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WHITE PAPER 1982: LOGISTICS DIRECTIONS FOR THE 1980'S
(U) DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS (ARMY)
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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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15 April 1982

SUBJECT: Logistics White Paper

DA 124285

The purpose of this White Paper is to give you my thoughts on the broad direction in which we Logisticians must guide Army logistics during the remainder of the 1980's and into the 1990's. To provide such direction, I have developed a set of objectives which I submit to you as a reference to assist you in carrying out your various responsibilities.

These logistics objectives are derived from a number of sources, the principal being the Total Army Goals published by Secretary Marsh and General Meyer on 7 December 1981. It is these Goals that served as the foundation upon which I have built this paper. Other major sources include guidance statements made by the Army leadership, their testimony before the Congress, and a considerable number of audit and inspection reports. These sources provide valuable, and often untapped, indicators for the logistic community.

I ask for your support to assure a logistics posture which our Army deserves -- and must have -- to be successful. Logistics cannot be a constraint to the successful accomplishment of the mission and objectives of the commanders in the field.

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Logistics White Paper

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for Logistics

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DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS

UNITED STATES ARMY

WHITE PAPER 1982

LOGISTICS DIRECTIONS FOR THE 1980's

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Introduction and Perspective.

Today the Army is faced with two very profound and far-reaching situations. The first of these concerns our expanding global commitments. The second concerns the current and future military capability of our forces.

While the NATO Alliance remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy, the possibilities are increasing for commitment of forces to meet threats outside of Europe. As the Army plans and trains to meet the threat in central Europe, the logistics community must do the same. But our global commitment requires us to be active participants in the process of preparing to support operations elsewhere as well.

At the heart of the many problems facing logisticians is the need to create and maintain a force structure which is ready, modern, and sustainable. These four components: Readiness, Force Structure, Sustainability, and Modernization are the pillars of our defense posture. It is important to note that a deficiency in any one of these four components can impact adversely on our ability to prevail against an enemy. Each will be addressed in the DCSLOG objectives.

Total Army Goals.

The logistics objectives laid out in this paper are directly supportive of the Total Army Goals. These goals were developed by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff in conjunction with the senior Army leaders. They are expressed in seven broad categories: Readiness, Human, Leadership, Materiel, Future Development, Strategic Deployment, and Management. Properly fulfilled, they will assist us in preparing for our statutory role of "prompt and sustained land combat." Our specific mission is made clear in the preamble to the Total Army Goals:

"... to deter any attack upon U.S. national interests and, if deterrence fails, to engage and defeat any enemy in any environment."

This mission and the Total Army Goals provide us appropriate forward-looking guidance upon which to base our actions, and standards upon which we might judge the value of our contribution.

The logistics objectives which follow are extensions of the Total Army Goals. They were developed to give direction to the logistics community; they are harmonious and fully supportive of our efforts to develop an Army consistent with the Total Army Goals.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics - Objectives

REALINESS

Achieve a responsive logistics system which supports both human and materiel readiness.

FORCE STRUCTURE

Achieve a logistics force structure that will meet both the peacetime and wartime needs of the Army.

SUSTAINABILITY

Achieve a logistics posture which is capable of supporting and sustaining the current and programmed force.

MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT

Achieve the capability to rapidly mobilize and deploy the force.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT - MODERNIZATION

Achieve comprehensive, effective and efficient logistics support for new and product-improved materiel systems and for those being displaced.

TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Achieve effective training, professional development, and career progression for those soldiers, officers, and civilians involved in logistics. Continue to upgrade the working environment of all ODCSLOG personnel by offering professional challenges and the opportunity for self-fulfillment.

RESOURCES

Achieve adequate resources for logistics programs in balance with the overall Army program, and the effective and efficient management of these resources as stewards for the soldier and taxpayer.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Achieve a Security Assistance program capable of carrying out DCSLOG responsibilities in support of national goals and policy.

STAFF PROCESS

Achieve a cohesive, well-managed ODCSLOG staff which participates effectively in the Army Staff process. Develop new initiatives and inventive ways to do more with less.

REALINESS

The Secretary of Defense and the Army's top leadership have given first priority in the near-term allocation of resources to improving the readiness of our forces. A central challenge facing Army logisticians is to continue doing our part in making the Army ready for combat and capable of defeating any adversary.

The Army's Readiness Goal describes readiness as

"... both a state of mind and summary of data indicating equipment operational readiness rates, equipment on hand, and manning levels. Training, maintenance, leadership ... are essential elements of readiness."

Our objective is to provide the necessary weapons systems, equipment and commodities to our units so that they are able to deliver the outputs for which they were designed. We must also be concerned with the living conditions and work place of the soldiers who operate and support the equipment.

Matériel Readiness. The challenge of Matériel Readiness is to have weapons systems and equipment on hand where and when needed and have them fully mission capable. The Army is procuring additional matériel each year to help reduce shortages and to modernize the Army. As logisticians, we must influence the determination of matériel requirements and the design of these systems to assure supportability when fielded.

It is our mission to distribute new equipment and to support both it and that which is displaced. This is where Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) pays off. The condition and support for displaced equipment being reassigned must be treated with care and consideration in the form of a reverse ILS. To the recipient, these displacements have the same impact as receiving new equipment. We must provide a support base that will maximize readiness, operational capability and sustainability of all matériel on hand. This requires that the entire logistic system contribute with all support functions to the matériel readiness requirement. We must use innovative concepts, measures and techniques wherever needed to meet matériel readiness goals; with full consideration given to the impact of force modernization, the redistribution of displaced matériel and its support, the absolute need to meet any global commitment, and to maximize the potential of interoperability with our allies.

Personnel Readiness. General Abrams said, "The Army is People." We serve little purpose to concentrate on matériel readiness without recognizing that the readiness of our people is what makes it all work. We must make sure that logisticians, soldier and civilian alike, are given meaningful and satisfying work; attractive living and working conditions and areas; and the opportunity to have a rewarding career. Our job is to see that the troops are well clothed and fed; that they have those items of equipment, supplies, and tools needed to accomplish assigned tasks; that

they are trained to required skill levels and encouraged to increase these skill levels with appropriate motivation and incentives; and that they work together as a cohesive team with the common goal and challenge of providing the best possible logistic support no matter what the circumstance.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The Army is moving toward improving the logistics portion of the Total Army structured/designed for Combat Service Support (CSS). Requirements for CSS are receiving more recognition today than at any time in the past. But the logistics force is inadequate today. The need remains to identify and establish a realistic, attainable logistic force structure. This was recognized in recent Total Army Analysis - 88 decisions.

We must continually strive to achieve the combat service support needed to support combat missions. To the degree that resource constraints, both manpower and dollars, limit tomorrow's combat service support structure, it is imperative that we achieve increased productivity of that which we do field in both the Active and Reserve Components. Special attention must be given to Reserve Component units, which comprise the major logistics base for the Army, to ensure that they are equipped and trained with what they would support in combat. We must also seek maximum benefit from Host Nation Support. Overall, we need to take whatever measures are necessary to offset the shortages of logistic force structure. At the same time, we must recognize that wanting "more" -- more support units, spaces and dollars to safeside everything -- may not be realistic. There may not be "more." If we have to live with less, we must increase productivity to compensate.

SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability as described is the measure of our units and their equipment to endure without interruption the full prosecution of their post-D-Day mission. It is the most important challenge facing the logistician. It is the logistician's challenge to be prepared to satisfy battlefield consumption, regardless of the length or intensity of combat. Resource constraints preclude our having the massive stockpiles of end items, repair parts and spares needed to cover the requirements of all contingencies. Accordingly, we need to devise means of making better use of whatever resources we are provided, if we are to attain a sustainable posture. Compounding the already difficult nature of this problem, during the 1980's the Army will field hundreds of new systems while simultaneously undergoing a transition to new organizational structures of Division 86 and the Army of the 90's. With the potential for global involvement, worldwide visibility and control of critical military materiel is an absolute essential if we are to have them available in time for use where needed.

As we examine the potential conflict of the future, we must consider interaction between stockpiled resources and the capability of the industrial base to provide new materiel. We need to carefully examine the cross-over point between the pre-war stockpiling of materiel needed for sustainability until the date of anticipated delivery of new production from

the industrial base. Here the question is a matter of assessing risk and costs, the risk of a void between exhaustion of stockpiles and startup and delivery of production, the cost of procuring and storing large stockpiles of materiel needed to fill that gap and the potential of expenditures on dated technologies.

We are currently questioning the use of "days of supply" as a realistic measurement of sustainability. Gross reliance on days of supply can give an inaccurate measurement of the sustainability picture since this process does not address the balance within and between classes of supply or the total logistic support posture of our forces. We are now looking at measuring "days of sustainability" which will address all elements of logistic support needed to sustain our forces in combat. While readiness is essentially a measure of pre-D-Day status, extending at most into initial combat operations, sustainability is a post-D-Day measure of military capability.

MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT

In case of mobilization, we face a major challenge in supporting the current force while bringing on board an effective support element from Reserve Components. The capability to rapidly mobilize and deploy a combat force has become increasingly difficult with the evolving global commitment versus the recent past when our primary areas of concern were with the NATO Alliance and Korea. While our commitments to NATO and Korea remain firm, events in southwest Asia and elsewhere have significantly increased potential requirements for a rapid mobilization and deployment. It does us little good to have a well-equipped combat ready force that cannot reach the scene of action when needed. We are very much concerned with the adequacy and responsiveness of strategic mobility. Needed is an airlift capable of rapidly deploying the initial complement of the combat force and the support base, backed up by a fleet of self-contained, fast deployment ships that can reinforce and resupply combat forces. Just as we use POMCUS (Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets) in Europe, we also may have to preposition critical materiel elsewhere, in order to assure that it is available when and where needed.

The challenge to the logistician has become infinitely greater than in the past. The expanded task of meeting a global commitment is gauged by the time required to mobilize forces and muster the strategic lift needed to project them. Mobilization exercises such as NIFTY NUGGET-MOBEX 78 and PROUD SPIRIT-MOBEX 80 served as problem finders in mobilization. Much progress has been made since NIFTY NUGGET. However, more work needs to be done. The four major areas of logistic concern are: (1) requirements and capabilities for combat service support; (2) equipment and people shortages; (3) availability of strategic lift; and (4) responsiveness of the industrial base.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

We are developing new concepts for operation, new force structure and new equipment to bring the Army into the 1980's and 90's. All of these are having a major impact on logistic support requirements, especially those

imposed by modernization with the entry of so many new weapons systems into the inventory.

We now face the largest force modernization undertaken by the Army in peacetime. We must recognize its impact on the Total Army. This is one of the most crucial and difficult tasks we now face. Modernization is one of the Army's highest priorities and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Of special concern will be to field and support each new piece of equipment as a total weapons system and to be able to displace and redistribute equipment and its support base from units receiving new equipment. The portent of global operations and modernization of the force present unprecedented challenges to the logistics community as well as the entire Army.

The Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) process is the means of assuring that logistic supportability is included in the design, development, testing, acquisition, and fielding of new equipment. ILS must begin with the initial design and selection of any new equipment since the reliability, maintainability and operational readiness of any new system, when fielded, will only be as good as its basic design. The ILS intensive management process must then follow through initial fielding until the design settles down and the system becomes fully supportable from producer down to the user through the standard logistics system. Fielding plans and procedures must be prepared to assure that logistic support is available when needed and that it can provide required readiness that can be sustained. Logistics doctrine, organizations and automated systems must keep pace with future development and modernization of the force.

TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The effectiveness and efficiency of Army logistics are directly related to the competency of the people, military and civilian alike, who operate the system. With the entry of high technology in many of our new systems, it becomes increasingly important that Army logisticians are well-trained and maintained in appropriate technical skills.

Military. Our thrust in the 1960's is to ensure that training and utilization of soldiers in logistic activities keep pace with the Army's manning and force modernization. We are maintaining close liaison with TRADOC to improve the quality and quantity of training given to our soldiers. Critical to their effectiveness is the supply of an adequate number of skilled non-commissioned officers who must be ready to supervise and train subordinate technicians.

Emphasis is also being placed on training officers in primary and additional specialties, particularly those officers coming into logistics from the combat arms. An officer and NCO corps capable of leading and managing complex logistic activities is a must for a successful logistic support program.

Civilians. It is essential that we develop broader-based civilian logisticians. The civilian career logistician is usually qualified in only one function. This requires change. We must provide the civilian workforce with the competence and opportunity to serve in key logistic assignments and be competitive with their counterparts in uniform. We have approval from the Vice Chief of Staff and are developing a capstone program to enable and make attractive for our civilians to become proficient in more than one function. We expect the program to take shape by end of 1982.

We are entering an era not experienced before by the Army. Historically, the Army has equipped men while the Air Force and Navy have manned equipment. The Army will always have the primary mission of equipping men. Now, with the advent of new high technology equipment and materiel needed on the battlefield of the future, the Army must also be prepared to man equipment.

RESOURCES

Adequate resources in men, money and materiel are needed to achieve our objectives. The availability of resources will continue to be constrained and will require highly selective application in support of competing demands. Recognizing resource constraints, solutions will have to be found to raise the productivity of logistic elements throughout the Army. A major DCSLOG thrust now underway is called PRIDE - Productivity Improvements in the Decade of the 80's. Using PRIDE, we intend to look at every logistic function to assure that we are getting the best value and return for every resource expended. An additional major thrust, Project SMART, focuses on increased productivity at using unit and direct support levels through the elimination of unnecessary logistic practices, simplification of procedures, automation of data related to readiness and maintenance, and innovation throughout the functional areas of logistics.

There are now incentives for productivity improvement in the form of four capital investment programs designed to reduce operating costs through capital investment. The four are: (1) the Quick Return on Investment Program (QRIP); (2) OSD Productivity Investment Funding (OSDPIF); (3) the Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment Program (PECIP); and (4) the Army Industrial Fund Fast Payback Program. These can supplement our regular budgets when funds are not otherwise available to support worthwhile projects.

As stewards for the soldier, civilian, and taxpayer, we must ensure that every dollar is allocated wisely and spent correctly. Every member of the Army, whether soldier, civilian or family, must work to eliminate fraud, waste, abuse, and inefficiency wherever they exist. Resources are too limited and too valuable to do otherwise.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security assistance is an important element of US foreign policy. It plays a significant role in enhancing US political and military interests


abroad. While security assistance has both positive and negative impacts on Army programs, frequent requirements to draw down US Army materiel assets in support of unforeseen and unprogramed requirements can adversely affect Army readiness and sustainability.

The Army has been working for some years to establish a fund to procure long lead time, high demand, short supply items in anticipation of urgent security assistance requirements. As a result, Congress and the President have approved a means to secure funds in advance for this purpose. Final authority to use this funding is now pending in the 1982 supplemental budget request. This singular action could minimize degradation of Army readiness caused by withdrawing or diverting supplies and equipment from Army units. We continue to work within the Army and with the other Services to integrate security assistance requirements into Army long-range procurement plans.

STAFF PROCESS

An effective and efficient staff derives from trained, highly motivated people who learn to work together in support of missions and functions of the agency to which assigned. The attitude of our people, regardless of the function, or the level at which they work, is of utmost importance in accomplishing the logistics mission. We must constantly question ourselves on whether we are unnecessarily constraining strategists or tacticians. Conversely, we must assure ourselves that we are not allowing them to head blindly toward implementing plans that are unsupportable.

Effectiveness in Army logistics is attainable through any number of leadership and management styles. Towards this end, we have established within ODCSLOG a system to manage the performance of the ODCSLOG staff. The nine objectives discussed in this paper are the DCSLOG Performance Management Objectives. They play a key part in the ODCSLOG management program, which consists of goals and objectives in a pyramid that extends from the top down to the ultimate action officer.



The DCSLOG objectives support the Total Army Goals and the Chief of Staff's objectives for the Army Staff. In turn, my directors' subobjectives support the DCSLOG objectives and division chief thrust items (projects) support the subobjectives. Finally, specific responsibility for tasks critical in accomplishing thrust items is fixed in officer evaluation

reports and civilian merit pay performance standards. This program provides focus and direction for the work of the ODCSLOG staff, assures uniformity and consistency in staff actions, and fixes responsibility for the accomplishment of discrete tasks.

SUMMARY

In looking to the future, the Army has become more global in outlook. This, coupled with the necessity to maintain required military capability of the force, presents unprecedented challenges to Army logisticians. In looking to the future, we can envision a battlefield radically different in the 1990's than that of World War II. We must rid ourselves of the logistics mentality of the 1940's and relate logistics to new operational concepts. We must take full advantage of how to use transportation, communications, and computer techniques that are available now and will be greatly improved in the 1990's. We must take a critical look at unrealistic road blocks such as that caused by a mindset that there is a line of demarcation between the wholesale and retail support systems. We must project our ideas and our concepts and doctrine toward supporting a modernized Army on a battlefield never envisioned before. All the above requires the exercise of sound leadership, leadership with the personal touch, care, and persuasion.

