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The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorist Policies
(Final Report, June 1982)

By Christopher Hewitt

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
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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the policies that have been used against urban terrorism, and to evaluate their effectiveness. In order to see if a particular policy is effective, the level of terrorist activity will be plotted over time, and then examined to see if the fluctuations bear any relationship to the introduction and operation of the policy.

The analysis is limited to situations where urban terrorism poses a major threat to society; it ignores spasmodic terrorism by lone individuals or small groups. In other words, the aim is to discover the appropriate response if terrorists are well-organized and have the popular support and other resources necessary to conduct a protracted campaign. Five cases have been selected for detailed examination: Northern Ireland (1970-), Spain (1975-), Italy (1977-), Uruguay (1968-73) and Cyprus (1955-59). This group includes the three most important on-going campaigns and two concluded campaigns which served as prototypes for many later groups.¹

Selecting a starting date for the analysis is sometimes difficult. The Cyprus case is easiest since the campaign opened with a

¹The Tupamaros "invented the original model for what has become the planetary fashion in urban guerrilla warfare" (Sterling, 1981: 18), and were an influence on the German RAF., the U.S. Weathermen and the Argentinian ERP. The organizational structure of the Italian Red Brigades is directly copied from the Tupamaros (Katz, 1980:63).

proclamation by EOKA and a wave of attacks in April 1955. In Uruguay and Italy the analysis begins at the point when the level of terrorism showed a dramatic escalation after several years of intermittent activity. In the case of Spain, there have been two jumps in terrorist activity, one around 1974-5, the other in 1978. The first date has been selected because it coincides with the ending of the Franco regime, an obvious watershed in Spanish society. In Northern Ireland, since most British Army records begin January 1970, this date has been chosen as a convenient starting point.

In Cyprus and Uruguay almost all terrorist acts were carried out by a single organization, EOKA in the former case, the Tupamaros in the latter. In Northern Ireland, Spain and Italy the situation is more complex and several groups are active in each country. In Italy, for example, as of April 1978, 209 different organizations had taken credit for terrorist attacks (Ronchey, 1979). This complexity has been reduced by aggregating the activity of terrorist groups within the same ideological category. Thus no distinction is made between "Provisional" and "Official" IRA actions; both are treated as manifestations of "Republican" terrorism. This can be justified on both theoretical and practical grounds. One would expect theoretically that any policy that reduces terrorism by the Provisionals would also reduce terrorism by the Officials. Furthermore, it is often very difficult in practice to be sure which particular group carried out a given act. In Italy the Red Brigades, Front Line and other Leftist groups use similar tactics against similar targets. Many acts are unclaimed, or are claimed by more

than one organization. Some organizations are believed to be "nommes de guerre" of other groups. In figure 1 the amount of terrorism attributable to each ideological category is shown for each of the five cases. In Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Spain fatalities have been used as the indicator, in Uruguay and Italy major terrorist acts.¹ Those types of terrorism which occur so infrequently that one cannot examine fluctuations over time will be ignored in the analysis.

The study is focused on macro-policies; micro-policies, such as hostage negotiations or surveillance techniques, will be ignored. The macro-policies examined fall into six categories:

- 1) Negotiating a ceasefire with the terrorists.
- 2) Emergency legislation giving special powers to the authorities and reducing the civil liberties of the general population.
- 3) Repressive policies involving the use of the security forces and the courts.
- 4) Improving economic conditions.
- 5) Making reforms.
- 6) The collective punishment of the civilian population.

The report is divided into five sections. Chapter 1 describes, case by case, the social and historical background to the insurgency, the aims, organization, and social composition of the terrorist group


¹The number of deaths was much lower in Italy (191) and Uruguay (49). Using deaths as an indicator gives a misleading impression of the significance of Rightist terrorism in Italy, since a single incident, the bombing of Bologna railway station, resulted in 84 deaths. If that incident is excluded Leftist terrorists have killed 84, Rightists only 13, during the 1977-80 period.

and its' internal and external support. Chapter 2 discusses the indicators that are used to measure terrorist violence, and Chapter 3 examines the policies used against terrorism and analyzes their effectiveness. Chapter 4 contains a discussion of the findings, which attempts to place them in theoretical context. The data sources and coding procedures are described in an appendix.

Researching an ongoing terrorist campaign is like aiming at a moving target. Any statement made about the situation is in danger of being falsified by events. The reader should bear in mind that part of the report (chapters 1 and 2) was first written in December 1981, although I have tried to update the material where necessary. There is usually a lag of at least several months between the collection of statistics and their publication. My goal in the case of Northern Ireland, Spain and Italy was to gather information on terrorist violence through December, 1981. However, some Northern Irish data came too late to be included in the analysis and for this reason tables and figures in the case of Northern Ireland refer to the period up to the end of 1980.

FIGURE 1

TERRORIST ACTIVITY BY COUNTRY CLASSIFIED BY
IDEOLOGY OF GROUP RESPONSIBLE



NOTE: Activity measured in terms of fatalities for Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Spain, and significant incidents in Uruguay and Italy

Chapter 1

FIVE CASES OF TERRORISM

In this chapter the five cases of terrorism will be considered case by case. For each case the following matters will be discussed: the social and historical background to the insurgency, the aims, organization, numerical strength and social composition of the terrorist group, its popular support and the amount and sources of any external aid received.

EOKA in Cyprus (1955-1959)

In 1955, Cyprus was a British colony and had been so since the island was taken from the Ottoman empire in 1878. The majority of the population (80%) spoke Greek and belonged to the Greek Orthodox church, while 18% were Turkish speaking Moslems. Most villages were either all-Greek or all-Turkish. In the mixed villages and large towns each community lived in its own quarter. The Turkish population was dispersed throughout the island and there was no administrative district in which they constituted a majority.

The Greek Cypriots aspired to "enosis" (union with Greece) and had done so since the early days of British rule. Their sense of Greek identity was encouraged by the schools where Greek history and

classics were taught.¹ The church was also a powerful force in maintaining enosist sentiments. Religion and ethnicity were regarded as synonymous. In the first census taken by the British the population was classified Moslem or Orthodox rather than Turkish or Greek. During centuries of foreign rule the Archbishop of the Orthodox church had been the secular as well as spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriot community.

Turkish Cypriots were bitterly opposed to the prospect of Cyprus being united with Greece. As Greek agitation increased, the Turks raised the counter demand of "taksim" (partition) should the British withdraw. Greeks were measurably better off than Turks but this was a result of cultural and educational differences rather than discrimination.² For the same reasons, Greeks were slightly overrepresented in the higher levels of the government administration. Social contact between the two communities was slight, with each community patronizing its own institutions, coffee shops and clubs.

In 1931 poor economic conditions, and enosist agitation caused a revolt during which Government House was burnt to the ground. The British responded by deporting two bishops, alleged leaders of the revolt, and by suspending the constitution.

¹Grivas notes that in his village school "the glories of Greek history always took first place" and that his secondary school "like all the others on Cyprus...was staffed with teachers from Greece who brought fresh fervor to our nationalism" (1965:3).

²Markides (1977:31) claims that Greeks "have always been better off economically than Turks" even under conditions favoring the Turks. He estimates that in 1961, Turkish per capita income was 20% below that of the Greeks.

After World War II the enosis issue emerged again. Delegations were sent to London, petitions presented to visiting government officials, and in 1950, in a church sponsored plebiscite 96% of the Greek Cypriots declared themselves in favor of enosis. British proposals for a new constitution were rejected with the slogan "Enosis and nothing but Enosis." In 1952, Archbishop Makarios III began a campaign to gain international support for enosis, visiting London, Athens, Washington, and New York. The Greek government raised the Cyprus question at the United Nations in 1954 and called for a plebiscite.

The origins of EOKA can be traced back to a Cypriot liberation committee set up in Athens by Cypriot emmigrés and conservative Greek politicians. In early 1951 Makarios recommended Colonel Grivas to the committee as a military leader should an armed struggle become necessary. Grivas was a native-born Cypriot, retired on pension from the Greek army. During World War II he organized a right wing resistance group called Xhi and gained further experience in irregular warfare fighting the Communists during the Greek civil war. In July 1951, Grivas returned to Cyprus to examine the situation and organize the revolt which began April 1955.

At the start of the revolt EOKA consisted of less than 80 fighters, but this number grew to 273 by February, 1956. At that time EOKA was organized into 47 town groups and 7 groups based in the Troodos mountains. All the groups were small, those in the towns

averaging 5 members and those in the mountains somewhat more. In addition there were a number of village groups¹ and sympathizers who acted as couriers, distributed leaflets, and collected information. Grivas exercised an unusual degree of personal control over the organization through an elaborate system of couriers. He picked many of the targets, decided which Greek Cypriots would be executed as "traitors" and for a period even disbursed the petty case.²

Markides (1977:18-20) and Loizos (1975:317-8) provide information as to the demographic and social characteristics of EOKA members. Of those brought to trial for terrorist offenses, such as possession of arms, throwing grenades, or murder, 87% were under 25 years old, and the average age was 21. Those killed in action were somewhat older; 57% were under 25 and the average age was 23. This youthfulness is explained primarily by psychological factors. Grivas himself noted that "among young people one finds audacity, love of taking risks and the thirst for great and difficult achievements" and deliberately recruited such "passionate youth" (1964: 14-15). While women played a significant supporting role in the struggle all the active terrorists were men. This fact reflects the traditional nature of Cypriot society. Grivas remarked that "some girls asked me for permission to form a guerilla group but this I did not allow."

¹Loizos (personal communication) suggests that the significance of the village groups has been underestimated in most accounts and that "in most of the Greek villages there was an EOKA unit." Grivas gives a figure of 75 village groups with "approximately 750 men" (1965:67).

²"Grivas was obliged to deal with routine matters which fell far outside the scope of a military leader's normal duties. When the pregnant wife of an EOKA prisoner needed to go into a maternity clinic it was the Colonel who granted the request. (Crawshaw, 1978:187).

Although Grivas and a few other EOKA leaders were from comfortable middle-class backgrounds, the majority of the guerrillas were of working class origin. Those old enough to have left school had jobs "as carpenters, mechanics, or electricians," and an elementary education (Markides 1977:18). Loizos (1978:317-8) found that of 68 EOKA killed in action only two were university graduates and that only 24 had a secondary education. Excluding students the most common occupational categories were farmers (13), craftsmen (12), clerks (7), and laborers (4).

Most commentators agree that the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots desired enosis. No evidence suggests that any sizeable portion of the population wanted anything else. The only controversy concerns the intensity of their commitment, and the extent to which a desire for enosis involved support for EOKA. There are reasons to believe that many Greek Cypriots were apathetic about enosis and opposed to EOKA. EOKA found it necessary to execute a large number as informers or traitors. Markides (1977:17) notes that no group had any pressing economic reasons to rebel against the British. The peasants and the middle-class were prosperous. Crawshaw gives several examples of the initial reluctance of Cypriots to make sacrifices for EOKA.¹ Bitter antagonism developed between the Cypriot left and the ultra-rightist Grivas.

¹ A priest "charged with finding hideouts for wanted men... suggested that EOKA should rent village houses used by townspeople as summer residences. ...Not even the priests were willing to make undue sacrifices... Before long some of the saboteurs began to demand payment. One man named his price for putting a bomb in a British cargo boat as £100" (Crawshaw, 1978:108,119).

On the other hand, demonstrations, strikes, and riots were frequent, wide-spread, and well-supported. EOKA sympathizers were found in the police force, the civil service, and among workers on the British bases, which suggests that EOKA could count on a very high degree of spontaneous mass support throughout the Greek community. EOKA could also rely upon the church and the various nationalist organizations to provide an infrastructure throughout the island. The first EOKA cells were recruited from the ranks of two nationalist youth groups, OXEN and PEON. Churches and monasteries were used to store arms and ammunition and as hideouts for the terrorists. The church supplied the terrorists with food and purchased arms and ammunition for them.¹ Some support came from Greece, even from the Greek government. Papagos, the Greek prime minister, knew of Grivas' plans as early as February 1953. Arms were smuggled into Cyprus with the connivance of an Admiral of the Royal Hellenic Navy. Weapons came from Greek army stores. The Greek government kept up diplomatic pressure against Britain at the United Nations while a torrent of propaganda poured from Athens radio.

The Tupamaros of Uruguay (1968-73)

Uruguay in the '60s was not a society where the emergence of a terrorist movement would have been expected. It was one of the most

¹Orthodox clergy even smuggled explosive timers into Cyprus. The episcopal staff of the Bishop of Kitium was filled with eight time pencils, while another priest had them sewn into his hat (Foley and Scobie, 1975:58-9).

urbanized and economically developed Latin American countries, with a long record of constitutional rule. A welfare state had been created by President Batlle as early as 1915 and the population enjoyed such benefits as a minimum wage, unemployment benefits and old age pensions.

However, the pastoral sector, the basis of the whole economy, had been declining since the late '50s. The result was a low growth rate and a high rate of inflation. Another problem was that the universities turned out an over supply of liberal arts graduates. While in good times these could be absorbed by expanding the public sector this was not possible in the depressed conditions of the '60s. Labor militancy and student radicalism both increased dramatically during this period.

In 1959 Raul Sendic, a law student, began to organize the sugar workers of northern Uruguay. His union became increasingly radical, moving from reformist demands for an eight hour day and a minimum wage to a call for the appropriation of uncultivated land. In June 1962 the union organized a march on Montevideo which ended in violence. Sendic was subsequently arrested and while in jail wrote an article, "Waiting for the Guerrilla," which advocated urban guerrilla warfare. Sometime during the next few months the Tupamaros were organized under Sendic's leadership. Their first operation was a raid on the Swiss Rifle Club in July 1963.

The Tupamaro ideology was obviously inspired by Castroism. Unlike orthodox Marxist-Leninism which held that the objection conditions for a revolution had to exist prior to revolutionary action, the

Tupamaros believed that "revolutionary action in itself...generates revolutionary consciousness, organization, and conditions."¹ Their model for the future was a centrally planned socialist society. Socialism was linked to nationalism through the belief that Uruguay was an exploited dependency of American Imperialism. According to Halperin (1976:53) their Marxist-Leninism was "the doctrine of the neo-Marxist dependency school that emerged in the late 1960's - a Marxism in essence reduced to an interpretation of the contemporary nonsocialist world as the system of metropolis-satellite or center-periphery relations dominated by the multinational corporations."

The Tupamaros grew from an original nucleus of less than fifty activists in 1965 to about 3,000 in 1970. They were organized into small cells of 2 to 6 members. Cells were linked together to form columns, which operated in particular geographic areas. Some Montevideo columns had a specialized function, such as the medical treatment of wounded guerrillas. Only a minority of the cells were engaged in combat: the rest were concerned with providing logistic support to the combat cells. Cells and columns had an infrastructure of sympathizers who did not live underground but aided the Tupamaros in various ways. Cell members did not know one another's identity and used nicknames and false identity papers. Links between various cells were minimized by the principle of compartmentalization. The group leader of each cell was the only contact between cells and

¹ This quotation is from "Treinta Preguntas a un Tupamaro" (Thirty Questions to a Tupamaro) based on an interview with a high-ranking Tupamaro. The interview is reprinted in several books and an English translation can be found in Kohl and Litt (1974).

there was no hierarchic structure within columns. Compartmentalization led to a number of problems in coordinating large scale operations, (Porzecanski, 1973:36) and in their day to day operations the Tupamaros "appeared to lack a unified comand" (Moss, 1972:222). The leadership of the Tupamaros was in the hands of an executive committee which was nominally subject to a national convention made up of representatives from all guerrilla units. The national convention, however, seems never to have met after 1970.

Of all the groups considered in this study the Tupamaros received the least external support and aid. Porzecanski (1973: 23) notes that while the Tupamaros were interested in developing contacts with revolutionary movements and governments abroad, they did not begin to do so until 1972, showing the degree to which they were "politically, ideologically, and militarily independent of foreign governments." The only international link reported is that some Tupamaros were sent for training in Havana after 1968 (Sterling 1981:20).¹

The best information on the characteristics of the Tupamaros is found in Porzecanski (1973), and is based on those killed and captured during the 1966-72 period. The average age of the Tupamaros was 27; one quarter (25.4%) were women. Occupationally the Tupamaros fell into three groups of almost equal size; students (29.5%) professional and technical (32.4%) and workers (32.4%).

¹"No evidence has been found that the Tupamaros ever received either money or arms from other countries or from social movements abroad" Porzecanski (1973:41).

The Tupamaros had a number of well-placed sympathizers in the police, the military, the civil service, and the banks, all of whom provided them with vital information. A network of support groups (Comites de Apoyo a los Tupamaros) was organized in the trade unions and among high school and college students. The Tupamaros themselves saw students as the group that supported them the most strongly. Their relationship with the Uruguayan Communist Party and other left wing parties was cordial, but ambivalent, since the Tupamaros believed that armed struggle was the only way to win power. However, the Tupamaros willingly participated in the Frente Amplio, an electoral alliance of left wing groups, as a means of mobilizing the masses. The Frente Amplio got 19% of the vote in the 1971 election--one measure of public support for the Tupamaros.¹ Another measure is a public opinion poll which asked whether the Tupamaros were motivated by a "concern for social justice." In mid 1971 59% of the population believed they were, but this figure dropped to 4% by the end of 1972. Not only was there public sympathy for the Tupamaros, but also the government's image was tarnished by several well-publicized examples of corruption. The result was that the contest between government and Tupamaros resembled "a football match in which the people felt themselves to be spectators" (Moss 1972:233).

¹The Frente Amplio (Broad Front) was composed of fourteen left-wing groups including the March 26 Movement, a group closely identified with the Tupamaros. The Front drew disproportionate support from the upper class (McDonald, 1972).

Northern Ireland and the IRA (1970 -)

Politically, Northern Ireland belongs to the United Kingdom; geographically, it is part of Ireland. In the seventeenth century, Scottish and English Protestants were settled in Northern Ireland, dispossessing the Gaelic population. The current division between Protestants and Catholic results from that historical act. The Protestants are, in general, descendants of the settlers, while most of the native Irish remained Catholic.

Religious identity provides (and has historically provided) the basis for communal identity. Both communities have distinctive traditions, and most organizations are aligned with one community or the other. Even prior to the current conflict there was a high degree of voluntary segregation between the two communities.

These communal identities are significant politically. When Irish Nationalism emerged as a serious force in the nineteenth century, it drew mass support only from the Catholic population. The Protestants, in contrast, organized against home rule and for remaining a part of the United Kingdom.

Militant Irish Nationalists rebelled against the British in 1916. Their campaign was effective in the twenty six Catholic Counties, but had little impact in the six Northern counties where Protestants predominated. Eventually, in 1921 Ireland was partitioned, the twenty six Catholic counties becoming the Irish Free State while the other six remained part of the United Kingdom. Within Northern Ireland, Protestants outnumbered Catholics about two to one, a figure which remained remarkably constant throughout the period since the higher

Catholic birthrate was exactly matched by a higher rate of emigration.¹

The sectarian geography of Northern Ireland is important because it largely explains the geographical distribution of violence. The practicality of certain policies, such as repartition or administrative decentralization, is limited by the fact that Catholics are a numerical majority in only a few areas. There are three main regions, an eastern heavily-Protestant zone, a western zone in which the two groups are evenly-balanced and a broken strip of land along the border where Catholics are in a clear majority. In the two largest towns, Belfast and Londonderry, the communities are residentially segregated. In Belfast Catholics are the minority (27%) while in Londonderry they form the majority (67%).

Northern Irish politics traditionally revolved around "the national question" with Protestants overwhelmingly supporting the British link and a plurality of Catholics favoring a United Ireland. However, a sizeable minority of Catholics does accept the existing constitutional situation.² The position of the Catholic minority within Northern Ireland was until recently a secondary issue. Catholics claimed that they were treated as second-class citizens, and discriminated against in various ways.³

¹In 1961 there were 929,000 Protestants and 497,000 Catholics. The percentage of Catholics was 34.9% in 1961 and 34.2% in 1911. In 1971 and 1981, many people refused to identify themselves by religion.

²In 1968 33% of the Catholics approved of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland (Rose 1971: 189) and in the most recent poll (Sunday Times, 6/28/81) 39% wanted complete integration with Great Britain.

³For a discussion of the situation of the Catholics prior to the present troubles see Rose (1971) and Hewitt (1981).

In the early 1960s, the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association (NICRA) organized a series of protests against discrimination. Many Protestants saw these demonstrations as Republican-inspired attacks on the state, and clashes between Catholic and Protestant crowds took place. As communal violence escalated, the U.K. government intervened, sending in the army in July 1969 and taking over the administration of the province in March 1972.

The IRA, one of the oldest terrorist groups in the world, can be traced back, ideologically and organizationally, to the mid-nineteenth century. During the 1916-21 struggle for Irish independence, the IRA were the backbone of the rebel forces. When the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed, a civil war broke out in Southern Ireland between the pro-Treaty forces and the anti-Treaty forces (i.e. the IRA). Although militarily defeated, the IRA survived as the embodiment of the most intransigent form of Irish Nationalism. Their goal was to end partition and create a "Thirty Two County Republic," not only driving out the British forces "occupying" the Six Countries but also toppling the treacherous "Twenty-six County" government.

Intermittent terrorist attacks were made against both English and Northern Irish targets. After the failure of the 1956-62 campaign, the IRA leadership embraced Marxism and abandoned the physical force strategy. The result was that when communal rioting broke out in 1969 the IRA could not protect the Catholic community. This in turn led to a split between the "Officials" and the "Provisionals." The former group is Marxist, the latter are traditional Nationalists who favor military rather than political action. The Provisionals are the major terrorist organization on the Republican side, but some attacks have been carried

out by Officials or by the Irish National Liberation Army.¹

The IRA was, in the past, organized in pseudo-military fashion with battalions, companies and a clearly defined hierarchy of officers, including Commanding Officers, Quartermasters and Information Officers. The battalions are territorially organized with a battalion based in each of the centers of Catholic population. Each company is composed of local "volunteers" who operate in their home district. This military-style organization was extremely vulnerable to penetration and around 1977 was replaced by a system of small cells in which members had little knowledge of their superiors.² The IRA reached a maximum strength of 2,000 in 1972, but now numbers about 500 (Holland, 1981:145).

Information is available on the characteristics of IRA volunteers killed in action or convicted of terrorist offences. Of those killed in action the average age was 20; 73% were under 25. The ages ranged from 14 to 47; the most common age 17 years. Of those convicted in 1979 more than half (53%) were under 21 and another fifth were aged between 21 and 25. In 1975 the group was even younger with 70% under 21 and 13% aged between 21 and 25.

Only a handful were women, reflecting the traditional nature of Irish society. Fighting is a male activity and women are only expected to play a supporting role in the struggle. Furthermore, working class Catholics marry young, get pregnant quickly, and have large families. It is therefore unlikely that Catholic women have much time to spare for terrorist activities.

¹The Irish National Liberation Army is the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, a breakaway faction of the Officials.

²According to Boyle et al (1980:18) "the extent of this change has probably been exaggerated" and the traditional structure still persists.

The socioeconomic background of the IRA killed in action, is lower working class. The most common job listed is unskilled laborer. Often they are unemployed. In Belfast the IRA volunteers come from the most deprived areas of the city. Seventeen wards in Belfast are classified as "areas of special need" in terms of housing, health and poverty; 89% of the dead IRA men were from these wards. The three Belfast wards with the highest male unemployment rates, Whiterock (49%), New Lodge (41%), and Clonard (36%) account for more than half of the fatalities.¹

The degree of support for the Provisional IRA within the Catholic community is variously estimated and also fluctuates over time. British army sources conceded in August 1971 that one quarter of the Catholics in Belfast and Londonderry were helping the IRA and another half were sympathizers. Clutterbuck (1980:72) suggests that in 1972 the Catholic population in Belfast, Londonderry and the border areas of South Armagh was "solidly behind them." Most estimates agree that support fell even in the hard core areas to "less than one third" by 1975, and to between one quarter and a third in 1978. The hunger strikers campaign appears to have increased support for the IRA.

Support for the IRA depends on a number of factors. A majority of Catholics share their aims even if they disapprove of their methods. IRA violence itself is legitimated by the rebel tradition in Irish history. Terrorist operations are carried out by local youths on targets

¹The analysis of the characteristics of the IRA is based on Boyle et al (1980) and on my own research into IRA fatalities. The obituaries in the Irish News allow a reconstruction of family size and fertility. Those aged 20 and under were single, those over 20 were married. The husbands mean age was 22 when his first child was born, 25 when his second child was born. By age 35 the typical volunteer had five children. For the most recent British Army assessment of the IRA (the Glover Report) see Holland (1981:147).

close to their homes. This insures that they will be known to the population of the local area as neighbors, friends, or relatives and will be protected and sheltered because of such local links.¹

This local support is further increased by two factors. In the Catholic ghettos of Belfast the IRA functions as a defense force, patrolling its borders and protecting the inhabitants from Protestant assassins or rioters. Those areas of Belfast attacked by Protestant rioters in 1968 continue to be IRA strongholds.² A vicious cycle also maintains sympathy for the IRA. IRA attacks on the British Army result in Army searches; in turn leading to further alienation of the public, to more IRA attacks and so on.

External aid to the IRA has come from several sources. In the latter part of 1969 the IRA asked for and received both guns and money from the Dublin government. Some of this aid was diverted from official government funds voted by the Dail (the Irish Legislature) for humanitarian relief to the North. One steady source of aid has been the

¹A comparison of home address and place killed for Belfast IRA volunteers "killed in action" shows that the average distance between the two was just over a half a mile. When an IRA volunteer is killed in action, the Catholic paper, Irish News, usually contains dozens of obituary notices placed by relatives, friends, workmates and neighbors. By looking at their addresses it can be seen that IRA volunteers swim in a sea of relatives and friends.

²In the communal rioting of August 1969, Protestants burnt out Bombay Street. One British Army officer comments that the "Burning of Bombay Street was the oft-repeated and most regarded underlying justification for the IRA's claim to be needed as the only defence force that the Catholics of Belfast could rely on in dire emergency to protect their lives and homes. The bulk of the Catholic population accepted this claim and...were not prepared to cooperate with the forces of the Crown to destroy the IRA, just in case another 'Bombay Street' situation might arise, with no one but the IRA to keep the murdering Protestant mob away from them" (Eveleigh, 1978:7).

Irish-American community, which has contributed large sums to NORAIID, an organization which supposedly provides aid to civilian victims of the conflict. It is generally accepted that NORAIID money has been diverted to buy guns.¹

The IRA has received an increasing degree of assistance from other terrorist groups and from the Soviet bloc countries.² In late 1971 the first shipment of Czech arms to the IRA was intercepted in the Netherlands. IRA volunteers have been trained in PLO camps in Lebanon and South Yemen. Some connections have been developed with the German RAF, the Italian Red Brigades and the Basque ETA.

¹ From July 1974 to July 1977, NORAIID sent \$812,530 to Northern Ireland. Most British soldiers have been killed by the US-made M16.

² Russian-made RPG-7 Rocket launchers were used by the IRA in November 1972.

The Basques and E.T.A. (1975-)

The Basques speak a language unrelated to any other in the world and their historical origins are disputed. The Basque homeland straddles the Western Pyrenees with about 200,000 Basques living in France, and the remainder in Spain. The Basque region of Spain is composed of four provinces inhabited by just over 2.3m people. Immigration into the Basque provinces from other parts of Spain has been heavy and ethnic Basques constitute only about 60% of the population. The proportion of Basque-speakers is considerably less, just under 20%.¹

Basque ethnicity is interesting in that a division between Basque and non-Basque is difficult to make with any precision. Possibly related to this is the fact that Basques and non-Basques do not form two separate social communities. There is no residential segregation and neither social activities nor social institutions are linked to ethnicity.²

The last independent united Basque state was the Kingdom of Navarra which lasted until 1035. Thereafter the Basque area South of the Pyrenees gradually came under the control of the Spanish monarchy. However, each of the Basque provinces retained a high degree of auto-

¹According to Nunez-Astrain, 51% had parents both of whom had identifiable Basque surnames, while 8% had one parent with a Basque surname (1977:168). For an excellent discussion of the Basque situation see Clark (1979).

²Based on personal communication from Professor Clark, George Mason University. Unlike Northern Ireland there is only a slight relationship between ethnicity and class, and ethnic Basques have an income 10% higher than non-Basques (Nunez-Astrain, 1977:168-173).

nomy and its own laws ("fueros"). In the nineteenth century, when a centralized Spanish state began to emerge, the Basque coastal provinces became the most industrialized region of Spain.

Basque nationalism dates from the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) having been founded in 1895 by Sabino de Arana. The Nationalist movement struggled to revive the Basque language which it saw as central to Basque identity. The movement was strongly Catholic, drew its initial support from the petit bourgeoisie and favored a non-violent parliamentary strategy.

The PNV remained the main vehicle of Basque nationalism throughout the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, the second Republic and the Civil War. During the Civil War the PNV sided with the Republic and in return the provinces of Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya were granted autonomy. The autonomous government had a brief existence from October 1936 until June 1937 when Franco's forces overran the territory.

Basque nationalism was savagely repressed under Franco but a resistance movement gradually developed. In the 1950s younger and more radical Basques became increasingly dissatisfied with the PNV leadership, and formed Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in 1959. A bitter ideological dispute within ETA went on for several years and led to a number of splits within the movement.¹ The main issues concerned cooperation with the Spanish left and the role of violence in revolutionary war.

¹The various factions are sometimes labelled in terms of the assemblies during which the splits occurred. Thus ETA militar is sometimes referred to as ETA 5, and ETA politico-militar as ETA 6.

At present three groups can be identified, all of which consider themselves Marxists engaged in a national liberation struggle. The most important organization is ETA-militar (ETA-m) which advocates armed struggle as the primary strategy, and has been responsible for most deaths in the conflict. ETA-politico-militar (ETA-pm) favors a combined military and political strategy and its violence has been more restrained than that of ETA-m. A third group, much smaller than the other two but the most fanatical, is called Comandos Autonomos.

ETA has a elaborate organizational structure. An executive committee controls day-to-day activities but is responsible to an annual assembly. The organization is divided into four fronts according to function; worker organization, cultural, political and military. The membership is divided into three categories, "liberados," "legales," and "apoyos." The first category, who work for the organization full-time and are paid a small salary carry out the actual attacks. The legales, who continue to hold regular jobs, gather intelligence and act as couriers. The apoyos supply shelter and other kinds of support to the active members. The basic unit is the "comando," a small cell of three to five persons. The number of active members, liberados plus legales, has fluctuated over time. Clark (1981) estimates that there have been two peaks, in 1968 when the membership total was about 600, and in 1979 when it may have reached 700.

The process of becoming an ETA member is a gradual one. The potential recruit becomes more and more involved in the organization as he

participates in increasingly dangerous operations. Clark's analysis shows the typical "etarra" to be male (91%) and in his mid' twenties (mean age is 26 years). Occupationally the etarras are fairly representative of the general Basque population, except that the middle class is overrepresented and there are no farmers and no unemployed. One very interesting fact about the current generation of etarras is that a high proportion (22%) are not ethnic Basques or are of mixed Spanish and Basque descent (38%).

According to most sources support for ETA was strong until recently. Bell described ETA as "not simply tolerated but protected" (1978:191). A 1978 survey found that at least a third of the Basque population were favorable to ETA. The consensus holds that support has declined since the granting of autonomy. In February 1981, extensive demonstrations took place in the Basque provinces against ETA terrorism (Washington Star, 2/10/81).

Election results in 1979 show that the three Basque nationalist parties (PNV, HB, and EE) together received 40-50% of the votes cast. Herri Batasuna (HB), the political arm of ETA, received 13% of the vote in the parliamentary elections and 15% in the municipal elections. Clark notes that the geographical distribution of ETA violence corresponds very closely to the distribution of support for HB and EE, being concentrated in a few towns in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.

Basque nationalists, unlike Greek Cypriots and Northern Irish Catholics, cannot count on the support of a friendly homeland. However, the Basque area of France provided sanctuary for etarras on the run

from the Spanish police, while French Basques supplied money and weapons. Since October 1972, however, the French government has officially banned ETA from operating in France.

The ETA are reported to have received aid and guerrilla training from Cuba, Algeria, the Soviet Union and Libya. They have close links with the IRA, as well as contacts with Breton, Palestinian and Italian terrorists. The IRA connection dates back to 1971 when the two organizations traded revolvers for explosives training. Since then they have engaged in joint gun-running operations. The IRA allegedly supplied the explosives for the assassination of Carrero Blanco.

Revolutionary-Leftists in Italy (1977-)

The current wave of Italian terrorism began in late 1969. Initially it was the extreme right that was responsible for most terrorist acts and for most terrorist related deaths. Sometime in the mid 1970's the situation changed in several ways.¹ The number of terrorist incidents increased, there were more assassinations, kidnappings, and shootings. Most important, violence by the extreme right declined and violence by the extreme left increased. It is this second wave of revolutionary leftist terrorism that will be examined.

Several factors are suggested as explaining or contributing to the emergence of leftist terrorism at this time. Italy had experienced an economic boom through the '50's and early '60's during which the country had been transformed into a modern industrial society. Massive population movements had taken place from the South to the North and from country to city. However, in the mid '60's the rate of economic growth declined and worker unrest surfaced in 1969.

Students as well as workers were affected by the economic situation. The rapid expansion of higher education from the mid '60's onwards meant that a university degree was no longer an automatic passport to a middle class occupation. A weak economy exacerbated this problem.

Economic change was accompanied by social changes so extreme as to constitute a cultural revolution. Traditional family discipline was

¹Ronchey (1979) dates the current phase from 1976 and suggests a distinction between Rightist terrorism using bombs and Leftist terrorism using revolvers and machine guns. According to Furlong "1974 is particularly apt as the dividing-point. It saw the maturity of the strategy of the BR into the objective of striking at the heart of the state... the demotion of the efforts of the neo-fascists... and ...the emergence of a variety of left-wing groups" (in Lodge, 1981).

weakened, academic structures first in the colleges and then in the high schools were challenged. From 1969 to 1975 the government enacted legislation that liberalized criminal penalties and procedures. According to Pisano (1979:40) "the birth of contemporary Italian terrorism took place in this climate of ... government weakness and permissiveness."

The "opening to the Left" by the Christian democrats and the willingness of the Communist party (PCI) to adopt a moderate non-revolutionary stance meant that militant revolutionaries had to find a new strategy. As the PCI moved toward the center, it lost control of the extreme left. The result was the emergence of groups such as Worker Power, Continuous Struggle and Proletarian Left, and a polemic over the issue of "armed struggle." From such groups and out of this debate emerged the Red Brigades, Front Line, Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP) and other revolutionary terrorist organizations.

Many Italians, not only those on the extreme left, feared that a rightist coup was imminent. Consequently some felt that the way to preempt this threat was to establish clandestine organizations which could carry out armed resistance if necessary.¹

Well over one hundred terrorist groups belonging to the extreme left have been identified. However most groups have been responsible for only a few attacks. Also it is suspected that some groups use different names both to confuse the authorities and to create the impression of a wide-spread revolutionary movement.

¹While generally agreeing on the causes Pisano (1979), Ronchey (1979) and Silj (1979) differ as to their significance. Silj emphasizes the genuine dangers of a Rightist coup, while Pisano dismisses such fears as "paranoid."

The three main groups are the Red Brigades, the Front Line and Armed Proletarian Nucleii. The Red Brigades founded by Renato Curcio developed out of the Proletarian Left and began operating in 1971. The Armed Proletarian Nucleii emerged in the aftermath of the prison riots of 1969-1974, linking together radicalized criminals and dissident members of the Continuing Struggle organization. Front Line first became active in 1976. There has been coordination between the Red Brigades and the NAP and between the Red Brigades and the Front Line. Indeed by 1978 the NAP had apparently been absorbed by the Red Brigades.

The ideology of the Italian leftist groups is variously characterized as Maoist, New Leftist, or Anarchist. They draw inspiration from several sources; from Leninism the idea of a vanguard group which would raise the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat, and from Maoism a hostility towards the revisionism of the PCI. They were communists who still believed, unlike the PCI, that a communist revolution was a realistic possibility in the near future.¹ Other influences were the Tupamaros and - particularly for the NAP - the writings of the American Black prisoners movement.²

¹This is suggested by their use of the term "Berlinguer's party" to describe the PCI, and by the choice of titles such as "Fighting Communists," "Revolutionary Communist Vanguard" or "Revolutionary Communists" for their own groups.

²One of the earliest NAP cells was called the Jackson Collective and one NAP militant was buried with a copy of George Jackson's book Blood in My Eye (Silj, 1979:130-1).

The Red Brigades are organized like a pyramid. At the lowest level are cells with four to five members. Two non-communicating but paired cells make up a brigade and the brigades in turn are grouped into columns. The first three columns were in the "Industrial Triangle," Genoa, Milan, and Turin. By 1978 there was a fourth column in Rome and possibly one in Naples. At the top of the Red Brigades there is a strategic command, made up of column commanders concerned with policy and operational strategy. Each level is "sealed" by the fact that a given unit is headed by one person who acts as a filter to the higher levels. The NAP was not so well organized, members were recruited indiscriminately and the various operational units were not compartmentalized (Pisano, 1979:81). The Front Line is made up of "fire groups" instead of columns; leadership is exercised on a situational basis, operation by operation, and each fire group operates in a different city from where its members live (Pisano, 1979:86).

Most sources agree that circa 1978 the Red Brigades had about 700 to 800 members, which suggests that all the leftist groups together numbered about 1,500-2,000. Silj estimated that there were at least 1,000 terrorists living underground and another 3-8,000 part-time guerrillas (Silj, 1979:XIX). Since then, however their strength has probably declined significantly. Hundreds of Front Line terrorists were arrested in 1980 and scores of Red Brigades members after the Dozier kidnapping.

According to Sterling (1981:216) the active terrorists are supported by a well organized network of supporters, the "Autonomous Area," involving "as many as 200,000" radicals. Others give a

lower figure. Time (5/1/78:29) suggests 10,000 sympathizers, and Silj (1979:XVI) says that "10,000 would seem to represent a reasonable estimate... of the numerical strength of Autonomia." The degree of popular sympathy for the terrorists is higher than one might expect. According to a poll in L'Espresso (1/10/1982) almost a third of the population agree that the Red Brigades are pursuing "a just end with the wrong means" and one in ten that they are "fighting for a better society." Among the young the figures were even higher. One distinctive feature of Italian terrorism is its links to criminal groups, such as the Mafia. The Mafia and the Red Brigades have carried out at least some robberies and kidnappings as joint ventures splitting the proceeds 50-50. The Italian terrorists are an important component of the international network of terrorist groups (Sterling, 1981:219-220) and there is some evidence that they received training in and arms from Czechoslovakia.¹

Only fragmentary information exists on the characteristics of Italian terrorists, and different organizations appear to recruit from different strata. Most of the historic nucleus of the Red Brigades had been captured or killed by the end of 1977. Of this group, 95% were men and the median age was 27. The socioeconomic background of the terrorists is quite varied. Furlong (in Lodge, 1981:76) says that the Red Brigades recruit mainly "from the universities, among the urban unemployed, and in the prisons." This is confirmed by a reanalysis of

¹The most recent evidence of their international connections was provided by two Red Brigades members, turned state evidence, who testified that they had received weapons from the Palestinians, New York Times (11/9/81).

the biographical data given in Pisano (1979) and Silj (1979). Of 36 terrorists 47% were manual workers, 31% were students and 18% had a criminal background.¹ However, given that most terrorists are young, and that for many being a terrorist is their primary role such occupational data must be interpreted with caution. More important than their occupational background is their political history. Most of the known Italian terrorists have at one time or another belonged to the PCI, to its youth organization or to one or more of the extra parliamentary leftist groups.

The inability of the Red Brigades to provoke a revolution in Italy led to a fierce internal debate from which two factions emerged, the "Movimentalists" and the "Militarists." The Movimentalists see the armed struggle as a spontaneous expression of the class struggle directly linked to mass needs and tensions. By contrast the Militarists view themselves as a vanguard, which is autonomous from the working class. Leaders of the Movimentalist faction linked Red Brigade actions to popular grievances by demanding, for example, that homeless Neapolitans be housed in exchange for the return of kidnap victim Cirillo. The Dozier kidnapping was carried out by Senzani, one of the leaders of the Militarist faction. The more adventurous strategy of the Militarist faction provoked a massive police crackdown in the aftermath of the Dozier kidnapping, with large numbers of terrorists being captured. Even if not mortally wounded, the Red Brigades have certainly been weakened.

¹ Professor Salierno of Padova claims that in 1981 the Red Brigades recruited an even higher proportion of working class members, which he attributes to the growth in unemployment, Sunday Times (1/3/82).

Summary

The characteristics of the five cases are shown in Table 1.

The information can be summarized as follows:

(1.) Each of the five terrorist groups had several hundred members when at maximum strength. Relative to the population of the society, the IRA in Northern Ireland and the Tupamaros in Uruguay were the strongest.

(2.) In all five cases, the typical terrorist was a male in his twenties.

(3.) The occupational background of the terrorists is highly variable between countries. Most EOKA and IRA terrorists are working class, but in the case of ETA and the Tupamaros the working class is underrepresented, and the middle class and students overrepresented.

(4.) In three cases, Cyprus, Northern Ireland and the Basque provinces of Spain, terrorism is associated with demands for "national" self-determination by an ethnic group. In Uruguay and Italy the terrorists' goal is a socialist revolution within the existing nation-state.

(5.) Nationalist terrorists have a much higher degree of popular support than do Revolutionary terrorists.

(6.) The Tupamaros and EOKA received very little support from outside the country. The IRA, ETA and the various Italian leftists have had much more support from the Soviet bloc and from the "international terrorist network." The IRA has also received significant funding from Irish-Americans.

TABLE 1 SUMMARY INFORMATION ON FIVE TERRORIST GROUPS

Country	Cyprus	N. Ireland	Spain	Uruguay	Italy
Main Groups	EOKA	IRA	ETA	Tupamaros	Red Brigades/Frontline
Period Active	1955-9	1970-	1975-	1968-	1977-
Type/Goals	Nationalist	Nationalist	Nationalist	Revolutionary	Revolutionary
Maximum Strength	300	2,000	700	300	1,500
Terrorists:Population	1:1900	1:800	1:3600	1:800	1:3300
Terrorist Characteristics					
Average Age	21	20	26	27	27
% Male	98	95	91	75	95
Occupational ¹ Background	W/F	W	M/W/S	M/W/S	W/S/C
Popular Support ²	Majority of Greek Cypriots	Majority of Catholics	Majority of Basques	15-20%	5-10%
External Support	Some arms and training from Greece	Major funding from Irish Ameri- cans. Arms and training from Soviet bloc/other terrorist groups	Arms and training from Soviet bloc/ other terrorist groups	Trivial	Arms and training from Soviet bloc/ other terrorist groups

Notes: 1. W=Working Class, M=Middle Class, F=Farmers, S=Student, C=Criminal
Arranged in order of importance excluding categories of less than 10%.

2. Defined as those agreeing with goals of terrorists and willing to provide passive support (such as not reporting terrorist activities to police) without coercion. Refers to period of maximum popularity. For data on which these estimates are based see text.

Chapter 2

MEASURING TERRORISM

In constructing measures of terrorist activity it is desirable to keep in mind the nature of the campaign as well as the data that are available. The three campaigns waged by nationalist groups (EOKA, IRA and ETA) have certain obvious similarities; all three have generated a high number of fatalities and their main targets have been the military and the police. In Cyprus there were 1,144 attacks on the British Army during the emergency, and in Northern Ireland 15,146 incidents in which the security forces were fired upon. Campaign characteristics are related to nationalist perceptions of their situation. They see their territory as occupied by foreigners and their strategy is to raise the cost of this occupation until the foreigners withdraw. Soldiers and policemen are not only symbols of foreign domination, they are also easy targets and killing them is a simple way of raising costs to the occu-

pying power.¹ Most security force deaths resulted from sniping, explosions or assassinations of off-duty and unarmed personnel. Only very rarely can encounters between the security forces and the terrorists be properly described as battles. As table 2 shows, members of the security forces make up the largest single category of terrorist victims in all three cases.

TABLE 2 FATALITIES CAUSED BY NATIONALIST TERRORISTS

	By <u>EOKA</u>	By <u>IRA</u>	By <u>ETA</u>
Total Killings	394	1029	280
/1000 population	.69	.69	.11
<u>Victim Type (%)</u>			
Security Forces	40	55	55
Spies and informers	36	2	8
Government officials/ politicians	8	1	10
Other civilians selected for personal characteristics	3	7	7
Civilian victims selected on basis of ethnic identity or accidental victims	13	35	20

¹Maria Maguire who associated with the Provisional IRA leadership describes well the tactical advantage of the terrorists over the security forces. "The British soldiers were very vulnerable, as are any uniformed force in a guerrilla war. Our Volunteers could recognise them; whereas they could never be sure who amongst the civilians around them was friend, who enemy... But in areas like Andersonstown, they were very clear targets, a sniper could fire a single shot with a modern weapon like an SLR or an MI carbine from a bedroom window a hundred yards away or more and then take cover and withdraw, or even stand up above a garden wall and pick off the last man in a patrol. A Volunteer once told me it was like aiming at the moving ducks in a fairground shooting gallery" (1973:75).

Some civilians are murdered because, as government officials or politicians, they are associated with the regime. Other victims deliberately selected by the terrorists include informers and people associated with another terrorist faction. EOKA's campaign was unusual in that the number of Greek Cypriots executed as informers almost equaled the number of security forces killed by EOKA. The remaining civilian deaths are of relevance in evaluating the claim by terrorist groups to be "guerrillas" or "partisans." Such a claim requires that they do not deliberately kill innocent non-combatants and try to minimize accidental deaths. According to this criterion ETA has the best claim to guerrilla status. EOKA killed very few people accidentally but deliberately murdered a significant number of British civilians who were clearly non-combatants.¹ The IRA is guilty of some sectarian killings of Protestants and large numbers of civilians have died in explosions set by them. The use of explosives by the IRA differs from that of EOKA or ETA in that most of their targets are non-military. By bombing shops, restaurants, offices, etc. and not giving adequate warning, a high civilian fatality rate is almost unavoidable. Given the high fatality rate in these cases it seems appropriate to use deaths as one measure of terrorist activity. In addition for Northern Ireland statistics on explosions and attacks on the security forces are available.

¹In one notorious incident two British women were shot in the back while shopping with their children (Foley and Scobie, 1975:147) Crawshaw (1978:205) charges that many times EOKA, if unable to kill informers, executed their relatives.

The campaigns of the Tupamaros and the Italian Leftists differ from those of nationalist groups in two ways. First, far fewer people were killed; 84 in Italy, only 26 in Uruguay. The Tupamaros' operations are given below in Table 3, and it is clear most were not intended to result in death or physical injury. The Red Brigades, and other Italian groups do attack individuals but the goal is usually to wound rather than to kill; for example, the practice of shooting people in the leg.

TABLE 3 TUPAMARO ACTIONS BY TYPE (%)

Robberies for money	30.3
Robberies for weapons	9.2
Robberies for other	1.7
Sabotage	30.3
Propaganda	10.5
Kidnappings	2.1
Attacks on Police/Army	10.9
Attacks on civilians	3.8
Attacks on other	<u>1.2</u>
	100.0

The second difference lies in the targets. For leftists, unlike nationalists, the police and military are not initially the main targets. Instead they attack businessmen, judges, conservative politicians and

other groups linked to the establishment (see Table 4). The security forces are killed because they get in the way of the terrorists attacking other targets, or because they are specifically engaged in antiterrorist activities.¹

TABLE 4 VICTIMS OF LEFTIST TERRORISM IN ITALY (1977-81)

	<u>%</u>
Corporate executives/business	31.3
Police and Prison service officers	30.9
Judges and lawyers	6.4
Christian Democratic Politicians	10.2
Rightist Politicians	1.9
Communist and Socialist Politicians	2.6
Journalists	3.8
Professors	1.9
Foreign Military	0.4
No political/establishment links or no information	<u>10.6</u>
	100.0

Note: Total number of victims (killed, wounded or kidnapped) was 265.

¹ The selectivity of the Tupamaros and of the Red Brigades is often noted. According to Porzecanski (1973:48) "Tupamaro tactics...were undertaken with great marksmanship, avoided the use of indiscriminate violence and concentrated on delivering one individualized blow after another." Moss (1972:230) says the Tupamaros "remained very selective in their use of terror... Until late in 1969, the guerrillas avoided bloodshed, and their only victims were gunned down when police closed in and forced them to fight a street battle." An Italian official notes "Since the Red Brigades normally claim credit for their violent acts with special messages, the singling out of the victim and the personalization of the attack are very important for this group; it is based on its ability to select appropriate victims that the group measures its operational efficiency and the psychological and political efficiency of its attack" (Anonymous, 1978:162).

While all the terrorist campaigns, whether nationalist or leftist, were primarily directed at domestic targets, there was a tendency for the leftist groups to define their enemies in more international terms. In Uruguay, 16% of the bombings and robberies were directed against diplomatic facilities or foreign businesses. The United States was a particular target with 33 attacks on American businesses and 4 bombings of American Embassy property. Ten percent of the attacks on persons were against foreigners, including the kidnapping of the British consul, the Brazilian consul, an Argentinian businessman, and an American agricultural expert. The most notorious incident was the kidnapping and killing of Dan Mitrione, a USAID official. In Italy, my sources record 14 bombings of American businesses and diplomatic facilities, and 4 attacks on other foreign-owned property. This is in addition to 147 attacks on German establishments in 1977 (Pisano, 1979:84). Prior to the kidnapping of General Dozier in December, 1981 only Italians were victims, but two shootings were of Italian executives of foreign corporations (Chemical Bank of New York and the Swiss-owned Icmesa Chemical Company). The attractiveness of foreign targets to the Tupamaros and the Red Brigade is explained by ideological considerations. The Tupamaros saw Latin America as dominated by Western capitalism, and to the Red Brigades Italy was part of an "Imperialist State of the Multinationals" (Pisano, 1979:70). Revolutionary leftists are likely to see their campaign as part of a global struggle, and to act in solidarity with revo-

lutionary groups in other countries. Hence the wave of attacks on West German targets in Italy, following the Mogadiscu and Stammheim affairs.

Nationalist terrorists are more parochial than leftists and less likely to attack foreign targets. The handful of cases in which foreigners were victims of EOKA, IRA or ETA terrorism were usually accidents. In Cyprus, in three separate incidents one American was killed and seven wounded. After an explosion which killed the U.S. vice consul and injured three other Americans, Grivas apologized publicly and pointed out that it was difficult to distinguish Americans from British (Grivas, 1964:72-3). In Northern Ireland, seven foreigners have died as a result of terrorist violence; three (a Dutchman, a Nigerian and an Indian) were accidental victims of explosions or crossfire. Other victims include a Pakistani employee of the British Army who was shot by the IRA as a spy, an "asian" murdered by Protestant terrorists because they thought he was a member of the IRA, and a German whose killer is unknown. The only real act of "international terrorism" carried out by the IRA was the 1973 kidnap-murder of Herr Niedermayer, Managing Director of Grundig and acting West German consul in Belfast. While foreign-owned businesses have been bombed as part of the IRA's strategy of disrupting the economy, there is no sign that they have been singled out. ETA kidnapped the West German consul, in December 1970, and attempted to kidnap the French consul in May, 1971. A few foreign tourists were injured when ETA set off bombs in coastal resorts in the Summer of 1979.

Since leftist terrorism has resulted in far fewer deaths than nationalist terrorism, deaths from terrorism would be an inappropriate indicator. Instead for Italy the measure of terrorist activity is the sum of those killed and wounded in terrorist attacks plus other shooting incidents, kidnapping and robberies. For Uruguay the measure is the sum of terrorist incidents of all types. Figures 2-8 shows the monthly fluctuations in terrorist violence in each country.

1955 — 1958






FIGURE 3 **TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN URUGUAY** (all actions by Tupamaros)
1968 — 1972








FIGURE 5-2 TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND (number killed by IRA)
1970 — 1981

18




FIGURE 6-1 TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND (explosions)
1970 — 1981




FIGURE 6-2 TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND (explosions)
1970 — 1981








FIGURE 7 TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN SPAIN (number killed by ETA)
1975 — 1981







Chapter 3

POLICIES AGAINST TERRORISM

Anti-terrorist policies can be classified into two types; those directed at the terrorists themselves and those directed against their supporters in the general population. The first policy examined is aimed at the terrorists, the next three policies against their supporters. The target of the last two policies is the terrorists, but their impact falls harshly on the general population. The six policies are:

- (1.) Ceasefires and Negotiations with the Terrorists
- (2.) Improving Economic Conditions
- (3.) Making Reforms
- (4.) Collective Punishments
- (5.) Emergency Powers, and other anti-terrorist legislation
- (6.) The use of the security forces.

Ceasefires and Negotiations with the Terrorists

Attempting to negotiate a settlement with the terrorists directly is tempting to politicians in a democratic society for several reasons.

First the cultural ethos of such societies emphasizes the desirability of resolving conflicts through the give and take of negotiations rather than through the use of force. Second, terrorist leaders are the only group in society who can, if they so choose, stop terrorism with a simple command. Third, negotiations are usually accompanied by a truce, which makes them intrinsically desirable.¹ Since they are usually linked, ceasefires and negotiations will be considered together in this analysis. The first matter considered is the reduction in violence during the ceasefire itself. Since ceasefires usually break down due to terrorist intransigence, we next examine the level at which violence resumes to see whether truces benefit the terrorists.

Ceasefires, whether mutually agreed to or declared unilaterally by the terrorists, are fairly common. There were three in Cyprus, two in Uruguay, and so far there have been four in Northern Ireland and three in Spain. None has occurred in Italy.²

Usually ceasefires result in a significant decline in the level of violence. To measure the effect of a ceasefire, a simple comparison is made with the period of the same duration immediately preceding the

¹Crawshaw notes that when EOKA suspended operations in August 1956 and called for negotiations with Makarios, "it was difficult for the Cyprus authorities to continue full-scale operations...faced with a gesture...certain to be seen as conciliatory by the world outside" (1978: 188-9). To the Conservative government, which began talks with the Provisional IRA in January 1975, "a ceasefire was an improvement over bombs in the underground" (Bell, 1979:416).

²The number would be even higher if ceasefires by the smaller groups such as the Official IRA or ETA politico-militar were included.

ceasefire.¹ Table 5 shows violence during the ceasefire as a percentage of violence during the pre-ceasefire period for all twelve ceasefires. In half the cases there was no violence during the ceasefire, and in only one case did the amount of violence increase. An alternative way of expressing the impact of ceasefires is to estimate the number of people who would have been killed during the ceasefire, if the rate of violence had persisted at the pre-truce level. Such measurements suggest that the truces in Cyprus saved 215 lives, and those in Spain 18. The three "good" truces in Northern Ireland resulted in 14 lives being saved.

These measures still understate the ability of the terrorist to turn violence on or off. Often, truces are defined in a restricted way. During the second and third EOKA truces, the execution of Greek Cypriot traitors continued, and there were frequent clashes with the Turks. The February 1975 truce between the Provisional IRA and the British army was limited to those two organizations and the Provisionals continued to attack loyalists and members of other republican groups. If the impact of these truces is recalculated in terms of the reduction in security force fatalities alone, all three show a significant decline (see second column of Table 5). The Cyprus truces may have saved the lives of 85 members of the security forces and the Northern Irish truce 23. However, it is difficult to justify a "truce" which merely results in a redirection of terrorist attacks, as was the case in Northern Ireland during 1975.²

¹For example, if the ceasefire lasted one month we examined the violence in the month preceding the ceasefire; if the ceasefire was for two months we looked at the violence for the two previous months.

²During the truce the IRA killed 24 members of the security forces and 106 civilians. In the comparable period preceding the truce, the numbers were 47 and 44.

TABLE 5 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CEASEFIRES IN REDUCING TERRORIST VIOLENCE

	Violence during ceasefire as % of violence during period preceding ceasefire	
	All Violence	Violence Against Security Forces ¹
<u>EOKA ceasefires in Cyprus</u>		
8/16/56-8/27/56	0.0	
3/14/57-3/2/58	5.3	0.0
8/4/58-9/1/58	50.0	22.2
<u>Tupamaro ceasefires in Uruguay</u>		
9/6/71-1/6/72	17.8	
6/1/72-7/25/72	0.0	
<u>Provisional IRA ceasefires in Northern Ireland</u>		
6/26/72-7/9/72	38.4	
12/22/74-1/16/75	0.0	
2/10/75-2/12/76	145.0	51.1
12/23/76-12/28/76	0.0	
<u>ETA-m ceasefires in Spain</u>		
10/31/75-11/25/75	0.0	
10/4/79-10/25/79	60.0	
2/21/80-3/9/80	0.0	
Average all ceasefires	26.4	

¹Only calculated for ceasefires restricted to security forces.

Before responding to a ceasefire offer, the authorities should consider not only the extent to which terrorist violence will continue against different targets, but also the ability of the terrorist leadership to control its followers and the response of other terrorist groups. Some evidence suggests that when one terrorist group observes a ceasefire, other terrorist groups increase their activity and that the longer a truce persists the more likely is a splintering off by militants.¹ However, our examination shows that in the short run at least ceasefires are usually effective in reducing terrorist activity.

Discussions between governments and terrorists rarely lead to conflict resolution.² Terrorist demands are radical and non-negotiable. Nationalist groups want changes in national sovereignty, revolutionary groups want a revolution. Since the terrorists are unwilling to settle for anything less, it is impossible for any government to reach a settlement with them, short of complete capitulation to their demands. Thus almost inevitably the talks end in failure and the ceasefire breaks down. The question that must next be discussed is what the consequences of the ceasefire are after it is over. Does the violence merely resume at the old level or does one side gain from the truce?

¹The Official IRA observed a truce since May 1972 but frustrated militants broke away in December 1974 to form the Irish National Liberation Army, which promptly launched its own campaign against the British.

²In Cyprus a compromise settlement was reached by negotiations between the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey. However, this settlement was possible only because of the division in Cyprus between political and military leadership roles. Makarios, the political leader, feared partition if he did not accept the agreements and abandon enosis. Grivas makes it clear that EOKA "would never have accepted the terms" if they had been at the London meetings. He only acquiesced in what he viewed as a betrayal, because not to do so would have led to "national division in which...we would lose all." (Grivas, 1965:179-203, 212-217)

Some writers argue that ceasefires are dangerous because they allow the terrorists to rebuild their military strength, as well as to enhance their public image. Crawshaw claims that in Cyprus prior to the March 1957 truce "EOKA's defeat seemed imminent" and that "the guerrillas were on the verge of collapse." However, after the year-long truce "the rebel movement which faced the administration in 1958 was stronger and even more fanatical than the earlier guerrilla groups which had been largely subdued under Harding. The long respite of the ceasefire had enabled EOKA to build up its military strength" (Crawshaw, 1978:234, 236, 279). There were also significant consequences in terms of public opinion. "EOKA rapidly recovered its lost prestige by being the first in the field to offer a ceasefire... No greater encouragement could have been given to the belief that the Cyprus question could still be settled on the lines demanded by the extremists. Cypriots who ... had begun to cooperate with the British, were baffled and afraid, and information which until then had been readily forthcoming, ceased to reach the security forces" (Crawshaw, 1978:236).

An almost identical argument is made by Wilkinson concerning the February 1975 truce in Northern Ireland. He claims that "with the benefit of hindsight it is now possible to see that the army had practically beaten the Provisional IRA by December 1974. Hence the Provos Christmas truce and their so-called ceasefire proffered in January 1975 were declared from a position of desperate weakness. They had been decimated as a military force and they urgently needed time to lick their wounds, recruit and train new members, await the release of their key men from internment and regroup" (Wilkinson, 1977:155).

As a result of the agreement between the British government and the Provisional IRA, the security forces were restricted in several ways; their intelligence gathering activities were restricted, internment was ended and the government imposed constraints on their ability to open fire. Furthermore, in order to monitor the ceasefire, eight "incident centers" run by the Provisional IRA were set up in Catholic areas. These played a crucial local role, bypassing the elected politicians who felt that "local control had been turned over to the Provos" (Bell, 1979:420).

The arguments made by Crawshaw and Wilkinson seem applicable only to the longer truces. In the eight truces which lasted less than a month, the violence level was not noticeably affected by the truce. If we compare the violence in the month before the truce to the violence in the month after the truce, there was a rise in four cases and a decline in the other four. For all cases together the average number of fatalities in the month preceeding the truce was 12.9, and in the month following the truce 11.5.¹ In the year-long truces, one in Cyprus and one in Northern Ireland, the terrorists did appear to benefit from the truce. In both cases there was a sharp decline in terrorist activity in the three to four month period immediately preceding the truce. EOKA killings fell from 34 in November 1956 to 8 in February 1957. In Northern Ireland, comparing November 1974 with January 1975, explosions fell from 49 to 24, attacks on the security forces from 123 to 37 and IRA killings from 15 to 4. This downward trend seems to have


¹The two ceasefires in Uruguay, one lasting four months the other two months, had no lasting impact. They are not included in these calculations because fatalities were not used as the measure of violence in Uruguay.

begun about a year before the truce in the case of Northern Ireland. Figure 9 shows the violence levels before and after the truces, for the year before the truce and the year after the truce for Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Statistics are given for each three month period. In Northern Ireland IRA killings and explosions resumed at a higher level than before the truce, and in Cyprus the violence shows a marked upward trend.

Thus our analysis suggests that negotiating a truce with the terrorists is a short-sighted policy. Negotiations will not lead to resolution of the conflict, and if the ceasefire is protracted the terrorists rather than the government are the gainers.

FIGURE 9

VIOLENCE BEFORE AND AFTER LONG TRUCES IN CYPRUS AND NORTHERN IRELAND



NOTES: Violence measured for three-month periods for the year before and after the Northern Irish truce of February 1975 — February 1976 and the Cyprus truce of March 1957 — March 1958. The ending of the Cyprus campaign in December 1958 means that there are only three post-truce quarters.

Economic Conditions

There is a considerable body of literature to suggest that economic conditions are an important factor in social conflict. Conflict is more frequent and severe in poor societies than rich ones, a situation plausibly attributed to the struggle for scarce resources (Lipset, 1960; Gurr, 1970). Within a given society the well-to-do are more likely than the poor to be satisfied with and support the status quo. Adverse economic conditions have been linked to outbreaks of violence in several countries (Tilly, 1975; Rude, 1964).

In three of the five cases we examine, a plausible argument can be made that bad economic conditions are at the root of the trouble. Northern Ireland has a low standard of living and a high unemployment rate, and the IRA and their active supporters are from the most economically deprived section of the society. Boyle argues that working class Catholics are relatively disadvantaged in terms of employment, income and housing. This situation produced a "strong feeling of continuing deprivation and discrimination...and creates a fertile environment for continuing recruitment by the IRA" (1980:12-13). In Uruguay and Italy the growth of terrorism occurred during a period of economic decline, when both unemployment and the inflation rate rose steeply. Although neither the Tupamaros nor the Italian terrorists were drawn to any significant extent from the ranks of the poorest class, they attracted considerable support from the educated middle class whose career prospects were diminished by the stagnant economy.

However, the appeal of EOKA in Cyprus was manifestly free of any economic appeals. Indeed, economic conditions were such that one

Enosist slogan was "better poor with Mother Greece than rich with Stepmother England" (Markides, 1977:17). It is also difficult to argue that the Basques were economically deprived since the region is the richest in Spain, and within the Basque provinces, ethnic Basques are better off than non-Basques. A further point against the economic deprivation argument in the case of ETA is that the middle class was over represented in their ranks and there were very few unemployed ETA members.

In only one of the five cases, Northern Ireland, was there any significant attempt to ameliorate economic conditions. Boyle notes that in addition to a variety of anti-discrimination policies the UK government "made strenuous efforts to remedy the situation" by creating new jobs in the areas of highest unemployment. The level of public spending in Northern Ireland has grown much more rapidly than in other parts of the United Kingdom (Boyle, 1980:9-12).¹

While it is difficult to show that particular economic policies are responsible for the state of the economy, it is comparatively easy to measure the effect of the economic conditions themselves on the level of violence. The latter type of analysis will suggest whether it is worthwhile trying to improve economic conditions in order to reduce terrorism. Three economic indicators, unemployment, the cost of living,

¹Excluding any military component, the payments by the United Kingdom to Northern Ireland, over and above the province's own tax revenues, rose from £ 52 million in 1966 to £ 313 million in 1974 (Utley, 1975:154). Holland (1981:196) puts the current subvention at £ 1.5 billion, of which military costs constitute about one-third

and income were collected, if available on a monthly basis, for all five cases. Unemployment data exist for all five, cost of living data for all except Northern Ireland, and income data only for Uruguay and Spain.

First we examine the correlation between violence levels and economic conditions for the same months. The Pearson correlation coefficients are shown below in column one of Table 6, with significant correlations starred.² Second, since it might be argued that economic conditions have a delayed rather than an immediate impact, we lagged the data for one through six months, and present the strongest lagged correlations in column two of Table 6.

The results contrary to expectation show that bad economic conditions are rarely linked to terrorism. Instead we usually find either that there is no significant link or that terrorism is higher during good economic conditions. If we consider the same-month correlations between terrorism and economic conditions, the relationship is not significant in five cases, and in seven cases terrorism is linked to good economic conditions (low unemployment in Northern Ireland and Uruguay, high income and salaries in Uruguay and Spain and low consumer price index in Uruguay). Only in Spain is the expected relationship found with bad economic conditions. The lagged correlations are very similar to the same-month correlations and in only two cases do non-significant correlations become significant. In Cyprus a rise in the consumer price index is linked to a rise in terrorism five months later. In Italy a rise in the index is associated with a decline in terrorism four months later.

¹A "significant" correlation is conventionally taken to be one that has a probability of happening by chance less than one time in twenty.

TABLE 6 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE

	<u>Same Month</u>	<u>Best Lag</u>	<u>Length of Lag</u>
<u>Northern Ireland (explosions)</u>			
Unemployment	-.24*	-.27*	6 months
<u>Northern Ireland (attacks on s.f.)</u>			
Unemployment	-.28*	-.28*	1 month
<u>Northern Ireland (IRA killings)</u>			
Unemployment	-.03	-.12	5 months
<u>Uruguay (all terrorist incidents)</u>			
Unemployment	-.27*	-.24*	5 months
Real Income, Private Sector	.46*	.45*	4 months
Real Income, Public Sector	.47*	.42*	2 months
Consumer Price Index	-.43*	-.51*	6 months
<u>Cyprus (EOKA killings)</u>			
Unemployment	.06	-.03	4 months
Consumer Price Index	.14	.28*	5 months
<u>Spain (ETA killings)</u>			
Unemployment	.64*	.54*	1 month
Salaries	.33*	.58*	3 months
Consumer Price Index	.55*	.61*	1 month
<u>Italy (killings, woundings and kidnappings)</u>			
Unemployment	-.17	.10	4 months
Consumer Price Index	.06	-.28*	4 months

Note: Statistics shown are Pearsonian correlation coefficients.

Starred if significant at the $P < .05$ level. A negative sign indicates that as the value of the independent variable increases, terrorist violence declines.

It is paradoxical that the only two countries where terrorism is associated with poor economic conditions (Spain and Cyprus) are the cases where it is most difficult to argue that the conflict was rooted in economic grievances. Any relationship in these countries is probably attributable to the impact of protracted terrorism on the economy.¹

We conclude therefore that our analysis does not support the view that an ongoing terrorist campaign can be checked by improving general economic conditions. Two caveats should be entered at this point. First, while economic reforms do not reduce ongoing violence, they may prevent violence if carried out in time. Second, while general economic amelioration has no effect, improving the economic situation of particular groups (e.g. Belfast Catholics, unemployed university graduates) might be efficacious.

¹Political uncertainty and terrorism in the Basque provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya led to a massive flight of capital from the region. "Factory after factory closed down after 1975, as hundreds of industrialists...picked up and ran to escape ETA's fund raising methods: abductions, killings (and)...a steep "Revolutionary Tax" extracted on threat of death" (Sterling, 1981:181).

Making Reforms

It is a well established view that violence is a result of popular grievances, and that one way to reduce violence is to remove the grievance by making reforms. By making reforms it is hoped to win over the terrorists' supporters among the general population, thus "drying up the water" in which the terrorist fish swim. In Uruguay and Italy there was no attempt at making the kind of reforms, which could be effective in reducing support for terrorism.¹ The British promised to finance a development plan for Cyprus that would make it "the most prosperous island in the Mediterranean" but the plan was never implemented. Throughout the insurgency a number of constitutional changes were proposed by the British, all of which excluded enosis and tried to balance the conflicting interests and aspirations of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities. The outcome is well summed up by Crawshaw as follows, "by 1958 almost every constitutional formula within the range of the human intellect had been discussed time and again by the parties concerned, amended and finally rejected by at least one of them" (Crawshaw, 1978:275).

However, in both Northern Ireland and the Basque provinces the authorities acknowledged that changes had to be made in the status quo, and embarked on a significant reform program.

¹About two thirds of Italians according to a recent L'Espresso poll op cit believed that "social reforms were necessary to weaken terrorism." Bell (1978:259) says that "Italy faces not so much a terrorist problem as a need to restructure its society" and Silj (1979:XIX-XX) believes that urban terrorism will increase unless Italy moves towards "social justice and...economic and social growth." For a list of problems in Italian society see Bell (1978:237, 244) and Silj (1979:200-204). The most meaningful reforms would be to restructure the university system, and reduce unemployment among university graduates.

In Northern Ireland the Cameron Commission, set up by the British government to study the situation in the aftermath of the riots of 1968, concluded that "social and economic grievances or abuses of political power were in a very real sense an immediate and operative cause of the demonstrations and consequent disorders" (Cameron Commission, 1969:48). There is a general consensus as to the nature of the grievances. Politically a disproportionate number of Catholics was denied a vote in local government elections, and in a number of cases, local government ward boundaries were gerrymandered in favor of Protestants. Protestant councils discriminated against Catholics in the allocation of housing and jobs, Protestant firms discriminated against Catholics, which together with a development policy that largely ignored Catholic areas, resulted in high rates of Catholic unemployment (Rose, 1971; Cameron Commission, 1969).

The reforms fell into two groups; first there were the administrative changes and acts of legislation by which the government manifestly removed many of the Catholic disabilities. The Electoral Law Act abolished plural voting and introduced universal adult suffrage. The Local Government Act set up a Ward Boundaries Commission to insure that there would be no gerrymandering. A Parliamentary Commissioner was appointed to handle citizens grievances. The Housing Executive, established to take over the powers of local councils and develop a "points system" to allocate public housing fairly, began meeting in May 1971. Catholic complaints that the police force was biased against them were met by disarming the police and abolishing

the B Specials.¹ All these can be termed "civil rights reforms" since they were designed to meet the demands of the civil rights movement (NICRA).

The second set of reforms attempted by constitutional adjustments to break the Protestant monopoly of executive power. Two major acts embody this policy: first the suspension of the Northern Irish Parliament at Stormont on March 24, 1972 and its replacement by the direct rule of United Kingdom civil servants, second the Constitution Act of March 1973, which provided for a return of a form of self government to Northern Ireland. Certain legislative functions were to be returned to a Northern Ireland Assembly and executive functions were given to a Northern Ireland Executive. A novel feature of this plan was "power-sharing" between Protestants and Catholics. To end the dominant power of the all-Protestant Unionist party the act stipulated that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would not sanction an executive consisting only of a party supported by one community (Rose, 1976:29). By guaranteeing a significant role to Catholics in the Northern Irish system, it was hoped to gain their support and allegiance with a consequent reduction in Catholic violence. The power-sharing executive broke down in May 1974.² The United Kingdom

¹The B Specials were set up in 1920 as an auxiliary police force. Exclusively Protestant, they gained a reputation for anti-Catholic bigotry and were accused of attacking civil rights marchers in 1969.

²Loyalists objected to the setting up of a "Council of Ireland," which had been linked to power-sharing. By industrial action they paralyzed the province and brought about the downfall of the power-sharing executive. For a full account see Fisk (1975).

government later set up a Constitutional Convention for which elections were held on May 1, 1975. The convention having failed to agree on a system of government for the province, it was dissolved on March 5, 1976.

The Basques under the Franco regime had several grievances. They were forbidden to use their language or to manifest their identity by celebrating their national day (Aberri Eguna) or flying their national flag (the Ikurrina). They were denied political autonomy, and, like other Spaniards, lacked all democratic rights. Indeed the Basques suffered more under Franco than any other group in Spain, and constituted an altogether disproportionate share of those in prison for political offenses.

Even as Franco lay dying the situation began to change. In November 1975 a decree was issued tolerating regional languages, in December 1978 the constitution declared regional languages co-official with Spanish, and in January 1979 the teaching of the Basque language in the schools was extended. The Ikurrina was tolerated by order of the Minister of the Interior in September 1976, whereupon just under half of the municipalities in the Basque region began to fly it alongside the Spanish flag. The first legal celebration of Aberri Eguna was in 1978. By a series of amnesties in November 1975, July 1976, March 1977, and May 1977 all the Basque political prisoners were given their freedom.

Beginning in May 1976, when political associations were allowed, Spain moved steadily towards democracy; the first free elections were held in June 1977 and the new constitution came into effect on December 28, 1978. Discussions on Basque autonomy began in September 1977, the

autonomy statute was formulated in July 1979, approved by a referendum in the Basque provinces in October 1975, and finally in March 1980 elections were held for a Basque parliament.

If it is true that making reforms reduces violence, then we should find in the period after the reforms have been made a lower rate of violence than in the period prior to the reforms. This proposition is easier to formulate than to apply. There is the problem of deciding what constitutes "making a reform" when the reform process goes through several stages. The level of alienation among Northern Irish Catholics and Spanish Basques, makes it highly unlikely that promises of reform, discussions or study commissions will have much effect, so we will consider only legislation or administrative changes. The violence levels for Northern Ireland and Spain are shown relative to the chronology of reforms in Table 7 and 8.

The changes in the rate of violence are easier to understand if the political context of the reforms is taken into account. We do this by dividing the reform process into a series of phases.

In the first phase an unpopular regime with a history of repression was visibly in crisis. In Spain the crisis was brought about by the illness and death of Franco, in Northern Ireland by the civil rights campaign, the communal rioting and the arrival of the British Army. In both countries the government tried to reduce opposition by making concessions. The concessions did not reduce violence in either country; in Spain the violence held steady, in Northern Ireland it increased. The concessions were ineffective because they were viewed as tokens, and as long overdue. Even more

TABLE 7 REFORM CHRONOLOGY AND VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Reform	IRA Killings (Monthly Average)
January 1970	
January 1971 Electoral Law Act (one man-one vote, Ward Boundaries Commission)	0.5
February 1971 Housing Executive set up	4.5
May 1971 First Meeting of Housing Executive	
June 1971 Anti-Discrimination clause in Government Contracts	8.2
November 1971 Local Government Boundaries redrawn	
March 1972 Suspension of Stormont/Direct Rule	13.3
March 1973 Constitution Act	17.1
May 1973 First Local Council Elections under new system	10.0
May 1974 Fall of Power Sharing Executive	8.1
May 1975 Constitutional Convention Elections	7.3
March 1976 Dissolution of Constitutional Convention	12.6
January 1977 Fair Employment Agency established	10.2
December 1980	5.5

Note: The figures given are the monthly averages for the period ending at the date specified, and beginning at the previous date.

TABLE 8 REFORM CHRONOLOGY AND VIOLENCE IN BASQUE PROVINCES

Reform	ETA Killings (Monthly Average)
January 1975	
November 1975 Regional Languages Tolerated	1.4
June 1976 Political Parties allowed	2.0
September 1976 Ikurrina tolerated	0.3
June 1977 First elected Spanish Parliament	1.0
December 1977 Pre-autonomy status granted to Basques Provinces	0.8
February 1978 Basque General Council set up	0.5
December 1978 Final approval of Democratic Consti- tution, Regional languages coofficial with Spanish	6.4
March 1979 Elections to Spanish Parliaments, Provincial Assemblies and Municipal Elections	10.5
October 1979 Approval of Basque Autonomy Statute	5.8
March 1980 Elections to Basque Parliament	5.6
December 1981	4.8

Note: The figures given are the monthly averages for the period ending at the date specified, and beginning at the previous date.

important, they were seen as a sign of weakness. People were emboldened to demand more, once the regime failed to repress dissent forcefully, as in the past.

The first phase ended for Northern Ireland with the suspension of Stormont (in March 1972) and for Spain with the first post-Franco elections (June 1977). At this point it was clear that the old regime was finished, and a new one in the process of creation. In this second phase when new institutions were being shaped, violence reached a peak in both societies. Such violence by the terrorists was a national strategy, a means of attracting attention and ensuring that their views were not ignored.

The conclusion of this phase came in March 1973 in Northern Ireland with the Constitution Act, and in October 1979 in Spain with the approval of the Basque Autonomy Statute. In both countries, as of these dates, the moderates were granted almost every one of their demands. Northern Irish Catholics had achieved one man-one vote, a reformed system of housing allocation, the abolition of gerrymandering, and a guaranteed role in the government. The Basques had achieved cultural-linguistic freedom, democratic rights and regional autonomy. From this point on one would expect therefore a decline in violence, and such was the case in Spain. In Northern Ireland, the post-reform period lasted for just over a year until the power-sharing executive collapsed. During the post-reform period violence declined and, surprisingly, continued to decline even after the end of power-sharing. The second attempt to create a new political system through a Constitutional Convention led to another increase in terrorism. Thereafter violence declined somewhat erratically.

Reforms then do affect the level of violence but they do so in a complex fashion. Policymakers should anticipate that concessions made from a position of weakness will increase violence, and that during the creation of new institutions terrorist groups will be very active. Not until several years after the start of a reform program will the violence start to decline. Finally one should note that even after significant changes have been made in Northern Ireland and the Basque provinces, terrorism still remains a major problem in both areas.

Collective Punishments

Collective punishments, in which the civilian population of a given area is held responsible for acts of violence taking place within that area, have been used throughout history. However, collective punishment was employed in only one of the five cases considered in this analysis.

In Cyprus under the Emergency Powers (Collective Punishment) Regulations, 1955, district commissioners, with the approval of the governor, could impose four kinds of sanctions. They could:

1. order that a fine be levied on the assessable inhabitants of the area;
2. order that all or any of the shops in the area be closed during such times and under such conditions as specified;
3. order the seizure of any moveable or immovable property of any inhabitant of the area;
4. order that all or any dwelling houses in the area be closed and kept closed and unavailable for human habitation for such period or periods as specified.

These powers were used quite sparingly. Fines were levied on twelve occasions, shops were closed four times, and buildings requisitioned twice. The clause allowing the seizure of property was invoked on only one occasion. Since some locations were punished more than once and in more than one way, only fourteen areas (five towns and nine villages) experienced collective punishments. A complete listing is given in Table 9.

TABLE 9 . COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENTS IN CYPRUS

<u>Area</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Sanction</u>
Lefkoniko	4 December 1955	£ 2000
Ypsonas	4 December 1955	£ 200
Paralimni	4 December 1955	£ 1500
Nicosia	16 March 1956	Eviction
Lapithos	19 March 1956	£ 7000
Yialoussa	19 March 1956	£ 2000
Phrenaros	28 March 1956	£ 1500
Kalopsida	10 April 1956	£ 1000
Nicosia	18 April 1956	Closing/Property
Limassol	20 April 1956	Closing
Paphos	13 May 1956	£ 5500
Nicosia	25 May 1956	Eviction
Pano	28 May 1956	£ 3000
Zodhia	28 May 1956	£ 3000
Famagusta	1 June 1956	£ 40,000
Limassol	22 June 1956	£ 35,000
Nicosia	28 September 1956	Closing
Kyrenia	28 September 1956	Closing

Notes: Size of fine given in Cyprus pounds, then equivalent to just under \$3.00. "Closing" refers to shop closing, "Eviction" to the eviction of people from their homes and "Property" to property seizure.

Before testing for the deterrent effect of collective punishment, one must make certain assumptions about the distribution of violence between areas and the likely impact of collective punishment. One assumption might be that violence would be randomly distributed throughout the Greek Cypriot areas. This, however, is implausible since we know that EOKA was strong in certain areas, weak in others. According to Grivas, there were seventy-five village bands, i.e., only about one in six Greek villages had an EOKA unit. In relation to the size of the Greek population in the six major towns, EOKA's strength was greatest in Famagusta, lowest in Larnaca.¹ There was a definite tendency for certain places to have a "bad record" and indeed this was the justification for punishing them.²

Collective punishments might reduce the violence in the area which was punished, in the areas surrounding and even in Cyprus as a whole. However, it seems most plausible to assume that the greatest effect will be found in the area punished, and we shall test first for this local effect. The test is as follows: for each urban place where a collective punishment was imposed we calculate the amount of violence in that area as a percentage of total violence throughout the island, before and after the punishment. If the proportion of violence occurring in that area decreases, it suggests that collective punishments do deter. On the other hand, if the proportion remains

¹ A comparison of EOKA strength (Grivas, 1965:66-67) with the 1960 Census shows that for every 10,000 Greeks there were 31 EOKA in Famagusta and only 4 in Larnaca.

² When the village of Lefkoniko was fined, the Governor paid a personal visit and warned the inhabitants that they had "a very bad record."

constant it suggests that collective punishments are ineffectual or even, if the proportion increases, that collective punishments are counter-productive. In Table 10, the statistics are given for each of the five towns and for the nine villages in aggregate: the nine villages have been considered together because the amount of violence in any one is such a small fraction of total violence in the whole island. The table distinguishes between the impact of the first collective punishment and any subsequent ones.¹

The figures support the view that collective punishments do reduce violence in the areas which are punished the first time they are imposed. In Nicosia and Limassol the impact is most apparent while in Paphos and Kyrenia, there is only a very slight reduction. It should be noted, however, that when collective punishments are repeated they have less impact, and in some cases a rise in violence ensues. Considering all cases together the average reduction is -2.6%.

It could be argued that these reductions are spurious because when an area is punished, the terrorists become more active in adjacent areas. Thus all that a collective punishment does is to move the violence from one place to another, without reducing the overall level. To test for this the statistics were recalculated for the

¹When more than one collective punishment was imposed on a town, the "before" and "after" periods are defined as follows, when A is the beginning of the period, B the first collective punishment, C the second collective punishment and D the end of the period. The "before" periods for the first punishment runs from A to B, the "after" period from B to C. The "before" period for the second punishment runs from B to C and the "after" period from C to D.

TABLE 10 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENTS IN CYPRUS

Place	Violence in Area as % of Violence in All Cyprus		
	Before Collective Punishment	After Collective Punishment	Change
<u>First Punishment</u>			
Nicosia	40.8	17.9	-22.9
Famagusta	19.2	13.2	-6.0
Limassol	13.7	8.0	-5.7
Paphos	7.6	6.6	-1.0
Kyrenia	2.1	1.3	-0.8
Villages ¹	4.4	1.4	-3.0
<u>Subsequent Punishments</u>			
Nicosia	17.9	35.7	+17.8
Limassol	8.0	11.5	+3.5
Nicosia	35.7	32.4	-3.3
Nicosia	32.4	28.2	-4.2
Average net change =			-2.6

¹All violence in Lefkoniko, Ypsonas, Paralimni, Lapithos, Yialoussa, Phrenaros, Kalopsida, Pano and Zodhia aggregated before and after last collective punishment 28 May, 1956.

area within a ten mile radius of each town.¹ This reanalysis does suggest that some of the decline, in the areas where collective punishments were imposed, is offset by an increase in violence in the surrounding areas. Even so the effect of collective punishments is still to reduce violence overall; the average reduction being -1.7%.

These findings are unexpected since writers on both sides argue that collective punishments alienated the population and increased sympathy for the guerrillas. Grivas claims that "village after village was made to pay sums ranging from a few £100 to as much as £7,000....The British kept this practice up for six months until... they realized that the only result of their actions was to turn the people still further against them" (Grivas, 1965:68). Paget (1967: 146) concludes that "the policy of collective punishment did not succeed in turning the people away from EOKA, and was widely criticized as doing more harm than good...in that it aroused bitterness among the uncommitted element of the populace and alienated potential goodwill." Our analysis does not support these arguments; collective punishments were certainly not counterproductive. Even if the policy increased popular resentment against the British they apparently made the Greek Cypriots more reluctant to help EOKA.²

¹I used a map put out by the Cyprus National Struggle Museum, which shows the location of violent incidents during the EOKA campaign, and was able to find all but six.

²It may be that such effects are not likely to occur in other societies. Loizos' study (1975) of Greek Cypriot villagers shows them to be highly calculating and rational. Also centuries of Ottoman rule had accustomed them to the concept of communal responsibility.

Emergency Powers and Anti Terrorist Legislation

Terrorism is much more likely to occur in liberal-democratic states than under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes (Laqueur, 1977:131-148). Unfortunately democracies face the dilemma that the powers which sustain tyranny are the same emergency powers which they need to defeat terrorism. The general nature of these powers is suggested by their names, "Prompt Security Measures" in Uruguay, "Special Powers" in Northern Ireland and "States of Exception" in Spain. Emergency powers can be classified into a variety of categories and serve several functions. Typically in an emergency situation, the government controls the possession of firearms, requires civilians to carry identity cards, grants the security forces additional powers to arrest, search and curfew the population, restricts due process for those suspected of terrorist offences and limits the exercise of political rights. We discuss the rationale for each of these powers in turn, and describe the variation between the five cases.

1. Controls on firearms are normal practice in most societies and while terrorists can obtain weapons through other channels, it is common sense to make their legal acquisition as difficult as possible. In Cyprus and Uruguay firearms strict controls were imposed and many privately held weapons confiscated.¹

2. Requiring the population to carry identity cards is also standard in several countries. The value of such a system to the

¹By an order issued January 24, 1956 all private guns in Cyprus were confiscated. The previous night EOKA gunmen had gone door to door in many villages, and obtained more than 200 guns.

security forces is apparent. If an identity card is not compulsory and if "suspicion is aroused...they have no option but to arrest the citizen on suspicion of being a terrorist,...and go through the elaborate, time-consuming and irritating process of checking the citizen's identity by visiting his home and questioning his neighbours. With a system of identity cards showing photograph, fingerprints and signature, the Security Forces would be able to look at the suspect's card and know that the person questioned was, at least in all probability, who he claimed to be" (Eveleigh, 1978:126). In Italy and Spain identity cards were required even before the current outbreak of terrorism, and in Cyprus and Uruguay were introduced during the emergency. Surprisingly no civil registration system is in effect in Northern Ireland.¹

3. The security forces are allowed to arrest and question people without charge, to search houses and to impose curfews. Eveleigh's justification of these arrest powers is that "there was no other way...to find out who the people living in the terrorist-affected areas were, what they looked like or where they lived." Also those arrested could give information without it being known that they had cooperated with the security forces (Eveleigh, 1978: 120).

4. Special courts and procedures are set up to try those accused of terrorist offences. Even more serious is detention with-

¹Maguire (1973:95) notes, however, that "British soldiers at road-blocks and at chance searches always asked for your papers. It was far simpler to present a driving license than to protest that you weren't obliged to carry papers."

out trial whereby people suspected of an offence can be imprisoned indefinitely.¹ These denials of due process are usually defended on the grounds that witnesses and juries are being intimidated.² In Cyprus, according to the Annual Police Report (1956), intimidation was so great that Cypriots were "completely terrified to be seen even talking to a policeman." In Northern Ireland the Gardiner Committee was given "details of 482 instances of civilian witnesses... being too frightened to make any statement or go to court" (Eveleigh, 1978:123). One trial of Red Brigade terrorists was postponed twice because lawyers and jurors were afraid to serve on the case.³

5. Anti-terrorist laws often impose draconian penalties upon those convicted of terrorist offences in the hope that this will serve as a deterrent. In Cyprus capital punishment was introduced for the legal possession of firearms and whipping for offenders under 18; collective punishments could be levied on towns and villages. Italy, in December 1979, made life imprisonment mandatory for those convicted of killing a policeman; Spain, in August 1975, imposed the death penalty for acts causing the death of a member

¹In Italy under the Cossiga Law of 1979, suspects may be held without trial for up to eleven years if the magistrate believes there are reasonable grounds for preventive detention.

²Another argument, put forward by the Diplock Committee in Northern Ireland, was that "unduly restrictive rules of evidence" should not prevent terrorists being convicted. The Diplock courts allow confessions, and signed evidence to be used, and place the burden of proof on the defendant if weapons were found.

³In June 1976 the Red Brigade murdered Attorney General Coco and then threatened the jury with death, causing the first postponement of Curcio's trial. On April 28, 1977 the president of the Turin Bar Association was killed and 36 potential jurors asked to be excused for "medical" reasons which led to the second postponement.

of the security forces, a government official or a kidnap victim.

6. Political rights such as free speech and the right of assembly are often curtailed by the authorities, organizations banned and censorship imposed. In Uruguay six leftist parties were banned, and 41 newspapers closed (11 permanently). The press was forbidden to use the word "Tupamaro" and prohibited from publishing any news of guerrilla activity, except that supplied by the government. In Cyprus the government banned AKEL, the Communist Party, and two Church-related youth groups, OHEN and PEON. All assemblies and demonstrations were also forbidden. The Times of Cyprus was convicted and fined under a regulation prohibiting the publication of "any report or statement likely to cause alarm or despondency, or to be prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order." However, in Northern Ireland, Italy and post-Franco Spain only the most minor and selective restrictions have been imposed.¹ Indeed the political groups Sinn Fein, Republican Clubs and Herri Batasuna, which are generally regarded as fronts for the IRA and ETA are allowed to contest elections.

Table 11 presents a summary of the emergency powers employed in each country. With the possible exception of Italy, there is a basic similarity although there are minor differences in the powers,

¹Though it should be noted that several Italian editors, journalists and lawyers were arrested in early 1981 as "propagandists" or "subversives," with no charge made that they had materially assisted the terrorists (See New York Times 1/2/81, 1/4/81, 2/14/81).

TABLE 11 EMERGENCY POWERS AND ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION BY COUNTRY

	<u>Cyprus</u>	<u>Uruguay</u>	<u>N. Ireland</u>	<u>Spain</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Compulsory civilian IDs.	+	+		+	+
Weapons control	+	+	+	+	+
Questioning without charge	+	+	+	+	+
House searches without warrant	+	+	+	+	+
Curfews	+	+	+		
Special courts	+	+	+	+	
Detention without trial	+	+	+	+	+
Increased penalties	+	+	+	+	+
Right of assembly restricted	+	+	+	+	
Organizations banned	+	+	+	+	
Censorship	+	+		+	
Collective punishment	+				

+ specified power in effect at some time during the period. For details see text.

such as how long persons could be held without charge. More importantly the table does not show the length of time that the emergency powers were in effect.


In figures 10-16 an attempt has been made to suggest the severity of the powers at different periods. The severity of the emergency powers is represented by the height of the shaded areas; the higher the shaded area the more extensive the powers. In constructing the index, we took six factors into account: detention without trial,

harsh penalties for terrorist offences or sweeping definitions of what constitutes terrorism, special courts, arrest without charge, searches without a warrant, and censorship. Powers that were legally granted but never exercised were ignored. Detention without trial was scored five, everything else two. If an emergency power was exercised in a mild form and then a severe form, it was scored accordingly. The indices constructed by these procedures are somewhat arbitrary, especially for making cross-national comparisons.¹ For comparisons within a given country over time they are a reasonably valid measure of a government's repressive potential. By showing the emergency powers in effect for different periods and superimposing on this diagram the terrorist activity indicator, we are able to examine the figures to see if there is any relationship between the two.

The most obvious connection is that emergency powers are usually enacted or made more severe as a response to an increase in violence. In Cyprus the State of Emergency proclaimed November 1955 was described by the Governor as a response to the increase in terrorism (Crawshaw, 1978:147). The State of Exception in the Basque provinces in April 1975 followed a series of attacks on the Guardia Civil. The Moro kidnapping of 1978 resulted in the enactment of severe anti-terrorist measures in Italy. Similarly when violence declines, emergency powers are often relaxed or done away with altogether.

¹I asked several academics who specialize in such matters to rank the emergency powers in importance, but no consensus could be obtained, except that detention without trial was judged the most severe deprivation of civil liberties.

FIGURE 10
 EMERGENCY POWERS AND
 TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN CYPRUS
 1955 — 1958



ALL TERRORIST INCIDENTS




FIGURE 11
EMERGENCY POWERS AND
TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN URUGUAY
1968 — 1972

91
DEATHS






FIGURE 12-2
 EMERGENCY POWERS AND
 TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND
 1970 — 1981

92



EMERGENCY POWERS AND
TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND
1970 — 1981

FIGURE 13-1







FIGURE 13-2
EMERGENCY POWERS AND
TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND
1970 — 1981





NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IN WHICH SECURITY FORCES WERE FIRED UPON

FIGURE 14
EMERGENCY POWERS AND
TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND
1970 — 1981




EMERGENCY POWERS INDEX

FIGURE 15 EMERGENCY POWERS AND
TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN SPAIN
1975 — 1981



ALL TERRORIST INCIDENTS



ALL TERRORIST INCIDENTS




FIGURE 16-2
EMERGENCY POWERS AND
TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ITALY
1977 — 1981

These facts suggest that emergency powers are, at least in part, symbolic. They are a way for the authorities to signal their recognition of the severity of the situation and their determination to do something about it. By relaxing or ending a state of emergency, the authorities signal their confidence that they have regained control of the situation.

The more significant question, of course, is whether the introduction of a state of emergency, or anti-terrorist legislation, causes a decline in the level of violence. None of the five cases displays any recognizable pattern whereby violence declines following the introduction of emergency powers. Sometimes violence declines,¹ sometimes it increases,² but most times the legislation has no discernible impact. Nevertheless we should not necessarily dismiss all emergency powers as ineffective. First one could argue that some emergency powers have an effect but not others; for example, capital punishment might work but not detention without trial.³

¹Imposition of the death sentence in Cyprus in November 1956 supposedly reduced EOKA terrorism (Crawshaw, 1978:204).

²A much cited example is the dramatic upsurge in violence following the introduction of internment in Northern Ireland. Since it was used only against Catholics and against many who were not connected with the terrorists, it increased support for the IRA.

³The most effective powers may not always involve the most severe deprivations of civil liberties. Eveleigh comments that "for me, detention without trial was an unnecessarily massive erosion of liberty in Northern Ireland, and as a security operator in the Upper Falls, I would have happily traded it for compulsory identity cards" (1978:61).

This argument is difficult to test, since most anti-terrorist legislation grants the government a package of powers, and the individual effects of a particular policy cannot be isolated. Second it could be objected that emergency powers do work eventually, but that a long period of time is required before they have impact. The problem here is deciding how long a lag-time is required. Certainly in some cases, such as Northern Ireland, emergency conditions have been in effect for lengthy periods without any noticeable impact on the level of violence. A third argument seems the most persuasive. Some reductions in the civil liberties of the population are probably necessary in order for the security forces to operate effectively against terrorism but the crucial issue is how these powers are used. The existence of a law allowing detention without trial is not as important as how many people and what kinds of people are imprisoned. In the next section therefore we consider how the army, police and courts operate against terrorism within the context of the legal powers granted to them.

The Use of the Security Forces

Even the most liberal state must rely, to some extent, upon the use of repressive force against terrorism. The significant role played by the security forces in any anti-terrorist struggle is indicated by the efforts made to increase their capabilities. Such efforts take various forms: numbers are increased, training is improved, structures are reorganized.

It is difficult to give a single statistic on the size of the anti-terrorist forces at any given time since a number of different groups may be involved in the counter insurgency effort to varying degrees. Sometimes the army is the main force in the war on terrorism, as in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. In Italy the main role is played by the national police, the Carabinieri, and in Spain by a special paramilitary unit, the Guardia Civil. In Uruguay the police initially took the major role but later were supplanted by the army. Some units of the security forces for example traffic police, are not involved in counter-terrorist activity. Despite these problems it still seems worthwhile to give, in Table 12, some measure of the strength of the security forces in each of the five cases. The figures pertain to the period of maximum strength and are broken down into three categories: military, police, and part-time/reserve/auxiliary. In the final column the ratio of security force personnel of all types to the total population is calculated.

In colonies, or countries where violence is limited to certain regions, dramatic increases in security force strength are possible. In Cyprus the peace-time garrison was under 6,000 but this figure

TABLE 12 SECURITY FORCE STRENGTH

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>Auxiliaries</u>	<u>/1000 Population</u>
Uruguay	16,000	17,000 (National) 5,000 (Local)		12
Cyprus	30,000	2,400	1,900 (Special constables)	60
Northern Ireland	21,070	4,200	2,500 (Police Reserve) 9,000 (Ulster Defence Regt)	24
Spain	210,000	62,000 (Guardia Civil) 32,000 (Policia Armada) 35,000 (Local)		10
Basque Provinces ¹				36
Italy	307,000	80,000 (Carabinieri) 80,000 (Pubblica Sicurezza) 40,000 (Customs Police) 250,000 (Local)		14

Note:

1. Assumes one quarter of Spanish security forces deployed in Basque Provinces.

was doubled in less than six months when an emergency was declared. In Northern Ireland the normal strength of the British army, some 3,000, increased overnight to 5,800 when troops were deployed to halt communal rioting. In Spain when the Basques "seem restless, large numbers of extra police of all kinds are moved into the area."¹ However, the total strength of the Spanish security forces declined slightly throughout the period.² In Italy the combined strength of the Carabinieri and the Pubblica Sicurezza has remained constant at about 160,000. The Uruguayan armed forces increased from 12,000 in 1968 to 16,000 in 1970.

The counter-terrorist capabilities of the security forces can be improved by special training, by special equipment and by administrative reorganization. In Cyprus, the police force was totally unprepared to respond to a terrorist campaign and indeed was heavily penetrated by EOKA. The British response was to appoint a new commissioner of police, to send in large numbers of British police officers to take over many key positions in the force and to reorganize police procedures along British lines. A small number of Cypriot police attended training courses in the United Kingdom. The military,

¹According to an estimate given in Medhurst (1972:17) there were as many as 15,000 Guardia Civil in the area in 1970, that is one quarter of the force for 7% of Spain's population. Clark suggests that currently just under one fifth of the Guardia Civil are stationed in the region.

²The Guardia Civil numbered 62,000 in 1974 and 60,000 in 1980 while the Policia Armada declined from 32,000 to 25,000 during the same period.

police and civil administration were coordinated by establishing a central joint staff and operations center. In each of the six districts, security committees, composed of the district commissioner, the senior police officer and the military commander were set up.

In Uruguay during 1962-70 the national police received a large amount of money and training from abroad, mainly from the United States through the Agency for International Development.

"Uruguay's law enforcement agencies were granted, over the 1961-71 period, more financial aid from the United States than any other of the 18 Latin American countries for which data are available. These funds were used to assist in the purchase of modern transportation vehicles; to improve communication facilities, patrol capabilities, investigative procedures, and riot control; to hire U.S. public safety technicians and consultants, and to train Uruguayan police officers. By 1971, 113 policemen had received training in the United States and over 700 had been trained in Uruguay" (Porzecanski, 1973:53).

There was increasing coordination between Uruguay's military and police as the terrorist threat worsened. In July 1969 the police were placed under military discipline and in September 1971 the armed forces were officially put in charge of the entire anti-Tupamaro campaign. At the same date the prison system was put under the control of the military.

In Northern Ireland the anti-terrorist capabilities of the British army have been improved by the introduction of such technology as night vision, explosive-handling devices and computers. However, there is very little coordination between the security forces and the civil authorities (Eveleigh, 1978:49-51, 112-113). The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) were disarmed in October 1969 which presumably reduced their effectiveness. (They were rearmed in late 1970.)

During the transition to democracy after Franco's death, it is likely that the capabilities of the Spanish security forces were reduced by various reorganizations of the police system. High ranking officers identified with the Franco regime were replaced, the political police were abolished (October, 1976) and the Guardia Civil lost responsibility for public order in many towns (June, 1977). However, in March 1978, a specially trained and equipped anti-terrorist police force was created, while later in the year an anti-ETA strike force was set up in Bilbao. This unit was able to infiltrate ETA and inflict severe damage on the organization (Clark, 1979:369-70).

In Italy during the early 1970's, police and intelligence agencies came under considerable criticism from Communist and Socialist politicians. The public image of the security forces was damaged by the Miceli scandal in which the director of SID was accused of being involved in two right wing coup attempts.¹ Consequently, in May 1976, the police were deliberately restricted and the department of public security was reorganized so that there was less coordination between the various intelligence agencies. However, matters improved in October 1977, when an Interministerial Committee on Intelligence and Security (CIIS)

¹General Miceli was arrested in October 1974, charged with complicity in both the "Tora Tora" coup attempt by the Fascists in 1970, and the "Compass Rose" conspiracy of 1973. SID was then the major non-military counterintelligence group. The head of military counter-intelligence (SIFAR), General DeLorenzo was accused of planning a coup in 1964.

was established.¹ Parliament authorized increased expenditures (\$117,000,000) for modern police equipment, and police salaries were increased substantially.

If Italy is excluded, there are marked similarities between the counterinsurgency policies pursued by the security forces in the different countries. The policies will be discussed under three headings, routine preventive measures, mass searches and intelligence-gathering.

(1.) The most common tactics are for the security forces to guard, to patrol, and to stop and search individuals and vehicles at random. The goal of such tactics is to dominate terrorist-infiltrated areas and to inhibit the movement and activities of the terrorists. Preventive tactics of this sort probably take up the major part of the time spent by the security forces in counterinsurgency activities in all countries. They have two disadvantages; a great amount of effort must be expended with only a small likelihood that the security forces will make contact with the terrorists, and the initiative remains with the terrorists. The military disadvantage of the security forces in this kind of conflict can be seen by comparing the fatalities on each side (Table 13). With the exception of Uruguay, where the Tupamaros deliberately avoided killing soldiers and police, the number of security force fatalities is always more than double the number of terrorists killed. If accidental deaths are excluded the ratio becomes even more unfavorable to the security forces.²

¹A further coordination was effected in 1978. A central office UCIGOS was set up to oversee both non-military and military counterintelligence, now renamed SISDE and SISMI respectively.

²It might be argued that terrorist organizations hide their dead or claim that they were innocent civilians for propaganda purposes. For example, in Cyprus the British claimed to have killed ninety EOKA and Paget thinks the true figure "was almost certainly higher" (1967:141). Given the strong emphasis upon the "heroic dead" in both EOKA and IRA ideology, I find this argument implausible.

TABLE 13 TERRORIST AND SECURITY FORCE FATALITIES

	Terrorist Fatalities	Security Force Fatalities	Ratio ⁽¹⁾	Ratio ⁽²⁾
EOKA (1955-58)	68	156	2.3	3.3
Tupamaros (1962-72) ⁽³⁾	15	19	1.3	1.7
IRA (1970-80)	216	587	2.7	7.3
ETA (1975-81)	42	278	6.6	9.3
Italian Leftists (1977-81)	21	46	2.2	2.7

(1) SF Fatalities for every terrorist fatality, all types of fatalities.

(2) Excluding accidental deaths (e.g. blown up by own bomb) and terrorists killed by other terrorists.

(3) Uruguay statistics up till April 15, 1972 when "State of Internal War" proclaimed

(2.) A second set of tactics involves an attempt to catch the terrorists through extensive house searches in urban areas or sweeps of rural areas. In Uruguay during August 1970 the police conducted over 20,000 house searches while in January 1971 during "Operation Fan" in Montevideo more than 300,000 houses were searched by the army. Later the army mounted several operations in the rural departments of Tacuarembó, and Treinta y Tres. House searches were routine in Cyprus and a series of "cordon and search" operations involving thousands of soldiers took place in the Troodos mountains and other areas where EOKA guerrillas were believed to be hiding. In Northern Ireland 93,000 houses were searched during the 1970-80 period¹ and

¹Boyle (1980:28) gives a significantly higher figure for the number of houses searched during this period.

in the peak year of 1974, 19,600 houses were searched. Bell (1978: 189) characterizes the policy of the Guardia Civil in Spain as "sweeping searches, extensive arrests and bloody shoot-outs." Indiscriminate mass searches are not normal practice in Italy, but were used after both the Moro and Dozier kidnappings.

Large-scale searches and other anti-terrorist operations give the security forces the initiative against the terrorists. However, since the security forces are operating in the dark as to the identities and whereabouts of the terrorists these massive operations usually result in very meagre results at a high cost in military effort. For example, in Cyprus, one sweep lasting a week and involving 1700 troops produced only "two sacks of explosives, some rifles, pistols and daggers." Another operation two months later in January, 1956 "captured the biggest quantity of arms to date including three machine-guns, a number of bombs, hand-grenades and many small arms."¹

For Northern Ireland monthly figures are available for houses searched and for weapons found; we can therefore plot the relationship between the two. Table 14 shows how the success rate falls dramatically as the number of houses searched increases. The varying success rate reflects the selectivity of the searches. The evidence suggests that when less than 100 houses are searched, most of the searches are based on precise intelligence, but when 1,000 or more houses are searched the security forces do not know where

¹Grivas was contemptuous of the British tactics saying "one does not use a tank to catch field mice--a cat will do the job better" (1965:71). Paget (1967:168) compares the search for guerrillas to "chasing individual fish in muddy and weedy water with a very small net."

TABLE 14 HOUSE SEARCHES AND WEAPON FINDS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Number of Houses Searched (monthly)	Weapons found/ 100 houses searched
2000+	4.5
1000-1999	8.2
300-999	8.8
200-299	13.5
100-199	30.7
less than 100	55.7

the guns are stored. Large scale indiscriminate searches and sweeps are not only inefficient, they also alienate the general public.

(3.) The security forces will be most effective if they have information on the terrorists. Such intelligence can be obtained in five ways:

- (i.) Through normal criminal investigation procedures and information provided by the general public.

The lack of any personal connection between the terrorists and their victims, the cell structure of the terrorist organization and public sympathy for, or fear of, the terrorists all make this method relatively ineffective.

- (ii.) By paying informants or attempting to infiltrate the terrorists group.

In Uruguay high rewards were offered for information leading to the rescue of kidnap victims or the arrest and conviction of a Tupamaro. For the former, the rewards ranged from \$20,000 to \$90,000 while for

the latter, they were set at \$8,000. (However, according to Porzacanski (1973:62) none of these rewards were ever collected!) In Cyprus, the British relied heavily on paid informers, and most captures of EOKA terrorists resulted from information obtained in this fashion. The informers were highly-paid; one received £200, the equivalent of a years wages, for revealing the names of those in one EOKA cell. In Northern Ireland the use of paid informers is generally acknowledged, but British army officers complain that they are unable to offer potential informers legal indemnity or much money (Eveleigh, 1978:69-75). The only case where paid informers are not used is Italy. Intelligence gathering is hindered by the current regulations and according to some sources (Pisano, 1979:146-7, Blackstone, 1978:105) infiltration is forbidden.

(iii.) By the interrogation of suspects.

The difficulty here is how to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of interrogation. In every case, except Italy,¹ there is evidence that the security forces used methods that involved brutality and torture. A committee of the Uruguayan Senate concluded in June 1970 that the police routinely used electric shock, beatings, burns, and starvation to gather information. When the armed forces took over from the police in April 1972 interrogation became:

¹In Italy, there were occasional claims by the terrorists or their lawyers that suspects were beaten up, made to drink salt water, etc., but it has never been alleged that such procedures were officially sanctioned.

"much more prolonged, systematic, and sophisticated. For instance, suspected Tupamaro collaborators were said to be subjected to a routine consisting of, perhaps, two days of plantón (prolonged standing without food), a week of capucha (completely blindfolded imprisonment), and a few mornings of submarinos (immersion of the prisoner's head in water, up to the point of asphyxiation, every half hour or so). During the interrogation proper, prisoners were supposedly beaten in ways that are hard to trace - for instance, by simultaneous blows against the ears. Forms of psychological torture (such as interruption of sleep, withholding of food or drink, and threats) and drug-induced confessions were also frequently reported" (Porzecanski, 1973:68).

At least one prisoner died under torture and two others were paralyzed. In Cyprus, EOKA suspects were frequently beaten by British interrogators, and Papachrysostomou (1969) lists 9 who "died under interrogation." In Northern Ireland interrogation procedures have been criticized on several grounds. Beginning in August 1971 there were complaints, confirmed by the Compton Committee in November 1971, of what was called "interrogation in depth." For up to five days suspects were hooded, subjected to continuous monotonous noise, forced to stand against the wall supporting themselves on their hands, and deprived of food and sleep. These five techniques had been developed by the British army in earlier campaigns and were taught to the RUC by the British army. Their use in Northern Ireland was apparently authorized at the highest levels. The European Human Rights Court decided in January 1978 that the five techniques constituted "inhumane treatment" and that the United Kingdom by their use had violated article III of the European Human Rights Convention. Interrogation in depth was abandoned in March 1972 but from 1977 onwards, complaints began to be made about beatings of suspects

during interrogation. In response to these complaints, a number of reforms were made in mid-1979. However, interrogation procedures are still criticized on the grounds that suspects are interrogated for prolonged periods of time. Throughout the Franco period there were frequent reports of brutal interrogation and torture of Basque nationalists. Amnesty International concluded that in 1975 during the state of Exception in the Basque provinces, at least 295 people were tortured, some repeatedly. The methods of torture included:

"severe and systematic beatings with a variety of contusive weapons, falanga (beating on the soles of the feet), burning with cigarettes, near drownings by being submerged in water while suspended upside-down, enforced sleeplessness, and forms of psychological stress, including mock executions and sexual threats."

By 1978 torture was much reduced but there were "enough signs of its continued use to... concern the families of Basques in prison" and former ETA members were "routinely detained and interrogated, sometimes for several days" (Clark, 1979:369-371).

(iv.) By building up and maintaining, through various mass-surveillance techniques, a dossier on the whole population in those areas where the terrorists are active.

Once a picture of the area is assembled any suspicious behavior can be identified quickly. This method was used in all the Catholic districts of Northern Ireland until 1974, but has been greatly curtailed since then. This type of intelligence is obtained by a variety of means. Army sources stress the use of foot patrols and observation points, but according to Boyle (1980:26) "the principle

mechanisms were regular house searches (and)...frequent arrests and screening of the population." More recently the army has begun to use technological devices such as hidden cameras, telephone-tapping and computerized data banks, as well as undercover units. Apparently this method has been used to a significant extent only in Northern Ireland.

(v.) By reducing the sentences of terrorists in exchange for information.

The Italian government in late 1980 passed an "Informer's Bill" which empowered the government to halve the sentences of those convicted of terrorism if they cooperated with the police by providing information. This law led to the "pentito" (penitent) phenomenon. The first important pentito was Patricio Peci in 1981 and since then many captured Red Brigades members have helped the police.

For obvious reasons we do not have reliable data over time on all aspects of security force activity. Information on such sensitive matters as interrogation procedures and surveillance techniques is not available, for example. However, some data are available on military strength and non-routine actions, terrorists killed and terrorists arrested.

Security force actions could have either an immediate or a delayed impact. To see whether a particular type of action has an immediate impact we look at the correlations between terrorism and security force actions in the same month. To see whether there is a delayed effect, violence is lagged against security force activity

for one through six months. Table 15 column 1 presents the correlations for the same month. The lagged correlations are shown, in column 2, only if they are negative and only for the months which show the best correlation.

It does not appear that troop strength or military activity in itself reduces terrorism immediately and in fact military activity and terrorism are usually positively and significantly correlated. These results could be interpreted in two ways; either that military activity provokes terrorism or, more plausibly, that military activity is frequently a response to terrorism. The statistics do not suggest that military activity reduces terrorism in subsequent months. In only two cases do we find a negative lagged correlation and in neither case is the correlation significant. Killing terrorists shows a similar pattern. Terrorists get killed in the months that terrorism is high and there is no indication of a later decline.

The relationship between arrests for terrorism and terrorist violence is more encouraging, and in several cases there are significant negative correlations. For example, in Northern Ireland the higher the number of terrorists interned, the lower the level of violence. The same is true in Spain for ETA arrests, the more etarras arrested each month, the lower the level of violence. These results are interesting and suggest that terrorist losses cannot be made up easily by recruiting new members.

TABLE 15 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SECURITY FORCE ACTIVITY
AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE

	<u>Same Month</u>	<u>Best Lag</u>	<u>Length of Lag</u>
<u>Cyprus</u>			
Troop Strength	.39*		
Military Activity Index	.57*		
Curfews	.44*	-.09	(5 months)
Terrorist killed	.59*	-.15	(5 months)
Terrorist captured	.54*	-.03	(5 months)
Terrorist convicted	.32*	-.01	(5 months)
<u>Uruguay</u>			
Military Activity Index	-.03	-.11	(5 months)
Terrorist captured	-.14	-.23*	(6 months)
<u>Spain</u>			
Terrorist killed	.04	-.04	(2 months)
Terrorist arrested	-.49*	-.49*	(2 months)
<u>Italy</u>			
Terrorist killed	.17	-.22	(4 months)
Terrorist arrested	-.15	-.12	(4 months)
Terrorist in jail	-.10	-.16	(4 months)
<u>Northern Ireland (explosions)</u>			
Troop strength	.53*		
Houses searched	.41*		
Terrorists killed	.49*		
Terrorist charged	.20*		
Terrorist interned	-.58*	-.73*	(3 months)
<u>Northern Ireland (attacks on security forces)</u>			
Troop strength	.56*		
Houses searched	.36*		
Terrorist killed	.73*		
Terrorist charged	.69*		
Terrorist interned	-.81*	-.80*	(2 months)
<u>Northern Ireland (IRA killings)</u>			
Troop strength	.59*		
Houses searched	.39*		
Terrorist killed	.48*		
Terrorist charged	.29		
Terrorist interned	-.37*	-.33*	(1 month)

Note: Statistics shown are Pearsonian correlation coefficients. Lag correlations only shown if negative. Starred if significant at $P < .05$ level. A negative sign indicates that as the value of the independent variable increases, terrorist violence declines.

Chapter 4

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Although there are some marked similarities between the anti-terrorist policies employed by different countries, there are also important differences. In Cyprus and Northern Ireland, lengthy ceasefires were negotiated but elsewhere there were only brief truces. Major reforms were enacted in Northern Ireland and Spain but not in Cyprus, Uruguay nor Italy. Cyprus was the only case in which collective punishments were imposed on the civilian population.

The degree of repression varied significantly. Using two indicators, the number killed by the security forces and the number imprisoned, and relating these statistics to the size of the population we rank the five countries. Table 16 shows that in Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Uruguay, the government was much more repressive than in Italy or the Basque provinces of Spain.

TABLE 16 CROSSNATIONAL VARIATIONS IN GOVERNMENT REPRESSION

	Number killed by Security Forces	Number Imprisoned	Killings/ m. population	Prisoners/ m. population
Cyprus	115	4300	200	7491
N. Ireland	192	6400	128	4267
Uruguay	119	4700	42	1668
Basque Provinces	60	1400	26	609
Italy	24	1200	1	21

Notes: Number of imprisoned rounded to nearest hundred. Figures for Cyprus and Northern Ireland exclude Turks and Protestants. Uruguay figures include killings and imprisonments after State of Internal War proclaimed.

Economic conditions also varied between the five countries. When terrorism began, unemployment was high in Uruguay, Northern Ireland and Italy, but low in Cyprus and Spain. Unemployment rose sharply in all five cases throughout the period, most noticeably in Spain.¹ We show in summary form in Table 17 the mix of policies for each of the five cases.

Given the mix of policies and social conditions in each country, we must be careful in imputing causality. In Chapter 3, our analysis implicitly adopted a ceteris paribus assumption and looked at each policy and its impact in isolation. We need to see whether our results

¹Comparing total unemployment at the beginning and end of the period, the number increased 25% in Italy, 31% in Uruguay, 79% in Northern Ireland, 137% in Cyprus and 538% in Spain.

TABLE 17 POLICIES USED AGAINST TERRORISM BY COUNTRY

	Ceasefires Negotiated	Reforms Enacted	Collective Punishment	Repression
Cyprus	Yes, lengthy	No	Yes	Severe
Uruguay	Yes, short	No	No	Severe
N. Ireland	Yes, lengthy	Yes	No	Severe
Basque Provinces	Yes, short	Yes	No	Moderate
Italy	No	No	No	Mild

still hold up, if the fact that several policies were applied simultaneously is taken into account. To test for this we construct a set of multiple regression equations. These are presented in Appendix 2. The multiple regression analysis is compatible for the most part with our earlier assessments of policy impact. We restate our findings below, noting where the multiple regression analysis suggests a different interpretation:

(1.) Ceasefires are highly effective insofar as there is a substantial reduction in terrorism during the ceasefire period. Protracted ceasefires appear to benefit the terrorists by allowing them to reorganize, with the result that after the truce violence resumes at a higher level. Short ceasefires, lasting less than a month, have no long-term effect on the level of violence.

(2.) Terrorism is rarely associated with high unemployment or a rise in the cost of living; instead it is more frequently linked to good economic conditions. This suggests that policies of general amelioration will not be effective in reducing terrorism.

(3.) The consequences of making reforms are complex. Two phases of the process; the initial announcement of concessions and the formulation of specific policies stimulate terrorist violence. Our first analysis concluded that both in Northern Ireland and in Spain, the reform program ultimately led to a decline in terrorism. However, the multiple regression analysis suggests that for Northern Ireland this may be an unwarranted conclusion. If the simultaneous impact of the other policies employed in Northern Ireland is taken into account, reforms appear ineffective. The multiple regression analysis supports the view that the Spanish reform program reduced violence.

(4.) Collective Punishments appear to reduce violence in those areas where they were imposed. This reduction is most marked for the first punishment, but subsequent punishments have less effect or increase violence. Since only in one case, Cyprus, were collective punishments used, this finding may be fortuitous or a result of some special characteristic of Cypriot society.

(5.) States typically respond to a terrorist threat by enacting emergency legislation which deprives the population of various civil liberties. There is a basic similarity in the emergency powers adopted in the countries we consider: detention without trial, house searches without warrants, special courts for suspected terrorists, etc. No relation is discernible between the imposition of such powers and the subsequent level of terrorist activity; nor does terrorism decline as the emergency legislation is made more severe. Emergency legislation may be justified, however, both as a symbol

of government determination and as a framework wherein the security forces may operate effectively.

(6.) Security force activity, such as searching houses, is highly correlated with, and presumably a response to, terrorist violence. There is no indication from our data that security force activity in one month reduces terrorism in subsequent months. However, in Northern Ireland and Spain, there is a relationship between the number of suspected terrorists in prison and the level of violence; the more terrorists imprisoned the lower the violence level.

Our study has not identified a policy or set of policies that works in all cases;¹ both reform and repression have been tried and both have failed more times than they have succeeded. Our research findings raise a number of questions.

The lack of any relationship between general economic conditions and terrorism is an important finding. However, it might be worth examining the changing economic situation of particular social groups, such as the university-educated. It would be very interesting to see whether the emergence of the Tupamaros in Uruguay and the Red Brigades in Italy is linked to the output of university graduates and their employment opportunities.

The efficacy of collective punishment in Cyprus was an unexpected finding. Very little research has been done on this topic, although such policies have been used throughout history. An interesting comparison could be made between the Cypriot experience

¹Truces work in the short run in that violence is reduced during the ceasefire itself, but in the long run, as our analysis showed, they benefit the terrorists more than the government.

and that of the Israelis in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza strip.

Since similar policies have different results, one could try to specify the conditions under which a given policy is effective. For example, what made the Spanish reform program work that was lacking in the Northern Irish situation? Were the reforms themselves different? Did moderate Basques respond in a different way from moderate Ulster Catholics, and if so why? Imprisoning suspected etarras reduced terrorism in Spain as did interning suspected IRA men in Northern Ireland, but in Cyprus, Uruguay and Italy, terrorism did not decline as the number of arrests increased. Were the Spanish and Northern Irish police more selective in making arrests or what?

In this study a relatively new method, time-series analysis, has been used to examine the impact of various anti-terrorist policies. It is certain that terrorism will be a problem in some societies for many years and our study suggests that current remedies will be only partially successful. The most effective anti-terrorist strategy is likely to be one that uses a mix of policies appropriate to the specific national situation. Even then a quick and easy victory in the war against terrorism is unlikely.

Appendix

DATA SOURCES AND CODING PROCEDURES

The data used in this study will be discussed under three headings; terrorist violence and security force countermeasures, economic conditions, significant events.

Terrorist Violence and Security Force Countermeasures.

The Uruguay Data

The main source for Tupamaro actions and security force countermeasures is a 63 page chronology in Spanish by Mayans (1971). Mayans' history is itself derived in part from two other chronologies; that of Mercador and Vera (1969) and that found in Tricontinental (March-April, 1970). Mayans study is described by one expert on Latin American terrorism as "the most complete single volume compilation of documentary materials relating to the Tupamaro movement...the best reference work available today in English or Spanish" (Russell, 1974:73). Unfortunately Mayans' chronology only goes up to March 1971 (i.e., to the point at which a state of internal war was declared). For the two year period following, during which the Tupamaros were crushed by the army, I have used Litt and Kohl's chronology (1974) which runs from June 1962 through July 1973. Litt and Kohl's work while good is clearly not as detailed as Mayans so it was supplemented with material from Keesings.

Since information on security force activity was not given in a quantified form it was necessary to create "an index of military activity" by scoring each reported operation. Large operations and searches were scored 10 points, small operations 1 point. How well our sources report the Tupamaro violence and government countermeasures

is difficult to assess since the government exercised censorship over press reports of the conflict. One figure is known, however, and can be used to estimate the degree of coverage. According to Porzecanski (1973:28) 648 Tupamaros were captured from December 1966 through June 1972, while our count for a slightly shorter period, January 1968 to June 1972, is 606. This suggests that during this period our sources record almost all the activity. After the state of internal war was declared in April 15, 1972, the figures are less reliable, although the Uruguayan government issued statistics on the total number of terrorists arrested, weapons found, houses searched and bases discovered on May 15, June 15, and July 15, 1972.

The Cyprus Data

The data on the Cyprus conflict are extensive and can be classified as either anti or pro-EOKA. Each category by itself is partial and incomplete; put together a rich data set is created. Information on terrorist activity and security force counter-measures come from several sources. Official records are available on curfews, since each curfew order had to be approved by the governor and they are all published, along with information on place and date, in the Cyprus Gazette. Killings by EOKA are given in the official casualty list and are broken down by month, by ethnicity and by victim characteristics (soldier, police or civilian). Keesings gives a chronology of "terrorist activities together with counter-operations by the security forces." The Keesings chronology is limited to "major" incidents but is very useful because it notes their location. Some additional information can be found in Kosut (1970) and Blaxland (1971); Blaxland's account is derived in part from

regimental sources. All the above give the official British view of the insurgency and appear to be based to a large extent upon press releases by the Cyprus government or British army. Fortunately the insurgent version is well recorded in Papachrysostomou's work, "The Archives of the Fallen" (1969). As its title suggests, this is a hagiology of those who died in the liberation struggle listing the dead under six categories (e.g., EOKA killed in action, EOKA executed by the British, etc.). The date of death is given in all except two cases. In a separate publication Papachrysostomou (1977) lists every Greek Cypriot who was imprisoned, the charge, date of trial and sentence.

The statistics on British troop strength are derived from Blaxland whose account of the campaign details the movements of British army units into and out of the island. By combining the information in Blaxland with various totals for particular dates given in Grivas (1965) Foley and Scobie (1975) etc., it is possible to estimate the changes in monthly troop strength throughout the period. Since Cyprus was used as a base during the Suez crisis of November 1956, and again in mid-1958, the total number of troops on the island is not always a valid indicator of the number of troops available for anti-EOKA operations. Those units which merely passed through the island without taking part in anti-EOKA operations are not included in the monthly totals.

Information on military activity is available for non-routine operations and usually the number of troops and the area involved is

given. For example, the military announced November 7, 1955 that "a large scale operation in the mountains are east of Kyrenia...in which 1,700 troops took part" had taken place the previous week. An "index of military activity" was constructed by scoring each operation. An operation described as "large," involving more than 1,000 troops or a sweep of an extensive area such as the Troodos mountains was scored 10. An operation in a town, or involving 500-1,000 troops scored 5. A search of a village or section of a town scored 2 and a search of a particular building scored 1. All operations in a particular month were summed. Keesings and Blaxland usually report the number of terrorists and suspects captured in each operation as well as the number of weapons found. For example, an operation in October 1956 "ended after 31 EOKA terrorists had been captured, over 50 suspects held and large stores of arms seized." The distinction between "terrorists" and "suspects" is apparently based upon the evidence against them and is linked to their subsequent treatment. Terrorists were those who had a price on their head, caught committing a terrorist act, or with weapons in their possession. They were usually prosecuted in regular court. Suspected sympathizers, whose involvement in EOKA was more difficult to prove, were usually detained without trial. The total number of arrested or captured terrorists given in Keesings agrees closely with the annual Cyprus police reports (1955-1959) and Papachrysostomou (1977).

The Northern Irish Data

The fatalities associated with the Northern Irish conflict are for the most part well-documented. Our death file has been created

by combining several sources, cross checking them against one another and, if possible, finding any information still missing.

The records kept by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) are the basic source for Northern Irish fatalities. The RUC records generally give the name, age, address, where a person was killed and the cause of death (i.e., gun shot wounds, explosion, etc.). Unfortunately, the records usually do not provide information on the victim's religion, whether or not the victim was a member of a terrorist organization or by whom the person was killed. Thus, it is not possible to distinguish between, for example, people shot by the army or those assassinated by terrorists. Fortunately the files maintained by the Belfast Office of the Irish Times while based upon the RUC files, provide additional information as to the circumstances surrounding a death, the likely killer and the characteristics of the victim. The RUC/Irish Times records do not begin until October, 1971. For deaths prior to this date there are two sources. The Belfast Newsletter (September 8, 1971) lists the first 100 deaths, giving name, age, address and a brief characterization of the cause of death. A written answer to a question in the House of Commons (26 October, 1971:56-70) gives the name, age, occupation, place where killed, date and cause of death for the first 100 victims in 1971.

Deutsch and Magowan's chronology (1974) records on a daily basis all the significant events that took place in Northern Ireland from 1968 through 1973. While rarely identifying fatalities by name, the chronology mentions about 90%. A typical entry might note that "a twenty year old girl was shot dead as she waited for a bus on the Crumlin Road when shots were fired at soldiers on patrol." McKeown (1972) lists

the first 500 deaths by name and classifies them into six categories; members of the security forces, terrorists, victims of terrorist activity, those shot by the security forces, assassinations and those killed during rioting. Assassinations have been studied in great detail by Dillon and Lehane (1973). The Last Post (1976) gives the names of all the Provisional IRA who died in action through the period. Since the book is published by the National Graves Commission, a Republican organization closely linked to the Provisional IRA, the list is virtually a definitive honor roll of the Provisional IRA.

The British army keeps excellent records on violence and security force counter-measures including monthly statistics on explosions, incidents in which the security forces were fired upon, incidents in which the security forces opened fire, houses searched, weapons found, arrests for terrorist offences and army force levels. From February 1973 to December 1975 the army recorded a statistic "terrorists out of action" which refers to the total number interned at the end of each month. Beginning January 1976, when internment was ended, this was replaced by a category "charges for terrorist offences." The "weapons found" and "terrorists out of action" categories are broken down by religion.

The Spanish Data

The Spanish authorities do not release detailed information on terrorism nor on counter-insurgency operations. In order to construct a data set of ETA-related fatalities I used Equipo Cinco (1977), which lists the victims from November 1975 to February 1977, Keesings, The

London Times and The New York Times. For the period from January 1980 to present, W. Kenneth Thompson, the U. S. Consul in Bilbao, provided me with information on terrorist incidents in the Basque region, based on local newspaper reports. Professor Robert Clark, George Mason University, has published extensively on the Basques and has developed a data-set of ETA attacks, which he allowed me to examine. While Clark has collected much more information on woundings and kidnappings, our statistics on ETA killings are fairly similar overall. For the 1975-1980 period, Clark found 250 killings while I found 243. Since Clark has more information on victim characteristics and why the person was killed than I do, the information on ETA victims in Chapter 2, Table 2 is taken from one of his papers (Clark, 1981).

No official figures of the number of Basque political prisoners are available on a regular monthly basis. However, a variety of sources (Clark, 1979, Keesings, etc.) give such figures for certain dates. For example, Clark reports that there were 150 Basque prisoners in November 1976 and 103 in March 1977 while Keesings notes that the total number of political prisoners (Basque and other) was 636 in July 1976 and 170 in March 1977. Keesings also records the arrests and trials of a large number of etarras and other Basque nationalists. These data have been used to estimate the number of Basque political prisoners for each month. In making the estimates I assume 1) that Basque and non-Basques were released at the same rate under the various amnesties, 2) that the rate of increase between

two dates corresponds to the number of arrests and 3) that any remaining values can be calculated by simple interpolation.

The Italian Data

The statistics on Italian terrorism are acknowledged to be somewhat unreliable. According to one Italian expert (Anonymous, 1978:159) the statistics "include in the same category heterogenous events and events not reliably identifiable as terrorist." It should be noted that different writers give different figures as to the number of terrorist attacks in a particular year. (Thus for 1977, Konchey (1979) gives a total of 2,128 attacks, Pisano (1979) 2,127 and the PCI 2,013 in one report and 2,124 in another). Another problem is that the official statistics include acts of widely varying severity, minor acts of vandalism as well as homicides and kidnappings.

This study used data from five sources; the Ministry of the Interior, the PCI (Sezione problemi dello Stato), Pisano (1979), Galleni (1981) and various English language newspapers (New York Times, London Times, and Keesings). The most detailed information is found in the annual and semiannual reports put out by the PCI. These list those killed and wounded in terrorist attacks and give the name, victim characteristics, place of attack and group responsible. One might be suspicious of information provided by the PCI, but a comparison between the PCI data and that from other sources does not reveal any obvious bias or omissions. In 1977 for example, the PCI data yield a total of 8 killed and 36 wounded in terrorist attacks, the other sources combined 8 and 42. The PCI statistics

also agreed closely with the other sources as to the targets of the attacks. The measure of terrorist activity used in this study is the total number killed and wounded plus other shooting incidents and kidnappings reported in any of the above sources.

The New York Times, London Times, Keesings and Pisano are the source for terrorist captures and arrests. Figures of the total number of terrorists in jail are given irregularly and are usually broken down by organization (Red Brigade, Front Line, etc). Between these dates I assumed that changes in the jail population corresponded to the rate of arrests.

Economic Conditions

The best single source on economic conditions is the United Nations' "Monthly Bulletin of Statistics" which was used to obtain unemployment and cost of living data for Spain and Italy, and cost of living data for Uruguay. Unfortunately, the most recent publication only gives statistics for the first months of 1981. The Northern Irish unemployment statistics up to September 1977 are from the Northern Ireland Department of Finance, "Digest of Statistics": For the period since then the figures were provided by the Department of Manpower Services, Belfast. Uruguay was one of the most economically developed and socially progressive societies in Latin America, and a wealth of information on economic conditions is available in the publications of the Instituto de Estudios Politicos (1965), the Instituto de Economia (1973) and Banco de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay (1967). Statistics on unemployment were supplied privately by the Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos. The annual

publications of the Department of Labour and the Financial Secretary's Office were the source for unemployment and cost of living data for Cyprus. When the base year for the index changed, I recalculated the figures to make the series consistent. For gaps of one or two months, I estimated the missing values by simple interpolation. The reader should note that the Spanish data are for the whole country not just the Basque provinces.

Significant Events

For information on truces, emergency powers, anti-terrorist legislation, reforms and other significant events my main source was Keesings. In addition for Cyprus, I used Crawshaw (1978), for Uruguay, Mayans (1971) Litt and Kohl (1974) and Porzecanski (1973) for Northern Ireland, Rose (1976) Darby (1976) Boyle (1975, 1980) Deutsch and Magowan (1974) Wilkinson (1977) and Holland (1981), for Spain, Clark (1979) and for Italy, Pisano (1979) and Bell (1978). I would like to record my debt to Professor Clark of George Mason University for helping me fill in various lacunae in the Spanish data.

If there were contradictions between different sources the more detailed account was used. For example, Porzecanski (1973:59) says that one Tupamaro truce began September 6, 1971 and "lasted for five months" (i.e., it presumably ended in February, 1972). However, Keesings describes the truce as ending on January 6, 1972 when "the Tupamaros took over a radio station and announced the end of the ceasefire," so the latter, more precise, source was used.

Appendix 2
Multiple Regression Analysis

To see if any different relationships would appear if we considered the simultaneous effect of several policies, we carried out a multiple regression analysis. The results are presented in this appendix. Seven equations, three for Northern Ireland and one for each of the other cases, are shown.

In addition to selected economic and security force variables, dummy variables for truces and reforms were entered into the equations. Certain variables, such as internment in Northern Ireland, could not be included because data were missing for too many months. F values significant at the .05 level are starred.

***** MULTIPLE REGRES

133

DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. VAR03 EOKA killings

VARIABLE(S) ENTERED ON STEP NUMBER 1..
VAR12 EOKA captured
VAR04 Consumer Price Index
VAR05 Unemployment
VAR06 Curfews
VAR09 EOKA killed
VAR11 Military Activity Index

MULTIPLE R .71929
R SQUARE .51738
ADJUSTED R SQUARE .44117
STANDARD ERROR 6.80156
F 6.79*

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
REGRESSION 6.
RESIDUAL 38.

----- VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION -----

VARIABLE	R	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
VAR12	.1285165+000	.12401	.17362	.546
VAR04	-.5577922-003	-.00406	.01856	.001
VAR05	.7872743-003	.06252	.00177	.198
VAR06	.3295056-002	.01281	.04524	.005
VAR09	.1433331+001	.37794	.69059	4.308 *
VAR11	.5210208+000	.43542	.18436	7.987 *
(CONSTANT)	.2288186+001			

ALL VARIABLES ARE IN THE EQUATION

STATISTICS WHICH CANNOT BE COMPUTED ARE PRINTED AS ALL NINES.
SPSS STATISTICAL SYSTEM

FILE EOKA (CREATION DATE = 05/17/82)

***** MULTIPLE REGRES

***** MULTIPLE REGRESSION

134

DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. VAR03 All Terrorist Incidents

VARIABLE(S) ENTERED ON STEP NUMBER 1.:
 VAR10 Terrorists captured
 VAR05 Public Sector Incomes
 VAR07 Unemployment
 VAR08 Truces
 VAR09 Military Activity Index

MULTIPLE R	.56705	ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE	DF
R SQUARE	.32154	REGRESSION	5.
ADJUSTED R SQUARE	.24616	RESIDUAL	45.
STANDARD ERROR	4.41380		
F	4.27*		

----- VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION -----

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
VAR10	.9482627-002	.07988	.03037	.097
VAR05	.2392828-001	.43048	.00742	10.395
VAR07	-.5151572-001	-.20024	.03233	2.540
VAR08	-.5968260+001	-.38202	2.25830	6.984
VAR09	.9805640-002	.02527	.08781	.012
(CONSTANT)	-.1031371+002			

ALL VARIABLES ARE IN THE EQUATION

STATISTICS WHICH CANNOT BE COMPUTED ARE PRINTED AS ALL NINES.
 SPSS STATISTICAL SYSTEM

FILE URUGUAY (CREATION DATE = 05/04/82)

***** MULTIPLE REGRES

135

DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. VAR03 Terrorist Incidents

VARIABLE(S) ENTERED ON STEP NUMBER 1.. VAR07 Terrorist Arrested
VAR04 Unemployment
VAR05 Consumer Price Index
VAR06 Terrorist killed

MULTIPLE R	.23251	ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE	DF
R SQUARE	.05406	REGRESSION	4.
ADJUSTED R SQUARE	-.02644	RESIDUAL	47.
STANDARD ERROR	4.99330		
F	.67		

----- VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION -----

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
VAR07	-.1625255-001	-.06412	.03778	.185
VAR04	-.5057896-002	-.11300	.00904	.313
VAR05	-.2312978-003	-.02823	.00161	.021
VAR06	.8196105+000	.14907	.78698	1.085
(CONSTANT)	.1432124+002			

ALL VARIABLES ARE IN THE EQUATION

STATISTICS WHICH CANNOT BE COMPUTED ARE PRINTED AS ALL NINES.
SPSS STATISTICAL SYSTEM

FILE ITALY (CREATION DATE = 05/17/82)

***** MULTIPLE REGRE

***** MULTIPLE REGRE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. VAR03 ETA killings

VARIABLE(S) ENTERED ON STEP NUMBER 1.. REFORM
 VAR04 ETA's killed
 VAR05 Consumer Price Index
 VAR06 Unemployment
 VAR08 Truces
 VAR10 Arrests

MULTIPLE R .71219
 R SQUARE .50721
 ADJUSTED R SQUARE .40526
 STANDARD ERROR F 3.03938
 4.97*

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
 REGRESSION
 RESIDUAL
 DF 6
 29

----- VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION -----

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
REFORM	-.2201530+001	-.28283	2.00731	1.203
VAR04	.3208442+000	.08566	.49610	.418
VAR05	-.7704618-001	-1.87942	.10437	.545
VAR06	.1691742-001	1.76282	.02372	.509
VAR08	-.1422675+001	-.10119	1.88499	.570
VAR10	-.2269617-001	-.93101	.01240	3.350*
(CONSTANT)	.1919457+002			

ALL VARIABLES ARE IN THE EQUATION

STATISTICS WHICH CANNOT BE COMPUTED ARE PRINTED AS ALL NINES.
 SPSS STATISTICAL SYSTEM

FILE SPAIN (CREATION DATE = 05/17/82)

***** MULTIPLE REGRE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. VAR21 IRA killings

VARIABLE(S) ENTERED ON STEP NUMBER 1.. VAR06 Houses searched
 VAR07 SF opens fire
 TRUCE
 VAR16 Unemployment
 VAR18 IRA killed
 NOGO
 REFORM

MULTIPLE R	.74081	ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE	DF
R SQUARE	.54880	REGRESSION	7.
ADJUSTED R SQUARE	.52008	RESIDUAL	110.
STANDARD ERROR	4.68014		
F	19.11*		

----- VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION -----

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
VAR06	.3237840-002	.29418	.00095	11.633 *
VAR07	.9332041-001	.46785	.02133	19.142 *
TRUCE	.5657838+001	.30240	1.36332	17.223 *
VAR16	.1126922-003	.23159	.00004	8.172 *
VAR18	.5474417+000	.17840	.29260	3.501 *
NOGO	-.1838338+001	-.11479	2.06119	.795
REFORM	.1932190+001	.13325	1.98080	.952
(CONSTANT)	-.3338474+001			

ALL VARIABLES ARE IN THE EQUATION

STATISTICS WHICH CANNOT BE COMPUTED ARE PRINTED AS ALL NINES.
 SPSS STATISTICAL SYSTEM

FILE ULSTER (CREATION DATE = 12/21/81)

***** MULTIPLE REGRE
138

DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. VAR04 SF fired upon

VARIABLE(S) ENTERED ON STEP NUMBER 1..

NOGO
VAR06 Houses searched
VAR07 SF opens fire
TRUCE
VAR16 Unemployment
VAR18 IRA killed
REFORM

MULTIPLE R	.96625	ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE	DF
R SQUARE	.93364	REGRESSION	7.
ADJUSTED R SQUARE	.92942	RESIDUAL	110.
STANDARD ERROR	51.72817		
F	221.10*		

----- VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION -----

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
NOGO	-.8593954+002	-.18620	22.78173	14.230 *
VAR06	.3058666-001	.09642	.01049	8.498 *
VAR07	.5468911+001	.95129	.23575	538.133 *
TRUCE	.4731091+002	.08774	15.06840	9.858 *
VAR16	.1272171-003	.00907	.00044	.085
VAR18	.4235566+000	.00479	3.23397	.017
REFORM	.5493984+002	.13146	21.89322	6.297 *
(CONSTANT)	.2460918+002			

ALL VARIABLES ARE IN THE EQUATION

STATISTICS WHICH CANNOT BE COMPUTED ARE PRINTED AS ALL NINES.
SPSS STATISTICAL SYSTEM

FILE ULSTER (CREATION DATE = 12/21/81)

***** MULTIPLE REGRE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE.. VAR03 Explosions

139

VARIABLE(S) ENTERED ON STEP NUMBER 1..

NOGO

VAR06 Houses searched

VAR07 SF opens fire

TRUCE .

VAR16 Unemployment

VAR18 IRA killed

REFORM

MULTIPLE R .71082
R SQUARE .50527
ADJUSTED R SQUARE .47379
STANDARD ERROR 28.54953
F 16.05*

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
REGRESSION 7.
RESIDUAL 110.

----- VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION -----

VARIABLE	B	BETA	STD ERROR B	F
NOGO	-.2413528+002	-.25870	12.57357	3.685*
VAR06	.1889786-001	.29473	.00579	10.649*
VAR07	.3983116+000	.34277	.13012	9.371*
TRUCE	.1154987+000	.00106	8.31647	.000
VAR16	.7684435-004	.02711	.00024	.102
VAR18	.5572453+001	.31172	1.78488	9.747*
REFORM	.1332513+002	.15775	12.08318	1.216
(CONSTANT)	.3888972+002			

ALL VARIABLES ARE IN THE EQUATION

STATISTICS WHICH CANNOT BE COMPUTED ARE PRINTED AS ALL NINES.
SPSS STATISTICAL SYSTEM

FILE ULSTER (CREATION DATE = 12/21/81)

***** MULTIPLE REGRE

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