


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16. Abstract The report includes an analysis of the current threat against civil aviation along with information regarding hijacking attempts, security incidents, bomb threats, and passenger screening activity. It also summarizes ongoing activities to assure adequate protection of civil air commerce against hijack, firearms and related crimes, and other aspects of the Civil Aviation Security Program.					
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SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS  
ON THE  
EFFECTIVENESS OF PASSENGER SCREENING PROCEDURES



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION  
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE

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CHARTS

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## SECOND SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

### Introduction

This is the Second Semi-Annual Report to the Congress on the effectiveness of passenger screening procedures in the prevention of aircraft hijackings and related crimes against air commerce. This report covers the 6-month period January 1 - June 30, 1975, and is submitted pursuant to Public Law 93-366 signed by the President August 5, 1974.

The initial semi-annual report required by PL 93-366 was submitted to the Congress April 17, 1975. It described the organization, basic policies and responsibilities of the Civil Aviation Security Program as it involves the airlines, airport operators and the Federal Aviation Administration. The first report called attention to security incidents which occurred both before and after the introduction of strengthened security measures. The effectiveness of the program was examined and areas needing additional emphasis were identified.

This Second Semi-Annual Report to the Congress reexamines some of the same areas, but largely concerns itself with activities since January 1, 1975. It reflects the continuing cooperation and effectiveness of the air carriers and the airports in implementing the security programs developed pursuant to Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).

### Current Civil Aviation Security Measures

The airport and airline security measures described in the initial report to the Congress remained in effect during the 6-month period covered by this report. They continued to yield dividends in increased safety for air travellers, air crewmembers, scheduled airliners, and air carrier airports. In addition, certain new security requirements have been introduced through the issuance of FARs since January 1, 1975.

Amendment 129-5 to FAR Part 129 was issued July 3, 1975, and although not occurring during this 6-month period, it is included in this report because of its significance. The rule requires that foreign air carriers operating large aircraft in scheduled passenger operations to, from and within the United States have security programs similar to those required of U.S. air carriers.

The programs will require the screening of all passengers and all property intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin. This regulation is required by PL 93-366 and becomes effective October 10, 1975. It will affect 69 air carriers representing 58 nations. These foreign air carriers maintain some 150 stations at 79 foreign airports and 180 stations at 32 U.S. airports. They operate about 425 flights each day to and from the U.S., enplaning some 10 million passengers per year.

On April 21, 1975, the FAA published Amendments under Part 121 of the FARs dealing with the carriage of weapons and escorted persons aboard aircraft. These Amendments, which went into effect July 20, 1975, establish requirements for persons authorized to carry weapons aboard aircraft, procedures for the carriage of firearms in checked baggage, and procedures governing the transport of persons in the custody of law enforcement officers. They also prohibit the serving of alcoholic beverages to armed persons and to those in their custody.

Another Amendment to FAR Part 121 which became effective on April 4, 1975, governs the installation and operation of x-ray devices for the inspection of carry-on baggage and other items. This regulation establishes safety, training and detection standards for the operation of x-ray baggage inspection systems and requires the posting of signs informing passengers of the use of x-ray equipment.

#### Aircraft Hijackings

No successful hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft occurred during the 6-months covered by this report. During this same period, there were 7 hijackings of foreign air carrier aircraft, 2 of which were successful. In fact, as of this writing, the last successful hijacking of a U.S. airliner occurred November 10, 1972, shortly before the current strengthened security measures were placed in effect.

During the first 6-months of 1975, however, there were 5 unsuccessful attempts to hijack U.S. air carrier aircraft. This compares to 1 attempt that was not successful during the preceding 6-months and to a total of 3 attempts in all of 1974. (See Charts I and II.)

- o The first hijacking attempt of 1975 occurred when a man, armed with a rifle, climbed an airport fence and boarded a parked air carrier aircraft undergoing pre-flight preparation. He announced to three workers aboard that he was going to take the aircraft. One of the workers grabbed the gun while the others subdued the potential hijacker. Airport police responded and took the man into custody.
- o The next incident involved a passenger who pounded on the cockpit door and demanded that the flight be diverted to San Juan. When the plane made an unscheduled landing to refuel, the man locked himself in one of the aircraft restrooms. Police then boarded and took the man into custody.
- o The third attempt began when a man standing in front of an aircraft preparing for departure asked the pilot to fly him to New Haven. The pilot refused and the man, claiming to have a knife in his possession, boarded the aircraft, entered the cockpit and repeated his demands. The pilot notified the tower, and law enforcement officers on duty at the airport responded immediately and took custody of the suspect.
- o The fourth attempted hijacking involved a man who demanded to be flown to Cuba. He indicated that he had a gun and a bomb and that if his demands were not met he would blow up the plane. When the hijacker allowed the flight to land for refueling, he authorized the passengers and all but one crewmember to deplane. However, all crewmembers left the aircraft with the passengers and the hijacker was left inside. Law enforcement officers then boarded and took the man into custody.
- o The last hijacking attempt involved a young girl who had been placed aboard a flight without escort to be returned to a state hospital. Shortly before landing, the girl approached a stewardess and demanded that the flight be diverted. The girl feigned possession of a knife and threatened to harm the crew if her demands were not met. As the plane landed, the girl was grabbed by a crewmember and held until airport police arrived.

Although current civil aviation security requirements do not extend to "general aviation" activities, two hijackings involving general aviation aircraft occurred during the first six months of 1975. This compares with 3 general aviation

hijackings during the last 6 months of 1974. Both of the 1975 attempts were successful. One involved a helicopter which was used in a prison escape. The hijacker and escapees were subsequently apprehended. The other involved a Cessna aircraft chartered by 2 men. During the flight, 1 of the men pointed a gun at the pilot and directed him to fly to Nogales, Mexico. The pilot was held captive but later escaped and notified authorities. One of the hijackers surrendered and the other was subsequently apprehended. (See Chart III.)

#### Passenger Screening Results

The screening of all passengers and their carry-on baggage by the airlines, coupled with the presence of local law enforcement support as arranged by the operators of air carrier airports, continues to be a major cornerstone of the defenses against aircraft hijacking and sabotage. Results of the passenger screening procedures continue to reflect the success and effectiveness of airline and airport security programs.

During the first 6 months of 1975, the number of passengers screened was approximately the same as during the preceding 6 months. There was, however, a significant increase in the number of weapons detected. More than 60,000 weapons and dangerous articles (including fireworks and ammunition rounds) were detected during the current period compared to approximately 30,000 during the last half of 1974. The major increases were in knives and articles categorized as "other" which includes flammable gases, tools, nunchaku sticks, chemical mace, clubs, etc. (See Chart IV.)

Among the 2,343 firearms detected were 958 handguns. There were 637 arrests made in connection with handgun detections during this 6-month period. This handgun arrest figure is based upon individual arrest/incident reports filed and is not consistent with the data presented in Chart IV. The inconsistency may be attributed to reporting weaknesses which result in some arrests and other data not being included in the routine monthly summaries compiled on passenger screening activities.

The 637 handgun arrests occurred at 91 air carrier airports with 27 large hub airports, such as Los Angeles, Atlanta and Chicago O'Hare, accounting for 441 or 69 percent. Twenty-nine medium hub airports (e.g., Portland, Oregon; Columbus, Ohio; Raleigh, North Carolina) accounted for 115 (18%) of the arrests,

while 63 (10%) occurred at 29 small hubs (e.g., Oakland, California; Des Moines, Iowa; Roanoke, Virginia) and 18 (3%) at non hub airports (e.g., New Haven, Connecticut; Charlottesville, Virginia; Valdosta, Georgia).

The 637 arrests occurred during the passenger screening activities of 22 of the 32 scheduled airlines. In 436 (68%) of the arrests, the handguns were detected by x-ray inspection of carry-on items (briefcases, purses, coats, etc.), and 29 (5%) followed the physical inspection of such items. One hundred and five (17%) of the arrests followed detection of the handguns on persons screened by weapons detectors. In 67 instances (10%), the arrests were made after handguns were declared when persons were confronted by the screening process.

Total data available indicates a downward trend in the total number of persons arrested during the passenger screening process--1,345 during the first 6 months of 1975 compared to 3,501 for all of 1974. With respect to aviation offenses detected, the number of offenses involving concealed weapons and explosives is about the same as the prior period--623 during the current 6 months and 1,147 during 1974. On the other hand, there is an encouraging decrease in the number of false information offenses--152 during the current period. This is probably due to increased efforts of the airlines to inform air travellers that hijack and bomb threats are not joking matters and are indeed treated seriously.

The decrease in the number of non-aviation related offenses from a total of 2,197 during all of 1974 to 570 during this 6-month period is also encouraging. It is probably the result of an increased awareness of the effectiveness in screening procedures on the part of the criminally oriented, coupled with an increasing dedication on the part of airline screening personnel and supporting law enforcement officers to the primary objective of the screening procedures--to keep weapons and dangerous articles off air carrier aircraft.

These results, as depicted in detail in Chart IV, demonstrate the continuing effectiveness of airline and airport security programs. While it is impossible to estimate accurately just how many hijackings and related crimes were prevented, the circumstances involved in some of the screening incidents

indicate that some 20 hijack attempts may have been prevented during the first 6 months of 1975. This is a significant upward trend from the estimated 25 hijackings possibly prevented during all of 1974 as indicated in the First Semi-Annual Report to Congress. These estimates indicate, when coupled with the actual hijack attempts that took place (see Chart I), that as many as 28 hijack attempts might have occurred during 1974 and as many as 25 during the first 6 months of 1975, if current airline and airport security programs had not been in effect. These totals are comparable to the peak hijacking years of 1969 through 1972. During those four years, there were, respectively, 40, 25, 25, and 27 hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft.

Illustrations of the hijackings possibly prevented during 1974 were included in the last report to the Congress. Summary descriptions of the potential hijackings possibly prevented during the period covered by this report appear below.

- o A man alarmed the detection device three times, each time emptying his pockets of metal. Before a physical search, he stated he had a gun under his shirt and claimed he did not see any signs prohibiting the carriage of weapons through the screening station. He did not explain why he was carrying the gun.
- o A 14 year old boy activated a detection unit and was found to be carrying a knife. Upon questioning, he stated he was at the airport to hijack an airplane. Inquiry revealed that the boy was familiar with weapons and that he told friends he intended to hijack an airplane. He was remanded to his parents.
- o A passenger alarmed the detector several times. Even after emptying his pockets of all metal, including 8 rounds of ammunition, he continued to trigger the detection device. During a subsequent physical search, a firearm was found tied to a string inside his pant leg and suspended from his shorts.
- o A passenger attempted to board an air carrier aircraft with a revolver in his carry-on bag after denying he had a weapon in it. He stated he knew the weapon was in his bag but did not think anyone would find it. Further investigation revealed that the suspect had a criminal record including armed robbery, vehicle theft, and assault.

- o A passenger attempted to board an aircraft carrying a concealed weapon. The weapon was detected and later determined to have been stolen. It was also found that arrest warrants were outstanding charging the passenger with stock theft and arson and that he had been treated for mental instability and was classified as a psychotic.
- o A passenger was arrested for attempting to carry a pistol in his carry-on baggage through a screening point. It was determined that he was travelling under an assumed name. Over \$21,000 was later found in his baggage which he refused to explain. The gun he was carrying belonged to an individual wanted for robbery and murder.
- o A passenger attempted to bypass the detection unit and after being directed through, he alarmed it. A physical search revealed a loaded firearm on his person along with \$1,240 in currency. He refused to explain why the weapon and money were in his possession.
- o A man repeatedly alarmed the detection device and a physical search located a loaded automatic pistol concealed in his gloves. No explanation was given for concealing the weapon in that manner.
- o A man activated a detector and was found to be carrying a loaded automatic pistol in his coat pocket. A further physical search revealed a 5 inch blade knife and a box of ammunition. The man refused to answer any questions. Subsequent investigation determined that he had been declared insane and dangerous.
- o A man was removed from an air carrier flight before takeoff after a passenger observed that he was carrying a 6 inch blade hunting knife on his hip. Upon questioning, he stated he had not been screened, but had boarded the aircraft from the ramp after hiding out in the woods for 3 days. The man's wife advised that he had been released from a mental hospital 2 years before.
- o A young man walked onto an air operations area and boarded a parked aircraft. Upon being confronted by a stewardess, he said he had a gun and demanded that the passenger boarding stairs be removed. The stewardess persuaded him to walk to the front of the aircraft and he was removed. He did not have a weapon. It was determined that he had

recently been discharged from a Veterans Hospital and had a previous record of aircraft theft. Earlier, he had tried to purchase a flight ticket, but was \$10 short of the cost. He was readmitted to the hospital for treatment.

- o A nonpassenger alarmed the detector at a screening point but initially refused to identify any items in his possession which might have triggered the alarm. Later, he admitted to the police officer at the scene that he had a gun but no permit to carry one. He pulled up his shirt and revealed a handgun tucked in his waistband. The man was placed under arrest. He did not explain why he had attempted to penetrate the screening system with a concealed weapon.
- o A woman and two companions attempted to board an airliner. The woman alarmed the detection device 3 times before a physical search revealed a revolver hidden in her brassiere. The 2 companions were carrying ammunition for the weapon.
- o A man going through the screening point was found to have a loaded automatic pistol in his attache case. He had no flight ticket or reservation and would not explain why he had the weapon. Further inquiry determined that the man had just been released from a hospital where he had received treatment for diabetes.
- o A man attempted to bypass a detection unit and when directed through he alarmed it. When asked to remove any excess metal from his clothing, he became very nervous and attempted to hurry away. He was intercepted by the police officer on duty at the screening station but then fled. After a chase and ensuing struggle, he was subdued. A .32 caliber revolver was found in his pants pocket.
- o A male passenger going through the screening process was found to have a loaded revolver and a 5 inch blade knife concealed in a shoeshine kit. Although unemployed, he had almost \$500 on his person.
- o A passenger, although alarming a detection device several times, was permitted to board the aircraft without further search. While boarding, a handgun he was carrying fell to the ground. The passenger was removed from the plane but refused to explain the reason for the concealed gun. Further search disclosed a leather clip-on holster strapped to the inside of his right leg as well as a bladed knife.

- o An airport police officer observed a young man acting suspiciously, gesturing and talking to himself. When questioned by the officer, the youth stated he had intended to follow passengers aboard an aircraft and then take it over and force the crew to fly to Peking. He expounded on the pure life in China and said he would drop a few bombs on the U.S. and kill a few million people to show everyone they were living wrongly. It was determined that he was under psychiatric care.
- o A man came to a screening point carrying a suitcase. X-ray inspection disclosed what appeared to be a suspicious item. As the suitcase was being physically inspected, the man turned and ran out of the terminal building. Search of the suitcase disclosed a loaded automatic pistol, some prescription drugs and marijuana.
- o Two men attempted to board a flight. The first man cleared the screening area and proceeded to the aircraft. The second man was found to be carrying a knife on his person and he attempted to retrieve his carry-on bag which was undergoing x-ray inspection when two guns were detected in the bag. He was arrested. Meanwhile, the first man seeing what had occurred, ran toward the aircraft but was apprehended by police. Both men had false identification documents including a fraudulent passport, and were determined to be fugitives on drug and burglary charges.

During the 6-month period, there has been no significant change in the types and quantities of the weapons detection equipment used by the airlines to screen passengers. However, the number of x-ray baggage inspection systems operated by the airlines to inspect carry-on items has increased appreciably. Three hundred and thirty-six x-ray inspection systems were in use as of June 30, 1975, compared to 260 at the close of the preceding period. This increase reflects continued airline efforts to improve passenger screening procedures. X-ray baggage inspection systems are more effective and efficient and minimize passenger delays and inconvenience, especially at high volume screening stations. (See Chart V and VI.)

The airlines have continued to assure that personnel participating in the passenger screening process receive adequate initial and refresher training. Such training stresses the need for courteous and efficient treatment of air travellers as well as the requirements for cautious and effective inspections and includes the proper operation and maintenance of screening equipment.

Aviation Explosives Security

The first semi-annual report noted the threat posed by the use of explosives against civil aviation. A number of incidents of this nature involving U.S. carriers and the facilities of foreign air carriers in the U.S. occurred during the current reporting period.

- o The only explosion aboard a U.S. air carrier aircraft occurred when a passenger attempting to commit suicide used incendiary material in an apparent effort to bring down the aircraft. There was no major damage to the aircraft. The passenger received minor burns and is in custody. Attempted murder and destruction of aircraft charges have been filed against him.
- o Two explosions occurred at foreign air carrier locations in the U.S. One involved a small bomb placed inside a stack of newspapers at the door of an airline ticket office. It exploded during early morning hours and no injuries and only minor property damage was reported. In the second incident, a device was detonated at the office of another foreign air carrier. No one was injured but considerable damage was done to the building. A young man was arrested in connection with that incident.
- o A crude pipe-bomb type device was found in the lost and found baggage area of a U.S. international airport. It could have caused substantial damage if detonated aboard an aircraft in flight.
- o At another U.S. international airport, a small device, possibly an M-80 military-type firecracker, exploded near a ticket counter. An approximate 1 1/2" stucco wall was blown out, but there were no injuries.
- o A group of youths broke the windows of the European ticket office of a U.S. Flag Carrier and threw a "Molotov Cocktail" device inside. There were no injuries and damage from the explosion was estimated at \$3,500.
- o Also, a bomb device was discovered in the Puerto Rico office of a foreign air carrier. It had been ignited but failed to detonate.

Worldwide, since January 1, 1975, 4 persons have been killed and 78 injured as a result of 32 unlawful acts against civil air commerce. These acts were directed against the air carriers and civil aviation facilities of 17 nations.

Threats involving the use of explosives against U.S. aircraft and airports continue to be a matter of concern. During the 6-month period of July-December 1974, there were 264 bomb threats against airports and 778 bomb threats against aircraft. Six months data, January through June 1975, indicate that there were 134 bomb threats against airports and 879 against aircraft.

The decrease in bomb threats against airports appears significant, but may be misleading. It is noted that an unusual number of bomb threats (127) occurred in August of 1974. Some of these threats were prompted by an explosion at Los Angeles International Airport on August 6, 1974, in which 3 persons were killed and 35 injured. The tragedy received wide publicity which probably provoked subsequent threats.

Bomb threats against aircraft during the first 6 months of 1975 exceed significantly the number of threats received during the last 6 months of 1974. Aircraft bomb threats in 1975 are averaging 147 a month, while during the last 6 months of 1974, the monthly average was 130. Many of these incidents result in costly flight delays or diversions to conduct search and inspection procedures. (See Charts VII and VIII.)

Some bomb threats are accompanied by extortion demands on the airlines or airports involved. During this reporting period, over \$5,000,000 was demanded in extortion bomb threat incidents. Such incidents usually originate with an anonymous telephone call or letter with a demand for payment in exchange for information as to the location or the means to render harmless a device alleged to be aboard an aircraft or at an airport. The FBI investigates threats to destroy aircraft and has apprehended persons responsible and charged them with violations of Federal law.

FAA has initiated action to develop more effective and efficient explosive detection capabilities for checked baggage and cargo. In addition, two aviation explosive security audiovisual programs were distributed on recommended safety procedures when suspect devices are encountered. Also, a film was prepared depicting recommended flight crew responses and procedures in dealing with suspected explosive devices.

Analytical studies have also been made to determine the least-risk bomb locations for some of the types of aircraft in wide use by the air carriers. Also, actual explosive effects tests have been conducted at the National Aviation Facilities Experimental Center. These tests have produced valuable data and future tests are planned.

With the funding cooperation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), a program for the placement of explosive detection dog and handler teams throughout the nation has been implemented. Law enforcement agencies providing support to certain key airports agreed to participate. Two officers and 2 dogs were trained for each of these agencies. The goal is that no threatened aircraft flying over the U.S. is more than one hour from an explosive detection team.

An overall program evaluation conducted by K9 experts from the U.S. Air Force under contract to LEAA, was completed in April. During these evaluation visits, explosive samples were hidden in various locations throughout air terminals and aircraft. All samples were detected by the K9 teams. In actual use, these teams have conducted many searches and have located several explosive items on aircraft and in airports.

#### Compliance and Enforcement

The FAA has the responsibility to ensure compliance by the airlines and the airports with the requirements of applicable FARs. In the case of prescribed security programs and procedures, this involves the monitoring and inspection of nearly 500 airports.

All alleged or apparent violations of security requirements are investigated, reported and appropriate administrative or legal action taken and recorded. Enforcement actions completed during the first 6 months of 1975, together with the investigations still pending, indicates that the enforcement experience for 1975 will be consistent with that of 1974. Since 1973, there has been an upward trend involving enforcement actions against airports. This may be attributable to the fact that a number of airport security requirements involve construction or modification of facilities necessitating budgetary and other financial actions. Until such actions were completed, temporary security measures and procedures were acceptable. However, sufficient time for the planning actions has now elapsed and temporary arrangements not yet replaced may be the basis for initiating actions to obtain compliance with the security regulations. (See Chart IX.)

International

The U.S. has long advocated the implementation of effective international aviation security measures by all member states of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and has urged the constant application of security measures which are often adopted by air carriers and airports only after a security incident and maintained in effect only while a sense of urgency prevailed.

The U.S. continues to pursue along with other states the concept of multilateral action through international law. These efforts have resulted in the adoption of the Tokyo Convention (crimes aboard aircraft), the Hague Convention (unlawful seizure), and the Montreal Convention (sabotage) which have been ratified by 76, 72 and 62 countries, respectively.

The U.S. ratified the Tokyo Convention on September 5, 1969, and it was implemented by PL 91-449. The Hague Convention was ratified by the U.S. September 14, 1971, and implemented by enactment of PL 93-366 August 5, 1974. The Montreal Convention was ratified by the U.S. November 1, 1972, and came into force January 26, 1973. Legislation has not yet been enacted for U.S. implementation.

Resolution A17-10 of the ICAO Seventeenth Assembly (Extraordinary) directed the Secretary General to develop a Manual of Security. U.S. representatives (FAA) were made available for the ICAO working group which developed the Manual. The first edition was published in December 1971. The working group continues to develop necessary amendments and issued the most recent "suggested amendment" to member states for comment June 25, 1975.

A new Annex (Annex 17 - Security) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation was adopted by the Council of ICAO on March 22, 1974, and became applicable on February 27, 1975. The Annex contains Standards and Recommended Practices to safeguard international civil aviation and its facilities against acts of unlawful interference. Following the Orly Airport, Paris, France, missile incidents of January 13 and 19, 1975, and subsequent Israeli initiatives to ICAO, there was a comprehensive review of Annex 17. In June 1975, the ICAO Council recommended upgrading certain material in the Annex and following review and comments by member states, it is expected that these items will be adopted.

On May 21, 1974, the International Air Transport Association recommended certain "minimum security procedures" at international airports. Also, the IATA Director General renewed efforts to persuade governments to ratify the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions and encouraged implementation of ICAO Security Standards and Recommended Practices.

In May 1975, the IATA Executive Committee approved 6 minimum security procedures for use at international airports and 2 additional procedures to be considered when circumstances require. The Executive Committee expressed concern that the security measures are not universally implemented and may be below safe levels noting the trend towards crimes of violence throughout the world and the fact that civil aviation is still a vulnerable target. The Executive Committee reaffirmed its recommendations for screening of all passengers and their carry-on baggage at international airports until the threat to civil aviation has been appreciably reduced.

The FAA participates in the exchange of information and technical assistance on civil aviation security matters with nations throughout the world. These activities include the formation of FAA technical teams to provide advice to foreign nations upon request. Thirteen countries have requested this technical assistance. Also, available upon request are in-depth briefings for foreign aviation and law enforcement officials on all aspects of civil aviation security. Officials from 30 countries have been provided these technical briefings. In addition, 108 representatives of 31 foreign nations have attended the FAA sponsored Aviation Security Training Course at the Transportation Safety Institute. A number of audiovisual training presentations have also been developed and made available to many foreign airlines and governments.

#### Program Effectiveness

The understanding and cooperation of the travelling public in the security measures required to assure safe air travel has contributed immeasurably to their effectiveness and apparent success. The dedicated efforts of the aviation industry, in general, and airport operators and airlines, in particular, in carrying out the necessary security procedures assured industry-wide consistency, efficiency and effectiveness. Although there has not been a successful air carrier hijacking in the almost 3 years since November 10, 1972, the incidence and potential for crimes against civil aviation remain. All parties involved will continue cooperative efforts to maintain security effectiveness in meeting this threat while working toward maximum efficiency and minimum inconvenience in scheduled commercial air travel.


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Department of Transportation  
Federal Aviation Administration

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# HACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT

Goal 2: Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum



DATE	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	TOTAL
ATTEMPTS	1	2	3	6	14	17	0	0	0	43
Successful	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unsuccessful	1	2	3	6	14	17	0	0	0	43

CV	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	TOTAL
TOTAL	3	11	20	35	77	1	7	1	1	122
Successful	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unsuccessful	3	11	20	35	77	1	7	1	1	122

DATE	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	TOTAL
ATTEMPTS	1	2	3	6	14	17	0	0	0	43
Successful	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unsuccessful	1	2	3	6	14	17	0	0	0	43

1/ Includes commercial operations operating in domestic common carriage covered by Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 121.7.  
2/ Hacking in which hijacker is apprehended/Alfied during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit".

CHART I

# CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

## U.S./FOREIGN AIR CARRIER HIJACKINGS





CHART 11

# HACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT

Goal 2: Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum.



CA	From 1968	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Total	3	5	2	3	4	1	2	2	2	2
Successful	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unsuccessful	3	5	2	3	4	1	2	2	2	2

1/ Reporting in which hijacker is apprehended & held during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit."

CA	Year	Operator	Location	Remarks
1	1968	...	...	...
2	1969	...	...	...
3	1970	...	...	...
4	1971	...	...	...
5	1972	...	...	...
6	1973	...	...	...
7	1974	...	...	...
8	1975	...	...	...
9	1976	...	...	...

CHART III

# CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY AIRLINE PASSENGER SCREENING RESULTS

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
<u>PASSENGERS SCREENED - MILLIONS:</u>	*	202.2	200.7	97.2
<u>PASSENGERS DENIED BOARDING</u>	8265	3439	2663	*
<u>REFERRALS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT</u>	*	*	*	5726
<u>PERSONS ARRESTED</u>	3658	3156	3501	1345
<u>AVIATION OFFENSES DETECTED:</u>				
<u>CARRYING WEAPONS EXPLOSIVES ABOARD AIRCRAFT</u>	774	736	1147	623
<u>GIVING FALSE INFORMATION</u>	244	658	1465	152
<u>OTHER OFFENSES DETECTED:</u>				
<u>NARCOTICS</u>	1424	465	593	161
<u>IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION</u>	1152	703	925	332
<u>OTHER</u>	605	562	679	77
<u>WEAPONS DETECTED:</u>				
<u>FIREARMS</u>	1313	2162	2450	2343
<u>EXPLOSIVES</u>	13	3459	14,928	113
<u>AMMUNITION FIREWORKS</u>	*	*	*	12,483
<u>KNIVES</u>	10,316	23,290	21,468	20,878
<u>OTHER</u>	3203	28,740	28,864	26,161

\* NOT AVAILABLE. COLLECTED OR TABULATED

△ UP TO 6 30 75

CHART IV

# CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

## METAL DETECTION DEVICES

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>BASIC CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>UNITS</u>
WALK-THRU PASSIVE	MEASURES DEVIATION IN EARTH'S	INFINETICS	182
	MAGNETIC FIELD. DETECTS FERROUS METALS ONLY.	SCHONSTEDT	4 <hr/> 186
		TOTAL	
WALK-THRU ACTIVE	CREATES AND MEASURES DEVIATIONS IN OWN ELECTRIC FIELD. DETECTS BOTH FERROUS AND NON-FERROUS METALS.	RENS	517
		METOR	108
		SPERRY RAND	104
		SOLCO	98
		WESTINGHOUSE	86
		DENSOK	1 <hr/> 914
		TOTAL	
HAND-HELD ACTIVE	COMPARABLE TO WALK-THRU ACTIVE. LIMITED EFFECTIVE RANGE	RENS	230
		FEDERAL	250
		SOLCO	720
		TOTAL	<hr/> 1200

TOTAL - ALL TYPES - 2300

**CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY**  
**X-RAY BAGGAGE INSPECTION SYSTEMS**

**CHARACTERISTICS:**

SMALL DOSE X-RAY, INTENSIFY IMAGE ELECTRONICALLY.  
DISPLAY ON TV

**OPERATING CRITERIA:**

MEET FDA BRH AND STATE HEALTH STANDARDS  
DISTINGUISH 24 GAUGE WIRE

**LIMITATIONS:**

DEPENDENT ON DILIGENCE OF OPERATORS, DEMANDS  
CONSTANT ATTENTION AND ABILITY TO QUICKLY  
RECOGNIZE DANGEROUS ARTICLE

**SYSTEMS IN USE:**

AMERICAN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING	69
ASTROPHYSICS	111
BEIDIX	83
DENNIS & MILLER	26
PHILIPS ELECTRONIC INSTRUMENTS	46
NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS	1
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>336</b>

6-30-75

CHART VI

Updated By: ACS  
 Source: ACS-20

Issued: 8/22/95  
 Updated: Monthly  
 As Of: 7/1/95

Department of Transportation  
 Federal Aviation Administration

# BOB THREATS AGAINST U.S. AIRPORTS

Goal 2-Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum




CHART VII


Updated By: ACS  
Source: ACS 20

Department of Transportation  
Federal Aviation Administration

Issued: 8-22-75  
Updated: Monthly  
As Of: 7/1/75

# BOOMB THREATS AGAINST U.S. AIRCRAFT AND FOREIGN AIRCRAFT IN THE U.S.

Goal 2-Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum



**CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY**  
**COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS**

<u>AIR CARRIERS (FAR 121.538)</u>	1973	1974	1975 $\Delta$
<b>ACTIONS TAKEN:</b>			
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRECTIONS	152	124	54
NO ACTION	66	36	30
CIVIL PENALTIES (AMOUNT)	<u>43 (\$42,850)</u>	<u>58 (\$75,750)</u>	<u>15 (\$19,200)</u>
INVESTIGATIONS CLOSED	261	218	99
INVESTIGATIONS PENDING			129

<u>AIRPORTS (FAR 107)</u>	1973	1974	1975 $\Delta$
<b>ACTIONS TAKEN:</b>			
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRECTIONS	40	68	50
NO ACTION	11	14	6
CIVIL PENALTIES (AMOUNT)	<u>1 (\$1,000)</u>	<u>14 (\$6,750)</u>	<u>6 (\$7,750)</u>
INVESTIGATIONS CLOSED	52	96	62
INVESTIGATIONS PENDING			33

$\Delta$  UP TO 6 30 75

**DAT  
FILM**