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THE SOVIET THREAT TO EUROPE:
PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980's



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**THE SOVIET THREAT TO EUROPE:
PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980's**

by

Otto P. Chaney, Jr.

20 May 1983



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Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Mrs. Janet C. Smith.

FOREWORD

↙ This memorandum examines current Warsaw Pact capabilities in Central Europe, with particular emphasis on force modernization and improvements, doctrine and tactics, and attack scenarios. Pact problems are discussed, including topography, logistics, reliability of allies, and language difficulties. Finally, the author discusses Soviet concerns for the remainder of the decade, concluding that the Soviets will not be able to launch a *blitzkrieg* against Western Europe which would lead to a quick and decisive victory. ↗

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



RICHARD D. LAWRENCE
Major General, USA
Commandant

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

COLONEL OTTO P. CHANEY joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1981 after serving as Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, US Command, Berlin. He is a graduate of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program specializing in the USSR and East Europe and has earned a doctorate in Russian Area Studies from American University. His publications include the definitive biography of Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, published in the United States and Europe. He has served twice on the Soviet missile desk in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, and Defense Intelligence Agency; two tours with the US Military Liaison Mission, East Germany; as Army Attaché, Czechoslovakia; and with the Office of National Estimates, CIA.

SUMMARY

Despite denials of aggressive intent, the Soviet Union not only has maintained, since the close of World War II, a significant superiority of conventional forces on the continent of Europe, but has, in recent years, steadily expanded and upgraded its conventional and nuclear forces. As a result, most Westerners remain concerned over the nature of the Soviet threat and the implications of the continued buildups for Western defense. Moreover, the recent introduction of air assault brigades at the *front* level, the rapid proliferation of the mobile and highly accurate SS-20 missile, and the tripling of artillery in many motorized rifle regiments, when coupled with a doctrine that stresses surprise, shock effect, and high tempo operations, suggest the Soviets are deliberately fielding forces opposite NATO capable of rapid offensive warfare.

Although they have made significant improvements in their military forces in Central Europe and on the northern and southern flanks, the Soviets face a number of operational problems which would serve to limit Soviet chances for quick success on the battlefield in Europe and then to discourage the Kremlin leadership from engaging in military adventurism in Western Europe in the near future. For example, for the remainder of the 1980's, the probability of renewed tensions in Eastern Europe is likely to add to Soviet uncertainties about the wartime allegiances of their Warsaw Pact allies. To add to their woes, the Soviet leaders must realize that their Marxist-Leninist ideology is bankrupt and Communist revolutionary enthusiasm is fast disappearing.

Although this study concludes that the Soviets cannot now launch a *blitzkrieg* against Europe which could lead to a quick and decisive victory, the reader is warned that the delicate scheme of things could change, especially if the Soviets continue their force buildup without an adequate response from NATO. Not only will the Soviets be constantly examining the balance of forces, but they will also be looking for exploitable weaknesses in the NATO military edifice. They will be especially alert to maldeployments and soft, vulnerable weaknesses in NATO's forward defenses. They will put high priority on evaluating NATO's strategic warning capability, which is essential for timely mobilization and deployment of forces to wartime positions. But most of all they will

be continuously assessing NATO's political cohesiveness, searching for a fissure which they can take advantage of.

At the moment, the NATO alliance is fairly strong, but this is not the time for complacency; indeed, this is a luxury which will never be afforded us. "The West," declared Milovan Djilas recently, "is damned to be strong."

THE SOVIET THREAT TO EUROPE: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980's

I repeat again and again: We do not seek military superiority. We have never intended and do not now intend to threaten any state or group of states. Our strategic doctrine is a purely defensive one. Allegations that the Soviet Union is building up its military might on the European Continent on a scale not called for by its defense requirements have nothing to do with reality. This is deliberate deception of the public at large.

Leonid I. Brezhnev, October 1979¹

In a rare admission during the "battle of the booklets," the Soviet authors of *Whence the Threat to Peace* (published in response to US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's late 1981 *Soviet Military Power*) wrote: "True, the USSR has more divisions in its ground forces than the USA." "But," they explained, "this is quite natural because owing to its geographical and strategic position the Soviet Union has to maintain the balance of forces not only in Europe but also in other regions adjoining its borders." They also admitted with some qualifications, that "the Warsaw Treaty countries have a somewhat greater number of combat aircraft" and "more tanks" than NATO. Nevertheless, they concluded that the Soviets are threatening no one and that "unrestrained intimidation of peoples with the spurious 'Soviet military threat' is no longer effective."²

Despite such denials of aggressive intent, the Soviet Union not only has maintained, since the close of World War II, a significant quantitative superiority of conventional forces on the continent of Europe, but has, in recent years, steadily expanded and upgraded its conventional and nuclear forces. As a result, most Westerners remain concerned over the nature of the Soviet threat and the implications of the continued buildup for Western defense. (Indeed, 18 months after the publication of Mr. Weinberger's booklet, many of his key figures on Soviet deployments were already out of date, prompting a second edition in March 1983.) Moreover, the recent introduction of air assault brigades at the *front* level, the rapid proliferation of the mobile and highly accurate SS-20 missile, and the tripling of artillery in many motorized rifle regiments,³ when coupled with a doctrine that stresses surprise, shock effect, and high tempo operations, suggest the Soviets are deliberately fielding forces opposite NATO capable of rapid offensive warfare. While it may be argued that the Soviet Union does not plan to attack NATO, that given the experience of World War II against a numerically inferior German army and the continued need to keep their East European Allies in line, the Soviet buildup is purely defensive in nature. Some will argue that the Soviet Union's weapons buildup in Europe (and in the USSR itself) is only a response to our own weapons deployments.⁴ These arguments notwithstanding, the recent improvements in Soviet forces have given rise to concerns in the West that if NATO fails to redress the balance, the Soviets will gain psychopolitical leverage in peacetime and a significant advantage during crises or war in Europe.

This paper will examine the nature of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe for the remainder of the decade. It will focus on quantitative as well as qualitative factors in an attempt to understand the likely prospects for and consequences of a Soviet-initiated conflict in Europe.

SOVIET/WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES

Organization and Combat Strength. The Soviet army in Eastern Europe, or the "forward area," is organized into four groups of forces: the largest and most important is the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) with 19 divisions and a supporting artillery division;⁵ the Northern Group of Forces (NGF), with two

divisions, located in western Poland; the Central Group of Forces (CGF) with five divisions on Czechoslovak soil; and the Southern Group of Forces (SGF) in Hungary, with its four divisions. All 30 Soviet maneuver divisions and GSFG's artillery division are classified by NATO as Category I, meaning that they are combat ready, between three-quarters and full strength, with all of their authorized equipment.⁶

These Groups of Forces are supported by tactical air forces (frontal aviation) consisting of fighters, fighter-bombers, transports, helicopters, reconnaissance units, and miscellaneous support units. With the tactical air units of the East European nations, these forces number over 3,000 combat aircraft in the central region, with another 1,000 deployed on the flanks.⁷

Each of the Warsaw Pact countries is tied closely to Moscow, not only by the 1955 Warsaw Treaty which obligates the signatory nations to act jointly "in the event of armed attack in Europe," but also by a system of bilateral treaties which require assistance to the USSR but with no geographic limitations.⁸ The headquarters of the "Staff of the United Armed Forces" is in Moscow. The Soviets always occupy the posts of commander in chief and chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact forces. Additionally, the Soviet Ministry of Defense provides general officer "representatives" to the armed forces of each Warsaw Pact country. In wartime, these individuals and their staffs would probably serve as Stavka (General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command) representatives to Pact members.⁹

Current non-Soviet Warsaw Pact divisional strength is 56 (60 percent of which are Category I) (see Table 1).¹⁰

When the military forces of the Soviet Union and those of their East European Allies are combined, the Warsaw Pact is superior to NATO in almost every traditional quantitative measure of military capability. On the ground, NATO, with 69 divisions, is confronted by 164 Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact equivalents.

Thus, while NATO and the Warsaw Pact are roughly comparable in total available air and ground force manpower, NATO finds itself outnumbered in combat formations by over two to one (see Table 2). In the past, differences in the numerical count of formations have been discounted, since Soviet divisions have generally been smaller than those of the West. However, in recent years, the average Soviet division has increased not only in size but

	Motorized Rifle/ Mechanized	Tank	Other
Bulgaria	8		
Czechoslovakia	5	5	1 artillery
GDR	4	2	
Hungary	5	1	
Poland	8	5	1 airborne 1 amphibious assault
Romania	8	2	
TOTALS	38	15	3

SOURCE: Based on author's calculations of data presented in The Military Balance, 1982-1983, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982.

Table 1. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Divisional Strength

	Northern and Central Europe ^a		Southern Europe ^b		Total	
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	NATO	Warsaw Pact	NATO	Warsaw Pact
<u>Divisions</u>						
Armor	12 1/3	42	4 1/3	4	16 2/3	46
Infantry	15 2/3	71	36 2/3	47	52 1/3	118
Mechan- ized & Airborne						
TOTAL	28	113	41	51	69	164

SOURCE: Based on author's calculations of data presented in The Military Balance, 1982-1983, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982.

NOTES:

^aIncludes, on the NATO side, the US, British, and Canadian forces in Germany and the forces of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway. On the Warsaw Pact side it includes the forces of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and those forces of the USSR stationed in those three countries or stationed in the Western military districts and likely to be committed to the Baltic or Norwegian area operations and as follow-on echelons for combat in the central region.

^bIncludes, on the NATO side, the Italian, Greek, and Turkish land forces. On the Warsaw Pact side, it includes the ground forces of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, and the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary and the southwestern USSR.

Table 2. Ground Forces Available in Peacetime

also in available firepower (see Table 3). Hence, today NATO is outnumbered not only in total available combat formation, but also in tanks by almost two to one, and in aircraft by over two to one (see Table 4). In fact, the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes:

The numerical balance over the last twenty years has slowly but steadily moved in favour of the East. At the same time the West has largely lost the technological edge which allowed NATO to believe that quality could substitute for numbers. One cannot necessarily conclude from this that NATO would suffer defeat in war, but one can conclude that there has been sufficient danger in the trend to require remedies.¹¹

Force Modernization and Improvements. While NATO—since the late 1960's—has increased its manpower and the numbers of combat formations, tactical aircraft, and tanks in the northern and central regions of Europe, it continues to fall behind in those critical items which have given modern armies their mobility and shock power. During the same period, the Warsaw Pact has substantially increased the number of tanks and aircraft available for combat in these regions. Indeed, since the mid-1960's, the Soviets have been carrying out a vigorous program of modernizing and upgrading their forces. This comprehensive program has vastly improved their mobility, firepower, command and control, obstacle-crossing capability, air defense, electronic warfare, logistical support, and thus their capacity for shock action. Among the many improvements benefitting the ground forces were the introduction of T-64 and T-72 tanks and the continued development and fielding of a new tank, the T-80, which incorporates major advances in armor protection, mobility, and fire control. The Soviets have replaced many older towed guns with self-propelled 122 and 152mm weapons and are deploying nuclear-capable heavy artillery brigades equipped with 203mm howitzers and 240mm mortars. They are currently introducing more accurate, longer-range SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23 tactical surface-to-surface missiles as replacements for the FROG, SCUD, and SCALEBOARD missiles. A new 16-tube 220mm multiple rocket launcher has been deployed opposite NATO since 1978. The Soviets are improving their communications equipment, including the introduction of tropospheric scatter and communications satellite equipment to enhance command and control. They have begun deploying air assault brigades at the *front* (army group)

<u>Countries</u>	<u>Armored</u>		<u>Mechanized</u>		<u>Airborne</u>
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>Men</u>
United States	18,000	324	18,500	216	16,800
Soviet Union	11,000	335	14,000	266	7,000
Britain	8,500	148	-	-	-
West Germany	17,000	300	17,500	250	8-9,000

SOURCE: Based on data presented in The Military Balance, 1982-1983, p. vii.

Table 3. Comparative Divisional Compositions

	<u>Division Equivalents^a</u>	<u>Tanks</u>	<u>Combat Aircraft</u>
<u>NATO</u>			
Belgium	2 2/3	359	164
Canada	1/3	59	42
Germany	12	3,938	473
Netherlands	2	1,811	172
United Kingdom	4	840	194
United States	4 2/3	3,000	306
TOTAL	25 2/3	10,007	1,351
<u>Warsaw Pact</u>			
Czechoslovakia	10 1/3	3,400	471
Germany	6 1/3	1,500	359
Poland	16	3,060	705
USSR	26	9,300	1,730 ^b
TOTAL	58 2/3	17,260	3,165

SOURCE: Based on author's calculations from data presented in The Military Balance, 1982-1983.

NOTES:

^aIncludes all divisions, brigades, and other formations aggregated on the basis of three brigades to a division. Supporting artillery battalions are not included.

^bThe Military Balance (p. 17) estimates 2,000 tactical aircraft in Eastern Europe. Since the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary is not listed here, by extrapolation the figure has been reduced to 270. In addition, all Warsaw Pact countries have paramilitary forces, some of which are sizable. For example, the paramilitary forces of the German Democratic Republic number over 70 thousand, 45 thousand of which are well-armed border guards organized into 27 regiments.¹² In the event of hostilities, these paramilitary forces would be employed to complement regular military forces and missions.

Table 4. The Central European Balance

level, and the total attack force opposite NATO has grown from 400 helicopters in 1978 to a current level of 800. They have continued to maintain a significant lead in air defense with the development of a variety of new surface-to-air missiles, including a new SAM with enhanced low-altitude capabilities and with the potential to defend against tactical ballistic missiles. The Soviets also are making important qualitative improvements in their tactical air forces with the introduction of FENCER, FITTER, FOXBAT, and FLOGGER aircraft. (The FROGFOOT ground attack aircraft, currently being used in Afghanistan, may eventually be deployed in Europe.) The Tactical Air Forces have been converted from a basic defensively-oriented force once dominated by interceptor type aircraft to one with greatly increased offensive capabilities for theater warfare. These new aircraft carry bombs, rockets, and guided munitions. Furthermore, new armaments, now under development, will greatly increase effectiveness of sorties against hardened ground targets.¹³

Highlighting improvements in Soviet tactical airpower, General Charles A. Gabriel, who at the time of the interview was Commander in Chief, US Air Force in Europe and Commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe, stated:

The quality/quantity argument is familiar to everybody: we stand short on numbers, but not on quality.

We've always said that we'd make up the difference with our technology. *That's wearing a little thin now. That gap has closed considerably with the new generation of Soviet Floggers, Fencers, Fitters, Foxbats, Backfires, and the long-range Soviet theater nuclear force. All have come on recently and very fast, so the technology gap is closing.* (Emphasis added)¹⁴

Simultaneously with force modernization and improvement, the Soviets have been expanding the size of their divisions and have been adding to the divisional equipment. They have added an artillery battalion to their tank regiments; have expanded the motorized rifle company to a battalion within tank regiments of tank divisions; increased from 31 to 40 the number of medium tanks in the tank battalion of each motorized rifle regiment (MRR); have added medium tanks to their reconnaissance battalions; equipped one MRR in each tank and motorized rifle division (MRD) with the BMP armored personnel carrier; and added a road/bridge construction company to divisional engineer battalion.

Such improvements have been designed to enhance the shock action, mobility, and firepower of Soviet forces.¹⁵ The net effect of these improvements has been a significant increase in the Soviet capacity for offensive warfare which, when coupled with Soviet doctrine, has raised serious concerns in the West.

Soviet Doctrine and Tactics. The impressive quantitative and qualitative improvements in Soviet forces now underway are the outgrowth of a long, serious study of military doctrine, operational art, and tactics, especially as these applied to fighting in Central Europe. In the late 1960's, Soviet military planners and strategists concluded that if a war broke out "it was clearly in the interests of the Soviet Union to be able to win it *before* the Western Alliance could reach a decision to use nuclear weapons."¹⁶ In the early 1970's, emphasis gradually shifted in Moscow from a study of the nuclear battlefield to examination of conventional operations, although the Soviets recognized that in a major conflict nuclear weapons might be used at any time.¹⁷

As Christopher Donnelly observes,

Whether any war which began in Europe would remain purely conventional or would involve nuclear weapons, the Russian victory, the Soviets believe, would only be certain if the war could be won quickly.

Forced to meet the political requirement that the Soviet army be able not only to fight and win a war with conventional weapons, but to do so *very quickly* indeed so as to lessen the dangers of escalation to global holocaust, it must have rapidly become clear to the Soviet general staff that both the tactics and equipment were not adequate to the task. Equipment was available in insufficient quantity and was often of an unsuitable type. Tactical doctrine for conventional war was weak, and the army was poorly practiced in it.¹⁸

Having identified these various shortcomings, the Soviet military leaders encouraged debate on tactical issues which eventually centered on two areas of concern. One related to tactical practice and viability of combat and logistical units on the modern battlefield (use of the BMP, deployment of artillery, flexibility of command and control, coordination problems of a high-speed offensive). The other concern involved the ability of the officer himself to cope with tactical problems and to develop qualities which would improve the training, motivation, and morale of his soldiers.¹⁹

At the same time that these questions were being discussed, the Soviets reexamined their principles of military art in light of

sweeping changes in weapons capabilities, troop mobility, and the "scientific-technological revolution."²⁰ One Soviet theoretician, Colonel Vasiliy Savkin, listed the important principles of mobility, high rates of mobility, high rates of combat operations, surprise, and concentration, all of which reflect the clear Soviet preference for bold offensive operations.²¹ While contending that the defensive form of warfare will undoubtedly be employed in a future war, "victory over the enemy (will be) achieved only by resolute attack."²²

The importance of the offensive as the principal manifestation of Soviet doctrine cannot be overemphasized. Soviet writings are replete with praise for such principles as surprise, maneuver, the breakthrough, high tempo operations, mobility and offensive combat in the enemy's rear.

Surprise is seen as one of the most important principles of military art. Savkin writes, "Use of surprise brings success in a battle or operation."²³

As a result of the stunning effects of surprise . . . and decisive offensive operations by Soviet troops, the enemy's capabilities are sharply lowered and the correlation of forces changes immediately. He may panic and his morale may be crushed.²⁴

Moreover, Savkin contends that "The desire for surprise has begun to permeate all decisions for the conduct of operations and battles."²⁵

Surprise is closely related to mobility and activeness. (Savkin contends success is achieved by that side which, with all else equal, is more active and resolute, takes the initiative, and holds it firmly.²⁶) Mobility and maneuver not only permit the amassing of shock forces for surprise, but also provide the means for the rapid development of the offensive. Savkin writes that the development of mobility and high tempos of combat operations is "the most important principle of operational art and tactics . . ."²⁷ A high degree of mobility permits the massing of superior forces in a timely manner at the required location in order to achieve surprise and a successful breakthrough.

For the Soviets, then, surprise is absolutely essential. According to one of their military publications,

Surprise is achieved by the use of various ways . . . by leading the enemy into error concerning one's own intentions, by preserving in secret the plan of

battle, by speed and decisiveness of action, by hidden artificial maneuvers, by the *unexpected use of the nuclear weapon* and other new combat means . . .
.²⁸ (Emphasis added)

A number of Western statesmen and defense specialists have concluded that Soviet forces are, indeed, capable of doing just what their doctrine dictates: that war in Europe would be characterized by a little or no warning massive armored blitzkrieg-type offensive. But NATO, though outgunned and outmanned, is still a powerful force capable of a credible forward defense. The Warsaw Pact can weight certain axes to give itself superiority in a particular sector, thus facilitating a breakthrough. NATO's operational strategy of active defense has been designed to permit the maximum of flexibility. Thus, NATO should be able to shift forces quickly to meet this threat.

A Warsaw Pact study which describes active defense as combining both positional and mobile defense states that it is intended to compel the attacker to make repeated attempts to break the defensive line, so that the attacker should expend forces and time without gaining momentum.²⁹ Thus, while the Soviet high command might prefer a quick blitzkrieg drive to the English Channel, it cannot count on a quick and decisive victory.³⁰ To cope with NATO's innovative defenses, the Soviets are taking deliberate steps to improve their offensive posture. They have revived a World War II exploitation force, the mobile group (podvizhnaya grupa). Mobile groups, or Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG's), as they are now known as, are large tank and mechanized formations principally designed to *complete* a breakthrough of the enemy's defenses already begun by forward forces.³¹ While little is available in current Soviet literature on the subject, it appears that the Soviets also will use their OMG's to attack the defenses which have been weakened by relocation of NATO reserves to a threatened sector. OMG's also will be tasked with penetrating deep into NATO's rear to operate for a limited period, destroying nuclear missile sites, command posts, electronic warfare equipment, and antiaircraft defense weapons. They also will be used to prevent withdrawal of NATO troops, to impede NATO's ability to reposition reserves, to interdict supplies, and to seize and hold important areas and objectives until the approach of the main forces.³² As one Warsaw Pact journal noted:

The aim of deploying an army's Operational Maneuver Group is to switch the focus of the fighting into the rear of the enemy formation; to destroy important objectives which cannot be destroyed by other means; to achieve chaos and disorganization; and to limit the freedom of maneuver and the effectiveness of enemy action"

Thus, the Warsaw Pact is probably changing its operational strategy to deal with NATO's effective active defense.


ATTACK SCENARIOS

In the event of war, the Soviets would probably divide Europe into theaters of military operations (*teatry voyennykh deistvii* or TVD), a Soviet term describing a major portion of a continent, including adjacent seas and airspace above, where military forces are deployed for strategic-level warfare. While the Soviets do not discuss their own TVD's on the European Continent, they do delineate NATO's theaters, which may suggest their own military division of Europe. The northern European TVD embraces the territories of Norway, Denmark, part of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the water area around these nations. It stretches almost 2,200 kilometers from Hamburg to Nordkapp. The Central European TVD includes the remainder of the FRG, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, and stretches 1,100 kilometers from north to south. The Southern European TVD encompasses Italy, Turkey, the Mediterranean, and the southern part of the Black Sea. From north to south, this theater stretches about 1,500 kilometers.³⁴ Forces allocated to a TVD might consist of one to six *fronts*, one or more air armies and fleets, one or more airborne divisions, and long-range aviation, military transport aviation, troops of air defense, and strategic rocket forces, as required.³⁵

The Central Region. There are a number of avenues of approach into NATO's central sector, and the Warsaw Pact could choose any combination of them. (See map.)

One of the potentially more threatening scenarios for an offensive against Western Europe is a fixing attack along the south German front (two German corps and the US V and VII Corps) which would occupy the bulk of NATO forces, followed by main thrusts toward Hamburg and across the North German Plains. Such an attack, if executed with shortened warning, might catch the forces of NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) far

LIKELY WARSAW PACT AXES OF ADVANCE IN AN ATTACK AGAINST NATO



from their defensive positions. NORTHAG contains four corps—Dutch, German, British, and Belgian from north to south—but the divisions and separate brigades comprising these corps are not normally deployed near their wartime defensive positions along the potential front. One US brigade moved from southern Germany to NORTHAG in 1978 in order to enhance the peacetime deployments and wartime readiness of NORTHAG. Other needed redeployments have not been carried out.³⁶

Soviet, Polish, and east German formations augmented by airborne units and helicopter forces to facilitate rapid forward movement might quickly capture or control Hamburg, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Kiel, Rotterdam, Antwerp, and Brussels, effectively cutting the north-south supply lines to the bulk of the NATO defenders.³⁷ Airborne and “spetsnaz” (special operations) forces would attempt to seize or destroy crucial bridges, airbases, nuclear storage sites, and nuclear delivery systems, as well as large storage areas, POL tank farms, and US POMCUS (prepositioned overseas materiel configured in unit sets) sites. Concerning the potential impact of “spetsnaz” and heliborne forces on NATO air assets, General Charles Gabriel stated: “The Soviets have the capability to come into the rear areas, damage our airbases and delay or stop sortie generation. With the Army committed to the front lines and unable to dedicate forces for airbase ground defense, we must take this threat seriously.”³⁸

The Northern Flank. Simultaneously with an attack against Central Europe, the Warsaw Pact would probably also strike NATO's northern and southern flanks. The Soviets have considerable interest in the Northwestern Region, that area encompassing the Kola Peninsula; the White Sea; the countries of Finland, Sweden, and Norway; and the surrounding waters of the Barents Sea, Greenland Sea, Norwegian Sea, North Sea, Danish Straits, Baltic Sea, Gulf of Bothnia, and Gulf of Finland.³⁹ They are well aware that this region contains naval chokepoints which, if controlled by NATO, could deny them access to their critical operating areas in the North Atlantic. Thus, it is likely that they would want to secure early the Northwestern Region in order to: (1) control the airfields, harbors, and strategic geography of Scandinavia; (2) prevent NATO's aircraft carrier forces from entering the Norwegian Sea and threatening targets in the Kola Peninsula; (3) intercept vessels resupplying NATO forces in Europe; (4) establish a springboard for amphibious operations to

other area; (5) prevent NATO from using Scandinavian countries as forward bases; and (6) increase Soviet strategic ballistic missile offensive capabilities by controlling Northeast Atlantic submarine missile launch areas.⁴⁰

To accomplish its missions against the Northern Flank, the Soviets would use naval forces from the Baltic and Northern Fleets, possibly a naval infantry regiment, airborne forces, and eight motorized rifle divisions and an artillery division from the Leningrad Military District,⁴¹ supported by fighters and bombers from tactical aviation and the Navy. East German and Polish units might also participate. Soviet amphibious and airborne forces could be used in an attempt to eliminate NATO's superior geographical position along the strategic Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. The Soviets might try to secure both ends of the Gap, control of which would provide them excellent base locations for gaining quick access to many vital sea lines of communications. Iceland, key to this control, would have to be seized and occupied.⁴²

The Southern Flank. In the south, NATO's southern flank (Turkey, Greece, and Italy) faces the combined forces of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and those positioned in the three Southern Soviet Military Districts (North Caucasus, Trans-Caucasus, and Turkestan). Historic animosities between Greece and Turkey resulting from conflicting territorial and nonterritorial interests in the Aegean have weakened the NATO Alliance. Greece actually withdrew its forces in 1974 but has now rejoined it. The Warsaw Pact has had its own reverses in the area. Albania withdrew officially from the organization on September 13, 1968 and shows no inclination to rejoin. Romania has been somewhat of a maverick.

The Soviet Union, and Russia before it, has long had an interest in the Mediterranean. "Imperial Russia," writes John C. Campbell, "devoted over a century of effort—never really successful—to breaking out of the Black Sea and becoming a Mediterranean power. Thus the impulse remains and continues to move the leaders of the Imperial Soviet Union."⁴³ The USSR has long been frustrated by Turkey's ownership of the strategic straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles which, according to the Montreux Convention, can be transited by foreign-warships only after specific request made eight days in advance. The Soviets also feel hemmed

in by the need to file for permission to overfly Turkey. In the past, that permission has not always been granted.⁴⁴

For many years, the Kremlin leaders have looked on the straits as part of the USSR's security zone, and in the fall of 1940, it will be recalled, Stalin demanded that Hitler sanction the establishment of Soviet land and naval bases "within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles."⁴⁵ With the growth of its naval power over the past decade, with its expanding global mission and preoccupation with power projection, the Soviets attach far greater significance to the straits than they did in 1940 when their demands infuriated Hitler. Thus, in the opening hours of a general war, one would expect the Soviets to attempt to seize the Turkish straits and destroy Turkish airbases in order to avoid having its Black Sea fleet bottled up and destroyed and to insure its uninterrupted access to the Mediterranean Sea.

Current Soviet interest in the Mediterranean can be measured by the growing presence of its naval vessels there. In mid-1964, the Soviets established a continual presence in the Mediterranean, and an average of five Navy ships were maintained on station in the Mediterranean that year. Subsequently, an average of at least 40 to 50 ships have been maintained on station (although the number rises sharply in periods of crisis—70 ships in June 1967, 96 in November 1973).⁴⁶ Moscow also continues to seek base facilities on the Mediterranean littoral, preferring more permanent arrangements for bases with greater facilities than presently available (limited support facilities are currently available in Tartus, Syria; overhaul and repair facilities are available on a contract basis in Yugoslavia, Tunisia, and Greece).⁴⁷

PROBLEMS FOR THE PACT

Despite significant improvements in their military forces and Soviet interests in Central Europe and on the flanks, the Soviets face a number of operational problems which would serve to limit Soviet chances for quick success on the battlefield in Europe and then to discourage Soviet leadership from engaging in military adventurism in Western Europe in the near future. While some of the problems are individually manageable, many are not clearly defined and when taken together they are likely to be of serious concern to Kremlin hawks.

Warning Time and Topography. As noted above, Soviet doctrine calls for speed and surprise to enhance shock effect. Nevertheless, no matter how carefully and covertly they plan their operations, Soviet planners must assume that NATO will have some warning time in which to move their forces out of garrisons to wartime positions. Once NATO forces are in these defensive positions, a rush to the Rhine by Soviet forces will be no easy task. Thus, Soviet planners must ensure that sufficient forces are brought to bear and that these forces are backed by adequate logistics. However, the greater the degree of mobilization the more likely the probability that surprise will be lost.

Further, Soviet military planners know that their rush to the Rhine will not be so simple because the urbanized terrain in Western Europe will no longer permit open terrain tactics. "Terrain that once contained ample maneuver space between urban areas," writes Lieutenant Colonel John W. Burberry, Jr., "is now virtually covered by man-made structures such as buildings, roads, and canals." To illustrate this problem, Burberry notes that "studies show that the average brigade sector in Western Europe encompasses 25 towns with populations up to 3,000. This does not include the larger towns and cities found in brigade sectors." Where sizable man-made structures do not exist, Burberry notes, "much of the ground is covered with forests and steep hills, topographical features that also tend to be severely restrictive in terms of tactical movement."⁴⁸ If nuclear and chemical weapons were used, rubble and contamination in these built-up areas would slow the attackers even to a greater degree.

Former Commander in Chief of the US Army in Europe, General James H. Polk, claims that a Warsaw Pact attack across the North German Plain would not be without difficulties, especially in wet weather, which is fairly common in this area. At this time, "all travel is roadbound," he writes, and "cross-country transit can be said to be good only in the dead of winter, when the terrain is frozen hard. The North German Plain, while indeed flat, does not in any considerable degree favor the attacker." On the other hand, General Polk points out, south of the Plain, "the going is fairly good for the attacker in places," and that once he has crossed the Weser River and passed through the Teutoburger hills into the plains around Paderborn, there are few obstacles to his movement except for the many small villages and towns. "Once

into this area in force, some 100 kilometers inside the Federal Republic of Germany," writes General Polk, "the Ruhr is at risk and the armies of Central Europe are split down the middle."⁴⁹

Logistics. Long considered the Achilles' heel of the Soviet army, logistical support has been greatly improved. Smaller cargo trucks are being replaced by much larger ones with double and triple carrying capacity; POL trucks, trailers, and pipelines have increased in number; some 2,000 tank transporters organized in heavy lift regiments reduce dependence on rail. Stocks have been significantly increased, and GSFG now has ammunition for at least 37 days and fuel for 16. GSFG's river-crossing assets have been augmented with at least four ponton bridge battalions, while the organic battalions have been reinforced with heavy amphibious vehicles and GSP ferries.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, the Soviet logistics system remains vulnerable. The large pipelines which run from the oil-producing areas of the Soviet Union (Oktyabrski and Kuibyshev) to the large refineries at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, and Schwerin, East Germany, and the pipeline, still under construction from Tyumen to Szczecin, Poland, would probably not survive the first few days of a war in Europe. The railroad container service between Riga-Rostock-Prague, Moscow-Warsaw-East Berlin, and Rostock-East Berlin-Prague-Budapest-Belgrade-Sofia also would very likely be disrupted or halted in such a war.⁵¹ Further, all cargo moving on rail from the USSR must be offloaded from Russian trains (which operate on a different gage than European trains) and reloaded onto East European trains. These transloading points along Western borders of the USSR, which are essential to east-west traffic, would be vulnerable. Thus, despite the extensive stockpiling of combat and strategic materiel (tanks, bridging, fuels, munitions, etc.) in the forward area wartime resupply is likely to be a critical problem for the Soviets.

Moreover, with the expansion, reequipping, and modernization of Soviet divisions, logistics problems have grown in magnitude and complexity. Tracked self-propelled howitzers are more difficult to maintain than the towed artillery piece they replace. The BMP personnel carrier is more complicated to maintain than the wheeled APC. Surface-to-air missiles and their associated fire control systems are far more complex than antiaircraft guns. In fast-moving, hard-charging combat, such systems—especially

tracked vehicles—would soon require time-consuming maintenance and even replacement.

Nevertheless, Warsaw Pact equipment is, for the most part, standardized which facilitates resupply. Several East European countries manufacture their own versions of Soviet military equipment, including armored personnel carriers and tanks. Warsaw Pact air forces also benefit from standardized aircraft servicing and handling facilities.⁵²

Moscow's pressure on its Warsaw Pact Allies to buy Soviet-designed equipment certainly has caused hardships on already-strained economies in Eastern Europe. As prices of high technology weaponry rise, the high commands of the various Pact countries must make hard decisions: to make do with older, out-of-date equipment for a little longer or to purchase the expensive new items which their economies can ill afford. It appears that some countries have compromised by retaining old equipment and buying some new items. The Czechoslovak air force, for example, has acquired the versatile FLOGGER, while still flying the antiquated MIG-15—which is older than most of the pilots flying them.⁵³

Certainly then, logistics, although improving over the last decade, remains a problem for Soviet military planners. Logistical difficulties often account for the bulk of critical articles in the official army newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)*. In the month of September 1982, for example, 4 percent of the newspaper's space allocated to all Soviet military topics was critical or negative in tone in regard to individual or unit performance. Eleven percent of the space about Soviet military discipline and morale was critical, but a not-so-surprising 17 percent of the space allocated to the subject of military logistics was critical in tone.⁵⁴ Such an emphasis on logistics difficulties cannot but leave the Soviets with some nagging doubts about their ability to carry out and sustain prolonged offensive warfare.

RELIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF SOVIET ALLIES

How reliable are the Soviets' Warsaw Pact Allies? How well will they cooperate during wartime? Will they fight? More importantly, would they fight an offensive war, beyond their own territory, or would their forces hold together in a campaign in which they were being defeated? There are no certain answers for these questions.

In the current Polish crisis there were those who predicted that the Army would side with the people and would never participate in crushing solidarity. Not surprisingly, Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, in an interview with Oriana Fallaci, in the wake of the initial Polish government success in defeating solidarity activists, declared that,

the extremists of Solidarity had convinced themselves that, when things would boil until the use of force, the Army and the militia would side with them. They counted, I guess, on the fact that many soldiers belong to Solidarity. What naivete . . . The point is that naivete wasn't limited to the frontiers of Poland: The West too was very naive.⁵⁵

Certainly, the efficiency and firmness of the Army surprised a number of people, some of whom had predicted bloody widespread revolt. Nevertheless, one does not have to travel extensively in Poland to realize that for many of the Polish people, the Soviets are among the most despised neighbors of Poland. Thus, the Polish army's value to the Warsaw Pact, especially in an offensive operation, is still a matter of question.

The Czechoslovaks, whose reliability is also given low marks by some,⁵⁶ probably feel trapped by history and geography and, therefore, see no other choice but to do the Soviets' bidding, at least in peacetime. They will quickly tell you that the events of 1938, 1948, and again in 1968 proved that help from the West was never seriously considered. They will tell you, too, that wedged between Germany and the Soviet Union they have had to choose their friends carefully. Finally, as do other East European countries, they look to the USSR as the principal source of raw materials for their industry⁵⁷ and see no way out of this situation. However, it is likely that the Soviets harbor some uncertainties concerning the wartime performance of the Czechoslovak military. Would they stand and fight? Would their performance be scenario-dependent?

Soviet perceptions of Hungarian reliability undoubtedly have been affected by the events of World War II—when Budapest sided with the Germans—and the 1956 uprising, which was put down with much bloodshed. As for the Romanians, Moscow chafes at their semi-independence and maverick behavior and probably holds Romania's armed forces in low regard and expects little support in time of conflict. There is no ambivalence in the

Kremlin's attitude toward the Bulgarian military, who often give the impression of being more Soviet than the Soviets.

How reliable would the East German army be in a war in which they would immediately see hard action and where they would be facing fellow Germans? One would certainly expect some defections, especially if the battle were going against them, but otherwise the East Germans could prove to be some of the staunchest, most disciplined fighters. Western military liaison officers who have observed the National Volksarmee at close range have been impressed with its order, thoroughness, and increasing confidence in itself.⁵⁸ Man for man, the East Germans in many ways outshine their Soviet "guests," especially in appearance, military bearing, and overall care of their facilities. Nevertheless, one must ask, as has one author, "Why are the military forces of the GDR, particularly the ground forces, kept at relatively small numbers in spite of the fact that the GDR economy and population size would support a significantly larger force?"⁵⁹ The Soviet High Command may have some lingering fears about the use of Germans to fight Germans. Christopher Donnelly concluded the GDR military forces "are the most trustworthy and least trusted of the military forces in East Europe."⁶⁰

Historic national and ethnic enmity also is likely to contribute to frictions which reduce the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact in time of conflict. Poles make no secret of their dislike for Germans and Czechs as well as Russians. Invaded by East Germans, Poles, Hungarians, and Bulgarians in 1968, the Czechoslovaks would probably like to return the favor, if the opportunity ever presented itself. The East Germans have no love for Poles or Soviets. The Hungarians would list Romanians, Russians, and Czechs as some of their least favorites. Romanians feel animosity toward Hungarians, Russians, Bulgarians, while their neighbor to the south, Bulgaria, dislikes Romanians (and Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks).⁶¹ In gatherings of Warsaw Pact officers, the East Germans sometimes find themselves the "odd man out," especially when the subject of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) is brought up. Despite their rewriting of history, the Soviets have not yet been able to convince anyone that all the fascists and Nazis resided in what is now the Federal Republic.

Frederick Turner, who served for 5½ years as a member and as Chief of the US Military Liaison Mission in GSFG, wrote about the Soviet soldier:

In East Germany, he finds himself in a foreign land, an enemy land. In general, Germans are still hated and feared, although Soviet propaganda does try to distinguish, without much success, between the East (good) Germans and the West (reactionary, revanchist) Germans.⁴²

For the remainder of the 1980's, the probability of renewed tensions in Eastern Europe is likely to add to Soviet uncertainties about the wartime allegiances of their allies. Poland's economy, in serious trouble, will probably worsen, as debts mount with little possibility of repayment. Since crucial supply routes and reinforcements must cross Poland, the Soviets are particularly sensitive to turmoil in what constitutes GSFG's rear. Past Polish labor problems have drawn quick reaction by the Soviets, including, in some cases, the military establishment, such as in October 1956. If the Soviet Union fails to fulfill the goals of its eleventh (1981-85) and twelfth (1986-90) Five-Year Plan, the effects will be felt throughout the bloc, and further labor unrest may erupt. East Europe is especially dependent on the Soviet Union for oil, and the Soviets have served notice that there will be no further increases in oil deliveries, which may force these countries to buy on the world market. With shortages of hard currency, East European countries will soon feel the pinch. Some of them might seek financing in the West, which would offer only temporary relief. The experience of Poland's debt servicing problems may make Western financing less obtainable, and West European economic difficulties may also play a role (for example, the FRG may reduce its annual generous interest-free loans to the GDR if its own economic problems continue). Such problems could further destabilize the situation in Eastern Europe and will almost certainly have an impact on the Warsaw Pact's warmaking capability.

To add to their woes, the Soviet leaders must realize that their Marxist-Leninist ideology is bankrupt and Communist revolutionary enthusiasm is fast disappearing. Noting the Yugoslav defection in 1948; Albania's "political meanderings," Romania's independent foreign policy, and various East European uprisings, Stanford Professor Wayne Vucinich concludes that,

Marxist-Leninist ideology has been made the servant of realpolitik and thereby reduced to the level of theoretical discussion. To be sure, discussion continues as to the relevance and irrelevance of ideology in Eastern Europe; and various views have been expressed by men of prominence . . . But, in general, ideology appears to consist of little more than the observance of

informalities. It has been reduced to hollow ritualism, and the revitalization of Marxist-Leninism as a viable ideology is not likely.⁶³

The populations which have lived under Soviet domination are disillusioned, disappointed, and apathetic. Their productivity is best expressed by a joke popular in East Europe: "They (the regime) pretend to pay us and we pretend to work!"

In sum, from the Soviet perspective, the reliability of East European forces cannot be taken for granted. There may be unforeseen factors affecting reliability over which the Soviet Union has little or no control.⁶⁴ While Western analysts do not seem to be able to agree on the issue of reliability of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies, one can safely assume that the Soviet leadership has its own doubts and misgivings about its military partners, all of whom, except Czechoslovakia, were enemies in World War II, and most of whom, including Czechoslovakia, have been bullied by Soviet intervention forces since the war.

In an attempt to improve reliability and at the same time tighten control, the Soviets bring promising East European officers to the USSR for training. A number of officers study at the famed Frunze Military Academy in Moscow which provides a 3-year course concentrating on preparing officers for combined arms warfare. Higher ranking officers may attend the Voroshilov Military Academy of the General Staff, also located in Moscow, and graduates are often destined for senior positions. In 1978, all ministers of defense of the Warsaw Pact countries were graduates of this academy.⁶⁵

The Kremlin has other means for enhancing the reliability and dependability of their Warsaw Pact Allies. The Soviet Union controls many of the key interests of the East European military, including the level of spending and the modernization of the armed services. In addition, notes Condoleezza Rice,

Soviet policy toward the East European elites is aimed at forging strong identification with the Soviet Union. There are even appeals to pan-Slavism and, in some cases, identification with the old Russian empire. Classes in the Russian language, history, and culture attempt to encourage a greater appreciation among the satellite elites of the Soviet Union. Working class heritage is no longer the primary requirement for mobility through the officer ranks. Study in the Soviet Union's military or military-political academies is also an important factor. Moreover, numerous awards, citations, and special projects are intended to ensure that East European officers remember to whom they owe their prestige and level of advancement.⁶⁶

Very senior officers of the Warsaw Pact countries are aware that they occupy their key posts, as a minimum, because of Soviet sufferance, and some leaders owe their jobs to the Soviet stamp of approval. One such individual is General Martin Dzur, the Czechoslovak defense minister who first supported Dubcek, then pressured Dubcek to accept Marshal Grechko's post-invasion ultimatum to take radical steps to restore order in Czechoslovakia. His reward for siding with the Soviet defense minister was keeping his job when Gustav Husak replaced Dubcek—a job he still occupies in 1983.⁶⁷

At the same time that they call for closer cooperation among the Warsaw Pact partners, the Soviets make it absolutely clear that they will play the dominant role in the alliance. Former Defense Minister Grechko, in his *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, discussed how the alliance could be strengthened. He called for unanimity of views on fundamental problems of theory and practice of military development; for joint troop and command and staff exercises; exchange of experience in combat and operational training; technical cooperation; mutual assistance in training cadres; and a number of other endeavors. In all these efforts, Grechko wrote, the USSR would play the leading role: "The existence of a very comprehensive combat experience in the Soviet Armed Forces, a first-rate material-technical base, and a well-trained military cadre ensures Soviet military scholars a vanguard role in the resolution of problems of military science."⁶⁸

The use of a common language also contributes to the improvement of working relationships between forces of the Warsaw Pact. A great number of the East European officers speak Russian, which naturally facilitates communication among Warsaw Pact units and enhances professional and social contacts. In Czechoslovakia, for example, Soviet and Czechoslovak units sometimes train together, and the winter exercise is launched when engineers of the two armies build a ponton bridge, names for the occasion "most druzhby," meaning "bridge of friendship" in both languages.

What are the Soviets doing to improve reliability and dependability of the rank-and-file of East European armies? Grechko claimed that Soviet soldiers who are to serve abroad are acquainted "with the traditions, state system, laws and customs of the friendly socialist country . . . where they will perform service."⁶⁹ But in this area the Soviets must receive low marks,

since their young soldiers are allowed almost no contact with the local populace in East Europe. He is not permitted to date the girls of the "host" country, and his rare visits to sightseeing attractions, museums, and other cultural spots are made toward the end of his stay as part of an officer-supervised group. Thus, propaganda extolling Soviet virtues would reach the East European soldier from political sessions conducted by his own officers, rather than from personal contacts with Soviet soldiers stationed nearby.

Quality of Forces. The image of the semiliterate *muzhik* serviceman bereft of any creative initiative and lacking in basic mechanical skills should have disappeared years ago. Today's Soviet soldier is most likely a high school graduate who began his military training in the ninth and tenth grades.⁷⁰ He may have been active in the DOSAAF (the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and the Fleet), where he probably learned to shoot, and may well have learned to drive, operate a radio, fly, and parachute. Thus, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said, "the traditional argument that we are able to offset pact numerical superiority with fewer, higher quality forces, is no longer persuasive by itself."⁷¹

Nevertheless, the Soviet army in Eastern Europe is beset with some of the same problems facing other armies serving abroad. There is insufficient space for training, especially in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; many of their hosts would prefer their being back in the USSR; and the majority of Soviets would rather be home ("zdes' khorosho, no doma luchshe"—"Here it's OK, but it's better at home," they will quickly tell you). Criminal acts against the local populace, maneuver damage, traffic accidents, competition for scarce goods in the marketplace do not endear Soviet soldiers to their fraternal hosts.

Discipline problems, though downplayed, do exist. Former KGB Captain Aleksei Myagkov has described some in his book.⁷² He wrote of drunken fights among officers, womanizing, thefts of government property, illegal financial transactions, black marketeering and other serious breaches of discipline. The rank-and-file soldiers were subjected to mistreatment by "old" soldiers (those whose term of service is nearing an end) or career soldiers, and sometimes young men died from beatings. Suicides are not uncommon, and in the 20th Guards Army (around Berlin), 24 men killed themselves in 1972, 33 in 1973. Desertions also are not isolated incidents, Myagkov writes, and many of these desertions

end in crimes of robbery, rape, and murder. Some young soldiers have made off not only with automatic rifles but occasionally also with armored personnel carriers and even tanks, events which ended in tragic loss of life.

Kirill Podrabinek, who served in the Soviet army, confirms these stories of maltreatment of young soldiers, especially the beatings and verbal abuse. "A weakling (first-year conscript) is not beaten every day, of course," writes Podrabinek, "but kicks are a daily occurrence. They don't take someone to the hospital with broken ribs every day, but bruises are commonplace. It's not every day they ship a soldier's corpse home to his parents in a zinc coffin, but the weakling is humiliated constantly."⁷³

Richard Anderson observes:

Podrabinek's testimony puts the lie to the fearsome image of the Soviet Army. Western scholars have established that the effectiveness of soldiers depends on the cohesion of small units. Men fight on the battlefield primarily because they want to maintain the respect of their fellow soldiers. When this motive is absent . . . , soldiers will at best fight indifferently and at worst refuse to fight at all. No army so constituted that half the enlisted men maltreat the other half with the knowing complicity of their officers will fight hard, as the performance of the Soviet army in Afghanistan attests.⁷⁴

The discipline problems described by Myagkov and Podrabinek are not confined to ground combat units but appear to be common throughout the Soviet armed forces.

Lieutenant Viktor Belenko, the Soviet MIG-25 pilot who defected to Japan in September 1976, described the same problems of drunkenness, brawls among soldiers, suicides, desertions, mutinies, and murders. In his supposedly elite air defense unit, men lived in filth, with no place to wash themselves and with 180-200 men jammed into barracks marginally adequate for 40. When Belenko pleaded with a visiting political officer to help solve these problems, he was told:

You ask the Party to give, give, give, give me utopia, now. You show that you lack the imagination to grasp the magnitude of the problem, much less the difficulty of solving it. *You do not understand that our country cannot build complex aircraft, modern airfields and barracks all at the same time.* (Emphasis added)⁷⁵

The Soviet army newspaper constantly exhorts its officer readers to improve discipline, to take their job seriously, to stop abusing

their positions, to report violations, and to respect regulations. Young officers are warned not to be too hasty in marriage, since it is difficult to find quarters and divorce rates are high. Training failures are attributed to poor leadership, poor organization of training, lack of strict daily routine, unwise use of time, disunity of officers, and a lack of competitive spirit. Dishonesty and cheating are criticized, and officers are cited for resorting to unscrupulous tactics for the sake of winning. Published letters to the editors reflect widespread abuses, such as thefts of aircraft de-icing fluids for drinking. Poor management and leadership, morale problems, sloppy maintenance, and disregard for safety are regular themes in *Krasnaya Zvezda*.¹⁶ One must assume that all of these problems are serious, even epidemic, to be described continually in the open press.

Quoting Richard Anderson again,

The accounts we have of Soviet soldiers' behavior suggest desperation. Who but a man at the end of his rope would drink de-icing fluid from an airplane or antifreeze from a truck? Who else would paint a piece of bread with shoe polish, place it in the sun to dry, scrape off the residue of wax and eat the bread for its alcohol content? Who else would desert from the Soviet army in the certain knowledge that escape is all but impossible and that a prison term or sentence to the disciplinary battalions is the best he can hope for? Soviet soldiers do desert. A fair number cross the border from East to West Germany, and they desert even inside the USSR.¹⁷

Soviet troops in the forward area find life especially difficult. As already mentioned, they are not allowed social contacts with the local populace, except for rare occasions when groups sponsored by the German-Soviet Friendship Society, for example, are brought to the bases for a cultural event. The young trainees receive the equivalent of about \$6 a month, and to supplement these miserable wages many men smuggle auto parts, grease, gasoline, rope, boots, and overcoats off base to nearby villages where they sell or barter these goods for alcohol. Army food for these troops is unappetizing: cabbage, potatoes, macaroni, *kasha* (buckwheat porridge), bread, fish, tea, and a little meat make up the soldier's diet.¹⁸ Rather than making him a tough, determined soldier, these hardships serve to make him want to terminate his military service as soon as possible.

Training is also a problem. The Soviet soldiers train long and hard. There are a number of things, such as river crossings and

airborne operations, they have come to do very well during training exercises. They, however, perennially do not perform well in march discipline, camouflage, night driving, and map readings. Concerning map reading, Frederick Turner has noted: "Since maps are classified materials that only officers are allowed to handle, in most cases the soldier has no idea where he is or of any master plan for movement."⁷⁹ Field sanitation and realism in training are also serious shortcomings. One would expect training weaknesses to be exacerbated in a real war situation.

Unfortunately for the Soviet army (and this must be an embarrassment), its combat experience since the end of World War II has been confined to fighting so-called friends—East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (since December 1979). (The Soviets and the Poles were very near to a shooting war in October 1956, but Khrushchev backed down and withdrew his invasion force after a bitter confrontation with Gomulka.⁸⁰) Fighting unarmed workers or bullying hapless Czechs—or even doing combat with illiterate Afghan partisans—has provided few lessons for fighting West Germans, Britons, Americans, or any of the NATO partners.

For the remainder of the 1980's and into the 1990's, the quality of Warsaw Pact forces will also be affected, albeit only moderately, by manpower shortages, economic problems, leadership changes, pacifism, and the continuing conflict in Afghanistan.

It has been estimated that over the next decade the draft pool in the USSR (and East Europe has similar problems) will decline by some 20 percent from its 1979 peak, and simultaneously, the proportion of ethnic minorities in the pool will rise substantially.⁸¹ While the Soviet economy will be competing for a greater share of the manpower pool, there is little doubt that military demands will prevail, not, however, without some adjustments here and there. For example, some of the units not immediately earmarked for reinforcement of Soviet groups of forces in East Europe or the Sino-Soviet border area might not be manned beyond cadre strength. The ethnic problem may not be so easy to resolve. The Soviet's 1979 census confirmed an extremely low rate of growth of Slavs (who are dominant in three republics: RSFSR, Ukraine, and Belorussia). Large increases were recorded in the predominantly Muslim republics of Azerbaidzhan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.⁸² The percentage of

Muslim nationalities in the draft-age pool is expected almost to double from the 1970 percentage of 13.1 to 24.1 in 1985.⁴³ And the percentage will continue to grow thereafter.

The Soviet military leadership is very concerned about the expected increase in non-Russians in the armed forces and regards the language problem serious enough to comment on in official writings. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff, recently discussed the requirement for Soviet soldiers to speak the Russian language. In his 1982 book, *Always Ready for Defense of the Motherland*, he wrote:

Considering the question of preparing youth for military service, one especially ought to point out the importance to them of a good knowledge of the Russian language. Regrettably, a number of young people still come into the army today with a *weak knowledge of the Russian language, which seriously hinders their military training*. In the armed forces, as is known, all regulations, instructions, training aids, technical and weapons manuals are in the Russian language. Orders, directives, and commands also are rendered in the Russian language. It is completely understandable that, if young people have a weak grasp of the Russian language, it will be more difficult to master weapons and technology entrusted to them; coordination of crews, teams will take place much more slowly; and all this in some degree will impact negatively on the level of combat readiness of subunits. (Emphasis added)⁴⁴

Thus, Soviet military leaders, at least, perceive a problem with their conscripts who lack a fluency in the Russian language.

In their study of the ethnic factor in the Soviet armed forces, Wimbush and Alexiev found that Slavs and non-Slavs are isolated into their ethnic groups and that there is intense racial discrimination against Central Asians and other dark-skinned non-Slavs. "Ethnic awareness," they report, "is heightened, not reduced in a close-quarter military environment. The conflict level between Slavs, and especially Central Asians and other Turkic or Muslim servicemen, is pronounced, often resulting in armed clashes of various intensity."⁴⁵

Former KGB Captain Myagkov describes a young soldier, Dzhavadze, in the 20th Guards Army, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, who was a Georgian by nationality. He spoke Russian badly, which led to unending jokes by other soldiers in his regiment and humiliations by the other soldiers. Even the officers often called him an insulting name. Finally, unable to take it any longer,

Dzhavadze cut his throat, but survived and remained an invalid for the rest of his life.⁸⁶

In addition to manpower problems, the economy will continue to plague the Soviets, despite an ambitious eleventh Five-Year Plan. The military, long pampered by a generous Politburo, may find competition for scarce resources increasing, as overall economic growth slows. Marshal Ogarkov, writing in *Kommunist* in July 1981 (and repeating himself the next year in *Vsegda v Gotovnosti k Zashite Otechestva*), appeared to be making "a rather blatant pitch to protect his budget," probably fearing that "economic stringencies would impinge on defense's share of the country's resources."⁸⁷ Rather than give up any resources, the Soviet military is laying claim to even more. Ogarkov reminded his readers that modern weapons change every 10-12 years, implying, therefore, that future cuts would be dangerous.⁸⁸

This military claim (writes William Hyland) is even more significant when we consider that for most of 1979 and 1980, Brezhnev was warning the heavy industry clique that they had to make a greater contribution to consumer goods production, and that defense industries in particular had to help out. Hence, Ogarkov may be answering Brezhnev.

In any case, the stage is set for a struggle over defense policy after Brezhnev. It could not really be otherwise if we consider that defense claims 12-15 percent of the Soviet national economic product.⁸⁹

As with demands on the manpower pool, so it is with the slice of the economic pie: something has to give, but will it be the spoiled military? Brezhnev was especially kind to the military, far kinder than his predecessor, Khrushchev. Now that Brezhnev has left the scene, Andropov may not give the military everything it asks for. Will Andropov and the new leadership lose patience with an Ogarkov who tells him costly weapons systems must be replaced every 10-12 years? Or will they eagerly seek some accommodation with Western leaders to reduce armaments? Surely, neither side wants an all-out arms race for the remainder of the decade. Nevertheless, the evidence is disquieting: the Soviet military leadership appears to be closing ranks behind Ogarkov, who seems prepared to press for major military expenditures for the indefinite future. He may even be challenging some of the Party's moderates when he urges the Party to explain to all of the people "in a more profound and better reasoned form the truth about the existing danger of war."⁹⁰ (Emphasis added)

The second most powerful man in the new government appears to be Dmitriy Ustinov, the Defense Minister, who, following Andropov, delivered the second eulogy at Brezhnev's funeral. The two men serve on the Defense Council, the Politburo's dominant committee and "the real, as opposed to the official, supreme center of power in the Soviet Union."⁹¹ Until recently, Andropov, as head of the KGB, was responsible for political and military-strategic intelligence, while Ustinov was—and still is—the Defense Council member responsible for military-strategic intelligence produced by the GRU.⁹² With the loss of key Defense Council members in 1982 (Suslov, Brezhnev, and Kirilenko), the power, influence, and prestige of Andropov and Ustinov have increased.⁹³ Thus, the military, for a while at least, may continue to receive priority on scarce resources, including manpower.⁹⁴

As the Soviets look to the future, they must also wonder about their costly commitment in Afghanistan, a war already 3 years old and one in which they keep pouring in ever-increasing numbers of men. By now, the Soviet people must know that their own government is lying to them, that their young men are not simply providing humanitarian assistance and technical support to the Afghan army against "bandits," "gangsters," and "mercenaries."⁹⁵ As the number of Soviet dead and wounded continues to climb, the truth will emerge, despite secret burials by military authorities or sending wounded and disfigured soldiers to East Germany for treatment.⁹⁶

If he can be believed, Vladimir Kuzichkin, a former KGB major who defected to the British in June 1982, said that Brezhnev himself overruled repeated advice from Yuri Andropov's KGB not to turn Afghanistan into a Soviet satellite.⁹⁷ Now that Brezhnev has left the scene, Andropov would be well-advised for economic, as well as political reasons, to take steps to extricate the USSR from its quagmire.

Another problem which faces the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact Allies in the 1980's is the antiwar sentiment among the youth. In his 1982 book, Ogarkov discusses this matter, saying that where elements of pacifism appear they must be decisively dealt with.⁹⁸ In East Germany, for example, authorities recently refused to allow young people to wear badges and armbands advocating disarmament, claiming that their symbol, a sword beaten into a plowshare, undermined military service.⁹⁹ And at the same time that demonstrators in America were calling for a ban on nuclear

weapons, the Soviets detained seven West Europeans in Moscow's Red Square as they attempted to unfurl a hand-lettered banner which read, "Bread, Life, Disarmament." "The police action," John F. Burns reported, "contrasted with Soviet support for Western European groups that have demonstrated against military spending by the United States and its plans to deploy a new generation of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe."¹⁰⁰ But, as Ogarkov made plain, Soviet young people must not display pacifist sentiments, no matter how sincere they may be.

CONCLUSIONS

The Kremlin, given the current quantitative and qualitative balance of forces in Europe, cannot now launch a *blitzkrieg* against Europe which would lead to a quick and decisive victory. NATO appears to have the capability to deny the Soviets early victory and then turn the conflict into a protracted struggle which the Soviets do not want.¹⁰¹

Nevertheless, one must warn the reader that the delicate scheme of things could change. A very real danger is that the Soviets could continue their force buildup, without an adequate response from the NATO side. "NATO must provide for the continuation of ongoing improvements in its force structure," John J. Mearsheimer writes. "There is no evidence that the Soviet effort to modernize her forces in Central Europe is slowing down. Therefore, NATO must continue to make improvements if it is to maintain the present balance."¹⁰²

Not only will the Soviets be constantly examining the balance of forces, but they also will be looking for exploitable weaknesses in the NATO military edifice. They will be especially alert to maldeployments and soft, vulnerable spots in NATO's forward defenses. They will put high priority on evaluating NATO's strategic warning capability, which is essential for timely mobilization and deployment of forces to wartime positions. But most of all, they will be continuously assessing NATO's political cohesiveness, searching for a fissure which they can take advantage of, such as disagreements over Olympic boycotts and sale of components for the Siberian gas pipeline. These tensions among major NATO partners probably give the Soviet leadership considerable satisfaction. At the same time, they must realize that

some future threatening gesture from their side would have a great unifying effect on NATO.

The question that Moscow must ask itself is whether unleashing a war in Europe, even after getting the jump on NATO in mobilization, is worth the risk to its national survival. Despite tough talk by their military chieftains, such as Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, the leaders are not reckless men. Even in military operations, they tend to be extremely cautious: witness, for example, the huge force they assembled to overwhelm the Hungarians (some 2,000 tanks), or the docile Czechs (the equivalent of 29 divisions),¹⁰³ or the more than 105,000 soldiers now in Afghanistan. The Kremlin leaders also see opportunities for mischief-making and power projection in other parts of the world which are far less risky than aggression in Europe.

Several months ago, Milovan Djilas was interviewed in his Belgrade department. Asked about the future of the USSR, he declared: "I think the Soviet system is in a state of rotting. But this may be prolonged, because the ruling class in the Soviet Union is relatively stable." But, he warned, "to avoid internal problems, they may go for expansion." And what can the West do? "The West must be strong if it wants to save peace and stop Soviet expansionism. If it stopped, the process of rotting will go faster. In some ways, the West is damned to be strong."¹⁰⁴

The remainder of the 1930's will be an uneasy period for both sides, as the Kremlin tests the strength of the NATO Alliance and continues to project the image of its awesome military might in Europe and elsewhere. At the moment, the Alliance is fairly strong¹⁰⁵ and the Soviet leadership dares not take it on. But this is not the time for complacency; indeed, that is a luxury which never will be afforded us. NATO must continue to strengthen its shield in a spirit of friendly cooperation, determined not to be bullied by a power which specializes in military aggression. The future will not be calm and easy—but when has it been?

ENDNOTES

1. *Pravda*, October 7, 1979, cited in Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1980, p. 6.

2. *Whence the Threat to Peace*, Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, 1982, pp. 69-78. The Russian language version is *Otkuda Iskhodit Ugroza Miru*. This booklet was quickly compiled in response to Caspar Weinberger's *Soviet Military Power*, Washington: Department of Defense, 1981.

3. *Soviet Military Power*, pp. 2, 25, 29; and Harold Brown, *Report of Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget*, Washington: Department of Defense, 1981, p. 69. The second edition of *Soviet Military Power* was released in March 1983. (Hereafter, these editions will be referred to as SMP II.)

4. See the excellent editorial, "Giving Europe a Defense," in *The Wall Street Journal*, January 14, 1983, p. 22. Describing a United States Strategic Institute study authored by Donald R. Cotter, James Hansen, and Kirk McConnell, the editorial notes:

The authors put to rest the myth that the Soviet Union's weapons buildup in Europe, as well as the whole arms race, is only a response to our own weapons deployments. Their analysis of Soviet nuclear weapons deployment in Europe reveals an integrated air and ground offensive military system. The types and numbers of Soviet weapons, along with their military doctrine, training, and rate of acquisition, 'describe a Soviet theater nuclear force capability that is far in excess of anything that could conceivably be characterized as counterdeterrent to NATO nuclear capabilities.' In other work, the Soviet forces deployed against Western Europe are designed for attack.

5. The 6th Guards Tank Division was withdrawn from East Germany after Brezhnev's unilateral pledge of October 6, 1979 to withdraw up to 20,000 personnel and 1,000 tanks, although there are reports that the withdrawal of this division was more than offset by reassignment of smaller tank units to other East European-based divisions. Daniel S. Papp, "From the Crest All Directions Are Down: The Soviet Union Views the 1980s," *Naval War College Review*, July-August 1982, p. 67. See US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture*, supplement to overview by General David C. Jones, USAF, for FY 82, p. 104; for a listing of GSFG divisions see Friedrich Wiener, *The Warsaw Pact Armies*, Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1981, pp. 62-63. Of the 30 Soviet maneuver divisions in Eastern Europe, 15 are tank, 15 are motorized rifle. See the International Institute for Strategic Studies (hereafter IISS), *The Military Balance, 1982-1983*, London: IISS, 1982, p. 14. The importance the Soviets attach to their largest group, GSFG, is shown by the title of its senior officer (currently General of the Army M. M. Zaytsev who succeeded Ye. F. Ivanovskiy in December 1986), who is designated "commander in chief," one of eight such positions in the Soviet military structure. See Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979, p. 206. Also, "Glavnokomanduyushchiy" in *Sovetskaya Voenennaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 2, Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, 1976, p. 564.

Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security*, Summer 1982, pp. 3-39.

31. V. A. Smirnov, "Podvizhnaya Grupa," *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya*, Moscow: Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, 1978, Vol. 6, p. 373.

32. Donnelly, pp. 1181-1182.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 1182, citing Polish Colonels Lachiewicz and Rajmanski, "Helicopter Reconnaissance and Fire Missions in Support of Land Operations at Night," *Air Force and Air Defense Review*, June 1981.

34. "Teatr Voyennykh Deistviy (TVD), *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya*, Moscow: Military Press of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1980, Vol. 8, pp. 8-9.

35. Department of the Army, *Soviet Army Operations*, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978, pp. 2-5, 2-6. A Soviet *front* is not a fixed organization, but is tailored for the situation and mission. A *front* would consist of several armies and varying numbers of surface-to-surface missile brigades, artillery divisions or brigades, multiple rocket launcher brigades or regiments, antitank brigades or regiments, surface-to-air missile brigades or regiments, signal brigades or regiments, combat engineer brigades or regiments, ponton regiments, and chemical brigades. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-6, 2-7.

36. See John M. Collins, *US-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities*, Washington: McGraw Hill Publications, 1980, p. 313, and Sir John Hackett, et al., *The Third World War*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978, p. 162.

37. Clayton A. Pratt, "The Benelux and Northern German Plains Avenue of Approach," *Military Review*, June 1978, pp. 2-8.

38. Interview in Schemmer, p. 27. General Gabriel went on to describe how the airbases will be defended—with security police, wartime augmentation forces, and host-nation forces.

39. William K. Sullivan, "Soviet Strategy and NATO's Northern Flank," *Naval War College Review*, July-August 1979, p. 26.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

41. *The Military Balance, 1982-1983*, p. 15.

42. Sullivan, p. 31.

43. John C. Campbell, "Communist Strategies in the Mediterranean," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1979, p. 3.

44. Lawrence J. Whetten, "Turkey and NATO's Second Front," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1981, p. 60.

45. George F. Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941*, Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960, pp. 111, 183.

46. Norman Polmar, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments*, Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979, pp. 5-6.

47. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, Fourth Edition, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 17-18.

48. John W. Burberry, Jr., "Urbanized Terrain: Perspective and Patterns," *Military Review*, March 1978, pp. 3-4.

49. James H. Polk, "The North German Plain Attack Scenario: Threat or Illusion?," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1980, pp. 61-62.

50. John Erickson, "Trends in the Soviet Combined Arms Concept," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1977, p. 44. As the Soviets attempt to resupply their forces in the forward area, they will experience some rail delays among their Western frontiers because of the requirement to change gage (5 feet to 4 feet 8 inches) as they move west. They have sought to overcome this problem somewhat by the creation of eight heavy-lift regiments. Each regiment reportedly can transport simultaneously almost all the tanks of a division, covering a distance of 500-600 kilometers in 24 hours. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact Allies will also rely heavily on mobilization of transport resources from the civilian economy to meet wartime needs. An extensive network of quasimilitary transport units in the USSR, known as avtokolony, which are manned by reservists, can be mobilized quickly to supplement regular units. *United States Military Posture for 1980*, pp. 54, 88; and Friedrich Wiener and William J. Lewis, *The Warsaw Pact Armies*, Vienna: Carl Ueberreuter Publishers, 1977, p. 67.

51. Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Soviet Theater Strategy: Implications for NATO* (USSI Report 78-1), Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1978, pp. 44-45.

52. *The Military Balance, 1982-1983*, p. 131. See also Lewis A. Frank, *The Arms Trade in International Relations*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969, pp. 55-57. Some specialists argue persuasively that the Warsaw Pact lacks standardization, citing the variety of armor vehicles, artillery pieces, diesel and gasoline vehicles, and the older, obsolescent equipment in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies. See Keith Dunii, *Soviet Military Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities: A Critique of the Short War Advocates*, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1979, pp. 17-18. Consider, for example, the problems posed by the variety of tank ammunition: the T54/55's gun is 100mm; the T-62, 115mm smoothbore; the T-64, T-72, and T-80, 125mm smoothbore.

53. *The Military Balance, 1982-1983*, p. 21. See also IISS, *Strategic Survey, 1979*, London: IISS, 1980, pp. 104-105.

54. *Krasnaya Zvezda-Soviet News and Propaganda Analysis*, Vol. 2, No. 9, 1982, p. 31.

55. Oriana Fallaci, "Even an Angel Can Become a Whore," *The Washington Post*, February 21, 1982, p. D1. Some readers may insist that the ZOMO's, or riot police, rather than the Polish Army, enforced martial law. The Army was also largely responsible; manning roadblocks, rushing in tanks and armored personnel carriers, and in other ways supporting the military rule of General Jaruzelski. "The most open supporters of the regime are, of course, the ZOMO's (the riot police), and at least a part of the Army, who are pampered, fed, given special bonuses, and kept sufficiently isolated from the rest of society not to become 'contaminated' by public unrest," writes a young Polish social scientist under the pseudonym Casimir Garnysz in "Holding a Bear by the Tail," *Encounter*, September-October 1982, p. 77.

56. See, for example, the article by Dale R. Herspring and Iyan Volgyes, "Political Reliability in the Eastern European Warsaw Pact Armies," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 6, Winter 1980, p. 289.

57. To quote again Polish Deputy Prime Minister Rakowski,

I am a very convinced advocate of strict ties with the Soviet Union. I firmly believe that our place is on the side of the Soviet Union. Of course, I have my national pride, I want to be independent and to be treated as an equal, but I

say that Poland should stay very close to the Soviet Union. I say it as a realist, not only as a Communist. The Russians are Slavonic people, they are rich, they represent a tremendous market. We need them. Where else would we get the raw material we get from the Soviet Union?
Fallaci, p. D4.

With the deductions in Western aid, Poland will be even more dependent on the Soviet Union and East European neighbors. See Tad Szulc's interview with Wojciech Jaruzelski, "Can Poland Be Free?," *Parade*, July 18, 1982, pp. 4-6.

58. R. L. Giles, "Die Nationale Volksarmee aus der Sicht eines Britischen Offiziers," lecture given at the joint conference of the "Arbeitskreis fuer Wehrforschung," the "Clausewitz Gesellschaft" and the "Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Wehrtechnik" in Bonn, November 14-15, 1979. Lieutenant Colonel Giles served 4½ years as Russian interpreter and liaison officer with the British Military Liaison Mission to the Group of Soviet Forces in East Germany. For a most useful discussion of the reliability of the Polish East German, and Czechoslovak armed forces, see A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean, and Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier*, Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1980.

59. Thomas O. Cason, "The Warsaw Pact Today: The East European Military Forces," in *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means*, edited by Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1982, p. 151.

60. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 152.

61. Herspring and Volgyes, p. 280. See, too, George Gibian, "The Way the Czechs View the Crisis in Poland," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 21, 1982, p. 34. Professor Gibian, during a recent visit to Czechoslovakia, found that "negative reactions to Poland far outweighed anti-Communist, anti-Soviet feelings of partnership and sympathy with the Poles."

62. Frederick C. Turner, "The Soviet GI," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1977, p. 83.

63. Wayne S. Vucinich, "Major Trends in Eastern Europe," in *Eastern Europe in the 1980s*, ed. by Stephen Fischer-Galati, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981, p. 25.

64. Dale R. Herspring, "The Warsaw Pact at 25," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1980, p. 11.

65. Scott and Scott, pp. 354, 356.

66. Condoleezza Rice, "The Problem of Military Elite Cohesion in Eastern Europe: The Case of Czechoslovakia," *Air University Review*, January-February 1982, pp. 66-67.

67. Michel Tatu, "Intervention in Eastern Europe," in *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, ed. by Stephen S. Kaplan. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981, p. 255.

68. A. A. Grechko (Marshal of the Soviet Union), *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State*, Moscow: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, 1975, translated and published under the auspices of the US Air Force, Washington: US Government Printing Office, pp. 340-343.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 343.

70. Scott and Scott, p. 316.

71. Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1982*, Washington: Department of Defense, 1981, p. 69.
72. Aleksei Myagkov, *Inside the KGB*, New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1976, pp. 86-112. See also Richard A. Gabriel, *The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980, pp. 151-182.
73. Kirill Podrabinek, "An Inside Look at Life in the Soviet Army," *Russia*, No. 3, 1981, p. 11. An editorial in the May 1982 issue of *Voyenno-meditsinskiy Zhurnal* revealed that the Soviet armed forces are suffering from dysentery and hepatitis, and that the diseases are related to poor living conditions: overcrowded, dirty barracks, lack of sewage systems, contaminated water supply, food poisoning, and lack of personal hygiene. See "Hard—and Dirty Life for Soviet Soldiers," *Soviet World Outlook*, August 15, 1982, p. 6.
74. Podrabinek, p. 12, Richard Anderson's afterword.
75. John Barron, *MIG Pilot: The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko*, New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1980, pp. 95-103.
76. The Special Operations Division of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff publishes a monthly *Krasnaya Zvezda Soviet News and Propaganda Analysis*. See, for example, Vol. 1, No. 11, 1981, pp. 24-29; Vol. 1, No. 12, 1981, pp. 23-26; and Vol. 2, No. 2, 1982, pp. 30-34.
77. Anderson's afterword to Podrabinek, p. 12.
78. "Moscow's Military Machine," *Time*, June 23, 1980, p. 27.
79. Turner, p. 83.
80. Otto Preston Chaney, Jr., *Zhukov*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971, pp. 372-376.
81. Ellen Jones, "Soviet Military Manpower: Prospects in the 1980s," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1981, p. 65.
82. Murray Feshbach, "Between the Lines of the 1979 Soviet Census," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1982, pp. 29, 33.
83. Jones, p. 71.
84. Nikolai Vasil'yevich Ogarkov (Marshal of the Soviet Union), *Vsegda v Gotovnosti k Zashchite Otechestva*, Moscow: Military Press of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1982, p. 64. (Author's translation.)
85. S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces: Preliminary Findings*, Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, May 1980, p. vi. This interesting study is based on indepth interviews with former Soviet servicemen.
86. Myagkov, p. 110.
87. William G. Hyland, "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1982, p. 24. Hyland cites Ogarkov's article, "Defending Peaceful Endeavor," *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1981, pp. 80-91. Ogarkov repeats himself in *Vsegda v Gotovnosti k Zashchite Otechestva*, p. 31, declaring that "realizing this dialectic process is especially important in the present time when on the basis of scientific-technical progress major weapons systems are to be renewed after every 10-12 years." (Author's translation.)
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*
90. Ogarkov in *Kommunist*, cited by Hyland, p. 24.
91. Michael Sadykiewicz, "Soviet Military Politics," *Survey*, Winter 1982, p. 180.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

93. Brezhnev was described as Chairman of the Defense Council in *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 1, p. 588, sent to the typesetters in September 1974.

94. Some months before Brezhnev's passing, Rand Senior Economist Abraham S. Beck wrote that "all that we have learned about the political context of Soviet decisionmaking suggests that the idea of drastic defense cuts would be abhorrent to the political-military leadership waiting in the wings The most attractive option for Mr. Brezhnev's successors, as it has been for Mr. Brezhnev, may be the decision to change nothing." Becker, "Guns, Butter and the Brezhnev Succession," *Wall Street Journal*, June 21, 1982, p. 16.

95. David Satter, "What Russia Tells Russians About Afghanistan," *The Wall Street Journal*, November 11, 1982, p. 30. Six men who were described as Soviet deserters from their military units in Afghanistan said in a February 17, 1983 interview on the ABC News Program "20-20" that they had been misled into believing that they would be fighting foreign mercenaries. See Stephen Kinzer, "Soviet Deserters, on TV, Say They Joined Afghan Rebels," *The New York Times*, February 18, 1983, p. A3.

96. Satter, p. 30.

97. "Coups and Killings in Kabul," *Time*, November 22, 1982, pp. 33-34. Kuzichkin provides an interesting accounting of the storming of the presidential palace the day after Christmas 1979 by a few hundred Soviet *spetsnaz* troops, plus a specially trained assault group of KGB officers. After killing a number of Afghan troops, the Soviets, who were wearing Afghan uniforms and using vehicles with Afghan markings, killed President Amin. The Soviet in charge, Colonel Bayerenov, head of the KGB's terrorist training school, was shot and killed by his own men in the confusion of the attack.

98. Ogarkov, *Always Ready* . . . , pp. 65-66.

99. "East German Pastors Protest Ban on Pacifist Badges," *The New York Times*, April 12, 1982, p. A3.

100. John F. Burns, "Seven West Europeans Detained in Soviet," *The New York Times*, April 20, 1982, p. A12.

101. Mearsheimer, pp. 3-4.

102. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37. According to Mearsheimer,

It is absolutely essential . . . that deployment of the American corps in NORTHAG be completed. It is also imperative that the Belgians, the British, and the Dutch continue to modernize and upgrade their conventional forces. More specifically, these forces, especially the British, must increase the firepower of their individual brigades. The Germans, for their part, must maintain their commitment to developing a formidable Territorial Army.

103. According to British writer Adam Roberts, about 400,000 Polish, Hungarian, East German, Bulgarian, and Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia. Cited in Michel Tatu, p. 230.

104. Thomas J. Bray, "A Conversation With Yugoslavia's Milovan Djilas," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 20, 1982, p. 33.

105. Much remains to be done. See Sam Nunn (Senator), "NATO: Can the Alliance Be Saved?," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1982, pp. 126-138.

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Despite denials of aggressive intent, the Soviet Union has, in recent years steadily expanded and upgraded its conventional and nuclear forces. Moreover, the recent introduction of air assault brigades at the front level, the rapid proliferation of the mobile and highly accurate SS-20 missile, and the tripling of artillery in many motorized rifle regiments, when coupled with a doctrine that stresses surprise, shock effect, and high tempo operations, suggest the Soviets are deliberately fielding forces opposite NATO capable of rapid offensive warfare. (CONTINUED)		

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20. The Soviet Union; however, face a number of operational problems which would serve to limit Soviet chances for quick success on the battlefield in Europe. For the remainder of the 1980's, the probability of renewed tensions in Eastern Europe is likely to add to Soviet uncertainties about the wartime allegiances of their Warsaw Pact allies. To add to their woes, the Soviet leaders must realize that their Marxist-Leninist ideology is bankrupt and Communist revolutionary enthusiasm is fast disappearing.

Although this study concludes that the Soviet Union cannot now launch a blitzkrieg against Europe which could lead to a quick and decisive victory, the reader is warned that the delicate scheme of things could change, especially if they continue their force buildup without an adequate response from NATO. Not only will the Soviet leadership constantly be examining the balance of forces, but they will also be looking for exploitable weaknesses in the NATO military edifice.

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