Is the Military Budget out of Balance?
Abstract
Occasionally one reads or hears complaints about the status of manpower, logistics and support in the development of the Department of Defense budget. It is felt that the United States spends too much to buy fancy new equipment, and not enough to man and support it adequately. The analytic issue is whether it is cheaper to get additional defense capability by buying more forces or by spending more to keep smaller forces working. This paper addresses this issue by examining four case studies. The analyses behind the case studies were performed at the Center for Naval Analyses during the last twelve years. Thus, they all examine Navy systems. I see no reason to believe that Air Force or Army analyses would yield different results. Each of the analyses focuses on the production of weapons system availability by application of additional support resources. The case studies look at the value of spare parts and people in producing equipment readiness. Specifically, they address the payoff to additional spare parts to repair ships, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters, and to additional personnel aboard surface combatants. For each of these four examples I will describe the research being drawn on, display the quantitative between support expenditures and system availability it derived, and compare the cost of buying availability via support with the cost of availability implicit in the life-cycle cost of equipment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1982
- Accession Number
- ADA122368
Entities
People
- Stanley A. Horowitz
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses