Robust Authentication for the National Seismic System.
Abstract
During recent (1977-1980) trilateral negotiations between the U.S., the USSR, and the U.K. leading toward a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, it was agreed that in order to monitor compliance with the treaty when it entered into force, unmanned, tamperproof seismic observatories would be installed on the territories of the three parties. The seismic waveforms from each observatory are digitized and combined with other digital information concerning the status of the observatory. Each one second of the digital information is processed by a cryptologic algorithm whose output is appended to the data to permit authentication of the data (to prevent substitution or alteration), and the total digital signals transmitted, via satellite links, to the U.S., USSR, and U.K. for processing and analysis. Transmission errors with a prototype system resulted in an unacceptably high rate of authentication failures. Nine options were examined to lower the rate of authentication failures. These included various combinations of bandwidth reduction, redundant paths, forward error correction coding, and post-reception processing. Four of these options will result in a mean time between authentication failures substantially larger than the mean time between hardware failures. The cryptologic aspects of the authentication process are treated in a classified annex, published separately.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1982
- Accession Number
- ADA122287
Entities
People
- Joseph T. Beardwood
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses