The Restricted Stackelberg Problem.
Abstract
The Stackelberg equilibrium strategy concept has wide applications in modeling of socio-economic and large scale systems. Its analytic difficulty, however, poses a main drawback. The Restricted Stackelberg Problem (RSP) considers a subset of the Stackelberg strategy where the leader achieves his team cost. It is more analytically tractable and offers a viable alternative. This report investigates discrete, LQ RSP using dynamic-to-static conversion. The approach reduces the dynamic progression of variables into an augmented static domain. The static results can then be applied. New sufficient conditions are obtained in simple forms as linear matrix equations for the centralized, decentralized and stochastic centralized information structures. These conditions also encompass the similar work done previously. Large threat strategy is examined as a possible near-optimal solution. It is found that as the threat tends to infinity, a nonzero offset from the team cost exists for the linear strategy representation, and team cost can be achieved for the discontinuous strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1981
- Accession Number
- ADA124638
Entities
People
- John Ting-yung Wen
Organizations
- University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign