Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Single-Peakedness Along a Linearly Ordered Set of Policy Alternatives.
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the question: Given a world in which both ideological labels and economic policies affect voter decisions, when is the basic assumption of Hotelling, Downs, et al. of single-peakedness along an ideological continuum justified? In particular, this question is studied for situations in which the link between ideological labels and economic policies is the one suggested by Downs (1957) in his explanation of why he focused entirely on the first of these. In this paper, this link is formalized by the assumption that each voter has a predictive map which assigns to each ideological label (or alternative predictive element) the economic policies which he thinks can be expected if a politician (or some other social aternative )identified with that label (or element) is the social choice.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1982
- Accession Number
- ADA121735
Entities
People
- Melvin J. Hinich
- Peter J. Coughlin
Organizations
- Stanford University