AD-A109 589 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA F/G 5/4
UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA: BEYOND THE 'CHINA CA--ETC(U)
SEP 81 J F BOUCHARD

UNCLASSIFIED NL




1.0
1.1
1.25
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.5
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963 A

(2) LEVEL

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

AD A109589



DTIC
ELECTE
JAN 1 3 1982
S D
B

THESIS

(6)

UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA:
BEYOND THE 'CHINA CARD'

by

Joseph Frederick Bouchard

September 1981

Thesis Advisor: C. A. Buss

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

DTIC FILE COPY

82 01 12 030

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A109589	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) United States Security Interests in China: Beyond the 'China Card'	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's thesis; September 1981
	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Joseph Frederick Bouchard	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	12. REPORT DATE September 1981
	13. NUMBER OF PAGES 474
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office)	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
	15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

People's Republic of China; Sino-Soviet Relations; Sino-American Relations; Asian Security; U.S. Security Policy; U.S. Foreign Policy; China Defense Policy; China Foreign Policy

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is developing rapidly in the realm of military and security affairs. The thesis of this paper is that, although the Sino-American relationship has been founded upon a mutual interest in opposing the Soviet military threat, the long-term development of the relationship will depend on the extent to which the scope of mutual interests can be broadened and the

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE S/N 0102-014-6601

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

#20 - ABSTRACT - (CONTINUED)

many latent sources of tension between China and America alleviated. A broad definition of national security, encompassing political and economic as well as military factors, and an alternative conceptual framework for analyzing international politics are proposed for defining security interests. Security issues examined include the Soviet threat to China; the U.S. interest in the security of China; China's role in Soviet-American relations, cooperation on world order issues, and Asian security; and American interests in a military relationship with China, including naval operations.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☑
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A	

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

United States Security Interests in China: Beyond the 'China Card'

by

Joseph Frederick Bouchard
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1976

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 1981

Author: Joseph F. Bouchard

Approved by: Claude A. Buss
Thesis Advisor

Edward A. Olsen
Second Reader

Donald C. Daniel
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

W M Woods
Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is developing rapidly in the realm of military and security affairs. The thesis of this paper is that, although the Sino-American relationship has been founded upon a mutual interest in opposing the Soviet military threat, the long-term development of the relationship will depend on the extent to which the scope of mutual interests can be broadened and the many latent sources of tension between China and America alleviated. A broad definition of national security, encompassing political and economic as well as military factors, and an alternative conceptual framework for analyzing international politics are proposed for defining security interests. Security issues examined include the Soviet threat to China; the U.S. interest in the security of China; China's role in Soviet-American relations, cooperation on world order issues, and Asian security; and American interests in a military relationship with China, including naval operations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ---------- 8

A. DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST ---------- 10

B. THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ---------- 17

C. AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE: INITIATIVE, CONSULTATION, AND PERSEVERENCE ---------- 19

II. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA ------- 23

A. THE EFFECT OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS ON AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF ITS SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA ---------- 24

B. SOVIET CHINA POLICY: CONTAINMENT AND COEXISTENCE ---------- 47

1. Objectives of Soviet Foreign and Defense Policy ---------- 48

2. Soviet Perceptions of the Chinese Threat ---------- 64

3. The Soviet Military Threat to China ----- 71

C. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE SECURITY OF CHINA - 101

1. Threats to the Security of China -------- 102

2. Potential Consequences for American Interests ---------- 107

D. CHINA IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP ---------- 112

1. China's Geopolitical Importance --------- 114

2. China in the Soviet-American Strategic Balance ---------- 120

3. China and Containment of Soviet Expansionism ---------- 145

4. China and Soviet-American Arms Limitations ---------- 159

5. China and Soviet-American Detente ------- 187

E. CHINA AND AMERICAN WORLD ORDER INTERESTS ---- 200

1. China and the Management of Global Problems ---------- 201

2. China and the Peaceful Resolution of Local Conflicts ---------- 218

F. CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN ASIAN SECURITY ---------- 226

1. China and American Security Commitments in Asia ---------- 237

2. China's Interests in the Trouble Spots of Asia ---------- 254

3. China and the American Commitment to Taiwan ---------- 261

4. China and American Naval Strategy in the Western Pacific ---------- 277

G. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA ---------- 285

1. Security Consultations ---------- 287

2. Arms Sales and Technology Transfers ----- 290

3. Intelligence Cooperation ---------- 301

4. Mutual Defense ---------- 307

5. Naval Operations ---------- 313

III. CONCLUSIONS ---------- 316

A. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA --- 316

B. PROSPECTS FOR SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS ------- 319

APPENDIX A: SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA ---------- 321

APPENDIX B: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS ---------- 331

FOOTNOTES ---------- 364

BIBLIOGRAPHY ---------- 458

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ---------- 472

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

1. Sino-American Two-Way Trade, 1971-1980 -------- 340

2. China's Trade Balance, 1970-1980 ---------- 347

3. China's Surplus From Trade With Developing Countries, 1970-79 ---------- 356

I. INTRODUCTION

United States policy toward the People's Republic of China has undergone dramatic change over the past decade. The evolution of American policy during this period both reflected and was a cause of much broader changes in the international political arena, in great power strategic relationships, and in Sino-American relations. Not least among the factors which have shaped the evolution of American China policy have been changes in Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics--changes which made possible the rapid improvement of Sino-American relations.

The Sino-American relationship of today can still be said to be young. The nine years since President Nixon's surprise visit to Beijing have not given the relationship what could reasonably be called a heritage, especially when viewed in the context of the much different relationship of the 21 years prior to the Nixon China trip. Although there have been definite trends toward improvement in Sino-American relations over the past two years, including the establishment of diplomatic relations, it is still true today that whatever course American policy toward China takes will be a new direction.

To emphasize the rapid pace of change and the uncertainty of the future is not to say, however, that a critical examination of the basis of United States policy toward China would be a futile endeavor. Quite to the contrary, such a fluid

state of affairs makes it all the more important that American interests in China be clearly perceived. That is the purpose of this paper: to define American interests in China, particularly in terms of national security.

The defining of interests is not a purpose that lends itself readily to formulation as a hypothesis whose validity can be tested by observations made in the course of a paper. Almost by definition, the validity of a policy study such as this can only be judged in the light of history. Even then the intellectual and political predispositions of the individual doing the judging will have as much to do with the verdict as the weight of historical evidence.

Be that as it may, there are three hypotheses upon which the procedure used herein is based that must be stated. The first is that the manner in which the concept of national interest is defined directly affects the perception of interests in a given situation. The second is that the conceptual framework used to define the structure of the international system directly affects the perception of interests in a given situation. The third is that the particular world role depicted as being appropriate or necessary will directly affect the perception of interests in a given situation.

The focus of this paper is on American interests in China rather than on methodological questions, therefore no attempt will be made to test the three hypotheses. Such a test would require operationalizing and then varying the three independent

variables--definition of the national interest, conceptual framework of the international order, and appropriate world role--to observe whether they do indeed directly affect the dependent variable--perception of interests. Instead, one specific definition of each of the independent variables will be stated and the three hypotheses treated simply as underlying assumptions. In a broader methodological context, what this paper will have accomplished is a case study of one particular given situation: Sino-American relations in the world today.

The title of the paper indicates a further limitation on the scope of the study: only security interests will be examined. This restriction will not be imposed, however, until after the concepts of national interest, international order, and world role are examined in the abstract--lest the specific interests to be discussed should bias the definitions of these underlying concepts.

A. DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Any discussion of United States foreign policy or of American interests in another country must ultimately come to grips with the perennial problem of defining the national interest. Without exception, every study that seeks to evaluate past foreign policy or to recommend contemporary policy is founded, whether implicitly or explicitly, upon a particular definition of the national interest. Even though the resulting observations may not demonstrate any greater

perspicacity for having done so, it is best that the concept of national interest be defined explicitly.

A definition of the national interest must answer three questions: From what source are interests deemed to be national to be derived? How is the concept to be broken down into functional interests that are manageable for analysis? And, how are such 'abstract' interests to be applied to a particular country, their magnitude measured, and priorities established among them?

United States national interests derive from the goals and guiding principles of the Constitution. This is, of course, vague to the point of not being a useful concept for the study of foreign policy--but vagueness is the price of universality. The central point is that a distinction must be drawn between national interests and the "circumstances of time and place" which determine the actual policies pursued:

> Yet the kind of interest determining politiaction in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue.[1]

The domestic processes by which the goals and guiding principles of the Constitution are translated into stated interests are beyond the scope of this paper, but the concept of 'national interests' itself can be analyzed by breaking it down into categories of functional interests.

Various scholars have proposed a variety of formulations of the national interest in terms of its functional components.

Ralph N. Clough, f r example, has stated that: "The national interests of any state can be regarded as comprising physical survival as a nation; preservation of the most cherished values of the people of the nation and enhancement of their material well-being; and creation of an international environment favorable to these interests."[2] Donald E. Nuechterlein, who has made a significant effort towards the rigorous analysis on national interests, uses a taxonomy of four interests: defense, economic, world order, and ideological.[3] These two formulations are quite similar and both are useful. For the purposes of this paper the "world order" or "favorable international environment" interest will be combined with the "defense" interest and certain aspects of "economic" interests as one broad category of security interests.

The goals and guiding principles of the Constitution can be seen as imposing three requirements on the conduct of United States foreign policy in order that it be in the national interest:

First, it must promote national security, "the defense of internal values against external threats."[4] As Morton H. Halperin has observed: "Whatever the shape of the international situation, the fundamental goal of American foreign policy must be the prevention of actions which could threaten the existence of the United States or its way of life."[5] This requires, however unpleasant the prospect, unflagging attention to national power and international power relationships in all their complex forms.[6]

Second, American foreign policy must strive continuously to create an international political and economic environment conducive to the enhancement of American economic and physical welfare. "Economic and physical welfare" covers a myriad of objectives and problems such as economic growth, employment, inflation, population, environmental protection, health, food and water, energy, and ocean and mineral resources. It is in this category of interests that the United States faces the greatest dilemmas over the long run, for the physical welfare of the nation may well demand certain sacrifices in economic welfare.

In an interdependent world it is not feasible to think strictly in terms of domestic problems in these areas, for problems abroad could defeat even the best-planned domestic programs. To an uncomfortably large degree, modern technology has robbed the United States--and every nation--of full sovereignty over its own economy and environment. Even the use of the term "robbed" is misleading. In most cases sovereignty was gladly ceded, albeit a minute portion at a time, in order to gain the undeniably vast economic benefits of global interdependence. The United States finds itself, therefore, committed to forums and agencies pursuing the cooperative and peaceful management of the international problems of economic and physical welfare.

The third requirement imposed upon American foreign policy by the Constitution is that it must be conducted in such a manner as to uphold and defend the democratic principles upon

which the nation was founded. From this requirement is derived the ideological interests category of Nuechterlein and the "most cherished values of the people" mentioned by Clough. Harry G. Gelber, writing from the vantage point of Tasmania, has observed of this ideological interest:

> ...America is a nation unlike any other. It is not a nation state in the same sense as Japan or France. Ethnic and racial matters are important as reflections of more fundamental values rather than as issues in their own right. America's primary obligation is the domestic cultivation and elaboration of that value system, which is the very cement of U.S. society.[7]

In addition to generating ideological interests abroad, this third requirement imposes constraints on the formulation and execution of American foreign policy--thereby affecting all of the categories of interests. The most significant constraint is that the Executive Branch of government does not have a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. Congress, in particular, but also the judicial branch and public opinion have a part in policy formulation. Another consequence of the Constitutional constraints on the Executive is that, in the execution of policy, the ends do not justify the means. Although foreign policy debates do not often focus on this issue in these terms, it is only with the greatest of trepidation that any President can assert that national security or economic interests demand the sacrifice of ideological interests.

Having identified the source of American national interests and derived from it functional categories of interests, the question of how to apply these to a particular country can now

be addressed. The first problem encountered is that American interests in a particular country must take into account not only the bilateral relationship, but also American global and regional interests, the interests the other country has in third parties, and the interests third parties may have in the country of interest. Ralph N. Clough has devised four "clusters of interests" that are useful for sorting out these various interests: general, intrinsic, derived, and created.[8]

General interests are "those with a global reach" and include "deterrence of attack against the United States," the "avoidance of nuclear war," and "the creation of a more stable world order" among others. Intrinsic interests are "inherent in its direct relationship with a particular country or area at a particular time," and include the "economic stake in a country, traditional ties with the people of that country," and the "ability of that country to help protect U.S. general interests." Derived interests "are not intrinsic to its relations with a particular state, but flow from its important interest in a third state," with the American interest in Korean security being cited as an interest derived in part from American intrinsic interests in Japan. Finally, created interests are "those that the United States itself creates in a given country by taking actions (especially by making defense commitments or by actually deploying its armed forces) that create an expectation that the United States would use armed force in order to protect other types of interests."[9]

Although these "clusters of interests" will not be used to structure this paper, reference will be made to them in specific instances because of their value in describing the broad origins that interests can have.

Measuring the magnitude of specific United States interests in another country and assigning priorities to those interests are by far the most difficult problems in using the national interest approach to the study of American foreign policy. Devising a scheme for stating the level of American interests, as Nuechterlein has done with his four "intensities of interest" (survival, vital, major, and peripheral),[10] is the easy part. While such a scheme does enforce clearly stated levels of interest, it cannot eliminate the subjective judgment required to assign a particular interest to a particular level. It also tends to treat any specific issue as autonomous, when in fact most interests are closely interrelated with numerous other interests. The issue of American credibility is probably the most knotty example of this problem. If American policy makers sacrifice a peripheral or major interest on one occasion, how will that decision affect an ally's or an adversary's perception of American willingness to defend a vital interest on another occasion?

This paper offers no panacea for the levels of interest problem. In all probability, there is none. Where there is no need to do so, levels of American interest will not even be assigned other than in general terms. Two observations can

be made to justify this. First, there is no absolute scale on which one can compare specific interests--all interests are relative and there is no single list of priorities among them. This is not to say that specific interests cannot be compared or that priorities cannot be established: they can and must. Rather, the point is that perceived levels of interest and priorities are specific to given "circumstances of time and place," even though the interests themselves can be derived in the abstract.

The second observation on the level of interest problem is that the short-term interest in an issue may well conflict with the long-term interest in the same issue, especially when its influence on other interests is considered. The investment that is unprofitable today might be the one with the greatest payoff in twenty years. Thus, any particular assignment of priorities must specify short-term versus long-term interests.

Introduction of the dimension of time brings the discussion back to the theme of the opening paragraph: change. In a rapidly evolving international context as exists today, understanding American interests in China is better served by focusing on deriving the interests themselves and stating priorities only in general terms.

B. THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A second task which must be undertaken prior to discussing American interests in China is to explicitly state the

conceptualization of the international "system" that underlies pronouncements on the role of Sino-American relations in world politics. All too often debate on foreign policy issues is muddled by unstated but critical assumptions on the nature of international relations.

There has for some years been an on-going debate as to the structure of the international system, and even on whether it can indeed be called a "system." The debate centers around the concept of "polarity" as a feature of the international system, but has been complicated by the rise of the non-aligned movement and the growing importance of so-called "north-south" disputes. This debate on the structure of the international system would be inconsequential, a matter of theoretical academic interest only, were it not for the fact that crucial foreign policy decisions are often made in the context of such models--even if only implicitly.

Morton Kaplan has proposed four models of the international system based on the polarity concept: tight bipolar, loose bipolar, multipolar (balance of power), and unit veto.[11] More recently, Gerald Segal has attempted to systematize a tripolar model derived from behavioral research.[12] Other observers, however, deprecate polarity as a fundamental factor. Joseph Nogee, for example, concludes that: "Polarity as a component of structure of the international system cannot by itself predict the behavior of the system or the nations in it," and believes that other factors are more important for describing the international system.[13]

Between these two views lie theories which recognize that the complexities of the international system make any one model based on polarity inapplicable in many circumstances, but which also recognize that distinct patterns based on power relationships do emerge in other circumstances. Stanley Hoffmann has proposed a "latent bipolar system" that emerges only when the interests of the two superpowers clash directly. On a routine day-to-day basis, however, the international system operates on the basis of "de facto polycentrism."[14] Donald Lampert, et al., proposed a more complicated but complementary model described as "multiple issue-based systems."[15] This model contends that the perceived structure of the international system varies, depending on the particular issue at stake and the power alignments around it. Synthesizing these two models: except when a particular issue directly involves the superpowers as the principal actors--when bipolar relations predominate--the international system operates simultaneously at several levels of complexity and with varying structural relationships, depending on the issues involved.

C. AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE: INITIATIVE, CONSULTATION AND PERSEVERENCE

What is America's role in such a world? This also must be understood before discussing United States interests in China. Experiences of the recent past certainly tend to indicate that the United States cannot be the "world's policeman," if only because the American people quickly tire

of the burdens of such a role. On the other hand, the United States cannot seriously consider retiring into a "Fortress America" to let the rest of the world fend for itself. As Morton H. Halperin has observed, in the context of Asia:

> America should not become the world's policeman, and the U.S. has no intention of acting like one. Neither are Americans irresponsible citizens of the world who will stand by when other nations are threatened by external aggression, or when other citizens of this planet are living in hunger and misery. The necessary U.S. role in Asia is well within the U.S.'s economic and political capability. To do less is to invite disaster. To do more would be to neglect American domestic problems, and to seek to do what the United States cannot do and should not attempt.[16]

The United States still has a vital leadership role to play in the world, but it is a role constrained by the nature of the international political arena in the world today. The United States can no longer act as a command figure, for not even the reawakening of awareness of the continuing cold war in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has altered the "de facto polycentrism" character of the international system.

Nor can the United States act as a savior figure, uplifting the grateful world masses from hunger, disease and ignorance. The developing nations have been at least as stingy with their good will as the developed nations have been with their aid. Furthermore, the Third World rejects the notion that our moral obligation to provide them with aid implies any right for the United States to claim leadership over, or even non-hostile relations with, the recipients of American aid.

What then is America's world role? Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, described it as follows in a speech in April 1981:

> First, we have recognized that, beyond simply asserting our role as leaders of the free world, we must act as leaders. Responsible American leadership is of the utmost importance in achieving our aim of a just and stable world order. We must be strong, balanced, consistent, and reliable in our policies and our actions, and we must proceed with prudence and sensitivity with regard to the interests of our allies and friends, consulting fully with them as we work together for the more secure and prosperous world we all desire.[17]

The image of the world role appropriate for the United States today is not particularly romantic, and probably is not amenable to being a catchy phrase--as is so popular in American politics--but it can be summed up rather simply: initiative, consultation and perseverance.

Initiative, because the world does need leadership--today more than ever. Only a few of the more than 150 independent nations perceive the magnitude or complexity of the many global problems facing mankind, and no other nation has the broad range of interests and abilities of the United States. Whether or not America desires a leadership role, the responsibility is thrust upon it. The question, then, becomes how to best fulfill that leadership role.

Consultation, because post-war experience has shown it to be an effective tool of American foreign policy. Consultation has two forms: bilateral, with friends and allies, and multilateral in the various international forums and agencies.

Consultation is the key to avoiding the "command figure" image of leadership that grates against the nationalistic sensitivities of other nations. Even when agreement on a course of action cannot be reached and the United States proceeds alone, consultations will have enhanced the prestige of the leaders consulted--better enabling them to cope with their own domestic politics.

Perseverance, meaning patient but unflagging dedication to initiative and consultation, because of the magnitude of the problems facing the world--and therefore facing the United States--and because the effort must be put forth in a flawed and sometimes chaotic international system. Neither glory nor gratitude is inherent in any leadership role. The reward lies in the preservation and furtherance of the national interest.

II. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA

China has been perceived as having an important role in the security of American interests in East Asia since the United States insisted upon, and was granted, "most favored nation" status in the Treaty of Wanghsia, signed July 3, 1844. This early American recognition that the monopolist trade policies and imperialist ambitions of the other Western powers could threaten American commercial interests became more explicitly linked with interest in the security of China--that is, in the territorial integrity of China--in the "Open Door" notes of 1899. Over the next fifty years, however, there was a significant shift in the American perception of the nature of China's importance: from being the most pitiable victim of imperialism to being the most dangerous source of aggression and revolution. For the first two decades after its founding, the People's Republic of China would be an ideological rival and cold war enemy.

Henry Kissinger's secret 1971 visit to Beijing dramatically marked the beginning of another swing in the American perception of China's role in United States security interests. The swing in American perceptions has not been smooth or steady: every step toward closer Sino-American relations has intensified the debate over security issues. Although China and the United States have achieved normalization of relations, there is still no consensus in America as to China's role in American security interests and policies.

A broad definition of national security considers the impact of diplomacy and economic policies as well as military relationships. Those 'world order' interests that have an impact on national security will be considered along with 'defense' interests. The following discussion will, as a consequence, be seen to include issues not normally associated with security policy in a narrow sense.

Examination of United States security interests in China will begin with a discussion of the conceptual framework within which American policy toward China is formulated. A brief overview of Soviet policy toward China will then be presented as background for subsequent discussions of the security of China and the role of China in the Soviet-American strategic relationship. The role of China in American world order and Asian security interests will then be examined, followed by a discussion of the implications of bilateral military relations between the United States and China.

A. THE EFFECT OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS ON AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF ITS SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA

This section will present the conceptual framework being used by virtually every observer today, the "strategic triangle," and compare the perceived interests that result from its use with those that derive from the alternative conceptual framework described in the Introduction: the latent bipolar, de facto polycentric, multiple issue-based systems approach to the study of international power relationships.

Richard Burt has observed that: "Ever since President Nixon's visit to Peking in February 1972, American officials have been fascinated with the notion of a 'triangular relationship' among the United States, the Soviet Union and China."[18] Even a cursory review of the literature reveals that Burt's observation is correct: virtually every discussion of the strategic aspects of the Sino-American relationship uses the strategic triangle as its conceptual framework. The strategic triangle concept can be used in three ways: First, as a simple description of the scope of a discussion--one that is limited to relations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Second, the strategic triangle can be used as a strategy for the formulation of American foreign policy. Third, the strategic triangle can be viewed as a systemic relationship operating on the basis of observable principles independent of the motivations of the three nations it encompasses.

The first use of the strategic triangle concept can be accepted at face value in that it makes no theoretical presuppositions. The second and third uses, however, deserve a closer examination. There has arisen an assumption, apparently derived from analogy to the geometry of triangles, that a triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China is the natural or most stable form of interaction among the three powers, and that an "equilateral" triangular relationship should be a primary strategic goal of

United States foreign policy. John King Fairbank, for example, perceives that "great power triangles naturally tend to become equilateral,"[19] and Harold C. Hinton has observed that "it appears that stability is best served when the Sino-Soviet-American relationship is an approximately equilateral triangle."[20]

Observers using the strategic triangle concept in this manner do not, however, necessarily agree in their policy prescriptions for maintaining the triangular relationship. Michael Pillsbury, on the one hand, believes that: "to maintain a rough parity in the global triangle of power, we need a policy which explicitly recognizes that Peking has a legitimate interest in improving its deterrence against the threat of Soviet attack."[21] Ralph N. Clough, on the other hand, has warned that: "Their triangular relationship will require delicate handling, however, because the purpose of the United States is not simply to tilt toward Peking and against Moscow, as the PRC wishes."[22] In the face of this debate, Richard H. Solomon has called for "greater consensus on the issue of how to relate to China in the 'triangular' context of Sino-Soviet relations and the Sino-Soviet dispute."[23]

The prominence of the strategic triangle concept in the analysis of United States policy toward China is an example of what could be called the "systematization" problem. Ideas that prove to be convenient for conceptualizing what are in fact highly complex relationships--such as "deterrence" and "detente"--come to be viewed as systems operating on their

own terms independent of the dynamics of the overall international system and the varied goals of the nations concerned that cannot be fit within the particular relationship being discussed. This is what has happened to the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle concept. The individual who has probably gone the farthest in this direction is Gerald Segal.[24] Using the results of behavioral research on relations among three individuals, he has devised a model for the strategic triangle and has attempted to prove that Chinese foreign policy is best understood in terms of his model.

When the strategic triangle is used as the conceptual framework within which analyses of United States foreign policy are made, policy choices tend to be defined in narrow terms with a focus on short-term considerations of power relationships. The debate on American policy toward China has become limited to essentially four policy options: the balanced approach, tilting toward China, playing the 'China card', or playing off the Soviet Union and China against one another.

Advocates of the balanced approach to relations with the Soviet Union and China have suffered a series of setbacks over the last decade, especially since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but are still fighting a rear-guard action to defend their views. The concept of maintaining a balanced approach has been applied to both the overall Sino-American relationship and to specific issues, such as arms sales and

technology transfers to China. Paul C. Warnke has given the balanced approach an especially altruistic tone by advising that the United States act "as the enemy of neither, with malice toward none."[25] Cyrus R. Vance has been one of the more influential advocates of the balanced approach. In a January 1979 interview with James Reston, the then-Secretary of State identified maintaining an "even-handed" policy toward China and Russia as one of the main problems of American foreign policy.[26] The United Nations Association of the United States in a 1979 study of American China policy recommended a balanced approach in the form of what it called an "equilibrium strategy."[27]

The justifications that are given for the balanced approach are that it is necessary to preserve detente and avoid a return to the cold war and that to move too close to China will provoke Soviet paranoia about the China threat.[28] A Los Angeles Times editorial in March 1980 neatly summarized these views:

> The United States, while moving toward closer economic and political cooperation with Beijing, should avoid an embrace so tight as to feed Russian paranoia about foreign encirclement and foreclose the possibility of an eventual change for the better in Soviet policy.[29]

"Tilting" toward China is, of course, the policy that has been pursued by the United States. But having tilted does not necessarily mean a deliberate rejection of the balanced approach as a policy objective. The level of cooperation or tension in a relationship does, after all, depend on the

attitude and--most importantly--on the behavior of both parties. From this perspective the American tilt toward China is as much the product of Soviet and Chinese foreign policies as it is the product of American policy. As Michel Oksenberg has pointed out:

> Rather than imagery of a China "tilt," however, it is more accurate to note that both China and the United States are eager to move forward, while our Soviet relations have deteriorated in the face of Soviet assertiveness from Ethiopia to Afghanistan to Indochina. To retard development of Sino-American relations because Soviet-American relations have soured would be to punish Beijing for Moscow's aggression.[30]

Supporting this view, the Los Angeles Times editorial mentioned earlier observed that: "Because Soviet behavior in the world is threatening to American interests and Chinese behavior isn't, a certain pro-Chinese tilt in U.S. relations with the two countries is inevitable."[31]

Playing the 'China card' is the policy option that has generated the most controversy in debates on American policy toward China and the Soviet Union. Playing the China card refers to unilateral United States initiatives toward China taken to overtly attempt to influence Soviet foreign policy behavior. Some observers implicitly treat any American tilt toward China as playing the China card, and warn that the Soviet Union would also view it as such. There is a difference between the two policies, however, in that a tilt is not necessarily directed against any other nation, whereas playing the China card is done with malice of forethought. A final point on the China card is that it is not just one

card but a deck of cards, so to speak.[32] There are numerous actions the United States can take toward China to play the China card against the Soviet Union--with as much subtlety or bluntness as an administration may desire.

Although none of the American administrations has ever admitted playing the China card, various observers have perceived such an intention in United States initiatives toward China. John Newhouse, while not using the China card term, has linked President Nixon's 1972 visit to Beijing with the successful conclusion of the SALT I agreement and quoted unnamed Administration officials as saying that Nixon's visit would "keep the Russians honest" in the talks.[33] Rowland Evans and Robert Novak have accused the Carter Administration of playing the China card in its decision to sell airborne scanning equipment to China on May 16, 1978.[34] More recently, remarks made to reporters by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger on April 4, 1981 concerning arms sales to China have been interpreted as playing the China card. The Washington Post observed that: "The Weinberger statement together with the emphasis placed on it suggest a Reagan administration attempt to signal Moscow that the United States may play the China card if Soviet troops march into Poland to suppress the independent labor movement."[35]

Despite this apparent willingness to play the China card over the years, most observers believe that this policy is counterproductive or at least ineffective. John Newhouse, as previously noted, believes the approach worked during the

SALT negotiations, and Richard H. Solomon has recommended that arms sales to China be handled as a China card to be played "in response to Soviet actions that threaten U.S. and PRC interests,"[36] but they stand virtually alone against the tide of opinion. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs specifically recommended in December 1979 that "the United States must not be perceived as playing nor should it play the so-called 'China card' against the Soviet Union."[37] Ironically enough, Henry A. Kissinger, who as National Security Advisor to President Nixon first played the China card, has issued a stern warning against reliance on the approach and, as one would expect, has denied that American initiatives toward China were directed against the Soviet Union.[38]

Four reasons are commonly given for opposition to playing the China card. The first and most common is that it will provoke Soviet paranoia and harm detente. Soviet leaders themselves have repeatedly warned the United States against playing the China card. Communist Party General Secretary and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Leonid I. Brezhnev warned in January 1979:

> There are some in the U.S. and in other Western countries who have found the course hostile toward the Soviet Union followed by the present Chinese leadership so much to their liking that they are tempted to turn Peking into an instrument of pressure on the world of socialism. Such a policy appears to me to be adventurous and highly dangerous for the cause of universal peace.[39]

More to the point, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko has specifically warned against playing the China card:

> In recent years the United States, as well as other Western countries, have resorted ever more frequently to playing the 'China card' in order to use to their own advantage the great-power ambitions of Beijing--which is itself keeping pace with the most zealous proponents of the position-of-strength policy, stubbornly and cynically advocating the idea of the inevitability of another world war, never giving up this thought....
>
> Aside from the question of who is playing whose card more, it must be emphasized that this game is a phenomenon dangerous to the cause of peace.[40]

Such soviet warnings are obviously self-serving, but they do illustrate the point that the United States must carefully consider its priorities before playing the China card.

A second objection to the China card approach is that the Chinese do not want to be treated as a card. Such an American attitude is in fundamental conflict with one of the most important of China's national goals. China is seeking a position of prestige and influence in the world in general and in Asia in particular. Treating China as a card to be played against the Soviet Union grates against China's deeply-rooted nationalism. This sentiment is apparent in a January 1981 Beijing Review commentary that used Ray Cline's remarks in Singapore as a pretext to issue a warning to the incoming Reagan Administration: "People like Ray Cline who think of China in terms of a card to be played in the game with the Soviet Union cannot possibly understand the national aspirations of the Chinese people for modernization."[41] Richard Holbrooke, formerly the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has pointed out Mao

Zedong's warning that the United States must not attempt to stand on China's shoulders to strike at the Soviet Union,[42] which is the essence of the China card approach. Henry Kissinger's warning against the China card approach, mentioned above, was based at least partly on this objection.

The third objection to the China card approach is that there is a parallel tactic open to the Chinese: playing their 'American card' against the Soviet Union. Robert Scalapino, among others, has observed that "China's 'punishment' of Vietnam immediately afterward strongly suggested that it was China which had played the American card, not vice versa."[43] Although on this occasion the consequences for the United States were not particularly grave, the implication is that actions taken by the Chinese in pursuit of their own interests could drag the United States into a conflict it otherwise would not have been involved in.

The fourth objection to the China card approach is that it diverts American attention from the need for developing its own capabilities for deterring aggressive actions by the Soviet Union. Instead of playing the China card, Edward Luttwak suggests, "we should play the American card, mustering more of our own strength for our own purposes."[44]

Playing off the Soviet Union and China against one another is the final policy option derived from the strategic triangle framework. The China card is half of this approach, the other half is to use American relations with the Soviets to manipulate Chinese behavior. Joseph Kraft is among those who have recommended this approach:

> If not worked too openly, or with too much fine tuning, this mutual hostility can be turned to American advantage. The trick is to engage Russia in negotiations on arms control, trade and other matters useful in themselves. The Chinese are then obligated to court Washington, seeking the support of America and its allies against Soviet pressure.[45]

Although it is doubtful that this was the intended purpose of the early stages of Soviet-American detente, a case can be made that the breakthrough in Sino-American relations in 1971-1972 was at least partially the result of American initiatives toward the Soviet Union.

By the time Joseph Kraft made his recommendation, however, the payoff to be gained from manipulating the Sino-Soviet dispute had diminished considerably. Allen S. Whiting observed in 1980 that: "The expedient exploitation of Sino-Soviet tensions has outlived its short-run advantages, considerable as they may have been ten years ago."[46] Almost every analysis of American policy towards China and Russia made over the past few years supports Whiting's conclusion. A common theme of these analyses is that the Sino-Soviet dispute has its own internal dynamics which are not subject to external manipulation. Leslie H. Brown observed in 1977 that:

> The Sino-Soviet split is not a variable that can be manipulated from outside. It exists as a consequence of geographic proximity, the personalities and outlook of the present leadership on both sides, the competition for primacy, a long history of difficult party-to-party and state-to-state relations and deep cultural differences.[47]

This view is also that of Kenneth Lieberthal, who goes on to recommend the approach the United States should take in dealing with the Sino-Soviet dispute:

> The basic contours of the Sino-Soviet relationship are relatively firmly fixed along the lines analyzed at the beginning of this section, and there is little the United States can do to manipulate this Sino-Soviet interaction. United States policies toward each of these communist powers should be based, therefore, primarily on U.S. bilateral interests with each, and should not take as a central concern a desire to produce an effect on the Sino-Soviet leg of the triangle.[48]

After having reviewed the policy options that can be derived from the conceptual framework of the strategic triangle, one is left with the uncomfortable feeling that adherence to a strategy based on maintaining or exploiting the triangular relationship is not a tenable basis for American foreign policy. Geometric perfectionism--that is, attempting to keep the triangle equilateral using the balanced approach--proved to be impossible in the face of quite divergent Soviet and Chinese behavior. Playing the China card and playing off the Soviets and Chinese against one another are both short-term tactical moves, rather than strategies, and both have serious long-term adverse consequences. That leaves tilting toward China as the only viable policy within the strategic triangle framework. But having tilted, where do we go from here?

There is emerging an awareness that the strategic triangle is not an adequate framework for policy formulation. Richard Holbrooke expressed such an awareness, which could reasonably be taken as representing a Carter Administration awareness, in a June 1980 speech: "While strategic factors

remain a central consideration in our relations, the famous triangular diplomacy of the early 1970s is no longer an adequate framework in which to view relations with China."[49] Michel Oksenberg has supported this view in a recent Foreign Affairs article,[50] but neither Holbrooke (and the administration he represented) nor Oksenberg offered an alternative conceptual framework--with the result that their analyses of strategic issues tended to reflect the triangular framework nonetheless.

It is not sufficient to attempt to innovate new policy options within the framework of the strategic triangle conceptual framework. In addition to being incapable of providing a basis for a sound strategy toward China, as discussed above, the strategic triangle concept has a fundamental theoretical flaw: triangular relationships are inherently unstable. Great power triangles do not naturally tend to become equilateral, nor is an equilateral relationship among the three powers in the triangle necessarily any more stable than any other geometric depiction of their relationships.[51]

It is not a coincidence that Morton Kaplan, who made a thorough study of the concept of polarity, did not even propose a "tripolar model," and that none of the analyses which advocated maintaining a triangular relationship could cite a historical example of a great power triangle that naturally tended to become equilateral or stable. The triangular relationship between the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany

and the Western powers during the 1930s certainly did not obey the rules of triangular models. The triangular relationship between the Soviet Union, China and Japan during the same period also did not adhere to geometric propriety.

Such comparisons undoubtedly are subject to a host of objections. The objections are welcome, for they will almost certainly illustrate the basic cause of the inherent weakness of the triangular model: a systemic relationship among the Soviet Union, the United States, and China cannot be defined without reference to the goals and strategies of the three powers. As described above, the balanced approach to relations with the Soviet Union and China--in theory the optimum policy for maintaining the triangular relationship--failed because of the widely divergent foreign policies of the Soviet Union and China. The failure of the balanced approach was not a quirk: it was symptomatic of the fundamental theoretical flaw of the strategic triangle as a conceptual framework.

The national interest requires that the United States abandon 'geometric determinism' in defining its security interests in China. The international political arena and the strategic relationships among the United States, the Soviet Union and China are far more complex than the triangular approach would suggest. There is an alternative conceptual framework, albeit not a neat, compact one, that better describes the current international system and provides a more suitable basis for the formulation of American

policy toward China and the Soviet Union. The alternative conceptual framework that will be used herein is the "latent bipolar/de facto polycentric/multiple issue-based systems" approach. For brevity, this conceptual framework will be referred to simply as the "multiple systems framework."

It must be stressed that this approach will be used merely as a conceptual framework, not as a model. No claim is made that there are patterns of international power relationships that have their own dynamics independent of the policies and behavior of the nations under discussion. Even more important: there is no one structural relationship that is superior to any other, and no normative judgment will be passed on particular foreign policy options based on structural criteria. The multiple systems framework is a tool for description, not a standard for prescription.

What are the consequences of using this alternative conceptual framework? First of all, the national interest is not defined in terms of maintaining any particular structural relationship with the Soviet Union and China. The focus is on issues and their impact on American interests, rather than on their impact on structural relationships.

This does not mean that American security interests in China will be defined in a strictly bilateral context, ignoring the broader international context. Nor does use of the multiple systems framework imply that there are no security issues for which the triangular Sino-Soviet-American relationship is the most important consideration in defining American

interests. The triangular strategic relationship is, however, just one of numerous structural relationships that might apply.

A second consequence of shifting from the strategic triangle to the multiple systems framework is that the element of time as a factor in defining American security interests in China is more fully taken into account. As was noted earlier, the policy options that derive from the strategic triangle concept all tend to focus on the short-term. This problem has been recognized as such by several observers. Steven I. Levine, for example, has suggested that policy makers "should differentiate between short-term power-maximizing and long-term problem-solving approaches,"[52] and Allen S. Whiting has called for "long-range policy planning" to cope with the problems of the Sino-American security relationship.[53] By addressing issues on their own merits and in terms of the particular international power relationship that applies in each case (if any does apply), the multiple systems framework allows more careful consideration of the long-term aspects of security problems.

The third, and probably the most significant, consequence of adopting the multiple systems framework is that it highlights the fragility of a Sino-American relationship founded primarily on a common concern with the Soviet threat to each nation's own national interests. Although this weakness in the Sino-American relationship has been pointed out on numerous occasions, it is of such great importance that it deserves to be discussed in detail.

Under Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. observed of Sino-American ties in April 1981 that: "These ties, now over two years old, are firmly grounded on both sides in enlightened self-interest and mutual respect."[54] This observation is essentially correct, but great care must be taken not to read into it more than was intended. The ties were not said to be irreversible, all-encompassing, or based on historical friendship. Moreover, when the scope of the "enlightened self-interests" that are common to the United States and China is compared with the scope of the self-interests--enlightened or otherwise--that each holds individually, the actual weakness of the foundation on which Sino-American ties is based becomes apparent.

Harry Schwartz, writing in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1974, warned that:

> ...we need to understand that neither the Soviet Union as it exists today nor the Chinese People's Republic as it exists today is a friend to the United States.... Their willingness to be cooperative comes from their mutual fear of each other. The United States has been the beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet split.[55]

Today, seven years later, that observation is still largely true. Of course, there has been a rapid growth in Sino-American trade, especially since normalization of relations, and various types of visits and exchanges have also increased in numbers and in the diversity of subjects being discussed, but the growth of these relationships has been a fringe benefit of ties established on the basis of the strategic relationship--opposition to the Soviet Union.

Western observers have tended to overstate the magnitude of the shift that has occurred in Chinese foreign policy. In terms of the specific policies being pursued, the swing from ideological hostility to the West to joining with the West in a united front against Soviet hegemonism--as the Chinese describe their present policy--has certainly been great. On a deeper level, however, there is a surprising degree of continuity in the basic national goals being pursued.

One of the major reasons why Western observers quite often have difficulty understanding and predicting Chinese foreign policy behavior is the apparently widely held assumption that pragmatic and ideological objectives can be differentiated, and that to a large degree they are mutually exclusive. The debate over the relative importance of ideology versus national interest in the foreign policies of communist countries--the Soviet Union as well as China--is one manifestation of this implicit assumption. The frequently observed overreaction to shifts in Chinese foreign policy, which results from an ethnocentric perception of the notion of "pragmatism," is another result. For example, Thomas W. Robinson noted in 1980 that:

> For the first time since the early 1950s, the Chinese Communist Party seems to be considering China's welfare in a reasonably objective sense, conducting a foreign policy to assure the country's political and social health, economic modernization, and external security.[56]

Observations such as Robinson's are not necessarily wrong, the problem is that--from China's point of view--foreign policy

decisions are always pragmatic and "reasonably objective." At the same time, every foreign policy decision must support the ideological objectives of the Chinese Communist Party, even if that requires what Western observers view as semantic gymnastics to bring the two into line. It is best, therefore, to not attempt to make the pragmatism-ideology differentiation and instead to be honest with ourselves and judge shifts in Chinese foreign policy in terms of their impact on American interests.

The Chinese decision to improve its relations with the West in order to gain political, economic and--indirectly--military support in its rivalry with the Soviet Union was certainly based on a pragmatic assessment of China's weaknesses and of what the West potentially had to offer. That decision also reflected strategic implementation of the ideological principle of the "united front": identifying the number one enemy to China--the Soviet Union--and seeking the support of those countries presenting less of a threat--the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in particular.[57] Geng Biao, a Vice Premier and member of the Politburo, is reported to have stated in a 1976 speech: "If we force these two superpowers to stand together, and deal with them one by one, the consequences would be unthinkable....Hence, we must strive to develop better Sino-U.S. relations to have one less enemy, and to be united with more friends."[58]

This is the foundation on which Sino-American ties have been builts since 1971. It has been strong eneough a motive

to allow both the United States and China to set aside for the time being numerous issues upon which there is little if any agreement, such as Taiwan and Chinese territorial claims against countries allied or friendly with the United States. Despite the strength that common opposition to the Soviet Union has shown as a basis for expanding the Sino-American relationship, over the long-term this motive will not be an adequate foundation for the pursuit of American interests in China. There are two reasons for this pessimism.

First, the United States and China do not see eye to eye on how best to cope with the Soviet threat. There appears to be, at least for the time being, more of a consensus among China's leaders than among American leaders as to how to respond to Soviet expansionism. On the American side, Allen S. Whiting has described the problem quite well:

> If Soviet expansionism is seen as inexorable and susceptible to being checked only by countervailing power, then Moscow's reaction should not inhibit the West in strengthening China, whether as a tacit or a full ally. If, however, the Soviet-American relationship is to be a blend of confrontation and cooperation, whereby coercion and persuasion mix military deterrence with economic inducements, then each move that increases Beijing's potential anti-Soviet posture must be assessed for its impact on Moscow.[59]

Which of these two views is held by the Reagan Administration is not entirely clear: based on the tone of public statements on the Soviet Union, the first view would appear to be prevalent; but based on actions taken toward the Soviets--such as ending the grain embargo and reopening theater nuclear talks--the second view is probably closer to that held

by the Administration. It is likely that the second view, which has more or less prevailed during the four administrations prior to this one, will continue to prevail in the future--unless the Soviet Union abandons completely its interest in detente in order to pursue its interest in expansion.

Chinese leaders, on the other hand, have made it clear how they intend to deal with the Soviets, and how they expect the West to deal with the Soviets. An April 1981 Beijing Review commentary asserted that: "History has proved that no agreement or negotiation can stop the Soviet hegemonists from pursuing their policies of aggression and expansion."[60] The contrast between the Western carrot-and-stick approach and the Chinese defiance-and-stick approach has been pointed out by Michael Pillsbury:

> There could hardly be a sharper contrast between those in the West who seek to reassure a paranoid Soviet leadership that it can trust the West and should participate in normal international life and the Chinese vision of a Soviet bully that must be punished and tamed whenever and wherever it misbehaves in order to dissuade it from increasing belligerence toward the civilized community.[61]

It seems inevitable that sooner or later the Western and Chinese strategies for dealing with the Soviet threat will come into conflict. When that day comes, a Sino-American relationship founded primarily on mutual opposition to the Soviets would be severely strained. It is not reasonable to expect either side to sacrifice what it perceives to be its own vital security interests in order to accommodate to the

other. Commentary in the Beijing Review has been quick to warn that "it would be a blunder to think that China has much to ask of the United States and, consequently, would submit to the latter's dictate."[62]

The second reason for doubting that common opposition to the Soviet Union will be an adequate long-term basis for Sino-American relations is that the many potential sources of conflict between the United States and China have not been resolved, they have merely been set aside until the common threat has been dealt with. Edward E. Rice has pointed out that: "In sum, the longer-term relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States may depend heavily on the extent to which the sources of mutual contention, which now lie latent, are removed during the present period of detente."[63] These points of potential conflict will be discussed as specific U.S. security interests are examined.

These latent sources of tension have deep historical and even cultural roots. One important warning that must be kept in mind is that the current Chinese strategy of joining with the West in a united front against the Soviet Union is the product of a pragmatic assessment of the international power balance, and reflects goals that are much more fundamental than simple anti-Sovietism. Should the Chinese in the future perceive the Soviet threat as subsiding--admittedly a dim prospect--then those same fundamental Chinese goals could bring China into conflict with the West again. Along these lines, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. has warned that:

> American policymakers must ask whether Beijing's interest is simply the replacement of Soviet "hegemonism" by the PRC as the dominant political influence in Southeast Asia? If it is, then China's aims, in the longer term, would not coincide with those of the United States or with other countries in the region.[64]

The current Sino-American relationship has even been able to moderate tensions arising from basic cultural differences in order to focus on common cause against the Soviet Union. Once again, however, the long-run prospects are not so bright. Lucian W. Pye has pointed this out:

> Thus the historic conflict between Chinese arrogance and Western avariciousness has been, at least temporarily, set aside in favor of a state of cooperative euphoria; but it is questionable how enduring a relationship can be when it is based upon this unlikely combination of the Chinese cultural sin of pride and the Western cultural sin of greed.[65]

It seems unlikely that a Sino-American relationship founded on opposition to the Soviet Union could have the breadth of view or the flexibility to cope with the tensions one can expect to arise out of cultural differences, differing foreign policy goals, and differeing views on how to cope with the Soviet threat. Therefore, the pursuit of American security interests over the long-term will require that deliberate efforts aimed at broadening the scope and basis of the Sino-American relationship be made.

The strategic triangle model does not provide a suitable basis for broadening the scope of the Sino-American reslationship, in that it focuses attention on and gives priority to the anti-Soviet tactical moves that are already the basis of

the relationship. The multiple systems view of the international arena, on the other hand, does provide a framework for broadening the scope of the relationship. Broadening the basis of the Sino-American relationship by addressing issues on the basis of mutual interests, rather than on the basis of maintaining or exploiting the strategic triangle, will be a primary theme of the remainder of this paper. The national interest, particularly as affected by the Sino-American relationship, requires that the American strategy toward China be founded on this approach--the broadening of the scope of the relationship. Paul C. Warnke has well described the long-term need for this approach:

> The way in which we look at China, however, should not be limited to the perspective of our own complex rivalry with the Soviet Union. The value of a reasonably normal relationship with China does not turn on its availability as a counter against expansion of Soviet power and influence. If the Soviet Union did not exist, it would still be important that we try to work with the government of one-quarter of the world's people to deal with the global problems of peace, development, and environmental protection.[66]

B. SOVIET CHINA POLICY: CONTAINMENT AND COEXISTENCE

A rigorous examination of American security interests in China requires an understanding of the Soviet view of their security interests in China. This is necessary because there has been somewhat of a gap in the study of the Sino-American security relationship. On the one hand there have been made several studies of the Sino-Soviet relationship detailing the complexities of their relations and of Soviet motives

toward China. On the other hand, however, analyses of the American security interest in China have tended to simply assume that a Soviet threat to China does (or does not, depending on the author's point of view) exist, and then focus on how rather than why the Soviets threaten China. The purpose of this section is to attempt to fill that gap--to gain an understanding of Soviet policy toward China as a foundation for examination of America's interest in the security of China.

Soviet strategy toward China will be developed in three steps, beginning with the objectives of Soviet foreign and defense policy--overall objectives, Asian objectives, and objectives vis-a-vis China. Next, Soviet perceptions of the Chinese threat to Soviet security will be described. Finally, the nature of the Soviet military threat to China will be discussed.

1. Objectives of Soviet Foreign and Defense Policy

There are many areas of disagreement among Western observers of Soviet foreign and defense policies. For example, there is no consensus as to whether the expansionist tendency of Soviet foreign policy is due to communist ideology, Russian imperialism, or merely to opportunism and lack of Western resolve. Likewise, there is disagreement as to whether the Soviet military and naval buildup has been drived by Soviet "paranoia"--the memory of the many invasions Russia has suffered in its history--or by a Soviet desire to achieve absolute strategic superiority in order to pursue a course of global domination.

Despite such disagreements--which are to be expected given the ambiguity and sparseness of the information--it is possible to describe in at least general terms the objectives of Soviet foreign and defense policies. In a January 1981 article in the Soviet journal Communist of the Armed Forces, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko described the goals of the Soviet Union as follows:

> The foreign policy course of the Soviet State, implemented under the leadership of the Communist Party, is aimed at ensuring favorable international conditions for the development of communism in the USSR, defending the Soviet Union's state interests, strengthening the positions of world socialism, supporting the people's struggle for national liberation and social progress, preventing aggressive wars, attaining general and complete disarmament, and at consistently implementing the principle of peaceful co-existence among states with different social systems.[67]

This statement, while reasonably straightforward and comprehensive in broad terms, cannot be understood at face value. Like any other Soviet public pronouncement, each term has precise ideological meaning--distinct from the dictionary definition it would have in the West--and each of the goals has a historical context which gives it operational meaning when estimating future Soviet behavior.

The first two objectives--ensuring favorable international conditions for the development of communism in the USSR and defending Soviet state interests--have five aspects in Western terms: (1) military security of the Soviet homeland; (2) expansion of Soviet influence at the expense of its global and regional rivals; (3) expansion of Soviet access

to Western markets and finance, particularly for foodstuffs and high technology, but also for Western investment in Soviet resource extraction projects and possibly for future access to Third World raw materials; (4) ideological isolation of the Soviet social and political order from potentially competitive ideas; and (5) active participation in international forums dealing with world order issues affecting Soviet interests, such as the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, to achieve short-run political or economic gains or at least to disrupt initiatives that would hinder the achievement of long-range goals.

"Strengthening the positions of world socialism" refers to what has come to be called the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' in the West. Although the name for the doctrine is somewhat misleading, in that the concept it labels dates back at least to Stalin's rule, the name has stuck because the most forceful articulation of the doctrine of limited sovereignty among socialist nations was made in September 1968 after Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces crushed the "Prague Spring" in Czechoslovakia.[68] This objective of Soviet foreign policy has special impact for the people of Afghanistan, who have been rendered fraternal assistance and are now enjoying its fruits, and for the leadership and people of Poland, who live in daily fear of being rendered fraternal assistance should the Soviets decide the Polish reforms threaten the socialist camp.

"Supporting the people's struggle for national liberation and social progress" refers to the type of operations

the Soviets undertook in Angola in 1975 and in Ethiopia in 1978, as well as to lesser levels of support rendered to various revolutionary movements. Lest there be any doubt as to Soviet intentions regarding such support, in the article mentioned above Foreign Minister Gromyko went on to state that: "Proletarian internationalism as the fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy means that this policy consistently upholds the basic interests of world socialism, of the forces of the international communist and workers movements, as well as of the national liberation movement."[69]

"Preventing aggressive wars" means deterring, by means of military power and an assertive foreign policy backed by the threat of its use, attacks by the West or China on the allies or clients of the Soviet Union. For example, the Chinese attack on Vietnam was an aggressive war in the Soviet view. By (Soviet) definition, revolutionary wars and wars of national liberation--as well as Soviet intervention in support of them--are "just" wars.

"Attaining general and complete disarmament" refers to a specific proposal first put forward by the Soviet Union on September 18, 1959 and pursued with varying degrees of enthusiasm ever since. General and complete disarmament includes conventional forces as well as nuclear weapons, and, although the basic Soviet intention may well be a sincere desire for disarmament, the history of Soviet exploitation of the proposal for propaganda purposes and a lack of serious proposals for implementing it both suggest that other arms control proposals

are of more immediate interest to the Soviet Union. Bringing up general and complete disarmament puts both the United States and China on the defensive regarding arms control (both nations oppose the Soviet proposal) and could well be designed to spur the U.S. to participate in discussions the Soviets do take seriously: European theater nuclear force limitations and strategic arms limitations.

The final objective described by Gromyko, "consistently implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems," has been the Soviet foreign policy objective least understood in the West. The Soviet view was described clearly by G.Kh. Shakhnazarov, President of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences, in a 1979 speech before the International Political Science Association in Moscow:

> Detente and peaceful coexistence assure what is most important for all peoples, for all humanity: prevention of the threat of a global nuclear conflict. So far as social progress is concerned, those who are dissatisfied with the situation can only submit their complaints to history itself, for it alone predetermined the inevitability of the downfall of the capitalist system and the affirmation of socialism.[70]

This Soviet view, that detente referred only to Soviet-American bilateral tensions and not to Third World conflicts or Soviet intervention in them, became a subject of great controversy when its implications sunk in after the Soviet actions in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviets had not, however, made any attempt to conceal their intentions and must have thought therefore that the American euphoria with detente represented

a tacit acceptance of their view. In 1974 Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev warned that: "Lenin, the greatest of revolutionaries, said revolutions are not made to order by agreement. It might be added that revolution, or a liberation movement also cannot be canceled by order or agreement. There is no power on earth that can turn back the inexorable process of renovation of the life of society."[71]

Summarizing the points (implicit as well as explicit) made in the Gromyko statement on Soviet foreign policy objectives results in a list of ten goals: (1) defense of the homeland, (2) expansion of Soviet influence, (3) access to Western markets, (4) ideological isolation, (5) shaping of world order issues, (6) the Brezhnev doctrine, (7) support for revolutionary movements, (8) defense of allies and clients, (9) arms limitations, and (10) peaceful coexistence.

The basic goals of Soviet defense policy are also encompassed in this list: six of the ten objectives are related to defense of the Soviet Union or its interests. Thomas W. Wolfe has deduced three "governing assumptions and priorities" of the military policy of the Brezhnev regime: (1) avoidance of general nuclear war through deterrence based on strategic nuclear power; (2) maintenance of the strong Soviet continental military position, due to its European interests and the Chinese threat; and (3) the development of more mobile and versatile conventional power to support its interests in the Third World.[72] Although Wolfe's analysis is over ten years old, the continuing momentum of the Soviet effort to modernize

and increase the firepower of its forces--an effort that is widely documented and need not be detailed herein--indicates that the same three principles are supporting the objectives described by Gromyko in 1981.

Before going on to discuss Soviet objectives in Asia, a final point on the purposes served by Soviet foreign policy must be made. As in any highly centralized authoritarian or totalitarian regime whose legitimacy is based upon the ideology of the ruling elite, foreign policy plays an important role in Soviet politics. Morton Schwartz has provided a good overview of the reasons for this linkage of foreign policy to legitimacy in the Soviet Union.[73] Adam Ulam has summarized the connection as follows:

> ...there is little foundation in the hope often expressed in the West that the growth and maturity of the USSR as a modern and industrial state will necessarily be reflected in more peaceful and less expansive policies. As we have seen, the growing power and prosperity of the USSR as a state, even the increased material well-being of its citizens, accentuate rather than diminish the ideological crisis. ...in the measure that the Communist movement achieves its objectives, it becomes increasingly difficult to preserve the totalitarian system, to continue to exact sacrifices and deny basic freedoms and amenities of life. The program of ideological revival devised by the despot's successors has aimed at preventing communism from "withering away," and thus at preserving the rationale of Soviet totalitarianism. An increasingly great part in this revival has been played by the renewed missionary character of communism. Thus the success of communism as a self-proclaimed worldwide liberation and peace movement, and as a tenable basis for the association of Communst states, becomes increasingly important to the present form of the Communist regime in the USSR.[74]

Ulam's observations, made in 1959, have surely been proven by the course of events over the succeeding 22 years. If anything, his observations understated what was in store. The Brezhnev regime would sacrifice improvement in the material well-being of the Soviet people to build up military forces capable of projecting Soviet power to ensure the success of the worldwide liberation movement.

The linkage of foreign policy to the legitimacy of the regime, caused by the ideological justification for Communist Party rule, has a negative side. As was mentioned above (objective number four), Soviet foreign policy must ensure the ideological isolation of the Soviet people. This has concrete, sometimes brutal, manifestations. It has forced the Soviets to engage in semantic gymnastics in an effort to justify their intention to essentially ignore the provisions of basket three of the Helsinki Accords of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Vernon V. Aspaturian has noted that: "The Soviet leaders are painfully aware that Basket Three is incompatible with the nature of their system as it now exists, but they are determined to preserve the essential character of the Soviet social order and will adopt all necessary measures to maximize its maintenance. There are too many glaring weaknesses and obvious malfunctions in Soviet society for the Soviet leaders to risk the importation of competing ideas or to allow the expression of dissident and critical views on the part of its own citizens."[75]

The so-called Brezhnev doctrine, although primarily intended to prevent Soviet satellites from leaving the Soviet-led socialist camp, is also related to the ideological isolation of the Soviet people. In the case of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 this Soviet motive is reasonably clear and there is a consensus among Western observers that it was a factor in the Soviet decision.[76] In the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, however, it is not so clear that ideological isolation of the Soviet Muslim population from fundamentalist Islamic beliefs was a major factor in the decision: Alexander Dallin asserts that it was not and that there is no evidence of Soviet fear of this problem; Vernon Aspaturian believes it was not "an immediate or critical concern" because the problem could be managed; and Jiri Valenta perceives it was a major concern because of "potentially grave side effects for Soviet Central Asia."[77] Contrary to Dallin's assertion, there is evidence--though hardly conclusive--of Soviet concern for the loyalty of its Muslim minorities prior to the Afghan operation, and clear indications that this problem will grow in the future.[78] Soviet concern over the turmoil in Poland today has again been linked with the problem of ideological isolation, even more solidly than was concern over Czechoslovakia in 1968,[79] strongly suggesting that the ideological isolation of the Soviet people will become an increasingly important foreign policy objective.

According to Thomas W. Robinson, the Soviet Union had become by 1980 "an indigenous Asian power of consequence that

it, and previous Tsarist regimes, had so long sought."[80] Becoming an Asian power was not an end in itself, it was the consequence of Soviet pursuit of well-defined foreign policy and security objectives in the region. Those Soviet objectives have been summarized well by Alfred Biegel:

> Generally, the Soviet Grand Design for Asia represents a broad security framework to bolster the USSR's global position while accomplishing the following important regional objectives:
> -Deterring potential threats to the territorial integrity of the USSR.
> -Increasing the Kremlin's regional power and influence at the expense of China and the Western world.
> -Maintaining ideological primacy over the PRC and other Communist governments and parties of Asia.
> -Achieving a rapprochement with China during the post-Mao era on Moscow's terms.
> -Minimizing the effects of the growing Sino-American rapproachement.
> -Improving relations with Japan.
> -Preventing a Sino-Japanese partnership with de facto U.S. backing.[81]

Two other Soviet objectives perceived by other observers, although closely related to points listed above, could be added to Biegel's analysis: ensuring freedom to deploy naval forces to deep water,[82] and breaking out of the relative political isolation the Soviet Union has experienced in Asia.[83]

China figures prominently in the Soviet Union's strategy for Asia. This is apparent from the list of objectives deduced by Biegel, and is emphasized by Robinson, who observed that "by 1980 most of the direction and the variance in the Soviet Union's Asian policy and position was traceable directly to the felt need, for a combination of offensive and defensive motives, to counteract Chinese influence everywhere

in Asia."[84] Furthermore, the China factor has given Asia a much higher priority in Soviet foreign policy than the region had in the past. Biegel believes that East Asia is now "no less vital than the political-military front between NATO and the Warsaw Pact" to Moscow.[85] His view is supported by Joseph Schiebel, who has provided the rationale for it:

> ...the Soviet Union can live with the status quo of her strategic position vis-a-vis Europe for some time even if it means having to defer some current expectations of expanding her political influence there; but, having lost the initiative in East Asia as a result of losing strategic access to Asia with the activation of U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation, the Soviet Union must move to regain her ability to project her power to that battleground of global competition. Soviet policies toward Europe, the United States and related areas are, then, in the first instance, functions of Soviet strategy toward China.[86]

Schiebel's analysis was made in 1977. Over the next two years it would become apparent that the lynchpin in the Soviet strategy for regaining strategic access to East Asia would be Vietnam: on June 28, 1978 Vietnam announced it was joining the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON); on November 3, 1978 the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed their Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance; and in the Spring of 1979, after the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, the Soviets began to regularly use ports and airfields in Vietnam for deployments of its navy and air force.

There is somewhat of a consensus among western observers that the Soviet Union has a dual strategy for dealing with China: containment and coexistence. Harry Gelman has described this dual strategy as follows:

> On the one hand the Soviets would like to do everything possible to weaken, subdue, or isolate the Chinese; on the other hand they would like to reduce Chinese hostility.... Neither element in the Soviet posture--the unrelenting competitive pressure and the unabashed effort to improve selected aspects of bilateral dealings--is likely to be abandoned by Brezhnev's heirs, for it is clear that this has been a very characteristic line of Soviet policy, practiced toward other powers with some success.[87]

Kenneth Lieberthal has referred to this Soviet dual approach as a "carrot and stick" policy--the carrot being offers to normalize relations and the stick being diplomatic encirclement and military buildup around China--both courses of which are aimed at the same objective: "to steer the PRC onto a less anti-Soviet course and thereby diminish somewhat the immense national security threat that it perceives looming from across the disputed Sino-Soviet border."[88]

The Soviet encirclement of China has two aspects: political and military. The political objective is to expand Soviet influence and limit Chinese influence in Asia.[89] The military aspect is manifest in the Soviet military buildup and force modernization in the Soviet Far East, the expansion and modernization of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the deployment of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and Vietnam, and in the Soviet treaties with those two nations and India--all of which have defense provisions. The Soviet proposal for a Collective Security System in Asia is also widely regarded as an element in the Soviet strategy of political and military encirclement of China.[90]

Another aspect of the Soviet containment policy is an apparent effort to keep China militarily weak. Gelman mentioned this in passing in the citation on the previous page as one of three elements of Soviet pressure on China. Donald Zagoria believes that keeping China weak is the key to the Soviet strategy toward China:

> The Soviets are interested in isolating China in Asia, and in encircling her militarily until the time comes to improve relations with China. They're interested as well in keeping Chinese ties to the United States, Japan, and other Asian countries at a minimum. And they're intent upon keeping China economically, technologically, and militarily weak. All of these goals, in fact, are part of a Soviet effort to keep China weak, for the Soviets want and need a weak China. Should China become a great power, they know that it will, in the long run, almost certainly be a dangerous adversary.[91]

There is ample evidence to support Zagoria's contention. The Sino-Soviet dispute over nuclear weapons and arms control from 1957 to 1963 is said by Alice L. Hsieh to have "confirmed Moscow's reluctance to see Peking acquire an independent nuclear capability."[92] Similarly, Joseph E. Thach, Jr., has concluded that during the ten years of Soviet military assistance to China (1950-1960), "the USSR never planned to give the PRC the amount of aid by which it might become an independent or co-equal power."[93]

Why should the Soviet Union desire to keep China militarily weak? The obvious answer is because of the deeply rooted Russian fear of the Chinese threat, and this will be discussed in the next section. There is, however, another possible explanation--one that complements the first one. O.

Edmund Clubb, in his exhaustive study of Sino-Russian relations, proposed that the Soviet Union needs buffers for its Asian frontiers:

> In Asia, Moscow proposes similarly to keep China functioning as a barrier between the Soviet Union and American sea and air power in the West Pacific, and to have the Mongolian People's Republic perform a valuable buffer role against China itself.[94]

Even though it is passé to think in terms of buffers in the West now that strategy has entered the nuclear era, the Russians--as their strategy in Europe today attests--still attach great value to the possession of buffers of some form along its lengthy frontiers. The danger to China is that, if the People's Republic cannot be cajoled or intimidated into adopting a foreign policy posture appropriate for being a Soviet buffer, the Soviet Union may settle for chunks of China instead: repetition of the Mongolian solution of 1921 in Xinjiang and Manchuria.[95]

The second half of the Soviet dual strategy toward China is coexistence. In his January 1981 article, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko reaffirmed this objective and in the process illustrated the dual nature of the Soviet approach to relations with China:

> The Soviet Union, while consistently opposing Beijing's expansionist aspirations and the aggressive nature of its policy permeated with pathological anti-Sovietism, nevertheless considers it necessary to normalize Soviet-Chinese interstate relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence. And it is prepared to go its share of the way in this direction.[96]

The first part of Gromyko's statement is representative of the way in which the Soviet Union describes its containment policy

toward China. It also illustrates the Soviet conception of a "carrot and stick" policy: when one holds forth the carrot, one does not put away the stick--one waves it menacingly lest its reality be discounted by the rival.

The second part of Gromyko's statement is significant for three reasons. First, it illustrates the Soviet focus on state-to-state, vice party-to-party, relations with China. Improving interstate ties is a much more modest goal than improving interparty ties, therefore is a more realistic goal, but also has less of a payoff for the Soviets. In particular, the ideological rivalry between the two communist powers would be left unresolved. This ideological rivalry is not just a semantic debate: it cuts across several of the foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union discussed earlier and even affects the critical issue of the legitimacy of the Soviet regime.

The second significant point in Gromyko's statement is that relations are to be normalized on the principles of peaceful coexistence. The concept of peaceful coexistence was originally meant to apply only to relations between countries with different social systems--socialism and capitalism--and is still used in that sense today. This is an implicit re-affirmation of the Soviet position that China is no longer a member of the socialist camp, but is an ideological rival to it. Soviet propaganda against China routinely makes the point that China is an enemy of the socialist and revolutionary movements.[97] Once again, this is far more than mere semantics:

China being in opposition to the socialist camp implies the threat of military action, and is further illustration of the principle of waving the stick while offering the carrot. Joseph Schiebel succinctly described the implications of this Soviet view of China:

> At the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev proclaimed that it was no longer enough to say that Maoist ideology and policy were incompatible with Marxist-Leninist teaching, but that "they are plainly hostile to it." This substantially revises the position the Soviet Union had taken on the Maoist 'heresy' until then: Communist China is no longer to be treated as a temporarily errant fraternal socialist country, subject to the restraints prescribed for adversaries in that category, but as an out-and-out enemy nation instead. This redefinition provides the doctrinal and, more importantly, propaganda base for drastic and theoretically unlimited action against China.[98]

The third significant point in Gromyko's statement is the Soviet offer to *"go its share of the way"* toward normalization of state-to-state relations. This indicates that the Gromyko statement is not merely propaganda--though it certainly has propaganda value. Soviet statements whose primary purpose is to score political points with third parties rather than to open a dialogue with Beijing tend to emphasize the need for China's leaders to come around to the Soviet view. This implied offer of concession is the real carrot in the Gromyko statement, and is typically and deliberately left vague. The primary reason for this is that the Soviets have been unwilling to offer the one carrot that the Chinese demand as an absolute minimum Soviet concessions: that the Soviets put down their

stick by making a significant reduction in the military threat to China.

What incentives does the Soviet Union have to seek normalization of relations with China? Donald Zagoria has deduced five: (1) to reduce Soviet fears of a two-front war; (2) to reduce the threat of an anti-Soviet combination of China, the United States, Japan, and Western Europe; (3) to increase Soviet diplomatic leverage on the United States and China; (4) to increase Soviet prestige in the international communist movement and the Third World.; and (5) to accrue prestige to the Soviet leader that achieves the thaw.[99] These five incentives directly and significantly support the ten Soviet foreign policy objectives discussed earlier, and, in the case of the fifth of Zagoria's incentives, affects the crucial legitimacy issue as well. Given such important pay-offs from a normalization of relations with Beijing, it is reasonable to expect that the Soviet strategy toward China will continue to be the dual approach of containment and coexistence.

2. Soviet Perceptions of the Chinese Threat

It seems difficult for Americans to understand the depth and emotion of the Soviet fear of the Chinese and the reality with which they take the military threat perceived to emanate from their continental neighbor. Visitors to the Soviet Union and others who have worked closely with the Russians consistently report on the intensity of such Russian fears. Charles Douglas-Home observed:

> The Russians are clearly obsessed with a fear of the yellow peril. In Moscow the visitor from West Europe is assailed by warnings about the Chinese menace. At a very basic, almost primitive level, they fear that the Far east region will soon be swamped by China's growing population...[100]

Nor are such warnings merely well-orchestrated repetitions of the party line, designed to indoctrinate the visitor in the official Soviet view. Hedrick Smith noted that, while the Soviet people are apolitical, even cynical, about many of the burning issues that the official media raise as immediate concerns, this is not the case when it comes to perceptions of China: "On no other issue did private opinion seem to coincide more closely with the official line than in the deep-seated Russian fear and mistrust of the Chinese."[101] A 1980 study of the views of the middle-level Soviet elite revealed that whereas their views of the United States were ambivalent--admiration and sense of a common cause against China as well as distrust--China was feared as an enemy.[102]

Attributing these fears to Russian or Soviet paranoia is too simplistic of an explanation for them. Having made such an attribution, the tendency is either to dismiss them as merely one of the unpleasantries of coexistence with the Russians, or to sanctify the assuaging of those fears as an inviolable article of detente. Neither course is a suitable basis for United States policy toward China or the Soviet Union. Historical fears, even traditions of paranoia or xenophobia, do not generate the conscious and apparently widely-held

concerns observed by Douglas-Home and Smith unless there is perceived to exist today the means and motivation for the Chinese to threaten Russia.

Western perceptions of the nature of Soviet fears of the Chinese threat have been clouded by the incessant polemical debate, with its attendant hurling of accusations and denunciations back and forth, between the Soviet Union and China. Keeping in mind the importance of the ideological imperatives, it would be expected that even statements made solely for propaganda purposes would reflect some aspect of the real Soviet fears of China. That expectation, it turns out, is valid--so statements from the Soviet press will be quoted herein--but caution must still be exercised in interpreting Soviet views due to the tactics employed by the Soviets in their propaganda duels with the Chinese. Appendix 'A' analyzes an important aspect of Soviet propaganda tactics that has lead to misinterpretations of Soviet fears of the Chinese threat and Soviet intentions toward China.

Allen S. Whiting has pointed out that there are concrete bases for the Soviet perception of a threat from China:

> Soviet concern is not the expression of a simple paranoia. So long as China contests territory controlled by the USSR, the possibility exists that aggressive local activity will trigger clashes, as happened in 1969. The volatility of Chinese politics and the xenophobia of the people, both dramatically evident during the Cultural Revolution, offer little assurance that this irrational behavior will not occur again.[103]

Regardless of whether Chinese behavior is rational or not, it has, from the Soviet point of view, been erratic,

provocative, and prone to violence. Soviet press accounts of the series of Chinese provocations along the Sino-Soviet border prior to the March 2, 1969 clash mentioned by Whiting, though perhaps embellished and naturally one-sided, are almost certainly not fabrications.[104] The Chinese attacks on India in 1962, the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, which were seized from South Vietnam in 1974, and on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1979--along with what the Soviets consider to be armed provocations against the Soviet Union itself--provide evidence to support the Soviet perception of an aggressive China, at least in the minds of Soviet leaders. The Soviets view the threat, according to Leon Gouré (et al), as "beyond any predictability as to the extremes to which Peking might go in furtherance of its anti-Soviet course, regardless of consequences."[105]

Soviet perceptions of the Chinese threat focus on Siberia. Because of its enormous economic potential, especially its energy resources, and the strategic importance of naval and air force bases near the Pacific, the Soviet Far East is of much greater significance than its vast empty stretches of permafrost might at first indicate.[106] Despite having deployed massive forces along their border with China since the mid-1960s, the Soviets apparently still feel Siberia is vulnerable to Chinese attack and perceive that the Chinese will have a growing motivation for such an assault as their population and economy expand.[107]

The Soviet Union takes the Chinese threat seriously, and there is substantial evidence to indicate that during the latter half of the 1970s the Soviets re-evaluated the danger of war with China--concluding that the danger was indeed real and was, in fact, greater than ever. The result of this upgrading of the Chinese threat has been a second buildup and modernization of Soviet forces along the Chinese border and in the Far East in general, including the Pacific Fleet. The intensity of Soviet concerns is demonstrated by the deployment of the latest in Soviet military equipment and weapons systems to the Far East, some of it with higher priority than deployments to the European theater.[108]

The Soviet perception of the Chinese threat extends far beyond a fear of People's Liberation Army hordes pouring over their borders followed by masses of land-hungry peasants. The Soviets also apparently fear the consequences of the Chinese rapprochement with the United States and improved relations with Japan and Western Europe. The consequences of the Chinese opening to the West affect virtually every major objective of Soviet foreign policy as well as creating new security problems for the Soviet Union.

Just as China has not made a secret of its desire to form a 'united front' against Soviet 'hegemonism,' the Soviet Union has made clear its opposition to such a grouping. As one would expect, the Soviets attribute this Chinese policy goal to aggressive aspirations:

> The expansionist and dangerous nature of China's present foreign policy course, a constant source of tension and a threat to peace, is revealed by the Peking rulers' drive for a military and political bloc with the American imperialists, Japanese revanchists and aggressive NATO...[109]

> Peking wants a militarisation of Asia, a strengthening of the American-Japanese military alliance and of other military-political blocs directed against the USSR. It calls for the creation of an anti-Soviet 'broad united front' and persistently offers itself as an ally of imperialism.[110]

The primary purpose of such statements is, of course, to attempt to deter Japan and the West from cooperating with China against the Soviet Union, but there is a consensus among most Western observers that underlying those statements is a genuine fear of being encircled by an alliance of ideological enemies.[111]

Chinese-American cooperation against the Soviet Union is the linkage that generates the greatest concern in Moscow. Even though the Soviets do perceive an immediate and growing threat from the Chinese, it is still the United States--economically and militarily the most powerful member of the capitalist camp--which is referred to as the "main antagonist" of the Soviet Union.[112] Whether or not the Soviets actually expect either the United States or China to attack them, for the military planner the prospects of a Sino-American alliance is cause for grave concern.

The Soviets see the Sino-American strategic alignment--even though currently still informal--as having two threatening aspects. The first is that the United States is using its

ties with China to tip the strategic balance back in its favor and increase pressure on the Soviet Union.[113] The second is that, in time of war, China might take advantage of Soviet preoccupation with defeating the West to launch an attack on Russia--either for strictly Chinese motives or as a diversion for NATO. The possibility of such a two-front war apparently has been a factor in the revision of Soviet military doctrine to include the possibility of having to fight a protracted war.[114]

Second only to concern over Sino-American military ties--in the strictly Asian context, of even greater concern--is the possibility of the Sino-Japanese relationship crystallizing as an anti-Soviet alliance. Soviet opposition to the "anti-hegemony" clause in the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty signed August 12, 1978, and Soviet efforts to forestall closer Sino-Japanese ties by offering Japan an economic carrot--investment opportunities in Siberian resources--while waving a military stick--the buildup of forces on the Northern Territories claimed by Japan--reflect the Soviet concern over the course that Sino-Japanese ties may take.[115]

Given the Soviet perception of a Chinese threat, it comes as no surprise that the Soviets are vehemently opposed to the sale of arms to China by the United States and Western Europe. The Soviet Union unleashed a barrage of public statements over the past decade warning against the arming of China--ultimately to no avail.[116] The most intense Soviet concern

appears to be that the West will cooperate in the modernization of China's nuclear arsenal. Leonid Brezhnev has been reported as having stated to a French visitor that the Soviet Union "would not tolerate" such Western involvement in China, and as having threatened a nuclear strike against China should it occur.[117]

The foregoing discussion has shown that the Soviet Union does perceive a threat to its security form China, particularly to the security of Siberia. Soviet perceptions of the Chinese threat are founded upon deeply-rooted Russian fears of China that have been compounded by the unhappy Soviet relationship with China since the late 1950s, and which are supported by what the Soviets believe to be evidence of a Chinese propensity to violence and of Chinese motives for an attack on Russia. The improvement in Chinese relations with the United States, Japan and Western Europe is also viewed as threatening Soviet security. These Soviet threat perceptions cannot be explained away as inconsequential expressions of 'Russian paranoia,' or as groundless because of the relative military weakness of China. Soviet fear of the Chinese has found concrete expression in Soviet foreign policy and military strategy.

3. The Soviet Military Threat to China

The primary Soviet response to what its perceives to be a threat from China has been in the political-diplomatic realm: the dual strategy of containment and coexistence. This aspect of Soviet China policy was discussed in the first part

of this section. There has also been, as noted above, a military aspect to the Soviet strategy for containment of the Chinese threat. Such military activities, while not conclusively demonstrating a Soviet intention to seek a final solution to their China problem through the use of force, does indicate a strong desire to have the capability to do so. Military strength also gives weight to its diplomacy.

Two questions concerning the Soviet military threat to China must be answered before attempting to determine United States interests in the security of China: First, under what circumstances would the Soviet Union resort to military action against China? Second, what would be the Soviet objectives and strategy in an armed conflict with China?

There are two aspects to the question of circumstances under which the Soviets would resort to military action against China. One aspect concerns scenarios: the situations in which the Soviets would consider military action. The other aspect, which is probably of greater importance for judging Soviet intentions, concerns the oft-noted element of caution in Soviet decisions regarding the use of military force: they do not strike unless the circumstances indicate an overwhelming probability of success in achieving the objectives of the operation.

The scenarios in which the Soviets would consider the use of military force against China can be grouped into three categories: those that result from the escalation of local

conflicts or spillover from fighting with third parties; those that are based on the Soviets seizing the opportunity to strike a blow at China in a moment of Chinese weakness; and those which represent a pre-meditated Soviet plan to permanently solve its China problem.

In the escalation and spillover category can be placed three scenarios: (1) escalation of a conflict involving clients of the Soviet Union or China to the level of a Sino-Soviet war; (2) escalation of an incident on the Sino-Soviet border into an all-out war; and (3) eruption of fighting between China and Russia during the course of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

As part of its strategy of containment of Chinese power and influence, the Soviet Union has been gathering into its fold a collection of clients around the periphery of China. Friendship treaties, all of which included some form of military cooperation, have been signed by the Soviet Union with India on August 9, 1971, with Vietnam on November 3, 1978, and with Afghanistan on December 5, 1978. An attempt has also been made to formalize this strategic containment of China in the form of an Asian collective security system, first proposed by Leonid Brezhnev on June 8, 1969 at a World Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow.[118]

The Soviet collective security proposal has foundered: only the Mongolian People's Republic and Afghanistan (in article eight of the friendship treaty) have endorsed it, and China has been able to counter it by improving its relations

with its neighbors. Japan agreeing to inclusion of the "anti-hegemony" clause in its Peace and Friendship Treaty with China was probably the death-knell for the Soviet plan.

The failure of the Soviet collective security proposal was more than just a diplomatic setback, it had important consequences for Soviet security policy as well. Arnold L. Horlick accurately foresaw the significance of the failure of the Soviet plan in his 1974 analysis of it. His observations are quite important in that they have been borne out by the course of events over the seven years since they were made:

> There is a danger, therefore, that the combination of (1) Soviet ambition to acquire a leadership role in Asian politics, driven by profound concern over the long-term implications of Sino-Soviet hostility, and (2) severely limited means for achieving that role either by conventional commercial or traditional diplomatic means, could channel Soviet assertiveness in Asia in directions far removed from the promotion of order and stability. Unable to find takers for its proposal to join in building a collective security system on a pan-Asian basis, the Soviet Union might instead offer security selectively to those Asian states embroiled in regional conflicts that might find themselves without access to other external sources of effective political-military support. It is precisely the provision of such support that has been the Soviet Union's stock in trade so far in the Third World. Where the USSR has been successful in planting its presence and expanding its influence abroad, it has done so by massive transfers of military resources and by flexing its muscles on behalf of clients engaged in regional conflicts with their neighbors.[119]

This is precisely the direction that Soviet policy in Asia has taken over the last decade. India, Afghanistan, and Vietnam (including now occupied Kampuchea) are the clients in the Soviet "Asian selective security system."

The potential for these states to involve the Soviet Union in a conflict of interests with China is great. India is involved in a deeply-rooted dispute with neighboring Pakistan--a client of China--and has unresolved border disputes with China that have in the past flared into war. Afghanistan, now an occupied Soviet satellite, disputes its border with Pakistan, accuses Pakistan of supporting the Islamic revolt in Afghanistan, and in turn supports the independence claims of ethnic groups in Pakistan--Pushtus and Baluchis--whose homelands sit astride the Afghan border. Vietnam has conquered and occupied China's ally Kampuchia, disputes its border with China and the sovereignty of several islands in the South China Sea, has been persecuting ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, and threatens--to the extent of having sent its troops into--Thailand, another friend of China.

Because the entire South and Southeast Asian region is a tinderbox waiting for the spark that will set it aflame with violence, the Soviet Union is clearly playing with fire by expanding its direct political and military presence in the region--especially its presence in countries neighboring on China. The pattern of Soviet support for its clients--in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America as well as in Asia--shows a considerable degree of caution and restraint when the determination of other powers to counter the actions of Soviet clients has raised the possibility of escalation to a war involving the Soviet Union. The most recent example of this pattern of Soviet restraint came when China invaded Vietnam

in February 1979 to teach the Vietnamese a lesson for occupying Kampuchea. The Soviets did respond with a show of force in support of Vietnam, it was carefully calculated to avoid the appearance of an imminent attack on China. Only a collapse in the Chinese and Western will to resist Soviet expansion or a significant shift in the balance of power in favor of the Soviets would cause the Soviet Union to abandon its restraint in the support of clients.[120] Thus, although the possibility does exist, the likelihood is small that a local conflict would escalate into a full-scale Sino-Soviet war.

Escalation of an incident on the Sino-Soviet border into an all-out war is a possible scenario, but is even less likely than escalation of a conflict involving client states. Although the border issue does have a life of its own, and has, in the events leading up to the March 1969 clashes, generated changes in broader Soviet and Chinese policies, it is generally more of a symptom than a cause of Sino-Soviet tensions. Border incidents of various types occur year after year: only when the Soviets or the Chinese are looking for an excuse to pressure the other party do such 'routine' incidents make the headlines or result in retaliatory gestures. A border incident may well be used as the polemical pretext for a Sino-Soviet war, but it certainly will not be the root cause for the war.[121]

An outbreak of fighting between the Soviet Union and China during the course of a Soviet war with the United States is becoming a more and more likely scenario as Sino-American

ties in the military field grow more extensive. As was pointed out earlier, the Soviets take seriously the threat of a Chinese attack while Russia is preoccupied in the European theater or recovering from an American nuclear strike. The Soviet military buildup in the Far East appears to be designed to allow the Soviets to fight a 'two-front' war without having to divert forces from either front to support the other.[122]

Do the facts that the Soviets fear a predatory Chinese attack and are preparing to fight a two-front war also indicate that a Soviet attack on China is inevitable in the event of a war with NATO? Much would depend on the actions of China just prior to and after the outbreak of the Soviet-American war, but nothing short of a Chinese decision to join in an alliance--or at least a non-aggression pact--with the Soviets would be sufficient to allay the deeply-rooted Soviet suspicions of Chinese intentions. A Chinese declaration of neutrality in a conflict of such destructiveness would not satisfy Soviet fears, as Douglas and Hoeber have observed:

> In the Soviet view, a country is either for them or against them, a distinction that would be most severely drawn in a general war situation.... Rules of war and traditions of neutrality appear to be of little concern.[123]

In all probability, therefore, unless there were to be a sudden reversal of Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union, the Soviets would take military action to substantially diminish China's capability to threaten the Soviet Union in the event of a Soviet-American war.[124]

The second category of scenarios in which the Soviets would be tempted to attack China can be labeled as 'opportunistic' attacks. There are two scenarios in which the Soviets might take advantage of China's distress to launch an attack: (1) political collapse or revolution in China, and (2) political isolation of China from the international community. Either scenario would greatly reduce the military and political costs of a Soviet military operation against China if the Soviet Union could in some way portray its intervention as being in the best interest of China or the world community.

If political collapse in China or isolation of China from the international community would make China a more inviting target for an opportunistic Soviet Union, why then did the Soviets not strike during the period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China? China at that time was both isolated and in turmoil, so there must be strict limits to the risks the Soviet are willing to take to seize an opportunity like that. Other factors must have weighed more heavily in the minds of the Soviet leaders than the fact that an opportunity had presented itself to them.

The Soviet Union did not intervene in China during the Cultural Revolution for two reasons. First, even though it was the most severe disruption of authority in China since the civil war of 1947-1949, the Cultural Revolution did not result in the collapse of authority in China. In particular, the People's Liberation Army remained largely intact and under

tight centralized control--even though it too had been besieged by the Red Guards and had been ordered to support them at one point. Radical xenophobia in China had been directed as much against the Soviet Union as against the West and there does not appear to have been an organized faction that looked to the Soviets as a force for restoring order. Thus, the Chinese could be expected to resist--and to resist violently.

The second reason for Soviet non-intervention in China's chaos was that China was not sufficiently isolated from the international community that the Soviets could strike without serious repercussions for its other foreign policy objectives. China's isolation was mainly of its own making, especially the recall of almost all of its ambassadors, rather than resulting from Western reaction against Chinese foreign policy. Chinese behavior simply had not been very threatening to Western interests, and the anti-Western name-calling was correctly seen to be directed more toward a Chinese audience (the "capitalist-roaders" who dared to propose openings to the West) than toward the West.

The Soviet Union could expect a Western outcry against a predatory Soviet attack on China--the typical Western response to such aggression since the days of the Open Door. Whether or not the West would have retaliated with economic, or even military, sanctions is less certain, but some form of response had to be expected. Even a moderate Western reaction could have set back initiatives the Soviets had launched to

improve relations with the West. Moreover, the Soviets had other pressing concerns which would have suffered from a diversion in China: enforcing the Brezhnev doctrine in Czechoslovakia, expanding its influence in the Middle East in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and supporting Vietnam against the United States in the Indochina War, among others. Thus, the Soviets also had to expect that a costly intervention in China would, at least temporarily, be costly to Soviet foreign policy as well.

The two 'opportunistic' scenarios--political collapse or diplomatic isolation--should be viewed more as prerequisites for Soviet military action against China than as scenarios in themselves. This point will be brought up again shortly when the discussion turns to the circumstances the Soviets desire to ensure a victory when embarking on a military operation.

The final category of scenarios for a Soviet attack on China are those that can be attributed to a pre-meditated Soviet plan for solving its China problem. The likelihood of these scenarios is not dependent on the occurrence of some event outside the control of the Soviets--as is the case in the escalation and opportunism scenarios. Their likelihood is based primarily on the basic Soviet fear and distrust of the Chinese, and on how much erosion of their primacy over China the Soviets will tolerate before deciding to put the Chinese in their place by force.

The scenarios in this 'masterplan' category are all basically one scenario--the premeditated Soviet attack designed to solve the China problem--with various different military objectives being attributed to the Soviets. The most common objectives the Soviets are said to be interested in are to pre-empt Chinese military modernization, to force a change in leadership in China, to inflict heavy damage on China in order to humiliate the Chinese and keep them weak, and to dismember China by occupying certain provinces along the Soviet border. The scenario of a Soviet 'bolt from the blue' attack on China to pre-empt its military modernization has become particularly fashionable as the debate over American arms sales to China has heated up.[125]

The Soviet objectives given for this scenario are all to some degree plausible, as will be discussed in greater detail later, but the scenario itself is questionable. The Soviets do have an image of the type of China they would feel comfortable with on their border. Likewise, the Soviets do have a strategy for dealing with China that they hope will result in a China somewhat close to their image. Neither the objective nor the strategy, however, is carved in stone. Stalin learned in the 1930s, and then relearned in the 1950s, that the Soviet Union could not shape the course of events in China except at a cost that would be exorbitant given the competing demands on Soviet economic, military, and political resources. As the Sino-Soviet dispute worsened and as China grew

stronger and more closely aligned with other rivals of the Soviet Union, the Soviets have had to increase the priority of China and Asia in their foreign and military policies. This does not indicate, however, that China is approaching some immutable point beyond which the Soviets will feel they have no choice but to destroy their rival.

While some of these scenarios for a Soviet attack on China are more plausible than others, none seems likely to occur in the near future. At least, that has been the consensus of most observers of Sino-Soviet relations--that war is not likely to occur.[126] But this reassuring conclusion, generally based on simple numerical comparisons of the military balance between Russia and China, has too much of a taint of the 'conventional wisdom' to be accepted at face value. It would perhaps be more accurate to state that Americans in the shoes of the Soviet leaders would not attack China. Vernon Aspaturian has warned against reliance on such reassuring conclusions:

> The unprecedented but not necessarily inexplicable or unpredictable Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates that past Soviet behavior is not a reliable guide to future behavior. Many of the turning points, or perhaps more accurately, milestones, in Soviet foreign policy have been without precedents: the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939; the unprovoked attack upon Poland and its dismemberment; the forcible establishment of Communist regimes in territories outside the former Russian Empire; the Soviet invasion of Hungary; the attempt to establish missile bases in Cuba; the use of Cuban troops in Africa; and now the invasion of a nonaligned country in the Third World. Those who were surprised by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan fail to appreciate that Soviet foreign policy

is not only routine and reactive but also innovative and initiatory.[127]

Taking heed of Professor Aspaturian's warning, how, then, does one assess the likelihood of an unprecedented Soviet action such as an attack on China? First of all, the Soviets do have motives for seeking a military solution to their China problem: Russian fear of the Chinese is pervasive and deeply-rooted. The Soviets perceive the Chinese as having, now and in the future, motives and a growing capability for threatening the Soviet Union. The current state of affairs, with China becoming ever more closely aligned with the West, is clearly unsatisfactory, a setback for several important Soviet security and foreign policy objectives. If the Soviet Union is deterred from attacking China, it is not because the Soviets lack the motives for launching the attack: it is because under current and anticipated international circumtances the costs of military action are greater than the cost of tolerating the Chinese threat.

The calculus of deterrence that urges restraint on the Soviet Union in its relations with China is not inherent in the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Nor are the Soviets deterred by a simple tallying of the military balance with the Chinese. The Soviets are deterred by the complex circumstances of the international context of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Those circumstances are subject to sudden, rapid, and drastic change. Lucian Pye has well described this aspect of the Soviet attitude towards China:

> Soviet strategy is much more likely to take the form of waiting for the propitious moment in which to strike so as not only to have the maximum damaging effects on the Chinese but also to embarrass all those who have been trying to help her modernize her forces.[128]

There are two aspects to the circumstances in which the Soviet Union would launch an attack on China: the internal situation in China and the international political situation.

The Soviets are deterred from attacking China not so much by the growing strength of China's armed forces--which are, in fact, falling behind in the balance with the Soviet Union--as they are deterred by their perception of the character of the Chinese people. Soviet public statements to the world on the vile nature of the Chinese are matched by popular images of the Chinese held by the Russians. Hedrick Smith reports that: "Intellectuals talked of the Chinese as the new barbarians: peasants brainwashed in the fields with loudspeakers, life entirely militarized, people mindless with Maoism."[129]

Neutralization of this militant Chinese character is a prerequisite for a Soviet attack on China. Uri Ra'anan has pointed out that, "given the tenacity and bitterness of her leadership," as well as military factors, "China does not rank as the most inviting target in the world, to be lightheartedly attacked by the Soviet Union--until and unless unique conditions arise which make prolonged Chinese resistance unlikely."[130] As was mentioned when disucssing scenarios for a Soviet attack, political collapse in China could provide the circumstances

neutralizing the Chinese will to resist an invasion. A loose parallel can be drawn to the period from 1842 to 1945, when the decaying Manchu Dynasty was unable to resist incursions by the Western powers--Russia included--and its successor, the Nationalist regime, was unable to consolidate its power before the onslaught of the Japanese. The magnitude of the task of maintaining control over a billion people must not be underestimated.

A political collapse in China would have to be widespread, near total, to tempt the Soviets to intervene. Joseph Schiebel has observed that "it will be in the Soviet Union's interest to have a prolonged period of turmoil during which the basic conditions and forces opposed to it can be eliminated or altered."[131] This is the key to understanding just how severe a political collapse would be desired by the Soviet Union, and why the Cultural Revolution was not enough of a disruption of authority in China to tempt the Soviets.

Two important conditions would have to result from political turmoil in China in order to the Soviets to perceive that prolonged Chinese resistance to a Soviet attack would be unlikely: First, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would have to be greatly diminished as an effective fighting force. This could occur if the Chinese armed forces were divided against themselves in a succession struggle among various military commanders. Warlordism has a long history in China, and has even cropped up under Communist rule--though the Party has succeeded thus far in controlling it. The PLA could also

be neutralized by being preoccupied with suppressing rebellions in the cities or provinces. This is another outstanding feature of Chinese history. The rebellions would have to be so severe as to require that front-line PLA units, and not just provincial garrisons, be diverted to suppress the violence.

The second condition that would have to result from political turmoil in China is the coalescence of an organized faction in the Chinese Communist Party, preferably one including some top members of the PLA, that has a pro-Soviet leaning. They might be useful to the Soviets as an interim tool for political control should the Soviets decide to occupy portions of Chinese territory, as was the Soviet tactic in Eastern Europe when the Red Army rolled in after defeating Nazi forces, but the primary value of a pro-Soviet faction would be to restrain the central authorities in China from ordering a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union until the Soviets had eliminated the Chinese nuclear force. After that any pro-Soviet groups would be expendable.

The international political situation would also have to be conducive to Soviet victory over China for the Soviets to commit themselves to an attack. Two Western reactions to a Soviet attack would have to be forestalled: direct aid to the Chinese, including possible military intervention, or political and economic reprisals that would seriously damage other Soviet foreign policy objectives. Direct aid would not only strengthen the Chinese militarily, but would also sitffen their will to resist the Soviet onslaught. Even the prospect

of receiving aid could enable the Chinese to hold out long enough to cause a Soviet offensive to lose its momentum.

The Western record of reprisals against Soviet expansion is not particularly frightening to the Soviets. In recent years, particularly, the West has not shown the unity of policies that is needed to make economic and political reprisals against the Soviets effective. There are also serious questions as to the efficacy of such sanctions. Nevertheless, to the extent that the Soviets could defuse the anticipated Western outcry against an attack on China, the overall cost to the Soviet Union of the operation would be reduced. In this regard, Lucian Pye has observed that: "depending on the circumstances surrounding the context of such a move, they might even be able to do it without unduly stirring up world opinion, much as China has gotten away with 'teaching lessons' to India and Vietnam."[132]

There are two situations in which the West would be unwilling or incapable of making more than a token response to a Soviet attack on China. The first would be if the West were already engaged in a war with the Warsaw Pact. In this situation, however, a Soviet attack on China--unless it resulted in a quick and decisive Soviet victory--would actually be in the interests of the NATO countries. This could not be admitted publicly, of course, but the Chinese have already admitted as much in their own statements on the global strategic situation.

The West would also be unwilling to come to China's defense, either directly or through sanctions, if China had taken some action prior to the Soviet attack that appeared to be an unwarranted provocation of the Soviet Union, and which violated the Western norms of appropriate international behavior. The most likely example of such a Chinese action would be a full-scale invasion of a Soviet client. The cases of the Chinese attacks on India and Vietnam both evoked Western censure, though not sufficient to clear the way for Soviet intervention in either case (and India was not, at the time, a Soviet client). The 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam, in particular, put the Soviet Union, and the world as well, on notice that China would not be intimidated by a Soviet commitment to defend another nation. In addition to neutralizing the Western interest in the defense of China, a military operation against a Soviet client would further divert the PLA from being able to defend against a Soviet assault.

Are not these two preconditions for a Soviet attack--internal disorder in China and a Chinese military provocation of Russia--to some degree mutually exclusive? Not necessarily, though the suggestion that an internally divided China would launch an invasion of a neighboring country does seem far-fetched. China was able to intervene in the Korean War, and with devastating effect initially, while it was still fighting Kuomintang forces in southern China and attempting to subdue Tibet (Tibet was invaded at the same time that PLA "volunteers" went into action in Korea). Another possibility would be for

domestic violence to erupt after the PLA had gone into action--perhaps partially as a consequence of the invasion--should disagreement within the leadership over the invasion result in a power struggle or if undue hardship resulted from having to support the action. The mandate of heaven, and the right of the people to withdraw it by rebelling, may not be an accepted tenet of Chinese Communist ideology, but it is alive among the masses of China.

These conditions for a Soviet attack on China establish a loosely-defined scenario, one with several variations. It needs to be emphasized that a Soviet attack on China under these conditions would not be motivated solely by opportunism. The Soviets would also have to perceive a growing Chinese threat to Soviet vital interests, a Chinese intent and capability to use its military power to the detriment of the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet relations would have to be stagnated or deteriorating, with little Soviet hope of bein able to coerce or cajole the Chinese into less hostile behavior. The attack on China would have to fit into the overall Soviet foreign policy strategy at the time: dealing with the Chinese threat is a Soviet priority, but it is not of such high priority that the Soviets would abandon their entire foreign policy in mindless pursuit of the emasculation of China.[133]

The second question posed at the beginning of this discussion of the Soviet military threat to China was what would be the Soviet objectives and strategy in an armed conflict with China? It will be useful to discuss Soviet military

strategy in general first, to gain an understanding of the doctrinal principles that govern the Soviet definition of objectives for an assault on China.

The central doctrine of Soviet military strategy is the 'primacy of the offensive.' The Soviets take seriously the long-standing principle that 'the best defense is a good offense,' and have structured their armed forces for precisely that purpose. In their study of the relevance of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in 1945 to modern Soviet military strategy, Peter W. Vigor and Christopher Donnelly observed that:

> Little is gained, in the Soviet view, by fighting defensive wars. The purpose of starting a war, the Russians believe, is to gain some political objective; and there are few political objectives of any kind (and fewer still of any great importance) that can be gained by fighting defensively.[134]

The Soviet principle of the 'primacy of the offensive' applies to Soviet strategy in all theaters, but it is significant to note in this discussion of the Soviet military threat to China that, although Soviet offensive doctrine has been revised over the years as military technology advanced, the Manchurian campaign remains, as Eugene D. Betit pointed out, "a prototype for Soviet offensive operations today."[135]

In a war with China, whether defensive in the sense that China had struck first against the Soviet Union itself, or offensive in the sense that the Soviets were striking first (though certainly with some pretext to justify their action), the Soviet Union would move as rapidly as possible to launch a full-scale combined arms offensive into Chinese

territory. There is no evidence to support the oft-quoted contention that Soviet fear of involvement in an Asian land war would cause them to abandon this fundamental principle of Soviet military strategy.[136] Moreover, the disposition of Soviet forces in the Far East supports the view that they would be used offensively, as Uri Ra'anan has observed:

> Conversely, the fifty-odd Soviet divisions in the far east are deployed offensively, and there are few who would dispute that their contingency plan is not to fall back in a straggly line to defend the long Trans-Siberian Railroad, but rather to thrust forward in a series of armored punches across Manchuria, Mongolia and probably Sinkiang.[137]

In a war against China, as in a war against NATO, the Soviet combined arms offensive into enemy territory would be supported by the use of nuclear weapons to the extent necessary to achieve the objectives of the offensive. This does not mean the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable--Soviet military writings have discussed, with an obvious lack of enthusiasm, the possibility of purely conventional warfare--but it does mean that a potential adversary of the Soviet Union must expect that nuclear weapons would be used. Edward L. Warner has described the role of nuclear weapons in the Soviet combined arms offensive:

> The theater campaigns included in the Soviet world war scenario are massive, mobile, and fully adapted to the nuclear era. They are supposed to commence simultaneously with the initiation of the strategic nuclear exchange and feature their own nuclear character provided by the peripheral-range strategic missiles and bombers of the SRF and LRA as well as the operational tactical missile units that are an integral part of the ground forces and the fighter-bombers of Frontal Aviation.[138]

The Soviet Union has made it clear, in its military writings and in Radio Moscow broadcasts directed at Beijing, that it would not hesitate to use its nuclear arsenal against China, nor would it hesitate to launch a first strike against the Chinese nuclear force.[139] These Soviet warnings are backed up by Soviet force deployments to the Far East, including the priority deployment of SS-20 mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).

The ultimate Soviet objective in a war with China would be victory. That may seem obvious, but it had to be stated explicitly because of the trend among some Western strategic analysts to presume that the Soviet leadership thinks in terms of the models fashionable in the West. The Soviets do not think in terms of 'war termination,' they think in terms of victory.

Joseph Douglas and Amoretta Hoeber have deduced from Soviet military writings that the Soviet Union has four conditions for victory: (1) defeat of enemy forces and potential, (2) seizure of strategic areas, (3) occupation and control, and (4) ideological conversion of the defeated foe.[140] Intuitively, not all of these four objectives could be fully realized by the Soviet Union in China--not even the conquest of all of Eastern Europe and its subsequent satellitization could compare with the magnitude of the scale of operations that would be required in China. Flexibility and adaptation to the circumstances at hand, as long as it serves long-range

objectives, are key tenets of Soviet ideology, however, so it is reasonable to expect that there are variants of these four Soviet warfighting objectives that apply to China.

There is a general consensus among Western observers that the Soviet Union does have the military capability necessary for achieving the first of its four conditions for victory: the defeat of enemy forces and potential. Most observers, however, add the caveat that the Soviets must avoid, as Lucian Pye put it, "entrapping themselves in the morass of continental China."[141] The task of defeating the Chinese forces and destroying their war potential, which Douglas and Hoeber specified must include (a) disrupting and disorganizing political and military control, and (b) destruction of nuclear and conventional ready military forces,[142] would be made easier for the Soviets by the conditions under which they would attack. Weakened by internal turmoil, with their leadership divided and the PLA preoccupied with internecine conflict or rebellion in the provinces, the Chinese would not be able to put up an effective defense against the modern Soviet war machine.

The Sino-Soviet nuclear equation is somewhat less clear, even though there is agreement that the Soviets are far superior and that the gap appears to be widening when measured strictly in numerical terms. Donald Zagoria, among others, believes that even a far inferior Chinese second-strike capability is enough to deter a Soviet attack. Charles Douglas-Home, on the other hand, contends that a Soviet attack

which "concentrated on inflicting heavy damage on military and industrial targets" in China "could not be counter-balanced in any limited contest by the steady progress of China's long-range missile program."[143]

The Soviet solution to the problem of a possible Chinese retaliatory nuclear strike, as is clear from Soviet military writings in general and their statements on the Chinese nuclear threat in particular, would be to launch a preventive (pre-emptive, the Soviets would prefer it be called) first strike on China's nuclear force. The New York Times has reported that a 1979 Department of Defense study of the vulnerability of the Chinese nuclear force concluded a successful first strike by the Soviets "probably could not be achieved."[144] It is doubtful that Soviet military planners would agree with this assessment, and even more doubtful that they would abandon their fear of a Chinese nuclear strike and their doctrine of protecting the homeland because of it. It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that the Soviet Union will attempt to destroy the Chinese nuclear force before it can be used, and that the overall Soviet offensive would be capable of inflicting decisive damage on the Chinese armed forces.

The second Soviet objective in a war with China would be the seizure of strategic areas: Manchuria (consisting of the provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning), Xinjiang (Sinkiang province, formally an 'Autonomous Region' for the Muslim Uighur peoples), and possibly Inner Mongolia ('Nei Monggol' in the current Chinese spelling, also an Autonomous

Region, the Chinese portion of the Mongol homeland). Joseph Schiebel has explained the Soviet motives for a seizure of these areas in the event of a war with China:

> ...no Chinese leadership, no matter how pro-Soviet it professes to be, can long be relied upon to resist the temptations and indeed the compulsion to pursue the independent course that China's geo-strategic size justifies. One necessary step in any Soviet program to reassert its claim to strategic mastery over China will be to reduce the country in size....
>
> Manchuria is what the Soviets must have to be able to project their power directly into East Asia. Its loss, combined with the loss of Sinkiang, might be sufficient to lessen the strategic weight and significance of China so that whose side she is on might matter a good deal less than it does today.[145]

This perceptive analysis reveals the broad range of Soviet fears that would be relieved and objectives that would be achieved by such a dismemberment of China. The Soviet Union would gain the buffers and strategic access it believes are essential to the defense of its Eastern flank. The Chinese threat, either alone or in alliance with the West, would be reduced to manageable proportions. An ideological rival would be humiliated, leaving the Soviet Union as the uncontested leader of the socialist camp and the national liberation movement. Such gains would be a windfall to rival that of the Soviet conquest and occupation of Eastern Europe during World War II.

Even though the Chinese border regions would be lucrative targets for the Soviets to seize, there remain questions as to the Soviet ability to seize them and as to possible


AD-A109 589
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
F/G 5/4
UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA: BEYOND THE 'CHINA CA--ETC(U)
SEP 81 J F BOUCHARD
UNCLASSIFIED
NL
2
5

SSIFIED

2 OF 5

AD A109589



undesirable consequences if they were seized. The Soviet Union does appear to have the military forces necessary to seize at least significant portions of the Chinese border regions. Uri Ra'anan believes the Soviets could occupy these regions without becoming bogged down in an "unending war of attrition" with China, and possibly even without the use of nuclear weapons, or with the use of only tactical and medium-range weapons. Lucian Pye agrees that the Soviets could avoid the danger of a 'People's War' with China, but cautions that Chinese defenses in Xinjiang and Manchuria would still present formidable obstacles to an invading army.[146]

A Soviet attack during a period of political turmoil in China could greatly ease the difficulty of seizing the Chinese border regions on the Soviet border. The Chinese Communists have been faced with military and political leaders in Manchuria from within their own ranks striking out on an autonomous path--with strong indications of Soviet involvement. The Uighurs of Xinjiang and the Mongols have both been targets for promises of national liberation, and have to some degree been receptive to offers of external support.[147] Dmitri Simes claims that, even though the Soviets could seize these regions, they have no desire to do so, at least in the case of Xinjiang, because they already have enough problems with the Muslim population they currently rule.[148] The objective of the Soviet 'liberation' of these regions would not, however, be annexation into the Soviet Union. The creation of relatively small, militarily weak, and virulently anti-Chinese states would suffice.

The third Soviet 'condition of victory' described by Douglas and Hoeber is the occupation and control of the enemy country. This objective probably could not be realized by the Soviet Union in an invasion of China except at exorbitant cost. There is a firm consensus on this point.[149] There is also no evidence to indicate a Soviet interest in attempting such a Herculean feat. The Russian fear of the brutal nature of the Chinese, as they see it, would probably be as much of a deterrent as the logistical problems and the prospects of a prolonged 'people's war' on Chinese terms. The most important of the Soviet objectives in attacking China in the first place could be achieved, however, by the seizure of the border regions of China without having to occupy the entire country. As long as China's warfighting capability had been destroyed, the Soviet Union could leave the remnants of the Chinese state to care for its ravaged masses.

Ideological conversion is said to be the fourth and ultimate objective of a Soviet war. In the case of China, this objective presents the Soviet Union with unique, and perhaps insurmountable, problems. If they could occupy China, the Soviets would undoubtedly pursue the ideological conversion of the Chinese from the Maoist (or post-Maoist) version of Marxism-Leninism to the Soviet 'true gospel.' This objective is most decidedly not, however, sufficient in itself to tempt the Soviets to occupy all of China. Only if Soviet strategic objectives, those deemed to be vital to the defense

of the homeland, demanded the occupation of all of China would the Soviets consider such a campaign.

There is a less demanding political goal which could probably be achieved without the occupation of the entire country and which would have almost the same value as direct ideological conversion under Soviet tutelage. That goal is to force a change in the political leadership of China. Hal Piper has noted that the Soviets perceive more of a fluid situation in the current state of Chinese politics than do most western observers:

> Soviet Asia specialists say they still think China is in a period of "transitional" leadership. Shake-ups of political cadres appear to be continuing, they point out, and the wallposter campaigns in Peking turn up conflicting sentiments, including even a pro-Soviet slogan or two.
>
> "In principle anything is possible," a Soviet analyst said. He means anything from restoration of capitalism to a return to the Soviet-Chinese friendship of the 1950's.[150]

This Soviet analysis may well strike Western observers as merely wishful thinking, or as a cynical attempt to deter the growth of Sino-American ties by creating doubts as to the reliability of the Chinese, but if it is indeed the Soviet view, as it appears to be, then it could provide the basis for Soviet planning of its political objectives in a war with China.

The ideal time for the Soviet Union to strike at China would be during a period of domestic political turmoil in China, as has already been pointed out. In such a situation in China it would be reasonable to expect that a faction with political leanings or policy objectives favorable toward Soviet

interests would emerge, and might even turn to the Soviet Union for support. The motives of such a faction in turning to the Soviets could well be altruistic: a desire to restore order from chaos so that the suffering of the masses could be alleviated. And if the PLA had collapsed as an effective political force or was unable to restore order, then Soviet power could well become attractive to ambitious and desperate men.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 may well be thought by the Soviets to be a possible prototype for a political solution in China: Lenin was spirited into Russia by Germany, which was at war with, and had invaded, his homeland. After he had carried out his revolution, with 'peace' as one of its rallying points, Lenin then submitted to the German-dictated Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which forced Russia to cede large areas of its soil to its enemy Germany. The Soviets might plan on a similar political turnover to complement their invasion of China. Even if a Soviet puppet could not be installed in Beijing, a Chinese leader willing to for sue for peace at the cost of Manchuria and Xinjiang in order to save what was left of his country would serve Soviet purposes.

This review of the nature of the Soviet military threat to China has shown that, while most of the commonly proposed scenarios for a Soviet attack are unlikely to occur, there is a particular combination of circumstances which would be propitious for a Soviet attack. That combination of circumstances involves political isolation of China from effective support from the West and internal political turmoil in China that had

disrupted the capability of the Chinese to resist a Soviet attack. If such a combination of circumstances were to occur at a time when Soviet resources were not previously committed to other objectives, and if the state of Sino-Soviet relations at the time indicated to Soviet leaders that crucial state interests were directly threatened by Chinese behavior, then the Soviet Union would not hesitate to seek a military solution to its China problem. Specific military and political objectives can be identified in China that would fit the conditions for victory known to guide Soviet military strategy.

Thus, while a simple prediction as to the likelihood of a Sino-Soviet war cannot be made, as its possibility is not inherent in the nature of the relationship but rather is derived from contingencies that cannot themselves be predicted, it is possible to predict the circumstances under which the Soviets would probably decide to launch a war on China. The sudden or imminent occurrence of various of those circumstances should provide warning to the analyst that a Soviet attack is forthcoming before evidence of military deployments to launch the attack are even begun.

In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union is not passively waiting for the appropriate circumstances to strike while its position vis-a-vis China deteriorates before its eyes. The Soviet Union is carrying out an active foreign policy designed to achieve its fundamental national goals, if possible, without resorting to the use of force. The Soviet strategy toward

China is a dual one of containment and coexistence. It has not been an overwhelming success for the Soviets, but is unlikely to be abandoned except for one other option: war with China on Soviet terms.

C. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE SECURITY OF CHINA

Thus far, it would seem, little has been said in this paper about United States security interests in China. The previous two sections have focused on conceptual frameworks and on Soviet policy toward China, rather than on American interests per se. The diversions were vitally necessary, however, because American perceptions of its security interests in China have been clouded by uncritical acceptance of a flawed conception of the international system--the strategic triangle--and by oversimplified views of the Soviet threat to China. In other words, it is in the national interest that United States policy toward China be formulated within a conceptual framework that allows clear perceptions of interests, and that security policies reflect a realistic appraisal of the Soviet threat to China.

In the process of defining the concept of national interest, mention was made of the "clusters of interests" devised by Ralph N. Clough for sorting out American interests in another country (see page fifteen). Clough proposed four categories of interests: general, intrinsic, derived, and created. This section will be concerned with 'intrinsic' American security interests in China, interests that are "inherent in

its direct relationship with a particular country at a particular time." Such intrinsic interests include, in the Clough formulation, "the ability of that country to help protect U.S. general interests," such as deterrence, avoidance of war, and creation of a stable world order. That particular subset of intrinsic interests will be discussed in succeeding sections, leaving for this section those American security interests that are intrinsic but generally within the geographic confines of China itself.

United States interests in the security of China will be defined by determining, first of all, if there are threats to the security of China that would also threaten American national interests, and, second, what the consequences for American interests would be should China succumb to any of those threats.

1. Threats to the Security of China

Sources of threats to the security of China can be grouped into two broad categories: internal and external. This taxonomy is not meant to be formal in the sense that the two categories are mutually exclusive. The pattern of Chinese history has been that internal and external threats to Chinese security almost always either arise simultaneously or one begets the other. It is no coincidence that the Western powers (including Russia) made their greatest imperial penetration into the Middle Kingdom at a time when its Manchu rulers were besieged by major rebellions. Nor is it a coincidence that the most serious border clashs the People's Republic has had with

its communist neighbor--those with the Soviet Union on the Ussuri River in March 1969--occurred in the wake of the Cultural Revolution in China. It is with this historical tendency for the two to be linked in mind that threats to Chinese security will be categorized as internal or external.

Three internal sources of threats to the security of China can be postulated: (1) a power struggle for leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) erupting into violence among armed factions, (2) rebellions of various segments of the Chinese population against CCP rule in general or against specific CCP policies, and (3) acts of terrorism, urban or rural, by individuals or groups lacking the popular appeal or political power to resist the regime by either of the first two means.

There is evidence, one is tempted to assert abundant evidence, that each of these three internal threats to Chinese security has occurred more than once since the Communist Party came to power in China. The Cultural Revolution, which was, in essence, a power struggle between the Maoist radicals and the previously-ascendant 'moderate' mor 'pragmatic' wing of the CCP (led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, both purged), degenerated into violence--even pitched battles. The purge of the "Gang of Four"--the leaders of the 'radical' wing of the CCP--after the death of their patron Mao Zedong was accompanied by numerous reports of violence in China during 1976-1977--including outright civil war in Fujian and Sichuan Provinces. Lin Biao and the Gang of Four have both been accused of plotting

military coups, charges that are not so far-fetched as to be dismissed without consideration. As recently as 1980 there were reports of several bombings of public places, such as railway stations, and other acts of sabotage in China that could be classified as acts of terrorism--if not rebellion. Tibet, it should also be noted, has risen in rebellion twice since being forcefully incorporated into China: in 1959 and 1965.[151]

Do all of these past examples of internal security threats indicate that similar problems must be expected in the future? Not necessarily, but it is still too early to conclude that the apparently successful consolidation of power in China by Deng Xiaoping and his protegés, Hu Yaobang (Party Chairman) and Zhao Ziyang (Premier), heralds a new era of Party unity and political tranquility. There remain numerous sources of tension which could generate renewed internecine Party conflict or popular dissatisfaction with the regime. The rank and file of the CCP are not fully united behind Deng and his modernization program, nor are workers and peasants everywhere satisfied with the gains they have made. Inflation, unemployment and youth dissatisfied with the opportunities open to them are all problems which cannot be solved in the short-term. There are reports of the leadership of the armed forces in China being upset with the decline in their prestige and priority, particularly because of two successive reductions in the defense budget, as well as reports that morale among

the troops is suffering. China's 'national minorities' (Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongols, and others) are also not overly happy with their lot, despite having made substantial economic progress in some areas and having been granted, of late, an increasing degree of political and cultural autonomy, raising the possibility of unrest in the key provinces of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet.[152]

In short, then, the possibility of there again arising internal threats to Chinese security must be taken seriously. The occasional optimistic assessment of the future course of Chinese politics[153] should be tempered by hard-nosed realism about the magnitude of the problems China will face merely providing for the basic human needs of a billion people, much less satisfying their aspirations for a better life.[154]

The external threat to the security of China has two basic forms, though they may well occur together: intervention in Chinese politics or outright military attack. An intervention in Chinese politics could consist of supporting a faction involved in a power struggle, subverting minority groups in the provinces on China's frontiers--which could go as far as the creation of a national liberation movement--or attempting to stir up popular dissatisfaction with government policies in the hopes of fomenting a rebellion or terrorist resistance. As was pointed out, China has had problems with all of these in the form of 'internal' security threats. They are also potential targets for external intervention.

The most immediate and dangerous potential external threat to the security of China, both in terms of capabilities and in terms of having motives to threaten China, has already been discussed in detail: the Soviet Union. There are other nations with motives for threatening China, but in each case they lack the capability to take effective action unless China were first defeated by the Soviet Union. India has territorial claims against China in the Aksai Chin, would like to have Tibet as an independent state--if not a client--to be a buffer against China, and probably would not be above seeking to avenge its national honor for its 1962 defeat by the Chinese. Vietnam likewise has a score to settle with the Chinese, the 1979 Chinese invasion certainly has not been forgotten, and disputes the ownership of the Paracel and Spratley island groups in the South China Sea with China. Both India and Vietnam have signed friendship treaties with the Soviet Union, both are armed primarily by the Soviets, and both have received diplomatic and military support from the Soviets against China. On their own, Vietnam and India can do little more than harass China: India by stirring up anti-Chinese sentiment in Tibet or putting pressure on Pakistan, and Vietnam by means of low-level military operations along its border with China. In the context of a Sino-Soviet war, however, such actions could well take on major proportions.

The existence, at least in theory, of potential external threats to China from the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan or from Japan should be mentioned in passing. Both threats

are, under present and almost any future circumstances, remote. Neither Taiwan or Japan could hope to gain more than they would lose by attempting to subvert or attack China. Only if China lay prostrate from internal upheaval or Soviet attack would Taiwan or Japan be capable of taking effective action, and even then Japan would still lack the motive.

2. Potential Consequences for American Interests

Western and American interest in the security of China has historical roots well over a century old, even though the interest itself died out after the Communist revolution.

Prior to the coming to power of the Communist Party, the West, including the United States, had taken a degree of interest in the internal security of China because of their own interests there. Intervention by the Western powers in the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Uprising are probably the two best examples of such interest. The Western powers intervened in these cases to protect their citizens, notably missionaries, property and investments, to restore tranquility for the growth of commerce, and to ensure a regime favorable to their interests remained in power. Indeed, it can reasonably be argued that the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, which was already in decline by the mid-nineteenth century, was forestalled by the 'support' it received from the Western powers.

The Communist victory, of course, ended this Western interest in China's internal security (except to the extent that the Soviets appeared to be involved). But now that China

has begun orienting its economy toward the West, using trade and investment to speed its development, there is somewhat of a revival of interest in the stability of the Chinese government. No single country, not even Japan, has a crucial stake in its trade with, or investments in, China. However, as China's trade grows, as its markets open up to foreign manufactured goods, as it becomes a supplier of resources such as oil and coal, and as it absorbs more foreign direct investment, so will the Western economic stake in China grow. At the same time the number of foreign citizens in China has been growing as China has developed its tourist industry and as businessmen, technicians, educators, and other professionals have flocked to China. If these economic and travel trends continue, and at this point it is reasonable to assume that they will, then the Western interest in the internal security of China can be expected to grow apace.

The direct American stake in China itself is still insignificant. In 1980, American exports to China were only 1.5% of total American exports and imports from China were only 0.35% of American imports; American direct investment in China is negligible; and China is not a significant source of any crucial energy or mineral resources. Appendix B examines the United States economic interest in China. The U.S. human presence in China, bodies which might be threatened in a disturbance, is likewise small. In 1980, about 70,000 Americans visited China, an average of about 172 per day, and there were perhaps 600 American educators, students, and technicians

residing in China. Probably the most significant American interest physically in China, at least from a security viewpoint, would be the U.S. intelligence equipment being utilized by the Chinese in a cooperative effort to monitor Soviet missile tests. Even in this case, however, it is doubtful that U.S. national security hinges on the safety of that equipment or the functioning of the stations.[155]

In comparison with American interests in other countries or areas of the globe, such as Japan, the Middle East, or Western Europe, the U.S. economic stake and human presence in China are relatively insignificant and cannot be counted as among the major determinants of the American security interest in China. Nevertheless, these direct U.S. interests in China would be threatened by either internal or external threats to China's security. Political upheavals and rebellions in China have commonly taken on xenophobic overtones, as in the Boxer Uprising and the Cultural Revolution, and it would be a serious mistake to presume that China's opening to the West has laid to rest the deeply-rooted emotions from which such anti-foreign outbursts arose. Internal upheavals have also tended to disrupt transportation, communications, production, and normal commerce--even when efforts were made to protect these from the turmoil. And a major war with the Soviet Union would, of course, result in immeasurable damage to the Chinese economy and to any foreign citizens who happened to be in the way of Soviet ambitions.

Another aspect of the American interest in China's security which must be brought up is the potential problem of refugees should China suffer political collapse or military defeat. The destructiveness of modern warfare, whether civil or among nations, can clearly be seen in the great number of refugees that result from violent conflicts--even a relatively small-scale conflict like the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan can generate hundreds of thousands of refugees. China's own Cultural Revolution produced a steady stream of what were, in effect, refugees into Hong Kong. A refugee problem affects both ideological and economic interests: humanitarian principles urge that they be aided, but economic constraints (the cynic would say selfish economic self-interest) can made that aid slow in coming. Depending on the scale of destruction suffered in an internal upheaval or from a Soviet attack, the refugee problem could be enormous.

The United States does have an interest in the security of China. Though the direct American involvement in China, in terms of economic stake, the presence of U.S. citizens, and military facilities, is still small both relative to American interests elsewhere and in absolute terms, it can be expected to grow in the years ahead. The growth of American involvement and interests in China will be paralleled by growth in the involvement of America's allies in China, resulting in what must be viewed as an overall Western interest in China's security. The capability of the Chinese government to maintain internal security and to defend itself against external aggression are,

therefore, of concern to the West, including the United States.

This conclusion that the United States has an interest in the security of China cannot be accepted at face value. The United States also has global and Asian security interests and commitments that far outweigh its direct stake in China. For example, were China to sign a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union on the eve of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, American lives and economic interests in China would be saved from the possibility of destruction; but in this situation the overriding American stake in Europe would make the sacrifice of those interests in China a reasonable cost for China's entry into the war on the side of NATO.

Stating that the United States has reason to be concerned with Chinese security also has ideological ramifications. Does the American interest in the security of China imply a corresponding interest in ensuring that the government of China can maintain internal security as well as defend against external aggression? Do American interests in China require an overt commitment to the continued viability of the present regime? The simple answer, that internal security is China's business but external security does involve the United States (because the primary threat, from the Soviet Union, also threatens the U.S.), is not sufficient. These questions have plagued America in its relations with Third World countries, many of whom, like China, have value systems quite different from our own.

Unless China is now entering an era of progress and domestic tranquility unlike any it has seen in well over a century, the United States must expect that it will at some point be forced to reconcile its security interests in China with its ideological interests, or to explicitly--through foreign policy decisions--select one as being of higher priority than the other. When the time comes for American interest in China's security to be put to the test there are not going to be any clear-cut choices. As was pointed out in discussing the Soviet threat to China, the Chinese are most vulnerable when they are isolated from the international community and weakened by internal political turmoil. Under such circumstances, when China, through its own actions--perhaps by military action against a smaller neighbor accused of fomenting revolt in China and violent suppression of the revolt itself--has offended American and Western values, it would be very difficult for America's leaders to commit themselves to the security of China.[156] The conclusion that America does have an interest in the security of China must be tempered by the realization that in the 'real world' such interests may never be clear-cut and the amount that should be spent in their defense may not be apparent.

D. CHINA IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

China's role in the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is the aspect of American security interests in China which has received the greatest

attention and generated the most controversy. The controversy over China's strategic role arises out of contention among three views as to the role the United States should assign to China in its strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. One view is that, because China is so firmly anti-Soviet and has opened to the West to drive its modernization, the Chinese should receive the full support of the West, including arms sales and joint strategic military planning. Another view is that China cannot be relied upon as allies against the Soviets because of potential political instability, doubt in China as to the resolve of the West, and the latent temptation for the Chinese to strike a strategic bargain with the Soviets at the expense of Western interests. The third view is that adopting a 'balanced' approach to relations with China and the Soviet Union will result in an equilateral triangular relationship pleasing to the aesthetics of all three powers.

These views share a common fault: all three place far too much emphasis on the ability of American policy to shape China's strategic role. Soviet policies toward China and the United States, as well as China's own foreign policy, are determinants of China's role at least as significant as American policies. It is for this reason that Soviet policy toward China was examined in detail and that Chinese views and objectives must also be considered. Even the policies of third parties, such as India, Vietnam, and Japan, affect China's role in the Soviet-American strategic relationship.

This section will examine the influence China has on the bilateral interactions involved in the Soviet-American strategic relationship. Five such Soviet-American relationships will be discussed: their geopolitical positions, the strategic balance of power, Soviet expansionism and the American effort to contain it, arms limitations efforts, and detente.

1. China's Geopolitical Importance

We return for a moment to the subject of the security of China itself. The geographic position of China, sharing a 4,000 mile border with the Soviet Union as well as dominating the central position of all of Asia, cannot be ignored as a factor affecting the Soviet-American strategic relationship. The American interest in the security of China that is based on China's strategic geographic location is the 'intrinsic' security interest that was postponed in the last section. The geopolitical aspect of the intrinsic American security interest is being discussed in this section because the most significant external threat to China's security comes from the Soviet Union--directly linking Chinese security to the Soviet-American strategic relationship.

The fundamental objectives the Soviet Union seeks to achieve in its foreign and defense policies tend to focus Soviet attention primarily on the Eurasian landmass. Eurasia is the target of Soviet efforts to secure objectives such as Soviet-dominated or at least passively compliant neighbors around the Soviet periphery as buffers for the defense of the Soviet homeland. Having to share the continent with the Chinese--openly

defiant and perceived to be a military threat to the Soviet Union--is one of the two most signficant barriers to the full achievement of Soviet goals in the region. The other major barrier is the continued American insistence that it has vital interests on the Eurasian landmass and its military presence on and near the continent for the protection of those interests.

Soviet strategy for dealing with China--containment and coexistence--has already been described. To understand the overall thrust of the Soviet effort to counter the American presence on the Eurasian landmass, Colin S. Gray has updated the geopolitical approach formulated by Sir Halford MacKinder and Nicholas Spykman, concluding that Soviet policy can best be described as an attempt to achieve "hemispheric exclusion" of the United States. According to this theory of geopolitics, the "heartland" power--the Soviet Union--will attempt to dominate the "rimlands" around its peripher on the Eurasian continent (Africa also is included in some formulations), an effort that the "insular" powers--led today by the United States--must resist in order to prevent the heartland power from gaining, in effect, world domination. Gray summarized the value of the theory as follows:

> In short, as Sir Halford MacKinder and Nicholas Spykman explained in theory, and as American politicians thus far have acknowledged by their deeds, denial of Soviet hegemony over the Eurasian Rimlands is a vital security interest of the United States. There is nothing crassly mechanistic about this proposition. It is not suggested here that <u>every</u> Rimland position is of vital importance. But the unifying concept of a long-term Soviet ambition for hemispheric

> denial does serve usefully to undermine the basis of some of the arguments advanced by those who prefer to examine every clash of Soviet and American interests as being solely of local significance (if of any significance at all).[157]

To suggest that Soviet strategy may be usefully conceptualized as one of "hemispheric denial" is not to imply that Soviet leaders actually use the term itself, or the phraseology of the geopolitical theory underlying it, in their internal discussions on their strategy. The "hemispheric denial" idea does, however, provide a useful conceptualization of Soviet strategy; it provides a unifying framework for what would otherwise seem to be disparate Soviet initiatives and objectives. The Soviet attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and the Western European nations, Soviet efforts to counter and diminish American influence in the Middle East, Soviet pressure on Pakistan and wooing of India, Soviet attempts to improve its relations in ASEAN and to ensure its hegemony in Indochina, Soviet attempts to forestall the improvement in Sino-American relations, and Soviet use of political and military pressure on Japan in conjunction with economic inducements; all are motivated by the objective of "hemispheric denial" of the United States (the Soviet actions in Asia also nearly dovetail with the Soviet strategy of containment of China).

China is, of course, one of the most crucial of the "rimlands" from which the Soviets must attempt to exclude any external influence or presence, particularly that of the

United States. To be an effective buffer for the defense of the Soviet homeland, China must also be forced to adopt a foreign policy posture complementary to Soviet strategic interests: that is, a posture that is not hostile to the Soviet Union, but which also is not so hostile to the West that it might drag the Soviet Union into a war (the problem that led to the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the late 1950s and early 1960s). The potential military threat from China must also be kept within acceptable bounds. If the Soviet strategy of containment and coexistence continues to fail to achieve these objectives, if the apparent military threat from China continues to mount, then, should the opportunity arise at a time when the Soviets have the resources available, the Soviet Union would not hesitate to pacify the Chinese "rimland" by military action.

Successful Soviet domination of China, a goal the Soviets have never--even at the height of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the early 1950s--been able to achieve, would have serious consequences for the American geopolitical position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Loss of the largest and most strategically important "rimland" in Asia is only one, and perhaps not even the greatest, of the consequences. Henry Kissinger has pointed out that a Soviet defeat of China would reverberate throughout the countries around the periphery of the Eurasian continent:

> If Moscow succeeded in humiliating Peking and reducing it to impotence, the whole weight of the Soviet military effort could be thrown against the West. Such a demonstration of Soviet

> ruthlessness and American impotence (or indifference--the result would be the same) would encourage accommodation to other Soviet demands from Japan to Western Europe, not to speak of the many smaller countries on the Soviet periphery.[158]

In the previous discussion of the Soviet military threat to China it was pointed out that the Soviet Union would probably attempt to dismember China, to separate Manchuria and Xinjiang as independent 'people's republics' similar to Mongolia, in order to ensure a permanent solution to the 'Chinese threat' and to gain strategic buffers. Charles Douglas-Home has observed that Soviet success in this endeavor, at least in Manchuria, would have profound condequences for East Asia and for America's Asian power position, as well as for the Chinese:

> Apart *from crippling* China, it would enhance Soviet domination of Korea and Japan. It would strike at the very foundation of America's defence guarantees to those countries, particularly in circumstances where the United States stood idly by and watched such a partial dismemberment take place with the same impotent huffing and puffing displayed by Washington following the *invasion of* Afghanistan.[159]

The critic of geopolitics would probably argue that these views expressed by Kissinger and Douglas-Home sound suspiciously like a reincarnation of the 'domino theory' being used to justify the American involvement in China. Though this argument has much more emotional impact (due to the "no more Vietnams" syndrome) than it has logical merit, it must nevertheless be given serious attention. No analyst has yet

directly applied the domino theory as an explanation for the strategic impotence of China, but when used in the past to justify American intervention in other countries there was an unfortunate tendency for the theory to be grossly oversimplified. The domino theory is not unique in that respect: most theories or strategies in international relations become grossly oversimplified in the arena of American politics--witness the fate of 'containment,' 'detente,' or 'deterrence.' It will be important, therefore, for future decisions on American policy toward China to be based on analyses of China's geopolitical significance that reflect the complex political dynamics of the international arena. International politics and global power relationships are not adequately described by a simple 'strategic triangle,' as was discussed in the first section of this chapter.

The United States government has already publicly ackowledged that it has an interest in the security of China for what are, in effect, strategic reasons (though the sticky term 'geopolitics' has not come up). Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Carter Administration, stated in a June 4, 1980 speech that: "A China confident in its ability to defend its borders against foreign aggression enhances stability in the Pacific and on the Eurasian landmass and therefore contributes to our own security and that of our allies."[160] Though at the time one of the more explicit statements of the American strategic

interest in China, Holbrooke's speech was hardly the first public commitment made by the United States. Vice President Walter Mondale had stated in Beijing on August 27, 1979, "any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests," an expression of interest that was firmed up in Harold Brown's January 1980 budget report, which stated that: "A strong, secure, and modernizing China is in the interest of the United States."[161]

2. China in the Soviet-American Strategic Balance

China's strategic importance is based on more than just its geographic location. With approximately 3.6 million men in the People's Liberation Army and a relatively small but growing nuclear capability, including now ICBMs, China is also a significant factor in the Soviet-American military balance. That China is a 'significant factor' is not necessarily an indication that the Chinese desire, or have the capacity, to play an active role in Soviet-American military competition. Nor is it likely that the Soviet Union perceives China's significance in the same light that the United States does, or will react as Americans feel a superpower should.

The conventional view among Western observers has been that the Sino-Soviet dispute and China's opening to the West have shifted the global balance of power against the Soviet Union, forced the Soviets to divert their military forces from other objectives to defend the Soviet border with

China, and caused a moderation in Soviet behavior lest China and the West step up their anti-Soviet cooperation. Leslie H. Brown has summed up these views:

> ...so long as the Soviet Union and the United States remain political and military adversaries on a global scale it is very much in American interest to see this dual threat to the Soviet Union maintained. It is an efficient and effective way to inhibit the exercise of Soviet military power in both hemispheres. It forces the dispersion of Soviet military resources, and the dedication of a significant share of them to the protection of one of the most isolated and, for the US, strategically unimportant areas on earth--the Sino-Soviet border. Soviet political freedom of action is limited as well, since Soviet decision-makers must also worry about other forms of Sino-American collaboration, short of the rather improbable extreme of collusive military attack. They must surely be conscious of the encouragement their own actions might give to a military supply arrangement from the United States to China, to the export of advanced Western technology and development assistance and, above all, to the organization of Asia under American, Chinese and Japanese auspices into an anti-Soviet bloc.[162]

There is certainly some merit in the points made by Brown--Soviet fear of the 'Chinese threat' and the linkage of that threat with the capitalist threat to socialism has already been described--but Soviet behavior has not conformed to Western expectations. The influence that the improvement in China's relations with the West would have on Soviet decision-makers has been greatly exaggerated. The points made by Brown can be broken down into two aspects of the Chinese role in the strategic balance: (1) the 'two-front war' threat as a deterrent to a Soviet attack on NATO, and (2) the actual, or potential, deterrent effect Sino-Western military cooperation has on Soviet expansionism or 'adventurism' in the Third

World. This section will focus on the first aspect, the next section will look at the second.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has made a major commitment of military resources to the 'China front.' The two phases of the Soviet buildup of forces along the Chinese border and in the Far East, and the factors that led the Soviets to decide the buildups were necessary, have already been described (see notes 108 and 122). The result, as Charles Douglas-Home observed, is that:

> The Far Eastern front absorbs more than one third of the Soviet military effort; and is no military side-show for Moscow. Although it costs three times as much to maintain a division there than it does in East Europe, the Asian units receive the latest equipment, often before it reaches the Warsaw Pact area.[163]

It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Sino-Soviet hostility, China's strategic alignment with the West, and potential increases in China's military capabilities (due to access to advanced Western technology) have forced the Soviets to 'tie down' a substantial portion of their forces along the Chinese border, and that this development is in the interest of the United States and NATO.[164]

This line of reasoning must not, however, be carried too far: it is easy to overstate the strategic benefits gained by the West from its strategic alignment with China. First of all, it is not safe to assume that the mere existence of the threat of a two-front war against NATO and China is sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack against either one of them. Richard Burt, for example,

concluded in 1979 that "the likelihood of any large-scale Soviet military action against the West has been reduced by Moscow's worry about a war on its eastern front."[165] This observation is valid, but only when viewed in the context of Soviet military strategy and doctrine.

The Soviet response to the threat of a two-front war has been to prepare to fight a two-front war, as is evident in the pattern of Soviet force deployments and in changes in Soviet military doctrine. The deterrent value of the two-front threat is not a universal or immutable feature of the international strategic environment: its effect on Soviet decision-making must be estimated on a case-by-case basis, keeping in mind that Soviet perceptions of the "correlation of forces" are not the same as American perceptions of 'systemic' determinants of behavior. The Soviets fear defeat in war more than they fear war itself. In a society and political culture which have deeply-rooted fears of invasion and which are strongly oriented toward risk-avoidance, as is the case in the Soviet Union, victory in a war launched under conditions of one's own choosing is preferable to the risk of suffering a devastating surprise attack while trying to avoid war.[166]

Caution must also be exercised in linking the Soviet build-up on the China border with Soviet force levels in the European theater. Allen S. Whiting, an observer of great perspicacity, is one of many who have carried the linkage too far:

> The Sino-Soviet confrontation drew off nearly thirty Soviet divisions that otherwise might have been deployed against NATO or objectives elsewhere. To be sure, there is no evidence to suggest that Moscow would have attacked West Europe had it not confronted a hostile China. Nevertheless, the NATO defense posture was improved because one fourth of Soviet military power was tied down on the China front.[167]

Whiting's qualification that there is no evidence Moscow would have attacked NATO were it not for China is valid, but he misses the more important pont: the Sino-Soviet dispute did not draw off any Soviet forces from the European front, new divisions were mobilized and equipped to deal with the additional threat. From the mid-1960s to 1980, about 33 divisions have been added to the Soviet ground forces (up from 140 to 173). All of this increase can be attributed to the Soviet build-up against China (at least 31, and possibly as many as 39, divisions have been added to Soviet forces around China's periphery, including divisions transferred from the central and southern USSR), but at the same time the number of divisions directed against NATO also increased (by six, one in Poland and the five in Czechoslovakia).[168]

The qualification Whiting should have made is that there is no evidence that the overall build-up in the number of Soviet ground force divisions would have been made had it not been for the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split. Western observers are not, of course, privy to the policy discussions of the Soviet Politburo, but the available evidence indicates that force level decisions in the European and Far Eastern

theaters have been based primarily upon the perceived defense needs and perceived threat in each region. Soviet force expansion and modernization in each theater has had its own dynamics, vice deployments to the China front having "drawn off" forces intended for expansion of capabilities against NATO. The Soviets do not have an inexhaustible supply of resources and manpower to devote to defense, but their capacity for expanding their forces apparently has not been overtaxed.[169]

Although the Sino-Soviet dispute and China's later shift to strategic alignment with the West did not divert Soviet forces from the European theater, now that the Soviet Union has assembled a massive military force on China's border it is essential to American security interests that those Soviet divisions (and aircraft and nuclear weapons) stay right where they are. If for some reason the Soviet perception of a military threat from China should cease to be a factor in Soviet strategic planning, at least 46 ground force divisions (though not all of them at full strength) and thousands of armored vehicles and aircraft would be freed for deployment to Europe or to Soviet military districts near the Middle East (Trans-Caucasian and Turkestan). The United States cannot, and therefore must not, rely on the potential Chinese threat to the Soviet Union to deter the Soviets from attacking NATO. Nor can the United States hope that Chinese pressure will divert Soviet forces from Eastern Europe or from the western Soviet military districts. The United States does, however, have a

crucial interest in keeping the Soviet forces deployed against China tied down.

There are three possible ways in which the Soviet perception of the 'Chinese threat' might be dispelled. The most reliable way of eliminating the potential threat from China, at least from the Soviet point of view, would be to destroy China's military capability and dismember the country. This potential Soviet threat to China was discussed at length in Section B of this chapter. The second possibility would be a decision by China that, although the Soviets are still an enemy and a threat to China, there is nothing to be gained by becoming directly involved in the Soviet-American strategic balance on the side of the West. The third possibility would be a Chinese decision to reduce the threat from the Soviet Union by opting for a rapprochement with the Soviets, the extreme form of which would be a new Sino-Soviet alliance against the West. If it is in the national interest that Soviet forces stay tied down on the Chinese border, which it is, then Chinese attitudes toward the second two possible options must be understood.

China has openly and emphatically identified the Soviet Union as its number one enemy. Although the Soviet Union is a political as well as a military threat to China, the Chinese being highly sensitive to the Soviet effort to isolate them from the international community, it is as a military threat that the Soviets are perceived to be most dangerous to China. The Chinese strategy for coping with the Soviet threat has been,

and can be expected to continue to be, the formation of a 'united front' against Soviet "social-imperialism." This Chinese strategy and the American need for a means of influencing Soviet behavior led to the realpolitic strategic alignment of the United States and China against the Soviet Union. As was pointed out earlier, this parallel interest in opposing Soviet assertiveness is still the foundation upon which Sino-American relations are being built.

The Chinese Government emphasizes the strategic importance of Sino-American relations in its public statements and it is on the international strategic situation, particularly the Soviet threat, that talks between Chinese and American leaders are usually described as "productive." In its January 1981 criticism of Ray Cline, Beijing Review asserted that: "Men of insight and vision the world over, including many Republicans and Democrats in the United States, are fully aware of China's role and weight on the global chessboard. Failing this, one can hardly claim to have a sound grasp of global strategy."[170] Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua similarly emphasized the "strategic significance" of Sino-American relations in a March 22, 1981, statement on the subject, though also emphasizing that relations must develop on the basis of the joint communique on normalization--a thinly veiled reference to American policy toward Taiwan, which irritates the Chinese Government.[171]

Analyses of Soviet strategy and of the Soviet-American strategic relationship published in the official PRC media,

as well as statements on strategic issues made by Government officials, bear a remarkable resemblance to analyses made by various Western observers (particularly those whom could be considered 'hawkish' in their views). In a November 29, 1977, speech before the United Nations General Assembly, the Vice Chairman of the Chinese delegation, Chen Chu, warned that the "strategic point" of Soviet expansionism is Europe, a view of Soviet priorities that most western observers would agree with, and further warned that: "At present, the Soviet Union is trying by every conceivable means to gain overall military superiority over the United States."[172] Other commentaries and analyses have presented the views that the Soviet Union is attempting to undermine the alliance between Western Europe and the United States by means of its detente policy and economic inducements, and that: "In the 1970s, the balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union changed in favour of the latter, and Moscow shifted from the defensive to the offensive, from avoiding direct confrontation to pressing very steadily and hard against the United States."[173]

Although the cynic might argue that such statements are too good to be true, that China must make them for some ulterior motive--perhaps to induce American concessions on the Taiwan issue--there is no doubt that the anti-Russian sentiments and fear of the Soviet threat that underlie them are, indeed, real. The Chinese Government can be forgiven for adopting Western ideas and phraseology in its strategic

analyses: U.S. officials have, after all, been known to speak of Soviet "hegemonism" and the threat from the "Polar Bear." More to the point, Michael Pillsbury has concluded that "the version of the world the Chinese describe in publications for foreign consumption and the way they talk to foreign visitors about strategic affairs bear a strong resemblence to the way they talk among themselves."[174]

The Communist Chinese media have on occasion addressed the specific issue of China's role in the Soviet-American strategic balance. A January 11, 1980, commentary on Renmin Ribao (People's Daily, the official Party paper) noted that the strategic alignment of China and the West exacerbated the Soviet 'two-front' problem:

> For political, geographical and other reasons, the Soviet Union has strategically always had to face the problem of fighting on two fronts--in the east and the west. This has been highlighted due to changes in the international situation in the past decade or so.[175]

It is tempting to read more into that statement than its apparently-deliberate vagueness will allow, but it at least shows an official awareness of an issue that is critically important to Western defense planners (and to Soviet defense planners, for that matter). A similarly enticing comment was made in the Beijing Review a year later, this time hinting at the threat of a Western military response to a Soviet attack on China:

> Moreover, launching a war against China will not be an isolated matter. If the Soviet Union were to demolish our strategic weapons bases, it will

> run the risk of being the first to launch a war, and if it were to attack China's Xinjiang or northeast, that would mean its launching of a world war in China.[176]

Such veiled Chinese comments have led some observers to conclude that reliance on Western nuclear forces ia a part of the Chinese strategy of deterrence. William V. Garner, for example, has stated: "Chinese strategists also seem to calculate that Soviet nuclear and conventional force requirements against both the US and NATO provide important restraints on Soviet military options towards China."[177] Garner's view is certainly reasonable, it is supported by the vague comments quoted above and by the well-known Chinese strategy of the 'united front' with lesser enemies against the most threatening enemy. As has been the case before, however, it is dangerous to push such a line of reasoning too far. Unless there exists a secret alliance between the United States and China specifying that an attack on one shall be an attack on the other, and committing both to some form of retaliation, it is unreasonable to expect that defense planners in either country intend to rely upon the anti-Soviet sentiments of the other to guarantee their own nation's security. There is no evidence whatsoever that such a secret pact exists.

In contrast to the ethereal Chinese remarks on the Soviet two-front war problem and the likelihood of a "world war" should China be attacked by the Soviets, the official press has also printed statements explicitly denying any

dependence on the West for the defense of China. The 1981 Beijing Review New Year's editorial on world affairs warned: "China has always sought to build its security on the basis of an independent and self-reliant defense policy and it will never resort to sheltering under an external protective umbrella."[178] This raises what has been one of the more volatile issues of Chinese domestic politics: the question of 'self-reliance' versus external support or dependence. This issue has generally been concerned with economic planning and modernization programs (whether or not to seek foreign technology, capital, and assistance), but it has undoubtedly become a point of debate in discussion on China's foreign policy and defense strategy. Despite the consolidation of power in China by the 'pragmatists' in the CCP, who have been identified with a willingness to seek external support, there remains a strong impetus for a 'self-reliant' posture.

Indications of a Chinese belief that they are capable of deterring a Soviet attack, whether conventional or nuclear, would cast doubt on the assumption that the Chinese must remain aligned with the West for strategic purposes and would also raise the possibility of China deciding to remain neutral in a Soviet-American conflict. The Beijing Review statement quoted in the previous paragraph on China's "independent and self-reliant defense policy" is one possible indicator of such a Chinese belief. In a January 1981 article on Sino-Soviet relations, Beijing Review carried warnings that China could

sacrifice all of its territory north of the Huanghe (Yellow) River and still fight on, and that the Soviets "must be prepared to fight at least 20 years" should they decide to invade China.[179] As for the nuclear threat, Su Yu[180] expressed in an August 6, 1977 Renmin Ribao article the following attitudes:

> We do not deny that nuclear weapons have great destructive power and inflict heavy casualties, but they cannot be counted on to decide the outcome of a war. The aggressors can use them to destroy a city or town, but they cannot occupy them, still less win the people's hearts; on the contrary, they will only arouse indignation from the people of the country invaded and the world's people at large.
>
> China's economic construction takes agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor and adopts the principle of combining industry with agriculture, the cities with the countryside, large and medium-sized projects with small ones, and production in peacetime with preparedness against war. Thus it cannot be destroyed by any modern weapons.[181]

Statements like these, along with the relatively low priority assigned to modernization of China's armed forces (fourth of the 'four modernizations' and suffering budget cutbacks for the last two years), has led some observers to conclude that the Chinese do indeed believe they can deter a Soviet attack. Jonathan Pollack has observed:

> Most statements have further asserted that a Soviet attack against China, whether nuclear or conventional, has already been deterred. While 'preparations against war' must continue, the likelihood of a sudden, surprise attack has diminished greatly. Soviet military capabilities, though extremely imposing and still intended in part to subjugate China, are deemed by most pronouncements as simply inadequate for the task.[182]

The pronouncements to which Pollack refers, and which were quoted above, cannot, however, be taken at face value. An oft-noted feature of the deterrence strategy of the People's Republic is that public statements out of China consistently show "an image of toughness and willingness to fight" designed to sway the "feelings the aggressor has about the potential victim" away from a willingness to attack.[183] The United States used to be the potential 'aggressor' such statements were directed at, today the Soviet Union is the power to be deterred. China also intends to maintain a certain degree of maneuverability in its relations with the United States, useful for coaxing concessions out of both Washington and Moscow, and such statements asserting China's strategic independence undoubtedly serve that purpose also.

The only firm conclusion one can draw from all this is that the evidence if sketchy and contradictory. The Chinese clearly attach great importance to their strategic alignment with the West, which is crucial for political as well as for strictly military reasons (to prevent the Soviet isolation of China, which could cause a severe deterioration in China's military position vis-a-vis the Soviets). At the same time, however, China has no intention of becoming dependent upon the West for the preservation of its security. Chinese cultural and national pride, as well as ideological principles and realistic strategic assessments, dictate against political or military dependence. Establishing the precise

balance the Chinese intend to maintain in their strategic relationship with the West is difficult because public statements on the subject almost always are made for their 'psychological deterrence' impact on the Russians. It is in China's strategic interest that the Soviets believe that an attack on China would result in war with the West also, but if the West were to stay out of the war China could defeat an invader on its own.

Aside from the question of China's strategic intentions, the mutual fear and mistrust between the Chinese and the Russians makes the prospect of Chinese neutrality in a Soviet-American conflict unlikely. The Soviet side of this issue has already been discussed (see p. 77). The Soviets have a deeply-rooted suspicion of the Chinese, reinforced by hostile Chinese propaganda and the growth of China's relations with the Western powers, and have a distinct dislike for having to tolerate neutrals when engaged in a major conflict. The Russians, for their part, would demand more than just a declaration of neutrality from the Chinese--a non-aggression pact, for example.

Does the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941 provide a precedent for a Sino-Soviet pact today? There are several parallels between the international situation that led to the 1941 pact and the situation today. Japan had shifted into strategic alignment with ideological adversaries of the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy, by signing the

Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1936 and the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940. Japan had also fought two serious border incidents with the Soviets in Manchuria in 1938 and 1939. Yet, in order to pursue Japanese interests in the Pacific, Japan was willing to sign the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union--as it turned out, just two months before Germany invaded Russia.

"Anti-hegemony" is one of the key points of China's foreign policy today, and the United States and Japan have both agreed to its inclusion in treaties and communiques with China. Though very low-key, the anti-Soviet implications of the "anti-hegemony" front China is attempting to build are not entirely unlike those of the "anti-Comintern" alignment. There is not, as of yet, a contemporary equivalent to the Tripartite Pact, but the United States has openly expressed its strategic interest in China's security and the Chinese media do carry veiled comments on strategic alignemnt with the West (see p. 129-130). China has also fought serious border incidents with the Russians, though not on the scale of the Japanese-Soviet clashes. China has much less of a common ideological cause with its Western partners than Japan had with Germany and Italy, so it is not unreasonable to expect that China would be willing--as was Japan--to pursue its own national interest by remaining neutral while its de facto allies went to war with the Soviets.

Historical precedent may suggest possibilities, but it cannot predict probabilities. In this case, the postulated

scenario of a sudden Chinese decision to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, the probability of such an eventuality must be assessed as very low. The Chinese do not appear to trust the Russians enough to be willing to enter into such a risky pact from a position of marked military inferiority. Statements in the official media regularly attack Soviet treaties as being "nothing less than shackles for the third world countries, which serve to aid Soviet intervention and conquest as the occasion arises," and warn that "no agreement or negotiation can stop the Soviet hegemonists from pursuing their policies of aggression and expansion."[184] Though such statements are obviously intended to disrupt the Soviet effort to isolate China by means of detente and 'friendship treaties' with countries around China's periphery, they also reflect underlying Chinese attitudes, as Kenneth Lieberthal has pointed out:

> This perspective explains why the Chinese will continue to refuse Soviet offers for a treaty on nonaggression and the nonuse of force, for Peking believes that Moscow will inevitably try to use the treaty to undermine China's sovereignty.[185]

The example of the 1941 Soviet-Japanese pact adds credence to these Chinese fears: as soon as the Soviets had defeated the Germans and redeployed their forces, they attacked the Japanese in Manchuria. The Russians did not attack Japan only, or even primarily, out of loyalty to their Western allies: they had old scores to settle with the Japanese, as well as the lucrative territorial gains awaiting their conquest. The same motives would apply to China today.

It is highly unlikely that the Chinese would abandon their strategy of the 'united front' (alignment with lesser rivals against the primary threat) to enter into a dangerous nonaggression pact with their 'number one enemy': the Soviet Union. This possibility can be discounted as a potential threat to the American interest in keeping the Soviet divisions on the Chinese border tied down where they are. There is a third possibility, as was mentioned earlier, that must be examined. That is the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, an actual shift by the Chinese to strategic alignment with the Soviets against the West.

Motives for China to seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union are not difficult to postulate. China's security would be enhanced by the relaxation of tensions with the country most threatening to China, China would gain flexibility and leverage in the international political arena, and China's economic development would benefit from both of the first two benefits, due to less need for defense allocations and less inhibitions on the part of the West to develop economic relations with China (and more incentives to do so). For these reasons, most Western observers do not rule out the possibility of China seeking 'detente' (in the strict sense of a relaxation of tensions) or a 'limited accommodation' with the Soviet Union.[186] It is pertinent to note, in this regard, that the Chinese and the Soviets have been able to conclude a number of agreements covering trade, river navigation, and railway

transportation over the past two decades, despite the persistence of their dispute.

A limited detente would not necessarily threaten the United States strategic interest in keeping Soviet forces tied down on the Sino-Soviet border. Such a detente certainly would not be able to resolve the fundamental differences between China and the Soviet Union that led to their split in the first place. A relaxation of Sino-Soviet tensions would not erase the fact, as the Chinese well know, of massive Soviet military forces along the Chinese border or the existence of Soviet-armed clients around the southern periphery of China. China has been highly critical of Soviet motives in seeking detente with the West, and certainly would not expect the Soviets to change their style of diplomacy just to improve relations with China, a much weaker power. As for the Soviets, unless China were to drop its strategic alignment with the West and take some sort of overt action to indicate alignment with the Soviet Union--for example, a mutual defense or military cooperation clause in a friendship treaty with Russia, as the Soviet treaties with India and Afghanistan have--the Soviet forces along China's borders would have to stay in place (to maintain pressure on China, in accordance with the 'dual strategy' described earlier, as well as for defense).

Although a Chinese decision to seek a lessening of tensions with the Soviet Union is a real possibility, it is not likely that there will be a return to a Sino-Soviet alliance as existed in the 1950s. Resurrection of the Sino-Soviet

alliance would require a drastic revision of the foreign policy and defense strategies of the Soviet Union, China, or both. A prerequisite for major shifts in Chinese or Soviet strategy would be a substantial change in the perceptions of security threats and the strategic balance (the 'correlation of forces') held by Chinese and Soviet leaders. There are, of course, numerous other factors contributing to the tensions between China and Russia, and these could also preclude a far-reaching rapprochement, but resolution of the military-strategic aspect of the dispute is the one irreducible requirement for a renewed alliance.[187]

There are several possible scenarios for the shift in Chinese and Soviet threat perceptions and defense strategies that would be necessary for China to become aligned with the Soviet Union against the West. The Soviet Union would like to be able to force a change in China's policies, by means of its 'dual strategy' of containment and coexistence, in order to gain a rapprochement on Soviet terms. This is unlikely to occur, as demonstrated by China's stiffening resistence to increasing Soviet pressure over the past two decades. The Soviets have also left open the option to force a "rapproachement" through military intervention in China, probably to exploit political collapse--revolution or a power struggle--and put in place a 'pro-Soviet' regime. A military solution to the 'China problem' by the Soviets, while a real possibility, would only take place under the unique combination

of propitious circumstances described earlier--circumstances which are, admittedly, unlikely to occur.

There are two other possible changes in the Chinese perception of China's vulnerability and strategic position which could lead to a decision for a rapproachement with the Soviet Union. These are 'non-coercive' scenarios, in that the change in China's strategy is not forced upon China by Soviet power. The first of these would be for China to succeed in building up its own military forces to the point that it no longer considered the Soviet Union to be a threat to its security. This is certainly the scenario that China's leaders have in mind. Soviet terms for a rapprochement have been too onerous and the Soviet application of crude military pressure on China has been too reminiscent of the humiliations China suffered in the past for the Chinese to be willing to submit to an 'unequal rapprochement.' Donald Zagoria has observed that "the Chinese know the Russians too well to think that they can deal with the Soviet Union from a position of weakness, and the Chinese are now almost completely encircled by the Soviets."[188]

Chinese statements on the inability of the Soivet Union to conquer China and the relative invulnerability of China's economy to destruction by nuclear weapons notwithstanding, China's leaders do not yet have enough confidence in the ability of their armed forces to deter Soviet attack to be willing to abandon strategic alignment with the West for an

alliance with the Soviet Union. Should China somehow be able to equalize the Sino-Soviet strategic balance, at least to the extent that the Soviets cannot hope to intimidate China, the strategic value of ties with the West would be greatly diminished.[189] Thomas W. Robinson has concluded that this is precisely the strategy being pursued by Beijing: "to use the Americans to fend off the Russians and then help build up China's economy and then, when the time is right, to strike a bargain with the Kremlin."[190]

The problem with this scenario is that, barring a collapse of the Soviet economy or internal political disorder on a scale the Soviet Union has not seen in almost fifty years, the Russians will not allow China to upset their present preponderance of power. Soviet policy toward China is not based solely on expansionist motives: the Soviets perceive China to be a military threat to their homeland--a threat they believe is growing both in terms of might and in terms of the intensity of hostility to the Soviet Union. Twice within the last twenty years the Soviets have reacted to a perceived increase in the threat from China by building up their forces along the Sino-Soviet border. Each time the margin of Soviet superiority over China widened. From the Soviet point of view, to allow China to achieve nuclear or conventional parity is not just to forsake an opportunity for expansion, it is also to expose the Russian motherland to devastation by a foe of unrelenting hostility. Add to

this the threat from the capitalist camp, waiting for the opportunity to destroy socialism, and the remoteness of the possibility of the Soviets consenting to a rapprochement with China as strategic equals becomes apparent.

The second 'non-coercive' scenario for a Chinese decision to shift alignment from the West to the Soviet Union is the possibility that China's perception of the 'number one enemy' might shift from Russia to one of the Western powers, presumably the United States, or to the West as a whole. Should such a shift in China's threat perceptions occur, the principles of the 'united front' doctrine would dictate a shift to strategic alignment with the lesser enemy--the Soviet Union. This is the position China was in when Mao Zedong journeyed to Moscow in December 1949 to negotiate an alliance with the Soviet Union. It is highly unlikely that China would decide to stand alone against two enemies other than to "watch two tigers fights" (that is, to stay neutral in a Soviet-American war, a possibility already discounted).[191] A. Doak Barnett has concluded that a shift in China's threat perceptions would be the only likely cause of a Sino-Soviet alliance against the West:

> Such a rapprochement would probably only become a serious danger if, at some point, China concluded that the United States--or a rearmed Japan--posed a greater and more immediate potential military threat to China than the Soviet Union does. US policy can and should try to insure that this will not occur.[192]

Although it is unlikely that the Chinese perception of the Soviet Union as their 'number one enemy' will change

in the near future, over the longer-term this cannot be stated with such assurance. There are serious constraints on the ability of the United States to directly influence China's threat perceptions, as Barnett recommended. Disagreements between the United States and China on a number of international questions, not the least of which is the status and future of Taiwan, and potential disputes between China and American allies in Asia cannot lie dormant indefinitely. Circumstances in which the United States believes military action must be taken to defend its national interest despite the vehement objections of Beijing are not difficult to imagine: in 1950 the United States failed to appreciate the seriousness of China's warning that it could not tolerate the approach of United Nations forces to its frontier, with severe consequences for American troops when the Chinese 'volunteers' struck. There are too many conflicts simmering among and within China's neighbors for it to be safe to assume that in every potential conflict the United States and China will always perceive a common need to oppose the Soviet Union as a higher priority than their own direct interests in the conflicts. Adroit Soviet diplomacy during such a test of wills between the United States and China could well result in a shift in China's perception of its 'number one enemy.'

To sum up the points made in this sub-section: The United States does have a security interest in China derived from China's role in the Soviet-American strategic balance. It is in America's interest for the Soviet forces deployed

on the Sino-Soviet border to stay tied down there. On the other hand, the United States should not expect that the threat of a two-front war will deter the Soviet Union from attacking NATO should the circumstances in Europe convince the Soviets such an attack would succeed. Neither can the United States expect that fighting between Russian and China would divert Soviet forces from the European front. Both the United States and China must understand that it is the Soviet intention to fight and win a two-front war if such a conflict cannot be avoided except at the scarifice of vital Soviet interests.

Although it is in the interest of the United States for the Soviet forces on the Chinese border to remain there, the United States must not assume those forces have been cemented in place as a Maginot Line against the Chinese. There are circumstances, admittedly remote but nonetheless demanding consideration, in which the Soviet Union would perceive enough of a diminution of the potential threat from China that it could safely redeploy its forces from the Sino-Soviet border to other theaters. Such circumstances could well arise out of a local conflict in which the United States had intervened to protect its interests against a threat not even emanating from either Russia or China.

The Sino-Soviet dispute will probably remain irreconcilable, though a slight relaxation of tensions is a distinct possibility. While it is reasonable to expect that a

Sino-Soviet rapprochement would not result in an anti-American alliance, this should not be relied upon as a basis for United States defense planning--for the reason given in the previous paragraph. The strategic alignment of China with the West has complicated Moscow's defense planning and forced the Soviet Union to devote substantial resources to the defense of all of its frontiers, but the fact that the Soviet Union has been able to make such large commitments of its resources to defense--and apparently will continue to be able to do so--demands that the United States not base its own force level decisions on the calculation that China's armed forces can be added into the Soviet-American strategic balance as substitutes or surrogates for American forces.[193]

3. China and Containment of Soviet Expansionism

Secretary of State Alexander Haig has made it clear that containment of Soviet expansionism is to be a high priority objective of the Reagan Administration:

> A major focus of American policy must be the Soviet Union, not because of ideological preoccupation but simply because Moscow is the greatest source of international insecurity today. Let us be plain about it: Soviet promotion of violence as the instrument of change constitutes the greatest danger to world peace....
>
> Our objective must be to restore the prospects for peaceful resolution of conflict. We can do this by demonstrating to the Soviet Union that aggressive and violent behavior will threaten Moscow's own interests....
>
> Only the United States has the pivotal strength to convince the Soviets--and their proxies--that violence will not advance their cause. Only the United States has the power to persuade the Soviet leaders that improved

> relations with us serve Soviet as well as American interests. We have a right, indeed a duty, to insist that the Soviets support a peaceful international order, that they abide by treaties, and that they respect reciprocity. A more constructive Soviet behavior in these areas will surely provide the basis for a more productive East-West dialogue.[194]

Although the April 24, 1981 speech in which Secretary Haig made these statements was titled "A New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy," the 'new direction' is more in the realm of tactics and priorities than in strategy or fundamental objectives. Every American administration since the end of the Second World War has committed itself in some manner to the policy of containment of Soviet expansionism.[195]

China has been proposed as a partner for the United States in the containment of Soviet expansionism. Ross Terrill, for example, has observed that: "China is much closer to the West than six months ago...and in some ways China promises to be a staunch partner in the containment of a USSR whose intentions it has perhaps read more accurately than the West has."[196] Such sentiments are reflected in policy statements by Reagan Administration officials (as in statements by the previous three administrations). Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs stated on April 24, 1981, concerning the foreign policies of China and the United States, that: "Our policies toward Soviet expansion and hegemonism run on parallel tracks."[197] The United States has, in effect, gone on record as having a security interest in China based on the broader American interest in the containment of Soviet expansionism.

This American security interest in China has two aspects. The first is the deterrent effect China's strategic alignment with the West has on Soviet behavior as a result of the shift in the Soviet-American balance of power. China's role in the Soviet-American strategic balance was discussed at length in the previous sub-section. As was noted, the Soviet response to China's alignment with the West has been to expand its military forces as much as Soviet leaders felt was necessary to prevent a diminution of the Soviet preponderence of power over China. The mere fact of a Sino-Western alignment does not deter the Soviets from taking action, as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates.

The second aspect of the American interest in China as a partner in containment is the possibility of Sino-American consultations, perhaps even coordinated policies, on how best to deter Soviet intervention in specific instances. Two questions must be asked regarding such a coordinated containment policy: Would China be an effective partner, from the point of view of American interests, in the containment of Russia? If a Sino-American collaboration were possible, would it be effective in deterring the Soviets from further aggression?

China's foreign policy strategy, based as it is on the 'united front' doctrine, at least makes China a de facto partner in the containment of the Soviet Union whether or not there is an explicit Sino-American agreement on such a

partnership. Commentaries in the Communist Chinese media on the Soviet threat identify the same targets and strategies as many Western analyses of Soviet expansionism, perhaps for the purpose of reinforcing the Western perception of shared strategic interests with China, but also certainly reflecting the perceptions of China's leadership.[198]

Since the mid-1960s, an editorial in Renmin Ribao asserted, "a dominant feature of Soviet foreign policy has been the pursuance of an offensive strategy for global expansion."[199] Although there is disagreement among Western observers as to whether "global expansion" is indeed the Soviet goal, there is considerable agreement that the Third World has been the principal target of Soviet efforts since control over Eastern Europe was consolidated in the late 1940s. The Chinese view of Soviet global strategy supports this Western perception:

> The Soviet plan for the areas flanking Europe, that is the Middle Wast and North Africa, has been to make use of the existing political unrest to expand its influence, to prop up pro-Soviet regimes, to seize military bases and to conclude treaties of a military nature so as to outflank Europe.[200]

The Soviet tactic of exploiting "existing political unrest" for its own strategic purposes is what has been labeled "opportunism" in the West, and the Chinese press has shown an awareness of the specific cases of such Soviet behavior which aroused concern in the West:

> ...during a number of local conflicts in the past few years, including the 1975 Angola war and the 1977 Ogaden war, the Soviet Union demonstrated

time and again its ability to support a proxy war in a third world country by a massive sealift and airlift, delivering huge quantities of arms and ammunition within a very short time.[201]

It is in Asia, of course, that Soviet behavior arouses the greatest concern among China's leaders. The Chinese assessment of current Soviet foreign policy priorities is similar to that of the Western observers quoted earlier (see page 57), that because of the stalemate in Europe and Soviet concern for the Chinese challenge the Russians have directed their attention to Asia as a target for expansion. Warns the Beijing Review:

> It is far from adequate today to repeat that the emphasis of Soviet strategy lies in Europe. Given the stalemated confrontation in Europe, the Kremlin, emobldened by the enervated reactions of the West to its advances, has turned away to strengthen its strategic dispositions in the East.[202]

Outflanking Europe is, however, only one of the Soviet goals in pursuing expansion in Asia. The other Soviet goal, the one that most worries Beijing, is to "encircle and isolate" China. The Chinese media regularly complain that:

> ...the Soviet Union has adopted a policy of encircling and isolating China. It has massed large numbers of troops along the Sino-Soviet borders and in Mongolia and has occupied the Wakhan region of Afghanistan bordering on China. The Soviet Union has also made use of Vietnam to harass China's southern borders, thus attempting to encircle China with a two-pronged pincer movement to create an atmosphere of uneasiness and to undermine her modernization drive. In addition, it has tried to sow discord between China on the one hand and Japan, the United States and the Southeast Asian countries on the other in an attempt to isolate China.[203]

Thus, Chinese perceptions of Soviet strategy suggest the possibility of a broad commonality of purpose with the West, and the United States in particular, in containment of Soviet expansionism. This commonality of purpose has, in fact, been expressed in the public descriptions of private conversations between American and Chinese leaders on global strategic issues. Common purpose has not, however, resulted in common policies for containing the Soviet threat. China has, at least in statements in the press, indicated an awareness of the need for greater coordination of effort in countering the Soviets:

> ...in order to check and defeat Soviet expansion, it is necessary to further strengthen the concerted efforts of the countries of the Asian and Pacific region and for this it is very important that the people and governments of the countries concerned have a maximum consensus on problems related to the destiny of their own region.[204]

Identification of common purpose and China's recognition that "concerted efforts" and a "consensus on problems" are needed to contain the Soviets allow the conclusion that it is in the national interest for the United States to engage in consultation with China's leaders for the purpose of developing a common policy for deterring or countering Soviet aggression.

Which brings up the second question: could Sino-American collaboration produce a policy which would effectively deter the Soviet Union from expansionist behavior? There are several reasons to believe that it cannot do so.

As was pointed out before, it is unlikely that China will divert Soviet military forces from other important missions, a point which Allen Whiting has specifically linked to China's role in containment of Russia.[205] Domestic political instability in China has in the past, and may well again in the future, limit China's role as a regional or global power.[206] As was also noted earlier, the United States and China have much different tactics for dealing with the Soviet Union: the Americans preferring to induce the Soviets into behaving themselves by reassuring Russian paranoia and with promises of the 'good life' of Western prosperity through trade, while the Chinese believe that only a tough, even belligerent, and uncompromising stance will convince the Russians of one's resolve to resist their expansionist aspirations. Common purpose and common strategy could founder on divergent tactics, or even on different styles in implementing the same basic tactics. China's united front may not be able to speak with one voice (a problem the Chinese Communist Party experienced in trying to form united fronts against the Japanese).

The apparent assumption that the Soviet response to a Sino-Western common policy will be one of moderation and conciliation must also be questioned. Jiri Valenta has concluded that Soviet decision-makers probably did consider China's likely reaction (and how it would affect Soviet interests) prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968,[207] but the consequences the Politburo may have feared at the

time have all come to pass in the years since then. A Sino-American common containment policy would have to be fairly explicit in defining the adverse consequences the Soviets would suffer as the price for aggression. Richard Pipes has warned: "In principle, it does not pay to be too clever with Russian politicians: they are inclined to interpret ambiguity as equivocation, equivocation as weakness, and weakness as a signal to act."[208] Writing in 1972, Pipes could well have been describing the circumstances at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[209] The U.S. government's reaction to events in Poland over the last year and the policies adopted by both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have been much more appropriate in this regard.

The point is that the structure of the international system does not in itself deter the Soviet Union from taking action. Soviet decision-makers, like national leaders everywhere, evaluate their opportunities and risks on a case-by-case basis. Long-range consequences and the possibility of retaliation or sanctions from the West and China are, of course, considered in each case, but not as factors that arise inevitably from the structure of relationships in the international system. A persuasive argument can in fact be made that, if anything, the structure of the international system, particularly the strategic alignment of China with the West, will impel the Soviet Union to take action to prevent the status quo from stabilizing in a form adverse to Soviet expansionist objectives.[210]

Sino-American cooperation on the containment of Soviet expansionism, to be effective, must be willing, and must state explicitly that it is willing, to directly confront the Soviet Union whenever and wherever the Soviets attempt to exploit local conflicts to expand their own influence or control by military means. Such a conclusion inevitably raises the criticism of being "brinksmanship" and advocacy of abandonment of detente in favor of a return to the cold war. These are points frequently brought up in the Soviet press whenever a Western leader or observer has the temerity to suggest that detente must entail a moderation of Soviet as well as of Western behavior.

The brinksmanship and return to the cold war arguments are based on a view of the world that is either hopelessly oversimplified or else naive to the point of being foolhardy. Though the expression itself fell out of favor, the phenomenon described by brinksmanship remains a feature of international politics. The threat of a crisis reaching the brink of war can be avoided by any of three means: by the Soviet Union of its own accord abandoning the ideology of its rulers and the lessons it has learned through its history just to become friends with the West, by the West backing down whenever the Soviet Union makes a thrust, or by the West and China firmly resisting every Soviet probe for opportunities for expansion. The first possibility is unlikely to occur, the second requires abandonment of the national interest,

only the third approach would appear to offer the prospect of containment without threat of war.

Not all features of detente and the cold war are mutually exclusive. This is the myth that led to the disillusionment with detente in the United States. The Soviet Union has made its point of view clear, as was pointed out earlier: detente is limited to the reduction of superpower tensions and cannot, indeed must not, be construed as in any way limiting Soviet intervention in Third World conflicts (the conflicts and Soviet intervention in them being preordained by history). On the other hand, from the Soviet point of view, Western activities in the Third World must be linked with detente. Thus, to assume that detente or a renewed cold war are the only two policy choices we face is to ignore the complexity of the international political environment--many local conflicts are beyond the power of the superpowers to control, or even anticipate--and is also tacit acceptance of the Soviet version of the ground rules for detente.

The essence of the Soviet version of detente is that east-west tensions are reduced by a reduction in the linkages drawn by the West, not by a moderation in Soviet behavior. Herein lies the key to a policy for containment of Soviet expansionism which can be carried out within the context of a continuing search for detente. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's January 1981 analysis of foreign policy and world affairs shows the Soviet sensitivity to the 'linkages' issue:

> In the United States, or to be more precise, among those who determine U.S. foreign policy, a thesis has circulated as of late to the effect that in examining a particular issue it is necessary to take into account its link with other problems or events in international life, in particular those actions by the Soviet Union....But if you disengage yourself from universal scales and take a sober look at the development of international events over a long term, it becomes obvious that with this 'linkage' it is essentially impossible to resolve a single international problem....If this concept were permitted to be introduced into international political practice to the advantage of someone's narrow interests--and we, but not we alone, have frequently had occasion to achieve this--a vicious circle would then inevitably develop around the process to solve urgent international problems and the overall state of affairs in the world would be deadlocked, with all the ensuing consequences.
>
> Conversely, the opposite concept--specifically, that the solution of any specific problem, particularly if it is an important one, can facilitate the solution of other questions--is perfectly justified.[211]

The tone of Gromyko's analysis is moderate, perhaps even conciliatory, but that cannot be mistaken for a change in the Soviet attitude toward the West or for a change in the Soviet approach to detente. The warning of the "ensuing consequences" should the linkages apporach be adopted is a thinly-veiled reference to the Soviet assertion that the West has but two choices: detente, as defined by the Soviets, or a renewed cold war. Gromyko's remarks are an attempt to preserve the previous pattern of detente, in which the Soviet Union, not the West, draws the linkages.

As if to confirm Gromyko's fears, the Reagan Administration has adopted a 'linkages' approach to relations with

the Soviet Union. Specifically, Secretary of State Haig has publicly remarked that the "Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations" signed May 29, 1972 must be observed by the Soviet Union before further progress can be made on a number of issues of interest to the Soviet Union. Secretary Haig is reported by the Washington Post to have stated that a Soviet demonstration of restraint in the Third World and a new understanding on the limits of Soviet activities would be essential conditions for future negotiations.[212] Although the record of the West, including the United States, in holding to such a linkage policy is not encouraging--the West has as much interest in compartmentalizing the various aspects of east-west relations as does the Soviet Union--it is clear that from the Soviet point of view a Western 'linkages' approach undercuts many of the advantages to be gained from detente.

The Soviet Union also confronts the 'linkages' problem in its relations with China. The Chinese are adamant that an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations depends upon Soviet abandonment of its policy of containment and isolation of China. China broke off discussions on the normalization of relations with the Soviets after the invasion of Afghanistan, talks which supposedly opened as a result of a moderation in China's preconditions for negotiations.[213] The Chinese almost certainly felt they had been the victims of the same Soviet strategy they had been warning the West against:

> In plain words, it wants others to stick to 'detente' while it single-mindedly pursues expansionism. It alone reserves the freedom to

> engage in flagrant aggression and expansion whenever and wherever it chooses, in the name of "supporting the national-liberation movement" or "supporting social change" in other countries. Whoever objects to such acts is labelled "the enemy of detente."[214]

Although the People's Republic has made overtures to the Soviet Union to resume the talks, the Chinese have not, as far as is known, again dropped the troop withdrawal precondition,[215] nor have they stopped insisting that Soviet troops must be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

The 'linkage' concept may offer a basis for a Sino-American strategy for deterring Soviet aggression, but it is not clear such a policy would succeed in moderating Soviet behavior. Historical precedent would suggest that, rather than adapting their behavior to the Sino-American linkage policy, the Soviets would make every effort to destroy the policy. The classic pattern of Soviet diplomacy--brute power and exaggerated inducements--would undoubtedly be the Soviet response: brute power in the form of psychological pressure on Western leaders and their constituencies, pressure applied by dire warnings of the consequences of a new cold war backed by typical Russian sabre-rattling made visible by increased force deployments; inducements in the form of trade and investment offers, arms limitations proposals, and the promise of a glorious new world free of tensions. The Soviet Union is using such tactics right now in an attempt to thwart the modernization of NATO's nuclear weapon force and preserve the Soviet preponderance in theater nuclear weapons.

The various difficulties which have been discussed above forewarn that Sino-American collaboration will not be a panacea for the problem of Soviet expansionism. This is not to say, however, that the United States and China should not attempt cooperative efforts at deterring Soviet intervention in local conflicts. It is in the national interest for the United States to pursue with China common policies for the containment of Soviet expansionism. Otherwise, there is a risk of China and America inadvertently working at cross purposes, sending the wrong signals to Moscow, thereby inviting Soviet intervention in conflicts. More important than collaboration with China, though, is clarity of purpose and resolve on the part of the United States. Whether or not the United States works with China on this issue, the Soviet Union can be expected to apply pressure on American leaders, directly and through the American public--to which the Soviets have enviable access--raising the spectre of a return to the cold war as the only alternative to detente on Soviet terms. The temptation will be to blame the Soviet pressure on American ties with China, a theme the Soviet Union must be expected to play upon. To yield to that temptation would be a grave error, just as it would be a grave error for Western Europe to abandon ties with the United States for Soviet inducements. Sino-American ties are not the issue: Soviet expansionism is the issue.

4. China and Soviet-American Arms Limitations

The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is highly complex: the two superpowers are at once adversaries, competing for power and influence, and partners, attempting to solve, or at least manage, a panoply of global problems--not the least of which is the prevention of thermonuclear war. The preceding two sections focused on the adversary side of Soviet-American relations: the strategic balance and Soviet expansionism. This section and the next will look at the mutual interests America and the Soviet Union share in arms control and the reduction of tensions. Whether or not Soviet or American leaders make a conscious decision to include China in their calculations of mutual interests, it is evident that each of the superpowers includes the 'China factor' in its own perception of interests.

Arms control and disarmament are, of course, issues that affect every nation on earth--not just the two superpowers. But because of their tremendous nuclear arsenals, the United States and the Soviet Union do have specific bilateral interests, and responsibilities, in the limitation of strategic weapons. China has a role, even if only one of non-participation, in both the global and bilateral Soviet-American aspects of the arms control problem due to its possession of nuclear weapons. This section will examine China's role in Soviet-American arms limitation efforts, broad global efforts will be discussed in part E.

Although the Reagan Administration has taken a 'hard-line' approach to relations with the Soviet Union, there has not been an abandonment of arms control as a fundamental interest shared by the superpowers. The new administration has expressed a willingness to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union in two areas of arms limitations--strategic arms limitations (SALT) and European theater nuclear forces (TNF) limitations--both of which have previously been the subject of Soviet-American talks. Because the two areas are closely related, and because China's nuclear force has an impact on both talks, they will be examined herein. Additionally, a third area which has been negotiated before, but is currently a dormant issue, will be mentioned for the same reasons: mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in the European theater.

The first priority of the Reagan Administration has been to ensure that its negotiating position in any future SALT talks is not burdened by implied commitment to Carter Administration policies with which it disagrees. During the election campaign, in an interview on September 30, 1980, Ronald Reagan emphasized his view that the SALT II treaty was "fatally flawed" and that he would, if elected, scrap it and negotiate a new one. Now that he is in office, President Reagan has indeed scrapped the SALT II treaty and the State Department has issued a statement that the United States is not legally bound by its provisions, though the Administration has not formally renounced it (the treaty was 'scrapped'

by not sending it to the new Congress for 'advise and consent' prior to ratification) and has thus far left open the possibility of using SALT II provisions as starting points for talks on a new treaty. The administration has also decided to take its time in opening the next round of SALT talks, primarily so that it can carefully prepare its negotiating strategy, but also because the American bargaining position should be much stronger after the Regan defense budget has passed (including decisions on new ICBMs, bombers, and related systems) and because the U.S. will not appear overly eager to reach an agreement.[216]

As for the Soviet Union, it also appears interested in resuming the SALT talks, despite earlier warnings that the SALT II treaty must be ratified before new talks could begin. Soviet leaders have on several occasions pressed the Reagan Administration to enter into new talks quickly, which is probably a tactical and propaganda ploy to manipulate American and European public opinion, but which also reflects an earnest desire to hold the talks (though, it should be pointed out, the talks themselves could well be a ploy to erode the American consensus for a defense build-up). Despite the apparent Soviet interest in talks, the initial contact the Reagan Administration had with the Russians--at the Standing Consultative Commission (which monitors SALT compliance) meeting in May 1981--did not go well due to Soviet intransigence on a number of long-standing issues. Thus, while it is

almost certain that the SALT talks will be reopened, it is equally certain that they will be at least as difficult and protracted as any of the previous SALT rounds.[217]

There was not a delegation from the People's Republic of China present at the SALT I negotiations, but China, in particular the superpowers' relations with China, weighed heavily on the course and outcome of the talks. John Newhouse has credited the Nixon Administration's opening to China as having been a decisive factor in the conclusion of the SALT I accords. Describing the impact of Henry Kissinger's secrete trip to Beining in 1971, Newhouse observes:

> Triangular politics had started. Indeed, the United States was playing at old-fashioned Real-politik, hitherto an alien style. The SALT agreement reached on May 26, 1972 was the product of multiple purposes and forces of which none may have been more critical than Washington's revival of nineteenth-century power politics.[218]

Earlier in the SALT I negotiations, Newhouse has also observed, the Soviet Union had felt constrained from engaging in serious talks with the United States until a Sino-Soviet dialogue had been opened on the border issue--which had erupted into armed clashes in 1969.[219] Throughout his memoirs of his years as National Security Advisor to President Nixon, Henry Kissinger remarks on the relationship between the American opening to China and the Soviet-American SALT talks, though he denies having opened relations with China for the purpose of playing the 'China card' against the Russians. Nevertheless, it is clear from his description of the policy decisions

made during those years that the wording and timing of public statements of American policy, and the scheduling of various visits and talks, were all carefully designed so as to have maximum impact on Soviet leaders.[220]

This could be termed the 'positive' aspect of China's role in Soviet-American arms limitations efforts. Due to its geopolitical importance, China provided somewhat of an incentive for the two superpowers to conclude a SALT agreement. But there has also been a 'negative' aspect to China's influence on Soviet-American arms cooperation. As was described earlier, the Soviet perception of an increasingly dangerous threat from China has twice led to large-scale build-ups of Soviet forces directed against China. Undoubtedly a portion of the build-up in Soviet strategic arms, perhaps even a significant proportion of it, has been directed against China. The problem is that, except in the case of relatively short-range delivery systems in place near the China frontier, it is exceedingly difficult to draw a firm distinction between weapons aimed at China and weapons aimed at the West. The result, as Jeremy J. Stone astutely foresaw in 1967, is that China contributes to the Soviet-American arms race:

> China will therefore probably trigger a new round of expenditures on active defenses that might--but only might--have been avoided had the Chinese detonation never occurred. Thus its impact on the superpowers' arms competition is likely to be a catalytic one: one that encourages expenditures disproportionate to its threat. These expenditures will be produced through exaggerated responses and through the reciprocal perception in each superpower of the other's reactions and of

> the political and strategic threats that these pose.[221]

China has been a factor in Soviet arms control policy since the late 1950s when disagreements between the two allies on relations with the West and on military and revolutionary strategy spilled over from the realm of ideological debate into matters of national policy. Policy disputes over Soviet arms control policy and the development of nuclear weapons by China appears, in fact, to have been a major (if not the major) cause of the Sino-Soviet split.[222] The role that China played in Soviet arms control policy through the mid-1960s has been summarized well by Helmut Sonnenfeldt:

> ...it would be overdrawing the case to say that the Chinese challenge has driven the Soviet Union 'westward' in its orientation. The most that seems warranted is that in several instances the Soviets have been prepared to conclude an agreement or arrangement that they judged to be in their national interest even though they knew it to be objectionable to the Chinese and realized that they would come under attack from Peking.[223]

After the split with China had become open and irreconcilable over the near-term, the Soviet Union did use the arms control issue as an element of its 'dual strategy' toward China, as Sonnenfeldt also noted: "As a very general proposition, it seems safe to conclude that disarmament proposals have at various times played a role in Moscow's tactical conduct of the dispute with the Chinese, sometimes as a stick, sometimes as a carrot."[224]

Once China had exploded an atomic device of its own (October 1964), the potential nuclear threat from China became

an element in Soviet arms control policy as well as in Soviet defense policy. The escalation in Sino-Soviet tensions in the late 1960s, which culminated in the March 1969 border clashes, led to a Soviet attempt to use the SALT negotiations as the basis for a Soviet-American alliance against China. The Soviets made this attempt in a July 10, 1970 proposal to the United States, according to John Newhouse:

> A stunning glimpse of Moscow's China phobia was provided; on learning of plans for some 'provocative' action or attack, the two sides--the United States and the Soviet Union--would take joint steps to prevent it or, if too late, joint retaliatory action to punish the guilty party. The Soviets, in effect, were proposing no less than a superpower alliance against other nuclear powers. Although clearly aimed at China, the proposal risked arousing NATO, whose membership includes two other nuclear powers, Britain and France. The Soviets never would explain what might constitute provocative actions. Washington rejected the idea immediately...[225]

Washington not only rejected this Soviet proposal, it reassured China that the United States would not collude with the Soviet Union against the Chinese.[226] Nevertheless, as this incident illustrates, and as Thomas W. Wolfe concludes in his study of the SALT negotiations, one of the Soviet objectives in SALT was to forestall a Sino-American rapprochement in order to "keep China politically and militarily isolated."[227]

The Soviet Union failed in its attempt to prevent a Sino-American rapprochement, but continues in its attempt to link American policy toward China with Soviet willingness to negotiate arms limitations. On June 17, 1979, Pravda warned that: "Alignment with China on an anti-Soviet basis would

rule out the possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union in the matter of reducing the danger of a nuclear war and, of course, of limiting armaments."[228] The next day President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev signed the Salt II treaty in Vienna. A similar warning would be made in December 1979, however, after Vice President Mondale made his remarks in Beijing in August on American interest in China's security:

> However, will it want to do so, at the risk of arousing the displeasure of its 'Beijing friends?' Which will prove the stronger: sensitivity to pressure from Beijing which has characterized the present administration, or concern for the really important aspects of mankind's present and future?[229]

These rhetorical questions on American interest in arms limitations with the Soviet Union attempt to establish the mutually exclusive 'SALT or China' policy linkage the Soviets still desire. Such 'SALT *or* China' warnings have been accompanied by a campaign of vituperative criticism of China's opposition to various arms control efforts, especially those proposed by the Soviet Union.[230]

In contrast to Soviet concerns, China has played a small role in the formulation of American strategic arms limitation policy. The most important reason for this is that until May 1980, when China tested its first ICBMs, the Chinese lacked a delivery system that could threaten the United States; whereas the Soviet Union had been threatened by the small Chinese nuclear force since 1964. Closely related to this point is the fact that since the end of the Korean War it has not been Americans and Chinese, but rather

Russians and Chinese, shooting at each other. In 1967, Jeremy Stone's assessment of China's impact on American arms control policy concluded that "for the most part, her impact on arms control is what we let it be, what we make it."[231] In retrospect it is apparent that, for the most part, as he hedged, Stone has been correct in that assessment.

For a short while during the mid-1960s China did, at least in public policy debates, play a role in American strategic arms policy. The issue at the time was whether or not the United States should deploy an anti-ballistic missile system, given the widely-held belief that the Soviet Union had already tested and deployed a first-generation system of its own. Because of the cost and dubious reliability of a full-scale system, and because of pressure to negotiate an ABM treaty with Moscow (as was done later), it was proposed that a "thin" ABM system be deployed initially to defend the United States against possible ICBM attack by China. John Newhouse has observed, however, that: "Even in Washington, most people think that McNamera saw an anti-China ABM simply as a hedge against the thick coverage he feared." Newhouse also quotes Dean Rusk as having stated that the "China issue was dragged in by the heels and became a makeweight for the decision."[232] Thus, China may have been in the thick of the American political fray, but as an actual concern for defense or arms control policy-makers the 'China issue' was at best peripheral, perhaps even spurious.

Beginning with Kissinger's reassurances to Beijing that the United States would not enter into collusion with the Soviet Union against China, first made in January 1970, China began to play a role in American arms control policy. China's role was not as a potential threat, nor as a potential party to negotiations (Kissinger reports that initial probes of this possibility were quickly and firmly rebuffed[233]), but rather as a means of spurring Soviet interest in reaching an agreement--playing upon the evident Soviet interest to preclude a Washington-Beijing detente. Thus far the United States has been remarkably successful in achieving both of its objectives--arms limitation agreements with Russia and improved relations with China--despite pressure from both Moscow and Peking to make the two objectives mutually exclusive.

As the United States enters the 1980s, however, the propitious circumstances that made possible the dual successes of the 1970s (counting the signing of the SALT II treaty as a success for diplomacy, if not for arms control) are rapidly being overtaken by a much more complex international political and strategic environment. The United States no longer has the 'China card' to play as an inducement for the Soviets to reach further SALT agreements--unless American leaders are willing to contemplate such drastic measures as participation in China's nuclear weapons program or the signing of a Sino-American military alliance. It is becoming increasingly

difficult to keep SALT separated from negotiations on theater nuclear forces and conventional force reductions in Europe due to a great deal of overlap in the capabilities of various weapons systems (particularly American "forward based systems" that can threaten the Soviet homeland even though their assigned missions may be elsewhere). It is also becoming increasingly difficult to keep China separate from Soviet-American arms talks because of Soviet concerns, China's growing nuclear delivery system capabilities, and because, as William Garner points out, "China itself is pressing the US to consider its interests in US-Soviet negotiations."[234]

If, as Garner observed, China is pressing the United States to consider Chinese interests in SALT, then the nature of those interests should be understood--whether or not they are allowed to influence American arms control policy. The Chinese concern which has been most widely recognized among Western observers is a fear that the SALT negotiations could lead to a Soviet-American 'condominium' against China. In 1965 Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins noted that Soviet-American negotiations on arms control agreements "are viewed by the Chinese as detrimental to their interest."[235] Their conclusion was not particularly novel, as China had been quite open in its opposition to Soviet participation in various arms control talks. At the time they wrote, however, the United States and the Soviet Union were beginning to make progress in discussions that would later result in the

Non-Proliferation Treaty and the SALT negotiations--both of which could have had serious implications for the Chinese (though, as it turned out, they did not). Two years after Halperin and Perkins made their observation on China's fears, Jeremy Stone warned of what the implications of successful Soviet-American arms talks would be:

> For the Soviets, and the Chinese, arms control agreements will be political indications signalling a coordinated opposition of Western and Soviet governments to China. From China's point of view, a US-Soviet arms control agreement is a primitive but still significant form of military alliance against her...[236]

The United States had several important reasons for desiring to improve relations with the People's Republic of China in the early 1970s, but not the least among them, as is evident in Henry Kissinger's description of the events of the period, was to make it clear to both the Soviet Union and China that Soviet-American arms negotiations most definitely were not the foundation for a superpower alliance against China. Nevertheless, China still harbors apprehensions about the potential consequences of SALT for Chinese security interests. Warnings from China against American 'appeasement' of the Soviet Union are more than just propaganda: they reflect underlying concerns about American reliability as a 'united front' partner and fears that the United States might be tempted to let the Soviets vent their expansionist cravings upon China.[237] Commentary in the Communist Chinese media on SALT repeatedly make the points

that the arms limitation negotiations have not--and cannot--halt the strategic arms race and that the Soviet Union is using the SALT talks to divert attention from its own arms build-up so that it can achieve strategic superiority over the United States.[238] Although these views have obvious political purposes--if the United States should come to accept the Soviet 'SALT or China' position, then the Chinese want America to opt for China--they also reflect China's security concerns. Even the Chinese fear of Soviet-American collusion against China has persisted, according to Michael Pillsbury, despite Kissinger's reassurances during the Salt I negotiations.[239]

These are the interests that William Garner stated China was pressing the United States to consider in the negotiation of arms limitations. This is one side of the double jeopardy China's nuclear force creates: it is as of yet, and for the foreseeable future, too small to effectively deter a Soviet strike against China. China must, therefore, seek at least a tacit alignment of Western and Chinese strategic interests, an imperative which could be disrupted by SALT. The other aspect of the double jeopardy is that by its very existence the Chinese nuclear force complicates SALT, and as that force expands and is modernized it will complicate SALT even more. Samuel S. Kim warned in 1979 that "The onset of a Sino-Soviet arms race is bound to complicate further the chronic problem of comparing apples and oranges in bilateral SALT negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union."[240] Whether or not their actions are labeled an 'arms

race,' both the Soviet Union and China have been building up their nuclear forces and the Soviets have specifically been increasing the deployment of medium-range weapons clearly directed against China. Tensions over the Sino-Soviet military balance could be exacerbated by general political tensions, such as arose over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, further complicating Soviet-American arms negotiations.[241]

Now that China possesses a demonstrated ICBM capability, both superpowers must consider China's nuclear force in their planning for SALT. As long as China is in alignment with the West, the Chinese nuclear force complicates SALT by generating Soviet demands that the terms of any treaty acknowledge the Soviet need to defend against the Chinese nuclear threat. William Garner has warned that: "The Soviet uproar over the Carter Administration's March 1977 proposals for substantial reductions may well indicate that the Soviet concept of 'equal security' against China requires SALT III levels well above what the Congress may seek."[242] The demise of SALT II and the hostility shown by the Senate against it notwithstanding, Garner's view of the Soviet position is still valid. The prospects for substantial reductions in strategic arms is further diminished by China's ICBM capability regardless of whose side China should swing to at some time in the future. In this respect the two superpowers probably do have a common interest against China, in that neither would want to be in the position of having to rely on the allegiance of

a 'swing power' who could decisively alter the strategic nuclear balance--a possibility only if SALT were to result in deep cuts in force levels.[243]

Helmut Sonnenfeldt predicted in 1967 that for the "foreseeable future" it would be likely that "only arms control arrangements that the powers involved consider useful without Chinese participation, or in which Chinese participation is not relevant...will be agreed upon."[244] He has been proven correct, and his conclusion is of even greater importance today than it was at the time he made it. For the reasons given above, China's impact on arms control will no longer be "what we let it be" or "what we make it," as was the case, for the most part, over the past two decades. Today, the United States must face the imminent danger that, as William Garner warned, "the failure of U.S. arms control policy to deal innovatively with the 'China factor' may soon result in the unravelling of the entire US-Soviet arms control process."[245] The United States will not be able to straddle for much longer the 'SALT or China' dilemma being forced upon it by both the Soviet Union and China.

The United States is thus confronted with a fundamental decision regarding the future course of its arms control policy: either accept the premise that it must choose between SALT or China, then abandon one in favor of the other on the terms being demanded by Russia or China; or reject the 'SALT or China' framework, as has been the implicit

American policy all along, and pursue an arms control policy which attempts to resolve the complications created by the Chinese nuclear force and Sino-Soviet hostility. Barring some highly unlikely change in Soviet foreign policy--such as total rejection of 'peaceful coexistence' in favor of confrontation or the opposite extreme of abandoning all support of national liberation movements in favor of closer ties with the West--the first policy option, accepting the 'SALT or China' framework and opting for one or the other, cannot be reconciled to the national interest. The United States has vital interests in both further progress in arms control and the continued development of Sino-American relations. To sacrifice one for the other, whichever interest were lost, would be a substantial setback for American national interests.

The United States must, therefore, seek some means of implementing the second policy option--rejection of the 'SALT or China' framework. This will require that the Chinese nuclear force, and the intentions of the Chinese Government for the use and development of that force, be brought into the SALT process. There are several means by which this could be achieved. As long as the Soviet and American nuclear forces remain far superior to that of the Chinese, it could be sufficient to rely on an 'equal security' formulation of some sort--as has been the approach, at least by the Soviets, thus far. This technique precludes, however, the possibility of more than token cuts in strategic force levels, as was mentioned

earlier.[246] And as the Chinese nuclear force grows it will be difficult to maintain any particular agreed-upon limitation of Soviet and American strategic arms, unless the ceilings are raised to the point that they are meaningless anyway.

A second approach which has been suggested in the context of multilateral arms control efforts, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Limited Test Ban Treaty, would be to induce China to lend "tacit support" for arms agreements that benefit Chinese interests.[247] Applied to SALT, this approach would demand concessions from both China and Russia which are not likely to be granted. First, China would have to agree to abide by the terms of the Soviet-American treaty, possibly in writing in a separate treaty with the United States using the same language as the SALT treaty. The problem here is that unless such an arrangement were kept absolutely secret, it would appear that China was allowing the United States to speak for the Chinese in arms control matters--a position the Chinese would vehemently reject. In January 1960 the Chinese rebuked the Soviets for daring to infringe upon China's sovereignty in such matters:

> China will unhesitatingly commit itself to the international obligations to which it has agreed. However, it must be pointed out that any international disarmament agreement which is arrived at without the full participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of its delegate cannot, of course, have any binding force on China.[248]

This is a warning the United States must not take lightly. To gain indirect Chinese participation in a Soviet-American

SALT treaty by means of a Sino-American treaty would demand, in effect, full Chinese participation--through the United States--in the negotiation of the SALT treaty itself. Even with that concession the Chinese would probably refuse to agree to such a scheme--for reasons of national pride if for no other reason.

The concession which would be needed from the Soviet Union is to rely upon the United States as a guarantor of Chinese compliance with the terms of the SALT agreement that apply to the Chinese nuclear force. As has been noted earlier in another context, the Soviets are not particularly impressed with the American record of reliability. Nor do Soviet ideology or Russian history dispose the leadership of the Soviet Union to trust in such inherently dangerous arrangements. To protect Chinese dignity and to preclude a Soviet propaganda coup against the Chinese, it would probably be necessary to phrase the sections of the SALT treaty which applied to China in such a manner as not to mention China by name. This, and the fact that there would not be a Chinese signature on the SALT treaty itself, only upon a parallel treaty with the United States, would leave the Soviet Union in a precarious position, dependent upon the United States to control Chinese behavior. The Soviets know from their own bitter experience as allies of China that no nation can claim to control China's behavior. The Soviets are left to rely, then, upon Chinese goodwill towards the United States and the

Soviet Union--and the Russians refuse to believe that the Chinese are capable of such an emotion.

Although the 'parallel treaties' or 'tacit support' approach appears to be infeasible, history may not be an accurate guide for the prediction of the Soviet and Chinese reactions to such a proposal. A 'parallel treaties' scheme would have to be proposed very carefully--with utmost secrecy and slowly, in a step-by-step manner--but this is true of most arms limitation proposals. Both the Soviet Union and China, as well as the United States, would be able to achieve significant security objectives that are otherwise unattainable, therefore it may well be worth the effort to explore at least the concept with Russia and China individually.

A third approach, one which has been urged upon the United States Government on occasion by well-intentioned but poorly-informed Western observers, would be to accede to some form of total nuclear disarmament proposal. The Soviet Union and China have both advocated such proposals over the years, therefore this approach could, in theory, offer a means of including the two nations in the arms control process. The theory is, however, fatally flawed.

There is no evidence that either the Soviets or the Chinese take their own nuclear disarmament proposals seriously, other than perhaps as a vague, altruistic goal achievable only when socialism has vanquished the true source of war: capitalist imperialism (and, now, social-imperialism, at least

from the Chinese point of view). There is abundant evidence that both the Soviets and the Chinese have used disarmament proposals overwhelmingly for political and propaganda purposes. China has since 1963 been advocating "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons," but at the same time has adamantly opposed Soviet proposals for essentially the same goal--a stance which Western observers have consistently identified as being motivated by political considerations.[249] As was pointed out earlier, the Soviets have used similar tactics against the Chinese (see pages 165-166), and the two continue to wage a propaganda war over each others disarmament policy.[250]

The second fallacy of the total nuclear disarmament approach is the unstated assumption that, once the three powers had agreed in principle to the objective, the conclusion of a disarmament treaty would be much simpler than the SALT negotiations have been. There is absolutely no evidence to support this assumption. Indeed, the record shows that the greater the propaganda stake in an issue, the more difficult the negotiations. Certainly no other disarmament issue has been as deeply entangled in the Sino-Soviet propaganda war, as well as in Soviet and Chinese political attacks on the West, as the total nuclear disarmament proposals of Russia and China. Whether the objective is to halt the expansion of nuclear forces, to reduce them by some percentage, or to abolish them completely, it will not be possible

to circumvent the inevitable long and difficult negotiations that are required for the success of any arms control effort. Pending a significant shift in the political and propaganda motives of the Soviet Union and China, the total nuclear disarmament approach will continue to be implausible as an alternative to SALT.

A fourth possible approach would be to include China as a direct participant in the present SALT framework. As in the case of the two previous approaches, this idea does have some merits which warrant its consideration, but it likewise is fraught with possibly debilitating difficulties. In the mid-1960s, Morton Halperin and Dwight Perkins recommended that China be kept out of Soviet-American arms talks and that whatever arms talks the United States may hold with China be kept separate from the Soviet-American talks. Their recommendations were based on China's overwhelmingly political and propaganda motivations for interest in arms control.[251] By the end of the 1970s, however, most observers were concluding that, difficult as it may be, the United States will soon have no choice but to bring China directly into the SALT negotiations.[252] To bring China directly into the SALT process will require that the United States somehow convince the Soviets and the Chinese that their interests are better served by substantive talks than by their continuing propaganda battle over arms control and their efforts to enlist the United States as a partner against the other power.

Realistically, there are severe limits to the capability of the United States to induce change in Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward each other. Unless the two communist powers have motives of their own for mitigating their polemical battle, it is unlikely that they would do so at the bidding of the United States. The Soviet Union and China do have incentives for reducing tensions between themselves, so it is possible that propaganda motives could be set aside to pursue arms talks at the same table--and the United States may well be able to provide the formula which would allow both to consent to such talks without the fear of an unacceptable propaganda coup by the other side.

Although this approach is a possibility, and were it to succeed it would certainly have tremendous payoffs for the further progress of the arms control process, the difficulties that would be encountered in any attempt to implement it must not be understated. The suspicions, fears, and animosities between Russia and China are deep, and their history written in blood. The Sino-Soviet polemical dispute that makes their mutual participation in arms control so difficult cannot be dismissed as peripheral to the fundamental national interests of the two nations. The ideological and political disputes are inseparable from the national security and foreign policy goals of which they are a manifestation. The United States may indeed have no choice but to attempt to bring China directly into the SALT process, but the effort will undoubtedly be

the most difficult initiative ever undertaken in the realm of arms control.

China's impact on Soviet-American arms limitation efforts goes beyond the complications created by the Chinese nuclear force for further progress in SALT. The strategic arms negotiations have already become linked to talks on the limitation of 'theater nuclear forces' due to the deep involvement of the superpowers in the military balance in Europe. The United States, for its part, committed itself to the "two-track" policy in December 1979 by agreeing to pursue the limitation of "long-range theater nuclear forces" (TNF) in talks with the Soviet Union while NATO modernized its nuclear weapons with the Pershing II ballistic missile and the ground launched cruise missile. The Soviets have been lobbying intensively for the TNF talks to start as soon as possible, an apparent attempt at manipulating European public opinion against the new NATO arms.[253] Although the Reagan Administration has been proceeding slowly on the issue to emphasize that the talks must be matched by a clear Western commitment to modernize their forces, preliminary talks on the TNF negotiations have begun and the administration has stated the formal talks will open before the end of the year.[254]

The TNF talks complicate SALT because some of the long-range theater weapons are capable of striking at the Soviet homeland. The Soviet Union has, consequently, made efforts to include American "forward based systems" in the totals

being discussed in SALT, while at the same time exempting their own theater weapons. Although the Soivet point of view may have some merit, the way it has been exploited shows that the primary Soviet purpose has been to emasculate NATO. The result has been an American refusal to discuss 'forward based system' limitations in the context of SALT and to agree to the opening of TNF talks. The two talks, SALT and TNF, may be separate, but they are inextricably linked.

China complicates the TNF talks because the Soviets have been deploying medium-range nuclear systems against China to maintain an overwhelming superiority over the Chinese nuclear force. The advantage of this strategy for the Soviets is that the theater forces they deploy against China are not limited by the SALT agreements. The Soviet Union is free, therefore, to deploy whatever level of forces it may desire to use in its attempt to intimidate the Chinese. Additionally, any concessions the Soviets can cajole the United States into making on the basis of providing 'equal security' against China only serve to turn the SALT process to the unilateral advantage of the Soviet Union.

Depending on the form they take, the TNF talks could be a serious setback for Chinese security. If the American objective is to merely limit the deployment of such weapons in the European theater--the goal that the European allies of the United States have in mind--then the Soviet Union would be free to redeploy those weapons against China. From the Chinese

point of view it would be preferable that the total number of such weapons, wherever they may be located, be limited. William Garner has pointed out that seeking an overall limitation of this sort is preferable for Western security interests as well. Limitations confined to the European theater would have to ignore the obvious fact that such weapons are by their very design mobile. Soviet theater weapons deployed against China also have the range to strike at American friends and allies in East Asia.[255] Thus, while China's security interests do complicate the American interests in TNF limitations, to a large degree Chinese and American concern over Soviet medium-range systems are parallel. It is Chinese and European interests that conflict.

China's military capabilities, and the obvious Soviet concern for those capabilities, can also be expected to complicate the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. The MBFR negotiations opened in November 1973 and have been essentially deadlocked ever since due to Soviet attempts to exploit the talks to gain unilateral advantage over NATO in central Europe. The central issue dividing east and west is the Soviet insistence that NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are already approximately equal, whereas the United States and its allies insist the Warsaw Pact has a superiority of at least 100,000 men and thousands of tanks and tactical aircraft. This numbers game is of critical importance because the Soviets have insisted upon equal reductions (roughly 17 percent was their initial proposal), while the West has proposed equal

force levels (which would require larger reductions by the Warsaw Pact than by NATO). Although there has been minor progress on technical issues, there has been none at all on the fundamental issues impeding the MBFR talks. Nevertheless, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, has testified in Congress that the Reagan Administration will continue to participate in the Vienna talks.[256]

MBFR becomes intertwined with the TNF talks and SALT because some of the tactical nuclear weapon delivery systems which NATO relies upon to offset the overwhelming Warsaw Pact superiority--systems such as attack aircraft and the Pershing I missile--have become issues in all three talks. The Soviet 'forward based systems' proposal in the SALT negotiations attempted to limit American systems which the United States considers to be tactical, rather than strategic or theater in their scope, and which the Carter Administration had used as concessions for withdrawal in the MBFR talks. From the Soviet point of view, the more American nuclear delivery systems that can be shifted to the higher-level talks (SALT and TNF), the greater will be the Soivet advantage in the lower-level talks (MBFR) and the greater will be the overall Soviet superiority if it achieves its goals in all three talks. The United States has, of course, been aware of this danger and has attempted to coordinate its position in all three talks to thwart these Soviet efforts to gain unilateral advantage from the negotiations.

China becomes involved in the MBFR talks because the Chinese believe that a strong NATO supports China's security interests and that arms control agreements with the Soviet Union will only weaken the resolve of the West to resist Soviet hegemonism and the Soviet drive for strategic superiority. The danger that a successful MBFR agreement would free large numbers of Soviet troops for redeployment against China is real, but is secondary to the political consequences such a pact would have: stabilization of the European front could generate an even greater commonality of Soviet and Western European interests. This would almost inevitably work to the disadvantage of China because the strategic interests of the European nations are, for the most part, narrowly focused within their own theater. China would be left, then, with only the United States--a United States being pressured by its NATO allies to give first priority to their interests--as a Western partner in the Chinese 'united front' against the Soviet Union.

William Garner has suggested that China has been a factor in the Soviet interest in the MBFR negotiations. He postulates that the increased Soviet increase in conventional warfare, without immediate escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange, has prompted a Soviet desire to use the MBFR talks to free forces for deployment along the Sino-Soviet border in order to ensure conventional Soviet superiority over China.[257] Although it is clear that the Soviet Union has not had to make any sort of a trade-off between its European and Far Eastern

forces, but rather has increased its overall force levels so that both areas could be strengthened, it is still possible that this could be a Soviet motive in the MBFR talks. Garner has proposed that the United States take advantage of the China factor in Soviet MBFR interests by adopting "a dual policy of negotiating the redeployment of Soviet forces to Asia, while bolstering Chinese conventional forces with sales of western military technology."[258] Unfortunately, there is no way that this proposal could possibly succeed. The Soviet Union, even without MBFR, has the capacity to expand its forces faster than the United States could arm China, whether the U.S. sold the arms or provided them free of charge.

China is far from being the most significant factor complicating the MBFR talks. The fundamental difference in the Soviet and NATO approaches to making the reductions is the most significant problem. Second only to this is the geographical asymmetry between the positions of the two superpowers relative to their European allies--with the Soviet Union at the edge of the theater and the United States separated from it by the Atlantic Ocean. Nevertheless, if, as has been proposed herein, the United States does have an interest in the security of China, then China's security interests will impinge upon the overall American interests in the MBFR negotiations. As was also true in the case of SALT, there is no simple means of reconciling the American interests in China with American interests in MBFR. The first step is to be constantly aware, in the formulation of American policy, that the

two sets of interests are linked, just as MBFR, TNF and SALT are all linked.

The preceding discussion of China's role in Soviet-American arms limitations efforts has raised many more problems than it has solutions. That may, in itself, be progress of a sort, but it certainly highlights the increasing difficulties the United States must expect to face as it pursues its interests in arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. It does seem clear that within the next few years the United States must be prepared to make sweeping revisions in its arms control policy. Likewise, the United States will be forced to reassess the basis of its relationship with China. As long as the United States could straddle the 'SALT or China' dilemma, neither American arms control policy nor American China policy required such revision or reassessment. Unfortunately, the fortuitous circumstances which made that American policy possible are rapidly being eroded--and a much more difficult political and strategic environment is replacing them. If the United States is to pursue its interests in China as well as its interests in Soviet-American arms limitations, then American policy must be adapted to the changing international circumstances within which it is executed.

5. China and Soviet-American Detente

Much has already been said, indirectly, herein on the subject of detente. In examining the effect that one's conceptual framework has on perceptions of national interests it was

noted that 'detente' is one of the convenient ideas which has come to take on a theoretical life of its own. The idea itself, a relaxation of tensions, is elegantly simple, but the term for that idea, 'detente,' is overburdened with intellectual and political baggage. It seems, at times, as if 'detente' is uttered with reverence, as if it were a divine or mystical state of international nirvana, the only worthy goal toward which leaders could possibly aspire to lead their nations.

For the purposes of this study the term 'detente' will be used, precisely because it is a convenient shorthand for 'a reduction of tensions,' but it will not be treated with theoretical reverence. That is, detente is not a system of interaction between two countries, nor is it necessarily even a goal in and of itself. Detente describes a short-term trend in the relations between two countries. A nation can, indeed, set detente with another country as an objective of its foreign policy, but detente as an objective and detente as an accurate description of a bilateral relationship are not one and the same. A reduction in the level of tension between two countries can only be the product of the overall foreign policies of both of those nations. An era of inviolate or irreversible detente cannot simply be proclaimed as existing--every policy decision and every action taken day after day either adds to or reduces the level of tensions.

This description of detente is heresy to the Soviet Union. The Soviets are invariably precise in their language,

abhorring in their own councils the vagueness upon which Western diplomacy survives, and detente has evolved a strict definition--and even its own historical niche in the dialectic of history. In the Soviet view, detente is a specific form of peaceful coexistence; one made possible only by the shift in the balance of forces in favor of the socialist camp. Once that shift had occurred, the irresistible trend in human history made detente inevitable. The result has been the opening of an era of detente, founded upon Soviet power, that can be impeded only by the subversive actions of the 'enemeies of detente' lurking within the capitalist camp. Rational men recognize the preponderance of Soviet power and embrace detente. They likewise accept the inexorable march of history, which dictates that the national liberation movement shall everywhere overthrow the bonds of capitalist imperialism--with Soviet assistance, naturally. Detente only prevents the threat of nuclear war by reducing the possibility that the capitalists would embark upon such an irrational course, and in so doing it "creates the conditions for class struggle to develop more freely."[259]

Despite its 'hard-line' approach to relations with the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration has not foresworn detente. Administration spokesmen have made it clear, however, that the terms for detente set by the Brezhnev regime are unacceptable, and that detente cannot be a substitute for military power as guarantor of the nation's security. Secretary

Haig's speech on April 24, 1981, quoted above (page 145), set the tone of the Administration's Soviet policy. Emphasis would be upon deterring Soviet promotion of violence, on the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and on reciprocity on the part of the Soviet Union as "the basis for a more productive East-West dialogue." It is also clear that the Administration has adoped a 'linkages' strategy as the basis for relations with the Soviet Union, despite Gromyko's tirades against the concept. Lawrence S. Eagleburger testified in Congress in June 1981 that the American relationship with the Soviet Union would be based upon the principles of "restraint and reciprocity." His explanation of these principles neatly sums up administration policy:

> Demonstrating to the Soviets, by expanding our own capabilities, that there is no alternative to restraint is a sine qua non to the success of our approach. But, we recognize as well the value and long-term necessity of giving the Soviets incentives to act with greater restraint.
>
> The Reagan Administration does not view cooperation with the Soviet Union as an end in itself. Nor does it believe that the prospect of cooperative activities will necessarily induce the Soviet Union to moderate its policies. Linkage will be an operative principle. The leaders of the Soviet Union cannot expect to enjoy the benefits of joint activities in areas of interest to them, even as they seek to undercut our interests.
>
> But, in the context of adequate and credible U.S. defense and regional capabilities and on a basis of strict reciprocity of benefits, the United States is open to an expansion of mutually beneficial activities, if justified by Soviet behavior. The United States is prepared to respond positively to constructive initiatives by the Soviet Union. However, given the lessons of recent history, it is clear that we cannot be satisfied with words alone.[260]

Thus, while it appears that the United States will be in for a period of 'luke-warm cold war' or 'tense detente,' the possibility of a significant lessening of Soviet-American tensions cannot be ruled out. If detente is a possibility, then China's interests in that possibility, and the likely Chinese reaction should it come about, must be considered. The Chinese view of detente with the Soviet Union, at least when it is the West seeking the relaxation of tensions, is quite hostile. Commentary in the Communist Chinese media constantly warn against "appeasement" of the Soviet Union, attribute the desire for detente to an "appeasement mentality," and assert that "any accommodation or concession to Soviet social-imperialism is dangerous."[261] China accuses the Soviet Union of using detente to "lull" Western Europe to the danger from Soviet military expansion, to mask Soviet arms expansion from the American public, and to "cover up its crimes of aggression" in Afghanistan and Kampuchea.[262] Of late, Brezhnev's speech at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1981 has been denounced as merely another Soviet "peace offensive" embodying all of the vile purposes described above:

> The Soviet Union's new peace offensive is aimed at sapping the fighting will of the people of the world against Soviet hegemonism, driving a wedge between Western Europe and the United States, covering up its wild amibitions of aggression and expansion, and extricating itself from its predicament in Afghanistan and Kampuchea.[263]

Statements out of China such as these have obvious propaganda purposes, but they also reflect the underlying

AD-A109 589 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA F/G 5/4
UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA: BEYOND THE 'CHINA CA--ETC(U)
SEP 81 J F BOUCHARD

UNCLASSIFIED NL



0958



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963 A

importance China attaches to the maintenance of its 'united front' against the Soviet Union. Western observers do not seem to be sure, however, just how much Western detente with the Soviet Union can be tolerated by the Chinese. Leslie H. Brown leans toward the pessimistic view of China's attitude:

> ...the excesses of Chinese ideological fervour are not to be underestimated; detente with the Soviet Union is anathema to China, and the United States has been her major Western protagonist. If detente, by whatever name, continues as a policy objective of the United States, it will continue also as a source of tension in American-Chinese relations.[264]

Michael Pillsbury--waxing optimistic on China--perceives the Chinese as being not all that hostile to Soviet-American detente as long as the Americans "give 'tit for tat' in response to Soviet challenges" in order to "tame the polar bear rather than appease it":

> Yet the Chinese have not encouraged the United States to downgrade its relations with the Soviet Union, but instead have urged Washington to reply to specific Soviet challenges in a more assertive fashion....The Chinese do not suggest that the United States should break diplomatic relations, reduce trade, or otherwise provoke the Soviet Union in the absence of any specific challenge, and they deny any desire to exacerbate U.S.-Soviet tensions.[265]

There is merit to both views. China does indeed oppose detente, but it primarily opposes the Soviet version of detente. If the Reagan Administration sticks to its early pronouncements on its Soviet policy, then it is likely that a future detente with the Soviet Union would avoid the worst of the errors of which the Chinese statements warned. At

this point there is no reason to believe that the new administration will reverse itself on its Soviet policy, therefore Pillsbury's caveats will probably be met and his view of China's attitude may well turn out to be reasonable. Those caveats--the Chinese expectation that the United States respond 'tit for tat' to the Soviets--are crucial, however, for they lie at the heart of China's 'united front' strategy. Should the United States back off from its current 'hard-line' approach to the Soviet Union in favor of a conciliatory stance, the tensions in Sino-American relations of which Leslie Brown warned would surely arise.

The danger of Sino-American relations becoming strained due to a Soviet-American detente is but one side of the impact China has on detente. The other side is the possibility that Chinese behavior could, through guilt by association in the eyes of the Soviets, disrupt progress toward Soviet-American detente or even preclude it altogether. The extreme case would be the threat of China dragging the United States into a war with the Soviet Union.

Just as the Soviet Union attempted to force upon the United States a 'SALT or China' decision, so too have the Soviets attempted to force a 'detente or China' decision in America.[266] Much to the credit of American foreign policy during the last four administrations, these two Soviet efforts came to naught. SALT and detente did eventually founder, but it was due to Soviet behavior and the American reaction thereto--not because of Soviet retaliation against closer Sino-American ties.

Although Soviet efforts to exploit detente as an inducement for the United States to forestall the improvement of relations with China have failed thus far, it must be expected that similar efforts will continue in the future.[267] Considering first conflict situations short of armed clashes, it is not likely that the Soviets would take other than propaganda action against the United States in retaliation for Chinese actions considered by the Kremlin to be hostile to Soviet interests. Even in the case of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which was an armed clash (though with a proxy of the Soviets), the Soviets denounced the United States for complicity in the assault,[268] but did not take more active symbolic moves as they did against the Chinese (stepping up border force readiness and deploying naval units off the coast of China).

If, on the other hand, the Soviets should have some reason to be upset with the United States in the first place, then it would be to their advantage to retaliate against the Americans for a Chinese transgression (still talking of situations short of war). Because of their free access to the American public through the news media, such a maneuver could build enough pressure on an administration to back off from a 'hard-line' stance on some issue the two superpowers had been deadlocked over. The American sense of justice and fair play would be vulnerable to skillful propaganda by the Soviets designed to portray the administration as condoning, by its

actions if not by its words, belligerent actions by China against a Soviet Union which was all the while striving to improve relations with the United States. In short, it is much more likely that China would be a pretext for a worsening in Soviet-American relations, rather than the actual cause of the tensions. Under such circumstances it would be of crucial importance for American leaders to seek out the issue in Soviet-American relations which was the actual point of key interest to Soviet leaders before taking action to defuse the "crisis."

As was mentioned, the extreme case of concern over Chinese behavior is the fear that China could drag the United States into a war with the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders could probably sympathize with such fears, as it appears they became highly uncomfortable with the actions of their Chinese allies during the Taiwan Straits Crises and the two episodes of Sino-Indian border tensions. Propaganda in the Soviet media also appears to play upon such fears of Chinese militarism, and predict that China will turn on its allies at the opportune time.[269]

The precepts of Soviet strategy and of Soviet military doctrine make it unlikely that the scenario of a Soviet attack on the United States in retaliation for a Chinese provocation would ever occur. As was discussed at length in Section B of this chapter, the Soviets would not seek a military solution to their 'China problem' unless assured of a definitive political and military victory. An essential prerequisite for

victory over China would be to isolate China from the West, so that the Chinese could not expect military or political support from the United States. In a crisis with China the Soviet Union would be much more likely to hold off from striking the decisive blow until the international position of the Chinese could be eroded--due primarily to the actions of the Chinese themselves, but also by intense propaganda and political activity by the Soviets. If they could prevent it, and they almost certainly could, the Soviets would not let China drag them into a war with the West. The Soviets would only attack the West if they thought they could also win a decisive political and military victory over the West--a much more formidable task than defeating China. The reverse scenario--the West dragging China into a war with the Soviets--would be more plausible.

Concerns that China could drag the United States into war arise largely from the differences in the styles preferred by Beijing and Washington in their dealings with Moscow. As has been pointed out before, the Chinese prefer a belligerent tone for deterring Soviet aggressiveness, whereas the Americans prefer to avoid provoking Soviet 'paranoia' and mix inducements with warnings. Even the 'hard-line' approach of the Reagan Administration has not veered too far from the historical American pattern. But the belligerence of Chinese propaganda does not indicate a similar belligerence in Chinese conflict behavior. The Chinese have been willing to use force

to support their foreign policy (as have the Americans and the Russians), but when they have done so their actions have been measured to retain control over the momentum of events--and as soon as the Chinese felt they had made their point, or reduced the threat to a tolerable level, their forces were pulled back. This pattern in Chinese conflict behavior has been described by Steve Chan, and that the pattern was maintained in the Chinese incursion into Vietnam has been demonstrated by Edward Ross.[270] Because of this caution in the use of force shown by the Chinese, and because the Soviet Union is not likely to be provoked by such Chinese behavior into a costly attack on the United States without some clear objective in (or unacceptable threat from) the West, fears that China might drag the United States into war are largely unfounded.

China's impact on Soviet-American detente is clear, but not clear-cut. Differences in the political styles of the Chinese and the Americans seem to generate at least as much tension over their relations with the Soviet Union as do differences of substance. The United States has an interest in improving relations with both the Soviet Union and China. Pursuing better relations with both is made difficult, however, with the Chinese and the Russians pulling from opposite directions for the United States to make a 'detente or China' decision in their favor. Despite this pressure the two objectives are not mutually exclusive by definition:

through careful diplomacy the United States can, to a degree, achieve better relations with both countries. Careful diplomacy does not mean the 'balance' or 'equilibrium' approaches formerly urged on American leaders--such formulas were a dismal failure because they did not account for the asymmetry in Soviet and Chinese motives and behavior.

As long as the United States does not assent to detente on Soviet terms, a reduction in Soviet-American tensions will not result in strained Sino-American relations. In fact, Soviet-American detente on "American terms"--that is, restraint and reciprocity enforced by a strong commitment to military defense and by the 'linkages' strategy--could well create conditions conducive to a Sino-Soviet detente that would also benefit American interests. For the time being, however, it does not seem likely that the Soviet Union will easily agree to "detente American style." Nevertheless it is more to the national interest to let detente be a slow process than to rush into a Soviet-dictated detente. Rushing into a detente relationship on Soviet terms would also be the American action vis-a-vis the Soviets most likely to strain Sino-American relations--ultimately for no good reason.

Ironic as it may seem, the only sure means of achieving a reduction in Soviet-American tensions that will prove effective over the long-term is to take many of the actions against which the Soviets have warned over the near-term. This means demonstrating that the United States has the capacity and determination to maintain--and even upset, should we so

desire--the strategic balance. It means concerted efforts at the containment of Soviet expansionism, insisting on Soviet restraint in the use of force and insisting upon the peaceful resolution of conflicts. And it means ensuring that the Soviets understand that American foreign policy will not be driven by the needs of maintaining detente with the Soviets to the exclusion of all other American interests, ensuring that the Soviets understand that detente demands reciprocity.

At the same time, the United States must not mistake means for ends. The United States does not increase its defenses to overwhelm the Soviet Union, but to make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot overwhelm the West. The United States does not contain Soviet expansionism in order to isolate the Soviet Union from the world and leave it weak and vulnerable, but to leave the Soviets with no other means of reaching out to the world and securing the benefits of global social and economic intercourse than by doing so in peace, without the threat of force of arms. And the United States does not spurn the Soviet version of detente for the purpose of escalating tensions and subjugating diplomacy to military solutions, but rather to achieve a reduction of tension in which both sides must pursue their interests by peaceful means.

China has an important, and in many respects growing, role in all aspects of the Soviet-American strategic relationship. In geopolitics, in the strategic balance, in the

containment of expansionism, in arms control, and in detente, American foreign policy will be affected in its consequences by China--whether or not China affected its formulation. The role China plays is complex and to a large extent beyond the capacity of American policy to shape, but vital nonetheless. In many cases United States policy toward the Soviet Union and United States policy toward China can be to some degree coordinated--though at times the best that such coordination can hope to achieve is to reduce the adverse consequences of a decision. China and the United States do have a great many parallel interests in their relations with the Soviet Union, interests which are the foundation upon which Sino-American relations have been built, but interests the United States must be willing to look beyond if it is to pursue the full scope of American interests without sacrificing its interests in China.

E. CHINA AND AMERICAN WORLD ORDER INTERESTS

United States national security is affected by much more than just the strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, even though that one aspect does indeed encompass the most potentially destructive sources of tensions. The United States has a major, if not vital, interest in the establishment and maintenance of a world order in which the nations of the earth can effectively join together in cooperative efforts to manage the many problems that transcend national boundaries, as well as in cooperative efforts at the local,

regional, and global level aimed at the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It is in the management of global problems and the peaceful resolution of conflicts that American diplomacy and economic policy contribute at least as much as American defense policy to the security of the nation.

This section will examine China's role in international cooperation on global problems and local conflicts, and how that role affects American interests in these issues. Because China and the United States were able to set aside their differences on many of these issues in order to pursue their common interest in opposing the Soviet Union, discussion of the American interest in China as regards global problems and local conflicts has largely been overshadowed by discussion of the strategic implications of the Sino-American relationship. For this reason, the possibilities for Sino-American cooperation on global issues and local conflicts, and the potential for conflict over them, will also be addressed. Each section will conclude with a summarization relating United States interests in these issues with the overall American security interest in China and with the prospects for Sino-American relations.

1. China and the Management of Global Problems

The United States has a world order interest in international cooperation because the world is beset with a host of problems that are global in scope and growing in severity. Many of these global economic, environmental, social, and arms control issues affect, directly or indirectly, United States

national security. To the extent that such problems are the root cause of local conflicts, north-south tensions, and revolutionary causes, United States participation in international action on those problems contributes to national security, broadly defined.

Global problems requiring international cooperation cannot properly be understood, nor can effective policy on those issues be formulated, if they are viewed narrowly within the context of the bipolar model of east-west competition. Even worse is to attempt to understand China's role in the management of global problems strictly in terms of the strategic triangle. On the other hand, it is equally misleading to analyze the politics of global problems only within the context of the north-south dispute: bipolar superpower competition is ever present beneath the surface of the international alignments on such issues, China does interject its own rivalry with the Soviets into its policies on global problems, and on different issues the 'north' and 'south' camps are deeply divided within their own ranks.

The de facto polycentric, multiple issue-based systems conceptualization of the international system recognizes the actual complexity of the continually shifting patterns of alignments within the international community. On some issues the United States and China may find themselves in opposition, despite their common cause against the Soviet Union. On other issues, the United States may find it has common interests

with the Soviet Union that China opposes due to the Sino-Soviet dispute (the best example being arms control). Because of its commitment to capitalism and Western democratic freedoms, the United States has in the past found itself--singly or as leader of the 'West'--standing alone against both China and Russia in opposing socialist and Marxist solutions to international problems. On top of all this one must overlay the innumerable conflicts among the Third World nations themselves, conflicts which complicate or even frustrate effective cooperation on many issues (such as non-proliferation and resources management).

The impact that global issues have on United States security interests is also complex. International problems affect security interests indirectly as well as directly in some cases. To the extent that it contributes to the level of international tensions, almost every global problem has an indirect effect on national security. Most problems of economic development and food supplies fall in this category. Certain international issues, such as sources of energy and crucial minerals, arms sales and nuclear proliferation, and the law of the sea negotiations, have a more direct impact. Decisions on the allocation of foreign aid are also influenced by the perceived relative importance of indirect and direct security benefits from economic development. A perception that the indirect security benefits are the more significant argues for priority being given to support of multilateral assistance institutions that aid the Third World in

general without recipient obligations to the donors. On the other hand, a perception that the direct security benefits of aid are the more important argues for bilateral assistance to specific countries whose resources or geographic location make them important to American strategy. There is no conclusive evidence that either view has more merit than the other--a decision in favor of one approach over the other is likely to be motivated more by the political predispositions of the particular administration than by the evidence supporting the efficiency of the approach.

The security aspect of global problems is complex for a second reason as well. An international issue may affect power relationships in general by its contribution to the level of international tension, or it may affect a particular set of power relationships, such as the east-west rivalry or the north-south dispute. Many issues, moreover, affect more than one set of power relationships, but there is not necessarily a correlation of interests among the various parties. Thus, for example, problems of resources management and commodity price stabilization are primarily north-south issues, but also have an element of east-west ideological competition; whereas arms control issues have primarily been viewed within the context of the east-west rivalry, but have been the topic of north-south disagreements as well (in terms of charges that the nuclear powers are attempting to establish a monopoly over such weapons so as to be able to subjugate the developing

countries--a charge China has made in the past). Not every nation with an interest in a particular issue will perceive it as affecting the same set of power relationships, if any at all. Though the United States may focus its foreign policy on its competition with the Soviet Union, the non-aligned nations of the Third World are still going to perceive the primary division within the international system as being between rich nations and poor.

The Reagan Administration has not completely overlooked or disregarded the American security interest in global problems despite its clear shift in emphasis to east-west relations. In his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in March 1981, M. Peter McPherson, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, reviewed the many global problems the international community must deal with and pointed out the security aspect of one of those issues:

> Failure to make acceptable progress in ameliorating conditions of poverty can only lead to domestic instability and increasing frustration on the part of Third World governments over the workings of the international system and the distribution of economic and institutional power in that system as it is now constituted. Such instabilities, as we know all too well, can quickly spill over into regional disequilibrium and create opportunities for interventions that are to the interest neither of the countries directly involved nor to ourselves.[271]

Secretary Haig has observed that one of the fundamental problems that American foreign policy must take into account is that "Limited resources and political disturbance impede the eradication of hunger, poverty, disease, and other important

humanitarian goals."[272] Haig has also linked global problems with national security, including the major themes of the foreign policy of the Reagan Administration:

> Restraint of the Soviets, the reinvigoration of our alliances, and the strengthening of our friends are crucial aspects of the Reagan foreign policy. But the underlying tensions of international affairs go beyond the themes of allies and adversaries. A fresh American approach to the developing countries is essential if we are to treat the roots of international disorder.[273]

The "fresh approach" that the Reagan Administration has taken toward developing countries, and international problems in general, is probably not what the Third World has in mind as a desirable American policy. Thus far, the major initiatives of the administration have been to withdraw from the proposed United Nations conference on north-south issues, to block completion of the Law of the Sea Treaty, and to be the only nation to vote against the 'baby formula' resolution. The first two actions were explained as being necessary while the new administration reviewed the issues and American interests in them. President Reagan has made it clear, however, that his attendance at the conference on cooperation and development to be held in October 1981 at Cancun, Mexico, does not represent a shift in United States policy on the proposed United Nations conference (the Carter Administration had opposed both the United Nations conference and participation in the Cancun meeting). It has also been reported that the administration is considering major revisions to the proposed Law of the Sea Treaty to protect the

commercial interests of American corporations involved in sea-bed mining.[274]

Although these initial policy actions may presage a major shift in American policy toward global problems, it is more likely that the shift will be more of emphasis than of goals. The third of the three objectives that Secretary Haig has set forth for United States foreign policy is "to offer hope and aid to the developing countries in their aspirations for a peaceful and prosperous future."[275] The shift in emphasis appears to be a greater consideration of the direct and indirect security implications of global problems, especially the direct American security interests in them. Myer Rashish, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, has stated to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress that:

> Ultimately, our responsibility is to craft and implement a U.S. foreign policy which takes into account all our interests--our security needs, our resource requirements, our trade and investment concerns, our need for good working relations with the many countries a world power must deal with in today's interdependent world.[276]

Secretary Haig has explicitly drawn the linkage between United States economic policies and security interests in his statement that "in the formulation of economic policy, in the allocation of our resources, in decisions on international economic issues, a major determinant will be the need to protect and advance our security."[277] Haig refers here to direct security interests--allocating aid to those countries that play the most important role in American strategy.

There is a two-way relationship between the American security interest in global problems and the American security interest in China: China has a role to play in the international efforts at managing the problems--be it disruptive, indifferent, or cooperative--which will affect American interests in those problems; and the status of Sino-American relations will be affected by the policies each nation has toward global problems, which in turn affects the American security interest in China. Each of these two aspects will be examined individually.

The importance of the "positive participation and contribution" of China to international cooperation on global problems has been pointed out by former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, presumably indicating an awareness within the Carter Administration of the linkage between China's world role and American interests in global problems.[278] In more general terms, Under Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., remarked, speaking for the Reagan Administration, that: "We recognize that the one billion people of China play a very important role in the maintenance of global peace and security."[279] Thus, there is a basis for proposing that it would be in the national interest to encourage the participation of China in the various forums and agencies for dealing with global problems,[280] as well as to maintain a Sino-American dialogue at all levels of government on these issues. For the United States to do otherwise, that is, to define its interests

in China in strictly bilateral terms (What can China offer the U.S.?) rather than in broad international terms (What can China contribute to the international community?), would be a failure to consider that the manner in which China develops its world role will directly affect American security interests.

If the United States does have a security interest in China's participation in international efforts to manage global problems, then the Chinese attitude toward world order and the role of China in that order needs to be understood. The attitude that the People's Republic has displayed since its founding has not been conducive to Chinese participation in forums for international cooperation other than for propaganda purposes. In 1968 Walter C. Clemens, Jr., concluded that China "has little cause to be satisfied with the basic structure of world politics, the state of her internal development, or the apparent thrust of economic and social change."[281] During the 1970s there was a significant reorientation of China's foreign policy from revolutionary goals toward what Western observers have labeled more "pragmatic" goals, but as recently as 1979 Samuel Kim concluded that, to a large degree, the 'traditional' Chinese Communist view described by Clemens still persists:

> The Chinese image of world order that is projected throughout the United Nations system defines the international system as a Manichean struggle between the status quo defenders and the revolutionary challengers. It is an image deeply imbued with 'justice' rather than with order, with change

> rather than with stability. The moral and strategic imperative of the Chinese image is that the old and unjust order had to be destroyed first, before a new and just world order could be established.[282]

The change in Chinese policy toward global problems and world order issues has not been so much a change in ideology as a change in means and a reaction to perceived changes in the external threat to China. China's earlier efforts to unite the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in a "people's war" against the developed nations, and China's present attempts to unite with the West and the Third World against Soviet "hegemonism" are both manifestations of the same ideological principle: the united front strategy.[283] The earlier revolutionary attitude toward world order was at least partially a result of China's leaders not perceiving their nation as possessing a more effective means of pursuing its goals. Morton Halperin and Dwight Perkins concluded in 1965 that: "To some degree, of course, the Chinese Communist posture of seeking more active support of world revolution from the Soviet Union results from the lack of alternative means for exercising influence on the international scene."[284] Today, although China still does not have the resources or capabilities to be a truly global power,[285] it has largely overcome its diplomatic isolation and has greatly improved its relations with the West, thereby gaining, on balance, much more influence than it had previously.

The consequence of this change has been that "anti-hegemonism" has replaced revolutionary themes as the primary

political interest China has in global problems. In his study of China's role in the United Nations, Samuel Kim noted that: "At the operational level, even New International Economic Order politics has been transformed into an anti-hegemonic model."[286] This shift from revolutionary politics to anti-Soviet politics is hardly a gain for the American interest in cooperative efforts at managing global problems, but it does reflect an underlying reorientation of China's objectives that is encouraging and apparently has been the first step in an on-going evolution in Chinese attitudes.

The Third World, of which China claims leadership, has not reacted favorably to China's efforts at infusing serious international efforts at coping with global problems with the spirit of "anti-hegemonism," and, according to Thomas W. Robinson, "Beijing seems now to have learned its lesson."[287] Though he probably would not go so far as Robinson, who has described China's attitude toward global issues as "promising," Samuel Kim does perceive somewhat of a symbiotic relationship between China and the United Nations, despite the negative political attitudes he descrbies the Chinese as having:

> When all is said and done, the reciprocal interactions and impacts between China and the United Nations system have on the whole been positive. The relationship between the two during the first half of the 1970s may be characterized as a mutual adjustment, mutual legitimization, and mutual enhancement of each other's symbolic capability.[288]

Not only has China not been able to enlist Third World support for using the United Nations as a forum for its

anti-Soviet policies, China has also had to take the same 'pragmatic' approach toward developing nations that Western observers have credited China with taking toward the developed nations of the West. T.B. Millar has observed of China's foreign policy that:

> The new diplomacy and the new links are not only with the developed states. A much more pragmatic set of relationships has developed between China and the non-communist states in Africa, Asia and South America. China has become a far more representative member of the world community with its forms and norms.[289]

These are the very countries that China had previously viewed as prime targets and potential allies in its revolutionary strategy. The 'pragmatic' adaptations China has been willing to make in its policies toward the Third World countries, both to improve relations with them and to oppose Soviet initiatives, have been so great so as to lead one to wonder whether China is leading or being led by the Third World. Samuel Kim observed:

> More specifically, the United Nations--or, more accurately, its most dominant group, the Group of 77--exerts a subtle but substantial influence on Chinese behavior. It may be appropriate to say that China, instead of manipulating the Third World, is actually being manipulated by it.[290]

The change that has taken place in the apparent Chinese attitude toward the sale of conventional arms to developing countries is illustrative of the type of shift in China's perception of global issues that may be termed encouraging. In 1977, China was adamantly opposed to the exploratory talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on restraint in

the transfer of arms to Third World nations. The justification for this opposition was that:

> Confronted by the fierce contention between the two superpowers, and, in particular, by the rabid expansion of Soviet social-imperialism, the third world countries cannot do otherwise than strengthen their own defense capabilities. In fact, their weapons, far from numerous, are not nearly enough. This is one of the reasons why so many developing countries are being bullied by imperialism and social-imperialism.[291]

By March 1981, commentary in the Beijing Review had almost completely reversed itself in its attitude toward this issue:

> The booming trade in arms has brought serious consequences to third world countries. In the first place, their money is not being spent to develop their economies. In the second place, buying armaments fuels an arms race between antagonistic neighbours, which further destabilizes the region and further exacerbates relations. And lastly, it affords the big powers chances to intervene and control them, endangering their independence and sovereignty.[292]

Western analysts of the arms transfers phenomenon might dispute the details of some of the contentions in this second statement, but it is nevertheless clear that China is now demonstrating a much more sophisticated understanding of the issue than was shown in the first of the two statements. This in itself is encouraging, even though there is no indication that the second statement represents the final word on Chinese policy toward arms sales to the Third World.

As important as China's interests in international issues may be from the point of view of United States security interests, for the Chinese global problems have been, and remain, secondary to domestic issues. The two most important

objectives that must be supported by China's foreign policy are national defense and domestic economic development. The defense aspects of Chinese foreign policy are discussed throughout this paper. The relationship between China's development program and Chinese foreign policy is discussed in Appendix B, and will be summarized here to understand how it shapes China's role in the world.

In 1968, near the end of the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution in China, Morton Halperin pointed out that: "It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that the major preoccupation of the Chinese leaders--both Mao and the opposition--is with internal events within China and with the future shape of the Chinese revolution."[293] Today, although the "opposition" has triumphed and the Chinese revolution has turned away from the more radical policies of Mao and the Cultural Revolution in favor of 'pragmatic' policies based on Western models of management, Halperin's observation is still correct.

Deng Xiaoping has identified economic development as the fundamental task to which China must devote itself during this decade. The program guiding this task, the "four modernizations," largely orients China's economic development toward the West as a source of technical and management expertise, capital, and trade to drive China's growth. China has also turned to the West for the modernization of its science and technology.[294]

This departure from self-reliance in economic development and entry into the free-market Western economic system has given China a stake in the stability of the international environment. Deng stated in January 1980 that: "Our strategy in foreign affairs, as far as our country is concerned, is to seek a peaceful environment for carrying out the four modernizations." He went on to emphasize that "the size of the role we play in international affairs depends on the speed and range of our economic development."[295] Because Deng's remarks were made before a closed party work conference, vice in the media, they are probably an accurate reflection of the official Party attitude toward China's world role. Thus, although domestic concerns are predominant over interest in global problems, the current thrust of China's development program and the manner in which Deng has linked it with China's world role make it reasonable to expect that Chinese participation in international forums on global issues will not be disruptive, and may even be supportive of American security interests in managing global problems.

An overall assessment of the impact of the Chinese attitude must balance the encouraging changes discussed above against the persistence of views and policies that are not necessarily parallel with American interests in global issues. Ross Terrill has warned that China's outlook on international issues is still highly nationalistic and lacking in what he describes as "internationalist values."[296] Chinese and American

perceptions as to what policies are in the best interest of the international community can be expected to differ, and at times conflict. Samuel Kim's description of the Chinese view of world order, which emphasizes justice and change rather than order and stability, should also be kept in mind. As a developing nation, China stands to gain from progress toward the creation of a 'new international economic order' that emphasizes Third World interests at the expense of protection for the inordinate wealth of the developed countries. As long as such a new order could be achieved within the "peaceful environment" Deng identified as being necessary for China's modernization, China would probably pursue both objectives.

This caution that China and the United States may well disagree on how to handle global problems leads to the second aspect of the relationship between American interests in global issues and American interests in China: the policies each nation adopts toward global issues will affect the status of Sino-American relations to some degree, which in turn affects the American security interest in China. For this reason it was proposed that the United States has an interest not only in encouraging China's participation in international efforts at managing global problems, but also in maintaining a bilateral Sino-American dialogue at all levels of government on those issues.

A Sino-American dialogue on global issues would be a primary means for broadening the scope and basis of the

bilateral relationship. As was pointed out in discussing the effect of conceptual frameworks on perceptions of interests, there exist numerous latent sources of Sino-American tension that have been set aside in the interest of cooperation in dealing with a common threat--the Soviet Union. As a means of initiating the process of normalization and growth in Sino-American relations, this 'agreement to disagree' on many issues was a master stroke of diplomacy. The long-term development of Sino-American relations will require, however, a foundation greater than mutual opposition to the Russians.

The United States cannot expect that such a dialogue would fundamentally change China's views of its interests in world order and international problems. The lessons of Soviet-American detente are instructive in this regard. It had been hoped by some that efforts to increase Soviet contact with the West, vice keeping the Soviets politically contained, would allow Soviet leaders to perceive the common interests they actually had with the West, and that this in turn would result in a moderation in Soviet behavior. Such hopes have largely proved groundless. The actual Soviet response was to exploit the common interest it had with the West to neutralize opposition to Soviet policies while preserving as much freedom of action as possible. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the epitome of this strategy. China would not necessarily adopt the Soviet approach, but would certainly refuse to sacrifice what it perceived to be

vital national interests to pursue harmonious relations with the United States.

Nevertheless, if the United States does not make an effort to broaden the scope of the relationship, ties with China will remain dependent upon the sole significant mutual interest in opposing the Soviets. This would not be a problem were it not for the fact that both the United States and China have incentives for improving relations with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets have been attempting to exploit those incentives to hinder the development of Sino-American relations. Beyond the direct benefits for American security interests resulting from maintaining good Sino-American relations, efforts at broadening the scope of the relationship would probably also aid in the improvement of China's relationship with the West in general. At least part of the barrier between China and the West in the past has been a lack of mutual understanding, and the United States can help to alleviate this problem. Then, should the Sino-American relationship become strained, China's ties with the West as a whole and with other Western nations should prevent a drastic reorientation of China's strategic alignment back to the Soviet Union.

2. China and the Peaceful Resolution of Local Conflicts

The second category of American world order interests that affect national security is the peaceful resolution of local conflicts. For the purposes of this paper the term

'local conflicts' includes both disputes among nations (other than the United States, the Soviet Union, and China) and external interventions in internal strife in a single nation (such as support for a guerrilla movement or for one side in a civil war).

The United States interest in the peaceful resolution of local conflicts is long-standing and has been a fundamental tenet of American foreign policy. In recent history, the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt and the peaceful transition to black majority rule in Zimbabwe represent successful efforts at the peaceful resolution of both of the types of local conflicts described in the previous paragraph.

Because of the Soviet-American ideological and political rivalry, the American interest in the peaceful resolution of local conflicts has often become intertwined with the east-west dispute. In many cases this occurs because of Soviet support for a revolutionary or "national liberation" movement that seeks to overthrow a pro-Western government. In most of the rest of the cases opportunistic Soviet intervention on behalf of one party in a local dispute, such as on behalf of India against Pakistan or on behalf of Ethiopia against Somalia (even though the Somalis had been Soviet clients), has exacerbated or escalated the level of violence of a dispute that could otherwise have been addressed at the negotiating table.

The Reagan Administration has chosen to emphasize the east-west aspect of the American interest in the peaceful

resolution of conflicts. Although Secretary Haig has stated that "Our objective must be to restore the prospects for peaceful resolution of conflict," that objective was clearly linked with constraining Soviet use of violence in the pursuit of its national goals.[297] This emphasis on the Soviet-American rivalry, and its application in American policy toward El Salvador, has led to criticism of the Reagan foreign policy for ignoring the sources of local conflicts that cannot be traced to the Soviet Union. While the presupposition upon which this argument is based--that not all local conflicts are instigated by the Soviet Union--is valid, the argument itself is overstated. Administration spokesmen, including Secretary Haig, have acknowledged that the "underlying tensions" that lead to local conflicts go deeper than east-west competition and require United States concern for the problems of the Third World (see page 206).

The Chinese attitude toward the peaceful resolution of local conflicts remains somewhat of an unknown factor. Although there have been reports that China has pressured revolutionary groups receiving its aid to participate in negotiations--the Vietminh in 1954, North Vietnam in 1972, and Mozambique (which was supporting guerrilla operations against white-ruled Rhodesia) in 1978-9--there are other cases in which China's role led to an escalation of, or at least hindered a solution to, a local conflict--the development of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict during 1976-9 being the most recent example.

There does not appear to be one preeminent ideological imperative that guides China's policy toward local disputes. China does, however, still espouse ideological objectives for its foreign policy that should be taken into account. In his 1979 "Report on the Work of the Government," former Premier and Party Chairman Hua Guofeng summarized China's overall policy toward the Third World as follows:

> We uphold proletarian internationalism and support all the oppressed nations and peoples in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism and for liberation and social progress. Adhering to Comrade Mao Zedong's theory of the three worlds, we will strengthen our unity with the proletariat and the progressive forces of the world, with the socialist countries and third world countries and unite with all the forces in the world that can be united in a joint effort to oppose the hegemonist policies of aggression and war.[298]

Fortunately for the American interest in the peaceful resolution of local conflicts, this statement by Hua appears to have been primarily a counter to Soviet criticism of China's foreign policy. Hua included all of the revolutionary ideological phraseology used by the Soviet Union to describe its own Third World policies, then drew the distinction that China desires the Third World to perceive between Chinese and Soviet (hegemonist) foreign policies.

At the operational level, ideological goals have been de-emphasized, in some cases reformulated, and in general implemented in such a manner as to be supportive of the defense and development goals guiding China's foreign policy. The causes of local conflicts, however, are still explained

in terms of the ideological concept of "contradictions." Originally developed by Mao Zedong to explain the persistence of political conflicts and non-Marxist ideas within the Chinese masses, the concept of "contradictions" has since been applied to the analysis of conflict in the international arena.[299] The result has been a flexible scheme for defining a variety of causal factors for local conflicts, which allows a broad spectrum of policy options from which to choose in dealing with them. This is a significant departure from strict Marxist-Leninist ideology, which defines all conflict in terms of class struggle or the struggle between capitalist imperialism and revolutionary national liberation movements.

This flexibility in Chinese foreign policy raises the possibility of Sino-American consultation, and perhaps even cooperation, on a number of potential and actual local conflicts. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak have reported that such consultation has already taken place. During his May 1978 visit to Beijing, Zbigniew Brzezinski is said to have asked the Chinese to support the Anglo-American settlement in Zimbabwe.[300] Michel Oksenberg perceives that, even without actual talks, Chinese and American policies have become increasingly complementary: "Strategically, particularly in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, each nation now appears to be genuinely taking into account the views of the other, so that, when possible, our separate actions will be mutually reinforcing."[301]

Although these developments are encouraging, the extent to which Chinese and American interests in local conflicts are complementary or parallel is limited. The tacit mutual accommodation described by Oksenberg in particular has its limits. Ralph Clough has warned that "The ability of the United States and the PRC to act in mutually beneficial ways when dealing with problems involving other countries rests on their success in promoting their bilateral relations."[302] But even improving bilateral relations will not guarantee that China and the United States can cooperate effectively on local conflicts. The flexibility of China's approach to such problems could lead to disagreement with the United States when Chinese and American national interests diverge.

Revolutionary ideological goals have been de-emphasized in China's foreign policy because this is an expedient means of pursuing other goals that currently have higher priority, and which cannot effectively be achieved by revolutionary policies. The ideology from which those revolutionary goals are derived has not been abandoned, the 're-assessment' of Mao Zedong notwithstanding. In describing the Chinese attitude toward the 'contradictions' present in the international scene, Clough et al., observed that: "They seek to take advantage of these tensions by a variety of means, ranging from diplomatic moves through people-to-people activities to support for communist insurgents."[303] The encouraging developments discussed above are just one of the means--diplomatic

moves--available to China for dealing with local conflicts. There is no ideological barrier precluding the possibility of a renewed emphasis on revolutionary policies, including support for communist insurgents, in China's approach to local conflicts should the leadership of Chinea perceive this to be in their nation's interest.

The priority that China gives to opposition to the Soviet Union has been the underlying interest determining the direction in Chinese policy toward 'contradictions' and local conflicts. China's leaders are well aware of the vastly superior Soviet capability for supporting revolutionary movements and clients in local disputes. They are also aware of the increased Soviet willingness to intervene directly in such conflicts, including with Soviet troops as in Afghanistan--a willingness backed up by the powerful Soviet airlift and sealift capability. Because China cannot hope to match these Soviet capabilities for a long time to come, and because the Soviet Union has been using its support for national liberation movements and client states as an element in its strategy of containment and isolation of China, the Chinese have been willing to support the peaceful resolution of local conflicts whenever this would preclude an opportunity for Soviet intervention.

The mutual interest that China and the United States share in opposing Soviet expansionism has been the basis for the tacit coordination and overt cooperation that has occurred

thus far in dealing with local conflicts. But this will not be an adquate long-term basis for Sino-American consultation on such issues. The latent tensions that threaten the development of Sino-American cooperation in other areas also could interfere with cooperation on local conflicts. China and the United States could easily end up being adversaries in a local conflict, despite their mutual opposition to Soviet expansionism. The Soviets are not the sole source of tensions in the Third World, nor do they always intervene in local conflicts. Without the threat of Soviet intervention to motivate Sino-American cooperation, whether tacit or through consultations, the divergent interests that were set aside to allow the initial improvement in Sino-American relations could emerge to generate tensions between China and the United States. This would be detrimental to the United States security interest in the peaceful resolution of local conflicts as well as to American security interests in China.

It would be best, therefore, for the United States to take a broader view of China's role in the peaceful resolution of local conflicts. On-going discussion of this issue would be helpful for building mutual understanding of the interests that each nation has in potential trouble spots and of the overall attitude each takes toward the means by which local disputes should be resolved. More important than this, however, will be the growth of China's relations with the West as a whole. China must perceive that it is assuming a position

in the international community commensurate with the world role to which it feels entitled. China's view of its world role is evolving as China's interactions with the West and the Third World evolve--it is not an immutable demand made of the community of nations. The Chinese definition of their nation's role in the world will to some degree be shaped by traditional outlooks and Party ideology, but to a much larger degree it will be shaped by Chinese perceptions of their national interest.

That national interests will play a large part in the evolution of the world role that China seeks also argues for a broader American view of its interests in China. To the extent that China's leaders perceive their nation as having a wide range of mutual interests with the West, they will be less inclined to jeopardize relations with the West to pursue revolutionary ideological goals that directly threaten Western interests. This could serve to moderate Chinese foreign policy in situations wherein the United States and China disagree on the cause of and solution to a local conflict. United States security interests, global as well as in China, might well be served better by an American policy toward China that is founded upon interest in the contribution that China can make to the international community than by a policy founded upon interest in China's role in the strategic triangle.

F. CHINA AND AMERICAN INTERESTS IN ASIAN SECURITY

United States security interests in China are most complex and difficult to reconcile with the broad range of

American security interests when examined in the regional setting of Asia. Major power rivalries, instability and tensions within the region, and the continuing American commitment to the security of Taiwan generate numerous potential security problems that cannot easily be integrated into a single strategic framework for regional security. American security interests in Asia are in some cases incompatible--a few verge on being mutually exclusive--requiring the United States to set priorities among its interests and to accept trade-offs among them.

This section will examine four aspects of the role China plays in the Asian security interests of the United States: China's effect on American security commitments in Asia, China's interests in the potential and actual trouble spots of Asia, China and the American commitment to Taiwan, and the role of China in American naval strategy in the Western Pacific. As background for the discussion of these issues, an overview of the security problems of Asia and the American security interests and objectives in the region will be presented.

Diversity is the characteristic of Asia that has the greatest influence in shaping American security interests in the region. Leslie H. Brown has described the impact this has on the formulation of American policy:

> In developing a statement of American interests in the Pacific around which to build a strategic policy, the United States cannot treat Asia, as she might Europe, as a coherent political, geographic or military entity; quite the reverse. Asia is geographic shorthand for a diverse collection of cultures, societies and politico-economic

> systems that cannot be combined logically into one unit. As a consequence, American Asian interests virtually have to be developed in terms of country interests and bilateral relationships the sum of which are taken as interests for the region as a whole. From these are derived an 'Asian' set of objectives and a policy.[304]

Recognition of the diversity of Asia forewarns that it is a risky procedure to apply American global strategy and interests to the Asian setting other than in general terms. The failure of the American strategy of containment--a policy originally applied in Europe and the Middle East--in the Asian setting is the best example of this risk.

The conceptual error made by the United States was the assumption that the ideological dimension--the conflict between communism and democracy--rather than diverse political and social causes was the root of conflict in Asia. The primary sin committed by the American 'China hands' purged during the McCarthy years had been their refusal to ascribe to this erroneous presupposition. Domestic instability in the developing nations of Asia most often arises from the problems of political and economic development that strain their societies. Morton Halperin warned in 1968 that:

> Violence also emanates, of course, from many non-Communist sources. Internal violence has marked political development in many Asian countries, and the U.S. can expect such violence to continue.[305]

His observation is as valid for the decade of the 1980s, and probably beyond, as it was in the 1960s. Donald Zagoria has reached a similar conclusion about the political problems of the Asian nations today:

> ...all over the developing countries of Aisa, one could question whether political stability is likely to last. Political development and modern institutions of government have not taken deep root. In most of these countries the military is ruling, either directly or indirectly. In many of them, the whole political system rests on one man, or on an oligarchy.[306]

It would be an error, therefore, for the United Staates to view every revolutionary movement or terrorist group in Asia as existing only because of the efforts of the Soviet Union (and to a lesser degree China) to spread its ideology throughout Asia.

Disputes among the nations of Asia often have as their root cause local circumstances--historical, religious and ethnic animosities; territorial claims; and dreams of regional or local pre-eminence--rather than external provocation. Richard Solomon observed that "National interest has replaced ideology as the orienting force of international relationships in Asia," and concluded that this and the frictions of development may lead to local conflicts:

> While military factors will, of course, continue to be a major element in regional security affairs, one aspect of the "transitional" quality of current developments in Asia is that emerging social, political, and economic factors will produce new tensions and international alignments which ultimately may lead to regional conflicts.[307]

Just as the Iran-Iraq war (before it stagnated) was a potential threat to the American interest in the oil shipping routes in the Persian Gulf, so too should American policy in Asia be cognizant that local conflicts unrelated to Soviet-American competition might threaten United States Asian security interests.

Does, or should, the United States have a role in these internal and local conflicts? William W. Whitson argues that the nations of Asia are becoming increasingly capable of handling their own disputes:

> The thirty years between 1945 and 1975 witnessed a steady movement toward management of Asian affairs by Asians. By the late 1970s, the accumulation of power and newly won confidence by leaders within the subregions of Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia had provided the foundation for a uniquely Asian system of interests, values, and techniques of crisis management that was decreasingly dependent upon the involvement of the superpowers.[308]

Whitson's description of the trend in Asian politics is essentially correct, but recent conflicts in Indochina and South Asia tend to indicate that not much has been built on the foundation for a "uniquely Asian" system of crisis management he perceives. This is due not so much to any inherent weakness in Asia as to the continuing presence of both superpowers in the region, and especially to the growing assertiveness of the Soviet Union. There can be no hope for an effective regional crisis management system as long as the Soviet Union pursues the encirclement of China through its 'selective security system' of proxies hostile to the Chinese.

Under these circumstances the assessment of Guy J. Pauker seems a better basis for defining an American role in Asian security:

> The international mechanisms by which regional stability had been maintained in East Asia are no longer effective. Unless the United States regains a position of major influence in the region, the next decades could become a period of political chaos.[309]

Pauker's view probably overstates the direction in Asian affairs (in the opposite direction as Whitson), but the point that the United States does have a role in regional security is well taken. Even if the United States does regain a "position of major influence in the region," as Pauker deems necessary, the American role will be constrained by the political trends Whitson believes to be predominant.

The constraint imposed by political circumstances in Asia on the role of the United States in regional security was described by Selig S. Harrison in his 1978 study of Asian nationalism and American policy:

> In attempting to suggest new guidelines for American military and economic policy in Asia, this analysis proceeds from the pivotal assumption that nationalism sharply circumscribes the role. American policy options are defined, in this approach, by the limits inherent in the situation rather than by an a priori definition of American interests as viewed in a global perspective from the vantage point of Washington. Thus, the United States must differentiate between a variety of distinctive regional and national environments, each struggling for its own place in the sun, each with its unique world view, and each with an identity worthy of American recognition in its own right.[310]

Harrison's view of the context of American security policy in Asia brings the discussion back to the point with which it opened: the diversity of Asia. Nationalism and the pursuit of national interests (the factors identified by Harrison and Solomon, respectively) build upon the diversity of Asia to preclude the use of the east-west ideological rivalry as a common denominator for the conflicts in Asia.

Thus, while the United States has an important role in the security of ASia due to the aggressive Soviet policy of

exploiting the tensions of the region to improve its position against China (as well as to supplant American influence in the region), the American definition of that role must be careful to distinguish between policies whose purpose is to pursue global American security interests (containment of Soviet expansionism) in the Asian setting, and policies which inadvertently or by design attempt to redefine, or even overtly shape, that Asian setting to conform with American notions as to what is best for Asia. The first purpose is important to American security interests and can be pursued; the second is unattainable and to pursue it would be disastrous for American interests.

The fundamental United States security objective in Asia has been described by Morton Halperin as maintenance of a balance of power in the region:

> First and most important, the U.S. has been and continues to be concerned with maintaining a balance of power in Asia so that no single nation can gain sufficient control of the area to directly threaten the American homeland.[311]

Although this is an accurate description of the single most important American security interest in Asia, it is not the only, nor has it always been the foremost, security interest guiding American policy. In the closing years of the nineteenth century, for example, American leaders, often quoting the influential naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, were unabashedly espousing imperialist goals for the United States in Asia, and the Philippine Islands were kept after being seized from Spain (though with some reluctance) for avowedly

imperialist reasons as well as to preserve the balance of power in Asia.[312] During the 1950s and 1960s the American cold war goal of containment of communism likewise was pre-eminent over what would have been a less demanding 'pure' balance of power strategy.

There are compelling reasons for considering maintenance of a balance of power in Asia as the basis for American security interests in the region. Raymon H. Myers has pointed out that:

> ...an American commitment to maintain a stable balance of power among states in East Asia and elsewhere, arises from the perception that checks and balances are required to deter aggressive acts by other states in a world where order is constantly threatened by competition between diverse power groups.[313]

"Checks and balances" are required in Asia because of the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union in the region, and because Soviet clients in Asia have an unsavory reputation for hostilities against their neighbors (North Korea against South Korea, India against Pakistan, and Vietnam against Kampuchea--in each case solid Soviet backing was a major factor in the escalation of local tensions to the level of armed conflict).

Although the United States has an interest in the maintenance of a balance of power in Asia, American policy in the region should not be focused exclusively upon this one objective. As was noted earlier, the diversity of the political circumstances of Asia argue against an American policy based solely on a single global objective. Selig S. Harrison

perceives that the political circumstances of Asia require that great care be taken in using the balance of power concept:

> The diffusion of power accompanying the spread of nationalist consciousness greatly reduces the danger of one-nation dominance that has provided the rationale for the past application of balance of power logic to Asia. In a geopolitical landscape that becomes more and more kaleidoscopic, the enduring American interest does not lie in any particular transitory balance of power but rather in compatible relationships with countries big and small cutting across the multipolar spectrum....
>
> The task of defining an appropriate American military policy in Asia is facilitated by making a clear distinction between two separable objectives that have been consistently merged in cold war perspectives. One is the maintenance of a global American military capability, encompassing Asia, designed primarily to assure a stable bilateral power equation with the Soviet Union. The other is the promotion of regional power balances within Asia, buttressed by the continuing interposition of American forces and American military aid. The first objective can be pursued in ways that avoid a direct collision with nationalism in Asia; the second, by its nature, places the United States on a collision course with nationalism and can only be self-defeating.[314]

Harrison makes important points in these paragraphs that should be considered in the formulation of American security policy in Asia, but his analysis has one major weakness: the Soviet Union does not respect his distinction between global and regional balances. The capacity and willingness of the Soviet Union to project its military power into Asia, directly and through client states, have grown enormously over the last decade and are still expanding today. As part of its 'selective security' policy in Asia, aimed at the military encirclement of China, the Soviet Union has been vigorously interposing its forces and military aid to buttress its clients in

Asia--particularly Vietnam and Afghanistan, and to a lesser degree India. The United States interest in Asian security requires, therefore, close attention to regional power balances as well as to the global power balance.

Because the Soviet Union is the pre-eminent threat to American security interests in Asia, those interests have become directly linked with America's global security interests. In 1977 Leslie H. Brown observed:

> With the decline of China as a major US security concern and her replacement by the Soviet Union, the 'threat' becomes global in character and has as its focus interests lying for the most part outside Asia, not within it. As a consequence, American security policy in Asia, particularly with respect to China but to other Asian countries as well, is increasingly a function of Soviet-American interests and rivalries external to the region and subordinate to them.[315]

Although it is argued elsewhere in this paper that the United States has security interests in China that are not merely a function of Soviet-American relations, when one looks at the overall priorities of American global security interests Brown's assessment is essentially correct. Even the April 1980 United States policy announcement that American forces in the Pacific would no longer automatically be committed to the defense of NATO in the event of a Soviet attack (the "swing strategy") was not based primarily on America's Asian security interests. The primary American concern in this policy shift was the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf, which had required a heavy commitment of American forces to the Indian Ocean--forces for the most part drawn from those committed also to the defense of American interests in East Asia and the Pacific.[316]

The Reagan Administration has reaffirmed this linkage between American security interests in Asia and American global security interests. Under Secretary Stoessel stated in April 1981 that:

> In recent years, we have recognized that our Asian security policy is related to our larger task of coping with the challenge posed by our principal adversary, the Soviet Union, and by the aggressive actions of nations which receive its backing and act as its proxies, such as Vietnam. The challenge is global in character, and what we do in Asia will be consistent with our efforts elsewhere.[317]

The Reagan Administration has also been reported to have adopted a "two war" strategy--actually somewhat of a misnomer in that both wars would likely be one war against the Soviet Union fought in two theaters--but, as was the case in the earlier de-emphasis of the "swing strategy," the Middle East appears to have been the region primarily responsible for the shift in American policy.[318] Although the overall increase in the level of American forces that is implied by upgrading the strategy from "one-and-one-half wars" to "two wars" will indirectly benefit the commitment of the United States to the security of Asia (mainly by reducing the possibility of a diversion of forces from Asia), it does not appear that the priority of the Asian region itself has increased as a result of the strategy shift.

With this overview of the security problems of Asia and of the United States interest in Asian security as a background, the discussion now turns to the role of China in American security interests in Asia.

1. China and American Security Commitments in Asia

The United States is heavily committed to the security of its interests, and to the security of its allies and friends, in Asia. The foundation of this commitment is the series of treaties the United States has signed with several of the nations of the region. Under Secretary Stoessel reaffirmed the American commitment to those treaties in April 1981:

> Our security arrangements are spelled out in bilateral treaties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines; our trilateral treaty with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS); and the Manila Pact, under which we have a commitment to the security of Thailand. In a broad sense, then, we are committed to peace and stability throughout the region.[319]

The United States also has interests, commitments, and obligations arising from other sources. The Taiwan Relations Act expresses American interest in the security of Taiwan, but this is a special case and will be examined in a separate section. The United States has clearly stated its interest in the security of Pakistan, and in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has reaffirmed the American commitment to Pakistan's defense. The exact nature of the American commitment to Pakistan, however, is unclear because the tempestuous history of the relationship has obscured to what extent treaty commitments made in the 1950s are still operative. The United States has also clearly expressed an interest in the security of the ASEAN nations, though no treaty binds the United States to the organization itself.

The Reagan Administration reaffirmed this interest during Secretary Haig's June 1981 visit to Manila, and it has been expressed by John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in his July 15, 1981 statement before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[320]

The commitments, both formal and informal, that the United States has made to the security of allies and friendly nations in Asia imposes two requirements on American policy in the region. First, the United States must maintain forces--either in the region or which can quickly be deployed there--that can effectively fulfill these American commitments. For this purpose the United States maintains a military presence in Asia consisting of naval, ground and air forces supported by forward bases and facilities, engages in joint military training and planning with its allies in Asia, and supports the strengthening of the defensive capabilities of its allies and friends by means of arms sales, the military assistance program, and technical assistance and training. In the background, but an essential contribution to Asian security nevertheless, is the American strategic nuclear deterrence force--some of which is deployed in the Pacific region.

The second requirement imposed upon American security policy in Asia is that if the United States hopes to deter aggression, then its commitment to the security of its allies and friends must be credible--credible both to potential aggressors and to the nations relying on American support as

well. Morton Halperin has warned that "the United States must be concerned not only with threats to particular pieces of territory, which if dominated by hostile forces could threaten her security, but also with threats to the credibility of American commitments and to the principles of peaceful change to which it is dedicated."[321] There have indeed been threats to the credibility of the American commitment to Asian security, and the United States has not been entirely successful in maintaining its credibility in the face of those challenges. As a consequence of the "Nixon doctrine" reduction of American forces in Asia, the Vietnam debacle, and the irresolute United States response to Soviet adventurism in Africa, the Vietnamese conquest of Kampuchea, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, United States credibility has suffered. Richard H. Solomon reports "there is a widespread concern that the United States cannot be depended upon to meet its regional security commitments."[322] The Reagan Administration has expressed an awareness of this problem and a commitment to restoring American credibility,[323] but it is a problem that is not readily susceptible to one-time 'quick-fixes'--constant and unflagging attention to the viability of America's relations with its allies and friends is required.

The relationship between American security interests in China and America's Asian security interests has two major aspects: China's attitude toward the American commitments in Asia, and the attitudes of America's Asian allies and friends

toward American commitments to the security of China. It is possible that only fortuitous circumstances have thus far prevented these two sets of American security interests from being mutually exclusive.

China's attitude toward American security commitments in Asia has been shaped since the early 1970s by the perception of a growing Soviet threat to China. China's leaders believe that the Soviet Union is attempting to encircle their country militarily, both with Soviet forces and with the forces of nations hostile to China that are enlisted as Soviet proxies. In the realm of politics and diplomacy, China has attempted to forge a 'united front' against Soviet 'hegemonism.' In the military realm, China dropped its opposition to the American military presence in Asia and in public statements acknowledged that the American presence was crucial as a counterweight to Soviet power. In an equally dramatic policy reversal, China now calls on Japan to strengthen its defense forces to resist Soviet efforts at military intimidation of the Japanese. Likewise, in Southeast Asia, because of Soviet backing of Vietnam, and in South Asia, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet ties with India, China has been supportive of American commitments to allies and friendly nations. In Thailand and Pakistan, in particular, Chinese and American security interests are closely parallel due to aggressive Soviet policies in those regions of Asia. Only in the case of South Korea does China publicly

oppose an American commitment, but this appears to be due largely to Chinese competition with the Soviets for influence in North Korea. There is evidence that the Chinese have no interest in a new war on the Korean Peninsula, both because it would disrupt China's development program and because the Soviets would be better able to exploit the conflict for their own ends (which are anti-Chinese), and therefore are willing to lend tacit support for preserving the status quo on the peninsula.[324]

Another element in the Chinese attitude toward United States commitments in Asia is the differing approaches the Americans and the Chinese prefer to take in their policies toward the Soviet Union. As was described earlier, China prefers a more resolute opposition to Soviet belligerency, whereas the United States is more comfortable with a mix of inducements and warnings. The more moderate American approach is in part due to the web of alliances the United States has around the world. Leslie H. Brown has described this linkage:

> Moreover, the United States is operating, as China is not, through a system of alliances and other international arrangements. United States ability to deal successfully with the Soviet Union, politically and militarily, is critically dependent on maintaining her alliances in good order. She must take into account in her Soviet policies the views and interests of the partners, most of whom, for domestic political reasons, are strongly inclined towards negotiation rather than confrontation tactics.[325]

China could well come to the conclusion that what it perceives as a lack of American resolve against the Soviet Union is in fact symptomatic of a subordination of China's interests to

the interests of America's allies and non-communist friends in Asia. A perception in China that the United States lacks resolve in dealing with the Soviets could also lead to a weakening of American credibility in the eyes of the Chinese. Earl C. Ravenal has pointed out:

> The more painful irony is that somehow we have to be even stronger in Asia than we were when we were in a posture of confrontation with China, in order to demonstrate our resolve as a worthy alignment partner and discourage China from thinking of accommodating the Soviets; and somehow we must now have a larger defense budget and a more active global posture than we had before the Sino-Soviet split.[326]

Ravenal overstates the actual state of affairs in Sino-American relations, but the point that the United States may face credibility prcblems with China--problems similar to those experienced with other countries in Asia--must be kept in mind when defining security interests in China.

The attitudes of America's Asian allies, and those of Asian countries commonly labeled as "friends" of the United States (a convenient but potentially misleading label), toward American commitments to the security of China and Sino-American security cooperation are a second potential source of conflicts between America's security interests in Asia and America's security interests in China. Richard H. Solomon observed in 1979 that: "More recently, a concern has arisen that the development of US-PRC security cooperation on the theme of anti-hegemony will either provoke the Soviet Union or take precedence over America's traditional alliance

relationships in Asia."[327] To a certain degree such concerns are to be expected whenever United States foreign policy in a region changes significantly. The concerns of America's Asian allies do not require that the United States choose once and for all between China and its allies, but American policy should be formulated so as not to needlessly exacerbate those concerns.

Underlying concern that the United States will give China priority over its allies in Asia is a fear that, in its eagerness to buttress China militarily against the Soviet Union, the United States will fail to consider the possibility that China could become a threat to its neighbors. This issue comes up most frequently in discussions of arms sales to China. Because there is this concern that the United States might be creating a "Frankenstein's monster" in Asia, the possibility of China becoming a military threat to its neighbors needs to be examined.

China, naturally, is adamant that it is not and will not become a threat to any of its neighbors:

> Another point is that when it becomes stronger, it will not place the Soviet Union or any other country in jeopardy. The Chinese don't want to threaten anyone; they want to be strong because they know weakness would bring humiliations and injuries which they had suffered from the big powers for more than a century.[328]

Statements like this one in the Communist Chinese media are more than just propaganda, but the Chinese perception as to what constitutes a threat is not necessarily the same as the perceptions of the West or China's neighbors (especially the

Soviet Union). Chinese history, particularly the memory of humiliations suffered at the hands of the West, weighs heavily on China's view of its role in Asia and the world. This leads, in some instances, to the perception that because the status quo threatens Chinese security or sovereignty, actions to force a change in the status quo (such as seizure of the Paracel Islands in 1974) cannot be considered a Chinese threat to its Asian neighbors. This is reinforced by the Marxist-Leninist concept of "just" wars--those which defend the proletariat from capitalism or which are waged for national liberation from imperialism. Thus, although China's leaders may well firmly believe that they have no intention of threatening anyone, their definition of a 'threat' may exclude a broad range of actions that are, in fact, threatening.

Western perceptions of the potential threat from China have tended to take wide swings, at various times either greatly overstating or understating the Chinese threat. The common practice of contrasting the Chinese threat with the Soviet threat is probably cause for such swings. In the late 1950s and early 1960s when the United States and the Soviet Union moved toward "peaceful coexistence," and again in the late 1960s and early 1970s when Soviet-American detente began to arise, the American view of the threat from China took a swing toward exaggerating Chinese intentions and capabilities. In 1968, for example, Walter C. Clemens wrote that "While Moscow tends on the whole to prefer the preservation of existing frontiers, Peking wants to change them, to move again

toward a grand design of a Middle Kingdom, and is calling for the overthrow of existing governments all over the world."[329] Such comparative descriptions of Soviet and Chinese foreign policy almost invariably result in far too sharp a contrast between the two nations. Although Chinese foreign policy did shift toward 'radical' goals and confrontation tactics in both of the periods mentioned above, the shifts were more of emphasis than of national purpose.[330]

A more reasonable view of the nature of the Chinese threat would take as its starting point the observation of Alice Langley Hsieh (stated in 1963) that: "In sum, there is little in Chinese military doctrine, policy, or behavior to support the thesis that the Chinese are militarily reckless or adventurist."[331] This is the essential counterpoint that should be kept in mind when evaluating the hostility often seen in Chinese polemics against its adversaries (formerly the United States, now the Soviet Union). Western observers have tended to emphasize the military dimension over the political dimension in their assessments of Chinese policy--which is a reversal of the Chinese view of the importance of these factors.

The potential threat from China lies primarily in the political dimension rather than in the military dimension, though--as the Chinese are well aware--military forces are an essential foundation for the exercise of political power. A. Doak Barnett has concluded that "the bulk of the evidence indicates that the Chinese leadership does not think in broad

territorial expansionist terms, although it is determined to increase its political influence."[332] Barnett's observation is not only applicable to the policy of the People's Republic, it identifies a continuity in the Chinese attitude toward their neighbors that originated in dynastic times. The Middle Kingdom, for the most part, saw no need to conquer and annex the lands of its "barbarian" neighbors as long as they acknowledged Chinese influence by accepting tributary state status (in many cases little more than a pro forma ritual). Joachim Glaubitz has described this political dimension of the Chinese threat:

> We can presume that China is committed to its anti-hegemony formulas. But it must also be taken into consideration that China--as we can learn from its past--is very skillful in exercising political influence and economic control in neighboring countries without overt interference. The possibility cannot be excluded that China, while openly and emphatically opposing hegemony, will continue to use subtle means of indirect influence and subversion with the aim of dominating the other countries in the region in its own peculiar fashion.[333]

It would probably not serve American security interests for the Asian allies of the United States to become the modern equivalent of tributary states to China. Such a situation would be a significant challenge to the balance of power that best serves America's Asian security interests. On the other hand, the Chinese have not shown themselves to be as "skillful in exercising political influence and economic control" as Glaubitz credits them. In the economic sphere in particular China's influence over its neighbors is severely

limited. Indeed, to the extent that China's development is financed by profitable trade relations with its neighbors, and by their investments in China's economy, the "control" will operate in the opposite direction than Glaubitz postulated. Appendix B takes a closer look at China's economic interactions with the countries of Asia--which are going to directly affect, whether positively or negatively, American security interests in China and Asia. In the political sphere as well, as is evidenced by the moderating effect that the Third World has had on Chinese policy, the ability of China to exercise sufficient influence to dominate its Asian neighbors is limited. Only China's relationship with Burma comes close to being an example of such influence, and even here the extent of Chinese dominance is arguable.

The conclusions of Hsieh and Barnett that China is neither "adventurist" nor "expansionist" and the observation that the political threat from China is political more so than military do not fully describe that potential threat. As Leslie H. Brown has warned, China has interests that could (and have in the past) lead to policy decisions which are threatening:

> The arguments that can be marshalled to support the non-imperialist view of China are persuasive. But there remains a nagging doubt. There are large Chinese populations in a number of Asian countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia) that Communist China has in the past manipulated for political ends (notably in Indonesia in the mid-1960s) and could do so again. There are also irridentist claims outstanding not only on the Soviet Union but also on India, Hong Kong, Macao and a variety of small islands in the East and

> South China seas. Any or all of these claims could one day be pressed.[334]

Two additional issues, then, need to be addressed: China's support for subversive groups in neighboring countries and Chinese territorial claims.

China's support for subversive groups in neighboring countries takes two forms: manipulation of the overseas Chinese, as mentioned by Brown, and support of revolutionary and national liberation movements. The two forms of support tend to be somewhat indistinguishable in Southeast Asia, where the overseas Chinese have been prominent in the communist movements of some nations (Indonesia being the best example). Chinese support for both forms of subversion has been greatly de-emphasized in favor of developing closer state-to-state relations with the nations of Asia. This is one aspect of the overall adjustment in China's foreign policy--away from revolutionary goals to support the domestic development program--that was described in Section E.

Other than during the period of the Cultural Revolution, China has since the Bandung Conference (1955) generally been conciliatory toward the Southeast Asian nations on the subject of the overseas Chinese.[335] A January 1978 editorial in Renmin Ribao on overseas Chinese affairs reaffirmed the Chinese Government's declared policy on this issue:

> We should continue to implement the policy set forth by Chairman Mao for settling the question of dual nationality among overseas Chinese and encourage them to acquire the nationality of the country of residence on a voluntary basis. Upon acquiring such a nationality, they are no longer

> citizens of China, but they are still our kinsfolk and friends. The policies concerning overseas Chinese affairs at home also fully apply to their relatives in China. As to those overseas Chinese who wish to retain their Chinese nationality, we should welcome their choice, and the state has the duty to protect their legitimate rights and interests. It is our hope that overseas Chinese abide by the laws and decrees of the countries in which they reside, live in harmony with the local people and make contributions to the development of the economy and culture of these countries. We also hope that the governments of these countries will protect the legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese and respect their national traditions, customs and habits.[336]

Overall, this policy is respectful of the interests of the Southeast Asian countries. The duty of the state to protect the legitimate rights and interests of those overseas Chinese electing to retain Chinese nationality is somewhat ambiguous, and could be a cause for concern. The bulk of the editorial, however, was concerned with Chinese Government policy toward the overseas Chinese in China itself, and with policy toward the relatives in China of the overseas Chinese. The ambiguous passage probably refers to such policies, and therefore does not contradict the overall conciliatory tone of the statement.

Chinese Communist Party policy toward the support of revolutionary groups has also been constrained so as not to impede the government policy of forming a 'united front' against the Soviet Union. Donald Zagoria has pointed out how this fits into the overall scheme of China's Asian policy:

> Because of its fear of the Russians, China also is now building up relations with many governments in Asia to which it had formerly been hostile. Many of these regimes--in the Philippines, Malaysia,

> Thailand, Indonesia, and particularly in Japan--have long been supported by the United States. The switch in Chinese policy is motivated by Peking's desire to counter Soviet diplomatic efforts to line up an Asian collective security pact directed against China. This switch means that Chinese support of revolutionary movements throughout Asia is played down.[337]

Keeping in mind that Japan, the Philippines and Thailand are allies of the United States, and that there are American bases and facilities in Japan and the Philippines, the connection between China's Asia policy and American security interests in the region is clear.

Although China has played down its support for the revolutionary movements in Asia, it continues to provide a low level of material aid and other assistance to them. The Chinese Government has not been responsive to requests from its Asian neighbors that it cease such support, citing historical ties with the groups and the threat of the Soviet Union supplanting China as their patron as its motives.[338] Although there is a certain degree of merit in the second excuse, it is likely that the persistence of Chinese support for revolutionary groups in Asia reflects a continuing commitment to the ideology that brought the Chinese Communist Party into power. "It would be naive to expect Peking to abandon the utopian goal of world revolution," warned Shao-chuan Leng, even though China has focused on state-to-state relations and "playing the balance of power game."[339] Deng Xiaoping's January 1980 statement that China seeks "a peaceful environment for carrying out the four modernizations" should

be interpreted narrowly, as a statement of current foreign policy priorities, rather than broadly, as being indicative of a fundamental shift in Party ideology.

Chinese leaders appear to be aware that support for subversive groups in neighboring countries is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, support for such groups can be a convenient tool for harassing or pressuring a government, and a successful revolutionary movement might replace a regime hostile to Chinese interests. On the other hand, when China desires to improve relations with a neighbor support for a subversive group in that country becomes a liability--but to abandon the group could cause it to turn to the Soviet Union for support. A victory for a revolutionary movement is also not necessarily in China s interest. As the Vietnam example has shown, nationalism and historical animosities are stronger factors than a common ideology in determining the state of relations between China and a communist neighbor. This creates opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence around China's periphery by offering its diplomatic and military support as a counterweight to the Chinese. Thus, China faces somewhat of a dilemma: whether it abandons support of revolutionary groups or backs them in a victorious struggle there is a risk of the Soviets capitalizing on the situation at China's expense, but to maintain a level of support in between those two extremes is to risk alienating the established regime--which could also benefit the Soviet Union.

China's territorial claims in the East and South China Seas and border disputes with India and Vietnam are a second potential source of conflict between China and its neighbors. The disputes with India and Vietnam will be discussed in the next section, on China's interests in the trouble spots of Asia. Because Chinese claims in the East and South China Seas are a source of tension between China and allies and friends of the United States in Asia, those claims could adversely affect American security interests in China and the rest of Asia.

China's claim of "inviolable sovereign rights over the continental shelf in the East China Sea" has been the basis of Chinese condemnation of an agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea on joint development of a portion of that shelf.[340] Closely related to the continental shelf dispute is a disagreement between China and Japan over possession of the Senkaku (Tiao Yu Tai) Islands north of Taiwan, which led to tension in April 1978 when a number of Chinese fishing boats intruded into waters claimed by Japan. China also asserts sovereignty over most of the South China Sea and the various island groups and banks in it. The Paracel (Xisha) and Spratley (Nansha) island groups have been the focus of the disputes in the area--China and Vietnam claim both groups and the Philippines claims the Spratleys. Because China claims almost all of the South China Sea, however, the Chinese contest several claims with the Philippines and are also involved in disputes with Malaysia and Indonesia. The potential for oil under the

South China Sea, in particular, and fishing rights are the reasons for such great interest in the region.[341]

The possibility cannot be dismissed that these or other potential disputes could lead China to take military action against its Asian neighbors. China has clearly demonstrated a willingness to use its military forces outside its own borders, as the seizure of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in January 1974 illustrates. Chinese military doctrine and forces provide a limited capacity to conduct offensive operations--but it needs to be stressed that this Chinese capability is extremely limited. In assessing the possibility of China seizing the Spratleys as it did the Paracels, for example, Jonathan Pollack observed that: "The scale of allocation and preparation which would be required to assert these claims--not to mention the even larger objective of Taiwan--vastly exceeds any operations that have yet been undertaken by China's naval and air forces."[342] China appears to be making an effort to expand its ability to project naval power beyond its coastal waters, but as an indication of future Chinese intentions this must be balanced against the record of caution China has shown in the use of its military forces.[343] As long as opposition to the Soviet Union remains China's top foreign policy and security objective, it is unlikely that China would take military action against America's allies and friends in Asia.

Unites States security interests in China and American commitments to Asian security are inextricably linked.

Because China and the United States share a mutual interest in the containment of Soviet expansionism those two sets of American security interests have been mutually supportive over the past decade. Although it appears that these fortuitous circumstances will continue to shape the security environment of Asia for the next several years as well, there are far too many latent sources of tension in the region for this to be the basis of American security policy indefinitely. Over the long-term, the range of interests China shares with its Asian neighbors, and the importance China attaches to those interests, will be the decisive factor in the evolution of American security interests in Asia. Recent trends have been encouraging in this regard, but there remain significant potential conflicts which could erupt in violence and force the United States to choose between its interests in China and its commitments to its allies in Asia.

2. China's Interests in the Trouble Spots of Asia

There are three places in Asia where long-standing disputes have in the past broken out in fighting: the Korean Peninsula, Indochina, and the Indian Subcontinent. In all three areas the basic conflicts remain unresolved and in Indo-China there is still fighting today. The United States has security interests and commitments in all three areas: South Korea and Thailand are allies and Pakistan is a former ally and of strategic importance to American interests in the South Asian-Indian Ocean region.

China's security interests in these loci of conflict are even greater than those of the United States. North Korea, Kampuchea (the Pol Pot regime), and Pakistan are allies of China. The Soviet Union, China's prime adversary, is competing for influence with China in North Korea, and has signed friendship and cooperation treaties with India and Vietnam that are clearly directed against the Chinese: China fought a border war with India in 1962 and launched a punitive attack on Vietnam in 1979. Thus, it would appear that the stage is set for renewed violence in Asia--violence which could embroil China and the superpowers in a much wider conflict. This section will examine China's interests and roles in these three trouble spots of Asia.

Although China is firmly committed to North Korea, this does not mean that the Chinese would back a second attempt by Pyongyang to reunify the peninsula by attacking the South. The Sino-Soviet dispute is the primary reason for such Chinese reticence. An attack by the North on the South would strain China's relations with the United States and Japan--the two most important partners in China's 'united front' against the Soviets. A North Korean victory in a new war would be desirable only if the Communist regime remained on good terms with China vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, but there is no assurance that this would be the case. The greater Soviet ability to provide military aid might induce a Pyongyang tilt towards Moscow. On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet competition in the North constrains the Chinese from overt

cooperation with the United States on the Korean problem and inhibits the development of relations with the South. Reports of Chinese trade and contacts with the South are vehemently denied by Beijing lest the Soviets capitalize on them. While China would probably agree to cross-recogniztion of the South once Pyongyang had accepted the idea (not a likely prospect), it is unrealistic to expect China to take the initiative on such a proposal without a concurrent Soviet commitment. Thus, while China can be epxected to restrain the North from future aggression, China will not risk alienating the North Koreans by backing proposals opposed by Pyongyang.[344]

The political-military situation in Indochina is much more volatile than the situation on the Korean Peninsula. China and the Soviet Union are squared off in a clearly adversary relationship, which has polarized a number of disputes in and around the region. War-torn, poverty-stricken Kampuchea stands at the center of the tensions and disputes in Indochina--and has been the primary battleground on which those disputes have been fought. China lost the first round of the Kampuchean conflict when the Soviet-backed Vietnamese ousted the Pol Pot regime, which was allied with China, and installed the Heng Samrin government. China continues to support the Khmer Rouge and the non-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front in their guerrilla war against the Vietnamese in Kampuchea, and also backs the efforts to form a united front of the various anti-Vietnamese Khmer groups (an effort being led by

Norodom Sihanouk, among others). The Soviet Union and Vietnam oppose all of these Chinese actions.[345]

The Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea is just one of the sources of tension between China and Vietnam. Others include a dispute over the Sino-Vietnamese border, conflicting claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratley islands and large areas of the South China Sea, and Chinese displeasure over Vietnam's treatment of the overseas Chinese (the Vietnamese counter that China seeks to subvert the overseas Chinese in Vietnam). The Soviet Union has exploited, and thereby exacerbated, these Sino-Vietnamese tensions by forming an alliance with the Vietnamese and seeking the use of airfields and ports in Vietnam for Soviet Pacific Fleet naval and air deployments. To counter the Soviet-Vietnamese alignment, China has sought to improve its relations with the members of ASEAN, particularly Thailand.[346]

The situation in Indochina is almost hopelessly polarized and deadlocked at the present time. Unlike the situation on the Korean Peninsula, however, it has not yet had time to set into a rigid pattern of relationships nor is there an armistice agreement among the feuding parties to formalize the deadlock. On the negative side, this unstable situation could erupt in renewed fighting (beyond the continuing guerrilla activity in Kampuchea) at any time. The next round in the Indochina War could involve Thailand and the Soviet Union as well as China and Vietnam. On the positive side, there is

still a possibility of a breakthrough on any one of a number of fronts which could lead to a partial settlement of some of the more dangerous disputes. If the Soviet Union continues to consolidate its direct control over Kampuchean affairs, as it now appears to be doing,[347] the most likely prospects will be for a stalemate in Indochina marked by continuing tensions and fighting in Kampuchea.

China's two primary objectives in South Asia are to contain the expansion of Soviet influence and power in the region and to resolve the long-standing border dispute with India. To a certain degree these two objectives are incompatible. China's alliance with Pakistan is the cornerstone of Chinese efforts to counter the Soviet presence in South Asia, but Pakistan is embroiled in a deeply-rooted conflict with India. Resolving the border dispute with India is important to China because it directly affects China's control over its unruly Tibetan autonomous region. Tibet has been a source of animosity between China and India: India would prefer an independent Tibet, and harbors the Dalai Lama in exile; China is determined that Tibet is an inseparable part of China and resents Indian interference in its "internal affairs." The border issue is also tied to questions of national pride and Sino-Indian competition for status and influence in Asia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a setback for Chinese efforts at containing the Soviets in the region, has also complicated the India-Pakistan and Sino-Indian disputes.[348]

Although India has lent partial (perhaps even reluctant) diplomatic support to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, China has continued to pursue the improvement of relations with India--a process begun in 1976 with the exchange of ambassadors. The Chinese interest has been expressed in public statements by top Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Premier Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping; in conciliatory gestures such as assurances that China would cease its support of rebels in the Indian provinces of Mizoram and Nagaland and would not disturb the "existing tranquility" on the Sino-Indian frontier; and in annual exchange visits by the foreign ministers of China and India over the last three years. India has also been expressing an interest in improving relations with China, though this has at least partially been an Indian tactic for pressuring the Soviet Union into greater concessions in talks with India (a ploy which payed off handsomely for India in a large arms agreement on easy financial terms in 1980). Nevertheless, India and China did agree to open talks on their border dispute during Huang Hua's June 1981 visit to New Delhi. China has also been encouraging Pakistan to improve its relations with India, and Pakistan has expressed just such an interest.[349]

There are several additional potential sources of tension in South Asia: the nuclear proliferation question, separatist sentiments in Pakistan's provinces of Baluchistan

and Pushtunistan and in parts of India as well, and unresolved disputes and historical animosities between India and its neighbors Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Soviet-American naval competition in the Indian Ocean, a region India and other nations would like to have recognized as a "zone of peace," is another source of tensions. These problems, and those described above between China, India and Pakistan, add up to an unstable international environment in which violence could arise for a number of reasons. But the outlook for South Asia is not completely bleak. India and China both perceive benefits to be gained from an improvement in their relations, and this could improve the chances for an Indian-Pakistani detente. Such initiatives would not eliminate the many potential sources of conflict in the region, but they would reduce the likelihood of violence--thereby reducing the opportunities the Soviet Union has for expanding its influence and military presence in South Asia.

The only pattern to the Chinese interests in the three trouble spots of Asia is that in each case opposition to the expansion of Soviet influence and presence in the region is one of the most important Chinese objectives. Although this Chinese objective generates a number of parallel interests with American security objectives in Asia, the ability of China to pursue policies that would be of benefit to American as well as to Chinese interests varies greatly in each trouble spot. In Korea, for example, China cannot risk alienating Pyongyang to improve relations with Seoul. In South Asia,

on the other hand, an improvement in Sino-Indian relations would probably be to the benefit of Pakistan. The United States should keep in mind this variation in the role that China can play in managing the potential conflicts in the trouble spots of Asia. The United States and China should also engage in close consultations on these areas of conflict so that each will understand the constraints which limit the freedom of action of the other. Without such an understanding Sino-American relations could become strained over an issue in which the two countries share substantial mutual interests.

3. China and the American Commitment to Taiwan

The relationship between the United States and the Kuomintang (Nationalist) regime on Taiwan creates special problems for the defining of American security interests in China and Asia. The problems arise as much from American domestic politics as from the hostility between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. The perception in the United States of the relationship between People's Republic of China and the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan has become somewhat distorted through a process of 'selective' memory and the drawing of inaccurate analogies to other countries. Observers in the United States remember the historical ties between America and the Republic of China, but forget that the Kuomintang lost the Chinese civil war in every province of China except Taiwan--and is still insistent that it will reconquer the mainland.

The Nationalist regime on Taiwan was not created in the way that the state of Israel was created, and it is a false and misleading analogy to compare the American commitment to Taiwan with the American commitment to Israel. Israel is an independent nation. Taiwan is a province of China ruled by the remnants of a regime defeated in a contest for the control of the nation.

The official policy of the United States toward the status of Taiwan is derived from three sources: the Shanghai Communique, the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, and the Taiwan Relations Act. The Shanghai Communique was issued by the United States and China on February 27, 1972 during the visit of President Nixon to China. It stated:

> The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.[350]

This statement governed American policy until the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations was issued on December 15, 1978. This communique made essentially the same point: "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China."[351] When the People's Republic of China criticizes American policy toward Taiwan, this is the position to which it insists the United States must adhere.

The Taiwan Relations Act was passed by the Congress on March 29, 1979 and signed into law by President Carter on April

10, 1979. This act declares that "peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern," and that it is the policy of the United States:

> ...to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
>
> ...to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
>
> ...to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.[352]

This act, of course, greatly upsets the government of the People's Republic, which reacts with vigorous indignation whenever an American spokesman reaffirms the intention of an administration to comply with it. Under Secretary Stoessel issued just such a reaffirmation for the Reagan Administration in April 1981:

> Regarding Taiwan, this Administration intends to implement faithfully the Taiwan Relations Act, the law passed by Congress which sets the parameters for our nonofficial ties on the basis of a longstanding and warm friendship with the people of Taiwan. Our conduct of this relationship with Taiwan will be responsible, respectful, realistic, and consistent with our international obligations.[353]

The "international obligations" of which he speaks presumably would include the position of the United States, as stated in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, on the status of Taiwan as a part of China.

Although the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States has an interest in the security of Taiwan due to concern for the "peace and security of the Western Pacific," it does not formally commit the United States to the defense of Taiwan. The President is obliged to "maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion," but is not obliged to employ that capacity to comply with the provisions of the Act itself. The causal linkage between an effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means and the peace and security of the Western Pacific is not explicitly defined by the Act, giving the President leeway in deciding the circumstances under which the "grave concern" of the United States should be backed by American military force. Thus, the United States is not formally committed to the defense of Taiwan and while an informal commitment may well derive from historical ties with the Republic of China, the exact nature of that informal commitment is not defined by the Taiwan Relations Act--American domestic politics will be the ultimate arbiter.

The United States relationship with Taiwan raises five issues concerning American security interests: (1) American credibility as an alliance partner, (2) the effect of Taiwan-American relations on Sino-American relations, (3) the possibility of China using force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland under one government, (4) the possibility of a desperation move by Taiwan to defend itself should it lose the American

commitment, and (5) the possibility of Kuomintang intervention in political turmoil on the mainland.

It has been argued that the United States must maintain its commitment to the defense of Taiwan in order to preserve American credibility as an alliance partner. Ray S. Cline, for example, has warned: "While geopolitical realities sometimes require us to deviate a little from principle, nothing that China is likely to do for the United States against the Soviet Union could compensate for the shock that our allies and friends would feel if Washington did not honor its commitment to defend Taiwan."[354] Although it is true, as was discussed earlier, that the United States must be concerned with its credibility, Cline's statement greatly oversimplifies the many ways in which other countries perceive American foreign policy as affecting their own national interests.

The effect that "abandoning" Taiwan would have on American credibility has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The primary interest of the nations of ASEAN is that Sino-American relations continue to improve so that Chinese behavior will continue to be moderated in a manner favorable to their political and economic interests--and if United States ties with Taiwan would prevent this, then the commitment to Taiwan should be scaled down.[355] South Korea and Japan would be much more concerned with the credibility of American commitments in East Asia, but there are a number of actions the

United States could take to reassure them of its commitment. Outside of East Asia, concern over such an American move would be much less intense. In almost every case direct American action toward its allies has a far greater effect on American credibility than the symbolic importance of American actions outside of their immediate geographic area.

The circumstances in which the United States terminated its informal commitment to the defense of Taiwan would largely determine the effect of such a move on American credibility. The repercussions would be much more severe if the United States were to abandon Taiwan in the face of an assault from the mainland than if the defense commitment were ended in the context of the opening of talks between China and Taiwan. In the latter case such an American move would probably be welcomed by most nations. Thus, the credibility argument is not so much an independent variable shaping American interests as it is a dependent variable which can, to a degree, be controlled through the careful implementation of American foreign policy.

The continuing American relationship with Taiwan has been somewhat of a hindrance to the development of Sino-American relations. China is adamantly opposed to the Taiwan Relations Act and reacts strongly to any indication that the United States might upgrade the status of its relations with Taiwan. China maintains that the United States is interfering in the internal affairs of China, in violation of the 1978 Joint Communique position, by implying any form of an

American commitment to the defense of Taiwan. The sale of American arms to Taiwan draws the most vehement Chinese condemnations of the United States. In January 1981 a commentary in the Beijing Review stated:

> The continued supply of weapons by the United States will only make the Taiwan authorities more arrogant and obstruct the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the motherland. This is really detrimental to 'the peace and security of the western Pacific area.'[356]

It is highly likely that China's downgrading of its relations with the Netherlands (from ambassadorial to chanrge d'affaires level) in retaliation for the Dutch decision to sell two submarines to Taiwan was intended primarily to be a warning signal to the Reagan Administration.[357]

United States relations with Taiwan may slow the development of Sino-American relations, but almost certainly will not preclude such further development. The mutual interests China shares with the United States--above all, opposition to the Soviet Union, but also the desire for American trade and investment--limit the actions China is willing to take to pressure the United States to abandon Taiwan. American leaders will have to expect a great deal of verbal abuse from China over relations with Taiwan, but, as long as the principle that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China is not violated, China will not take more than symbolic actions to express its displeasure.

The United States must also be aware that the Nationalist regime on Taiwan is not above manipulating its relations

with America for its own purposes--which may not serve American interests. The current controversy over Taiwan's request to purchase the F-16 jet fighter is a case in point. Although Secretary Haig has stated that there is "no urgency" to the sale and that the administration's decision will be based solely on Taiwan's genuine defense needs--vice on political grounds to balance the decision to sell arms to China--it is hardly likely that all of the administration officials who will be involved in the decision will agree with his views. Indeed, there have been press reports that the sale is regarded by some officials as important for maintaining American "friendship" with Taiwan.[358]

The debate on Taiwan's request has thus far focused on whether the air threat (now and in the future) justifies the advanced aircraft and on what the consequences will be for Sino-American relations (the economic health of certain defense contractors has also entered into the picture, as it always does in such decisions). What has been missing is a questioning of Taiwan's motives in making the request. Defense needs and a reaffirmation of the American commitment to Taiwan are the obvious, but not the only, motives. The timing of the request strongly suggests additional motives. The Kuomintang regime clearly intended to catch the Reagan Administration as soon as it was in office, before the first formal contacts between the new administration and the People's Republic of China. In this way, it was hoped, the pro-Taiwan

rhetoric of the campaign could be capitalized upon before the pressures of the "real world" caused the inevitable moderation in outlook that occurs in every new administration.

In addition to scoring a political coup in the Reagan Administration, Taiwan would also be spared from much of the growing pressure to negotiate with the mainland. China could reasonably be expected to harden its position against both Taiwan and the United States as a result of approval of the request. A hard-line position against Taiwan would probably emphasize that China had not renounced the option of using force to reunify the country, and the many lucrative inducements China has offered Taiwan would at least be de-emphasized and perhaps even rescinded. Thus, for Taiwan, the political benefits of the sale would far outweigh the defense benefits--no matter what the basis for the American decision had been. The United States should remain constantly aware that it is, by the nature of its commitment to Taiwan, highly vulnerable to political manipulation by the Kuomintang regime.

China has not renounced the option of using force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. The Beijing Review warned in January 1981:

> It is our hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland peacefully. But if we are driven by the Taiwan authorities' adamant refusal to resort to non-peaceful means to solve the issue, that is entirely China's internal affair which the United States has no right to meddle in, let alone claim that it poses 'a threat to the peace and security of the western Pacific area.'[359]

There is no reason to expect that China would renounce its military option other than in the context of progress in negotiations with Taiwan on a political solution. The Kuomintang regime, however, is adamant that it will never agree to talks with the mainland and that the only ultimate solution is the destruction of the communist regime ruling China.[360]

This standoff between China and Taiwan is not as dangerous as it seems. Deng Xiaoping has been quoted on more than one occasion as having stated that China would not use force against Taiwan unless the Kuomintang regime indefinitely refused to enter into negotiations or unless there were an attempt by the Soviet Union to interfere in the affairs of Taiwan.[361] There does not appear to be a time limit on the "indefinite" refusal to negotiate, even though Deng Xiaoping has identified "the return of Taiwan to the motherland" as one of the "three major tasks" that China must accomplish in the 1980s.[362] Only a declaration of an independent state of Taiwan would permanently foreclose talks, but the Kuomintang regime is adamantly opposed to the 'Taiwan independence movement' and is firmly in power.[363]

Turning to the second situation in which Deng said China would use force, although Henry Kissinger has reported Soviet contacts with Taiwan and China has in the past made similar accusations against the Russians, the Soviet Union appears to be cautious in its approach to Taiwan--knowing that a severe deterioration in already tense Sino-Soviet relations could be provoked with little to show for the

efforts. Additionally, Kuomintang officials have stated on more than one occasion that Taiwan has no intention of turning to the Soviet Union for support against China, and for this reason will not even trade with the Soviets.[364]

Thus, the political circumstances which would provoke an attack by China on Taiwan are not likely to occur. Nor would an attack on Taiwan be an attractive option for China. Stuart E. Johnson examined four military options China might consider: a nuclear attack on Taiwan, a conventional attack on Taiwan, an attack on one of the offshore islands (probably Quemoy), or a blockade (probably partial) of Taiwan. Each of these options has its own serious drawbacks. Any military action against Taiwan could entail heavy losses and high political and economic costs for China, particularly if the United States came to the aid of Taiwan.[365] Tying together these two factors--the political circumstances which would provoke a Chinese attack and the costs China would suffer if it did attack--should be the key to American policy toward Taiwan according to Ralph N. Clough:

> The key to living with the Taiwan problem lies in three propositions: keeping high the potential loss to the PRC in men and equipment if it resorts to military force against Taiwan; expanding relations between the United States and the PRC so that the potential gains to the PRC from continuation of this process and the potential losses from its interruption will be high; and keeping open the possibility of an eventual reunification of the PRC and Taiwan.[366]

Clough's observation is probably correct, but it is not an easy policy to implement. Clough himself admits that the three propositions are contradictory, and the government of China would certainly agree with him. Moreover, the Kuomingtang regime on Taiwan has found China's refusal to renounce the use of force to be a convenient form of leverage over American policy. Taiwan officials, including President Chiang Ching-kuo, have cited the threat from China as justification for their requests to purchase American weapons. As was noted above, Taiwan's arms requests may have ulterior motives: the frustration of efforts to induce Taiwan to negotaiate with China. China, on the other hand, expects a more active and positive American role in "keeping open the eventual reunification of the PRC and Taiwan." Vice Premier Wan Li has been reported to have suggested that the United States should help get discussions started between China and Taiwan.[367] The United States has thus far rejected any such role and the American experience as mediator in the Chinese civil war argues against assuming that role again. But the conflicting roles that Taiwan and China envision for the United States could unravel the delicate policy outlined by Clough, forcing American to seek a new approach to the entire issue.

The fourth security issue that arises from the American relationship with Taiwan is the possibility of a desperation move by Taiwan to ensure its own defense without reliance

upon the informal American commitment. Such a desperation move could result from a deliberate American decision to "abandon" Taiwan or from a loss of confidence in the informal American commitment to Taiwan's defense. Two desperation moves Taiwan might take have been suggested: alignment with the Soviet Union against China or acquisition of a nuclear weapons force. The first "desperation option" was discussed above--it is a course of action Taiwan is not likely to take. The Kuomintang regime trusts the Russians even less than it does the Chinese Communists. The only Soviet interest in such an arrangement would be to exploit Taiwan for all it was worth against China. It would be much more likely, if it can be assumed that there is such a thing as a "Chinese" style of politics, for Taiwan to make low-level overtures to the Soviets in order to manipulate the Chinese fear of the Soviet Union. This would greatly increase the maneuvering room and bargaining power Taiwan would have against China, but would not expose Taiwan to exploitation by the Russians.

The second "desperation option" open to Taiwan would be the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This is a much more serious threat than a Taiwan-Soviet alliance. In terms of scientific and technological capabilities Taiwan is fully capable of building nuclear warheads. The eleventh of the "ten great projects" Taiwan pursued in its development program of the 1970s was a surreptitious uranium reprocessing

facility--but Taiwan was caught red-handed and was pressured into closing down its operations. It would be premature, however, to cite that incident as a victory for non-proliferation. If Taiwan were to lose, or lose confidence in, the informal American commitment to its defense, the nuclear option would become very attractive. The possibility of losing the informal American security guarantee might deter Taiwan from "going nuclear" for a while, but over the long-term the threat of such a loss is an incentive to acquire nuclear arms. An American policy toward Taiwan based upon this approach would ultimately be self-defeating. The proliferation issue has become a tool for Taiwan to exercise leverage over American policy: if the United States balks at selling Taiwan the conventional arms it requests, Taiwan can threaten to go nuclear. The only other disincentive which might deter Taiwan from acquiring nuclear weapons is the threat of a pre-emptive strike by China before Taiwan could develop a credible nuclear deterrent force.[368]

The fifth security issue related to the American relationship with Taiwan is the possibility of Kuomintang intervention in political turmoil on the mainland. Given the insistence of the Kuomintang regime on Taiwan that it will, someday, return to the mainland and free the Chinese people from their "subjugation" by the communists, the possibility of such a move cannot be dismissed. There would probably be nothing the United States could do to prevent Taiwan from

intervening in a collapse of authority on the mainland--sentiment in the United States could be expected to favor the Kuomintang in any case--but this does not mean that Kuomintang intervention would be in the best interests of either the United States or China. As was discussed in an earlier chapter, China is most vulnerable to external aggression when weakened by internal political disruption. This is precisely the type of situation which the Soviet Union would prefer as the context for an attack on China to guarantee a final solution to its China problem. Kuomintang intervention in a rebellion or power struggle on the mainland could well be the factor which would prompt the Soviets to strike: the only situation worse than a China united under the Communist Party would be a China united under the Nationalist Party. The Kuomintang might even emerge victorious in the political struggle (though this is doubtful) but its prize would likely be a China that had been dismembered and devastated by the Soviet Union.

The five security issues discussed above suggest that the United States should reconsider the manner in which it pursues its commitment to the security of Taiwan. In particular, the United States should reverse the tables on Taiwan: instead of the Kuomintang regime being able to exploit its historical ties and (supposed) ideological affinity with the United States to manipulate American policy and resist any movement toward negotiations with the People's Republic, the United States should emphasize those same factors as the basis

for encouraging (a polite word for pressuring) Taiwan to enter into talks on reunification. In its public declarations of friendship with and support for the regime on Taiwan, the United States should emphasize that the proven economic viability and political cohesion of Taiwan are a solid foundation for Kuomintang negotiations with the mainland. The United States should also point out that it expects Taiwan, as a free country dedicated to peaceful progress, to seek a negotiated settlement to its dispute with the mainland--and that arms cannot be provided under any other conditions. The quid pro quo for American arms should be a Kuomintang policy line that does not absolutely rule out any talks with the Chinese Communists. It would not be overly difficult to formulate a statement which would allow the regime on Taiwan to save face while opening the possibility of talks--thereby reducing the threat that China would resort to force to recover Taiwan.

Once the regime on Taiwan had revised its policy line to allow the possibility of some form of discussions, the next objective of American policy toward Taiwan should be to ensure that a dialogue, no matter how modest, was begun. This is a formidable, but not entirely hopeless, objective. The conciliatory stance that China has been willing to take toward Taiwan (probably a tactical ploy, but there may well be substance to some of the offers) and the reports of unofficial contacts between the two rivals suggest that there may well

be subjects--economic, educational, and humanitarian--which could be used for a trial effort to open talks.[369] The United States should not mediate or host such talks, but could provide a confidential channel for arranging them.

4. China and American Naval Strategy in the Western Pacific

The Asian security interests of the United States cannot be defined only in terms of the interests America has in the security of its allies and friends in the region. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, as has already been noted, is global in scope, requiring the United States to view its security interests in any given region in the context of the overall Soviet-American power equation. Local conflicts, and the Soviet involvement in them, need to be understood not only in terms of the indigenous origins of the dispute but also in terms of the potential effect they could have on the geopolitical positions of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Naval power is a significant element in the Soviet-American strategic balance. The capacity to utilize the oceans of the world for the projection of national power, for the support of allies and friends abroad, for the transport of commerce, and for the exploitation of the wealth of resources in and under their waters is the sine qua non of global power. The possession of nuclear weapons made the Soviet Union a superpower, but it has been the growth of its

naval and maritime power which has made the Soviet Union a global power.

Possession of naval forces is only one of the elements of naval power. A strategy for the employment of the navy in support of national goals and the unity of purpose behind the pursuit of those national goals are two other important elements--but are beyond the scope of this discussion. A fourth element of naval power is geography. Because geography cannot be changed (with few exceptions, such as the digging of canals), it is a fundamental determinant of naval strategy. The effect of geography on the exercise of naval power, however, can to a degree be controlled. This can be done by purely military means (such as by mining a strategic strait) or by a combination of political and military means (for example, by forming an alliance with a state whose naval forces can control a strategic body of water in place of one's own forces). Thus, geopolitics becomes a vital element in the formulation and implementation of naval strategy.

The fundamental missions of the United States Navy, broadly defined, are nuclear deterrence, sea control, and power projection. Ballistic missile submarines are assigned the strategic nuclear deterrence mission, as one element of the "strategic triad" (along with intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers). Although there are ballistic missile submarines deployed in the Pacific, the nuclear deterrence mission will not be discussed herein because the

operations of those submarines are, for the most part, unaffected by geopolitical considerations.

The sea control and power projection missions are the fundamental tasks of the United States Navy in the Western Pacific. Sea control requires that the United States be capable of defeating any force which seeks to deny it free access to and transit of the international waters of the Western Pacific. Power projection is the deployment of ground, air, and naval forces to locations abroad in order to influence the course of events in a crisis ashore or, if necessary, to defeat the military forces of countries threatening American interests. The United States maintains the Seventh Fleet, supported by forward bases in Japan and the Philippines, for carrying out these missions in the Western Pacific. Elements of the United States Air Force and the navies of America's allies in the region also participate--to varying degrees--in planning and training for these missions. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is the primary potential threat to the maritime interests and security of the United States and its allies in the Western Pacific.

Geography preordains that China must be primarily a continental rather than a maritime power. Because China shares a lengthy frontier with its number one adversary--the Soviet Union--ground forces are the most important of the Chinese armed forces and national strategy gives primary attention to the threat of a land invasion. China nonetheless has significant maritime interests: the defense of

its long coastline against seaborne attack, a large and vital fishing industry, offshore oil and gas deposits on the verge of extensive development, and a rapidly expanding merchant shipping fleet that is important for domestic as well as international commerce.[370]

"The defense of Chinese territorial waters and maritime interests" has been identified by Jonathan Pollack as one of the four principal objectives of China's military planning (the other three being defense against a Soviet ground and air assault, acquisition of an independent nuclear deterrent, and people's war).[371] China's capacity to pursue its maritime interests outside its territorial waters remained extremely limited through the 1970s (for political and economic reasons as well as technological constraints) with the result that the mission of the Chinese navy was essentially coastal defense. The mainstay of the Chinese navy is forces suitable for the coastal defense mission that can be built in large numbers at low cost: small fast attack craft armed with guided missiles and torpedoes, medium and light coastal patrol vessels, and diesel-electric submarines armed with torpedoes. Although the Chinese navy is technologically at least a generation behind the Soviet and American navies, because of its large numbers and its limited mission it is a formidable force to be reckoned with by any adversary seeking to threaten the mainland of China.[372]

Coastal defense--that is, sea control within the operational radius of China's combat vessels and land-based

air cover--is the primary, but not the only, mission of the Chinese navy. Power projection has also been a mission of the Chinese navy. Jonathan Pollack concludes that the conduct of offensive air and naval operations has been an element of China's military doctrine since the 1950s, due originally to the presence of Nationalist Chinese forces on several of the offshore islands.[373] This mission was initially limited to China's coastal provinces and territorial waters, but, as was demonstrated by the 1974 seizure of the Paracel Islands, has since expanded in scope as China's capabilities and interests have grown. Most observers (outside of Taiwan) do not believe, however, that the Chinese navy has the power projection capability that would be required to launch a successful amphibious assault on Taiwan. "The Republic of China stands a good chance of holding off a PRC seaborne invasion," conclude the Japanese naval experts Hideo Sekino and Sadao Seno, because China's naval forces are inappropriate for such an attack and are dispersed along the coast.[374]

The range of the sea control mission has also been expanding. China laready possesses naval forces--its submarines and some of its larger surface combatants--which are capable of operating at distances well beyond China's coastal waters. This was dramatically illustrated by the May 1980 deployment of a ten ship squadron to the South Pacific in order to recover the re-entry vehicles from China's first ICBM tests. With the support of three relatively small but

surprisingly modern underway replenishment vessels (at least one was rigged for alongside underway refueling and cargo transfer--a technology that is essential for effective long-range naval operations in time of war), the Chinese ships operated at least 4,000 miles from Shanghai. The most critical weakness of the Chinese navy, however, is its lack of effective air defenses on its surface ships, which limits the range of combat operations to the range of land-based air cover (about 500 miles).[375]

China will probably continue to expand the range of operations of its surface forces, particularly in the South China Sea. The Chinese navy has been increasing its presence and range of deployments in the South China Sea since the mid-1970s, and this effort received additional impetus in recent years as the Soviet navy began using facilities in Vietnam on a routine basis to maintain a standing presence in the region.[376] The basic reason for an expansion of the Chinese naval presence in the seas off its coasts will be the growth of China's capacity to pursue its maritime interests outside Chinese coastal waters. According to Pollack:

> Increased Chinese claims to 200-mile economic zones and the right of states to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such territories will ultimately be matched by military capacities to uphold and enforce such claims. The prospect of a significant offshore oil drilling capacity reinforces this conclusion.[377]

The indications that China will continue to expand the range of operations of its navy have led to a misleading debate over whether the Chinese navy will remain essentially

a coastal defense force or become a "blue water" navy. This distinction cannot be drawn as sharply as adherents of one view or the other would assert. In the case of China, and in the case of other navies as well, there is an intermediate possibility: an 'expanded coastal defense' or 'limited blue water' naval capability. Although China will probably continue to deploy its navy far beyond its coastal waters in peacetime (practicing naval diplomacy, or to accomplish specific tasks as in the case of the ICBM test), the capacity to exercise sea control and to project power within the seas contiguous to China--the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea--appears to be the objective of China's current modernization efforts. China is already putting forth an effort to maintain surveillance of all Soviet surface combatants in these seas (though the southern South China Sea is difficult for China to cover). For the most part this has been accomplished with lightly armed fishing vessels manned by the 'people's militia' (which probably report to the local fleet headquarters rather than to the militia), but larger and more capable vessels have also been assigned this task.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet is much more technologically advanced than the Chinese navy, packs more firepower (including sea-based jet aircraft on the carrier Minsk), and can operate at longer ranges for longer periods of time. The Soviet naval threat to China is nevertheless limited. The

primary missions of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are related to countering the United States Navy and ensuring command of the waters contiguous to the Soviet Union.[378] Unless the Soviets were convinced that the United States and NATO would not intervene against them in a Sino-Soviet war, or unless the U.S. Pacific Fleet had been eliminated as an offensive threat (through Soviet attacks or by being diverted from the Pacific), there is little likelihood that major offensive naval operations would be conducted against China. Even without the threat of American intervention, however, the defensive capabilities of the Chinese navy when operating in its own waters are great enough that the Soviet Union would not attempt an amphibious assault on China. The primary theaters of a Sino-Soviet war would be Manchuria and Xinjiang, where Soviet ground and air superiority are decisive and where limited but strategic objectives could be seized.[379]

A more likely Soviet naval threat to China would be interdiction of shipping to China in attacks outside the operating radius of the Chinese navy. There would be little that China could do to break such a blockade other than attacks by Chinese submarines on Soviet surface combatants or shipping--neither of which would be an unmanageable threat for the Soviets.[380] If the United States were to intervene militarily in support of China, however, the Soviet Union would have great difficulty in maintaining its blockade other than with mining operations (which would present a problem).

The 1979 study of the Soviet naval threat made by the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing the Seas concluded:

> In short, the Soviet threat to the sealanes across the Pacific is probably no greater than it is in the Mediterranean and probably half as great as it might be in the North Atlantic. While such a threat is by no means negligible, neither is it a cause for serious speculation that the Pacific sealanes could be severed for any extended period by Soviet naval actions.[381]

This reinforces the observation made earlier that the seriousness of the Soviet naval threat to China is critically dependent upon the likelihood of the United States intervening on behalf of the Chinese. This option for American policy toward China will be examined in the next chapter.

Overall, there is little reason for the security of China to be a central concern of American naval strategy in the Western Pacific. The Chinese navy is a potent force within its restricted operating areas in the East China and South China Seas, but once outside the range of its land-based air cover it is highly vulnerable. Although the range of operations of Chinese surface combatants is growing, the scope of wartime naval operations--other than submarine operations--will probably remain limited to the seas contiguous to China. China's power projection capability also seems likely to grow, but without a large and modern amphibious force supported by fighter and attack aircraft China will only be a threat to lightly defended objectives.

G. AMERICAN INTERESTS IN A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA

The expression 'military relationship' is used in this paper to describe a category of bilateral ties whose purpose

is enhancement of the military security of each of the two nations. Previous chapters have used a broad definition of national security which considered economic policy and diplomacy as well as military matters. This discussion will be more narrowly focused on the military dimension of national security.

A wide range of bilateral ties can be described as being a military relationship. Examples include arms sales, training assistance, declarations of a commitment to the defense of another country, mutual defense agreements, multilateral security organizations (such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact), and joint military commands and operations. Although some observers implicitly define a military relationship as being synonymous with a military alliance, and treat any bilateral military ties as indicators of a tacit alliance, there is no apparent analytical justification for such a sweeping generalization. The level of commitment underlying a particular military relationship cannot be deduced by simply assuming that the existence of the relationship proves the existence of an alliance. Rather, the level of commitment is a function of the perceived importance of the national interests being served by the particular military relationship. Thus, a nation may well enter into a military relationship with no intention of forming an alliance--tacit or otherwise.

Two questions concerning American interests in a military relationship with China will be addressed: First, is it in the security interests of the United States to enter

into a military relationship with China? Second, if it is in the American interest to enter into such a relationship, then what form of a military relationship, which types of bilateral military ties, would best serve America's security interests?

Because China affects nearly every aspect of American security interests--the strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, world order issues such as management of global problems and peaceful resolution of conflicts, and Asian security--and because the United States has a growing interest in the security of China itself, it is in the national interest for the United States to enter into some form of a military relationship with China. Five types of bilateral military ties will be assessed as possibilities, either alone or in combination, for the form that this Sino-American military relationship should take: (1) security consultations, (2) arms sales and technology transfers, (3) intelligence cooperation, (4) mutual defense, and (5) naval operations.

1. Security Consultations

Of all the initiatives the United States could take to form a military relationship with China, security consultations are the most important. Continuing consultations between the United States and China at all levels of government were identified as being necessary in virtually every area of American security interests. Although the United States and China agree that they must join in opposing Soviet

AD-A109 589 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA F/G 5/4
UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA: BEYOND THE 'CHINA CA--ETC(U)
SEP 81 J F BOUCHARD

UNCLASSIFIED NL



0958



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963 A

expansionism, they do not necessarily agree as to the strategy and tactics for pursuing this common interest. Additionally, each of these two nations has goals and perceptions of the world not shared by the other. Thus, there are numerous latent sources of tension--not the least of which is the status of Taiwan--which cannot be expected to fade away of their own accord.

Security consultations have already been initiated between the United States and China, a process that began with Henry Kissinger's secret 1971 visit to Beijing. These talks have already generated a much improved mutual understanding of the security interests shared by China and the United States. It is likely that normalization of Sino-American relations could not have been achieved without the mutual understanding that grew out of these talks. It is also likely that security consultations will continue to be a central element in the Sino-American relationship, even as a broader range of mutual interests develops. Under Secretary Stoessel has stated the attitude of the present administration toward such consultations:

> Equally important, our two governments have established a pattern of frequent and extremely useful consultations between our highest leaders and diplomats. We will continue the serious dialogue on international security matters which now takes place in an atmosphere of friendship and candor.[382]

The value placed on these talks with China is evident in the July 16, 1981 testimony of Assistant Secretary Holdridge to the House Foreign Affairs Committee: "An active consultative relationship has taken shape, through which our two

countries seek to discuss and, when appropriate, coordinate our remarkably convergent policies over practically the entire spectrum of global and regional issues."[383]

The primary importance of security consultations lies in the building of mutual understanding, which is crucial for the formulation of mutually supportive policies against Soviet expansionism, for broadening the scope of the Sino-American relationship to encompass cooperation on security problems not directly a product of the Soviet threat (various world order issues), and for exploring means of accommodation on the many potentially divisive issues which were set aside to deal with the Soviet threat. The fact of consultations does not determine the level of commitment in the relationship--that is a product of the substance of the talks. Therein lies a potential problem. The "atmosphere of friendship" described by Stoessel may well be conducive to Sino-American consultations, but the candor he also mentions must not be compromised just to improve that atmosphere. Michel Oksenberg has warned:

> To repeat, Sino-American relations cannot be nurtured through rhetoric that engenders temporary good feeling but which we do not intend to live up to. The Chinese have a tendency either to allow their expectations to soar or, more likely, to feign high expectations in order to force greater performance from their partner. With some exceptions from 1971 on, the American record has been good, but as we extend the relationship to the military sphere, it may prove tempting to suggest that the relationship will extend to areas we subsequently may not reach.[384]

With this warning in mind, it is in the American national interest to pursue security consultations with China as the central element of a Sino-American military relationship.

2. Arms Sales and Technology Transfers

China's leaders are aware that most of the equipment of the Chinese armed forces is technologically out-dated, and are determined to modernize their military. Modernization of national defense is one of the four modernizations, and, as in the case of the other three modernizations, China has turned to the West as a source of the modern technology it needs. The top ten types of military weapons, equipment and technology China has expressed an interest in since 1977 includes whole aircraft and spare parts for them, anti-tank weapons, technology for shelter and defense against nuclear attack, anti-submarine warfare equipment, computers with military applications, reconnaissance and communications satellites, anti-aircraft weapons, tanks and armored personnel carriers, nuclear weapons and missiles, and naval engines.[385] In some of these categories Chinese interest is not an indication of an intention to purchase related equipment or technology, but this list does reveal the areas of technology in which China believes it must exert the greatest effort to modernize its forces. The broad scope of the list is an indication of the magnitude of the task Chinese leaders face.

Although China is intent on modernizing its military and is interested in acquiring Western technology to

accelerate that modernization, there are significant limitations on China's ability to purchase and effectively utilize modern Western weapons technology. Modernization of national defense has the lowest priority of the four modernizations, consistent with a long-standing Chinase policy of giving economic development priority over modernization of the armed forces. The economic problems China is suffering at the present time, including large budget deficits, has led to reductions in the military budget two years in a row (1980 and 1981) and will severely restrict China's ability to purchase weapons from abroad. This financial constraint has led to priority being given to the acquisition of advanced technology for the domestic development and production of weapons, and secondarily to the acquisition of components and equipment for the modernization of existing Chinese weapons systems and platforms (for example, China has sought bids from Western shipbuilding firms for upgrading the command and control facilities in its present destroyers). This approach also serves the purpose of preserving China's "self-reliance" by minimizing dependence on the West for parts and technical assistance (a lesson China learned the hard way in 1960 when the Soviet Union withdrew its technicians from China), but China's ability to absorb advanced technology is limited by a lack of trained personnel, outdated industrial technology, and a poorly developed economic and industrial infrastructure.[386]

Arms sales and defense technology transfers to the People's Republic of China have become a major point of controversy in the United States. The debate opened in earnest in 1975 when Michel Pillsbury suggested that the policy of "balanced" exports to the Soviet Union and China be scrapped and that restrictions on exports to China be relaxed due to China's military vulnerability. The Carter Administration held to the "evenhanded" approach favored by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance until January 24, 1980, when, in retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it was announced that the United States would sell "dual use technology and military support equipment" to China. The Carter Administration also appeared to tacitly condone the sale of weapons by America's NATO allies to China. The Carter policies were abandoned by the Reagan Administration on June 16, 1981 when Secretary Haig announced while on a visit to China that the administration had decided "in principle" to sell defensive weapons to China on a case-by-case basis. This policy was further elaborated by Assistant Secretary Holdridge in July 1981. Thus far it has entailed liberalization of export controls over dual-use technology and revision of arms export regulations to permit the licensing of commercial sales to China on a case-by-case basis. Holdridge stated the adminstration is considering legislative amendments to various trade and assistance acts which impose restrictions on China as well as the Soviet bloc, but denied that it would seek authorization for government foreign military sales (FMS) to

China (FMS is not limited to the $100 million ceiling that is imposed on commercial sales) or that FMS credits or loans are being sought. He added, however, that the Administration would be prepared to address these additional measures should the need arise.[387]

Valid arguments can be offered in support of the sale of weapons and defense technology to China, but it is easy to press those arguments too far. It is clear, for example, that China's armed forces are greatly outclassed by those of the Soviet Union and that the gap between them has widened as the Soviets built up their forces against China (a quantitative expansion during the 1960s and early 1970s, followed by a qualitative upgrading of those forces from 1977 onward). This is of concern to the United States because it would not be in the American interest for China to be so weak that it could be militarily intimidated or defeated by the Soviet Union. The limitations on China's ability to pay for modern Western weapons or to absorb advanced Western technology, however, cast doubt on the impact that Chinese purchases from the West could have on the Sino-Soviet military balance (other than over the long run, and even then the Soviets will probably be able to maintain--if not increase--their lead). It is even less tenable to argue, as a 1979 Department of Defense study is reported to have done, that arms sales to China would increase the Chinese threat to the Soviet Union, thereby forcing the Soviets to divert forces from the NATO front. The

Soviet perception of the Chinese threat would be likely to grow, but the actual capability of China to project power into Russia could not be expected to expand faster than the Soviet forces countering that threat. The Soviets cannot expand their forces forever, but the limit to their expansion is far greater than the limits that already hinder the Chinese.[388]

Most observers agree that the political and symbolic significance of the willingness to sell arms to China is of far greater importance than the actual military capabilities gained by transfer of the weapons. The American decision to sell arms to China and President Reagan's description of that decision as a "normal part" of improved relations emphasize the progress that has been made in Sino-American relations and underscore the common interest of the two countries in opposing Soviet belligerence. Unlike consultations, the fact of an arms sales relationship in many cases implies an American commitment to the defense of another country because the United States most often decides to sell arms on the basis of its strategic and security interests. The political significance of arms sales probably does not, however, extend to influence or leverage over Chinese foreign policy. China seeks to avoid dependence on any foreign country and has explicitly warned the United States against assuming that China would sacrifice its interests because it needs American arms or power to counter the Soviets. Ross Terrill has warned that the Chinese are "highly sensitive to being patronized by friends more powerful and wealthy than themselves."[389] The

example of the Sino-Soviet split should forewarn the United States that a close military relationship with China will not guarantee an American capacity to influence Chinese behavior. Mutual interests, not gratitude or dependence, are the only viable basis for the development of Sino-American relations.

Another benefit that has been claimed for an arms sales relationship is that by linking American decisions to sell arms to China with Soviet foreign policy behavior the United States would be able to exploit the Russian fear of the Chinese and moderate Soviet assertiveness.[390] This is the 'China card' approach to relations with China. The Reagan Administration may have considered this strategy at one point--Defense Secretary Weinberger stated in April 1981 that the United States would sell arms to China if the Soviet Union intervened in Poland[391]--but the announcement of the change in American policy on arms sales to China was not visibly linked with any particular Soviet transgression. Former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance denounced the Reagan Administration's shift on arms sales to China, claiming it had "substantially diminished" American influence over the Soviet Union. According to Vance: "We played the China card in no-trump, and there is not much left."[392] This view has been countered by Ross Terrill, who argues that the Reagan policy shift actually reinforced American influence over the Soviets. Because the policy announced in June 1981 was essentially that the United States is willing to sell arms to China

and was not linked with any particular sales agreement, Terrill asserts, decisions on individual sales can still be linked with Soviet behavior.[393] It remains to be seen whether Vance or Terrill is correct.

The 'China card' approach to the sale of American arms to China is subject to the same criticism leveled against this approach earlier: China's security is, in effect, made subservient to Soviet-American relations. It is a short-term power maximizing rather than a long-term problem solving approach to Sino-American relations. Not only does it essentially preclude progress on the many latent sources of tension between China and the United States, it also cuts away at the foundation of the relationship--a common opposition to the Soviet Union. China's leaders have clearly warned the United States against manipulating its relationship with China as if China were a pawn whose interests could be sacrificed to suit American purposes. China affects far too many American security interests for the 'China card' strategy to be a viable approach in any aspect of Sino-American relations.

A panoply of arguments can be mustered in opposition to the sale of arms to China. Many of the potential problems cited as reasons for not selling arms to the Chinese are not unique to this particular aspect of Sino-American relations, and it oftentimes seems such arguments are merely embellishments for a preconceived attitude toward China or arms sales in general. There are, however, some serious drawbacks to selling arms to China which need to be considered.

One of the two most common arguments made against selling arms to China is that it would harm Soviet-American detente, leading to a deterioration in their relations which could result in a new cold war.[394] A related theme is that arms sales to China would be provocative: Vance criticized the Reagan policy shift on arms sales as being "needlessly provocative" and asserted that it "smacked of bear-baiting rather than well-thought-out policy."[395] Both themes are played upon by Soviet leaders and the Soviet press. Brezhnev warned in 1980 that selling arms to China would mean "eroding the pillars of confidence erected among states in the process of detente," and Tass labeled the Reagan decision to sell arms to China a "provocative" action.[396] Such Soviet statements are a part of the overall Soviet effort at forcing a 'detente or China' decision upon the United States, with a decision for China being equated with a new cold war and an unending arms race. It even seems at times that the Soviets go so far as to promote the American belief that Russians are "paranoid" about the Chinese threat. An American fear that the Soviets might take some irrational move to destroy China and any country aligned with the Chinese would be of definite value to Soviet efforts to deter the development of Sino-American relations.

In addition to being convenient for Soviet foreign policy, the "don't feed the bear's paranoia"[397] argument is faulty on historical grounds. Soviet foreign policy behavior

is not noted for paranoid reactions to provocation, it is noted for cautious and carefully-calculated initiatives to exploit propitious international circumstances. Ross Terrill has offered a perceptive critique of this argument against arms sales to China:

> Vance is right to say that Moscow cares very much about China-US relations. But at no point has the growing China-US tie "provoked" Russian to reckless action. Moscow went into Afghanistan, as previously into Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to arrest what it saw as a deteriorating situation within that country, in the absence of much likelihood that the US or anyone else would interfere.
>
> Indeed, since World War II the Soviet Union has never reacted as a "cornered beast," committing aggression out of desperation at being ganged up upon, but many times has expanded its sphere out of a sense of opportunity, starting in Eastern Europe at the end of the war, through Hungary, the missiles into Cuba, Czechoslovakia, to the advances in Africa during the Carter Administration. Much of the Kremlin's fury with China stems from Soviet inability, now that China has friendly ties with the US, Japan, West Europe, and most of Asia, to do anything about its "loss of China."[398]

Soviet opposition to the sale of arms to China is a factor which must be considered in every decision by the United States to make such a sale, but it is not the only--nor even the most important--factor entering into that decision.

The second of the two most common arguments made against selling arms to China is that those arms could be used by China to threaten neighbors other than the Soviet Union: the "ultimate end use question," as Donald C. Daniel has called it.[399] Although to a degree modernization of China's armed forces will increase the capacity of China to threaten Asia whether or not the United States sells arms to

China, this observation does not ameliorate the ultimate end use problem. At the least, this problem argues for close American consultation with its allies and friends in Asia (including countries we would like to be our friends, such as India). The reaction in Asia to the Reagan policy shift on arms sales to China has been mixed, but clearly there is concern and apprehension in several countries whose friendship the United States values.[400] It would not be in the interest of the United States if arms sales to China were to result in an expanded Soviet military presence in Asia as countries not on good terms with the Chinese turned to the Russians for support. Soviet propaganda is already playing up the threat of Chinese "hegemonism" in Asia, citing China's territorial claims, the overseas Chinese, and "Great Han chauvinism" as grounds for the threat. Tass commentary on the Reagan Administration decision to sell arms to China explicitly linked that policy shift with a growing Chinese threat to Asia.[401]

Another aspect of the ultimate end use question is that there is no clear technical means of differentiating between offensive and defensive weapons--a point driven home by the recent Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor using American-made F-16 fighters sold to Israel for defensive purposes only. The definition of "defensive" is almost entirely political: American domestic politics more than technical attributes determine whether a particular weapon

system is defensive or offensive at the time the decision whether or not it may be sold is being debated. In actuality, however, the military strategy and tactics of the nation that purchases the weapon will determine in almost every case whether that weapon serves offensive or defensive purposes. In the case of China, military doctrine and the equipment of the armed forces both support the view that China's strategy is defensively oriented, but China has also sent its troops into battle outside its borders in operations which were offensive tactically even if the strategy behind them was defensive. Nevertheless, some form of "defensive" criteria for the approval of arms sales to China will be required by American domestic politics, and this can be expected to generate tensions at home, with China (when a sale is disapproved), and with those Asian allies of the United States wary of arms sales to China (when a sale is approved).

The complexity of the arms sale and technology transfer issue does not permit the identification of a specific national interest. The United States does have an interest in China's security, but it also has security interests in several of the countries neighboring China--some of whom fear China second only to the Soviet Union. China's long-term debt management problem (described in Appendix B), although primarily affecting economic development plans, will clearly have a direct impact on Chinese arms purchases and the level of goodwill engendered by American sales. Given

these problems and the magnitude of the effort that will be required to modernize China's armed forces, it appears that the most important contributions that the United States can make to reduce China's immediate vulnerability are in areas other than arms sales. Thus, arms sales and technology transfers should not be the central form of bilateral tie in the Sino-American military relationship. There is no compelling reason to prohibit arms sales or technology transfers altogether, but there is also little to be gained--and potentially much to be lost--by making them the foundation on which a Sino-American military relationship is built.

3. Intelligence Cooperation

The premise for the contention that the United States has an interest in a military relationship with China is the conclusion, drawn earlier, that the United States has an interest in the security of China. It is in the American national interest that China be able to defeat Soviet aggression and have enough confidence in that ability that the Soviet Union cannot intimidate China into submission. These interests would still be relevant even if Sino-American relations were to become strained over the latent sources of tension between the United States and China, such as the status of Taiwan. The damage to American interests would be much worse under these circumstances if China felt compelled by Soviet military might to seek an accommodation with the Russians.

The United States could, in theory, ensure China's defense by arming the Chinese to the teeth with the latest

in American weapons. As was seen in the previous section, however, this is neither feasible nor desirable. This American interest in China's security might also be secured with American forces fighting on behalf of the Chinese. As will be seen in the next section, however, this also has serious drawbacks. Thus, the United States is in need of a form of bilateral military relationship with China to supplement security consultations and ensure that China can repel Soviet aggression.

Intelligence cooperation is the one type of bilateral military relationship that can make an immediate contribution to the defense of China without the many side-effects and implications that detract from other alternative ties. Michael Pillsbury suggested intelligence sharing as a policy option for the development of Sino-American military ties in 1975,[402] but the issue for the most part faded from the on-going debate over the security implications of Sino-American relations for the next six years.

The Carter Administration, however, resurrected the possibility of an intelligence cooperation arrangement with China in 1978. As the political situation in Iran continued to deteriorate and the prospect of losing the American electronic intelligence facilities used to monitor Soviet missile tests for SALT verification became an imminent threat, the Carter Administration is reported to have proposed the establishment of similar stations in China. After the establishment of diplomatic relations with China in January 1979,

which coincided with the fall of the Shah of Iran, China agreed to one station in Xinjiang manned by Chinese technicians and with the intelligence collected by the facility being shared by the United States and China. The facility is reported to have begun surveillance operations in 1980 and its existence was reported in the press for the first time in June 1981 (though previous reports had alluded to it).[403]

Thus, the United States and China have already entered into a limited inteligence cooperation arrangement. This particular facility, however, does not make an immediate contribution to the security of China--if press descriptions of its capabilities are accurate. Intelligence information on the characteristics of new Soviet strategic missiles is of no doubt valuable to China, but does not address the pressing defense problems which China faces today.

Military intelligence can be divided into three categories of information: scientific and technical, order of battle, and surveillance and threat warning. Scientific and technical intelligence includes information on weapons characteristics and the doctrines for their employment--information critical for procurement decisions and training programs. The missile test monitoring facility generates this type of information. Order of battle information covers numbers and locations of hostile forces--information valuable for decisions on the deployment of one's own forces. Surveillance and threat warning is the continuous monitoring of potentially threatening forces and weapons launch sites

(or the territory that they must transit to attack one's own forces or homeland), an intelligence function essential for preventing a surprise attack.

The United States and China would both benefit from cooperation and sharing of information in all three areas of military intelligence, even if the sharing were little more than a one-way flow from the United States to China. The one caveat on this observation is that the sharing of intelligence should be limited to information on the Soviet Union. The United States would gain little from sharing information with China on the military forces of China's neighbors in Asia, while such information would exacerbate the "ultimate end use" problem encountered in arms sales to China. Unlike arms sales, however, the United States would have a certain degree of control over the scope of the arrangement and it is likely that China would be willing to limit that scope to Soviet forces.

The immediate objective of an intelligence sharing arrangement with China would be to deter a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack by enabling the Chinese to deny the Soviets the circumstances which would ensure a Soviet victory. This is achieved by taking advantage of what is known about Soviet military doctrine. In the case of an attack by ground forces, Soviet military doctrine is based on the combined arms offensive. The three most important principles of such an offensive are (1) mass, a clear superiority in all types of forces, (2) surprise and (3) speed, rapid advance to seize key

objectives and keep enemy forces off balance. Deny the Soviet Union the ability to launch an attack using these three principles and the Soviets would be faced with a protracted war of attrition with China. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the Soviets would attack China if denied the circumstances they believe are necessary to achieve a military victory.[404]

The weakness in the Soviet combined arms offensive strategy is that to a degree the principles of mass and surprise are contradictory. Thomas W. Wolfe has pointed this out in the example of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, when "despite the tactical surprise achieved by the invasion forces, their build-up and positioning had required several weeks of preinvasion maneuvering, which gave NATO strategic warning and thus provided at least an opportunity to put Western defenses on the alert."[405] The Soviets have had the same problem in Poland today: the West closely monitors Soviet forces around Poland, thus denying the Soviet Union the possibility of launching a surprise attack. The mass versus surprise problem would be an order of magnitude greater on the Sino-Soviet border, where the Soviets would have to mobilize and deploy a huge army in order to attack China. Without surprise, however, that huge army could not fight a blitzkrieg war--it would become mired in a prolonged war of attrition.

Denying the Soviet Union surprise would also help to deter a Soviet pre-emptive first strike on China's nuclear

force, increasing the credibility of that force as a deterrent and thus stabilizing the Sino-Soviet strategic nuclear balance. China is already taking measures to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear force to a surprise first strike,[406] and has been reported by Angus M. Fraser as having a ballistic missile early warning system that covers about ninety percent of the approach arc from the Soviet Union.[407] Nevertheless, to the extent that an intelligence sharing arrangement would further enhance the early warning China has of a Soviet nuclear strike, it would contribute to the survivability of China's nuclear force and thereby deter a Soviet first strike. This form of intelligence cooperation would also help to ease Chinese anxiety over the implications of the Soviet-American SALT agreements for Chinese security. Michael Pillsbury suggested the establishing of a Sino-American "hot line" for strategic warning purposes.[408] While such a link would certainly be of value, granting the Chinese direct access to information from American early warning satellites over the Soviet Union (using their own ground stations) would be a more effective means of providing strategic warning. There are other forms of cooperation which might also be of value to both China and the United States and should not be excluded from consideration.

There are drawbacks to intelligence cooperation with China: the risk of compromise of American sources and methods to the Soviet Union, the risk that intelligence collection technology turned over to the Chinese could be turned against

the United States, and the argument that such cooperation would undoubtedly be viewed as "provocative" by the Soviets (and by those Americans who worry about provoking the Soviets). None of these drawbacks, however, outweighs the gains for Chinese security and for American interest in China's security which would accrue from an intelligence cooperation arrangement. Therefore, it is in the American national interest to pursue intelligence cooperation with China.

4. Mutual Defense

Efforts at mutual defense can take many forms. The American refusal to condone a Soviet pre-emptive strike on China's nuclear program in 1969 was a contribution to the defense of China. China, in turn, by tying down a quarter of the Soviet armed forces on the Sino-Soviet frontier contributes to the security of NATO--which the United States considers vital for its own security. Thus, without any hint of a military alliance the United States and China contribute to each other's security--a rudimentary form of mutual defense.

Security consultations also contribute to mutual security, and could therefore be considered a form of mutual defense entailing a low level of commitment. By improving mutual understanding of security interests and threat perceptions, consultations allow individual national policies to be formulated so as not to unnecessarily conflict with the vital interests of the other party. This in itself contributes to mutual defense by reducing the opportunities the

Soviet Union might have to play off China and the United States against each other so as to neutralize their responses to Soviet aggression.

Security consultations also allow the coordination of policies to achieve common objectives, such as deterring Soviet aggression, or to react in a coordinated manner to a specific Soviet threat. Although the Carter Administration adamantly denied having any interest in contingency planning,[409] as the scope and depth of mutual interests grows, such planning becomes the logical follow-on to coordination efforts. Military contingency planning has come to be equated with a military alliance by opponents of any form of Sino-American cooperation which might be suggestive of an alliance. This is not necessarily always the case, but great care must indeed be taken when engaging in such talks lest the implied commitments bind the parties to courses of action they could not or would not take should the contingency being planned for arise.

The primary value of contingency planning short of alliance commitments is as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. The political value of such planning exceeds its military value in this sense, but there are also significant military advantages to be gained from contingency planning. This view is often disputed on the grounds that only an actual alliance would allow for effective joint military planning. Lucian Pye, for example, contends:

> The idea that there could be informal cooperation in the military area ignores the fact that military cooperation requires a very high level of specificity in arrangements and if these arrangements do not exist there is not much in the way of an alliance.[410]

If one assumes that the only effective form of military cooperation between two nations is combined operations under joint command structures à la the Western allies during World War II, then Pye's view is correct. Department of Defense studies of the possibility of Sino-American military cooperation have been reported as concluding that there would indeed be tremendous problems in attempting to conduct joint operations in China.[411]

On the other hand, this type of combined Sino-American military operation would not be the optimum strategy for mutual defense--whether or not an alliance was signed. The example of World War II is again relevant: the Western allies and the Soviet Union did very little in the way of the specific military planning Pye describes, yet it cannot be denied that the combined assault on Nazi Germany from both east and west greatly accelerated the destruction of Hitler's empire. The only genuine coordination was at the very top levels of government, other than broad strategic coordination the Soviet and Western assaults on Germany were almost two entirely separate wars.

This is the approach that should be used in any form of military coordination--consultations, contingency planning, or alliance--between the United States and China. The

strategic objective should be to force the Soviet Union to disperse its massive armed forces in order to defend against potential threats from a variety of directions. Committing American forces in China would be contrary to this objective. The United States does not have sufficient military capacity of any type to be able to make a significant commitment of forces to the defense of China and still be able to fulfill American commitments elsewhere in the world. American military forces would therefore be better utilized to force the Soviet Union to avoid an all-out commitment of its forces against China. The threat of an American assault on the strategic Soviet base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula would do more to defend Manchuria than placing the same forces around Harbin (Shenyang). It also would not require the detailed joint military planning that Pye rightly said would be needed, whereas the second option (American forces in Manchuria) would demand close coordination.

Thus, there are forms of military coordination which could be undertaken effectively without a formal alliance. This does not address, however, the critical question of whether the United States would want to make such commitments without a formal alliance, and if not, then is an alliance with China in the American interest? There are persuasive arguments against making formal or, even worse, implied commitments to take specific military actions other than within the framework of a formal alliance. There are too many things

that could go wrong--including a deliberate Soviet effort to divide the two partners and thus nullify the planning that had been done. If it is believed to be necessary to make explicit commitments to take military action in certain contingencies, then those commitments should be made within an alliance framework. This does not preclude lesser levels of coordination, as discussed above, but it necessarily restricts their scope.

The highest level of mutual defense cooperation between the United States and China would be a military alliance. The form of a Sino-American alliance could range from a simple mutual defense treaty to a combined headquarters and planning for joint military operations. Whatever form it would take, however, there are numerous arguments against entering into an alliance with China unless Soviet behavior takes a sharp turn for the worse. The most important argument against an alliance is that China does not want to form one. There is an explicit and significant difference between a "united front" and an alliance--the united front strategy actually opposes the formation of alliances except when absolutely necessary--and China has clearly built its foreign policy on the united front approach. The United States also has to consider the security interests of its Allies and friends in Asia, not all of whom would support a Sino-American alliance. The status of the Soviet-American relationship is another factor worthy of consideration. A military alliance with China would not serve American interests unless Soviet

behavior made it clear that the prospects for improved Soviet-American relations had no moderating effect whatsoever on Soviet belligerence.[412]

A Sino-American military alliance may not be in the interest on the United States at the present time, but it is not difficult to envision circumstances in which both the United States and China would benefit from such an alliance. The Soviet-American alliance against Nazi aggression during World War II is a prime example of an alliance born of necessity. It is therefore in the American national interest to leave open the option of a military alliance with China, lest the United States prematurely foreclose a potentially critical means of enhancing its security. The best way of leaving this option open would be to issue a joint declaration that neither the United States nor China seeks to form an alliance, but that neither side has forsworn the possibility of reversing their attitudes should the threat from a "hegemonistic" power force them to do so. The possibility of an anti-Soviet alliance would thus be a 'Sino-American card' for both to use jointly as part of cooperative efforts at deterring Soviet aggression. The credibility of this 'Sino-American card' would be enhanced by visits and exchanges between the military forces of the two countries timed and publicized so as to have an impact on Soviet perceptions of the likely reaction to an aggressive move on its part. Such visits and exchanges would also be of value for familiarization purposes

should it ever become necessary to implement the alliance option.

Although the alliance option should be kept open, the United States will have to weigh carefully and with caution the decision to actually form a Sino-American alliance. In addition to the problems discussed above, an alliance with China is bound to be tempestuous. The experience of the United States as an ally of the Republic of China during World War II and the experience of the Soviet Union as an ally of the People's Republic of China during the 1950s should not be overlooked.[413] An alliance with China does not guarantee influence over Chinese behavior: China must be expected to pursue its own interests as it best sees fit, with only the strength of the mutual interests shared with the alliance partner as a moderating influence on its policy decisions. It is not likely that China and the United States will in the near future share sufficient interests to prevent an alliance between them from being a stormy and crisis-ridden affair.

5. Naval Operations

The observations made above on the role of contingency planning in mutual defense efforts also apply to the possibility of Sino-American naval operations. The most important contribution the United States Navy can make to the maritime defense of China is to divert Soviet Pacific Fleet forces to missions of higher priority than offensive operations

against China. Maintaining a potential naval threat to the Soviet homeland from the Pacific would be the best way of diverting the Soviet navy from attacks on China or Chinese shipping. The U.S. Pacific Fleet would also be better used in operations against Soviet naval forces outside of the seas contiguous to China than in joint Sino-American naval operations off the coast of China.[415] It would be difficult, perhaps even dangerous, to integrate the battle group type of naval operations favored by the United States Navy with the widely dispersed and less centrally-controlled coastal defense forces of the Chinese navy. The American and Chinese navies are most supportive of each other if they do not operate in the same waters, but rather force the Soviets to expect an attack at any time in any location in the Pacific.

It must also be asked whether the United States should even make a commitment to the maritime defense of China. As was true of contingency planning, it is not wise to make formal or implied commitments outside the framework of a formal alliance.[415] The United States Navy, particularly its Pacific Fleet, would be hard pressed to take on an addditional major commitment such as the defense of China--it already has more commitments than it has forces to meet those commitments.[416] On the other hand, it would be questionable for the United States to encourage the Chinese to expand the scope of their naval operations to supplement American naval capabilities in the Pacific. Again, the United States should consider the security interests of its

Asian allies, not all of whom would welcome an expanded Chinese naval presence off their shores.[417] The same caution that should govern the American attitude toward an alliance with China should also govern the American attitude toward naval cooperation with China.

Naval operations could make a substantial contribution to the 'open option' alliance policy previously recommended. The American naval presence in the Western Pacific is a visible means of demonstrating the resolve and capability of the United States to defend its security interests in the region.[418] Port visits in China and small-scale joint exercises could also be used to remind the Soviets of the 'Sino-American card'--an alliance--that remains to be played. Thus, the political significance will far outweigh the actual military significance of Sino-American naval operations. For this reason the political ramifications of such naval operations should be given priority over their military value in the formulation of American naval strategy in the Western Pacific. There is no compelling reason to prohibit Sino-American naval cooperation, but it will have to be handled carefully to support American security interests.

III. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has examined United States security interests in China from the level of the conceptual framework used to define those interests down to the level of American interests in specific military policy options. In the process a number of security interests have been identified, but, equally important, a number of issues and potential problems that affect those security interests have also been raised. Both the issues and the potential problems need to be addressed.

A. UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA

The full scope of American security interests in China cannot adequately be perceived if Sino-American relations are viewed as a function of the power relationships of a "strategic triangle." This conceptual framework greatly oversimplifies the complexities of the international environment and the many ways in which it affects the security of the United States. It also leads to the formulation of American policy toward China being guided by the single objective of short-term enhancement of the American power position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Hence, the 'China card.'

There is an alternative conceptual framework which allows balance of power considerations to be addressed without losing sight of the many security interests that do not derive solely from Soviet-American rivalry: the latent bipolar,

de facto polycentric, multiple issue-based systems framework. Local conflicts and world order issues are addressed on their own merits and on the basis of the broad scope of American security interests, while keeping in mind that superpower conflict is an ever-present possibility when international tensions arise over such issues. This broader view of the international environment and American security interests leads to the conclusion that the United States should seek to broaden the scope of the Sino-American relationship so that it is founded on a range of mutual interests that extend beyond common opposition to Soviet expansionism. Over the long-term, by enabling China and the United States to address the many latent sources of tension between them, this broadening of the Sino-American relationship will provide a more secure foundation for cooperative efforts to counter the assertiveness of the Soviet Union.

Although the most important American security interests in China derive from the state of Soviet-American relations, the United States has a range of security interests in China (or which China affects) that are not primarily related to the Soviet threat. The United States has world order interests and security interests in Asia which are also affected by China and by the state of Sino-American relations. The formulation of American policy toward China should encompass this broad range of interests.

Even in the narrower context of China's role in the Soviet-American relationship, however, United States policy

should consider a wider range of issues than just the strategic balance and the containment of Soviet expansionism. China is important for geopolitical reasons and does have an important role to play in the strategic balance and in deterring Soviet aggression, but it is not in the American interest to place too much stress on just these aspects of American security interests in China. The role that China can play in the Soviet-American relationship is significant, but in many respects limited. Additionally, China affects other aspects of Soviet-American relations, such as arms limitation efforts and detente, and Chinese and American interests often diverge in these areas. The actual complexity of China's influence on Soviet-American relations also argues for a broadening of the scope of Sino-American relations. United States security interests in China are better served by a long-range problem solving approach than by a short-term power maximizing approach to security issues.

The broad range of American security interests which are affected by Sino-American relations make it prudent for the United States to be extremely cautious in developing a military relationship with China. Because the United States has an interest in the security of China it is in the national interest for there to be a Sino-American military relationship, but the form that relationship takes should reflect the broad scope of American security interests. The United States has an interest in security consultations and intelligence cooperation with China. Other forms of bilateral military ties,

however, are not so clearly supportive of American interests at the present time. Arms sales and technology transfers, and joint naval operations, should be pursued with caution and as part of an overall strategy for the development of Sino-American military relations. Contingency planning likewise could be pursued, but close attention must be paid to the commitments implied by such planning. A military alliance is not in the national interest at the present time, but should not be precluded as a future possibility if the Soviet Union should for some reason embark upon a policy of hostility and aggression that could not be moderated other than by threat of force. The optimum policy toward the alliance question would be to formalize the American attitude toward it as an 'open option.' With a similar Chinese approach the possibility of an alliance could be a 'Sino-American card' for influencing Soviet behavior without irreversibly polarizing the tensions that already exist.

B. PROSPECTS FOR SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Despite the broad range of potential mutual interests between China and the United States that have been identified in this paper, a balanced assessment of the future prospects for Sino-American relations would have to stress the difficulties and potentially divisive issues at least as much as the opportunities for broadening the scope of the relationship. Divergent international interests will be exacerbated by domestic politics in both countries, in some cases making it

almost impossible to reach an accommodation or even a mutual understanding of the interests each holds.

The existence of mutual interests does not signify an underlying ideological compatibility. China and the United States have widely different historical backgrounds and political-economic systems. Chinese and American leaders do not share a common view of the international environment, the world order that should govern that environment, or the role of their respective nations in that world order. These differences do not preclude the long-term development of cordial and mutually beneficial Sino-American ties, but they do demand that the United States not inadvertently try to shape China in its own image. The Chinese respect American learning and many aspects of American culture, but they do not want to be "Americanized." United States security interests in China make it in the national interest for America to accept the cultural and political differences between China and itself rather than try to mold an image of China that fits notions as to what would be best for the Chinese.

APPENDIX A

SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND AMERICAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA

The American perception of the Soviet military threat to China is a major factor in defining United States security interests in China. For this reason Soviet policy toward China was examined in detail prior to discussing American security interests in China. In the course of that examination of Soviet policy it was noted that caution should be exercised in using statements by Soviet leaders or commentaries in the Soviet press as indicators of Soviet intentions, lest the propaganda element in such public statements lead to misperceptions of the Soviet threat to China.

It should also be borne in mind that if the Soviet Union should ever decide to attack China it would be at a time when political authority has collapsed in China or when China has become politically isolated from the international community as a result of its own behavior. Under such circumstances, the United States could well find itself torn between its ideological values and its geopolitical security interests. This uncertainty and the openness of American society would be a tempting target for the Soviet Union to exploit through adroit propaganda so as to ensure the isolation of China from the United States.

Soviet public statements and commentaries on China and the United States are explicitly designed to take advantage

of Western freedom of the press and the policy of nonalignment prevalent among many Third World nations. In the political and ideological polemics with the West and China, the only distinctions between the Soviet Union and its adversaries which can be tolerated by the Soviets are those drawn by the Soviet themselves. This Soviet belief that they must control the framework of the political polemics with their ideological adversaries (or with errant friends who stray from the true path of Soviet ideology) is one of the consequences of the Soviets having appointed themselves leaders of the evolution of human society. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has asserted:

> CPSU congresses are of lasting international significance. This is because their decisions quite naturally attract very close attention throughout the world as they generalize experience and outline new targets in socialist development and in the creation of the material and technical base of communism--and the Land of the Soviets created by Great October is the pioneer on this path leading to new heights in the development of human society.[1]

Distinctions between the Soviet Union and its adversaries that are drawn by its adversaries are often obscured by demonstrating that the adversary's real intention is to disguise his own faults or hostile intentions by attributing them to the Soviet Union. This particular tactic is evident in a recurring pattern that occurs in Soviet statements on China and the United States. The pattern is that phrases and terminology used by China and the United States to level accusations against the Soviet Union are often adopted by the

Soviets in their own public statements and the charges turned against their accusers.

Three examples of this tactic demonstrate the attempt that is made to obscure accusations made against the Soviet Union by China. Soviet 'hegemonism' is today a central theme of Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda. Chinese public statements blame these hegemonistic aspirations on Soviet 'social-imperialism' and draw parallels to Russian imperialism under the Tsars. The following excerpts from a 1977 Hongqi (Red Flag, the Communist Party journal) are illustrative of such Chinese statements:

> This arrogant and ambitious craving for world hegemony is setting Soviet social-imperialism on a rampage all over the world like a wild beast running amok; and wherever it goes, it leaves a trail of turmoil and unrest.
>
> The new tsars dwarf the crusade of aggression and expansion of the old tsars...Surpassing the old tsars in aggressive ambitions, it now strives to build a great empire embracing all five continents.[2]

The Soviet response to such accusations has been to label the Chinese as hegemonistic and imperialists, and to attribute these sins to 'Great Han chauvinism.' An editorial in the March 1980 issue of the Soviet journal International Affairs used all of these accusations against China:

> Hegemonism, displayed by China's leaders in their foreign policy, is the sum total of the traditions of Great Han chauvinism and Sinocentrism that has taken the shape of a concrete political doctrine. It has grown into the specific ideology of Chinese foreign policy, because the Peking leaders have departed from the socialist principles of interstate relations and set themselves the aim of building a great China on the basis of nationalism,

> territorial expansion and subjugation of neighboring peoples and countries.[3]

A second theme of Chinese public statements against the Soviets has been opposition to detente on the grounds that the Soviets exploit it for military expansion. This Chinese view was presented in an April 1981 Beijing Review article ("It" being China):

> It is not against detente or negotiations. What it opposes is the Soviet hegemonists using them as a smokescreen to cover up their arms expansion and aggression against other countries.[4]

The Soviet press, in turn, levels similar charges against China, as did Pravda on February 11, 1981:

> It is an open secret that under cover of peace Peking-style is the old Maoist instigatory course for sharpening international tensions and preparation for war. This policy really constitutes a serious danger to the cause of peace all over the world.[5]

A third Chinese theme that the Soviets reciprocate on are comparisons between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. In particular, the policy of detente with the Soviet Union is frequently and explicitly compared with Neville Chamberlain travelling to Munich in 1938 to seek peace with Adolf Hitler--an obvious accusation of Western appeasement.[6] The Soviets turn this comparison against the Chinese by warning the West against using China as a tool of aggression against the Soviet Union in the manner that Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy were supposedly, at least in the Soviet view, supported as tools of anti-communism (as if the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact never existed):

> Whoever in the West today may be thinking that one can play the 'China card' in an anti-Soviet game is being short-sighted, for the arms will be used in more than one direction, as those who abetted Hitler and Mussolini once dreamed.[7]

In each of these three cases the Soviet statements reflect underlying antagonistic perceptions of China and it is likely that the Russians do indeed believe the accusations they level against China. At the same time, however, the pattern of Soviet statements indicates that a conscious effort is made to control the framework of the polemic by means of obscuring the political or ideological position of adversaries. Although a similar pattern was not observed with such clarity in Chinese statements on the Soviet Union, China has made ideological initiatives (particularly toward the Third World) which at least temporarily placed the Soviets on the defensive in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It is probable that China does employ tactics similar to the Soviet tactics described above.

The Soviet Union also appears to make efforts to control the context of its polemic with the United States. In his first press conference as Secretary of State, Alexander Haig launched a new campaign for American foreign policy--opposition to international terrorism--and explicitly linked the Soviet Union with the problem:

> I would also suggest that an additional subject related intimately to this, in the conduct of Soviet activity and in terms of training, funding, and equipping, is international terrorism...they today are involved in conscious policies, in programs, if you will, which foster, support, and expand this activity, which is hemorrhaging in many respects throughout the world today.[8]

Such an American campaign cannot be tolerated by the Soviets. Even if the Soviets were keenly interested in improving relations with the United States, they could not let such an explicit and significant distinction drawn by an ideological adversary to stand unobscured. Denials of the American accusation, which were made by the Soviets, are not a sufficient response--they leave the Soviets on the defensive and allow the distinction to persist.

On May 12, 1981, United States Customs delayed the take-off of an Aeroflot airliner bound for Moscow for four hours after receiving a tip that it carried "defense-related items" illegally being taken out of the country. As it turned out, the items seized were not defense-related but had simply been mislabelled. In responding to the incident the Soviet government, through Tass, labelled it "an act of international terrorism." The incident was given top play on page one for two days in the Soviet press and a formal protest by the Soviet government charged the United States with "terror and banditism."[9]

Such a virulent Soviet response to what was actually a minor incident--in particular the labelling of the American action as "international terrorism"--would seem contrary to Soviet interests, given that they were at the same time making overtures to improve relations with the United States. The Soviet reaction to the incident makes sense, however, when viewed as a deliberate effort to counter the charges of the United States in kind.

The fact that the incident the Soviets chose to label as "international terrorism" was of little consequence made no difference to the Soviet leadership. It would have been more convenient for the Soviets if it had been the CIA rather than the Customs Service that could have been stigmatized as terrorists and bandits, but the incident nonetheless served a fundamental Soviet purpose. Should a leader of a non-aligned nation question the Soviet assertion that it is the Americans and not the Russians who are international terrorists, all a Soviet diplomat has to do is point to this incident and ask why the leader of a supposedly non-aligned country is in fact siding with the Americans.

The examples given above show the roots of propaganda conflicts between the Soviet Union and both the United States and China--the two nations that are the greatest ideological rivals of the Soviets. In the light of this evidence, Soviet statements denouncing the United States or China should be examined carefully before being taken as indicators of trends or shifts in Soviet foreign policy, or as revelations of underlying Soviet fears and intentions.

The Soviet propaganda tactic of obscuring distinctions drawn by its adversaries is adapted to serve foreign policy purposes beyond preserving Soviet control over the polemical framework of its ideological rivalries. The Soviet skill in using negotiations as a forum for propaganda is well known: but the propaganda is also used by the Soviets in an attempt

to improve their own bargaining position vis-a-vis their adversary in the talks. Foy D. Kohler, in a 1979 study of Soviet negotiating style, pointed out the Soviet tactic of obscuring distinctions drawn by adversaries:

> In practice, the effect has been a systematic attempt at what Fred Ikle, a former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has aptly called "semantic infiltration," that is to the Soviets' taking over and exploiting for their own purposes words and expressions basic to the political heritage of the Western world.[10]

Even when an adversary has not attempted to draw a specific distinction between itself and the Soviet Union, by appealing to Western concepts of morality and justice the Soviets attempt to force concessions before the negotiations begin, or even attempt to make such concessions preconditions for negotiations. Richard Pipes noted this in a 1972 study for the Senate Committee on Government Operations: "An interesting and often successful technique employed by Moscow is to turn the tables on the opponent by confusing the real issue at stake."[11]

Given the intensity and bitterness of the polemical battle that has been waged by the Soviets and Chinese since the late 1950s, it comes as no surprise that this Soviet propaganda tactic should be used to support the Soviet position in negotiations with the People's Republic. One observer, intimately familiar with the Sino-Soviet dispute, has been able to date the first Soviet use of the tactic of obscuring an adversary's position against China. In a Rand Corporation

study published in August 1970, Thomas W. Robinson, referring to an editorial that appeared in Pravda on September 2, 1964 concerning the territorial dispute between China and Russia, observed that: "This editorial appears to be the first instance of the Soviet tactic of fighting fire with fire."[12] The Soviet tactic, says Robinson, was:

> ...if China claimed that certain areas of the Soviet Union do not, because of "historical circumstances," "belong" to that state, the Russians would then claim that certain areas of China were historically non-Chinese and disputed by more than one state and hence, Chinese title to those areas is open to question.[13]

The Chinese claims and Soviet counter-claims discussed by Robinson were being made in the context of stalemated negotiations on the border issue. The Chinese had attempted to put the Soviets on the defensive by asserting that the Sino-Soviet border had been fixed by "unequal treaties" forced upon China at gunpoint by imperialist Russia. The Soviet response was to obscure the Chinese position in order to bolster the bargaining position of the Soviet Union.

Robinson's observation on the Soviet tactic of "fighting fire with fire," as he calls it, illustrates the risk of taking Soviet statements at face value as indicators of Soviet intentions. Soviet claims that large areas of China are historically non-Chinese could well be interpreted as laying the basis for Soviet occupation of those territories. Such an interpretation, however, would greatly exaggerate Soviet intentions as the statements were made to influence the

course of on-going negotiations. Thus, the Soviet tactic of obscuring the position of its adversary could be misinterpreted as signifying a military threat--which would in turn affect American perceptions of its security interests in China.

The Soviet tactic of appealing to the values of its adversary so as to disarm moral or ideological positions opposed to Soviet interests would probaly be used to neutralize American sentiment for China should the Soviets attack the Chinese. The Soviet objective would be to exacerbate the differences of opinion in the United States over American interests in China, and the free access the Soviets have to the American media would make this task relatively easy. It would, in fact, be derelict on the part of the Soviets *not to appeal* to American values if it would isolate China from the United States.

APPENDIX B

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF SINO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

A broad definition of national security, as is being used herein, must consider the impact of a nation's foreign policy and foreign economic policy as well as its defense policies. American national security is enhanced by the creation and maintenance of an international order in which conflicting interests are resolved by peaceful means and in which peoples striving to improve their lives can realistically hope to do so without having to overthrow the established order. The economic interactions the United States has with the developing world, and the American economic policies that shape those interactions, thus have a role in the security of the nation.

Brief mention was made of the American economic interest in China while examining the American interest in the security of China. The complexity of those American economic interests, as well as their potential for growth, deserve further study.

American economic interests in China have historical roots as old as the United States itself. Economic opportunities in China were already perceived at the time independence was declared, and the first American trading ship visited China in 1784. Preservation and furtherance of economic opportunities in China were objectives of America's China policy

from the beginning of the treaty system in 1842 through the first round of Open Door notes in 1899. There were other objectives, such as the dual missions of civilizing and Christianizing the Chinese masses, but none found as concrete an expression in official policies as did the economic objective.

From 1900 to 1945 the objective of preserving the territorial integrity of China--which was derived from and closely linked to economic interests--became paramount as the European powers sought to consolidate spheres of influence, and in jarticular as Russia and later Japan attempted outright occupation and rule of Chinese territory.

The 1949 victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war against the Kuomintang effectively ended America's economic interest in China until 1971, when Richard Nixon began the process of normalization of relations. Since diplomatic relations were established in 1979, U.S.-PRC trade has grown rapidly--reaching an estimated $4.3 billion in 1980--and direct investment in joint ventures is being explored by both sides.

Three aspects of Sino-American economic relations will be examined: China's development goals and program, trade with and investment in China, and China's role in the international economic system.

1. China's Development Goals and Program

The United States should not underestimate the magnitude of the task facing China's leaders as they strive to

develop China's economy. The progress made by the People's Republic over the past thirty-one years is generally recognized to have been substantial, but China is still a developing country: merely feeding its growing population and maintaining their current standard of living--not to mention becoming a modern and wealthy nation--are tremendous undertakings.

The United States should not expect the Chinese to view America's history of economic development as a model for China, and should not, by design or inadvertently, attempt to impose it on them. This applies just as much to the attitudes which American corporations take with them to China as to the attitude of the United States government in formulating its economic policies towards China.

China's economic development program is currently focused on the "Four Modernizations:" the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. This program is the second of two stages of development proposed by Zhou Enlai in his "Report on the Work of the Government" to the Fourth National People's Congress in January, 1975:

> ...we might envisage the development of our national economy in two stages beginning from the Third Five-Year Plan: The first stage is to build a independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system in 15 years, that is before 1980; the second stage is to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, and national defense and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world.[1]

The requirements for accomplishing the first stage were never made clear, although official statements claim

that "a fairly complete industrial and national economic system has been established" as of 1980.[2] In any event, commencement of the second stage was announced by (then) Premier and Party Chairman Hua Guofeng at the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress in February, 1978.

The "Ten-Year Plan" announced by Hua, which was said to have begun in 1976, contained the Four Modernizations and highly ambitious goals for expansion of industrial and agricultural output.[3] To meet the goals, China in 1978 embarked upon an overseas spending spree in an attempt to achieve rapid modernization of industry.[4]

By the end of 1978 it became obvious to China's leaders that China simply was not earning sufficient foreign exchange to pay for its imports[5] and could not afford to use the credits made available by foreign governments to purchase imports.[6] Further, China could not use all of the equipment being purchased even if they could afford it due to limitations in China's "ability to assimilate," "construction and capacity to provide the ancillary equipment," and in the "supply of raw and semi-processed materials, fuel and power."[7]

Because of these and other problems, the Ten-Year Plan was scrapped and Hua Guofeng announced at the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress in June 1979 that "the country should devote the three years beginning from 1979 to readjusting, restructuring, consolidating and improving the national economy."[8] This program, which has been

confirmed as a task for 1981[9] and will probably be extended for at least two years,[10] consists of ten points for achieving certain key objectives of the Four Modernizations without attempting rapid expansion of the entire economy.[11]

The current readjustment program is, in effect, a return to stage one of Zhou Enlai's original program. Public statements to the contrary notwithstanding, the experience of 1978 revealed that China did not in fact have the "independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system" needed as a prerequisite for the Four Modernizations. The underlying objective of the readjustment program appears to be to make several relatively cheap quick-fixes to the Chinese economy which will make possible a shift back to the ambitious scale of development envisioned in the Ten-Year Plan. In announcing this program, Hua stated: "Further strengthening of the groundwork is an important precondition for smooth development later."[12]

The quick-fixes, which may well end up taking 5-7 years instead of the three years originally planned, include: (1) improving management efficiency and worker productivity, (2) increasing the ability of the economy to assimilate advanced technology, (3) relieving energy supply and transportation bottlenecks constraining expansion of output, and (4) improving China's foreign exchange position by rapidly increasing selected exports while restricting imports to absolute necessities.

The interest of the United States in China's economic development goes far beyond opportunities for trade and investment, although these are certainly valid interests in themselves. The success of China's development program is directly linked to China's foreign policy and to domestic political stability.

Vice Premier and Party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping explicitly drew the link between domestic development and foreign policy in a January 1980 speech on the three major tasks China faces in the 1980s:

> Modernization is the core of the three major tasks. This is our main condition for solving international and internal problems. Everything depends on whether we make a success of running our affairs, and the size of the role we play in international affairs depends on the speed and range of our economic development.[13]

Most observers agree that United States trade with China from 1972 to 1978 was inhibited by the lack of diplomatic relations between the two nations--for political considerations as well as technical problems. The trade-politics linkage is, however, broader than specific issues, as Paul Balaran points out:

> China's leaders have always viewed foreign trade in the context of foreign relations. They have shown that they are aware of the significance of China becoming a full-fledged member of the international community subject to all the vagaries and pressures of the economic and political front.[14]

China's internal political stability is also of great concern to the United States, especially as it affects China's security. In this regard, Michel Oksenberg has observed:

> In this regard our concerns with respect to China are similar to our interests in other developing countries. Whether they meet the basic aspirations of their people for an improved livelihood and whether they are reliable trading partners will decisively shape whether we live in a stable world in the years ahead....
>
> China contributes to the global equilibrium simply by governing its huge mass and thereby removing itself as a potential focal point of great power competition. A weak or divided China would become a source of international instability, as it was from the 1860s to the 1940s.[15]

There are three reasons why political instability could possibly arise from China's modernization efforts: leadership struggles, a xenophobic reaction to foreign influences, and widespread discontent if expectations rise faster than the economy can grow.[16] The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a clear (though by no means the only) example of the first two phenomena, and Premier Zhao Ziyang has expressed an awareness of the third--noting that "the government can't expect the Chinese people to continue sacrificing."[17]

The United States should not assume that the present ascendancy of the "pragmatists" and demise of the "radicals" represents a resolution of the ideological debate on modernization. Throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party it has been standard practice for most major economic and social issues to be translated into the "left-right" terminology of party ideology. Such labels often have little relevance to the actual decision-making process, the label attached to a particular policy position can change with time, and a particular individual may be "leftist" on one issue but

"rightist" on another. Only when personal or institutional prestige and power are at stake do such "left-right" distinctions become central to a decision.

This aspect of Chinese politics has two consequences for China's economic and foreign policies. First, policies which have been or are now discredited as "leftist," "revisionist," or whatever, can be reborn with a new label and adopted on purely pragmatic grounds. Second, the continued ascendency of the "pragmatic" (formerly labeled "capitalist roader") wing of the Chinese Communist Party will depend upon their handling of economic and social problems which we in the West would not ordinarily perceive as ideological issues. Problems such as wages and prices, educational opportunities, promotion policies, technical errors in modernization, and even natural disasters--all of which can reasonably be expected to persist or recur in China--could crystalize as ideological disputes, cause dramatic shifts in economic and foreign policies, and even lead to changes in government and party leadership.

Thus, to the extent that American security interests are served by domestic political stability and the continuity of the present regime in China, the United States also has an interest in the success of China's economic development efforts.

2. Trade and Investment Opportunities in China

The "China market" probably will never live up to Western dreams of its potential. Nevertheless, there are growing opportunities for mutually beneficial trade with and

investment in China. Before discussing those opportunities, however, it is important to understand why China's leaders have decided to open their economy to the West.

There is ample evidence that the Chinese people themselves are, when given the opportunity, accomplished capitalists. This entrepreneurial bent and recent trends in Chinese economic policy should not, however, be interpreted as being indicative of a government orientation toward "free trade" in the Western sense. An ambivalent attitude toward foreign trade is not unique to China: most developing nations (and even some developed nations) do not trade for trade's sake. Foreign trade is engaged in to meet specific development goals which could not economically be met through a policy of economic autarchy.

China's top leadership today is committed, as was Zhou Enlai, to the trade philosophy attributed to Mao Zedong: "Rely mainly on our own efforts while making external assistance subsidiary."[18] In December 1980 Hu Yaobang stated:

> Fundamentally, China is building socialism through self-reliance. On this basis, however, we will actively develop economic contacts with other countries. One of our mistakes in the past was to close the country to the outside world.[19]

Japanese businessmen and trade officials have reported being told outright by Chinese officials that China seeks foreign investment to gain "technology, capital, export markets and management know-how, as well as to boost China's international competitiveness."[20]

The United States and China have taken several bilateral and unilateral actions to develop their economic relations since establishing diplomatic relations, including the formation of a Joint Economic Committee. The rapid growth in two-way trade--which in 1979 was 95% above 1978, and in 1980 was 84% above 1979[21]--indicates that the efforts at trade promotion have been successful. Figure 1 shows the trend in Sino-American trade since 1971. It is worthy of note that United States two-way trade with China surpassed Soviet-American two-way trade in 1980, due largely to the trade sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union to protest their invasion of Afghanistan.[23]



Figure 1. SINO-AMERICAN TWO-WAY TRADE, 1971-1980[22]
(In millions of dollars)

What are the prospects for United States trade with China? The outlook for the immediate future is rather bleak. In September 1980 the Wall Street Journal reported:

> Chinese Vice Premier Yao Yilin, in his report to the Congress, said the value of overall trade will rise only 7.5% next year. In view of worldwide inflation, this could well reflect a drop in volume.[24]

John R. Dewenter, Vice President of the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, has pointed out the effect this will have on American trade with China: "Our members realize that it's going to be a slow two or three years ahead. Most firms recognize that the long-term benefits in the relationship will be 10, 15, 20 years down the line."[25] This view is supported by John Moore, President of the U.S. Export-Import Bank, who said in November 1980, "I don't see an awful lot happening in fiscal years '81 and '82."[26]

Despite these gloomy prognoses, the National Council for U.S.-China Trade has estimated that two-way trade with China could reach $6 billion in 1981,[27] and the U.S. Department of Commerce projects that it will reach at least $10 billion by 1985,[28] a growth rate of 26.5% annually. The validity of such projections will depend upon the length of the present period of readjustment and on the ability of the international economy to absorb China's exports of light industrial and textile products. Given the dour outlook of China's leaders for their nation's economy and the weak state of the international economy, the National Council and Department of Commerce projections are probably too optimistic.

During the period of readjustment of China's economy, growth in United States exports to China will largely be limited to those items needed to meet China's immediate economic objectives. The five categories of goods selected by China for United States exporters to display at the trade

exhibition in Beijing clearly illustrate current import priorities: agricultural machinery, petroleum equipment, transportation, power generation, and manufacturing machinery for textiles and consumer goods.[29]

After completing the readjustment of their economy, China's leaders intend to return to a program of rapid economic growth--to include a rapid growth in foreign trade. A recent Wall Street Journal article noted that lucrative future prospects are being held out to foreign companies to keep them in the China market during the slow-growth readjustment period:

> Chinese officials, such as Vice Premier Bo Yibo,... have told foreign business executives that, if they stay with China during its period of difficulty, they won't be forgotten in four or five years when the country is ready to take off economically.[30]

Although it is reasonable to expect the China market to expand over the long-term, it is unlikely that China's leaders will ever completely abandon the philosophy of making trade serve development goals. Bohdan and Maria Scuprowicz observed in 1978 that during the 1970s the value of China's imports was only 2.5% of China's GNP, and that: "On that basis alone China can claim that its economy is more self-sufficient than any other in the world."[31] Despite rapid growth in China's foreign trade since 1977, the ratio of the value of imports to GNP has not risen much: in 1978 it was 3.3% and in 1979 it was still only 3.9%, even though the value of imports had risen 40.7% over 1978.[32]

China's leaders have never articulated a limit on the ratio of imports to GNP, but their development strategy is likely to keep it low.[33] American businessmen must be aware that successful development of China's economy will not mean a rapid expansion of the China market. Conversely, because of this de facto linking of import growth to GNP growth, it is in the national interest that China's development efforts succeed in order to allow at least some growth in the China market. This observation completes a circular relationship between trade and development: China trades to serve specific development goals, and development of China's economy is required to expand trade. Such a relationship suggests "mutually beneficial" as an objective to be sought in the development of Sino-American trade.

Though growing much more slowly than trade, there are also expanding opportunities for investment in China. The numbers of various forms of investments and joint ventures illustrate how far China has come in just the last few years: China has entered into 3200 processing arrangements and 170 compensation trade arrangements with foreign firms,[34] signed over 300 joint venture agreements--including 17 joint equity ventures--in 1980,[35] and has allowed 490 industrial, commercial and farming enterprises to be established in the Shumchun special economic zone.[36] Large-scale commercial lending to China has also begun, though caution prevails among foreign bankers.[37]

China's policy towards foreign investment, like its policy towards trade, is tailored to serve specific development goals. Chinese leaders in no way believe in the free flow of capital based strictly on market factors. This attitude has meant that during the readjustment period foreign investment in China is carefully regulated. Investment is being limited for the same reason that imports are being limited, as Xue Muqiao indicates: "At present, China doesn't have enough energy supply, transport, managerial skills, and other objective conditions for large-scale introduction of foreign investment."[38]

Western financial analysts have noted an emphasis on infrastructure development and rapid export growth in China's investment priorities. Matthew Polsky, of Bear-Stearns China Trade Advisors, has said: "I see more emphasis on two types of projects--infrastructure and those that will generate export earnings relatively soon."[39] Stanley Lubman, another observer of the China market, emphasizes the second of the two sectors: "The projects most likely to be attractive to the Chinese are those that will increase their foreign exchange earnings, that will modernize their equipment to produce greater export earnings."[40] There are also signs that the limits on foreign investment are being relaxed to include projects that will allow import substitution for the domestic market.[41]

One consequence of the current readjustment program has been the cancellation or postponement of several large

and expensive projects.[42] These cancellations have seriously disturbed the foreign investors involved in the projects, and have contributed to the prevailing mood of caution. As Cheng Hang-sheng, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, put it: "the earlier euphoria about lending prospects has passed; in its place is a more realistic appraisal of China's financial needs and absorptive capability."[43]

It is not possible at this time to make projections as to future investment opportunities in China, other than in very general terms. The current fluid situation is due to China's continuing efforts to revise its financial laws and restructure its economic system to attract the type and levels of foreign investment its leaders believe will support their development goals. Despite the initiatives already taken by China to attract foreign investment, there remain numerous uncertainties and outright barriers discouraging prospective investors.[44]

One potential indicator of the future scale of China's borrowing was revealed in September 1980 in the Wall Street Journal: "China will limit foreign borrowing so that repayment of interest and principle in each year of the next decade doesn't exceed 15% to 20% of the country's exports."[45] Xue Muqiao has indicated that current restrictions on investment and borrowing may be relaxed upon completion of the readjustment period:

> By then, we shall be able to use more of the funds loaned to us by foreign countries. In this way, China will become not only the biggest

> domestic market in the world, China will also become the most promising international market.[46]

His assessment may be somewhat optimistic, but it is reasonable to presume that investment opportunities in China will grow (in terms of amounts) and broaden (in terms of the types of investments) as China's economy strengthens.

As the preceding paragraphs have shown, there are opportunities for trade and investment in China which serve China's development goals as well as generate profits for American business. Therefore, it is in the national interest to develop mutually beneficial trade with, and investment in, China.

"Mutual benefit" does not, however, arise as a natural result of trade and investment: it requires attention by each party to the needs and perceptions of its partner.[47] There are three potential sources of friction which must be examined: the trade balance, technology transfers, and China's debt structure.

China is not satisfied with its trade balance with the United States. In December 1980 Vice Premier Bo Yibo warned:

> We want very much to buy things from the U.S., but we are short of foreign currency. It won't do for us to just keep buying from the U.S. We request that the U.S. buy from China and in greater volume.[48]

A similar warning--linking Chinese cotton purchases to American textile quotas--had been given during negotiations leading to the three-year textile agreement signed September 17, 1980.[49] Textile exports to the United States

are a significant source of foreign exchange for China,[50] but are also a sensitive political issue in the United States.[51] This issue certainly is not dead, and there are several other potential sources of friction caused by restrictive American import policies.[52]

The record of Sino-American trade balances tends to support the concerns of China's leaders. As is shown in Figure 2, China has run a deficit every year since trade was resumed except in 1976 and 1977. In 1980 China's deficit with the United States is estimated to have been $2.53 billion,[53] about 74% of the total two-way trade and up 124% over the 1979 deficit.



Figure 2. CHINA'S TRADE BALANCE, 1970-1980[54]
(In millions of dollars)

When viewed in the context of China's overall balance of payments, or even only in the context of China's overall balance of trade, the persistent trade deficit with the United States appears to have been manageable. China has been able to cover a cumulative trade deficit with the United States of $5.97 billion with its trade surplus from other partners during the same period, and still be $436 million in the black. In 1980 China was able to hold its overall trade deficit to about $526 million,[55] down 31% from 1979's deficit, as a result of its efforts to boost export earnings.[56] The wide swings shown in Figure 2 seem to be due more to the state of the international economy and the American economy than to structural problems in the Sino-American trade relationship.

What is disturbing to China's leaders about their negative balance of trade is its long-term effect on China's foreign debt. China is attempting to hold down its total debt, which requires that priority be given to long-term low-interest loans for productive investments, rather than to credits and loans for financing consumption. This policy requires that trade be kept in balance as much as possible so as not to disrupt the overall balance of payments.

There are also tensions and potential conflicts in American exports to China, including fears that the trade balance will permanently shift in China's favor. American buinessmen experience numerous technical problems in trading

with China, most of which are due to the legal and managerial structure of the Chinese economy and government, but which are compounded by America's lack of experience in economic relations with the People's Republic.[57] This situation has improved somewhat as a result of the efforts at trade expansion made in recent years, but difficulties still exist. The U.S. Department of Commerce is seeking to open commercial offices and conduct market research in China, as well as pursuing bilateral agreements on specific problems such as visas, to further alleviate technical problems.[58]

Beyond the host of minor irritants just mentioned, there is an underlying fear among some American businessmen that in the long run China could turn out to be another Japan--that as soon as China's economy is off and running it will be the United States which suffers persistent trade deficits. Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Robert E. Herzstein has bluntly expressed these fears:

> In the absence of specific efforts to do otherwise, I could see how the enterprising Chinese will learn how to do business with America but somehow or other we won't find the way to sell to the 'inscrutable orientals.' Japan has benefited from our own very open market and American know-how to operate in that market, yet American companies continue to have a great deal of difficulty doing business with Japan....
>
> I don't think the trade balance will be as lopsided as it is now. My own feeling is that China will sell us a lot within a short period of time in the area of consumer products because U.S. merchandisers will show them what to do.[59]

There is evidence to support such fears. Xue Muqiao has explicitly stated the narrow view China's leaders have towards imports into China:

> To be precise, within the next three to five years, we shall import mainly items which require less investment, yield quicker results and turn out products for export to increase foreign exchange earnings.[60]

This attitude applies to investments in China also: they must either generate increased export earnings or must allow import substitution for domestic consumption.[61] The new "internal accounting" exchange rate applied by China to its own trading organization is, semantics aside, a 47% devaluation of China's currency--a classic maneuver for discouraging imports and boosting exports.[62]

China has also sent advertising officials to the United States to study strategies for penetrating the American consumer market.[63] There are, therefore, observable grounds for the concern expressed by Under Secretary Herzstein.

Importing advanced technology from abroad is a key element in China's strategy for achieving the "Four Modernizations," but weaknesses in China's economy have led China's leaders to adopt technology acquisition policies that are bound to generate conflict with the American business community.

Jeffrey Schultz has succinctly summarized the problems which China's leaders face in managing their program of technology acquisition:

> Especially important for understanding current Chinese attitudes are the lessons of the 1950s: (1) that technology imports can easily lead the country into unconscionably high debt (a lesson relearned in the early 1970s); (2) that such imports are often incompatible with Chinese factor

> proportions and needs; and, most importantly, (3) they are capable of generating unexpected technological imperatives, independent of the desires of the political leadership.[64]

China's system of economic management, its education system, its political system, and its industrial infrastructure have all acted to inhibit the assimilation and effective utilization of advanced technology from abroad.[65] The current readjustment program is designed to focus China's scarce capital and trained personnel on alleviating these problems, while at the same time continuing highly selective imports of advanced technology.

The present emphasis in technology imports, in the words of Vice Premier Bo Yibo, is the giving of "high priority to importing technology from Western nations, rather than complete factories."[66] The distinction he draws is between importing selected machinery or production processes, as opposed to importing the entire factory in which they would be used. Despite this economy measure, technology intensive imports rose to 15% of the value of total imports in 1979, compared with 6.7% in 1978 (the year of the buying spree).[67]

The Chinese technology import policy most likely to raise hackles among American businessmen is "prototype purchasing." To avoid having to expend large sums of foreign exchange on imports or production licenses, the Chinese are widely believed to purchase just a small number of a given item, then through a "reverse engineering" process set up

production on their own.[68] A recent report alleges that China has used this technique to reproduce its own version of the Boeing 707 airliner.[69] Under Secretary Herzstein has expressed the concern of the business community over this issue: "We have to watch the way things are developing. If we find a tendency to milk American companies of technology and technical skills, we have to put our foot down."[70]

The manner in which China structures its borrowing and the foreign investment in its economy is also likely to generate tensions with the United States--at least from the point of view of China's leaders. Like any capital-scarce developing country, China needs large amounts of long-term, low-interest loans to invest in projects to upgrade its infrastructure and human resources--projects which do not offer an immediate return on the investment, but which are vital for sustained and balanced growth. What China has been offered (like any developing country) are mainly short-term trade credits and commercial loans (at market rates) useful only for those projects promising a near-term return on investment.

A rough comparison of the aid and credit available to China will illustrate the magnitude of the problem. The total amount of aid and concessionary loans currently available to China for economic development projects is on the order of about $2.5 billion. In contrast, during 1980 alone China was able to arrange about $26 billion in commercial and foreign government trade credits.[71] Although the amount

of capital available on concessionary terms can be expected to grow, it cannot supplant capital at commercial rates.[72] This is the type of imbalance that has radicalized the economic policies of other developing countries, exacerbated north-south tensions, and generated calls for a new international economic order.

China has been strictly limiting its use of short-term credits,[73] and limiting its commercial borrowing to projects which will immediately improve its balance of payments position.[74] The United States has already been in disagreement with China over the terms of Ex-Im Bank trade credits, due to China's pressing for larger financing at lower interst rates than the United States is prepared to offer.[75]

Japan has been much more sympathetic to China's financial needs than has the United States, and for this reason has probably scored a major coup in the competition for the China market. Japan has provided China with a $1.5 billion loan for six development projects at 3% annual interest over 30 years after a ten-year grace period. The funds are largely "untied," allowing China to purchase equipment from any nation it chooses.[76] American quibbling over the terms of a $60 million export credit (China had dared to ask for the 7.75% minimum rate)[77] probably did not enhance our image as a trading partner in comparison with the Japanese.

Thus, although there are potentially lucrative opportunities for trade with and investment in China, there are

also potentially serious sources of tension between the United States and China. Whether they are harmonious and growing or bitter and stagnated, Sino-American economic relations will affect American security interests in China. The debt management problem, for example, limits China's ability to purchase Western arms and a lack of sympathy for China's debt problems could lead to a Chinese perception that the West is exploiting the Soviet threat to China for its own economic gain. Additionally, to the extent that the American economic stake in China--its direct investment, exports, and imports of critical materials--expands, the American interest in the security of China will also grow.

3. China in the International Economic System

The United States should not lose sight of its global and Asian economic interests while developing its economic relations with China. The rapid growth of China's impact on the international economic system is both a potential source of conflicts and an opportunity for increased international economic cooperation. The attitude that the United States and other industrialized Western countries take toward their economic relations with China will largely determine which prevails. China's opening of its economy to the West will probably result in intensified competition or increased tensions in four key areas: international trade, aid and development assistance, seabed territorial claims, and world grain supplies.

There are several dimensions to the impact China is having on international trade. China is a competitor with other developing countries for the markets in developed countries, and for the domestic markets in the developing countries themselves. China's current development strategy places emphasis on the export of goods which compete with the exports of other developing countries.[78] India in particular believes its exports have been hard hit by the growing competition from China.[79] China's competition with its fellow developing nations is made all the worse by the rising protectionist sentiments of the developed countries.[80]

The impact China has had in the markets in the developing countries themselves is revealed by the trade surplus China has with the nations of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. As Figure 3 illustrates, the total surplus from trade with these regions has grown from $630 million in 1970 to almost $3.9 billion in 1979, an average annual growth rate of over 57%. The cumulative surplus from this trade is about $19.25 billion for the 1970-79 period.[81]

China is competing with producers in the developed countries for their domestic and export markets. This was discussed previously as a problem in bilateral Sino-American trade relations, with frictions over textile imports into the United States presented as an example of the nature of such conflicts.



Figure 3. CHINA'S SURPLUS FROM TRADE WITH[82] DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1970-79 (In millions of dollars)

China's neighbors face competition in their export markets as China strives to increase its foreign exchange earnings. The countries of Southeast Asia are particularly vulnerable to dislocations from Chinese competition,[83] and their own markets have provided China with the bulk of its trade surpluses over the last decade.[84] Returning to the example of textiles: China is the fifth largest supplier to the United States, behind only its neighbors Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.[85] As China learns the ropes of the American consumer market it will become an increasingly strong competitor with its textile-exporting neighbors.

China's opening of its economy to the West has generated competition among the developed nations for a slice of the China market. Japanese trade and investment delegations openly ask for special consideration from the Chinese,

and the large aid loan made by the government of Japan to China should help ensure that Japanese business does indeed receive special consideration.[86] H.B. Malmgren has pointed out that much of China's current allure is due to the sluggishness of other markets,[87] and therefore may fade when the international economy strengthens. The possibility of conflict will nevertheless remain a real possibility, and will become more likely as China's economy expands.[88]

Aid and development assistance is another sector of the international economic system in which China is competing with the other developing nations.[89] China voluntarily relinquished 10% of the $142 million in United Nations aid offered to it for the 1982-86 period due to the needs of other countries,[90] but will nonetheless be seeking as much development aid as is available internationally.[91] Competition with other developing countries for commercial loans and trade credits is not yet a problem, as China eschews such borrowing, but this could change if China's economy takes off as is planned by China's leaders.

The potential for large reserves of oil and natural gas under the continental shelves of the East China Sea and the South China Sea has heightened concern over the many conflicting territorial claims in these areas. China has seabed territorial claims disputes with North and South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.[92]

Observers disagree over the potential for conflict to arise from these territorial disputes. While Selig Harrison expects increased conflict, and has predicted that China may seize the Spratley Islands by force or with political pressure, Guy Pauker expects China to take a more conciliatory approach.[93] There is evidence to support both views: although China seized the Paracel Islands by force in 1974 and apparently tried to intimidate Japan over the Senkaku (Tiaoyu Tai) Islands in 1978, the Chinese have avoided conducting Seismic surveys in contested East China Sea areas,[94] and have shown similar discretion in the South China Sea.[95]

At present China's grain imports do not compete with the needs of other developing countries. Lurking in the background, however, is the spectre of widespread famine in Asia and Africa. Under those circumstances any grain imports by China would be a threat to other countries.

China is not expected to be able to become fully independent of grain imports,[96] but is relatively well off in comparison with most developing countries. In 1980 the total volume of China's grain imports was about 3.3% of total domestic production.[97] Even though 1980 production was 10 to 15 million tons below the record 1979 harvest of 332 million tons, it was still the second largest crop of the past 30 years.[98]

The global food and agriculture picture is grim. Despite projections of bumper rice and wheat crops in 1980-81, world stocks of these grains are expected to decline to

dangerously low levels before the 1981 harvest can replenish them--and a shortfall in the 1981 harvest would leave the world on the brink of disaster.[99] Meanwhile, population continues to grow faster than grain production, so that up to one billion people in Africa, Asia and Latin America could starve after just one or two years of poor harvest.[100] Neither is the long-term picture for rice production in Asia outside of China very rosy:

> The ADB anticipates that these ten member countries, which collectively had a food grain deficit of less than 8 million tons in 1972, will have a shortfall of 46 million tons in 1985. The ADB survey concluded that the "green revolution" will not be able to raise agricultural output at a faster rate than population growth.[101]

Thus, it can be seen that there are numerous sectors of the international economy in which China's growing presence could exacerbate existing problems, rekindle smoldering conflicts, and even generate new tensions in currently placid relationships. Such potential conflicts, which would directly affect America's world order interests, are another dimension of the overall American security interests in China.

The need for bilateral Sino-American consultation on global issues and for greater Chinese participation in multilateral efforts at managing global problems have already been presented as being in the national interest (Chapter II, Section E). Those global problems include the economic issues just discussed: trade, aid, seabed territorial claims, and world grain supplies.

There are other international economic issues in which China, as a major developing country, will play a significant role--whether or not it chooses to do so actively. These issues can be grouped under the heading of "evolution of the international economic system," and include the north-south dispute, the demand of the developing nations for a new international economic order, the future progress of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) after the Tokyo Round, and readjustment of the international financial system to cope with the recycling of petrodollars and the financing of the energy bills of the non-oil-producing developing nations.

The United States has a vital interest in the peaceful evolution of the international economic system. If the system as a whole or a major sector of it should collapse--due to an unbridled wave of protectionism or a series of defaults by developing countries heavily in debt--the American economy would be threatened with the loss of its export markets, its substantial overseas investments, and its critical sources of minerals and energy resources.

It is therefore in the national interest that China play a constructive role in international negotiations on the evolution of the international economic system. Bilateral consultations are vital for this interest. Even more important, however, is for China's leaders to perceive that the peaceful evolution and future strength of the international economic system are in their national interest. The success

of China's development efforts and the role that foreign trade and investment have in that success are what will give China's leaders a vested interest in an international economic system compatible with American interests.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have both recently taken actions to increase China's role in those institutions, including the giving of an executive directorship on the board of the World Bank to China.[102] These actions should serve to develop a constructive role for China in the international financial system. China may also be considering entering into the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT),[103] a move which the United States should encourage. The United States should also, as Guy Pauker has recommended, work in close cooperation with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries to manage the trade and financial problems which will be generated by the rapid expansion of China's impact on the international economy.[104]

Another initiative the United States should support that would aid in shaping a constructive role for China in the international economic community, as well as being of benefit for a host of other regional economic problems, is the creation of an Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTD). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979 passed a resolution recommending that such an organization be established, and there is wide support for the

concept.[105] An OPTD would be able to address the many thorny issues discussed above, and would fill a structural gap in the economic relations among the nations of East Asia and the Pacific.

4. Conclusions

United States security interests in China extend far beyond the purely military dimension of security. Likewise, American economic interests in China extend far beyond just trade and investment opportunities. Sino-American economic relations are inseparably linked with American security interests. Over the long-term, the importance of economic issues will probably come to rival that of the Soviet threat or the Taiwan issue as a determinant of the state of Sino-American relations. The American interest in the security of China and the development of the Sino-American security relationship would be better served, for example, by a large "no strings attached" economic development loan on highly concessionary terms than by a willingness to sell to China any sophisticated weapons it might request. American world order interests--the management of global problems and the peaceful resolution of local conflicts--will also be advanced by concern for economic progress in China. China's economic stake in the West is a deterrent to certain courses of action which would alienate the United States--such as an attack on TAiwan. Thus, the security implications of Sino-American economic relations are extensive and affect a number of

American security interests. American economic policy toward China should reflect consideration for those implications.

NOTES

[1]Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 9.

[2]Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 28.

[3]Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 4-8.

[4]As defined by Dr. Frank M. Teti, Naval Postgraduate School.

[5]Morton H. Halperin, "After Vietnam: Security and Intervention in Asia," Journal of International Affairs, v. 22, n. 2 (Fall 1968), p. 231.

[6]It must be stressed that considerations of power and principles of 'morality' or 'humanity' are not mutually exclusive. See Morganthau, chapters 3 and 8.

[7]Harry G. Gelber, "America, the Global Balance, and Asia," Asian Survey, v. 19, n. 12 (December 1979), p. 1147.

[8]Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security, p. 29.

[9]Ibid., pp. 29-30.

[10]Nuechterlein, pp. 8-11.

[11]Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), pp. 21-53.

[12]Gerald Segal, "China and the Great Power Triangle," China Quarterly n. 83 (September 1980), p. 490.

[13]Joseph L. Nogee, "Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept," Orbis, v. 18, n. 4 (Winter 1975), p. 1193.

[14]Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles: Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 33.

[15]Donald E. Lampert, "Is There an International System?" International Studies Quarterly, v. 22, n. 1 (March 1978), p. 143.

[16]Halperin, p. 246.

[17]Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., "Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia," Current Policy, no. 274 (April 24, 1981), p. 1.

[18]Richard Burt, "Washington Seeks 'Equidistance' in the Big-Power Triangle," New York Times, March 4, 1979, Sec. 4, p. 1.

[19]John King Fairbank, The United States and China, Fourth Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 457.

[20]Harold C. Hinton, The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policy-making Under Soviet Pressure (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1971), p. 100.

John Newhouse, in his study of the negotiations that led up to the SALT I agreement, concluded that: "Triangular politics is useful, if only because the greatest single source of instability in the years ahead lies in the relentless hostility that sets China and Russia against each other."

John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 271.

[21]Michael Pillsbury, "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" Foreign Policy, no. 20 (Fall 1975), p. 64.

[22]Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 229.

[23]Richard H. Solomon, "American Defense Planning and Asian Security: Policy Choices for a Time of Transition," in Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition, ed. Richrd H. Solomon (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980), p. 4.

[24]Segal, p. 490.

[25]Paul C. Warnke, "We Don't Need a Devil (To Make or Keep Our Friends)," Foreign Policy, no. 25 (Winter 1976/77), p. 87.

[26]James Reston, "Mr. Vance: The Year Ahead," New York Times, January 10, 1979, p. 23.

[27]United Nations Association, Beyond Normalization: Report of the UNA-USA National Policy Panel to Study US-China Relations (New York: U.N.A. of the U.S.A., Inc., 1979), p. 5.

[28]Examples of observers who have stated these views:
A. Doak Barnett, "Military-Security Relations Between China and the United States," Foreign Affairs, v. 55, n. 3 (April 1977), p. 592.
Donald C. Daniel, "Sino-Soviet Relations in Naval Perspective," Orbis, v. 24, n. 4 (Winter 1981), p. 802.
Edward N. Luttwak, "Against the China Card," Commentary, v. 66, n. 4 (October 1978), p. 41.

[29]"Don't Feed the Bear's Paranoia," Los Angeles Times, March 24, 1980, p. 28.

[30]Michel Oksenberg, "China Policy for the 1980s," Foreign Affairs, v. 59, n. 2 (Winter 1980/81), p. 317.

[31]"Don't Feed the Bear's Paranoia," p. 28. Along these same lines, Robert A. Scalapino has observed that:

> One can ascribe this in considerable degree to Soviet policies, both specific and general: specific in such places as northeast Asia, Indochina and Afghanistan; general in terms of the Soviet determination to be accepted as a global power, at a minimum co-equal to the United States.

Robert A. Scalapino, "Asia at the End of the 1970s," Foreign Affairs, v. 58, n. 3 (1980), p. 737.

[32]Although I do not know if he originated it, I first heard this expression from Professor Parris Chang.

[33]Newhouse, pp. 165, 220, 234.

[34]Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Playing the China Card," Washington Post, June 22, 1978, p. 27.

[35]George C. Wilson, "Weinberger Hints at Arming China if Poland Invaded," Washington Post, April 5, 1981, p. 1.

[36]Solomon, p. 26.

[37]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Asia: Circle of Fear (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1979), p. 5.

[38]Secretary Kissinger's comments are worthy of being quoted in their entirety:

> There are some native ideas around that if we appeal properly to the Chinese that they will somehow take care of our Soviet problem for us; that we can use the Chinese by some undescribed means to bring additional pressure on the Soviet Union. The fact is: No offer of co-operation has ever been made to us by the Chinese that we have refused or that we would not have followed up if it was in our own interest. The worst mistake we could possibly make is to give the Chinese the impression that we are using them for our purposes, and that we are asking them to take additional risks in order to help us out.
>
> The Chinese have been in business as a major country for 4,000 years. They did not survive that long by letting themselves be used by foreigners. The Chinese need us for security reasons and because they have an interest in world equilibrium. We have, for our own reasons, our own interest in preventing any country from upsetting the balance of power. Therefore, if we both understand our interests properly, we can pursue certain parallel policies without fawning and without giving the impression that there is some gimmick which is going to solve our basic security problem for us. Much as we value our relationship to China, it cannot determine all our other policies. We must pursue those in our national interest, neither using the Chinese nor letting them use us.

"'We are Determined to Resist Expansionism': Interview with Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State," U.S. News and World Report, March 15, 1976, p. 27.

[39]"An Interview with Brezhnev," Time, January 22, 1979, p. 22.

[40]"The 35th U.N. General Assembly Session: A.A. Gromyko's Address," Pravda, September 24, 1980, p. 4. Translated in Soviet Press: Selected Translations no. 80-12, December 1980, p. 421.

[41]Hua Xiu, "Ray Cline's Imperialist Bias," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 3 (January 19, 1981), p. 11.

[42]Richard Holbrooke, "China and the U.S.: Into the 1980s," Current Policy no. 187 (June 4, 1980), p. 3.

[43]Scalapino, p. 716.

[44]Luttwak, p. 43.

[45]Joseph Kraft, "China's Future Role on the World Stage," Washington Post, April 13, 1976, p. 19.

[46]Allen S. Whiting, "China and the Superpowers: Toward the Year 2000," Daedalus, v. 109, n. 4 (Fall 1980), p. 97.

[47]Leslie H. Brown, "American Security Policy in Asia," Adelphi Papers, no. 132 (Spring 1977), p. 14.

[48]Kenneth Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Its Implications for the Strategic Triangle (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corp., July 1978), p. 185.

[49]Holbrooke, p. 3.

[50]Oksenberg, p. 318.

[51]Robert C. North, The Foreign Policy of China, Third Edition (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978), p. 218. North summarizes an effective critique of triangular 'stability.'

[52]Steven I. Levine, "The Soviet Factor in Sino-American Relations," in Dragon and Eagle; United States-China Relations: Past and Future, ed. Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam (New York, Basic Books, 1978), p. 252.

[53]Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 97.

[54]Stoessel, p. 2.

[55]Harry Schwartz, "The Moscow-Peking-Washington Triangle," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 414 (July 1974), p. 48.

[56]Thomas W. Robinson, "China's Asia Policy," Current History, v. 79, n. 458 (September 1980), p. 1.

[57]For studies of the "united front" strategy, see:
J.D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1977), p. 237.

Uri Ra'anan, "The Washington-Moscow-Peking Triangle: A Re-examination of Chinese and Soviet Concepts," Orbis, v. 19, n. 3 (Fall 1975), p. 827.

[58]Jonathan Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 35, n. 1 (January 1979), p. 3.

[59]Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 112.

[60]Guo Li, "Detente Offensive," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 17 (April 27, 1981), p. 3.

[61]Michael Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," Foreign Policy, no. 41 (Winter 1980-81), p. 57.

[62]Hua Xiu, p. 11.

[63]Edward E. Rice, "The Sino-U.S. Detente: How Durable?" Asian Survey, v. 13, n. 9 (September 1973), p. 811.

[64]Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "China, Soviet Strategy, and American Policy," International Security, v. 5, n. 2 (Fall 1980), p. 30.

O. Edumund Clubb has issued a similar warning concerning the persistence of China's communist ideological objectives, such as leadership in the world communist movement and in the nonaligned movement. See:

O. Edmund Clubb, "China and the 'Industrialized Democracies'," Current History, v. 79, n. 458 (September 1980), p. 43.

[65]Lucian W. Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," International Security, v. 4, n. 1 (Summer 1979), p. 13.

[66]Warnke, p. 85.

[67]Andrei Gromyko, "Leninist Foreign Policy in the Contemporary World," Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil no. 1 (January 1981), pp. 13-27. Translated in: Soviet Press: Selected Translations no. 81-4 (April 1981), p. 118.

[68]Sergei Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the International Duties of Socialist Countries," Pravda, September 26, 1968. Found in: Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 302-305.

[69]Gromyko, p. 119.

[70]G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, "The Problem of Peace: An Analysis of Basic Concepts," Soviet Review, v. 21, n. 3 (Fall 1980), p. 14.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 428.

[73]Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, Ca.: Dickenson, 1975), Chapter 5, pp. 137-166.

[74]Adam B. Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," In: The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Second Edition, ed. Erik P. Hoffman and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., (New York: Aldine, 1980), p. 152.

Ulam emphasizes that economic development and prosperity will not diminish the need for Soviet foreign policy to support domestic ideological imperatives. There is another aspect to the linkage: the external threat, the intent of capitalism to destroy socialism, is an important justification for the sacrifices and denials of freedom of which Ulam writes. Barrington Moore, Jr., has noted this aspect of the linkage:

> It is probable that a certain amount of hostility toward the outside world is an essential ingredient in the power of the present rulers of Russia. Without the real or imagined threat of potential attack, it would be much more difficult to drive the Russian masses through one set of Five Year Plans after another.

Barrington Moore, Jr., "The Pressures Behind Soviet Expansionism," In: The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, Third Edition, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 459.

Richard Pipes has pointed out a third aspect of the linkage of foreign policy with domestic politics, one that sheds light on why the ideological competition with China over the loyalty of other communist parties should be of such great concern to the Soviet Union:

> Last, but not least, foreign Communist organizations are valuable to the Soviet Union for internal purposes. On any given issue, the Soviet press can always cite resolutions of foreign Communist parties

to convey to the Soviet public an impression of solid support abroad for Russian policies.

U.S. Congress. Senate. *Committee on Government Operations*, International Negotiations: Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1972), p. 12.

[75]Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Vulnerabilities and Strengths of the Soviet Union in a Changing International Environment: The Internal Dimension," In: The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Second Edition, eds. Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. (New York: Aldine, 1980), p. 709.

[76]Thomas W. Wolfe, Adam Ulam, and Jiri Valenta, for example, all agree on this point. See:

Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 387.

Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973, Second Edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 738.

Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1979), pp. 15-16.

[77]Vernon Aspaturian, Alexander Dallin, and Jiri Valenta, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Three Perspectives (Los Angeles: Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles, September 1980), pp. 64 (Dallin), 38 (Aspaturian), and 8 (Valenta).

[78]Edward Mortimer, "The Muslim Republics--Weak Links in the Soviet Chain?" The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1981, pp. 12-13.

[79]Jiri Valenta, "Poland: Soviets Watch and Weigh the Risks," The Financial Post (Toronto), December 20, 1980.

Ned Temko, "Keeping the Lid on Soviet Labor," The Christian Science Monitor, June 4, 1981, p. 1.

Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Will the Soviet Empire Survive 1984?" The Christian Science Monitor, July 10, 1981, p. 23.

[80]Thomas W. Robinson, "The Soviet Union and Asia in 1980," Asian Survey, v. 21, n. 1 (January 1981), p. 19.

Robinson goes on to point out that, in his view, these Soviet aspirations do not include territorial expansion (p. 28).

[81]Alfred Biegel, "Strategic Implications of Moscow's Concept for Collective Security in Asia," Military Review, v. 57, n. 2 (February 1977), p. 8.

[82]I.P.S.G. Cosby, "Disquiet in the Far East," RUSI Journal for Defence Studies, v. 125, n. 3 (September 1980), p. 48.

[83]Leslie Brown, p. 18.

[84]Robinson, "The Soviet Union and Asia," p. 17. Richard Pipes concurs in Robinson's analysis:

> In the 1960's the conflict with China has increasingly attracted Russia's principal attention. In the past several years, the previous strategy of containing and isolating the United States has been replaced by one stressing the containment and isolation of Communist China.
>
> Committee on Government Operations, p. 17.

[85]Alfred Biegel, "Sino-NATO Military Links as Viewed by the Kremlin," International Defense Review (January 1980), p. 26.

[86]Joseph Schiebel, "The Soviet Union and the Sino-American Relationship," Orbis, v. 21, n. 1 (Spring 1977), p. 79.

[87]Harry Gelman, The Soviet Union and China (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, March 1980), p. 1.

[88]Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 146. "Dual strategy" is used by Robinson, who describes it as comprising "threats of violence and offers of compromise," and as having been adopted by the Soviets after the March 1969 border clashes with China:

Thomas W. Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, August 1970), pp. ix, 73.

Other observers who have noted this same Soviet dual approach in relations with China include Barnett and Gayler:

A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1977), pp. 50-52.

Noel Gayler, "Security Implications of the Soviet Military Presence in Asia," In: Asian Security in the 1980s:

Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition, ed. Richard H. Solomon (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1980), p. 61.

[89]Henry Kissinger described a particular instance of the Soviet containment policy that took place in 1969, after the March clashes with China on the Ussuri River:

> In late June, Soviet ambassadors made coordinated efforts to "expose" Chinese policy to their host governments and to discourage various Western European nations from recognizing Peking. The Soviet Union sought to expand its contacts with non-Communist Asian nations; feelers were even extended to Taiwan. In a campaign to thwart any Chinese effort to break out of its isolation, Soviet diplomats hinted that in order better to isolate China the Soviet Union was prepared to avoid complicating relations with the United States.

Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), p. 178.

For detailed discussions of the Soviet strategy of encirclement of China, see:

O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The "Great Game" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 514.

C.G. Jacobsen, "Sino-Soviet Crisis in Perspective," Current History, v. 77, n. 450 (October 1979), p. 110.

John G. Soessinger, "China and the Soviet Union: Retrospect and Prospect," In: China and the Great Powers: Relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, ed. Francis O. Wilcox (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 23.

Donald Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," International Security, v. 5, n. 2 (Fall 1980), p. 70.

[90]Biegel. "Strategic Implications of Moscow's Concept for Collective Security in Asia," p. 9.
Ra'anan, p. 832.

[91]Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," p. 66.

[92]Alice Langley Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," In: Sino-Soviet Military Relations, ed. Raymond L. Garthoff (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 160.

[93]Joseph E. Thach, Jr., "Modernization and Conflict: Soviet Military Assistance to the PRC, 1950-60," Military Review, v. 58, n. 1 (January 1978), p. 88.

[94]Clubb, China and Russia: The "Great Game," p. 514.

[95]On July 6, 1921, the Soviet Union launched its first successful "war of national liberation" by sending the Red Army into Outer Mongolia, occupying the country, and founding a puppet Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government. Later, in 1924, the Mongolian People's Republic was proclaimed.

[96]Gromyko, p. 130.

[97]The following quotes, both from the Soviet journal International Affairs, are illustrative of such Soviet propaganda:

> Proceeding from their selfish aims, they view the developing countries and the national liberation movement as a whole as an instrument for pursuing their great-power, hegemonistic policy. There can be no doubt that Peking's divisive actions are detrimental to the cause of national liberation and undermine the unity of the three most important forces of our time--socialism, the international communist and worker's movement, and the revolutionary national liberation movement.

Y. Semyonov, "Peking and the National Liberation Movement," International Affairs (Moscow, January 1980), p. 29.

> The most striking change has recently occurred in Peking's policy with regard to developing countries. It is here that the renunciation of the former 'ultra revolutionary' slogans and earlier calls to uncompromising armed struggle against imperialism and colonialism was most apparent and cynical. Instead, there is now a de facto alliance with neo-colonialists and the most reactionary regimes.

A. Meliksetov, "Peking Threatens International Peace and Security," International Affairs (Moscow, March 1981), p. 47.

[98]Schiebel, p. 77.

[99]Donald Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement: A Proposal for U.S. Foreign Policy," Pacific Community, v. 8, n. 1 (October 1976), p. 129.

Not only are there definite advantages to a rapprochement with China, there are also no inherent ideological barriers precluding it. Nathan Leites has deduced from Soviet writings and political behavior that one of the precepts of the 'operational code' guiding Politburo actions is that: "The Party must not regard the existence of either 'close relations' or of 'rupture of relations' with an outside group as definitive for any length of time."

Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, 1951), p. 35.

[100]Charles Douglas-Home, "Why Two Giant Armies Face Each Other in the East," Times of London, July 31, 1980, p. 14.

[101]Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1976), p. 449.

[102]International Communications Agency, "Soviet Perceptions of the U.S.: Results of a Surrogate Interview Project," USICA Research Memorandum (Washington, D.C.: U.S. International Communications Agency), June 27, 1980, Sections I.A. and II.C.

The observation reported in this study on the Russian fear of China was that:

> Nothing unites the Soviets, particularly Russians, more than a fear of China. Their attitude verges on the irrational. It mixes real concern for border integrity and awareness of the vast number of Chinese with a large dose of Russian racial intolerance. Only a small group of Soviet Sinologists seem to share any Sinophilism and even they are ambivalent.
>
> Over the long haul, China is perceived as enemy number one.

Ibid., p. 11.

[103]Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 108.

[104]The journal Studies in Comparative Communism has published a collection of these Soviet reports:

"Documents: The Border Issue, China and the Soviet Union, March-October 1969," Studies in Comparative Communism, v. 2, n. 3/4 (July/October 1969), pp. 150-382.

[105]Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Coral Gables, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974), p. 5.

There is evidence that Soviet fear of the "extremes to which Peking might go" includes fear of a Chinese nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. John Newhouse observed that:

> Insiders remember SALT I for many reasons, among them some palpable signs of Moscow's Sinophobia. At one point, the Russians began talking somewhat vaguely about 'provocative attacks' by third nuclear powers.

Newhouse, p. 176.

[106]For detailed discussions of the economic and strategic importance of Siberia, see:

Robert N. North, "The Soviet Far East: New Centre of Attention in the USSR," Pacific Affairs, v. 51, n. 2 (Summer 1978), p. 195.

E. Stuart Kiby, "Considering Siberia," RUSI Journal for Defense Studies, v. 118, n. 2 (June 1973), p. 42.

Hedrick Smith observed while in the Soviet Union that Siberia has a symbolic importance for the Communist Party that is at least as great as its immediate economic value. Smith comments that "for a nation that has lost its revolutionary elan without shedding its revolutionary pretensions, Siberia is vitally important as a political symbol of the new frontier." A Soviet economist is quoted by Smith as having remarked that: "If Siberia did not exist for those projects, the Party would have to invent it." (Smith, pp. 445-446).

[107]Doublas-Home, p. 14.

Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 101.

[108]A brief chronology of Soviet actions vis-a-vis China since 1976 will serve to sumarize the evidence of a growing Soviet concern for what is perceived by Soviet leaders to be a clear and present military threat emanating from China:

Feb 1976 CPSU 25th Congress, China declared "plainly hostile" to Marxism-Leninism.

Oct 1976 Soviets announce, in wake of death of Mao, willingness to normalize relations with China.

Nov 1976 Soviet delegate to Sino-Soviet border talks arrives in Beijing.

Feb 1977 China calls for a strong United States military presence in the Western Pacific, raising the possibility of Sino-American strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union.

Feb 1977 Soviet delegate to border talks leaves Beijing.

May 1977 Brezhnev issues anti-Chinese statement, ending the post-Mao honeymoon.

Sep 1977 Deng Xiaoping publicly states that 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty has "virtually ceased to exist," a gesture toward improved relations with Japan at the expense of Sino-Soviet relations.

Feb 1978 China's 5th National People's Congress steps up polemical feud with the Soviet Union.

Mar 1978 Brezhnev and Defense Minister Ustinov make highly-publicized inspection tour of the Soviet Far East.

May 1978 U.S. presidential National Security Advisor Brezinski visits Beijing, indicating American interest in strategic cooperation with China.

Aug 1978 China-Japan Peace and Friendship Treaty, included an "anti-hegemony" clause despite intense Soviet pressure on Japan.

Nov 1978 Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed.

Dec 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendliness, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation signed.

Dec 1978 U.S. announces agreement with China on normalization of relations.

Jan 1979 U.S. and China establish diplomatic relations; Deng Xiaoping warns of need to teach Vietnam a lesson while in Japan.

Feb 1979 China attacks Vietnam.

Mar 1979 Soviet ships and aircraft begin using facilities in Vietnam, later to become routine operations.

1979 Soviets establish joint command encompassing the Far East, Siberian, and Trans-Baikal military districts, headquarters at Chita; the only unified command of its type in the USSR.

Jun 1979 Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk and amphibious landing ship Ivan Rogov join Pacific Fleet.

1979 Mig-27 attack aircraft and SS-20 mobile IRBMs deployed to Soviet Far East (SS-20 deployment may have begun in 1978).

These events highlight the changes in the strategic balance in Asia over the past five years, illustrating that as China moved into strategic alignment with the West, the Soviet Union took diplomatic and military actions to counter what was perceived to be a growing Chinese threat to the USSR. Sources that address the Soviet military buildup or points made above include:

Jacobsen, pp. 110-111 (Brezhnev-Ustinov tour and the force buildup).
Solomon, p. 5 (Soviet force buildup).
Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," p. 78 (Soviet force buildup).

"Japan Confirms Location of USSR East Asian Hq," Japan Times, August 10, 1980, p. 1.

Leo Y. Liu, "The Modernization of the Chinese Military," Current History, v. 79, n. 458 (September 1980), p. 38.

"The Power Game: Soviet Forces in the Far East," Asia Yearbook 1981 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1981), pp. 19-23.

Finally, it should be noted that Soviet actions, eloquent as they are, are matched by the appearance of some new themes in Soviet statements on the 'Chinese threat.' The primary purpose of such statements is undoubtedly tactical: to counter Chinese claims of the existence of a Soviet threat to China and to inhibit the United States from developing a military relationship with China. Nevertheless, such tactical purposes could have been met with any one of a number of propaganda lines, therefore statements such as this one probably reflect a real underlying Soviet concern:

> One of the most sinister changes in Pekings' foreign policy is a new approach to the military factor. One is struck by a certain change in the theoretical foundations of the military policy: today we see that the doctrine of the 'restriction' of 'people's war' as a defensive war on home

territory is being dropped and a concept of large-scale military actions by a modernized professional army transcending China's borders is being developed.

Meliksetov, p. 48.

[109]"Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance with Imperialism," International Affairs (Moscow, March 1980), p. 52.

[110]Semyonov, p. 30.

[111]For discussions of the Soviet fear of the formation of an anti-Soviet block, see:

Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," p. 66.

William R. Kintner, "A Strategic Triangle of 'Two and a Half Powers," Orbis, v. 23, n. 3 (Fall 1979), pp. 528-530.

[112]The purpose of this statement is not to establish a definitive ordering of Soviet priorities: there is no conclusive evidence for the contention that Soviet foreign policy is founded upon a fixed set of threat priorities. Rather, the purpose is to emphasize why the Soviets perceive the improvement in Sino-American relations as a threat to their foreign policy objectives and even as a threat to the Soviet Union itself.

It was Uri Ra'anan who concluded that the United States is still the "main antagonist" in the eyes of the Soviets. He based that conclusion on the observation that:

Moscow feels this way apparently because of the 'subversive' attraction the West presents to the Soviet intelligensia, because of America's technological and military potential, and because the spectacle of America's apparent fatigue as a world leader renders the West a more inviting target for Soviet gains than China.

Ra'anan, p. 834.

Ra'anan is supported in his analysis by Leon Goure (et al), who contend that it is, in fact, American might which makes the threat posed by much weaker China seem so grave to the Soviets:

No doubt the Soviet leaders are very conscious of and concerned over the potential Chinese threat and the possibility of having to wage a war on

two fronts, as well as the advantages the US may derive for its power position in the event of a Sino-Soviet war. It is uncertain, however, to what extent the requirement to deter and, if necessary, to fight a China increasingly armed with nuclear weapons and missiles affects the overall Soviet drive for the further buildup of its military capability and specifically, its strategic missile force. Obviously, from the Soviet point of view, it is still the US which potentially poses the greatest military threat to the Soviet Union, while China, even though it is becoming militarily more powerful, would not pose the same security problem for Moscow if US power could be reduced or neutralized and China was once again isolated.

Goure, p. 86.

The conclusion that the the United States is the number one enemy of the Soviet Union, as is argued by Ra'anan and Goure, is disputed by other observers on two grounds. First, that Soviet foreign policy behavior has shown clear indications of being directed primarily against China. This is the conclusion reached by Alfred Biegel, Joseph Schiebel, Thomas Robinson, and Richard Pipes in their individual analyses (See page 57 and footnote 84). Second, observations of Soviet threat perceptions have shown that fear of the Chinese penetrates deep into the Russian psyche and is unequivocal, whereas the Russian view of the United States is more ambivalent (See pp. 64-65 and footnote 102).

The lack of consensus among Western observers as to whom the Soviets perceive to be their number one antagonist is understandable: the Soviets simply have not established a set of fundamental threat priorities which result in a clear ranking of the United States and China. Nor do Russian history or Soviet ideology necessarily impel them to do so. Soviet priorities are flexible, established on the basis of the fundamental objectives of Soviet foreign policy (See pp. 49-53) and the circumstances of the international milieu. So long as different objectives are not perceived to be mutually exclusive or competing for an insufficient supply of some resource (arms, aid or attention), priorities may not even be set at all, at least not in a formal manner. There is more than one example of the Soviets having suffered foreign policy setbacks--not deliberate retreats planned in advance--because they resisted setting priorities among policies that turned out to be contradictory. The Soviet expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and from Somalia in 1977, while revealing after the fact what Soviet priorities were, did not happen under circumstances of the Soviets' choosing. The collapse of Khrushchev's 'grand design,' as postulated by

Adam Ulam, can similarly be attributed to a Soviet failure to set realistic priorities among a number of important foreign policy objectives (Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, Chapter XI, discusses the 'grand design' and its collapse).

It is when the United States and China begin working together to thwart Soviet foreign policy ambitions that the 'circumstances of the international milieu' produce a clear and overriding number one priority for the Soviet leadership: break up or neutralize the effectiveness of the Sino-American entente.

[113]For example, see:

"Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance with Imperialism," p. 48.

A. Bobin, "Shortsighted Calculations," Izvestia, January 8, 1980, p. 5. Translation In: Soviet Press: Selected Translations, n. 3-80 (March 1980), p. 77.

[114]Allen S. Whiting believes that the Soviets fear an outright Chinese attack, and that the current trend in the development of Sino-American relations is feeding this Soviet fear. A Chinese attack in conjunction with a Soviet-American strategic exchange, says Whiting:

> ...need not be openly specified by a formal Sino-American agreement or even spelled out in a secret protocol. As Beijing and Washington continue to emphasize their 'common strategic interests,' bolstered by high-level military consultation and high-technology transfer, the implications for Soviet defense analysts are sufficiently ambiguous to require contingency plans that include combined strikes against Chinese weapon systems as well as against the panoply of American land, sea, and airborne strategic systems.

Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 100.

Dmitri Simes has been quoted as having the view that the Soviets only see a need to deter possible Chinese "diversionary tactics" in support of NATO, a much less demanding task.

Eduardo Lachica, "Big Soviet Defense Buildup in Siberia Stresses Region's Value, Holds Danger," Wall Street Journal, August 4, 1980, p. 16.

The Chinese factor in Soviet preparations for protracted war has been described by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber. They note that the Soviets expect to have to

defend against attacks by the Chinese "jackals" after a strategic nuclear exchange with the West.

Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 12.

[115]Allen Whiting and Alfred Biegel have both noted such Soviet concerns, which are evident in Soviet press commentary on Sino-Japanese relations. "Right-wing, nationalistic forces among Japan's ruling circles" are blamed for the perceived anti-Soviet thrust of Japan's relationship with China. See:

Whiting: "China and the Superpowers," p. 102.

Biegel, "Strategic Implications of Moscow's Concept for Collective Security in Asia," p. 8.

Meliksetov, p. 47.

[116]For example, see:

A. Kemov and V. Kozlov, "International Arms Trade," International Affairs (Moscow), January 1980, p. 55.

[117]Unfortunately, Brezhnev's remarks were made in private and cannot be confirmed. His warning to the United States, if reported accurately, is very interesting in that it is the most belligerent made by a Soviet leader in many years:

> Believe me, after the destruction of Chinese nuclear sites by our missiles, there won't be much time for the Americans to choose between the defense of their Chinese allies and peaceful co-existence with us.

R.W. Apple, Jr., "Brezhnev Reported to Warn US on Arming China," New York Times, January 30, 1980, p. A15.

[118]Arnold L. Horlick, "The Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security Proposal: A Club in Search of Members," Pacific Affairs, v. 47, n. 3 (Fall 1974), p. 269.

[119]Ibid., p. 284. Henry Kissinger has observed the same pattern of Soviet support for its clients and has concluded that the 1971 Soviet treaty with India was a part of that pattern:

> What Singh had in mind became public on August 9 when India and the Soviet Union signed a Friendship Treaty, which for all practical purposes gave India a Soviet guarantee against Chinese intervention if India went to war with Pakistan. By this action the Soviet Union deliberately opened the door to war on the subcontinent; it was the first of a series of moves throughout the Seventies whereby the Soviets fueled conflicts by giving arms and assurances to countries with high incentive to resort to force.
>
> Kissinger, p. 767.

[120]The Chinese have shown similar restraint, though they have demonstrated a greater willingness to throw their own troops into the fray (possibly because they lack the proxies available to the Soviets). Even when China has committed its troops, as in Korea in 1950, India in 1962, and Vietnam in 1979, Chinese foreign policy behavior has shown a reluctance to use force except as a last resort, after warning the potential adversary that his actions were becoming intolerable. For a description of Chinese conflict behavior, see:

Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

Steve Chan, "Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management," World Politics, v. 30, n. 3 (April 1978), p. 391.

Edward W. Ross, "Chinese Conflict Management," Military Review, v. 60, n. 1 (January 1980), p. 13.

[121]Robinson has described the policy context and the consequences of the 1969 border clashes:

Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, pp. 41-71.

See Gelman, p. 13, for a current discussion of the border issue.

[122]Thomas W. Wolfe reached this conclusion in his 1970 study of Soviet military strategy and Soviet policy in Europe. Referring to the escalation of Sino-Soviet tensions in the 1966-1969 period, Wolfe states:

> In view of these developments, one may assume that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime found it prudent to conduct a running reappraisal of its military planning to take into account a potential "two-front"


AD-A109 589
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
F/G 5/4
UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN CHINA: BEYOND THE 'CHINA CA--ETC(U)
SEP 81 J F BOUCHARD
UNCLASSIFIED
NL
END
DATE FILMED
82
DTIC


0958
1.0
1.1
1.25
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.5
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963-A

> threat in Europe and in the Far East. While such a reappraisal would have been likely to confirm the wisdom of proceeding with the build-up of Soviet strategic nuclear power as insurance against China's developing atomic capability, it no doubt would have raised also the question whether Soviet theater forces in the regions bordering China should be permanently strengthened, and if so, whether this requirement might best be met by shifting some forces from the European theater to the Far East. The answer apparently was that the Soviet Union should indeed bolster its military garrisons in Asia, but not at the expense of the general purpose forces deployed in Europe.
>
> Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 461.

Edward L. Warner confirmed Wolfe's observations in his 1977 study of the Soviet military establishment:

> The total number of division within the ground forces has expanded from a stable 140 throughout the mid-1960s to 168 reported in September 1976. This buildup has been concentrated in the Far East, which currently contains 43 divisions where only 15 were stationed in 1968. These additional divisions have been newly formed or transferred from the southern or central USSR. They have not come either from Eastern Europe, where the deployed Soviet forces increased with the stationing of five divisions in Czechoslovakia since August 1968, or from the western USSR where 60 divisions continue to be identified.
>
> Edward L. Warner III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 154.

This thesis, that the Soviet build-up of forces directed against China has been pursued for the purpose of enabling the Soviet Union to fight a 'two-front' war, is not accepted by all observers. A. Doak Barnett dismissed such implications with the conclusion that: "The Soviet buildups can probably best be explained as an overreaction by Soviet leaders in the late 1960s and early 1970s to what they saw as a growing potential Chinese threat." Barnett attributes this Soviet "overreaction" to 'worst case' planning by the Soviet military, bureaucratic momentum, and a primary purpose of deterring the Chinese from considering 'adventurist' moves.

Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 78.

While the underlying factors that Barnett cites are almost certainly operative, they do not justify the conclusion that the Soviet buildup is attributable to simple "overreaction." From an American point of view the Soviet build-up may appear to be an overreaction, but that does not help to explain Soviet strategy or intentions.

Tying together three threads of the observations made on Soviet behavior that have been presented thus far reveals a more plausible explanation for the Soviet military build-up: First, as was noted above, the escalation in Sino-Soviet tensions in the late 1960s caused the Soviets to reappraise their defense strategy, with the result--confirmed by the actual pattern of ground force deployments--that a decision was made to build-up Soviet forces in the Far East. Second, the Soviet leadership made a second reappraisal of the 'Chinese threat' in the 1977-1978 period when it became apparent that the post-Mao leadership of China would not be amenable to a reconciliation on Soviet terms and would, in fact, turn to the West to buttress its strategic position against Soviet pressure (See p. 67 and note 108). The result of this Soviet reassessment was a second surge in the build-up of Soviet forces deployed against China. Third, it seems clear that the Soviets take seriously the threat they perceive as arising from the Sino-American strategic alignment (See pp. 69-70 and notes 111-114).

When the cumulative evidence of the Soviet military build-up in the Far East, the pattern of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda, and the revisions that have been made to Soviet military doctrine are viewed together in the context of world affairs--notably the failure of the Soviet 'Asian Collective Security System' gambit and the growth in Sino-American ties--it is clear that the Soviets do indeed take seriously the threat of a two-front war and are making thorough and intensive preparations to fight, and win, such a war.

[123]Douglass and Hoeber, p. 20. Their view, that the Soviet Union would not respect the neutrality of third parties, is supported by observations made by Nathan Leites in his study of Bolshevik political behavior. Leites identified three elements in the Soviet 'operational code' that opposed neutrality for third parties:

> Any group not controlled by the Party, both at home and abroad, is an enemy.
>
> That is, there are no intermediate, neutral groups.
>
> That is, the only good neighbor is the absolutely controlled neighbor.

Leites, p. 56.

Is it valid to apply principles evolved during the revolutionary struggle for power and the subsequent civil war to the conduct of Soviet foreign policy today? There has been, after all, a continuing evolution of the ideological principles of the CPSU, such as the enshrinement of 'peaceful coexistence' on the basis of justifications that do not appear in Leites' study. Separating, for the moment, the questions of when the Soviets would choose to go to war and what their behavior would be once a war had begun, the value of looking into Bolshevik political precepts becomes more readily apparent. It is true that the Soviets have, in their statements and in their behavior, supported neutrality and non-alignment (though in the latter case with the obvious purpose of subverting the movement for their own purposes). It is not reasonable, however, to assume that this pattern of behavior would be maintained in wartime--particularly in a struggle as potentially devastating as a war on two fronts, against NATO and China. In such a struggle, as the Soviets would call it, the principles derived during the revolution and civil war are probably a better guide to Soviet behavior.

[124]It is important to keep in mind the "never again" attitude that pervades Soviet military thought as a result of the nearly catastrophic surprise attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, launched June 22, 1941. For the Soviet Union to turn its back on China during a war with NATO would be to take a tremendous risk, and the Soviet military has no intention of taking such a risk.

[125]For example, see:

Kintner, p. 527.

Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," p. 78.

[126]Allen S. Whiting is emphatic on this point:

> Except for the period 1969-70, alarmist prognostications of a Sino-Soviet war have been grossly exaggerated. Neither the issues nor the incidents have been sufficiently serious or threatening to prompt the two colossi into what could be a catastrophe for either or both. Each side has suffered too much devastation from war within living memory for the leadership to risk its reoccurrence over anything less than national survival. No such interest is at stake now or in the prospective future.

Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 103.

Whiting is correct in his observation that "Neither the issues nor the incidents have been sufficiently serious or threatening," but his view of the role of memories of "devastation of war" presents only half the story, at least in the Soviet case. In fact, to believe that the only effect of memories of past wars is to inhibit the Soviet Union from wanting to fight future wars is to project the American point of view as being the Soviet point of view.

The rest of the picture is the concerted effort made in the Soviet Union to keep memories of the 'Great Patriotic War' alive as part of the nation-wide "military-patriotic education campaign." The emotion may seem alien to Americans, but the Russians take pride in the destruction they suffered as proof of their unity and invincibility. If memories of past wars has any direct impact on Soviet decision-making, it is not that war must be avoided at any cost, but that losing a war must be avoided at any cost. This attitude would, of course, have an inhibitory effect on decisions to go to war, but it would also, under some circumstances--as in the case of the Chinese threat at Russia's back--be an impetus for ensuring that an 'unavoidable' war be launched under conditions of the Soviets' choosing.

For further discussions of the role of memories of the second world war in Soviet society and polictics, see:

Warner, pp. 100-102.

Smith, pp. 418-434.

William E. Odom, "The Militarization of Soviet Society," Problems of Communism (September-October 1976), p. 34.

[127]Aspaturian, Dallin and Valenta, p. 23.

[128]Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," p. 10.

[129]Smith, p. 449. A recent description of the Chinese in Soviet journal International Affairs, though made for propaganda purposes, is probably representative of the popularly-held view among Russians:

> Militaristic sentiments are intensively being cultivated in China; broad segments of the population are being brought up in a spirit of chauvinism, disregard for other peoples, and the thought that war is fatally inevitable is being hammered into the minds of the Chinese people. This is an inalienable component of the aggressive and expansionist course pursued by Mao's successors. As for the moral and psychological conditioning of broad sections of the Chinese population in the

spirit of belligerent militarism, it is an important aspect of Peking's policy of aggravating international tension.

N. Kapchenko, "The Threat to Peace from Peking's Hegemonistic Policy," International Affairs (Moscow, February 1980), p. 69.

[130]Ra'anan, p. 833.

[131]Schiebel, p. 92.

[132]Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," p. 7.

[133]This paragraph has attempted to reconcile, in the particular case of Soviet policy toward China, one of the long-standing debates on the nature of Soviet foreign policy: Is it expansionist and opportunistic, or is it defensive and cautious? Answers that fall squarely on one side or the other are probably determined more by the political leanings of the observer than by the weight of the evidence. Incidents in the history of Soviet foreign policy and passages in Soviet public statements on world affairs can be cited to 'prove' either point of view.

The answer that best fits the available evidence, however, is "both." Thomas W. Wolfe ascribes to that view: "Historically speaking, it is perhaps more accurate to say that Soviet foreign policy has reflected a combination of caution and militance..." (Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 511). That the Soviets strike a balance between seizing opportunities and pursuing an orderly foreign policy is the conclusion drawn by Richard Pipes, who also provides the criterion used for striking that balance:

> While pursuing the primary objective of the moment, the Soviet Union does not neglect other opportunities; but by and large, mindful of the principle of "correlation of forces", its leaders maintain a clear distinction between the primary thrust and diversionary actions.
>
> Committee on Government Operations, p. 17.

The ideological doctrines of the CPSU, which are supposed to provide infallible guidance for the policy-maker, dictate that Soviet foreign policy be both opportunistic and cautious, depending on the circumstances at hand. Juxtaposing two of the principles of the 'operational code' guiding Soviet behavior, as deduced by Nathan Leites, shows the dual nature of this guidance:

> There are rare occasions which offer unusual possibilities for making great advances. The Party must learn to seize them.
>
> The Party must never show "adventurism" in its attempts to advance; that is, it must never risk already conquered major positions for the sake of uncertain further gains.

Leites, pp. 66, 68. Richard Pipes has noted that the element of caution that tempers Soviet opportunism can also be traced to roots in Russian culture:

> Still, mindful of the Russian proverb: "If you don't know the ford, don't step into the river," they do not plunge into contests blindly; they rarely gamble, unless they feel the odds are overwhelmingly in their favor.

Committee on Government Operations, p. 6.

[134]Peter W. Vigor and Christopher Donnelly, "The Manchurian Campaign and Its Relevance to Modern Strategy," Comparative Strategy, v. 2, n. 2 (1980), p. 162.

For further discussion of the fundamental concept of the "primacy of the offensive" in Soviet doctrine, see:

Goure, p. 106.

Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 457.

Warner, p. 154.

Alan J. Vick, "Soviet Military Forces and Strategy Come of Age," Air University Review, v. 32, n. 2 (January-February 1981), p. 19.

[135]Eugene D. Betit, "The Soviet Manchurian Campaign, August 1945: Prototype for the Soviet Offensive," Military Review, v. 56, n. 5 (May 1976), p. 65.

[136]John G. Stoessinger, for example, contends that "the Soviets seem to have learned sufficiently from history--including recent American history--the possible calamitous consequences of a major land war in Asia." (Stoessinger, p. 27.)

How Stoessinger arrived at that conclusion, other than by projection of the American point of view onto Soviet leaders, is somewhat mystifying. His is essentially the same argument

as was used by Whiting to defend the view that a Sino-Soviet war is highly unlikely (See p. 81 and note 126). The same critique applies in both cases: Russian history and Soviet ideology do not produce the same world view as Americans have. Russia has been fighting major land wars in Asia (or against Asians on Russian soil, in the case of the Mongols) for the last seven centuries. Considering the Russian record of expansion--eastward to the Pacific and southward to the Khyber Pass--it would seem that the Russians have, overall, been well able to avoid the "calamitous consequences" of which Americans are so sensitive.

If the Soviets have learned anything from history, it is how a major land war in Asia should be fought, not that a major land war in Asia should not be fought.

[137]Ra'anan, p. 833.

[138]Warner, p. 153.

[139]Goure, pp. 20, 31. This study quotes a Radio Moscow broadcast made on January 13, 1970 as having stated:

> The defensive, as a means of military operation, has lost its importance. In the face of an enemy possessing nuclear weapons and pinning his hopes on a first strike, a defensive strategy means to voluntarily subject a country and its armed forces to nuclear strikes, which is contrary to the concept of modern warfare.

Ibid., p. 107. This broadcast may well have had propaganda purposes, but the threat it implies is certainly consistent with what is known about Soviet military doctrine. The Brezhnev warning against American participation in China's nuclear weapon program (see note 117) also threatened a Soviet first strike against China.

[140]Douglass and Hoeber, pp. 15-31.

[141]Pye, "Dilemmas for American in China's Modernization," p. 7. Other observers who agree with Pye's assessment include:

Kintner, p. 532.

Robinson, "China's Asia Policy," p. 2.

[142]Douglass and Hoeber, p. 18.

[143]Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement," p. 126.

Douglas-Home, p. 14.

[144]Drew Middleton, "Pentagon Studies Prospects of Military Links with China," New York Times, January 4, 1980, p. A2.

[145]Schiebel, pp. 93-94.

[146]Ra'anan, p. 830.

Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," pp. 6-7.

[147]Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 103.
Barnett, China and the Major Powers, p. 79.
Schiebel, p. 93.

The incident in Manchuria refers to the case of Gao Gang (Kao Kang), a trusted ally of Mao Zedong, who was sent to Manchuria in September 1945 and assumed the top military, government, and party posts in the region when the People's Republic was proclaimed in 1949. Gao is alleged to have defied Party policies and to have colluded, openly and secretly, with the Russians. He was briefly raised to a key central government post but could not fend off the accusations made against him and was purged on December 24, 1953. He is reported to have committed suicide not long after being purged.

[148]Lachica, "Big Soviet Defense Buildup in Siberia," p. 16.

[149]For example, see:

Gayler, p. 64.

Kintner, p. 532.

[150]Hal Piper, "Soviet Sees Itself Along Against China," Baltimore Sun, March 12, 1979, p. 1.

Steven I. Levine has noted the same phenomenon:

> In political terms, Soviet leaders, unlike many Western observers, expect additional major changes in a Chinese political system that they believe has not yet stabilized. Elite conflict and popular pressures may yet force a change in Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union and may return China to the socialist fraternity.

Steven I. Levine, "The Unending Sino-Soviet Conflict," Current History, v. 79, n. 459 (October 1980), p. 72.

A. Doak Barnett has chronicled the record of Soviet attempts to manipulate Chinese domestic politics, which would indicate that the Soviets have enough confidence in their perception of the nature of Chinese politics that they are willing to implement policies on the basis of that perception. See:

Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 352, note 119.

[151]A detailed analysis of all of these events is beyond the scope of this paper. For further information on them, the following sources are recommended:

On unrest and revolt in Tibet:

Dawa Norbu, "The Tibetan Response to Chinese "Liber-tion'," Asian Affairs, v. 6, n. 3 (London, October 1975), p. 264.

George N. Patterson, "The Situation in Tibet," China Quarterly, no. 6 (April-June 1961), p. 81.

On the Cultural Revolution:

Juliana P. Heaslet, "The Red Guards: Instruments of Destruction in the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey, v. 12, n. 12 (December 1972), p. 1032.

Thomas W. Robinson (ed.), The Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1971).

Ross Terrill, Mao: A Biography (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), Ch. 18, pp. 303-331.

On the Lin Biao purge:

Michael Y.M. Kau, The Lin Piao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975).

Jaap van Ginneken, The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao (New York: Avon Books, 1977).

On the Gang of Four purge:

Roger Garside, Coming Alive: China After Mao (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981).

Asia Yearbook 1977 and 1978 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, Ltd.). The sections on China and the "News Roundup" chronologies in these two editions discuss the purge of the radicals and the accompanying violence.

On recent unrest and bombings:

Fox Butterfield, "Peking Says Bomb Caused Fatal Blast," New York Times, October 31, 1980, p. A3.

"Unexplained Blast Kills 9 in Peking," Monterey Peninsula Herald (Associated Press report), October 30, 1980,

p. 31. Two reports on the same incident are included because of their slightly different perspectives.

"China Attacks Unrest Sweeping Countryside," Washington Post, February 1, 1981, p. A6.

[152]David Bonavia's reports for the Far Eastern Economic Review provide a good picture of the underlying political tensions in China that arise from dissent within the Party, economic problems, and resentment within the military:

David Bonavia, "Will the Gang Rise Again?" Far Eastern Economic Review, February 20, 1981, p. 36.

--- "The Jobless Generation," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 6, 1981, p. 30.

--- "The Heroes' Last Stand," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 17, 1981, p. 17.

For recent reports on conditions in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet, see:

Fox Butterfield, "Muslims Prospering in Rugged Chinese Border Area," New York Times, October 29, 1980, p. A2.

Mike Chinoy, "An Outsider's View of Inner Mongolia," Christian Science Monitor, March 18, 1981, p. B18.

Donna M. Liu, "Lifting of Veil Reveals Trouble in Tibet," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, October 27, 1980, p. 11.

[153]Roger Garside and David Bonavia, both of whom are experienced and perceptive observers of the Chinese political scene, have expressed views of China's political prospects which can only be described as optimistic (perhaps excessively so) when one considers the magnitude of the problems that China's leaders are attempting to manage--problems that Garside and Bonavia themselves have documented. For their optimistic assessments, see:

Garside, Ch. 17, pp. 419-427.

David Bonavia, "More Hearts at Ease," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 10, 1981, p. 28.

[154]For an overview of these problems and their political ramifications, see:

Frank Ching, "In China, Party Rules but Confusion Reigns," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, January 5, 1981, p. 10.

Earl Foell, "China: Can A Great Civilization Rise Again after Decades of False Starts?" Christian Science Monitor, April 8, 1981, p. B2.

Robert Keatley, "The Chinese Contend With an Uncertain Future," Wall Street Journal, January 19, 1981, p. 19.
Kenneth Lieberthal, "China: The Politics Behind the New Economics," Fortune, December 31, 1979, p. 44.

[155]Trade percentages calculated from data In:
John T. Norman, "U.S. Could Become China's Top Trade Partner, Bo Says," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 22, 1980, p. 6.
"US Trade Gap Hit $32.25 Billion in '80," Wall Street Journal, January 29, 1981, p. 7.

For U.S. imports of minerals from China, see:
Ralph Shaffer, "Rare Metals for US from Cathay," Christian Science Monitor, August 19, 1981, p. 10.

Figures on Americans in China were drawn from:
U.S. Department of State, "U.S.-PRC Exchanges," Gist, March 1981.

For U.S. missile surveillance stations in China, see:
Philip Taubman, "US and Peking Jointly Monitor Russian Missiles," New York Times, June 18, 1981, p. 1.

[156]It should be pointed out, in respect to the moral dilemma that the United States is likely to face should it have to make a decision to back China under these circumstances, that this is precisely the type of situation the Soviets would prefer to have should they perceive the need to strike at China in defense of Soviet interests. One of the patterns observable in Soviet public statements and press commentaries on China and the United States (see Appendix 'A') is the tactic of appealing to the values of an adversary--in this case to isolate the U.S. from China.

[157]Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1977), p. 17.

[158]Kissinger, p. 762. Harold C. Hinton has expressed a similar view in a more limited setting: "Soviet humiliation and browbeating, to say nothing of military defeat, of China would be seriously detrimental to balance and stability in the Far East." (Hinton, The Bear at the Gate, p. 14.)

[159]Douglas-Home, p. 14.

[160]Holbrooke, p. 3.

[161]Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 29, 1980), p. 52.

On January 4, 1980, the New York Times reported on a classified 1979 Department of Defense study of Chinese security which concluded: "Thus, it would be in NATO's interest to deter (or help China defend against) either large-scale conventional or nuclear attacks by the Soviets." (Middleton, "Pentagon Studies Prospects of Military Links with China," p. A2.)

This study may well have been leaked to Drew Middleton deliberately as a warning to the Soviet Union in response to the invasion of Afghanistan nine days earlier.

[162]Leslie Brown, p. 18. Since the next several paragraphs are going to critique this conventional Western view, it should be noted that Brown is not alone in his opinion. Steven I. Levine has asserted, "There is no doubt that Sino-Soviet hostility short of war divides the attention of the Soviet leadership, ties up Soviet political and military resources, and weakens Soviet pressure on the West." (Levine, "The Soviet Factor," p. 253). Donald Zagoria has concluded that for ideological, military, and political reasons, changes in Chinese attitudes "have helped to hold back Soviet power," (Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement," p. 124). Michael Pillsbury has similarly observed that: "Chinese strategic principles benefit the United States to the extent that those principles enhance Chinese military power and cause further Soviet apprehension and circumspection." (Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," p. 48).

[163]Douglas-Home, p. 14. He does not, however, define what "one third of the Soviet military effort" entails in terms of numbers of units or economic costs. Simple calculations based on numbers of personnel, vehicles, aircraft, etcetera, result in proportions in the 20 to 30 percent range. Nevertheless, his main point--that the Soviets are deeply committed on the China border--is well taken. The build-up of Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet frontier described earlier (notes 108 and 122) tends to substantiate Doublas-Homes' view of the nature of the Soviet commitment.

[164]A point made by:

Barnett, "Military-Security Relations Between China and the United States," p. 591.

Pillsbury, "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" p. 58.

[165]Burt, "Washington Seeks 'Equidistance' in the Big-Power Triangle," p. 1.

[166]Stalin's strategy for avoiding war with Nazi Germany from 1939 to 1941 does not disprove this point. His blunder reinforced the fundamental principle that invasion of Russian soil must be prevented. This demands that deterrence and diplomatic measures must be founded upon the capability to pre-empt 'aggressors' and defeat them on their own territory. Thus, the 'primacy of the offensive' in Soviet military doctrine.

[167]Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 106.

[168]Data taken from:
Warner, p. 154 (also see note 122).
"The Power Game: Soviet Forces in the Far East," p. 19.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1979-1980 (London: I.I.S.S., 1979), p. 9.

[169]Neville Brown, "The Myth of an Asian Diversion," R.U.S.I. Journal for Defence Studies, v. 118, n. 3 (September 1973).

[170]Hua Xiu, p. 11.

[171]Two excerpts from Hua's remarks quoted in the Beijing Review well illustrate China's primary concerns in its relations with the United States:

> Recently, American leaders have stated that the new U.S. Government attaches importance to the strategic significance of Sino-U.S. relations and that it will develop these relations on the basis of the principles set forth in the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. We welcome these remarks.
>
> We firmly believe that as long as our two sides face up to the stark reality of the world situation, earnestly handle our bilateral relations in the context of overall strategy and abide by the principles laid down in the joint communique on the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations, there is no reason why Sino-U.S. relations should not develop still further.

"Sino-U.S. Relations," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 13 (March 30, 1981), p. 6.

[172]Chen Chu, "What Do Moscow-Vaunted 'Detente' and 'Disarmament' Add Up to?" Peking Review, v. 20, n. 50 (December 9, 1977), p. 22.

[173]Jiang Yuanchun, "Soviet Strategy for East Asia," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 12 (March 23, 1981), p. 19.

[174]Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," p. 50.

[175]"Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 4 (January 28, 1980), p. 16.

Reading this statement alongside the previously quoted assertion that "to have a sound grasp of global strategy" requires one be "fully aware of China's role and weight on the global chessboard," (see page 127) gives the impression that there is a consistency to such statements, which may well reflect the actual Chinese Government view of its role in the Soviet-American strategic balance.

[176]Guo Ji, "Sino-Soviet Relations," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 3 (January 19, 1981), p. 3.

This statement could also imply a threat of a conventional forces counterattack by China after a Soviet nuclear strike, or a Chinese nuclear retaliatory strike in response to a Soviet conventional attack. This interpretation does not, however, account for the warning that "a war with China will not be an isolated matter," or the threat that a Soviet attack would be the "launching of a world war in China." Twice making the same point for emphasis indicates the statement probably was not carelessly worded: the implied threat of Western involvement was deliberate.

[177]William V. Garner, "SALT II: China's Advice and Dissent," Asian Survey, v. 19, n. 12 (December 1979), p. 1227.

[178]Chen Si, "1980 in Retrospect: The International Situation," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 1 (January 5, 1981), p. 13.

[179]Guo Ji, p. 3.

[180]Founding member of People's Liberation Army in 1927, commander of rear guard force at Kiangsi Soviet when CCP departed on Long March in 1934. Formerly Chief of Staff of the PLA General Staff. Currently a member of the Central Committee of the CCP, a member of the Military Affairs Commission, and a Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

[181]Su Yu, "Great Victory for Chairman Mao's Guideline on War," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 34 (August 19, 1977), p. 15.

These views expressed by Su Yu are almost an anachronism--much closer to Chinese propaganda of the late 1950s and early 1960s (prior to China's first atomic explosion) than to contemporary discussions on military strategy in China. Yet his remarks cannot be dismissed out of hand. Since the 1960s China has been carrying on a civil defense program that rallies around Mao Zedong's admonition to "dig tunnels deep." Su Yu himself, though past the peak of his power in the 1950s, was a relatively young (by Chinese standards) 68 at the time he wrote, and has since been promoted in the government.

[182]Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," p. 23. Michael Pillsbury has noted the same point: "Since 1974, however, the Chinese have claimed that Soviet forces along the Chinese border are not enough even for defense let alone aggression." (Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," p. 59).

Robert C. North has postulated that while China's leaders acknowledge their country's weakness, they nonetheless believe China has the power to deter an attack:

> Chinese leaders must be fully aware that the Soviet Union and the United States both possess overwhelming superiority in tactical and strategic capabilities. Moreover, even an all-out effort by China would not be sufficient to redress the military balance for some time to come. On the other hand, the Peking regime may well have concluded that its combined nuclear and conventional forces are now sufficient to deter the USSR or any other country from a major attack--a level of sufficiency that Chinese leaders may be satisfied with for some time to come.

Robert C. North, p. 218.

[183]Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," pp. 52-55.

[184]Yu Pang, "Moscow's Southward Thrust Menaces the Third World," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 19 (May 12, 1980), pp. 24-25.

[185]Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, p. 155.

[186]Segal, p. 500, and Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement," pp. 127-129, discuss motives for the PRC to improve relations with the USSR. Zagoria concludes that "a limited accommodation" is one of the two most likely future scenarios for Sino-Soviet relations (the other being

"continuation of the present cold war"). A. Doak Barnett also believes a Sino-Soviet detente to be possible:

> There is a real possibility, in my opinion, that there could be a limited Sino-Soviet detente at some point in the future--and here I use the term 'detente' in its literal and limited meaning, namely 'a relaxation of strained relations or tension.'

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 5.

[187]The intensity of the tensions and emotions that divide China and Russia were summed up in one short paragraph by Hal Piper:

> The true sources of Soviet-Chinese friction run deeper. "Zoological," one Soviet commentator called the "anti-Sovietism" of China's senior vice premier, Deng Xiaoping. The feelings are mutual.

Piper, p. 1. For more detailed analyses of the Chinese perceptions and fears that act as barriers to a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, see Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, pp. 177-178, and Gelman, pp. 2-5. Among the many important points made by Lieberthal and Gelman are that China perceives the Soviets as aggressive and expansionist; China is apprehensive about the Soviet record of invading its socialist allies and the growing Soviet capability to project military power over great distances; China is wary of the Soviet habit of attempting to exploit friends and allies to its own advantage; the ideological dimension of the dispute, though no longer the paramount issue, reflects a broader source of tension--the Soviet refusal to treat its friends and allies as equals, but only as junior partners; and the continuing Soviet effort to encircle and isolate China militarily and politically.

When all of these factors are considered, almost all observers agree that it is highly unlikely that there will be more than a limited relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and China. Lieberthal writes that there may well be fluctuations in the level of tension between China and Russia, including gestures indicating the possibility of a significant improvement of relations, but he warns that: "These 'flurries,' if they occur, will prove to be more shadow than substance, as far-reaching rapprochement between these two continental giants remains beyond the realm of the

politically possible," (Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, p. 145). Richard E. Pipes has concluded that a "complete change in government in either country" would have to be a prerequisite for a "lasting rapprcchement," (House Committee on International Relations, p. 37), but Ralph N. Clough (et al) warn that even fulfilling this prerequisite will not necessarily achieve such far-reaching results, at least in the case of China:

> A change in leadership in China might result in some easing of the tension between China and the Soviet Union, but the problems between them are so basic and difficult to resolve that no far-reaching rapprochement is likely in the next few years.

Ralph N. Clough, A. Doak Barnett, Morton H. Halperin, and Jerome H. Kahan, The United States, China, and Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), p. 9.

Along these same lines, Donald Zagoria, citing Russian fears of the "yellow peril" and the intensity of Chinese nationalism, observed that: "The huge cultural and psychological gap between China and Russia made it impossible for the two countries to achieve any real degree of intimacy" during the previous period of Sino-Soviet alliance that broke down into the present dispute. (Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement," p. 126).

There is also a consensus among Western observers that a revival of the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s is not likely to occur. Allen S. Whiting, for example, has written:

> The Sino-Soviet alliance cannot be revived. Too much blood has been spilled, both figuratively and literally, for either side to rely on the other for national security. As for a division of the world into spheres of interest, this proved impossible even during the 1950s, when the alliance was in force. No such agreement on who will prevail where is conceivable now that Moscow has acquired clients in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 105. For similar views of the improbability of a renewed Sino-Soviet alliance, see Levine, "The Soviet Factor in Sino-American Relations," p. 254, and Barnett in House Committee on International Relations, p. 5.

[188]Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," p. 68.

[189]Gerald Segal has postulated that "Once a more reasonable defense is provided against possible pressure from Moscow, Beijing may well feel able to negotiate from strength and equalty with the USSR, and Sino-Soviet detente may become more likely." (Segal, p. 508.) Kenneth Lieberthal reached essentially the same conclusion after studying China's policy of alignment with the West:

> Barring any major unforseen setback, it is extraordinarily unlikely that the Chinese will change the anti-Soviet basis of their global foreign policy... In all likelihood, only when Peking feels the vitality of rapid industrial growth combined with infusions of military hardware and technology will the Chinese leaders dare to contemplate pulling away from the policy outlined above and risk offending important U.S. policy interests across the board in the Pacific region.

Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, p. 159.

[190]Robinson, "China's Asia Policy," p. 46.

[191]It appears that China may well have adopted a strategy of standing alone against both superpowers for a few years in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. In 1968 the PRC media began referring to both America and Russia as enemies, and it was not until 1971 that the Soviets clearly stood alone as "enemy number one" and the United States became a candidate for membership in China's 'united front' against Soviet hegemonism.

More than likely, if the Chinese did adopt a 'two main enemies' strategy--it is not clear that they actually did so--it was because they were unable to achieve a consensus within the CCP leadership as to which superpower was the greater threat. In other words, the strategy may have been adopted by default, rather than because it was seen to be superior to the 'united front' doctrine.

There is strong circumstantial evidence, and a few direct indications, that China's relations with the two superpowers was one of the crucial issues in the debate over defense strategy and military policy that is known to have been fought in China during the two-year period leading up to Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in July 1971. A brief review of some of the key events of this period illustrates the possibility of the linkage:

20 Feb 1970 PRC accepts US proposal for high-level meetings presented the previous month at Warsaw.

1970	Throughout the remainder of the year there appear in the PRC media reports and criticism of continuing factional conflict within the CCP over economic and military policy, and over "revisionist" lines.
30 May 1970	PRC accepts formal US proposal for Kissinger to visit Beijing.
3 Jun 1971	Last public appearance of Lin Biao, the PRC Defense Minister and officially-designated heir to Mao Zedong as party chairman.
1 Jul 1971	Editorials on CCP anniversary carry numerous indications of serious factional strife and attack unnamed persons with "treasonable foreign associations" (possibly Zhou Enlai's communications with Washington, which Mao approved, but more than likely Lin Biao's links with Moscow, as alleged later).
9 Jul 1971	Secret Kissinger visit to Beijing (two days).
1 Aug 1971	Army Day editorials emphasize policies opposed to Lin Biao's line, indicating he is no longer directing PLA.
12 Sep 1971	Lin Biao dies in plane crash in Outer Mongolia, supposedly while fleeing to Moscow.

In White House Years Kissinger makes an interesting comment on the fall of Lin Biao: "The upheaval was in all likelihood induced by the sharp new turn in China's policy toward us: so Mao told Nixon in February 1972." (Kissinger, p. 768.) He adds to this observation later, in describing President Nixon's first meeting with Chairman Mao:

> Mao used the context of a generally teasing conversation about Nixon's political prospects to mention his own political opposition. There was a "reactionary group which is opposed to our contact with you," he said. "The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad." The plane crashed in Outer Mongolia, Mao and Chou explained, in case we had missed the reference to Lin Piao.
>
> Kissinger, p. 1061.

[192]Committee on International Relations, p. 5.

[193]Essentially the same point has been made by Robert Pfaltzgraff and Michel Obksenberg. Pfaltzgraff concluded that:

> Under such circumstances, the priorities of the United States lie more in the strengthening of its own capabilities for national security than in the development of China as a surrogate for American power--an alternative that lies beyond the capacity of China, as its leaders have reminded their American counterparts.

Pfaltzgraff, p. 48. Along the same lines, Oksenberg observed:

> The Chinese are unlikely to be able to contribute more than they already do to the maintenance of a global balance of power, though it is important that they sustain their role. At best, therefore, we should consider Chinese military capability a supplement to, and not a substitute for, the American military presence in the Western Pacific. The burden of maintaining stability in Northeast Asia cannot be lifted from our shoulders.

Oksenberg, p. 316.

[194]Alexander Haig, "A New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy," Current Policy, no. 275 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, April 24, 1981), p. 2.

[195]A few choice quotations, all of which were made in the context of Soviet actions perceived as threatening vital Western interests (not just for general 'anti-communist' motives), will illustrate that the policy transcends party lines in American politics and, even more importantly, could not be cast off in the transition from the 'cold war' to the era of 'detente':

President Harry Truman, March 12, 1947 (the 'Truman Doctrine'): "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 5, 1957 (the 'Eisenhower Doctrine'): "Now, under all the circumstances I have laid before you, a greater responsibility now devolves upon the United States. We have shown, this country has shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purpose and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate."

President John F. Kennedy gave the principle its most stirring and far-reaching expression: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay

any price, bear any burden, meet any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty." (Quoted, of course, from Kennedy's inaugural address, January 20, 1961.)

Even Jimmy Carter, the president who has thus far been the most emphatic in his desire to reorient American foreign policy away from its focus on the East-West rivalry, was forced to concede that the Soviets must be "persuaded" to abandon their expansionist policies and that the United States must play a central role in this effort:

> Now, I believe in detente with the Soviet Union. To me, it means progress toward peace. But the effects of detente should not be limited to our own two countries alone. We hope to persuade the Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another, either through direct military intervention or through the use of a client state's military force, as was the case with Cuban intervention in Angola. (May 22, 1977.)
>
> Ever since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been the leader in moving our world closer to stable peace and genuine security. We have the world's strongest economy; we have the world's strongest military forces; and we share burdens of mutual defense with friends abroad whose security and prosperity are as vital to us as to themselves. (February 20, 1979.)
>
> Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." (The 'Carter Doctrine,' quoted from his state of the union address on January 23, 1980, barely one month after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.)

The evolution in President Carter's policy toward the Soviet Union--from persuasion in the context of detente, to recognition of the importance of American power, and finally to the clear invocation of that power against the threat of Soviet expansionism--is not surprising. He was dealing with the same Soviet Union with which his predecessors quoted above had to deal, changes in Soviet leadership and the emergence of detente notwithstanding. Thus, the "new direction" in American foreign policy outlined by Secretary of State Haig is to a large degree a firm reaffirmation of

the same policy, first announced by President Truman, that has been followed--with more or less vigor--by every administration for the past 34 years.

Sources for the statements quoted above are as follows:

"Text of President Truman's Speech on New Foreign Policy," New York Times, March 13, 1947, p. 2.

"Text of the Address by Eisenhower to Congress Outlining New Program for Mideast," New York Times, January 6, 1957, p. 34.

"Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 1.

"Humane Purposes in Foreign Policy," Department of State News Release, May 22, 1977, p. 3. (Text of President Carter's speech at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, on that date.)

"America's Role in a Turbulent World," Current Policy, no. 57 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, March 1979), p. 1.

"Transcript of President's State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress," New York Times, January 24, 1980, p. A12.

[196]Ross Terrill, "China Enters the 1980s," Foreign Affairs, v. 58, n. 4 (Spring 1980), p. 935.

[197]Stoessel, p. 2.

[198]A January 1981 Beijing Review article reviewing international affairs over the previous year identified the following as targets of Soviet 'social-imperialism': the oil producing regions of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, warm water ports for the Soviet navy, ASEAN, the Strait of Malacca, the oil supply routes to the West and Japan, Iran, Baluchistan, Pakistan, Thailand, and, of course, Western Europe. (Chen Si, p. 11.)

The PRC press is sensitive to Western perceptions of Soviet strategy and picks up on themes current in the Western media. In 1981, for example, Beijing Review published a commentary on the crucial issue of resource dependency:

> Brezhnev has declared that the Soviet goal is to control the two treasuries which the West relies on: the oil-rich Persian Gulf and mineral-rich

central and southern Africa. Moscow's strategy is to seize control of the strategic resources and passages leading to Europe. Once the Soviet strategy succeeds, the West will be in a dangerous position.

"The Battle for Resources," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 18 (May 4, 1981), p. 15.

This is not meant to imply that China's leaders do not share those perceptions as a result of their own analysis of Soviet behavior. Quite to the contrary, Chinese awareness of Western security concerns implies a willingness to take a stand supportive of Western interests even when China's own security interests are not directly threatened. We in the West must not, however, misjudge the source of Chinese willingness to support, at least in its propaganda, Western security interests. China is motivated not out of friendship for or loyalty to the West, but out of enlightened self-interest.

Indeed, it is not really accurate to suggest that China supports Western security interests. China's position is one of opposition to the Soviet threat to those interests. In the absence of a perceived Soviet threat--from China's, not the West's, point of view--Western security interests are of no interest to China except to the extent that they might impinge upon China's own interests.

[199]"Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," p. 16.

[200]Jiang, p. 19. It should be noted that it has been accusations such as this one that led to the Soviet counter-attack, declaring China's actions to be "detrimental to the cause of national liberation" and warning that Beijing would "undermine the unity of the three most important forces of our time--socialism, the international communist and workers movement, and the revolutionary national liberation movement." (Semyonov, p. 29.) The Soviet Union remains highly sensitive to challenges from China to the self-appointed Soviet position as leader of the socialist camp and the national liberation movement.

[201]"Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination," p. 16.

[202]"Moscow's 'Dumb-Bell' Strategy," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 8 (February 25, 1980), p. 9.

[203]Jiang, p. 20. Attempts by China to reassure the West that the Chinese share Western concerns for the Soviet

threat have, however, resulted in statements that contradict this analysis of Soviet strategy:

> China is not afraid of being encircled by the Soviet Union. Our analysis of Soviet moves in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean is based on an overall global strategy rather than China's own interests.
>
> Guo Ji, p. 3.

Once again, on another occasion, the same contradiction on Soviet goals--in this case concerning Soviet motives in Afghanistan and Vietnam:

> The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea with Soviet backing are two major problems affecting the whole world. They are not 'local' problems concerning only the security of Asia. They are global problems, for the Soviet Union's southward thrust is a major step in its drive to attain global hegemony.

Chen Si, p. 11. Only by viewing the Soviet encirclement of China as part of the Soviet plan for global hegemony, as these statements imply, is the apparent contradiction in the Chinese perception of Soviet strategy resolved. While this assumption may appear to resolve the contraction, it seriously misinterprets the nature of Chinese fears of the Soviet threat.

China's leaders are evidently faced with a dilemma when presenting their case against the Soviets to the world. On the one hand, China is deeply concerned with the Soviet threat to its security and with the Soviet attempt to contain and isolate China. If the Chinese counter to those threats--the 'united front against Soviet hegemonism'--is to succeed, the West, and the Third World as well, must believe that China is indeed threatened by the Soviets (and not vice versa, as the Russians contend).

On the other hand, the Chinese fear that should the West perceive Soviet actions as being overwhelmingly directed against China, Western leaders may be tempted to avoid a strategic alignment with China so that the full brunt of the Soviet expansionist drive would be borne by China alone. The West would then be in the position of "watching two tigers fight." China must, therefore, attempt to deter the West from succumbing to that temptation by convincing its united front partners that Soviet ambitions are global, that Soviet aggression anywhere threatens all equally, and that, while the isolation and emasculation of China may be the Russians' immediate objective, this is but one step in the Soviet plan

for the conquest of their ultimate objectives--Western Europe and inevitably thereafter the world.

Hence, the apparent contradictions that are occasionally seen in China's assessments of Soviet strategy are but two aspects of the same underlying concern for the Soviet threat to China and of the 'united front' strategy for countering that threat.

[204]Jiang, p. 22.

[205]Whiting observed:

> In addition, it is questionable how much Beijing can or will contribute to halting Soviet expansionism beyond the present diversion of Soviet forces around China's periphery. These forces are not likely to increase significantly, given the rate and type of military modernization that can be anticipated in the PLA over the next decade.

Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 112.

[206]In 1976, between the deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, less than a week after Deng Xiaoping was purged (by the same group of radicals who had purged him in the Cultural Revolution), and just after Hua Guofeng was finally named Premier (he had been acting premier for two months), Joseph Kraft observed:

> But while sentiments seem to remain constant, for the time being, China is plunged into domestic turmoil. The present crisis has clearly involved all the institutions and leaders who count in China. The central committee of the Communist Party has been, by Peking's own admission, divided, Mao himself, his wife and her allies on the left as well as Teng and his allies among the moderates have all been playing hard ball.
>
> So the Chinese can no longer be expected either to weigh in so heavily in direct pressure on Moscow, or to play so large a part in balancing Russia's influence in the rest of the World. Indeed, it has been clear for weeks that the Chinese have recently been pulling in their horns in countries such as Cambodia, Angola, Tanzania and Cuba where they used to contest Russian pressure.
>
> If the Soviet Union is to be contained, accordingly, the U.S. and its allies will have to undertake a more active policy than has recently

come easily. Washington, in particular, ought to be developing much better relations with one set of countries treated until recently as stepchildren. Those are the underdeveloped countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa where Russia seems now to be concentrating its efforts.

Kraft, "China's Future Role on the World Stage," p. 19.

[207]Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, pp. 16, 44, and 68. The Soviet intervention did indeed result in the consequences some Politburo members are postulated to have foreseen by Valenta:

> The invasion contributed to a deepening of the split with the PRC, as the Chinese leadership exploited the crisis to condemn the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders appear to have believed, correctly or incorrectly, that the intervention was the manifestation of a new Brezhnev doctrine of 'limited sovereignty' seeking to justify Soviet intervention in any socialist country, including China. The intervention convinced the Chinese of the imperialist intentions of the USSR and served as a catalyst in Chinese domestic and foreign affairs. The Soviet-Chinese border incidents of 1969 confirmed these convictions. The Chinese leadership reacted to the intervention by curbing the Cultural Revolution, reinforcing the Sino-Soviet borders, and establishing better relations with the United States as a counterbalance to the perceived Soviet threat.

Ibid., p. 163.

[208]Committee on Government Operations, p. 15.

[209]The Soviets apparently had a low opinion of President Carter's resolve and were reasonably confident that his reaction would not entail too high a cost. Jiri Valenta's assessment of the Soviet view of the U.S. at the time is that: "The United States was distracted in Iran as it had been during the Suez crisis in 1956 when the Soviets invaded Hungary and during escalation of the Vietnam war in 1968 when the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia. United States' vacillation during the Cuban mini crisis in September 1979--when an unacceptable Soviet combat brigade suddenly became acceptable--and its hesitancy and preoccupation with Iran were probably powerful arguments to the Soviet decision makers who favored Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." Vernon Aspaturian believes the Soviet leadership "concluded that his inconsistency,

rather than concealing a sinister cunning, reflected indecisiveness, lack of resolution, and poor judgement. In situation after situation, the President would express moral or political outrage, resort to exaggeration, hyperbole, and overstatement in his choice of words, issue vague but ominous threats, then adjust and accommodate to changing situations. The Soviet leaders discovered that if they held out long enough, the Carter administration would come around." Alexander Dallin noted the same Soviet perception: "a lack of American credibility, in particular the remarkable record of vacillation and contradictory signals from the Carter administration." (Aspaturian, Dallin and Valenta, pp. 13, 27, 60.)

[210]Joseph Schiebel has made this point quite effectively:

> ...the current leadership both in Moscow and in Peking works under this assumption: that a serious deterioration in the relationship between their two nations may lead to a confrontation that will be qualitatively different from the conflicts of the past--a confrontation requiring internal stability and, above all, a secure international position. The basic motivations, however, are not symmetrical. Peking's advantage would lie in avoiding any confrontation; hence its interest in lining up US support and in wanting to identify with what it perceives to be American designs for creating an international environment that would put the Soviet Union on the defensive. Moscow, on the other hand, could stand to lose from a perpetuation of the status quo under which Chinese communist nations consolidate their relations among themselves and with other noncommunist countries. Moscow, then, would appear to be acting less on the basis of a favorable prognosis than from a sense of urgency and a need to take some risks.
>
> Schiebel, p. 83.

[211]Gromyko, p. 127.

[212]Don Oberdorfer and Michael Getler, "Soviet Restraint Set as Condition for Pacts," Washington Post, February 13, 1981, p. 33.

For further information on this Reagan Administration policy, see:
Daniel Southerland, "US Wants Hard Proof of Soviet Goodwill," Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 1981, p. 1.

Walter S. Mossberg, "Weinberger Links Arms Control Talks to Cut in Soviet Forces Around Poland," Wall Street Journal, April 15, 1981, p. 3.

"Interview With Alexander Haig, Secretary of State," U.S. News & World Report, May 18, 1981, p. 29.

For the Soviet reaction to the Reagan Administration's 'linkage' approach, see:

Anthony Austin, "Soviet Aide Criticizes U.S. on Arms Talk 'Linkage'," New York Times, April 23, 1981, p. 11.

Kevin Klose, "Soviet Aide Denounces U.S. Policy," Washington Post, April 23, 1981, p. 1.

[213]Craig R. Whitney reported the moderation in China's demands:

> Soviet calls for negotiations at the governmental level to put relations on a more normal footing have been regular and frequent. But until this spring, the Chinese insisted that the Soviet Union first pull back its military forces from disputed territory.
>
> Diplomats believe that the Chinese dropped this demand in the unpublished note of May 5 to which Mr. Gromyko has now replied. The Chinese reportedly also proposed negotiations on scientific, technological, cultural and trade exchanges, and parallel talks on the border issue.

Craig R. Whitney, "Soviet Asks Chinese to Talks in Moscow," New York Times, June 6, 1979, p. A11.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry statement of January 19, 1980 cancelling the talks shows the linkage approach in China's policy toward Russia: "The invasion of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan threatens world peace and China's security. It creates new obstacles for normalizing relations between the two countries. Under these circumstances, it goes without saying that it is inappropriate to hold these Sino-Soviet talks."

Fox Butterfield, "China Cancels Talks With Soviet on Improving Ties," New York Times, January 20, 1980, p. 11.

[214]"Soviet Detente Fraud Exposed," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 3 (January 14, 1977), p. 32.

[215]Michael Weisskopf, "Peking Calls for Talks With Moscow on Long-Standing Border Dispute," Washington Post, June 18, 1981, p. 1.

[216]For more detailed discussions of the points made in this paragraph, see:

Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Says It is Not Bound by 2 Arms Pacts With Soviet," New York Times, May 20, 1981, p. 11.

--"New Talks With Russians on Arms Are Still Likely, Reagan Aides Say," New York Times, February 2, 1981, p. 1.

James Reston, "Reagan Is Prepared to Hold Arms Talks if Soviet is Sincere," New York Times, February 3, 1981, p. 1.

"Weinberger Says SALT Talks Can Wait 6 Months While U.S. Starts Arms Buildup," Wall Street Journal, January 7, 1981, p. 6.

Judith Miller, "Rostow Predicts Delay in Talks On Arms Limits," New York Times, June 23, 1981, p. 1.

"Arms Control for the 1980s: An American Policy," Current Policy, no. 292 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, July 14, 1981), p. 3.

Henry Trewhitt, "SALT to Stall 9 Months--or More," Baltimore Sun, July 16, 1981, p. 2.

[217]For the Soviet attitude toward resuming the SALT talks, see:

Ned Temko, "Soviets Don't Like Reagan's Tone, But Want the Arms Talks," Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 1981, p. 1.

--"Vance Trip Gives Moscow Opening to Push Arms Talks," Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 1981, p. 4.

Jim Gallagher, "Key Soviet Official Urges Arms Curb," Chicago Tribune, June 23, 1981, p. 2.

Henry S. Bradsher, "Soviet Arms Control View Frustrates U.S. Officials," Washington Star, July 7, 1981, p. 7.

[218]Newhouse, p. 220.

[219]In describing the course of the SALT negotiations during 1969, Newhouse observes:

> Over the summer and into early autumn, Moscow and Washington played rhetorical badminton with SALT, but not until the Russians could establish a parallel negotiation with China on the border issue could they sit down with the Americans. Soviet leaders had to show that they were no less concerned with the stability of the Communist bloc than with stable US-USSR relations. Not until they had opened communications with Peking could they adequately defend themselves against charges of selling out to Washington to solemnize a contemptible great-power nuclear monopoly. Not just the Communist bloc but the third world was looking on.

Ibid., p. 165.

[220]For Kissinger's description of the geopolitical considerations involved in the opening to Beijing, see Kissinger, pp. 763-764 (similar views of his can be found in note 38 herein).

[221]Jeremy J. Stone, "Arms Control: Can China be Ignored?" In: Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, ed. Morton H. Halperin (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967), p. 91.

Granted that the particular issue of which Stone writes--active defenses--was subsequently forestalled, though not resolved, by the 1972 ABM treaty, Stone nonetheless identified a phenomenon that has indeed come to pass. Although his thesis cannot be proven conclusively without access to Politburo deliberations, there is substantial circumstantial evidence to support Stone's view: the Soviets do take the Chinese nuclear threat seriously (see note 105, page 70, and pages 93-94), there has been a rapid and sustained expansion and modernization of Soviet strategic and theater nuclear forces (far beyond what would be needed to deter only the U.S.), and over the past few years the United States has, for the most part, responded to this Soviet build-up as if its full weight were directed against the U.S.

[222]Hsieh, pp. 150-170.

J. Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Generals' View of China in the 1960's," In: Sino-Soviet Military Relations, ed. Raymond L. Garthoff (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 183-192.

A brief chronology of the arms control and military policy-related events that occurred during the critical 1957-1964 period will help to illustrate that such issues were deeply involved in, if not central to, the Sino-Soviet split:

15 Oct 1957	USSR and PRC sign 'Agreement on New Technology for National Defense' in which the Soviets pledged to aid China develop atomic weapons.
13 Jun 1958	PRC starts up its first nuclear reactor.
20 Jun 1959	USSR unilaterally abrogates 1957 agreement, halts atomic weapon assistance.
15 Sep 1959	Khrushchev visits U.S. for summit with Eisenhower, proclaiming doctrine of 'peaceful coexistence,' PRC condemns both.
21 Jan 1960	PRC warns that it will not be bound by any disarmament agreement it did not take part in negotiating.

Aug 1960 USSR withdraws technicians from PRC as ideological attacks in press intensify

31 Jul 1963 PRC denounces negotiations on limited test ban treaty.

5 Aug 1963 USSR, U.S., and U.K. sign Limited Test Ban Treaty.

16 Oct 1964 PRC detonates its first atomic weapon.

These incidents occurred in the context of two crises in the Taiwan Strait (1958, 1962), Sino-Indian border disputes (1959 and 1962, the latter resulting in a Chinese attack on India), and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), all of which fueled the growing tensions between Russia and China as the Soviets repeatedly acted with caution when faced with American determination to resist belligerent moves by either the USSR or the PRC.

[223]Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament Policy," In: Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, ed. Morton H. Halperin (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1967), p. 109.

[224]Ibid., p. 106.

[225]Newhouse, p. 189.

[226]Kissinger, pp. 686, 689, 699.

[227]Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979), pp. 15, 204, 248.

[228]David K. Shipler, "Soviet Warns That Policy of U.S. Is 'Fraught With Dangers' to Peace," New York Times, June 18, 1978, p. 1.

[229]V.P. Lukin, "Washington-Beijing: 'Quasi-Allies'?" SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologia, no. 12 (December 1979), pp. 50-55. Translated In: Soviet Press: Selected Translations, no. 80-5 (May 1980), p. 151.

[230]For example:

> Chinese official representatives are constantly attacking the efforts of other countries that strive to halt the arms race, strengthen detente and reduce the military confrontation between the two systems.

Semyonov, p. 32.

> As one way to gain world domination Peking is whipping on the arms race and building up its war, primarily nuclear, potential. It has not signed a single agreement to limit its nuclear arms stockpiles. China goes on with nuclear testing in the atmosphere in defiance of strong protests from other countries and refuses to recognize the treaty of nuclear non-proliferation. Pretending to protect the right to develop nuclear arms for self-defence needs, it opposes the treaty on the principles of states' activity in outer space and the treaty that prohibits nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction being placed on sea-bed and ocean floor. Self-evident in this respect is Peking's refusal to support the proposal on the non-use of force and a ban on the use of nuclear arms. The negative attitude of the Chinese leadership to these issues and opposition to the latest Soviet initiatives only bear out that they aim to turn China into a major aggressive military power as is required by their world hegemony ambitions.
>
> "Peking's Foreign Policy," p. 46.

[231]Stone, p. 93.

[232]Newhouse, pp. 81, 84.

[233]Kissinger, p. 705.

[234]Garner, p. 1225. This article also discusses the changes in the international political and strategic environment which are increasing the importance of China in American arms control policy.

[235]Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 165.

[236]Stone, p. 91.

[237]Michael Pillsbury noted China's concern for American reliability in the context of SALT:

> Any apparently unreciprocated American concessions in SALT can only heighten Peking's anxiety and undermine its confidence in the long-range

utility of tilting toward the United States and frontally opposing the Soviet quest for global hegemony.

Michael Pillsbury, SALT on the Dragon: Chinese Views of the Soviet-American Strategic Balance (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corp., April 1975), p. 73.

William Garner pointed out the fear that SALT could lead to a greater Soviet threat to China: "Chinese strategists have likewise revealed their suspicion that Western 'appeasement' of Soviet arms expansion in these negotiations is designed to deflect Soviet military expansion eastward into a war with China." (Garner, p. 1227; these Chinese concerns were also described in note 203 herein.) China's worries have not been unfounded: the Soviet Union has indeed proposed superpower military cooperation against China in the course of the SALT negotiations (see page 165).

[238]For the Chinese view that SALT cannot halt the superpower arms race, see:

"Soviet-U.S. Moscow Talks: Scheming Against Each Other," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 15 (April 8, 1977), p. 29.

"What Does the Failure of Moscow Talks Signify?" Peking Review, v. 20, n. 16 (April 15, 1977), p. 21.

"New SALT Agreement: A Fraud," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 45 (November 4, 1977), p. 46.

Chang Hua, "Soviet-US Nuclear Talks: An Analysis," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 51 (December 16, 1977), p. 22.

For the Chinese view that the Soviet Union is using SALT to achieve strategic superiority over the United States, see:

"Soviet Social-Imperialism--Most Dangerous Source of World War," p. 8.

Chang Hua, p. 21.

"Pacific Ocean: Soviet Missile Tests," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 14 (April 1, 1977), p. 32.

"'Detente' Smokescreen: Moscow Steps Up War Preparations," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 11 (March 11, 1977), p. 28.

[239]According to Pillsbury the "peculiar historical sensitivity of the Chinese to a potential Soviet-American conspiracy against China" was exacerbated by the creation of the Standing Consultative Commission:

> From Pekings' perspective, it would be difficult to imagine a more alarming type of potential Soviet-American 'collusion' than what appears to be institutionalized secret intelligence consultations between military officers of the two superpowers in the SCC.

Pillsbury, SALT on the Dragon, pp. 72-73.

[240]Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 480.

[241]Oksenberg, p. 312.

[242]Garner, p. 1238.

[243]Thomas W. Wolfe perceived this point clearly in his 1979 study of SALT:

> One might also observe that the introduction of triangular politics could have sensitized both sides in SALT to China's potential as a future balance between the two superpowers. The effect of this, in turn, could have been to persuade both the USSR and the United States that the eventual outcome of SALT should not result in paring the superpowers down to such an extent that China would automatically gain a great deal of ground on both of them.
>
> Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 297.

[244]Sonnenfeldt, p. 111.

[245]Garner, p. 1240.

[246]It should be noted, as Wolfe has pointed out, that the 'China factor' is not the only reason for Soviet resistance to deep cuts in force levels:

> On the Soviet side, resistance to substantial reductions, as in the reaction to the Carter March 1977 proposals, would probably be fed not only by Soviet military conservatism and the China factor, but also by the fact that the Soviet Union's international power and prestige rest largely on its massive military machine.
>
> Wolfe, The SALT Experience, p. 259.

[247]Clough, et al., The United States, China and Arms Control, p. 68.

[248]"NPC Standing Committee Support Soviet Disarmament Appeal," Summary of the China Mainland Press, no. 2185, January 27, 1960, p. 4.

[249]For the original proposal on the "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons," see:

"U.S. Nuclear Fraud Exposed," Renmin Ribao, July 19, 1963, In: Peking Review, v. 6, n. 30 (July 26, 1963), p. 48.

"Statement of the Chinese Government Advocating the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons," Peking Review, v. 6, n. 31 (August 2, 1963), p. 8.

Reading the proposals in the context of the political commentary which invariably accompanies them reveals their propaganda purposes. This led Halperin and Perkins to conclude in 1965 that:

> Similar to the Soviet position in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Chinese approach to disarmament and arms control is primarily political. They view the subject not as one which involves enhancing or threatening military security but rather as a means of promoting political objectives directly.

Halperin and Perkins, p. 132. A decade later Ralph Clough, et al., reached the same conclusion:

> To date, China has opposed all U.S.-Soviet sponsored arms control agreements and has attempted to be the spokesman for the non-nuclear powers against the superpowers. At the same time, Peking has put forward sweeping nuclear disarmament proposals, which, by U.S. standards and in light of the history of actual arms control progress, appear to be unrealistic and propagandistic. Unless China adopts an approach to arms control that emphasizes the negotiation of limited measures designed to improve the stability of the strategic balance, little progress in negotiations is likely to be made.

Clough, et al., The United States, China and Arms Control, p. 71. In his 1977 speech at the United Nations, Chen Chu would declare "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons" to be the "fundamental issue" of disarmament, while disparaging such "glib" efforts as nuclear test bans and non-proliferation (Chen Chu, p. 23).

[250]In February 1980 the Soviet journal International Affairs attacked the latest Chinese maneuver in the disarmament propaganda battle:

As for China, its representatives are invariably among those who fiercely oppose these proposals and try hard to discredit them. Moreover, at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978, the Chinese delegation submitted a so-called 'working document' the meaning and purpose of which was to cancel out the results already achieved in this field over a number of years.

This 'working document' again outlined China's extremely negative attitude to the possibility of disarmament and proposed the unilateral disarmament of the so-called 'super-powers,' first of all the Soviet Union, as 'the underlying principle in the question of disarmament.'

Kapchenko, p. 68. As was mentioned in the previous note, Chen Chu could not, of course, pass up the opportunity to lambast the Soviets from the pulpit of the U.N.:

The Soviet 'draft resolution on the prevention of the danger of nuclear war' is a masterpiece of the naked policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail by this superpower. It is also a manoeuvre to divert the attention of the world people from the unprecedented Soviet expansion of conventional arms.

Chen Chu, p. 23.

[251]Halperin and Perkins, pp. 165-166.

[252]Clough, Island China, p. 87.
Clough, et al., The United States, China and Arms Control, p. 236.
Garner, p. 1239.
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 100.

[253]Serge Schmemann, "Gromyko Presses U.S. on Starting Arms Control Talks," New York Times, June 16, 1981, p. 6.
John F. Burns, "Brezhev Says U.S. Is Evading Arms Talks," New York Times, June 24, 1981, p. 3.
"Brezhnev Offers to Halt Missile Deployments--If," Washington Star, June 30, 1981, p. 2.

[254]Gerald F. Seib, "U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Talks Will Start by End of Year, Haig Tells NATO Allies," Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1981, p. 5.
Don Oberdorfer, "U.S., Russia Start Talks on Missiles," Washington Post, May 17, 1981, p. 1.

"U.S. and Soviet Set Meeting on Missiles," New York Times, June 6, 1981, p. 1.
Ned Temko, "US in No Mood to be Lobbied on Arms-Control Talks," Christian Science Monitor, July 6, 1981, p. 4.

[255]Garner, p. 1238.

[256]Background on the prolonged stalemate in the MBFR talks can be found in:
Don Cook, "New Issue Looms in Troop Cut Talks," Los Angeles Times, September 30, 1976, p. 19.
"Europe: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks," Gist (Washington, D.C.: Department of State), October 1978.
"NATO, Warsaw Pact Fail In Troop Reduction Talks," Japan Times (Associated Press report), December 26, 1980, p. 4.

Eagleburger's comment on Reagan Administration policy on MBFR is available In:
"U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia," Current Policy, no. 284 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, June 10, 1981), p. 3.

[257]Garner, pp. 1234-1235.

[258]Ibid., p. 1239.

[259]Shakhanazarov, p. 14. Also see pages 52-53 herein for statements by Gromyko and Brezhnev. Sonnenfeldt, p. 108, noted back in 1967 that it was already clear in the last two years of the Krushchev regime that the Soviets had exempted revolutions and liberation wars from the types of conflicts which the superpowers must avoid.

[260]"U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia," p. 2.

[261]"Soviet Social-Imperialism--Most Dangerous Source of World War," p. 10. Also see:
"Soviet Detente Fraud Exposed," p. 32.
Guo Li, p. 3.
"Shulman's Appeasement Policy," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 47 (November 18, 1977), p. 29.
"A Straight Race Between the Two Superpowers," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 8 (February 18, 1977), p. 24.

[262]Jiang, p. 19.
"Soviet Detente Fraud Exposed," p. 32.

"A Straight Race Between the Two Superpowers," p. 24.
"Soviet Social-Imperialism," p. 9.

[263]Guo Li, p. 4. For a second analysis of the Soviet 'peace offensive' which looks at its arms control aspects, see:

Wang Chongjie, "Parity of Superiority?" Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 17 (April 27, 1981), p. 14.

[264]Leslie H. Brown, p. 16.

[265]Pillsbury, "Strategic Acupuncture," p. 55.

[266]Adam Ulam, in a 1976 analysis of the Soviet view of detente, observed: "The primary cause and purpose of detente (apart, of course, from minimizing the possibility of a nuclear conflict) was for the Kremlin to prevent a too close rapprochement between Washington and Peking."

Adam B. Ulam, "Detente Under Soviet Eyes," Foreign Policy, no. 24 (Fall 1976), p. 154.

John Newhouse had noted a particular manifestation of this in his history of SALT three years earlier: "There is little doubt that Kissinger's first China trip and Nixon's commitment to go himself aroused Brezhnev to hasten the sluggish pace of his detente diplomacy. Few concepts are more detested in Moscow than that of a multipolar world." (Newhouse, p. 235.) Donald Zagoria concurred with both Ulam and Newhouse when he wrote in 1980 that:

> Detente with the United States was supposed not only to limit the strategic arms race and to reduce tensions with the West; it was also supposed to keep China and the United States apart. The idea was that so long as the United States considered relations with the Soviet Union more important than it considered relations with China, this would set severe limits on an American-Chinese rapport.

Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," p. 67.

[267]Two statements from the Soviet press, both made in 1980, will illustrate that the Soviets still accuse the Chinese of attempting to wreck Soviet-American relations:

> In trying to provoke a clash between the USSR and the USA, the Chinese leaders accuse the American Administration of being 'soft' and inactive, of being reluctant to interfere in

> conflicts and the internal affairs of African states and aggravate relations with the USSR, Cuba and the other socialist countries.
>
> Semyonov, p. 35.
>
> The Chinese leadership has its own logic and its own objectives. They regard stepping up of tensions between Moscow and Washington as an important factor which expands room for China's maneuvers in the world arena. But meanwhile--meanwhile, obviously--Beijing is not opposed to squeezing everything possible out of its friends and patrons in terms of credits, sophisticated technology, and, if it can be done, armaments, too.
>
> Bobin, p. 78.

Such statements serve two purposes. First, they are part of the effort to force the 'detente or China' choice on U.S. leaders. Second, they lay the groundwork for using Chinese behavior as a pressure point against the United States. When the time comes that the Soviet leadership might want to use some Chinese action as a pretext for raising tensions with the United States in an effort to force a concession on an issue unrelated to the incident at hand, the position of the Soviets would be stronger if they could say: "See, we told you it would come to this--but you Americans didn't heed our friendly warnings. Now you've allowed your Chinese allies to cause a crisis and you've no one to blame but yourselves."

[268] "Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance with Imperialism," p. 50.

[269] For example:

> The Chinese leaders' approach to the cardinal problems of war and peace does not leave any doubt that, in order to establish their domination over the world, they are purposely leading matters toward the provocation of an all-out conflict--obviously, a Soviet-American one first of all--which would result in the death of hundreds of millions of people of many countries.
>
> Oleg Bykov, "The Main Problem of All Mankind," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye ostnosheniya, no. 3 (March 1980), pp. 3-16. Translation In: Soviet Press: Selected Translations, no. 80-11 (November 1980), p. 393.
>
> And we cannot fail to be put on the alert by the actions of those forces who whip up the arms race

and do not rule out war as a means of settling disputes. Among those forces is Peking, which is trying to rearm, with the help of the West, so as to attain its goals by force. One is astounded by the nearsightedness of those in the West who are impressed by the anti-Sovietism of Peking and would not mind selling arms to it as an ally in the struggle against the Soviet Union--and this under conditions in which the Chinese leaders do not exclude nuclear war from their plans.

Karl Deutsch and Vladimir Lomeiko, "To Prevent Nuclear Apocalypse: A Dialogue," Soviet Review, v. 21, n. 3 (Fall 1980), p. 36. (Quoting Lomeiko, world affairs commentator for the Literaturnaia gazeta.)

Thus, the United States is invited to enter into an anti-Soviet alliance with Beijing so as to prepare the ground for its own elimination and for the creation of a 'world community' under the sole hegemony of the Chinese chauvinists.

Lukin, p. 151.

[270] According to Steve Chan:

Chinese conflict behavior tends to be characterized by graduated and intermittent escalation. Periods of conflict abatement provide an opportunity for both sides to re-evaluate the situation....

Peking tends to employ a variety of detente measures for controlling the momentum of a conflict. These measures...are usually applied immediately after each series of military operations. They provide escape hatches for both China and its adversary to avoid 'locked-in' confrontations.

Chan, p. 408. Edward Ross (Ross, p. 13) applied Chan's model to the events leading up to the February 1979 attack by China on Vietnam and discovered that Chinese behavior in that conflict conformed to the historical pattern. The 1979 Vietnam incident is important for American policy-makers in that it was the first such conflict in which China was aligned with the West against the Soviet Union.

Stoessinger, p. 27, and Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement," p. 126, have also concluded that China is not likely to provoke a war with the Soviet Union.

[271]"Development Assistance for the Third World," Current Policy, no. 267 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, March 19, 1981), p. 2.

[272]Haig, p. 1.

[273]Ibid., p. 3.

[274]Louis Wiznitzer, "Reagan Stalls Rich-poor Talks on Trade, Aid, Resources, Fuel," Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 1981, p. 1.

Don Oberdorfer, "Sea Law Treaty Being Blocked at White House," Washington Post, March 4, 1981, p. 1.

Harry B. Ellis, "Reagan Firm: No Summit on Poor Nations," Christian Science Monitor, August 19, 1981, p. 1.

Gerald F. Seib, "US Blockade of Law of Sea Treaty Will Continue at August Conference," Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1981, p. 7.

[275]Haig, p. 2.

[276]"Approach to Foreign Economic Issues," Current Policy, no. 294 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, July 14, 1981), p. 1.

[277]"Security and Development Assistance," Current Policy, no. 264 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, March 19, 1981), p. 2.

[278]Holbrooke, p. 4.

[279]Stoessel, p. 2.

[280]Michel Oksenberg has observed:

> We also have an interest in Chinese participation in all international organizations and in various multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations. Many of the issues which transcend national boundaries--population control, food supply, energy supply, nuclear proliferation, protection of the environment, arms control, underground nuclear testing, use of the sea--cannot be adequately addressed without constructive Chinese involvement.

Oksenberg, p. 312.

[281]Walter C. Clemens, Jr., The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1968), p. 242.

[282]Kim, p. 474.

[283]Armstrong, pp. 108-113, 237.

[284]Halperin and Perkins, p. 5.

[285]John F. Copper, China's Global Role (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980).

[286]Kim, p. 492.

[287]Robinson, "China's Asia Policy," p. 46.

[288]Kim, p. 500.

[289]T.B. Millar, "The Triumph of Pragmatism: China's Links with the West," International Affairs, v. 55, n. 2 (April 1979), p. 205.

[290]Kim, p. 498.

[291]"Fantastic Statement About Arms Race," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 30 (July 22, 1977), p. 24.

For China's attitude toward the Soviet-American talks, see:

Kan Chun, "New Skullduggery by Super-Merchants of Death," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 40 (September 30, 1977), p. 22.

[292]Dan Lin, "Booming Arms Traffic," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 10 (March 9, 1981), p. 15.

[293]Halperin, p. 240.

[294]The importance of exchanges with the West in the modernization of China's science and technology has formally been recognized in China's development plans and in statements by Chinese leaders. In Article 12 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China adopted on March 5, 1978, it is stated that "In scientific and technical work we must follow the practice of...combining learning from others with our

own creative efforts." This policy was made explicit in the Outline Plan for the Development of Science and Technology presented by Vice Premier Fang Yi to a National Science Conference held in March 1978. The fifth of ten measures called for in the Outline Plan was to "Learn advanced science and technology from other countries and increase international academic exchanges." In his opening remarks at that National Science Conference, Deng Xiaoping stated: "We must actively develop international exchanges and step up our friendly contacts with scientific circles of other countries." While none of these policy statements specifically limit China to exchanges with the West, it is clear from the trend in the implementation of this policy that the West, and not the Soviet Union, will be the primary source of the knowledge and skills the Chinese seek. As of 1980, China had almost 5,000 scholars and students studying at over 160 schools in the United States alone, and was sending more than 100 delegations a month to visit the United States.

Sources for statements and data presented above are as follows:

"The Constitution of the People's Republic of China," Peking Review, v. 21, n. 11 (March 17, 1978), p. 8.

Fang Yi, "Outline Plan for the Development of Science and Technology, Relevant Policies and Measures," Peking Review, v. 21, n. 14 (April 7, 1978), p. 13.

Teng Hsiao-ping, "Speech at Opening Ceremony of National Science Conference," Peking Review, v. 21, n. 12 (March 24, 1978), p. 13.

U.S. Department of State, "US-China Relations," Gist, September 1980.

U.S. Department of State, "US-PRC Exchanges," Gist, March 1981.

"China-U.S. Science Exchange Moving Fast," Monterey Peninsula Herald (Associated Press report), November 23, 1980, p. 9A.

[295]Deng Xiaoping, "Report on the Current Situation and Tasks," Foreign Broadcast Information Service--People's Republic of China (FBIS-PRC) Daily Report, March 11, 1980, p. 1.

[296]Terrill, "China Enters the 1980s," p. 926.

[297]Haig, p. 2.

[298]Hua Guofeng, "Report on the Work of the Government," Beijing Review, v. 22, n. 27 (July 6, 1979), p. 11.

[299]Clough, et al., have described this Chinese view as follows:

> On the international scene they perceive numerous contradictions--among the big powers, between the leaders and the people of the big powers, between the big powers and the lesser powers, and between the leaders and the people in many of the lesser powers.
>
> Clough, et al., p. 11.

Zhou Enlai, not unexpectedly, appears to have been the Chinese leader that adapted Mao's "contradictions" concept to the study of international affairs. For examples of Zhou's application of this concept, see:

Chou Enlai, "Report on the Work of the Government," Peking Review, v. 18, n. 4 (January 24, 1975), p. 24.
"Chou En-lai Reports Explained Foreign Policy Decisions," FBIS-PRC Daily Report, February 23, 1977, p. E25.

[300]Evans and Novak, p. 27.

[301]Oksenberg, p. 304.

[302]Clough, Island China, p. 234.

[303]Clough, et al., p. 11.

[304]Leslie H. Brown, p. 9.

[305]Halperin, p. 240.

[306]Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," p. 77.

[307]Solomon

[308]William W. Whison, "Political and Military Dimensions," In: Two Chinese States: U.S. Foreign Policy and Interests, ed. Raymon H. Myers (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 14.

[309]Pauker, p. 254.

[310]Selig S. Harrison, The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 361.

[311]Halperin, p. 238.

[312]For American reasons in keeping the Philippines, see:
D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, Third Edition (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 768.
David J. Steinberg, et al., In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 264.

For the influence of Mahan on the American attitude toward possession of colonies, see:
Margaret T. Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power," In: Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 421-429.

[313]Raymon H. Myers, Two Chinese States: U.S. Foreign Policy and Interests (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 75.

[314]Harrison, The Widening Gulf, p. 361.

[315]Leslie H. Brown, p. 18.

[316]Richard Burt, "U.S. Strategy Focus Shifting From Europe to Pacific," New York Times, May 25, 1980, p. 3.

[317]Stoessel, p. 2.

[318]Walter S. Mossberg, "U.S., in Defense-Strategy Switch, Plans Power to Fight 2 Big Wars Simultaneously," Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1981, p. 12.

[319]Stoessel, p. 2. There are also two other documents which have in the past been cited as the source of certain American security commitments in Asia. The first is the Pacific Charter, signed September 8, 1954 in Manila by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, Thailand, Great Britain, and the United States. It stated political and economic development goals for the region, and affirmed the determination of the signatories to "prevent or countery by appropriate means any attempt in the Treaty Area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity." The Pacific Charter has been cited as the basis for the American commitment to the defense of Pakistan.
The second source occasionally mentioned is the Rusk-Thanat Joint Statement issued by the United States and Thailand on March 6, 1962. This statement reaffirmed the American commitment to Thailand that is derived from the Manila Pact:

> ...the United States regards the preservation of the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United States and to world peace. He expressed the firm intention of the United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in resisting Communist aggression and subversion.
> ...in the event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the treaty.

[320]Frederic A. Moritz, "SE Asia Hopes for Reagan Help Against Vietnam," Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 1981, p. 11.

"U.S. Interests in Southeast Asis," Current Policy no. 295 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, July 1981), pp. 1-3.

[321]Halperin, p. 237.

[322]Solomon, p. 4. Donald Zagoria reached the same conclusion at about the same time:

> America's 'credibility problem' is an important aspect in all of its foreign relations, and in its relations with the countries of East Asia, it is no less a critical problem. If American credibility continues to decline in East Asia as rapidly in this decade as it has declined in the past one, some very serious and far-reaching political problems could present themselves.

Zagoria, "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia," p. 77.

[323]In his April 1981 speech, Secretary Haig emphasized that, along with the building up of American military power, "Another essential element in the restoration of our leadership is the strengthening of our alliances," and that "The reinivigoration of our alliances must be accompanied by the strengthening of our friends as well." (Haig, pp. 2-3.)

[324]For the Chinese perception of the threat to China from Soviet policy in Asia, see p. 149 herein. Also see;
Jiang, p. 20.

For China's attitude toward the American military presence in Asia, see:
Kissinger, p. 705.
Fox Butterfield, "Peking Says Taiwan Can Keep Autonomy Under Reunification," New York Times, January 10, 1979, p. 1.

Shao-chuan Leng, "Chinese Strategy Toward the Asia-Pacific," Orbis, v. 19, n. 3 (Fall 1975), p. 791.

For China's attitude toward Japan's defense forces, see:

Jiang, p. 20.

"Expansion of SDF Favored by Teng," Daily Yomiuri (in English), September 16, 1977, p. 1.

"People's Daily Views Soviet Military Threat to Japan," FBIS-PRC Daily Report, June 30, 1978, p. A3.

Yang Bianyi, "Japan Looks to Its Defence," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 13 (March 31, 1980), p. 10.

[325]Leslie H. Brown, p. 15.

[326]House Committee on International Relations, p. 89.

[327]Solomon, p. 4. Some American observers are opposed to the possibility that commitments to China could take priority over existing alliance commitments. William E. Griffith, for example, has written:

> ...US relations with its economically strong but militarily weak allies, Western Europe and Japan, remain in my view more important, even though US economic competition with them makes their maintenance more difficult.

William E. Griffith, Peking, Moscow and Beyond: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1973), p. 59.

[328]Hua Xiu, p. 11.

[329]Clemens, The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations, p. 243.

[330]In the earlier period (late 1950s and early 1960s) the shift in Chinese foreign policy was motivated by the Sino-Soviet split, in the latter period (late 1960s and early 1970s) the Cultural Revolution was the primary cause. Thus, in these cases it was the search for a means of countering the Soviets and the exploitation of foreign policy as an issue in a domestic political struggle, respectively, that led Western observers to conclude that Chinese foreign policy was motivated by an aggressive and hostile Chinese sense of national purpose.

[331]Hsieh, p. 154.

[332]House Committee on International Relations, p. 23.

[333]Joachim Glaubitz, "Anti-Hegemony Formulas in Chinese Foreign Policy," Asian Survey, v. 16, n. 3 (March 1976), p. 215.

[334]Leslie H. Brown, p. 16.

[335]Thak Chaloemtiarana, "Peking, Southeast Asia, and the Overseas Chinese," Problems of Communism, v. 26, n. 2 (March/April 1977), p. 75.
C.Y. Chang, "Overseas Chinese in China's Policy," China Quarterly, no. 82 (June 1980), p. 281.

[336]"Attention Must Be Paid to Overseas Chinese Affairs," Peking Review, v. 21, n. 3 (January 20, 1978), p. 15.

[337]Zagoria, "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement," p. 124.

[338]Robert Keatly, "Peking's Split-Level Asian Diplomacy," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 29, 1980, p. 10.

[339]Leng, p. 792.

[340]"China's Sovereignty Over East China Sea Continental Shelf," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 20 (May 19, 1980), p. 6.

[341]"China's Indisputible Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 7 (February 18, 1980), p. 15.

Appendix B discusses the offshore oil problem in greater detail. A good current analysis of the South China Sea problem can be found In:
David Jenkins, "Trouble Over Oil and Waters," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 1981, p. 24.

[342]Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," p. 31. Liu, p. 12, and Oksenberg, p. 308, have also concluded that China's ability to project power abroad is severely limited.

[343]For assessments of the Chinese willingness to use military force, see:
Chan, p. 391.
Clough, et al., p. 13.
Halperin, p. 240.

Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," p. 30.

Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 110.

Lucain W. Pye, China: An Introduction (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), p. 333.

[344] Oksenberg, p. 313.

"Chinese Leader, in Japan, Asserts North Korea Won't Exploit Crisis," New York Times, May 28, 1980, p. 6.

Hong Yung Lee, "Korea's Future: Peking's Perspective," Asian Survey, v. 17, n. 11 (November 1977), p. 1088.

Richard L. Sneider, "Prospects for Korean Security," In: Asian Security in the 1980s, ed. Richard H. Solomon (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980), p. 110.

Franklin B. Weinstein and Fuji Kamiya, ed., The Security of Korea: US and Japanese Perspectives on the 1980s (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 197-203.

Donald S. Zagoria, "Korea's Future: Moscow's Perspective," Asian Survey, v. 17, n. 11 (November 1977), pp. 1109-1111.

On China-South Korea trade, see:

Norman Thorpe, "China and South Korea Are Quietly Cultivating Budding Trade Partnership, Warmer Relations," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, February 16, 1981, p. 1.

"Refuting Rumours About Trade With South Korea and South Africa," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 12 (March 23, 1981), p. 9.

[345] On the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Indochina, see:

G.D. Loescher, "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Recent Historical Perspective," Survey, v. 24, n. 2 (Spring 1979), pp. 135, 141.

Gareth Porter, "The Great Power Triangle in Southeast Asia," Current History, v. 79, n. 461 (December 1980), p. 163.

On China's policy toward Kampuchea, see:

John McBeth, "From China with Goodwill," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 8, 1981, p. 13.

Frederick A. Moritz, "Sihanouk Launches Cambodian 'United Front'; US, China Hint at Aid," Christian Science Monitor, May 6, 1981, p. 9.

Idem, "UN Cambodia Parley to Test US-China-ASEAN Harmony," Christian Science Monitor, July 10, 1981, p. 10.

[346] Loescher, pp. 125-141, is a good overview of Sino-Vietnamese relations. On China's relations with ASEAN and Thailand, see:

Barry Kramer, "China Warms Up to Wary Neighbors," Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1981, p. 27.

"Hua Affirms China's Support for Thailand," Japan Times, July 10, 1980, p. 1.
"Chinese Leader's Visit to Bangkok Strengthens Ties," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, February 9, 1981, p. 8.

[347]S. Rajaratnam, "Now Vietnam Fights for a Soviet Indochina," Wall Street Journal, June 1, 1981, p. 29.

[348]G.W. Choudhury, "China's Policy Toward South Asia," Current History, v. 76, n. 446 (April 1979), p. 182.
"The Afghan Troubles," China News Analysis, February 1, 1980, p. 1.
Zhang Gioling, "Moscow Covets Baluchistan," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 10 (March 10, 1980), p. 26.
"Strong Protest Against Indian Government's Support to Tibetan Rebel Bandits," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 33 (August 12, 1977), p. 7.

[349]On Chinese interest in improving relations with India, see:
"India's Defense Chief Tells of Vow by China to Keep Border Calm," New York Times, February 22, 1979, p. A6.
"Delhi and Kabul," China News Analysis, n. 1154, May 11, 1979, p. 5.
"China and India to Improve Relations," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 5 (February 4, 1980), p. 4.
"Xinhua Commentary Expects Sino-Indian Relations to Improve," FBIS-PRC Daily Report, June 25, 1980, p. F1.
"Sino-Indian Relations," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 16 (April 20, 1981), p. 9.
David Bonavia, "More Bricks in China's Wall," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 5, 1981, p. 14.
"Zhao's Tick-tack Tactic," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 12, 1981, p. 21.

On India's interest in improving relations with China, see:
David R. Francis, "Chinese Wave an Olive Branch at India--and India Waves Back," Christian Science Monitor, May 5, 1981, p. 1.
Carol Honsa, "Gandhi Flashes a 'China card'," Christian Science Monitor, July 6, 1981, p. 12.

On the Sino-Indian agreement to open talks on the border issue, see:
Idem, "China, India Agree to Discuss 20-Year-Old Border Dispute," Christian Science Monitor, June 30, 1981, p. 4.

On Chinese and Pakistani interest in an improvement in India-Pakistan relations, see:
"Pakistan Foreign Minister's Visit," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 1 (January 5, 1981), p. 10.

[350]"U.S. Policy Toward China, July 15, 1971-January 15, 1979," Selected Documents, no. 9 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, January 1979), p. 8.

[351]Ibid., p. 45.

[352]DuPre Jones, ed., China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 41.

[353]Stoessel, p. 3.

[354]Ray S. Cline, "Peking Will Press Reagan for Changes," New York Times, January 6, 1981, p. 19.

[355]Mike Chinoy, "ASEAN Concerned that Taiwan Could Yet Come Between US and China," Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 1981, p. 12.

[356]"U.S. 'Taiwan Relations Act'," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 2 (January 12, 1981), p. 9.

On China's attitude toward U.S.-Taiwan ties, see:
"The Taiwan Question," China News Analysis, no. 1202, March 13, 1981, p. 1.
Robert Keatley, "The Chinese Want Reagan to Deemphasize Taiwan," Wall Street Journal, May 26, 1981, p. 22.

On China's attitude toward U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, see:
Takashi Oka, "Facing Soviet Pressure, China, US Draw Closer," Christian Science Monitor, April 6, 1981, p. 1.
Frank Ching, "China Takes Hard Line on US Arms Sales to Taiwan in Advance of Haig's Arrival," Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1981, p. 4.
Michael Weisskopf, "Peking Opposes U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Regime," Washington Post, June 12, 1981, p. 18.

[357]Barry Kramer, "China Says U.S. Had Part in Sale of Dutch Subs," Wall Street Journal, January 19, 1981, p. 22.
"China Tells Dutch It Is Downgrading Diplomatic Links," Wall Street Journal, January 20, 1981, p. 27.
"Safeguard Chinese National Dignity," Renmin Ribao, January 20, 1981, translated In: Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 4 (January 26, 1981), p. 10.

[358]Bernard Gwertzman, "Jets to Taiwan: From Haig's Viewpoint, No Urgency," New York Times, June 22, 1981, p. 2.
Michael Getler, "Taiwan Seeks F16s, Raising Issue of Policy," Washington Post, March 9, 1981, p. 1.

[359]"U.S. 'Taiwan Relations Act'," p. 9.

[360]Rodney Tasker, "The Message of Success," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 22, 1981, p. 32.
"Interview/Chiang Ching-kuo: Learning How to Survive a Political Shockwave," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 22, 1981, p. 47.

[361]Butterfield, "Peking Says Taiwan Can Keep Autonomy Under Unification," p. 1.
Leo Liu, p. 39.

[362]Deng, p. 1.

[363]"The Taiwan Question," p. 6.
Tasker, "The Message of Success, p. 34.

[364]Kissinger, pp. 173, 178.
Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s, pp. 151-152.
Paul Hoffman, "Taiwan and Russia Said to Hold Talks," New York Times, April 1, 1978, p. 4.
Rodney Tasker, "Trade Overcomes Diplomatic Isolation," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 22, 1981, p. 37.
Takashi Oka, "Taiwan's Hard Line on Peking: 'No Talk with Chinese Communist Regime'," Christian Science Monitor, February 24, 1981, p. 8.

[365]Stuart E. Johnson, The Military Equation in Northeast Asia (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979), pp. 66-70.

[366]Clough, Island China, p. 237.

[367]"The Taiwan Question," p. 3.
"China Official Suggests U.S. Arrange Taiwan Talks," Japan Times, October 5, 1980, p. 4.

[368]Edward Schumaker, "Taiwan Seen Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel," Washington Post, August 29, 1976, p. 1.
Melinda Liu, "Taiwan Develops Nuclear Industry, Weapons Capacity," Washington Post, February 27, 1977, p. A21.
Ernest W. Lefever, Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979), pp. 87-88, 91-92, 96-99.

[369]"Letter to Taiwan Compatriots," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 8 (February 25, 1980), p. 4.

James P. Sterba, "Taiwan Cautiously Increasing Mainland Contacts," New York Times, July 31, 1980, p. 3.

[370]Appendix B discusses offshore oil. Also see:
Daniel, pp. 795-796.
Jenkins, pp. 24-33.
Charles N. Dragonette, "The Dragon at Sea--China's Maritime Enterprise," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings v. 107, n. 5 (May 1981), p. 78.
John R. Dewenter, "The East China and Yellow Seas," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 101, n. 5 (May 1975), p. 188.

[371]Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," p. 24.

[372]Ibid., p. 30. Also see:
"Chinese Seen Expanding Naval Role," Japan Times, November 22, 1980, p. 4.
Norman Kempster, "Brown Finds Chinese Navy Ship-Shape," Los Angeles Times, January 13, 1980, p. 16.
Richard R. Pariseau, "The Role of the Submarine in Chinese Naval Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings v. 105, n. 10 (October 1979), p. 66.
Hideo Sekino and Sadao Seno, "Asian Navies," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 107, n. 3 (March 1981), p. 55.
Bruce L. Swanson, "The Navy of the People's Republic of China," In: Guide to Far Eastern Navies, ed. Barry M. Blechman and Robert P. Berman (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978), pp. 94-113.
John F. Tarpey, "A Strategic Analysis of Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 106, n. 5 (May 1980), p. 120.

[373]Jonathan D. Pollack, "China as a Military Power," In: Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan, ed. Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 67-68.

[374]Sekino and Seno, p. 55. Also see:
Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," p. 31.
Clough, et al., p. 13.
William J. Durch, "The Navy of the Republic of China," In: Guide to Far Eastern Navies, ed. Barry M. Blechman and Robert P. Berman (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978), pp. 216-269.

[375]Daniel, p. 793.
Tarpey, p. 120.
"Chinese ICBM Test Photos," International Defense Review, no. 5 (May 1980), p. 654.

[376]Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," p. 31.
"Chinese Seen Expanding Naval Role," p. 4.
"Chinese Navy Plans to Up Presence in S. China Sea," Japan Times, November 28, 1980, p. 5.
Nayan Chanda, "Bickering Begins as Old Friends Fall Out," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 27, 1981, p. 32.

For the Chinese view of the Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea, see:
Jiang, p. 19.
An Ding, "Southeast Asia: Increasing Soviet Menace," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 34 (August 25, 1980), p. 10.

[377]Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," p. 30.

[378]Paul H. Nitze and Leonard Sullivan, Jr., Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), p. 114.

[379]Daniel, p. 795.
Tarpey, p. 121.

[380]Daniel, p. 796.
Tarpey, p. 121.

[381]Nitze and Sullivan, p. 114.

[382]Stoessel, p. 3.

[383]"U.S. Relations With China," Current Policy, no. 297 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, July 16, 1981), p. 1.

[384]Oksenberg, p. 315. Lucian Pye has made essentially the same point:

> Unless great care is taken not to make the Chinese believe that we are using them to our geopolitical advantage, and hence that we owe them incalculable obligations, the stage will be set for an almost certain Chinese disillusionment with the United States.

Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," p. 16.

[385]Angus M. Fraser, "Military Modernization in China," Problems of Communism, v. 28, n. 5-6 (September-December 1979), p. 40.

386On the priority of defense modernization relative to economic development, see:

Pye, "Dilemmas for American in China's Modernization," p. 3.

Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," pp. 24-25.

Don Oberdorfer, "Implications of Sino-U.S. Accord Go Beyond Eventual Arms Sales," Washington Post, June 18, 1981, p. 33.

On the reductions in the military budget, see:

"The Four Modernizations, Part III: The Army," China News Analysis, March 27, 1981, p. 1.

On China's limited financial ability to purchase Western arms, see:

Daniel, p. 802.

Middleton, "Pentagon Studies Prospects of Military Links with China," p. A2.

Oksenberg, p. 309.

R.D.M. Furlong and Al Biegel, "Chinese Military Links with NATO? An Assessment of the Kremlin's Concerns," International Defense Review, no. 9, September 1979, p. 1467.

Karen Elliot House, "U.S. Arms Sales to China Strengthen Administration's Anti-Soviet Policy," Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1981, p. 30.

On China's desire to acquire Western technology for domestic production, see:

Furlong and Biegel, p. 1468.

Jay Mathews, "Brown Says China Fears Buying Arms Restricts Its Independence," Washington Post, January 11, 1980, p. 20.

George C. Wilson, "U.S. Is Warned Not to Arm China or Taiwan," Washington Post, June 11, 1981, p. 10.

On China's desire for Western assistance in upgrading existing weapons, see:

Furlong and Biegel, p. 1468.

"Chinese and ICBM Test Photos," p. 655.

On China's "self-reliance" policy, see Appendix B. On the related Chinese fear of dependence on the West, see:

Mathews, p. 20.

On China's absorption problems, see:

Leo Liu, p. 12.

Middleton, "Pentagon Studies Prospects of Military Links with China," p. A2.

Oksenberg, p. 309.

Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," p. 5.

Jonathan Pollack, "The Modernization of National Defense," In: China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution, ed. Richard Baum (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 246.

[387]Pillsbury, "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" p. 63, addressed the defense technology issue in 1975. On Carter Administration policy, see:
Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S., in New Rebuff to Soviet, Announces It Will Sell China Military Support Equipment," New York Times, January 25, 1980, p. 1.
Richard C. Holbrooke, "Procedures for Sale of Military Support Items to the P.R.C.," Department of State Bulletin, v. 80, n. 2039 (June 1980), pp. 25-26.
Harold Brown, p. 52.

On Reagan Administration policy, see:
David Bonavia, "Haig Opens Up a Candy Store," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 19, 1981, p. 8.
Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Decides to Sell Weapons to China in Policy Reversal," New York Times, June 16, 1981, p. 1.
"U.S. Relations With China," pp. 2-3.

[388]On the contribution arms sales could make to the defense of China, and the American interest therein, see:
Biegel, "Strategic Implications of Moscow's Concept for Collective Security in Asia," p. 10.
Clough, Island China, p. 2.
Oksenberg, p. 312.
Pillsbury, "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" p. 58.
Ra'anan, p. 837.
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," p. 111.

On the likelihood that arms sales cannot significantly alter the Sino-Soviet military balance, see:
Gayler, p. 64.
Oksenberg, p. 321.
Pfaltzgraff, p. 43.
Scalapino, p. 737.

On the proposal to arm China to threaten the Soviets, and arguments that this is not feasible, see:
Richard Burt, "Study Urges U.S. Aid to Chinese Military," New York Times, October 4, 1979, p. 1.
Biegel, "Strategic Implications," p. 10.
Middleton, "Pentagon Studies Prospects," p. A2.
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," pp. 100, 107.

[389]Ross Terrill, "US Treads Fine Line on Weapons," Boston Globe, July 5, 1981, p. 69.

On the political and symbolic significance of arms sales, see:
"U.S. Relations With China," p. 3.
House, p. 30.
Charles W. Corddry, "Reagan Links Arms Sales to Aiding China Ties," Baltimore Sun, June 17, 1981, p. 2.
Don Oberdorfer, "Implications of Sino-U.S. Accord," p. 33.

On the question of gaining influence through arms sales, see:
Leslie H. Brown, p. 26.

[390]Clough, Island China, p. 236.
Solomon, p. 26.

[391]Wilson, "Weinberger Hints At Arming China," p. 1.

[392]"Vance Assails Policy on China Arms Sales," New York Times, June 24, 1981, p. 1.

[393]Terrill, "US Treads Fine Line on Weapons," p. 69.

[394]Cline, p. 19.
Daniel, p. 802.

[395]"Vance Assails Policy on China Arms Sales," p. 1.

[396]Kemov and Koslov, p. 56.
Serge Schmemann, "Soviet Says Reagan Confirms "Militaristic Ideology," New York Times, June 18, 1981, p. 11.

[397]This was the title of a March 24, 1980 editorial in the Los Angeles Times.

[398]Terrill, "US Treads Fine Line on Weapons," p. 69.

[399]Daniel, p. 802. Also see:
Leslie H. Brown, p. 26.
Cline, p. 19.
Oksenberg, p. 321.
United Nations Association, p. 52.
Whiting, "China and the Superpowers," pp. 108-110.

[400]House, p. 30.
Oberdorfer, "Implications of Sino-U.S. Accord," p. 33.
Terrill, "US Treads Fine Line on Weapons," p. 69.

Frederic A. Moritz, "Asia Cautions US: Go Slow on Arms Sales to China," Christian Science Monitor, July 31, 1981, p. 4.
Barry Wain, "U.S.-China Arms Deal Vexes ASEAN," Wall Street Journal, June 23, 1981, p. 37.

[401]Schmemann, p. 11, describes the Tass commentary. Also see:
"Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance with Imperialism," pp. 46, 51.
Kapchenko, p. 72.
Semyonov, pp. 32-33.

[402]Pillsbury, "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" p. 61.

[403]Taubman, p. 1.
Murrey Marder, "Monitoring: Not-So-Secret Secret," Washington Post, June 19, 1981.

[404]Soviet military doctrine was described in the chapter on Soviet China policy.

[405]Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 474.

[406]Pollack, "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy," p. 26.

[407]Fraser, p. 42.

[408]Pillsbury, "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" p. 59.

[409]Holbrooke, "China and the U.S.: Into the 1980s," p. 3.
Idem, "Procedures for Sale of Military Support Items," p. 25.

[410]Pye, "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization," p. 14.

[411]Middleton, "Pentagon Studies Prospects of Military Links with China," p. A2.

[412]For the arguments against a military alliance, see:
Daniel, p. 803.
Oksenberg, pp. 312, 319.
Pye, "Dilemmas for America," pp. 13-14.
Edward A. Olsen, "Beware Close US Military Ties with China," Christian Science Monitor, March 18, 1981, p. 23.

[413]Hsieh, pp. 168-169, discusses the problems the Soviets had with their Chinese allies. The best account of the American problems with the Kuomintang is Tuchman's:
Barbard W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York: Macmillan, 1971).

[414]Kenneth R. McGruther, "Two Anchors in the Pacific: A Strategy Proposal for the US Pacific Fleet," U.S. Naval Institue Proceedings, v. 105, n. 5 (May 1979), p. 134.

[415]Daniel, p. 803.

[416]David Halevy, "More Ships Sought for Pacific Fleet," Washington Star, February 21, 1981, p. 4.
Drew Middleton, "Navy's Plight: Too Many Seas to Cover," New York Times, February 1, 1980, p. C1.

[417]Harrison, The Widening Gulf, pp. 301-303, 370.
"Chinese Navy Plans to Up Presence in S. China Sea," p. 5.

[418]Daniel, p. 802.
McGruther, p. 134.

APPENDIX A NOTES

[1]Gromyko, p. 118.

[2]"Soviet Social-Imperialism--Most Dangerous Source of World War," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 29 (July 15, 1977), p. 5.

[3]"Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance with Imperialism," p. 45.

[4]Guo Li, "Detente Offensive," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 17 (April 27, 1981), p. 3.

[5]"Official Soviet Paper Issues Attack on China," Washington Post, February 12, 1981, p. 4.

[6]Jen Ku-ping, "The Munich Tragedy and Contemporary Appeasement," Peking Review, v. 20, n. 50 (December 9, 1977), pp. 6-11.

[7]Kemov and Kozlov, p. 56.

[8]"Secretary Haig: News Conference," Current Policy, no. 258 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State), January 28, 1981, p. 5.

[9]"US Seizes Items on Soviet Airliner," Christian Science Monitor, May 14, 1981, p. 2.

Charles R. Babcock, "Customs Says Cargo Seized From Soviets Not Defense Related," Washington Post, May 15, 1981, p. 35.

[10]Foy D. Kohler, SALT II: How Not to Negotiate with the Russians (Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1979), p. 10.

[11]Committee on Government Operations, p. 13.

[12]Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, p. 10.

[13]Ibid.

APPENDIX B NOTES

[1]Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government," Peking Review, v. 18, n. 4 (January 24, 1975), p. 23.

[2]"The Tasks Before Us--Renmin Ribao 1981 New Years Day Editorial," Beijing Review, v. 24, n. 2 (January 12, 1981), p. 19.

[3]Hua Kuo-feng, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country!" Peking Review, v. 21, n. 10 (March 10, 1978), p. 7.

[4]Shannon R. Brown, "China's Program of Technology Acquisition," In: China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution, ed. Richard Baum (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 162.

[5]As has been stated by Vice Premier Bo Yibo:
John T. Norman, "U.S. Could Become China's Top Trade Partner, Bo Says," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 22, 1980, p. 6.

[6]Ibid. As well as Vice Premier Bo, this has been stated by Premier Zhao Ziyang:
Frank Ching, "Premier Paints Bleak Picture of China's Economic Prospects, Sees Big Deficits," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, January 5, 1981, p. 2.

[7]Gu Ming, Vice Minister in Charge of the State Planning Commision, In:
"Importing Technology: Plans Readjusted, Policy Unchanged," Beijing Review, v. 22, n. 30 (July 27, 1979), p. 9.

[8]Hua Guofeng, "Report on the Work of the Government," Beijing Review, v. 22, n. 27 (July 6, 1979), p. 11.

[9]"The Tasks Before Us," p. 18.

[10]Vice Premier Yao Yilin has prediced a two year extension:
"Yao Says Current Readjustment May be Extended by Two Years," Japan Times, December 6, 1980, p. 4.

Premier Zhao Ziyang had been quoted as saying that at least five more years will be needed (Ching: "Premier Paints Bleak Picture," p. 2).

Xue Muqiao, advisor to the State Planning Commission and director of the Economics Research Institute, has estimated that five to ten years of readjustments are needed:
"China's Changing Attitudes Toward Capitalism," In: U.S. China Trade, supplement to The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, November 24, 1980, p. 5.

[11]Hua, "Report on the Work of the Government," pp. 14-20.

[12]Ibid., p. 11.

[13]Deng Xiaoping, "Report on the Current Situation and Tasks," Foreign Broadcast Information Service--People's Republic of China (FBIS-PRC) Daily Report, March 11, 1980, p. 1.

[14]Paul Balaran, "China: A Competitor for World Markets?" The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 1980, p. 22.

[15]Oksenberg, pp. 314, 312.

[16]Shannon Brown, p. 171.

[17]Ching, "Premier Paints Bleak Picture," p. 2.

[18]Chou En-lai, p. 24.

[19]"Bright Prospects for China's Reforms," Beijing Review, v. 23, n. 51 (December 22, 1980), p. 11.

[20]Raphael Pura, "Japanese Say China Adopts Flexible Policy on Ventures," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, November 3, 1980, p. 2.

[21]Percentages calculated from 1978 and 1979 data In:
"U.S.-China Trade, 1972-1979," The China Business Review, May-June 1980, p. 32.

Data for 1980 is from:
Norman, "U.S. Could Become China's Top Trade Partner," p. 6.

[22]Ibid.

[23]"China to Surpass Soviets in Trade with the U.S.," The Wall Street Journal, September 5, 1980, p. 23.

[24]Frank Ching, "China's Spending Reductions Next Year May Mean Slower Foreign Trade Growth," The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 1980, p. 34.

[25]Pam Lambert, "China Specialists Take Project Setbacks in Stride," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 1, 1980, p. 13.

[26]E.S. Browning, "China Retains Its Allure for Bankers, But Some Becoming More Cautious," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, November 24, 1980, p. 16.

A 1981 report on the Chinese economy by Bank of America projects continued slow growth, persistent inflation and unemployment, and a widening trade deficit, all of which will tend to slow the growth of China's foreign trade.

"China Facing Slower Growth During '81, Bank of America Says," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, May 18, 1981, p. 2.

Vice Premier Yao Yilin's March 1981 report to the standing committee of the National People's Congress, though not quite so bleak as the Bank of America projection, pointed out much the same problems and prospects.

"China Registers Budget Deficit of $7.38 Billion," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, March 16, 1981, p. 2.

[27]Norman, "U.S. Could Become China's Top Trade Partner," p. 6.

[28]"China to Surpass Soviets in Trade with the U.S.," p. 23.

[29]"American Exhibition in Peking Pays Off in Good Will, Sales," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 15, 1980, p. 4.

[30]Ching, "China's Spending Reductions Next Year," p. 4.

[31]Bohdan O. and Maria R. Scuprowicz, Doing Business With the People's Republic of China: Industries and Markets (New York: Wiley, 1978), p. 47.

[32]Percentages calculated from data In:
"Official PRC Statistics, 1978-79," The China Business Review, May-June 1980, p. 54.

[33]The value of imports should hover at around 4-5% of GNP for the duration of the 'readjustment' period, however long that lasts, then if the Chinese economy takes off, as planned, imports should grow to about 14-15% of GNP and level off there (14.7% is the world average for the ratio of imports to GNP; see Scuprowicz, p. 47). Debt management problems could, however, keep the growth in imports depressed indefinitely.

[34]"China Won't Use Its Vast Credits at Foreign Banks," The Wall Street Journal, September 10, 1980, p. 32.

[35]"China Signs Over 300 Joint Venture Pacts," Japan Times, December 16, 1980, p. 1.
Frank Ching, "China Attracts Over $1 Billion in Investment," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, March 16, 1981, p. 2.

It has been reported that China further relaxed its investment controls in June 1981 to allow full foreign ownership of enterprises in China:
"China Now Permits Full Foreign Ownership," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 15, 1981, p. 3.

Full foreign ownership may be tolerated, but it probably is not being encouraged. In all likelihood, only small-scale foreign enterprises will be tolerated; major projects, especially those in such key sectors of the economy as energy, mining and heavy industry, will probably be restricted to the partial foreign ownership provisions of the joint venture law.

[36]"490 Enterprises Located in China's Economic Zone," Japan Times, December 30, 1980, p. 9.

[37]Browning, p. 16.

[38]Barry Kramer, "Chinese Official Says Tax on Earnings of Foreign Investors Likely to be Cut," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, October 13, 1980, p. 5.

[39]Lambert, "China Specialists Take Project Setbacks in Stride," p. 13.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Pura, p. 2.

[42]For example: the Beijing foreign trade center (cancelled, a $125 million project backed by Chase Manhattan Bank), two ethylene plants in Nanjing (deferred, $200 million Japanese project), the Baoshan steel complex (postponed, a $5 billion project largely Japanese-backed), a Beijing chemical plant (cancelled, $180 million project), and a joint venture with Sanyo to produce electrical equipment (deferred, $22.2 million).

[43]Hang-sheng Cheng, "China: Money and Banking," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Weekly Letter, September 22, 1980, p. 3.

[44]Problems include: "uncertainties over taxes, legal questions, labor relations, and quality control," a shortage of "capital and skills to put into major ventures," ("China Signs Over 300 Joint Venture Pacts," p. 1); a lack of information on "land and labor costs, utility supplies, and the availability and quality of other industrial requirements," and problems of "low productivity, insufficient quality control and a poorly integrated manufacturing system, in which capital, raw material supplies and markets aren't well-coordinated." (Pura, p. 2.)

[45]"China Won't Use Its Vast Credits," p. 32.

[46]Kramer, p. 5. Chinese Government commercial representatives have also been attempting to reassure the business community that, on a selective basis reflecting China's development priorities, foreign direct investment is still being sought.

Frank Ching, "Despite Cutback, Chinese Say They Seek to Boost Foreign Business Links," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, March 30, 1981, p. 7.

[47]Although ideologically committed to "free trade," the United States cannot be oblivious to the political ramifications of trade and investment decisions. Over the long run American economic relations with the developing countries--including China--will be stronger and more profitable if American business and the United States Government do pay attention to the political sensitivities associated with trade and investment. For a discussion of this issue, see:

Selig S. Harrison, The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1978), pp. 311-350.

[48]Norman, "U.S. Could Become China's Top Trade Partner," p. 6.

[49]Frank Ching and John Norman, "China and U.S. Reach Accord on Textile Curbs," The Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1980, p. 21.

[50]Textile exports provided about 20% of China's foreign currency earnings in 1980 (Balaran, p. 22). In 1979 China sold $197 million of textiles to the United States (Ching and Norman, p. 21), which was 33% of the total value of China's exports to the United States that year.

[51]John T. Norman, "U.S. Clothing Makers Upset By China Pact," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, September 29, 1980, p. 4.

[52]Stanley B. Lubman, "Trade and Sino-American Relations," In: Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Relations: Past and Future, ed. Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 208.

[53]Norman, "U.S. Could Become China's Top Trade Partner," p. 6.

[54]Data for 1970-1979 from:
"China's Foreign Trade by Area and Country, 1970-79," The China Business Review, July-August 1980, p. 35.

Data for 1980 from:
"China's Foreign Trade Rose 20.7% Last Year," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, January 19, 1981, p. 6.

[55]Ibid. Yao Yilin put the 1980 deficit at $570 million ("China Registers Budget Deficit of $7.38 Billion," p. 2). Differences between Chinese and Western figures on the volume of China's trade are not uncommon.

[56]Balaran, p. 22. China has, additionally, been aided in managing its international payments problems by loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China has $550 million available in 1981 for this purpose, and had a similar amount available last year.

"IMF Agrees to Lend China $550 Million to Aid its Economy," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, March 9, 1981, p. 7.

[57]Lubman, pp. 196-201.
Frank Ching, "Trading Hassles Said to Frustrate U.S. Executives," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, November 24, 1980, p. 4.

[58]"American Exhibition in Peking Pays Off," p. 4.

[59]Pam Lambert, "U.S. Urged to Strive for Delicate Balance in Trade with China," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 15, 1980, p. 1.

[60]Kramer, p. 5.

[61]Pura, p. 2.

[62]Frank Ching, "China Will Use New Exchange Rate in Trade Transactions to Boost Exports," The Wall Street Journal, December 8, 1980, p. 30.

As any wiley capitalist would expect, this dual rate system has resulted in a black market for foreign currency (Ibid), and is an incentive for China's own trading companies to keep their earnings abroad.

"China Orders Return of Overseas Deposits," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, January 19, 1981, p. 6.

Such efforts to control the side-effects of the dual exchange rate system do not appear overly successful, so it can be anticipated that China will be forced to "officially" devalue its currency if it is adamant on improving its trade balance by that means.

[63]"Chinese Ad Agencies Go to Madison Avenue to Learn to Sell," The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1980, p. 34.

[64]Jeffrey Schultz, "The Four Modernizations Reconsidered," In: China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution, ed. Richard Baum (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 279.

[65]Harry G. Gelber, Technology, Defense, and External Relations in China, 1975-1978 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 144-148.

[66]Norman, "U.S. Could Become China's Top Trade Partner," p. 6.

[67]Ching, "Trading Hassles Said to Frustrate," p. 4.

[68]Scuprowicz, p. 45.
Gelber, Technology, Defense, and External Relations, p. 144.

[69]"Chinese May Have Secret Copy of Boeing 707," Monterey Peninsula Herald (Washington Post News Service report), May 11, 1980, p. 10A.

[70]Ching, "Trading Hassles Said to Frustrate," p. 4.

[71]The $2.5 billion figure is the sum of the loans made or offered on concessionary (or at least highly favorable commercial) terms during 1980-81 by Japan (up to $1.5 billion offered), the World Bank (about $500 million, over half at 9.6% interest, some interest-free), the United Nations ($142.8 million), Australia ($59 million), and from miscellaneous sources. Data from:

Frank Ching, "In Policy Change, China to Ask Firms to Bid on Contracts," The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1980, p. 27.

"China Turns for Aid to Countries It Once Shunned as Enemies," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 29, 1980, p. 4.

Eduardo Lachica, "World Bank Acts Quickly on First Loans to China," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 29, 1981, p. 4.

The $26 billion figure for commercial and governmental (at commercial rates) credits is from:

"China Won't Use Its Vast Credits," p. 32.

[72]Because China's long-term debt management problems are going to have a major impact on China's development program, as well as on China's relationship with the West (united front or no united front, China will not let itself become a supplicant groveling before Western financial institutions), it will be worthwhile to examine some of the potential sources of capital to which China could turn.

Thus far, trade credits have been the financial resource most available to China. As was noted above, Western governments and private financial institutions have been falling over themselves to arrange such credits for China to spur the opening of the fabled "China market." Unfortunately for China, these are the financial resource of least value to its development program. Trade credits are convenient for speeding transactions, and their terms are generally not bad (7 to 9%), but their terms are generally short (3-5 years) and they are tied to specific transactions--therefore could not be used for a large capital construction project. The IMF loans, which are disbursed to aid in balance of payments problems (not in advance to fund projects), are a form of aid due to their favorable interest charges (4.4-6.78%), but not many long-term development projects can earn even that small of a return on investment in the time allowed to repay the IMF loan (3-5 years). As a developing country, China has a $3.14

billion borrowing limit in the IMF, and over the past two years has been alloted about $1.1 billion to help it finance its trade deficits. IMF and trade credit data from:

"China Won't Use Its Vast Credits," p. 32.
"IMF Agrees to Lend China $550 Million," p. 7.
Eugene A. Birnbaum, "The IMF's New Lending Power," The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 1980, p. 22.

Second to trade credits in quantity has been various forms of private capital (direct investment in joint ventures, commercial loans, and, soon, debentures issued by the China International Trust and Investment Corporation), and some government loans offered at commercial rates. As long as China remains a good credit risk, private investment should be available to the extent that China can generate projects to absorb it. The drawback is that the projects must earn a competitive return on invesment--but not all development projects can do this. China is well aware of the massive debt problems of many of the Third World nations--almost all developing countries turn to the private financial markets because the various aid programs cannot, or will not, supply capital on the scale that is felt to be needed. Although it appears the World Bank will be making a special effort to spur private investment in development projects on the best possible terms as a supplement to aid programs, it is not likely that such concessionary private capital would ever be available on the scale that commercial capital is. See:

Pura, p. 2.
Browning, p. 16.
"China Won't Use Its Vast Credits," p. 32.
Ching, "China Attracts Over $1 Billion," p. 2.
Cheng, p. 3.
Frank Ching, "China Is Planning A Debt Offering in Japan in Yen," Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1981, p. 27.
Richard F. Janssen, "Third World's Debts, Totaling $500 Billion, May Pose Big Dangers," Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1981, p. 1.
"Countries in Arrears: A Threat to World Banking?" Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 1981, p. 11.
Kenneth H. Bacon, "Clausen Pondering Ways for World Bank to Stimulate More Private Investment," Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1981, p. 9.
June Kronholz, "Rich, Poor Spar at IMF Meeting Over Easier Credit and Development Aid," Wall Street Journal, May 22, 1981, p. 25.

The type of capital that China, like any developing nation, desires the most is long-term low-interest "soft" loans. Most desirable of all, but also the scarcest, are the interest-free development loans made by the International Development Association (IDA, associated with the World Bank)

and the Asian Development Fund (administered by the Asian Development Bank). Various sources of development assistance potentially available to China are as follows:

Foreign governments. Thus far only Japan and Australia have offered substantial loans on easy terms. Although Japan has offered $1.5 billion, only about $498 million was actually lent in the 1979-80 period. China is reported to have asked Japan for an additional $2 billion of soft loans for the financing of the joint ventures cancelled in 1980 (see note 42), which would, in effect, transform those commercial ventures into aid projects. Loans on concessionary terms from foreign governments are unlikely to be a major source of development capital for China, and most loans will probably be tied to projects in some way benefiting the commercial interests of the lender nations.

World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). China will be lent about $500 million from the World Bank in 1981, including at least $100 million from the IDA, which is interest-free. The World Bank has projected that its lending to China will increase annually, to about $1.8 billion in its 1984-5 fiscal year. World Bank president Robert McNamera has stated, "Examination of the projects on the shelf and the capabilities of Chinese institutions indicates that a lending program on the order of $10 billion over the next five years could be feasible and would not be out of proportion to the scale of bank activity in other large countries." Such an assessment must be reassuring to China's leaders, who had earlier been reported as seeking loans on the scale of about $5 billion from the World Bank.

Asian Development Bank. China is not a member of the ADB and there have been no firm reports that the Chinese seek membership. It is also quite likely tha China's smaller neighbors in Asia would be adamantly opposed to China joining, if that meant sharing the ADB's limited capital resources with China. Since its founding in 1966, the ADB has lent $4.3 billion, of which $1.2 billion has been Asian Development Fund concessional loans (amounts as of March 1978). In 1980, the ADB lent a total of $1.44 billion to 17 developing nations in Asia; $477.2 million of that was in the form of concessional loans, the rest in hard loans at 9.25% interest. These are not large amounts, and the ADB has been plagued with funding difficulties. To make matters worse, India, who had voluntarily refrained from borrowing from the ADB in the past, has announced its intention to seek ADB hard loans starting in 1983, and Asian Development Fund concessionary loans starting in 1986. The Indian government has stated it will ask for 11.3% of the $17.8 billion the ADB expects to lend in the 1983-87 time frame. Thus, it appears that unless the ADB gains an unexpected increase in its funding, China will not be able to seek more than small loans from it--and would probably be better off, for political reasons, not to seek any at all.

United Nations. China has already been alloted $15 million for technical assistance programs during the 1979-81 period, and will be eligible for at least $142 million in the

1982-86 period, from the United Nations Development Program. The United Nations also has financial problems, which has prompted China to voluntarily relinquish 10% of its 1982-86 allotment. U.N. technical assistance can be expected to make a contribution to China's economic development, but the UNDP and the U.N. Capital Development Fund will not be able to make a substantial financial contribution to China's development program.

It would appear, then, that China will not be able to escape reliance upon private capital if it is to continue its current orientation toward the Western international economic system as a central element of its development program. This, in turn, suggests that China will be faced with the long-term debt management problems that have plagued many developing nations. In the past, fear of such debt problems led China to practice "self-reliance" in its development programs--a strategy which has undoubtedly hindered China's economic development. Today, China has decided to carefully give the Western economic system a try--a decision which, if successful in spurring growth without overwhelming China in debt, will be greatly in the interest of the West and the United States in particular. As China's 1978 "buying spree" and the subsequent wave of project cutbacks in 1980 warn, however, China still has much to learn and is not going to have an easy time of it. It goes without saying that China's debt management problems will directly impact upon China's relations with the West, and therefore upon American security interests in China.

Sources for data on development aid potentially available to China are as follows:

Ching, "In Policy Change, China to Ask Firms," p. 27.

"China Turns for Aid to Countries It Once Shunned," p. 4.

Frank Ching, "China Will Seek OVer $2 Billion in Japan Loans," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, April 13, 1981, p. 13.

Lachica, "World Bank Acts Quickly," p. 4.

John T. Norman, "China May Get $845 Million Loan From IMF," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, March 2, 1981, p. 6.

Arthur S. Banks (ed.), Political Handbook of the World, 1979 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 554, 565, 566.

"ADB Loans to 17 Nations Totaled $1.44 Billion in '80," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, April 20, 1981, p. 20.

David R. Francis, "India Disturbs Smaller Neighbors with Plan to Tap Asian Bank for Loans," Christian Science Monitor, May 8, 1981, p. 14.

[73]Lambert, "China Specialists Take Project Setbacks in Stride," p. 13.

[74]Browning, p. 16.

[75]Ibid.

[76]Ching, "In Policy Change, China to Ask Firms to Bid," p. 27.

[77]Browning, p. 16.

[78]Balaran, p. 22.
H.B. Malmgren, "An Economic Perspective on the East Asian Region," In: Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition, ed. Richard H. Solomon (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1979), p. 215.

[79]Balaran, p. 22.

[80]Ibid.

[81]"China's Foreign Trade by Area and Country," p. 35.

[82]Ibid.

[83]Guy J. Pauker, "The Security Implications of Regional Energy and Natural Resource Exploration," In: Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition, ed. Richard H. Solomon (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1979), p. 255.

[84]Over 89% of China's cumulative 1970-79 trade surplus came from Southeast Asian nations ("China's Foreign Trade by Area and Country," p. 35).

[85]Ching and Norman, p. 21.

[86]"Yao Says Current Readjustment May be Extended," p. 4.

[87]Malmgren, p. 205.

[88]Pauker, p. 221.

[89]Balaran, p. 22. Also see note 72 herein.

[90]"China Turns for Aid to Countries," p. 4.

[91]"China Won't Use Its Vast Credits," p. 32. Also see note 72 herein.

[92]Pauker, pp. 231-247.
Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 178-198.
David Jenkins, "Trouble Over Oil and Waters," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 1981, p. 24.

[93]Pauker, p. 246.
Harrison, China, Oil and Asia, p. 198.
Jenkins, pp. 28, 30.

[94]Eduardo Lachica, "American Oil Firms Eager to Probe East China Sea," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 29, 1980, p. 22.

[95]Pauker, p. 244. Although showing discretion, China is proceding with the development of its offshore oil deposits. The Chinese have signed a production agreement with a French oil company for a tract in the Tonkin Gulf, and another with Arco for drilling in the Ying Ge Hai Basin in the South China Sea.

"Arco Venture Finds Oil Development Pact with China," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 8, 1981, p. 22.

Though China appears to have postponed seeking bids until the Spring of 1982, sometime in the near future production agreements will be signed for drilling in 514,293 square miles of potential offshore oil fields that have already been surveyed by 48 oil companies.

"China Reportedly Ready to Seek Bids for Oil Exploration," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 29, 1981, p. 5.
"China Said to Delay Offshore Drilling Bids," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, July 6, 1981, p. 6.

[96]Robert F. Dernberger, "U.S.-China Trade: An Appraisal," In: Post-Mao China and US-China Trade, ed. Shao-chuan Leng (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1977), p. 86.
"China's Grain Imports Seen Remaining High," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, May 25, 1981, p. 22.

[97]"Drought and Floods Hurt China's Grain Harvest in 1980," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, January 5, 1981, p. 5.

[98]"China Expects to Reach Grain Target for Year," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, April 6, 1981, p. 22.
David Bonavia, "A Nightmare Shortfall," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 15, 1981, p. 96.

[99]For information on world grain harvest, see:
"Record Rice Crop, Stable Prices Seen for '80-81--Asian Outlook Mixed," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, October 20, 1980, p. 26.
"Large Wheat Harvest Is Forecast for World for 1980-81 Crop Year," The Wall Street Journal, June 24, 1980, p. 46.
Sue Shellenberger, "Food Shortages Feared in 1981 as Grain Stocks Are Uneasily Balanced," The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 1980, p. 1.
Terri Minsky, "Big Increases in Food Prices Loom As World Demands More U.S. Grain," The Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1980, p. 13.
Don Kendall, "Early Signs Look Good For World Grain Output," Monterey Peninsula Herald (Associated Press report), April 9, 1981, p. 24.

[100]For information on the prospects for famine, see:
"U.N. Official Fears World Food Crisis by 1981," Monterey Peninsula Herald (Associated Press report), November 25, 1980, p. 2.
Stanley Karnow, "Coming Soon--Famine," Japan Times, December 15, 1980, p. 12.
"McNamera Says 800 Mil. Living on Life Margin," Japan Times, December 18, 1980, p. 5.
Richard M. Harley, "Food: Humanity's Need, America's Interest," Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 1981, p. 12.

[101]Pauker, p. 230.

[102]John T. NOrman, "Two Agencies Act to Enlarge Role of China," Wall Street Journal, August 11, 1980, p. 14.

[103]"China Attends GATT Course," Wall Street Journal, August 27, 1980, p. 22.

[104]Pauker, pp. 254-256.

[105]Malmgren, p. 241.
Scalapino, p. 696.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS

Armstrong, J.D. Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1977.

Aspaturian, Vernon V. "Vulnerabilities and Strengths of the Soviet Union in a Changing International Environment: The Internal Dimension." In: The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, second edition, pp. 694-718. Edited by Erik P. HOffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. New York: Aldine Publishing Co., 1980.

Aspaturian, Vernon, Alexander Dallin, and Jiri Valenta. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Three Perspectives. Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California at Los Angeles, September 1980.

Barnett, A. Doak. China and the Major Powers in East Asia. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977.

Brown, Leslie H. American Security Policy in Asia. Adelphi Papers no. 132. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1977.

Brown, Shannon R. "China's Program of Technology Acquisition." In: China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution, pp. 153-173. Edited by Richard Baum. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.

Clemens, Walter C. Jr. The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations. Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1968.

Clough, Ralph N. East Asia and U.S. Security. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975.

_____. Island China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.

Clough, Ralph N., A.D. Barnett, M.H. Halperin, and J.H. Kahan. The United States, China, and Arms Control. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975.

Clubb, O. Edmund. China and Russia: The "Great Game." New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.

Copper, John F. China's Global Role. Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

Dernberger, Robert F. "U.S.-China Trade: An Appraisal." In: Post-Mao China and US-China Trade, pp. 79-89. Edited by Shao-chuan Leng. Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1977.

Douglass, Joseph D. Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War. Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

Durch, William J. "The Navy of the Republic of China." In: Guide to Far Eastern Navies, pp. 216-269. Edited by Barry M. Blechman and Robert P. Berman. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978.

Fairbank, John King. The United States and China. Fourth edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Far Eastern Economic Review. Asia Yearbook, published annually. Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., 1977-1981.

Garside, Roger. Coming Alive: China After Mao. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Gayler, Noel. "Security Implications of the Soviet Military Presence in Asia." In: Asian Security in the 1980s: Problems and Policies for a Time of Transition, pp. 54-68. Edited by Richard H. Solomon. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980.

Gelber, Harry G. Technology, Defense and External Relations in China, 1975-1978. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979.

Gelman, Harry. The Soviet Union and China. Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corp., P-6465, March 1980.

Ginneken, Jaap van. The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao. New York: Avon Books, 1977.

Goure, Leon, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey. The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy. Coral Gables, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974.

Gray, Colin S. The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Rimlands and the Technological Revolution. New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1977.

Griffith, William E. Peking, Moscow and Beyond: The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1973.

Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia. Third edition. London: Macmillan, 1968.

Halperin, Morton H., and Dwight H. Perkins. Communist China and Arms Control. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Harrison, Selig S. China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

_____. The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy. New York: The Free Press, 1978.

Hinton, Harold C. The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking Under Soviet Pressure. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research, 1971.

Hoffmann, Stanley. Gulliver's Troubles: or the Setting of American Foreign Policy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

Hsieh, Alice Langley. "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963." In: Sino-Soviet Military Relations, pp. 150-170. Edited by Raymond L. Garthoff. New York: Praeger, 1966.

International Institute for Strategic STudies. The Military Balance, 1979-1980. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979.

Johnson, Stuart E. The Military Equation in Northeast Asia. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979.

Jones, DuPre, ed. China: U.S. Policy Since 1945. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1980.

Kaplan, Morton. System and Process in International Politics. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957.

Kau, Michael, Y.M. The Lin Piao Affair: Power Politics and Military Coup. White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975.

Kim, Samuel S. China, the United Nations and World Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.

Kohler, Foy D. SALT II: How Not to Negotiate with the Russians. Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1979.

Kovalev, Sergei. "Sovereignty and the International Duties of Socialist Countries," Pravda, September 26, 1968. In: The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, third edition, pp. 302-305. Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. New York: Random House, 1972.

Lefever, Ernest W. Nuclear Arms in the Third World: U.S. Policy Dilemma. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979.

Leites, Nathan. The Operational Code of the Politburo. Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, 1951.

Levine, Steven I. "The Soviet Factor in Sino-American Relations." In: Dragon and Eagle; United States-China Relations: Past and Present, pp. 235-255. Edited by Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam. New York: Basic Books, 1978.

Lieberthal, Kenneth. Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Its Implications for the Strategic Triangle. Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, R-2342-NA, July 1978.

Lubman, Stanely B. "Trade and Sino-American Relations." In: Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Relations: Past and Future, pp. 187-214. Edited by Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam. New York: Basic Books, 1978.

Makintosh, J. Malcolm. "The Soviet Generals' View of China in the 1960's." In: Sino-Soviet Military Relations, pp. 183-192. Edited by Raymond L. Garthoff. New York: Praeger, 1966.

Malmgren, H.B. "An Economic Perspective on the East Asia Region." In: Asian Security in the 1980s, pp. 200-215. Edited by Richard H. Solomon. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980.

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Fifth edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.

Moore, Barrington, Jr. "The Pressures Behind Soviet Expansionism." In: The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, third edition, pp. 457-460. Edited by Alvin Z. Rubinstein. New York: Random House, 1972.

Myers, Ramon H., ed. Two Chinese States: U.S. Foreign Policy and Interests. Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Newhouse, John. Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

Nitze, Paul H., Leonard Sullivan, Jr., and the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing the Seas. Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979.

North, Robert C. The Foreign Relations of China. Third edition. North Sciuate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1978.

Nuechterlein, Donald E. National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978.

Pauker, Guy J. "The Security Implications of Regional Energy and Natural Resource Exploration." In: Asian Security in the 1980s, pp. 216-257. Edited by Richard H. Solomon. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980.

Pillsbury, Michael. SALT on the Dragon: Chinese Views of the Soviet-American Strategic Balance. Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, P-5457, April 1975.

Pollack, Jonathan D. "The Modernization of National Defense." In: China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution, pp. 241-261. Edited by Richard Baum. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.

_____. "China as a Military Power." In: Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, and Japan, pp. 43-99. Edited by Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.

Robinson, Thomas W. The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes. Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, RM-6171-PR, August 1970.

Robinson, Thomas W., R. Baum, W.F. Dorrill, M. Gurtov, and H. Harding, Jr. The Cultural Revolution in China. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1971.

Schultz, Jeffery. "The Four Modernizations Reconsidered." In: China's Four Modernizations, pp. 267-287. Edited by Richard Baum. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.

Schwartz, Morton. The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors. Encino, Ca.: Dickenson, 1975.

Scuprowicz, Bohdan O. and Maria R. Doing Business With the People's Republic of China: Industries and Markets. New York: Wiley, 1978.

Smith, Hedrick. The Russians. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976.

Sneider, Richard L. "Prospects for Korean Security." In: Asian Security in the 1980s, pp. 109-147. Edited by Richard H. Solomon. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980.

Solomon, Richard H. "American Defense Planning and Asian Security: Policy Choices for a Time of Transition." In: Asian Security in the 1980s, pp. 1-35. Edited by Richard H. Solomon. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980.

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. "The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament Policy." In: Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, pp. 95-113. Edited by Morton H. Halperin. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967.

Steinberg, David J., ed. In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

Stoessinger, John G. "China and the Soviet Union: Retrospect and Prospect." In: China and the Great Powers: Relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, pp. 9-28. Edited by Francis O. Wilcox. New York: Praeger, 1974.

Stone, Jeremy J. "Arms Control: Can China Be Ignored?" In: Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, pp. 73-93. Edited by Morton H. Halperin. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967.

Swanson, Bruce L. "The Navy of the People's Republic of China." In: Guide to Far Eastern Navies, pp. 64-167. Edited by Barry M. Blechman and Robert P. Berman. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978.

Terrill, Ross. Mao: A Biography. New York: Harper and Row, 1980.

Tuchman, Barbara W. Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45. New York: Macmillan, 1971.

Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73. Second edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974.

_____. "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy." In: The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, second edition, pp. 136-153. Edited by Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. New York: Aldine, 1980.

United Nations Association. Beyond Normalization: Report of the UNA-USA National Policy Panel to Study US-China Relations. New York: United Nations Association of the United States of America, Inc., 1979.

Valenta, Jiri. Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.

Warner, Edward L., III. The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institutional Analysis. New York: Praeger, 1977.

Weinstein, Franklin B., and Kamiya, Fuji, ed. The Security of Korea: US and Japanese Perspectives on the 1980s. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.

Whiting, Allen S. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1975.

Whitson, William W. "Political and Military Dimensions." In: Two Chinese States: U.S. Foreign Policy and Interests, pp. 13-23. Edited by Raymon H. Myers. Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970.

_____. The SALT Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979.

ARTICLES*

Barnett, A. Doak. "Military-Security Relations Between China and the United States." Foreign Affairs, 55 (April 1977): 584-597.

Biegel, Alfred. "Strategic Implications of Moscow's Concept for Collective Security in Asia." Military Review, 57 (February 1977): 3-13.

Bonavia, David. "Haig Opens Up a Candy Store." Far Eastern Economic Review, June 19, 1981, pp. 8-9.

Chan, Steve. "Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management." World Politics, 30 (April 1978): 391-410.

---

*Only articles of a broad focus related to the topic of this paper and articles cited more than once are listed in this bibliography. Complete bibliographical information was provided in the first citation for each source, therefore the many articles cited only once for information on a specific point are not listed here.

Chang Hua. "Soviet-US Nuclear Talks: An Analysis." Peking Review, December 16, 1977, pp. 21-23.

Chen Chu. "What Do Moscow-Vaunted 'Detente' and 'Disarmament' Add Up to?" Peking Review, December 9, 1977, pp. 22-24.

Chen Si. "1980 in Retrospect: The International Situation." Beijing Review, January 5, 1981, pp. 11-13.

"China's Foreign Trade by Area and Country, 1970-79." China Business Review, July-August 1980, p. 35.

Chou Enlai. "Report on the Work of the Government." Peking Review, January 24, 1975, pp. 21-25.

Choudhury, G.W. "China's Policy Toward South Asia." Current History, 76 (April 1979): 155.

Clubb, O. Edmund. "China and the 'Industrialized Democracies'." Current History, 79 (September 1980): 5.

Cosby, I.P.S.G. "Disquiet in the Far East." RUSI Journal for Defence Studies, 125 (September 1980): 44-49.

Daniel, Donald C. "Sino-Soviet Relations in Naval Perspective." Orbis, 24 (Winter 1981): 787-803.

Deng Xiaoping. "Report on the Current Situation and Tasks," January 16, 1980. Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), March 1, 1980, p. 11. Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-People's Republic of China Daily Report, March 11, 1980, pp. 1-27.

Dewenter, John R. "The East China and Yellow Seas." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 101 (May 1975): 188-211.

"The Four Modernizations, Part III: The Army." China News Analysis, no. 1203 (March 27, 1981), pp. 1-8.

Frazer, Angus M. "Military Modernization in China." Problems of Communism, 28 (September-December 1979): 34-49.

Furlong, R.D.M., and Biegel, Al. "Chinese Military Links with NATO? An Assessment of the Kremlin's Concerns." International Defence Review, 12 (September 1979): 1467-1468.

Garner, William V. "SALT II: China's Advice and Dissent." Asian Survey, 19 (December 1979): 1224-1240.

Gelber, Harry G. "America, the Global Balance, and Asia." Asian Survey, 19 (December 1979): 1147-1158.

Gromyko, Andrey. "Leninist Foreign Policy in the Contemporary World." Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, January 1981, pp. 13-27. Translated In: Soviet Press: Selected Translations, no. 81-4 (April 1981), pp. 118-132.

Guo Ji. "Sino-Soviet Relations." Beijing Review, January 19, 1981, p. 3.

Guo Li. "Detente Offensive." Beijing Review, April 27, 1981, pp. 3-4.

Halperin, Morton H. "After Vietnam: Security and Intervention in Asia." Journal of International Affairs, 22 (Fall 1968): 236-246.

Holbrooke, Richard C. "Procedures for Sale of Military Support Items to the P.R.C." Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, pp. 24-26.

Horlick, Arnold L. "The Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security Proposal: A Club in Search of Members." Pacific Affairs, 47 (Fall 1974): 269-285.

Hua Guofeng. "Report on the Work of the Government." Beijing Review, July 6, 1979, pp. 11-31.

Hua Kuo-feng. "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country!" Peking Review, March 10, 1978, pp. 7-40.

Hua Xiu. "Ray Cline's Imperialist Bias." Beijing Review, January 19, 1981, pp. 11-12.

Jacobsen, C.G. "Sino-Soviet Crisis in Perspective." Current History, 77 (October 1979): 110.

Jenkins, David. "Trouble Over Oil and Waters," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 1981, pp. 24-33.

Jiang Yuanchun. "Soviet Strategy for East Asia." Beijing Review, March 23, 1981, pp. 10-22.

Kapchenko, N. "The Threat to Peace from Peking's Hegemonistic Policy." International Affairs (Moscow), February 1980, pp. 66-77.

Kemov, A., and Kozlov, V. "International Arms Trade." International Affairs (Moscow), January 1980, pp. 52-56.

Kintner, William R. "A Strategic Triangle of 'Two and a Half Powers'." Orbis, 23 (Fall 79): 525-534.

Lampert, Donald E. "Is There an International System?" International Studies Quarterly, 22 (March 1978): 143-166.

Leng, Shao-chuan. "Chinese Strategy Toward the Asia-Pacific." Orbis, 19 (Fall 1975): 775-792.

Levine, Steven I. "The Unending Sino-Soviet Conflict." Current History, 79 (October 1980): 70.

Liu, Leo Yueh-yun. "The Modernization of the Chinese Military." Current History, 79 (September 1980): 9.

Loescher, G.D. "The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict in Recent Historical Perspective." Survey, 24 (Spring 1979): 125-141.

Lukin, V.P. "Washington-Beijing: 'Quasi-Allies'?" SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologia, December 1979, pp. 50-55. Translated In: Soviet Press: Selected Translations, no. 80-5 (May 1980), pp. 150-155.

Luttwak, Edward N. "Against the China Card." Commentary, October 1978, p. 37.

McGruther, Kenneth R. "Two Anchors in the Pacific: A Strategy Proposal for the US Pacific Fleet." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 105 (May 1979): 126-141.

Meliksetov, A. "Peking Threatens International Peace and Security." International Affairs (Moscow), March 1981, pp. 44-48.

Millar, T.B. "The Triumph of Pragmatism: China's Links with the West." International Affairs (London) 55 (April 1979): 195-205.

"Moscow's 'Dumb-Bell' Strategy." Beijing Review, February 25, 1980, pp. 8-9.

Nogee, Joseph L. "Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept." Orbis, 18 (Winter 1975): 1193-1224.

Oksenberg, Michel. "China Policy for the 1980s." Foreign Affairs, 59 (Winter 1980/81): 304-322.

"Peking's Foreign Policy: Hegemonism and Alliance with Imperialism." International Affairs (Moscow), March 1980, pp. 45-57.

Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. "China, Soviet Strategy, and American Policy." International Security, 5 (Fall 1980): 24-48.

Pillsbury, Michael. "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" Foreign Policy, no. 20 (Fall 1975), pp. 50-64.

_____. "Strategic Acupuncture." Foreign Policy, no. 41 (Winter 1980-81), pp. 44-61.

Pollack, Jonathan. "The Logic of Chinese Military Strategy." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 35 (January 1979): 22-33.

Pye, Lucian W. "Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization." International Security, 4 (Summer 1970): 3-19.

Ra'anan, Uri. "The Washington-Moscow-Peking Triangle: A Re-examination of Chinese and Soviet Concepts." Orbis, 19 (Fall 1975): 827-837.

Rice, Edward E. "The Sino-U.S. Detente: How Durable?" Asian Survey, 13 (September 1973): 805-811.

Robinson, Thomas W. "China's Asia Policy." Current History, 79 (September 1980): 1.

_____. "The Soviet Union and Asia in 1980." Asian Survey, 21 (January 1981): 14-30.

Romance, Francis J. "Modernization of China's Armed Forces." Asian Survey, 20 (March 1980): 298-310.

Ross, Edward W. "Chinese Conflict Management." Military Review, 60 (January 1980): 13-25.

Scalapino, Robert A. "Asia at the End of the 1970s." Foreign Affairs, 58 (America and the World 1979 edition, 1980): 693-737.

Schiebel, Joseph. "The Soviet Union and the Sino-American Relationship." Orbis, 21 (Spring 1977): 77-94.

Segal, Gerald. "China and the Great Power Triangle." China Quarterly, no. 83 (September 1980), pp. 490-509.

Sekino, Hideo, and Sadao Seno. "Asian Navies." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 107 (March 1981): 52-59.

Semyonov, Y. "Peking and the National Liberation Movement." International Affairs (Moscow), January 1980, pp. 29-39.

Shakhnazarov, G.Kh. "The Problem of Peace: An Analysis of Basic Concepts." Soviet Review, 21 (Fall 1980): 3-30.

"Soviet Detente Fraud Exposed." Peking Review, January 14, 1977, pp. 31-32.

"Soviet Military Strategy for World Domination." Beijing Review, January 28, 1980, pp. 15-19.

"Soviet Social-Imperialism--Most Dangerous Source of World War." Peking Review, July 15, 1977, pp. 4-10.

"A Straight Race Between the Two Superpowers." Peking Review, February 18, 1977, p. 24.

"The Taiwan Question." China News Analysis, no. 1202 (March 13, 1981), p. 1.

Tarpey, John F. "A Strategic Analysis of Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 106 (May 1980): 106-125.

Tasker, Rodney. "The Message of Success." Far Eastern Economic Review, May 22, 1981, pp. 32-35.

"The Tasks Before Us--Renmin Ribao 1981 New Years Day Editorial." Beijing Review, January 12, 1981, pp. 16-19.

Terrill, Ross. "China Enters the 1980s." Foreign Affairs, 58 (Spring 1980): 920-935.

"U.S. 'Taiwan Relations Act'." Beijing Review, January 12, 1981, pp. 9-11.

Warnke, Paul C. "We Don't Need a Devil (To Make or Keep Our Friends)." Foreign Policy, no. 25 (Winter 1976/77), pp. 78-87.

Whiting, Allen S. "China and the Superpowers: Toward the Year 2000." Daedalus, 109 (Fall 1980): 97-114.

Zagoria, Donald. "Averting Moscow-Peking Rapprochement: A Proposal for U.S. Foreign Policy." Pacific Community, 8 (October 1976): 122-135.

_____. "Soviet Policy and Prospects in East Asia." International Security, 5 (Fall 1980): 66-78.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

Brown, Harold. Department of Defense Annual Report: Fiscal Year 1981. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 29, 1980.

Cheng, Hang-sheng. "China: Money and Banking." Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Weekly Letter, September 26, 1980.

International Communication AGency. "Soviet Perceptions of the U.S.: Results of a Surrogate Interview Project." USICA Research Memorandum, June 27, 1980.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Asia: Circle of Fear. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1979.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. International Negotiations: Some Operational Principles of Soviet Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

U.S. Department of State. "America's Role in a Turbulent World." Current Policy, no. 57. March 1979.

_____. "Arms Control for the 1980s: An American Policy." Current Policy, no. 292. July 14, 1981.

_____. "Approach to Foreign Economic Issues." Current Policy, no. 294. July 14, 1981.

_____. "China and the US: Into the 1980s." Current Policy, no. 187. June 4, 1980.

_____. "Development Assistance for the Third World." Current Policy, no. 267. March 19, 1981.

_____. "Europe: Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks." Gist, October 1978.

_____. "Foreign Policy Priorities in Asia." Current Policy, no. 274. April 24, 1981.

_____. "Humane Purposes in Foreign Policy." Department of State News Release, May 22, 1977.

_____. "A New Direction in U.S. Foreign Policy." Current Policy, no. 275. April 24, 1981.

_____. "Secretary Haig: News Conference." Current Policy, no. 258. January 28, 1981.

_____. "Security and Development Assistance." Current Policy, no. 264. March 19, 1981.

_____. "US-China Relations." Gist, September 1980.

_____. "U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia." Current Policy, no. 295. July 1981.

_____. "U.S. Policy Toward China, July 15, 1971--January 15, 1979." Selected Documents, no. 9. January 1979.

_____. "U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia." Current Policy, no. 284, June 10, 1981.

_____. "US-PRC Exchanges." Gist, March 1981.

_____. "U.S. Relations With China." Current Policy, no. 297. July 16, 1981.

NEWSPAPERS

Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly

Baltimore Sun

Boston Globe

Christian Science Monitor

Chicago Tribune

Daily Yomiuri (Japan, in English)

Financial Post (Toronto)

Japan Times

Los Angeles Times

Monterey Peninsula Herald (Monterey, Ca.)

New York Times

Times (London)

Wall Street Journal

Washington Post

Washington Star

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

		No. Copies
1.	Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virgina 22314	2
2.	Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
3.	Department Chairman, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
4.	Professor Claude A. Buss, Code 56Bx Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	2
5.	Professor Boyd Huff, Code 56Hf Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
6.	Adjunct Professor Edward A. Olsen, Code 560s Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
7.	Associate Professor Frank M. Teti, Code 56Tt Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
8.	Asian Seminar, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940	1
9.	Professor John W. Lewis Arms Control and Disarmament Program 320 Galvez Street Stanford University Stanford, California 94305	1
10.	Robert B. Bathurst 47 Appian Way Barrington, Rhode Island 02806	1

11. CDR James E. Auer, USN — 1
1060 North Montana Street
Arlington, Virignia 22205

12. LT Joseph F. Bouchard, USN — 3
3860 Park Blvd. Apt. 11B
Palo Alto, California 94306

13. MAJ Kenneth Allen, USAF — 1
1003 Leahy Road
Monterey, California 93940

14. CAPT Robert Brown, USAF — 1
SMC 1093
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

15. LT John G. Karas, USN — 1
1959 Half Pence Way
San Jose, California 95132

16. Alice K. Lee — 1
9 Overlook Place
Monterey, California 93940

17. John Y. Rhee — 1
1121 McClellan Ave.
Monterey, California 93940

18. LCDR Peter R. Smith, USN — 1
USS W.S. SIMS (FF 1059)
FPO New York, New York 09587

19. CAPT R.D. Thompson, USAF — 1
SMC 1037
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

20. Major Edward Ross — 1
Director for Estimates
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20301

21. Professor Patrick Parker, Code 56Pr — 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

22. Professor Michel Oksenberg — 1
Political Science Department
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

23. Richard S. Solomon 1
Rand Corporation
Santa Monica, California 90406

24. Robert Pranger 1
American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research
1150 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

25. Professor Harold C. Hinton 1
George Washington University
Washington, D.C. 20006

26. Professor John King Fairbank 1
Center for East Asian Studies
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

27. Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 2
Plans, Policy and Operations
Navy Department (ATTN: OP-602)
Washington, D.C. 20350

28. Curricular Office, Code 38 5
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940

DATE
FILMED