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
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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This essay reviews the origin and history of special forces. It covers the expansionary period of Viet Nam in fair detail with its attendant crosscurrents and the development of contemporary missions and incongruities. The current threat, interests, and objectives of the United States are examined in light of their applicability to special forces. Doctrinal shortfalls in the training and application are critically revealed. A strategic reorientation is suggested which espouses a proactive verses reactive strategy.		

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH BASED ESSAY

A STRATEGIC REORIENTATION FOR SPECIAL FORCES
IN THE 1980s

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID J. BARATTO



10 MAY 1982

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I. THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF SPECIAL FORCES

During World War II, Operation PLOUGH was originated by an English civilian named Geoffrey N. Pike. The plan called for the development of special equipment to be used in snow-covered mountain terrain for the purpose of attacking critical hydroelectric plants in Norway. These plants were being used by the Germans in the mining of strategic ores and minerals. American manufacturers, in conjunction with this project, developed a tracked vehicle known as the Weasel (eventually standardized as the M29).¹

In the spring of 1942, the British Chief of Combined Operations, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, introduced the project to General George C. Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff. Due to the special, and unique requirements which were dictated, General Marshall concluded that a "special force" should be recruited for Operation PLOUGH, and similar strike missions. He selected an American, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Tryon Frederick, to assemble, organize, train, and command a joint U.S.-Canadian force of three regiments. This unit was named the 1st Special Service Force.²

The unit became a separate branch of service, trained in demolitions, rock-climbing, ski techniques, survival, amphibious, and airborne assault. The original mission was abandoned after a brief period of experimentation and the unit was developed into a special tactical unit which emphasized assault techniques and night operations.³ It fought

under Allied Command with distinction and enjoyed considerable success in the Aleutians, North Africa, Italy, and Southern France.⁴ The 1st Special Service Forces was officially deactivated on December 5, 1944, as the Canadians fell out of the ranks and paraded by the Americans who remained standing in place.⁵

With the campaigns of the 1st Special Service Forces (American-Canadian), the lineage, heritage, and honors of the present US Army Special Forces were conceived. Techniques continued to be developed through the experiences of the Rangers in World War II and Korea, and the OSS's involvement in Far Eastern guerrilla wars. Growing primarily out of the collective experiences of officers who participated in those activities, a recognition arose as to the presence of a "new" form of warfare — unconventional warfare. Actually this warfare was anything but new; however, against the backdrop of World War I, and World War II, these demonstrations of unrest, manifested by paramilitary/guerrillas, were viewed as "small wars" undeserving of significant national interest.

With little fanfare, and even less support, the Army activated the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) on June 20, 1952. Colonel Aron Bank, who had previously served in the French Marquis, was assigned as Commander and tasked to formulate the training plans. In typical OSS pattern he set out to develop a nontactical unit with the capability of training and equipping guerrilla potential deep in enemy territory.⁶

As ideological and military pressures mounted in Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand, President Eisenhower assigned the prestigious Draper Committee to examine the military aid program. The 1962 composite report of the committee detected "a shift of emphasis of the

Communist tactics - for the time being at least - from direct military challenges to subversion, propaganda and economic offenses."⁷

President Kennedy's initial concern about "guerrilla wars," his desires to develop a capability for "flexible response," and Khrushchev's January 6, 1961 speech on "wars of national liberation," prompted National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) Number 2. This memorandum instructed the Secretary of Defense to look into the matter of increasing counter-guerrilla resources. Actions soon followed words and increased funding was provided to enhance the limited capability that existed at the time. Over the objection of military traditionalists, he invested in Special Forces as the unit to counter what he perceived to be the major threat of the future. His objective was to revise command priorities away from conventional, heavy, unwieldy units and their attendant doctrine of "massive retaliation."⁸ With the official donning of the green beret, Special Forces assumed a permanent place in the Army Force structure.

II. RVN CROSSCURRENTS

At this point in time in the development of the roles and missions of Special Forces, we see a distinct, yet subtle shift in the application of Special Forces towards the accomplishment of a political aim. Although a classical capability had evolved from experiential events to organize guerrilla potential, political forces and trends extant in the 1960's were demanding an application of those capabilities in a counterinsurgent mode. The common tasks running through both forms of application were direct action type missions (which required specialized techniques, skills and methods for attacking unique targets) and the basic orientation relating to indigenous personnel.

The initial efforts of the United States to counter subversive insurgency became a coordinated departmental endeavor at the highest national level.⁹ Through a long series of experiments and adjustments, the mission of Special Forces in RVN eventually focused on the requirement to develop a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), within South Vietnam. Thus, the classical role was maintained, while the political objective was - in a doctrinal sense - reversed. On the surface, it appeared to be a "good fit." Training would be allowed (for the most part) to continue as normal, but application of force would be dramatically different so as to contribute to the accomplishment of the intended objective. Operational detachments and Special Force Groups expanded, along with target areas which were unrelated to South Vietnam. As

Vietnam became a more and more consuming activity, only the point of insertion changed. By the mid 1960's, seven Special Forces Groups were in existence with target areas that virtually spanned the globe. Yet, the center of gravity when it came time for commitment of those forces, became South Vietnam and only 5th Special Forces Group. Obviously the operative premise was born out of expedience rather than farsighted logic: once basic insurgency skills were learned, then they could be transferred to counterinsurgency and the area orientation factor was only a minor consideration which would take care of itself once commitment occurred.

At the peak of Special Forces involvement in South Vietnam, there were over 80 CIDG camps with a total of over 30,000 irregular defense soldiers being advised. In addition, projects Delta, Sigma and Omega were added to devote almost 6,000 indigenous personnel toward direct action missions such as reaction forces and long range reconnaissance and across-the-border operations. Counting regional and popular forces which were advised by Special Forces, approximately 60,000 armed irregulars were incorporated into the program effort.¹⁰ The assigned group strength of 5th SFG was less than 3,000 US personnel, which amounted to a force-multiplier factor of greater than 20:1.

Even today arguments abound as to the effectiveness of Special Forces in Vietnam. Conflicting viewpoints exist as to their image vs. their ability, their role vs. their application, their mission vs. their execution, etc. It is not my intention to address any of those arguments here, but rather to point out that manifold crosscurrents affected their employment, their performance, and their contemporary role.

III. CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINAL MISSIONS & INCONGRUITIES

More recently, the doctrinal missions for Special Forces were expanded upon in TC 31-20-1, The Role US Army Special Forces, 22 October 1976, and FM 31-20, (c) Special Forces Operations (u), 30 September 1977. These documents prescribed the following missions:

1. Unconventional Warfare
 - a. Guerrilla Warfare
 - b. Escape and Evasion
 - c. Subversion
 - d. Sabotage
2. Special Operations
 - a. Intelligence - strategic reconnaissance
 - b. Strategic Targets - acquisition, designation or attack
 - c. Recovery - POW, prisoners, etc.
 - d. Anti terror -
3. Foreign Internal Defense

Concurrent with the development of those missions, it is ironic that Special Forces Groups were reduced in number from the seven that existed in the Vietnam era, to the three that exist now (5th, 7th, and 10th SFGs). Terrorism and the direct threat that it imposed on peace, stability and the achievement of national objectives received increasing attention. The invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian hostage incident, the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force, and the fermenting unrest in

Central America have all placed additional direct as well as indirect demands on Special Forces.

FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, dated January 1981, consolidates the guidance of several previous field manuals into a doctrine intended to provide fundamental principles designed to guide the actions of military forces conducting Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) operations which occur in a low intensity conflict environment.¹¹ The introductory chapter of this manual carefully establishes the purpose and scope of the doctrine as it applies to all levels of US involvement from advisory effort to situations requiring commitment of US ground combat forces. Early-on, it places specific emphasis on the caveat that, "In applying the principles, you must be aware that the SITUATION in each country faced with an insurgency IS UNIQUE TO THAT COUNTRY, and the situation in different areas of the same country may vary a great deal."¹² Chapter 6, Section VIII, prescribes the Army's role in Foreign Internal Defense and outlines the "three tiers of forces upon which the commanders of unified commands and chiefs of MAAGs can draw to support IDAD."¹³ The first tier, Security Assistance Forces (SAF), is a composite organization of units organized under a Special Forces Group headquarters. "The mission of the SAF in FID is to assist MAAGs by providing training, operational advice, and assistance to host country forces."¹⁴

Field Manual 100-20 is a well written document which incorporates thoughtful consideration towards effective and economical methods of dealing with insurgencies in their early stages. It places increased emphasis on US security interests, indigenous initiatives and self-help. It recognizes the requirement for a thorough, timely and comprehensive

host country assessment of internal defense needs. It accepts the reality that "often, the government will not admit that an insurgency threat exists until it reaches dangerous proportions."¹⁵ Certainly this is a major assumption which should have profound impact on the judicious employment of any and all the factors which could be applied to counterinsurgencies. Dr. Stephan Possony (Director of International Studies of the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, at Stanford University) aptly portrayed our common tendency in the following terms:

Regular military establishments have not shown impressive skills in subduing insurgency A people's war usually does not start with a dramatic attack but with small incidents which tend to be overlooked, even if the Communists openly proclaim the initiation of conflict, as they did in South Vietnam (1960) and Thailand (1965). The preparations preceding the initial blows frequently remain unobserved and almost invariably are discounted. The result is that counter-actions are initiated only after a fairly large infrastructure has been firmly entrenched and the guerrilla force has reached significant strength. Once counter-actions are decided upon, the conflict still is estimated to be a squabble about peripheral and unimportant areas. Hence counter-measures usually are improvised and initially remain on a minute scale. When, at long last, the danger is recognized clearly, there comes a call for a LARGE Army¹⁶

On the surface, it would appear as though the US Army was finally attempting to come to grips with the incipient aspects of "small wars," and was plotting a course in the proper direction. Furthermore, Special Forces would play a significant part in that process. Yet, as one examines follow-on supporting and implementing documents, he is only chagrined to find a dearth of information on the same course. Field Manual FM 31-22, Command, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations, dated 23 December 1981 (almost one year later), is devoted almost entirely to unconventional warfare; only two pages are focused on Foreign Internal Defense.¹⁷ This hardly recognizes — let alone addresses — the unique interfaces of command, control, and support

functions which would be inherent in SAF operations as a part of the country team concept.

The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is designed to provide guidance for unit training and evaluation by identifying training objectives and minimum performance standards for critical missions and tasks.¹⁸ The following training and evaluation outlines are prescribed in the current ARTEP for Special Forces:

- a. Conduct Preinfiltration Activities
- b. Infiltrate the Operational Area - Entry
- c. Infiltrate the Operational Area - Movement to the Base Area.
- d. Organize and Train Indigenous
- e. Conducting Exfiltration/Resupply
- f. Participate in and support Escape and Evasion Operations
- g. Conduct Psychological Operations in Support of the UW Mission
- h. Organize an Area Command
- i. Plan and Conduct Linkup and Post Linkup Operations
- j. Demobilize the Guerrilla Force.
- k. Conduct Unilateral (Direct Action) Special Operations
- l. Infiltrate the Operational Area and Employ Special Atomic Demolitions.¹⁹

The supplemental missions which are assigned include: (1) Nuclear Biological and Chemical protective/defensive measures; (2) Operating in an Electronic Warfare (EW) environment; and (3) Employing Operations Security (OPSEC).²⁰ Only the preface contains any mention of Foreign Internal Defense: "Special Forces may also be employed in a limited internal defense role to provide advisory assistance to host country military forces or government agencies."²¹

Thus it appears bureaucratic inertia in the military continues to play a significant part in the institution's failure to coalesce unity of thought as to the purpose and application of Special Forces. In spite of significant inroads which have been made toward directing and allowing Special Forces to assume a major role in countering insurgency, the prevailing wisdom remains traditional — limited to training, and

advising a counterpart organization. Regrettably, this approach at best allows for the creation of a mirror-image armed force equivalent to the one conceived in South Vietnam. The record continues then, to reflect a great unwillingness to grant Special Forces a free hand in meeting US needs to counterinsurgency.²² By and large, the old classical role of organizing guerrilla warfare and conducting special operations looms heavy over the day-to-day training world of Special Forces.

IV. THE CURRENT THREAT, INTERESTS, AND OBJECTIVES

Any meaningful assessment of the efficacious employment of a force would be null and void without a careful examination and analysis of the current as well as projected threat! With the end of World War II a dramatic departure began to occur in the way nations fulfilled their responsibilities in both defense planning and their preparation for and acceptance of warfare as a viable means to accomplish their political objectives. New theoretical constructs began to manifest themselves in the international arena which were foreign to the most capable of military strategists. In general, "the national security process created in the aftermath of World War II shifted from its traditional concentration on war to the more ambiguous demands of Cold War."²³ The real constraints of limited resources soon eroded previous national forces such as economic, naval, and nuclear supremacy. The Korean and Vietnam experiences brought to the surface a natural derivative — limited war. Ambitious policies and national objectives dwindled . . . in some cases vanished. Today, these complexities in addition to the incipient nature of communist expansionist strategy place into question our ability to arrive at a requisite level of national will and consensual agreement necessary to actuate military options. The threat appears to be global, vague, and unbounded by time. The clear and eminent dangers of an event such as Pearl Harbor are no longer obvious nor are they probable in the short or midrange.

Nonetheless, reason plus historical perspective can shed considerable insight into today's multipolar environment. Colonel Staudenmaier's essay on "Microstates: Pawns in the Global Strategic Balance," is most enlightening in that respect. In summary, he reviews the genesis of a salient trend in our international community: the creation of 165 more or less independent states. He further classifies 57 of these states as microstates (independent states with populations fewer than 2.5 million people). These microstates characteristically are small, weak, and vulnerable; notwithstanding, many of them are geostrategically important and he concludes "their vulnerability serves as an invitation to political, economic and military penetration by other nations."²⁴

Considering the fact that three-fourths of the microstates have only minimal capability to defend themselves and that most microstates must rely on external military power to survive, there are begging needs that must be satisfied by some nation which has a commensurate capability to meet those needs. Too often the United State's body-politic lacks agreed vision in how to meet those needs because foreign interests in emerging nations are not always congruent with our own. "It has responded to threats more than to opportunities, to the world it wants to avoid more than it wishes to shape."²⁵ The impetus from private interest groups, because of the different channels available to them, far outdistances any sort of coherent US policy that eventually emanates from the executive branch, or the Congress. Frequently the effects, and purpose of this private impetus are dysfunctional to the promotion of any mutual national interests. The result is a credibility gap which compounds, rather than contributes to a trusted and meaningful relationship. Resolution of these dichotomies can only be achieved by a

determined long range thrust to secure emerging nation's active cooperation by focusing on their needs first.²⁶ A necessary premise to the pursuit of this strategy, however, is the realization that these "governments or regimes always carry a heavy baggage of notions - which may be sensible or ridiculous - about their national interests."²⁷ It is therefore imperative that understanding - gained by close, continuous and integrated associations - is the first step.

The more apparent threats and interests such as the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf are addressed in numerable writings and properly remain in the forefront of concern for contemporary strategic planners. But the problems posed by the obvious need not be labored here. Certainly reactive courses of action are in the making and the full energies of our nation's most talented minds are hard at work devising "damage limiting" responses. My intent is to focus concern on the emerging threat and proactive measures to counter or even suppress the threat before it becomes visible.

V. DOCTRINAL SHORTFALLS IN THE TRAINING AND APPLICATION OF SPECIAL FORCES

Special Forces was conceived out of a requirement to create a "special force" to conduct a unique mission which would demand a variety of unique talents. The initial scope was tactical in nature, but as global threats mounted, the primary emphasis centered on a capability to organize guerrilla warfare in a "behind the lines" context. President Kennedy opted to use Special Forces in a strategic role for his "flexible response" alternative to counter wars of national liberation. He surmised that a shift from guerrilla to counter-guerrilla missions only involved a change in purpose, while incorporating similar skills and techniques. The "specialties" of Special Forces soon were diluted with the influx of regular soldiers. The strategic role, correspondingly - or coincidentally - was reduced to a tactical role. Special operations (better known as direct action missions) began to confuse the role of Special Forces with the role of Ranger units. Concomitantly, the classical covert role (Guerrilla warfare) still lingered as the primary training objective of Special Forces.

Field Manual 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict was obviously devised as a seminal work which would prescribe a reorientation in the doctrinal role of Special Forces. Its precepts and principles recognize and adhere to the prevalent thought of renowned contemporary military and civilian strategists; yet, follow-on Field Manuals that provide guidance

to Special Forces units seem to ignore the basic direction and framework established in Field Manual 100-20. Furthermore, the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP 31-101), places almost exclusive emphasis on covert activities which are classical in nature.

Training preoccupation continues to center on clandestine modes of infiltration (SCUBA, HALO), unconventional operations, and special operations. These training objectives are pursued at the exclusion of developing Foreign Internal Defense capabilities. Area orientations are conveniently shifted on paper to meet strategic plans, but any effort to gain an area focus is soon lost in the shuffle. Language requirements drain critical human resources for long periods of time only to realize a capability that may never be used because the mission target area has been changed. Area Specialist Teams (ASTs) assume perfunctory roles and are quickly pawned off to fill more pressing, but secondary duties. Wartime missions are subsumed by major training exercises (JTXs, JRXs) with attendant reallocations of preparation time. In the absence of a generally understood doctrine regarding the employment of Special Forces, conventional commanders who control these exercises normally assign missions on the order of "do your thing," rather than "achieve this objective." Incentives are redirected from a matter of "maintaining honor" to a matter of "proving worth." Images are reduced from "America's best," to "snake eater." This vicious cycle continues to reverberate in the fullest of psychological prophecies.

Compounding the confusion of nebulous roles, is the incompatibility of Special Forces training with that of conventional forces training. In the simplest sense, the Special Forces soldier is primarily a trainer (a force-multiplier), in a benign or semi-hostile environment, whereas the conventional soldier is a team player on a lethal battlefield. In

training the multiplier effect works in reverse, i.e. to train a 12 man Special Forces detachment to ideal standards requires several hundred "trainees" in addition to several weeks of time. The trainer should be capable of instructing in a broad variety of subject areas as well as on a great variety of weapons systems — both sophisticated/nontechnical and foreign/domestic. Current Skill Qualifications Tests (SQTs) and ARTEPs are tailored to test proficiency in conventional forces, not military assistance capabilities. In a 1979 survey conducted by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 96 percent of Special Forces soldiers surveyed indicated that the SQT had little or no value to them as a training criterion. Even more revealing was a sensing of 74 percent indicating mission readiness training as inadequate.²⁸

Furthermore, Special Forces training is expensive. "The cost per graduate has been fixed at approximately \$25,000 for initial training."²⁹ Needless to say, this is a considerable investment which should be preserved and properly employed in peacetime as well as war. Personnel turbulence — particularly in the officer corps — is another factor which seriously degrades proficiency in the art of special warfare and mission readiness. Little consideration is given to language capabilities or area orientation. Officers are discouraged from serving repetitive tours in Special Forces. In general, current personnel management policies fall far short of optimizing those individual talents which have been developed at great costs to the Army. Likewise, it is difficult to justify the use of Special Forces units in direct action missions in a wartime situation. Limited availability coupled with limited survivability in "throw-away" type missions would be a tragic misuse of a valuable strategic asset.³⁰ Mission clarity is an essential

parameter which needs to be commonly understood and accepted before stabilization, preservation and maximization of Special Forces can be achieved.

VI. STRATEGIC REORIENTATION

Beyond the temptations to grasp for easy solutions and to create colorful and distinctive elite forces for the sake of Man, the overwhelming forces of logic seem to suggest a reorientation in the strategic employment and training of Special Forces. In the modern world of limited resources, extreme political sensitivities, ubiquitous global threats, and a US national populous which is skeptical of a large standing army, we can ill-afford to have elite units standing missionless. We should also be aware of the possibility that elite forces created to respond under peculiar conditions might well be caught by circumstance and become spectators to the main battle.³¹ The deterrent value and reactive purposes of such a force does not justify its existence. Dr. Kissinger in his book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, cries out for a strategic doctrine which transcends the problem of selecting weapons systems. He points out that "our policy is so explicitly based on deterrence."³² We must pay too much attention to how the enemy will assess risks vs. gains and seek to increase his risks while minimizing his gains. This results in a doctrine which is dictated according to criteria which is established by the opponent. Policies grow out of actions which are taken to counter the initiatives of other powers rather than to build on the strengths of our own initiatives. The result is an ever increasing defensively oriented doctrine. What we must seek, he argues, is a strategic doctrine "which is able to assess

the forces which move contemporary events and find the means for shaping them in the desired direction."³³

As pointed out earlier, the most salient force in motion during the current and midrange period are those that surround the "microstates." Their extreme vulnerability coupled with their geostrategic importance make them "pawns" in the quest for strategic balance. Neither strategic nor conventional weaponry in itself will deny their exploitation by the Soviet Union. Although Internal Foreign Defense planning factors³⁴ apply to considerations of providing military assistance, the most critical ingredient to a proactive strategy must begin with a genuine understanding of the nation state involved. Country teams should incorporate Special Forces Operational Detachments (SFODAs) as an inherent part of their organization. Priority of effort should be directed in the following order: understanding, cooperation, assessment of military needs, and assistance. Special Forces Operational B Detachments (SFODBs) should also be forward deployed to establish regional command/control over their deployed SFODAs. The SFODCs should co-locate with the major MAAG, unified of specified command headquarters to facilitate coordination. Depending on the level of commitment, Special Forces Groups (SFGs) should be similarly deployed as are the SFODCs.

The forward deployment of Special Forces will accomplish a major portion of a necessary reorientation in their employment. This physical immersion into their target area legitimizes and stabilizes their area focus. Language and cultural knowledge will be gained primarily through experiential processes over extended periods of time, thus reducing perishability. Area assessments will be conducted on the ground versus on outdated maps. Country team coordination will develop in a progres-

sive mode through co-participation in nation building tasks or Foreign Internal Defense development. Military efforts would then evolve in consonance with, and complimentary to, economic, social, and political programs related to the affected regions. Preoccupation with outmoded classical roles and exotic methods of infiltration will be reduced by real demands that are germane to the area and are of real-time value to current missions . . . those missions which involve shaping events rather than reacting to events. Early entry not only provides for long range continuity, but stems the tide of demand for major development programs. Basic needs can be met by small scale projects which are low visibility, less costly and more efficient in terms of gaining sincere cooperation. Moral imperatives implanted early on and cultivated through a long term understanding of mutual interests will gradually allow a more palatable flavor of firmness in our strategic doctrine.

With regard to training -- clearly, the first in a long parade of corrective measures is to recognize the amorphous and discontinuous state of current training literature, guidance and standards that are prescribed for Special Forces units. FM 100-20 dated 16 January 1981, signals the appropriate contemporary mission for Special Forces. With that as the capstone document, systems engineering can provide for supporting organizational and training reforms which are compatible with the concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of Internal Defense and Development assistance operations in a low intensity conflict. Special Forces must sever its umbilical cord with conventional unit/individual standards (SQTs and ARTEPs) and develop its own criteria of performance.

Training opportunities need to be explored which stretch rather than limit the productive capacity of SFODs. They might be used in an augmentive role to assist in training ROTC elements for summer camp, or

to assist reserve units in preparing for annual training. Perhaps they might even be used to provide basic or advanced individual refresher training to the Individual Ready Reserve. SFODAs should have demands placed on them that equate to training battalions for combat operations. Their weapons expertise should not be limited to small arm and mortars, but should, include TOWs, Dragons, Vipers, Tube artillery, Tanks, and any other weapons system which might be commonly in demand through our foreign military sales program. Implied here is a need to diversify to an extent which will definitely cross branches of service and may even cross interservice boundaries. Parochialism is seldom a problem at the lowest levels of the military where the most pressing need of mission accomplishment overshadows individual biases.

The search for talent and skills should be extended even further than to those which our own services and nation cannot provide. The embryo of Special Forces included Canada as a coequal partner; the Lodge Act (Alien enlistment, 30 June 1950) recognized the necessity to incorporate foreign nationals as an invaluable asset to bridge the gap between U.S. and foreign understanding and capabilities. What formidable obstacles exist today that would prohibit the judicious recruitment of selective foreign nationals as "political officers" in our own national forces? Consider the insight that would be provided by someone who was truly indigenous to the region and at the same time shared a mutual interest in promoting security for that region.

It is not sufficient in itself to declare - as the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did in their U.S. Military Posture for FY83 - that

The current special operations forces reflect a serious shortfall in the number and types of units to meet requirements now and in the remainder of the decade. To offset this critical shortfall, a measured expansion of special forces is required.³⁵

Much more needs to be done and can be done without waiting for the necessary budget allocations to solve the problem in the "out years." Clarity of vision and steadfastness of purpose require no funding, yet these ingredients seem to be lacking when it comes to the current and midterm strategic application of Special Forces units. A total, unified strategic reorientation is paramount in order to cross the threshold from deterrence to proactive measures which will secure our national interests for the long-run.

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