Equilibrium Policy Proposals with Abstentions.
Abstract
This paper analyzes spatial models of electoral competitions with abstentions in which candidates have directional or local strategy sets. It includes, as a special case, situations in which incumbents must defend the status quo. The results derived here provide necessary and sufficient conditions for directional, convergent stationary and convergent local electoral equilibria for these spatial models. These conditions provide a method for finding such equilibria. They also provide existence results for directional, stationary and local electoral equilibria for societies with abstentions. The results on stationary and local electoral equilibria are obtained by analyzing cumulative plurality (or plurality potential) functions. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 1981
- Accession Number
- ADA111672
Entities
People
- Peter Coughlin
Organizations
- Stanford University