Decision Process Models of Contractor Behavior: The Development of Effective Contract Incentives. Multi-Project Decision Process Model.
Abstract
A major premise of DOD incentive contracting for the development and production of new weapon systems is that contractors are primarily motivated to maximize profits. Research, however, suggests that the goal structure of contractors consists of survival, growth, market share, and reputation as well as profit. The relative operational importance of these goals is significantly influenced by the positions and responsibilities of the contractor's primary decision makers. Past research has failed to understand the differences between the traditional and the defense contracting markets. In this research, a computer simulation called the Decision Process Model (DPM) is developed which describes the organizational and contractual interaction of the defense contracting firm with the DOD by focusing on the decision process at the project manager level. The DPM simulates the actions of a project manager in a defense contracting firm and the interdependent actions of corporate and DOD management in a dynamic framework. It models actions on three organizational levels: contractor project manager, corporate level manager, and Government project manager, Basic elements incorporated into the model are DOD project goals, DOD incentive mechanisms, contractor goals, and contractor organizational response mechanisms. Each element is decoupled and parameterized to facilitate analysis of different incentive schemes and behavioral assumptions. Future research on the DPM will include validation studies consisting of scenario analysis, sensitivity analysis, and external validation. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1981
- Accession Number
- ADA121643
Entities
People
- Arie Y. Lewin
- Daniel L. Blakley
- Kalman J. Cohen
- Richard C. Morey
Organizations
- Duke University