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
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
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Monterey, California



## THESIS

THE US AND THE FRG IN THE THIRD WORLD

by

Michael Kelly Hopkins

June 1982

Thesis Advisor:

M. Clough

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The US and the PRG in the Third World

by

Michael Kelly Hopkins

Major, United States Army

B.A., Texas A & M University, 1974

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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## ABSTRACT

German-American relations in the Third World constitute a vital concern to the entire international community and represent a particularly important subject for American policymakers at this time. Over the past three decades, the FRG has developed into one of the most important and stable allies of the United States. However, during the same period the FRG, once little more than a protectorate of the US, has become a medium-sized power, showing great economic strength and growing independence in pursuit of its national interest. Though the FRG's interests continue to strongly link it to the Western alliance, its increased economic strength, growing independence in international relations, and a more complex international environment makes differences of opinion between Germany and America more likely. Today German-American relations and foreign policy toward the Third World are complementary. However, there are differences and potential conflicts. This study examines the Third World policies of the FRG and the US in an attempt to determine whether or not they are likely to be a cause of conflict or cooperation in future German-American relations.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

Over the past 36 years, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has developed into one of the most important and stable allies of the United States. During the same period, however, the FRG, once little more than a dependent divided country has become a medium sized power in its own right. Though still aware of its American nuclear protection as well as the network of common interest and outlook tying it to the NATO alliance, the FRG is beginning to show a growing independence in the pursuit of its national interest. This independence is due largely to the increased freedom of diplomatic movement acquired through Ostpolitik - a policy that gave the FRG flexibility to work for a better economic and political relationship with East European states. West Germany's rise from the status of a client state to that of a full partner has brought about a number of problems for U.S.-German relations, issues related to the Third World.

A changing international environment has created possibilities for Germany to expand its global influence. The new international environment, with the advent of nuclear equivalence between the U.S. and USSR and the growing importance of economic issues in international relations, requires states to pursue the combination of political and economic policies for which Germany is well suited. The increased influence enjoyed by the FRG today is based on its economic potential, on its freedom of maneuver acquired through Ostpolitik, and on its NATO allies and the European Economic Community (EEC). Germany can use its growing influence and economic policies in the Third World as well

as in East and West relations, to help protect its security interests. By working with its partners in a European system in which it increasingly plays a larger role, Germany can count not only on its own resources but often on those of Western Europe as a whole. Increasingly, Germany is in a position to operate independently of the United States, either unilaterally or in concert with other European countries. However, Germany continues to suffer from deep vulnerabilities. In dealing with all nations, it must live with its history, with relative military weakness, and with the division of the German nation. In dealing with the Third World, and especially the resource countries, it must overcome its import dependence.

At the same time the FRG's influence is increasing, so is its insecurity, and so is America's vulnerabilities. The U.S. now depends on many foreign resources, most notably oil. American well being is more exposed to outside events than before, whether those events are political or economic in nature. The United States can no longer chart its own course without concern for how others might react. The U.S. has to count on its allies more than before.

Although possessing clearly superior military clout and economic resources, America has not been able to bring its full strength to bear in the new international environment. Americans' views of the world and of themselves were changed by the Vietnam and Watergate experiences. Although events in Iran and Afghanistan sparked a rebirth of patriotic sentiment, the effects of these earlier attitudes and changes continue.

The combination of increasing German power and independence and a more complex international situation makes differences of opinion between Germany and America more likely. Today the United States and Germany must coordinate

their policies on a wide range of problems that may arise all over the globe, whether political, economic, or even military. Minerals, apartheid, instability in southern Africa, lines of communication (LOC), and human rights in Latin America are only a few examples of policy issues that require discussion. Now that economic issues have come to occupy such a central role in international relations without security issues being any less important it is almost certain that disagreements will develop.

Today, there is a sense that the FRG has a wider range of options, or that at the very least Germany must go along with alliance decisions, not with American wishes. Therefore, differences must be resolved on the basis of common agreement on the problem and on the policies necessary to solve it. Moreover, the range of issues on which differences can arise is wider than ever. Today German-American relations and foreign policy toward the Third World are basically complementary. However, there have been and continue to be important differences and potential conflicts between these two countries. My analysis will examine the extent of the differences in order to understand them and determine if they are growing.

## B. THE ISSUES

Before addressing German-American differences in the Third World in detail it is necessary to survey German foreign policy toward the Third World. The general focus will address the following important questions: (1) What are the determinants of German foreign policy toward the Third World? (2) What are German interests in the Third World-economic, military, political, or a combination? (3) Does Germany see the Third World in East-West, North-South, or West-South terms? (4) Which issues and areas are priority

concerns of Germany? The more specific aim of this analysis is to: (1) Examine the major US/FRG policies toward the Third World, (2) Determine if there is a convergence between US and German views of the Soviet threat to the Third World, (3) Determine if there are differences between the US and German preferred strategies for dealing with Third World conflicts, and (4) Investigate differences between US and German posture toward the New International Economic Order (NIEO).

### C. GERMANY'S CHANGING POSITION IN THE WORLD VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

In the early 1970s Germany emerged as a strong actor in world affairs. Previously, the Germans concentrated upon affairs at home and in Europe. Beyond those areas, the United States was regarded as the protector of German interests, with the world economic and security system led by the United States essentially supplying Germany's needs. West Germany developed extensive trade relations with many countries, but abstained from political involvement, maintaining a low profile policy. Its policy was based largely on the Hallstein Doctrine, under which it would break relations with any state that recognized East Germany. The Hallstein Doctrine was proclaimed by Bonn in the late fifties when both the rival German states were beginning to develop more active policies of trade, aid, and diplomatic relations throughout the world. This doctrine explicitly embodied in the FRG the right of sole representation of the German nation and laid down the rule that no state (except the USSR) could be permitted to maintain diplomatic relations with Bonn as well as the GDR. This dominant influence in Bonn's foreign relations was a factor that inhibited

development of more flexible and constructive relationships- for instance, with the Arab states in the sixties; and it meant that Bonn's diplomats in Third World countries were excessively preoccupied by the need to monitor and to counter the influence of the GDR. [Ref. 1]. AT the same time West Germans perceived world events in the mirror of their own immediate concerns near home and saw no reason for any independent or significant world role. [Ref. 2].

This situation changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The US, because of Vietnam, Watergate, the recession of 1973, and the oil crisis, was less able to protect German interests internationally. After the 1973, Arab-Israeli war and the drastic oil price hike of 1973, raw material shortages and high petroleum prices became a dominant concern of German policy makers. Moves by the U.S. and USSR to establish detente and the movement by the FRG away from the Hallstein Doctrine freed Germany to move more freely on the international scene. Germany began to play a greater international role not only economically but also politically.

As its freedom to act in world affairs has expanded the FRG has tended to move on the world scene largely in concert with partners in the European Community (EC). This suits the German desire to maintain a low profile. German policies in the world as a whole still concentrate heavily on economic relations, but they have also developed through the EC and separately a notable political content.

German policy as part of the EC has occasionally put the FRG in disagreement, with the US, when a majority of the EC wanted to pursue policies different from the US. In these cases, the FRG has tried to play a mediating role, not abandoning EC policies but attempting to structure them in order to reduce conflict with US policy.

There are exceptions to Germany's general policy of acting in concert with its EC partners. One example of this is the sale of German civilian nuclear technology abroad. In this area Germany has acted on its own. This industry was regarded by the Germans in the 1960s and early 1970s as a key element in their strategy to stay in the lead of international technology exports. After 1973, the Germans also saw this industry as a way to greater energy and economic independence. The Germans have sold nuclear power plants to a number of states. The biggest and most sensitive contract was with Brazil for \$5 billion signed in 1975. This contract created a crisis between the FRG and the US when the US challenged it as a potential source of proliferation in an area of particular US sensitivity-Latin America.

Today the FRG has a European relation and a US relation. Germany attempts to develop a European consensus that will not create a rift with the US. At the same time, Germany does not want to be perceived as Washington's puppet or as Europe's directing power.

Germany's relationship with the US has shown, over many years and through many changes of political leadership, a striking absence of major conflicts at all levels. Despite a successful record of coordination in the face of pressures that might have been extremely disruptive, tensions and conflicts in the Third World do exist between Washington and Bonn and require a close examination. At least three of these issues threaten to cause serious friction. These issues are first, how to respond to the demands of the world's poorer countries for a new economic order in North-South relations; second, how to deal with Third World conflicts; and finally, how to respond to the Soviet threat to the Third World. It must be determined if areas of friction are minor or whether they are expressions of a deepening divergence between the FRG and the US.



#### D. ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE

In this study I will not attempt to list all the current or potential issues of the German-American North-South dialogue. That would require a major book, since it would relate to virtually all significant international problems. Nor will I describe personal relations of senior officials. Instead, I will look at the foundations of the relationship and use some central issues and cases to illustrate the importance and complexity.

Chapter II deals with the formulation of German foreign policy and how policy is a reflection of certain interests. This chapter is intended to highlight the motivations behind the FRG policies toward the Third World in the NIEO, how they relate to US Third World policy and US policy toward the World as a whole. Chapter III examines the US and FRG strategy toward Third World conflicts and the Soviet threat. This chapter will explain how the Germans view the Third World in a West-South framework rather than in terms of East-West conflicts. Germany feels the Soviets are losing influence and with patience, most countries can be moved out of the Soviet camp. Two case studies, South Africa/Namibia and El Salvador, will be used to illustrate and explain findings in chapter III. Tensions currently exists between the U.S. and the FRG. Germany has attempted to deal with these tensions, both in its position as a member of the NATO alliance and as a junior partner to the US, even with growing conflicts over peripheral Third World countries. Finally, chapter IV will conclude with a summary of the differences in US/FRG Third World policies and argue that even though differences will continue, common interest are strong and stable enough to overcome all differences if careful and responsible effort is made on both sides.

## **II. THE US AND FRG IN THE NIEO**

### **A. THE NIEO**

In recent years, the less-developed countries of the world have been calling for a "New International Economic Order". One noted Third World economist has said that what these countries are really seeking is "greater equality of opportunity in the future, which is impossible to achieve within the present economic imbalances and the existing world structures which favor the rich nations". He cites the international credit system as an example: "poor nations, with 70% of the world population, have received less than 4% of the international credit of \$126 billion in the last two decades" [Ref. 3: p. 2].

### **B. THE US AND THE THIRD WORLD**

Members of the Third World have turned for cooperation and help to the advanced industrial powers, and especially to the United States. In the past U.S. assistance programs have not had the effects intended and Third World Countries have not taken steps for real development-to reform the use and control of land, to promote investment, to reform their bureaucracies, or to control growth of their populations. Even though the Third World is heavily dependent on the United States and will be increasingly so-especially for food- the United States also has a large and growing interest in cooperative relations with the Third World. To state a few of the more evident reasons:

1. The United States is now importing over 30% of its oil needs from the Third World; and this requirement will probably go higher.

2. U.S. industry is almost wholly dependent on foreign sources of chromium, cobalt, bauxite, manganese, and tin. Between 40% and 95% of these imported minerals are from the Third World.
3. The developing countries are increasingly important as markets for exports. In 1979 26% of U.S. manufactured exports went to the non-oil developing countries. These export markets in the developing world are estimated to maintain about one out of every 20 jobs in the manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy.
4. Trade with the Third World helps in the fight against inflation. For example, a recent analysis based on a survey of actual retail sales in the U.S. found that imports from the developing countries were as much as 16.3% cheaper than similar goods produced in the U.S. In contrast, imports from developed countries were only 0.5% cheaper than American products. This saves U.S. consumers more than \$2 billion a year. It is estimated that for low income groups this is a savings of 13% by purchasing goods made in developing countries rather than in the U.S.
5. Half of total U.S. bank loans to foreign borrowers go to the Third World.
6. Economic growth in the less-developed countries (LDCs) is expected to have a significant positive impact on the growth rates of the developed countries. The total demand of the LDCs was important in maintaining the production level of goods and services in the U.S. during the 1974-75 recession.
7. Relatively prosperous LDCs are more likely to experience political and economic stability that would benefit U.S. economic and security interest.

8. More rapid development of certain LDCs could lessen the pressure for emigration by providing employment opportunities in those countries.
  9. About one-third of American exports already go to the less-developed countries. With further development, these same countries could provide a considerably larger market. Most economists seem to believe that advantages to the global economy from increased trade would be great.
  10. The original value of American private direct investments in the Third World is over \$30 billion, and market value is perhaps double that. Earnings from these investments amount to about 5% of total U.S. corporate profits.
  11. Cooperative relations with the Third World is essential if we are to cope with such global concerns such as drugs, disease, law-of-the-sea, population, environment, terrorism, and possible nuclear thefts.
- [Ref. 4]

The philosophy of the NEIO was first set forth in a "Declaration" and then in a "Program of Action" (both adopted by the UN on May 1, 1974). The new order was to "redress existing injustices" and make possible the elimination of the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries. These two resolutions were soon followed by a "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States". The issues dealt with the following: (1) Expropriations of foreign industrial property without due regard for international law on compensation; (2) the encouragement of "producer associations"; (3) establishment of export and import of developing countries" (4) The Charter acknowledged that "responsibility for the development of every country rests primarily on itself"; (5) The

Declaration acknowledged a "close interdependence between prosperity of the developed and the growth and the development of the developing countries"; and (6) The Charter called for "higher standards of living for all peoples," not just those of the less-developed countries. [Ref. 5]

### C. PAST US POLICIES TOWARD THE SOUTH

By the mid-1960s the United States in addition to having supported the goal of independence for many of the developing countries had provided large amounts of public and private capital. Also, the American role as champion of development assistance seemed to meet with wide approval at home and abroad.

The decade of the sixties was one of considerable progress for the less-developed countries: with rapidly rising exports, they collectively increased their real national product much faster than the industrial countries had done at a comparable stage in their own history. However, gradually there were second thoughts about bilateral aid on both sides. Some of the LDCs complained that it involved too much interference in their economic policy decisions, it was politically motivated, it was insufficient, it was unpredictable and it enriched a few but not much trickled down to the mass of people.

In the U.S. view the program was sometimes mismanaged or corrupt and gained little appreciation. Over time, the events of Vietnam, the recession of 1973, and the oil crisis all had a bearing on American attitudes toward the cost of foreign involvement and thus toward foreign aid.

In view of the disappointing results obtained from U.S. aid program U.S. aid,. placing major emphasis on the poor countries. Some other developed countries began to follow a similar policy, as did the World Bank in its development assistance programs.

#### D. THE US VIEW OF THE THIRD WORLD TODAY

Today although there have been increasing aid flows to the poorer LDCs from members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the largest amounts continue to be provided by the industrial powers. [Ref. 6: p. 11] The industrial powers have been providing official development assistance rather than private capital, which they have furnished in large amounts. The developed countries have furnished about \$12 billion per year-of which the U.S. contributes about \$4 billion. [Ref. 7: p. 12]

Believing that there will not be any sizable increase in aid in the near future the LDCs have looked more and more for other ways to increase the flow of resources to promote their development. The U.S. has urged LDCs to look more to private capital markets, and to take steps that encourage foreign investments. The LDCs in turn have been seeking new preferential trade arrangements and special trade advantages for their raw materials or commodities in which they want a higher return on than market prices have provided.

Industrial nations want to promote mutually beneficial change while preserving the fundamentals of a system they believe has served the interest of all countries. The industrial nations believe the system has responded flexibly over the last three decades to major global changes-including the growing economic and political importance of the developing countries. The U.S. favors continued evolution of this system. Sudden changes in the rules for investment and financial transactions, or massive shifts in trade patterns, prevents overall economic activity. The U.S. wants an international system that promotes efficient use of the world's resources and provides the stability required for trade and financial transactions. Thus, the U.S.

supports basically open trade and free capital flows. Change must be at a rate that can be absorbed without undue dislocation. [Ref. 8: p. 1]

The U.S. believes that increased trade is an important force in promoting the economic growth for the less developed countries. For most LDCs, trade rather than official aid is the main source of foreign exchange and the primary external factor in economic progress. The ability of the LDCs to buy from the advanced countries the goods they need for their development is dependent to a large extent on expanding their exports. The U.S. and other developed countries have instituted a temporary generalized system of preferences (GSP) for LDCs to encourage development of exports of manufactures. The U.S. GSP allows specific LDC products to enter the U.S. duty-free. In 1980, \$7.3 billion worth of LDC exports entered the U.S. under this program. [Ref. 9: p. 1]

There are many points of differences between developed countries and the Third World, however, the climate for addressing these differences are favorable. In many ways the industrial nations and LDCs find themselves in a state of mutual economic dependency. The U.S. stake in the Third World is growing, and the leverage of the Third World is growing, and as a result, the ability of the Third World to affect the U.S. is growing. It seems the U.S. and other developed countries understand these facts and are formulating policy accordingly.

## **B. GERMAN THIRD WORLD POLICY IN THE NIEO**

The debate on the idea of a "new international economic order" became a central theme of world diplomacy in the mid-1970s with the U.S and FRG being major actors. In debates in the UN's seventh Special Assembly in September

1975, in the fourth UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi in June 1976, in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation which lasted from the end of 1975 until June 1977, and Cancun in 1981 the views of the U.S. and FRG received much attention.

In the 1970s the FRG and the U.S. began to disagree on issues of North-South economic relations. The Conference on International Economic Cooperation, in which representatives of "have" and "have-not" nations tried to reach a common position, met in 1976 and then waited to see what view a new American administration would take. President Carter's position turned out to be distinctly opposed to that taken by the FRG.

The FRG argued strongly against international economic planning and the provision of large buffer stocks of raw materials, on the grounds that such actions would distort the operation of world market forces, the Carter administration liked the idea of buffer stocks and international planning of raw material markets. [Ref. 10]

The most striking feature of the German position on the major issues of North-South economic relations-and in particular on the question of the management of trade in raw materials sold by poorer producing countries to the industrialized nations of the Northern Hemisphere- is the sharp conflict which has emerged between the strong laissez-faire economic principles of the Germans and the commitment of almost all their partners to some degree of international economic planning. In every conference in which the North-South dialogue has been discussed the FRG has been relatively isolated in opposition to demands from developing countries, and also to the views of Germany's western partners including the U.S. on the subjects of international planning and financing of raw materials stocks.



Part of the conflict of views and policies is due to the suddenness with which the industrial countries had to face the challenge of the raw material producer's demand for a new deal after the Middle Eastern oil revolution of 1973. The rapid development of the oil producing countries' demands in UNCTAD, and their bargaining power as a united bloc, forced the industrial countries of the West to adopt positions that in most cases reflect their national and ideological assumptions about economic policy, rather than positions that were well thought out.

A historical look at actual policies pursued with respect to the Third World shows some persistent patterns. In his first message as head of government, Konrad Adenauer set the tone when he addressed non East-West problems. "The development and the freedom of international trade is the subject of our special attention. [Ref. 11: p. 183].

An independent foreign policy in the formal sense did not start before the mid-1950s, when the FRG became a sovereign state. Its foreign policy toward the Third World was slow to develop in the fifties, and sixties. The Federal Diet programmed a limited amount of development aid in 1956. The first piece of legislation setting guidelines for a development policy was not enacted before 1960. The first comprehensive debate about Third World policies was conducted in Parliament in May 1961. The head of the trade policy section in the Foreign Ministry defined the motives of German Third World Politics in 1965 to be:

1. humanitarian motives, in order to mitigate the misery in many countries;
2. economic motives, because only economically strong countries would provide for meaningful markets, sufficient supplies and investment opportunities;

3. finally, motives of national policy. [Ref. 12: p. 183]

Despite the first priority being given to the humanitarian motive, the second dominated relations with the Third World. Humanitarian aid program with first priority would have focussed on the poverty-stricken countries or least developed countries, and would have largely supported food aid and disaster relief. None of these programmes dominate in actual West German aid patterns.

There is evidence of some humanitarian aid, but the commitment of the FRG was strongest to those areas where a clear cut economic interest could also be gained. The third motive, mainly the issue of German reunification, played a role but it is hard to find cases where this priority contradicted economic interest. On the international level in the area of production and trade, the FRG has long-standing priorities, inherited from former political systems-economic priorities that seem to still be true today.

Africa has played a central role in German policy. Latin America was for the most part considered the backyard of the U.S., and in spite of activity on the part of industry, little political attention was paid, to Latin America, as indicated by the absence of such things as military aid programs. Latin America was left to commercial enterprises until the late sixties when Bonn undertook large aid programs and political experiments-like training union officials.

Asia was also less important than Africa. Bonn felt such more comfortable concentrating on the traditional focus of German colonial policies, i.e. Africa. The Afrika-Handbuch of the semi-official Afrika-Verein maintains that:

the comparatively low share of Africa in international trade (between 5 to 6 percent of imports and exports at this time, UA) does not reflect the actual importance which the continent enjoys today, and will enjoy even more so in the future. Also today Africa plays an important role with a variety of crops in production and export...in another area, Africa is about to become one of the most important partners of the world: in the production of minerals. Numerous stocks, partially rich in potential, are known. [Ref. 13: p. 184] The Afrika-Verein quotes known reserves as: being very vast in chromium, bauxite, diamonds, iron ore, gold, cobalt, copper, mangan, platin; being vast in asbestos, beryllium, lead, columbite, natural gas, petrol, glimmer, graphite, uranium, vanadium, vermiculite; being average in antimonium, barite, cadmium, fluorite, silver, titanium, tin; and being small in coal, molybdenum, nickel, sulphur, tungsten, zinc. [Ref. 14]

Post-war Germany developed close relations with southern Africa where there were already many German links both with the Republic of South Africa and with South West Africa (Namibia). The former country had been partly settled by Europeans of German origin (these accounted for as much as 28 percent of the white population), and the latter territory had been a German colony from 1885 to 1919, before passing under a South African mandate, later revoked by the United Nations (UN). Southern Africa continued from the fifties onward to be an important area for German trade and investment (South Africa in 1973 provided the FRG with 54 percent of its manganese, 48 percent of its copper, and 29 percent of its chromium. [Ref. 15: p. 61] In 1980 Germany was 99.8 percent import-dependent in copper, 93 percent in iron, 87 percent in lead, and 68 percent in zinc. And Germany has been stockpiling such critical ores as chromity, cobalt, and manganese. [Ref. 16]

When Germany became a sovereign international actor in the mid-fifties the overriding principle was Deutschlandpolitik (German politics) rather than Aussenpolitik (foreign politics) -Germany tried to do everything possible to hold back the influence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) in order to preserve the FRG's claim to speak for Germany as a whole.

The so-called "Hallstein Doctrine", proclaimed by Bonn in the late fifties when both German states were beginning to develop more active policies of trade, aid, and diplomatic relations, stated that the FRG had the right of sole representation of the German nation. The doctrine laid down the rule that no state, with the exception of the Soviet Union, could be permitted to maintain diplomatic relations with Bonn as well as the GDR, and if a state established relations with the GDR, the FRG would automatically break all relations -- including the eligibility of economic aid, technical assistance, and diplomatic representation.

This policy was not popular among Third World countries. However, the FRG was not alone in the use of such policy. The U.S. has repeatedly used this type of policy as a tool to oppose regimes which came to power after liberation wars, most notably China. The GDR was, at least in the views of the more Moscow - oriented Third World governments, a state which emerged from a social revolution, and the withholding of recognition as a measure of discrimination, punishment and isolation was easily compared with cases when the Western powers treated some revolutionary Third World governments in exactly the same manner.

The Hallstein Doctrine collapsed in the Third World in 1965/66 when Tanganyika (a supporter of the West) and Zanzibar (with a Consulate General of the GDR) united to form Tanzania, and the Head of State wouldn't annoy the East

Germans by closing the consulate. Bonn stopped all military and some economic aid. In the Middle East Bonn's relations with Arab nations went bad with their support of Israel with military deliveries and Ulbricht (GDR Head of State) touring Egypt on a state visit. Arab governments copied Bonn's strategy and threatened to apply a reverse Hallstein Doctrine by severing diplomatic relations with the FRG if there was an exchange of ambassadors between West Germany and Israel. The next few years saw a determined effort by Bonn to contain the recognition of East Germany, but after Ostpolitik in 1969, there was a wave of diplomatic recognitions, and since then the issue has been dead. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Bonn's unwillingness to compromise a fragile relationship with the Arab world led to a sharp clash between the FRG and the U.S., which used its facilities in West Germany to supply military support to Israel.

Germany's policy in respect to the export of arms and weapon systems in the fifties through the early 1970s was one of "not willing to act as the substitute of the sales managers of German arms industries." [Ref. 17: p. 186] After 1974 the policy was one of only exporting arms to NATO countries. [Ref. 18: p. 187]

Soon after the price hike of crude oil in 1973 and the economic depression the FRG had second thoughts on its arms control policy and changed its restrictive policy. Commercial sales of German weapons developed from \$100 million in 1969 to \$1 Billion in 1977 [Ref. 19: p. 188] according to figures from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the export to Third World countries rose to \$150 million in the same time period. Prior to the Shah of Iran's abdication in early 1979, orders placed with the German armament industry were valued at DM 1 billion, an amount comparable with the French and the British.

The redirection of policy was the most dramatic in arms exports but other fields which were much more relevant to the German economic system quickly followed suit. The nuclear industry, another good example of sophisticated technology, fits the pattern. The commercial interest involved in the transfer of nuclear power stations is higher than in the case of arms sales: at a unit cost of DM 5 billion each individual sale creates six thousand jobs for six years. The German nuclear industry for many years paid a high cost for its technology at the same time lacking the export profits which other competitors were enjoying. [Ref. 20] In the mid-seventies the nuclear industry reached a point of non-profitability: "In order to use existing capacities economically, under given contract volumes the sale of six power station units per annum is mandatory...." [Ref. 21] export sales manager Hildenbrand states.

Germany accepted power station orders from Brazil (which caused a sharp conflict with the U.S.) and Iran, and expected orders for eight more annually, four of them for export. Then environmentalists brought construction work for nearly all nuclear power stations to a halt in the FRG and the biggest firm in the business, Kraftwerksunion didn't receive an order for four years. This caused pressures on the government to go into export of nuclear power stations to mount. In 1979 with eight nuclear power stations contracted to Germany, the Shah left Iran, leaving DM 5 billion worth of uncompleted facilities. This was a big shock to Germany's nuclear industry, which was unable to get other nuclear power stations export orders during the late seventies. There was some demand in the Soviet Union and South Africa- this left the industry in a position of fighting for survival and not wanting to go through another international storm such as in the nuclear deal with Brazil.

This picture could be drawn in nearly the same way for other German industries such as steel, ship-building, computers, heavy engineering equipment, to name a few which have suffered much from a combined impact of a shrinking home market and the high cost of the mark. For foreign economic policies, room for purely political considerations is dramatically reduced, and diplomats hardly have a choice other than support of German firms who fight for survival in the world markets.

It seems that pressures from vital economic interests play a big role in shaping the actual outcome of Bonn's Third World policies, especially the vulnerability of West German on imports of vital raw materials. This fact makes it essential for the FRG to build relations with suppliers outside the industrialized world. Africa with its rich resources becomes a focus of interest. When seen in this respect, it is obvious why Africa receives the largest amount of German development aid. (See Table I). Today German Third World policies are more or less equivalent to earlier patterns-that of a mix of industrial interest based on an effort to lure Third World countries into a convenient relationship which is much like the one that contributed much to the rise of the colonial powers of Western Europe in earlier times.

#### **F. THE US AND FRG IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA**

Before examining how U.S. and the FRG view conflicts it is necessary to briefly put their roles in Africa in perspective. Africa is an ideal area to compare U.S. and FRG policy toward the Third World because the Germans view Africa as the centerpiece of their Third World policy and for the U.S., today, Africa is an important part of U.S. Third World relations.

In general the great majority of states in Sub-Sahara Africa achieved their independence from Europeans through a peaceful transfer of authority beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Even so, European presence and policy has continued to be the principle instrument of western interest in Africa. However, during the last few years Africa has created increasingly important policy choices for the U.S.: how to bring about peaceful change in South Africa, how to decrease massive human suffering, how to strengthen the political economies of African states, how to respond to the invasion of Gambia, how to deal with Zaire's corruption and ineffectiveness, and the question of how much support for the Angolan war for independence. From 1960 to 1974 the U.S. and the USSR were directing their attention to other areas of the world and a favorable international climate existed. Neither the U.S. or USSR sent heavy military equipment to the area. The U.S. gave Africa low priority and depended upon the Europeans to maintain Western interest there.

Since 1974 the picture has changed. Liberation movements have gained power with substantial Soviet support. The Soviets established a major presence in the Horn of Africa and began to send heavy arms to Sub-Sahara Africa. Angola and Ethiopia received large amount equipment. Since 1974 the USSR has directly challenged U.S. and Europe interests in Africa, thus making it a more important part of foreign policy and creating a new environment.

The tension in the area is increased by U.S. and Western reliance on southern African minerals: Zaire's copper and cobalt; Zambia's copper; Zimbabwe's chrome; Angola's oil; Namibia's uranium; and South Africa's chromium, manganese and platinum group metals. The situation is even more complicated by the South African's commitment to apartheid and its





military and economic strength and ability to project this strength in southern Africa. Also, many Africans associate Western economic presence in South Africa as support for its government, making a peaceful and orderly transition to majority rule there an important issue to all Africa.

These problems are further influenced by underlying conditions such as, economic, political and military infrastructure deficiencies in a majority of African states. Africa is the most vulnerable continent. Two-thirds of the poorest LDCs are Africans; among them there was practically no economic growth during the 1970s and little is predicted for the 1980s, and famine and refugee populations have greatly risen since the mid-1970s. The poverty of many of these countries is incredibly poor and the outlook was further darkened by the 1979-80 OPEC oil price hikes. The many armed conflicts and military coups have derived from these poor conditions. The new environment, the increased reliance on African minerals, the intensification of southern African conflict, and continuing infrastructure deficiencies in the political economies of Africa together present increasingly difficult choices for the U.S. and Germany.

#### **G. WEST GERMANY'S FORMULATION OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY TODAY**

West German foreign policy is typically formulated with close reference to the European Community policies and those of the United States. Policy towards Africa takes place within this framework and may be characterized as "cooperative pragmatic"; neither leading nor standing alone on issues nor bound by "special relationships" but asserting and expanding interests in a manner designed to give maximum

benefit to the German economy. Since 1978 there has been a trend towards a more pronounced involvement and quietly assertive policy in southern Africa which comes from a conviction that West Germany's economy is significantly reliant upon the region's minerals. There is also greater awareness of Africa in Germany; for example, the 1980 Frankfurt Book Fair had as its theme "Africa: A Continent Asserts its Identity" with 35 African authors and journalists present and 2500 African works on exhibit. [Ref. 22: p. 61] increasing across the board, a defined policy is taking shape in the related but distinct areas of political, economic and security relationships and with respect to South Africa and Namibia.

#### 1. Political Relationships

The basis of German policy was outlined in speeches that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made in Nigeria and Zambia in 1978 during the first official state visit by a German chief of state to black Africa. Schmidt asserted that Germany wanted to see "an Africa undergoing steady economic and social development on a basis of political stability." [Ref. 23: p. 82] A prime principle of policy is recognition of the OAU principle of incontestable boundaries and the support of an Africa of Africans with African solutions.

European political considerations, particularly East German considerations, are an important element of policy. [Ref. 24: p. 93] Ostpolitik modified the Hallstein Doctrine but the expanded role of East Germany in Africa since the mid-1970s has caused particular concern in West Germany. Of considerable significance is West Germany's inability to conclude aid and trade agreements with Angola and Mozambique. The latter are signatories of Friendship Treaties with the Soviet Union and are not willing to accept

provisions in agreements with West Germany-the so-called "Berlin clause"- by which the provisions of the agreements are extended to West Berlin.

## 2. Economic Relations

Europe and Africa are viewed by Germans as natural economic partners and policy is designed to help Africa become a stronger partner through an increased transfer of real resources and technology and the encouragement of private investment. The government believes that the basic economic questions with which it is faced-economic growth, monetary stability and unemployment -- directly affect the LDCs and that growth in the industrialized countries is the major prerequisite for Third World development.

Africa is viewed as the centerpiece of the North-South relationship with the Lome Convention being one of the principal expressions of policy. Germany is a major aid donor, contributing 28 percent of EC and 11 percent of World Bank aid to Africa and is increasing its own aid budget for Africa 23 percent a year through 1983. Germany is the only major aid donor which does not tie aid to purchase of national products, believing that its products are competitive. There is widespread public support for economic assistance which has been present for years as being in German interests.

Germany is a stronger advocate of free trade than its British or French partners who sometimes promote protective quotas. Germany favored a STABEX formula in Lome rather than international commodity agreements, believing the latter produce distortions in markets rather than stabilize secular trends. [Ref. 25: p. 63]

There is little direct German investment in black Africa; with only Nigeria holding more than \$100 million.

Germany has a \$350 million direct investment in South Africa and its private banks are major creditors there.

### 3. Security Relations

Germany's principal security interests in Africa are (1) assured long-term access to oil and minerals, (2) support for more fully independent states, and (3) crisis avoidance. The Germans see a region of somewhat fragile and unstable states which should be strengthened economically in order to function more effectively in what is now a fully integrated world economy. Existing weaknesses are agitated by the Russian-Cuban-East German presence and there is the danger that regional crisis could blow up into a major crisis. The preferred instrument for dealing with African crisis is the OAU which is not viewed as being very effective but as being the only regional organization with which to work.

In general, Germany accepts the U.S. security point of view with respect to Africa; i.e., that the U.S. tends to examine every issue in terms of the East-West conflict. However, for Germany, the East-West conflict means Europe and it treats African issues in a West-South framework. Germany is closer to its European allies than to the U.S. with respect to its perception of Soviet influence in Africa. It believes that the Soviets are losing influence in Angola, Mozambique and Benin and that, with patience, even Ethiopia can be moved out of the Soviet camp. They note that the Soviets were removed from Egypt and Somalia, they had made major efforts, and Germany feels that in the long-term Ethiopia could move back towards the West.

These differences raise the possibility of sharper divergencies in policy response in the future, particularly given the new environment in Africa. Although the African

policies of Germany have not been a subject of great interest in the past, they may merit more attention in the future.

#### **H. COMPARISON OF THE US AND FRG FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD, AS SEEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

The U.S. and the FRG share two basic interests in Africa. First, there is a common interest in access to minerals and markets; southern African minerals are vital to Germany and important to the United States. Second, the U.S. and the FRG wish to be able to deny these assets as well as port facilities and oceanways to the Soviets and their allies. A third interest is to minimize North-South conflict and maintain as much support in international organizations from the African states as possible. These interests are interrelated.

Within the context of this commonality of interest there are differences in interpreting what constitutes instability. For example, some policy makers see Cuban military forces in Angola as destabilizing while others see them as stabilizing. There are also differences in priority. As a global power the U.S. tends to see issues in an East-West relation while the FRG tends to see East-West issues as the West meaning Europe; while German relations with Africa are seen primarily as North-South or West-South issues. The Germans, in particular, are concerned that a Reagan Administration overemphasis on the East-West dimension of African conflict could have a negative effect on arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

##### **1. Southern Africa: Minerals, Apartheid, Instability**

Possibly the most prominent African issues directly challenging the U.S. and Germany are those in southern

Africa. Here the interest of long-term access to strategic minerals is related to maintaining a degree of political stability and pro-western attitudes which are threatened by contention over apartheid (South Africa), stalled independence (Namibia), civil strife (Angola), ethnic hostilities (Zimbabwe), and ineffectual government (Zaire). The dilemmas they represent apply primarily to African conditions and attitudes. An additional concern is preventing those conditions and attitudes from being exploited by the USSR.

African minerals are vital to Western economies. Most of the World's minerals are found in Africa and many are an important part of world supply, particularly the energy fuels- oil, coal and uranium - and non-fuel minerals such as chromium and manganese. The money and technology are available for exploiting these resources. Therefore, the real issue is the nature of the regimes which exercise political control and what this means in terms of issues ranging from maintaining physical security of supply and transport to adherence to a market economy philosophy.

The most vital minerals to the U.S. and FRG, in terms of both use and limited access to other sources, are found in South Africa. The issue is one of longer term stability within South Africa rather than investment and production. South Africa now has one of the world's healthiest minerals industries.

South African apartheid - legal discrimination against blacks - renders cooperation with and acceptance of that government difficult for the U.S. and FRG. The U.S. and FRG seem in agreement that the basic issue facing them in South Africa is how to bring about change while preserving their interests. Both countries' governments and business communities view the Afrikaner government as rigid

and fundamental change ranging from unlikely to uncertain. They also seem assured that South African security capabilities are adequate to maintain law and order, at least for the short term, but they further believe that the government has initiated a policy of some change.

The basic policy for the U.S. and FRG is to denounce apartheid, advocate political participation for all, and promote codes of conduct to enhance black economic opportunity and life. Under President Carter the U.S. differed from Europe in specifically stating that change would come and in giving greater emphasis to human rights. The position of the Reagan Administration is more similar to the Germans who are explicit about dealing with the government in power. The Reagan Administration has moved the U.S. closer to South Africa, however, with its policy of "constructive engagement" and a desire to end South Africa's oppressed class status and resume friendly relations. [Ref. 26: p. 79]

There are some differences in approach. Basically, the Germans, place heavy emphasis on "contact and dialogue." Economic sanctions are viewed as bad policy and unlikely to be effective; however they indicate that time is running out in South Africa and pressures for change must be maintained. [Ref. 27]

## 2. Namibia

Namibia, which is a major producer of uranium and industrial diamonds, is a UN mandated territory administered by South Africa in violation of the UN mandate. In 1977 the U.S., France, Germany, the UK, and Canada, formed a "contact group" for the purpose of reaching an agreement to hold elections and grant independence to Namibia under UN supervision. South Africa agreed "in principle" to a



contact group plan submitted to the UN Security Council which, in the form of Resolution 435, created the means to carry out elections in Namibia. South Africa has refused to implement Resolution 435, most recently in a January 1981 conference in Geneva, where, it stated that there was inadequate trust between the different parties and ethnic groups in the territory to reach a sound political solution.

Before the January 1981 meeting it was widely believed that the African states would call for mandatory sanctions at the UN if South Africa did not agree to implement the UN resolution. The U.S. and European governments hoped this would not occur, reflecting their belief that South Africa cannot be pressured on this issue. The Western governments believe that progress did take place at the meeting in January; saying Namibian parties met face to face for the first time and a number of private meetings were held between people who were sworn enemies. The West also felt that some African states had come to accept their position of working quietly for greater understanding.

The Western governments failed, however, to persuade the Africans and Third World states not to force a vote on sanctions in the UN Security Council. Votes on breaking diplomatic relations with South Africa, imposing an oil embargo and economic sanctions and setting up machinery to enforce these measures were all vetoed by the U.S. but not the FRG. The contact group continues to pursue negotiations with South Africa but with little evidence of progress.

### 3. Policy Approaches

The U.S. and FRG have distinct national interests and different approaches which permit a flexibility which can be beneficial. The pressures created by South Africa may also lead to differences in approach. For example, the

Reagan Administration and the major governments in Europe are in close consultation on policy towards southern Africa but West Germany, in particular, has expressed some concern that the U.S. may be reluctant to diligently pursue the South Africans in order to achieve a negotiated settlement on Namibia. [Ref. 28]

#### 4. Countering The Soviet Threat

The primary issue currently agitating discussion in Germany and the U.S. is the Reagan Administrations avowed determination to challenge the Soviet presence in Africa. Currently, that presence is primarily Cuban- 19,000 troops and advisors in Angola, 17,000 in Ethiopia, 1500 in Mozambique, and a few hundred in other countries- backed by Russian equipment, weapons, and advisors. To these force levels, which have remained fairly constant for approximately five years, might be added 8,000 Libyan troops-seen by many as Soviet proxies, some of whom moved into Chad in 1981. In addition, there are a few thousand East European, mostly German, and some North Korean advisors in various African countries. The Reagan Administration has emphasized that African policy is one component of the overriding concern with East-West relations. Germany is concerned about the Reagan African policy. In the first days of his administration The German Foreign Minister Genscher visited Washington and urged that the U.S. use discretion in its response to Communist forces in Africa. They stressed the importance of not moving too far from the African consensus, which is tired of East-West confrontation in Africa, and have sought to impress upon the Reagan Administration the importance of maintaining pressure on South Africa with respect to Namibia. [Ref. 29]

Germany plays a limited security role in Africa supplying security related equipment to key African countries. The Reagan Administration is increasing the U.S. effort in promoting internal stability in Africa through an increase in Economic Support Funds for national security. The budget for this item has increased from \$144.5 million in FY 81 to \$231 million in FY82 and the Administration has stated that it may ask for further increases. It has also pledged \$585 million granted to Africa for emergency refugee assistance: an action which is seen primarily as humanitarian but which also has an important security dimension.

#### 5. Economic And Development Issues

Basic to successfully addressing the issues described above is the economic relationship between the U.S. and FRG and Africa. Africa is the only continent in the world which experienced a per capita decline in food production over the past two decades. It now has the largest number of refugees of any continent as well as the highest rate of population growth. These combine with ethnic differences and increased energy costs to place great strain on the social condition. There is general agreement by the U.S. and FRG that preservation and promotion of its economic and security interests in Africa will require a more sound economic climate in these societies. Trade and investment are necessary but insufficient tools to achieve this. Foreign assistance is essential but who the recipients should be and the level and type of assistance they need are issues.

There is competition for Africa's expanding markets but this is the norm for free market economies. The U.S. and Germany, concerned about their balance of payments and sagging economies, are becoming more competitive in seeking

out this market. However the Germans have become the second most important trading partner in most African states.

Increased competition for markets is supported by government trade finance support agencies. With domestic double digit inflation these agencies now lend to foreign importers at lower rates than they pay for funds in their domestic markets. The U.S. and the FRG have sought an international agreement to prohibit loans at less than domestic rates. The U.S. and the FRG will probably continue to compete for overseas markets and make government policies with respect to their trade support agencies as an issue.

Basically, the U.S. and the FRG have few differences in their approach to economic relations with Africa. The problems arise in development; the Development Decade of the 1970s produced minimal economic growth in Africa and projections for the 1980s are equally poor. While there are some differences of approach or emphasis by the U.S. and the FRG the fundamental problem is putting adequate resources into the continent to protect and promote their interests.

### **III. US AND FRG FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY TOWARD THIRD WORLD CONFLICT: EL SALVADOR & SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA**

#### **A. US FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY**

The Reagan administration's foreign policy is simple and direct. The major theme is anti-Sovietism [Ref. 30. p. 9.]. Every problem on the international scene is viewed in terms of the Soviet challenge. The Soviet Union as the main global danger to U.S. interests has been a major theme of the Reagan administration's foreign policy. President Reagan's foreign policy emphasises that the Soviet Union is directly or indirectly related to all the unrest that is going on - racism in South Africa, struggles in the Middle East, and revolution in Central America. President Reagan denounced the USSR at his first press conference in January 1981 and amplified his charges in a nationally televised interview in March of that year. Secretary of state Haig emphasized the Soviet danger in his first speech after taking office. [Ref. 31]

#### **B. THE US AND FRG PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT IN AFRICA**

The United States and Germany have similar interests and goals in Africa, but there are real differences in their respective positions in the global political economy, both with respect to Africa and to the Soviet Union, and in the perceptions of Soviet motives and capabilities with respect to Africa.

Both the Europeans and the U.S. are fully aware of Soviet eagerness to meddle in Africa, but the FRG tends to believe that this is made possible more by conditions in

Africa than by an aggressive grand design on the part of the Soviets. Africa is seen as being in a state of prolonged crisis; infrastructural deficiencies, ideological differences, persisting spheres of influence, national boundaries which cut across traditional polities, the incomplete process of decolonization, and a widening economic gap between mineral rich African states able to sustain economic growth and the many other countries with no growth and severe balance of payments problems are the causes of political insecurity and instability. Germans recognize that these conditions provide opportunities for Soviet penetration but believe it important that the West not over-react to Soviet advances nor see Soviet gains as necessarily long-term. Germany believes that the Soviets are not willing to directly challenge the West in Africa, and one European analyst concluded that "nowhere in Africa has the influence of the major Western powers been decisively challenged in an area where their interests are historically rooted and of perceived importance to their current economic welfare." [Ref. 32: p. 358]

The U.S. views the Soviet willingness to interpose themselves in Africa as an aggressive grand design with severe implications. The Reagan administration generally accepts the view of Soviet policy presented views in a recent book (The Next War) by former President Richard Nixon. Nixon asserts that Africa and the Third World countries are an immediate target of the Soviet Union because it believes that it can gain strategic advantages and place itself increasingly in a position to control the world's resources and lifelines at relatively little risk and cost. He states the Soviets want southern Africa and in the larger world struggle southern Africa is a key battleground as vital as the Middle East. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, prior

to his appointment, urged that NATO be informally extended to cover southern Africa, which contains minerals vital to Western security. President Reagan's assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Chester Crocker, has said that "Africa cannot be isolated from the global conflict". [Ref. 33] Africa is not the highest priority in foreign policy issue but it assumes significance in that it is seen as an indicator of Soviet intentions in the world.

Other factors also influence U.S. and German policies towards Africa. Because of the German colonial experience, political and cultural ties exist between the two continents and particularly for Germany, Africa is an area of some priority, where economic interests and ties are dominant and in some cases vital. For the United States, economic relations with Africa are less important than strategic/political concerns. As a rival superpower, the U.S. is particularly concerned with Soviet activity anywhere in the world. Germany, being closer to the Soviet Union and more reliant on Soviet energy supplies, finds itself more constrained in taking a hostile stance vis-a-vis the Soviets than does the U.S.

These differences are important, but, they are only differences of degree and both the U.S. and Germany, in terms of interests, perceptions and goals, see their roles in Africa as being more-or-less complementary. However, the new environment and the emergence of southern Africa as an issue not only raises the level of concern about interests in Africa but also increases the possibility of differences of approach.

The key issues for the U.S. and Germany in Africa are a function of basic interests: access to minerals, denial of assets to the Soviets, encouragement of economic development and political stability. While the interests seem clear-cut

they sometimes overlap and conflict with each other. For example, access to minerals has required an acceptable working relationship with South Africa which some see as jeopardizing U.S. access to Nigerian oil. This may prevent good working relationships with other African mineral producing states and it conflicts with the U.S. desire to deny Soviet influence. It is not chance-but rather Soviet support for opponents of European colonial rule and apartheid-that three states which border South Africa and Namibia are now presided over by self-styled Marxists.

It is Soviet presence and white supremacist government which creates and gives force to two major issues faced by the U.S. and FRG in Africa. Thus, two key questions for policy makers are:

1. How to promote political change in South Africa in such a way that economic and strategic interests will be maintained?
2. How to deny African assets to the Soviet bloc?

A third fundamental question-How best to strengthen the political economies of black African states?-comes from the important role they play in an integrated world economy and in international organizations as well as the wish to deny Soviet influence and avoid crisis.

Although the U.S. and the FRG define their interests and goals in a similar manner, they differ on which issues have priority. The Germans place greatest emphasis on regime support in black Africa believing that, combined with eventual change in South Africa and patient diplomacy, the African states can be taken away from Soviet influence. In contrast, the Reagan Administration has given highest priority to a denial of Soviet bloc presence, has rejected the notion of placing overt pressure for change on South



Africa, and states that in the future foreign aid will be determined in part by how states vote at the UN. [Ref. 34: p. 11]

Namibia will be discussed in more detail in section D.5 but this is one country of importance where the U.S. and the FRG tend to agree on policy but where there is a potential for differences. Namibia is an issue upon which the U.S. and Germany worked closely and actively for four years but here there are indications that their cooperation may be disintegrating. The Reagan Administration has given the goal of independence for Namibia some priority in its African policy but has implied that if an agreement cannot be reached, the U.S. will not expend its resources on the matter. The issue will not go away however; it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to walk away from this issue. A reduction in U.S. efforts to achieve a settlement in Namibia would put the U.S. in disagreement with the policies of the FRG. The Germans, believe it is important to make sure a united effort on Namibia be maintained.

#### C. US AND FRG STRATEGY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

##### 1. The US And Southern Africa in General

U.S. regional strategy for southern Africa in general is based on three basic realities, U.S. economic interest, U.S. national security interest, and political interest. First, U.S. economic interest in Sub-Saharan Africa are heavily concentrated in the southern third of the continent. Nearly \$3 billion of direct investment, or about 60% of the sub-Saharan total, is located there. U.S. southern African trade totals over \$6 billion. This concentration of interest reflects southern Africa's tremendous

mineral wealth and the relative sophistication of the area's economies- especially those of South Africa and Zimbabwe. Southern Africa accounts for over 40% of sub-Saharan Africa's GNP, 70% of its industrial and 60% of its mining output, 80% of the steel and 85% of the electricity consumed. The area contains immense deposits of many strategic minerals which are vital to industrial economies like the U.S., including: the platinum group (86% of world reserves), Manganese (53%), Vanadium (64%), Chromium (95%), and cobalt (53%), as well as a dominant share of coal, uranium, copper, and other minerals. Many of these, minerals are vital to western defense and high technology industry.

There is no longer much debate about southern Africa's economic significance. With regional stability the area can prosper and serve as a basis for African economic progress. Trade and private investment flows from the U.S. and other Western nations can reinforce this potential and provide a solid basis of mutual interest for U.S. - African relations. If there is movement toward regional turmoil, however, southern Africa's economic potential is threatened. The Reagan administration strongly supports southern African economic development through encouragement of trade and investment throughout the area and through the provisions of timely and carefully tailored foreign assistance. [Ref. 35]

Second, southern Africa has become an increasingly contested area in world politics. The significance of the region is derived from its economic potential, and mineral wealth, and as long as nations cannot resolve their conflicts without outside intervention this area has become a boiling pot with mounting East-West tensions. Since Portugal's departure from its ex-colonies in 1975, the USSR and its clients have shown every interest in keeping the pot of regional conflicts boiling. The Warsaw Pact countries

have arms agreement with four nations of the area and provide the bulk of external military support to guerrilla groups aimed at Namibia and South Africa. This is a potential explosive danger given that U.S. and German interests are enhanced by southern Africa's geopolitical importance along the strategic sea routes around Africa and by its growing importance as a source of critical minerals. It is in this context that the U.S. feels it must protect the region's security and counter the expansion of Soviet influence. The U.S. policy is to counter any state that tries to effect political change by military force and in areas of conflict to build the confidence necessary for equitable and durable solutions by encouraging the emergence and survival of genuine democratic systems and productive economies.

Third, the political basis for regional cooperation is strikingly absent. Racial and ethnic pluralism and colonialism and white minority rule make conflict resolution between African states difficult. The legally entrenched apartheid policies of South Africa are anathema to its neighbors who seek to lessen dependence on South Africa and increase political pressures for domestic change. The U.S. will not allow a situation to develop that would degenerate into destructive revolutionary violence. The low-level guerrilla conflict over Namibia has become a focal point of concern. All parties accept the principle of independence, and some measure of agreement exists about the procedures for a transfer of power but the talks are stalled. This war could expand if a settlement is not reached. Thus it is clear that southern Africa contains within itself the seeds of growing violence. To prevent this possibility the U.S. has developed what it feels like is a realistic strategy for the area.

#### **D. CASE STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA**

##### **1. The US And South Africa**

Relations between the United States and South Africa date back prior to 1910 and have traditionally been regarded as peripheral to the vital interest of both countries. Through most of South Africa's history its external relations-politically, economically, culturally and militarily-have been directed toward Europe (particularly Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France) and its immediate African neighbouring territories. The United States for its part, has long been oblivious to developments on the African continent. For all practical purposes, Africa did not exist as an independent concern of American policy prior to the Angolan civil war in 1975.

Since World War II, the situation has gradually changed, for three reasons. First, the emergence of the U.S. as a superpower and its role as the leader of the free world. Second, the emergence of black nationalism as Africa's new states crowded onto the stage of world politics since post-1960 with the result that today the African continent accounts for more than a third of the total membership of the UN. And third, the rise of black consciousness in the U.S. and its impact on U.S. electoral politics. Today U.S. policy toward South Africa has changed from benign neglect to constructive engagement with economic interaction being the strongest link between the two countries. This interaction is primarily manifested in the fields of trade and investments.

##### **2. US Economic Relations with South Africa**

Economic relations are the strongest links between South Africa and the U.S. These primarily involve the fields

of trade and investments. The overall trend in the U.S.-South African trade pattern can be described as a steady increase in the volume of trade, with the U.S. maintaining and increasing the trade balance in its favor. (See Table II).

South Africa is ranked eighteenth as U.S. export clients and ranked first as a market for U.S. goods on the African continent. In 1976, U.S. exports to South Africa reached a peak of \$1.3 billion, representing about one-third of America's exports to Africa, (almost as much as the combined total of the following four trading partners Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco), and this produced a favorable balance of \$423 million. In terms of American global exports, South Africa represents about one percent of the foreign market for American goods.

From the South African side in 1976 the U.S. was the fourth largest importer of South Africa's goods, (behind the UK, Japan and West Germany and was first as supplier of South African imports (21.4 percent of South African imports compared to 18.1 percent supplied by West Germany, 17.8 percent supplied by the United Kingdom and 10.3 percent supplied by Japan).

Even more important than the volume of U.S. trade with South Africa, is the growing value of U.S. investments in South Africa, partly in the form of indirect investment (loans and equity investment), and partly in the form of direct investment (ownership).

By the end of 1976, the U.S. percentage of foreign liabilities was 30 percent. The primary borrowers of international credit in South Africa are the public corporations such as ISCOR, the South African Railways and Harbours, the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the SABC and the South African Treasury. The primary U.S. creditors include many

of the largest international financial institutions: Chase Manhattan Bank, Citybank, Irving Trust Company, Bank of America, Central National Bank of Cleveland, Chemical Bank, Morgan Guarantee, Bank of Boston, Manufactures Hanover Trust, Wells Fargo Bank, and others.

The book value of American corporate investment in South Africa by 1976 was \$1,665 billion, or 37.3 percent of total American investment in Africa. Three hundred and forty South African firms were American owned, wholly or in a major part, and the American companies involved represented a cross section of the biggest in American business. [Ref. 36]

The Investors Responsibility Research Corporation (IRRC) estimated that U.S. firms employ some one hundred thousand workers in South Africa, 70% of whom are blacks. [Ref. 37] Ferguson and Cotter, arguing the case for economic pressure on South Africa, claim that U.S. investment in South Africa amounts to barely more than one percent of total private investment overseas and yields about the same percentage of foreign earning. The point is that losing U.S. investment in South Africa would do little harm to the U.S. economy. "South Africa is important, but far from crucial, for these great corporations." [Ref. 38]

### 3. US Mineral Dependence on South Africa

The U.S. is dependent on nine especially important foreign sources of minerals and metals. (see table III). Projections of these nine materials shows continuing high, and in some cases an increase in U.S. dependency between now and the year 2000. [Ref. 39]

The problem is two fold-access to sources of current production as well as access to sources of reserves for future production. ( see Figure 3.1 & 3.3) The U.S. is a

major mineral consumer and has a substantial reserve in copper (18.4%) and tungsten (6.1%) among the nine key minerals as shown by Figure 3.2.

The U.S. problem of inadequate reserves is intensified by the fact that world reserves are highly concentrated in key areas. Only three countries control over two-thirds of five of the key minerals: 95.6% of chromium, 90.5% of manganese, 99.7% of platinum, 74.6% of tungsten, 69.4% of nickel, and 69% of cobalt. Only two, South Africa and Rhodesia, have a dominant position with respect to chromium; another pair, South Africa and the USSR, have the dominance in platinum and manganese. Figure 3.2 shows that these three key minerals are dominated by two pairs of suppliers, the U. S. has extremely high import dependence, 89% for chromium; 95% for platinum; and 98% for manganese. And substitution is not likely in the short-term. The lack of manganese could shut down the U.S. steel industry. Platinum and chromium have unique and required characteristics for particular technological purposes. Chromium is resistant to corrosion and oxidation and is important for industrial precision tools. Platinum is an essential element in chemical and petroleum refining. Thus the U.S. is import dependent to high degree on key minerals.

However, import dependence is not necessarily a bad thing. Dependence suggests that a nation is achieving certain economic advantages through trade, acquiring minerals at lower cost by importing, rather than resorting to higher priced indigenous production or substitution. Thus, the economic consequence of using cheaper foreign material is generally strength not weakness. The crucial assumption is that the minerals are available when needed, at the right price and quantity. In view of the importance of key minerals, the degree of U.S. dependence, and the





Figure 3.1 Percent Distribution of Mineral Reserve





**Figure 3.2 Net Import Reliance as a % of Consumption**

potential unstable world situation especially in South Africa and with the USSR can the U.S. afford this degree of dependence?

Despite the difficult policy choices which South Africa's apartheid system represents there can be no doubt about the U.S. dependence on the minerals of the Republic of

South Africa. Figure 4 demonstrates South Africa's mineral wealth. Table IV indicated South Africa's high production and reserve position with respect to several critical minerals. For the U.S. South Africa is a major source, not only of chromium, manganese, and platinum but also of antimony, asbestos, copper, industrial diamonds, gold, and vanadium. [Ref. 40] Western Europe is even more highly dependent on such minerals imports from South Africa.




Figure 3.3 Mineral Resources of South Africa

#### 4. US Policy toward South Africa

In South Africa the U.S. seeks to encourage purposeful evolutionary change toward a nonracial society and supporting those who seek to build opportunities not determined on basis of race. "The Reagan Administration has no intention of destabilizing South Africa to please any of the races in South Africa nor alinging themselves with apartheid policies", said Crocker [Ref. 41]. South Africa is an integral and important element of the global economic system, and it plays a significant economic role in its own region. The U.S. will not sever those ties. The U.S. seeks to build a more constructive relationship with South Africa, one based on shared interest, persuasion, and improved communication. A measure of change is already underway in South Africa and many South Africans of all races are seeking to move away from apartheid. It is the U.S. policy to be supportive of this process so that futher reform and nonviolent change can take place.

#### 5. The US Namibian Factor in General

Namibia, known for many years as South West Africa, became South Africa's mandate territory as a result of the Treaty of Versailles that disposed of this German colony at the conclusion of World War I. At the end of World War II in 1946 South Africa applied to the newly created United Nations, proposing to incorporate the territory as one of its provinces, but this was rejected by the General Assembly. After a period of close administration of Namibia under South African laws South Africa in 1977 finally agreed in principle to leave the territory and allow it to become independent. (also see page 50 for additional discussion of this subject.)

The question of Namibian independence has not been resolved and in an effort to find a practical, internationally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem in the spring of 1977 a contact group was established of five Western members of the UN Security Council--the U.S., Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany. The contact group was organized when South Africa proceeded with a unilateral internal settlement designed to deny the Namibian people the right to choose freely and fairly their own form of government and imposed a South African-designed government. The contact group held talks with the parties of the dispute. Their effort was based on the 1976 Security Council Resolution 385, which calls for free and fair elections in Namibia under UN supervision and control. In April 1978 the UN was presented a proposal containing a time table and set of requirements for holding election under Resolution 385. South Africa and SWAPO accepted this proposal with differences on how it would be implemented--which is still an issue today.

In September the Security Council adopted Resolution 435 which approved the Secretary General's plan for implementing Namibia's independence. South Africa objected to Resolution 435 and in 1978 held its own elections in Namibia which was boycotted by major Namibian political parties, including SWAPO. The winner of the election was the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance sponsored by South Africa. The UN declared the elections null and void. Diplomatic efforts have been underway since then to obtain implementation of Resolution 435. [Ref. 42]

The outcome in Namibia has important implications. An international acceptable settlement would show the world that peaceful solutions to a seemingly unmanageable conflict is possible. It would also reduce the likelihood of Soviet

or Cuban intervention in Namibia. If the situation cannot be solved it is likely to lead to more bloodshed and outside power involvement.

Namibia now accounts for 6 percent of the world's uranium production and the new uranium mine developed by the Rio-Tinto Zinc Corporation at Rossing is described as the largest uranium mine in the world. In addition Namibia is a significant producer of diamonds and gems, copper, lead, vanadium, tungsten, zinc, cadmium, arsenic, and salt and a minor producer of other metals. Namibia's uranium resources could be a major attraction to COMECON countries to secure nuclear fuel sources for their expanding nuclear power programs. [Ref. 43: p. 100]

#### a. Namibia's Economy

Namibia is a rich land with a wealth of untapped natural resources. The uncertainty concerning its transition process has had adverse effects on its economy due to investors reluctance to make commitments until some type of solution with South Africa is reached. Despite this reluctance Namibians are optimistic about their eventual role in the international market. Its chief industries are mining, fishing, husbandry and agriculture.

Namibia's mining industry ranks 17th out of the world's 20 major mining countries. It possesses untold amounts of diamonds, uranium, copper, lead, zinc, manganese, tin, iron, tungsten, silver, cadmium, vanadium, lithium, sulphur, and salt. The mining industry alone accounted for 59 percent of Namibia's total exports in 1970. The data regarding Namibia's mineral wealth is particularly impressive. The Oranjemund mines are the world's richest gem diamond source. Diamonds account for 66 percent of the country's total mineral exports and production runs at over

1.6 million carats a year. The Rossing open uranium mine was opened for development in 1976 and is scheduled for production of 1,000 tons of uranium oxide per year. The Rossing facility is the world's largest and has over 100,000 tons in reserve. Namibia also ranks as the world's second largest producer of Vanadium and Lithium. The territory was Africa's largest producer of refined lead (producing 62,700 metric tons in 1972) and the continent's second largest producer of Cadmium (producing 159,000 metric tons in 1972). Finally Namibia was the third largest producer of zinc in Africa (with an output of 34,800 metric tons in 1973). These are indeed impressive figures that make investors anxious for a peaceful transition to independence. [Ref. 44]

The fishing industry in Namibia accounted for 25 percent of the territory's total exports in 1970. The offshore Benguela Current is the primary fishing ground. Over 600,000 tons of fish, primarily pilchards are caught each year and processed in Walvis Bay. Another 3,000 tons of rock lobster are also caught each year and processed at Luderitz. The choice areas have been heavily over fished by Soviet, Cuban, and Bulgarian vessels in recent years and has impacted on South-Africa's decision not to extend the territorial waters to 320 KM. These nations are anxious to negotiate different fishing agreements with a new Namibian government.

Husbandry has emerged as Namibia's third largest industry behind mining and fishing. It accounted for 16 percent of the total exports in 1970. Namibia exported 3.9 million Karakul pelts (persian lamb) in 1972 and is presently the world's largest exporter of this product. The industry is in far better shape than the fourth and final sector that of agriculture.

Since most whites are involved in the management of the various industries the task of tilling the unresponsive soil is primarily done by the blacks. There are six basic features of Namibia's agricultural industry. First, its vulnerability to climatic factors and stock disease. Second, its dependence on cattle and Karakul sheep. Third, the inability of the territory's meat and dairy products to compete regularly on the international markets and the consequent reliance upon markets in South Africa. Fourth, the inability to supply any significant percentage of the grain, vegetable and fruit requirements of the inhabitants; necessitating large purchases from South Africa. Fifth, the high standards of farm management required to combat a harsh and arid environment and difficult marketing problems. Sixth, the limitations which natural conditions, especially in the southern sector, impose upon agricultural growth. [Ref. 45] Farming is thus a difficult and arduous task. There is a great amount of frustration on the part of the blacks toward their role in the Namibian economy. swapo claims that 75 percent of Namibia's choice area, containing the best farming and mineral land's are controlled by the whites who make up only 12 percent of the population. Thus the redistribution of land will be one of their first tasks should they attain power.

The economic wealth of Namibia cannot help but play a role in the lands transition to independence. The U.S. has many transnationals who have a great interest in the economic policies that a new government there will adopt. They will be watching the proceedings quite closely as will U.S. policymakers. For Southern Africa contains enough riches so that if the Soviets should ever establish control over it they would manage 90 percent of the world's platinum production; 80 percent of its gold cobalt and

chrome; 75 percent of its manganese and 70 percent of its diamonds. [Ref. 46] The economic potential of the area is one that took on an additional significance in the wake of Soviet expansionism into Angola.

b. Namibia's Relationship to South Africa

Namibia cannot compare with South Africa's huge reserves of minerals, many of them of considerable strategic importance to the West. However, it is a territory of considerable economic potential, with substantial mineral reserves, especially of uranium and diamonds, as well as base metals. But the lack of infrastructure, especially water and transport, and the lack of a skilled workforce, and the political uncertainty, have held back more rapid economic development.

More important is Namibia's political and geographic position: it is the last white-ruled colonial buffer state between black and white Africa. As an added complication, the effective colonial power is South Africa itself. The political development of Namibia is likely, both through example and direct contact, to have an important effect on the political development of South Africa. (Financial Times)

c. US Policy toward Namibia

The White House policy of constructive engagement toward South Africa means that it will try to maintain cordial relations in an effort to influence South African actions. Many nations object to this relationship between Washington and Pretoria. To some black Africans, the U.S. appears to be accepting South Africa's policies of racial separation. But whether they agree with the relationship or not, other countries now expect the Reagan administration to



use it constructively by convincing South Africa to relinquish control of Namibia.

Because of these expectations, the Namibia problem contains the seeds of potential trouble for the Reagan administration. If it wins South African cooperation on Namibia, it will show that constructive engagement is a sound policy that can bring positive changes. The administration also will have taken a large stride toward its goal of ending South Africa's international isolation.

But if the U.S. fails to win South African cooperation on Namibia, it is sure to be accused of tolerating, or even encouraging, South Africa's defiant attitudes. Black Africans won't believe that constructive engagement can bring changes in South Africa's internal policies.

Namibia is one of Africa's lingering decolonization problems, and to black Africans it is a pressing and emotional issue. Four years ago, the UN adopted a plan to make Namibia independent and to hold elections for a new government there. South Africa accepted the plan, but has refused to carry it out.

South Africa contends that unsupervised elections would turn control of Namibia over to SWAPO, a rebel group lead by Sam Nujoma who South Africa regards as a "communist". [Ref. 47] The rebels are based across the Namibian border in Angola, where the government is supported by some 20,000 Cuban troops [Ref. 48].

During the Carter administration, the U.S., Britain, France, West Germany and Canada - known collectively as the "contact group" - began searching for a way break the Namibian deadlock. The Reagan administration hopes to adjust the UN plan to ease some of South Africa's worries. Before Namibian elections are held, for instance, the U.S. wants all parties in Namibia to agree to a set of

principles guaranteeing the rights of the white minority there. South Africa also would like some group besides the UN to supervise the elections.

The sticky point in the contact-group discussions has been the American and South African desire to arrange a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in conjunction with the Namibian settlement. South Africa is leery of granting Namibia independence as long as Cuban troops remain next door in Angola. It fears that the presence of Communist troops in Angola will bolster Communist groups in Namibia. The U.S. will object to any plan that allow for the introduction of Communism into Southern Africa.

So U.S. strategy is to find a Namibian plan that insures the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Critics contend that it only complicates and delays the Namibian solution. They believe that Angola will send the Cuban troops home voluntarily once its neighbor, Namibia, is stable and independent.

#### 6. West Germany and South Africa

West Germany's policy towards South Africa is to urge the replacement of apartheid with economic, social, and political equality. Germany believes the best way to achieve this is through involvement with the white population although it readily recognizes the stiff resistance of the Afrikaner government to change. On balance, Germany sees itself as an honest broker in South Africa, engaged in a "critical dialogue" which leans towards majority rule as important to bringing about long-range regional peace and stability.

Germany seeks to influence South African policy through diplomatic persuasion, including meeting with black leaders who operate both within and outside South Africa.

They support cultural exchanges, not placing restrictions on visas for South Africans (as the Dutch have) because they feel this presents the possibility of blacks as well as whites coming to Germany.

a. German Economic ties with South Africa

German economic ties with South Africa are increasing. German officials say, this is due to the flourishing economy of South Africa. Large contracts for coal and uranium imports have been signed and private banks have significantly increased their lending. Two-way trade between Germany and South Africa in 1979 was over \$3 billion. German banks made a total of \$2.4 billion in loans to South Africa from 1972 to 1978. West German trade and investment with South Africa represent nearly 1% for the United States. Germany imports 60% of its chromium, 50% of its manganese and platinum, and 90% of its asbestos from South Africa. In 1977 South Africa was West Germany's largest African export market. During the first quarter of 1980, imports from West Germany totalled R362 million. They grew during the first quarter of 1981 to about R290 million. Imports are predominantly raw materials, some strategic, and 85% of German exports to South Africa are end-products.

The thirty-three largest German companies operating in South Africa have approximately 22,000 employees. Germany's direct investment of \$336 million makes it the largest investor in South Africa. Investments are concentrated in Volkswagen, Daimler-Benz, Metal-Gessellschaft, Hoechst, AEG Telefunken, and Siemens. Lurgi, an engineering group, provided the design and special equipment used at the three South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (SASOL) plants. The process used in SASOL was adapted from a German technique, and German companies are

heavily involved in the transfer of technology and expertise to South Africa. Of the 140,000 German nationals in South Africa, 15,000 to 20,000 are employed by German companies. German immigration, which had been heavy in the past, has recently begun to taper off.

As a precondition to the insurance of loan guarantees to Companies doing business in South Africa, the German government now requires a declaration of support for the EEC code of conduct for companies with interests in South Africa. Delegations from German trade unions have visited South Africa to check on compliance. However, according to a 1980 study by Intecontecs LTD., an international consulting firm, many German companies have pursued a relatively independent policy in South Africa regarding enforcement of the code, with some arguing that it limits their ability to compete with those companies not required to conform.

The German government does not support economic sanctions, trade boycotts, or prohibitions on investments. Chancellor Schmidt has said that it is not his government's policy "to destroy the economic structures of South Africa, plunge the country into economic chaos, and hurt the very sections of the population most badly whom we would like to help the most: the black majority, which would have to suffer most from the resulting unemployment.

The FRG, EC, and Japan are much more dependent on South Africa than the U.S. (see Table V) This also shows that Germany and the EC rely significantly on South Africa for gold and uranium, while the U.S. is self-sufficient in uranium. For most of the crucial minerals supplied by South Africa, Western Europe, and Japan import between 75% and 100% of total consumption. [Ref. 49: p. 70]

The FRG has almost no minerals resources and is thinking about a mineral deal with the Soviets. West Germany is 100% dependent on imports in aluminum, tungsten, nickel, titanium, molybdenum, vanadium, antimony, mercury, platinum, manganese, chromite, zirconium, asbestos, magnesite, and phosphate. It is 99.8% import-dependent in copper, 93% in iron, 87% in lead, and 68% in zinc. Germany has been stockpiling such critical ores as chromite, cobalt, and manganese. A shift to the Soviet Union as a principle supplier would reflect Bonn's uncertainty about developments in Southern Africa and U.S. policy toward Pretoria. Schmidt may be bargaining for Soviet neutrality in Southern Africa. In 1977 Wolfgang Ulrich, the foremost German specialist on minerals resources geopolitics warned: "Europe cannot afford to allow third parties to upset the process of peaceful change which is about to start in Southern Africa." [Ref. 50]

b. German's interest in Namibia

Germany's only special African tie is with Namibia. There is a 28,000 person German minority there which represents 3% of the total population or 30% of the white population. The German government feels some responsibility for these persons who, in general, support the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). Germany also accepts that SWAPO will play an important role in an independent Namibia.

Germany has worked hard, both in the "contact group" and unilaterally, to bring the various Namibian parties to an agreement on UN Resolution 435. It has worked with the ethnic Germans who are organized in an interest group and has invited SWAPO leader, Sam Nujoma, to Germany a number of times. Nujoma visited in November 1980 at which

time he made explicit his willingness to recognize the civil rights of Namibians. At the January 1981 Geneva Conference on Namibia a deputy to Foreign Minister Genscher chaired a meeting at which Nujoma and SWAPO representatives met with the Namibian Interest Group. Nujoma stated at this time that SWAPO would need the white population to run the country and the German government gave indications that it would be willing to give strong financial support to an independent Namibia.

The failure of the January 1981 Geneva Conference on Namibian independence is viewed as only a temporary setback. A reevaluation of policy is now taking place on the part of all parties but it is unclear what the next steps will be. It is believed that the call for economic sanctions against South Africa made by the African group at the UN was a "ritual" condemnation. West Germany does not believe that pressure or coercion will work with South Africa. It now sees the issue as building trust between parties which are sworn enemies and which had never formally met before the January conference. However, Germany is greatly concerned that the U.S. may back away from the "contact group" efforts to negotiate independence which it continues to view as being important. [Ref. 51: p. 67]

#### **E. CASE STUDY: EL SALVADOR**

Central America, is seen by the U.S. as a convenient area for the U.S. to intervene and to challenge what is perceived as Soviet expansionism. One of the places the U.S. has chosen to "break the Communist winning streak" [Ref. 52], is El Salvador. Secretary of State Haig stated: "We can do this by demonstrating, as we are doing in El Salvador today, that a government bent on making necessary

reforms will not be overthrown by armed intervention supported by Moscow or its surrogates.....Our problem with El Salvador is external intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation in this hemisphere." [Ref. 53]

To the Reagan administration El Salvador represents a familiar case of Soviet, Cuban, and other Communist military involvement in a politically troubled Third World country. The Communist have greatly increased the suffering of the Salvadoran people and intensified and widened the conflict by providing arms, training, and direction to a local insurgency. The Soviet objective in El Salvador is to bring about the overthrow of the established government and imposition of a Communist regime in defiance of the will of the Salvadoran people at as little cost to the Communists as possible. [Ref. 54]

#### 1. Background on El Salvador

For decades El Salvador suffered under the dictatorship of a tiny oligarchy that monopolized land, credit, and trade. On October 15, 1979, young military officers broke with the old system of repression and joined with moderate civilian leaders to establish a peaceful democratic revolution. This date is considered a watershed in Salvadoran history. The new Revolutionary Junta of two military colonels and three civilians, freed political prisoners and committed themselves to social and economic reforms, respectful of human rights, and democratic elections. Within weeks, the Revolutionary Junta came under attack from the left and right. And so began the upheaval that is still bloodying the country today. Between October 1979 and January 1980 the Junta gradually disintegrated, unable to control the violence or establish its authority.

In January 1980, the Christian Democratic party with an overwhelming majority of military officers entered the government and helped launch far-reaching reforms. Although most Salvadorans welcomed social reforms, extremist groups reacted by intensifying violence. Thousands died in conditions sometimes bordering on anarchy.

Today there is a broad array of political forces that oppose the Junta-Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Liberal Democrats, as well as independent Marxist groups and pro-Moscow coalitions. It is an over simplification to reduce the opposition to a handful of Marxist guerrillas manipulating the "non-Marxists". There is a Christian opposition from which at least twenty-eight catholic priests, nuns, and community leaders have been murdered for possible opposition activities against the regime. Many public organizations such as churches, trade, unions, independent newspapers and peasant co-ops have been forced to resort to guerrilla type activities because political channels or options have been closed. There have also been some moderates that split off from the Junta and joined the Revolutionary Democratic Front. [Ref. 55]

a. The Guerrillas of El Salvador - The Extreme Left

The extreme left, which includes the long-established Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) and three small non-Marxist-Leninist political parties have become increasingly more committed to a mili solution since 1976. In the late 1970s, these organizations carried out several spectacular embassy seizures and kidnapped or murdered several Salvadoran, U.S., European, and Japanese businessmen, as well as the Swiss Charge d'affaires and the Ambassador of South Africa.





Figure 3.4 Panama and The Caribbean

During 1980, the fragmented groups of the left agreed to coordinate their action in support of a joint military battle plan developed with Cuban assistance. In late 1980, in exchange for large-scale Cuban aid, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders met in Havana and formed several organizations. The Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) was formed as their central executive arm for political and military planning. The Farabundo Marti' People's Liberation Front (FMLN), named after the leader of the 1932 revolt, was formed as the coordination body of the guerrilla organization. A front organization, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), was also created to disseminate propaganda abroad. For appearance the small non-Marxist-Leninist political parties (FDR and FMLN) were established but have no representation in the DRU. The Salvadoran guerrillas, through the FDR, have deceived many about what is happening in El Salvador. They have been aided by Nicaragua and by the worldwide propaganda networks of Cuba, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

#### b. El Salvador's Far Right

Not having control of the government, opponents of change resorted to private death squads and vigilante bands in a war against reforms. In early 1980, Major Roberto D' Aubuisson, a National Guard officer forced into retirement in October 1979, denounced the Christian Democratic-military coalition as a Communist movement aimed at destroying the traditional fabric of Salvadoran society. He served as a rallying point for those landowners, local bosses, and security force members against reforms.

Christian Democrats and Catholic activists became targets, many of which were coordinated by a clandestine organization called "Maximiliano Hernandez

Brigade"-named for the man who crushed the 1932 revolt. On March 24, 1980, Archbishop Romero was shot while saying mass. Since then, several priests and foreign missionaries and more than 60 Christian Democratic mayors and local officials have been assassinated, as well as several hundred trade unionists and thousands of ordinary people - often not knowing if the extreme right or left was responsible. On December 1980, four American Catholic women-three nuns and a social worker- were murdered. In January 1981, two American labor specialists from the A.F.L.- C.I.O. were assassinated together with the head of El Salvador's land reform institute.

The right extremist had a natural recruitment base in former members of the White Warriors Union and ORDEN, ORDEN being a conservative organization made up of thousands of peasants with close ties to local security forces and the White Warriors Union being a clandestine group of far rightists. Retired and active duty police and military personnel linked to individuals landowners or personally opposed to the government were another source of support. At the same time, guerrilla attacks against uniformed personnel cause violent reaction from the rightists driving them to more violence. Retired military have been assassinated while pursuing civilian occupations. In October 1980, guerrillas burned an officer's home to the ground with himself, wife, and three children trapped inside. During the first half of 1981, approximately 1,300 uniformed men were either wounded or killed by guerrillas and some of these were killed by execution.

## 2. US Policy toward El Salvador

### a. US Basis for Support of El Salvador

The following sections C-E present the Official U.S. view on El Salvador taken from Official State Department documents. In some cases these documents were not designed so much to clarify the situation in El Salvador as to provide justification for the administration's position of casting issues in East-West terms.

Before September 1980 the divided guerrilla groups in El Salvador were unorganized and poorly armed with an assortment of pistols, hunting rifles, and shotguns. After the late 1979 and early 1980 Havana meeting the Cubans worked with the DRU to obtain arms from Vietnam, Ethiopia, the PLO, and Eastern Europe. In December 1980 the guerrillas began to employ U.S. made M-16 and M-14 rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, and Chinese-made rockets-propelled grenade launchers. In January 1981, Salvadoran authorities destroyed an aircraft flying arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Honduran authorities captured a truck carrying weapons and ammunition destined for the guerrillas. [Ref. 56]

Most of the M-16s on the truck were individually traced directly to Vietnam where they had been left behind by U.S. units. By January 1981 the guerrillas had acquired modern weapons and supporting equipment never before used in El Salvador. In addition to the U.S. weapons already described the guerrillas also possessed Belgian FAL rifles, German G-3 rifles, Israeli UZI submachinegun and Galil assault rifle, .30 to .50 caliber, Russian hand grenades, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles. Since late 1979 a series of contracts between Salvadoran communist leaders and key

officials of several communist states resulted in commitment to supply the guerrillas with nearly 800 tons of the most modern weapons and equipment. By January 1981 nearly 200 tons of arms were covertly delivered through Cuba and Nicaragua. [Ref. 57] During this same time period 1977 to January 1981 the United States provided no weapons or ammunition to the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

Several important document caches were captured from the guerrillas in November 1980 and January 1981. This was a mass capture which included battle plans, letters, and reports of meetings and travels. When verified against other evidence and other intelligence sources these documents make it possible to reconstruct the central role played by Cuba and other Communist countries in political unification, military direction, and equipping the insurgents in less than 6 months with an impressive array of modern weapons that enabled the guerrillas to launch a well-armed offensive.

The guerrillas with Cuban and Soviet support stuck to their original plan as called for in documents found in caches between November 1980 and January 1981. On January 10, 1981 using modern weapons the guerrillas launched a general offensive, striking at 40-50 locations, downing two helicopters, overrunning an isolated National Guard post and forcing the army to use much of its reserve ammunition.

The Reagan administration presents the view that there is little doubt that the Salvadoran insurgency has become the objective of a significant commitment by Communist states outside of Latin America. The political direction, organization, and arming of the insurgency is coordinated and heavily influenced by Cuba-with support of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Vietnam, and other Communist

states. The massing and delivery of arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas by the Communist was during a period when the U.S. provided no weapons or ammunition to El Salvador. The overwhelming mass of arms and assistance is conducted by the Communist who have made a major effort to conceal their activity by supplying arms of Western manufacture and by supporting front organization known as the Democratic Revolutionary Front to seek non-Communist political support through propaganda.

It is clear to the Reagan administration that in recent years the insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively transformed into another case of indirect armed aggression against a Third World country by Communist powers acting through Cuba. The United States considers it of great importance that the American people and the world community be aware of the seriousness of the actions of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Communist states who are conducting a well-coordinated, covert operation to bring about the overthrow of El Salvador's established government and replace it with a Communist regime. [Ref. 58]

When Cuban activities in Latin America (in countries like Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay) are examined it becomes even more clear that Cuba is directly engaged in efforts to encourage armed insurrections and their activities militarize and internationalize what would otherwise be local conflicts. This is made clear by a country-by-country examination in Latin America (and especially Central America in which the Cubans have been the most active) reveals that since 1978, Cuba has:

1. Worked to unite traditionally splintered radical groups behind a commitment to armed struggle with Cuban advice and material assistance;

2. Trained ideologically committed cadres in urban and rural guerrilla warfare;
3. Supplied or arranged for the supply of weapons to support the Cuban trained cadres' efforts to assume power by force;
4. Encouraged terrorism in the hope of provoking indiscriminate violence and repression, in order to weaken government legitimacy and attract new converts to armed struggle; and
5. Used military aid and advisers to gain influence over guerrilla fronts and radical governments through armed pro-Cuban Marxists.
6. Cuba's enormous investment of energy, money, and agents in these areas would not be possible without Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now totaling over \$8 million a day, enables Cuba to maintain the best equipped and largest per capita military forces in Latin America. [Ref. 59]

b. Past US Policy toward El Salvador

The U.S. believes that Salvadorans should be allowed to resolve their own problems without coercion or dictation from any source and there would be no U.S involvement if the communist were not involved.

During the 1970s, reflecting general policy trends, U.S. economic and military assistance to El Salvador declined sharply. Military assistance was terminated in 1977. U.S. economic assistance increased modestly after the El Salvador 1980 reforms created a framework for cooperation insuring that aid would reach the needy and the poor. Military trucks and radios were sold on credit, but no transfers of arms or ammunition were authorized. (See Table VI).

On January 16, 1981, in response to the Communist-armed guerrilla offensive, the Carter Administration resumed arms sales for the first time in 3 years. Helicopters and some military trainers were also sent. The Reagan Administration authorized additional military supplies and services totaling \$35 million and doubled economic assistance to more than \$100 million. In mid-1981, 55 U.S. military trainers were in El Salvador under orders to perform no duties of a combat nature or any training that could engage them in combat.

c. Present U.S. Policy toward El Salvador

On July 16, 1981, assistance Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders noted that U.S. assistance was preventing the guerrillas from turning their foreign arms supplies to new advantage, but that El Salvador remained a divided country. The U.S. believes that only salvadorans can solve those divisions and that neither the U.S. or any other foreign country can solve the divisions. The U.S. official policy is to support the objective of the Salvadoran Government itself overcoming these divisions by establishing a more democratic system not because of a desire to reproduce an American system but rather out of the belief that only a pluralistic approach can enable a profoundly divided society to live with itself without violent disturbance, gradually overcoming its differences.

The present administration believes that El Salvador can accomplish this by (1) promises of land reform should be kept. Land reform should be effected now not more debate on whether land reform is advisable or not. (2) controlling and eliminating violence from all sources. Communist supplies to the guerrillas must stop. More Salvadoran army leadership is needed to fight rightist death



squads and to control security force violence. (3) All parties that renounce violence participate in the design of new political institutions and the process of choosing representatives for them. Both the extreme left and right opposed the March 82 elections. The U.S. and the centralist government's view not to grant the left through negotiations the share of power the rebels have not been able to win in war. It is believed by the Reagan administration that El Salvador's leaders are willing to compete with the insurgents at the polls. And (4) a political solution cannot succeed without assistance from the United States. The point is not that assistance from the United States might lead to a government military victory; It is that a political solution can only be achieved if the guerrillas realize they cannot win by military force.

The official U.S. policy objective is to prevent a victory of leftist forces by implementing the following strategy: (1) extending economic and military assistance to counter the Communist intervention in El Salvador. (2) Support El Salvador while they work out a democratic solution; and (3) Identify and seize opportunities to help such a solution actually take place. It is believed by the administration's foreign policy experts, that the El Salvadoran centralist government and its program offers the best chance for evolutionary reform, political liberation, and respect for human rights.

An opposing view and possibly a less biased view is that of the Mexican government. In the political realm, significant Mexican involvement in El Salvador has consisted of direct opposition. The Mexican government and ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party are firm supporters of Salvadoran leftist. Mexico City is the principle base of operations for the FDR's efforts to gain diplomatic support.

The Mexican policy is based upon an assessment of Central American military governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras cannot long survive the growing demands of the poor for social change. Stability in the region therefore requires that these narrowly-based dictatorial regimes be replaced with popular governments willing to dismantle the oligarchic land-owning systems and distribute the benefits of development to a broader section of the population. While the Mexicans have no desire to see a pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regime in Central America, they see fundamental change as inevitable and believe that strong international support for social democratic opposition elements offers the best hope for long-term stability. Based upon their experience of peaceful coexistence with Cuba, the Mexicans are confident that they can live cordially with whatever form of revolutionary government that emerges. This same view is shared by a number of key European Social Democratic parties, including those in Germany. German leaders disagree with the U.S in this area as well as the degree of the threat of Communism, and the priority of peace or rolling back communism.

### 3. Germany and El Salvador

German interest in Latin America has been mainly economic. In the 1950s, German trade and investments in Latin America represented a significant percent of overall German foreign economic activity; however, in recent years there has been a relative decline in German dealings with Latin America, in contrast to the FRG's increased activities in Africa. It is only with the recent rise in political importance of the issue of raw materials that the Latin American countries have acquired more importance for Bonn, as for other industrialized countries. The FRG's political

relations with the states of Latin America have been limited, and a large part of Germany's economic investments there - almost one-half - are concentrated in Brazil. It is only with the recent rise in political importance of the issue of raw materials that the Latin American countries have acquired more importance for Bonn, as for other industrialized countries. [Ref. 60: p. 63]

In the past Latin America has been considered by the Germans as the backyard of the U.S. and, as a consequence, has received little political attention as indicated by the absence of limited amount of development aid programs. (See Table VII). Latin America was farther away and just not as important as other areas. Activity in Latin America was left to commercial endeavours, and it was not until the late sixties that Bonn undertook large aid programs, political experiments like training of union officials, and the transfer of a nuclear power station to Brazil which created six thousand German jobs for six years. [Ref. 61]

It is in this context as well as the perception of the Soviet threat that Germany views El Salvador. The Germans, just as the U.S., supports a political solution in El Salvador. However, Germany believes the main reasons for the conflict is the government's hesitance to implement reforms, hold elections, and alleviate social injustice. German leader's assessment of the Soviet threat is at odds with the U.S. assessment in that they do not feel the degree of the Soviet threat is as great as the U.S. believes it to be. At the same time the FRG realizes that their security is based on the U.S. guarantee of protection and thus if they expect the U.S. to be capable of bearing great responsibility, then they cannot deny the U.S. the ability to solve a problem like El Salvador even if this means supporting a less than ideal government. [Ref. 62]

Many Europeans disagree with the Reagan assessment. They see the Guerrilla tide sweeping the area as home grown, with perhaps some Marxist support. They see the promise of radical change under the guerrillas as the way the people of Central America want to go. France is much stronger in its disagreement than other European countries in that it is providing arms to Nicaragua in direct opposition to the U.S. [Ref. 63: p. 12]

Many see Cuban influence losing ground in Latin America by pointing out the fact that over the last 2 years, Columbia, Costa Rica, and Jamaica suspended or broke relations with Cuba. Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador withdrew their ambassadors from Havana.

German policy is to use every opportunity to bring political stability to Central America. The Federal government adheres to a view that civil war in El Salvador can best be ended by an understanding between democratic forces in both camps. In late 1980 and early 1981 Germany took an aggressive role in trying to bring the two sides together. The Federal Republic was requested by several countries in the area-one of which was Costa Rica- to mediate between both sides in the conflict. The FRG made a concerted effort to solve the conflict by attempting to bring the parties together in the Federal Republic and mediate a settlement. By March 1981 the FRG's attempt at mediation failed and the reason given by the Bonn government was the reluctance and even the negative attitude of both sides to talk to one another. [Ref. 64] The leader of the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) Guillermo Manuel Ungo has stated that he is willing to talk with the U.S. and other governments, but has rejected a direct dialogue with the El Salvadoran government and junta President Jose Napoleon Duarte "who does not have true power" [Ref. 65]. At the present time

both sides in El Salvador have enough outside support to believe they have a chance to win. The Guerrillas believe they have more to lose by elections (run by their opponents) at this time. This is where the U.S. and the FRG disagree. The U.S. believes that concessions should not be given to the guerrillas that could not be won. Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten's statements on the situation in El Salvador irritated the U.S. Department of State when he directly criticized the U.S. decision to step up its military aid, which he said only leads to the prolongation of the fighting and allows the centralists to believe they can win without giving concessions to the leftists.

The FRG sees the situation as: on one side there is the Fidelist party which is receiving its arms from Soviet countries and on the other side a military junta, when it overthrew General Romero's dictatorship, contained many Christian Democrats and proposed to carry out an agrarian reform program. The revolutionaries went all out against a reformist effort and contributed to the junta's shift to the right. The conservative military strengthened their influence and Christian Democrats abandoned an apparently sinking ship. The extreme rightwing guerrillas are abducting and murdering people and adding to the civil war's horror. [Ref. 66]

The FRG opposes all use of violence in El Salvador, whether from the right or the left. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the two major political parties in Germany, the SPD and CDU, maintain separate relations with both groups in El Salvador. The left in the form of the Social Democratic Party of Germany has no hesitation in siding with the national front. Hans Juergen Wischenwski, who is close to the chancellor, is proclaiming the government party's solidarity with the Salvadoran opposition.

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hans Bruecher praises the junta's effort. The official government position is to call for reasonable but inopportune talks between both sides. [Ref. 67]

The social democratic party is on record as supporting the FDR and opposing any deeper U.S. military involvement in El Salvador. They have cast themselves as intermediaries between the government and opposition - so far to no effect.

Since there is no trust between the Salvadoran government and the guerrillas certain necessary conditions must be met for negotiations to take place: (1) each side must believe there is no hope for winning a military victory in the short run; (2) each side must believe the other side will not gain a military advantage during negotiations; (3) each side must believe the other side will comply with whatever political process comes out of a peaceful conference. Even with these conditions political pressure will have to be applied. The political situation that exists now in El Salvador provides an opportunity for these conditions to come about but as U.S. military and economic aid is increased the chances are being reduced. The Reagan administration by no longer tying aid to reforms and human rights is sending the signal to the Salvadoran government it will tolerate whatever level of violence pacification requires. [Ref. 68]

The U.S. should be putting conditions on their support for El Salvador. It is crucial for the U.S. to play an active role in supporting a dialogue. As the major supplier of aid only the U.S. has the ability to bring the Salvadoran government to a negotiating table and insure compliance of any agreements. Germany and other socialist democratic governments can probably bring the guerrillas to

a negotiating table. The problem is the Reagan administration has decided to "draw the line in El Salvador" and make it an example of U.S. resolve to stop the spread of Soviet influence in the Third World-it is hard to "draw" the line" and fail to win a victory.

One of the strongest critiques of U.S. El Salvadoran policy appeared in an editorial in the Frankfurter Rundschau 15 January 1981. Carl Grobe criticized Secretary of State Haig for placing U.S. interest higher than treaties such as the OAS charter and reducing foreign policy to the denominator of anti-communism. Grobe states that the focus of U.S. policy is narrowing dangerously. There are only enemies and conspirators and anyone who stands up against U.S. interest is bound to be a communist. Each and every social reform movement, and much more so any revolutionary revolt, is taken as the work of Moscow's agents. As a result, any reform movement leads to confrontation with the Soviets. Grobe also charges that the U.S. condones terror as long as it is not done by the communists and that it is permissible to conclude alliances with despots like Syngman Rhee in South Korea, Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam, and President Duarte in El Salvador, the main thing being that they are not communist. Grobe also disagrees with Haig in that for Germany peaceful survival under conditions prescribed by Germany has the highest priority rather than rolling back communism which the U.S. has placed the highest priority. To Grobe the Reagan confrontation scheme is unacceptable on principles for the Social Democrats and liberals in their approach to the Third World and El Salvador. Social Democrats and liberals cannot accept a situation where juntas such as in El Salvador are declared friends without any criticism. [Ref. 69]

All the actors in the El Salvador conflict declare that they recognize the need for a political rather than a military solution to the civil war. But, so far, the obstacle to negotiations between the government and opposition has been the belief of each party that the other lacks sincerity. At the present a military stalemate exists which provides an opportunity for the arrangement of a political solution, but this situation is changing rapidly because of the elections and flood of aid. As the Reagan administration and the leftist supporters continue to provide massive amounts of economic and military aid to the Salvadoran government and guerrillas both sides become increasingly convinced that their drive for military victory will be underwritten. The fact that the U.S. no longer ties aid to reforms or human rights means, to the Salvadoran, that the U.S. will tolerate and encourage whatever it takes for pacification.

The West German view is very close to that of the Mexican's in that they see the problem as home grown, with some Marxist support and social change inevitable with the benefits of development transferred to a broader section of the population. The FRG believes that aid to El Salvador should be based on reform and the Salvadoran government should sit down at the negotiating table with the left and work out a peaceful solution. The FRG believes that they can bring the FDR-FMLN to the bargaining table if the U.S. can bring the Salvadoran government to the negotiating table, with the threat of a cutoff of aid if necessary.

The analysis of U.S. and FRG policy toward the Third World shows that their interest and motivations are similar but that differences in their economies and perceptions cause differences in their priorities and strategy. Both the U.S. and the FRG are interested in maintaining stability



in Third World countries so as not to present the Soviet Union an opportunity to exert influence. However, because of Germany's much more sensitive economy the FRG is more vulnerable than the U.S. thus the FRG places a higher priority on stability. The FRG is an economic power but very dependent on foreign export markets and raw materials. The U.S. is an economic giant and less vulnerable than the FRG. This situation allows the U.S. more flexibility in foreign policy and the ability to follow a hard-line policy on issues. The Reagan administration places the highest priority on directly confronting what they see as the USSR's grand design to establish their influence. Whereas, the FRG places more emphasis on negotiations. The Germans see the Soviet involvements, not so much as a grand design, as the social conditions in the Third World countries offering the Soviets a convenient opportunity to intervene.

Differences in priority are also seen from the fact that the U.S. and FRG both need raw materials from the Third World especially South Africa, but, the FRG's need is greater. Latin America is located closer to the U.S. and is more of a security threat than to the FRG. The FRG is located closer to the Soviet Union than the U.S. and at the same time Germany has to depend on a more vulnerable U.S. for security and any irritation of the Soviets could possibly lead to a destabiling situation. Because of these conditions and interest, the U.S. can develop a harder-line with El Salvador than South Africa and follow different strategies than the Federal Republic whos priorities are also different.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Despite differences in priorities and strategies, German -- American Third World policies tend to be complementary. At the same time, decisions made by the U.S. or the FRG on such issues as economics, security, and raw material supply have consequences for the Third World regardless of the degree of German-American agreement. As a result of this situation, conflicts are more possible now than in the past. The declining strength of the U.S. as a superpower as well as the nature of the international environment makes conflicts more likely.

We have seen that U.S. interests and motivations in the Third World are similar to those of the FRG. But, there are differences in their economies and perceptions which cause differences in their priorities and strategy. The U.S. is a Superpower and economic giant whereas the FRG is not. This gives the U.S. more flexibility between directly cooperating with the FRG or temporary coalitions against the FRG. This is enhanced by the fact that the FRG's strengths and weakness are interrelated. The economic capacity of the FRG is connected to its dependence on exports and greater vulnerability to economic stress and at the same time the FRG sees itself as the country most directly exposed to the growing military power of the Soviet Union, but has no possibility of meeting this threat alone. Although the FRG is growing in importance for the Third World, especially in Africa and Latin America, the FRG will continue to have no capability to project itself as a military power, and yet, as a result of its economic interest, it will be increasingly entangled in regional conflicts (Southern

Africa) or will appear as a direct competitor to the U.S. (Latin America).

From this survey of the U.S. and the FRG, in the Third World, it has emerged very clearly that the German approach is strongly marked by the philosophy of economic liberalism. As stated by Ambassador Jaenicke "We Europeans, after all, have not freed ourselves painfully in the course of our history from the fetters of feudalism and mercantilism, of protectionism and totalitarian planned economy, only to agree today to a worldwide program, which moreover would be run by the present majority in the UN". The dominant role of economics in the FRG's foreign relations is the heart of national policy making. When the FRG resists the demands of the Third World, and the desires of many of its western partners to go along with them, the FRG is using its economic strength in pursuit of political objections.

The FRG has tremendous economic strength, but this strength depends on others. One job in every four in German industry depends on production in export. The importance to the FRG of export markets among LDC's plays a key role and helps to explain its active concern with the problems of North-South economic relations, as does Germany's dependence on imported raw materials. This double dependence on export markets and raw materials determines to a large degree the amount of emphasis the FRG will place on the management of the international economic environment. And Germany's economic strength is being used to achieve certain political purposes, such as shaping the international environment in ways conforming to the FRG's own interest. The FRG does seek an improvement in North-South economic relations and a fair deal for raw material producers, but a deal corresponding to Germany's ideas of fairness, and not breaking the German tradition of economic liberalism. The

U.S. also operates (to a lesser degree than the FRG) on economic liberalism. The U.S. is less vulnerable to any cutoff of its sources of supply of raw materials and the fluctuations of the international economy and this difference in degree of economic vulnerability causes a difference in perspective. The U.S. can develop longer-term strategies and priorities to problems and can take a harder stand on the short-term issues.

This economic relationship overlaps into the other key issues which threaten to cause friction between the U.S. and the FRG. Fragile and unstable states in the Third World threaten (to a different degree) the well-being of both the U.S. and the FRG. An unstable situation allows for superpower involvement and for the development of a possible crisis which could threaten security and access to minerals. The Germans believe that the Soviets are not as great a threat as the U.S. believes them to be, that the Soviets are losing influence in Latin America and Southern Africa and that with more patience will move away from the Soviet Union and closer to the West. The FRG sees over emphasis and overreaction to a Soviet threat as harmful to arms control negotiation and causing local conflicts to intensify, which could threaten the international environment. The U.S. does not place as much emphasis as the FRG on contact and dialogue because it is not as vulnerable as the FRG and can take a harder stand on issues if the U.S. determines it to be in their best interest. Thus different strategies and priorities are developed to obtain the basic interest of both countries in the Third World. These basic interests are essentially the same: access to minerals, denial of assets to the Soviets, encouragement of economic development and political stability.

At the end of the sixties the German political scientist Hans Peter Schwarz identified a range of roles which the FRG played in the international system "first, the German's favorite role of the economic man; next, the twin main roles of potential victim of Soviet pressure and potential vassal of the United States; and finally, the combined roles, in the European Community, of partner of France and Britain." Schwarz characterized the style in which the FRG played these roles as "the sober pragmatism of a domesticated great power". Today, despite the addition of new roles, the central role (economic) that Schwarz identified is the same. [Ref. 70 pp. 219-260.]

Since economic issues have come to occupy such a central role in the international environment (without the importance of security issues being any less), the economic strength of the FRG is cast in a central role-whether in North-South or East-West relations and the economic strength of the FRG becomes a political force as well. The obvious constraints of the FRG's dependence on North-South relations for markets and raw materials suggest the emergence of a further political-economic role as an important partner of the Third World. However, the FRG's most important relationships are still those of the late sixties: the U.S. as protector, the Soviet Union as potential threat, and France and Britain as partners in the European Community. What has changed is the degree of strength and influence enjoyed by the FRG. Germany is increasingly pursuing a more independent foreign policy due mainly to its increased freedom to act which was acquired by its development of Ostpolitik and the alleviation of the constraints of the Hallstein Doctrine. At the same time Germany is forced to increase its influence because it can depend less on the U.S. for security due to increased American vulnerabilities.

Today the FRG can take the lead in many of the roles it plays.

Because of the overriding German interest in a stable political and economic environment (resulting from insecurity and economic interdependence) the FRG's influential position is very often used to bring its partners together when there is a risk of their divergences causing instability. One example is when the problems of energy and the Middle East caused a rift between the United States and France early in 1974, the FRG pressed for the "Gymnich Formular" of a systematic consultation between Europe and the United States.

The continued development of the FRG's authority and ability to influence events will inevitably be accompanied by varying degrees of friction. Specific acts of German policy are bound to provoke disappointment or disagreement. However, the FRG's foreign policy today shows that its economic power has been consistently used for an improvement of the international environment as well as Germany's own immediate interests.

The FRG is an important partner for the U.S. in matters of alliance teamwork (including military confrontation with the Soviet Union) and in promoting Third World cooperation. For the U.S. it is important that divergence of issues with the FRG be reached that does not endanger the FRG's stability and supportive capacity. Stability of the international environment is vitally important for both the U.S. and the FRG and can only be decisively influenced in agreement. Today German-American cooperation is more necessary and more difficult than ever. It requires a kind of political leadership that has no parallel in history. The common interest in Germany's stability in the long run is vital for the U.S. stability and security.

The analysis presented here has shown that there are tensions and divergences of interests between the FRG and the U.S. due to Germany's increased authority on one hand, its international dependence on the other, and the international environment itself. However, even though the FRG's ability to influence international events has increased, Germany still operates in the same environment it did ten years ago--an environment of opportunities and constraints. And in this environment the divergence of issues between the U.S. and the FRG, which will probably be more numerous in the future, are mainly a matter of priority and strategy. The scarcity in raw materials alone, to which both governments are vulnerable (to different degrees) and must now anticipate future shortages, will lead to the adoption of different political strategies and priorities. Both nations realize that cooperating together they can contribute more to solving problems in the Third World and in doing so contribute more to their own security and well-being.

**APPENDIX A**

**TABLES**

**TABLE I**  
**Bilateral Official Development Assistance 1979**  
**in DM millions**

| Recipient  | Loans    | Grants   | Total    |
|------------|----------|----------|----------|
| Europe     | 625.00   | 124.45   | 749.45   |
| Africa     | 783.50   | 1,436.75 | 2,220.25 |
| S. America | 227.70   | 418.15   | 645.85   |
| Asia       | 1,403.00 | 787.72   | 2,190.72 |

1970-1979

|            |           |          |           |
|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| Europe     | 3,518.351 | 834.89   | 4,353.24  |
| Africa     | 6,609.66  | 7,706.65 | 14,316.31 |
| S. America | 1,824.92  | 2,825.16 | 4,650.09  |
| Asia       | 8,791.90  | 5,549.09 | 14,340.99 |



TABLE II  
1979 Trade with South Africa (US \$ million)

| Exports     |       |          |            |
|-------------|-------|----------|------------|
|             | Value | % OF SSA | % OF World |
| FRG         | 1,711 | 38.6     | 1.0        |
| US          | 1,413 | 41.1     | 0.8        |
| Imports     |       |          |            |
|             | Value | % of SSA | % of World |
| FRG         | 2,006 | 31.9     | 1.3        |
| US          | 2,717 | 18.8     | 1.2        |
| Total Trade |       |          |            |
|             | Value | % of SSA | % of World |
| FRG         | 3,717 | 34.7     | 1.1        |
| US          | 4,130 | 23.1     | 1.0        |

TABLE III

Selected Nonfuel Minerals, US Dependence on Foreign  
Sources of SupplyPERCENTAGE OF US DEMAND THAT IS NOT MET BY DOMESTIC  
MINE AND/OR SECONDARY PRODUCTION

| Mineral        | 1965 | 1975 | 1985 (est) | 2000 (est) |
|----------------|------|------|------------|------------|
| Bauxite and    |      |      |            |            |
| Alumina        | 84   | 85   | 86         | 81         |
| Chromium       | 92   | 90   | 92         | 89         |
| Cobalt         | 93   | 98   | 98         | 97         |
| Copper         | 22   | 13   | 13         | 18         |
| Manganese      | 93   | 98   | 98         | 100        |
| Nickel         | 73   | 70   | 67         | 67         |
| Platinum group | 91   | 84   | 81         | 80         |
| Tin            | 75   | 71   | 67         | 66         |
| Tungsten       | 53   | 50   | 57         | 70         |

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
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**MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART**  
 NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

**TABLE IV**  
**South Africa's Minerals Production and Reserves Position**  
**& Supplies to US**  
**1975**

|                | Production    |                                  | Reserves      |                             | US Imports    |
|----------------|---------------|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|---------------|
|                | % of<br>world | % of<br>non-commun-<br>IST WORLD | % of<br>world | % of<br>non-com<br>IST WRLD | % from<br>RSA |
| Vanadium       | 46            | 58                               | 64            | 96                          | 57            |
| Gold           | 59            | 74                               | 49            | 61                          | -             |
| Platinum       | 55            | 88                               | 86            | 99                          | 48            |
| Chrome         | 30            | 47                               | 83            | 84                          | 30            |
| Chromite       | -             | -                                | -             | -                           | 21            |
| Petrochrome    | -             | -                                | -             | -                           | 35            |
| Manganese      | 24            | 41                               | 48            | 84                          | -             |
| Ferromanganese | 24            | -                                | -             | -                           | 36            |
| Diamond        | 17            | 22                               | 8             | 92                          | -             |
| Antimony       | 21            | 31                               | 4             | 10                          | 43            |

**TABLE V**  
**Mineral Imports from SA as Percentages**  
**of the Total Imports of each Commodity to**  
**the Indicated Countries**

| Commodity     | EEC as<br>a whole | United<br>Kingdom | West<br>Germany | France | Japan |
|---------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------|-------|
| Platinum gp   | 24                | 37                | -               | 22     | 38    |
| Antimony      | 9                 | 95                | 50              | 14     | 15    |
| Copper        | 4.5               | 4                 | 10              | 1      | 21    |
| Iron ore      | -                 | -                 | -               | -      | 2     |
| Nickel        | 5                 | -                 | 11              | 14     | 21    |
| Vanadium      | 42                | 60                | 50              | 31     | 62    |
| Chrome ore    | 31                | 15                | 43              | 20     | 87    |
| Ferrochrome   | 31                | 15                | 43              | 20     | 87    |
| Manganese ore | 31                | 43                | 52              | 40     | 43    |
| Ferro-        |                   |                   |                 |        |       |
| Manganese     | -                 | 27                | 14              | -      | -     |
| Asbestos      | 13                | -                 | -               | -      | 35    |
| Fluorspar     | -                 | -                 | -               | -      | 23    |
| Vermiculite   | na                | 100               | 14              | 19     | 100   |

Table VI

Major US Security Aid to El Salvador, FY 1950-1979  
(in 1000's of dollars)

Foreign Military Sales Agreements

|            |      |
|------------|------|
| FY 1955-59 | 1469 |
| FY 1970-75 | 867  |
| FY 1976    | 846  |
| FY 1977    | 271  |
| FY 1978    | 29   |
| FY 1979    | -    |

Military Assistance Program

|            |      |
|------------|------|
| FY 1950-69 | 4307 |
| FY 1970-75 | 2833 |
| FY 1976    | 266  |
| FY 1977    | 9    |
| FY 1978    | 4    |
| FY 1979    | 5    |

International Military Education  
and Training (IMET) Program

|            |      |
|------------|------|
| FY 1950-69 | 2300 |
| FY 1970-75 | 2195 |
| FY 1976    | 805  |
| FY 1977    | 514  |
| FY 1978    | -    |
| FY 1978    | -    |
| FY 1979    | -    |

Commercial Sales Program

|            |      |
|------------|------|
| FY 1971-73 | 753  |
| FY 1974-75 | 370  |
| FY 1976    | 240  |
| FY 1977    | 2229 |
| FY 1978    | 278  |
| FY 1979    | 151  |

**TABLE VII**  
**Official Development Assistance from 1950 to 1977**  
**in Billion DM**

| Conntinents   | Credits  | Grants   | Total    |
|---------------|----------|----------|----------|
| Europe        | 2,884.2  | 913.5    | 3,797.7  |
| Africa        | 4,360.7  | 3,940.9  | 8,301.6  |
| Asia          | 9,386.8  | 7,629.1  | 17,016.0 |
| Latin America | 1,247.7  | 2,489.8  | 3,737.5  |
| Total         | 18,223.8 | 16,851.0 | 35,074.8 |



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