


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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING AND PREDICTING INSURGENCY

by

Daniel W. Wagner

December 1982

Thesis Advisor: Michael Clough

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
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


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insurgent balance in organization, legitimacy, and coercion. An analyst using the methodology evaluates each factor that is relevant to the current phase of the insurgency and records his responses on a factor scale. The scales are isomorphic, extending from conditions of government to insurgent advantage, and are arranged in parallel on a worksheet. Connecting the selected points produces a graph that suggests the status of the insurgency. The analyst may overlay different worksheets to determine change over time or to compare insurgent situations.

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A Framework for Analyzing and Predicting Insurgency

by

Daniel W. Wagner
Major, United States Army Reserve
B.A., Lake Forest College, 1967

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1982**

Author: _____

Daniel W. Wagner

Approved by: _____

Michael Clough

Thesis Advisor

Claude A. Buss

Second Reader

Sherman W. Blandin

Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

W M Woods

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

This study develops a method to analyze and predict rural insurgencies in the third world. First it derives a causal model and a process model of insurgency from social science theories and empirical studies. The models help to identify and organize twenty-eight analytical factors describing the society, physical environment, government, and the insurgents. The factors calculate the government-insurgent balance in organization, legitimacy, and coercion. An analyst using the methodology evaluates each factor that is relevant to the current phase of the insurgency and records his responses on a factor scale. The scales are isomorphic, extending from conditions of government to insurgent advantage, and are arranged in parallel on a worksheet. Connecting the selected points produces a graph that suggests the status of the insurgency. The analyst may overlay different worksheets to determine change over time or to compare insurgent situations.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Few problems confronting the intelligence analyst today recur with such frequency, variety, and telling effects as does insurgency--defined here as a mass-based, rural movement seeking political power through violence. Ten of the world's thirteen deadliest conflicts over the past century and a half have been civil wars or rebellions [ref. 1], and one source records 367 "revolutions" during the first 65 years of this century [ref. 2]. Since 1960, Africa alone has experienced twelve civil wars [ref. 3]. There are active movements today in El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Indochina, the Philippines, and more.

Although few would argue with Charles Tilly that "collective violence is normal" [ref. 4], there is no consensus on the terminology to describe, nor causes to "explain," these civil wars, rebellions, and revolutions. Sam Sarkesian discusses more than 38 overlapping terms including revolution, guerrilla warfare, people's war, and insurgency [ref. 5], while Monte Palmer and William Thompson despair that "one person's riot may well be another person's civil war." [ref. 6] Each of the social sciences has spawned its own theories of political violence, and

interdisciplinary efforts have failed to reconcile the conflicting theories and empirical evidence.

This paper aims at structuring a methodology to analyze insurgencies--both communal and class conflicts. It should be as applicable to the factional civil wars of Africa as to the revolutions more typical of Asia. A systematic checklist of factors describes the social and physical environment, the government, and the insurgent movement, and a step-by-step procedure evaluates the factors in turn. Worksheets record and visually depict each judgement to aid in making an overall assessment. A user may overlay the sheets to look for changes over time or to compare different movements.¹

A. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

Insurgency presents four successive challenges to the intelligence analyst. Each involves evaluating a complex array of data and calls for the prediction of specific developments or events.

1. Prior to the existence of an insurgent movement, the analyst must evaluate the country's vulnerability

¹It should be clear at the outset that This is not an exercise in quantified political analysis, of which the intelligence analyst tends to be skeptical. [ref. 7] With key variables disputed, factor weights unknown, and many indicators ambiguous, insurgency has so far proven too complex for quantification.

and predict a group's appearance.

2. Once a potential insurgent movement exists, he must anticipate an armed uprising.
3. Throughout the struggle, he constantly reevaluates the prospects of insurgent success and tries to predict the outcome.
4. Finally, if the insurgents win, he must anticipate the type of regime they will install.

Is insurgency predictable, or does the analyst face an impossible challenge? In Switzerland in January 1917, Lenin reportedly doubted whether "we, the old [will] live to see the decisive battles of the coming revolution." [ref. 8] If the leader of the Russian Revolution could be so wrong just weeks before the event, the difficult task of prediction might indeed seem intimidating.

The challenge certainly has discouraged some scholars. David Schwartz believes that "we have nothing like an adequate understanding of these incidents" [ref. 9], and Chalmers Johnson insists that "It is intrinsically impossible to construct a statistical measure that will predict the occurrence of a revolution." [ref. 10]. However, others are more hopeful. John Lewis finds that "Comparison appears to offer a promising approach to...questions on Asia's revolutions." [ref. 11]

This paper surveys the literature² on political violence with only limited goals in mind. It seeks a procedure to examine rigorously insurgent situations and to make use of indicators that aid prediction.

Section II begins to construct a framework of concepts and indicators by considering a simple causal model of revolution. It identifies the independent, intervening, and dependent variables which cause, mediate, or result from the insurgent process. "Discontent," the result of political and socioeconomic circumstances, creates a potential for insurgency. "Legitimacy" and "coercion" intervene to shape that potential. An Insurgency either results or it does not; it succeeds or it fails.

We find that discontent makes a poor variable for a model intended for practical applications. Discontent is everywhere in the third world today, yet insurgencies only break out here and there. It is a difficult variable to observe and measure for it exists in people's minds. And scholars argue over whether the causes of discontent actually galvanize or demobilize the discontented. The model we ultimately select does not disregard this important variable but subsumes it into the others.

²To sample the literature, one might begin with the review articles by Goldstone [ref. 12], Zagorin [ref. 13], Stone [ref. 14], Freeman [ref. 15], and Powell [ref. 16]. Excellent anthologies in the field are by Davies [ref. 17], Eckstein [ref. 18], and by Kelly and Brown [ref. 19]. A useful comparative study is by Greene [ref. 20].

A second change to the causal model is to add the variable "organization." Insurgency is a drawn-out and large-scale affair. Without organization the insurgent leaders could never rouse traditionally passive peasants to rebel, and lacking organization they certainly could not win.

Because organization, legitimacy, and coercion are so telling, we propose to compare the government and the insurgents--or any two sides in an insurgency--on the basis of these three criteria. The relative "balances" of organization, legitimacy, and coercion break down into twenty-eight components or "factors." The rationale here is simple: it is easier to evaluate each of the twenty-eight factors one at a time, and then to recombine them, than it is to assess the entire situation in all its complexity.

Section III presents an overview of the twenty-eight analytical factors and four phases of an insurgency that are the basic elements of the framework. The factors describe the situation (the society and the physical environment), the government, and the insurgent movement. Each actually represents a cluster of related concerns rather than a specific, narrow item. The factors are general enough to be applicable across a variety of countries and conditions, yet sufficiently precise to be evaluated accurately. They make use of both quantitative (the most useful for measurement) and qualitative indicators.

Section IV discusses each of the situational factors in some detail, and Section V does the same for those describing the government and the insurgents. The paper attempts to justify each factor with arguments drawn from the literature.

The procedure requires a user to make each of the many separate decisions called for and to record his judgements on one of the worksheets provided. The organization of the framework and the technique of using visual scales on the worksheets enable combining the judgements toward an overall evaluation.

Each factor has an accompanying scale on which to record an evaluation of that factor. The scales are isomorphic, running from an endpoint signifying government advantage or stability to one representing an insurgent advantage or instability. Any point on the scales suggests a degree of advantage to one or the other rival, although an indeterminate, mid-range value also is possible. Since the worksheets arrange the scales in parallel, the locus of points selected forms a graph of the overall advantage, if any.

The procedure is fully transparent, enabling a user to add, delete, or tailor factors to fit local conditions or his own convictions. The scales and worksheets are optional. Because the scales are of equal length, they weight the factors equally. A concerned user can accord

greater or lesser weight to individual factors as he prefers (perhaps by redrawing the scales to different lengths while continuing to array them in parallel with all midpoints along a vertical centerline).

The framework is intended to have four worthwhile properties. It is rigorous yet flexible, reproducible, and visually aided. Rigor ensures completeness; the procedure provides a systematically constructed checklist of items to be evaluated. The factors may be flexibly tailored to the circumstances of specific situations. Successive iterations can be compared³ to provide a reliable measure of change. In fact, an analyst might periodically "take the temperature" of his country or insurgency to see if incremental developments have shifted the overall situation appreciably. Finally, the visual display comprehends a great deal of material and suggests implications that traditional methods might miss.

³Because many of the factors call for a qualitative judgement, and no "objective" standards are imposed upon the analyst (they would unavoidably be controversial and difficult to apply uniformly), there is a limitation on use of the methodology. A comparison of "Smith's" assessment of an insurgency done six months ago, and "Jones's" just-completed evaluation is not necessarily meaningful. The same individual must complete both evaluations in any comparison, and he must come close to applying the same standards each time. It matters less what standards he uses than that he apply them consistently.

Section VI concludes the paper with some illustrations of applying the procedure and with the blank worksheets. The historical case of the Malayan "Emergency" (1948-1960) shows how the methodology tests for trends over time, which are often more significant than the absolute values of the factors at any given moment. The current situations in the Philippines and Mozambique provide two more looks at the framework in action.

In sum, the paper presents little that is new and attempts to prove nothing. Instead, it surveys theoretical and historical scholarship to assemble many apparent lessons of insurgency. Although the discussion concentrates upon Southern Africa and Southeast Asia, the approach is intended to be applicable throughout the third world. The paper includes aids for record-keeping and graphic representation of the assessment.

B. INSURGENCY DEFINED

In defining "insurgency," we draw upon the same criteria used to define and differentiate many forms of political violence. These are:

1. The goals of the movement. A dissident group may intend to alter the political and social system at any of five levels: those of the leaders, policies, political institutions, ideology, and social

structure [ref. 21]. Thus, Samuel Huntington's is a "maximal" definition of revolution: it is "a rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies." [ref. 22] On the other hand, Crane Brinton prefers a "minimalist" definition. "Our focus is on the drastic, sudden substitution of one group in charge of the running of a territorial political entity by another group hitherto not running that government." [ref. 23]

2. Participation. Participation varies from tiny conspiracies within the ruling elite to tens of millions of people involved in political and social revolutions.
3. The duration and level of violence. Charles Tilly suggests that "The largest disparities in definitions of revolution come from the time spans the definers want to consider....In general, the longer the time span, the fewer the events that will qualify as revolutions." [ref. 24]
4. External intervention. This is the direction or support of a group by others outside the country.
5. Outcome. Success or failure is a common criterion. Revolution may simply mean successful rebellion.

We define an insurgency as the process by which a mass-participation movement located primarily in the countryside uses paramilitary units to wage guerrilla or conventional warfare for the purpose of taking political power from an established regime. Although its leaders typically will come from the society's socioeconomically more advantaged students, intellectuals, professionals, tradesmen, officials, and so forth, the movement will recruit its followers from among the farmer and worker masses. The group must be seeking political power through violence. Its goal may be sovereignty over the entire state (an attempt at revolution) or only over a portion of it (a secession). The group must possess the organization and resources to wage guerrilla or conventional warfare. Thus, we evaluate insurgent movements in terms of membership, area concentration, goals, and tactics.

Revolutions tend to be insurgencies, as do civil and "internal" wars, but most coups and international conflicts do not. Insurgency is generally large-scale and domestic political violence. Although insurgents are necessarily dissidents, and they often employ terrorism and urban guerrilla tactics, small groups of political dissidents or terrorists* do not qualify as insurgent movements.

*It is particularly important to distinguish insurgency from terrorism. Although international terrorism is a major problem for the intelligence community, it is actually rare in the third world. A study done with the aid of the RAND

C. APPLYING ACADEMIC RESEARCH TO INTELLIGENCE

Richard Heuer, a 27-year veteran with the Central Intelligence Agency, believes that "there are, of course, very many similarities between academic and governmental research.... There are also significant differences." [ref. 27] While seeking to capitalize on the similarities, we must also consider the following differences.

First, the analyst is concerned with making probabilistic forecasts that are more near-term and event-oriented than are the predictions that interest many scholars. Second, academic models strive for "parsimony and elegance," sometimes to the extent that "accuracy is both indeterminate and inconsequential." [ref. 28] Models that try to get the maximum explanatory value from the fewest possible variables must be enriched with detail to be useful to the analyst,

Corporation's computerized data base on terrorist acts committed from 1968 through 1974 (i.e., the "ITERATE" data bank, an acronym for "International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events") concludes that "transnational terrorism is an oddity rather than a serious problem for Africans and Asians...." [ref. 25] Insurgent leaders resemble terrorists in socioeconomic profile, and frequently in tactics, but the crucial distinction concerns mass participation in the movement. Isolated groups of elites are simply not as capable as are mass movements. As Gary Olson observes, "in most cases, workers, students, and intellectuals cannot succeed in toppling the government by themselves." [ref. 26] Terrorism thus differs from insurgency in membership, goals, scale, and other aspects, and it requires analysis of factors different from those stressed here.

and certainly accuracy is paramount. Third, the analyst (ideally) should not be prone to parochial concern for a specific discipline's principles and concepts. What is desired is a pragmatic approach--either interdisciplinary or employing simultaneous, competing models as checks on each other. And fourth, cross-national tools of research favored by many in the academic world are generally of less utility to the analyst than are techniques for examining absolute criteria, developments, and trends within a single country.

To the extent possible, this paper recognizes and adjusts for these differences of perspective. It addresses the time horizon of the analyst rather than that of the historian, but the methodology cannot predict specific events. The framework does not favor a single discipline, and it is enriched with indicators⁵ that are different from the "causal variables" favored by scholars. Finally, techniques that compare and rank numbers of states, such as the quantified, composite indices of the Feierabends [ref. 30], or Donald Morrison [ref. 31], are not included here.

⁵Karl Deutsch defines indicators as "telltales." They are "things that are easy to observe and that are coupled or linked supposedly or in reality to other things that are harder to observe, but which we consider important." They need not be causes; in fact, it is not necessary that they have any particular link to the phenomenon under study except that the indicator tends to appear whenever the phenomenon does. Thus, indicators are "tools of discovery, tools for directing our attention and curiosity." They prove nothing. "No single indicator can be trusted." They merely serve to suggest. [ref. 29]

II. A CAUSAL MODEL OF INSURGENCY

Section II constructs a simple causal model of insurgency by building upon academic theories of political stability and revolution. It isolates several variables and considers their utility for practical applications. In so doing, the concept of discontent, and the classic psychological theories of revolution, are rejected in favor of a scheme that focuses upon the variables of organization, legitimacy, and coercion.

A. ARISTOTLE'S "DISCONTENT, LEGITIMACY, AND COERCION"

Aristotle apparently developed the first causal model of revolution and identified the key variables of discontent, legitimacy and coercion. He observed that people became discontented whenever what they possessed was less than what they believed they were due, especially regarding economic and political power. That is, whenever people enjoying a measure of the one lacked a commensurate amount of the other, they became discontented. But before this condition could translate into revolt, Aristotle observed that the mediating variables of legitimacy and coercion came into play. Thus, the philosopher advised that a ruler had two means of protecting himself against an overthrow: he could

rely upon force, or he could rule in such a manner that the people would "think that it is the tyrant's power which serves them in their position." [ref. 32] Thus, the probability of revolution increased with growing discontent, but it diminished with expanding legitimacy and coercion.




Figure 2.1 Aristotle's Model of Revolution.

Over the centuries, this simple model has proven durable, although the concepts have at times acquired different names and slightly different meanings. Machiavelli, of course, advised his prince to either repress the people or acquire their approval. Modern sociology explains political and social order in terms of value and coercion theories, and Ted Gurr says revolutionaries must have "normative and utilitarian justification" in order to use violence against the state (that is, they must believe that it is both "right" and "effective" to do so) [ref. 33]. Discontent is now commonly called relative deprivation, the pivotal variable in psychological theories of political violence to which we now turn.

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

Modern psychological theories of political violence rest upon the related concepts of relative deprivation, cognitive dissonance, and frustration-aggression.* Relative deprivation, or Aristotle's discontent, is usually an explicit variable in psychological theories of violence and it is often implicit in the models of other disciplines.

According to the cognitive dissonance and frustration-aggression concepts, an upsetting state of mind (e.g., from relative deprivation) generates efforts to reduce the upset or dissonance, often through aggression aimed at the perceived cause of the frustration. Therefore, deprived and frustrated people may come to blame the government and support an insurgent alternative. The argument is that deprivation should be measured as an indicator of the potential for insurgency, but as we shall see, deprivation proves to be a difficult and ambiguous indicator.

Individuals and groups may perceive themselves as deprived on the basis of past experience or through comparison with some reference group. They might perceive their situation as worse than past experience led them to expect, or they may observe other groups better off than they.

*James Geschwender's "fourteen assumptions" in working toward a general theory of social movements integrate much of the material discussed here, including the theories of de Tocqueville, Marx, Sorokin, and Davies, and a capsule summary of cognitive dissonance theory [ref. 34].

Relative deprivation is common in the developing countries, as Crawford Young observes:

Neither mobility nor status is evenly distributed in a society...[thus] the relative well-being of one group serves as a reference point and aspiration level for another...The enlargement of social horizons, intensification of interactions through urbanization, widening communications networks, and political competition have increased the number and salience of reference groups. [ref. 35]

1. Three Types of "RD"

There are three types of relative deprivation (RD), each inspiring a theory of political violence. Aspirational deprivation occurs when expectations (what people believe that they are capable of achieving) rise faster than satisfactions (what people actually achieve). Incremental deprivation is when satisfactions decline while expectations continue on as before. And a so-called third variant is a combination of the first two.

With aspirational deprivation, an individual used to regularly improving economic or status conditions may suddenly find further progress blocked. His expectations continue to rise while his satisfactions do not. This happens to individuals in caste systems and other societies where upward mobility is discontinuous at some point. It inspires the theory that rebellion is most probable when conditions in society are improving.

The classic expression of aspirational deprivation is Alexis de Tocqueville's account of the French Revolution. De Tocqueville asserted that people do not rebel when hardest pressed, for then they are too busy just staying alive. Rather, they do so once conditions begin to improve.

Such records of the Ile-de-France Region as have survived prove clearly that it was in the districts in the vicinity of Paris that the old order was soonest and most drastically superceded.... Well before 1789 the system of forced labor (as applied to individuals) had disappeared in this region. The taille (tax) had become less onerous and was more equitably assessed than elsewhere.

Thus it was precisely in those parts of France where there had been the most improvement that popular discontent ran highest.... For it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary, it oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it. [ref. 30]

Douglas Bwy's quantitative research supports de Tocqueville's thesis. Using "24 operational indices of domestic conflict behavior occurring with 65 Latin American provinces over a nine-year period," and testing the effects of force, discontent, and legitimacy upon the dependent variables of turmoil and internal war, Bwy showed that discontent was directly related to turmoil (dissatisfaction and disorganized violence rising and falling together), but inversely related to internal war (organized violence becoming more likely as dissatisfaction declined). According to Bwy, "The positive regression coefficients

then, appear to support the notion that 'revolutions are born in societies on the upswing.'" [ref. 37]

Karl Marx is the best known proponent of the theory that decremental deprivation is the cause of revolution. Also called "downward mobility," this is an actual fall in the level of satisfactions while expectations--conditioned by previous experience--remain at the former, higher level. A depression, the imposition of new taxes, famine--all are examples of decremental deprivation. According to this reasoning, an uprising is likely when conditions in society are worsening.

Marx argued that men are apt to revolt when they are most oppressed, increasingly impoverished, and lacking any other hope for relief. [ref. 38] His well-known theory begins by recognizing that although most factors of production are relatively fixed in cost, wages can vary. Unable to reduce fixed costs in order to increase his profits, the capitalist reduces what he pays for labor. Even if wages are rising, the capitalist will increase his profits by raising prices faster than he allows wages to rise. Thus, the worker's pay declines in purchasing power at the same time as he sees the capitalists (a "reference group") enjoying an improving standard of living. As he becomes poorer, the worker also finds his work becoming increasingly monotonous as the result of industrialization. At some point in his misery, the worker comes to understand his plight, to acquire class consciousness, and to revolt.

Any disadvantaged group may experience a self-awareness akin to Marx's class consciousness. Thus, black consciousness leads to militancy and violence in South Africa, the United States, and elsewhere. Previously quiescent ethnic groups in developing countries assert themselves when urbanization, improving communications, and expanding literacy make them aware of their inferior standing relative to others in society.

James Davies has attempted to reconcile de Tocqueville and Marx by describing a third type of deprivation. His "J-curve" theory hypothesizes satisfactions and expectations both rising in synchronous parallel when suddenly there is a real drop in satisfactions. A graph of the satisfactions level thus resembles an inverted letter "J."

Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs--which continue to rise--and, during the latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality, the actual state of socioeconomic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future. [ref. 39]

Although Davies insists that his concept applies equally well to minor, unsuccessful rebellions and to major, social revolutions, and that it accepts a variety of data on economic, social, and political conditions, it fails as a predictive tool. First, in any revolutionary situation



Figure 2.2 Davies' "J-Curve" Theory of Revolution.

there occur numerous downturns on the way to the "sharp reversal." In a live situation, these could not be distinguished from the major event until after the fact. Davies' graph of the period leading to the Russian Revolution shows minor setbacks occurring with the assassination of the Czar in 1881, the War with Japan in 1904, a subsequent period of repression in Russia, and the War with Germany in 1914. An analyst using the J-curve, then, might have produced a series of false alarms over a 36-year period preceeding the Russian Revolution. Secondly, there is no consistent length to the periods of relative improvement and decline. There would seem to be no way to employ this concept for accurate prediction, although it does serve to isolate the causes of past revolutions.

2. Ted Gurr's Model

Ted Gurr's complex and quantifiable model of the causes of political violence is based upon deprivation theory and intended for practical application. [ref. 40] The Central Intelligence Agency was sufficiently impressed to test it. However, although the Agency determined that the model was useful conceptually, it was incapable of precise predictions.

The model can aid in profiling the underlying causes of political violence. It can help the analyst focus in a systematic way on the strengths and weaknesses of specific actors [groups] with a potential for political violence. It can aid in assessing conditions conducive to particular forms of violence. And it can provide a continuing quantitative measure which reflects and, in a general way, predicts a major change in political violence in a given country.... Yet, the methodological critique indicates serious deficiencies in the reliability of the data generated by the model and in the model's utility as a predictive tool. [ref. 41]

⁷The Gurr model represents the "state of the art" in complex, quantifiable models of political violence. The CIA test made use of expert-generated, rather than empirical, data. It called for analysts to evaluate specific factors and respond in a manner that could be converted to numerical values. The procedure was first applied to an ex post facto analysis of the pre-coup situation in Chile in mid-1973. Obtaining encouraging results, it was tested in three on-going situations of political conflict--in Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand--from late 1974 to mid-1975. Nonetheless, it was judged that, "As to the model's predictive capability, however, the results must be regarded at this stage as ambiguous and inconclusive." [ref. 42]

Among its identified shortcomings, the model puts heavy demands on the analyst. Each panelist in the three "live problem" tests made an average of 435 decisions with each iteration. Also, the critique suggested taking into account "unique factors" including the stability of the political system of the country in question and the traditional, or "normal" level of violence. [ref. 43]




Figure 2.3 Ted Gurr's Model of Political Violence [ref. 44].

Although failing as a quantitative model, Gurr's formula proves useful conceptually. It includes both psychological and societal variables, the former representing individual mental processes while the latter aggregate for all members of various social groups (e.g., special interest groups, the insurgents, the dominant elite).

To use the model, one first analyzes the target population and distinguishes the political groups that are relevant in a revolutionary situation. Then, for a hypothetically "average" member of each group, one estimates the intensity of his relative deprivation (how angry is he?). Multiplying that by the number of people in the group, and summing for all such groups in the society, produces the potential for collective violence. This potential is politicized to the degree that a representative individual can justify, in normative and utilitarian terms, his use of violence against the state. For example, violence may be normatively justified if the state is perceived as responsible for the deprivation and no nonviolent action is possible to remedy the situation. Multiplying the potential for collective violence by the portion of the society who find violence justified, we get the potential for political violence. The intervening variables which translate this into the magnitude of political violence are the balance of insurgent and regime coercive control over the populace, and the balance of institutional support which each enjoys. The process is symplified by concentrating upon only those groups where the deprivation is strongest and the means exist for taking effective action.

The Gurr model offers useful insights into political violence and makes a complex problem manageable, but there are at least three serious drawbacks to any model that

explicitly recognizes deprivation as a variable. First is the problem of how to measure it. Second is the uncertainty of its correlation with political violence. And third is the fact that it is everywhere in the third world, thus diluting its value as an indicator.

Relative deprivation exists in the minds of individuals. It is subjective. A wealthy man may feel deprived upon seeing a wealthier one. It is not solely economic, but comprehends other values including social status and political power. It does not exist only in the present, for it concerns expectations of future achievement. How does one find valid indicators for such a variable?

Gurr suggests determining the "scope and intensity of the psychological variables" through "survey techniques," but that is an impractical solution as Gurr himself recognizes. "Political elites are notoriously sensitive about inquiries into the disloyalties of their citizens...." Instead, Gurr offers very indirect indicators of deprivation: "the total goods available for distribution in the society, changes in each group's means for obtaining those goods, and their changing levels of value attainment vis-a-vis their own past and the experience of other classes." [ref. 45]

Even if it could be observed and measured, deprivation's effect on political stability is unclear. De Tocqueville argued that revolts are likely when such indicators of

deprivation as tax rates, standards of living, and political oppression are diminishing. Marx believed they become more likely as deprivation increases. Davies believed both were right--at different times--while Bay simply equivocates: "While discontent, then, appears to be an important correlate of political instability, the direction of the association is very much in doubt." [ref. 46] Moreover, Edward Muller's test results showed no significant correlation between the potential for political violence and deprivation [ref. 47], and Marylee Taylor recently concluded that "basic propositions, which form the common core of widely-used past/present relative deprivation formulations, should be met with healthy skepticism." [ref. 48]

Finally, there would seem to be little value in a variable that is nearly everywhere present in large measure. Deprivation is most commonly represented in economic terms. Speaking of such measures and the frameworks in which they are employed, one authority concluded,

The difficulty with the economic theories of political violence is that they provide us with an "all systems go" perspective, and we wonder why societies do not trigger continual turmoil....Economic frustration does not always produce political violence, and it is essential to understand the powerful effects that organizational factors exert on the political process. [ref. 49]

C. "BALANCES" OF ORGANIZATION, LEGITIMACY, AND COERCION

For good reasons we reject trying to estimate the potential for insurgency by measuring the level of discontent in a society. More productive and practical is to focus upon Aristotle's intervening variables of legitimacy and coercion, along with an important addition: organization. In effect, discontent is absorbed into legitimacy, for discontent can be a stimulus to rebellion only if it is blamed upon the government. When a people find their leaders to be responsible for their problems, or ineffective in reducing their grievances, they regard that regime as illegitimate.

It is essential to add organization as a variable because insurgency requires mobilizing large numbers of people on both sides. A recent study of insurgency notes that "political organization is what distinguishes insurgent movements from banditry and Robin Hoodism" [ref. 50], and Robert Thompson (the well-known British authority) advises that "the key thing in any counter-insurgency is organization.... The priority still remains to break [the insurgents'] infrastructure." [ref. 51]

In sum, the framework presented here adopts many of the concepts and techniques provided by Aristotle, Gurr, and others. In selecting and combining, it also modifies them. It adopts Aristotle's intervening variables of legitimacy and coercion, finding them critical to the outcome of any

insurgency. It adds organization as a third primary variable, believing organization to be a precondition for acquiring legitimacy and coercive capabilities. But it avoids the difficulties of trying to use discontent as an explicit variable.

The framework considers organization, legitimacy, and coercion as three "balances" between the government and the insurgents. Adopting Gurr's technique of making a complex problem manageable by dividing it into simpler increments, these to be recombined later, the three balances are divided into twenty-eight analytical factors. Section III now presents an overview of the factors and the phases of an insurgency.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE ANALYTICAL FACTORS AND PHASES

Among the greatest enemies of the next revolution are the academic theorists who write about the last one.... Lessons which are too neat and principles which are too vague are generalized.... "Models" of revolution are produced. Thus we have a Leninist, a Maoist and a Guevarist model whose contemporary Western adherents indulge in abstruse and often irrelevant arguments. [ref. 52]

Section III provides an overview of the twenty-eight analytical factors and four insurgent phases that make up the framework. There are three sets of factors to describe the situation (i.e., the society and the physical environment), the government, and the insurgents. Within the sets, each factor is "typed" to show whether it primarily relates to the government-insurgent "balance" of organization, legitimacy, or coercion. A movement that develops fully and culminates in an insurgent victory is divided into four successive phases: the period before an insurgent movement emerges, the nonviolent stage, the armed struggle, and the period of consolidation of the new regime. Section VI will group the factors into a separate worksheet for each insurgent phase. The illustrations in Section VI show how the individual factors are calculated and then combined into the three "balances."

A. A CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE

Figure 3.1 depicts how the variables organization, legitimacy, and coercion relate to each other. It also shows the secondary variables they comprise. The letter-number symbols represent the analytical factors and show where each fits in the conceptual framework. The symbols will not be intelligible at this point, but the reader may find it useful to refer to Figure 3.1 later. Although the schematic is simplified to show each factor only once, there is considerable interaction and overlap among the factors. All of them are considered in due course--and ultimately combined into an overall evaluation of the struggle--so that repeating them would serve only to complicate and confuse.

The diagram shows organization to be the key ingredient in any insurgent situation. Organization provides the means for acquiring legitimacy and coercion. It consists of leadership, structure, discipline, and ideology.

Leadership provides essential skills, and organizational structure adds the numerical strength of followers. The leaders motivate members by interpreting and explaining issues and events. They plan policies and lead in carrying them out. The structure links the leaders with the members and mobilizes human and material resources. It transmits directives downward and channels grievances upward.

Organization: The basis of legitimacy and coercion

Leadership: Provides skills (agitates,
organizes, leads) -- IG-1

Structure: Provides strength (mobilizes
resources) -- S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, IG-2

Discipline: Controls followers -- IG-3

Ideology: Differentiates & Unifies: ->-->-->
Controls leaders

+LEGITIMACY: The right to rule

Identification: Normative support <--<--<
-- IG-4

Effectiveness: Utilitarian support
-- S-5, S-6, IG-5

+COERCION: The power to rule

Resources: Capabilities
-- S-8, S-9, S-10, IG-7, IG-8

Environment: Shapes tasks
-- S-7

Strategy & Tactics: Methods
-- IG-6, IG-9

Figure 3.1 A Conceptual Outline.

Discipline contributes to success by controlling members and enforcing directives. In particular, defections--clear breaches of discipline--deplete organizational strength and provide the other side with intelligence, weapons, and other resources.

Ideology differentiates believers from nonbelievers; it defines shared values that strengthen a group internally. Ideology fosters commitment and is principally responsible for motivating and controlling top-ranking and mid-level leaders. Our framework includes ideology within legitimacy, where it becomes a determinant of identification with either the regime or the rebels.

Legitimacy and coercion complement each other. Legitimacy, or the perception that the leaders are worthy of support, reduces the need for coercion. Legitimacy results when people identify with the leadership and when they perceive that the leaders are effective in accomplishing tasks.

Coercion is both the threat and the use of force to gain compliance. When legitimacy is low, leaders rely upon coercion. The available coercive resources constitute a potential which is mediated by environmental constraints. Strategy and tactics are the methods of employing coercive potential.

The twenty-eight analytical factors are indicators of the concepts shown. Ten relate to the situation (S), and nine each describe the government (G) and the insurgents (I). The "G" and "I" factors are mirror-imaged and later combined, thus they are shown as "IG."

Some of the indicators are familiar and straightforward, while others are little known or complex. Each calls for a single judgement to be recorded on the scale provided, but that is only part of what is intended. The framework is a structured learning process that hopefully will unearth considerations that a less disciplined approach might miss. At the conclusion of study, there should be a broad and in-depth understanding of the situation. Whether or not the analyst finds Section VI's graphic worksheets to be useful, he hopefully will profit from the check-list approach to the problem.

B. FACTOR OVERVIEW

1. Situational Factors

The Situational Factors (see Figure 3.2) describe the society and the physical environment; they examine the predisposing conditions to an insurgency and are valid for analysis whether or not an insurgent group has appeared. Some apply to the country as a whole and help to identify states where an insurgency is likely to emerge or flourish.

Others describe characteristics of social groups or regions within a country. Taken together, they reveal cross-cutting and reinforcing patterns of varying strength. For example, when geoethnic divisions are reinforced by grievances resulting from differential modernization, terrain favorable to guerrilla warfare, and good proximity and access to external support and sanctuary, not only is the probability of insurgency high, but the shape of the conflict can be discerned.

The scales accompanying the factors have several properties.

1. First, they avoid forcing unrealistic, all-or-nothing decisions and allow the analyst to register a response anywhere between two stated conditions.
2. Second, the endpoints are two polarized types of the variable under consideration, the range between them being most relevant to the insurgent situation. Some scales add intermediate benchmarks as further aids.
3. Third, there are no arbitrary thresholds above or below which it might be asserted that insurgency is likely or not.
4. And fourth, the scales are isomorphic, with conditions favoring the government or suggesting stability toward the left end, and those favoring the insurgents or signalling instability toward the right. In most cases, the scales indicate relative advantage

between the two sides. In a few cases, however, the dimension examined suggests the probability of stability—instability working to the government's disadvantage and favoring the insurgents. The pattern of responses visually suggests the probability that an insurgency will appear or the overall advantage in an on-going struggle.

Factors S-1 and S-2 examine societal cleavages of race, ethnicity, language, religion, geography, lineage, class, caste, and more in order to determine the major social groups within a population and the barriers to organization. Cultural pluralism refers to vertical cleavages that differentiate communities, while the mass-elite gap tests a horizontal division (discrimination). Certain patterns are politically destabilizing, and the groups so defined are the potential actors in an insurgency.

S-3 and S-4 relate to the potential for mobilizing the population to support an insurgent group. Existing urban-rural ties tend to lessen the time and effort required to forge a revolutionary coalition between the potential leaders in the towns and the mass followers in the countryside. Relatively autonomous peasants are unlikely to assume great risks and join the insurgents.

S-5 and S-6 investigate two major causes of discontent that historically have stimulated rebellions, revolutions, and civil wars. The level of landlessness is

Toward the Left favors the Government; Toward the Right favors the Insurgents.										
<u>Organizational Factors</u>										
FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.										
0 or many									2 or 3	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.										
same % as in population									0%	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction.										
minimal/controlled									extensive/uncontrolled	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.										
exit option									vulnerable	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
<u>Legitimacy Factors</u>										
FACTOR S-5. Landlessness.										
0		20%		30%		40%			60%	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization.										
equitable									highly polarizing	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
<u>Coercion Factors</u>										
FACTOR S-7. Traditional Level of Violence.										
low									high	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-8. Arms & Military Skills.										
scarce									abundant	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.										
impenetrable/none									porous/plentiful	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-10. Terrain & Lines of Communications.										
open/good									rough/poor	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Figure 3.2 Situational Factors.

one indicator of peasant restiveness; it suggests the probable impact of insurgent promises of "land to the tiller." The polarizing effects of modernization tend to produce disgruntled "have-nots" anxious to force a redistribution of society's goods.

S-7 recognizes that people vary in their inclination to use violence. It examines history as a guide to this important variable.

S-8 calculates the military skills and arms available within the country. Although guns alone do not shoot people, they are essential nonetheless. Even if the government controls the skills bank and arsenal, defections and raids can effect the transfers.

S-9 and S-10 examine the country's external isolation and internal accessibility and concealment. These are geographical determinants of insurgent supply and survival.

2. Government and Insurgent Factors

Whereas the Situational Factors describe predisposing conditions in the social and environmental "arena," the Government (Figure 3.3) and Insurgent Factors (Figure 3.4) consider more immediate causes involving the "actors" in an insurgency. There are two mirror-imaged sets of nine factors each. When combined on dual scales, each pair of factors indicates a common dimension but uses different benchmarks for the government and the insurgents.

Toward the Left favors the Government; Toward the Right favors the Insurgents.

Organizational Factors

FACTOR G-1. Concentration of Authority.
unitary diffused
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-2. Regime Access.
open blocked
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-3. Loyalty.
intact defections
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

Legitimacy Factors

FACTOR G-4. Origin & Indigenous Authority.
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
|----1|---2---|3---|---5|---6---|7---8|---9---|

FACTOR G-5. Rural Services.
effective ineffective
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

Coercion Factors

FACTOR G-6. Control.
totalitarian weak
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-7. Armed Forces & Police.
strong weak
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-8. External Aid.
unnneeded plenty some none
|----1----2|---3---4---5---6---7---8---9---|

FACTOR G-9. Repressive Violence.
legal/appropriate illegal/excessive
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

Figure 3.3 Government Factors.

Toward the Left favors the Government; Toward the Right favors the insurgents.

Organizational Factors

FACTOR I-1. Unity of Command.

hostile rivals cooperative unitary
|----1----2---3----4----5----5----7-|--8----9----|

FACTOR I-2. Upward Mobility.

blocked open
|----1---2---3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR I-3. Commitment.

"returnees" determined
|----1----2---3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

Legitimacy Factors

FACTOR I-4. Ideology & Appeal.

fragile strong
|----1---2---3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR I-5. Administration in Rebel Areas.

ineffective effective
|----1---2---3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

Coercion Factors

FACTOR I-6. Liberated Areas.

none defended
|----1---2---3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR I-7. Guerrillas.

weak strong
|----1---2---3---4---5---5---7---8---9---|

FACTOR I-8. External Aid.

none some plenty unneeded
|----1---2|---3----4----5---5---7---|8---9---|

FACTOR I-9. Tactics.

nonviolent paramilitary
|----1---2---3----4----5---5---7---8---9---|

Figure 3.4 Insurgent Factors.

Factors G-1 and I-1 are measures of the centralization of decision-making in the government and the insurgent organization. They reflect the principle of "unity of command" and an appreciation of the speed, efficiency, and constancy inherent in unified authority.

G-2 and I-2 gauge an important inducement to recruitment. The opportunities for upward mobility (a product of the scope of the organizational structure and the criteria for participation), are particularly important in the contest for popular support.

G-3 and I-3 examine defections as an indication of discipline (as well as loyalty and morale) within the two camps.

G-4 and I-4 regard the degree to which people identify with an organization as a measure of its legitimacy. Governmental institutions that are well based in local tradition, along with borders of historical or self-determined origin, augur well for regime legitimacy. An insurgent program that is respectful of local traditions and associated with a prestigious ideology is an attraction to potential supporters and a strengthening bond among members.

G-5 and I-5 consider each side's effectiveness in meeting the responsibilities of government. The legitimate leaders are those who accomplish the tasks that the people consider important and appropriate.

G-6 and I-6 are estimates of the control each side exercises over the population and territory under its authority. Totalitarian control is the standard by which government coercion is judged. For the insurgents, the existence of liberated areas from which they cannot be evicted is a telling indicator of control over a segment of the population.

G-7 and I-7 are estimates of government and insurgent armed strength. Taken separately, they are less meaningful than when combined into a ratio. The direction and rate of change in the ratio is more significant than its absolute level.

G-8 and I-8 are estimates of the external support available to each side. The "taint" of foreign association, and the patron's constraints on one's actions, are among the caveates here.

G-9 and I-9 evaluate the use of violence by each side. The government would be wise to observe its own laws and avoid excessive violence so as not to diminish its legitimacy. For the insurgents, whose use of violence is illegal in any case, it is more appropriate to examine the scope of operations. Paramilitary organization and tactics imply the capability to field forces able effectively to challenge those of the government.

C. FOUR PHASES OF INSURGENCY

The analytical factors are indicators of the causes of insurgency, but we also need to be familiar with how the process unfolds. Scholars offer any number of process models, but a formula of four clearly demarcated phases seems best. Before presenting that model, we briefly review several others.

Crane Brinton is probably the best known of the historians who compared the Great Revolutions in England, America, France, and Russia in search of patterns. His "striking uniformities," analogy of revolution to a fever, and various stages of the process are widely known. [ref. 53]

Brinton generally supported de Tocqueville's findings that the societies studied were economically advancing at the time of the revolution. Like Aristotle, Brinton noted that those who were increasingly well off economically complained of their lack of commensurate political leverage. One significant observation was that the society's intellectuals were switching their allegiance from the regime to the dissidents, while another was that the old regime was in each case inefficient and the ruling class inept. The inefficiency resulted from governmental institutions that did not adjust to changing circumstances, such as industrialization and modernization generally. Individuals were growing

distrustful and detached, and were sometimes defecting. The governments proved particularly inept at coping with financial crises brought on by war or modernization, and they mishandled the armed forces. Brinton found the government's military ineptitude was more responsible for defeat than was any rebel prowess.

It is almost safe to say that no government is likely to be overthrown from within its territory until it loses the ability to make adequate use of its military and police powers. [ref. 54]

Brinton's stages of revolution were later elaborated by David Schwartz to describe "a mass-linked social movement oriented to the acquisition of political power through the use of social disruption and/or violence--including insurgencies, civil wars, and nationalist movements, but excluding most coups." [ref. 55] It sounds appropriate to our needs.

There are ten stages to the Brinton/Schwartz model of revolution.

1. The political alienation phase. Individuals begin to withdraw their support from the regime. Violent crimes are on the rise, as are instances of personal disorders (such as, vice, insanity, suicide) and political withdrawal (such as falling voter turnouts).
2. The origin of revolutionary organizations. New revolutionary groups appear, existing reformist

organizations become increasingly radical, and intellectuals criticize the government. These organizations pattern themselves after previous revolutionary examples or governmental institutions, although the result is also shaped by their "resource mix" of participation, money, weapons, discipline, and so forth.

3. The revolutionary organizations make appeals for support. They reveal their targets and techniques, and they propose solutions to the state's problems that cannot be met without the regime virtually abdicating.
4. The revolutionary coalition and movement building stage. The government and the dissidents are increasingly polarized, and the revolutionary leadership expands.
5. The period of nonviolent revolutionary politics. Here Schwartz believes that "any spark can touch off the revolution."
6. The outbreak of revolutionary violence. The government tries to respond with force, fails, and the revolutionaries take over.
7. The rule of the moderates. This is the brief calm that Brinton calls the "honeymoon." Moderate revolutionary leaders take over, but they are no match for the extremists pressing them.

8. The accession of the extremists. Due to "their discipline, their contempt for half measures, their willingness to make firm decisions, their freedom from libertarian qualms," these men are better able to centralize power and rule effectively. Power thus shifts from the "right" to the "left" until "it reaches a limit usually short of the most extreme or lunatic Left."

9. The reign of terror. The new government arrogates great power to itself. It creates emergency councils or commissions often dominated by a "strong man," sets up extraordinary courts and revolutionary police, and denies civil liberties. The measures are excessive, even for crisis circumstances. There is profligate use of the sword, guillotine, or rifle.

10. Thermidor. The terror subsides, although short relapses are possible. The revolution is over.

However, if the Brinton/Schwartz model appears useful, we must heed the complaint by John Lewis that "theorists of revolution have grown too dependent on frameworks developed largely from the evidence of Western revolutions." [ref. 56] The model we use must reflect third-world realities and avoid the mirror-imaging of European patterns.

Samuel Huntington and Charles Tilly draw several contrasts between the circumstances and patterns of revolutions in Europe and Asia. Tilly points to "the combination

of weak patronage, weak corporate kinship, relatively homogeneous culture, and territorial communities that were prominent as units of solidarity and collective action [in] Europe," conditions generally not found in Asia [ref. 57]. Huntington, meanwhile, captures the difference in patterns.

In the Western revolution the revolutionaries come to power in the capital first and then gradually expand their control over the countryside. In the Eastern revolution they withdraw from central, urban areas of the country, establish a base area of control in a remote section, struggle to win the support of the peasants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the scope of their authority, and gradually escalate the level of their military operations from individual terroristic attacks to guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare and regular warfare. Eventually they are able to defeat the government troops in battle. The last phase of the revolutionary struggle is the occupation of the capital. [ref. 58]

Our framework must be designed to analyze movements of the Eastern "periphery-in" pattern, rather than those of the Western "center-out" variety. More appropriate models come from the study of Asian movements beginning with the Chinese Communist Revolution. For example, Robert Scalapino sees five, self-explanatory stages to a communist, rural revolution: "party emergence, broadening the base of the party, mounting the challenge to the ruling party (class), the people's war, and the establishment of People's Democracy." [ref. 59] To this, we could add Mao Zedong's three stages of people's war: strategic defense, stalemate, and strategic offense [ref. 60]. Another model stresses modes of warfare and arrives at the five steps of the establishment of a

vanguard, survival, protracted warfare, mobile warfare, and positional warfare [ref. 61].

There are other possible models, but each has its drawbacks. Many feature prominently developments that are peculiar to only one or a few historical cases. Thus, some schemes focus on the need for a strong party and the value of a united front to harness and control other revolutionary individuals and groups. Although this was the pattern in China and Vietnam, it was not in Cuba. Some models are designed from those movements that co-opted traditional leadership and structures, at least initially, but groups have also established entirely new organizations. A characteristic of many models is the lack of sharp contrast between phases. As one stage blurs into the next, the model loses much of its predictive and explanatory power.

The model adopted separates four phases of an insurgency by three sharp thresholds unlikely to be missed by an attentive observer. The thresholds are the emergence of an insurgent movement and the beginning and end of the armed struggle. Figure 3.5 shows how various process models correlate to this one. It also suggests the different analytical tasks associated with each phase. These determine the selection of analytical factors for each worksheet.

Section VI groups the appropriate factors into three worksheets corresponding to the first three phases of this model. Figure 3.6 shows the factors included in each of the worksheets.

1. PRE-EMERGENT STAGE:

This is the Brinton/Schwartz phase of initial political alienation. This stage is one of evaluating conditions and dissident groups for the potential to develop into a viable challenge to the government.

The analyst gauges the potential for insurgency and predicts the appearance of a movement.

Threshold: Appearance of an insurgent movement.

2. ORGANIZATION AND GROWTH STAGE:

The Brinton/Schwartz phases of the origin of the revolutionary organization, revolutionary appeals, revolutionary coalition and movement building, and nonviolent revolutionary politics. Scalapino's model lists the phases of party emergence, broadening base, and mounting a challenge.

The analyst monitors the group's expansion and predicts the outbreak of guerrilla warfare.

Threshold: Outbreak of guerrilla warfare.

3. ARMED STRUGGLE - including the sub-stages of guerrilla warfare (when the insurgents are weak and harassing) and conventional warfare (a time of rough parity, civil war):

The Brinton/Schwartz outbreak of revolutionary violence phase. Scalapino's stage of people's war. Mao's strategic defense, stalemate, and strategic offense.

The analyst monitors the struggle and tries to predict the outcome.

Threshold: "End" of hostilities.

(Insurgent defeat may mean a return to stage 2, whereas victory brings on stage 4.)

4. CONSOLIDATION:

The Brinton/Schwartz phases of rule of the moderates, accession of the extremists, reigns of terror, and thermidor. Scalapino's establishment of people's democracy. Other models prescribe victory and consolidation.

The analyst forecasts the nature of the ultimate regime.

Figure 3.5 Process Model of Insurgency.

Factors arrayed according to the phases in which they are considered.			
		Phases:	
		1/	2/ 3/
ORGANIZATION:			
Leadership	G1 Concentration of Authority	----	
	I1 Unity of Command	-----	
Structure & Participation	S1 Cultural Pluralism	-----	
	S2 Mass-Elite Gap	-----	
	S3 Urban-Rural Interaction	-----	
	S4 Peasant Mobilization	-----	
	G2 Regime Access	-----	
	I2 Upward Mobility	-----	
Discipline & Loyalty	G3 Loyalty	-----	
	I3 Commitment	-----	
LEGITIMACY AND EFFICIENCY:			
Identity	G4 Origin & Indigenous Authority	--	
	I4 Ideology & Appeal	-----	
Performance	S5 Landlessness	-----	
	S6 Differential Modernization	-----	
	G5 Rural Services	-----	
	I5 Admin. in Rebel Areas	--	
COERCION:			
Environment	S7 Traditional Level of Violence	--	
	S9 Borders & Sanctuaries	-----	
	S10 Terrain & LOCs	-----	
Resources	S8 Arms & Military Skills	-----	
	G7 Armed Forces & Police	-----	
	G8 External Aid	-----	
	I7 Guerrillas	-----	
	I3 External Aid	---	
Tactics	G6 Control	-----	
	G9 Repressive Violence	-----	
	I6 Liberated Areas	-----	
	I9 Tactics	-----	

Figure 3.6 Factor Matrix.

IV. SITUATIONAL FACTORS

If we are to understand the phenomenon of revolution, we must take into account the entire society that produces it and not isolate a factor--political, social, or economic--as if it alone were the ultimate and determining one. We must look at all of them together and in relation to one another in order to see the true conditions under which revolt and revolution have been possible and fomented. [ref. 62]

The length, detail, and order of presentation here are not intended to reflect the relative significance of individual factors. The sections vary according to how familiar and simple each item is, and the order is arbitrary.

A. THE SOCIETY

1. Societal Cleavages

FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.	
0 or many	2 or 3
----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----	
FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.	
same % as in population	0%
----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----	

Societal patterns of two or three major groups are the least stable. A mass-elite gap indicating discrimination against a group suggests a potentially receptive audience for insurgent appeals.

All societies are divided to some extent, and the pattern and intensity of the splits have clear implications for insurgent situations. Vertical cleavages separate "communities" according to such ascriptive criteria as race, ethnicity, language, religion, geography, ideology, or clientelism. Horizontal cleavages form strata, typically socioeconomic classes or castes. Together, these divisions constitute a grid upon society. The cleavages are barriers to organization--frequently "encapsulating" an insurgent movement and preventing its expansion--and the groups or "social forces" they differentiate are potential actors in an insurgency.

We examine social cleavages in order to gauge the potential for the government and the insurgents to expand their organizations and popular base. The differences between groups indicate their ability to cooperate, as in an insurgent movement. Most important are the patterns which reinforce each other to create especially strong barriers.

1. The vertical and horizontal divisions can be cross-cutting - working to divide and weaken - or they may be reinforcing. For example, socioeconomic class bonds tend to break down ethnic differences over time. Because classes generally are weak in the third world, ethnicity frequently demands primary allegiance. Should a black middle class develop in South Africa, forging economic ties to the white

middle class, it would weaken black solidarity. For the present, however, race and class reinforce each other there to form an especially strong separation between the white elite and the black majority.

2. The intensity of individual cleavages varies. In the United States, religious differences are far less divisive than in the Middle East.
3. The groups formed by these patterns vary in size and in the resources they control. In Malaysia, the Malays have most of the political power, while the Chinese and Indians possess the greater share of the wealth. Of the latter, the Chinese greatly outnumber the Indians.
4. The grid upon any society slowly changes, individuals and groups realigning as different issues arise.

Ted Gurr finds that "multiracial societies [so common in the third world] tend to have greater levels of strife of all kinds...[and] countries with ethnic diversity also are more likely to have regional and political diversities, which also tend to generate internal conflicts." [ref. 63] Samuel Huntington finds that "hierarchical [i.e., vertical] ethnic structures exhibit the paradox of normative support for inequality for long periods of time and then large-scale, bloody social revolutions when the system's normative bases are eroded." [ref. 64] Gurr thus expects frequent violence in the third world, while Huntington warns that it will be traumatic.

Factor S-1 examines vertical cleavages with the aid of Crawford Young's six-fold classificatory system of culturally plural societies and his empirical finding that conflicts are most apt to get out of control when there are two or three primary groups. Young's classifications are:

1. A. Homogeneous.
2. B. A single clearly dominant group, with minorities.
3. C. Core culture, linked to central institutions, with differentiated groups in the periphery.
4. D. Dominant bipolar pattern.
5. E. Multipolar pattern, with no dominant groups.
6. F. Multiplicity of cultures, with more than one basis of differentiation. [ref. 65]

The relationship between instability and the number of major groups in a society is curvilinear. Instability tends to be low in societies of one primary culture (e.g., Botswana, Somalia, Thailand, and Vietnam), rises to its highest levels in countries of two or three cultural groups (e.g., Burundi, Nigeria, Malaysia), and drops again in states of many cultures (e.g., India, Tanzania, Indonesia, and the Philippines).

Mostly homogeneous Botswana, Somalia, and Thailand are relatively stable countries. In India, with its extreme diversity, Young accounts for the apparent stability:

Religion, caste, and language provide interlocking, interacting, but distinctively separate bases for politically relevant groups.... [and] cross-cutting affiliations and cleavage may facilitate integration. [ref. 66]

In contrast, one easily recalls the destructive civil wars and "emergency" in Burundi, Nigeria, and Malaysia. Nigeria's proliferation of internal states (now 19) is intended to achieve stability by fragmenting the three major ethnic groups and reducing the resources under their control. Similarly, South Africa's policy of creating numerous black "homelands" is a strategy designed to break down racial and class solidarity by accenting "tribal" differences.

Vietnam and the Philippines at first glance appear to challenge Young's hypothesis--although certainly exceptions must be expected. But despite Vietnam's single core culture, the resistance against the French, Japanese, and Americans was clearly between two separate communities: natives and foreigners. Moreover, the artificial separation of the country at the 17th parallel broke the core culture into two rival groups. In the Philippines, insurgency has waxed and waned for years in areas of dense population on the islands of Luzon and the Visayas, but despite an abundance of economic grievances, ethnic diversity, geography, and other features have tended to "culturally encapsulate" the movement in these areas. The Muslim situation in the south is typical of the separatist demands of small, peripheral groups in the third world. (Section VI examines the Philippines as an illustration of the methodology.)

The scale accompanying Factor G-1 places the least stable condition of "2 or 3" major cultures at the right-hand end, and "1 or many" at the left-hand, stable end. At least two "actors" are necessary for there to be a conflict, and the existence of many actors leads to a stable balancing.

Factor S-2 is an indication of horizontal cleavage. The existence of a mass-elite gap (calculated separately for each relevant group in the society) indicates discrimination impairing the upward mobility of group members. [ref. 67] Any group's representation among the society's elites may be greater, equal to, or less than its proportion of the total population. If group members enjoy representation among the elites that is more than or equal to their percentage of the population, then the group is either privileged or "justly" represented. But the existence of a mass-elite gap indicates that the group is relatively deprived. The greater the gap, the more that a group is discriminated against. This tends to breed group or class consciousness and growing resentment.

Should the available data not permit calculating the percentages called for by the mass-elite gap, Ted Gurr's scoring system for economic discrimination may prove useful. Defining economic discrimination as the "systematic exclusion of social groups from higher economic value positions on ascriptive bases," Gurr's four descriptions of steadily

increasing discrimination could be evenly spaced along the factor scale from left to right (i.e., beginning with the greatest discrimination at the right-hand pole).

1. Most higher economic value positions, or some specific classes of economic activity, are closed to the group.
2. Most higher and some medium economic value positions are closed, or many specific classes of economic activity [are closed].
3. Most higher and most medium economic value positions are closed.
4. Almost all higher, medium, and some lower economic value positions are closed. [ref. 68]

For Factors S-1 and S-2, the more that a society is integrated, the less likely insurgency becomes [ref. 69]. However, measures taken to integrate a society vertically (i.e., reordering representation of social groups within the elite to close a mass-elite gap) may aggravate communal tensions. Speaking of African regimes, Donald Morrison argues,

Those means of closing the mass-elite gap which succeed in reducing the incidence of elite instability increase the likelihood of communal instability, and those means which succeed in reducing the incidence of communal instability increase the likelihood of elite instability....The problem is one of satisfying the demands of ethnic groups for equal access to the rewards of modernization and elite status, while at the same time preventing an intensification of conflict over the scarce positions of power and wealth among members of an increasingly large educational elite in these nations.

[ref. 70]

2. Mobilization Potential.

FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction.

minimal/controlled	extensive/uncontrolled
----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----	

FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.

exit option	vulnerable
----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----	

Extensive, uncontrolled urban-rural ties and eroded peasant autonomy facilitate insurgent organization.

Third-world insurgencies, like their earlier European counterparts, tend to begin in the cities, but because the government's coercive capabilities are concentrated there, urban movements frequently fail. Students of Asian revolutions thus speak of the elite mobilization and mass mobilization, or the urban and rural, phases of a revolution.

Unless they succeed with a coup d'etat, the odds are against the urban rebels. In most underdeveloped countries, the urban proletariat is extremely small and the Marxist-Leninist model of urban revolt unworkable. Thus, the Chinese communists were slaughtered in Shanghai and other major cities in 1927. They were forced to turn instead to a peasant movement. Vietnamese resistance began in the cities, as did Castro's original group, but they had to move to the countryside to succeed.

A rural insurgent movement must combine urban leadership⁸ with rural recruits, primarily peasants. Two important considerations in gauging the potential for an insurgent movement to appear and prosper are the existing relations between urban and rural areas and the traditional passivity of the peasant. Existing urban-rural links generally facilitate the formation of a "revolutionary coalition" of town and countryside. They will have begun to break down the peasant's traditional suspicion of "outsiders" from beyond the village. To the degree that links beyond the village make the peasant more approachable, they also tend to exploit him, giving him cause to rebel.

⁸Whether or not the movement has an initial period of urban insurrection, the insurgent leaders tend not to come from the peasants or workers, but from the more urbanized intellectuals, students, professionals, and other socioeconomically advantaged members of society. For example, according to a communist document, some sixty percent of the leadership of the Malayan uprising came to the party by way of the student movement [ref. 71], and the top leaders of the Huk movement in the Philippines were "urban intellectuals, bureaucrats, lawyers, and other professionals" [ref. 72]. A study by the Vietnamese Communist Party once found that 74% of its 1855 leading cadres at the time were intellectuals or of bourgeois origin [ref. 73]. Lenin was a lawyer, the grandson of a physician and son of a school district administrator. Ho Chi Minh's father was a gentry official, and Vo Nguyen Giap held a doctorate of law degree. Castro was a lawyer and the son of a wealthy plantation owner, Che Guevara was a physician. [ref. 74] The list is endless.

Factor S-3 evaluates the urban-rural interaction. Initially, a major insurgency is less likely if the ties between the urban and rural areas are weak. Later, it is also true that a government improves its chances if it can control this interaction, making it a barrier between the guerrillas and their urban sources of recruits, supplies, and intelligence.

Charles Tilly has extensively researched the subject of "town and country in revolution." Tilly writes,

To the extent that the prevailing rural-urban division separates exploited agricultural workers from their exploiters, it tells us, we should expect little collaboration between rural and urban classes and little common action from the necessarily fragmented countryside, despite the probability of widespread conflict on a local scale. A revolutionary movement is likely to bring town and country together only where the town is already serving as a generator of rural activity. And in a predominantly agricultural country the revolution is likely to fail if an effective rural-urban coalition of the exploited classes does not appear.

If rural-urban cleavage is great, a successful revolution is less likely; the cleavage separates the natural revolutionaries, the exploited classes of town and country, from each other.

All other things being equal, the more thoroughly the influence of cities pervades the countryside, the more likely is revolution. Revolution, in this case, is the effective transfer of power to a new class. Rebellions of different sorts are quite likely to occur where the working classes of city and country are insulated from each other. But an effective transfer of power requires a union of the two. [ref. 75]

Urbanization and economic development establish ties between the two areas, and in most parts of Asia a single local elite controls the major links from any particular

rural area to the central government. Usually, this is the landowners, and Tilly finds that if they are in place (i.e., not absent in the cities) and loyal to the government, no widespread mobilization of the countryside can succeed without their collaboration. Thus, under certain circumstances, the government can control the urban-rural linkage.

During the unsuccessful Malayan insurgency in the 1950's, the government used population and movement controls, resettlement, and other techniques to isolate the rural guerrillas from their urban supporters. Since the insurgents lacked external sources of supply, the Chinese squatters located near the towns and villages were virtually their only popular base of support. Sir Robert Thompson stresses how critical it was to break those ties:

Unless the communist subversive political organization in the towns and villages is broken and eliminated, the insurgent guerilla units will not be defeated.

In the process of eliminating the political organization, the attention of the intelligence organization should also be directed to identifying, and eliminating if possible, all members of the insurgent organization who for one reason or another have to cross this heavy line [drawn on a chart] between the insurgent units and the population. This should be followed up by civilian measures and military operations designed to break the contact between the guerilla units and the subversive political organization. As this process develops, the guerilla units will themselves be forced to cross the line in an attempt to make contact with, and support, their political organization and to secure their sources of supply. The area of the heavy line is turned into a sort of barrier, and will become the killing ground.... [ref. 76]

Isolation of the insurgents from the people ensures rebel defeat. Under conditions of many third-world areas, cutting the guerrillas off from the more heavily populated areas will be effective. This is especially true if rural recruits and external sources of supply are quite limited, and it becomes possible if urban-rural ties are minimal or government-controlled. Where such ties are extensive, they will likely be beyond the government's limited capacity to control.

Factor S-4 is an indicator of the relative difficulty an insurgent movement must encounter in trying to mobilize peasant support. Their participation appears essential to insurgent success. Ted Gurr calculates that peasants and farmers participated in 93 percent of the internal wars in 114 nations and colonies between 1961 and 1965.⁹

Yet, anthropologists agree that the peasant is traditionally passive, suspicious of outsiders, and unwilling to risk all in a revolt. Eric Wolf finds this understandable. Usually, the peasant is isolated, much concerned with survival, and able to retreat to subsistence farming when threatened. He is somewhat insulated from

⁹Gurr defines internal wars as instances of "highly organized strife with widespread popular participation, accompanied by extensive violence and including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars; civil wars; 'private' wars among ethnic, political, and religious groups; and large-scale revolts." [ref. 77]

economic shock by kinship support and supplemental income from handicraft production. He has little power unless aided, and the impotent do not rebel. [ref. 78]

Joel Migdal sees three essential preconditions to mobilizing the peasants. First, the village must participate in the cash market. Second, market participation must have exposed the villagers to corruption, monopoly, and structural incompleteness (blocked upward mobility). And third, there must be revolutionary leadership. [ref. 79]

There is disagreement concerning just who in the countryside are the likeliest early recruits. Migdal finds that his first two conditions are most often met in areas of marginal land or frontiers, having a structure of small capitalist (land-owning) farmers, poor peasants, and separate large or wealthy capitalists. Wolf agrees, arguing that the early recruits in the countryside are likely to be the land-owning middle peasants, and the "free" (i.e., most isolated) peasants in remote, peripheral areas. The middle peasants, with more numerous contacts outside the village gained through market participation and residence nearer the towns, are most exposed to the unrest and political ideas of the cities. At the same time, the unencumbered peasants in the peripheral areas enjoy the tactical advantages of remoteness, defensible terrain, and relative autonomy, and they are often susceptible to ideology that appeals to their separateness and religion. But Jeffrey Paige disagrees,

insisting that the sharecropping system (landless peasants) is the most prone to revolt [ref. 80].

Where all these arguments converge is in agreeing that the insurgent recruits are to be found among those peasants interacting beyond the local village. Whether their involvement has made them land-owning beneficiaries of "the system," or they have become its tenant-farming victims, they are the ones to revolt. The reverse is also true. The peasant who can "withdraw" from the outside world and farm for his own family's consumption is least likely to become an insurgent recruit.

Goran Hyden studied peasants in Tanzania, and in Africa generally, to conclude that while "economic history is largely the story of how to capture the peasants,...Africa is the only continent where the peasants have not been captured by other social classes." [ref. 81] In Africa, labor rather than land is the primary factor of agricultural production, peasants are socially more independent than their Latin American and Asian counterparts, and African farmers are less integrated into the cash economy than are peasants elsewhere.

The extent to which peasant autonomy has been reduced obviously differs from one African country to another. [Still,] Although the peasants are incorporated into the larger world economy, and thus interact with other social classes in that context, their dependence on the system is marginal. They live in the boundary region of this system and there they have the unique prerogative of choosing to withdraw. They have a true exit option." [ref. 82]

One might argue that Africa is not as different as Hyden insists--for instance, the World Bank notes that land is no longer plentiful on most of the continent. [ref. 83] But his observation is valid that peasants vary in relative autonomy. In describing the African farmer's attitude toward innovative agricultural techniques, Hyden might as well be speaking of attitudes toward joining an insurgent movement.

Given their rudimentary technology and the lack of variety of product among the households, producing the basic necessities is a cumbersome task. The peasant invests so much time and effort in it that he is naturally reluctant to take chances. [ref. 84]

The peasant ceases to have an exit option when the government tax collector and military conscription officer, the rent-collecting landlord, and the cash market penetrate the traditional village. Forced to pay taxes and rent, and increasingly needful of manufactured goods, the peasant must enter the cash market to sell his crop and handicrafts and buy other goods.

The factor scale places "exit option" at the stable, left-hand pole not because such a peasant is likely to support the government, but because he is unlikely to join an insurgent movement. Able to retreat to subsistence farming, he is relatively immune to pressures that drive others to risk all in a revolt. At the other end of the scale is the condition "vulnerable"--Hyden's "captured"--peasants who are dependent upon the world

"Land to the Tiller" gained substantial support for the Chinese and Vietnamese communists among land-hungry peasants. It was also a central demand of the communist Farmers' Front in Indonesia, and governmental land reform is credited with preempting the Huk's appeal to farmers in the Philippines. Whether Jeffery Paige is right that the land-starved, tenant farmer is most prone to revolt, or Wolf and Migdal are correct that the land-owning, middle peasants are the likeliest early insurgent recruits, any rural movement must eventually acquire wide support among the peasants in order to succeed. Tanter and Midlarsky note that "successful revolutions [have] occurred in those polities with a higher degree of land inequality." [ref. 87]

Factor S-5 makes use of Roy Prosterman's measure of land inequality to suggest the probability of revolution. His Index of Rural Instability (IRI) is the percentage of landless peasants out of the total population of the country. An IRI of 30% or greater indicates a "substantial danger" of a major revolution, while 40% or more signifies a "critical danger."¹⁰ [ref. 88]

¹⁰An IRI of 30, for example, means that 30% of all families in that society are tenant farmers, landless laborers, and in other categories of those who work the land but do not own it. Where the data show some families in more than one role--for example, part tenant and part owner-cultivator--the IRI figure is shown as a range: the lower figure considers such families proportionately as "owners;" the higher figure considers them all as "landless."

An examination of calculated IRI's for ten insurgent situations in this century suggests that the relevant range of variation is from zero to 60 percent. [ref. 89]

Pre-1911 Mexico	62
Pre-1917 Russia	32-47
Pre-1941 China (rice region only)	35-45
Pre-1952 Bolivia	60
Pre-1959 Cuba	39
Pre-1961 South Vietnam	42-48
Pre-1975 Ethiopia	50
Pre-1979 Iran	35
Pre-1979 Nicaragua	>38
Pre-1980 El Salvador	38 [ref. 90]

Figure 4.1 IRI Values for Ten Pre-Revolutionary Situations.

The IRI is applicable only where land is relatively scarce and there exists some secure means of land tenure--private or collective ownership. The high significance of land tenure is amply demonstrated for wet rice areas of Asia. Some scholars insist that Latin Americans do not revolt for land, but it seems significant that El Salvador in early 1980 had both the highest level of landlessness and the greatest population density of any country in the region. Only pre-1959 Cuba and pre-1979 Nicaragua had such high indications of landlessness in this century. [ref. 91]

Although much land remains undeveloped in Africa, the World Bank notes that

Population pressures have existed for many decades in parts of East Africa (Burundi, Kenya, and Rwanda), Southern Africa (Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe), and West Africa (Mauritania and Niger). There are important pockets of high-density settlement in a few countries, such as Southeastern Nigeria, the Western Highlands of Cameroon, the Mossi plateau of Upper Volta, and Senegal's Groundnut Basin. [ref. 92]

Land pressure created by European settlers in areas needed by an expanding native Kikuyu population in Kenya was a stimulus to the Mau Mau Rebellion of 1952-1956 [ref. 93]. Fighters in the Mau Mau "Land Freedom Army" formally swore to "go forward to fight for the land, the lands of Kirinyaga that we cultivated, the lands which were taken by the Europeans [ref. 94].

In arguing his case, Prosterman distinguishes three categories of peasant upheavals approximating the concepts of revolution, independence movement, and turmoil.

1. Category 1 is a conflict in which peasants have been mobilized along class lines, primarily around the issue of land tenure, and sometimes secondarily around the issue of agricultural credit.
2. Category 2 is a conflict in which peasants have been mobilized along geographic or tribal lines, chiefly around the issue of independence.
3. Category 3 is a riot-like conflict without any clear structure or issue, stemming chiefly from the common frustrations of deep poverty. [ref. 95]

With poverty widespread in the third world, and peasants typically unorganized, the frustration-aggression theory suggests that "category 3" turmoil is normal and to be expected. Prosterman argues that where there are enough sharecroppers or other landless peasants, and their aggression is sufficiently politicized, the "category 1" revolution is apt to supplant the "category 3" riot or lynch mob. The IRI thus suggests how many landless peasants are required for this to happen.

This stimulus to insurgency is reduced by successful land reform, but the effectiveness of on-going programs appears particularly difficult to evaluate. For example, in 1970 Prosterman considered the reform in Iran to be among "the half-dozen major non-communist land reforms of this century [that] have led to large increases in agricultural production and have furnished a bulwark of political stability." [ref. 96] By 1981, he had reevaluated "the Shah's vaunted 'white revolution' [as] little more than a public relations campaign, actually redistributing land to only some 15 percent of the landless population..." [ref. 97]

True land reform is a zero-sum proposition where landlords must lose their property to the new owners.¹¹

¹¹The "green revolution" and other aid and agrarian reform programs fail to actually redistribute land. Such efforts may benefit only those able to afford the required fertilizers, insecticides, and seeds. [ref. 98]

Since Gracchus first warned the Roman assembly to "relinquish a portion of your wealth lest the whole be taken from you someday" [ref. 99], governments have been urged to redistribute land as a palliative to potentially revolutionary farmers. Samuel Huntington argues that "no social group is more conservative than a landowning peasantry and none is more revolutionary than a peasantry which owns too little land or pays too high a rental." [ref. 100]

The Bolivian Revolution of 1952-1953 massively redistributed land, often as a result of spontaneous seizures rather than at central direction. Before the revolution, about six percent of the farms and ranches controlled about 92 percent of the exploited land, and the peasants actively supported the revolution. More than ten years later, the Bolivian government was overthrown by a military coup, and Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara judged the country ripe for a second popular revolt. However, the peasants--in possession of their land--were uninterested in supporting Che. [ref. 101]

The successful land reforms in Asia shortly after World War II were all externally imposed under circumstances unlikely to be repeated, but they suggest the scale of successful reform.

1. In Japan, between March 1947 and December 1950, and under the watchful eye of Douglas MacArthur, the Japanese government deprived an estimated one million

landlords of their estates and transformed 90% of all tenant land in Japan into owner-operated land. The IRI value dropped from 28.7 to 5 percent. There had been fears at the time that Japan might "run to communism," but, "land reform in Japan after World War II inured Japanese peasants to the appeals of socialism and made them the strongest and most loyal supporters of conservative parties. [ref. 102]

2. In Korea, at the time of the Japanese surrender, 70% of the Korean population was considered agrarian, yet 4% of the farm households owned or managed 50% of the farmland. Only 35.6% of the total arable land was owner-operated, and a fledgling, socialist "Korean People's Republic" began imprisoning landlords and vowing to distribute land free to the farmers. The U.S. outlawed the "government" and took over all Japanese land holdings. It sold the Japanese properties, 15.3% of all farmland in South Korea, and set a precedent that the Republic later continued. A U.S. occupation official later concluded that "land reform in Korea did more, probably, to fortify the democratic forces than any single move that was made by the American military government." [ref. 103]
3. In Taiwan, just before the arrival of Chinese fleeing the mainland, some 55% of the farmland belonged to owner-cultivators. Tenant farmers were paying up to

70% of their harvest in rent. The Chinese advance party was originally welcomed as liberators from the Japanese, but bloody suppression by the Chinese soon alienated the natives. However, in the late 1940's and early 1950's, the Chinese reduced land rents, sold public lands, and redistributed additional land under a 1953 land-to-the-tiller act. Whereas only 55% of the farmland belonged to owner-cultivators in 1948, 85.6% was so owned by 1959--an IRI of 14.4%. As in Korea, former landlords were partially compensated with industrial stocks, causing many of them to shift their activities to industrial development. The land reforms have been credited with helping two million Chinese to control politically some twelve million Taiwanese. [ref. 104]

FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization.											
equitable					highly polarizing						
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----	

Economic development creates or exacerbates situations of "haves" and "have-nots," increasing the probability of insurgency.

Factor S-6, differential modernization, examines the second major cause of peasant grievances. It derives from the clear consensus among scholars that rapid economic

development is destabilizing.¹² Eckstein, Gurr, Huntington, and others agree that the modernizing societies are the most apt to revolt. Wallace Conroe finds that "the faster (the slower) the rate of change in the modernization process within any given society, the higher (the lower) the level of political instability within that society." [ref. 106] Moreover, modernization invariably benefits some groups, sectors of the economy, or regions over others. "Development tends to cause polarization of wealth and power." [ref. 107] Where modernization is rapid and polarizing in patterns that reinforce geoethnic or other rivalries, insurgency becomes more likely.

¹²As summarized by Huntington, rapid economic growth raises the potential for political violence in nine ways; it: (1) disrupts traditional social groupings (family, class, caste), and thus increases 'the number of individuals who are declassés... and who are thus in circumstances conducive to revolutionary protest'; (2) produces nouveaux riches who are imperfectly adjusted to and assimilated by the existing order and who want political power and social status commensurate with their new economic position; (3) increases geographical mobility which again undermines social ties, and, in particular, encourages rapid migration from rural areas to cities, which produces alienation and political extremism; (4) increases the number of people whose standard of living is falling, and thus may widen the gap between rich and poor; (5) increases the incomes of some people absolutely but not relatively and hence increases their dissatisfaction with the existing order; (6) requires a general restriction of consumption in order to promote investment and thus produces popular discontent; (7) increases literacy, education, and exposure to mass media, which increase aspirations beyond levels where they can be satisfied; (8) aggravates regional and ethnic conflicts over

In Zambia, most development has been concentrated in the northern "copper belt" region and along the north-south railway linking the copper area with seaports in South Africa. The peasants away from the right-of-way have been neglected, many becoming aware of their situation through seasonal labor opportunities in urban areas and on commercial farms. [ref. 108] In tiny Swaziland, there is a huge disparity between urban and rural development. Residents of the Mbabane/Manzini "corridor" number less than 20% of the population, yet they account for some 66% of all income [ref. 109]. It remains to be seen if differential modernization will impel these countries toward political violence as it has their northern neighbor, Zaire.

4. The Traditional Level of Violence

FACTOR S-7. Traditional Level of Violence.											
low										high	
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----	

"Traditions of arms bearing and bellicosity among the peasantry versus deep-rooted pacifism, passivity, fatalism" affects the potential for insurgency [ref. 110].

the distribution of investment and consumption; and (9) increases capacities for group organization and consequently the strength of group demands on government, which the government is unable to satisfy. [ref. 105]

With Factor S-7 we begin to consider some human, material, and geographical variables that facilitate or obstruct the use of force. Intuitively, a "warlike tradition," an abundance of available arms, and favorable terrain are permissive causes of insurgency.

Other things being equal, some societies appear to be more prone to violence than others. Factor S-7, the traditional level of violence, looks at the frequency with which violence has previously occurred in a society as a clue to the future. "Successful violence increases the likelihood of its recurrence; the greater the extent of historical violence, the more likely it is that some groups have found it effective." [ref. 111] In Latin America, for example, the common occurrence of coups d'etat has made the coup "as institutionalized a form of changing governments [there] as the ballot." [ref. 112] Some scholars look to harsh environments to breed hardy people well-suited to violence. "It is natural that countries most suitable to guerrilla fighting should breed the best guerrilla fighters." [ref. 113] "Races who live in the tropics, and in countries full of jungle and bush, are timid as compared with hillmen and the nomad wanderers of the desert." [ref. 114] Still others examine cultural traditions and note the passivism of Hindu Indians, or suggest that Buddhism "spoiled" previously ferocious Mongols, Thai, and Khmer.

Gurr explains why history is a reasonably reliable guide.

Populations in which strife is chronic tend to develop, by an interactive process, a set of beliefs justifying violent responses to deprivation; the French tradition of urban "revolution" is a striking example. [ref. 115]

B. THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

1. Military Resources.

FACTOR S-8. Arms & Military Skills.											
scarce						abundant					
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----	

The probability of an insurgency appearing is directly related to the availability of arms and military skills in the country. Once an uprising begins, the potential for insurgent success relates directly to the arms and skills resources of the insurgents.

The training, experience, and arms that World War Two spread through the third world certainly influenced the wave of rebellions, revolutions, and civil wars that swept the region soon after. The core of the insurgent movement in Malaya was the former anti-Japanese guerrillas trained and equipped by Britain's Force 136 [ref. 116], and Americans originally provided some aid to the Viet Minh. Demobilized veterans played very active roles in the independence movements in Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, and more [ref. 117].

Factor S-8 considers the supply of arms and military skills in a country to be an indicator of the probability and likely magnitude of political violence. Initially all skills and arms should be considered, including those in government hands. This is because in civil violence the government is usually responsible for most of the human casualties (the insurgents tend to account for most of the property damage) [ref. 118], and because defections and attacks on government arsenals serve to redistribute the nation's military resources. Defections do the same for expertise.

Gurr points out that "the most fundamental human response to the use of force is counterforce," and Morrison and Stevenson conclude that "greater coercive potential means a greater potentiality that those who have guns will use them, and that those who have guns used against them will retaliate." [ref. 119] Considering the present weakness of many third-world (and most African) states, domestic violence is likely to increase over coming years as the regimes continue to arm themselves. When, or whether, these governments can reach levels where further increases in repressive capacity will reduce the violence is uncertain.

Chester Crocker, now Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, and Michael Samuels noted in 1979 that "Africans

are now arming themselves at an unprecedented rate."¹³ [ref. 120] They were not speaking solely of government efforts. Rather, they concluded that more arms and money were becoming available to "movements and regimes with an interest in challenging the existing order," and that "the balance between the guerrillas and black government security forces moves steadily in favor of the former...." [ref. 123]

There is yet another way in which the supply of arms contributes to violence. Government forces, fearful of weapons in the hands of potential rebels, sometimes move to collect them--igniting the very violence they fear. In 1972, Manila began to confiscate privately-owned firearms in order to end the "Wild West" atmosphere throughout the Philippines. The southern Muslims, however, saw the move as aimed specifically at them. The result was a resurgence of the separatist movement. [ref. 124] In Indonesia in January 1965, communist party leader Aidit called for arming "no less than 5 million organized workers and 10 million organized peasants" in response to the British build up in

¹³U.S. Government figures comparing conventional arms transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa during 1972-1976 and 1977-1981 reveal that Soviet deliveries of armored vehicles and artillery more than doubled [ref. 121]. Dimitri Simes calculates that between 1972 and 1976, Soviet arms deliveries to Africa "increased almost 20 times, from \$55 million to over \$1 billion, even before the Soviets invested more than \$1 billion in military aid to Ethiopia." [ref. 122] In addition to the traditional major arms exporters, China and South Africa are now aggressively pursuing arms sales.

neighboring Malaysia. As the Indonesian armed forces had long been hostile to irregular armed formations, the incident may have encouraged the army's bloody suppression of communists following the Aidit-inspired coup a few months later. [ref. 125]

Once an armed uprising has begun, however, Factor S-8 must be calculated on a different basis. The regime and the insurgents will both seek to increase the arms they have available. The level of violence is certain to rise, and military skills will be acquired through experience. Beginning with the armed struggle, Factor S-8 considers the arms and military skills available to the insurgents.

2. Isolation and Accessibility.

FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.									
impenetrable/none					porous/plentiful				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----
FACTOR S-10. Terrain & Lines of Communications.									
open/good					rough/poor				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

Open borders that offer sanctuary and supplies to insurgent forces, and (within the country) inaccessible terrain affording good concealment to the guerrillas, are conditions favoring insurgent success.

Two aspects of geography are of proven significance to insurgent situations. Factor S-9 considers the country's external isolation (borders and sanctuaries) while Factor S-10 examines the internal accessibility and concealment (terrain and lines of communication).

The incumbent government has important advantages, and except for the final phases of a successful insurgency--such as when Phnom Penh, Cambodia, was surrounded in 1975--its ability to seek and receive external aid is generally independent of terrain or location. On the other hand, it is critical to the insurgents whether they can make use of friendly border areas for training, rest, and resupply, and whether the terrain inside their country enables them to avoid detection and evade superior government forces.

According to Bernard Fall,

An active sanctuary is a territory contiguous to a rebellious area which, though ostensibly not involved in the conflict, provides the rebel side with shelter, training facilities, equipment, and if it can get away with it--troops. [ref. 126]

Due to porous, unpoliced borders, sanctuaries were plentiful in Vietnam but generally not in peninsular Malaya. In Sarawak, the communist insurgent threat diminished substantially in the mid-1960's when Indonesia denied further use of sanctuaries in its territory. The Algerian FLN established sanctuaries in Libya, Morocco, and Egypt, until the French "Morice Line" effectively closed the borders. In Kenya, the Kikuyu Mau Mau had none. Today, the anti-insurgent forces in El Salvador are attempting to close off guerrilla access to neighboring Nicaragua.

Rough terrain, providing concealment to the insurgents and restricting and slowing the movements of anti-insurgent forces, seems essential in this age of

aircraft and helicopters. Although dispersion, night movements, camouflage, and other tactics can partially off-set the government's typical advantages in transportation and surveillance, an absence of rugged terrain reduces the size of units that can safely move about as well as the size and locations of base camps. For example, once the Portuguese acquired helicopters for use in Angola, they virtually ran the MPLA and their villages out of the country [ref. 127]. The Orange River and desert conditions of northwestern South Africa might prove effective barriers to guerrilla infiltration should that be attempted from an independent Namibia in the future.

V. GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT FACTORS

Whereas the situational factors describe predisposing conditions in the social and environmental arena, the government and insurgent factors relate to more immediate causes and to the actors of an insurgency. The sets are mirror-imaged, and each pair of one government and one insurgent factor will be discussed together.

A. ORGANIZATION

Three pairs of factors add to those already presented in describing the organizational strength of the government and the insurgents. The first pair addresses the centralization of top leadership as enhancing efficient decision-making, planning, and constancy of effort. The second pair looks at existing and potential participation as a measure of organizational scope. The third pair concerns the loyalty and discipline of leaders and members alike.

1. Concentration of Authority

FACTOR G-1. Concentration of Authority.									
unitary					diffused				
	---	1---	2---	3---	4---	5---	5---	7---	8---
	---	1---	2---	3---	4---	5---	5---	7---	8---
FACTOR I-1. Unity of Command.									
hostile			rivals			cooperative unitary			
	---	1---	2---		---	3---	4---	5---	5---
	---	1---	2---		---	3---	4---	5---	5---

Increasing centralization of authority enhances efficient decision-making, planning, and constancy of effort.

Addressing the tasks of long-term economic development, Samuel Huntington makes an argument that applies to counter-insurgency as well.

Fundamental changes in society and politics come from the purposeful actions of men, not in unchanging law. In addition, men must have the power to effect change and hence authority must be concentrated in some determinate individual or group of men. [ref. 128]

Social and economic reform is normally facilitated by a relatively high concentration of power in the political system. Meaningful land reforms, for instance, are almost never enacted by democratically elected parliaments; they are imposed by some undemocratic source of authority....The centralization of power may also be necessary for the government to maintain the control over violence that is essential to carry through major reforms. No reform occurs without violence. [ref. 129]

Factor G-1 assesses the government's concentration of authority. (This is not a measure of power or effectiveness inasmuch as it examines neither the available resources nor the performance of governmental institutions in carrying out their instructions.) At the scale's left end is the limiting case of a single, unchallenged individual holding ultimate and sweeping power. Ideally, he would be a charismatic figure inspiring national approval and unity. The opposite pole is diffused leadership. Between them we might list the following common models of government in order of

increasingly centralized authority: democracy (parliamentary, presidential), single-party state (populist, vanguard), military rule (council, strongman), and personal rule. Another scheme might include confederation, federation, and unified state. Actual states combine these analytical types, and within a variety of systems there often arises a supreme leader.

A supreme leader's authority is not necessarily unrestrained, and a small clique--especially if sharing a strong commitment to a common ideology--may prove more decisive and constant. The typology of personal rulers in Africa by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg well illustrates the variety of authority and prerogative.

An effective ruler may be a political policeman with sufficient power and authority to preside over the game [i.e., political infighting] and keep it orderly--in a regime we shall term "princely rule." He may be a political strongman who at least temporarily succeeds in dominating everyone else and in effect transforming politics into administration--"autocratic rule." Or he may be a charismatic personality who can convert politicians into missionaries and politics into a crusade--"prophetic rule." The deterioration of some personalized games into fights can be caused by the rulers themselves in a wholly abusive and unrestrained manner--the case of "tyrannical rule." [ref. 130]

In Africa today, Malawi is probably the state with the most centralized decision-making. The conservative autocrat, President Kamuzu Banda, determines virtually everything of significance. Elsewhere personal rulers seldom are as unrestrained. To stay in power, they regularly favor the armed forces, ruthlessly crush any potential

challengers, and allow no criticism. The ruler's tactics of co-option, consultation, agreement, and patronage, while preventing a too-powerful rival from emerging, impose constraints upon his personal prerogative.

Factor I-1 applies the same principle of unity of command to the insurgents. Movements often are factious,^{1*} thus the leadership may be characterized as "hostile, rivals, cooperative, or unified." Common organizational models on a scale of increasing concentration include: traditional (tribal council, hierarchy), party-army (united front, party or military high command, tiny clique), and a single leader. Again, actual cases vary from these analytical types, and movements may initially co-opt traditional authority structures and develop more modern organization later. [ref. 132]

Robert Scalapino finds that communist movements and regimes tend to evolve from collective to individual leadership. Supreme figures arose in China, North Korea, and Vietnam. As they aged, each country tended to drift back toward collective leadership. [ref. 133] Perhaps the armed struggle demands concentrated leadership and puts a higher premium on a single, charismatic individual than does the subsequent consolidation and rule.

^{1*}In Angola, where three major indigenous movements led the anti-Portuguese resistance, John Marcum recorded no less than 87 nationalist movements [ref. 131].

Useful in gauging the personal authority of Asian communist leaders is the typology of cadres that Scalapino provides. The "ideologue" is an intellectual, although he may not have come from the intellectual class. His is a combination of resentment over the status quo and desire for change, a conviction that Marxism is scientific, and a desire to play the role of philosopher-king. He is sincere and serious but lacks mass appeal and is often uncomfortable in an open arena. He is particularly given to factionalism. The "activist" is attracted by the opportunities to use his organizational and leadership skills. He is motivated to act, often finds theory boring, and is frequently an extrovert and natural leader. The "careerist" comes in great variety. He is attracted by opportunities for education, status, escape from monotony, or the chance to lead. Should the party come to power, new careerists appear: opportunists and technocrat-administrators. [ref. 134] Not only the style, but seemingly the authority of each of these types must vary.

The corollary here is that dissunity in the leadership can greatly reduce the insurgent movement's potential. The Algerian FLN suffered from fragmented leadership.

The creation of area commands, which was intended to facilitate the armed confrontation against France, tended also to produce factional allegiances, jurisdictional disputes, and petty revolutionary states. This group of phenomena, which has been given the term *willayisme*, fragmented the FLN organization to a considerable extent. There was also the conflict that developed between the noncombatant, regular army ANP

(Armee Nationale Populaire) stationed outside the Algerian borders, and the combatant, guerilla forces of the ALN (Algerie Liberation National) operating from within, a conflict which the French helped to exacerbate, but did not cause, through their imposed system of land blockades. [ref. 135]

In Mozambique, a schism developed within FRELIMO between those leaders located in neighboring Tanzania and those within the Portuguese colony [ref. 136]. The front organization in South Vietnam was shoved aside by the North Vietnamese after the fall of Saigon. The isolated, regional communist groups in Malaya sometimes defected en masse. And a sympathetic account of a movement in Brazil years ago painted a picture of disunity and weakness.

The overwhelming defect of the Brazilian revolutionary movement is the disunited state of the revolutionary organizations and their disagreement over attitudes and objectives. Within this disagreement there is an intense struggle for leadership going on. Each organization is tactily claiming the leadership of the revolution for itself, and this makes it difficult to discover a common denominator among those who are prepared to fight against our common enemy. This is an objective feature of the Brazilian revolution and of the special conditions in which it is evolving. [ref. 137]

2. Potential for Participation

FACTOR G-2. Regime Access.									
open								blocked	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR I-2. Upward Mobility.									
blocked								open	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Opportunities for upward mobility provide strong inducements to recruitment.

The next two factors focus on the question of why people join the government or the insurgents; a substantial advantage here is the best indication of ultimate success in organization building. Of course, each side has its volunteers and its conscripts.¹⁵ The guerrillas, for example, may initially force a youth to join. After indoctrination, and compulsory involvement in illegal acts which he is told leave him no other option, he stays without being physically coerced. Volunteers, on the other hand, may be seeking material, social, or status rewards.

Recruits are attracted with a mixture of inducements, but we are primarily concerned here with upward mobility. Samuel Huntington, for example, argues that two variables--socioeconomic and political mobility--intervene

¹⁵Robert Thompson observed three types of communist recruits in Vietnam and Malaya. The "naturals" were those for whom "Communism, with its strength of purpose and discipline, with the chances of promotion in its monolithic structure, with its security of organization and its conspiratorial secrecy, with its belief in inevitable victory and its sense of political power, offers them their opportunity." The "converted" include those who join because of government excesses or abuses of power...[also] those who are persuaded to join the insurgent ranks because they have close friends in them." This group includes those who join the "bandwagon" if they see the insurgents winning. Finally, the "deceived" are those who joined for legitimate reasons (e.g., to participate in the anti-Japanese or anti-colonial resistance), and those who are abducted, forced to participate, and convinced that they are committed. [ref. 138]

to affect how discontent arising from the strains of modernization becomes political violence. Factor S-2 (the mass-elite gap) evaluates a group's access to the socioeconomic elite, thus Factor G-2 stresses political mobility. Again, as Huntington writes,

Urbanization, increases in literacy, education, and media exposure all give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and groups into politics. [ref. 139]

In many third-world countries, there are few opportunities for personal advancement outside of the government bureaucracy. Socioeconomic and political mobility blend together, as Jackson and Rosberg relate.

State power in African countries has been the major arena of privilege--the religious, business, and other arenas provide fewer opportunities--and it has been more accessible to ambitious men of humble origin. [ref. 140]

Because of the general poverty and underdevelopment of African countries and the restricted scope of the private sector, government has become the main dispenser of patronage and is perceived as such. The interest in patronage resources is directed specifically at persons with power, positions, and influence in the ruling councils of the state--that is, officeholders in the cabinet, the party, the army, the civil service, and parastatal organizations. The officeholders tend to monopolize the kinds of goods and services that other individuals and groups need or want; a marked feature of pre-industrial societies is the treatment of governmental offices as entitlements. [ref. 141]

The demand for political participation quickly outstrips the absorptive capacity of the weak political institutions typical of underdeveloped countries. If politicized individuals and groups are denied "regime access,"

they may turn to the insurgents. Thus, Lucian Pye found that Malayan communist party members joined the uprising "on an endless quest for advancement and personal security." [ref. 142]

An insurgent organization's capacity for accommodating these volunteers is the product of the size of the organization and its criteria for participation. The Chinese communists created a vast organization capable of indefinite expansion through associated grassroots, special-interest groups (e.g., for women, youths, farmers) Douglas Pike describes how the Viet Cong emulated the Chinese, building an organization with echelons at national, interzonal, zonal, provincial, district, and village levels. [ref. 143]

However, Jeffrey Race makes it clear that we must speak of more than political participation. It must be meaningful participation - providing benefits to both the individual and the organization. According to Race, Viet Cong recruitment was based upon an exchange of material and status rewards by the organization for certain behavior by individuals. [ref. 144] In contrast, Race believes that President Diem's institutions were "hollow shells" that failed to rival those of the VC insurgents.

Initially, the Viet Cong relied upon material inducements. Some tenant farmers probably joined the movement in exchange for promises of land--and some land was

redistributed. Later, the insurgents provided mobility and status by installing individuals in positions previously filled by government officials. The organization not only duplicated the government positions, but it expanded them and placed more authority at lower levels. The insurgents has a continuous system of promotion from the lowest to the highest levels, whereas rural elites were effectively blocked from central positions in the Saigon government. Later, when the movement gained wide support, indirect rewards came into play. Peasants then joined in order to trade their obedience to the group for the social approval of their peers.

Factors G-2 and I-2, regime access and upward mobility require the same sort of examination as does Factor S-2, the mass-elite gap. We are interested in the groups appealed to and those discriminated against. Another of Gurr's simple scoring systems may be useful here. Defining political discrimination as "systematic limitation in form, norm, or practice of social groups' opportunities to participate in political activities or to attain elite positions on the basis of ascribed characteristics," Gurr uses four levels of intensity.

1. Some significant political elite positions are closed to the group, or some participatory activities (party membership, voting, etc.) [are closed].

2. Most or all political elite positions are closed or most participatory activities, or some of both.
3. Most or all political elite positions and some participatory activities are closed.
4. Most or all political elite positions and most or all participatory activities are closed. [ref. 145]

3. Loyalty and Discipline

FACTOR G-3. Loyalty.									
intact					defections				
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8-----9----
FACTOR I-3. Commitment.									
"returnees"					determined				
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8-----9----

Defections shift resources from one side to the other and suggest the levels of discipline within each organization.

No matter how centralized the leadership and vast the membership, discipline remains essential to successful insurgency. It is a basic difference between an insurgent organization and bandits or terrorists. Thus, indiscriminate, undisciplined terrorism by the FLN in Algeria and the CTs in Malaya was detrimental to their cause.

Scholars have found defections to be an early and good indicator of prospects for an insurgency. Crane Brinton described the transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals as "in some respects the most reliable of the symptoms we are likely to meet." [ref. 146] Harry Eckstein

explained their consequences to the government side. "Internal wars are unlikely wherever the cohesion of an elite is intact, for the simple reason that insurgent formations require leadership and other skills and are unlikely to obtain them on a large scale without some significant break in the ranks of an elite." [ref. 147] John Gillis observed that defections leave those who remain behind in a "state of confusion and despair" [ref. 148], and Katherine Chorley summed up by saying that "whatever government or party has the full allegiance of a country's armed forces is to all intents and purposes politically impregnable." [ref. 149]

In Vietnam and Malaya, Thompson urged that amnesties and other measures be used to induce insurgent defections.

The main base of a successful psychological warfare campaign will depend on a clear and precise government surrender policy toward the insurgents. Such a policy has three main aims: (1) to encourage insurgent surrenders; (2) to sow dissension between insurgent rank-and-file and their leaders; and (3) to create an image of government both to the insurgents and to the population which is both firm and efficient but at the same time just and generous. [ref. 150]

Defections also reflect levels of morale, perceptions of who is winning, the distribution of resources, and other variables. A recruit from among the neutral populace is a plus for one side, but a defection is also a minus for the other. Factors G-3 and I-3 can reflect the state of discipline by noting whether or not defections are taking place, or the factors can be combined into a net defection score.

B. LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Two pairs of government and insurgent factors serve to examine legitimacy. The first argues that a "oneness" between a group and its leaders is a powerful source of legitimacy. The second argues that a legitimate regime is one that is effective at the tasks people expect of their government.

1. Identification with the Regime or Rebels

```

| FACTOR G-4.  Origin & Indigenous Authority
| 8      7      6      5      4      3      2      1
| |----1|----2--|3----|---5|---6--|7----8|---9----|
|
| FACTOR I-4.  Ideology & Appeal.
| fragile
|
| |----1--2---3----4---5---6---7---8---9---|
| strong

```

The origins of state institutions and the backgrounds of its leaders shape the degree to which people identify with and support a regime. Ideology solidifies an insurgent movement and enhances its legitimacy.

Two methods useful for estimating government legitimacy focus upon the historical origins of political institutions or the backgrounds of the leaders. Ted Gurr's seven-point scale assumes that institutions which are native in origin, or at least adapted by natives to fit local circumstances, are more legitimate in the people's eyes than are foreign imports. His concept concentrates upon political form and seems to slight the important question of who

actually wields power. Crawford Young's eight-fold scale examines both the power in indigenous hands and the degree to which territorial borders are of historical or (better still) self-determined origin. Young's formula may put more stress on state borders than is justified if considering the potential for domestic conflict. On balance, Young's seems the more substantial and useful of the two; it is used with Factor G-4 to indicate the origin of the government and the degree of indigenous authority.

With either scale, the higher the value the more legitimate the regime appears to be. Gurr's assumes that institutions of autochthonous (indigenous) origin which have slowly evolved are more legitimate than those suddenly implanted from abroad. His seven conditions are:

1. Seven: Institutions are wholly or primarily accretive and autochthonous; reformations, if any, had indigenous roots (although limited foreign elements may have been assimilated into indigenous institutions).
2. Six: Institutions are a mixture of substantial autochthonous and foreign elements, e.g. they are polities with externally-derived parliamentary and/or bureaucratic systems grafted to a traditional monarchy.
3. Five: Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, and have been adapted over time to indigenous political

conditions. (Adaptation is either the modification of regime institutions themselves or development of intermediate institutions in order to incorporate politically the bulk of the population.)

4. Four: Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, have been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions, but were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign power rather than chosen by indigenous leaders of their own volition.
5. Three: Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were deliberately chosen by indigenous leaders, but they have not been adapted over time to indigenous political conditions.
6. Two: Institutions are primarily foreign in origin, were inculcated under the tutelage of a foreign power, and they have not been adapted to indigenous political conditions.
7. One: Institutions are imposed by, and maintained under threat of sanctions by, foreign powers (including polities under colonial rule as of [now]. [ref. 151])

The Young scale implies that native control and traditional (or self-determined) borders are signs of high legitimacy.

1. Eight: Cultural self-determination states. (e.g., Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia, and Saudi Arabia).

2. Seven: Traditional states (having escaped formal colonialism). (China: transformed; Iran, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia: kingdom overthrown; Thailand and Japan: monarch's powers reduced).
3. Six: Historical states (former kingdoms) affected by colonial experience. (Kingdoms destroyed by colonials in Libya, Madagascar, and Burma; kingdoms destroyed by nationalist movement in Tunisia, Rwanda, Burundi, Egypt, Vietnam; kingdoms survive in Morocco, Swaziland, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Nepal).
4. Five: Colonial states with historical personality. (Algeria, Syria, Iraq, India, Sri Lanka).
5. Four: Arbitrary colonial units, indigenous successors to power. (A large category including Nigeria, Zaire, Tanzania, Cameroon, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Jordan).
6. Three: Homeland states. (for diaspora: Israel and Liberia).
7. Two: Colonial units, African or Asian numerically-dominant immigrant power-holders. (Guyana, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Singapore).
8. One: Historically arbitrary, immigrant dominated. (Most of Latin America and South Africa). [ref. 152]

Insurgents gain legitimacy in the first instance if they oppose an illegitimate regime. They advance their standing by goading the government into using excessive

violence or repressive controls, into accepting a tainted relationship with a foreign patron, or into diverting scarce resources to a military buildup and away from projects which address the society's problems. Insurgents also legitimate themselves by incorporating popular traditions and grievances into their program. Thus, the Chinese communists emphasized their nationalism and closeness to the masses, and African rebels have made use of spirit mediums and magic.

The Gurr and Young scales being inappropriate for the rebels, Factor I-4, suggests that ideology be the focus of attention.

The adoption of a new political and ideological designation formally provides an unestablished elite with internal bonds and external boundaries--with an enhanced capacity to offset its regional, tribal, religious, generational, and educational diversity, a common dimension along which to relate to one another, and the corporate capacity to distinguish or separate themselves from others. One might hypothesize that, other things being equal, the less established an elite the greater the propensity to adopt political and ideological designations that sharply distinguish them from their more culturally and socially secure political rivals and the latter's international supporters. [ref. 153]

A strong ideology has important advantages.

1. It could establish linkage to a powerful foreign patron.
2. It differentiates the insurgents from their enemies, especially the regime.
3. Association with a purportedly authoritative ideology confers status on the believers.

4. It may provide "a formal set of ideological, strategic, and regime references" of use to a new elite unfamiliar with each other and the tasks they face.
5. It provides an entre to target groups of like mind.
6. It may be viewed as a quasi-magical solution to desperate men facing tough challenges, including the problem of organizing themselves. [ref. 154]

These potential values of an ideology provide criteria for use with Factor I-4, ideology and appeal. Where significant advantages accrue from its use, the ideology should be considered a plus for the rebels.¹⁶

2. Evaluating Performance

FACTOR G-5. Rural Services.										
effective									ineffective	
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	5----	7----	8----	9----
FACTOR I-5. Administration in Rebel Areas.										
ineffective									effective	
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	5----	7----	8----	9----

¹⁶Kenneth Jowitt believes he sees the attraction that Marxism-Leninism holds for Africans. "'Scientific socialism,' or 'Marxism-Leninism,' with its emphases on the heroic role of cadres, the significance of the party leader, its paternalistic concern with welfare, and substantive rather than procedural orientations, fits more readily with African traditional and colonial experiences than do the procedural and individualistic emphases of liberal or social democratic political and economic tenants." [ref. 155]

A leadership's effectiveness in dealing with tasks the people consider important and appropriate is another measure of legitimacy.

Aspirations and needs should be studied for the specific country at issue, and for the social groups being evaluated, but two examples of such concerns are provided.

Concern	Average of Hopes	Average of Fears
Personal Economic	71	48
Family	46	24
Health	27	41
Values and Character	20	7
Job or Work Situation	19	6
International World Situation	3	9
Social	6	4
Political	2	4
Maintain Status Quo or No Fears	2	6

Figure 5.1 Average Personal Concerns.

Hadley Cantril collected survey data for over 20,000 people in 13 countries over a six-year period ending in the mid-1960's. Figure 5.1 shows the percentages of responses grouped according to several general categories. [ref. 156]

A second, country-specific example comes from a survey of 114 people in Ghana in 1974 and 1975. Asked, "What do you expect the government to do for you?" the people responded (answers given by five percent or more of those interviewed) as given in Figure 5.2. [ref. 157]

Guarantee employment and reduce the cost of living	23.7%
Provide housing	17.5
Provide better roads	14.0
Provide free education	12.3
Provide more and better food	6.1
Provide more health clinics	5.3

Figure 5.2 Ghana Survey: "The Government Should...".

We might compare these concerns with a final list, this one of areas in which "government efficiency or inefficiency in providing services [was] significant during insurgencies." [ref. 158]

Providing justice at the local level.
 Implementing land reform.
 Controlling of land rent and interest rates.
 Providing security against outlaws.
 Processing documents and certificates (red tape).
 Reducing graft and petty thievery by local government.
 Providing educational facilities and teachers.
 Providing health services at reasonable prices.
 Providing transportation and agricultural storage.

Figure 5.3 Key Government Services during an Insurgency.

These data convey an impression of the areas in which the people look to the government for help. Results presumably go a long way toward establishing the regime's legitimacy. Unfortunately, a government that is "too effective" at some of these tasks can undermine itself as surely as if it did nothing. An example is education.

Alienated university graduates prepare revolutions; alienated technical or secondary school graduates plan coups; alienated primary school leavers engage in more frequent but less significant forms of political unrest. [ref. 159]

If a government buys trouble by educating its citizens, it might seem wiser not to do so. Introducing Western education in Vietnam is frequently cited as one of the things the French contributed to their own undoing there. [ref. 160] But a government that fails to educate its people is depriving them of a much-valued good, and it is giving the insurgents a key grievance as well as a vehicle for their use in indoctrinating the people.

Education is so widely regarded as an essential first step for individual socio-economic advancement that one can infer deprivation among the uneducated, and among the parents of children who cannot attend school if not among the children themselves. [ref. 161]

Although denying education directly contributes to political instability, providing it is destabilizing only to the degree that educated people are unable to find employment and are increasingly aware of inequities in the society. The goal is not to maximize education, but to have it grow in step with job opportunities in an expanding economy.

A second area of difficult choices for the government is reform. Often badly needed, it may be useful in preventing or combatting an insurgency. It may also be too costly or unnecessary, and if done under pressure from events the demands of the insurgents may only increase, or

there may occur a counter-revolutionary backlash. Thus, Huntington advises the South Africans to adopt a "Fabian strategy" of steady but gradual reforms because "substantial reform...requires a substantial period of time for implementation" and should be accomplished from a position of strength [ref. 162].

Factors G-5 and I-5, call for evaluations of government and insurgent performance at providing services and administering the rural areas under their control. Programs out of balance with other projects and trends (e.g., educating or training too many people for the available job opportunities) are indicative of poor effectiveness. Reform implemented quickly, at great cost, and under visible pressure must be carefully examined to determine if the results strengthen or weaken popular perceptions of the regime.

C. COERCION

The remaining four pairs of factors measure coercive potential and performance. The armed forces and police (or the guerrillas), along with aid provided by external actors, determine much of the potential. Another element reflecting both potential and performance--is population control. Finally, the force actually used--its level, patterns, and tactics--reflect performance.

1. Potential Capabilities

FACTOR G-6. Control.	
totalitarian	weak
----1----2----3----4----5----5----7----8----9----	
FACTOR I-6. Liberated Areas.	
none	defended
----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----	

Population controls are advantages in insurgent situations.

Factors G-6 and I-6 address each side's control over portions of the population and territory. In the case of the government, we measure control on a scale from "weak" to "totalitarian," and the example of the People's Republic of China serves as a standard by which to judge totalitarian technique. For the insurgents, the existence of "defended liberated areas" is an indication of substantial coercive capabilities and control. Where information is available, the insurgents' population controls within liberated areas can be evaluated like those of the government.

Great government control in China is achieved through the use of official structure, traditions and sanctions, and unofficial grassroots organizations. The armed forces, public security (police) personnel, militia, and a maze of organizations and committees share responsibility for public order to an extent uncommon in the West. To the degree that the Ministry of Public Security takes the lead in this area, its hierarchy is the structure of control. It

includes the ministry headquarters, departments, bureaus, subbureaus, and stations, aided by local organizations and individual cadres or activists.

The public security station--the basic element of this structure--has sweeping responsibilities.

The arch criminal [as of 1980] was the "counter-revolutionary," a vague term that could be applied to any troublemaker, giving the police considerable latitude beyond the restrictions on their powers. The station's household section maintained a registry of all persons living in the area. Births, deaths, marriages, and divorces were recorded and confirmed through random household checks. The station regulated all hotels and required visitors who remained beyond a certain number of days to register with it. It also controlled all theaters, cinemas, radio equipment, and printing presses to regulate gatherings and censor information reaching the people. [ref. 163]

Additionally, the police control all changes of residence, limiting urbanization by denying permission to move from rural areas to the towns and cities.

The police and other cadres use a variety of sanctions to maintain control, many of them expanding upon traditional Chinese methods. Collective responsibility makes groups responsible for the behavior of individual members. Mutual surveillance capitalizes on a tradition of social and political conformity, and--by actually penetrating households and families--exceeds anything achieved prior to communist rule. Secret police operations utilize plain clothes agents at public places (e.g., bus and railway stations), "roving spies" within factories and other work places, and informants who denounce "bad elements" and help

surveil suspected political criminals. "Youths aspiring to be Communist Youth League (CYL) members or CYL members aspiring to be party members commonly cooperated as informants and agents for the police." [ref. 164] The Xinhua (New China News) Agency in 1980 advised the police to eradicate the use of torture ("a chronic and stubborn disease") to extract confessions. [ref. 165] Most revealing of the methods used to control citizens was the technique of public criticism.

"Struggle sessions" were held to persuade, educate, and criticize an offender, who was under tremendous pressure to admit guilt and criticize himself or herself. The accused understood that confession was rewarded with leniency, while failing to confess was evidence of a "bad attitude" deserving severe punishment. Denouncing family and friends was a meritorious way to get ahead. Those suspected of criminal activity or harboring counterrevolutionary thoughts were watched constantly. The social ostracism was severe, and frequently those under suspicion for some minor infraction buckled under the pressure and committed or were judged to commit a serious offense. Treatment was unequal; those with influence were able to flaunt the system while others less fortunate received harsh punishment. [ref. 166]

The police could administratively sentence "vagabonds, people who have no proper occupation, and people who repeatedly breach public order" to "reeducation through labor," generally for two years. "Capped" individuals, those deprived of political rights, would receive less pay for the same work, were denied medical services free to others, and along with their families were discriminated against regarding political participation, education, and work. [ref. 167]

The state structure is extended by the grassroots organizations, including neighborhood committees, residents' committees, and residents' small groups. Mediation and conciliation committees intervene to settle disputes. Here again, the authority of these civilian, unofficial mediators is substantial.

The Chinese mediator may merely perform the function of an errand boy who maintains contact between parties who refuse to talk to one another. At the other end of the spectrum, he may not only establish communication between parties, but may also define the issues, decide questions of fact, specifically recommend the terms of a reasonable settlement - perhaps even give a tentative or advisory decision - and mobilize such strong political, economic, social and moral pressures upon one or both parties to leave little option but that of "voluntary" acquiescence. [ref. 163]

Control achieved through voluntary compliance is preferable to police state tactics since material resources are not required. Still, where the state has achieved high control through coercion, and has the resources to continue doing so, coercion appears to outweigh legitimacy. South African dominance by 4.5 million whites in a country of 27.7 million can hardly be legitimate, but the bleak prospects for overcoming state control keep the regime in power.

Liberated areas are regions of the country where the insurgents exercise authority comparable to that of the government. The areas are far more than "bases," which typically are not defended and must remain secret to be usable. The existence of liberated areas means that a state of "dual sovereignty" exists, government forces are unable

to enter portions of the countryside, and the situation resembles civil war more than revolution. In China, the communists established their most secure liberated areas at Yenai following the Long March. The Malayan CTs, on the other hand, never succeeded in creating any liberated areas, although they had many jungle bases.

FACTOR G-7. Armed Forces and Police.									
strong					weak				
	1		2		3		4		5
	6		7		8		9		
FACTOR I-7. Guerrillas.									
weak					strong				
	1		2		3		4		5
	6		7		8		9		
FACTOR G-8. External Aid.									
unneded			plenty			some		none	
	1		2		3		4		5
	6		7		8		9		
FACTOR I-8. External Aid.									
none		some		plenty				unneded	
	1		2		3		4		5
	6		7		8		9		

The government-to-insurgents troop ratio and external assistance are standard indicators of the coercive balance.

Factors G-7 and I-7 are of some value separately, but together they form the more useful ratio of troops between the two sides. The size of its forces are useful in calculating the government's deterrent to an insurgent threat and also in estimating the overall level of violence to expect. Political violence tends to be greatest in countries with medium-sized military and security forces, and less in those with either small or very large establishments

(see Factor S-8). [ref. 169] But the more useful rules of thumb concern the ratio of government-to-insurgent forces.

Calculating that the government troop advantage during the Malayan Emergency grew steadily from about 5-to-1 initially to over 25-to-1 toward the end, and that the same ratio in Vietnam was over 50-to-1 initially but dropped just as steadily to about 10-to-1 by 1955 (when U.S. combat troops began arriving), Thompson drew a important lesson.

There are many who say that a government cannot win an insurgency unless it has a favourable strength ratio of at least ten to one over the insurgent, and who thereby imply that the government force must be expanded, or outside forces introduced, until that ratio is achieved. This is nonsense.... The rise, or fall, in the ratio is one of the indicators of how the war is going. Obviously a government can expand its forces, but only within limits.... The real crux is whether, while expanding, the government is at the same time taking other action to ensure that the insurgent rate of expansion is correspondingly slower so that the favourable ratio is steadily improved. It is clearly better to have a favourable ratio of five to one which is improving, rather than a ratio of fifteen to one which is declining. The magic figure of ten to one, therefore, is not a prerequisite but an indicator. If it is reached on an improving trend (or an initial higher ratio is maintained), the government is on the way to victory, but if it is reached on a declining trend, then the fault lies elsewhere and will not be corrected by raising yet more forces. [ref. 170]

There is, of course, the problem of counting rules. If we compare manpower levels, should we ignore advantages in superior equipment including helicopters? If we choose to do better than compare gross inventories and instead calculate forces that might actually oppose each other--perhaps using one of the available quantified measures of effectiveness--do the calculations adequately address human

factors like leadership, training, loyalty, morale, and tactics? How do we calculate advantages in intelligence, communications, terrain, and differences in each side's targets?

Alternatives to inventory comparisons are possible, but except for some rough calculations of what constitutes minimal or appropriate force levels, they are not especially useful. T. E. Lawrence once calculated the troops that Turkey would need to occupy Arabia--a calculation Lawrence called "the algebraic factor."

In the Arab case the algebraic factor would take first account of the area to be conquered. A casual calculation indicated perhaps 140,000 square miles. How would the Turks defend all that--no doubt by a trench line across the bottom, if the Arabs were an army attacking with banners displayed...but suppose they were an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile as a whole, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. The Arabs might be a vapor, blowing where they listed. It seemed that a regular soldier might be helpless without a target. He would own the ground he sat on, and what he could poke his rifle at. The next step was to estimate how many posts they would need to contain this attack in depth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of these 100,000 square miles. They would have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not be less than 20 men. The Turks would need 600,000 men to meet the combined ill wills of all the local Arab people. They had 100,000 men available. It seemed that the assets in this sphere were with the Arabs, and climate, railways, deserts, technical weapons could also be attached to their interests. The Turk was stupid and would believe that rebellion was absolute, like war, and deal with it on the analogy of absolute warfare. [ref. 171]

Lawrence's capabilities-versus-requirements analysis is certainly entertaining, but not practical. The matter seems to rest with Thompson's lesson. Provided that some reasonably comprehensive criteria are used to compute the ratio, then the most significant point is whether that ratio declines or grows. We might as well perform standard manpower comparisons, with side calculations of fixed requirements and disparities in surveillance, transport, and intelligence capabilities. For the government, the full-time police should be counted. They suffered 70% of the security forces' casualties in Malaya, and both there and in Vietnam the police included field forces equipped as light infantry [ref. 172].

Also important are the trends within the forces and the costs involved for each side. That is, is a favorable trend due solely to government expansion (which cannot be sustained indefinitely), or are the insurgent forces at the same time slowing their growth or declining? Large armed forces are extremely expensive to build and maintain. Are these costs bearable indefinitely? Will a patron eventually balk at the expense?

Factors G-8 and I-8, external aid, are rather straightforward. As noted earlier, dependence upon a patron imposes constraints upon the benefactor, and legitimacy suffers if a relationship acquires the appearance of subservience to a foreign supplier. Of course, supply lines are

vulnerable to interdiction. And although self-sufficiency is touted as a virtue for guerrillas, they more often find it a regrettable necessity. more often it is a necessity. Legitimacy suffers from apparent subservience to a foreign supplier.

2. Performance and Effect

FACTOR G-9. Repressive Violence.											
legal/appropriate					illegal/excessive						
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	5----	7----	8----	9----	
FACTOR I-9. Tactics.											
nonviolent					paramilitary						
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----	

A government employing force illegally and excessively sacrifices legitimacy. An insurgent force--whose tactics regularly include terrorism and are, in any case, illegal--must qualify as a paramilitary force in order to challenge the government's forces.

There is great disagreement about the amount of force a government should use in deterring or defeating an insurgent challenge. Some scholars argue that heavy use of force diminishes legitimacy and thus brings on the insurgency. Chalmers Johnson and Falcott Parsons belong here. Others insist that either light or heavy use of force is less likely to arouse resistance than is some middle policy. A government using little force probably enjoys high legitimacy, and one resorting to excessive violence intimidates its opponents, but in between is a condition of less

legitimacy and less intimidation. Bwy and Gurr are among the the believers here. Robert LeVine claims that consistency is paramount. He concluded that colonial regimes in Africa that were consistently repressive or permissive encountered less anti-colonial violence than others with ambivalent policies. [ref. 173]

Factor G-9 argues that excessive force is disadvantageous to the government. It also reflects Robert Thompson's second principle of counter-insurgency.

The government must function in accordance with law.... A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot expect its people to obey the law...

Action in accordance with the law was a vital factor during the Huk insurgency in the Philippines, where Magsaysay made a reality of the constitution, and in Malaya, where the civil courts functioned normally throughout the Emergency.

Some very tough laws were enacted in Malaya. [But] they were seen by the population to be effective and were applied equally to all.

In the long term, adherence to the law is a great advantage to the government.... It puts the government in a position in which it is represented as a protector of those who are innocent, and it puts the terrorists in the position of criminals. [ref. 174]

This amounts to use of coercion only so far as legitimacy is not sacrificed, and in fact the Malayan campaign (which Thompson helped to direct) succeeded with a twin program of advancing the government's legitimacy and coercive advantage. On the one hand, the security forces of some 21,000 at the start of the Emergency were increased to

a high of about 90,000, and a part-time home guard was created--ultimately to number about 250,000. [ref. 175] The government buildup was coupled to insurgent decline, and as noted earlier the government-insurgent troop ratio climbed steadily. At the same time, the movement toward Malayan Independence, with such steps as the Malayan-Chinese partnership to form the powerful Alliance Party led by Malaysia's first prime minister, gained legitimacy by depriving the insurgents of their nationalist appeal.

Factor G-9 marries the concept of appropriate (not excessive) use of force with that of legality. The two will tend to coincide unless legality is reduced to only a technical adherence to the letter of the law. Should the analyst have to choose between these benchmarks, excessive violence seems more harmful to the government cause than are legal infractions.

Because the government usually enjoys military superiority, Factor G-9 focuses on the appropriateness of its use of force. For the insurgents, on the other hand, capabilities are more important. Its use of violence is, in any case, illegal, and such distinctions as "selective" versus "indiscriminate" terrorism tend to be difficult and unproductive.

"Paramilitary" represents the scale of organization and support necessary to field combat units able to challenge those of the government. Farmers wielding pitchforks,

saboteurs, and bandit gangs are all less than this. Paramilitary units will have a military-style chain of command, specialized organization that distinguishes between combat and support personnel or units, and at least light infantry weapons and tactics. These characteristics evolve over time, but any movement unable or not intending to develop them does not qualify as an insurgent movement.

Paramilitary organization would resemble that of the Huks in the Philippines as described by a former guerrilla.

The Huk was organized on the basis of squadrons, composed of approximately 100 men each. The squadron was subdivided into platoons and squads. On the ascending scale, two squadrons make a battalion and two battalions a regiment. In that respect, we paralleled fairly closely the ordinary army....

The squadron officers: commander, vice-commander, political instructor, supply officer, and intelligence officer....For every Huk soldier in the field there were two others in reserve in the barrios, where they engaged in production work or in civilian pursuits that otherwise aided the overall struggle....Couriers were of two types, the direct and the relay. [ref. 176]

Mao Zedong's writings on guerrilla warfare are so well known that we turn instead to Vo Nguyen Giap, the Vietnamese military strategist, for an example of strategy.

From the strategic point of view, guerrilla warfare, causing many difficulties and losses to the enemy, wears him out. To annihilate big enemy manpower and liberate land, guerrilla warfare has to move gradually to mobile warfare.... mobile warfare [is] a form of fighting in which principles of regular warfare gradually appear and increasingly develop but still bear a guerrilla character. Mobile warfare is the fighting way of concentrated troops, of the regular army, in which relatively big forces are regrouped, operating on a relatively vast battlefield, attacking the enemy where he is relatively exposed with a view to annihilating enemy manpower, advancing very deeply, then withdrawing

very swiftly, possessing to the extreme, dynamism, initiative, mobility and rapidity of decision in face of new situations....In the course of the development of mobile warfare, owing to the enemy's situation and ours on the battlefields, entrenched camp warfare gradually came into being. Entrenched camp warfare, which became part and parcel of mobile warfare, kept developing and occupied a more and more important position.

The conduct of the war must maintain a correct ratio between the fighting forms. [ref. 177]

The scale with Factor I-9 does not distinguish between guerrilla and conventional forces, both of which are paramilitary, in order to avoid misleading. Premature commitment to conventional tactics--such as positional, or Giap's "entrenched camp" warfare--may invite destruction by government forces typically superior in firepower.

VI. USING THE METHODOLOGY

Section VI concludes the paper with three illustrations of the framework and worksheets for future applications.

A. ILLUSTRATIONS FROM MALAYA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND MOZAMBIQUE

The first illustration is a detailed, factor-by-factor examination of an historical case offering relatively complete and reliable information. The Malayan "Emergency" of 1948 through 1960 is evaluated twice to show that trends among the factors may be more significant than their absolute values at any given time. The next two examples are current situations. They are the Maoist and Muslim movements in the Philippines and the South African-backed group in Mozambique. Recognizing the limitations of the available information, these current examples are brief and summary.


The illustrations serve two purposes. First, they demonstrate use of the methodology. For example, the Malayan case is examined at the beginning of the armed uprising and reexamined nine years later at independence. Although an intelligence analyst would use a shorter time-frame and more specific facts, he still would use the framework as shown here.

The second purpose here is to test the methodology's influence in shaping the outcome. Does the process of separately evaluating twenty-eight factors and combining those judgements into three government-insurgent balances introduce undesirable effects? To evaluate this with some precision, the illustrations mathematically combine the factor judgements. (Note: a user need not do so.) The results suggest that--in addition to simplifying the analytical process--the procedure also draws implications from the individual factors and contributes unexpected insights.

1. The Malayan "Emergency" (1948-1960)

The twelve-year, unsuccessful insurgency in Malaya is considered by many authorities to be "the perfect exemplar of counter-subversion or counter-insurgency warfare." [ref. 178] The first assessment (letter "A" on the scales in Figures 6.5 and 6.6) is as of June 1948, the month the armed uprising began. The situation is reexamined as of August 1957 (letter "B," or simply "A" if no change has occurred), when Malaya achieved independence.


Factor S-1 (Calculations: initial 9, subsequent 8). The composition of Malaya's population was the most critical determinant of the course of the insurgency. In 1948 three communities--Malay, Chinese, and Indian--lived apart from each other, worked at different occupations, spoke different languages, followed separate religions and customs, and were represented by different political organizations.



O
R
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N
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Z
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Figure 6.1 Insurgency in Malaya, 1948 & 1957 (continues).



C
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C
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N

Figure 6.2 Malayan Insurgency (continued).

A number of cleavages reinforced ethnicity to form an unstable society of three primary communities. The Malay elite generally monopolized whatever government positions the British colonials did not reserve for themselves, and the Chinese and Indian elites controlled the greater share of the country's wealth and economic power. Non-elite Malays tended to live in rural areas, engaging in low-income agriculture, while higher percentages of Chinese and Indians

GOVERNMENT/INSURGENT BALANCES												
ORGANIZATIONAL BALANCE												
government advantage					insurgent advantage							
----	1----	2----		B<<<<<<<<<<<<A	----7----					8----	9-----	
LEGITIMACY/EFFICIENCY BALANCE												
government advantage					insurgent advantage							
-----	1-----	2-----	3	B<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<A	7-----					8-----	9-----	
COERCIVE BALANCE												
government advantage					insurgent advantage							
----	1----	2----	3	B<<<<<<<<<A	6----					7----	8----	9-----
June 1948, August 1957												
<u>Date Worksheet Completed</u>												

The plural society presented difficulties for the insurgents, whose appeal was limited to the Chinese. [ref. 180] In the rural areas where the guerrillas were, the populace was largely Malay. The potentially sympathetic Chinese tended to be found in more urban surroundings. Moreover,

	Percent of Population		Number (in thousands)	
	1947	1957	1947	1957
	-----	-----	-----	-----
Malay	49.5%	49.8%	2,428	3,125
Chinese	38.4	37.2	1,985	2,334
Indian	10.8	11.7	531	735
[ref. 179]				

Figure 6.4 Ethnic Composition of Malayan Society.

although clandestine organization among the Chinese was facilitated by the existence of numerous tightly-knit secret societies [ref. 181], it was hindered by the fact that they spoke nine mutually unintelligible dialects and tended to settle in villages and communities having little contact with their neighbors. [ref. 182]

The three-part character of Malayan society did not change substantially in only twelve years, but a number of developments associated with the insurgency and Malaya's progress toward independence provided some impetus toward integration. (The significant direction of change is indicated on the scale by the small movement from the initial position "A" to the later "B.") Among these developments was the partnership between the United Malayan National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) to form the Alliance Party. Victorious in the elections of 1952, the Alliance expanded to take in the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) and achieve even greater success in the elections of 1955. [ref. 183] Moreover, by

1952 about one-third of the Chinese had become citizens of Malaya, and in that year the ruling sultans further relaxed the requirements [ref. 184]. Finally, the expansion of the armed forces and police--multiracial except for the army's single Malay Regiment--tended to pull the communities together.

Factor S-2 (Calculations performed for the ethnic Chinese as the group most likely to support the insurgents: initial and subsequent 0). Already limited ethnically to only 40 percent of the population, the potential support base for the insurgents further diminished due to the affluence of the Chinese upper and middle classes. For example, between 80 and 90 percent of all private employers in Malaysia as the the 1970s were Chinese [ref. 185]--a fact that had probably changed only little since the Emergency. and the income for a Chinese family was roughly twice that of a Malay household. [ref. 186]

The absence of a mass-elite gap did not mean, however, that all Chinese were content. Rather, those who were better off were not attracted to the cause, and the insurgents' principal supporters included only the poorer Chinese--the 500,000 to 600,000 squatters living on the fringe of the urban areas.

Factor S-3 (Calculations: initial 9, subsequent 2). Urban-rural interaction in Malaya in 1947 was generally unhindered and more extensive than in most third-world

countries. Malaya enjoyed the highest per capita standard of living in Asia [ref. 187] and the emphasis on export crops and mining had lead to the development of a good road network and a railroad in the populated areas. The remainder of the country--dense and mountainous jungle--was inhabited by some 50,000 to 100,000 aborigines who were not a significant factor in the insurgency.

Urban-rural interaction changed dramatically in the early 1950s with the start of "Operation Starvation." These population controls were effective in cutting the guerrillas off from their sources of food and other supplies.

Factor S-4 (Calculations: initial and subsequent 3). About three-quarters of the peasant rice farmers and fishermen were Malays [ref. 188]. Ethnically alienated from the insurgents, they were also content in their traditional, subsistence economy and preferred to avoid involvement in the movement. Most rural Chinese, on the other hand, were wage laborers on the rubber plantations. Therefore, the great majority of the rural inhabitants had an "exit option."

Factor IG-1 (Calculations: initial government 5, insurgent 9; subsequent government 1, insurgent 5). (Averaging the paired values, "A" is placed at 7 and "B" at 3.) Government authority initially was diffused, but it became greatly concentrated during the early years of the insurgency. Each of the nine Malay states was ruled by a

local sultan advised by a British official. The settlements of Penang and Malacca were ruled directly by British officers of the Malayan civil service. The eleven states all came under the Federal Government headed by a British High Commissioner. With the appointment of General Templer as High Commissioner in 1952, the powers of that office greatly increased. Additionally, a Federal War Council, composed of key cabinet officials and service representatives, spared the full cabinet from considering most decisions. Finally, a Director of Operations was granted sweeping authority for the day-to-day conduct of the effort. [ref. 189]

The insurgent leadership was headed by Chin Peng and the Party Central Committee. Chin remained the supreme leader throughout, but the situation required organizing the guerrillas into eight isolated and virtually autonomous regiments [ref. 190]. By the mid-1950s, groups of guerrillas were defecting together, and the high command seemed increasingly irrelevant.

Factor__IG-2 (Calculations: initial government 9, insurgent 8; subsequent government 3, insurgent 8). The Chinese (as the critical group here) enjoyed little regime access in 1948, but their opportunities grew with the extension of citizenship and the alliance between UMNO and the MCA. Insurgent access remained relatively open throughout.

Factor IG-3 (Calculations: initial government 1, insurgent 9; subsequent government 1, insurgent 3). Unless the initial guerrillas are regarded as defectors from the government, neither side suffered from poor discipline and loyalty at first. By 1954, when high guerrilla leaders Osman China and Hor Leung defected and then induced others to cross over [ref. 191] the insurgents were defecting regularly. In 1955, for example, there were 245 surrenders reported as against 362 insurgents killed and 56 captured. [ref. 192] While the government score remained constant, that for the insurgents dropped.

Factor S-5 (Calculations: initial 5, subsequent 3). Accurate figures on landlessness are lacking, but the level definitely fell when the Chinese were resettled and for the first time given title to their property (they had not enjoyed tenure earlier). Extrapolating from available data, we come to the very rough calculations that landlessness was reduced from about 30% in 1943 to just under 20% in 1957. [ref. 193] However, land ownership was not a strong motivation for the Chinese in Malaya, who tended to be more interested in other investments.

Factor S-6 (Calculations: initial 8, subsequent 3). Differential modernization was polarizing initially. A dual economy of traditional subsistence farming and modern export agriculture and mining was much in evidence, and the Chinese squatters and Malay farmers were the most neglected.

Resettlement in the New Villages--complete with better housing, running water, electricity, and other services--greatly improved conditions for the Chinese. Additionally, expenditures for rural development were increased, and foreign nurses and teachers volunteered to bring their skills to the Malayan countryside.

Factor IG-4 (Calculations: initial government 10, insurgent 8; subsequent government 5, insurgent 3). Young's scale for government identity would identify colonial Malaya as a "type 1" colony in 1948, becoming a "type 4" arbitrary colonial unit with indigenous successors to power in 1957. The insurgents' identity blended a nationalistic, anticolonial appeal (by a group that had been in the forefront of resistance to the Japanese) with a narrower Chinese communist ideology. If we rate this mixture highly during the early period (on the strength of its nationalism and anticolonialism), it must drop substantially with the grant of independence in 1957.

Factor IG-5 (Calculations: initial government 8, insurgent 2; subsequent government 4, insurgent 2). Government performance in the rural areas was initially ineffective primarily because the British did so little to integrate the Chinese and Indians into Malayan national life. For example, no schools were provided for the Chinese, who had to establish their own. The situation changed, of course, with resettlement of the squatters and

the other measures described with Factor S-6 above. The insurgents, however, never established a single "liberated area," and the jungle areas they occupied contained only a few aborigines.

Factor S-7 (Calculations: initial and subsequent 5). Lacking a history of empire, and with the Malay stereotyped as lazy, Malaya nonetheless experiences communal violence and has a history of piracy. A neutral score is advised.

Factor S-8 (Calculations: initial 8, subsequent 2). The armed struggle having begun, Factor S-8 calculates the arms and military skills available to the insurgents rather than including those of both sides. In Malaya in 1948, the insurgents had ample stocks of arms and possessed considerable military skills. The core of the movement was the 5,000 or so guerrillas of the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army trained and equipped by the British commando Force 136. Arms had been cached in the jungle for use after World War Two ended. However, only a month after the uprising began, Chin Peng's military strategist Lau Yew was shot. British intelligence and police operations sought out arms and guerrillas, and rewards and amnesty were effective in depleting the insurgents' ranks and arsenals. Robert Thompson's figures for weapons lost and recovered by the government show a steady drain from the guerrillas. [ref. 194]

Factor S-9 (Calculations: initial 2, subsequent 5). Malaya had 1,000 miles of coastline but only 150 miles of border. There was never any evidence of supply to the insurgents by sea, and the Thai frontier was not a factor in the early years. In 1953, Chin Peng and his group fled to Thailand and led the movement from Thai soil thereafter. Thus, while the border was unimportant initially, it did provide sanctuary for the insurgent leadership and the several hundred guerrillas who ultimately followed. An observer might have given this factor a low value early on, but he would have had to upgrade it later. Thus, this is the only factor which appears to show movement in a direction favoring the insurgents, and without Thai sanctuaries the remaining guerrillas would long ago have disappeared.

Factor S-10 (Calculations: initial and subsequent 8). Malaya offers rough terrain and good concealment in the jungle areas where guerrilla base camps often escaped detection for years. But the populated areas offer good access to government forces. On balance, the terrain favored the insurgents.

Factor IG-6 (Calculations: initial government 8, insurgent 1; subsequent government 3, insurgent 1). Government population control initially was weak. Later it became quite strong with the imposition of "Operation Starvation," the expansion of the security forces, and other measures. The insurgents never established any liberated areas.

Factor IG-7 (Calculations: initial 7.5, subsequent 0). According to Robert Thompson, the government-to-insurgent troop ratio was about 5-to-1 when the uprising began, and it grew steadily as the government forces expanded faster than did the insurgents. In time, the insurgents' strength began to decline. By 1957, the ratio was probably in excess of 20-to-1. [ref. 195]

Factor IG-8 (Calculations: initial government 8, insurgent 0; subsequent government 4, insurgent 0). The insurgents never received significant external aid. The government enjoyed increasing support from Britain.

Factor IG-9 (Calculations: initial government 3, insurgent 9; subsequent government 2, insurgent 7). Although the British and the Malayan government used increasing force as the buildup got underway, they took care to observe the law and to avoid excessive violence. The courts functioned normally throughout. Tough laws were passed, but they were generally perceived as necessary and were not abused. Civilian control for the most part limited the military means used. [ref. 196] For their part, the guerrillas remained a paramilitary force, but their formations dwindled. Their image also suffered from the indiscriminate use of terrorism.

2. Maoists and Muslims in the Philippines Today

The Philippines today faces two simultaneous insurgent threats. The Maoist New Peoples' Army (NPA) formed in 1969 from remnants of the earlier Huk movement. It is most active today in the Visayan Islands, especially on the island of Samar. [ref. 197] Landa, "Philippine Prospects After Martial Law, p. 1157. The Muslim National Liberation Front (MNLF) on Mindanao and the Sulu Islands seeks autonomy from the Christian government in Manila. Except for an uneasy ceasefire in the mid-1970s, the MNLF has been in armed rebellion since 1972. Its basic grievances date back to Spanish rule in the 16th Century.

With this case we are at the mercy of incomplete information, and the unclassified sources examined are frequently contradictory. Hotly debated are the legitimacy of the Marcos regime and the effectiveness of land reform and development efforts. For purposes of illustration, each factor is evaluated regardless of the adequacy of the data. In this regard, the author was more comfortable indicating judgements on the factor scale as a short range of values rather than with single points suggestive of precision. Wherever possible, the apparent trend was indicated by arrows (i.e., ">>>"). When there was no apparent trend, crosses ("+++") were used.

3. ARMED STRUGGLE. Predicting outcome.										
FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.										
0 or many									2 or 3	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.										
same % as population									0%	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction.										
minimal/controlled									extensive/uncontrolled	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.										
exit option									vulnerable	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
FACTOR IG-1. Leadership. (Note dual scales)										
unitary (Government)									diffused	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
hostile rivals (Insurgent)									cooperative unitary	
FACTOR IG-2. Political Mobility.										
open (G)									blocked	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
blocked (I)									open	
FACTOR IG-3. Loyalty.										
intact (G)									defections	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
"returnees" (I)									determined	
FACTOR S-5. Landlessness.										
0		20%		30%		40%		60%		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization.										
equitable									highly polarizing	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
FACTOR IG-4. Identity.										
8	7	6	5	(G) 4	3	2	1			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
fragile (I)									strong	
FACTOR IG-5. Performance.										
effective (G)									ineffective	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
ineffective (I)									effective	

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Figure 6.5 Philippine Insurgency, 1982 (continues).

FACTOR S-7. Traditional Level of Violence.									
low					5<<<<5				high
	1	2	3	4		7	8	9	
FACTOR S-8. Arms & Military Skills.									
scarce				4++5	5				abundant
	1	2	3			7	8	9	
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.									
impenetrable/none									porous/plentiful
	1	2++3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-10. Terrain & Lines of Communications.									
open/good									rough/poor
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8<<<9	
FACTOR IG-6. Control.									
totalitarian				(G)					weak
	1	2	3<<<4	5	5	7	8	9	
none				(I)					defended
FACTOR IG-7. Government/Insurgent Troop Ratio.									
20/1					10/1				1/1
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7>>>8	9	
FACTOR IG-8. External Support & Dependence.									
unnneeded plenty				(G)			some	none	
	1	2++3	4	5	5	7	8	9	
none		some		(I)			plenty	unnneeded	
FACTOR IG-9. Violence.									
legal/appropriate				(G)			illegal/excessive		
	1	2	3	4	5<<<<6	7	8	9	
nonviolent				(I)			parasilitary		

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Figure 6.6 Philippine Insurgency (continued).

The Philippines are a culturally diverse state with a variety of bases for differentiating groups. The population divides ethnically into four major groupings (i.e., Tagalog, Ilocano, Visayans, and Muslims), it fragments regionally as a result of the 7,100 islands, and it is prone to political factions based upon strong patron-client networks. Even seemingly cohesive groups are divided.




Figure 6.7 Philippine Government-Insurgent Balances.

Muslims, for instance, see themselves as a single group only with regard to non-Muslims. Otherwise, they consider themselves to be Tausugs, Maranaos, and Maguindanaos. [ref. 198]

Revolutionary movements in the Philippines have tended to be concentrated regionally. The Huks, for example, could not attract much support outside of the Papangan area of central Luzon, a region of dense population and wet rice agriculture [ref. 199]. This same area is the heartland of the pro-Moscow faction of Filipino communists, who have cooperated with the government since the communist

party schism in the 1960s [ref. 200]. The Maoist NPA finds its support elsewhere. The reports of NPA attacks in more than half of the provinces of the Philippines over recent years signal a disturbing new trend [ref. 201], although support for the insurgents may not be substantial in most areas.

The fluid, bipolar political system is considered the most powerful inhibitor of ethnic mobilization [ref. 202], and it is in areas where the patronage system has decayed that rebellion becomes most likely. Forces for integration of Philippine society include Christianity (practiced by over 90% of the population), the Filipino and English languages (spoken by over 50% and some 40% of the people respectively--figures that are rising rapidly), and possibly by the migrations from over-populated areas to primarily Mindanao [ref. 203].

The Manila government is dominated by Ilocanos, including the President, and other groups are generally underrepresented in the national elite [ref. 204]. President Marcos is an astute politician who at times co-opts leaders of opposition groups (e.g., the pro-Soviet communists and the Muslims) thus reducing the apparent discrimination.

Among the remaining factors contributing to the organizational balance, urban-rural links presumably came under greater government control following the imposition of

martial law in 1972. Although martial law formally ended in January 1981, most measures in the areas of unrest remained in effect. Most rural Filipinos do not have a true "exit option." They tend to be employed at sharecropping or wage labor, dependent upon a patron. Resettlements and land reforms may be reducing the vulnerability of at least some of the Filipino rice and corn farmers.

Government leadership has become increasingly concentrated, especially under martial law. The President appealed directly to the people via popular referendums and used the mandate he obtained to change the bureaucracy's structure and distribution of power. Meanwhile, rumours circulate that the various rebellious groups are coordinating their operations, but the inherent incompatibility of communism and islam suggests that the NPA and the MNLF will not reconcile their differences to the extent of close cooperation. Potential sources of insurgent leadership include the Catholic parish priests, but Marcos has so far successfully manipulated threats to church interests to limit the antigovernment activity by the priests. [ref. 205]

Meanwhile, access into a government dominated by the President and a few key families is probably less than that offered to insurgent recruits. Insurgent strength appears to be growing, although there is great variation among the estimates.

Loyalty to President Marcos suffered from reactions to martial law, but a series of insurgent defections in the 1970s (primarily from the MNLF) suggests a government advantage here [ref. 206]. The ending of martial law last year may repair some of the damage to loyalty and discipline.

Economic conditions are harmful to government legitimacy. Roy Prosterman considers central Luzon to be one of the five worst areas in the world in terms of land pressure [ref. 207], and economic development has been extremely polarizing. The "trickle down" distribution method has showered new wealth upon the already rich, while development projects bring added suffering to many rural poor.

The damming of some mountain valleys in northern Luzon for hydroelectric development, one of Marcos's World Bank-supported efforts to meet the energy crisis, has brought with it... displacements. These distant developments have attracted little notice in Manila. But several of these remote localities and, more generally, the economically most depressed regions of the country - the Cagayan Valley, the Bicol, the eastern and central Visayas, and northern Mindanao - have become redoubts and recruitment areas for the Maoist New People's Army, which finds them, as the late Chairman put it, friendly waters in which to swim. [ref. 208]

Mindanao, home of the Muslims, has only meager government services and the worst roads in the Philippines. And before 1967, there was only one high school in the entire Sulu Island chain [ref. 209]. On the other hand, government performance in the rural areas has genuinely improved under President Marcos. He has built roads and developed other projects by using the army in classic civic-action style. Conditions are improving.

The most glaring government deficiency affecting legitimacy concerns identity. Most Filipinos were upset when martial law ran roughshod over democratic principles long established in the islands.

The Philippines's traditional level of violence is another factor that is difficult to judge. Filipinos are little given to political demonstrations and mass violence. Individually, however, they can be hot-tempered. Until the confiscation of privately-owned firearms began in 1972, a "wild West" atmosphere prevailed. The confiscation has noticeably reduced levels of violent crime, although it stimulated Muslim resistance.

The Philippines, of course, lacks land borders with another country, but arms have long been funneled to the Muslims by boat from Malaysian Sabah. MNLF guerrillas train there as well. Although the training and arms deliveries diminished markedly after a key Malaysian official in Sabah was removed in 1975, they do continue. [ref. 210] Meanwhile, Manila enjoys substantial U.S. military aid provided in return for continued access to Philippine military bases. The aid has enabled a quadruppling of the size of the armed forces since 1972. About 130,000 active-duty army and air force troops today [ref. 211] confront 3,000 to 7,000 guerrillas of the NPA and 15,000 to 20,000 fighters of the MNLF [ref. 212].

The confiscation of firearms and other measures induced a resurgence of the Muslim resistance in 1972. Half of the Filipino army reportedly is deployed in the south combatting the paramilitary NPA and MNLF. Casualties have been high among government troops, insurgents and civilians. The revocation of martial law suggests a trend toward greater legality and appropriateness in the government's use of force.

Each factor on the worksheet was evaluated according to this general view of the Philippine situation, and the factor values were averaged to compute the organization, legitimacy, and coercion balances. The results reflect an understandably "close call," the insurgent forces seemingly enjoy a slight advantage now but the trends favor the government. The greatest advantage to the insurgents lies with the legitimacy balance, which accords with the view that Marcos did damage to the government cause by declaring martial law.

By the close of the decade, though some still spoke favorably of the regime and many others had lost interest in politics, prevailing opinion among the educated stratum had shifted decisively against both the President and martial law, and a widespread desire to see them go was clearly evident. There was a new appreciation, among thoughtful Filipinos, of the value of checks and balances. Both the moderate and Marxist opposition leaders meanwhile had risen again in public favor, not because people believed that they could govern more ably than Marcos, but because their courage in opposing him publicly cast them as the only available instruments for removing him from power. The opposition was now joined by members of the clergy. [ref. 213]

How much this has changed with the end of the declaration is unclear, but certainly the martial law situation improved the government's coercive capabilities.

Perhaps surprisingly, there is no clear government advantage indicated with the organization and coercion balances. Completing this evaluation as though there were only two sides to the struggle--instead of the three that exist--may have accorded a greater advantage to the insurgents than they deserve. A more realistic evaluation would entail separate calculations for the NPA and the MNLF.

As this evaluation stands, it suggests a short-term stalemate with a longer-term expectation of government recovery. The many developments that could reverse that outcome call for regular attention to the situation.

3. Insurgency in Mozambique Today

In 1975, Mozambique ended ten years of anticolonial struggle and became independent of Portugal. The Marxist-Leninist independence movement FRELIMO, which had long occupied the country's northernmost two provinces, took over the entire country. Soon the white, anti-communist regime in neighboring Rhodesia began organizing an anti-FRELIMO armed movement, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Initial recruits included a group of former colonial soldiers--Mozambicans trained by the Portuguese as counter-guerrilla troops. When white-ruled Rhodesia became black-governed Zimbabwe in 1979, the MNR

3. ARMED STRUGGLE. Predicting outcome.									
FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.									
0 or many								2 or 3	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.									
same % as population								0%	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction.									
minimal/controlled								extensive/uncontrolled	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.									
exit option								vulnerable	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR IG-1. Leadership. (Note dual scales)									
unitary (Government)								diffused	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
hostile rivals (Insurgent)								cooperative unitary	
FACTOR IG-2. Political Mobility.									
open (G)								blocked	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
blocked (I)								open	
FACTOR IG-3. Loyalty.									
intact (G)								defections	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
"returnees" (I)								determined	
FACTOR S-5. Landlessness.									
0		20%		30%		40%		60%	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization.									
equitable								highly polarizing	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
FACTOR IG-4. Identity.									
8 7 6 5 (G) 4 3 2 1									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
fragile (I)								strong	
FACTOR IG-5. Performance.									
effective (G)								ineffective	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
ineffective (I)								effective	

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Figure 6.8 The Mozambique National Resistance (continues).

FACTOR S-7. Traditional Level of Violence.									
low									high
	1	2	3	4	5	5++++7	8	9	
FACTOR S-8. Arms & Military Skills.									
scarce									abundant
	1	2	3	4	5	5++++7	8	9	
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.									
impenetrable/none									porous/plentiful
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8++++9	
FACTOR S-10. Terrain & Lines of Communications.									
open/good									rough/poor
	1	2	3	4	5	6++++7	8	9	
FACTOR IG-6. Control.									
totalitarian					(G)				weak
	1	2	3	4	5	6++++7	8	9	
none					(I)				defended
FACTOR IG-7. Government/Insurgent Troop Ratio.									
20/1					10/1				1/1
	1	2	3	4		6	<<<< 8	9	
FACTOR IG-8. External Support & Dependence.									
unnneeded plenty					(G)		some		none
	1	2	3	4	<<<<	5	7	8	9
none		some			(I)		plenty	unnneeded	
FACTOR IG-9. Violence.									
legal/appropriate					(G)		illegal/excessive		
	1	2	3	4	+++++	6	7	8	9
nonviolent					(I)			paramilitary	

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Figure 6.9 Mozambique National Resistance (continued).

lost its patron and sanctuaries. Reportedly, the South Africans stepped in and have since then trained, equipped, resupplied, and even led MNR units [ref. 214].

Mozambique has an ethnically diverse population of "12 major and over 34 lesser tribes," [ref. 215] Ethnic divisions reportedly are not strong--cooperation and inter-marriage being common among neighboring groups--but there are few other available bases of differentiation. The MNR




Figure 6.10 Mozambique Government-Insurgent Balances.

reportedly aims its appeals at the Shona-speakers (about 10% of the population) and emphasizes ethnic themes. It points out, accurately, that FRELIMO is dominated by non-Shona southerners--especially the Thonga, some 25% of the population--and that Marxist FRELIMO is destructive of traditional Shona values and customs including polygamy, bride price, and ancestor worship. The MNR's potential base of support, the Shona, would appear to be underrepresented among the Mozambican elite. [ref. 215]

The MNR operates in isolated areas of south-central and western Mozambique. Villagers there are mostly subsistence farmers possessing a true "exit option" and few ties to the cities or the government. Mozambique is among Africa's poorest countries, and the rural infrastructure is extremely weak.

Government leadership is the hands of President Samora Machel and the Party Central Committee, but a series of involuntary demobilizations and purges suggest less than harmony within the party. The upper leadership appears unified, although reassignments (reportedly to strengthen "Party work" and separate it from the government bureaucracy) have led to speculation of demotions [ref. 217]. MNR authority is likewise concentrated in a single individual, but the power struggle after the former top official was killed in 1979 suggests that significant rivalries exist [ref. 218]. Reportedly, South African direction is firm and obeyed.

Judging from the involuntary demobilizations, FRELIMO probably offers less upward mobility today than do the insurgents. There is evidence of coerced recruitment, but the MNR's growth since 1976 to a force of 3,000 to 5,000 guerrillas is impressive. A European hostage, later released, reports having seen about 1,000 insurgent troops at the two camps where he was held, and he noted that well-armed groups of up to 300 were free to move about [ref. 219].

The steady stream of disaffected people defecting from FRELIMO to the MNR includes three distinct groups. The first were those who had opposed FRELIMO during colonial times and dared not remain where they were after Independence. Next were those who were forced out of FRELIMO. Most recently, the cross-overs have been people who simply could not get ahead in the government. [ref. 220]

Mozambique's poverty and underdevelopment are serious obstacles to lasting legitimacy for FRELIMO. Landlessness is probably not a significant problem in rural areas because unused land remains available to anyone willing to clear and use it. Differential modernization has been polarizing, however. The Portuguese developed mines, plantations, and the urban areas, but ignored most of the countryside. FRELIMO has been unable to change the pattern of neglecting the subsistence sector, although the army may now be engaging in civic action projects. Any advantage accruing to the insurgents from government neglect may be lost if the reported MNR terrorism against civilians is widespread. [ref. 221]

Mozambique is an "arbitrary colonial unit with indigenous successors to power"--Young's "type 4" with Factor IG-4--and the MNR has no strong ideological appeal beyond anticommunism and traditional Shona values. Neither side appears effective in performing government services in rural areas.

After ten years of guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese, the traditional level of violence might be assumed to be high. This is tempered, however, by the peasant's usual passivity. There certainly appear to be ample arms available, and the South Africans and the Soviets are willing to provide more.

Sanctuaries, no longer available in Zimbabwe, now exist in South Africa. Additional guerrilla units are basing from Malawi, but it is not clear if these units belong to the MNR or to a separate group known as Africa Libre [ref. 222]. Roads are poor, the terrain is relatively gentle, and the predominant grasslands provide adequate concealment. That the guerrillas can move about in groups of 300 seems to confirm this judgement.

Government control is assumed to be weak with the country still recovering from the long anticolonial struggle. Machel's tough line ("only those who work have a right to eat" [ref. 223]) and the FRELIMO reductions suggest a measure of control over parts of the country.

Estimates of guerrilla strength are inevitably suspect, but the MNR is believed to number some 3,000 to 5,000 personnel. Against this, the government's 23,600 ground and air forces yield about a 6-to-1 advantage [ref. 224]. FRELIMO reportedly is arming urban militia and has recalled 1,500 guerrilla veterans, so the effective ratio may be increasing [ref. 225]. Both sides seem to have ample

external aid. The government's use of violence appears to be legal and appropriate, especially since the MNR camps they have attacked were in sparsely populated areas. The MNR is clearly a paramilitary organization; its image may have suffered from the use of terrorism.

The results of this evaluation suggest a FRELIMO advantage in legitimacy and a somewhat more significant MNR edge in coercion. Organization shows a slight plus for FRELIMO. Should the MNR develop its comparative advantage, expanding in strength and increasing the scope of its operations against the government, FRELIMO is certain to feel threatened. If the insurgent coercive advantage is as significant as suggested here, FRELIMO might be forced to call for stepped up Soviet aid and a commitment of Cuban troops sooner than many observers expect.

B. WORKSHEETS: FACTORS ARRANGED BY INSURGENT PHASE

The worksheets below may be used with the first three phases of an insurgency. No additional factors, and therefore no new sheet, are provided for phase four.

Static Measure

<-- Near left, government advantage.
Near right, insurgent advantage. -->

Change Over Time

<-- Toward the left, insurgent victory less likely.
Toward the right, insurgent victory more likely. -->

1. PRE-EMERGENT STAGE. Gauging potential for insurgency and predicting appearance of a movement.

FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.

0 or many 2 or 3
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.

same % as population 0%
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction.

minimal/controlled extensive/uncontrolled
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.

exit option vulnerable
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-1. Concentration of Authority.

unitary diffused
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-2. Regime Access.

open blocked
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-3. Loyalty.

intact defections
|----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

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Figure 6.11 Worksheet 1: Pre-Emergent Phase (continues).

FACTOR S-5. Landlessness.										L E G I T I M A C Y									
0	20%		30%		40%		60%												
	1		2		3		4		5			6		7		8		9	
FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization.																			
equitable					highly polarizing					I M A C Y									
	1		2		3		4		5			6		7		8		9	
FACTOR G-4. Origin & Indigenous Authority.																			
8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1												
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		
FACTOR G-5. Rural Services.										C O E R C I O N									
effective					ineffective														
	1		2		3		4		5			6		7		8		9	
FACTOR S-7. Traditional Level of Violence.																			
low					high					C O E R C I O N									
	1		2		3		4		5			6		7		8		9	
FACTOR S-8. Arms & Military Skills.																			
scarce					abundant														
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.										C O E R C I O N									
impenetrable/none					porous/plentiful														
	1		2		3		4		5			6		7		8		9	
FACTOR S-10. Terrain & Lines of Communications.																			
open/good					rough/poor					C O E R C I O N									
	1		2		3		4		5			6		7		8		9	
FACTOR G-6. Control.																			
totalitarian					weak														
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		
FACTOR G-7. Armed Forces & Police.										C O E R C I O N									
strong					weak														
	1		2		3		4		5			6		7		8		9	
FACTOR G-8. External Aid.																			
unneded plenty					some		none			C O E R C I O N									
	1		2		3		4		5			6		7		8		9	
FACTOR G-9. Repressive Violence.																			
legal/appropriate					illegal/excessive														
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		

Figure 6.12 Worksheet 1 (continued).

2. ORGANIZATION AND GROWTH STAGE. Predicting outbreak of guerrilla warfare.															
FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.															
0 or many					2 or 3										
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.															
same % as population					0%										
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction.															
minimal/controlled					extensive/uncontrolled										
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.															
exit option					vulnerable										
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
FACTOR IG-1. Leadership. (Note dual scales)															
unitary (Government)					diffused										
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
hostile rivals (Insurgent)					cooperative unitary										
FACTOR IG-2. Political Mobility.															
open (G)					blocked										
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
blocked (I)					open										
FACTOR IG-3. Loyalty.															
intact (G)					defections										
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
"returnees" (I)					determined										
FACTOR S-5. Landlessness.															
0		20%		30%		40%		60%							
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization.															
equitable					highly polarizing										
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
FACTOR IG-4. Identity.															
8		7		6		5 (G)		4		3		2		1	
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
fragile (I)					strong										
FACTOR IG-5. Performance.															
effective (G)					ineffective										
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----					
ineffective (I)					effective										

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Figure 6.13 Worksheet 2: Nonviolent Phase (continues).

FACTOR S-7. Traditional Level of Violence.									
low									high
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR S-8. Arms & Military Skills.									
scarce									abundant
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.									
impenetrable/none									porous/plentiful
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR S-10. Terrain & Lines of Communications.									
open/good									rough/poor
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR IG-6. Control.									
totalitarian					(G)				weak
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
none					(I)				defended
FACTOR G-7. Armed Forces & Police.									
strong									weak
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR G-8. External Aid.									
unnneeded	plenty						some		none
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR G-9. Repressive Violence.									
legal/appropriate								illegal/excessive	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

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Figure 6.14 Worksheet 2 (continued).

3. ARMED STRUGGLE. Predicting outcome.																			
FACTOR S-1. Cultural Pluralism.																			
0 or many					2 or 3														
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
FACTOR S-2. Mass-Elite Gap.																			
same % as population					0%														
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
FACTOR S-3. Urban-Rural Interaction.																			
minimal/controlled					extensive/uncontrolled														
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
FACTOR S-4. Peasant Mobilization.																			
exit option					vulnerable														
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
FACTOR IG-1. Leadership. (Note dual scales)																			
unitary (Government)					diffused														
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
hostile rivals (Insurgent)					cooperative unitary														
FACTOR IG-2. Political Mobility.																			
open (G)					blocked														
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
blocked (I)					open														
FACTOR IG-3. Loyalty.																			
intact (G)					defections														
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
"returnees" (I)					determined														
FACTOR S-5. Landlessness.																			
0		20%		30%		40%		60%											
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
FACTOR S-6. Differential Modernization.																			
equitable					highly polarizing														
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
FACTOR IG-4. Identity.																			
8		7		6		5 (G)		4		3		2		1					
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
fragile (I)					strong														
FACTOR IG-5. Performance.																			
effective (G)					ineffective														
	----	1	----	2	----	3	----	4	----	5	----	6	----	7	----	8	----	9	----
ineffective (I)					effective														

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Figure 6.15 Worksheet 3: Armed Struggle (continues).

FACTOR S-7. Traditional Level of Violence.									
low									high
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR S-8. Arms & Military Skills.									
scarce									abundant
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR S-9. Borders and Sanctuaries.									
impenetrable/none									porous/plentiful
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR S-10. Terrain & Lines of Communications.									
open/good									rough/poor
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR IG-6. Control.									
totalitarian					(G)				weak
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
none					(I)				defended
FACTOR IG-7. Government/Insurgent Troop Ratio.									
20/1					10/1				1/1
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
FACTOR IG-8. External Support & Dependence.									
unnneeded plenty					(G)		some		none
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
none		some			(I)		plenty	unnneeded	
FACTOR IG-9. Violence.									
legal/appropriate					(G)		illegal/excessive		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
nonviolent					(I)		paramilitary		

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Figure 6.16 Worksheet 3 (continued).

GOVERNMENT-INSURGENT BALANCES											
ORGANIZATIONAL BALANCE											
government advantage					insurgent advantage						
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----	
LEGITIMACY/EFFICIENCY BALANCE											
government advantage					insurgent advantage						
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----	
COERCIVE BALANCE											
government advantage					insurgent advantage						
	----	1----	2----	3----	4----	5----	6----	7----	8----	9----	
Date Worksheet Completed											

Figure 6.17 Worksheet 4: Government-Insurgent Balances.

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