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THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

September 20, 1976

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to forward our Fourth Semi-Annual Report to Congress concerning the effectiveness of the civil aviation security program. This report is submitted in accordance with Public Law 93-366 signed by the President on August 5, 1974.

Notwithstanding the unfortunate September 10 weekend hijacking of a TWA jetliner, the estimates, experience and actions reflected in this report, coupled with the continuing understanding and support of airline passengers, indicate that the civil aviation security measures currently applied by the aviation community are affording air travelers a level of safety and security unmatched in the world. In fact, the actions of the TWA hijackers tend to strengthen this conclusion. In planning their crime, they apparently studied the security measures in place and concluded they could not penetrate the system with real or even simulated weapons. Rather, they had to resort to an assortment of innocent and harmless articles which were assembled and disguised as weapons on board the aircraft. But, even these items were inspected in the screening process and cleared because they were not dangerous.

Although the very nature of air transportation precludes a guarantee of complete invulnerability to criminal acts without defeating its very purpose--the efficient flow of air commerce--a proper balance appears to exist. Moreover, airline and airport security programs appear to be capable of responding to changes in the nature and level of current and future threats. The challenge to maintain the U.S. record of success and to improve the efficiency of security procedures will be met by the continuing teamwork which has proved so effective within the aviation community.

A report has also been sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sincerely,

/signed/ William T. Coleman, Jr.

William T. Coleman, Jr.



THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

September 20, 1976

Honorable Carl Albert
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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/signed/ William T. Coleman, Jr.

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FOURTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM



JANUARY 1 - JUNE 30, 1976

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SERVICE

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is the Fourth Semi-Annual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the six-month period January 1 - June 30, 1976, and is submitted pursuant to Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act as amended by the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-366).

The report includes an analysis of the current threat against civil aviation along with information regarding hijacking attempts, security incidents, bomb threats, and passenger screening activity. It also summarizes actions taken to assure adequate protection of civil air commerce against hijacking/sabotage and related crimes, and other aspects of the program.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The threat of hijacking and sabotage remains significant throughout the world. Contributing to its seriousness, especially in Europe, the Middle East and South America, is the continuing increase in terrorism. Current estimates indicate that the threat of sabotage constitutes the greatest danger to civil aviation.

During the period covered by this report, there were no U.S. air carrier hijackings and only two unsuccessful general aviation hijackings--in one, the hijacker was killed when attempting to transfer to a large aircraft. In contrast, there were six foreign air carrier hijackings during the same period--three of which were successful. In fact, it is now 45 months since the last successful U.S. airline hijacking (November 10, 1972).

Bomb threats against U.S. aircraft and airports increased significantly, due primarily to the great number received in the aftermath of the bombing at New York's La Guardia Airport, December 29, 1975. Although these threats did not result in any explosions or in the detection of live bombs, numerous searches, evacuations, flight delays and diversions were experienced.

Airline and airport security measures continued to afford the necessary level of protection to U.S. air transportation. Perhaps the best evidence of this is the number of hijackings and related crimes prevented. While this number cannot be determined with certainty, the circumstances

involved in at least five incidents support a judgment that the persons involved intended to commit hijackings or related crimes and were prevented from doing so by the security procedures in effect.

Additional evidence of civil aviation security effectiveness is found in the results of current passenger screening procedures which continue to prevent weapons and dangerous articles from being carried aboard aircraft. During the period covered by this report, 1054 handguns were detected in the screening process. In 422 cases the firearms were detected under circumstances which led to the arrest of individuals involved. Of those arrested, 390 were charged with violations of local laws and 32 were charged with violations of Federal statutes.

Increasing concern with the sabotage threat was demonstrated by the work of the joint government-private sector task force immediately following the La Guardia bombing at the close of 1975. That group worked diligently and cooperatively in response to the President's mandate to protect airline passengers and the airline system from acts of violence and destruction. The U.S. aviation community responded immediately and effectively to this national concern. Airport public lockers were closed, relocated or otherwise secured. Explosives security surveys and seminars were conducted at all U.S. air carrier airports--some 20,000 airline, airport and other interested personnel attended more than 850 seminars.

This expansion of aviation security concern from air operations activities to airport public terminal areas was also demonstrated by the assignment of explosives detection dog teams to support six additional airports increasing the number having this support to 24. Action is underway to further expand this coverage to 30 airports. This will result in improved explosives search and detection capability at major U.S. airports accounting for about 75 percent of the 200 million airline passengers enplaned each year. The strategic locations of these airports will enable en route aircraft encountering bomb threats to reach one of them within 30 minutes for search and inspection requirements.

The recently enacted Airport and Airways Development Act Amendments of 1976 will also contribute to improved security at U.S. airports by providing for Federal financial assistance in meeting recently identified

security needs in airport terminal areas, in addition to continuing previously authorized aid for security requirements in air operations areas.

The La Guardia tragedy also focused considerable concern and attention on the security of airline passengers' checked baggage. As a result, on April 15, 1976, U.S. airlines began screening checked baggage under criteria and guidelines jointly developed by the airlines and FAA. The screening procedures have proved effective with no significant passenger inconvenience or adverse impact on airline operations. Although no explosives have been found, the procedures have detected certain apparent criminal activities, thus tending to validate their reliability.

Also contributing to the consistency and effectiveness of industry-wide security procedures, three FAA Advisory Circulars were issued providing guidance for Supplemental Air Carriers, Commuter Airlines and Air Freight Forwarders. In addition, the Air Carrier Standard Security Program which became effective January 1 has gained wide acceptance and is contributing to more efficient U.S. airline security operations.

Foreign air carriers operating scheduled passenger operations to, from and within the United States became subject to FAA security regulations on October 10, 1975. The foreign airlines affected have demonstrated a willingness to comply with the new security requirements which are substantially identical to those required of U.S. air carriers.

In the research and development field, efforts have been accelerated to develop more effective and efficient techniques and equipment to detect explosives on airports, in checked baggage and cargo, and on aircraft. Concepts being considered include x-ray absorption, vapor detection, nuclear magnetic resonance and thermal neutron activation. A number of airport operational tests have been conducted and more are planned.

The estimates, experience and actions reflected in this report, coupled with the continuing understanding and support of airline passengers, indicate that the civil aviation security measures currently applied by the aviation community are affording air travelers a level of safety and security unmatched in the world. Although the very nature of air transportation precludes a guarantee of complete invulnerability to criminal acts

without defeating its very purpose--the efficient flow of air commerce--a proper balance appears to exist. Moreover, airline and airport security programs appear to be capable of responding to changes in the nature and level of current and future threats. The challenge to maintain the U.S. record of success and to improve the efficiency of security procedures will be met by the continuing teamwork which has proved so effective within the aviation community.

III. CURRENT THREAT AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION

The threat of terrorism, including aircraft hijacking and sabotage, continues to be significant throughout the world with the level of danger to lives and property remaining high.

Terrorism has increased worldwide over the past year. Explosives have been planted aboard aircraft; attacks have been directed against airports and airline offices; aircraft have been hijacked; and passengers have been killed and injured.

There appears to be an increase in cooperation between terrorist organizations in various parts of the world. Alliances have been established between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Japanese Red Army and, more recently, among guerrilla groups in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay). Mutual training and financial and technical assistance arrangements increase the impact of these alliances in that they provide small splinter groups with the resources to undertake far more serious operations than they would normally be capable of conducting.

The greatest danger remains in Europe, the Middle East and South America where terrorist groups have strengthened coordination and contacts with other revolutionary organizations. Such cooperation increases the possibility of terrorism on a broad front against international targets, including acts by one organization on behalf of another. With the availability of modern weapons and technology, terrorist and guerrilla groups are being afforded a growing capacity for disruption and destruction.

Sabotage constitutes the greatest threat to civil aviation. Worldwide, during this reporting period, 130 lives were lost and 76 persons injured in 26 incidents involving civil aviation. These incidents include one in-flight explosion that killed 82 persons; four hijacking-related

incidents in which 45 were killed and 64 injured; an airport explosion that killed two persons and injured 10 and an attack against an airport accounting for the death of one individual and injuries to two others. Nine of the 26 incidents occurred in the U.S. and resulted in one death. (See Chart 1)

During the prior reporting period, June through December 1975, there were 32 criminal acts against civil aviation which claimed 84 lives and accounted for 83 injuries. These incidents included one in-flight explosion which killed 64 people; two hijackings in which two were killed and one was injured; four explosions at airports which claimed 12 lives and injured 64 others; two suicides aboard in-flight aircraft; and two attacks against civil aviation facilities which led to four deaths and 18 injuries. Fifteen of the 32 criminal acts, resulting in 14 deaths and 55 injuries, occurred in the U.S.

In the U.S., the absence of any successful airline or general aviation hijackings indicates that current security procedures remain effective. However, five possible hijackings or other related crimes prevented during this reporting period highlight the fact that the threat to civil aviation remains. During the last six months of 1975, 15 possible hijackings or other related crimes were prevented.

IV. INCIDENTS DURING REPORTING PERIOD

Hijacking, sabotage and threats of criminal acts directed against U.S. civil aviation during this period are described below:

Hijackings - There were no U.S. air carrier hijackings and only two hijackings involving general aviation in the U.S.

- o Air Carrier Aircraft - In contrast to no U.S. air carrier hijackings, there were six foreign air carrier hijackings, three of which were successful. In the last six months of 1975, there was one unsuccessful hijacking of a U.S. air carrier aircraft and five foreign air carrier hijackings, one of which was successful. (See Charts 2 & 4)

- o General Aviation Aircraft - There were two hijackings involving U.S. general aviation aircraft and one involving a foreign general aviation aircraft. In the last half of 1975 there were four U.S. general aviation hijackings, two of which were successful. Neither of the attempts in the U.S. this year were successful, although in both incidents the lives of innocent individuals involved were seriously jeopardized. (See Chart 3)
- The first general aviation hijacking of 1976 occurred April 18 when an armed man commandeered a small aircraft and demanded to be flown to Mexico. The man was shot and killed in Denver, Colorado, after he and two hostages transferred to a larger aircraft.
- The second originated in Denver on May 13. In this incident, an armed man chartered a flight purportedly for a trip to Houston, Texas. While in the air the man attempted to shoot the pilot and co-pilot but his weapon did not discharge. He was subdued and taken into custody.

Aircraft/Airport Sabotage - Summaries of sabotage incidents follow:

- o On February 9 a man threw an unlighted Molotov cocktail through a glass door on the lower level of a terminal at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. The plate glass was shattered; however, no injuries occurred. The individual involved was arrested and is presently in a mental health facility to determine if he is competent to stand trial.
- o On June 22 an explosive device was discovered aboard a general aviation aircraft at Lubbock, Texas. The device was incendiary in nature and was discovered before any damage occurred.
- o One explosion occurred at a U.S. airport during the reporting period. Two vehicles in a public parking area at New York's Kennedy Airport were firebombed on June 23. The two vehicles were damaged, however, no injuries resulted.

Bomb Threats - Threats involving the use of explosives against aircraft and airports in the U.S. increased by 45 percent over the previous reporting period. There were 1148 bomb threats reported against aircraft and 724 against airports. These figures represent an 18 percent increase in aircraft bomb threats and a 130 percent increase in airport bomb threats over the June-December 1975 reporting period.

The significant increase is due mainly to numerous threats received during January 1976 after wide publicity was given to the bomb explosion at La Guardia Airport on December 29, 1975. In the first week of January over 300 threats directed against airports and aircraft across the nation were reported. After the January increase, bomb threats against aircraft returned to a pattern more consistent with the previous reporting period but threats against airports are still averaging higher than in 1975. Forty of the threats during this reporting period were accompanied by extortion demands on the airlines or airports involved. (See Charts 5 & 6)

In the last report it was recognized that many of the bomb threats against aircraft are made at the passenger screening points by persons attempting to be humorous and frequently are made in a manner which make them inherently unbelievable. To obtain a more accurate picture of the significance of bomb threats, a distinction has been made between frivolous-type threats and the more serious threats. It is believed that a separate analysis of serious threats, as defined in Chart 5, provides a more accurate account of the adverse effects on the aviation industry.

An analysis of bomb threats against aircraft from January-June 1976 indicates there were 429 in the serious category, representing about 37 percent of the 1148 total. This approaches the 39 percent reported in the previous period. About 73 percent (312) of the serious threats were received telephonically. The others were made either verbally at screening points or other locations, or in a written or visual form. The threats resulted in at least 150 reported flight delays or diversions and at least 225 aircraft searches, each contributing to passenger inconvenience and disruption of airline operations. The threats were not concentrated against any particular airline--they involved 47 air carriers, including 22 foreign. Thirty-eight, or about 9 percent, of the serious threats were directed against foreign air carriers.

Almost all of the 724 bomb threats against airports had to be taken seriously since 94 percent were received telephonically making immediate evaluation difficult. These threats resulted in at least 88 evacuations of airport facilities, at least 488 searches and contributed to at least 28 air carrier flight delays. The threats involved 116 airports across the nation.

Aircraft and airport bomb threats resulted in 120 reports of persons arrested under Federal or local statutes. Ninety-one resulted in local charges against the subjects and 29 in Federal charges. In 8 of the 29 Federal cases, civil penalties were levied. Two others resulted in sentences of 3 months probation and 9 months in custody; and in three cases, charges were later dismissed. The prosecutive disposition of the remaining 16 Federal cases has not yet been reported.

Possible Hijackings or Other Crimes Prevented - The number of hijacking attempts or other crimes against civil aviation prevented or deterred as a result of airline and airport security procedures cannot be determined with certainty. However, the number of firearms detected at passenger screening points under suspicious circumstances and the number of individuals apprehended while attempting to gain unauthorized access to aircraft indicate that some of these individuals were intent on committing a crime. In at least five incidents it appears the individuals involved intended to commit a crime against aviation and were prevented from doing so by security procedures. The five incidents are summarized below:

- o A female passenger went through a passenger screening point successfully with no weapons being discovered. Several minutes later she left the security area to go to a restroom and upon return a loaded .25 caliber automatic pistol was discovered in her purse. The airline screening agent was sure the passenger did not have the weapon when initially screened. She was charged with the Federal offense of attempting to carry a weapon aboard aircraft. She subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced to one year in the custody of the Attorney General.

- o A ticketed passenger was arrested on local charges involving possession of a fully loaded automatic pistol which was concealed in a tape recorder. The weapon was discovered by airline screening personnel as the tape recorder was processed through an x-ray inspection unit. Local prosecution is pending.
- o A loaded .22 caliber pistol, tucked into the waistband of a female passenger's blue jeans and hidden by her blouse, was discovered during screening through a weapons detector. The passenger had twice activated the detector and when asked if she had a weapon replied "no." When the weapons detector activated a third time, she admitted she had the weapon. She pled guilty to a Federal charge of attempting to carry a weapon aboard aircraft and was sentenced to one year probation.
- o After an airline agent refused to accept a check for payment of a ticket because of insufficient identification, a man pointed a gun at the agent and demanded he be given a ticket to his destination. He was apprehended by local police before reaching an aircraft, arrested and jailed under \$6,000 bond.
- o After activating a walk-through weapons detector three times and denying having a weapon, a passenger was screened using a hand-held weapons detector. A .38 caliber revolver was found under the waistband of the passenger's trousers. Subject was charged with attempting to carry a weapon aboard an aircraft, appeared before a U.S. Magistrate and was released on \$3,000 personal recognizance bond.

V. EFFECTIVENESS OF PASSENGER SCREENING PROGRAM

During this reporting period more than 191 million persons (passengers and non-passengers) were processed through the airline screening points at the nation's airports. The screening procedures continue to be effective in preventing weapons and dangerous articles from being carried aboard aircraft. Screening equipment used by the airlines continues to consist of walk-through weapons detectors for individuals and x-ray inspection systems for carry-on items, especially at high-volume stations. (See Charts 7 & 8)

In the past, FAA has collected and distributed reports on the type and quantity of all weapons and dangerous devices detected in the passenger screening process. To reduce the possibility of confusion and distortion related to the detection of items during the screening process, reporting and analytical procedures have been refined to focus attention and resources on those weapons and dangerous devices considered to present the greatest threat to aviation security. Specifically, analysis of passenger screening activities now concentrates on the detection of firearms and explosive/incendiary devices along with related intelligence, arrest, and prosecutive information.

The detection of 2840 firearms, including 1054 handguns, represents an increase of 16 percent over the 2440 firearms detected during the previous reporting period. The number of handguns detected represents a 2 percent increase over the 1035 detected during the previous period. Of the 1054 handguns detected, 68 percent (722) were found by x-ray inspection of carry-on items, 17 percent (177) by physical search of carry-on items and 15 percent (155) by weapons detector screening of individuals. (See Chart 9)

In 422 reported cases, firearms were detected under circumstances which led to the arrest of individuals under Federal or local statutes. These 422 arrests involved the operations of some 20 U.S. air carriers at 68 U.S. airports. Twenty-three large hub airports (e.g., Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chicago) accounted for 284 or 67 percent of the arrests, and 19 medium hub airports (e.g., Memphis, Nashville, Indianapolis) for 103 or 24 percent. The other 35 arrests occurred at 26 small and non-hub airports. A closer analysis indicates that seven large and medium hub airports--Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Memphis, and Tampa--accounted for 213 or slightly more than 50 percent of all reported firearms arrests.

The 422 reported firearms arrests include 390 cases in which local charges were filed against the persons involved and 32 cases in which Federal criminal charges were filed. Of the 390 local cases, fines were levied in at least 30, and penalties of probation or supervision were handed down in at least 18. Charges were dismissed

in 20 cases and the prosecutive disposition of the remaining 322 local cases has not yet been reported. The 32 Federal cases resulted in 10 convictions with sentences including fines, probation and/or confinement. Two Federal cases were reported to have been dismissed and the disposition of the remaining 20 has not yet been reported.

VI. CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY ACTIONS

Airport and airline security measures in effect continue to yield dividends in increased safety for air travelers, air crewmembers, scheduled airlines, and air carrier airports. During this reporting period a number of significant actions were taken to maintain this level of security for U.S. civil air commerce.

Airport Security - There is heightened security awareness and increased vigilance at U.S. air carrier airports. Specific actions were initiated by airport operators to provide better security and protection for people and property in airport terminals. Some of the contributing initiatives are highlighted below:

- o Explosives Security Surveys and Seminars - In the last report it was indicated that airport explosives security surveys had been initiated to identify explosives security needs and to develop appropriate and effective countermeasures. During this reporting period, 466 surveys were completed at all U.S. airports served by air carriers. The surveys produced short and long-range recommendations for improved security of public locker facilities, baggage claim and makeup areas and other sensitive or vulnerable locations.

Concurrently, FAA explosives security specialists conducted 863 seminars attended by 19,886 airport, airline and other interested personnel. The surveys and seminars were well received. (See Chart 10)

- o Explosives Detection Dog Teams - Coverage of FAA-sponsored explosives detection dog teams has been expanded from 18 to 24 airports throughout the nation. In addition to the six new jurisdictions now participating, action has been initiated to expand this capability to 30 airports. Locations

selected for these teams provide the capability for en route aircraft over the U.S. to divert to one of the airports where the explosives detection support is available within 30 minutes.

(See Chart 11)

Several participating law enforcement agencies have added locally trained teams to augment their capability. Most of these teams have been tested by U.S. Air Force experts who also provide the training for the FAA-sponsored program under contract to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Those meeting established standards are certified for use in support of the air industry.

The FAA recently completed an analysis of the second annual U.S. Air Force evaluation of participating teams. This analysis indicates that the teams scored 99.2 percent in detecting various quantities and types of explosives in aircraft, vehicles and airport locations. They had a false detection rate of 3.7 percent. Search time averaged 16 minutes for aircraft, 18 minutes for terminal areas and 15 minutes for public locker facilities. To date, the teams have discovered 22 explosives substances in the course of 1038 actual aircraft/airport searches. (See Chart 12)

- o Financial Assistance for Airports - The Airport and Airway Development Act Amendments of 1976, signed by the President as Public Law 94-353, contain a number of provisions that will significantly enhance the ability of airport operators to implement adequate security measures. Particularly noteworthy is the coverage of the cost of certain eligible security equipment designed for use in the airport terminal.
- o Federal Aviation Regulation Part 107 - A complete revision of the regulation that established basic airport security requirements is currently underway. The proposed recodification, which will be made available for public comment through a Notice of Proposed Rule Making, includes numerous changes based on nearly three years experience with the current regulation. Consistent with the current threat estimate that sabotage constitutes the greatest danger and with the provisions of the

Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, it is contemplated that the revision will provide for more flexible and comprehensive local law enforcement presence and capability to insure the safety of persons traveling in air transportation from acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy. This would be an expansion of current requirements for law enforcement support, primarily for airline passenger screening activities.

- o Aviation Security Training School - The civil aviation security training program was established at the Transportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, in January 1973. The current eight-day course provides in-depth coverage of civil aviation security requirements and procedures. To date, 58 classes have been conducted for 1394 students, including 997 local police officers, 205 FAA security personnel, 24 representatives of other U.S. Government agencies, 19 aviation industry officials, as well as 156 foreign students. At least one police officer from 373 U.S. air carrier airports has now attended this course. In addition to the formal classes at Oklahoma City, 11 special two-day seminars, attended by 676 persons, have been conducted at eight other locations.

Aircraft Security - The Air Carrier Standard Security Program is accomplishing the objectives which led to its development. Since it became effective January 1, it has been adopted by 29 U.S. airlines. It is contributing to greater efficiency and uniformity in airline security operations. Also, additional steps were taken to supplement existing security procedures for checked baggage and to promote increased consistency and effectiveness in industry-wide security procedures.

- o Checked Baggage - Another of the tragedies of the La Guardia bombing--beyond the deaths, injuries and property damage--was the widespread exposure of the vulnerability of airline checked baggage. This resulted from an erroneous initial news report that the device that exploded was in a piece of arriving checked baggage. In fact, there was no evidence then, nor is there today, indicating that the device had been on an aircraft or was intended to be placed aboard an aircraft.

Nevertheless, considerable attention was devoted to the security of passenger checked baggage. As

a result, Federal Aviation Regulation 121.538 was amended to require airlines to adopt and put into use a screening system designed to prevent or deter the carriage of any explosive or incendiary device in checked baggage aboard aircraft. On April 15, 1976, U.S. airlines began screening checked baggage under criteria and guidelines developed jointly with FAA. This baggage screening procedure was determined to be the best approach after extensive study of other alternatives.

The baggage screening procedures have proved effective with no significant passenger inconvenience or adverse impact on airline operations. Although no explosive devices have been found, a number of apparent criminal acts have been uncovered. Examples include detection of a large sum of currency and a stolen gun and varying amounts of narcotics in checked baggage identified in the screening process. These instances tend to validate the reliability of the screening criteria and guidelines.

- o Air Taxi Commercial Operators - Although three Air Taxi Commercial Operators which had elected to voluntarily implement security procedures consistent with those required of scheduled air carriers went out of business, three others have elected to adhere to the security procedures. Seven commuter airline operators now have approved security programs and several more are in the process of developing acceptable procedures.
- o Advisory Circulars - During this period three advisory circulars were issued outlining security measures for Air Taxi and Commercial Operators (commuter airlines), Indirect Air Carriers (air freight forwarders), and Supplemental Air Carriers (charter operators).
- o Foreign Air Carriers - As noted in the previous report, FAR 129 was amended, effective after October 9, 1975, to require foreign air carriers engaged in scheduled passenger operations conducted with large aircraft to, from and within the United States, to use security programs similar to those used by U.S. air carriers. Sixty-eight foreign air carriers conducting about 180,000 scheduled flights to and from the U.S. each year

are covered by this regulation. These 68 carriers serve 29 U.S. airports from 103 airports in 82 countries. Experience to date indicates foreign air carriers are generally complying with the new requirements. Their cooperative efforts constitute a significant contribution to civil aviation security worldwide.

Research and Development - Efforts have been accelerated to develop more effective and efficient techniques and equipment for the detection of explosives at airports, in checked baggage, in cargo and on aircraft. New equipment and procedures must be quick and effective. They must be reliable, easily maintained and operable by relatively unskilled personnel. They must not present any hazards to persons or the environment or damage luggage or its contents and airports, airlines and passengers must also be able to afford them.

All feasible systems and methods for detecting explosives are being explored. Some of the specific concepts under development include x-ray absorption, vapor detection, nuclear magnetic resonance and thermal neutron activation. Operational tests were conducted at Dulles and Pittsburgh International Airports, and additional demonstrations are planned. (See Chart 13)

International Activities - Due to the worldwide threat of criminal activities directed toward the civil air transportation system, U.S. Government and industry representatives continued their efforts to seek implementation of effective civil aviation security programs by all nations.

Many governments have developed and implemented such programs and the results are reflected in worldwide hijacking statistics. During the period 1970-71, there were 141 hijacking attempts worldwide; whereas, during 1974-75 this figure was reduced to 51. During the first half of 1976, there was a total of 9.

There is, however, a growing concern with the menace of international terrorism. Although the number of hijackings has decreased dramatically, fatalities and injuries attributable to acts of sabotage, or other criminal attacks, are on the increase. During the period 1970-71, when hijackings were at their peak, crimes against civil aviation resulted in 123 deaths

and 41 injuries. However, during 1974-75, there were 258 individuals killed and 221 injured. From January 1 through June 30, 1976, there were 130 deaths and 76 injuries.

Some of the more significant multilateral actions which contribute to safer air travel for U.S. citizens follow:

- o International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) - Amendment No. 1 to Security Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation was adopted by the ICAO Council March 31, 1976, and will become applicable on December 30, 1976. This amendment upgrades three previously Recommended Practices to Standards, i.e., (1) contracting states shall establish a civil aviation security program. (2) the appropriate authority shall establish or arrange for the establishment of an aerodrome security committee at each international aerodrome. (3) states responsible for providing air traffic services for an aircraft which is the subject of an act of unlawful interference shall collect and compile all pertinent information on that flight and transmit same to all other states where the aircraft is known or presumed to be flying.

On the same date the ICAO Council also adopted measures which upgrade and expand security provisions contained in Annex 9 - Facilitation. In summary, the Recommended Practice regarding unauthorized weapons aboard passenger-carrying aircraft was upgraded to a Standard and new Recommended Practices regarding unauthorized weapons aboard aircraft not carrying passengers and establishment of procedures to prevent unauthorized introduction of explosives and incendiary devices in baggage or cargo were established. The revised Annex will be applicable on December 15, 1976.

- o International Air Transport Association (IATA) - On May 18, 1976, the IATA Executive Committee approved revised Minimum Security Procedures for Implementation at International Airports as recommended by its Security Advisory Committee. The only major revision of procedures adopted in May 1975 concerned positioning of law enforcement officers. The previous recommendation was that a law enforcement officer be assigned to the screening area as backup to and separate from the guards

conducting search, while the current recommendation states that law enforcement officers should be readily available to assist in dealing with suspected or actual cases of unlawful interference with civil aviation.

- o International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) - INTERPOL continues to assist in the exchange of information regarding location of individuals who have committed acts of terrorism as well as providing an international communications network on threats of such criminal attacks. Civil Aviation Security is included on the agenda of the INTERPOL General Assembly each year. Attendance by the ICAO Security Officer has assured closer cooperation between aviation security forces and law enforcement entities in countries throughout the world.
- o European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) - On January 28, 1976, six recommendations on civil aviation security took effect among the 20 member states of ECAC. The measures relate primarily to the screening of passengers and baggage as well as to the protection of aircraft and facilities at airports. This collective effort to achieve common and high security standards is considered a significant step forward in tightening security at major Western Europe airports.
- o Foreign Technical Assistance - In addition to multi-lateral efforts, FAA continues to pursue a bilateral program of technical assistance and exchange of information. These activities include the formation of technical teams to provide advice and assistance to foreign nations upon request. This is funded through a recent Interagency Agreement with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration which provides funds for visits to a limited number of countries. The program was initiated during this reporting period with a visit to Colombia.

Also available upon request are in-depth briefings on all aspects of civil aviation security for foreign aviation and law enforcement officials. Officials from 62 countries have been provided these technical briefings. In addition, 156 representatives of 45 foreign nations and U.S. territories have attended the FAA-sponsored Aviation Security Training Course at the Transportation Safety Institute. Attendance of

approximately 25 of these students was funded under another FAA/LEAA Agreement. Also, a number of audio-visual training presentations have been developed and made available to many officials of foreign airlines and governments. (See Chart 14)

VII. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

The civil aviation security program is implemented through a series of Federal Aviation Regulations and, as with any laws, the regulations are subject to both inadvertent and deliberate violations. The FAA approach is to prevent such violations, to the greatest extent possible, by fostering an atmosphere of voluntary compliance.

Nevertheless, there are occasional incidents involving failures to comply. These incidents are investigated and appropriate corrective actions taken, which may include Letters of Correction or Warnings, or in serious cases, the assessment of civil penalties.

During this reporting period, 450 investigations were completed involving alleged violations of FAA security regulations by airports, passengers, and U.S. and foreign air carriers. Thirty-six cases resulted in payments of civil penalties amounting to \$26,900; 110 were closed with administrative corrective action and 78 were closed with no action. The total investigations completed also include 226 Warnings issued to air carriers and airport operators. (See Chart 15)

VIII. OUTLOOK

Much progress has been made throughout the world to combat the threat to aviation posed by terrorists, hijackers and saboteurs. Much remains to be done. International cooperation and combined government-industry efforts to meet this threat are necessary. Work will continue to assure the availability and capability of the resources and "know-how" necessary to accomplish this task.

In summary, we are convinced the civil aviation security procedures in use are capable of responding effectively to the changing nature and level of current and future threats. In continuing efforts to achieve the goal of protecting airline passengers and the air transportation system from acts of violence and destruction, the complacency that inevitably follows success must be overcome. By maintaining vigilance and continuing the teamwork within the aviation community, we will meet this challenge.

Civil Aviation Security

The Threat to U.S. Aviation

	1961-7	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
HIJACKING ATTEMPTS	12	22	40	27	27	31	2	7	12	2
EXPLOSIONS:										
AIRCRAFT	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	2	0
AIRPORTS						2	2	4	4	1
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FOUND:										
AIRCRAFT					1	2	2	1	1	2
AIRPORTS					5	5	3	11	5	1
BOMB THREATS TO:										
AIRCRAFT			400	601	1145	2156	1383	1453	1853	1148
AIRPORTS					212	288	239	387	449	724
CARGO THEFT-PILFERAGE						\$4.5M	6.0M	6.4M	5.5M	.

*FIGURES UNAVAILABLE

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CHART 1


Updated By: ACS
Source: ACS 20

Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

Issued: 7/23/76
Updated: Bi Annually
As of: 7/1/76

HIJACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT ^{1/}

Goal 2 - Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum



CY	HIJACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT ^{1/}										
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	TOTAL
TOTAL	9	17	40	25	29	27	1	3	6	0	151
Successful	4	13	33	17	11	8	0	0	0	0	86
Incomplete ^{2/}	1	1	7	7	8	14	1	1	1	0	55
Unsuccessful	4	3	0	7	10	8	0	2	5	0	50

^{1/} Includes commercial operators operating in interstate common carriage covered by Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 121.7

^{2/} Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended/ killed during hijacking as a result of "hot pursuit"

DATE	AIR CARRIER	FLIGHT NO.	CITY ORIGIN	CITY DESTINATION	1975		1976		REMARKS
					ATTEMPTS	ATTEMPTS	ATTEMPTS	ATTEMPTS	
12/13	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/14	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/15	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/16	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/17	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/18	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/19	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/20	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/21	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/22	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/23	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/24	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/25	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/26	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/27	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/28	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/29	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/30	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful
12/31	DELTA	101	MEMPHIS	ATLANTA	1	0	0	0	Unsuccessful


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Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration

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HIJACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. AND FOREIGN AIRCRAFT

Goal 2: Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum




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As of: 7/1/76

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BOMB THREATS AGAINST U.S. AIRCRAFT & FOREIGN AIRCRAFT IN THE U.S.

Goal 2: Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum.



Analysis: The significant increase shown for December 1977 and January 1978 is the result of an explosion at LeGarde Airport on December 29, 1977. Threats have been relatively consistent in the other months.

A statement is considered a serious threat if one of the following occurs:

1. It is directed against a particular aircraft or flight.
2. It is not possible to immediately determine if it is made in a joking manner.
3. It results in inconvenience to other passengers.
4. It results in a search or otherwise disrupts airline operations.


Updated By: ACS
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Issued: 8/1/76
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 As of 7/1/76

BOMB THREATS AGAINST U.S. AIRPORTS

Goal 2: Reduce Aviation Security Incidents to an Absolute Minimum



TOTAL BY CALENDAR YEAR	
CY	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
1974	10
1975	260
1976	260
1977	260
1978	260

Analysis: The significant increases in threats in August 1974 and December 1975 and January 1976 are the result of explosions at Los Angeles International Airport on August 6, 1974, and LaGuardia Airport on December 29, 1975.

**CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
WEAPON DETECTION DEVICES**

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>BASIC CHARACTERISTICS</u>	<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>UNITS</u>
WALK-THRU ACTIVE	CREATES AND MEASURES DEVIATIONS IN OWN ELECTRIC FIELD. DETECTS BOTH FERROUS AND NON-FERROUS METALS.	RENS	641
		INFINETICS	195
		METOR	131
		SOLCO	69
		WESTINGHOUSE	40
		SPERRY RAND	30
		SENTRIE	2
	TOTAL		1108
HAND-HELD ACTIVE	COMPARABLE TO WALK- THRU ACTIVE LIMITED EFFECTIVE RANGE.	RENS	230
		FEDERAL	250
		SOLCO	720
		TOTAL	1200

TOTAL - ALL TYPES - 2308

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CHART 7

CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

X-RAY BAGGAGE INSPECTION SYSTEMS

CHARACTERISTICS: SMALL DOSE X-RAY, INTENSIFY IMAGE ELECTRONICALLY,
DISPLAY ON TV

OPERATING CRITERIA: MEET FDA/BRH AND STATE HEALTH STANDARDS
DISTINGUISH 24 GAUGE WIRE

LIMITATIONS: DEPENDENT ON DILIGENCE OF OPERATORS, DEMANDS
CONSTANT ATTENTION AND ABILITY TO QUICKLY
RECOGNIZE DANGEROUS ARTICLE

SYSTEMS IN USE:

AMERICAN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING	69
ASTROPHYSICS	127
BENDIX	99
DENNIS & MILLER	34
PHILIPS ELECTRONIC INSTRUMENTS	68
NEW SECURITY CONCEPTS	6

TOTAL: 403

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CHART 8

**CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
AIRLINE PASSENGER SCREENING RESULTS
JANUARY - JUNE 1976**

<u>PERSONS SCREENED (MILLIONS)</u>	191.1
<u>WEAPONS DETECTED</u>	
<u>FIREARMS</u>	2940
(1) HANDGUNS	1054
(2) LONG GUNS	101
(3) OTHER	1605
EXPLOSIVE/INCENDIARY DEVICES	7
<u>PERSONS ARRESTED</u>	
<u>FOR CARRIAGE OF FIREARMS/EXPLOSIVES</u>	422
<u>FOR GIVING FALSE INFORMATION</u>	119
<u>OTHER OFFENSES DETECTED</u>	
<u>NARCOTICS</u>	176
<u>ILLEGAL ALIENS</u>	302
<u>OTHER</u>	734

SOURCE - MONTHLY REPORTS OF PASSENGER
SCREENING ACTIVITIES AT
U.S. AIRPORTS

REGIONAL EXPLOSIVE SECURITY SURVEYS AND SEMINARS


REGION	AIRPORTS SURVEYED	SEMINARS CONDUCTED	PERSONNEL ATTENDING
NORTHEAST	21	18	507
EASTERN	41	63	2,626
SOUTHERN	75	141	3,637
GREAT LAKES	71	78	1,828
CENTRAL	39	70	1,200
ROCKY MOUNTAIN	55	93	1,783
SOUTHWEST	56	166	3,669
WESTERN	36	56	1,779
NORTHWEST	17	21	762
ALASKA	45	110	1,189
PACIFIC	10	47	986
TOTALS	466	863	19,886

SURVEYS AND SEMINARS RESULTED IN SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS BEING TAKEN, SUCH AS THE
CLOSING OR RELOCATION OF PUBLIC LOCKERS AND IMPROVED SECURITY FOR OTHER VULNERABLE
AREAS.

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CHART 10

FAA SPONSORED EXPLOSIVE DETECTION K9 TEAMS LOCATIONS & UTILIZATION



TOTAL AIRCRAFT & AIRPORT SEARCHES	1020
TOTAL EXPLOSIVE ITEMS DETECTED	27
TOTAL MISSIONS IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES	1041
TOTAL EXPLOSIVE ITEMS DETECTED	05
* FUTURE LOCATIONS	

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AS OF: 7/1/76

CHART 11

EXPLOSIVE DETECTION K9 TEAM EFFECTIVENESS

	<u>AVERAGE SEARCH TIMES REQUIRED</u>
AIRCRAFT	16 MINUTES
TERMINAL BUILDINGS	18 MINUTES
COIN OPERATED LOCKERS.....	15 MINUTES
VEHICLES	9 MINUTES
CARGO & BAGGAGE AREAS	18 MINUTES

REACTED TO EXPLOSIVE PLANTS - 99.2%
FALSE ALERTS - 3.7%

SOURCE: FY 78 EVALUATIONS.

**CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
CHECKED BAGGAGE EXPLOSIVE DETECTION**

- **X-RAY ABSORPTION**
**PROTOTYPE CARRY-ON BAGGAGE SYSTEM TESTED -- GREATER
PITTSBURGH AIRPORT.**
**TWO UNITS DESIGNED FOR CHECKED BAGGAGE AVAILABLE
NOVEMBER 1 AND APRIL 1. OPERATIONAL TEST DCA/AA
NOVEMBER -- DECEMBER**
- **THERMAL NEUTRON ACTIVATION**
**FEASIBILITY DEMONSTRATION COMPLETED JULY 31. AIRPORT
OPERATIONAL TEST TO BE SCHEDULED.**
- **NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE**
**EVALUATION OF LABORATORY MODEL TO BE COMPLETED
JANUARY 1977.**
- **VAPOR DETECTION**
**TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS CENTER EVALUATING ALL
COMMERCIALY AVAILABLE DETECTORS. RESULTS OCTOBER 1, 1976.**

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CHART 13

CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

<u>ACTIONS</u>	<u>COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING</u>
• FAA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM VISITS	14
• AVIATION/LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS BRIEFINGS	62
• TRAINING PROGRAMS:	
- TSI COURSE (STUDENTS)	45 (156)
- ANTIHIJACKING TACTICS	26
- GROUND EXPLOSIVE PROCEDURES	49
- INFLIGHT EXPLOSIVE PROCEDURES	64
• ANALYTICAL STUDIES DISTRIBUTION	13
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CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

U.S. AIR CARRIERS (FAR 121.530)

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976*</u>
WARNINGS ISSUED			329	154
LETTERS OF CORRECTION	152	124	128	45
NO ACTION	66	36	63	53
CIVIL PENALTIES (AMOUNT)	43 (\$42,850)	58 (\$75,750)	56 (\$45,300)	28 (\$21,250)
INVESTIGATIONS CLOSED	<u>261</u>	<u>218</u>	<u>576</u>	<u>200</u>
INVESTIGATIONS PENDING				141

FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS (FAR 129.25)

LETTERS OF CORRECTION				6
NO ACTION			1	1
INVESTIGATIONS PENDING			<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
			3	9

AIRPORTS (FAR 107)

WARNINGS ISSUED			155	72
LETTERS OF CORRECTION	40	60	83	41
NO ACTION	11	14	7	3
CIVIL PENALTIES (AMOUNT)	1 (\$1,000)	14 (\$8,750)	16 (\$14,450)	7 (\$5,300)
INVESTIGATIONS CLOSED	<u>52</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>231</u>	<u>123</u>
INVESTIGATIONS PENDING				33

INDIVIDUAL (FAR 121.505)

ADMINISTRATIVE CORRECTIONS			1	18
NO ACTION			2	21
CIVIL PENALTIES (AMOUNT)			1 (\$25)	1 (\$350)
INVESTIGATIONS CLOSED			<u>4</u>	<u>40</u>
INVESTIGATIONS PENDING				0

*AS OF 7/1/76

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CHART 15

DATE
ILME