Patterns of Organizational Influence in Soviet Military Procurement,
Abstract
Although political choices have established the thrust of present Soviet weapons procurement policies, these choices and their implementation are conditioned by decisionmaking procedures and organizational relationships. The military maintains a near-monopoly of information and expertise on military affairs. This monopoly, coupled with a generation of alternative policies in military and civilian sectors that is conservative and incremental, requires that non-incremental change be stimulated by intervention from the political leaders. But, in order to preserve its stability, the collective leadership of the past 15 years is also conservative and incrumental. We can therefore expect continuation of present trends until major change is broadly supported by the leadership. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1982
- Accession Number
- ADA118206
Entities
People
- Arthur J. Alexander
Organizations
- RAND Corporation