


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A176	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER 230
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The Caribbean - Implications for the US Army	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Student Essay	
	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER	
7. AUTHOR(s) LTC (P) Frank Zachar	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same	12. REPORT DATE 16 April 1982	
	13. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified	
	15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) A survey of historical, political, social and economic forces and trends in the Caribbean. Thesis is that Caribbean is and will continue to be a volatile region which has the potential for major security, political and economic crises for the US. Thus, the US Army must focus attention on the region--for contingency planning and also in development assistance.		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH BASED ESSAY

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THE CARIBBEAN -- IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US ARMY

BY

LTC(P) FRANK ZACHAR



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THE CARIBBEAN — IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US ARMY

I. General

Americans, as well as the rest of the world, are becoming more and more aware of the fact that there is a Central America—and a Caribbean Basin. There are nagging daily news items concerning a war in El Salvador, Cuban involvement in Nicaragua, boat people from Haiti, human rights violations in the Dominican Republic, etc. Virtually none of the news is good news for America—it all seems like so much of someone else's problem and so far from our vital interests. Sort of like Laos and the Plain of Jars sounded to us back in 1964. Not one in ten Americans could rough-in the international boundaries in Central America or even name in proper sequence the countries that are located there. Probably not one in a thousand could name the independent island countries in the Caribbean Basin. Ketchup as a vegetable in government subsidized school lunches is an issue that seems to strike closer to home than turmoil in "the banana republics". And yet we see the President and Secretaries of State and Defense obviously increasing the American involvement (and expenditure of funds) in the area. One thing that seems to be uniformly accepted is that there is no strong American support for direct US military involvement in the area.

Events in El Salvador and neighboring Central American countries have seemingly gained the lion's share of government foreign policy

concern and press coverage of late. And certainly while that part of the world does in fact seem to be on fire, there lurks yet another nearby area—the islands in the Caribbean Basin—which has yet to realize its full potential for creating problems for America. These islands cannot be lumped with Central American nations as if they were part of the same subregion. The history, institutions, culture, tradition and circumstances of the two areas are very different and it is distorting to try to consider the two together in any kind of unified concept.¹ While totally divorcing the islands from events in Central America is neither possible nor desirable, this paper will focus on the Caribbean Basin islands and sea areas as they relate to each other and to major world powers.

II. Geography and Sea Lanes

The Caribbean, when visualized by most Americans, consists of islands with beautiful white-sand beaches, quaint little towns peopled by smiling, friendly natives and crystal clear water supporting luxury charter yachts riding at anchor above exotic corals and fish. It is always pleasantly warm and the winds are consistent and kind. It is a geographical and climatic paradise in our backyard. Better than Buffalo.

In specifics, the region under review in this paper (see Annex A) runs from the Bahamas (200 miles east of the tip of Florida) and Cuba (100 miles South of Florida) east southeast for approximately 1500 miles to Antigua and then curving to the south for a distance of approximately 500 miles to Trinidad. Included in that giant skeletal tail chain are some 7,000 islands and reefs. The larger east-west islands (Cuba, Jamaica, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico) are collectively known

as the Greater Antilles while those smaller, north-south islands are called the Lesser Antilles. Of the Lesser Antilles, those from Anguilla to Guadeloupe are known as the Leeward Islands while those further south are known as the Windward Islands. Non-sailors forget how these distinctions among Spanish Main ports-of-call came to be but these terms continue to be employed as a means to group islands and peoples who otherwise could not logically be tied together. Sort of like "Western Europe".

The topography of the islands range from lush sea level tropics to higher broad grasslands to the high peak of Pico Duarte (10,417 ft) in the center of the Dominican Republic. The smaller islands are in fact the steep peaks of some very high drowned mountains. Land that is not used for housing or agriculture would be called lush forestation—jungle to some.

The Caribbean Sea is deep—the average depth runs around 2,000 feet deep with one point off of Puerto Rico being the deepest point in the Atlantic (-28,374 ft).² Weather, winds and tides are all favorable to the international shipping and luxury yacht chartering trade. The islands do, however, present barriers to shipping and consequently force sea routes to such passages as the Yucatan Channel (between Mexico and Cuba), the Windward Passage (between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico) or to smaller, more hazardous channels.

III. Major Historical Regional Concerns and Involvements

Anthropologists maintain that the "Indians" first seen in 1492 by Columbus at San Salvador in the Bahamas were Arawak, Carib and Ciboney natives who sailed up the island chain from South America. Columbus came for trade and fame. His followers came for gold, quasi-military

purposes (protect the sea lanes coming from the gold producing regions of Central and South America) and eventually agricultural opportunities.³ The French, English, Portuguese and Dutch saw the military and economic potential in laying claim to these strategically placed rich earth islands in the new world and took full advantage of colonization opportunities. Of course colonization of Central and South America also took place at a rapid pace with some of these Western Hemisphere colonies quickly becoming independent states. But it was not these colonizing nations which gave rise to American fears in the 1820's—it was Russia, Austria and Prussia (the Holy Alliance), the last of the European absolute monarchies. These monarchies were bent on ending representative governments in Europe and possibly abroad as well. As a result of the complex interaction of these and other related concerns, President Monroe set forth a policy in 1823 which, as a Doctrine, stated that the American continents were henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.⁴ It was only through careful and guarded diplomacy that the US did not have to militarily stand behind this Doctrine for, in fact, the US often did not yet have the means.

In 1898, however, America had the means and employed it in support of Cuba's rebellion against Spain. As a result of a quick U.S. victory against this old world power, Cuba eventually became independent and the United States acquired Puerto Rico and the Philippines.⁵ In the early 1900's, Roosevelt gave the Doctrine a corollary when his big stick philosophy stated that if intervention in the Western Hemisphere were to be necessary, the US would do it. Woodrow Wilson generally endorsed this Monroe Doctrine Corollary but avoided evoking it when Mexico revolted; he stated that the US would "never again seek one additional

foot of territory by conquest."⁶

We used the Caribbean islands and ocean passages during both World Wars as naval ship and air patrol bases as well as for lines of communications and resupply purposes. Strategically such use was necessary, for the Caribbean (and the east coast of South America) was the western side of the "Atlantic Narrows" and the western end of the safest sea lanes to Europe.⁷

With the end of World War II, foreign imperialism ceased to be a perceived threat to American stability and well being in the Western Hemisphere. It was Communism. Although slightly outside our area of concern here, American involvement in the 1954 alteration of the Guatemalan government indicated our resolve to continue to take direct action when US hemispheric interests were affected.

Cuba in the late 1950's and early 1960's established the format for what has become the greatest threat to hemispheric peace and democratic development and to the security of the American southern border. The success of the Cuban revolution in 1959, supported in spirit by the US, resulted in an unexpected communist Cuban government with interests and activities directly inimical to our interests. Ill-planned, ill-advised and poorly executed US actions in 1961 gave rise to the Bay of Pigs debacle. This event signaled, in effect, what some think and what the Soviets hope was the end of the will of the Colossus of the North to take action necessary to secure American interests in the Caribbean. If some historians chose to select Potsdam as the beginning of our modern problems in Europe, the Bay of Pigs must certainly be considered when we look for the political genesis of our present problems in Central America, the Caribbean and elsewhere. Cuba, in fact, lies at the core

of what can only be described as a state of danger in the Caribbean Basin. The Cuban strategy for uniting the left in the countries of the region, committing it to violence, arming it, training it in warfare, and attempting to use it for the destruction of existing governments is having its effect.⁸

In spite of the Bay of Pigs effect, President Johnson sent US forces in 1965 to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, to assist in defeating an attempted communist attempt to overthrow the in-place government. Vietnam was sufficiently in the future that such a US military involvement was not met with overwhelming negative social outcries. In the final analysis, that intervention seems to have worked (so far).

The Vietnam experience, however, has become the social and political benchmark against which all present potential US military interventions are measured. Presidential caution therefore, reigns supreme. For example, when Prime Minister Maurice Bishop staged the New Jewel Movement leftist coup in Grenada in March 1979,⁹ little American reaction by either the people, press or government was apparent. Grenada was simply quietly added to the ever growing list of countries restricted to US personnel having certain security clearances. Maybe we will see more concern when Soviet or Cuban long range military aircraft begin flying from the St. Georges Airport which is now being modernized and increased in capability beyond that needed to service commercial aircraft.

Not is all bleak, however. In October 1980, a historically friendly but economically devastated and politically polarized neighbor somehow managed to hold democratic elections. By a sizable majority the Jamaican people voted in a new government which rejected further drift

toward alignment with Cuba and Cuba's model of development. In some aspects, however, the Jamaican election was a close call and Cuban preoccupation with Central America may have permitted the outcome to be what it was.¹⁰

As a sort of wrap-up of 20th Century actions taken by the United States, I offer the following examples of US intervention which have been all but forgotten by us but are clearly remembered by our neighbors to the South:

- Occupation of the Isthmus of Panama from 1903 to 1914;
- Occupation of Cuba from 1906 to 1909;
- Occupation and military presence in Nicaragua from 1912 to 1925;
- Seizure of the city of Vera Cruz and expeditionary force into northern Mexico from 1914 to 1917;
- Occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934;
- Military presence in Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924;
- Military presence in Cuba from 1917 to 1922;
- Military presence in Dominican Republic in 1965.

And these were the major actions—many other minor political and military actions were taken by the US which were seen as sovereignty infringements.¹¹

Although I do not see a "Santo Domingo" in the islands at this time (there is an El Salvador nearby), there are economic and political conditions in the Basin which create unsettling situations and grist for all propaganda mills. Among the latest of these events is the American reception of Haitians fleeing tyranny and economic privation and Cubans fleeing mental institutions and prisons. Such situations permit, indeed seem to generate, regional instability, shifts in respected leadership roles, and changes in political, economic or military influence.

IV. Description of Present Regional National Entities

The history of each of the island nations and territories in the Caribbean Basin is a significant key to understanding their present situation, needs and desires. Although each separate island and national grouping of islands has a proud and unique history that bears more detailed study than is possible here, certain historical aspects must be mentioned in order to gain a clearer picture of today's realities.

As noted earlier, the goldless islands were initially employed as protective way-stations for the early exploitative gold flow from Mexico, Central and South America. But the island soil was fertile and African slaves provided cheap cane field labor. The Spanish, French, English and Dutch each staked a New World claim in the Basin and forced a government, economy and religion on the mixed bag of island inhabitants. During this century the islands became strategically important as a part of the defensive perimeter around the Panama Canal. During World War II, the islands were of concern in so far as they were to be denied to the Nazis. In the 1960's and through today the islands are a focal point of US-Soviet rivalry.¹² In short, the jewels of the Caribbean have been exploited, ignored, bullied and, most recently, underestimated in their potential for creating superpower tensions and mischief inimical to US interests.

Virtually every form of government can be found in the islands today. Cuba and Grenada are pro-Soviet communist, Haiti is a dictatorship, the Bahamas are a British colony with self rule, Puerto Rico is a US "Commonwealth", Antigua is a brand new democracy, little St. Lucia is today led by a leftist but hopefully not likely to swing to

the left,¹³ and Jamaica was barely able to hold democratic elections and reject closer alignment with Cuba.¹⁴ Certainly of greatest concern to the US is Cuba and the potential for more Cubas.¹⁵ Growing nationalism in each of the independent nations generally limits island nation unity of action in facing common or related problems.

Diversity in government types, economies and languages (See Annex B) among the islands also abounds and stems in large measure from the character of government and leadership afforded each island by the earlier colonial power. Islands which were (or are) French charges (see Annex C) are marked by an indefinable sophistication; an easy approach to social relationships; an air of reasonableness that is nevertheless ready to explode into unreasonable passion, probably over politics.¹⁶ Islands taking their heritage from the British (see Annex D) are busy exercising their stormy freedom. Grenada selecting communism; Barbados being restless, polite to the point of subservience, and harboring a bitter readiness to rise up and riot; moody Jamaica teetering between "evils"; the smaller islands just trying to stay solvent; and the Bahamas seeking American capital.¹⁷ Spookiest of the groupings from an American point of view are the old Spanish island (see Annex E) colonies—Cuba, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. US troops have spent a lot of time in these places. These "Latin" West Indians hold a wholehearted belief in man and particularly in two basic human qualities: "machismo", or virility (Castro's five hour speeches, beards, knives, lots of boy babies—all the old stereotypes), and "dignidad", or self respect. These people are willing to die for causes and they make formidable revolutionists and explosive human beings. They also, unfortunately, resent the United States.¹⁸ Heaven help us!

(Small islands settled and claimed by the Netherlands are indicated at Annex F.)

If the less than stable sociology of the region were not enough, little solace may be found in the fact that the economics of each island and island state or territory, while varied, share certain difficulties: energy costs, falling commodity prices, declining investments, and loss of skilled manpower.¹⁹ Trinidad and Tobago might like to go communistic but oil associated revenues are sufficient to keep that small nation in a nonaligned status. The Cuban economy is heavily dependent upon Soviet assistance. US tourism keeps several of the smaller islands alive. Subsistence level agricultural systems throughout the Basin permit limited exports. Industry is light, not heavily committed, and highly labor intensive. They are in trouble but it seems that the Red Cross only comes when the house burns down. As with virtually every other major international problem facing the United States, the problem in the Basin basically has its genesis in economics and more will be said of this later.

It seems odd that in this paper, which addresses places which we would like to serenely sail to, we must address military forces—but we must. Cuba leads the Caribbean military parade with a well equipped, well trained, highly capable and dedicated military force that serves as the basis for island control and defense as well as revolution exportation (a la Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, other African states, South Yemen, Nicaragua and Grenada).²⁰ The Caribbean Basin military equation is greatly complicated by the presence of a Soviet brigade and air force advisor personnel in Cuba, the only significant non-hemispheric forces in the area. The infusion of massive amounts of Soviet military equipment into Cuba is systematically expanding the Cuban capacity to project

military power beyond its own shores. The arrival this year of a second squadron of MiG-23/Floggers and the 63,000 tons of war supplies imported from the Soviet Union last year comes on top of what was already by far the largest air, land and sea military equipment inventory of the region.²¹ The Soviet forces in Cuba serve well to let Cuban forces roam worldwide, yet at the same time act as a "trip wire" force to insure that US intervention in Cuba will result in superpower confrontation. The only other islands having an appreciable military force are the Dominican Republic (a force sufficient to protect itself from Haiti and internal uprisings) and Puerto Rico (in the form of a recently diminished US National Guard force). Throughout the remainder of the Caribbean Basin islands, local police and lightly armed national guard paramilitary forces keep the peace and the incumbent relatively secure. With the exception of Cuba, no Caribbean government could seriously resist a determined US effort to militarily intervene in insular activities.

Finally, mention must again be made of Grenada and the potential for the St. Georges Airport to be used by Soviet and Cuban military surveillance or attack aircraft. Throughout the Third World, Soviet strategy has been to exploit the Third World's colonial history and turn sentiments against the United States and the former colonial rulers,²² and care must be taken to accurately discern Soviet involvement in area activities which may be destabilizing or threatening. Certainly such is the case in Grenada and the island does serve well as a stationary aircraft carrier in our midst.

There remains, however, a valid question concerning the goals and objectives of Caribbean nations. What do these small, socially

divergent and economically troubled states want? Any listing in answer to this question would be illustrative rather than comprehensive but high among their needs and desires are stable and profitable markets for goods produced, reasonable energy costs, increased foreign investments in capital industry, a leveling of population pressures, retention of skilled manpower, nonexploitative relations with larger world powers, nationalistic pride, internal security and external defense, freedom, economic justice and order.²³ Whenever efforts are made to determine or articulate US interests or programs in the area, great care must be exercised to properly ascertain the impact each interest or program may have on each of Basin nations involved. Such care has not always been well exercised in the past, Yankee.

V. US interests in the Caribbean

There are those who maintain, and possibly quite accurately, that American foreign policy since 1945 has been thoroughly dominated by two larger conflicts: the Cold War with the Soviet Union and the challenge posed by revolutionary nationalism in the Third World. Although these two conflicts are not necessarily related, American policy has seemingly forced them together in the sense that we have viewed each conflict as part of a larger struggle against an enemy called "communism" and that the struggle is one of win or lose.²⁴ Unquestionably the United States has demonstrated a preference for regional stability—seemingly at virtually any cost. Stability, i.e. the present government (as long as it is non-communist), preserves the status quo—a better known commodity than a society in transition to an unpredictable variety of options.²⁵ Examples (in the negative "liberal" sense) of such US support for stability abound—Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, South

Africa and South Korea to name a few. Nevertheless, a succession of US administrations have held that there are systemic differences between traditional and revolutionary autocracies and these differences have a predictable effect on their respective degree of repressiveness. Generally speaking, traditional autocrats tolerate social inequities, brutality and poverty while revolutionary autocracies create them. Traditional autocrats do not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of residence, habitual patterns of family and personal relations. Because the miseries of traditional life are familiar, they are bearable to ordinary people growing up in the society in the miserable roles they are destined to fill. Such societies create no refugees.²⁶ This is not to say that such US support of traditional autocracies or other forms of non-democratic governments, in the name of stability, is always wrong. Oftentimes the only near term potential alternative to right wing dictatorship is seen to be a left wing dictatorship²⁷ created as a result of an armed take over by an externally supported, trained and guided communist minority. The communist alternative is purposefully packaged and propagandized as the only apparent option to repressive, dictatorial or ineffective non-communist governments. Communist minorities are in the ideological and moral position to employ the principles of the "power comes out of the barrel of a gun" philosophy, terrorism tactics and national economic destruction campaigns. In the absence of opportunities for positive American democratic type changes in a less than wholly democratic Third World country, and faced with options of supporting the known "stability" of the status quo or permitting unimpeded opportunities for an armed communist minority to overthrow the status quo, the status quo looks pretty good. So, in part, US interests in the Caribbean may be found in

stability and slow evolutionary, not revolutionary, change in the status quo. Nevertheless, a position strongly held that political, economic and social development should be accomplished only through participatory revolutionary change often fails to note that social change and conflict are common traveling companions.²⁸

Traditional US policy toward the Caribbean Basin region is exemplified by the historic pattern of intermittent interventions and neglect. It has been called an area of vital interest to the US, but evidence of such concern has been displayed only when circumstances arise which pose a security threat to the United States, and only when relatively little can be done to avert conflict short of direct intervention or military support.²⁹ Such is our situation in El Salvador, as it was in many other troubled Third World countries, and as it may be again in the sun-washed, white-sanded islands.

In specifics then, what are the US interests and objectives in the Caribbean islands? A synthesization of numerous official written and expert verbal statements permits the creation of the following list:

- Security of the US "third border". (A host of meanings are included in this point—see foregoing discussions of retaining the status quo.)
- Deny use of the area to hostile forces. (Admittedly a negative purpose aimed at Cuban/Soviet influence.)
- Retain use of our military bases and access to all maritime regions of the basin.
- Retain access to strategic materials produced by region countries (notably bauxite from Jamaica) or transiting (notably oil) the region.

- Reduce the flow of illegal drugs from the islands (the only truly significant narcotics source country in the area presently is Jamaica) to the US.³⁰
- Safeguard the approaches to the Panama Canal.
- Control the flow of illegal immigrants.
- Preserve and strengthen democratic institutions in the region.
- Provide for reasonable security for US investments (roughly \$2 billion) in the region.³¹
- Improve economic management and development to help these small nations demonstrate that their governments work and meet popular aspirations.³²

Quite obviously, stating an interest or objective is significantly easier than developing and executing a strategy which will secure the desired results.

VI. Current US Policies and Actions In Support of US Interests and Objectives

The new realities, new at least as they are currently perceived in Washington, require some significant changes in how the US operates vis-a-vis our Caribbean neighbors. In the event of problems, "the well-advised US diplomat (in the Caribbean) will not mention the Monroe Doctrine,³³ let alone the Roosevelt Corollary thereto! We have adopted an attitude of respect for the diversity and nationalism in the regional nations. We consciously attempt to be (and appear to be) patient as these nations strive to shape their own and collective destinies. We also appreciate the fact that we must deal with the possible—an Alliance for Progress or Marshall Plan of massive assistance for the Caribbean Islands is simply unrealistic for they do not, in the main, have the industrial base or markets necessary to permit such aid to work

in a manner other than welfare grants. Clearly, however, our actions must support both their and our security considerations, the importance of reform and a political process, and economic development.³⁴ Toward this end we must take great care to avoid repetitions of being seen as the meddling Colossus of the North. Nevertheless the United States must resolve a number of difficult policy issues which serve to, in principle, isolate and neutralize the disruptive and destabilizing influences of Cuba and Grenada as well as the Soviet Union until the more basic underlying economic and social causes of instability in the region are better addressed. Among required measures which would assist in the near term are those which would shore up the Jamaican government in the face of what will be a concerted subversive Cuban threat, controlling the serious illegal Haitian immigration problem without further destabilizing the prospects for orderly change in Haiti, and supporting the fragile democratic system in the Dominican Republic to weather financial difficulties and increased potential tensions associated with national elections next May.³⁵

The critical need, however, is economic support which will serve to provide an early promise of long term benefits. As mentioned earlier, welfare type aid is both inappropriate for the problems faced and a source of resentment generated by the recipients. In line with this philosophy is the relatively new Reagan Administration Caribbean Basin Initiative (see Annex G for a State Department "Gist" reference aid describing this initiative). The viability of the Caribbean Basin Initiative lies in its concept:

- work closely with other interested countries;
- fully engage the planning and execution support of recipients;

- begin on the supply side;
- follow through on the demand side;
- obtain other donor participation;
- while the overall action concept must be multilateral (true concentration is the product of dispersion³⁶), actual implementation should be bilateral.³⁷

The Initiative recognizes that a bootstrap program can't work when one has no boots and such is the case in many of the smaller Basin countries.

In addition to measures included in the Caribbean Basin Initiative, significant mutual advantages could be achieved at relatively low cost by the US assisting in the implementation of a program for regional cooperation in development of national seabeds and maritime resources. Certainly we must expedite the economic recovery of Puerto Rico. The depressed economy of Puerto Rico, evidenced by high inflation and unemployment, is a liability in US-Caribbean relations, particularly since some Caribbean countries look upon Puerto Rican-US ties with disdain.³⁸ (Although here is not the place to address it, I think a very good case can be made for Puerto Rico to become the 51st State—fast).

VII Grand Strategy Considerations and Implications for US Defense Planners

There must be, however, more than just a singular "initiative". As B.H. Liddell Hart said,

. . .one must foresee and provide for alternative courses. A plan, like a tree, must have branches if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a 'bare pole'.³⁹

The problem, however, is how does the United States preclude the "bare pole" complex when faced with such a divergent set of threats—many of

them not clearly defined or concrete in nature? Obviously, as political and economic efforts are marshalled and employed, care must be taken to insure that the military aspects of contingency planning are not forgotten.

On the military side of the equation, plans have been generated and reorganization action taken to counter certain worse-case conflict contingencies. The Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force has been upgraded and redesignated as the US Forces Caribbean, subordinate directly to the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command. In the process, the Antilles Defense Command in Puerto Rico was disestablished. This change in organization was reported to have been made in order to signal US concern over increasing communist activities in Central America and arms shipments in the area, specifically from Cuba to Nicaragua.⁴⁰ The shadow of the signal, however, equally covers the Basin islands should conditions so deteriorate. There is, however, little near-term potential seen today for a beneficial US military intervention in any island matter.

But conditions change rapidly in that part of the world and planners can ill-afford to discount worst-case contingencies. Certainly as Hart (among others) has said,

The perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting. That goal, for a state that is seeking not conquest but the maintenance of its security, can be fulfilled if the threat be removed—if the enemy is led to abandon his purpose.⁴¹

And with that statement we have been brought full circle, for the in-depth definition of "the threat" and "the enemy" stems from the history and nature of the island peoples, the status of national economic conditions, the worldwide communist-capitalist ideological struggle, and the

never changing nature of man himself.

VIII. Implications for the US Army

In light of the foregoing, it might seem as if the role of the Army is probably limited to that of a last resort projection of force. While that may in fact have been the case in other circumstances, the US Army is ideally suited to assist Third World nations in the business of national development—helping to build the boots for the bootstrap program to follow.

Military assistance in forms other than arms sales can be provided to Third World nations with great benefit to both individual nations and the region involved. Assistance for purposes other than security is greatly needed and the Army, as well as other Services, is well suited for assistance missions which promote internal stability and national development. Road building, water systems, engineering projects, health and sanitation facilities, communications networks, education, resettlement projects, etc., are all missions tailor-made for the US Army, sans guns! The Army, serving the host government as part of a national assistance program, can serve well to indicate to the host people that both their own government and the US government has their welfare in mind. Serving in such a capacity, the US Army has the capability to act as a key element in nation building, a force for modernizing the assisted society and an organization for providing technical and citizenship training. The gentle and apolitical assistance offered in leadership techniques promote political stability and assist in developing administrative functions. The role of the Army in political development, however, is very limited—and it must be perceived as being so. Military assistance must not hinder the growth of responsible

Such a program of assistance cannot be highly successful if it were to be only employed to obtain near-term political objectives, tempting as such a proposal must seem. The assistance must benefit the recipient in a manner which permits the recipient to in fact aid itself. Furthermore, such aid must be provided on a regional basis (but through bilateral agreements) in order to preclude intraregional charges of favoritism or subrosa political maneuvering. Use of Army forces in this manner would have the additional benefits of broadening the training of our own forces and instituting a positive and productive international dialog which neatly complements Caribbean Basin Initiative efforts. Such are the non-crisis implications currently seen for the US Army.

IX. Conclusion

The Caribbean Basin contains all of the potential ingredients necessary for the development of major security, political and economic crises for the United States. We have not done well by our neighbors and we are not doing well now. While America remains the land of riches and hope to those less fortunate in the Third World, the fact that America fails to share or assist gives rise to feeling of frustration and hate. There are measures being taken to assist the islands in the Basin, and there are other measures which could be taken. Certainly the Army has a contingency planning role which must be carefully executed in this environment but possibly more important is the role the Army could play to complement planned national assistance initiatives. As the State Department says,

For most of its life as a nation, our country has faced no threat from its neighbors. But unless we act decisively now, the future could well bring more Cubas: totalitarian regimes so linked to the Soviet Union that they become factors in the military balance, and so incompetent economically that their

citizens' only hope becomes that of one day migrating to the United States.⁴³

Many Americans will go to amazing lengths to avoid facing the fact that in some conflicts one side or the other is going to win,⁴⁴ and losing in some conflicts has irreparable consequences. The Caribbean island nations must be seen in light of these potential consequences. We can no longer, for any reason, delay our beneficial actions toward our neighbors.

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
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MAJOR ISLAND	POPULATION	AREA (sq. m)	TYPE GOVT	HEAD OF GOVT.	TRADE		MAJOR PRODUCTS/INDUSTRY	MAJOR LANGUAGE
					EXPORT	IMPORT		
Antigua	79,000	171	Parl. Demo.	G.G. Sir W. Jacobs PM Vere C. Bird	UNK	UNK	Sugar, Sea Island Cotton	English
Bahamas	252,000	4,404	Parl. Demo.	G.G. Sir G. Cash PM L.O. Pindling	3,493	3,493	Tourism, Int'l Banking, Salt, Lobsters, Rum	English
Barbados	280,000	166	Parl. Demo.	G.G. Sir D. Harcourt PM J.M.G. Adams	219	521	Sugar, Molasses, Rum, Tourism	English
Cuba	10,330,000	44,216	Comm. Total	Pres. Fidel Castro Ruz	4,700	5,000	Sugar, Tobacco	Spanish
Dominica	87,000	290	Parl. Demo.	Pres. Aurelius Marie PM Mary Charles	8	24	Cocoa, Tourism, Citrus fruit	English
Dominican Republic	5,764,000	18,704	Parl. Demo.	Pres. S. Fernandez	995	1,433	Sugar, Coffee, Cocoa, Rum, Lumber, Furniture	Spanish
Grenada	111,000	133	Comm. Total	Maurice Bishop	22	42	Agriculture-Nutmegs, Bananas, Cocoa, Sugar	English
Haiti	5,174,000	10,714	Dicta	Pres. Jean-Claude Duvalier	145	236	Bauxite, Copper, Coffee, Sugar, Seal, Cotton	French Fr/Creole
Jamaica	2,273,000	4,411	Parl. Demo. US	G.G. Sir F. Glasspole PM Edward Seaga	769	1,010	Bauxite, Sugar, Coffee, Bananas, Rum	English
Puerto Rico	3,672,000	4,345	Comm-wealth	Gov. Carlos Romero Barcelo	2,454	6,044	Manufacturing, Construction Materials, Cement, Agriculture	Spanish
St. Lucia	126,000	238	Parl. Demo.	G.G. Sir A. Lewis PM Winston Cenac	28	76	Sugar, Tourism, Cocoa	English
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	118,000	150	Parl. Demo.	G.G. Sir Sydney Gunn-Munro	15	46	Arrowroot, Sea Island Cotton	English
Trinidad and Tobago	1,186,000	1,979	Parl. Demo.	Pres. B. Sir I. Clark P.M. Eric B. Williams	4,077	3,176	Oil Refining, Tourism, Sugar, Asphalt, Rum	English
US Virgin Islands	110,000	133	US Unincor Terr.	NA	UNK	UNK	Tourism, Jewelry, Rum, Women items	English

Sources: The 1981 World Book Yearbook (Chicago: Worldbook-Childcraft International, Inc., 1982), p. 366.
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THE DUTCH (NETHERLANDS) ISLANDS



Annex F

Caribbean Basin Initiative

February 1982

Background: The Caribbean Basin includes some two dozen small developing countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and northern South America. They have been seriously affected by the escalating cost of imported oil and declining prices for their major exports such as sugar, coffee, and bauxite. This has exacerbated the region's deeply rooted structural problems and caused serious inflation, high unemployment, declining economic growth, enormous balance-of-payments deficits, and a pressing liquidity problem.

National security interests: The Caribbean Basin forms the third border of the US, contains vital sea lanes through which 75% of our oil imports must flow, is an important market for US exports, and is the second largest source of illegal immigration to the US. We have a basic interest in preventing the political and economic collapse of this region. The economic crisis threatens political and social stability throughout the region and creates conditions which Cuba and others seek to exploit through terrorism and subversion. If the economic problems are not resolved, a vast increase in illegal immigration to the US would be inevitable. It is not in our interest that a major border of the world's richest nation consist largely of hostile states, among which are some of the world's poorest countries.

Development of the initiative: The US has been developing its program for responding to the region's economic crisis in close consultation with other donor countries and potential recipients. In July 1981, Secretary Haig and US Special Trade Representative Brock met in Nassau with the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela. They agreed to sponsor a multilateral action program for the region within which each of the four nations would develop its own program. Venezuela and Mexico already are making a significant contribution to the basin, particularly through their joint oil facility, and Canada has announced major increases in its foreign assistance to the region. Colombia also intends to increase its financial contribution to the basin. We expect other donors to expand their efforts in the trade and investment area.

US program: The proposed US program consists of integrated, mutually reinforcing measures in the fields of trade, investment, and financial assistance. The centerpiece of the program is the offer of one-way free trade. Presently, the countries of the region already are afforded liberal entry into the US market. Nevertheless, some of the duties which remain in place are in sectors of special interest to the basin countries. They also limit export expansion of many nontraditional products.

The President will request from Congress the authority to eliminate duties on all imports from the basin except textiles and apparel. Sugar imports will receive duty-free treatment but only up to a certain limit in order to protect the US domestic sugar price

Annex G

support program mandated by Congress. A safeguard mechanism will be available to any US industry seriously injured by increased basin imports. The President also will seek congressional authorization to grant US investors in the Caribbean Basin a significant tax measure to encourage investment.

Other major elements of the program include the following items:

- The US will extend more favorable treatment to Caribbean Basin textile and apparel exports under bilateral and multilateral agreements while continuing our overall policy of seeking tighter limits on import growth from our major suppliers.
- The US will seek to negotiate double taxation and bilateral investment treaties with interested countries.
- The US will work with multilateral development banks and the private sector to develop insurance facilities to supplement the Overseas Private Investment Corporation's noncommercial investment risk operation.
- The US Export-Import Bank will expand protection, where its lending criteria allow, for short-term credit from commercial banks to basin private sectors for critical imports.
- The US will work with each country to develop private sector strategies to coordinate and focus development efforts of local business, US firms, and private voluntary organizations. These strategies will seek to remove impediments to growth, including lack of marketing skills, shortages of trained manpower, poor regional transport, and inadequate infrastructure.

Economic aid: The President will request an FY 1982 supplemental economic assistance appropriation of \$350 million to provide emergency assistance for several key countries whose situation is critical. That will bring proposed FY 1982 economic assistance to \$823.9 million or \$403 million above FY 1981. The Administration's request is for \$664.4 million in FY 1983 economic assistance.

Role of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands: The US Government has consulted closely about the Caribbean Basin initiative with Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, whose involvement will be critical to the success of private sector development strategies. Legislation under the initiative will reflect Puerto Rican and Virgin Island interests in important ways. Excise taxes on all imported rum will be rebated to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and their industries will have access to the same safeguards provisions as mainland industries.

Summary: The Caribbean Basin initiative is an innovative program which represents a new approach to North-South relations. For many years, leaders of the developing countries have been urging the US to offer trade--not aid--and to live up to our own belief in free trade. We are offering both trade and aid and will be working with these countries to help them make their systems more competitive and open. The program's integrated nature assures that we are not just treating symptoms but are addressing root causes. The initiative is based on the strongly held view that economic and political competition reduces privilege and expands opportunity and that economic and political freedom is essential for the evolution of prosperous, modern societies.

(Gist, p. 2)

Annex G

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