Rational Cooperation in the Finitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma.

Abstract

The purpose of this note is to demonstrate how reputation effects due to informational asymmetries can generate cooperative behavior in finitely-repeated versions of the classic prisoners' dilemma. The methods employed are those developed in our work on the chain-store paradox (Kreps and Wilson 1981, Milgrom and Roberts 1981). We refer the reader to those papers for motivation, formal definitions, and interpretation. (Author)

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 01, 1982
Accession Number
ADA121729

Entities

People

  • David M. Kreps
  • John Andris Roberts
  • Paul Milgrom
  • Robert Wilson

Organizations

  • Stanford University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Asymmetry
  • Asymptotic Normality
  • Cooperation
  • Cooperative Games
  • Economics
  • Efficiency
  • Estimators
  • Military Research
  • Money
  • Non-Cooperative Games
  • Political Science
  • Probability
  • Psychology
  • Social Sciences
  • Three Dimensional
  • United States
  • Universities

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Game Theory.