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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Col Danner's paper centered on the subject of political violence as it relates to current events in world affairs. He traces the trends and transitions in this subject; which he terms contemporary terrorism. He compares the vulnerabilities of various types of governments to terrorist acts and makes a series of substentions on how the United States might organize to better combat the threat of political violence. The tone of this paper is a mixture of good research and the strong feelings of a U.S. Army Infantry Officer on this subject. <i>4</i>		

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CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM

Prepared For
Mr. James McInnis

by

LTC(P) Malcolm A. Danner
US Army War College

19 April 1982

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INTRODUCTION

1. Nature of the Challenge.

"Political Terrorism is a form of clandestine, undeclared and unconventional warfare; indiscriminate. It is an attempt to exercise a peculiar kind of tyranny over its victims. Many terrorists are motivated by idealism, though their movements attract common criminals and psychopathic killers. Revolutionary Theorists have argued that terrorism alone is ineffectual. Tactical terrorist objectives include publicity and militarization of a political situation."¹ Terror and terrorism are as old as the human discovery that people can be influenced by intimidation. But only recently have the means become available through which time-honored fear production has grown into a menace of global dimensions. Today, we live in an age of terror. Violence, threats, blackmail, and the fear they arouse are the conditions of our daily existence. We are hostages of the nuclear balance of terror at the highest strategic level.

"Contemporary Terrorism involves modern variations on old techniques which are far more dangerous than ever before because of their tremendous potential destructive power. Current indications are that it will become more serious over the coming decade as terrorists capitalize on the advantages of improved weapons technology and growing international support from radical governments. Terrorists have maintained the offensive role and governments have had to react to their innovations; during this action-reaction cycle, terrorists have been forced to cross new thresholds of violence to retain their momentum."² "We permit terrorists to obtain the machine guns and manufacture the bombs with which they blow us to pieces; we give them heroes' welcomes in our most prestigious institutions; we surrender to them the use of our powerful mass media; and we are entertained by the spectacle of our own destruction. By merely reacting to their

actions, we dance to their tune; by leaving all the initiative and imaginative innovation to them. We talk violence, watch violence, fear violence, and we guide our lives accordingly."³ "Not everybody has a bomb planted in his car or has to surrender his freedom to protect his life; not everybody lives under the dictatorship of terroristic blackmail or a police state -- not yet. But these things happen here and everywhere. And they can happen to any of us at any moment."⁴ The practice of intimidation, at one time a luxury reserved for the powerful few, has now become common custom among the many would-be powerful. Today's terrorists profit from the speed and anonymity of modern travel and communication. They have their own jet set and are among the best customers of telephone companies, wire services, manufacturers of electronic equipment, travel bureaus, and luxury hotels that furnish smooth service, perfect cover and all the necessities for quick appearances and disappearances anywhere in the world. Easy access has given disgruntled small groups and even individuals a new capacity for spectacularly disruptive and destructive acts such as the power to hold up large communities and whole nations. "Interdependence, complexity, and technological efficiency, which provide the terroristic tools for mobility, anonymity, and destructiveness in unprecedented excellence, make complex modern society more vulnerable than ever before to the simple threat of crudely manipulated fear. Through the help of advanced technology, the 'smallness' of the groups (or individuals) has assumed an unexpected significance denied to them by the 'bigness' of a deindividualizing and dehumanizing society. The big and powerful can be, and therefore are, successfully blackmailed and intimidated by the small and so-far powerless."⁵ All these phenomena and worldwide developments have resulted in a greater need to understand contemporary terrorism by those who must protect society if they are to cope successfully with present and future variations.

The expressed purpose of this paper is to provide a brief historical trace of worldwide terrorism, significant terrorists movements, the effective responses to terrorism; and provide the reader with an analytical framework with which to anticipate future variations (and responses) to worldwide terrorism. Research articles and books were chosen which provide background and perspective on contemporary terrorism in general, not just the specific activities of a single group or geographical region, nor a heavy treatise which deals with contemporary terrorism either as an abstract phenomenon or attempts to develop a general theory of terrorism. This paper is based on an examination of the trends and transitions of contemporary terrorism. It should provide sufficient background with which to evaluate terrorism's overall threat potential. Clearly, an understanding of the threat is required to develop effective response within the rule of law.

2. History.

A list of names and acronyms used by groups claiming responsibility for international terrorist attacks, 1968-1979 is provided at Appendix A. "Soon after Soviet authorities sent the Nobel Prize physicist Andrei Sakharov into forced exile in Gorki, early in 1980, he told a Washington Post reporter how he felt about the worsening terrorist phenomenon: 'Among the problems which trouble me is the irrationality of international terrorism, no matter how high the aims predicated by terrorists (and often there are no such justifications), their activities are always criminal, always destructive, throwing humankind back to a time of lawlessness and chaos, provoking (perhaps with the help of the secret services of foreign governments) internal and international complications, contradicting the goals of peace and progress."⁶ Would Menachem Begin agree? To answer this question it must be understood that the purpose

of a revolutionary terrorists group/movement and that of a guerrilla movement or an urban terrorists group have distinct differences which have evolved through years of successes and failures. Claire Sterling's book, "The Terror Network," provides a current, reasonably accurate account of how contemporary international terrorism began. One "good" point, worthy of mention prior to launching into history, is the common thread I found during this research - many young people set out with blazing revolutionary faith, only to reach the hard, dry conviction that somehow, tragically, they had gone wrong. They wanted to make things better and made them worse. In the end, they found a grotesque identity of interest with a Black terrorist group, their hideous mirror image. Both were joined in a single-minded effort to disarticulate and eventually destroy the democratic order whenever they found it. The higher their rank, the more clearly they perceived this common goal. "Being a terrorist might have its exhilarating moments, but it was mostly a life of corroding anxiety and dismal drudgery. * * * "The longer you do it, the more you sink into the shit."⁷ Somehow, if we could convince the unwashed of the real nature of the life of terrorists we could at least slow the trend of rapidly growing dissidence worldwide. "Time and again, authentic left-wing liberation movements have slipped over the line from brave organized resistance to terrorist violence. All too often - not always, happily -- their success in overthrowing an oppressive regime has simply led to installing another just like it."⁸ "The fact that there is such a thing as an international terrorist circuit, or network, or fraternity, that a multitude of disparate terrorist groups have been helping one another out and getting help from not altogether disinterested outsiders -- is hardly classified information anymore. There is enough evidence lying around to pole - as the reader. It does not prove a closely planned and centrally commanded worldwide conspiracy. But if these terrorist bands may not be all welded, they are linked."⁹ The terrorists Sterling refers to here are not the right-wing

neo-Nazi sort. The groups she refers to "the past decade (1970-1980) belongs to the emerging forces of the radical left, in Africa, Asia, South and North America, Europe, and the Middle East. They come from the generation of 1968, an amazing year."¹⁰

Distinctions between Guerrilla Warfare, Revolutionary Warfare, Urban Terrorism and Terrorism in general are difficult to make - the definition this paper is based on depends on two very important factors. First, terrorism is an act of violence which is perpetrated by a group of individuals, or an individual, for political, ideological purposes. What makes it distinctly terroristic is that the intent is to inflict psychological terror on the targeted population, whether it is a government, or a country or - now, as we enter into the new arena of terrorism - the international community. The second factor is that the terrorist act in itself is leveraged through the media. In other words, what the terrorist basically hopes to accomplish is to leverage a very ineffective power base into a position of credibility and, hopefully, legitimacy. Revolutionary and guerrilla warfare encompass terrorism as one of many actions to accomplish a similar end; i.e., both forms are a greater and larger operation. A quick review of world leaders provides an interesting group of ex-terrorists, who, of course, would deny that they were ever terrorists. Israel is at present run by an ex-terrorist and Egypt was run by one: Menachim Begin was the head of the terrorist Irgun Zvai Leumi, and Anwar Sadat was part of the Islamic brotherhood and was used as a hired gunman. Both men understood each other as terrorists, and they had a similar history and sense of destiny. That sense of destiny was the legitimatization of their political aspirations.

From such examples - since antiquity and certainly in contemporary times, one could conclude that there is such a thing as a successful terrorist. History

tends to legitimize the terrorist act. The initial activities of the American revolution were principally terrorist; the Boston Tea Party was an act of terrorism, and the American Revolutionary Party was a very successful terrorist organization. There seems to be an evolution in considering someone a terrorist, then a revolutionary, and then finally a national hero. When one thinks of Begin, George Washington, Mao Tse-Tung, Giuseppe Garibaldi - they could all have been considered terrorists at one time in their careers. All have been "validated" by history. The word "terrorism," from this analogy, has a very unfavorable and worsening connotation when used in the present. Unfortunately, it appears that the force of violence is so pervasive that few nations in the world have yet achieved the political or emotional context in which they can resolve ultimate disputes other than through violence. Those who understand that point have clearly been able to utilize it to their most effective means (Israel). Both Begin and Sadat are exemplary of the charismatic leadership required to define that correct moment of transition from terrorism to legitimatization/validation. Opposing such simple, clear definitions of terrorists and terrorism, Dr. Walter Lacquer, Chairman of the International Reserach Council for the Center for Strategic and International Studies provides incisive analysis:

"The study of terrorism is not made any easier by the fact that most terrorists have been neither popular heroes in the mold of Wilhelm Tell nor plain horse thieves but both these as well as many other things. It is a moot point whether Burke was right when he said that one had to scratch an idealogue to find a terrorist, but it is certainly not true that scratching a terrorist will necessarily reveal an idealogue."

"The interpretation of terrorism is difficult for many other reasons. Even over this last century the character of terrorism has changed greatly. This goes not only for its methods but also for the aims of the struggle and the character of the people that were and are involved in it. Only two generations divide Sofia Perovskays and Emma Goldman from Ulrike Meinhof and Patty Hearst, yet morally and intellectually the distance between them is to be measured in light years. The other difficulty is equally fundamental: unlike Marxism, terrorism is not an ideology but an insurrectional strategy that can be used by people of very different political convictions."

"Yet terrorism is not merely a technique. Those practicing it have certain basic beliefs in common. They may belong to the left or the right; they may be nationalists or, less frequently, internationalists, but in some essential respect their mental makeup is similar. They are often closer to each other than they know or would like to admit to themselves or others. And as the technology of terrorism can be mastered by people of all creeds, so does its philosophy transcend the traditional dividing lines between political doctrine. It is truly all-purpose and value free."

"Terrorism is not, as is frequently believed, a subspecies of guerrilla (or 'revolutionary') warfare and its political function today is also altogether different. 'Urban guerrilla' is indeed urban, but it is not 'guerrilla,' in any meaningful sense of the term; the difference between guerrilla and terrorism is not one of semantics but of quality. This study grew out of a dissatisfaction with many of the current attempts to explain and interpret political terrorism, both on the popular and academic level. According to widespread belief, the main features of contemporary terrorism are, very briefly, as follows:

1. Terrorism is a new, unprecedented phenomenon. For this reason, its antecedents (if any) are of little interest. (Emphasis mine).
2. Terrorism is one of the most important and dangerous problems facing mankind today.
3. Terrorism is a response to injustice; if there were political and social justice, there would be no terrorism.
4. The only known means of reducing the likelihood of terrorism is a reduction of the grievances, stresses and frustrations underlying it.
5. Terrorists are fanatical believer driven to despair by intolerable conditions. They are poor and their inspiration is deeply ideological.
6. Terrorism can occur anywhere."¹¹

NOTE: The author (W. Lacquer) provides meaningful insight to the difficulties involved in agreeing on a comprehensive definition of terrorism: "Such a definition does not exist nor will it be found in the foreseeable future. To argue that terrorism cannot be studied until such a definition exists is manifestly absurd. Even now, three decades after the end of the Fascist era the controversies about its character continue but the contemporaries had to confront Fascism anyway on both the

theoretical and practical level. Many terrorist groups, past and present, were not at all revolutionary, including some which stressed their revolutionary orientation.

One may disagree with Lacquer's positions that if there were no social and political injustice there would be no terrorism. I do. His assertion that all terrorists are "fanatical believers driven to despair by intolerable conditions and that they are poor is also erroneous." According to Mr. Chris Frederick, CIA, "the PLO has an annual budget of \$54 million and has revenues exceeding \$80 million annually." (This information provided from a seminar at USAWC on 28 October 1981.)

3. Transnational and International Contemporary Terrorism. A flight of events worldwide which occurred in 1968 illustrate a significant direction in philosophy, "an upsurge of variation in violence and the emergence of transnational terrorism and ultimately, international terrorism.

- Student sit-ins from Berkely, California to the Orient.
- Robert Kennedy and Martin L. King assassinated.
- Tet offensive, Vietnam -- antiwar sentiment climaxes.
- LBJ sued for peace; renounces 2d term.
- Parisian students very nearly destroy de Gaulle's Fifth Republic.
- Crazy rightist shot the new left student leader, Rudi Dutschke - Germany neared insurrection.
- Andreas Baader burned down his first department store in Frankfurt.
- Uncontrollable rioting swept Tokyo - led by predecessor of Japanese Red Army.
- Street fighting in Turkey - followed by martial law.
- Violence in Spain's northern Basque provinces - worsening in 81-82.
- Northern Ireland moved to threshold of Civil War.
- China, Mao gave first official sign of sanction to the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution.

- Beirut - Palestinian Christian Physician George Habash exported terrorism from ME to Europe for first time, hijacking an El Al Plane in Rome.
- Rome, Italian Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, millionaire publisher (Zivago) issued Europe's first open call for armed guerrilla warfare.
- Rio de Janeiro - Carlos Marighella publishes "Mini-Manual" on armed guerrilla warfare.
- Cuba - Castro lost the last of his independence - Soviets cut off his oil and vital industrial supplies until he gave in to their wishes. Five thousand Soviet technicians arrived to oversee Cuban economy; KGB begins to supervise Cuban Intelligence Service, DGI."¹²

Starting in 1968, the news deriving from these events could be transmitted by satellite television. Claire Sterling correctly concludes that "there is no simple way to sum up this remarkable string of events. All the same, 1968 was clearly the year when a generation born after the last world war declared its own war on society, with a brief but stunning show of strength."¹³ For a while, the entire world seemed to be heading leftward toward a revolution none too well defined but momentarily expected. "Then, almost as abruptly as it began, the dramatic interlude of mutual discovery and messianic revelation was over. Nine out of ten who went through the experience have long since put it behind them. But those with a true vocation for violence had found each other while it lasted, and others found them."¹⁴ The data collected by the National Foreign Assessment Center, printed in 1980, is provided at Appendix B. These data reflect the most recent trends in regional, national and international terrorism. Clearly, there has been no elimination of terrorism to say the least; however, I agree with Sterling's analysis that had the rate of incidence of terrorism in Latin America, Western Europe, Middle East countries and Japan continued at its 1968-1970 unabated pace, the problem would be unmanageable by most Western World industrialized countries.

The spread of terrorism from Italy to other countries in Western Europe is well documented and in 1968, other actions developed which are significant

to the contemporary terrorism analyst. There is strong evidence of a significant change in the Russians' unofficial foreign policy concerning terrorism. Officially, they showed contempt for confused, disorganized infantile leftists threatening the world's carefully balanced stability. Unofficially, however, the Kremlin took an active interest in various terrorist movements. Practically every sort of armed guerrilla group bent on destroying the vital centers of multinational imperialism has been able since then to count on active support from Moscow. "The Communists always remain the party of socialist revolution, a party which never tolerates the capitalist order and is always ready to head the struggle for the total political power of the working class."¹⁵ "In 1968, General Jan Sejna of Czechoslovakia defected to the U.S. (bringing 20 years of collected documents as military counselor to the central committee of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. He revealed, proof in hand, that as early as 1964 the Soviet Union's Politburo had decided to increase spending in the field of terrorism abroad by one-thousand per cent!"¹⁶ (Emphasis mine.) He further indicated that the secret services of all the Communist Bloc countries were involved in recruiting spies and infiltrating the world's left-wing terrorist movements; special guerrilla training schools had been set up in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Cuba for "selected terrorists from all over the world."

The most recent (available) and up-to-date data on worldwide terrorism are at Appendix C and are provided by the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA).

"During 1981 it became apparent that the act or threat of terrorism as a means to obtain political goals was growing rapidly in frequency. The yearly rate of incidentals of terrorism worldwide increased from 279 in 1971 to 2,773 in 1980. Terrorist acts in 1971 caused 22 deaths but by 1980 the toll reached 1,173. This year the bombing and shooting that grows out of the infasse in Northern Ireland has spread to England and has expanded. Pope John Paul II was shot by

a member of a radical Turkish sect. In Iran, terrorism begat more terrorism as political opponents sought to exterminate each other. The U.S. Army Commander in Germany escaped a rocket grenade attack with only minor injuries, but President Sadat of Egypt did not survive an attack by religious fanatics. The President of the United States was wounded by a young man whose attorneys say he is deranged and was only trying to attract attention. And, in case an American is convinced that it cannot happen here, they should know that in the past 12 years there has been 325 explosive bombings in North America, a rate of almost 30 per year. This gives our continent the dubious distinction of ranking just behind Western Europe, Latin America and the Mideast in the number of such incidents."¹⁷

The AUSA Special Report lends further confirmation that the Soviets and their surrogates (primarily Cuba) are increasing support to terrorism throughout the Eastern Hemisphere:

"Our own hemisphere continued to be kept in turmoil by insurgencies fomented and supported by the Soviet Union and its Cuban agents and by political unrest that has fundamental, economic roots. The assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt has served to slow progress toward a peaceful solution of the Middle East's many problems."¹⁸

These discussions and data I have provided concerning the numbers of terrorist incidents since 1968 are simply to prove that terrorism is definitely on the increase. Whatever conclusion one wants to make, so be it - however, in my opinion terrorism is unimportant in terms of numbers of people killed annually. What is most important to the U.S. government (or any other) is the fact that leaders of government cannot afford to be held hostage, restrained or pressured by radicals . . . or the threat that if leaders don't acquiesce to terrorists, it would/will result in greater terrorism. In this regard, the present U.S. policy of dealing with terrorists, while theoretically correct and provides an excellent role model, often causes extreme difficulty in terms of counter-terrorist (CT) operations, i.e., don't negotiate with terrorists, don't give in until the terrorist(s) is obviously prepared to do sufficient harm to the security of U.S. national interest. . . then compromise and negotiate. This

policy results in committing CT units under almost impossible conditions; when all else fails (diplomatic channels, etc.) then commit a CT operation. All element of surprise is lost and we (public citizenry) should expect disaster.

"In essence, the U.S. will not, cannot, does not, want a CT organization;

reasons:

- Expensive
- 1 in 300 Government/Army officers capable
- Contrary to U.S. policy/philosophy
- As yet, problem insufficient to warrant CT
- Terrorists would orient operations on the CT organization and consequently gain more publicity than otherwise."¹⁹

Chris Frederick, CIA and Mr. Norman Hope, FBI provided in-depth explanations of the current developments in both domestic and international law. Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to provide a detailed discussion, the following points are significant:

- "International Terrorism Law was promulgated under the Carter Administration 1203-6."²⁰
- "New trend internationally is the 'Patron-State' supported terrorism such as existing now by Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Cuba and USSR."²¹

(NOTE: Relevance to law here is that the "Patron-State" classification authorizes the U.S. President to take military sanctions against the Patron State. Frederick, CIA.)

- "FBI jurisdiction extends only to domestic terrorism; no jurisdiction beyond OCONUS; (however, FBI does trace funding, travel, personal traits, personalities of international terrorists.)"²²
- "FBI does not always have jurisdiction to investigate a terrorist incident in the U.S."²³
- "Under the Statute of Protection of Foreign Officials, the FBI has the authority and responsibility to investigate when anyone (foreigner or whomever) attacks a foreign diplomat in the U.S. (Federal Law)."²⁴
- In discussion during seminar with Colonel Zane Finkelstein, USAWC, the following definition of terrorism becomes meaningful because it was developed by a special committee created to study terrorism:

"The systematic use or attempted use of abnormal violence for political objectives through the influence on an audience wider than the victim."²⁵

4. Underlying Causes of Terrorism. The underlying causes of the continuing international proliferation of terrorism are clearly a matter worthy of further research and analysis, however, the following conditions appear to be common in an analysis of contemporary terrorist incidents:

- "Success in gaining short-term objectives has encouraged emulation."²⁶
- "Emulation has been facilitated by diffusion of information about techniques, tactics, and weaponry, both through the mass media and terrorist literature, (such as the works by Begin, Grivas, Fanon, Marighela)."²⁷
- "The overall strategic situation is conducive to terrorism as to all other forms of unconventional warfare. The major nuclear powers attempt to avoid involvement even in limited international war lest the conflict should escalate and disrupt nuclear balance and detente. And both major and minor powers increasingly resort to cheaper and less hazardous indirect methods of coercion such as the fostering of internal subversion and proxy terrorism within allegedly hostile States."²⁸
- "Domestic and internationally-based terrorism as methods of unconventional war by proxy have been energetically promoted by a wide variety of States such as the Soviet Union, China, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Vietnam, and Zaire. The backing of foreign governments has enormously increased the cash, weaponry, and training facilities available to terrorist movements. Ironically, the West has unwittingly financed much recent Arab terrorism through providing some of the oil revenues of Arab States which are then tapped for large contributions to Palestinian terrorist movements."²⁹
- "The scale, complexity and vulnerability of international communications have made the terrorist more mobile and potentially more dangerous."³⁰
- "The world-wide development of mass media with international news coverage has vastly increased the terrorists' opportunity and appetite for publicity. There is almost a Gresham's Law of terrorism: 'those who spill the most blood will make the biggest headlines.'³¹

Many profound theories have attempted to explain the proliferation of civil violence in general by reference to socio-economic and cultural developments such as responses to feelings of intensifying deprivation and oppression or stresses engendered in States undergoing rapid modernization. However, none of these theories can explain why, or under what precise conditions, people resort to terrorism rather than to other forms of violence.

Whatever its underlying causes, terrorist violence confronts liberal democracies and the international system with special dangers. Most obviously it poses a threat to the life and limb of citizens. Even though the number of casualties from terrorism is extremely small compared to the number of victims of international and civil wars. But that surely does not mean that killing and maiming by terrorists is tolerable, or that it can be safely ignored. Moreover, terrorism poisons communal relations and, if carried out extensively over a long period it can also disrupt and destroy normal government and political and economic life. Widespread and sanguinary terrorism can sow the seeds of civil war and exacerbate international relations.

In contrast to totalitarian regimes, which ruthlessly suppress even in the first flickers of dissent, liberal democracies are extremely vulnerable to harassment and disruption by terrorists. This is due to the relative ease with which the terrorist can exploit liberal democratic freedoms of international and national travel, communication and association. Yet liberal democratic States are extraordinarily resilient in withstanding terrorist attempts at a revolutionary seizure of power.

In this respect they have an overwhelming source of strength compared to dictatorships and colonial regimes: they have the unqualified support of the overwhelming majority of the population behind them and against the terrorists.

The only clear case of terrorism, combined with urban guerrilla war, bringing about the collapse of a liberal-democratic government is Uruguay in 1972. Yet even in Uruguay what the Tupamaros actually achieved was not the left-wing revolution they desired but an overwhelming repressive reaction from the authoritarian right which effectively extinguished democracy.

The gravest internal dangers posed by terrorism to liberal democracy are the weakening of national security, the erosion of the rule of law and the undermining of government authority. Mere handfuls of terrorists can cause serious local disruptions and threats to life, and often cause expensive diversions of security forces, sometimes on such a large scale that they disturb delicate military balances. More prolonged or widespread terrorist campaigns (for examples those affecting a whole region or major city, or involving threats to national security) may succeed in blackmailing governments into making major concessions to terrorist demands.

It should be remembered that international terrorism also constitutes a serious challenge to international stability and normal diplomatic and economic relations. However, during the past decade there have been some increasingly dangerous trends. There has been a dramatic increase in the number of terrorist organizations operating internationally, based mainly in Middle Eastern and European capitals, and employing a network of highly professional hit men, kidnapers and plane hijackers.

The growing trend towards proxy terrorism by sponsor States has already been noted. Other growing trends are embassy attacks, diplomatic kidnappings ("diplonappings") and the use of business personnel and other hostages to secure release of prisoners, ransoms, or policy concessions. It must be stressed that diplomapping is not merely a violation of traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges: it is an attack on the foundations of diplomatic reciprocity and a potential threat to normal diplomatic and economic relations.

The clearest danger posed by terrorism to the international system, however, stems from the fact that certain terrorist movements are no longer restricting themselves to challenging the domestic authority and laws of States. Some are apparently ready to make undeclared war against foreign countries and citizens. Yet terrorist movements do not share the same responsibilities or constraints imposed on governments. They have no treaties, obligations, citizens or territories to consider.

The worst danger is that, acting entirely irresponsibly and blinded by desperate fanaticism, a terrorist movement may attempt to detonate an international conflict. Nor should the possibility of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon be discounted in view of the lax security concerning nuclear materials.

It is clear, therefore, that the international and national problems of response to terrorist threats are interwoven. To be effective, action against terrorists must be synchronized at both levels. By tolerating the terrorists' capacity to provoke international war the international community is playing with fire. And we have seen that terrorists confront liberal democracies internally with a ruthless challenge against the safety of their citizens, the security of the State, and the rule of law. Liberal democratic governments have to decide how to react to terrorist violence, and they have to carry their citizens with them behind their policy.

Possible responses to terrorism, either transnational or international, include submission (such as Lebanon); counter-terror and ruthless repression (Soviet kind); and counter-terror against foreign based terrorists, plus democracy (Israel). Within each of these options a "tough-line" approach or a "soft-line" approach can be employed based on extant circumstances. According to a recent Rand Corporation study: "on average, world-wide, terrorists have a

79 percent chance of evading death or imprisonment for their crimes."³²

There are many recent examples of liberal democratic governments conducting ill-judged negotiations with terrorists and conceding to most or all of the terrorists' demands. This is due to the soft-line approach and response to "make a deal" with the terrorists. The price of the soft-line response to terrorism by governments is further humiliating defeats.

Again, Paul Wilkinson provides an incisive, well-balanced discussion on pros and cons of the "tough-line" approach/response:

"The liberal state tough-line approach means combining harsh and effective temporary measures to isolate and eliminate terrorist calls, their leaders and their logistic support, with the maintenance of liberal democracy, a vigorous political life of participation, debate and reform within the framework of the law."³³

The essential element of this approach is not panic repression and over reaction, which in any case plays into the hands of terrorists, but a consistent policy of maximizing the risk of punishment run by the terrorists and minimizing their potential rewards.

"However, even when the tough-line approach has eliminated a specific threat to the security of the State or to law and order by destroying active terrorist cells there will generally be passive sympathisers who remain. Indeed, part of the price we pay for the survival of democracy is the freedom of ideas. Hence in a working liberal democracy it is both dangerous and naive to hope 'to destroy a subversive movement utterly.'"³⁴

To counter terrorism effectively the tough-line approach involves waging two kinds of war: a military-security war to contain and reduce terrorist violence, and a political and psychological war to secure the popular consent and support which must be the basis of any effective modern democratic government. It is foolish to assume that terrorists need mass support before they can

perpetrate murder and destruction; as has already been observed, many contemporary terrorist groups are numerically tiny. Yet it is important for the success of anti-terrorist operations that popular support for the terrorists should remain limited to a minority - indeed that they be as isolated as possible from the general population.

"To be successful this strategy demands a unified control of all counter-insurgency operations, an intelligence service of the highest quality, adequate security forces possessing the full range of counter-insurgency skills and complete loyalty to the government, and last but not least enormous reserves of patience and determination."³⁵

There are rarely any easy victories over terrorism. The characteristic features of political terrorism, its undeclared and clandestine nature and its employment by desperate fanatics, imply a struggle of attrition constantly erupting into murder and disruption. Moreover, the terrorists know that security forces in a liberal State are forced to operate at dangerous mid-levels of coerciveness. Judicial restraints and civil control prevent the security forces from deploying their full strength and firepower. No doubt this is inevitable and desirable in a liberal democracy, but it does mean that the tasks of countering terrorism and urban guerrilla war in a democracy are enormously complex and demanding.

5. Anti-Terrorism and Response by Democratic Governments.

The following excerpts from Paul Wilkinson's treatise on "Response to Terrorism by Liberal Democracies" is comprehensive, analytical and provides an excellent model for not only the U.S. but all liberal democracies of the Western world:

"It is possible to draw from the recent experience of low-intensity and counter-insurgency operations certain basic ground rules which should be followed by liberal democracies taking a tough line against terrorism.

- The democratically elected government must proclaim a determination to uphold the Rule of Law and constitutional authority, and must demonstrate this political will in its actions.

- There must be no resort to general indiscriminate repression. The government must show that its measures against terrorism are solely directed at quelling the the terrorists and their active collaborators and at defending society against the terrorists. A slide into general repression would destroy individual liberties and political democracy and may indeed bring about a ruthless dictatorship even more implacable than the terrorism the repression was supposed to destroy. Moreover, repressive over-reaction plays into the hands of terrorists by giving credence to the revolutionaries' claim that liberal democracy is a sham or a chimera, and it enables them to pose as defenders of the people.
- The government must be seen to be doing all in its power to defend the life and limb of citizens. This is a vital prerequisite for public confidence and co-operation. If it is lacking, private armies and vigilante groups will tend to proliferate and will exacerbate civil violence.
- There must be a clear-cut and consistent policy of refusing to make any concessions to terrorist blackmail. If the terrorist weapon can be shown to pay off against a particular government then that government and its political moderates will find their power and authority undermined. There is abundant evidence that weakness and concession provoke a rapid emulation of terrorism by other groups and a dramatic escalation in the price of blackmail demands.
- All aspects of the anti-terrorist policy and operations should be under the overall control of the civil authorities and, hence, democratically accountable.
- Special Powers, which may become necessary to deal with a terrorist emergency, should be approved by the legislature only for a fixed and limited period. The maximum should be six months, subject to the legislature's right to revoke or renew the Special Powers should circumstances require. Emergency measures should be clearly and simply drafted, published as widely as possible, and administered impartially.
- Sudden vacillations in security policy should be avoided: they tend to undermine public confidence and encourage the terrorists to exploit rifts in the government and its security forces.
- Loyal community leaders, officials, and personnel at all levels of government and security forces must be accorded full backing by the civil authorities.

- No deals should be made with terrorist organizations behind the backs of the elected politicians.
- The government should not engage in dialogue and negotiation with groups which are actively engaged in promoting, committing or supporting terrorism. To do so only lends the terrorists publicity, status, and, worst of all, a spurious respectability.
- Terrorist propaganda and defamation should be countered by full and clear official statements of the government's objectives, policies and problems.
- The government and security forces must conduct all anti-terrorist operations within the law. They should do all in their power to ensure that the normal legal processes are maintained, and that those charged with terrorist offences are brought to trial before the courts of law.
- Terrorists imprisoned for crimes committed for professedly political motives should be treated in the same manner as ordinary criminals. Concessions of special status and other privileges tend to erode respect for the impartiality of the law, arouse false hopes of an amnesty and impose extra strains on the penal system.
- It is a vital principle that liberal democratic governments should not allow their concern with countering terrorism, even in a serious emergency, to deflect them from their responsibilities for the social and economic welfare of the community. Liberal democratic governments must, by definition, be grounded upon the broad consent of the governed. They are inherently reformist and ameliorative: it is their citizens' natural and legitimate expectations that their representatives and ministers will respond constructively to the expressed needs and grievances of the people. The business of attending to the public welfare must go on. It is, of course, true that this is one of the greater inner strengths of liberal democracy and, incidentally, one reason why its citizens constitute such a hostile "sea" for the terrorist to swim in.
- It would be the height of folly for a liberal democracy faced with a terrorist emergency to halt its work of amelioration and reform. On the contrary, everything possible should be done to prevent the serious disruption and paralysis of social and economic life so ardently sought by the terrorists. Yet, the liberal democratic government should not, on any account, concede a reform or change of policy under terrorist duress. Such grave acts of weakness would only breed contempt for the normal political processes and for the law.

Terrorists are always ready to exploit genuine grievances and profound social problems for their own revolutionary purposes. Naturally governments are in a much stronger position if they can show some bona fide successes in tackling these socio-economic problems. And terrorists invest considerable effort in the propaganda work of their political wings. Where the terrorist organization proper is prescribed front organizations are used for this work. Governments must effectively counter the barrage of terrorist propaganda and defamation if the counterinsurgency campaign is to have any hope of success."³⁶

The past several years have demonstrated that while all nations are vulnerable to attacks by contemporary terrorism, democracies are especially threatened because their sociological and political environment has permitted terrorists to exploit laws designed for the protection of citizens. Yet, responses to terrorism by the industrialized societies have remained within the rule of law in most cases. There are several exceptions involving industrializing nations, which have destroyed democratic governmental processes while overreacting to terrorism. As suspicions grow regarding the motives of nations which are actively supporting terrorism (USSR), it may be discovered that this is part of a grand design to further global revolutionary objectives. In spite of this possibility, the response by threatened societies must remain within the rule of law while going to the limit of what the law allows.

6. Conclusions.

John Wolf provides a "Battle Plan to meet the terrorist threat" for the U.S. in the future:

"Confronted with proliferating and increasingly sophisticated terrorist groups at home and abroad, on the one hand, and the necessity to maintain the basic constitutional freedoms and safeguards that are the hallmark of a democracy, on the other, the United States must develop new programs and policies to combat political terrorism. In America today, by virtue of a process of governmental debate and freedom of the press, it is fortunately almost impossible to undertake a program of pure repression. If we examine the political culture within which Americans function, it is evident that there exist well-defined convictions about what the government may or may not legitimately do and a broad consensus on the fundamental rights of man.

Our democratic system is thus both a necessary and a sufficient limitation on the use of repressive force. Moreover, any illegal action by a democratic state is undertaken with peril since it can be manipulated by the terrorist to serve his own purposes. But Americans' desire to maximize individual freedom also blinds them to the dangers presented by political terrorism and at times prevents them from seeing the necessity for deterrent action.

Consequently, the federal government should embark on an educational program designed to inform the public about all aspects of political terrorism, particularly the difficulty of combating it in a free society. Once made aware of the seriousness and extent of the problem, the American people might give their support to the institution of uniform penal codes, the discretionary death penalty, improved court management programs, laws constraining the payment or receipt of ransom, and other measures necessary to control terrorism. Such a program would also help Americans to understand the rationale behind the governments' official hostage policy and thus accept it as a painful necessity. The program would be aimed additionally at heightening the news media's awareness of terrorist tactics intended to obtain publicity and public sympathy and could serve to warn the policeman on the beat to guard against being manipulated by the terrorist into violating his code of conduct.

Apart from educational measures, the government should expand the scope of the Cabinet Committee and its working group and battle for legislation that would establish full-time, highly specialized counterterrorist assessment and Response Group as described above. Units of this new group would perform several vital tasks: education of police agencies' public security analysts, assessment of the domestic and international aspects of terrorism, development of a consolidated terrorist-information system, study of significant terrorist incidents around the world, and support of the Cabinet Committee and its working group. Once the Counterterrorist Group is established, however, it is mandatory that proper safeguards be implemented and that procedures be established to regulate its computerized intelligence system. Moreover, the group must make its information available to local law enforcement agencies and to other federal agencies.

Meanwhile, it is imperative that security operations be continued by local police agencies and that they be made responsive to the legal principles and public policies developing in the United States today. Police intelligence units should be upgraded in the areas of personnel selection

and training, information handling techniques and organization. Furthermore, the men and women of the press and in Congress who relentlessly investigate the activities of the American intelligence community must take care not to undermine the effectiveness of the CIA as a global collector of information on terrorist matters, or that of the FBI as the nation's primary guardian of internal security."³⁷

In our highly politicized age it would appear that the dangers posed worldwide by political terrorism are likely to continue into the immediate future. Americans must, therefore, be prepared to cope with terrorist acts that will almost certainly occur in their cities. No doubt some will argue that there is no way to guard against the unknown and the unseen and will oppose the expenditure of tax dollars for preventive measures. This sort of fatalism can result in terrorist incidents that might otherwise have been prevented - incidents that will be both costly and internationally embarrassing. It would be foolish to pretend that the tide of sabotage, extortion, bombings and hijackings can be totally turned back. But if we are not to surrender to lawlessness, we must expand present efforts to make terrorism less effective and less attractive as a political weapon.

APPENDIX A

**Names and Acronyms Used by Groups
Claiming Responsibility for
International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-1979**

This list includes names of non-US organizations responsible either by claim or attribution for specific international terrorist actions noted in statistics at "B". The inclusion of any given group should not be interpreted as an evaluation of that organization's goals or motives. Some groups that began as violent organizations may have changed their ideology and tactics or may have disbanded with their members joining other groups. Some attacks may have been carried out without the approval, or even foreknowledge, of that organization's leaders. In still other cases, claims of responsibility may be falsely made by opponents of the organization who are attempting to discredit their enemies.

Many of the groups listed are cover names for organizations wishing to deny responsibility for a particular action that may yield counterproductive results. Some names may have been used by common criminals to throw off police investigators or by psychotics seeking public recognition. No attempt has been made to pierce these covers, and the names provided by the claimants have been accepted.

The list is organized according to the probable nationality of the terrorists or, when ambiguous, by the terrorists' area of operations. This list does not include US organizations that have claimed responsibility for attacks against foreigners on US soil.

Groups With Indeterminate Nationality

Che Guevara Brigade
International Che Guevara Organization
International Revolutionary Front
Islamic Liberation Organization
Moslem International Guerrillas
VFVP LBF (expansion unknown)

Western Hemisphere

ARGENTINA

Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA)
Argentine Liberation Front (FAL)
Argentine National Organization Movement (MANO)
Argentine National Social Front
Argentine Youth for Sovereignty
Comite Argentino de Lucha Anti-Imperialista
Descamisados Peronistas Montoneros
ERP-August 22
Frente de Liberacion Nacional del Vietnam del Sur
Maximo Mena Command
Montoneros
Movimiento Peronista
Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)

Bolivia

National Liberation Army (ELN)
Nationalist Commando

Brazil

Action for National Liberation (ALN)
Armed Revolutionary Vanguard-Palmares (VAR-Palmares)
Aurora Maria Nascimento Furtado Command
Revolutionary Movement of the 8th (MR-8)
Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria (VPR)

Canada

Canadian Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation
Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ)

Chile

Chilean Socialist Party
Proletarian Action Group
Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR)

Colombia

Group of Revolutionary Commandos-Operation
Argimiro Gabaldon
Invisible Ones
Military Liberation Front of Colombia
Movement of the 19th (M-19)
National Liberation Armed Forces
National Liberation Army (ELN)
People's Revolutionary Army-Zero Point
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)
Red Flag
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Workers Party
September 14 Workers Self-Defense Command
United Front for Guerrilla Action

Costa Rica

Revolutionary Commandos of Solidarity
Roberto Santucho Revolutionary Group

Cuba

Abdala
Alpha 66
Anti-Castro Commando
Anti-Communist Commandos
Brigade 2506
Condor
Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations
(CORU)
Cuba Action
Cuba Action Commandos
Cuban Anti-Communist League
Cuban C-4 Movement
Cuban Liberation Front
Cuban National Liberation Front (FLNC)
Cuban Power (el Poder Cubano)
Cuban Power 76
Cuban Representation in Exile
Cuban Revolutionary Directorate
Cuban Revolutionary Organization
Cuban Youth Group
International Secret Revolutionary United Cells
JCN (expansion unknown)
Latin American Anti-Communist Army
Movement of Cuban Justice
Movement of the Seventh (M-7)
National Integration Front (FIN; Cuban Nationalist
Front)

Omega 7

Pedro Luis Boitel Command
Pedro Ruiz Botero Commandos
Pragmatistas
Scorpion (el Alacran)
Second Front of Escambray
Secret Anti-Castro Cuban Army
Secret Cuban Government
Secret Hand Organization
Secret Organization Zero
Young Cubans
Youths of the Star

Dominican Republic

Dominican Popular Movement (MDP)
Twelfth of January Liberation Movement
United Anti-Reelection Command

El Salvador

Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)
Faribundo Marti Liberation Labor Forces (FPL;
Popular Liberation Forces)
February 28 Popular Leagues (LP-28)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR)
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers
(PRTC)
United Popular Action Front (FAPU)
White Warriors Union (UGB)

Guatemala

Guatemalan Anti-Salvadoran Liberating Action
Guerrillas (GALGAS)
Guatemalan Nationalist Commando
National League for the Protection of Guatemala
National Liberation Movement
Peoples Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR; PGT/FAR;
Rebel Armed Forces)
Revolutionary Movement of November 13 (MR-13)

Guyana

People's Temple

Haiti

Coalition of National Liberation Brigades
Haitian Coalition

Mexico

Armed Communist League
Armed Vanguard of the Proletariat
Mexican People's Revolutionary Army
People's Armed Command
People's Liberation Army
People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FRAP)
23rd of September Communist League
United Popular Liberation Army of America

Nicaragua

Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN)

Paraguay

Political Military Organization
Popular Colorado Movement (MoPoCo, dissident
faction of Colorado Party)

Peru

Armed Nationalist Movement Organization (MANO)
Condor
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
MTR (expansion unknown)
Peruvian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAP)
Revolutionary Vanguard

Uruguay

Armed Popular Front (FAP)
National Liberation Movement (MLN; Tupamaros)
Organization of the Popular Revolutionary-33
(OPR-33)
PCU (expansion unknown)
Raul Sendic International Brigade

Europe

Albania

Anti-Communist Military Council

Austria

Justice Guerrilla

Belgium

Julien Lahaut Brigade
Revenge and Freedom

Cyprus

Enosis Movement (EOKA-B)
National Patriotic Front M.P. 14/31

France

Action Front for the Liberation of the Baltic Countries
Andreas Baader Commando
Autonomous Intervention Collective Against the
Zionist Presence in France
Avengers
Charles Martel Group
Committee for Socialist Revolutionary Unity
Committee of Coordination
Group for the Defense of Europe
International Revolutionary Solidarity
International Solidarity
Jewish Self-Defense Front
Masada Action and Defense Movement
Movement of Youthward Brothers in War of the
Palestinian People
New Order
Organization Delta
Red Army Faction of Southern France
6th of March Group
Solidarity Resistance Front
Talion Law
We Must Do Something
Youth Action Group

Greece

Army Officers Representing the Free Greek Spirit
ELA (expansion unknown)
Free Greeks
Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth (EAN)
Greek Militant Resistance
Greek People
Independence-Liberation-Resistance (AAA)
National Youth Resistance Organization
Organization of November 17
Patriotic Front
Peoples Resistance Organized Army
Popular Liberation Organized Army
Popular Resistance Sabotage Group-11 (LAOS 11)
Popular Resistance Sabotage Group Number 13
(LAOS Number 13)
Popular Resistance Sabotage Group People Number
One (LAOS People Number One)
Popular Revolutionary Resistance Group
Union of Officers Struggling for the National Idea

Italy

Armed Communist Formations
Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)
Armed Proletarian Power
Autonomous Workers Movement
Black Order (Ordine Nero)
Combatants for Communism
Proletarian Committee of Subversion for Better
Justice
Proletarian Internationalism
Proletarian Justice
Proletarian Squad
Red Brigades (BR)
Red Guerrilla
Revolutionary Action Group

Netherlands

Red Brigades
Revolutionary Peoples Resistance of the Netherlands

Portugal

Action Group for Communism
ARA (expansion unknown)
Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement
Portuguese Liberation Army
Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity

Spain

Anti-Fascist Resistance Group of October 1
(GRAPO)
Basque Nation and Freedom (ETA; Euzkadi Ta
Azkatasuna)
Commando of Solidarity with Euzkadi
Hammer and Sickle Cooperative
Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL)
International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI)
Juan Paredes Manot International Brigade
Nationalist Intervention Group
Popular Revolutionary Armed Front (FRAP)
Spanish Armed Groups
Spanish National Association
Warriors of Christ the King

Sweden

B-26 (expansion unknown)

Switzerland

Les Beliers de Jura
Petra Kraus Group

Turkey

Acilciler
Armenian Liberation Army
Avengers of the Armenian Genocide
Front for the Liberation of Armenia
Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
Justice of Armenian Genocide
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU)
Mayir Cayan Suicide Group
New Armenian Resistance Group
Secret Armenian Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(Secret Armenian Liberation Army; SALA)
Slave Kortin Yanikiyan Group
Turkish Peoples Liberation Army (TPLA)
Turkish Peoples Liberation Party/Front (TPLP/F)
Turkish Revolutionaries
Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation
28 May Armenian Organization
Yanikian Commandos

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

October 15 Commando

United Kingdom/Ireland

Black Liberation Army
Irish Freedom Fighters
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
Irish Republican Army-Provisional Wing
(IRA-Provos)
Red Flag 74
Sinn Fein
Ulster Defense Association (UDA)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
Young Militants

West Germany

Andreas Baader Commando of the Red Army Faction
Baader Solidarity Group
German Liberation Popular Front, Andreas Baader
Brigade
Holger Meins Brigade
Holger Meins Kommando, Revolutionary Cell
International Anti-Terror Organization
Puig Antich-Ulrike Meinhof Commando
Red Army Faction (RAF; Baader-Meinhof Gang;
BMG)
Revolutionary Cell Brigade Ulrike Meinhof
Robert E. D. Straker Commando of the Territorial
Resistance Army

Second of June Movement
Socialist Patients Collective
Ulrike Meinhof Commando

Yugoslavia
Croatian Intelligence Service
Croatian National Liberation Forces-Fighters for a
Free Croatia
Croatian National Resistance
Freedom for the Serbian Fatherland (SOPO)
Trotskyist Organization
Young Croatian Army for Freedom
Young Croatian Republican Army

Africa

Angola
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA)
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA)

Cabinda
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
(FLEC)

Canary Islands
Canary Islands Independence Movement
Canary Islands Intelligence Service
Movement for Self-Determination and Independence
for the Canary Islands (MPAIAC)

Chad
Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT)

Djibouti
National Independence Union (UNI)
Popular Liberation Movement
Somali Coast Liberation Front (FLCS)

Ethiopia
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
ELF-General Command
ELF-Revolutionary Council
Popular Liberation Forces (PLF)
Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)

Mozambique
Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)
Mozambique Revolutionary Council (COREMO)

Rhodesia
Patriotic Front (PF)
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)

Somalia
Somali Liberation Front

Spanish Sahara
Mustafa el Wali Bayyid Sayed International Brigade
Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra
and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO)

Zaire
Peoples Army of the Oppressed in Zaire (APOZA)
Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP)

Asia

Afghanistan
Afghan Islamic Society
Afghan National Liberation Front
Afghan National Liberation Movement
Islamic Movement of Afghanistan

Bangladesh
National Socialist Party (JDS)

Burma
Kachin Independence Army

India
Ananda Marg
Kashmiri Liberation Front
Universal Proutist Revolutionary Front

Indonesia
Darul Islam Holy War Command
Free South Moluccan Youth Organization
Front for the Liberation of Aceh-Sumatra

Japan

Anti-Japan Armed Front of East Asia
Japanese Red Army (JRA; Arab Red Army; Army of
the Red Star)
Maruseido (Marxist Youth League)
Okinawa Liberation League
Red Army Faction (Sekigun-ha; United Red Army)
VZ 58

Philippines

Kabataang Makabayan
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Peoples Revolutionary Front

Taiwan

People's Liberation Front
World United Formosans for Independence

Thailand

Pattani Liberation Front

Middle East and Northern Africa**Algeria**

Soldier of the Algerian Opposition
United Liberation Front of New Algeria

Iran

Fedayeen
Forghan
Iranian Peoples Strugglers (IPS; Mujahiddin e Khalq)
Iranian Students Association (ISA)
Moslem Liberation Front
National Front Forces of Iran
Reza Reza International Brigades

Iraq

Free Iraq

Israel

Wrath of God

Jordan

Jordanian Free Officers Movement
Jordanian National Liberation Movement

Lebanon

Imam As-Sadr Brigades
Lebanese Revolutionary Guard
Lebanese Revolutionary Socialist Movement
Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization
(Shibbu Gang)
Phalange
Phalangist Security Group
Revolutionary Arab Youth Organization
Socialist Labor Party
Standard Bearers of Imam Musa As-Sadr
Organization

Oman

Peoples Liberation Army

Palestine

Abdel Nasser Movement
Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
(AOLP)
Arab Communist Organization (CAO)
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)
Arab People (Ash-Shab al-'Arabi)
Arab Revolutionary Army-Palestinian Commando
Arab Revolutionary Movement
Arm of the Arab Revolution
Black June Organization (BJO)
Black March Organization
Black September-June
Black September Organization (BSO)
Commando Muhammed Boudia
Correct Course of Fatah (Al-Khat as-Sahih Lifatah)
Eagles of the Palestine Revolution (EPR; Red Eagles)
Fatah
Friends of the Arabs
Ghassan Kanafani Commandos
Group of the Fallen Abd al Kadir al Husayni
Mount Carmel Martyrs
National Organization of Arab Youth
Nationalist Youth Group for the Liberation of
Palestine
Organization of Arab Nationalist Youth for the
Liberation of Palestine (ANYOLP)
Organization for the Victims of Zionist Occupation
Organization of the Struggle Against World
Imperialism (SAWIO)
Organization of Avenging Palestinian Youth
Organization of the Sons of Occupied Territories

Organization of the Sons of Palestine
Organization of Victims of Occupied Territories
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PSF)
Palestine Rejection Front
Palestine Revolutionary Forces
Palestine Revolutionary Movement
**Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PDFLP)**
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
PFLP-General Command
PFLP-Special Operations
Punishment Squad (al Icab)
Rejection Front of Stateless Palestinian Arabs
Saiqa (Thunderbolt)
Seventh Suicide Squad
Sons of the Occupied Land
Squad of the Martyr Patrick Arguello


Saudi Arabia
**Union of the Peoples of the Arabian Peninsula
(UPAP)**

Yemen
Eagles of National Unity

APPENDIX B

Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks*
1968-79

Figure 1




*Casualty figures are particularly susceptible to fluctuations due to inclusion of especially bloody incidents.

International Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-79

Figure 6

Total: 3,336




1. Includes hijacking of modes of transportation for air, sea, or land, but excludes numerous non-terrorist hijackings.
 2. Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

Unclassified
 5/14/78

**International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-79**

Figure 2

Total Incidents: 3,336




Unclassified
SI 000 1-80

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-79

Figure 3

Total: 3,336




Unclassified
SIIS 73

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks Directed Against US Targets, 1968-79

Figure 4


Total: 1,348



Unclassified
SIIS 73

**Nationality of Victims
of International Terrorist Attacks,^a
1969-79**

Figure 5



^aThe percentage of the total number of incidents would be much smaller under the total number of incidents including victims from this region. Percentages are in excess of 100 due to incidents in which victims also had several regions.

1979 percentages are represented by solid sections of bars.

Table 1

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-79

Location	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
North America	35	7	23	24	18	18	38	51	37	23	19	25	318 (11.4)
Latin America	41	71	113	70	49	80	124	48	105	46	61	53	861 (25.8)
Western Europe	16	31	58	38	112	141	151	109	179	129	166	137	1,267 (38.0)
USSR/Eastern Europe	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	0	2	3	3	15 (0.4)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	7	8	4	4	4	9	18	16	20	24	10	124 (3.7)
Middle East and North Africa	18	32	60	52	35	21	47	56	62	48	61	39	531 (15.9)
Asia	1	12	19	24	43	10	11	13	14	8	16	26	197 (5.9)
Oceania	0	5	1	2	3	1	1	0	0	3	3	0	19 (0.5)
Transregional	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 (0.1)
Total	111	166	282	216	269	275	382	297	413	279	353	293	3,336

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each region.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 2

International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Target

Target	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Diplomatic officials or property	12	17	52	51	22	19	12	12	12	21	22	21	273 (20.3)
Military officials or property	4	2	38	36	11	12	12	9	33	40	30	7	204 (15.1)
Other Government officials or property	26	32	57	21	20	10	16	14	2	7	2	10	217 (16.1)
Business facilities or executives	6	25	24	40	44	51	86	42	52	33	47	27	487 (36.2)
Private citizens	3	7	17	5	12	10	13	27	26	13	21	12	166 (12.3)
Total	51	93	188	153	169	182	139	104	125	84	122	77	1,347

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of target.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 3

**International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Kidnaping	1	3	32	17	11	37	25	38	30	22	27	20	263 (7.9)
Barricade-hostage	0	0	5	1	3	8	9	14	4	5	11	13	73 (2.2)
Letter bombing	3	4	3	1	92	22	16	3	11	2	5	24	186 (5.5)
Incendiary bombing	12	22	53	30	15	31	37	20	91	57	69	19	456 (13.7)
Explosive bombing	67	97	104	115	106	136	239	169	176	131	133	115	1,508 (47.6)
Armed attack	11	13	8	8	9	10	21	11	21	14	36	26	188 (5.5)
Hijacking ²	3	11	21	9	14	6	8	4	6	8	2	8	100 (3.0)
Assassination	7	4	16	12	10	18	12	20	48	23	29	47	246 (7.4)
Theft, break-in	3	7	22	10	1	0	8	8	5	0	12	2	78 (2.3)
Sniping	3	2	7	3	4	3	3	9	14	6	9	8	71 (2.1)
Other actions ³	1	3	11	10	4	4	4	1	7	11	20	11	87 (2.6)

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

² Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.

³ Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 4

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Oceania	Trans-regional	Total
Kidnaping	3	144	25	0	40	34	15	2	0	263
Barricade-hostage	6	19	24	0	2	19	3	0	0	73
Letter bombing	15	9	100	0	14	7	37	0	4	186
Incendiary bombing	30	72	256	3	4	53	34	4	0	456
Explosive bombing	214	403	641	8	12	250	48	12	0	1,552
Armed attack	3	37	38	1	23	62	24	0	0	188
Hijacking ¹	6	23	19	1	7	28	16	0	0	100
Assassination	17	62	94	0	20	38	14	1	0	246
Theft, break-in	3	45	14	0	0	14	2	0	0	78
Sniping	12	32	9	1	1	13	3	0	0	71
Other actions ²	9	15	47	1	1	13	1	0	0	87
Total	318	861	1,267	15	124	531	197	19	4	3,336

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 5

International Terrorist Attack on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Attack

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Kidnaping	1	2	17	9	2	20	8	20	7	4	5	5	100 (7.4)
Barricade-hostage	0	0	3	0	1	2	2	1	1	3	0	3	16 (1.2)
Letter bombing	2	1	2	0	3	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	12 (0.9)
Incendiary bombing	12	18	40	26	13	19	25	4	36	24	49	39	278 (20.4)
Explosive bombing	30	58	77	93	73	52	90	63	44	35	40	38	693 (51.4)
Armed attack	1	4	3	4	6	6	5	3	8	3	11	7	61 (4.5)
Hijacking ²	0	4	12	3	4	0	0	2	5	4	0	1	35 (2.6)
Assassination	3	2	9	2	2	3	2	7	13	5	6	9	63 (4.7)
Theft, break-in	0	3	15	8	0	0	3	3	1	0	8	0	41 (3.0)
Seizure	2	1	5	2	2	0	3	1	5	4	3	3	31 (2.3)
Other actions ³	0	0	5	6	3	0	0	0	3	1	1	2	21 (1.6)
Total	51	93	188	153	109	102	139	104	125	84	123	77	1,348

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

² Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft.

³ Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 6

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1979, by Category of Attack

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Total
Kidnaping	1	11	2	0	1	1	4	20
Barricade-hostage	0	8	1	0	0	4	0	13
Letter bombing	1	0	22	0	0	1	0	24
Incendiary bombing	1	3	7	1	0	1	6	19
Explosive bombing	16	15	66	1	2	13	2	115
Armed attack	1	4	4	0	2	4	11	26
Hijacking ¹	1	1	0	1	0	4	1	8
Assassination	2	6	25	0	5	7	2	47
Theft, break-in	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Seizure	1	4	1	0	0	2	0	8
Other ²	1	0	8	0	0	2	0	11
Total	25	53	137	3	10	30	26	283

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 7

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Attack

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Oceania	Total
Kidnaping	0	61	1	0	14	20	4	0	100
Barricade-hostage	3	3	1	0	0	8	1	0	16
Letter bombing	3	2	1	0	2	0	4	0	12
Incendiary bombing	6	61	131	1	3	42	27	4	275
Explosive bombing	77	267	186	0	4	118	38	3	693
Armed attack	0	19	12	0	3	17	10	0	61
Hijacking ¹	6	5	11	0	0	3	10	0	35
Assassination	3	23	11	0	6	14	6	0	63
Theft, break-in	0	28	5	0	0	7	0	0	41
Seizure	0	16	4	1	0	7	3	0	31
Other actions ²	1	7	3	1	0	8	1	0	21
Total	99	492	366	3	32	244	105	7	1,348

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 8

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property, 1979, by Category of Attack

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Total
Kidnaping	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	3
Barricade-hostage	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	3
Letter bombing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Incendiary bombing	0	1	1	0	0	1	6	9
Explosive bombing	12	10	12	0	0	2	2	38
Armed attack	0	2	0	0	0	3	2	7
Hijacking ¹	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Assassination	1	0	6	0	1	0	1	9
Theft, break-in	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Seizure	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
Other ²	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Total	15	15	21	0	1	10	12	77

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

APPENDIX C

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE YEAR'S MOST SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- January 20 — Ronald Reagan inaugurated as President of the United States.
— U.S. citizen-hostages held by Iran released to start trip home.
- March 30 — President Reagan is wounded by a would-be assassin.
- May 10 — Francois Mitterand, a socialist, is elected President of France.
- May 13 — Pope John Paul II is wounded by a radical Turk already under sentence of death in his own country.
- June 7 — Israeli aircraft bomb a nuclear reactor in Iraq.
- August 13 — The Berlin Wall is 20 years old.
- August 19 — U.S. Navy jets shoot down two Libyan interceptors in international water off Libyan coast.
- August 30 — Iranian president and prime minister are killed by a bomb explosion.
- August 31 — A bomb explodes at Ramstein Air Force Base, West Germany, injuring 20 U.S. personnel.
- September 15 — West German terrorists attack General Frederick Kroesen, U.S. Army commander in Europe, but he survives with minor injuries.
- October 6 — President Anwar Sadat of Egypt is assassinated by religious extremists.
- October 27 — Soviet submarine goes aground in restricted area of Swedish coast.
— U.S. Senate approves the sale of airborne warning and communications aircraft (AWACS) to Saudi Arabia.
- November 18 — President Reagan describes a "Zero Option" for theater nuclear weapons in Europe.
- December 1 — U.S. and Israel sign a strategic cooperation agreement.
- December 13 — The Polish government declares martial law.
- December 15 — Israel annexes the Golan Heights.
- December 17 — Italian Red Brigade kidnaps U.S. Brigadier General James Dozier
- December 21 — Reacting to U.S. criticism of Golan Heights action, Israel abrogates the strategic cooperation with the United States.

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