoes of tanks, artillery pieces, rocket launchers and ammunition in Luanda," which was under MPLA control.⁹

The first Soviet naval vessels to be overhauled under the provisions of the coastal sea law of April 1974 were two Foxtrot conventional submarines. Both arrived in Tivat accompanied by a Don-class submarine tender in early December 1974. Afterwards, the naval repair yard (Sava Kovachevich) in Tivat became the center for overhauling Soviet naval vessels in Yugoslavia. One Russian Don-class subma-

rine tender was permanently deployed there. Approximately three to four Soviet conventional submarines a year were overhauled in Tivat.¹⁰

The provisions of the new law also had an almost immediate effect on the number of Soviet operational ship visits to Yugoslav ports. While in the period 1972 to 1974, there were three to five ship visits a year; after 1974, their number tripled. The Yugoslav ports available for naval visits by both Soviet and other foreign warships were Dubrovnik, Split and Rijeka. The average size of Soviet detachments visiting Yugoslav ports varied between three and five ships and invariably included one or two conventional submarines accompanied by a tender.

The pattern of Soviet visits between 1972 and 1976 showed that they roughly coincided with or followed U.S. Sixth Fleet visits to Yugoslavia. On many occasions Soviet and U.S. ships passed each other either in the Southern Adriatic or in the proximity of Yugoslav territorial waters. The Russians normally scheduled naval visits to coincide with the visit of their highest officials, both civilian and military, to Yugoslavia. For instance, during Kosygin's visit to Belgrade in September 1973, a Soviet naval squadron under Admiral Viktor Sysojev visited Split. Also, during Admiral Gorshkov's visit in August 1976, a naval detachment comprised of the ASW cruiser Leningrad and the missile cruiser Krasny Krim was in Split.

There were also rumors that the Russians extensively used Yugoslav civilian repair facilities for overhaul of their auxiliary vessels. For instance, a submarine tender with her name printed over and flying a merchant flag was observed moored in a Yugoslav port in early August 1976.¹¹ Other sources reported that three Soviet auxiliaries flying merchant flags were repaired in Yugoslav civilian facilities. Yugoslavia, it was believed, served as one of the main supply bases for Soviet naval forces deployed in the Mediterranean. Although this was denied by Zagreb radio on August 12, there was little if any doubt that the Russians systematically took advantage of the ambiguities in the Yugoslav law on the coastal sea, with the probable connivance of the Yugoslav authorities themselves.¹²

The frequency of Soviet ship visits to Yugoslavia increased following President Sadat's decision in March 1976 to abrogate the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Egypt then gave Moscow one month's notice to close down its submarine support facilities and remove their personnel from Alexandria. The loss of both naval and air facilities in Egypt was a blow to the Russians, prompting an intensified search for access to facilities in other Mediterranean countries. Admiral Gorshkov, during his visit to Yugoslavia in August 1976, reportedly requested that Belgrade grant priority to Soviet ships and increase the number of units of the Soviet Navy allowed at any time in Yugoslav ports.¹³

Additional Soviet pressure on Belgrade came in November 1976, during Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia. According to the Yugoslavs, who leaked the details of talks between Tito and Brezhnev to the foreign press, Moscow asked to use the Bay of Cattaro, not only as a site for repairs and supplies, but also as a naval base as well. Moscow also requested rights for Soviet military and civilian aircraft and the assignment of a Yugoslav representative to the Warsaw Pact military council. Yugoslav diplomats disclosed to U.S. officials in Washington that Tito categorically rejected these requests.¹⁴ Thereafter, all basic organizations of the LCY were informed confidentially about the content of the Tito-Brezhnev talks in mid-December 1976. It was alleged that the talks ended badly because Brezhnev strongly pressured Tito to allow permanent use of the Bay of Cattaro and Zadar as naval and air bases, respectively, for the Soviet armed forces. Moreover, Brezhnev declared that Moscow was not going to tolerate any "counterrevolution" in Yugoslavia, and if that was to be the case, it "would intervene militarily."¹⁵

Apparently, the only concession the Yugoslavs made to Moscow was to increase secrecy and strengthen the security of Soviet naval vessels being repaired in Yugoslavia. On December 31, 1976, Belgrade publicly revealed a new list of prohibited zones in the Yugoslav territorial sea. It was the longest such list since 1967. Among the 12 zones, which were prohibited for navigation by merchant vessels and craft, was included an area in front of the naval repair yard in Tivat.¹⁶ Curiously enough, there was no off-limit zone around

the naval yard in Šibenik, where a major part of the Yugoslav navy was being repaired and overhauled.

Yugoslavia already in 1969 intensified its search for alternate sources of arms and equipment for its armed forces. A modest effort to strengthen military relations with Western nations continued despite a steady improvement of ties with Moscow following Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade in 1971. Yugoslav efforts were directed primarily toward acquiring licenses and technical cooperative agreements in the West, and secondarily towards arms purchases through commercial channels. Yugoslavia enjoyed particularly close military relations with France and the United Kingdom. In 1971, Yugoslavia signed an agreement with France, by which it acquired rights for licensed domestic production of Anglo-French SA-341 Gazelle helicopters. The first eight Gazelle's were delivered by France two years later, and an additional 132 were planned to be produced in Yugoslavia.

Military cooperation between the U.K. and Yugoslavia also developed steadily after 1971. The indigenously designed and produced light combat aircraft J-1 Jastreb (Hawk) and the G-2A Galeb (Seagull) trainers used the British Viper engine and avionics. Also the U-75 Orao (Eagle) light combat aircraft, jointly developed by Yugoslavia and Romania, was planned to have installed the Viper MK 632-41 jet engine and some British avionics. Yugoslavia purchased the RR Proteus gas turbine for its new Končar-class of missile/gunboats. Yugoslav enterprises also signed a great number of license agreements

with Italian, Austrian and West German firms, particularly those involved in the production of motor vehicles with military applications.

By contrast, military relations between Yugoslavia and the U.S. lagged far behind. From 1970 through 1979, Yugoslav arms purchases in the U.S. amounted to \$2.7 million.¹⁷ In 1975, Belgrade apparently approached the U.S. for the purchase of advanced arms and equipment. Yugoslavia had an urgent need to modernize its anti-tank defenses, ground control intercept radars and naval electronic equipment. Reportedly, during the Yom Kippur War, the Yugoslavs had been unable to spot (with their Soviet-supplied radar system) Soviet military aircraft overflying their territory.¹⁸ The Pentagon promised in early 1976 to review the Yugoslav requests. The proposed deal was widely reported in the U.S. press. This prompted the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry spokesman at a press conference in January 1976 to deny the reports, stating that "the purchase of spare parts and some equipment not produced in Yugoslavia discussed with U.S. officials involves a small quantity and of a commercial nature."¹⁹ Because of publicity in the U.S. press in May 1976, the Yugoslav government backed out of the proposed deal. Belgrade was reportedly uneasy with the suggestion that planned purchases of arms in the U.S. were made in response to a perceived threat from the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs continued to intensify their efforts to free the country from too heavy dependence on foreign sources of advanced arms and equipment. They claimed that in the 1971 through 1975 period some 55 percent of their arms and equipment was produced within the country. For 1976 through 1980, it was planned to reach some 65 percent of total items or 80 percent of total value.²⁰ The most important fact of all was that there was a firm commitment by the country's leadership to continue with further investment in defense industries. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia by the end of 1976 was still overly dependent on foreign sources, particularly the Soviet bloc, for most of their heavy and advanced arms and equipment (figures 2 and 3).

The growing capabilities of domestic defense industries were also reflected in the rather rapid and steady expansion of military cooperation between Yugoslavia and other countries. By the mid-1970s, Yugoslavia maintained military ties with 55 countries, most of whom belonged to the less-developed and nonaligned countries in Asia and Africa.²¹ While in the 1960s, Yugoslavia had its closest military relations among Arab countries, Egypt and Sudan, and in the 1970s, high priority was also given to relations with Libya and Iraq. This reflected the already existing close political and economic relations with these countries. Iraqi and Libyan air force cadets attended schools in Yugoslavia. Reportedly, in June 1973, when Libya decided to mine its territorial waters in the Gulf of Syrte, Egyptian auxiliary vessels and tugs were used, but Yugoslavia supplied the SAG-2 contact mines and Soviet KMD-500 and KMD-100 influence mines.

YUGOSLAV ARMS IMPORTS 1967-1976
(in \$ millions)

Country	East			West					Total
	Poland	USSR	Others	Canada	France	Germany	U.K.	U.S.	
Total	10	540	11	5	10	5	1	5	26
Percentage of total	1.8	96.2	2.0	19.2	38.5	19.2	3.9	19.2	100
Percentage of total import (\$587)	1.7	92.0	1.9	--	1.7	0.9	0.2	0.9	--

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, DC: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1978), p. 157.

YUGOSLAV ARMS IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 1969-1978
(in \$ million)

Category	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>
Import	20	--	30	40	80	80	140	140	110	90
Export	32	--	44	56	106	97	155	148	110	83

Source: Ibid., (December 1980), p. 157.

Between 1970 and 1976, Yugoslavia exported some \$24 million in arms and equipment or 0.1 percent of the world's total. The largest recipient of Yugoslav arms was the Middle East with 78 percent.²² Egypt alone, with 70 percent, was the largest importer of Yugoslav arms and equipment.²³

Sadat revealed that, after the cease-fire in the Yom Kippur War, Yugoslavia sent 150 and Algeria 100 tanks in contrast to the non-support of the Soviet Union at that time.²⁴ When Moscow denied Egypt vitally-needed spare parts for its Soviet-built tanks and aircraft, apart from India, President Sadat also appealed for help to Yugoslavia during his visit to Belgrade in April 1976. Tito, however, rejected this request because he did not want to break his agreements with the Soviet Union.²⁵

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VII. BELGRADE AND MOSCOW SINCE 1976

The present trend in Soviet-Yugoslav relations started in the wake of Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade in November 1976. During the past four years, new sources of tension were added to already deep differences between Belgrade and Moscow. Among the most serious were sharp disagreements between the two countries over the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia), the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The latter case undoubtedly has the most chilling effect on Belgrade's attitude toward Moscow. More ominous in the Yugoslav view, the Soviet action in Afghanistan may signify the beginning of greater activism toward Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era.

After 1976, Belgrade became more critical of the Soviet policy of force in the Mediterranean in its public pronouncements and press commentaries. However, Yugoslavia, despite tensions with the Soviet Union, continued to grant access to both port facilities and ship repair facilities for the Soviet fleet deployed in the Mediterranean. More important, Soviet transport aircraft continued to use the Yugoslav airspace for both routine and crisis-related airlift missions. Another trend in Yugoslav attitudes, discernible after 1978, signified a certain lack of interest in the situation in the Mediterranean. This perhaps came as a result of policy differences with her former close ally, Egypt, within the nonaligned movement over the latter's peace treaty with Israel. Subsequently, Yugoslavia greatly

strengthened its relations with Libya and Iraq, both the staunchest opponents of President Sadat's policies. Nevertheless, these new allies in the Middle East did not come close to having the influence formerly exercised by Egypt. Another reason for Yugoslavia's relative lack of concern was that the Camp David accords for the time being removed the possibility of a large conflict between the Arabs and Israelis.

Brezhnev's visit in 1976 apparently failed to remove the growing estrangement between Moscow and Belgrade. Relations between the two countries deteriorated steadily during the spring and summer of 1977. There was no basic improvement following Tito's four-day visit to the Soviet Union in August 1977 while on his way to North Korea and the PRC. The joint communiqué released at the end of the visit on August 19 said that talks took place in an "atmosphere of friendship, mutual understanding and respect." The communiqué reiterated the need for respecting each country's "independence, sovereignty and rights to non-interference, and called for internationalist, comradely, voluntary cooperation between the two countries and parties."¹ During their meeting in Moscow, Tito and Brezhnev exchanged opinions on various international issues. There was either an identity or a great similarity of opinion on such diverse issues as security in Europe and the Middle East and Cyprus situations.

The apparent reorientation of Egypt toward the U.S. and the West, away from the Soviet Union, caused a further cooling-off of

relations between Cairo and Belgrade. Yugoslavia instead intensified its already close relations with Iraq and Libya, two of the most radical Arab states. The reasons were as much economic as political. President Sadat's initiative in seeking a peace agreement with Israel, manifested by his visit to Jerusalem, was greeted ambiguously in Belgrade. Yugoslavia still insisted that for any just settlement to be durable it must encompass Israel's withdrawal from all occupied territories and the recognition of the Palestinian rights could not be reduced to a "homeland," because the Palestinian people would then not be independent.²

Following the CSCE held in 1975 in Helsinki, Yugoslavia began to advocate the view that problems of security were not to be considered in isolation from developments in the Mediterranean, particularly those in the Middle East and North Africa. Belgrade argued that geopolitical factors made it illusory to consider it possible to consolidate peace over the long run on the European continent "as long as crisis and confrontation existed in the waters and on the shores of the Mediterranean."³

By 1977, Yugoslavia came to argue that security in the Mediterranean should be linked, not only with the Middle East problem, but also with the situation in the Balkans as well. Apparently aiming at the Warsaw Pact and Bulgarian territorial pretensions toward Macedonia in particular, Belgrade advocated a strict application of the Helsinki agreements in relations between the Balkan countries. Yugo-

slavia viewed the situation in the Mediterranean as caused by rivalry between the two superpowers. Furthermore, the problems which existed between the countries in that region could be resolved by their common efforts were it not for "the presence and influence of the great powers in the Mediterranean."⁴ Belgrade argued that it was in the interest of all riparian states "to reduce the presence of non-Mediterranean powers." Thereafter, the essential preconditions would be created for strengthening of security and cooperation in the region, regardless of the policy and social systems of the Mediterranean countries. The Yugoslav media, in their commentaries through 1977, equated, or more precisely did not try to distinguish between, the U.S. and Soviet naval presences in the Mediterranean. Belgrade complained that, despite the declaration on the Mediterranean adopted at the conclusion of the CSCE, this area was not made part of any policy of relaxing tension.⁵

The Yugoslavs charged that at the root of all crises in the Mediterranean was the presence of "foreign powers." Allegedly, the most frequent "victims" were the nonaligned countries, because they were the main obstacle to a "bloc strategy" of dividing the world into spheres of interests and satisfying the "military and political and economic appetites" of the superpowers.⁶ Belgrade, for instance, charged that the Libyan-Egyptian frontier skirmish in 1977 "was clearly part of a scheme devised by those (presumably in the West) aspiring to influence indirectly the course of developments in the Middle East" and to weaken the forces endorsing "progressive"

tendencies in that part of the world.⁷ Belgrade, although not openly criticizing Egypt, clearly sided with Libya on that issue.

In 1978, Yugoslavia was determined to strengthen its relations with both the West and the PRC and in this way to neutralize any Soviet threat. At the beginning of March, Tito visited the U.S., where he had very successful talks with President Carter and other high U.S. officials. Then in August 1978, the Chinese Chairman Hua Guofeng paid a week-long visit to Yugoslavia after his official tour in Romania. Hua's visit to the two independent communist countries greatly alarmed and irritated Moscow.

Soviet-Yugoslav relations also worsened in the course of 1978 over several, principally ideological, issues. First, there was an ongoing dispute over the question of "proletarian internationalism" and the meaning of "democratic centralism." Another and increasingly sharp disagreement developed over nonalignment. At the 11th LCY Congress, held in June 1978, three senior Yugoslav party officials criticized the thesis that nonaligned countries had to fight against "imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism" but not against "hegemonism." Admittedly, the criticism was aimed primarily at Cuba's activities on Moscow's behalf, but incidents of this sort ultimately aggravated relations between Belgrade and Moscow. The Yugoslav delegation at the world's Youth Festival held in Havana in the summer of 1978 refused to sign the final document because of its excessive pro-Soviet character. Yugoslav party theoreticians in the summer and

fall of 1978 also attacked Soviet ideological journals commenting on the question of the "international worker's movement" and nonalignment.

At the turn of 1978-79, the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute erupted with renewed vigor over the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The fact that both warring sides, Vietnam and Kampuchea, professed "nonalignment," and moreover, were communist-ruled countries, deeply worried Belgrade. The Yugoslav concern was twofold: first, that one non-aligned country attacked another; and second, that Vietnam, supported by Moscow, invaded Kampuchea, another communist country. Belgrade, while emphasizing the first point, in fact, feared more the fact that one communist country was the aggressor determined to impose its own Moscow-type "real socialism." The Yugoslav media did not conceal its pro-Kampuchean attitude. On January 7, 1979, TANJUG, without mentioning the "Brezhnev doctrine" by name but clearly aiming at Moscow, stated in reference to the Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict that "worse of all is the belief that occupation of a foreign territory and the forcible overthrow of governments which are not to someone's taste can solve the problems which underlie armed conflicts."⁸

Relations with Moscow also deteriorated over the Chinese-Vietnam border war. Although the Yugoslav media called for both the Chinese and the Vietnamese withdrawal from Vietnam and Kampuchea, the Soviet press, supported by Czechoslovak television, criticized Belgrade for

its alleged anti-Soviet line in reporting. The Soviet view was that, while the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was "justified," the Chinese military action constituted "aggression." The Soviet media in its reporting omitted the fact that Belgrade called for the withdrawal of both Chinese and Vietnamese troops in Indochina, and gave the impression that Yugoslavia had been in favor of only Chinese withdrawal.⁹

Tito, speaking at the 60th anniversary of the LCY, warned that the Yugoslavs "must bear in mind the possibility of a further deterioration of an already extremely unfavorable international situation as well as the possibility of political, intelligence and even military provocation" on the Yugoslav borders. He also reaffirmed the Yugoslav stand that "to impose one's will on other peoples more or less by force of arms is to inflict irreparable harm to the cause of socialism."¹⁰

On April 5, the Yugoslav Under Secretary of the Defense Ministry and ex-secretary of the organization of the LCY in the YPA, Lt. Gen. Djemil Šarac, warned at the third plenary session of the CC of the LCY that "any use of armed forces in the form of military pressure or any direct aggression against Yugoslavia would be anti-socialist and counterrevolutionary, because this would be an aggression against socialist self-managing and independent Yugoslavia, against the achievements of a great authentic socialist revolution, against a prominent fighter for peace and progress." Apparently aimed at the

Warsaw Pact countries and Vietnam, he accused them of "military interventions and aggression against other socialist countries" and of behaving "according to the pattern characteristic of imperialist countries."¹¹

Although relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were strained, Tito paid a six-day official visit to Moscow on May 16. He later said that his talks with Brezhnev and other high Soviet officials were held in "an atmosphere of complete openness and mutual respect." Such a statement was a diplomatic term conveying the meaning that it was not possible to reach any agreement. Pravda, for its part, said that talks had been held "in a friendly and frank atmosphere and in a spirit of mutual respect." Pravda also characterized Soviet-Yugoslav relations as "permeated with a profound sympathy and marked with an enduring aspiration toward peaceful, all-around cooperation." This formulation is usually used by Moscow when dealing with countries of differing political systems. Although the joint statement issued on May 18 after Tito's visit did not mention the most controversial topic, the conflict in Indochina, it was certain that differences over this issue remained as large as ever.¹²

Another area of disagreement between Moscow and Belgrade was nonalignment, on which subject Yugoslavia was strongly opposed to the Cuban attempts on Moscow's behalf to divide the movement into "progressive" and "conservative" countries. Yugoslavia and some of its supporters within the movement, notably India, interpreted non-

alignment as a policy of equidistance between the two opposing sides, and not as a "reserve" force of their natural ally, the "socialist camp," as Cuba, Vietnam and a dozen other radical states argued.

There were a number of areas in which an identity or similarity of views were reaffirmed, however. Both Moscow and Belgrade fully or almost completely agreed on a policy of detente and disarmament and the position to be taken on the Middle East and Southern Africa. Brezhnev also did his best to convince Tito that all rumors of possible Soviet interference in post-Tito Yugoslavia were "absurd fantasies."¹³

Belgrade's attitude toward the U.S. and Soviet presences in the Mediterranean in 1978 and 1979 was one of assessing the policies of both superpowers for creating pressures and constantly threatening the "security, independence and peaceful development, particularly of the nonaligned countries in the region."¹⁴

Representatives of the LCY and SAWPY participated at the Third Mediterranean Conference held in Athens between May 14 and 18, 1979. The conference was hosted by Andreas Papandreu's All Greek Socialist Movement (PASOK) and was attended by 27 "socialist" and "progressive" parties and the "liberation" movements (PLO and Polisario) from 13 Mediterranean countries. The conference adopted a platform which called for non-participation in blocs, the pursuit of an independent foreign policy, the advancement of economic cooperation among the

Mediterranean countries, and for joint efforts to settle crisis situations and for the building of "socialism."¹⁵ In Belgrade's view all the participants of the Athens conference considered the presence of the U.S. and Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean as evidence of bloc rivalry and their intention to strengthen their influence and meddle in the internal affairs of the countries' fleets and the removal of foreign bases from the Mediterranean.

The Yugoslav objective of removing both the U.S. and Soviet presence and thus transforming the Mediterranean into "a zone of peace and cooperation" was linked, however, to the resolution of the crisis in the Middle East and Cyprus. In Belgrade's view both problems continued to be intertwined with security in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Yugoslavia took an ambiguous attitude with regard to the Camp David accords leading to the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Belgrade considered that a separate agreement could not represent a final settlement, although "it might be a useful step toward a comprehensive and just settlement provided it is concluded in accordance with the agreement and participation of all the Arab countries and that it does not sacrifice the Palestinians."¹⁶ Yugoslavia continued to insist on Israel's unconditional withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967. It urged the U.N. "to recognize the Palestinian nation's legitimate rights to self-determination, to a return to its homeland, and to establish an independent state." Yugoslavia urged recognition and acceptance of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the

Palestinian people. However, Yugoslavia did recognize Israel's right to exist and supported the inviolability of borders of all countries in the region.¹⁷

Meanwhile, following Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade in November 1976, it was reported that seven high-ranking generals, including Deputy Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Miloš Sumonja (a Serb) and Undersecretary of the Defense Ministry Lt. Gen. Djoko Jovanich (a Serb) were suddenly dismissed from their posts and prematurely sent into retirement. Reliable sources said that these generals had urged that Moscow's request for permanent naval and air bases was not to be rejected, but to be negotiated. It was said that Tito's wife, Jovanka, also attended the meeting of Lt. Gen. Sumonja and other generals. Defense Minister Ljubicich warned Tito about the entire affair and Jovanka's role in it.¹⁸ This in turn led to the disappearance of Tito's wife from public life in June 1977. According to other sources, the reason for the dismissal of the seven generals and Jovanka's disgrace was her excessive role in the appointment of high-ranking generals. She allegedly plotted to remove Defense Minister Gen. Ljubicich from his post and to appoint instead her wartime commander, Lt. Gen. Jovanich.

The gradual worsening of relations between Belgrade and Moscow had some effect on military cooperation between the two countries. After the beginning of 1977, there were very few high-level visits between the Yugoslav and Soviet military. A Yugoslav military dele-

gation in July 1977, led by then Navy Commander Branko Mamula, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union at the invitation of Admiral Gorshkov. The visit was revealed in Krasnaya Zvezda, but not in the Yugoslav press. In February 1978, Defense Minister Gen. Ljubicich led a high-level delegation to Moscow, which attended the traditional festivities on the occasion of Soviet Army and Navy Day. Since then, there have been no reported visits of Yugoslav high military officials to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union remained the largest and the most important source of heavy and advanced arms and equipment for the Yugoslav Armed Forces (figure 4). At the end of 1977, for example, 85 percent of Yugoslavia's arms imports still came from the Eastern bloc.¹⁹ The training program for Yugoslav officers in the Soviet Union and two other East European countries (Poland and Czechoslovakia) appeared to be on a smaller scale. Soviet naval vessels continued to use Yugoslav naval facilities for overhaul under the provisions of the 1974 law on the coastal sea. Since then, only one U.S. naval vessel has taken advantage of the provisions of this law. In 1978, small repair work (valued at \$74,300) was carried out on a 1,530-ton salvage vessel ARS-8 Preserver in the Tivat Navy Yard. Other Western countries to date have not used Yugoslav facilities for the repair of their warships.

FIGURE 4

SOVIET ARMS AND EQUIPMENT IN THE
YPA's INVENTORY, 1980

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number (if known) and Type</u>
<u>GROUND FORCES</u>	
Tanks*	60 T-62; 530 T-54; 225 T-55; 250 T-34/85; ? PT-76
APCs	BTR-40 PB/BRDM-2; BTR-50 PU; BTR-60; BTR-152
Battlefield support rocket	FROG-7 (Luna)
Guns	100mm M-1955; 130mm M-46, 155mm M-2, 76mm SU-76 SP (M-18)
Guns/Howitzers	152mm M-55/D-20; 155mm M-37
Howitzers	122mm M-38; 122mm D-30; 130mm M-54
SAMs	SA-6 Gainful; SA-7 Grail; SA-9 Gaskin
ATGMs	AT-1 Snapper; AT-3 Sagger*
Rifles/MGs	Several versions of AK-47 Kalashnikov produced under license in Yugoslavia
Engineering equipment	armored recovery vehicles; bridgelaying and mine-clearing tanks; armored tracked artillery tractors; heavy mechanized bridges; heavy folding pontoon bridge; trench diggers
Combat support vehicles	800 GAZ-69; KRAS-214/1-255B, ZIL-130; ZIL-131; ZIL-135
<u>AIR FORCE & AA DEFENSE</u>	
Fighters-interceptors	110 MiG-21 C/D/E; 12 MiG-21J Fishbed
Trainers	18 MiG-21 UTI Mongol
Transports	12 An-12 Cub; 12 An-26 Curl; 13 Il-14(VIP), 1 Il-18 Coot(VIP); 3 YAK-40 Codling, 2 Li-1 Cap
Liaison/Utility	2 YAK-12A Creek D
Helicopters	14 Mi-1; 18 Mi-4 Hound; 12 Mi-8 Hip; ? Ka-26
SAMs	SA-2 Guideline;* SA-3 Goa
AAMs	AA-2 Atoll*
Radars	GCI Barlock (P-60)

*Major part produced under license in Yugoslavia.

FIGURE 4 (Cont'd)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number (if known) and Type</u>
<u>NAVY</u>	
Ships	1 Koni-class missile frigate 10 Osa 1-class missile boats 14 Shershen-class torpedo boats**
SSMs	SS-N-2A/B Styx SSC-2b Samlet
Torpedoes	TR53VA conventional passive homing anti-shipping torpedo.
Mines	KMD-500 and KMD-1000 influence mines
ASW	RBU-1200 ASW rocket launchers
Aviation	Ka-25 Hormone and Mi-8 Hip ASW helicopters

 **Four transferred from USSR and the rest assembled at Tito shipyard (Kraljevica).

Sources: Front (Belgrade), 1968-1980; Narodna Armija (Belgrade), 1970-1980; Mornaricki Glasnik, (Belgrade), 1963-1980; Soldat und Technik, (Frankfurt a.m.), 1968-1980; Eastern Europe Daily, (Springfield, Va.), 1970-1980.

Potentially only the Libyan Navy may use these facilities in the future for its ex-Soviet vessels. Soviet naval visits between 1977 and 1980 remained on approximately the same level as in 1976; that is, 10 to 12 operational ship visits per year.

The Soviet Union has continued to use Yugoslav airspace, both for the regular supply of arms and equipment to its clients in the Middle East and Africa and in crisis situations (figure 5). During the Ethiopian-Somali War, the Soviet Union mounted a huge sealift and airlift to Ethiopia between November 1977 and July 1978.²⁰ The airlift got underway on November 26 and lasted until early January 1978. Some 225 aircraft (about 15 percent of the Soviet transport fleet) were involved, most of the flights originating in Odessa. One route passed over the Dardanelles and then Aden. Also, Damascus and Baghdad were used as refueling stops on the way to Ethiopia. While Turkey under the Montreux Convention has the authority to inspect overflights, it does not exercise it because of dependence upon Bulgaria for Turkish overflights to West Europe.²¹

Another route using Budapest as a staging area ran over Yugoslavia and then to Syria and Ethiopia. It was reported that the Soviet airlift involved the violation of the airspace of ten countries and drew an official protest on this score from the Yugoslav government.²² The Russians also used Yugoslav airspace in a number of routine arms resupply missions to its clients in the Middle East and Africa (figure 6).

FIGURE 5

SOVIET USE OF YUGOSLAV AIRSPACE 1967-1978: CRISIS-RELATED AIRLIFT

<u>Date</u>	<u>Route from/to</u>	<u>Destination</u>	<u>No. of flights</u>	<u>Type of aircraft</u>	<u>Crisis</u>
Jun 8-Jul 2, 1967	Budapest-Cairo-Dubrovnik/ Tivat-Damascus/Cairo Algiers	Syria/Egypt Algeria	350	An-12	June War of 1967
Nov 17 - Dec 31, 1967	Budapest-Dubrovnik-Cairo- Hodeida	North Yemen	170	An-12	Yemeni Civil War (Republi- can faction)
Jan 18-31; Feb 25- Apr 15, 1970	Budapest-Dubrovnik/Tivat- Cairo	Egypt	87 33	An-12 An-12/22	War of Attrition (Buildup of Egyptian AA defenses along Suez Canal)
Mar 1971			120		
Oct 10-23, 1973	Budapest-Dubrovnik/Tivat- Cairo/Damascus	Egypt/Syria	1040	An-12	Yom Kippur War
March 1975	Budapest-Dubrovnik/Tivat- Cairo/Kartoum-Brazzaville- Luanda	Angola	5	An-12	Angolan Civil War (MPLA fac- tion)
Oct 31, 1975- Mar 31, 1976	Budapest-Dubrovnik/Tivat- Algiers-Bamako-Luanda (or Budapest-Conakry-Brazzaville- Pte Noire-Luanda)	Angola	70	An-12	Angolan Civil War
Nov 26, 1977- Jan 1978	Odessa-Budapest-Dubrovnik/ Tivat-Damascus-Aden-Addis Ababa	Ethiopia	?	An-12	Somali-Ethio- pian conflict

FIGURE 6

SOVIET USE OF YUGOSLAV AIRSPACE 1967-1978:
NON-CRISIS RELATED AIRLIFT

Country	Destination	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76
India	N.A.	-	-	-	O	O	S	O	S	-	-	-
Egypt	Cairo	-	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	O	-
Syria	Damascus	-	S	O	O	O	-	S	S	S	O	O
YAR	Cairo-Hodeida	-	-	S	O	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PDRY	Cairo-Aden	-	-	-	S	-	S	S	S	O	S	-
Tanzania	Dar es Salaam	-	-	-	O	O	O	O	O	O	-	-
Guinea	Conakry	-	-	-	-	O	-	O	O	O	-	-
Libya	Tripoli	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	O	-
Mali	Bamako	O	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somalia	Mogadiscio	-	-	O	O	O	O	O	O	-	-	-
Chad	Tripoli-Ndjamene	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	O	O
Algeria	Algiers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	O	-	-
Nigeria	Lagos	-	S	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	S

O = occasional flights
S = substantial airlift effort

After 1976, military cooperation between Yugoslavia and the U.S. gathered momentum following Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) James L. Holloway's visit in April 1978 to Yugoslavia. Admiral Holloway reportedly held successful talks with his counterpart, Admiral Mamula. Then in October 1978, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited Belgrade. This was the first visit of any U.S. Secretary of Defense to a communist country. Yugoslavia reportedly showed a keen interest in diversifying its arms supplies. Belgrade drew up an extensive list of possible arms purchases from the U.S., which included wire-guided anti-tank missiles, early warning radar systems, AA weapons and communications equipment.²³ During his visit, a question was raised with Belgrade officials over the reported Yugoslav transfer of 50 to 100 U.S.-made M-47 Patton tanks to Ethiopia.²⁴ Belgrade's action represented a clear violation of the U.S. terms under which tanks had been transferred to Yugoslavia in the 1950s. U.S. officials confirmed that the question had been resolved to the satisfaction of their government. According to some sources, Belgrade promised that the incident would not happen again. Secretary Brown, during his visit to Belgrade, emphasized that the U.S. attached great importance to Yugoslavia's continued independence and territorial integrity. The U.S. also made it clear that any attack against Yugoslavia was to be considered a "very serious matter, indeed, carrying very strong and very negative implications about European security and peace."²⁵

In the wake of Secretary Brown's visit, it was reliably reported that Moscow exercised very strong pressure on Belgrade not to buy U.S. early-warning radar systems and SAMs, but to continue to purchase these items from the Soviet Union.²⁶

Further talks on the issue of Yugoslav arms purchases were apparently held during Tito's visit to the U.S. in March 1978. At this time, it was reported that, among other items, the Yugoslavs wanted to obtain some of the latest U.S. weapons, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Maverick AGMs, Dragon ATGMs and an integrated AA naval defense system. The Yugoslav request, however, caused some tension between the administration and the U.S. military as to whether to give such advanced weapons to a communist country. Reportedly, the U.S. Army Attaché in Belgrade, Colonel Robert E. Bartos, was fired because his reports from Belgrade stood in sharp disagreement with those of other officials on the question of how large the Soviet influence was within the YPA.²⁷

Following Tito's visit to the U.S. in 1978, several visits of defense officials of both countries took place. The then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, Gen. David Jones, visited Yugoslavia where he held talks with their Air Force and AA Defense Commander, Lt. Gen. Enver Chemalovich. Defense Secretary Ljubicich visited the U.S. in September 1978. He met with Secretary Brown and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Bernard W. Rogers and discussed military sales. Talks between Gen. Ljubicich and Secretary Brown were described as "warm

and cordial." Following Ljubicich's visit, it was learned that Yugoslavia had decided to purchase MK-44 A/S torpedoes, radars, jet engines, communication equipment and ammunition. The U.S. reportedly decided to approve most of these requests. Sources said that combined sale of U.S. arms and equipment to Yugoslavia, which amounted to \$3 million in FY 1978, were to amount to \$40 million in FY 1980 and some \$10 million in FY 1981.²⁸

A rather surprising development was represented by the visit to Belgrade of the Inspector of the West German Bundeswehr, Gen. Juergen Brandt, at the beginning of November 1979. He met with General Ljubicich and with the new Chief of the General Staff, Admiral Mamula, and visited the Naval Headquarters in Split. Although details of the talks were not publicly disclosed, it appeared certain that Yugoslavia intended to purchase some advanced arms and equipment from West Germany. The latter developments were surely more upsetting to Moscow than even the Yugoslav requests for the purchase of U.S. arms.

The Yugoslav defense industries since 1977 made further progress toward achieving a greater degree of self-sufficiency in equipping the country's armed forces with heavy and advanced arms. Reportedly, the first indigenously designed tank is presented under development as a new generation of ATGMs. It was claimed that, in 1979, some 80 percent of all arms and equipment for the Yugoslav armed forces was produced domestically.²⁹ A high Yugoslav military official said that Yugoslavia "does not intend to compete with the world's military

superpowers, but we not only firmly intend, but are also taking and will continue to take all necessary measures to reach the technological level of European armies."³⁰ On June 1, 1979, two new laws regarding the management of Yugoslav defense industries came into force. Both are important because they represent further strengthening of the military influence in production, export and import of arms and equipment. Also, some provisions may have repercussions in relations with foreign countries, because the Defense Ministry became a supreme authority on the Yugoslav arms exports and imports. When arms imports, for example, arrive at the Yugoslav border, the customs authorities were not allowed to request "custom declarations which include military secret data." Perhaps most important is article 65 in the law, which stipulates that "transit of arms and military equipment over Yugoslav territory shall be possible only if the Defense Ministry has given special permission."³¹ Obviously, this article of the law would have great significance in the case of some Soviet requests for airlift over the Yugoslav territory. In fact, giving the authority to the Defense Ministry for such permission and excluding the Foreign Ministry from the process, made it possible for Soviet requests to be granted more promptly and the entire airlift operation to be undertaken in greater secrecy than previously was the case.

The growing capabilities of the defense industries was illustrated by the fact that Yugoslavia in 1978 became the tenth largest of the world's exporters of arms.³² By far the largest share of

Yugoslav arms exports was to the nonaligned countries. The largest recipient of arms was again the Middle East. Although not publicly known, it was believed that Libya and Iraq were heading the list. Yugoslavia also acted as supplier of spare parts for Soviet-made weapons and equipment. For example, Cairo's Mena on July 19 said that when Moscow suspended its supply of spare parts and weapons to Iraq until the question of implementing the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty was resolved, Iraq turned to Belgrade for weapons, parts, and experts.

By the end of 1979, it was apparent that Belgrade was making a great effort to strengthen Yugoslavia's international position. Despite generally favorable economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and its allies, state and party relations continued to deteriorate. Three main issues then divided Belgrade and Moscow. First, there was a fundamental difference over the problem of various roads to "socialism" and the interpretation of "proletarian internationalism." Second, there was strong disagreement over the role and policy of the "nonaligned" movement. Third, both Moscow and Belgrade had different viewpoints regarding the "crisis of capitalism" and attitudes toward the policies of the West European communist parties (Eurocommunism). These basically ideological differences exerted an extraordinarily great influence upon not only party but also state relations between the two countries.

However, following President Tito's death in May 1980, the new collective leadership in Belgrade apparently decided on the gradual

improvement of relations with Moscow and its East European Allies at all levels. In the past few years, there has been a visible trend toward the expansion of trade between Yugoslavia and Comecon countries. By the end of 1980, the Comecon's share of Yugoslav exports and imports was 44.2 percent and 29.2 percent, respectively, or 34.8 percent of overall trade.³³ The main reasons for Yugoslavia's apparent reorientation to the Comecon markets, but primarily to the Soviet Union, were (1) the continuing recession in West European countries which has reduced Yugoslav trade possibilities, (2) the fact that trade with the Comecon countries is conducted in "clearing" dollars and not in hard currency, and (3) the relative uncompetitiveness of Yugoslav-manufactured goods in Western markets. For example, more than one half of the total Yugoslav production of footwear and a large part of textiles and ships is exported to the Soviet Union. The overall Soviet-Yugoslav trade in 1976 to 1980 reportedly amounted to about \$16 billion.

The first Soviet high-level visit after President Tito's death came in October 1980, when Deputy Premier and Chairman of the State Planning Committee Nikolai Baibakov came to Belgrade to hold talks on a new Soviet-Yugoslav ten-year (1981 through 1990) economic, trade, and technical agreement.

In the aftermath of Baibakov's visit, a great many delegations representing various Soviet republics and socio-political organiza-

tions have visited their counterparts in Yugoslavia. Concurrently with the steady expansion of economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union and its East European Allies, the new collective leadership in Belgrade has sought to improve the political climate with all of these countries, but most notably with Bulgaria. There have recently been almost no polemics between Belgrade and Sofia over the perennial Macedonian question which long poisoned relations between these two countries. Although underlying hostilities between Belgrade and Sofia are by no means eliminated, the state of relations between the two countries is a reliable indicator as the the state of relations between Belgrade and Moscow. Always when these relations are good and improving, there are no visible strains in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations and vice versa.

There were several significant events which took place in mid-1981 which may provide a partial answer as to how Soviet-Yugoslav relations could develop in the immediate future. First, the new five-year (1981 through 1985) Soviet-Yugoslav trade agreement was signed in Moscow on June 15, 1981. It envisages an overall trade between the two countries in the amount of some \$32 billion. The Soviet share of Yugoslavia's overall trade is to reach 45 percent, while in commodity exchange their share will be 20 percent. The Soviet Union also agreed to lend Yugoslavia \$450 million in credits (Belgrade reportedly asked for \$900 million). This credit was given for Yugoslav purchases of Soviet goods, with 4 percent interest and no payments for the first two years. The new five-year economic

and trade agreement is considered very favorable to Belgrade. Yet, some Yugoslav officials openly expressed concern about the country's too-heavy economic dependence on the Soviet Union and the Comecon countries in general.

Another significant event was a visit by a Soviet Navy delegation, led by Admiral Gorshkov, to the Yugoslav Navy, which took place between June 29 and July 4, 1981. It should be noted that this was Gorshkov's first visit to Yugoslavia since August 1976. Although it is too early to tell the real reason behind Gorshkov's visit and talks with Yugoslav military and political leaders, judging from his previous visits to Yugoslavia it is almost certain that it was the permanent use of Yugoslav ship repair facilities. There are some signs that close Soviet-Yugoslav naval cooperation may be renewed. Already, in February 1980, the Yugoslav Navy had acquired one 2,700-ton Koni-class frigate from the Soviet Union. Admiral Gorshkov's visit will undoubtedly provide another strong impetus to expand the cooperation between the two navies.

Two days after the end of Admiral Gorshkov's visit, the Chief of Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, General Aleksei A. Yepishev, made a five-day visit to Belgrade, where he met with a number of the YPA's high-ranking generals and Yugoslav high state and party officials. It should be noted that it was the first publicly known visit of Gen. Yepishev to the Yugoslav armed forces in his capacity as the Chief of Political Administration of the Soviet Army

and Navy. Although the contents of Yepishev's talks in Belgrade were not revealed, their significance cannot be underrated. At the moment at least, it seems that Soviet-Yugoslav military relations seem destined to further improve and possibly expand.

By the end of the summer of 1981, Yugoslavia was apparently passing through one of its worst economic and domestic political crises. Negative economic trends persist, despite many drastic measures taken by the new collective leadership of Belgrade. The national debt by the end of 1981 will reach some \$20 billion, or, \$5 billion more than it was at the end of 1980. Inflation is 40 percent, which is considered too high even by Yugoslav standards. The number of unemployed in the country at the end of 1980 was officially put at over 800,000. More serious problems facing Belgrade involve the virtual state of insurrection in the Albanian-populated province of Kosovo. In many towns and villages, mass demonstrations by Albanians erupted against the government in March and April 1981, demanding in effect the secession of the province from the Yugoslav federation so that it could be joined with neighboring Albania. Belgrade's leaders apparently overreacted by using the police and the army against the demonstrators. Reportedly, many hundreds of ethnic Albanians were killed and wounded (Belgrade officially put the number of killed at nine) and thousands of them were arrested. Subsequently, more than 1,700 Albanians were sentenced to long prison terms, most from 8 to 12 years, for their participation in and organization of the demonstrations. The harsh measures by Belgrade's government

against Albanians in the Kosovo province produced a backlash of resistance among the Albanian population there. Also, Yugoslav-Albanian relations, which in recent years had been steadily improving, had deteriorated sharply in the aftermath of the Kosovo events. The situation in the Kosovo province is still very serious, although some five months have passed since the mass demonstrations took place. All signs indicate that the problem of Albanian "nationalism" and "irredentism" and terrorism (which is already evident in West European countries against Yugoslav diplomatic representatives) will haunt Belgrade's leadership for a long time.

The internal political situation in other parts of Yugoslavia appears relatively stable, although nationalistic animosities are much in evidence, as well as growing problems in church-state relations, especially with the Catholic and Moslem church leaders in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, respectively.

The increasing domestic instability and the grave economic situation are not the only problems facing the present collective leadership of Belgrade. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, and the Cuban activities on behalf of Moscow for all practical purposes have destroyed the nonaligned movement, which always was a cornerstone of Yugoslavia's foreign policy. Consequently, Yugoslavia's international position has been significantly weakened in the last few years. Of course, Tito's death is an almost irreplaceable loss for the country because of his immense prestige

both internationally and in the country. There are few doubts that present events in the Kosovo province would have taken place much earlier if Tito had not been living. Marshal Tito's presence was especially valuable when Belgrade had to face Moscow's various demands in respect to the country's sovereignty and its role in international politics.

Although Belgrade and Moscow still differ on many ideological questions, it appears that their relations will continue to improve, barring such events as a Soviet invasion of Poland. The combination of the present lack of outstanding leaders in Belgrade and the grave domestic, political, and economic problems facing the country will make it easier for Moscow to exercise its already great economic leverage to extract political concessions from Belgrade. Also, in the absence of an open Soviet threat to the country's security and the apparent determination of the Reagan Administration to rebuild U.S. strength and prestige and oppose Soviet expansionism worldwide, it appears unlikely that the new and increasingly insecure leadership in Belgrade will be able to continue having good relations with both Moscow and Washington. Thus, the prospects are, at least for now, that Soviet-Yugoslav relations will improve.

The trend in Soviet-Yugoslav relations is at present a very positive one. The recent U.S.-Libyan confrontation over the Bay of Sidra, when two Libyan aircraft were shot down by U.S. Navy planes, may move Belgrade to closer military cooperation with Moscow, since

apart from Iraq, Libya is Yugoslavia's closest friend in the Arab world. Moreover, besides Iraq and the Soviet Union, it is one of Yugoslavia's principal suppliers of oil.

Meanwhile, Yugoslavia still is embarked on a policy of intensified and expanded cooperation with the West and with the PRC. There is some question, however, whether these efforts have not come too late and amount to too little. There is no doubt that, thanks to the misguided and unrealistic policies of the Belgrade leadership toward Moscow, the country is less secure and has less leeway in its foreign policy today than was the case 10 or 20 years ago.

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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The main feature of Soviet-Yugoslav relations since 1948 has been an oscillating pattern, in which the period of estrangement and open hostility was always succeeded by brief and ultimately ill-fated attempts by Belgrade to achieve a genuine reconciliation with Moscow. This love-hate relationship was largely, but not exclusively, conditioned by Tito's own attitudes toward Moscow. While secretly longing for close relations with the Soviet Union, he was always a realist, and did not want Yugoslavia to become merely a Soviet pawn. However, Tito repeatedly misjudged Moscow's motives. Although each time Yugoslavia succeeded in extricating itself from becoming dominated by the Soviet Union, it was done at an ever higher price. The end result was that Belgrade's freedom of action in facing Moscow became narrower each time rapprochement was followed by the worsening of relations between the two countries.

Notwithstanding the ideological differences between Moscow and Belgrade, there were many areas with identical or similar interests and policies. Both countries are apparently dedicated to expanding the influence of "socialism" worldwide. Moscow and Belgrade differ only in methods, not in objectives. There is a great identity of policies, but not necessarily of interests, toward "progressive" regimes and "national liberation movements." Although Belgrade and Moscow disagreed over the role of nonalignment, there is no doubt that the Yugoslav interpretation of nonalignment and its activities

within this movement until quite recently were largely inimical to Western interests and the U.S. in particular. The current, almost desperate, Yugoslav attempts to save the "nonaligned" movement from becoming a "reserve" of the "socialist camp" are highly ironical, if compared to Belgrade policies in the mid-1960s. Then, Yugoslavia was openly supportive of Moscow's aims and actively lobbied against policies of some nonaligned countries which wanted to take an equidistant stance between the two opposing blocs.

Belgrade and Moscow, despite periods of bad relations, basically agreed on most of the main international issues, such as the Middle East, the war in Indochina, world disarmament, European security, and racial conflict in Southern Africa. The Middle East was perhaps the issue over which both Moscow and Belgrade showed the greatest unanimity of views and policies. Both countries consistently supported the PLO and "progressive" Arab regimes in their struggle against Israel. The Yugoslav support was not just verbal. Significant material aid was given to radical Arab states, including the PLO, although Belgrade did not go so far as its radical Allies in the Middle East in calling for the destruction of Israel. Belgrade's support of Arab countries, however, was not based only on ideological and political considerations. There were strong and ever growing economic interests in Belgrade's policies toward the Middle East, a fact which is sometimes forgotten.

The Yugoslav policy and attitude toward the U.S. and Soviet presence in the Mediterranean was mainly influenced by the state of relations between Belgrade and Moscow. Rapprochement with Moscow invariably led to deterioration of relations with the United States, although not necessarily with Western countries in general. Belgrade never succeeded in having at the same time excellent relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States.

Yugoslav policy toward the U.S. presence in the Mediterranean would have been perhaps more favorable if it had not been for Belgrade's policies of extending almost unreserved support to the Arabs in their dispute with Israel and support in general to the "non-aligned" and "progressive" countries in the Mediterranean. These two factors severely limited Yugoslav options in the Mediterranean short of a retreat to neutralism. Hence, Belgrade continued tacitly to support the Soviet policies of force in the Mediterranean for fear of losing support and influence in the "progressive" Arab countries, even when its relations with Moscow deteriorated sharply.

Since 1964, the Yugoslav policy toward the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean changed from all-out support to criticism, in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Then, following the rapprochement in 1971, Belgrade sometimes strongly, and sometimes less obviously, supported Soviet policies in the Mediterranean. Following Brezhnev's unsuccessful visit to Belgrade in 1976, Yugoslavia called for withdrawal of both the U.S. and Soviet fleets in the Mediterra-

nean, without trying to make distinctions in their missions as done previously.


Yugoslavia correctly perceived, however, that any eventual confrontation between the two superpowers in the area would have a negative effect upon its security. Since the mid-1970s, Belgrade argued that security in the Mediterranean cannot be separated from European security. Although Belgrade was critical at times of the Soviet policy of force in the Mediterranean, it never supported the U.S. and Western presence in the area. At best, Belgrade equated the U.S. and Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and, at worst, it accused the Sixth Fleet of being the main instrument of U.S. "imperialist" policy and of exerting threats and pressures against "nonaligned" Mediterranean countries.

At present, Yugoslavia's ultimate aim is to transform the Mediterranean into "a zone of peace and cooperation." The attainment of this goal seems very remote, however. It should be emphasized that Belgrade's policy in this respect is not only unrealistic, but also runs counter to declared Yugoslav interests, that is, to remain free, independent and nonaligned. These goals could be maintained only if a rough balance of military power, both in Central Europe and in the Mediterranean, existed. Any sign of weakening U.S. interests in these two areas will always draw Belgrade closer to Moscow.

Though the matter of Belgrade's return to the Soviet orbit must remain speculative, it deserves consideration nonetheless. Leaving aside the incalculable political effects on neighboring countries, momentous consequences would ensue in the military-strategic sphere. Moscow would attain its long-sought aim of becoming a truly Mediterranean power. Soviet naval forces deployed there would acquire numerous and excellent bases and anchorages along the highly indented Yugoslav coast. The center of gravity of operations would shift to the central part of the Mediterranean.

Yugoslavia also offers a highly developed infrastructure, capable of supporting large naval forces stationed there (appendixes B, C and D). Hence, the Soviet Union would be able to achieve a significant increase in its naval strength permanently deployed in the Mediterranean. No less important would be the Soviet ability to move their submarines at will, from the Baltic and Northern Fleets into the Mediterranean, less encumbered by the restrictions now imposed by the Montreux Convention on the use of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

Yugoslav airbases would allow the Russians to station significant air strength there. The Soviet naval forces deployed in the Mediterranean would receive sustained and powerful air support which they presently lack (see the map). Yugoslavia's advantage as a base for Soviet naval forces lies also in offering uninterrupted land access from Hungary to the Adriatic Sea. Moscow would also gain in having permanent use of Yugoslav airspace for military transports supporting client states in the Middle East and Africa.



MAP 1: YUGOSLAVIA AS A BASE FOR SOVIET AIRCRAFT*

To sum up, Yugoslavia's support of Soviet policies of force in the Mediterranean area and in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1967 has been substantial. This was especially true in permitting Soviet use of Yugoslav airspace both for crisis-related and routine arms resupply of pro-Moscow states or "liberation" movements in Africa. Yugoslavia played a crucial role in the success of Soviet policy in the Third World on three notable occasions, that is, in the June War, the Yom Kippur War, and the Angolan Civil War. In other crisis-related airlift efforts, Yugoslavia, by granting use of its airspace to Soviet military transports, eased considerably the logistical problems and rapidity of the entire operation. Soviet use of Yugoslav naval repair facilities has been modest.

Although the number of ships overhauled in Yugoslavia was not considerable, compared to that of the Al Gabbari shipyard in Alexandria, it nevertheless lengthened operational deployments of combatants, especially submarines, in the Mediterranean. Another element often forgotten is the bilateral agreement on repair and servicing of Soviet merchant ships and fishing vessels in Yugoslav civilian repair facilities. This side of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation, although formally commercial in nature, nevertheless had a direct impact on the Soviet forward deployment of naval forces in the Mediterranean. The fact was, and still is, that among the many hundreds of ships docked and repaired in Yugoslavia after 1961, a large number were in fact vessels employed to supply Soviet warships in the Mediterranean.

Yugoslavia's direct and indirect support of the Soviet policies of force in the Mediterranean contributed in large measure to the success of these policies. The reasons why Belgrade, despite ups and downs in its relations with Moscow over the last two decades, openly or tacitly supported Moscow are manifold. Perhaps the single most important factor was that both Belgrade and Moscow largely shared the same policies toward the Middle East.

For the immediate future, there will probably be no significant changes in the Yugoslav attitude toward the Soviet policy of force in the Mediterranean. Belgrade will continue to accede to Moscow's requests for use of Yugoslav airspace and ground facilities, both for routine and crisis-related airlift. Yugoslavia would most likely oppose, as it has in the past, any airlift of Soviet troops over its territory. Belgrade would allow Soviet airlift missions in any conflict between the Arabs and Israelis and possibly in any Soviet and/or Cuban intervention in Southern Africa, or when Moscow is rendering military aid to Libya, if the latter is in conflict with Egypt. Belgrade also is expected to allow Moscow the use of Yugoslav airspace in any resupply effort of any "liberation movement" and "progressive" regime in the Middle East and Africa. Yugoslavia, however, would refuse the request in any situation involving a Soviet attempt to support a "Marxist" or communist regime if it invaded another "Marxist" but "nonaligned" state, as Belgrade's stand toward the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly showed. If the new collective leadership continues to pursue "Titoist" foreign policies, the possibility that

Belgrade will accede to the Soviet request for permanent access to the Yugoslav air and naval facilities is remote.

Yet, the future is by no means certain. The present Yugoslav policies in regard to the Soviet's request for the use of the country's air and naval facilities may well change in the immediate future. If the summer 1981 visits of Gorshkov and Yepishev are harbingers of things to come, Yugoslavia may well become more sympathetic to Soviet naval presence and policies in the Mediterranean and its relations with the Soviet Union may continue to improve and expand.

APPENDIX A

SOVIET-YUGOSLAV COOPERATION IN SHIPPING SINCE 1961

The Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation agreement in shipping industries includes not only ship construction, but also mutual deliveries of ship equipment, repair and overhaul and joint scientific-technical cooperation. Since 1961, three 5-year construction programs have been completed and a fourth is in the last stage of completion (see figure A-1). They coincided with the medium term plans of development of both countries. Yugoslav shipyards, between 1951 and 1980, built a total of 189 vessels. While the Yugoslav ships built represent only 3 percent of the Soviet merchant fleet, the Soviet orders made up 18.5 percent of the total Yugoslav ship exports. The latest agreement on economic and scientific-technical cooperation, signed in March 1978, envisaged that in the five-year period beginning in 1981 a total of 88 ships were to be built in Yugoslavia for Moscow's "Sudoimport." The Soviet orders include tankers of 40,000 and 24,000 DWT, floating docks, three submersible oil-drilling platforms, two types of dredgers, and 100-ton capacity floating cranes. At the same time, Yugoslav shipping companies were to order 34 vessels to be built in the Soviet Union.

Reportedly, the Russians are very punctual in paying for the orders placed with Yugoslav shipyards. Usually, they pay 50 to 60 percent of the total price after signing the contract or during construction, with the rest on delivery. However, payments are in

FIGURE A-1

SHIPS BUILT AND ON ORDER IN YUGOSLAV
SHIPYARDS FOR THE SOVIET UNION (1961-1985)

Shipyard	Construction Program			
	1961-65(First)	1966-70(Second)	1971-75(Third)	1981-85(Fifth)
1. MAJ (Rijeka)	7x20.800 DWT(T)	10x14.300 DWT(CL)	?	6x40.000 DWT(T)
SPLIT (Split)	8x20.800 DWT(T)	12x20.800 DWT(T)	9x20.800 DWT(T)	3x23.900 DWT(T) ?40.000 DWT
ULJANIK (Pula)	10x14.300 DWT(CL)	10x14.300 DWT(CL)	?	2x12.160 DWT(BC) ?24.000 DWT
TITO (Kraljevica)	-	-	6x ? (CP)	8x4.500 DWT(CP) 3 submersible platforms
MOSOR (Trogir)	-	4x30.000 t.(FD)	3x30.000 t.(FD) 1x28.000 t.(FD)	3x30.000 t.(FD)
TITO (Belgrade)a	-	11x2.300 HP(tugs)	8x tugs 6x dredgers	
Total number of ships & craft	92		59	38 ^b 100
Value of program (in \$ million current)	370		300	N.A. 1,300

a River shipyard
b plus 12 craft

Abbreviations:

BC = boxcar carrier (railway ferry)
CL = cargo-liner
CP = cargo-passenger
DWT = dead weight ton
FD = floating dock
HP = horse power
T = tanker

clearing dollars and that is not favorable for Yugoslav shipbuilders. The Russians also insist on firm prices. They kept doggedly to such a position, in spite of all Yugoslav requests to apply so-called "sliding prices," which included an inflation factor. This is clearly disadvantageous to Yugoslav shipbuilders, because in most cases the material and equipment used in construction must be purchased in the West in hard currency and at inflated prices. On the other hand, the Russians always demand the best quality ship and the installation of modern equipment. Very often the Russians want to reduce prices as much as possible. For instance, in 1976, they delayed the signing of a contract for tankers which had already been initiated.

Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation in shipbuilding, however, has been beneficial for both sides. Soviet orders help greatly to alleviate the very unfavorable situation in shipbuilding which results from the worldwide slump in new orders. Perhaps the most important aspect of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation in shipping from Moscow's view is the agreement for repairing and servicing Soviet ships in Yugoslav civilian repair facilities. Since 1961, several hundred Soviet merchant and fishing vessels have been repaired at four large Yugoslav facilities--Martinišćica (Viktor Lenac), Kraljevica (Tito), Trogir (Mosor), and Rijela (Veljko Vlahovic). This consequently indirectly enhanced Soviet naval capabilities, because many of the Soviet auxiliary ships deployed in the Mediterranean, especially tankers, were overhauled in Yugoslavia. It should be noted that some 60 percent of Soviet naval auxiliary vessels belong to the merchant marine.

APPENDIX B
YUGOSLAV SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIES

Yugoslavia has approximately 60 large and small shipyards and ship repair facilities located along the 3,800-mile-long coast and offshore islands. Additionally, there are a few shipyards inland on the main rivers--Danube, Sava, and Drava. The six largest shipyards were consolidated in 1968 into the joint firm "Jadranbrod," with its head office in Zagreb. After the shipyard in Bijela (Veljko Vlahovich) joined the "Jadranbrod" in 1975, this group possessed together some 90 percent of all the country's shipbuilding capacity. While "Jadranbrod" employed 21,000 in 1973, three years later it had an average of 29,400 workers. Of this total, 23,500 workers were employed in shipyards in Croatia; 1,300 in Slovenia; 1,500 in Serbia; 800 in Montenegro; and 2,300 in Vojvodina. In 1977, some 160 small firms around the country were associated with the shipbuilding industries. The shipyards have very great importance in many communities, especially where they represent practically the only place for employment of the labor force. For example, the "Uljanik" shipyard in Pola contributes directly over one-half of all communal expenses for schools, hospitals, and cultural activities.

More significantly, the shipbuilding industries are great earners of the country's hard currency. Between 1956 and 1976, a total of 455 ships with 10,524.000 DWT (6,854.700 BRT) were built. Of this total, 318 vessels with 9,486.700 DWT or 70 percent were exported,

while the rest were delivered to domestic operators. Since 1956, when the first ship was delivered to a foreign owner, Yugoslav shipyards built ships for more than 40 countries, of which 28 percent went to less developed countries and the West, and 24.6 percent to the East. Some 96 percent of all ship exports went to 11 countries, including 22.8 percent to India and 18.5 percent to the Soviet Union. Reportedly, some 80 percent of all equipment installed on the ships came from domestic sources. Between 1972 and 1976, Yugoslav ship exports were valued at \$1.4 billion, of which \$290 million was for the communist countries. In 1978, 17 ships were delivered, valued at \$417 million. In the same year, "Jadranbrod" concluded contracts for 51 vessels with 850,000 DWT, including 14 ships to be built for the Yugoslav merchant marine. An additional 40 vessels were negotiated, including 26 for export.

Despite these impressive results, Yugoslav shipyards, ever since 1973, have been in a deep crisis caused mainly by a world slump in ship orders. In 1973, there was a significant decrease in ship orders for the Yugoslav shipyards. Then in 1975, there was a small increase in orders, followed a year later by a significant decrease. By 1978, the idle capacity of the Yugoslav shipyards was estimated to be 50 percent.

APPENDIX C
NAVAL REPAIR FACILITIES

The Yugoslav Navy has two naval yards, "Velimir [✓]Skorpik" in Sibenik and "Sava Kovachevich" in Tivat (Bay of Cattaro). Both yards are under the administrative control of the Navy Section in Belgrade. In the operational chain of command, they are subordinate to the Sibenik Naval District and the Naval Sector-Boka, respectively. The employees in the naval yards are civilians. However, the director of the facility is a naval engineer (Colonel), as are the main staff positions. Since the end of the 1960s, the navy yard in [✓]Sibenik has been utilized almost exclusively for repair and overhaul of the Yugoslav Navy's ships and craft. A limited surplus capacity existed for docking and repair of small- and medium-size merchant vessels. The repair facility in Tivat presently serves for the overhaul of the Navy's submarines, SCs (Mornar and Udarnik class), LCTs, and some auxiliaries. The "Sava Kovachevich" yard is practically the only one with a large surplus capacity for overhaul of foreign warships. This facility, known before 1965 as an arsenal, was established in 1889 as one of the two navy yards for the Austro-Hungarian Navy. Tivat's arsenal continued with work for the Yugoslav Royal Navy between 1919 and 1941. At the end of the war in 1945, the navy yard in Tivat resumed its normal activities. Between 1945 and 1952, it overhauled mostly ex-German and Italian minesweepers. Tivat's navy yard in 1956 overhauled two ex-British W-class destroyers. From 1953 to 1963, some 150 SCs, torpedo boats, amphibious craft, and auxiliaries were

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overhauled. By the end of 1963, the yard employed some 530 workers (excluding administrative personnel).

Thereafter, the yard fell into a difficult financial situation when the Navy decommissioned or sold to civilian operators a large number of obsolete vessels (torpedo-boats, amphibious craft, and auxiliaries). At the same time, these units were replaced by modern ships which required initially less repair work. Tivat's facility in the mid-1960s was in a very disadvantageous position because of the obsolescence of its mechanized equipment. The navy yard had only one small-capacity floating dock, which was almost useless. The modernization of the "Sava Kovachevich" yard included the building of new halls and workshops and the replacement of obsolete equipment. The working force was also restructured. By the early 1970s, modernization was almost complete. Since then, the Yugoslav Navy has overhauled its submarines and SCs almost exclusively in Tivat. The navy yard had a large idle capacity which, after 1974, was almost fully utilized in the overhaul of Soviet submarines. The capabilities of the yard increased in 1975, when a new floating dock for ships up to 40,000 tons and synchrolift for submarines were bought. Tivat's yard is also engaged in the construction of some types of smaller craft. It presently employs some 1,400 workers.

APPENDIX D
SHIP REPAIR FACILITIES

VIKTOR LENAC (MARTINIŠĆICA)

Founded in 1896, Viktor Lenac is the largest civilian ship repair facility. Presently, the facility employs between 2,000 and 2,500 workers. Viktor Lenac was reconstructed and expanded in 1971. The work included a new 70,000-ton floating dock and a 3,000-foot-long breakwater. The facility has the capability of repairing ships up to 70,000 tons. There are three floating docks; dock 3 (115 x 70 m); dock 5 (201.5 x 33.8 m) and 70,000 t; and dock 7 (165 x 27.4 m). Docks 3 and 5 were built in 1903 and 1966, respectively. Dock 7 was built in Leningrad in 1972. It was planned to build, with Soviet technical aid, a dry dock between Martinišćica and Žurkovo which will have the capacity to dock ships up to 300,000 DWT.

VELJKO VLAHOVICH (BIJELA)--BAY OF CATTARO

By the end of the 1960s, this repair facility was in a very bad financial situation. In 1969, losses amounted to 3 billion dinars. The situation improved after 1970 when the shipyard was reconstructed and expanded. Also, the shipyard started cooperation with the nearby naval repair facilities in Tivat. The shipyard was expanded with the aim of repairing and constructing oceangoing fishing vessels. By 1972, the Bijela facility repaired 70 ships, mostly of Soviet, Italian, Greek and Panamanian registry. The modernization of the shipyard

included the purchase in 1973 of the floating dock. The dock was eventually built in West Germany, however (Sterkerade AG at Nordenham-Blexen). It arrived in Bijela in February 1976. The new 33,000-ton floating dock (252 x 53 m) had the capacity of receiving ships up to 110,000 DWT.

Apart from the new dock, the Bijela shipyard received new mechanization and a new pier was built. The working force was increased from 300 to 900 over the period 1971 to 1976. Because of heavy investments in modernization, the shipyard is obliged to repay, between 1977 and 1987, some 60 million dinars annually. The investment proved to be worthwhile, because the shipyard's capacities have been fully utilized. Between 1968 and 1976, the Bijela shipyard repaired 555 ships, mostly under foreign flags. In this total, the largest number were comprised of Soviet merchant ships and ocean fishing vessels. Since 1977, the shipyard has been fully booked. For example, in January 1977 alone, 19 ships arrived for repair. The Bijela shipyard, however, was practically destroyed in a catastrophic earthquake on April 15, 1979. All parts of the facility, including mechanization, cranes, administrative buildings, and some 250 meters of the pier, collapsed into the sea. The floating dock was only slightly damaged. Some 800 workers were left without employment. The ship repair facility in Bijela is not expected to resume its activities in the next few years.

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