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U.S. Training of Foreign Military Personnel

Volume II — Main Report

By:

Harry O. Amos
George R. Bieber
John R. Johnson, Jr.
Charles S. T. Mallet

March 1979

Contract Number: MDA 903-79-C-0166

OPERATIONS ANALYSIS GROUP

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
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IMET	Security Assistance									
IMET Program Development	Military Assistance									
Zero Base Budget (ZBB)	Grant Training									
FMS Training										
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This report evaluates current policies and procedures for planning, budgeting, and programming US training of foreign military students under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Within the framework for overall IMET policy, the study proposes specific policy formulations in the following areas: staffing for IMET management; nation building; mobile training teams; English language training; Canal Zone Military Schools; professional military										

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20. ABSTRACT (continued)

training; expenditures for travel and living allowances.

The study then sets forth the conceptual basis, or rationale, for the IMET program, and lays out steps that should be taken to assure that individual country IMET programs are designed and prioritized within the conceptual framework.

Volume I is the executive summary; Volume II contains the main report and appendixes.



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Vol I

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE TASK

The purpose of this study is to evaluate current policies and procedures for planning, budgeting, and programming U.S. training of foreign military students in order to ensure that budget requests for International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs are based on a coherent rationale, reflect changing needs abroad, and take into account Foreign Military Sales (FMS) training alternatives, and that IMET funds are allocated to achieve the priority military and political objectives of U.S. foreign military training. A copy of the Work Statement, which includes specific areas and questions to be addressed, is appended to the report (Appendix A of Volume II).

The Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), requested that the study effort focus, to the extent practical in the limited time available, on the following aspects:

- Over the years, the rationale for IMET appears not to have been uniform, vacillating from one concept to another. There is a need to look at both the historical experience of some 30 years and at the situation today. From this review there needs to be developed a single, clear-cut rationale. In devising it, however, the study must not lose sight of reality; it must work in the world today while it points to the future.
- The rationale must be accompanied by a correlated concept for allocating funds. As with the rationale itself, this concept must be realistic, taking into account the way things are done today. The study should examine the feasibility of a transition in a year or more in order to implement the concept in a smooth and reasonable manner.

THE PROGRAM

IMET provides, on a grant basis, instruction and training in military skills and U.S. military doctrine to military and the related civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defense and Military Departments of friendly countries. This training, which is authorized under Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, supports the foreign policy objectives of the United States by providing an effective and relatively inexpensive contribution to the military strength of the free world. To date, the U.S. has trained approximately 500,000 foreign personnel under IMET since the inception of grant military assistance in 1950. Currently, the program is in the range of \$32 million annually, which accommodates about 4000 foreign trainees.

Most of the training is conducted in English in the United States, where the foreign trainee also has an opportunity to observe and become personally familiar with American institutions and customs. The prerequisite English language capability for training in the U.S. prepares students to attend subsequent training. English often becomes their second language, opening the door to Western literature well beyond military subjects. With few exceptions, the foreign trainees receive the same training as their U.S. counterparts, and are judged against the same professional and technical standards. All IMET serves some specific and legitimate military purpose within the armed forces of the trainee's country. IMET is not a cultural exchange program, although the exchange of cultural values inherent in bringing foreign and U.S. trainees together may be an additional benefit.

In addition to training installations in CONUS, DoD operates schools in the Panama Canal Zone and conducts training at certain other foreign locations. In the Canal Zone, instruction is conducted in Spanish and is designed to meet the unique training needs of Latin American countries. These schools also serve as multinational centers of learning and foster friendly relations with and among Latin American nations. Use is also made of mobile training teams, which conduct training in the foreign

country in those instances where the number of trainees is large, the period of training is relatively brief, the training requires the extensive use of interpreters, or the training necessarily involves equipment or facilities in the foreign country.

VALUE TO THE UNITED STATES

As with other aspects of military assistance, the value of IMET to the U.S. derives from the contribution it makes to international military cooperation between the U.S. and friendly foreign countries. In this role, the training of foreign military personnel plays a unique and continuing part. It is by attendance at U.S. military training institutions that foreign military personnel acquire the information and insight into U.S. military institutions and forces on which to base a decision as to the practicality of cooperation with the U.S. on military matters. It is in the training environment that military-to-military relationships of enduring value to the U.S. are made. There are many ways to establish such relations, but when U.S. and foreign military personnel sit down to plan and undergo training together, the mutual insight and rapport that result are of a different and higher order than relationships based on most other types of contact.

When a foreign country agrees to send its military personnel to be trained by the U.S., it casts a vote of confidence in the U.S. and its military institutions. When the U.S. offers training to foreign military personnel on a grant basis, it demonstrates a continuing real and active interest on the part of the U.S. in the national security of the foreign country. At the same time, the recipient country may perceive the training as serving its political as well as military interests.

For more than 30 years, U.S. programs to train foreign military personnel have made important contributions to U.S. national security. While the majority of U.S. training of foreign military personnel is now acquired by purchase under FMS procedures, IMET, even in its reduced form, continues to make those contributions unique to a grant program:

for example, a country of military importance to the U.S., such as Portugal, may not have the money to pay for the training; a country with little or no previous contact with U.S. military institutions, such as Finland, might be inclined to accept grant training, but would not consider purchase; a country with limited means might be persuaded, on the basis of experience with IMET, to seek additional essential training under FMS. Furthermore, IMET, as a grant program, gives the U.S. an important role in choosing individuals to receive the training.

There is a continuing need—with each generation—for the special benefits that flow from being able to train selected foreign military personnel in U.S. military facilities. These benefits are such as to justify a U.S. policy of providing training on a grant basis in those cases where purchase under FMS is not to be expected.

SUCCESS OF THE PROGRAM

The large number of students that friendly foreign governments have been willing to commit to the armed forces of the U.S. for training, and the number of countries willing to adopt, in large measure, the tactics, techniques, and weaponry of the U.S. are indicative of the success of IMET and prior grant programs. One writer has observed that never before in history have so many governments entrusted so many personnel, in such sensitive positions, to the training of another government. The success of IMET is also to be seen in the number of countries that, after experiencing grant training, purchase training under foreign military sales.

In the long run, however, there is perhaps nothing to compare with the success of IMET programs in directing U.S. military training to foreign officers who would occupy positions of influence and importance in their countries and armed forces. In April 1978, DoD asked U.S. MAAGs and diplomatic missions for names of foreign officers who had achieved flag rank, and or held positions of prominence and importance in their countries during the period FY 1974-1978. The responses from 47 MAAGs identified over 1000 persons holding prominent positions, and almost 1000 who have achieved flag rank.

OBJECTIVES AND EMPHASIS

Currently stated objectives of the IMET program are:

- To create skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the U.S.
- To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment.
- To foster development by the foreign country of its own indigenous training capability.
- To promote U.S. military rapport with the armed forces of the foreign country.
- To promote better understanding of the United States, including its people, political system, and other institutions.

Initially, all of the objectives stated above should be pursued simultaneously, with emphasis shifting progressively from operations and maintenance to management of in-country capabilities, and finally to the preservation of military rapport. The ultimate objective is to limit programs to the latter and should be pursued as rapidly as possible, consistent with the achievement of overall objectives. Within this context, emphasis is placed on the training of individuals likely to occupy positions of responsibility in the foreign country's armed forces, on instruction that encourages military professionalism and the effective management of defense resources.

When U.S. missions were queried as to the relative importance of these objectives in the particular foreign country, "assisting the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment" was ranked first in the greatest number of cases. Ranking next in number of votes for first place was the objective "to promote better understanding of the U.S., including its people, political systems, and other institutions." A few missions responded

with objectives other than those stated but, with the exception of one that called for displacing Soviet influence, these were subsumed by the objectives now in effect.

CONCLUSIONS

From the data studied, the conclusions that follow appear warranted. Those of a general nature relate to the conceptual basis, or rationale.

General

IMET has been and continues to be an important, effective, and relatively inexpensive instrument for the achievement of U.S. security and foreign policy objectives. It provides a means through which the U.S. tangibly demonstrates its concern for the security interests of friendly foreign countries. It enables the U.S. to influence the selection of training perceived by the U.S. as being of the highest priority, and which the foreign government may, for various reasons, be unable to purchase. It contributes substantially to the objective of establishing communications and influence with foreign military and civil leaders.

There is a continuing need for the unique advantages inherent in a program to train foreign military personnel on a grant basis: a means through which the U.S. tangibly demonstrates its concern for the security interests of friendly foreign countries; an opportunity to influence the selection of training perceived by the U.S. as being of highest priority; a contribution to the establishment of communications and influence with foreign military and civilian leaders.

In the selection of IMET programs, program levels, training, and trainees, many diverse considerations, such as foreign policy imperatives, military requirements, and economic capabilities, must be taken into account. No generalization can be made as to which outweighs the other, and a determination necessarily demands a case-by-case evaluation in the context of the then existing situation.

Regardless of the dominant factor, however, the training must fulfill a military need of the foreign country.

Objectives

Currently stated objectives and emphases for IMET are basically sound. Consideration should be given, however, to amending current guidance to include the objective of tangibly demonstrating U.S. concern for the security interests of friendly foreign governments as a general objective.

Objectives and their relative priorities vary country by country and, with respect to each country, and must be stated clearly in order for those concerned to know what is to be accomplished and to judge what should be done. Because situations change, these aspects should be reviewed at least annually and, as appropriate, revised.

Program Development

The current zero-base budgeting (ZBB) concept for developing programs is fundamentally effective. It needs, however, to be strengthened. More detailed data are needed at the outset of the process. Program increments should be tied more precisely to a single objective—recognizing, however, that other objectives also will be served. And with respect to each program or increment thereof, better insights are needed as to how its objectives are best served by IMET rather than some other form of U.S. involvement. These changes can and should be introduced into the FY1981 budget cycle.

Consideration might be given to limiting the first increment to the minimum program required to meet the objective of establishing and maintaining military-to-military linkage between U.S. and foreign armed forces, with emphasis on reaching potential future leaders and disseminating U.S. military concepts and doctrine, thus furthering the perception of tangible U.S. interest in the armed forces of the foreign country.

Additional Data for ZBB Process

In preparing the May message, the Chief of Mission should state:

- The objectives, in order of importance, that the proposed training is designed to accomplish. These objectives are set forth in the MASM, Chapter E, Part 2. Any other objectives that might be applicable should also be noted.
- When, on a case-by-case basis, the training should be provided on a grant basis rather than sold under FMS.
- When considered appropriate, how the country program contributes to U.S. goals for observance of human rights.
- Why IMET funding levels proposed for English language training and Travel and Living Allowances are considered appropriate.

Professional Military Education

The utility of attempting to categorize certain courses as "professional military education" is in doubt. Certain courses, such as war collage and command and staff college, appear to warrant the distinction. Others, such as those concerned solely with operation and maintenance of equipment do not. In between lies a large body of courses that are difficult to so differentiate, and their arbitrary classification appears to serve no really useful purpose. It might be more meaningful to simply define professional military education as that training designed to provide or enhance leadership and the recipient force's capability to conduct military planning, programming, management, budgeting, and force development to the level of sophistication appropriate to that force.

MAAG Staffing and IMET Program Management

Because of manpower reductions over the past few years, DoD and MAAGs themselves have sought and found organizational and procedural innovations for carrying out, in the field, functions relating to

planning, developing, and implementing IMET programs. As a result, these reductions have not yet seriously jeopardized the program's management. When queried, a group of smaller MAAGs stated that further reductions would seriously affect their ability to manage IMET programs. To date, however, the principal effect has been a reduced capability on the part of MAAGs to follow up on utilization of trainees.

Nation Building

There is ample reason to consider nation-building effects in assessing the accomplishments of an actual or proposed IMET program. For IMET, however, nation building is not an end in itself; the essential purpose of IMET is to fulfill some actual or potential need in the country's defense establishment.

English Language Training

Consistent with their capabilities, foreign countries should be urged and encouraged to provide English language training from their own resources. Their ability to do so will, however, vary and only a relatively few countries can be expected to provide language training to the level required for successful completion of the more sophisticated and more specialized courses of instruction.

Travel and Living Allowances

It is not practical to establish arbitrary and generally applicable rules limiting the payment of travel and living allowances (TLA) by IMET, the situation being quite different from country to country. In some cases, payment of these costs by the IMET program is essential to continue a program. Wherever practical, however, foreign governments should be pressed to assume some or all of these costs.

Canal Zone Schools

The Canal Zone Military Schools (CZMS) are unique in that they offer instruction geared specifically to Latin American needs, are taught in Spanish, include foreign guest instructors, and promote

professional and cultural relationships among personnel from the participating American Republics. Much of the instruction offered is not available to other U.S. military schools. Total costs are comparable to those that would be incurred by attendance at schools in the U.S. but, unlike the latter, the CZMS currently are dependent on IMET support. The Canal Zone treaties and related arrangements should be taken into account in considering the future of these schools.

Mobile Training Teams

Mobile training teams are sometimes the most efficient, and possibly the only practical way to provide certain training. Where these conditions prevail and accomplishment of the particular training is of a sufficiently high priority, there should be no hesitancy to employ the mobile team method.

PREFACE

The authors wish to express their sincere appreciation to the numerous officials who so generously contributed their time and suggestions; to Mr. Walter B. Ligon, Director of Plans and Programs, DSAA for reading and commenting on the draft; to Dr. Spiro C. Manolas, DSAA, the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative, for help in many ways; to Mr. Anthony Kochanek and Colonel Glenn Reisling, USA, of the Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs, for insight into the question and assistance in obtaining interviews in the Department of State; to Mr. Leslie A. Gilson, Security Assistance Division, OJCS-J5, for answering many of our questions. Our thanks go as well to Mrs. Patricia Engle of GRC for the typing.

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

As provided in the contract's Statement of Work (Appendix A), the purpose of this study is to evaluate current policies and procedures for planning, budgeting, and programming U.S. training of foreign military students in order to ensure that the International Military Education and Training (IMET) budget requests are based on a coherent rationale that reflects changing needs abroad, takes into account FMS training alternatives, and ensures that available IMET funds are allocated to achieve the priority military and political objectives of U.S. foreign military training.

1.2 BACKGROUND TO STUDY

This study is a continuation of a study directed by the International Affairs Division of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in a memorandum (Appendix B) dated May 31, 1978. The Department of Defense was asked to lead the study and carry it out in close consultation with the State Department.

On July 21, 1978, the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) asked the Security Assistance Management Activities overseas to supply some data for the OMB study (Appendix C). In particular, the DSAA asked for a priority ranking of the training objectives for which IMET would be used.

On October 18, 1978, the International Affairs Division of OMB noted that the study previously requested in its May 31 memorandum would not be completed in time to be considered in making budget decisions for the 1980 budget. Therefore, OMB requested (Appendix D) a hearing on October 26, 1978, in order to take advantage of the preliminary findings of the study. Specifically, OMB was interested in 16 questions.

At the October 26, 1978, hearing, the questions posed by OMB were essentially answered except for the following three:

1. Provide a list of IMET countries that also purchase training, indicating the dollar value of IMET and FMS training for 1978, 1979, and 1980 for each country.
2. What criteria should be used to determine whether needed military training should be grant funded through IMET or purchased through FMS? Of those countries that can "afford" to purchase necessary training through FMS, which would forego training in the absence of IMET? In which of these countries is it nevertheless in the interest of the U.S. to provide IMET? Why?
3. Assuming a static or declining funding level for the IMET account (\$25 to \$30 million) and the increasing cost of providing training, should the direction of the account be toward more smaller country programs or fewer large ones? Does the FY1980 budget proposal reflect this policy?

1.3 CONFERENCE WITH DIRECTOR DSAA

The contract for the GRC study reported herein (see Appendix A) was awarded on December 5, 1978. On December 6, 1978, representatives of GRC met with the Director, DSAA in order to further define the emphasis and priority for the GRC effort. The Director, DSAA stated that in the time available he wished GRC to concentrate on two problems which would make the study of maximum value to DSAA during the coming Congressional hearings. These hearings could start as early as February 1979.

Problem one: Over the years, the rationale for IMET appears not to have been uniform, vacillating from one concept to another. We need to look at both the historical experience of some 30 years and at the situation today. From this review there needs to be developed a single, clear-cut rationale. In devising it, however, the study must not lose sight of reality; it must work in the world today while it points to the future.

Problem two: The rationale must be accompanied by a correlated concept for allocating funds. As with the first problem, this concept must be realistic, taking into account the way things are done today. We should examine the feasibility of a transition in a year or more in order to implement a new concept in a smooth and reasonable manner.

1.4 STUDY OBJECTIVE RESTATED

As a result of the guidance from Director DSAA, priority for the effort was as follows:

First priority—the two problems set forth in 1.3 above. These are subsumed in items 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Statement of Work. (Appendix A)

Second priority—questions from the Work Statement which are not addressed in the first priority.

1.5 THE APPROACH

The GRC study is developed as a series of chapters arranged so as to provide analytical base for the last two chapters, which address the first-priority questions. In providing the analytical base, specific questions from priority two are treated in individual chapters. In addition to addressing priority one and two questions, some other chapters have been included in order to make the analysis more complete.

1.6 SOURCES

The study is based on source materials (see Appendix H) available in the Washington area. These have been augmented by interviews of knowledgeable government officials and members of the study team.

2 THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION

The purpose of this chapter is to extract those portions of legislation which provide for International Military Education and Training (IMET) and delineate the respective responsibilities of the Departments of State and Defense.

2.1 THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE

The following sections of Part III, Chapter 2 (Administrative Provisions), of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, specify the responsibilities of the Secretaries of State and Defense for security assistance programs in general.

Sec. 622.^{***} Coordination With Foreign Policy.—(a) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to infringe upon the powers or functions of the Secretary of State.

(b) The President shall prescribe appropriate procedures to assure coordination among representatives of the United States Government in each country, under the leadership of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission. The Chief of the Diplomatic Mission shall make sure that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance (including civic action) and military education and training programs ^{***} are coordinated with political and economic considerations, and his comments shall accompany such recommendations if he so desires.

(c) ^{***} Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) or a military education and training program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.

Sec. 623.⁴⁰⁰ The Secretary of Defense.—(a) In the case of assistance under part II of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall have primary responsibility for—

- (1) the determination of military end-item requirements;
 - (2) the procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration with service programs;
 - (3) the supervision of end-item use by the recipient countries;
 - (4) the supervision of the training of foreign military and related civilian ⁴⁰¹ personnel;
 - (5) the movement and delivery of military end-items; and
 - (6) within the Department of Defense, the performance of any other functions with respect to the furnishing of military assistance, education and training.⁴⁰²
- (b) The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery, and allocation of military equipment shall be determined by the Secretary of Defense.

2.2 THE 1976 AUTHORIZATION FOR IMET

Prior to 1976, U.S. training of foreign military personnel on a grant basis was provided as a defense service within the framework of grant military assistance (MAP). The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, established for the first time separate authority for grant training:

Chapter 5—International Military Education and Training ⁴⁰³

Sec. 541.³⁵³ General Authority.—The President is authorized to furnish, on such terms and conditions consistent with this Act as the President may determine (but whenever feasible on a reimbursable basis), military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. Such training and education may be provided through—

- (1) attendance at military educational and training facilities in the United States (other than Service academies) and abroad;
- (2) attendance in special courses of instruction at schools and institutions of learning or research in the United States and abroad; and
- (3) observation and orientation visits to military facilities and related activities in the United States and abroad.

Sec. 542.³⁵⁴ Authorization.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out the purposes of this chapter \$27,000,000 for the fiscal year 1976 and \$30,200,000 for the fiscal year 1977.³⁵⁵ After June 30, 1976, no training under this section may be conducted outside the United States unless the President has reported and justified such training to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

¹Amended by P.L. 95-92 (FY1978 authorization of \$31 million) and by P.L. 95-384 (FY1979 authorization of \$31.8 million).

Sec. 543.³³⁶ Purposes.—Education and training activities conducted under this chapter shall be designed—

(1) to encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security; and

(2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.

2.3 A HUMAN RIGHTS CONSTRAINT ON IMET

The International Security Assistance Act of 1978, which amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, adds a specific human rights constraint on the provision of IMET by amending Section 503B (Human Rights) to include a reference to chapter 5 (IMET):

- 22 USC 2304. (e) Section 502B(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by subsection (d)(1) of this section, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Assistance may not be provided under chapter 5 of this part to a country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance."
- 22 USC 2347. (e) Section 502B(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended by subsection (d)(1) of this section, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Assistance may not be provided under chapter 5 of this part to a country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights unless the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance."

The above reference to human rights is followed in the same legislation with the addition to Section 543 of a third purpose for IMET:

— INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

- 22 USC 2347a. **SEC. 11.** (a) Section 542 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking out "\$31,000,000 for the fiscal year 1978" and inserting in lieu thereof "\$31,300,000 for the fiscal year 1979".
- 22 USC 2347b. (b) Section 543 of such Act is amended—
- (1) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (1);
 - (2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (2) and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon and "and"; and
 - (3) by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
" (3) to increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights."

In this connection it should be noted that the House legislation called for the Secretary of Defense to include human rights training as part of the program of instruction for each foreign military recipient of IMET. This House proposal was rejected by the Senate. It was the view of the Senate and the administration that such instruction would be seen for what it would be—a too overt effort to influence friendly foreign personnel while guests in the United States. The proponents of the language as enacted held that preaching and exhortation in a classroom would be counterproductive; it is best to let the IMET trainees learn by seeing and experiencing.

2.4 POLITICAL VS. MILITARY JUSTIFICATION

A significant characteristic of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is that its execution is vested in two separate executive departments. While the language of the law with respect to the authorities and responsibilities of the two secretaries is generally straightforward, it provides the possible basis for a difference of view as to overall program emphasis for IMET.

For example, the Secretary of State is responsible for:

- Continuous supervision
- General direction, including:
 - whether there shall be a program,
 - and the value thereof (Section 622)

At the same time, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for:

- Determination of end-item requirements
- Procurement
- Supervision of end-item use
- Supervision of training
- Delivery of end items
- Other necessary functions within DoD (Section 623)

When training was a part of MAP, the question of criteria for determining who should be trained in what subject was perhaps simpler than at present, because a requirement for training went more or less hand in hand with a program to introduce certain end items into the foreign armed force. The latter's being the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, the basis for a military justification—among others—for training was perhaps clearer than in present circumstances where IMET has separate authority.

The language of Chapter 5 of the legislation contains no effort to distinguish between the responsibilities of the two secretaries. Thus, it is not clear whether the Secretary of Defense is responsible for determining the requirement for training—i.e., the specifics of who, what, and how many—after the Secretary of State has decided whether there will be a program and what its dollar value will be. Note the purpose as stated in the legislation (Section 543):

- (1) To encourage effective and mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security
- (2) To improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained by them from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.
- (3) To increase the awareness of nationals of foreign countries participating in such activities of basic issues involving internationally recognized human rights.

Although these purposes can be achieved by furnishing military education and training at military installations or other institutions, the purpose itself is not to achieve some specific military objective.

The stated purposes are more general, or vague: encourage beneficial relations, and increase understanding, in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security, in the first instance. In the second instance, IMET should improve ability to utilize resources, including defense articles and services, and contribute to greater self-reliance.

The requirement in the second sentence of Section 542 for a report to the Congress on training to be conducted "outside the United States" appears, to serve no purpose within the Executive Branch (see Chapter 3) nor to serve any meaningful Congressional oversight purposes (see Chapter 6). That requirement should therefore be repealed in the interests of economy.

The language used in the legislation to state the purposes for IMET is general in nature. We must not assume, however, that these statements comprehend the entire body of legislative intent with respect to the program. Responsibilities, authorities, constraints, and admonitions found elsewhere in the Act also apply. Examples are the responsibilities and authorities of the Secretaries of State and Defense found in Sections 622 and 623, and the general guidance contained in Section 502 with respect to civic action (although Section 502 deals expressly with "defense services" which term does not include training by statutory definition). As with MAP, training must fulfill some actual or potential need of the country's defense establishment.

3 TRAINING PROGRAMS AND THEIR EVOLUTION

The purpose of this chapter is to: describe IMET programs; present historical data on trainee and dollar levels; analyze data provided in August 1978 on IMET programs by country.

3.1 GENERAL

The International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) provides, on a grant basis, instruction and training in military skills and U.S. military doctrine to military and related civilian personnel of friendly countries. This training, which is authorized under Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, supports the foreign policy objectives of the United States by providing an effective and relatively inexpensive contribution to the military strength of the free world. To date, the U.S. has trained approximately 500,000 foreign personnel under IMET since the inception of our grant military program in 1950.

Most of the training is conducted in English in the United States where the foreign trainee also has an opportunity to observe and become personally familiar with American institutions and customs. The prerequisite English language capability for training in the U.S. prepares students to attend subsequent training, and English often becomes their second language, opening the door to much Western literature other than military. The foreign trainees, with few exceptions, receive the same training as their U.S. counterparts. They sit beside them, are given the same instruction, and are judged against the same professional and technical standards. All IMET training serves some specific and legitimate military purpose within the armed forces of the trainee's country. It is not a cultural exchange program, although this may be an added benefit.

In addition to training installations in CONUS, DoD operates schools in the Panama Canal Zone and conducts training at certain other foreign locations. In the Canal Zone instruction is conducted in Spanish,

and is designed to meet the unique training needs of Latin American countries. These schools also serve as multinational centers of learning and foster friendly relations with and among Latin American nations. Use is also made of U.S. mobile training teams which travel to the foreign country concerned in those instances where the number of trainees involved is large, the period of training is relatively brief, the training requires the extensive use of interpreters, or the training necessarily involves equipment or facilities in the foreign country.

3.2 IMET PROGRAMS BY YEAR

The following figures show the general dimensions of the IMET program for the last five years. Trainee and dollar levels for 1950 through 1978 are presented in Appendixes F and G.

(Dollars in Thousands)

	FY75	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY79	FY80
IMET (\$) PROGRAM	33,243*	26,467*	23,508*	31,506*	28,755** (est.)	32,900** (proposed)
Numbers of IMET TRAINEES	8,859*	6,961*	4,833*	4,542*	3,538** (est.)	4,059** (proposed)

* DSAA Facts Book, December 1978. FY76 figure includes transitional quarter.

** Congressional Presentation, Security Assistance Program, FY1980.

The decrease in the number of students under IMET is due to many factors. They include the general increase in the cost of training, inflation, the higher costs generally associated with the more advanced training as country needs proceed to the higher levels of training, and a recent requirement to charge full pro rata costs (exclusive of military pay and allowances), including indirect costs. Prior to FY1977, IMET was charged only "incremental" costs, i.e., those costs which would not be incurred in the absence of the foreign students.

3.3 THE VALUE OF IMET TO THE UNITED STATES

As with all other aspects of U.S. national security, the value of IMET to the U.S. derives ultimately from the nature of the world order itself, the place of military forces in that order, and the general strategic situation confronting the United States at this time.

In the simplest terms, the world is a collection of nation states; and the emergence on the international scene of so many new nations supports this assertion. The nation state remains the primary actor in the world order, despite the greater ease of international travel and communication, despite greater interdependence between nations, and despite the advocacy in some quarters for a more interdependent world.

Each nation state seeks to survive as such, and in some way places dependence for its survival on a sovereign right to employ military force to further that end. While other factors are relevant, the world is, at its foundation, animated by considerations of power; and, the nations of the world are in a continuous process of perpetuating and developing their own power.

Nation states can be conceived as "purposive," being organized around essential goals and objectives, and managed for their attainment; and fundamental choices by nations concerning power and national interest are made in response to the internal political process. Thus,

nations organize armed forces in response to their status as sovereign nation states in a world made up of similar entities. Nations do not organize armed forces in response to an offer of military assistance from another nation, nor do they disband their armed forces when foreign military assistance is withdrawn. Nations disband their armed forces only when they cease to exist as sovereign entities.

Turning now to the United States as a nation state seeking to survive in a world system animated by considerations of power, the connection between the military power of the U.S. and that of certain foreign countries is easily made. From the U.S. point of view, the nation states of the world are divided in three groups: the U.S. and its allies, its potential enemies, and the remainder of the nations. Each group has both current and potential military capability. If the potential enemies could not threaten the U.S. beyond the U.S. capability, there would be no need for U.S. interest in the armed forces of other nations. However, the situation is otherwise; in order to ensure its own survival, the U.S. needs its own power in combination with that of other countries. Since the U.S. does not command these other countries, an effective combination of U.S. force with that of other nations must be based on mutual cooperation. In other words, there must be international military cooperation.

International military cooperation, as with international cooperation on any subject, can take place only if there is a mutual interest and concomitant political decision by the two nations concerned. But a political decision to seek military cooperation, however enthusiastically entered into, cannot be effective without specific contact and cooperation between uniformed members of the two armed forces. It is at this point in the sequence of logic that, from the U.S. point of view, the training of foreign military personnel begins to play its unique and continuing role.

It is by attendance at U.S. military training institutions that foreign military personnel acquire the information and insight into

U.S. military institutions and forces on which to base a decision as to the practicality of cooperation with the U.S. on military matters. It is in the training environment that military-to-military relationships of enduring value to the U.S. are made. There are many ways to establish such relationships, but when U.S. and foreign military personnel sit down to plan and undergo training together, the mutual insight and rapport which result are of a different and higher order than relationships based on most other types of contact.

When a foreign country agrees to send its military personnel to be trained by the U.S., it casts a vote of confidence in the U.S. and its military institutions, and it lays the necessary practical basis for that commonality of tactics, techniques, weaponry, and equipment, which serves general world stability, and, if necessary, military cooperation in an emergency. When the U.S. offers training to foreign military personnel on a grant basis, it demonstrates a continuing real and active interest on the part of the U.S. in the national security of the foreign country. At the same time, the foreign country may perceive the training as serving its political as well as military interest.

During the more than 30 years since the end of World War II, U.S. programs to train foreign military personnel on a grant and sales basis have made these contributions to U.S. national security. While the majority of U.S. training of foreign military personnel is now acquired by purchase under FMS procedures, the grant training program (IMET), even in its reduced form, continues to make those contributions to U.S. national security which only a grant program can make: a country of military importance to the U.S., such as Portugal, may not have the money to pay for the training; a country such as Finland with little or no previous contact with U.S. military institutions might be inclined to accept grant training, but would not consider purchase; a country with limited means might be persuaded, on the basis of experience with IMET, to seek additional essential training under FMS. Furthermore, IMET, as a grant program, gives the U.S. an important role in choosing individuals to receive the training.

There is a continuing U.S. need—with each generation—for the special benefits which come from being able to train selected foreign military personnel in U.S. military facilities. These benefits to the U.S. are such as to justify a policy of providing training on a grant basis in those cases where purchase under FMS is not to be expected.

3.4 THE SUCCESS OF IMET PROGRAMS

The large numbers of students that friendly foreign governments have been willing to commit to the armed forces of the U.S. for training, and the number of countries willing to adopt, in large measure, the tactics, techniques, and weaponry of the U.S. are indicative of the success of IMET and prior grant programs. In writing on this aspect of U.S. grant training programs in 1976, Ernest W. Lefever stated:

One of the least well known and least expensive per capita leadership programs conducted by the United States Government is also one of the largest and most consequential. I refer to the Military Assistance Training Program, which over the past 28 years has provided United States training for more than 450,000 men and officers from 70 different friendly and allied countries around the world. Never before in history have so many governments entrusted so many men in such sensitive positions to the training of another government.¹

The success of IMET is also to be seen in the number of countries who, after learning about U.S. military institutions through grant training programs, were willing to spend their own money to purchase training.

In the long run, however, there is perhaps nothing to compare with the success of IMET programs in directing U.S. military training

¹Ernest W. Lefever, "The Military Assistance Training Program", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 424, March 1976.

to foreign officers who would occupy positions of influence and importance in their countries and armed forces. In April 1978, DSAA asked U.S. MAAGs and diplomatic missions for names of foreign officers who had achieved flag rank, and/or held positions of prominence and importance in their countries in the five year time period FY1974-78; respondents included 47 MAAGs countries, identifying over 1000 holding prominent positions and almost 1200 as having achieved flag rank. See Table 1.

The value and success of IMET have been recognized in the Congress, as shown by the following three quotations.

-House Committee on International Relations, Report No. 94-848, 24 Feb. 76, page 22:

...The committee's indepth review of security assistance programs concluded that the record of international military education and training program demonstrates that such programs are the most effective form of grant security assistance and should be retained. In addition to enabling recipient countries to utilize more efficiently defense articles and services provided by the United States, the program affords officers from the individual countries the opportunity to visit the United States and to gain an appreciation of our system of government. The program also provides such individuals an opportunity to meet U.S. military personnel and to form durable relationships with them. This aspect of the program is invaluable to U.S. security interests. ...

-Senate Committee on Appropriations, Report No. 95-352, 18 July 77, page 105:

...While the Committee has expressed some reservations about individual country allocations, it nonetheless has been a strong supporter of the International Military Education and Training program. Illustrative of this position is language which appeared in the report accompanying the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 1977 as follows:

This Committee believes that there are, indeed, important national security and foreign policy objectives which are served by the provision of military education and training to foreign countries. In many developing countries the military is the core

of the state. It is frequently the only effectively organized instrument of national policy and, accordingly, occupies leadership positions in economic and political as well as security fields. One effective way of exposing foreign leaders to the ideas and practices of the United States is through the provision of military education and training, including observation and orientation visits to the United States. ...

-House Committee on International Relations, Report No. 95-1141,
12 May 78, page 22:

...In addition to transmitting professional military skills and instruction in U.S. military doctrine, the grant training program assists in the pursuit of U.S. policy objectives by providing significant opportunities for communication with the military leadership of other countries. ...

3.5 POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

DoD policy statements concerning the conduct of IMET programs are contained in Chapter E, Part II of the Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM), paragraphs 1 through 7, which are reprinted in Appendix E of this report.

The objectives for IMET (paragraph 2) are as follows:

- a. To create skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the U.S.
- b. To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment.
- c. To foster development by the foreign country of its own indigenous training capability.
- d. To promote U.S. military rapport with the armed forces of the foreign country.
- e. To promote better understanding of the United States, including its people, political system, and other institutions.

The paragraph concludes with the following statement:

Initially, all of the objectives stated above should be pursued simultaneously with emphasis shifting progressively from operations and maintenance to management of in-country capabilities, and finally to maintenance of military rapport. The ultimate objective is to limit programs to the latter and should be pursued as rapidly as possible consistent with the achievement of overall objectives.

The above objectives are amplified in paragraph 3 by the statement on areas of emphasis as follows:

To the extent consistent with the military requirement and the achievement of more immediate objectives, emphasis will be placed on:

- a. The training of individuals who are likely in the future to occupy key positions of responsibility within the foreign country's armed forces.
- b. Training that encourages military professionalism and the interchange of military doctrine, particularly by attendance at U.S. service schools at the advanced career and command and staff levels, and
- c. Training related to the management of resources at all levels within the defense establishment.

3.6 OBJECTIVES OF CURRENT IMET PROGRAMS

The DSAA message of 21 July 1978 (Appendix C) asked MAAGs to rank the five objectives of IMET as stated in the MASM (paragraph 3.5 above) as they applied to the FY79 IMET programs. The results of the IMET survey are summarized (without reference to specific countries) in Table 1.

Worldwide, the U.S. missions in 16 countries assigned the highest priority to Objective A (see Objectives listing in Table 2), "assist the

TABLE 1
IMET TRAINEES ACHIEVING POSITIONS
OF IMPORTANCE*

	<u>COUNTRIES</u>	<u>PROMINENT POSITIONS†</u>	<u>GEN/FLAG RANK</u>
<u>EUROPE</u>			
(Incl. Greece and Turkey)	12	262	355
<u>NEAR EAST</u>	3	21	17
<u>AFRICA</u>			
(Incl. Egypt Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan)	7	66	22
<u>FAR EAST</u>			
(Incl. So. Asia)	14	446	451
<u>INTER-AMERICA</u>	11	223	336
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>1018</u>	<u>1181</u>

* Source: DSAA Survey based on replys to SECDEF 210138Z, April 78

† Includes General or Flag rank officers who have achieved prominent positions (e.g., President or Chief of State, Minister of Government Departments, Member of Parliament, Chairman, JCS; Chief/Vice Chief of Staff; Deputy Chief of Staff; Commander Army, Corps, and other major commands; agency directors; commanders of war, command and staff colleges and academies; attaches to major world capitals, NATO commanders, etc.). Many of the prominent persons, of course, did not achieve General or Flag rank in the military but, nevertheless, hold influential positions (e.g., colonels who serve as chief of a Service and the Chief of the Royal Household, and other colonels who occupy critical positions such as cabinet aides, commanders of major military or civilian installations (e.g., Ciampino Airport, Rome) chief test pilot).

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF IN-COUNTRY MAAG RESPONSES
REGARDING IMET OBJECTIVE PRIORITIES:^a WORLDWIDE

IMET Objective	Objective Label ^b	Objective Priority (Rank) ^c						No. of no Response
		I	II	III	IV	V	VI	
To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment	A	16	10	10	2	4	0	(4)
To create skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the U.S.	B	5	14	5	5	7	3	(7)
To foster development by the foreign country of its own indigenous training capability	C	7	10	16	4	5	0	(4)
To promote U.S. military rapport with the armed forces of the foreign country	D	2	5	6	17	10	2	(4)
To promote better understanding of the U.S., including its people, political system, and other institutions	E	9	3	4	13	13	0	(4)
Other ^c	F	5	1	1	1	1	1	(36)

Total countries: 46

^aSource: DSAA message 21 July 1978, Subject: IMET Study. (See Appendix C for message text.)

^bFor this study, IMET objectives have been labeled A through F. These labels are for identification purposes only, and are not intended as indicators of rank or the value of objectives. Rank or priority as specified by the MAAGs is indicated by Roman numerals.

^cThe types of responses indicated in the "other" category include (1) influence attitudes of the political leadership and facilitate improvement of relations; (2) maintain U.S. presence in country and influence within the military by encouraging attitudes favorable to the U.S.; (3) provide an alternative to USSR military training and assistance—reduce indigenous country dependence on USSR; (4) continue perceived U.S. support/interest and indicate U.S. willingness to provide military training on a grant basis.

foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment." The second most frequent objective cited as the highest priority was Objective E, "to promote better understanding of the U.S., including its people, political systems, and other institutions." However, over one-half of the MAAGs surveyed ranked Objective E as last or next to last in priority. The relatively few respondents indicating "other" objectives suggests that the IMET objectives found in the MASM accurately reflect those of current IMET programs.

The rank ordering of IMET objective priorities derived from examining aggregate IMET survey results remains relatively unchanged when the worldwide distribution of MAAG responses is broken down by geographical region. Table 3 summarizes the regional variations in assigning priorities to IMET objectives. The responses of MAAGs in European countries and Latin America (MILGP) are identical to the worldwide summary. The majority of differences are relatively minor, resulting in a change of +1 step in the rank ordering; for example, Objective C in the Near East and South Asia is ranked second, while Objective B is ranked third. The most notable difference is the exceptionally high priority assigned by MAAGs in African and East Asian/Pacific countries to promoting better understanding of the U.S. (Objective E). Worldwide, and in each of the other regions, this objective ranks last or next to last as a priority. This difference is important, particularly if one considers that IMET may have its most significant impact in Third World areas. With MAP being phased out, and with FMS costs often economically prohibitive to developing countries, IMET may well be the most viable program to promote better understanding and linkage of security interests between the U.S. and the armed forces of these nations. Furthermore, the findings suggest that for many Third World countries the willingness of the U.S. to maintain an IMET program, and/or the level at which the program is maintained is often the host country's "barometer," by which it measures its relationship with the United States.

TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF IMET
OBJECTIVE PRIORITIES
WORLDWIDE AND BY GEOGRAPHICAL REGION

Region	I	II	Rank III	IV	V
Worldwide	A ^a	B	C	D	E
Europe	A	B	C	D	E
Latin America: MILGP	A	B	C	D	E
Latin America: SCSA	C	B	A	D	E
Near East and South Asia	A	C	B	E	D
East Asia and Pacific	A	E	B	C	D
Africa	E	B	A	C	D

^aIMET Objective Label; see Table 2 for objective description.

Potentially, another objective of IMET involves providing an alternative to training provided by the Soviet Union or the Peoples Republic of China. As shown in Table 2, ten U.S. missions specified "other" IMET objectives. Two of these MAAGs indicated that the top priority of IMET was to serve as an alternative to Soviet training, with one of the two also specifying training by the PRC. This objective accounts for 20% of the ten "other" responses, and 40% of the five "other" objectives given the highest priority. Additional comments from MAAGs surveyed by DSAA suggest that providing foreign countries an alternative to Soviet training may be even more widely perceived as an important program objective of IMET.

3.7 CONTENT OF CURRENT IMET PROGRAMS

In the same survey cited in Section 3.6, MAAGs were asked to indicate the type of training IMET provided to their particular country, and the courses proposed to accomplish the type of training. Table 4 indicates the responses, worldwide, of MAAG representatives. The most frequently cited type of training provided through IMET (column A) was "defense management" (20)* and "technical" training (18).

A large number of types of courses have been cited as part of the IMET program (Table 4, column B). In most cases, however, six or fewer countries are enrolled in a given course. Table 5 relates the number of courses cited in Table 4 to the number of countries taking the courses. As indicated in the first row of Table 5, each of 21 courses (column A), representing 41% of the total number of courses (column B) cited by respondents, have an "enrollment" of only one country, and 92% of the courses cited have an "enrollment" of between 1 and 6 countries.

A majority of countries (25 of 46, or 54% of the countries surveyed)[†] selected one course: C&GSC, NCC, and AC&SC. A relatively large percentage of countries also selected three additional IMET courses and types of courses. Fourteen of 46 MAAGs (30%) cited "resources management" courses (columns D and E, row 9). Ten countries cited

*If high-level and mid-level defense management categories are included, the number is 28.

[†]See columns D and E, row 10.

TABLE 4
NUMBER OF MAAGs INDICATING TYPE OF IMET
TRAINING AND COURSE AND TYPES OF COURSES RECEIVED^a

Column A		Column B	
Type of Training	No. ^b	Course and Type of Course	No. ^c
High-level military education	3	War College C&SC, C&GS	3 15
High-level defense management	3	Senior command courses, sr. service school courses,	2
High-level defense management	5	Postgraduate courses	3
		Mid-grade, mid-level development, jr. officer courses	3
Technical training	18	Advanced officer courses, Adv. career courses, Adv. branch courses	5
Leadership	2	Resources management Personnel, pers. management/adminis- tration	14 5
Leadership and management	7	Logistics, logistics & supply, logistics management	9
		Logistics executive dev., grad. level logistics courses	5
Defense management	20	Finance PPBS	3 1
Resources utilization/ management/development	3	Defense management, mgt. techniques skills training, training management	6
Logistics supply management	1	English language Operations research, systems analysis	4 3
Basic officer	2	Instructor Basic skills development, basic technical training	3 3
English language	1	Technical training Highly advanced technical training	2 1
Systems application and instruction techniques	1	Oceanography	1
		Combat & support branch training; basic, advanced	1
Advanced mid-level career	1	Combat training Advanced combat arms courses	1 2
Administration	1	Infantry, infantry Bn level tactics Combat service support Artillery, Bn level tactics Airborne	2 1 1 1

TABLE 4 (Cont.)

Electronics/Communications	10
Microwave/Satellite comm.	1
Aerospace	1
Mapping	1
Basic and advanced QM	1
Armored vehicles	1
Engineer, engineering	4
Maintenance, equip maint., field radio repair	5
Helicopter operations & maintenance	1
Jet aircraft maintenance	2
Aircraft maintenance	2
Aviation related technical courses,	2
Navigation	1
Navigator, Flight and Ground Safety	3
Air Traffic Control	1
Air Defense	2
Weapons	1
Pilot and Navigation	1
River and patrol craft	1
Operation & maintenance of US equip.	1
Basic health services, medical supply	2
Advanced medicine	1
ADP, computer programming	2
VEH	1

TOTAL NUMBER OF COURSES = 51

^aSource: DSAA message dated 21 July 1978, Subject: IMET Study.

^bNumber of MAAG's citing type of training.

^cNumber of countries citing course. Responses were received from 46 countries. Due to multiple answers, totals equal more than 46.

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF COURSE SELECTION
BY COUNTRIES RECEIVING IMET
ASSISTANCE

Column Row	A	B	C	D	E
	Number of Courses	Percent of Total Number of Courses (%)	Cumulative Percentage (%)	Number of Countries in Ea. Course	Percent of Total Countries (%) ^a
1	21	41.0	41.0	1	2
2	10	19.5	60.5	2	4
3	7	13.5	74.0	3	6
4	3	6.0	80.0	4	9
5	4	8.0	88.0	5	11
6	2	4.0	92.0	6	13
7	1	2.0	94.0	9	20
8	1	2.0	96.0	10	22
9	1	2.0	98.0	14	30
10	1	2.0	100.0	25	54
11	51	100.0	-	46	-

^aTotal percentage equals more than 100% due to multiple answers from respondents.

"electronics and communications courses, and nine countries indicated "logistics, logistics and supply, and logistics management" as a type of course being taken. Thus, only four courses, or 8% of the courses cited, are taken by more than six countries. However, these four courses appear to be fairly consistent with respondent expressions of "Type of Training", i.e., management and technical training.

4 PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW, AND EXECUTION

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the process by which IMET programs are developed, reviewed, and executed within the budget cycle.

The program is carried out in three major steps:

- Formulation
- Refinement
- Execution

4.1 FORMULATION

IMET program proposals originate with the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in the foreign country. Aided by the DoD security assistance management element in country, he recommends a program which is usually presented in three incremental budget levels. The nature of the training in each level is described. Finally, he states why the program is recommended for IMET (grant aid) rather than for sale under FMS or by acquisition from in-country or third country sources. These inputs are reviewed and coordinated by the appropriate elements of the Departments of Defense (e.g., Unified Command, JCS, OASD/ISA, DSAA) and State (e.g., regional bureaus). From them, the State regional bureau formulates decision unit packages for consideration in the zero-base budget (ZBB) process. After coordination with the Department of Defense, the program proposals are submitted to a working group of the Arms Export Control Board (AECB) for deliberation and formulation of a recommended worldwide program under ZBB procedures within budget guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget. Unresolved issues developed by the working group are referred, along with the recommended program, to the AECB.

AECB recommendations are considered by the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, who makes appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of State for programs to be proposed

to the President for inclusion in the budget. The Department of Defense is a full participant in the programming and budgeting process.

Program levels proposed by the Secretary of State are dispatched to U.S. embassies, which in turn input detailed programs within these levels to the Defense Department. OMB provides State and Defense with its "pass back," which reflects revised program levels it proposes to recommend to the President. State and Defense reclaim if appropriate.

The President makes budget decisions which include specific levels by country. These are still subject to further reclaim, but are sent to embassies which input program revisions as may be needed to bring detailed programs into line with any revised levels.

4.2 REFINEMENT

Detailed programs are provided to the Military Departments for study and determination of the capability for meeting the stated training requirements. This phase of program refinement culminates in a series of Foreign Military Training Workshops hosted by the Unified Commands.

Normally early in the calendar year, about 6-9 months prior to the start of the new fiscal year, these workshops convene at EUCOM, PACOM and SOUTHCOM. Attendees include representatives from: the U.S. elements in the foreign countries (e.g., MAAG, ODCs, DAO), the Unified Command; the military departments and DSAA.

The objective of the workshops is to match requirements and capabilities and to determine what desired training can be accomplished, at what facilities, by whom, and when. Specific workshop functions may be described as follows:

- To ensure that detailed programs conform to established policy and objectives.

- To verify the availability and location of programmed courses.
- To establish starting dates.
- To ensure that prerequisite training is scheduled.
- To coordinate sequential courses.
- To settle such other technical aspects as may be appropriate.

Obviously, some changes in the detailed program content will occur as a result of the refinement process.

4.3 EXECUTION

Following Congressional action, programs are adjusted as may be necessary to conform to legislation and, upon receipt by DoD of State Department approval, the military departments are authorized to proceed with their execution. During this phase, further changes may occur because of more recent changes in requirements, unexpected non-availability of trainees, etc. Required changes are reviewed in DSAA for conformity with established policy, and, if necessary, are coordinated with OSD/ISA and State prior to approval or disapproval. The final approved program is resubmitted to the military departments for execution of their respective training responsibilities.

Actual education and training is implemented by the appropriate agencies, schools, etc. within the military department that offers the courses to be taken by the foreign student. The military departments are also responsible for establishing the security clearance status of the student where necessary.

4.4 PARTICIPATION BY THE JCS AND MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

As a generalized statement, participation in IMET by the JCS and the military departments can be described as providing military advice during program formulation and execution.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The OJCS office of primary responsibility for IMET is the Security Assistance Plans Division, Director for Plans and Policy (J05). No individual works full time on IMET, although one single person may handle most IMET matters.

In IMET program formulation, the Joint Staff develops worldwide priorities for Foreign Military Training, which include IMET. Regional priorities established by the CINCs are left undisturbed in the course of integrating individual countries into a worldwide priority list. This worldwide priority list, a part of the soon to be promulgated "Joint Security Assistance Memorandum", is then processed within the JCS in accordance with Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 132, and is then used by the Joint Staff representative in the deliberations of the AECB Security Assistance Program Review Working Group (SAPRWG).

Other Joint Staff activities are:

- Budget reclama actions
- Workshop attendance and participation
- Coordination with CINCs and military departments

Military Departments

The military departments have the basic responsibility for IMET program implementation. They are included by the OJCS in the coordination cycles for program priority and policy development and may submit comments. They may also provide inputs and assistance to Joint Staff budget reclama actions.

A secondary responsibility of the military departments involves IMET program refinement. Each military department may recommend non-policy actions involving program changes necessary to accommodate feasible and effective implementation of the program at the various schools and training centers, and in the use of MTTs.

Although day-to-day cognizance of the IMET program is maintained by each military department, the more important activities of program refinement occur at the overseas workshops, at single service CONUS workshops, and, on occasion, at DoD workshops. The military departments actively participate in each workshop within their respective area of interest.

The military departments are required to provide training status inputs and minor program adjustments for the DSAA Foreign Military Training Management Information System. They also maintain a wide variety of current and historical data relating to students, courses, and costs.

4.5 TRAINING WORKSHOPS

The Unified Command Workshops provide a joint forum for the purpose of IMET program refinement. They sometimes participate in out-year IMET program formulation on behalf of the CINC. Normally the workshops are held within the first quarter of the calendar year. This scheduling permits review of the next fiscal year budget and also the program year guidance.

Normally, a single, joint workshop is convened in PACOM and SOUTHCOM, though SOUTHCOM sometimes convenes separate workshops by service, which may or may not be convened simultaneously. EUCOM convenes at least three workshops, one each for Army, Navy, and Air Force. Attendance at the workshops includes representatives from DSAA, the military departments, the Unified Command, and U.S. MILREPs or Attaches from the IMET, and FMS countries.

This examination has not revealed any indications that training workshop activities result in program changes or policy decisions which exceed the policy guidance under which they operate. At the same time, it is not clear just how the Washington-level staffs accomplish a positive policy review of workshop output.

4.6 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND POLICY REVIEW

There is no question that the U.S. military departments and OSD manage the training that the policy process directs them to conduct. However, some aspects of the policy review process warrant highlighting.

The large number of questions posed by the policy process in the course of budget review for FY1980 suggests that the program development process is not presently structured to answer relevant questions.

The practice of developing worldwide priorities for IMET on the basis of regional country groupings arranged by priority within the region, which regional priorities are not disturbed in the course of developing a worldwide priority list gives a regional tone to the development of worldwide priorities.

There has been a tendency to judge the appropriate program level for a given country or region in terms of dollars extrapolated from the dollar levels of previous years, either as a continuation of its order of magnitude or as a percentage of the total worldwide program. This perception has a degree of validity, primarily when viewed in terms of the signal it might convey to the recipient government. This, however, is too simplistic an approach and, if given too much weight as it appears to have been given, it violates the concept of the zero-based budget which contends that a given program has many possible levels or increments, each with its own unique objectives, accomplishments, and relative priorities. The program development system should be designed to expose all relevant considerations and allow the decision makers to assign each of them individually appropriate weights and precedents.

During the IMET budget review for FY1980, some of the priorities recommended by the AECB were rearranged by OMB. It appears that this happened because OMB felt that the guidelines for developing the FY1980 IMET program under ZBB procedures did not adequately prescribe the content of each increment nor did it require that each increment be tied to a

specific program objective and specific degree of accomplishment. This presented difficulty in assigning a proper priority to some country increments which apparently lumped more than one objective into a single large increment.

It is not clear whether the Washington-level participation in, or contact with, the training workshops adequately serves the needs of policy review of the changes made during the workshops.

5 MAAG STAFFING AND IMET MANAGEMENT

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate effects of reduced MAAG staffing on effective country-level management of IMET.

The number of U.S. military personnel engaged overseas in the administration of security assistance programs had been reduced from a peak level of over 10,000 in 1955 to 1659 in FY75. Effective with FY78, the security assistance legislation imposed a worldwide ceiling of 865 on the number of U.S. military personnel managing security assistance programs overseas. The legislative ceiling for FY79 is 790, and the CPD for FY80 proposes a total of 769. Note that the legislative ceiling does not apply to U.S. civilians or local personnel. See Table 6.

New, smaller organizations, such as the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC), replaced many of the previous larger MAAGs and MILGPs; and, in some cases, host country military personnel took over some of the administration at home or in the United States. In accordance with the security assistance legislation, DoD has been making greater use of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in the management of security assistance activities.

5.1 EFFECT OF MAAG REDUCTIONS ON IMET

Many of the countries that have received U.S. grant military training since World War II are now handling the administration of their U.S. training programs. To some degree, these countries were pushed into this self-sufficiency by a reduction in U.S. personnel available in country to do the work. At the same time, most of those countries taking charge of the training programs were among the more advanced. The present situation is different, however. The IMET recipient countries in FY1979 are, in all but two cases, developing countries. The two exceptions are Austria and Finland, whose programs consist of four and six officers respectively.

TABLE 6

SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES OVERSEAS, FY75 THROUGH FY80, BY CATEGORY

ACTIVITY	FY75	76/77	77	ACTIVITY	FY78	FY79	FY80
MAAG plus military groups in Latin America	46	45	33	MAAG (More than 6 Military)	15	14	14
ODC (4-6 Military)	<del> </del>	<del> </del>	<del> </del>	ODC (4-6 Military)	21	20	23
ODC (1-3 Military)	<del> </del>	<del> </del>	11	ODC (1-3 Military)	8	11	11
Defense Attache Office (DAO) (with Augmentation)	7	8	10	DAO (with Augmentation)	9	10	9
DAO (without Augmentation)	1	14	13	DAO (without Augmentation)	15	16	15
US Embassy		5	6	US Embassy	7	6	16
TOTAL ACTIVITIES	54	72	73	TOTAL ACTIVITIES	75	77	88
TOTAL Military Personnel Authorizations ^a	1,659	1,458	1,288	TOTAL Military Personnel Authorizations ^a	865	790	769 ^b

^a MAAG plus ODC.^b Congressional Presentation Document, FY1980.

In 1978, U.S. diplomatic missions in the IMET recipient countries were asked by DSAA what impact current reduced levels and further MAAG reductions would have on the U.S. capability to develop and manage IMET programs in the future. The responses were mixed, but can be explained to some degree by the variations in MAAG size, as explained in subsequent paragraphs. Fourteen responses stated that there would be little or no effect; 16 responses indicated that programs would be jeopardized in varying degrees. See Tables 7 and 8. MAAG personnel reductions have impacted adversely on MAAG ability to follow up on the assignments of IMET graduates after training. For example, in contrast to a decade ago, few MAAGs are now able to keep up-to-date information on foreign military graduates.

In the 16 IMET recipient countries anticipating problems, several characteristics can be noted. In all these countries except Korea there are small MAAGs or similar organizations. All but Venezuela have a relatively large number of individuals to be trained considering the size of the country. All but three countries, Portugal, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, have both IMET and FMS training programs that would be affected. What U.S. authorities in these latter three countries appear to be saying is that they and the host governments have reached the limit of their abilities to absorb more reductions without jeopardizing the programs. Further cuts would impair the ability to administer, plan, manage and monitor the programs under way. In some cases, reductions would also have an adverse effect on FMS equipment scheduled to arrive.

In countries where reductions would have little effect, other characteristics are apparent. Six of these smaller military assistance organizations are in Latin America where SOUTHCOM provides administrative assistance, coordination is easier because much is done in Spanish, and a great deal of the training is done in the Canal Zone, also in Spanish. Other countries' programs seem to be governed, too, by special considerations. Austria and Finland have small programs with differing objectives. Those remaining are larger MAAGs of special categories.

TABLE 7
COUNTRIES PREDICTING LITTLE EFFECT
FROM MAAC REDUCTIONS^a

MAACs With Answers of Little or No Effect	Some Impact on FMS ^b	MAAC Size ^b		Proposed FY80		Actual FY78		Estimated FY79		Actual FY78		Estimated FY79		Numbers of IMET Trainees ^b	
		Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	Milit/Civ/Local	CONUS	Overseas
Austria	Yes	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	9	9	9	9	9
Finland ^c	Yes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greece	Yes	28	7	16	25	5	12	24	5	13	114	4	0	196	12
Spain	No	27	7	14	24	4	10	14	4	7	332	38	182	228	84
Comment															
Turkey	Yes	64	16	40	55	10	30	37	7	24	0	0	0	182	8
Tunisia	Yes	6	1	3	6	1	3	6	1	3	124	67	125	118	97
India	Yes	2	1	4	2	1	4	2	1	4	21	0	26	44	0
Philippines	Yes	34	9	6	27	6	4	27	6	4	113	23	97	108	2
Bolivia	Yes	6	2	5	6	2	5	6	2	5	11	218	17	17	74
Colombia	Yes	6	2	8	6	2	8	6	2	8	35	225	50	53	246
Guatemala	Yes	4	0	3	4	0	3	4	0	3	0	0	0	11	33
Honduras	Yes	6	2	4	6	2	4	6	1	5	10	212	12	18	91
Panama	Yes	13	1	1	13	1	1	13	1	1	5	78	11	17	77
Paraguay	Yes	3	2	4	3	2	4	3	2	4	52	92	0	0	0

^a Source: 1978, DSAA Survey on Effects of Reduced MAAC Staffing on Need for IMET and Effective Country-Level Management of Both IMET and FMS Training.

^b CPD, FY 1980.

^c IMET & FMS managed overseas by DAO without augmentation.

TABLE 8
COUNTRIES PREDICTING ADVERSE EFFECT
FROM MAAG REDUCTIONS^a

MAAG's Predicting Problems	Same Impact on FMST	Actual FY78		Estimated FY79		Proposed FY80		Actual FY78		Estimated FY79		Proposed FY80	
		MII/Civ/Local		MII/Civ/Local		MII/Civ/Local		COMUS		COMUS		COMUS	
		MII	Civ	Local	MII	Civ	Local	MII	Civ	Local	MII	Civ	Local
Portugal	No Comment	12	4	9	12	4	9	90	38	142	46	89	30
Jordan	Yes	11	2	5	11	2	5	296	5	258	5	230	7
Morocco	Yes	16	2	6	13	2	2	211	0	184	6	168	6
Yemen	Yes	1	0	0	6	2	2	33	0	23	0	40	0
Ghana	Yes	0	1	0	0	1	0	54	0	41	0	50	0
Liberia	Yes	6	1	2	6	1	2	32	0	6	0	16	0
Zaire	Yes	6	1	3	6	1	3	59	0	75	0	53	0
Indonesia	Yes	33	4	19	27	3	16	238	21	156	8	192	0
Korea	Yes	130	38	50	112	36	43	203	5	238	6	259	9
Pakistan	Yes	6	1	7	6	1	7	80	0	77	0	86	2
Thailand	Yes	40	7	15	35	5	10	158	8	154	0	164	0
Dom. Rep.	Yes	4	1	2	4	1	2	24	69	21	73	13	46
Ecuador	Yes	6	1	4	6	1	4	32	375	23	453	23	354
Haiti	No Comment	1	0	0	1	0	0	21	0	18	0	16	0
Peru	Yes	5	0	5	5	0	5	13	45	26	34	26	69
Venezuela	Yes	5	2	5	6	2	5	9	21	0	0	0	0

^aSource: 1978, DSAA Survey on Effects of Reduced MAAG Staffing on Need for IMET and Effective Country-Level Management of Both IMET and FMS Training.
b:CPB, FY 1979

Turkey and Greece had no IMET program at the time of the survey. Spain's affirmative response was conditioned upon a Spanish capability of setting up adequate liaison personnel in the U.S. to assume the work now done in the MAAG. The Philippines predicted an increase in need for the IMET management course because there would not be sufficient trained Philippine officers to take the place of U.S. officers eliminated in further reductions. Apparently, in the countries with larger MAAGs, there are still alternatives to further cuts, albeit qualified in several cases. In sum, there are ways which may keep the programs alive and productive, but at a price in terms of effectiveness.

5.2 SPECIFIC PROBLEMS GENERATED BY CONTINUED MAAG REDUCTIONS

The most profound effect of further reductions in MAAG personnel is to be found in the smaller countries that are, in general, incapable of absorbing military assistance administrative functions themselves. Some programs may become ineffective, or grind to a halt when qualified U.S. personnel depart. The embassy in Haiti reported that "...One USAF NCO is assigned as an augmentee to manage the program; reduced staffing would, in effect, bring the program to a halt."

Where MAAGs are slightly larger, there are limited alternatives, but most programs would also be adversely affected. Some probably would not be worth pursuing. The Chief of the U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG) in Indonesia stated that "...the depth of experience required to insure effective management of the complex business of security assistance, particularly IMET and FMS training, does not now exist in the GOI. In this respect, further reductions in the numbers of USDLG personnel which would impact on U.S. management of the training problem would have a detrimental effect on the security assistance program in Indonesia." Venezuela reported that the MILGP had "...experienced less than satisfactory results from host country management of both IMET and FMS training. Consequently, the reduced staffing level for the MILGP has required greater individual effort by all remaining personnel for training than required previously; other programs/problems/advisory efforts therefore suffer delays."

Reductions have the effect of requiring increasing attention to administration and the mechanics of IMET program development on the part of remaining MAAG personnel. This is at the expense of those activities involving contact with the local armed forces that are so necessary to make informed judgments about the suitability of a particular candidate for IMET training. In other words, if there is only one person to work on training, that person's activity will tend to be in the office, with less time to get out and know the foreign military personnel involved. This will occur regardless of how well prepared U.S. personnel may be to make contacts among host country military personnel when they arrive on station. Many have had language training; some have undergone an extensive and lengthy area studies program; still others have the opportunity to attend military schools in the host country prior to assuming MAAG duties. Spain is an example of the latter case.

The U.S. commander of the MAAG in one country cited the value in identifying and reaching future military leaders in that country. He emphasized the fact that "Younger officers are rising out of..... whose future may be increasingly our future in the evolving scene...and who do not share [the favorable perceptions of their seniors of the United States]. ...We must know more about these officers and find ways to provide them broader perspective. As a top priority, we should expand our military training programs to provide greater contact with younger ... officers." This observation speaks not only to the need for a continued IMET program, but for sufficient U.S. military personnel in country to do the work necessary to knowing and maintaining contact with each generation.

5.3 MINIMUM STAFFING REQUIREMENTS FOR IMET

The source materials for this study do not provide a basis for stating minimum staffing requirements for handling training (IMET and FMS) in MAAGs. However, to be effective, it is clear that even a small training program requires advance planning, coordination

with the U.S. training installations and the local armed force, and monitoring of the utilization of U.S. training by the trainee after return home. In this latter connection, it is significant that many MAAGs have either limited or no records of those from their country of station who have received U.S. military training. The presence of an MTT can also place special, additional demands on a MAAG, requiring it to take time with the team to orient and provide assistance to its members. It is reasonable to conclude that any country program that experiences a significant increase in the use of MTTs may have a requirement for additional MAAG personnel in that country during the presence of the MTTs.

6 NATION BUILDING AS AN OBJECTIVE OF IMET

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the concept of "Nation Building" as an objective of IMET.

6.1 GENERAL

"Nation Building" is a term that can be applied to almost any military endeavor that is a part of the development of national infrastructure. The idea of military contribution to nation building is not new, having been part of security assistance legislation and programs since their inception following World War II. The type of assistance provided took on a different character and significance as the countries to which U.S. military assistance was provided changed from those in Europe to the developing countries of Asia, Africa, Near East, and Latin America. Since these countries were far less advanced, military assistance assumed an added meaning and emphasis in the development of national infrastructure, not only in military terms, but in economic and political aspects as well. Later, when U.S. security assistance was at its height in Latin America, another term — "civic action"—became synonymous with "nation building." The term was appealing and popular because it meant the active, progressive use of military assets in response to a civic need. However, Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended states:

Sec. 502. Utilization of Defense Articles and Services.--Defense articles and defense services to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security, or for the purpose of assisting foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries (or the voluntary efforts of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States in such countries) to construct public works and to engage in other

activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries. It is the sense of the Congress that such foreign military forces should not be maintained or established solely for civic action activities and that such civic action activities not significantly detract from the capability of the military forces to perform their military missions and be coordinated with and form part of the total economic and social development effort. (emphasis added)

It is reasonable to assume that these admonitions were intended to apply to IMET as well as to MAP.

6.2 IMET POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Guidance in the 1978 MASM places some constraints on nation building and civic action instruction offered under IMET to foreign students. Prohibited without prior approval of the appropriate Unified Commander or DSAA are:

- "Training in basic skills normally utilized by both the military and civil sectors."
- "Training that, even though uniquely military in nature, is primarily for the purposes of civic action or nation building programs."

In addition, DSAA is to be notified immediately of all waivers granted by Unified Commands regarding these constraints, along with a detailed rationale for these waivers.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the one indispensable criterion for justification of training under IMET is that the training meet a military requirement. Thus, the contribution of the training to nation building appears to be a plus value, and not the sole or principal purpose.

6.3 CONCLUSION

There is ample reason to assess the value that nation building or civic action may have in a country program, both to the U.S. and the foreign country. Accordingly, civic action or nation building are proper considerations in selecting specific courses for training under IMET, as long as this is not the primary goal or purpose.

7 THE USE OF MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the relative value of mobile training teams to bring expert training into countries vs. CONUS training that exposes students to American society.

Foreign military forces frequently have priority requirements for certain types of training that can be accomplished best in country at training facilities and with equipment that often cannot be removed from the country. This type of training usually must be accomplished at minimum cost, in the most rapid manner possible, and in response to a particular threat or adverse condition affecting the security of the country concerned. Sometimes these training requirements are such that U.S. capabilities and resources can be applied in a manner that helps to achieve U.S. security objectives at a time when long periods of schooling in the English language and technical or complex subjects are either not feasible or not necessary.

In some cases, even though particular training is of a high priority, it may be either impractical or uneconomical to accomplish it by sending foreign trainees to DoD schools or other training facilities. Such cases occur when the training is of relatively short duration, must reach large numbers of trainees, entails extensive use of interpreters, must necessarily be conducted on equipment or in facilities located in the foreign country, or some combination of these factors.

7.1 PERCEPTIONS OF MTT AND CONUS TRAINING

In a recent world-wide DSAA survey to determine preference for MTT's or CONUS training, only two U.S. embassies reported that the host country preferred MTTs over CONUS training. Almost all indicated that CONUS training was more advantageous to the host country and to U.S. interests; a few embassies held to the position that MTTs and CONUS training had distinct advantages under differing conditions in achieving objectives that were equally important, but not alike. To some extent,

these interpretations of MTT vs. CONUS training could be due to the fact that the query was general in nature, without restrictions, such as those of funding and time. Nevertheless, the responses indicate that, except where special conditions prevail, the preferred type of foreign military training is that of courses conducted in CONUS. For example, in FY1979 approximately 1.7% of IMET has been programmed for mobile teams; and about .02% is projected for FY1980. (about \$500,000.00 of \$28.7 million, and about \$93,000.00 of \$32.3 million.)

CONUS training is generally a better long-term solution for most foreign countries insofar as creating the skills to eventually eliminate the majority of extra-territorial training is concerned. This is also a principal goal in any U.S. foreign training provided. In-depth CONUS training, gives the foreign student an operational/technical expertise and, with some practical experience in-country, an instructional capability. The sooner an in-country base of professional and technical expertise in a given area of training is established, the earlier that country can become self-sufficient. However, relatively few countries will be able to achieve complete self-sufficiency in training since the demand for a particular type of training may be too small to establish an economical in-country training capability, or country resources may be insufficient to sustain an indigenous training capability.

It is recognized that MTT training lacks many of the benefits of formal courses, particularly those conducted in DoD schools in the U.S. Unquestionably, the formal instruction is broader in scope and deeper in treatment, and thus has a more profound and longer lasting impact. The level of formal training better equips and foreign trainee to impart his knowledge and expertise to others, leading to an increased self-sufficiency on the part of the foreign country in producing needed skills.

Training in the U.S. also offers the tremendous advantage of exposing the foreign trainee to the American people, their way of life,

institutions, beliefs, and aspirations. The foreign student opens new doors of understanding through his pursuit of English language proficiency. Friendships and personal contacts are made during the training that remain throughout a lifetime. This is all the more significant because the students chosen for CONUS military training may eventually occupy positions of leadership in that country's military establishment—often at the national level. The U.S. experience in this regard has been noted in Chapter 3 of this study. See Table 1.

Despite these advantages of formal training courses, the U.S. must recognize the need for MTT training in those cases where the situation dictates this to be the efficient way of meeting the military requirement.

7.2 CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING MTT OR CONUS TRAINING

The responses to the DSAA survey revealed a thorough understanding in the field and on the part of U.S. MAAGs of the value of MTTs, compared with CONUS training. There are times, as well, when the military department enters the decision process to make the point that an MTT is the best (perhaps only) way to do the job.

As with any other aspect of a particular IMET country program, the decision to use an MTT must be based on consideration of all of the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the use of the particular MTT at a particular time, and in a particular country.

Any policy which suggests use of MTTs solely for their apparent cost benefits runs the risk of detracting from accomplishment of overall U.S. foreign training objectives.

8 THE COST OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the cost of English language training to IMET and FMS training. These costs have been characterized by a high degree of tuition inflation affecting all U.S. schools and differences in foreign country English language preparation of military students sent to CONUS.

8.1 GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING

English language training costs are properly justified under IMET for one overriding reason: proficiency to a predetermined level, depending on the course, is necessary in order to pursue successful instruction presented in English. In keeping with the general policy, the U.S. seeks to have the country concerned provide certain basic English language training in country prior to commencing IMET training in the U.S. However, the rule is that the student must have an English language proficiency sufficient to permit learning. In some cases, it is necessary to supplement the basic level training received at home after arrival in the U.S., since the principal purpose of the language training is to assist the foreign military student to comprehend the military training for which he has come to the U.S. and not for the purpose of learning English as a language. Therefore, in almost every case, some higher level of instruction in technical vocabulary is also required.

At the same time, English language training for IMET students provides the U.S. with many fringe benefits. These are much the same as those cited in Chapter 7 for any training received in the U.S. The ability to communicate in English, and efforts to improve fluency, become catalysts for the acquisition of correct impressions of the U.S. on the part of key foreign officers.

8.2 ANALYSIS OF IMET AND FMS ENGLISH LANGUAGE COSTS

There does not appear to be a disparity in the IMET and FMS English language costs in the courses conducted at the Defense Language

Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) at Lackland AFB, Texas, where all CONUS DoD English language training is carried out. FMS customers seem to accept the need and benefits of English language training as worth the cost; notwithstanding the rising prices, the courses are well attended by FMS students. The GAO pointed out in its Report #77-545, May 17, 1977, however, that with few exceptions, foreign countries have an English language training capability and that the facilities in foreign countries should be maintained and utilized. The GAO recommended that since English language training is not a primary IMET objective, it should be deemphasized and be eliminated in some countries that do not make use of their in-country facilities.

In a review of IMET programs for FY1977, 78, and 79, there do appear to be several countries that rely heavily on IMET funds for English language training. See Table 9. There are situations, however, in which U.S. national security interests are overriding in a country where English language capabilities are lacking, as has been the case in the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). Notwithstanding, however, there was under way at the time of the writing of this study the establishment of an English Language Laboratory in North Yemen under the tutelage of DLIELC.

To judge whether a country is capable of operating its own English language training, one must understand how CONUS English language courses are conducted. At Lackland, foreign military students are integrated into the basic English course at the most advanced two-week increment of the course for which they are qualified. If they do not need the basic course, or have finished it, they pursue one of a variety of specialized courses with vocabulary appropriate for the technical or complex subject they will be studying in CONUS.

Unless the IMET country is a large one, it is not likely to have an English language capability beyond the basic English course, and in some instances, even that may be extremely limited. The establishment

TABLE 9
ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING
IMET PROGRAM FOR FY 1978

The English language portions of IMET country programs for FY 1978 are tabulated below:

Country	Total Students	Total Program	English Language Students	English Language Program	% of Students Programmed for English Language	% Of Program Allocated to English Language
Egypt	34	\$ 180,543	12	\$ 65,320	35.3	36.2
Greece	357	2,027,653	24	55,800	6.7	2.8
Jordan	462	1,529,181	15	12,210	3.3	.8
Lebanon	173	740,947	3	5,850	1.7	.8
Morocco	494	1,257,655	45	185,080	9.1	14.7
Portugal	288	2,233,974	27	128,903	9.4	5.8
Senegal	11	40,296	3	6,550	27.3	16.1
Spain	557	1,837,139	8	13,360	1.4	.7
Tunisia	390	1,022,029	40	102,662	10.3	10.0
Yemen	81	496,400	24	256,320	29.6	51.6
Zaire	338	2,195,525	108	346,318	32.0	15.8
Afghanistan	94	355,389	15	29,666	16.0	8.4
Indonesia	439	2,342,198	79	169,945	19.0	7.3
Korea	359	1,130,142	6	3,600	1.7	.3
Thailand	294	979,242	15	65,740	5.1	6.7
Bolivia	236	799,779	9	34,280	3.8	4.3
Dom. Rep.	150	666,222	14	41,326	9.3	6.2
Haiti	89	196,583	35	64,392	39.3	32.8
Honduras	248	607,732	1	3,100	.4	.5
Mexico	65	176,171	5	4,690	7.7	2.7
Nicaragua	229	391,678	2	14,120	.9	3.6
Paraguay	163	556,631	5	12,450	3.1	2.2
Peru	358	780,923	24	31,370	6.7	4.0

TABLE 9 (Cont.)
 ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING IMET PROGRAM FOR FY 1978

The following IMET country programs did not include English language training during FY 1978:

Austria	Bangladesh	Taiwan
Finland	India	Colombia
Ghana	Malaysia	Panama
Kenya	Pakistan	Venezuela
Sudan	Philippines	

SOURCE: DSAA Working Paper.

of an effective in-country basic English language program requires considerable time and expense, even though political and military requirements for foreign students qualified in English may be immediate. Also, English language training in foreign countries must be arranged to accommodate a consistent student load over a number of years; it cannot function well on an uneven or sporadic basis. In any case, the quality of in-country basic English training facilities will depend to a great extent on having a volume of students that make the costs worthwhile. For this reason, and also due to the usual scarcity of qualified instructors, advanced courses with more technical and specialized vocabulary are normally not found in small recipient countries.

Valid judgments for a particular country as to the necessary assistance in developing adequate English language training can be difficult to obtain. It is in this area that the DLIELC make a valuable contribution. It can provide the teams to study, analyze, and make the critical recommendations required.

8.3 CONCLUSIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

There is a need for more valid information from country teams justifying IMET English language training in cases where the costs are high by comparison with the overall program costs. This should include a clearer rationale for training and better explanation of the extent to which in country facilities are available and used.

English language training is an excellent way to provide key foreign officers with a better understanding of the United States, fostering continuing interest in a culture that differs from their own. This deserves careful consideration in any proposal to reduce funding which is based to any degree on the high cost of CONUS English language training.

There may be some cases in which foreign countries do devote an excessive amount to CONUS English language training and fail to develop facilities that are needed for adequate English language training in-country. This calls for a priority U.S. effort at the DoD level to determine the reasons these conditions exist and to make every effort to solve the problems prior to the termination of IMET CONUS English language programs.

9 IMET FUNDS SPENT ON TRAVEL AND LIVING ALLOWANCES

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the feasibility of reducing the percentage of IMET funds spent on travel and living allowances.

9.1 ALTERNATIVES IN REDUCING TRAVEL AND LIVING COSTS

It would be difficult to establish a workable limit on IMET funds to be used for travel and living allowances (TLA), whether at the total program, regional or country level. Neither travel expenses nor living allowances lend themselves to controls that could be maintained by setting a limit to the percentage of funds devoted to these portions of programs. Yet, travel costs and living allowances are expenditures which need to be monitored and controlled as closely as possible.

Experience indicates that these costs are ones which even poorer countries have been able to assume in a number of cases. Several replies from the field, as part of the DSAA survey (Appendix C), support this assertion. For example, the Philippines has begun using national airlines to transport students. A number of other countries have begun transporting their military students in a similar manner, where this has been possible. Based on the information available in responses to the 1978 DSAA survey, the goal of reducing travel costs will be achieved more effectively through the elimination of costs that countries can assume (such as that possible in using national airlines) than by establishing a limit of a percentage of the total funding for training. As a matter of fact, the latter would penalize countries that are geographically remote from CONUS or the site of overseas training, or, that do not have a national airline that operates over international routes.

Many countries, like Tunisia, in the view of the U.S. Embassy, would probably choose European training, which is cheaper. Some countries—like North Yemen—would simply have to eliminate the programs because Saudi Arabia, which pays for much of the equipment and training

for Yemen, has indicated that it would not pay TLA associated with IMET training, which may have a high priority for the U.S., but is not important to Saudi Arabia. The result would be cancellation of IMET for Yemen.

Much of the same logic can be applied to living expenses. For example, according to our embassies, Finland and Austria, which have small CONUS programs, would either cut back, or eliminate the IMET training entirely, if required to pay the travel or living costs. Even countries that desperately feel that they need the training—as does Portugal—would have to reduce the amount of training, if it were necessary to absorb any quota of the TLA costs. Finally, there is also some evidence that the current levels of TLA authorized by the MASM are not adequate to cover the daily living allowance; and that, as a result, some countries also supplement this expense. See Table 10.

There are other travel and per diem costs for IMET that relate to deployment of MTTS. In general, the above reasoning applies here as well. In addition, it would appear illogical to risk foregoing the potential cost benefits of an MTT by a fixed per diem and travel charge which might make the MTT unavailable.

9.2 REALISTIC CONTROLS FOR TLA COSTS

Because of the differences that exist in the needs and capabilities of IMET recipient countries to assume these costs, and due to varying U.S. priorities, control of expenditures for TLA should be undertaken on a case-by-case basis. Judgments should be made—wherever possible at the country level—on how these costs compare with other expenditures for training. Decisions on the use of any funding available should be based on military requirements, and TLA should be considered a cost of doing business, to be minimized wherever possible but not at the expense of providing the training.

TABLE 10
STATUS OF TLA PAYMENTS
FOR IMET COUNTRIES^a

SUMMARY

This table records the status of TLA payments in 43 countries having IMET programs in 1978.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Number of Countries</u>
Pay all TLA -----	9
Pay no TLA -----	24
Pay travel only-----	2
Pay living allowance only-----	1
Pay partial travel-----	7
Pay partial living allowance----	3

<u>Pays</u>			<u>Comments</u>
<u>Country</u>	<u>Travel</u>	<u>Living</u>	
		<u>Allowances</u>	
<u>EAST ASIA PACIFIC</u>			
A	No	No	Country currently adds a small amount to the pay of officers in the U.S. Would be unwilling and unable to pick up TLA.
B	Pays Part	No	Country pays travel between London; beyond that small national training budget would not allow payment of additional TLA costs.
C	No	No	MOD has requested approval from Finance Ministry for payment of travel expenses, effective Jan 1980. No agreement at this time to address paying living allowance expenditures.
D	Pays Part	Pays Part	In FY 78, country initiated a program to pay some or all TLA on a selected basis, especially CONUS IMET. Practice expected to continue if not expanded in FY 79.
E	Yes	Yes	

^aSOURCE: DSAA Survey of 1978 (Appendix C of this report).

TABLE 10 (Cont.)
STATUS OF TLA PAYMENTS
FOR IMET COUNTRIES^a

Country	Pays		Comments
	Travel	Living Allowances	
F	No	No	Country could pay TLA costs. MOD has difficulty in obtaining funds from Treasury. In any case, should funds be made available they would not be sufficient to maintain the present number of IMET students and country would reduce trainee numbers to those considered most essential.
G	No	No	Limited Defense budget precludes paying TLA.
H	Pays Part	Pays Part	U.S. pays CONUS portion of TLA only. Country pays for all overseas TLA.
I	Pays Part	No	In March 1978, country assumed transoceanic portion of travel.
J	No	No	Pressing demands of a developing economy and small Defense budget makes it difficult to pay TLA.
K	Yes	Yes	
<u>LATIN AMERICA</u>			
L	No	No	Extremely poor country and low budget resources, argues against paying TLA.
M	Yes	Yes	
N	No	No	Would be hard pressed to pay TLA due to scarce financial resources, allocated to only the most critical priorities.
O	Yes	Yes	
P	Yes	No	Uses National Flag Carrier. Country also pays students a stipend additional to IMET LA in order "to maintain appearance in international setting."
Q	No	No	Would be hard pressed to pay TLA due to very limited financial resources.
R	Yes	Yes	
S	No	Yes	Should economic conditions improve, country may be prepared to pay part of travel.
T	Yes	Yes	
U	No	No	In view of limited CONUS training, doubtful whether country would fund LA.

TABLE 10 (Cont.)
STATUS OF TLA PAYMENTS
FOR IMET COUNTRIES^a

Country	Pays		Comments
	Travel	Living Allowances	
V	No	No	Difficult to assume since military handicapped by fixed budget and hard currency deficiency.
W	Army: Yes Navy: No Air Force: No	Yes Yes No	There are indications that country might also be willing to pay additional portions of TLA.
X	Yes	Yes	
<u>EUROPE</u>			
Y	Pays Part	No	Country pays travel to CONUS and return. Country supplements LA paid under IMET since LA does not cover amount to be paid under country law. Additional country contributions would encounter difficulties because of severe budget limitations, or necessitate reduced IMET participation, or a turning to other sources for training.
Z	No	No	Payment of TLA by country would result in termination of IMETP.
AA	No	No	Country's economy and foreign currency availability precludes payment of TLA. In addition, IMET training is already constrained by Service budgets, which are required to make per diem payments to trainees as required by law.
AB	No	No	Country would object to paying TLA. Country has refused any training shorter than 8 weeks duration specifically to preclude funding of TLA.
<u>MIDDLE EAST</u>			
AC	No	No	IMET initiated in FY 78; too early to determine whether country would accept TLA costs.
AD	Yes	Yes	Country has paid all TLA since FY 77 and is expected to do so unless the financial situation deteriorates further. Should the economic situation worsen, country is expected to pay travel costs but ask that IMET assume LA.

TABLE 10 (Cont.)
STATUS OF TLA PAYMENTS
FOR IMET COUNTRIES^a

Country	Pays		Comments
	Travel	Living Allowances	
AE	Yes	No	Country assuming cost of travel. Paying LA would cause cutback in IMETP due to FMS purchases to rebuild armed forces.
AF	No	No	Equipment purchases are supported by funds from third countries; and IMET TLA costs would have to be provided from a restricted regular O&M budget. Since the national airline flies to the U.S. four times a week, it is possible that country could assume travel costs to CONUS, and the question has been broached.
AG	No	No	Country would fund TLA for IMET only if comparable training was not available elsewhere (e.g., UK, France, Italy) and should those course costs and TLA be more expensive.
AH	No	No	Economically, country could not assume TLA expenses.
<u>AFRICA</u>			
AI	No	No	Country is unable economically to assume these expenses.
AJ	Yes	Yes	Country currently funds TLA. It is anticipated that country may request IMET assume TLA because of exchange problems and should the problem not be corrected.
AK	No	No	Country is experiencing acute foreign exchange problems. Should U.S. insist that country assume TLA, country would turn to UK, Israel, India and Pakistan for training.
AL	No	No	Country has agreed to assume a portion of the travel expenses in FY 80.
AM	No	No	
AN	No	No	Assumption of TLA costs by country is under discussion. Indications are that country may agree to assume LA costs but would not be able to assume T costs at this time.
AO	Pays Part	No	Country pays travel to London; cannot afford to assume additional TLA because of economic reasons.

TABLE 10 (Cont.)
STATUS OF TLA PAYMENTS
FOR IMET COUNTRIES^a

Country	Pays		Comments
	Travel	Living Allowances	
AP	No	No	Economically country would be hard pressed to assume TLA.
AQ	No	No	Country cannot assume TLA expenses considering the prevailing economic and financial crises and the administrative/ bureaucratic problems.

10 CANAL ZONE MILITARY SCHOOLS

The purpose of this chapter is to assess and analyze the comparative cost of IMET-sponsored training in the Canal Zone and CONUS. In doing so, two related questions are addressed: Is it probable that the effectiveness of the Canal Zone Military Schools (CZMS) would diminish in the future as the canal is returned to Panamanian control? Should other locations (e.g., Puerto Rico) be considered as alternatives?

10.1 GENERAL

Three schools in the Canal Zone depend almost solely on IMET funding for their operation and, therefore, are considered in this study: the U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA), the USAF Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA), and the U.S. Navy's Small Craft Instruction and Technical Team (SCIATT). Two other, smaller schools, the Inter-American Geodetic Survey Facility and the Inter-American Naval Telecommunications Network, are also conducted in the Canal Zone. However, these are not included in the study because IMET funds involved are relatively small.

Canal Zone schools have proven extremely effective over the past 30 years in providing Latin American military students a variety of much needed training in modernizing their land, sea, and air forces. Latin American participation has been heightened by high esteem for the capabilities of U.S. military forces and equipment, excellence of U.S. training techniques, and the fact that the courses were conducted in Spanish on a grant basis, or where this was not feasible, at a reasonable cost. The 26 May 1977, Report of the Joint State/Defense Team Review of Canal Zone Military Training Schools confirmed these views and considered the schools "...by their presence and the quality of their instruction...to be a definite 'plus' in terms of overall U.S. interests in the hemisphere."¹ The recent U.S.-Panamanian

¹U.S. Department of State Action Memorandum "Report of Joint State/Defense Team Review of Canal Zone Military Training Schools," dated May 26, 1977.

agreement (associated with the Panama Canal Treaties) to continue operation of the schools, reflects the interest of the U.S., Panama, and to a great extent, other Latin American governments. It provides for continued operation of the Air Force and Navy schools until 1999 and the Army School of the Americas until 1984. The latter date could be extended provided both countries agree.

10.2 THE DIFFICULTY OF COST COMPARISON

Costs are difficult to measure in contrasting Canal Zone training with that presently conducted in CONUS. To date, no conclusive studies have been identified for several reasons:

- Canal Zone Military Schools are unique. The courses themselves are not for the the most part comparable with instruction at military schools in CONUS.
- Emphasis in Canal Zone schools is on teaching students with a lower educational level certain basic and less sophisticated military subjects, or training them on materiel that is often outdated or obsolescent in the U.S. but still in use in Latin America.
- All instruction in the Canal Zone Military Schools is in Spanish. Comprehension of complex or technical subjects is routinely accomplished in Spanish that would require extensive language training, if taught in English. Instruction in Spanish is more cost effective than CONUS courses which require prior English language training, also provided in CONUS. Moreover, many of those who could qualify for the prerequisite English training might have little opportunity to utilize an English language capability in any other military endeavor later in their careers. Those who now attend the CZMS but could not qualify for the English language training would miss the military training entirely.

- The number of students attending in the Canal Zone is far less, which precludes certain economies possible at larger CONUS schools.
- Budgeting procedures for Canal Zone schools vary considerably in the three services, and many of the real costs for Canal Zone Military Schools cannot be easily isolated from other U.S. military activities in the Canal Zone.

An attempt at comparison was made in the 1977 Report of the Joint State/Defense Team Review for the Command and General Staff courses taught at Fort Gulick and at Fort Leavenworth. Tuition expenses were less at Fort Leavenworth, but considering lower living expenses and travel and the cost of 20 weeks of English instruction training at USARSA was estimated to be approximately the same price. On the other hand, however, when all training programmed under IMET in the Canal Zone is compared to all training programmed under IMET in CONUS, the average cost per student is approximately \$4000.00 for the Canal Zone vs. \$11,000.00 in CONUS. No attempt was made to evaluate the type of training or the numbers of courses encompassed within total numbers of students.

Current costs for Canal Zone schools do appear moderate and not excessive in attaining the priority objectives for which they are intended. They ensure effective training needed by Latin American military students that is tailored to their country's priorities and conducted in Spanish, in one of the more realistic and demanding operational environments found in Latin America.

The fact that the training provided results in a common U.S.-Latin American program, situated in Latin America, has had significant political advantages for all the participating countries. Thus, U.S.-Latin American cooperation in itself has become an additional factor in continuing the training in the Canal Zone, even though it is difficult

to quantify in terms of cost. The guest instructors from Latin American countries are important to the international aspect of the schools, and are a source of pride and prestige to the furnishing country. This program, however, has been curtailed since many of the instructors from the Latin American countries were from countries with human rights considerations and the U.S. would not review the teaching arrangement with those countries.

In effect, U.S.-run Canal Zone schools have become specialized international military educational and training centers which are unavailable elsewhere.

US SOUTHCOM studies and the 1977 Joint State/Defense Review report emphasize that the use of these facilities is the best way in the immediate future to continue providing training, barring unforeseen treaty-related developments. Some changes will be required to assure adequate funding, should IMET funds be unavailable or reduced, in order to further lower the overall costs, where appropriate, and to update the curriculum to provide for changing Latin American needs. This is particularly true of those resulting from revised Latin American priorities and their increasing technological and training abilities. U.S. CINCSO is now in the process of making such realignments at USARSA.


10.3 THE NEED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES

Because the Canal Zone schools have such high value at this time as cooperative, international activities where training tailored to Latin American needs is presented in Spanish, there is a need to consider alternative locations now. There are pressures on the Panamanian side which may develop in intensity to the point of interfering with U.S. operation of these schools in Panama, and diminishing their value. The most probable cause for pressure that could diminish the effectiveness of the Canal Zone schools would be that related to Panamanian desires to utilize land and facilities presently occupied by the schools, since these sites are adjacent to the expanding and more


populated, industrialized, port cities of Panama and Colon. In this respect, it is worth noting that the site of the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Albrook Field may become more vulnerable than that of the School of the Americas at Fort Gulick—even though the 1984 agreement date limits the latter. Albrook undoubtedly will be affected sooner by Panamanian expansion pressures into the extremely narrow segment between Panama City and the port of Balboa. As far as Panama is concerned, this space would appear more critical than Fort Gulick, which is further away from Colon and which is near other areas, that could provide suitable space for expansion (Maps 1 and 2).

Other pressures diminishing the effectiveness of CZMS could result from changing attitudes of the Panamanian Government, or from unstable political conditions. The first of the pressures mentioned above is growth-related, would occur gradually, and could be anticipated, whereas the second is political and might occur overnight. Since conditions are more favorable now and the pressures in either case cited are likely to increase with time, it is prudent to begin now to think about negotiations with Panama as soon as possible regarding the extension of the time period for the School of the Americas. Planning for this is under way in military and political channels.

MAP 1 - COLON AND FT. GULICK



MAP 2 - PANAMA CITY



11 THE CONCEPT OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY TRAINING

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the concept of "professional military training" and its suitability for primary emphasis in IMET. In the past several years policy guidance has been to stress attendance at courses characterized by this term. Yet, is the term meaningful and useful? If not, what categories of training should be used and which should have priority claims on IMET funding?

11.1 THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

A precise definition of the term "professional military training" for foreign military training purposes is not available at the U.S. Government interagency level, and there are varying views as to exactly what is meant. To some officials who participate in the policy process, the term means postgraduate education of the type to be had in civilian institutions or at the Naval Postgraduate School. To others, definitions center around certain courses of instruction for officers, particularly higher level courses, such as command and staff or war college.

Another possible definition is that professional military training is the training provided to members of the armed forces, and conducted by the armed forces, primarily because the training is generally unavailable outside of the armed forces. In this connection one Latin America MAAG used the terms "professional military training for officers" and "professional military training for enlisted men" in developing its IMET program for FY80. This definition would include any one of a variety of courses in the career development of professional members of the armed forces. Training for cadets and that of junior officers at basic and advanced courses in the combat arms, intelligence, logistical and maintenance fields are considered "professional military" training under it.

Then there is the term "technical training", and the question of where one might fix the dividing line between it and "professional

training". Flight training appears to be a case in point; it can certainly be defined as technical training. On the other hand, for an officer in the Air Force, flight training is possibly fundamental to his professional development. Furthermore, it might be considered one of the more general, rather than specific or technical, things he might study. This question must also be viewed from the point of view of the recipient country. What is "professional" in one country might well be basic or technical to another. For example; a unit communications officer course might be professional in Chad, but strictly low-level skill training in Germany.

11.2 POLICY STATEMENTS ON PROFESSIONAL MILITARY TRAINING

While agreed interagency definition is lacking, there are references in authoritative publications that categorize "professional military" training. The MASM directs that priority be given to certain military personnel and courses in stating that, "...the requirement for selection of career personnel is mandatory for attendance at professional level (e.g., command and staff or equivalent and higher, college level) schools." Defense guidance also emphasizes that the career personnel chosen should be those who will most likely occupy positions of leadership in the defense establishment in their country in the future.

The Military Articles and Services List (MASL) describes as "professional" such courses as the CGSC at Fort Leavenworth, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the U.S. senior service colleges.

There are numerous references to professional military training in the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD), where the term is used to describe the objective of the IMET program in a particular country, or a category of training to be included in the program.

11.3 DEFINITIONS IN THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS

The term professional military training (or education) is in general use throughout the U.S. Military Departments. There appears to be agreement in all three departments that professional military education/training (PME) for foreign personnel encompasses foreign military career officer training in military planning and programming, strategy and tactics, military management and budgeting, force development, and military roles in national and international power and politics. Other ideas to be imparted in courses of PME in the U.S. are: development of international military rapport; introduction to, and indoctrination in, Western military roles and concepts; and developing the potential for long-term continuing contact and interrelationships with key military personnel who may become high level military or government officials in their own country. An additional benefit through officers trained in the U.S. is the possibility of establishing western military training methods and military operational concepts within the recipient country.

When restated in terms of specific courses of instruction, the departments define PME as follows:

- Army:
 - Armed Forces Staff College
 - U.S. Army Command and Staff College
 - Basic and Advanced Branch Courses, e.g.,
 - Infantry School
 - Engineer School
 - Field Artillery School
 - Signal Corps School
 - Transportation School
 - Air Defense School

- Navy:
 - Naval Command College
 - Naval Staff College
 - Armed Forces Staff College
 - Marine Corps Staff College
 - Naval Postgraduate School
 - Amphibious Warfare School
- Air Force:
 - Air Command and Staff College
 - Air War College
 - Armed Forces Staff College
 - USAF Institute of Technology

11.4 UTILITY OF THE TERM FOR IMET

Notwithstanding the fact that within the U.S. Military Departments the term plays a useful role for U.S. purposes, any effort to impose a single definition for "professional military education" on the IMET program development process will probably prove infeasible.

The first problem arises from the multiplicity of definitions, several of which tend to place the more senior schools in the professional category. While these senior schools may be relevant to some of the recipients of IMET, this is probably not so for many others. The inference of the MASM directive as to level of schools and the tendency to move the IMET program toward greater emphasis on "professional military" training, could prevent desirable military training from reaching the very best qualified officers and future leaders, particularly in the developing countries.

This points to the need for a very broad definition of professional military training, or better still for purposes of IMET, no definition

at all. Not only do many of the less sophisticated countries have little need for what might be termed war college-level professional military training, their own training bases do not produce personnel sufficiently trained to absorb higher level training. Many developing countries place a high priority on sending personnel to U.S. career courses at the junior and advanced officer level, and to technical courses which the foreign country either cannot afford to operate or does not have the capability to conduct. IMET funds, for example, are used almost exclusively for this type of training at the USAF Inter-American Air Forces Academy in the Canal Zone, where courses are designed for students with less formal education and for the maintenance and operation of equipment that, in most cases, is obsolescent in the U.S. These courses are not available in CONUS schools.

But the more fundamental problem relates to the objectives of the IMET program. Clearly, it would not be in the U.S. interest to complicate the achievement of a desirable IMET objective by insisting on what would, of necessity, be an arbitrary categorization of professional military training. However, it should be feasible to define "professional military training" in terms of the types of capabilities to be provided to or improved in the recipient force. Thus, a definition might be: "That training designed to provide or enhance leadership and the recipient force's capability to conduct military planning, programming, management, budgeting and force development to the level of sophistication appropriate to that force."

12 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

12.1 ANALYSIS

U.S. grant training programs under MAP and IMET have been extremely successful over the years in accomplishing their military purposes and in supporting overall U.S. national policy.

In recent years, however, and especially since the separation of training from MAP in 1976, there has been a growing questioning of the rationale for IMET. Lacking a more persuasive rationale, IMET has become increasingly vulnerable to arbitrary cuts by the Congress, despite Executive Branch arguments that the training of foreign military personnel is one of the most effective means of enhancing the security and influencing the policies of recipient countries.

IMET budget requests have tended to be based more on past year budgets than on up-to-date analyses of specific objectives for the country, its needs and capabilities to purchase training, training cost factors, and relevant foreign policy considerations.

In this environment, the rationale for IMET has not been clear. It has appeared to vacillate from one concept to another. The IMET program has been increasingly influenced by political considerations that may have tended to override the military justification.

Despite this questioning of rationale, there is continuing support for IMET in the United States.

However, for purposes of program development and justification there is a need to reassert the concept for IMET and to restate the fundamental importance of the military requirements that all IMET training is intended to fulfill.

Objectives

In general, the objectives for IMET as stated in the MASM are sound. The DSAA survey indicates that the vast majority of country programs find the present statement of objectives entirely adequate to describe their programs. Of course, there is variation between countries as to relative priority of the objectives. See Table 2. However, there is a need to capitalize more fully on the unique capability of IMET to be a tangible demonstration of U.S. interest in foreign armies and to establish, through the special environment of shared training, military-to-military linkages with present and future foreign military leaders. This aspect of IMET is particularly suited to serving the broader needs of U.S. foreign policy, while continuing to fulfill legitimate military requirements.

In making any necessary revisions to the stated objectives for IMET, the process should not be complicated by attempting to insert a narrow or limited definition (necessarily arbitrary) of professional military training. Although this term has meaning within the U.S. Military Departments, its use in IMET program development may be counter-productive. As can be seen from the statistics of Table 4, over 50 different courses and types of courses are to be found in individual IMET country programs at this time; many of these are clearly technical courses which is appropriate considering the needs and desires of the recipient armed forces. Any use of the term professional military training should be understood in the terms of the explanation set forth in Chapter 11.

Content of Programs

The widely varying situations in the armed forces of the countries receiving IMET clearly dictate that the purposes and objectives of U.S. IMET are best served by policies which make maximum provision for flexibility and judgment, both political and military, at the country level. Only by this policy of flexibility can the program achieve the purposes of mutual benefit. The country concerned clearly wants, and in the long run may even demand, that the program take into consideration its specific needs and situations. This not only argues against any

effort on the part of the U.S. to dictate the content of the program too specifically, it also makes for the kind of country program most likely to be justifiable within the policy process, because it will be based on specific objectives as perceived in the country and agreed to by the U.S.

Regional Orientation

The regional orientation of the worldwide program may be one factor that complicates policy review on a worldwide basis. This may be an inadequate way to deal with the basic question raised by the budget process, which proposes to consider the program on a worldwide basis and provide sufficient information not only to justify the program within the budget process but for priority formulation in sufficient detail to make informed decisions about funding levels.

Correlation of the Policy Process with ZBB Procedures

The revisions that were made to certain country programs during the budget review of the FY1980 IMET program suggest that the concept for IMET must take more fully into account the fact that under ZBB procedures the worldwide IMET program is viewed not as a series of country programs arranged in priority, but, rather, a series of country increments, which increments are finally arranged in a single priority list for budget decisions.

Information for Policy Review

It appears that the information and justification relating to country programs is not carried forward to the budget review process in sufficient detail to answer the questions posed during the review process.

During the FY1980 review, the country proposals did not adequately justify the programs or their priorities. In many cases, it could not be discerned with sufficient clarity what specific objectives were being pursued, the extent to which they were to be

achieved, and what training was being proposed to be accomplished. This situation points to two problems:

- Instructions from Washington do not presently require that the country proposals be stated in the detail that now appears necessary for policy review.
- The information on the general military situation contained in the May message, as now constituted, does not provide an adequate context within which to carry out policy review in Washington.

The first problem can be addressed by a concept for IMET that gives specific guidance for the preparation of country proposals.

The second problem appears to require some revision to the format of the May message. It is assumed that the country teams have a clear view of the armed forces in the recipient countries. More of this country perspective needs to be communicated to Washington as part of the IMET program development process. In addition to information on mutual perceptions of threat, it would be useful to have a summary description of the force development situation in the particular armed force.

All armed forces, wherever found, are in some phase of force development. Some forces are in an initial phase, where the basic organization is still being determined, as in the case, perhaps, of armed forces created in the new nations since World War II. Other forces are in a maintenance phase, from the standpoint of force development, wherein the basic outlines of the force structure have been settled and the primary activity is one of training and improving the skills of the force. From the standpoint of U.S. military assistance, some forces are in a significant expansion phase. This expansion might also be accompanied by the introduction of new U.S. weapon systems throughout the force. Other forces may not be expanding, but are

converting their weapon systems to those of some other country, the U.S., for example.

Whatever stage of force development a particular force may be in, in a particular year, the choice of personnel to be trained in general and those to be trained under IMET should be, from a military point of view, governed by the force development situation of the particular armed force.

The size of the force, the general level of complexity and sophistication of its organization and equipment and the long-range force development goal of the country concerned, all provide a basis for deciding not only who should be trained in what skills and how many should be trained, but also at what level of complexity the training should aim.

U.S. objectives are served by two approaches. First, the training provided should be understood by the recipient country to be of maximum utility by their armed forces. Second, the courses chosen should be of a nature to insure that the training leads to lasting contacts and goodwill for the United States. These two objectives may under certain circumstances conflict, and compromise may therefore be necessary.

Training Workshops and Program Changes

Any revision of the policy process at the State-DoD level must, to be completely effective, provide for a thorough review of the policy aspects of training workshop output and program change procedures.

Staffing for Policy Review

The number of questions raised during the budget review strongly suggests that IMET does not have the undivided attention of sufficient personnel in the Defense Department and in the State Department in order to answer relevant questions, and, particularly, to make an informed review of the regional priorities which the policy process now develops.

12.2 CONCLUSIONS

The concept for IMET should be restated along the lines suggested in Chapter 13.

Specific guidance on the development of program increments to ensure better correlation with ZBB procedures is required. This includes the need for advance planning to identify specific training proposed.

As a minimum, the following additional information should be included in the May message for IMET purposes:

- Numbers of trainees in all categories: IMET, FMS, IN-COUNTRY, THIRD-COUNTRY.
- The force development situation in summary form; and, to the extent feasible.
- How each course selected contributes to appropriate force development. Courses of similar nature and purpose (e.g., Command and General Staff courses, Logistics Management Courses, etc.) might well be aggregated under one explanation and category.

The procedures for OSD-level policy review of the output of training workshops, and review of the program change process need to be strengthened.

There is a requirement for additional staffing at the Washington level to carry out necessary policy review of IMET programs.

Use of the term "professional military training" when applied to IMET program development should be understood to apply to the types of capabilities to be provided, or improved, in the recipient force and not necessarily in terms of specific types of courses.

13 CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR IMET

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the conceptual basis, or rationale, for the IMET program, and to lay out steps that should be taken to assure that programs are designed and prioritized within the conceptual framework.

13.1 GENERAL

IMET has been and continues to be an important, effective, and relatively inexpensive instrument for the achievement of U.S. security and foreign policy objectives. It provides a means through which the U.S. tangibly demonstrates its concern for the security interests of friendly foreign countries. It enables the U.S. to influence the selection of training perceived by the U.S. as being of the highest priority, and which the foreign government may, for various reasons, be unable to purchase. It contributes substantially to the objectives of establishing communications and influence with foreign military and civilian leaders.

The selection of IMET programs, program levels, training, and trainees are influenced by many diverse considerations such as foreign policy imperatives, military requirements, and economic capabilities, which must be taken into account. No generalization can be made as to which outweighs the other, and a determination necessarily demands a case-by-case evaluation in the context of the then existing situation. Regardless of the dominant factor, however, the training necessarily must fulfill a military need of the foreign country.

13.2 OBJECTIVES

Currently stated objectives and emphases for IMET are basically sound. Consideration should be given, however, to amending current guidance to include the objective of tangibly demonstrating U.S. concern for the security interests of friendly foreign governments as a general objective.

Objectives and their relative priorities vary country by country and, with respect to each country, must be stated clearly in order for those concerned to know what is to be accomplished and to judge what should be done. Because situations change, these aspects should be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised annually.

13.3 PROGRAM INCREMENTS AND THE ZBB CONCEPT

The current zero-base budgeting (ZBB) concept for developing programs is fundamentally effective. It needs, however, to be strengthened. More detailed data are needed at the outset of the process. Program increments should be tied more precisely to a single objective—recognizing, however, that other objectives also will be served. And with respect to each program or increment thereof, better insights are needed as to how and to what extent its objectives are best served by IMET rather than some other form of U.S. involvement. These changes can and should be introduced into the FY1981 budget cycle.

Consideration might be given to limiting the first increment to the minimum program required to meet the objective of establishing and maintaining military-to-military linkage between U.S. and foreign armed forces, with emphasis on reaching potential future leaders and disseminating U.S. military concepts and doctrine, thus furthering the perception of tangible U.S. interest in the armed forces of the foreign country. Subsequent increments should be tied to specific objectives, and explanations should be provided as to how and to what extent the proposed increment will achieve the stated objective.

Each increment should be accompanied by a statement in reasonable detail (e.g., MASL detail) as to precisely what courses of instruction are to be included, estimated number of students for each, and how the courses are relevant to the future duties of the trainee.

Program increments should be tied more precisely to a single MASM objective—recognizing, however, that other objectives (which should be

stated) also will be served. In this connection, it should be noted that the difficulty of assigning an adequately high priority (in the worldwide rank ordering) to a particular increment is compounded if the increment addresses more than one objective, each of which may warrant a different priority when judged against other objectives and increments worldwide. It is recognized, however, that there will be cases where one objective subsumes others (e.g., a commitment at a given figure).

13.4 ADDITIONAL DATA FOR ZBB PROCESS

In preparing the May message, the Chief of Mission should state:

- The objectives, in order of importance that the proposed training is designed to accomplish. These objectives are set forth in the MASM, Chapter E, Part 2. Any other objectives that might be applicable should also be noted.
- When, on a case-by-case basis, the training should be provided on a grant basis rather than sold under FMS.
- When considered appropriate, how the country program contributes to U.S. goals for observance of human rights.
- Why funding levels proposed for English language training and Travel and Living Allowances are considered appropriate.

STATEMENT OF WORK

U.S. TRAINING OF FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to evaluate current policies and procedures for planning, budgeting, and programming U.S. training of foreign military students in order to ensure that IMET budget requests are based on a coherent rationale, reflect changing needs abroad, and take into account FMS training alternatives and that available IMET funds are allocated to achieve the priority military and political objectives of U.S. foreign military training.

Background

Training in U.S. military schools is currently offered through both cash and credit FMS and the grant IMET program. While FMS training is increasing, the IMET appropriation remains static (around \$30 million annually) in an environment of inflation and increasing per student costs. Lacking a more persuasive rationale, IMET is increasingly vulnerable to arbitrary cuts by the Congress on human rights or other vague grounds despite Executive Branch arguments that the training of foreign military personnel is one of the most effective means of enhancing the security and influencing the policies of recipient countries.

Since 1976 the State Department has urged that IMET funds be devoted to "professional military" training and that other training requirements, particularly those of a technical nature, be purchased under FMS. However, to date the concept of "professional military" training has not been defined and no specific directive implementing such a policy has been issued.

IMET budget requests tend to be based more on past year budgets than on up-to-date analyses of country needs, capabilities to purchase training, training cost factors, and relevant foreign policy considerations. The programming of foreign military students into specific courses is accomplished largely through the services' regional training workshops, held 5-6 months after IMET levels are established, and subsequently through numerous program revisions.

Scope

The study, which should review relevant GAO studies, congressional committee reports, and field evaluations, should cover:

1. Improvements in planning and budgeting of IMET to provide adequate and timely information upon which to base the interagency ZBB review of IMET budget proposals.
2. Criteria for determining individual country IMET levels, to include:

- Assessment of each country's military training requirements.
 - Justification for IMET in meeting these requirements that takes into account in-country training capabilities, availability of and ability to purchase FMS training, and third country training availabilities.
 - Statement of numbers of students, courses required, and estimated costs.
 - Foreign policy considerations that justify IMET for each country.
3. Criteria for establishing priorities among countries and an evaluation of the relative merits of more small IMET country programs vs. fewer large programs.
 4. Criteria for deciding which training should be IMET and which FMS.
 5. Analysis of concept of "professional military" training and its suitability for primary emphasis in IMET.
 6. Analysis of concept of "nation building" as an objective of IMET.
 7. Evaluate effects of reduced MAAG staffing on the need for IMET and effective country-level management of both IMET and FMS training.
 8. Evaluate relative value of training teams (MTT) to bring expert training into countries vs CONUS training which exposes students to American society.
 9. Cost of English language training to IMET and FMS training.
 10. Feasibility of reducing the percentage of IMET spent on travel and living allowances.
 11. Analysis of comparative costs of training in Canal Zone Schools and in CONUS.

In assessing the training workshop system for programming, the relationship of IMET to FMS training should be clearly defined and guidelines developed (i.e., out of a country's total training needs, how to determine which courses and students should be IMET-funded). The timing of the critical stages (including funding) for planning/programming of IMET and FMS training (where possible) should be evaluated and a new sequence or approach developed, if necessary.

APPENDIX B



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

May 31, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: LTG Ernest Graves ✓
Director
Defense Security Assistance Agency

Mr. Richard A. Ericson, Jr.
Deputy Director
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State

FROM: Harry J. Shaw, Chief
Military Assistance Branch
International Affairs Division

SUBJECT: ZBB Evaluation Studies

In our spring review of the 1980 budget we identified three subject areas deserving study in some depth before the fall budget review begins in August. To avoid delay in getting the studies under way, the Director has agreed we need not await transmittal of the planning ceiling letters as we did last year.

Accordingly, I have enclosed draft study outlines for your review and comment before putting them in final form. We will be glad to discuss these drafts with you or your representative. We would appreciate a response by c.o.b. June 6.

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Sanders

ZBB EVALUATION STUDY
U.S. TRAINING OF FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to evaluate current policies and procedures for planning, budgeting, and programming U.S. training of foreign military students in order to ensure that IMET budget requests are based on a coherent rationale, reflect changing needs abroad, and take into account FMS training alternatives and that available IMET funds are allocated to achieve the priority military and political objectives of U.S. foreign military training.

Background

Training in U.S. military schools is currently offered through both cash and credit FMS and the grant IMET program. While FMS training is increasing, the IMET appropriation remains static (around \$30 million annually) in an environment of inflation and increasing per student costs. Lacking a more persuasive rationale, IMET is increasingly vulnerable to arbitrary cuts by the Congress on human rights or other vague grounds despite Executive Branch arguments that the training of foreign military personnel is one of the most effective means of enhancing the security and influencing the policies of recipient countries.

Since 1976 the State Department has urged that IMET funds be devoted to "professional military" training and that other training requirements, particularly those of a technical nature, be purchased under FMS. However, to date the concept of "professional military" training has not been defined and no specific directive implementing such a policy has been issued.

IMET budget requests tend to be based more on past year budgets than on up-to-date analyses of country needs, capabilities to purchase training, training cost factors, and relevant foreign policy considerations. The programming of foreign military students into specific courses is accomplished largely through the services' regional training workshops, held 5-6 months after IMET levels are established, and subsequently through numerous program revisions.

Scope

The study, which should review relevant GAO studies, congressional committee reports, and field evaluations, should cover:

1. Improvements in planning and budgeting of IMET to provide adequate and timely information upon which to base the interagency ZBB review of IMET budget proposals.

2. Criteria for determining individual country IMET levels, to include:

- Assessment of each country's military training requirements.
- Justification for IMET in meeting these requirements that takes into account in-country training capabilities, availability of and ability to purchase FMS training, and third country training availabilities.
- Statement of numbers of students, courses required, and estimated costs.
- Foreign policy considerations that justify IMET for each country.

3. Criteria for establishing priorities among countries and an evaluation of the relative merits of more small IMET country programs vs fewer large programs.

4. Criteria for deciding which training should be IMET and which FMS.

5. Analysis of concept of "professional military" training and its suitability for primary emphasis in IMET.

6. Analysis of concept of "nation building" as an objective of IMET.

7. Evaluate effects of reduced MAAG staffing on the need for IMET and effective country-level management of both IMET and FMS training.

8. Evaluate relative value of training teams (MTT) to bring expert training into countries vs CONUS training which exposes students to American society.

9. Cost of English language training to IMET and FMS training.

10. Feasibility of reducing the percentage of IMET spent on travel and living allowances.

11. Analysis of comparative costs of training in Canal Zone Schools and in CONUS.

In assessing the training workshop system for programming, the relationship of IMET to FMS training should be clearly defined and guidelines developed (i.e., out of a country's total training needs, how to determine which courses and students should be IMET-funded). The timing of the critical states (including funding for planning/programming of IMET and FMS training (where possible) should be evaluated and a new sequence or approach developed, if necessary.

Timing

This study should be completed by August 15, 1978, in order to be available to the Security Assistance Program Review Working Group in reviewing IMET country levels for 1980.

Lead Agency

Department of Defense should lead this study in close consultation with State.

APPENDIX C

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FROM DSAA/TT

SUBJ: IMET STUDY

1. DOD IS BEING TASKED TO LEAD AN IN-DEPTH EVALUATION STUDY OF IMET IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH STATE. DESPITE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ARGUMENTS THAT IMET IS ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF FINANCING U.S. SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS AND, LACKING A MORE PERSUASIVE RATIONALE, IMET IS INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO ARBITRARY CUTS BY THE CONGRESS. THE CHARGE IS THAT IMET TENDS TO BE BASED MORE ON PAST YEAR BUDGETS THAN UP-TO-DATE ANALYSES OF COUNTRY NEEDS, CAPABILITIES TO PURCHASE TRAINING, COST EFFECTIVE FACTORS, AND RELEVANT U.S. SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.

2. AS PART OF THE EFFORT, WE NEED THE FOLLOWING:

A. A RANKING IN PRIORITY OF THE FOLLOWING IMET TRAINING OBJECTIVES FOR EACH COUNTRY FOR WHICH IMET FUNDING IS PROPOSED FOR FY 1979 (AND IF DIFFERENT) FY 1980:

(1) TO CREATE SKILLS NEEDED FOR EFFECTIVE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT ACQUIRED FROM THE U.S.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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(2) TO ASSIST THE FOREIGN COUNTRY IN DEVELOPING EXPERTISE AND SYSTEMS NEEDED FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF ITS DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT.

(3) TO FOSTER DEVELOPMENT BY THE FOREIGN COUNTRY OF ITS OWN INDIGENOUS TRAINING CAPABILITY.

(4) TO PROMOTE U.S. MILITARY RAPPORT WITH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE FOREIGN COUNTRY.

(5) TO PROMOTE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S., INCLUDING ITS PEOPLE, POLITICAL SYSTEM, AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS.

(6) OTHER (SPECIFY).

B. CONSIDERING THE PRESENT STAGE OF HOST COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT, WHAT TYPE OF TRAINING AND SPECIFIC COURSES WILL CONTRIBUTE MOST TO THE CAPABILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES TO DEVELOP AND MANAGE THEIR RESOURCES?

C. EFFECTS OF REDUCED MAAG STAFFING ON THE NEED FOR IMET AND EFFECTIVE COUNTRY-LEVEL MANAGEMENT OF BOTH IMET AND FMS TRAINING.

D. RELATIVE VALUE OF TRAINING TEAMS (MTT) TO BRING EXPERT TRAINING INTO COUNTRIES VS. CONUS TRAINING WHICH EXPOSES STUDENTS TO AMERICAN SOCIETY.

E. FEASIBILITY OF REDUCING THE PERCENTAGE OF IMET SPENT ON TRAVEL AND LIVING ALLOWANCES (TLA). WHAT COUNTRIES (A) COULD NOT OR (B) WOULD NOT PAY TLA? WHY? IF APPLICABLE, GIVE SEPARATE RESPONSES FOR TRAVEL AND FOR LIVING ALLOWANCES.

3. FOR USCINCSO ONLY. REQUEST AN ANALYSIS OF COMPARATIVE COSTS OF TRAINING IN CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS (CZS) AND IN CONUS AND LIST THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CZS AND HOW CZS RELATE TO IMET PURPOSES. LIST THOSE COURSES AND/OR TRAINING THAT (1) CAN BE AND (2) CANNOT BE EQUATED TO CONUS TRAINING, EXPLAIN WHY AND WHAT WOULD THE FOREIGN FORCES DO IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS TRAINING IN CZS. IN SUPPORT OF THIS ANALYSIS, PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR EACH SCHOOL:

A. TOTAL IMET FUNDING IN FY77 (ACTUAL) AND FY78 (ESTIMATED IF NECESSARY) WITH A BREAKOUT OF THESE COSTS BETWEEN (1) COURSE COSTS (INCLUDING OVERHEAD PRO-RATA) AND (2) TLA.

B. A BREAKOUT SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED IN PARA 3.A. ABOVE FOR EACH COURSE FOR WHICH THERE IS A CONUS EQUIVALENT.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING AS MUCH OF THE REQUESTED DATA AS PRACTICAL BY 15 AUG 78, REMAINDER NLT 31 AUG. RESPONSES MUST REFLECT VIEWS OF CHIEF, U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION CONCERNED. DR. S. C. MANOLAS, SA-DSAA, X57976, IS THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR THE STUDY.

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
APPENDIX D

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

October 18, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: LTG Ernest Graves
Director
Defense Security Assistance Agency

Mr. Richard A. Ericson, Jr.
Deputy Director
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State

FROM: Harry J. Shaw, Chief 
International Security Affairs Branch
International Affairs Division

SUBJECT: Budget Hearing on U.S. Training of Foreign
Military Personnel

Since the ZBB evaluation of U.S. training of foreign military personnel may not be completed until December 31, 1978, too late to be considered in forming budget decisions for the 1980 budget, we are arranging for a budget hearing on October 26 at 10 a.m. in Room 1410 of the State Department to take advantage of the preliminary findings of this study. Attached are a list of pertinent questions, some requiring written responses.

Due to the large number of countries that might be affected by new policy decisions in the training program, we recommend that regional bureaus from State be represented at the hearing. We also suggest that the replies to the Department of Defense field survey and such analytical material as has been developed in the course of the ZBB study be made available to hearing participants.

We are prepared to discuss these questions informally prior to the hearing as necessary to make the hearing as useful as possible.

Attachment

Training Hearing

The purpose of the ZBB evaluation study of U.S. training of foreign military personnel is to evaluate current policies and procedures for planning, budgeting, and programming U.S. training in order to ensure that IMET budget requests are based on a coherent rationale, reflecting changing needs abroad, and take into account FMS training alternatives and also that available IMET funds are allocated to achieve the priority military and political objectives of U.S. foreign military training.

While the completion date for the study was extended to December 31, 1978, in order to permit a comprehensive evaluation of these aspects of our training programs, we would be remiss if we did not take advantage of the interim results of the study in developing the Administration's 1980 IMET budget request. Accordingly, the following issues and questions should be considered

1. Five purposes of training were given to the field (DoD cable) to prioritize by country, and other purposes were also elicited. A number of the field responses in the "other" category suggest that the five DoD purposes may not adequately express the use of training to achieve foreign policy goals. How should these foreign policy purposes of training be expressed? (In one or two categories.)
2. Prioritize all these purposes of training by country.
3. For several years the policy guidance for IMET was to emphasize the types of courses characterized as "professional military training." Is this concept still meaningful and useful? If not, what categories of training should be used and which should have priority claims on IMET funding.
4. Is "nation-building" an appropriate goal for IMET? If so, which courses could be categorized as "nation-building?"
5. Provide a list of IMET countries that also purchase training indicating the dollar value of IMET and FMS training for 1978, 1979, and 1980 for each country.
6. What criteria should be used to determine whether needed military training should be grant-funded through IMET or purchased through FMS? Of those countries that can "afford" to purchase necessary training through FMS, which would forego training in the absence of IMET? In which of these countries is it nevertheless in the interest of the U.S. to provide IMET? Why?
7. What were the total amounts and the percentages of the funds available for IMET in FY 1977 and FY 1978 spent on travel and living allowances and on English language training? Should maximum percentages for TLA and English language training be established?

8. How have MAAG reductions affected our ability to administer the IMET program? What are specific possible problems which might arise with continued MAAG reductions?
9. Should a country's past performance be considered in determining level and suitability of IMET?
 - a. What is each country's dropout rate, due to either English language deficiency, technical deficiency, etc.?
 - b. Which countries regularly do not utilize portions of their IMET allocations?
 - c. How do we monitor the subsequent careers of IMET students to ensure effective utilization of their U.S. training?
10. Mobile Training Team (MTT's) are used to meet specific training needs which cannot be accommodated within regularly scheduled or planned courses. Some MTT's are overseas, reducing the per student cost of transportation and the need for English language proficiency, but many are CONUS based. What criteria are used to determine whether particular training objectives can best be achieved by overseas MTT's, CONUS MTT's, or regular courses? Does the present mix of regular courses and MTT's make best use of scarce IMET funds?
11. What is the relationship between the AECB Working Group review of each country's IMET level (August-September) and the actual programming of students by the training workshops in January-March? Do the Working Group members (and the regional bureaus) have adequate data on courses and costs to determine country levels? Are substantial program changes made in workshops such that original AECB justifications are no longer valid?
12. Is it probable that the effectiveness of the Canal Zone Schools would diminish in the future as the Canal is returned to Panamanian control? Should other locations (e.g., Puerto Rico) be considered as alternates?
13. Compare the costs of training under IMET and FMS. (A list of direct costs and training overhead included in IMET costs was provided to OMB by DSAA last year--if these are still accurate, then indicate how FMS costs differ.)
14. What is IMET's proper role as a means of influencing countries with human rights problems? When is it in the U.S. interest to deny IMET on human rights grounds? Should only certain types of courses be allowed for countries with objectionable human rights records? What courses would they be?

15. The IMET budget guidance for FY 1980 was \$36.5 million. However, since appropriations for both FY 1978 and FY 1979 were \$30 million or less, it may no longer be reasonable to request such a high level. Would the proposed package levels and rank-orderings reflect State's and DoD's true priorities if the budget level were set at (1) \$25 million, (2) \$30 million?
16. Assuming a static or declining funding level for the IMET account (\$25 to \$30 million) and the increasing cost of providing training, should the direction of the account be toward more smaller country programs or fewer large ones? Does the FY 1980 budget proposal reflect this policy?

APPENDIX E

CHAPTER E

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING

1. Purpose

This chapter provides guidance and instructions for providing military training and training aids to foreign countries as grant aid in a manner that will insure greatest benefit to both the foreign country and U.S. interests.

As used in this chapter, the term "Continental United States," or CONUS, excludes Alaska and Hawaii.

2. Objectives

Objectives of providing grant aid training to foreign countries are:

- a. To create skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the U.S.
- b. To assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management of its defense establishment.
- c. To foster development by the foreign country of its own indigenous training capability.
- d. To promote U.S. military rapport with the armed forces of the foreign country.
- e. To promote better understanding of the United States, including its people, political system, and other institutions.

Initially, all of the objectives stated above should be pursued simultaneously with emphasis shifting progressively from operations and maintenance to management of in-country capabilities, and finally to maintenance of military rapport. The ultimate objective is to limit programs to the latter

and should be pursued as rapidly as possible consistent with the achievement of overall objectives.

3. Areas of Emphasis

To the extent consistent with the military requirement and the achievement of more immediate objectives, emphasis will be placed on:

- a. The training of individuals who are likely in the future to occupy key positions of responsibility within the foreign country's armed forces.
- b. Training that encourages military professionalism and the interchange of military doctrine, particularly by attendance at U.S. service schools at the advanced career and command and staff levels, and
- c. Training related to the management of resources at all levels within the defense establishment.

4. Resources Management

In developing programs for training in the field of resources management, care must be exercised to avoid "mirror imaging" of U.S. concepts, systems, and procedures that exceed the real needs or capabilities of the foreign country.

There is no precise definition of what constitutes resources management or the skills associated with it. The following listing, therefore, is intended only as a guide to subjects generally in this field of activity.

- a. Planning—Defining defense objectives and making decisions among alternative courses of action to achieve these objectives.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES MANUAL—PART II

b. Programming—Establishing schedules for achieving objectives, collecting functions and activities sharing the same objective into families (programs) and estimating resource requirements for each.

c. Budgeting—Formulating detailed yearly projections of resource requirements for the programs, obtaining and allocating associated funds and balancing priorities in the competition for limited resources.

d. Management of Capital Assets—Acquisition and disposition of goods and services. Management systems relating directly to tactical use of weapon and support systems normally are excluded.

e. Management of Resources of Operating Activities, including employment of manpower resources—Administering the acquisition of consumable resources and their consumption in the execution of assigned missions.

f. Accounting—Measuring results and status, usually in financial terms, for both organizational units and functional areas.

g. Reporting—Transmitting financial and non-financial information on status and results of operations and investment to appropriate levels of management.

h. Evaluating—Analyzing defense activity performance and test results to determine the merit or degree of effectiveness of the activity or resources concerned.

i. Auditing—Reviewing the accuracy of reported results and judging the adequacy of and compliance with established policies and procedures.

j. Financial—Budget submissions; status reports on obligations and allotments; general ledger accounting; working capital fund reports.

k. Manpower—Military and civilian authorization procedures; manpower status reports; management engineering methods.

l. Supply—Item and weapon system supply management; inventory accounting; property disposal.

m. Maintenance—Field maintenance management procedures; depot maintenance industrial fund; standard cost accounting and workloading.

n. Facilities—Management reports; contract construction procedures.

o. Acquisition—Contractual procedures; cost information reports.

p. Research and Development Test and Evaluation—R&D concept papers; project control documents, test design; analysis; reliability.

Since titles of courses selected for resources management training will not necessarily conform to the topics listed above, such training is identified for record purposes by entering the alphabetic "R" in card column 59 when programming data is submitted.

5. English Language Training

a. Language training to the comprehension level required for attendance at the particular course of instruction, regardless of how and where conducted, is a responsibility of the foreign country. Thus, except as may be elsewhere authorized specifically in this manual, English language training at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) will be authorized only as follows: Minimum English language comprehension level (ECL) cut off scores for entry into English language courses conducted by the DLI, other than English language instructor or refresher, will be progressively increased as follows: FY 74—ECL of 55; FY 75—ECL of 62; FY 76—ECL of 70. Exceptions to these requirements require prior approval of DSAA and will be granted only where clearly justified by unusual circumstances.

b. With but few exceptions, all foreign countries are considered to possess the resources (e.g., public and private schools, commercial institutions) needed to provide necessary English language training to meet ECL's set forth in paragraph 5a, above.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES MANUAL—PART II

without external assistance. These countries will be expected to increase their English language training capability to meet the minimum ECL requirements outlined in paragraph 5a, above. Where this is shown not to be the case, assistance may be provided under this program by training of instructors at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), by providing English Language Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) or Field Training Services (FTS), and by providing appropriate training aids. Information on MTTs and FTS is contained in DLI Pamphlet 350.1.

c. MAAGs are responsible for insuring that trainees meet the minimum English Language Comprehension Level (ECL) prescribed by the Military Department for each course of instruction or for entry into DLI as outlined in paragraph 5a, above. Tests to determine the ECL of foreign selectees are provided by DLI. Instruction for the administration of ECL tests is provided in DLI Pamphlet 350.3.

6. Selection and Utilization of Trainees

a. To the extent practicable, personnel trained under auspices of this program, and particularly those attending CONUS schools, will be selected from career personnel likely in the future to occupy key positions in the foreign country's defense establishment. Except as may be authorized specifically by DSAA, the requirement for selection of career personnel is mandatory for attendance at professional level (e.g., command and staff or equivalent and higher, college level) schools.

b. Under the direction and supervision of Commanders of Unified Commands, MAAGs are responsible for obtaining appropriate assurances that personnel trained under the auspices of this program are properly and effectively utilized. Such utilization is defined as prompt employment of the individual in the skill for which trained for a period of time sufficient to warrant the expense to the U.S.

A system of periodic review of trainee assignments should be incorporated into MAAG

operating procedures. As a guide, optimum assignment periods are considered to be three years for flight instruction and highly technical training such as missile training, and not less than two years for other training, particularly instructor training.

c. To the extent consistent with available resources, MAAGs are expected to maintain surveillance over utilization of U.S. trained personnel with emphasis on the more critical and higher level skills and personnel attending CONUS schools. Periodic reports rendered by appropriate foreign authorities normally will satisfy this requirement.

d. Chapter C, paragraph 4.f, provides guidance pertaining to the prohibition on the use of Foreign Assistance funds for assistance for police. In this regard, where training furnished on an individual rather than a unit basis, no training of any kind will be provided to any individual unless it is reasonably assured that the individual will not be assigned to a unit performing on-going civilian law enforcement functions for a reasonable period subsequent to the completion of his training. Paragraph 6.b. and c., above, applies to determine reasonable period of time.

7. Constraints

a. The following categories of training will not be programmed without prior approval of DSAA on a case-by-case basis:

(1) Training essentially for the purpose of obtaining a degree, or for accumulating credits toward a degree.

(2) Any training not clearly related to achievement of the objectives set forth above.

Requests for exceptions to above constraints will be forwarded to the Director, DSAA, who will coordinate such requests with other agencies, as appropriate.

b. The following categories of training will not be programmed without prior approval of the appropriate Unified Commander:

(1) Training in basic skills normally utilized by both the military and civil sectors.

(2) Professional training offered by in-country military or civil educational and

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES MANUAL--PART II

training facilities.

(3) Any training for which the foreign country possesses the technical competence and economic capability for establishing in-country training facilities.

(4) Training already provided in a quantity that, taking into account reasonable attrition, is sufficient to meet minimum military requirements.

(5) Orientation tours except for officers of general or flag rank holding influential positions in the foreign country's defense establishment, in small groups (ten or fewer), and where the tour will be of clearly identifiable benefit to career(s) of the individual(s).

(6) Except as specifically authorized elsewhere in this Manual, English language training other than provision of articles and services in support of such training conducted in the foreign country.

(7) Training that, even though uniquely military in nature, is primarily for the purposes of civic action or nation building programs.

(8) Training of other than uniformed military personnel (e.g., civilians), regardless of their relationship to the foreign country's defense establishment.

(9) Training in CONUS for other than career military personnel.

(10) Any training where, on the basis of experience, it appears unlikely that the skills produced will be utilized properly.

(11) Repeat participation by foreign individuals in (a) orientation tours, or (b) the same formal training course.

c. DSAA will be immediately notified of all waivers granted by Unified Commands in connection with the above constraints. Notification will include a detailed rationale and, in the case of orientation tours, a description of the proposed itinerary.

d. Training program lines resulting from waived constraints will be identified by placing an "A" in column 58 of "4" and "Q" cards.

e. Deployment of DOD personnel and teams, military or civilian, on PCS under MAP or FMS for the purpose of providing technical assistance or training to foreign

countries, will require approval of the Director, DSAA, on a case-by-case basis, prior to making any offer or commitment to the foreign government concerned.

8. Program Development and Execution

a. **Guidance.** In addition to guidance and instructions contained in this manual, the following documents provide information for the development of training programs:

(1) The Military Articles and Services List (MASL). See Chapter H, Part I.

(2) AR 5550-50 (Army), OPNAVINST 4950.1E (Navy), and AFM 50-29 (Air Force).

b. Submission

(1) Prior to 1 April of each year, or as may be directed otherwise, Unified Commands submit to DSAA detailed training programs for the first planning year (i.e., data submitted April 1973 addresses FY 75). Instructions for preparation of data are contained in Chapter F, Part II.

(2) Budget year program data are recorded in the DSAA Master ADP file together with data for the current year and all prior years.

(3) Data in the DSAA master file are maintained current through the submission of program changes as such changes occur. A general updating and refinement of the budget year program should take place prior to 1 April. To accomplish this, Unified Commands are authorized to conduct Training Workshops, with participation by the Military Departments, for the purpose of confirming availability of training and providing technical advice.

(4) Technical programming instructions are provided in sections of this chapter that follow discussing various types of training and in Chapter F, Part II (Program Submission and Management).

c. Execution

(1) Program implementation by the Military Departments, and the movement of trainees to training facilities and activities, is authorized only after MAP orders, Program Directives, or other specific approvals are issued by DSAA. Such orders, directives, or approvals are required prior to the issu-

APPENDIX F

NUMBERS OF IMET STUDENTS,

COUNTRY / REGION	FISCAL YEAR															
	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65
Worldwide	327	3739	1205	15263	10465	11266	7532	11369	10845	7275	16556	28384	50777	26392	18159	5829
East Asia and Pacific	309	221	11	2472	2808	5506	5278	6269	6025	5430	9888	14270	21085	13225	8949	7733
Burma				2	4					1	34	183	244	236	32	34
Taiwan			276	801	1217	1764	1437	1731	1721	1619	1556	2875	3578	1720	827	953
Indochina				42	64	5	4	2	22	103		174	18			
Indonesia			8	16	15					41	201	498	1017	507	307	3
Japan					177	906	1763	1362	452	570	2114	1712	4304	832	365	527
Kampuchea							3	9	14	25	48	91	99	73	3	
S. Korea			412	907	859	1900	559	1141	1289	1122	2493	4219	3709	2519	2425	1674
Laos									7	90	488	843	2258	1331	2463	2187
Malaysia																26
Philippines	309	221	265	531	212	286	394	550	144	325	939	1425	2471	989	528	559
Thailand			58	173	260	645	473	448	653	492	747	870	1564	1359	656	654
Vietnam							645	1026	1123	1042	1268	1380	1633	2598	1302	1116
Near East and South Asia			103	149	196	345	542	842	1023	562	1540	2185	2350	1874	2349	1620
Afghanistan									1	19	22	50	64	68	11	14
Bangladesh																
Egypt																
India														1	304	131
Iran			103	149	196	98	227	363	660	190	947	1346	1045	1077	950	609
Iraq						3	5	169	6	17	4	7	26	6	44	45
Jordan									19	26	14	31	31	24	41	23
Lebanon										2	16	16	9	17	274	343
Libya									6	13	15	28	33	61	75	69
Morocco											1	2	3	4	78	50
Nepal																
Pakistan						244	310	306	290	164	327	627	908	497	410	182
Saudi Arabia							4	21	131	194	74	158	90	102	110	
Sri Lanka																
Syria															7	8
Tunisia												9	24	29	45	36
Yemen																

A*SOURCE: DSAA FISCAL YEAR SERIES (FYS) 27 DECEMBER 1978. FY76 INCLUDES TRANSITIONAL QUARTER (FY7

ET STUDENTS, FY1950-FY1978

APPENDIX F

L YEAR

63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	TOTAL
26392	19159	5829	16864	1667	15785	18288	21847	25671	52231	37411	12477	8859	6961	4833	4542	491721
13225	8949	7733	8506	2873	8081	11150	15253	19153	47057	32586	7859	4035	1580	291	979	276500
236	33	34	10	82	15											878
1720	867	953	428	640	608	328	375	106	265	168	92	104	122	120	124	25595
																434
564	307	3		82	84	127	289	433	320	194	234	276	268	198	259	5438
832	365	527	423	174												15681
73	3							1858	33838	27349	2625	1429				67464
2517	2425	1674	1020	951	1122	1019	667	645	538	436	1193	484	442	172	208	34225
1331	2463	2187	3949	4291	2135	4944	4887	6253	5304	1372	1256	439				44497
		26	28	43	43	49	45	70	29	36	42	66	75	45	86	683
989	528	559	592	456	786	664	628	433	398	344	189	327	392	126	136	16259
1359	656	654	730	721	743	751	966	1170	799	574	720	500	281	230	166	17603
3578	1322	1116	1326	1533	2545	3068	7356	8135	5566	2113	1508	410				47743
1874	2349	1620	1672	1068	878	1464	1163	816	630	360	391	417	532	551	968	26570
68	11	14	15	24	24	20	17	16	14	13	12	15	34	14	20	487
														12	23	35
															12	12
1	304	131	17		10	14	19	26	10		25	6	17	13	21	614
1077	950	609	480	408	318	765	504	554	186							11025
6	44	45	40	34												406
24	41	23	33	46	57	69	69	55	159	131	116	157	140	287	301	1828
17	274	343	616	18	25	17	21	11	32	32	27	17	27	3	59	1582
61	75	69	49	76	51	68	23									567
4	78	50	232	328	281	320	373	212	105	7	71	93	132	85	211	2558
		4	6	3	4	2	3	5	7	6	5	6	6	3	5	59
497	418	182	20		22	27	46	33	23	77	39	47	84	56	80	4832
90	102	110	140	88	50	55	47	43	32	33	41	12				1425
				7	17	15								3	12	54
	7	8	4	1												20
29	45	36	52	39	30	78	27	63	64	60	54	65	77	55	171	998
													15	20	33	68

QUARTER (FY/T).

2

NUMBERS OF IMET STUDENTS, FY1

APPENDIX F

FISCAL YEAR

	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66
Europe	18	3518	10883	12642	7162	4495	2811	3407	2503	2569	3192	6729	7278	4980	2417	2759	18
Austria								2	11	1	10	77	113	70	67	21	1
Belgium		379	1141	1585	818	35	34	57	23	73	58	146	607	60	55	14	
Denmark		275	590	876	419	266	20	134	147	84	144	248	864	72	231	249	
Finland														1		1	
France		1346	4171	1010	1412	433	413	57	130	185	59	273	1817	61	30		
FRG								848	7	7	5	48	87	222	33	129	
Greece	18	35	385	329	557	233	173	315	725	67	953	2645	2316	846	821	921	
Iceland																	
Italy		444	1018	1327	617	333	242	314	326	363	829	1044	2341	300	67	20	
Luxembourg			5	2	1	5	1	2		98	4	16	14	4	1	1	
Netherlands		588	1296	1471	776	344	50	2	23	36	86	208	974	522	60	40	
Norway		269	766	1067	467	195	132	118	92	119	98	275	1027	677	160	15	
Portugal		54	344	367	205	73	26	96	1	1	22	112	783	118	62	35	
Spain				366	1227	238	1756	61	228	184	229	1560	252	120	313		
Turkey			561	849	985	1185	480	383	694	605	697	1332	3481	1951	600	1064	
United Kingdom	128	586	641	421	142	128	128	565	483			36	685	13	14		
Yugoslavia		20	118	138	24	26	40	1	1			1	474				
Africa					4	48	35	54	107	107	387	315	477	368	308	399	
Benin																	
Cameroon																	
Ethiopia				4	48	35	54	107	99	386	289	418	255	201	189		
Ghana												3	17				
Guinea																	
Ivory Coast																	
Kenya																	
Liberia										8		13	40	54	27	54	
Mali															2	34	
Niger																	
Nigeria													5	23	57	70	
Senegal												1		1		3	
Sudan											1	7	11	17	9	38	
Togo																	
Upper Volta																4	
Zaire												5			12	7	

STUDENTS, FY1950-FY1978

FISCAL YEAR

APPENDIX F (CONTINUED)

	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	
20	2417	2759	1825	1416	1472	292	1369	1319	923	857	677	495	575	569	531	100683
0	67	21	11	11	3		2		4	8	9	1	3	4	9	437
0	55	14	9	7												5118
2	231	275	19	7												4657
		1	5	2	6	4	2	3	3	4	3	3	6	6	6	55
1	30															14379
22	33	127	65	45	42											1532
16	821	921	626	525	401	441	387	235	239	127			479	136	118	14518
															20	20
0	67	20	16	21												9622
1	1	1	3													157
22	60	40	10	20												6506
77	160	15	9	15												5501
8	62	35	14	15	74	130	88	123	79	83	58	47	181	215	128	3514
22	120	313	375	269	335	314	294	316	370	382	339	342	336	188	270	10684
51	600	1064	663	470	653	403	596	667	208	253	268	102				19150
8	14															3970
																843
8	308	399	427	363	354	289	363	471	299	248	254	239	326	212	206	6660
				4	4	8										16
						4	2									6
5	201	189	182	181	198	147	154	140	160	158	148	129	184	46		3912
7				12	13	14	22	11	9	14	8	45	57	28	54	307
						4										4
				4	4	12	8	12	8	2						50
												8	22	21	28	79
4	27	54	25	51	80	36	44	38	36	34	36	20	26	16	32	670
	2	34	13			4	9	2	2	1						67
					4											4
3	57	70	80	76	9	5	5	108	34							472
		3		2		3	5			2				2	7	26
7	9	38	24	20						2	5			17	26	177
														4		4
		4	4	4	4											16
	12	7	99	9	38	52	114	160	50	35	51	37	37	76	51	850

APPENDIX F

NUMBERS OF IMET STUDENTS

FISCAL YEAR

	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65
Latin America					275	871	864	796	1206	606	1548	4883	8975	513	4119	3311
Argentina											29	368	475	406	255	231
Bolivia										2	6	136	290	386	333	190
Brazil					13	125	78	124	153	174	306	1267	797	247	330	270
Chile					33	51	207	75	184	38	131	316	1242	482	215	190
Colombia					68	277	176	136	77	90	147	299	1225	274	139	22
Costa Rica											4	48	79	244	175	5
Cuba					52	179	15	36	25	30	79	30	77			
Dominican Republic					7	13	13	53	78	19	5	18	214	554	334	37
Ecuador					62	64	65	60	288	52	280	470	589	354	185	30
El Salvador											7	63	141	110	98	7
Guatemala							34	28	23	36	46	127	391	225	181	7
Haiti							7	12	8	9	66	177	181	113		
Honduras					4	3	22	25	8	18	39	127	177	319	24	12
Jamaica														1	10	
Mexico												31	144	73	87	5
Nicaragua					3	50	93	88	84	77	136	439	710	714	280	18
Panama												105	292	518	275	19
Paraguay											10	71	113	147	97	86
Peru					33	109	98	84	233	41	234	646	1155	256	240	22
Uruguay							56	55	15	20	22	87	428	100	108	10
Venezuela											1	8	255	562	651	3

STUDENTS, FY1950-FY1978

APPENDIX F (CONTINUED)

FISCAL YEAR

	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78				
33	417	3318	4454	4931	4675	4670	3679	3712	3322	3350	3316	3667	3548	2610	1858			81	246
6	255	231	292	195	226	197	201	138	332	237	137	19	139	140				4	017
6	333	170	271	375	220	250	206	290	224	323	152	323	241	183	229			4	650
7	330	270	479	519	590	620	555	482	300	279	258	273	220					8	659
2	215	190	257	279	477	310	425	264	309	367	459	565						6	893
4	139	226	252	275	475	429	282	315	215	361	354	310	688	350	260			7	500
4	175	53	78	5															696
																			523
4	334	374	126	192	279	178	142	262	208	208	229	201	235	73	93			4	108
4	185	207	305	440	291	252	236	137				153	220	288	406			5	504
0	98	70	74	111	165	106	125	130	93	104	137	158	230	47				1	971
5	181	14	73	607	152	135	125	196	109	148	164	139	134	127				3	334
												3	13	12	21				622
	24	129	158	139	150	116	107	245	191	180	194	240	256	116	222			3	219
	10																		11
	87	55	82	32	50	24	24	28	37	4	15	59	65	37	39				706
	280	187	211	272	244	179	242	216	177	92	154	253	242	234	273			5	670
	215	149	254	423	278	141	129	246	157	252	190	354	316	234	83			4	706
	91	26	132	112	132	126	137	110	117	8	63	102	196	99	144			2	017
2	340	221	371	458	233	277	277	310	472	315	378	237	411	657	58			7	904
2	108	106	128	119	132	175	133	187	129	232	150	136	192					2	806
2	651	380	400	348	584	595	373	356	232	240	280	142	150	13	30			5	540

APPENDIX G

COSTS OF IMET PROGRAMS, FY199

FISCAL YEAR

	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64
Worldwide	5595	31941	69453	94126	55765	63664	71581	69388	77861	91262	89167	103371	144764	97599	914
East Asia and Pacific	594	513	4297	15828	10732	17667	18885	28459	25926	29575	35911	50587	59757	36180	424
Burma	11								12	8	623	976	1044	330	271
Taiwan			1889	4500	5050	4111	5075	9249	5698	8886	3934	16456	6247	4364	582
Indochina				89	150	359									
Indonesia			15	50	11				3	1518	1448	1106	1186	88	150
Japan					545	2450	5020	5560	3308	3094	11809	1371	2726	2200	270
Kampuchea							18	102	79	487	151	544	566	229	291
S. Korea			1687	4208	3497	7550	2450	4292	7605	5389	9057	13702	21033	7579	964
Laos								1	48	684	1123	4245	7140	649	651
Malaysia															
Philippines	583	438	552	1010	450	639	859	2489	2398	1729	755	1968	2510	2689	221
Thailand		75	154	5971	1029	2558	1635	1694	2559	2544	2164	3144	4167	461	444
Vietnam							3828	5571	4216	5236	4837	6975	11318	17591	1571
Near East and South Asia	110	218	257	865	1115	2144	2859	4480	10672	9553	6841	5187	13339	12077	1191
Afghanistan									150	200	200	500	1000	831	151
Bangladesh															
Egypt															
India											21	77	210	77	271
Iran	110	218	257	865	1115	779	1211	2049	7675	6312	2050	1601	7721	5812	510
Iraq						15	19	669	25	53	25	45	70	35	71
Jordan									142	25	192	16	77	101	161
Lebanon										10	69	44	37	72	4
Libya									20	96	16	59	95	354	4
Morocco											28	60	55	357	10
Nepal															
Pakistan						1350	1629	1723	2260	1598	2519	1072	3535	3372	15
Saudi Arabia								39	250	1259	1721	1674	484	998	66
Sri Lanka															
Syria															
Tunisia												17	53	66	6
Yemen															

A. SOURCE: DSAA FISCAL YEAR SERIES (FYS) 27 DECEMBER 1978. FY76 INCLUDES TRANSITIONAL QUARTER (FY7T)

S, FY1950-FY1978 (Thousands of Dollars)^A

APPENDIX G

YEAR

	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	TOTAL
599	91470	70907	77528	79941	57301	53526	84672	71650	61281	47323	48136	33243	24467	23508	31506	1929017
480	43410	33038	36018	46524	29107	29071	61629	49104	40048	30968	31674	17234	7956	6235	7464	804593
0	278	249	203	198	91	83	105	41								4253
4	5826	4107	2763	3117	3071	2033	1783	1190	961	536	407	408	535	457	556	103210
																578
3	1504	124		302	398	718	880	1166	1965	1819	1712	2445	2429	2365	3064	26315
00	2709	1755	1609	433												44589
29	295							1343	1511	2511	5027	1675				14560
79	9649	6511	6270	5546	6599	7244	4965	5369	4693	2032	1525	1291	2260	1268	1493	154764
9	652	886	1536	2574	3181	3483	3590	3796	3353	1591	1269	902				42514
		81	189	170	183	165	170	215	137	181	177	284	401	277	596	3228
89	2297	1359	1146	910	1327	1051	795	824	994	813	579	410	825	614	704	33718
61	4443	3362	4933	4396	4498	4607	4119	4065	3147	1560	1507	1803	1505	1255	1050	74408
591	15756	14603	17371	28878	9758	9687	45222	31094	23287	19926	19473	8016				302143
77	11970	8661	8805	6148	5328	6188	5056	4500	3576	2091	2434	2891	3362	3676	6711	150514
1	154	67	117	162	192	272	201	155	239	208	142	191	259	163	269	5623
														50	209	260
															187	189
7	2717	1095	420		62	71	79	147	27		185	56	131	169	306	5874
12	5106	4902	4644	3043	2946	3247	2593	2084	885							67445
5	75	167	191	98												1487
01	121	99	150	128	177	187	204	200	535	726	632	985	802	933	1399	7832
2	46	50	73	48	95	77	78	98	184	151	141	125	117	31	560	2106
4	442	314	317	367	251	327	137									2795
7	1015	409	2056	1434	590	698	794	733	822	130	550	822	885	747	1249	13436
	6	86	29	16	12	12	5	12	24	33	25	28	41	30	64	422
72	1543	684	85		108	103	188	166	99	309	254	262	422	310	551	24133
8	665	706	666	768	755	536	491	632	429	179	169	37				12457
					43	79	44							5	62	233
	15	19	18	5												56
	66	62	40	79	77	581	241	273	331	355	336	384	485	896	1090	4931
													231	241	763	1235

(FY77).

FISCAL YEAR

[illegible]

PROGRAMS, FY1950-FY1978

APPENDIX G (CONTINUED)

FISCAL YEAR

3	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	Total
193	12514	8567	9815	6552	6747	4947	5162	5028	4128	3767	3175	1917	2377	4077	7026	545143
	377	48	22	16	10		4		12	23	24	9	18	24	57	1373
	327	37	12	22												33889
	1016	619	127	50												30451
		5	10	6	22	11	3	15	11	25	16	14	18	14	50	224
	56															107987
	300	44	50	47												16173
	2739	2215	2819	1612	1404	1107	1121	806	853	325			645	954	2001	46315
														17		17
	406	34	24	28												46566
	1	4	7													494
	523	85	60	28												39,100
59	1632	88	24	78												31652
	110	145	88	122	231	249	306	312	294	499	290	336	1159	1126	2940	16508
	450	956	1025	389	797	572	776	1172	889	1165	328	1180	537	1943	1979	37257
	5556	4287	5546	4154	4283	3009	2951	2724	2068	1729	2517	378				111228
	21															21624
																4286
	1888	2951	3114	2591	2333	2068	2038	2165	1918	1136	1341	1595	2311	2759	3106	41467
				4	2	14										27
						15	13									38
	1157	1478	1932	1678	1459	1244	1181	1261	1208	670	823	742	798	212		22773
				25	46	49	46	40	40	55	43	70	97	82	231	854
		16	58			15										89
				8	3	30	15	15	22	4						104
												363	933	193	374	1863
	149	207	133	324	460	300	285	297	259	99	93	88	92	90	196	3626
	73	299	173	56		1	45	6	43	4						982
						6										11
	269	270	327	203	16	28	48	201	98							1507
	13	33	12	6		6	16		(M)	19	7	34	29	15	62	304
	31	312	134	131						11	14			90	228	1036
														23		23
		7	8	8	4											33
	196	328	337	147	336	367	389	344	328	273	360	298	361	2049	2016	8197

COSTS OF IMET PROGRAMS, FY

APPENDIX G

FISCAL YEAR

	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64
Latin America				74	1101	2175	2724	3625	3249	5840	4761	7837	15117	8497	11658
Argentina											275	1305	1505	427	1408
Bolivia									6		162	332	1116	1172	1210
Brazil					50	250	474	533	244	989	461	1250	1795	721	740
Chile					146	204	479	771	573	850	881	788	1915	2	652
Colombia					110	559	489	385	329	577	390	535	665	159	555
Costa Rica											5	62	111	264	253
Cuba					219	691	98	110	213	692					
Dominican Republic					28	15	18	97	115	97	94	61	351	1103	394
Ecuador					259	169	225	329	845	805	356	736	1001	659	970
El Salvador											83	217	504	58	320
Guatemala							105	96	9	144	404	73	1170	95	508
Haiti							21	10	37	18	182	222	263		
Honduras					6	6	39	62	2	62	148	104	295	510	46
Jamaica														1	12
Mexico											70	369	174	142	252
Nicaragua					4	60	129	149	132	115	452	153	1005	795	965
Panama												85	250	244	102
Paraguay											72	131	256	192	599
Peru				74	279	221	489	841	682	973	449	799	1124	834	943
Uruguay							158	242	62	518	275	587	570	165	273
Venezuela											2	28	1047	934	1457

PROGRAMS, FY1950-FY1973

AL YEAR

APPENDIX G (CONTINUED)

3	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	
487	11658	10000	10705	10923	8882	7930	7612	7938	8185	8013	8084	8590	10293	6990	6999	187792
427	1408	978	1023	873	523	651	582	379	700	543	476	100	394	744		12856
772	1210	747	961	1270	566	710	495	606	546	816	446	595	765	585	734	13840
31	740	689	1003	859	875	754	776	689	668	623	572	757	630	44		16456
2	652	162	918	958	1192	736	852	690	875	907	1127	618				16896
59	555	626	755	740	775	790	635	604	589	502	533	677	1066	658	1179	14883
34	253	86	100	20												901
																2028
3	394	565	453	966	387	570	325	577	550	531	486	504	645	480	738	10150
57	970	590	686	877	488	499	482	195				381	496	398	743	12187
58	320	226	277	159	281	175	224	286	255	491	437	501	806	527		5827
95	508	490	270	326	300	226	271	392	251	497	490	400	490	451		7458
												14	102	93	248	1210
10	46	352	400	398	360	234	198	512	526	522	508	804	777	600	692	8202
1	12															13
12	252	184	251	83	108	87	89	80	107	11	35	110	109	118	124	2502
5	965	738	575	591	651	454	541	508	479	263	410	656	732	598	400	11554
4	102	151	211	163	85	72	140	289	255	281	258	320	582	403	499	4390
2	599	520	499	499	379	387	354	384	422	23	192	301	529	378	600	6718
4	943	783	1182	938	661	543	553	508	925	687	931	816	1065	839	941	19082
5	273	306	196	272	238	224	339	347	331	418	300	386	424			6629
34	1457	1208	944	930	1012	816	757	895	706	859	884	653	680	73	100	13985

APPENDIX H

SOURCE MATERIALS

PRIMARY SOURCE DOCUMENTS

The documents listed as primary sources are those most frequently used in the course of this study. They have been collected by GRC and provided to DSAA in a separate compilation entitled Source Documents to Accompany Report 1088-01-79-CR: U.S. Training of Foreign Military Personnel. 5 February 1979.

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GLOSSARY

ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AECEB	Arms Export Control Board
AFB	Air Force Base
AFP	Armed Forces, Philippines
C&GS	Command and General Staff School
C&SC	Command and Staff College
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCSO	Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CPD	Congressional Presentation Document
CZMS	Canal Zone Military Schools
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DoD	Department of Defense
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
EUCOM	European Command
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FMST	Foreign Military Sales Training
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	General Accounting Office
GRC	General Research Corporation
IAAFA	Inter-American Air Forces Academy
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMETP	International Military Education and Training Program
J-5	Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Assistance Plans Division, Director for Plans and Policy
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program (Grant Aid)

MASL	Military Articles and Services List
MASM	Military Assistance and Sales Manual
MILGP	Military Group
MILREP	Military Representative
MOP	Memorandum of Policy
MTT	Mobile Training Teams
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OASD/ISA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/ International Security Affairs
ODC	Office of Defense Cooperation
OJCS	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM	Pacific Command
PME	Professional Military Education/Training
PPBS	Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
QM	Quartermaster
SA	Security Assistance
SAPRWG	Security Assistance Program Review Working Group
SCIATT	Small Craft Instruction and Technical Team
SOUTHCOM	Southern Command
TLA	Travel and Living Allowances
USAF	United States Air Force
USARSA	U.S. Army School of the Americas
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ZBB	Zero Base Budget

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