


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U. S. Army War College
Carlisle, Pennsylvania

FOREIGN POLICIES OF
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

By

William C. Schweitzer
Lieutenant Colonel, USA

April 1982



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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged as a class-piece in the Middle East that is going to have to be dealt with by all major powers in the world. What went wrong in Iran which resulted in the ousting of the late Shah Reza Pahlavi and the rise to power of an exiled religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini must be addressed in order to provide an insight into what the political position that Iran intends to play in the 1980's-90's. It is also necessary to examine the political, economic and social systems that have evolved since 1978 under the Khomeini government.

Iran, prior to the revolution, was depicted in virtually all available studies, advisors and U.S. officials as being very stable, politically, with a recent record of considerable economic growth based on oil wealth and many social reforms that would lead one to believe that there existed a nation that was stable, content and without pressure from outside world powers. One must look closely at the development of the nation since 1941 to grip a firm understanding of what happened to this state.

Chapter 2

HISTORY

On September 16, 1941, Shapur Mohammed, the son of Reza Shah, at the age of twenty-two, assumed the throne of Iran and the title of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. He had been carefully prepared for the monarchy by his father. He was educated in Switzerland and then at the military college of Tehran. He ascended the throne facing political constraints by the Allied Powers occupying Iran and serious internal, economic and political problems. His father's tight political constraints over the country were gone, many repressed groups and tribal leaders had regained lost authority and traditional ways. Religious leaders and numerous political parties were vying for their share of control over the people and the country adding to the many economic, social and political challenges that were facing the new Shah.

Through the next year and until 1943, Iran was subject to strong Allied pressures. The effects of the war and Allied occupation resulted in scarcity of food and other essential items, severe inflation and lack of government unity.¹

In analyzing the Shah's reign, its effect on the country as a whole, and its people in particular, one must first analyze the political arm developed by the Shah to support his programs.

The executive Arm was headed by the Shah; he designated the prime minister and all cabinet members. He had the authority to convene and dissolve Parliament, determine all internal and external policy, and was commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The constitutional power of the Shah could best be summed up as "he rules as well as he reigns, and this position caused considerable political and religious turmoil during the decade following the end of World War II, bringing him into opposition with all of the traditional sources of power except the Army."²

The Shah's first real test of power came in 1946, when the Russians were reluctant to withdraw their forces from Iran in spite of a 1942 treaty. With the support of the United States, the Shah personally supervised the military operations against a Soviet-sponsored government in Ayerbaijan. This action raised the prestige of the Army and gave the Shah the power, through control of the Army, that he needed to insure his supremacy in Iranian politics. Despite the attempt on his life in 1954 by a communist network in the Army, and again in 1965 by a member of the Imperial Guard, the Army remained loyal to the Shah and was the backbone of his reign.³

By many purgings of the government to include communistⁱtic, socialistⁱc and religious factions, the Shah by the early 1960's had established control over all sectors of the government and had consolidated his power. He created a two-party system, one being a government-oriented majority party and the second, a legitimate

opposition party; this organization was basically ineffective as a political instrument but did provide some semblance of the legality which the Shah desired his government to have. In 1963, the Shah undertook a program of national reform called the White Revolution. This program was designed to cut him off from many of the traditional sources of power and gave him as a base of support the small farmers; working class; and, of course, he maintained control of the military. "The White Revolution initially consisted of six points: (1) the land reform law; (2) a law nationalizing the country's forests; (3) a law permitting the sale of state-owned factories; (4) a law requiring that 20 percent of the net profits of factories and industrial establishment be shared with the workers; (5) a law granting voting and political rights to women; and (6) the formation of a nationwide literacy corps."⁴ Additional points were added, all dealing with development and modernization of the country. Feeling a further need to secure his position, the Shah by various means overcame until 1978 all opposition including the various radical groups, large landowners, military and clergy. The Shah's stated aim was the leader of his country was to take those steps necessary to preserve the peace, stability and prosperity of his country: "with a population of more than 300 million and a per capita income of approximately \$100; the Shah saw the need to carry out economic and social reform with all possible speed."

After gaining control of the political factions in the country, initiating a modernization and buildup of the military forces, the Shah embarked on the development of a high technological state. He purchased nuclear reactors from France, steel mills from Germany, automobile assembly plants from the United States, and petrochemical plants; completed hospitals and refineries, built roads and dams; but did not have the 40,000 qualified technicians necessary to get the maximum utilization out of the facilities.⁴ In an attempt to develop the qualified technicians, a goal of higher degree of educational literacy was established. Most estimates place literacy, during the early years of the Shah's reign, at well below 35 percent. The Shah carried on many of his other programs in this area. He reissued the decree for compulsory elementary education that his father had initially instituted, and until he could get trained teachers, used high school graduates in the Armed Forces to serve their required time teaching in a newly developed elementary education system.

Educational programs, politics, and enrollments continued to expand throughout the 60's and 70's and was felt by many to be due to a popular demand for schooling. This assumption was not necessarily the case in the rural area. To the farmer, education did not mean more money or a better life, but those hours of the day when he lost needed workers from the fields. In the mid-70's, it was estimated that 3 million primary school-age children were still not in school, the majority of which were from the rural area; and the major

explanation for non-attendance to the schools was parental objection. In the urban environment, the importance of primary education was accepted by the people as resulting in their productivity and earning power being increased through acquisition of new skills. Above the primary level, a circumstance common to most developing countries is the desire of secondary schools to pursue academic schooling rather than technical education in order to prepare for the jobs that would become available in the expanding industry. Industry in turn had to rely on on-the-job training rather than school-trained workers.

In higher education, the University of Tehran was expanded to include engineering, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, agriculture, veterinary medicine, law, economics and education. Smaller universities were established in several of the provinces.⁷

With the Shah's reorganization and establishment of new goals for education in Iran, the historical educational process was removed from the hands of the religious leaders. The mullahs had taught reading, writing and the Quran to the people. In addition to administration of law, active influence in these areas was likewise decreased considerably by the constitution and governmental policies implemented by the Shah's reign. The Shah attempted to maintain a balance between the government and religious authority while still promoting modern social and economic programs. In later years, it was evident that though the religious leaders had lost their political power base, they could still offer solid opposition to the Shah and many of his policies.

One characteristic that must be noted about Shiite Islam was its ability to influence much of Iranian society, whether illiterate peasant or member of the middle/upper class. Religious leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the government through religious revivalist movements which were normally directed at Iran's social and political progress; in turn, these movements were classified as political opposition to the government and often dealt with very harshly.⁸

The urban society is the only sector that permits identification of the basic three-class social system. The middle class was represented by Tehran's government bureaucrats, professionals, technicians, etc. The stimulus for the development of a middle class and the increasing size of the upper class was political rather than economic, as in the West. "Tehran is where the elite lines form contracts and spends its money and favors. It also provides the educational services that spawn the growing modern middle class as well as the infrastructure to support the occupations of such a class."⁹

The upper class expanded from the traditional to include high ranking military, high level government administrators, security forces, wealthy industrialists and higher level professional men. Even with these additions to the ranks, in 1977 the upper class was still comprised of less than one percent of the population. The middle class also underwent change during the 1960's and 1970's and can be divided into the upper and lower middle class with separation

of each into modern and traditional groups. The members of the upper middle were from the same occupational sources as the upper class, but one step lower. Members of the urban lower class had a high rate of illiteracy, performed manual labor, and could be distinguished by traditional dress and linguistic use. The gap between the middle class and lower class is much wider than one might imagine. In the urban area, the lower class is made up of the street cleaners, apprentices in the bazaars, servants, peddlers, etc. In the rural area, the peasant fell in this class system with very little opportunity to improve his economic or social position. It was the stated intentions of the Shah through the White Revolution and in particular land reform that the traditional economic and social relationship between landlord and peasant was to change, raising the standard of living for the peasant. This never materialized to any measurable degree with the exception of the area of education; economically, the peasant continued to exist in poverty.¹⁰

In contrast, women's rights made tremendous progress during the Shah's reign. The majority of the progress was evident, however, only in the urban area where it was led and supported by the women from the upper class. The greater freedom awarded women was continually under criticism and opposition, especially by the religious leaders. In spite of the opposition from the religious leaders, women made gains toward equality with men in a country where women

throughout history had been nothing more than totally subservient to men. In 1977, 13 percent of the female labor force was employed, compared to 68 percent for men; women had twenty-one of the 268 seats in the Majlis, and held such additional positions as Head of Tribal Affairs Department and State Factories Department; two were senators; and the total number of professional women totaled approximately 120,000.¹¹

The determination of Shah Reza Pahlavi to elevate Iran and its people to a prominent position in the world was effected not only through political and social means but also through raising Iran's economy to the level of Western Europe's. Many of the economic programs he implemented were responsible for the population migration from the rural to urban areas and the increase in per capita income from \$200 in 1963 to \$2500 in 1978. This figure is misleading, in that agriculture is the principal economic activity in Iran and accounts for 35 percent of the total labor force but less than 15 percent of the G.N.P., with the end result that the peasant's income is generally very low. In the 1960's, Iran was required to import most quantities of food stuff, primarily because the peasant was still farming with the same equipment and methods they had used in the past and due to increased population and other demands could not produce at consumption levels. "Despite the early social and political benefits of land reform, agriculture in general suffered under the Shah, to the point where it became one of the principle issues against him by his opponents."¹²

The major industry in Iran is the petroleum industry; through modernization and foreign influence, it has been the primary source of income for the industrialization and modernization of the country. The industry of Iran has grown rapidly since 1963, financed initially by foreign loans and later by oil revenues. Over two million people were employed in industry in 1974. Iran's new industry was concentrated on turning local or imported raw materials into goods for consumption in Iran, thus reducing the foreign money flow and stimulating economic growth within the local economy. The growth of the economy made major changes in its internal structure. It was slow at first, but with the increasing oil revenues, the economic development reached a high peak. Roads, railroads, industrial plants, health services and educational services are just a few of the programs implemented by the government and financed by oil. These "fast growing sectors provided higher paying jobs, attracted workers to government employment and to construction, trade, transport and the oil industry."¹³ This growing economy resulted in many farmers coming to the urban centers to take advantage of the increased incomes; this migration in turn resulted in the urban centers being subject to shortages in housing, services and consumer goods. With the migration of the peasant to the urban area came the demand for, development of, additional manufacturing and utilities.

During the Shah's reign, Iran made remarkable economic progress, most of which took place between 1960-1977. The economy had achieved

s position of 15th in the world, but was still dependent on one industry, that being oil.¹⁴

In 1976, serious mass demonstrations erupted of such magnitude not seen in Iran for over a decade. Neither observers of Iran nor the Shah himself realized the significance of the demonstrations. All possible sources were investigated with negative results. "Only remnants of the Tudeh Party survived; the several hundred remaining members badly splintered among Soviet and Maoist factions. The Kurdish tribesmen in Northwest Iran, unlike their Iraqi brethren, had been comparatively docile since 1946."¹⁵

The Shah felt secure in his position. The military, now a modern force, was tied to the monarch through pay and stature.

In the latter part of 1977 and 1978, however, demonstrations and strikes against the Shah and in particular against his secret police (SAVAK) reached a very intense level.¹⁶ Various political groups (that will be discussed later) were involved, but the most effective opposition came from the exiled religious leader, Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini.

Chapter 3

ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Ayatollah Khomeini is an 81-year old religious leader of the Shiite Muslims who had been exiled to Iran in 1964 and later moved to Paris to conduct his opposition against the Shah. There are two important background facts in understanding Khomeini. He had previously suffered great tragedy at the hands of the Shah. His father was killed by the Shah's father's police and his eldest son was tortured and executed by SAVAK in 1973. One must also understand his position of power within the predominant religion of Iran. About 32 million of Iran's 36 million people are Shia Moslems. There are 350 Ayatollahs in Iran; of those, 12 are important and formed the nucleus of the effective leadership opposing the Shah. Khomeini, with his long-standing hatred of the Pahlavi family, his personal charisma, and his impeccable reputation for honesty, emerged as the leader.¹⁷

There are a great number of so-called experts, or what I would term as Monday morning quarterbacks, who have published articles such as "The Crisis in Iran" and "Why the U.S. Ignored A Quarter Century of Warning."¹⁸ Those articles submit all types of after-thought on causation, such as rising middle class, discontent of urban workers, students without futures, a useless civil service, etc. The fact is, none of these experts provided any written warnings prior to the Shah's departure from Iran that a real revolution was occurring. It is this student's opinion that the overriding factors in the Ayatollah

Khomeini's successful overthrow of the Shah were the traditional attitudes and religious fundamentalist philosophy of the Iranian people (as seen in the continuing theme in Shia Islam of the need for justice) and the legitimacy of the ruler according to the Holy Koran.¹⁹ Legitimate rule, according to the political theory of Shia Islam, belongs to the Iman (religious leader) alone. As a result, national leaders, including the Shah, have been viewed as usurpers, and would never be fully accepted by the Iranian people. Verse 6:4 of the Holy Koran reads, "the return of the twelfth Iman will result in the redemption and elevation of those who have been oppressed."²⁰ That verse indicated that the quest for social justice and a strong opposition to tyranny is extremely strong.

Rapid modernization efforts effected by the Shah tended to weaken traditional Islamic leadership; and coupled with the harsh use of SAVAK in controlling and even eliminating any person or group which opposed the Shah, made it much easier for the revolution to succeed. The people supported Khomeini and forced the Shah to leave Iran on 16 January 1979.

Khomeini arrived in Iran on 1 February 1979 and quickly formed a provisional government with Dr. Melefi Bozargan installed as Prime Minister. It was soon evident, however, that the real power had rested with a 15-member revolutionary council that Khomeini had formed in Paris and which he directed according to Islamic law.²¹ Khomeini held a national referendum after seizing power on the basic question, "Do you, the people of Iran, favor an Islamic Republic?"

The overwhelmingly positive response provided him the justification for declaring Iran an Islamic Republic. Khomeini immediately withdrew Iran from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and aligned itself with the Arab world against Israel. The next order of business was to establish revolutionary courts, which by April of 1979, had sent over 600 people to their death by firing squad. The Prime Minister, Dr. Bazargan, was not given authority over these courts and was himself dismissed from his post when he spoke out against them.²²

A draft constitution was formulated and was submitted to a constitutional assembly elected for the purpose of framing the Constitution. After much debate, the Constitution was passed in December 1979, and elections were held which resulted in Abolharun Bani-Sadr being elected President.

Chapter 4

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In keeping with the overall religious fundamental approach to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Constitution provides that the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government are directly accountable to the authority of the religious leader.²³ The President must be a Shia Moslem, a nationalist, without leftist or rightist leanings. It specifically states that he cannot be a follower of any misleading ideology.²⁴ The document goes on to say that the spirituality and laws of Islam are to be the basis for all political, social and economic actions in the republic.

The President is popularly elected and serves a 4-year term. The Majlis (National Assembly) which has 270 seats, is also elected for 4-year terms. Equal Rights are specifically promised for minorities and provision is made for representation of non-Moslem religious groups; however, their track record since December of 1979 suggests that the Constitution may not be of much validity.

Article 94 requires that all legislation passed must be sent to the Council for the Protection of the Constitution. The Council is made up of 12 religious lawyers, six appointed by the Imam, six appointed by the Majlis. Their function is to insure that no legislation is passed that conflicts with the Holy Koran. A review of basic freedoms that must exist are also present in Iran, but with strings attached to the government or the Moslem religion. The Press, for example, is

free, except in matters that are contrary to public morality or insulting to religious law. The formation of religion, political and professional parties is free, provided they do not negate the principles of the basis of the Islamic Republic.²⁵ Article 107 provides for the "Iman" or religious leader who carries the burden of leadership over the elected and appointed branches. The Constitution specifically names Ayatollah Khomeini these powers for the rest of his life. Upon his death, a council of experts will meet to choose a three-member Council of leadership, and the choice must be approved by the nation.²⁶ The Constitution gives Khomeini the power to declare war, appoints the military Chiefs of Staff and Command of the Revolutionary Guard, and has the power to dismiss the President on the basis of a vote of no confidence by the national assembly.

The Judicial System consists of a Supreme Court and a number of Islamic Revolutionary Courts. Each court consists of a Chief Justice and Chief Prosecutor. All justices and prosecutors are appointed by the "Iman." There are no provisions for appeal of a decision and guidance is provided by the Iman. Article 167 of the Constitution reads, "Judges must reach verdicts based on precedent or Islamic law." These courts have drawn worldwide criticism according to the 21 March 1980 printing of Keesing's Contemporary Archives. The International Commission of Jurists stated on 14 August 1979 that the court system has created a severe setback for Iranian political life by introducing

"the evil doctrine of guilt by association."²⁷ On 23 September 1979 Der Tagesspiegel of West Berlin, wrote that there are "more people in prison than ever before in Iran's history."²⁸ Other measures taken by the courts to enforce Islamic law range from banning all music from Iranian radio on the basis that "it makes the brain inactive" and "is a betrayal of the nation's growth." Women are not allowed to practice birth control if their husbands disapprove.²⁹ The most critical acts of the courts have been the execution of hundreds (some estimates range in the thousands) of former administrators, educators and members of the military for acts that by western standards are unbelievable. General Nazemi, of the Army, was accused of waging "war against God" tried and executed on 7 May 1979. Dr. Amin Hoveida, former Prime Minister from 1965 to 1977, was charged with misuse of office, was tried and executed on 14 March 1979.³⁰ These are just two examples of the current Iranian leadership's idea of justice in a so-called legitimate judicial system. No documentation can be found that indicates any reforms have been made on the system. In fact, newspapers and U.S. News service reports since about 1 June 1981 indicate a step-up in trials and executions in Iran. It is this student's notion that the activities of the court system may prove to be the undoing of the current system of government. The people of Iran have lived through three years of one-day trials and execution; eventually they are going to reject the brutal treatment of fellow countrymen.

The role of the dominant group is total authority by the religious leaders under the dictatorship of Khomeini, who receives power through religious law.

There are 12 political parties in Iran today. (The Constitution allows them.) The Islamic Republican Party is by far dominant, as it is the party identified with the policies of Khomeini; thus it receives no pressure from the government.³¹ The remaining 11 parties represent Marxist groups or are representatives of minorities, all of which have presented no real threat to the current order. In fact, news reports on 8 July 1981 indicate that the government tried and executed 28 members of the Fedayeen-Khalgh, an urban Marxist group who were given credit for the bombing that killed 72 people, including numbers of assembly members.³² It appears that the Marxist groups are surfacing and committing acts of terrorism directed against the government at this time, while being openly sought by the police and revolutionary guards.³³ If they are to become a formidable opponent to the current order, their only hope is to allow the current system and its leaders to shatter themselves through unrest, economic failure and mismanagement of their war with Iraq, then step in and win support of the middle class by offering stability and a human system of government. What they will probably do is attempt to fill a void which is being created by tyrannous acts and an economic system that cannot succeed but worst fail. They will also keep pressures on the government politically through creating unrest and fear through terrorism.

Chapter 5

THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

There is a growing awareness in Iran that you can't eat religious slogans, nor can they substitute in their war with Iraq revolutionary enthusiasm for weapons.³⁴ The revolution, the loss of trade with the U.S. (to include freezing of Iranian assets as a result of the U.S. hostage situation in 1979-80), and the war with Iraq have together caused a tremendous blow to the Iranian economy.³⁵ Iran is one of the world's leading producers of oil and the rest of the economy was built with oil revenues. Over half of the labor force is engaged in agriculture even though industry by 1980 predominated over agriculture in terms of the gross national product.³⁶

This system was a planned economic program fashioned after the United States in terms of a business economy with a strong agricultural base. A comparison of productivity indicates real problems in the future. By December 1979, oil production was 3.7 million barrels per day as compared to the same month three years earlier under the Shah, when it was 6 million barrels per day.³⁷ It has been estimated that production of goods and services had declined by 12 percent and manufacturing had declined by 40 percent since the first year after the revolution. The unemployment rate has varied between 12 and 25 percent.³⁸ In January 1980, all banks and insurance companies were nationalized, but by June 1980, there was still no economic policy or plan. There just has not been any energy devoted to revising the

economy. It was probably no accident that President Bani-Sadr, a former economist, would be named to guide the economic affairs of the country towards a positive recovery.³⁹

The degree to which the Ayatollah Khomeini and his militant religious followers have surpressed the Iranian political process was clearly evident in the dismissal on June 22, 1980, of President Bani-Sadr after the Ayatollah had relieved him as Commander-in-Chief. Bani-Sadr, and Massaud Rajovi, leader of the leftist Mujaheddin, both surfaced in France after fleeing the country and were promptly granted political asylum by the French government.⁴⁰ Reports released by Amnesty International in October 1981, state that there have been more political executions in Iran during the previous four months than there were in the entire world in 1980. There is nothing to indicate that this trend of continued slaughter of fellow Iranians has changed. It clearly appears that while continuing to attempt to defeat the invading Iraqi forces that the government is also attempting to once and for all eliminate any and all political opposition to the Iranian government.

The Iranian revolution has gone forward sort of seeking its own momentum and defining its structure as it proceeds. This willingness of the leadership, including Khomeini, to allow this to happen is proving to be a problem.⁴¹ U.S. Army doctrine taught at the John F. Kennedy Center for Unconventional Warfare says that a revolutionary government must immediately disarm the population and establish social

order. Most important is the disarmament of the active participants; this has not been accomplished in Iran. The result is that minority and political groups who participated in the actual overthrow of the Shah may now be so disenchanted with the disorder that they may attempt to re-ignite the spark of revolution once the outside thrust from Iraq is no longer prevalent. Some of the strongest attacks to date upon the current government have come from the Kurds, led by Abdur Qassemu, who was prominent in the anti-Shah movement, and now feels betrayed by Khomeini's government. As reported in the 21 March 1981 edition of the Nation, Qassemu stated: "All the peoples of Iran made the revolution, but the clergy have confiscated it."⁴² The Kurds of Turkey, Iraq, Russia and Iran have long sought Islamic autonomy. Qassemu claims that with the exception of Bani-Sadr, who on several occasions expressed sympathy with Kurdish demands, the request for Kurds to have equal status with Persians in the legal and educational institutions of the Kurdish region have been ignored.⁴³

The Mujahedeen is an urban guerilla group who have considerable strength in the more secular parts of the country. Their ideology is based on quotations from the Koran which they have given socialistic interpretations. They support the Kurds and denounce the courts and jails of the new regime.⁴⁴

This disenchantment has its counterparts in the cities as well. Rising unemployment and inept religious leaders who have attempted to replace trained administrators in the operation of a system have caused much disenchantment with the middle class. Dr. Marvin Lanis, an

authority on the Middle Eastern states in the 8 February 1981 issue of U.S. News and World Report that "the economic pressure is going to bring tremendous demand for political change, and the mullahs can't deliver on the economic front."⁴⁴ Many Iran watchers speculated that the war with Iraq would not bring the various groups together in a nationalist cause of unity. Professor Lanis points out that it has caused division and strife.⁴⁵ This was probably a valid assessment when the war first started in 1980, however, indications since the start of 1982 are that the war is having some very positive effects in terms of national pride and unity.

What appears to be valid now is that the early spring of 1982 Iranian victories are tending to create a very strong sense of nationalism among all the elements of the Iranian people. Their massive economic problems that were forecasted to topple the current leadership have been forgotten, at least for the present. The social injustices that created such a world-wide protest in regards to the purges and executions have also faded for the time. U.S. News and World Report in their April 26 issue states that: "The dramatic change produced in this unsettled nation by the Iranian offensive that has sent Iraqi forces reeling is plain to see. The battlefield triumph has shoved Iran's massive economic woes into the background, dealt a fresh blow to an already wounded political opposition and left 81-year old Ayatollah Khomeini more firmly entrenched than ever as the strong man in this three-year old, hardline Islamic state."⁴⁶

The fact that Iran's recent victories are very appealing to those countries who are linked to the Islamic Republic is causing some strange partnerships if not found at least sympathetic to arise. Some of the previous partnerships may or may not still be valid.

Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, was the first foreign leader to visit Khomeini in Iran. During his February 1979 visit, Arafat stated that the Iranian Revolution has "turned upside down" the balance of power in the Middle East. He claims also to have received a pledge from Khomeini that Iran would "turn to the issue of victory over Israel" after the Islamic Republic consolidated its power."⁴⁷ There is no question as to Khomeini's effect on giving the Moslem world a sense of power and even a strengthening of nationalist ideals and pride. The war with Iraq has obviously slowed down internal consolidation of power. Fighting a war with another Moslem nation could present a problem to Iran's ability to stand side by side with the other nations in the Moslem world at its conclusions. The ousting of President Bani-Sadr, the terrorist bombings of the headquarters of the National Assembly, and continued suppression has increased the tension that exists in a nation that is torn by internal disorganization and chaos. The overall greatest danger to the survival of the system according to Dr. Lanis, (U.S. News and World Report) is the disintegrating economy. The middle class in the cities will find it harder to maintain support for religious administrators who just can't run a government.⁴⁸

Chapter 6

IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy goals other than support for Arab causes and total rejection of any remnants of Westernization are not very clear. The reason, I believe, is that the system is exerting too much energy within itself and doesn't know what its policy is or should be. What is certain is that Khomeini at 81 years of age still maintains a very tight reign of control over the government and people.

There are two areas which should be closely watched by experts and serious students of this regime. First, what role will Iran play in the future in regards to her neighbors in the area; and secondly, what occurs in Iran itself politically, militarily and socially.

Russia will be very careful in attempting to exploit any tensions for fear of driving Iran towards the western camp, which in the opinion of Dr. Robert Dagis, could very well happen if Iran seeks the lesser of two perceived evils. With the current situation of Iraq's military situation being questionable, it would be very risky indeed for Russia to attempt to gain a foothold. Likewise, if Russia attempts to court the Khomeini government too closely, it could jeopardize their shaky relationship with the other Arab nations.⁴⁹ The exact same situation exists for the United States in terms of dealing with Iran. It is this student's opinion that the United States should

continue to support Arab states that have strong ties with the West and avoid supporting nations that are involved with the current conflict either economically or militarily.

What could change the entire situation in the area is the idea that Khomeini may very well be creating his own downfall through the rising influence of the military. Recalling the Shah's experience in that a loyal, competent military machine provided lines with the internal power to rule. The new order completely dismantled that machine sending most of its leaders in front of firing squads, but now through necessity, they are creating a similar situation with an Iranian armed force which is growing and becoming more efficient by the day. The middle class and the military will tire of the continued use of terror by the government against Iranians. If they are able to generate the right situation to displace the Khomeini government is still too hazy to attempt to forecast. But, the same indications are there that have been discussed by experts in the field. The already damaged economy is worse than it ever was. One western estimate places the lost oil revenue at \$400 billion, with oil production cut to less than one million barrels a day. The cost of importing basic commodities in short supply is rising.⁵⁰

The patriotic passion and strong central control should carry the day for Iran and ensure its ability to drive the Iraqi forces from their land. The Iraqi forces surely must be tiring of seeing their early success diminish and when this occurs, Khomeini will have his

hands full trying to consolidate a nation through its strong religious heritage of justice and humane treatment of others, in the chaotic state of affairs that will surely exist.

Chapter 7

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The prospects for Iran's future does not look bright. The early 1940-1978 development is in a shambles. Economically, the prime source of national income through oil revenues may never fully recover. The social problems internally will surely rise to a higher pitch when the war with Iraq is terminated.

The health and education programs which were overtaken by revolutionary excitement will resurface and be more important than ever.

The United States through its great commitment to the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt will always be a detriment to the Khomeini government and as long as Khomeini is in power, he will never embrace the West. The United States remains committed to and will continue to support Israel and this should be so for United States interests. Access to oil and an interest in the economic wealth it produces will continue to be of mild interest to the United States in the 1980's. This will cause us to maintain as friendly a relationship as possible with the Arab world in attempting to support and promote regional stability and peace.

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