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
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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

STRATEGIC STUDY

POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASED AUSTRALIAN-AMERICAN
COOPERATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENT

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THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

STRATEGIC STUDIES REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Possibilities for Increased Australian-American
Cooperation in the Indian Ocean

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DATE: April, 1983

Resource constraints limit the availability of American military forces to check Soviet expansionism in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Asia. Improved allied cooperation and coordination in the region is necessary to better deter aggression and, if necessary, actively combat it. Australia's western heritage and close ties to the United States and other free world nations makes it unique among Indian Ocean states. The paper suggests specific ways in which the Australian-American security relationship--historically excellent--could be improved to mutual advantage in the region.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kevin J. McGuire (A.B. Holy Cross College, M.A. Indiana University, M.P.A. Harvard University) is a career Foreign Service officer whose primary functional specialization is in economic affairs. His most recent overseas assignment was as Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy Gabon. Past tours include service in the Office of the Secretary of State, in several European capitals, and, most pertinent to this paper, in Canberra and Adelaide, Australia. Mr. McGuire is a recipient of the Department of State's Meritorious Service Award.

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All three authors are graduates of The National War College Class of 1983.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In recent years, events in Southwest Asia, particularly the Persian Gulf, have preoccupied United States foreign policy planners. The increasing presence of Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the southward thrust of the Soviet Army into Afghanistan sharply heightened American interest in the region. In response, the United States established an increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean and created a new unified command, CENTCOM.

These initiatives revealed glaring deficiencies in United States regional resources. Success of our policies clearly depends on the level of cooperation that can be achieved with regional friends, specifically those in the Indian Ocean littoral.

Australia has critical economic and security interests in the Indian Ocean. It shares with us a time-tested alliance, a compatible world view and similar economic, political and social aspirations. United States security policy in the Indian Ocean requires an investment of military resources and diplomatic initiatives that exceed the scope of this paper. It is clear, however, that greater Australian-American cooperation would substantially contribute to a more coordinated, cost-effective and forward-looking policy than now exists.

This paper examines possibilities for increasing bilateral cooperation in defense of the Indian Ocean and makes specific recommendations for action. Such recommendations are tempered

by the knowledge that Australia's modest defense budget, distance from current hot spots and the expected policies of the newly-elected Australian Labor Party (ALP) government impose severe limits on the range and scope of possible shared activity. Some suggestions are simple, such as ways to improve policy consultation. Others seem obvious but have long been neglected, such as joint planning, especially in those areas where Australia is expected to make a critical contribution in a crisis or war situation. Of potentially greater significance and longer-term value are those that deal with the improvement of Australia's sea control capability and support infrastructure while avoiding offense to Australian sensibilities on foreign basing. These include possible U.S. contributions to the development of Australian naval and air facilities in Western Australia and assisting in the Australian acquisition of an aircraft carrier. Other proposals would promote regional coproduction of defense items as a means of encouraging more efficient procurement and promoting a higher degree of allied interoperability. Finally, there are those proposals that will require considerable and persistent effort for acceptance, e.g., convincing Australia to carry a larger share of the regional defense burden.

The United States already enjoys a high level of cooperation with Australia in defense matters, but the authors feel efforts should proceed to improve and expand our joint capability to defend Free World interests in the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. should, however, demonstrate particular concern so as not to provoke a reaction from the ALP government which would jeopardize current arrangements. The authors recommend a careful approach designed to protect the status of joint-use installations available to us in Australia.

Such a strategy would proceed first with simple, noncontroversial proposals and progress toward those with greater, longer lasting benefit to both countries. Eventually those proposals which carry a higher price tag for Australia but contribute to allied military strength in the region could be broached.

CHAPTER 1

THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A STRATEGIC CROSSROAD

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean and its littoral has assumed a more prominent position in U.S. defense priorities. The problem of deploying and supporting forces in this vast, remote region has demonstrated the limitations in U.S. defense resources and has prompted efforts to seek means to improve our capability in the Indian Ocean. One avenue to enhance regional capability is through cooperation with other nations in the area. This paper specifically examines the possibility of greater Australian-U.S. cooperation in the defense of mutual Indian Ocean interests.

Background: Problems in the Indian Ocean

A variety of factors have combined in recent years to focus international attention on the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. Among the most significant of these factors is the southward thrust of Soviet naval and land forces. The Soviet buildup of naval presence in the region since the mid-1960s prompted a countervailing effort by the United States and the development of Diego Garcia as a regional base. But it was events in Iran and Afghanistan in 1979 that sharply focused U.S. concern on the potential consequences of the loss of Western access to Middle Eastern oil and to the

emergence of the Soviet Union as a preeminent power in the region. The prospect of Soviet control of vital petroleum resources and sea lines of communication (SLOC) signalled the need for a strengthened Free World posture to protect our own and allied interests. Unless there is a major change in our relations with Moscow or a reassessment of our interests, our commitment to this region will remain strong.

A natural concern of strategists is that U.S. resources to defend the region are limited. We lack support facilities in the area, and our naval forces are already so heavily committed in other theaters that a permanent presence strains existing resources. In reaction to this shortage of naval resources the U.S. Navy developed and is employing a flexible operations (FLEXOPS) policy enabling it to meet standing commitments for carrier battle groups (CVBGs) in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific while maintaining a posture to respond to a crisis in the Indian Ocean on short notice. As a result of FLEXOPS the Navy was able to maintain two CVBGs in the Indian Ocean in 1979 at the height of the Iranian crisis.

The creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and U.S. Central Command¹ further reflects U.S. commitment and poses additional demands on available manpower and materiel. Obviously, efficient use of our scarce defense resources and those of our allies requires maximum cooperation. The present lack of regional infrastructure to support extended operations by U.S. forces is a major problem with little prospect for dramatic improvement in the near

future. While our main Indian Ocean base, Diego Garcia, is extremely useful, its small size and remoteness limits its potential. Clearly, the cooperative establishment of an adequate regional support infrastructure with friendly nations on the Indian Ocean littoral would provide a major contribution to sustain major U.S. operations and to discourage Soviet aggression.

Despite modest progress in gaining cooperation with Indian Ocean littoral nations, glaring deficiencies in our capabilities persist. Some littoral states vocally support an American regional presence but do not wish bases or significant support facilities on their soil. Others lack useful facilities, the economic sophistication to render meaningful support, or strategic position. Many wish to avoid any involvement in what they see as a superpower conflict; still others are aligned with the USSR. The question of the long-term political stability of some regional nations poses a serious impediment to any major U.S. investment in military facilities. In addition, responsible U.S. officials are reluctant, given budget realities, to suggest the duplication in the Indian Ocean of facilities which already exist in the Philippines and other Western Pacific bases.

U.S. Goals In The Indian Ocean

Faced with this imperfect situation relative to force projection and support facilities, the U.S. would do well to consider all possibilities to counter Soviet influence and military capability in the region, including ways to:

- improve combat and surveillance capabilities for support of sea control and SLOC protection missions;
- encourage allied awareness of and involvement in Indian Ocean and Southwest Asian defense;
- improve the cost effectiveness of the U.S. presence in this region; and
- hedge against the loss of existing military facilities through hostilities or other factors.

In acting to achieve these goals the U.S. must bear in mind fiscal realities (both American and allied), the acceptability of possible options to the American public, popular sentiment in any country choosing to cooperate with us, and world opinion.

The authors contend that in pursuit of the above objectives the United States has neglected opportunities for securing assistance from Australia--the Indian Ocean littoral nation most likely to share our perceptions on regional issues, already a security alliance (ANZUS) partner and a friend of long standing.

CHAPTER II
PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-AUSTRALIAN COOPERATION IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN

Australia offers possibilities for further Indian Ocean cooperation. This is not to suggest that Australia offers solutions to all of the problems confronting the U.S. in that region. Australia is located far from the current Southwest Asian hot spots, possesses a small population with modest military power, and is currently in an economic recession. Still, Australia offers some unique possibilities as a military support base and regional political and military actor.

Australia as an Indian Ocean Power

Location. Despite its distance from the Persian Gulf, Western Australia is as close to it and to Diego Garcia in terms of steaming days as is Subic Bay in the Philippines. Sea transit from Western Australia to the northern Indian Ocean avoids the Indonesian straits. The increased Soviet presence in South Asia, particularly at Cam Ranh Bay, could make these chokepoints dangerous or impassable in time of crisis. A closure of these straits might mean a heavy U.S. military reliance on Australian support facilities in a protracted conflict.

Regional Actor. Australia is an Indian Ocean littoral state and has given special emphasis to maintaining good relationships with geographically located neighbors such as

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. One example of the positive political role played by Australia because of its status as a littoral state is its important moderating influence since 1976 on proposals for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace.

Australian Interests in the Indian Ocean. Australians have traditionally regarded themselves as members of the Pacific Community, and their defense policy has consistently reflected this self-perception. However, over the past twenty years Australians have increasingly come to recognize their self-interest in a secure Indian Ocean as well. The new prominence of Western Australia with its immense mineral resources has sensitized Australia to the importance of an Indian Ocean dimension to its defense efforts. Western Australia is no longer excluded from national defense strategy. Australian exports to Japan--much of them minerals from Western Australia--account for 30 percent of total exports and 10 percent of Australian GDP. Australia's connection to the Middle East also figures prominently in this new awareness of the Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil accounts for 30 percent of Australian petroleum requirements.¹ Exports to the Middle East reached A\$1.1 billion in 1982 (6 percent of total exports) and sales from the important agricultural sector were especially strong.² Fifty percent of Australia's trade by tonnage now passes through the Indian Ocean. The Suez Canal provides a key link for Australian-European trade. The canal, the Indonesian straits and the Indian Ocean SLOCs also have an important indirect effect on the Australian economy since each

is essential to the economic well being of Japan, Australia's biggest customer and trading partner. Clearly, Australia has a major stake in the security of the Indian Ocean.

A Common Commitment to a Secure Indian Ocean. Australia has cooperated with the United States in numerous ways to enhance the defense capabilities of the Free World. The limited scope of this paper precludes an extensive review of Australian-American cooperation to date, but Australian participation in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and in the Sinai Multinational Force are illustrative of the depth of this cooperation and commitment, as is the hosting of critical joint Australian-American communications and defense monitoring establishments at Northwest Cape, Alice Springs and Nurringar.³ The ANZUS Treaty signed in 1952 between Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. has served as the keystone for Australian defense and foreign policy since its inception. The text of the ANZUS Treaty focuses on the Pacific and is not explicit with regard to Indian Ocean responsibilities.⁴ While none of the three partners has sought clarification of the treaty's applicability to this area, it may prove necessary or desirable at some future time to confront this question directly, but it serves no useful purpose to do so now. For the present the real issue is not legalistic but whether and to what extent the Australian and American governments wish to collaborate in this area. In the late 1970s, before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser risked becoming persona non grata in Washington by his

frequent admonitions about the need for increased strength in the Indian Ocean. Fraser was most concerned about President Carter's decision to work toward a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union limiting Indian Ocean naval strength--a decision which was not discussed with Australia before it was announced.⁵ Events in Afghanistan in late 1979 converted the Carter Administration to Fraser's view. The Australian government has since assisted in strengthening allied Indian Ocean presence in a number of ways including: Royal Australian Navy (RAN) vessel participation in Northwestern Indian Ocean patrols (the RAN flagship, the carrier HMAS Melbourne, among them); invitations for frequent USN ship visits to Australian ports (43 in 1982); permission for the staging of USAF B-52 surveillance and training flights from Australian airfields; hosting joint land/sea/air exercises in Western Australia; and progress on new naval facilities at HMAS Stirling (south of Perth at Cockburn Sound) which is scheduled to support a new permanent Indian Ocean presence of four RAN escorts and two submarines. In 1980, Prime Minister Fraser invited the United States to establish a homeport for a carrier battle group (CVBG) at Cockburn Sound. While the invitation has neither been accepted nor rejected by the U.S., it at least served to reconfirm Australia's commitment to a joint approach to Indian Ocean security matters.

A Stable, Democratic Friend With Shared Aspirations.

Australia is one of the few nations on the Indian Ocean littoral, or indeed in the world, which enjoys stability,

democracy and a genuinely free society. In addition, Australians share with Americans a unique frontier experience which has contributed to the formation of cultures with many common attitudes and aspirations. Experience shows that on challenges to fundamental political rights and economic well being, the probability of Australian-American agreement and cooperation is as strong as with any two nations in the world. There is a highly positive public opinion of the United States among Australians which extends to their view of the ANZUS alliance. A nationwide poll published by The Melbourne Age on October 25, 1982, for example, revealed that 58 percent of those polled approved visits by U.S. naval ships even when carrying nuclear weapons, a matter that has been one of the most controversial in our relationship. Variation from state to state in the level of support for such visits was slight, apart notably from Western Australia where 65 percent favored them. In August, 1981, the national newspaper The Australian reported that the Northern Territories chief minister had suggested that Darwin become a base for U.S. warships. This does not mean that Australians accept the American security connection without reservation or qualification as Desmond Ball's critical book A Suitable Piece of Real Estate demonstrates. But, by and large, Australians like Americans and have a positive image of the alliance's importance to their security.

Party Politics and Defense Policy in Australia

Significant differences exist in the approach of the major political parties on national security. At the risk of oversimplification, the Liberal Party (LP) and the National Country Party (NCP) have tended to be more concerned about the worldwide threat of Communist aggression; more inclined toward a forward defense policy; more eager to establish ways to strengthen the alliance with America and to contribute to common efforts to contain Communism. In short, ANZUS and the American connection have been close to, if not at the heart of, the LP/NCP approach to national security questions.

The Australian Labor Party (ALP), on the other hand, tends to favor a more "fortress Australia" approach; shows less enthusiasm for seeking ways to actively cooperate with the U.S. on defense; exhibits less concern about Communist intentions worldwide; and gives a more sympathetic hearing to Third World views (for example, on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace issue), even when this meant a clash with U.S. policy. This is not to suggest that the ALP's view of what is good for Australia is based on an anti-U.S. attitude or that ALP perceptions are necessarily antithetical to those of the U.S.

The ALP has had only three years in power in recent decades, but on March 5, 1983, it won a resounding victory over the LP/NCP coalition which has dominated the post-World War II political scene. Economic issues overshadowed all others in the campaign, and the ALP election does not appear to reflect a significant change in Australian attitudes on defense matters.⁶

U.S.-Australian relations will remain warm regardless of the party in office. From the point of view of increased Indian Ocean collaboration with the U.S., however, an LP/NCP government would almost certainly have been a more enthusiastic partner than the ALP. Remarks by ALP members before the election suggested possible challenges to existing agreements, such as the terms for the Northwest Cape facilities, B-52 flights, participation in the Sinai Multinational Force and even the status of ANZUS. It remains to be seen exactly what line new Prime Minister Robert Hawke will follow. Although long prominent as a labor leader, he was selected party head just before the campaign and has served only one term in Parliament. By past performance he is bright, favorably disposed toward the U.S. and a close bilateral security relationship, and should prove a strong leader. In the brief period since the formation of the new government there have been clear indications that it regards ANZUS as fundamentally important; that it plans no basic changes in the current bilateral security relationship; and specifically that the joint facilities will remain and ship visits and B-52 flights will continue.

Australian Defense Forces

Australia is one of the strongest military powers in the Indian Ocean littoral. Still, her power is sharply limited by her small population and modest economic base. Active military personnel number barely 73,000.⁷ In 1979 the Fraser government

promised a five year defense improvement program reflecting an annual seven percent real growth in defense expenditures. Unfortunately, unfavorable economic conditions have delayed fulfillment of that promise, but the new government can be expected to continue some buildup.

Australia is in the process of major equipment acquisitions which will determine the direction of its defense capabilities into the 21st Century.⁸ The largest of these--in fact, the largest single defense purchase in Australian history--involves the acquisition of 75 F/A-18 fighter-bombers at a cost of A\$2.4 billion.⁹ These aircraft will offer a much improved capability over the aging Mirage III fighters they will replace.

Of more immediate impact on U.S.-Australian defense efforts in the Indian Ocean is the frustrating effort to acquire an aircraft carrier to replace HMAS Melbourne. Canberra had concluded an agreement in early 1982 to purchase HMS Invincible from the Royal Navy. Although not its first choice of contending designs, the Australians could not pass up the timing and cost at which Invincible could be acquired.¹⁰ The subsequent decision of the British government to withdraw its offer and refund the Australian deposit following the success of Invincible in the Falkland Islands has left RAN without a replacement for Melbourne and Australia with a major gap in its maritime defenses.¹¹ This decision also reopened the debate on the need for an aircraft carrier,¹² but the election of an ALP government has laid to rest, at least for the immediate future, any prospects for purchasing a carrier.

The RAN is purchasing four Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)-class frigates from the U.S. to be delivered between 1981 and 1984. Australia also is making plans to construct as many as six more of these ships in domestic shipyards.¹³

A final major acquisition effort of significance to Indian Ocean defense is the government's decision to replace ten older RAAF P-3B Orion long-range maritime patrol (LRMP) aircraft with the newer, more capable P-3C version of the Orion. This will maintain at twenty the number of LRMP aircraft in the RAAF inventory. These aircraft are ideal resources for patrolling and controlling the vast sea approaches to Australia, the key straits to the north, and the vital SLOCs into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Unfortunately, the RAAF Orion force suffers a serious degradation in potential effectiveness due to the lack of sufficient aircrews. The present ratio of .7 crews per aircraft has been a source of controversy and offers a ready target for the improvement of Australian maritime capabilities.¹⁴

Neither the government nor the political parties have defined an unambiguous defense strategy for the late 1980s or 1990s. The partisan nature of national security policy inhibits the production of such a plan. Perhaps even more relevant, as Minister of Defense Ian Sinclair put it in a November, 1982, speech to the Australian Defense Association, "the problems of planning for Australia's defense are made more complex because we are not confronted with an immediate, easily identifiable threat to our national security." The same

conclusion was reached by the Australian Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense in 1981.¹⁵ Lack of an explicit long-term military strategy has not prevented Australians from maintaining an active interest in regional stability and from assuming a broad (i.e., Western-oriented) view of Australia's security interests. The decision to purchase an aircraft carrier (although now reversed) and the F/A-18, coupled with increased P-3 operations from Butterworth airfield in Malaysia and a build-up of new naval facilities in the north and west reflect growing concern for Australia's medium-to-long-term defense needs. These and other signs indicate that a systematic long-term strategy for Australian defense may be on the way.

CHAPTER III
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR GREATER U.S.-AUSTRALIAN BILATERAL
COOPERATION

The following are specific measures which the United States might usefully pursue to increase cooperation with Australia in the Indian Ocean. Some are simple and immediately applicable while others may become more practical and attractive with time.

Increased Bilateral Consultations and Coordination

The Australians are sensitive to being consulted (or at least being kept informed) about developments in U.S. policy on matters of common interest. This is a natural concern of a loyal and supportive friend who has occasionally been embarrassed by unannounced zig-zags in U.S. positions, for example on relations with China in the early 1970s and Indian Ocean naval limitation. Historically, the problem lies at the highest levels of the U.S. government and is, therefore, difficult to resolve. It results from a lack of sensitivity and carelessness rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead. In the future, the U.S. must guard against taking the Australians for granted. While we have a generally good record on exchanges of information in the defense area, more can be done. The recent decision to conduct frequent ANZUS "officials talks" should usefully reinforce annual ministerial and other consultations. These meetings provide an excellent forum for in-depth exchanges on strategically important areas, including perhaps the Indian Ocean.

To foster a coordinated defense posture for the Indian Ocean, one or more Australian officers should be attached to the new U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). These officers must be of sufficient rank that their reports are given serious regard in Canberra and to ensure access to senior U.S. officers. The assignment of Australian officers to CENTCOM does not alter the need for increased liaison through a similar arrangement with the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) which will continue to be an important factor in Australian defense planning.

The above suggestions are hardly dramatic. A more significant departure from current practice would be to initiate joint Australian-American defense planning. A first and limited step would involve planning for the defense of the straits separating the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These straits are of critical importance in wartime and represent an area where the Australians can play a key defense role. This is recognized in the Collins-Radford agreement of 1951 which assigns to the Australians general responsibility for wartime security of the Indian Ocean approaches to these straits. Any initiative on joint planning should be made at the level of Secretary of Defense to his Australian counterpart. Such discussions should address planning only for the eastern Indian Ocean. The prospect for broader regional planning should be favorable if the initial efforts prove mutually acceptable. Throughout such a process U.S. participants must assure that the plans are the result of a partnership effort, fully reflective of Australian interests.

Such planning could also be accomplished within ANZUS, although significant institutional changes would be required. ANZUS reform goes beyond the scope of this paper, and as indicated above, ANZUS responsibilities in the Indian Ocean are not clearly defined. Nevertheless, it is clear that the types of problems addressed in this section can be alleviated by more structured ANZUS relationships. The establishment of an ANZUS secretariat is not a new idea, but its implementation may be well overdue. Such a creation would be an ideal step towards greater information exchange, coordination and more cost effective operations.¹

As Australia begins to develop a long-term defense strategy, it is in the best interests of both nations to have the frankest and fullest possible exchange of views. The specific role of the U.S. should be to assist the Australians by making clear our own plans and capabilities for the Indian Ocean and sharing thoughts on how efforts can be combined to common advantage.

Increased Use of HMAS Stirling and the Cockburn Sound Complex²

Cockburn Sound is located south of Perth on the western coast of Australia. There are two port facilities located there: Fremantle to the north and HMAS Stirling to the south. HMAS Stirling was commissioned in 1978. It presently has the capacity to support four ships of destroyer/frigate size and up to three submarines. The master plan for the base, however,

provides for about four times that capacity to include a large ship pier (approximately 1500 feet in length) and a 630 foot extension to the destroyer wharf. With these additions, HMAS Stirling's facilities would be adequate to berth a U.S. carrier battle group. The existing maintenance facilities are extensive and offer a wide variety of repair services. Electrical power, water and sewage treatment facilities present no problems for expanded use. External utility hookups for vessels are available at existing wharfs but would have to be expanded in capacity to accommodate more ships. There are no drydocks of suitable capacity in the Perth/Fremantle area; the closest drydock capable of handling a destroyer or frigate is at Melbourne with a larger drydock located at Brisbane.

Marine diesel fuel supplies are adequate at Cockburn Sound either at the Fremantle port facility or at HMAS Stirling for routine port visit purposes although reserve tankage and berthing space for fueling are limited. Current tank capacity at either Fremantle or Stirling would have to be increased substantially to support a U.S. carrier battle group. Supplies of jet fuel (JP-5) are not routinely stocked to provide for carrier resupply. Negotiations on fuel exchange agreements and logistic resupply requirements are presently underway in Navy-to-Navy talks. Mutual agreement on fuel tankage and facility access would be helpful if current usage is maintained and is critical to expanded use of the Cockburn Sound complex by the United States Navy.

There is no air support facility included as part of the Cockburn Sound complex. The closest suitable facilities are at Perth International Airport located 11 miles northwest of Perth and RAAF Pearce located 17 miles north of Perth. Both airports are suitable for occasional use by U.S. Navy aircraft. However, parking area, fuel storage and maintenance hangers at each would have to be expanded if a carrier were to use HMAS Stirling on a regular basis.

Facilities at the Cockburn Sound complex are modest compared to those at the U.S. Navy's main Western Pacific operating base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. The depth and range of repair facilities together with an adjacent naval air station at Cubi Point make the Subic Bay complex uniquely capable of supporting Pacific Fleet operations.

There are two advantages that accrue from expanded use of Cockburn Sound. First, although it is only marginally closer to Diego Garcia than Subic Bay, Cockburn Sound offers passage to the Indian Ocean unconstrained by straits or choke points. While right of passage is often taken for granted, the ability to use these straits may be severely tested in the future. As the recent Law of the Sea negotiations highlighted, the right of passage, especially by military vessels, through the Indonesian Straits are subject to question so long as the United States is not a signatory to the Law of the Sea Convention.³ Furthermore, in time of war passage through these straits could be denied by blockage or mining. Prudence dictates that the United States encourage the development of an

Indian Ocean support base alternative to Subic Bay. Cockburn Sound presents just such an alternative.

The second reason to expand use of Cockburn Sound would be to improve the U.S. bargaining position with the Philippine government for continued use of Subic Bay. Since 1947 when the United States established the right to exclusive use--rent free--of Subic Bay (reaffirmed through a mutual defense treaty in 1951), we have witnessed an erosion of these rights. Most recently, the 1979 amendments to the 1947 Philippine-U.S. basing agreement granted continued use of the bases in the Philippines in return for a five year package of \$500 million in security assistance which is still a bargain by any standards. However, implicit in the agreement was a pledge of \$80 million per year in economic development. Additionally and perhaps more significant in its long-term implications, the 1979 amendment reduced the acreage retained as U.S. facilities, acknowledged Philippine sovereignty over the bases and provided for a thorough review of the basing agreements at five year intervals.⁴

No one is suggesting that the United States abandon Subic Bay. However, President Marcos has made public statements that the U.S. bases in the Philippines eventually will be phased out,⁵ and it is probable that future negotiations will yield more constraints and require a higher price for use of these facilities. Increasing difficulties with access to Philippine bases would be even more probable should a change in government

result in an administration less favorably disposed to the United States than the present Marcos regime.

There are several specific ways in which the United States can take advantage of the facilities at Cockburn Sound:

A. U.S. Carrier Homeporting. In 1980 the Australian government offered to discuss the homeporting of a U.S. carrier at Cockburn Sound.⁶ The next year a U.S. Navy technical team evaluated the small naval facility. The team found the cost to develop the base as a carrier homeport was excessive, especially when the U.S. Navy's drive to build a 600 ship fleet placed heavy demands on the Navy's portion of the U.S. defense budget. Furthermore, placed in the broader context of whether or not homeporting a second carrier abroad (USS Midway is based in Japan) would substantially improve the Navy's ability to perform its mission, other sites were perhaps better suited from a strategic standpoint than Cockburn Sound.⁷

The U.S. Navy is continuing to weigh its options for homeporting a second carrier abroad. Under present conditions and in view of competing priorities for Navy funds (primarily the 600 ship Navy), approval of such a plan is not likely.⁸ However, were developments in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf to warrant our increased and sustained presence in the region and right of passage through the Indonesian straits become a problem as a result of a disagreement with that country over the Law of the Sea Treaty, then the homeporting of a carrier at HMAS Stirling would be cast in a more favorable light. It is thus in the best interest of the United States to assist

Australia in maintaining and building the necessary support infrastructure at Cockburn Sound to keep this homeporting option open for future consideration.

B. Scheduled Repair and Upkeep of USN Ships. One obvious measure to assist in the development of the Cockburn Sound complex would be the use of these facilities by the U.S. Navy for scheduled maintenance during assigned in-port periods. If a portion of the repair and upkeep of Seventh Fleet ships presently performed at Subic Bay and Singapore were assigned to HMAS Stirling, this activity would promote the growth of Cockburn Sound beyond what would be realized through Australian resources alone.

Beside building an infrastructure to support our future needs, U.S. use of this complex would:

- help underwrite the cost of the assignment of RAN escort ships to Western Australia, thus assisting Australia as it orients its defenses toward the Indian Ocean;

- have a salutary effect on U.S.-Australian relations by contributing to the Western Australian economy;

- provide some measure of leverage in negotiating basing agreements with the Philippines;

- provide a needed alternative in resolving right of passage disputes with Indonesia.

Increased U.S. Presence in Western Australia

Western Australian regional development as a prime source of raw materials and as a base for unconstrained access to the

Indian Ocean elevates its importance to the military planner. In recognition of Western Australia's role in an Indian Ocean strategy the U.S. has increased activity in this region in the last decade. This level of activity must at least be sustained and where possible expanded.

A. Joint Exercises. Western Australia affords the military planner unlimited stretches of beach to practice amphibious landings of the type anticipated in the Indian Ocean. In fact, there is political significance in the very fact of such exercises in the region. U.S. participants in the Sandgroper and Kangaroo series of exercises lauded these opportunities for mutually beneficial training. The U.S. Marine Corps is particularly keen to participate in exercises in this area.⁹

Worthwhile as these exercises might be, there seems to be a lack of objective to their undertaking. Fundamental to the application of military forces in defense of a region is a set of plans based on mutually negotiated responses to contingencies. Such planning would require that the United States provide Australia with an insight into the type and extent of commitment to defense of the region based on various scenarios. For example, assisting sea control and SLOC protection in the eastern reaches of the Indian Ocean and Indonesian archipelago are obvious missions for the RAN and the USN in time of war. Future exercises should test Australian ability to provide forces to carry out these tasks along with the joint tactics and functions of U.S.-Australian

interoperability. As far as can be determined there are no plans for contingencies such as exist in the NATO arena. Perhaps our common language misleads us into thinking that our navies can meet at sea and work out such problems as we go. It seems obvious that our exercises with Australian forces should be based on predetermined agreements on forces assigned, areas of responsibility and approved/standardized tactical doctrine if they are to enhance our mutual defensive posture.¹⁰

B. Increased ship visits. Nothing demonstrates American presence as visibly or as favorably as visits by U.S. ships. A policy of frequent ship visits will exercise access privileges to Western Australia while demonstrating our ability and resolve to project power and promote regional stability in the Indian Ocean. Concurrently, ship visits contribute to the development of Western Australia through the increased use of port facilities and infusion of money into local economies. The economic and public relations impact of such visits is greatest on smaller ports. Despite recent, well publicized controversy surrounding visits of U.S. nuclear powered vessels to ports located in some Australian states, the Fraser government made it clear that it welcomed visits by all U.S. ships. The new ALP government apparently will as well. There can be no doubt that ship visits are a low risk, low expense means of cementing U.S.-Australian relations at their roots.

C. Base for U.S. Maritime Prepositioning. Albany Bay, at the southwestern tip of Australia, was used during World War II as a staging point for convoys between Australia and Great

Britain. It offers a well protected harbor with sufficient depth and anchorages for the U.S. Navy maritime prepositioning ships for use in the Indian Ocean. The disadvantage of its distance from the Persian Gulf is offset by the advantage of a safe, assured location with unimpeded access to the Indian Ocean.¹¹

Increased Military Assistance

U.S. and Australian defense interests are strongly linked through the ANZUS mutual security treaty. Chapter II offers evidence that the United States has no more reliable an ally. Congress recognized the closeness of the U.S.-Australian relationship by granting Australia the same favored treatment afforded our NATO allies when it amended the Arms Export Control Act (PL 97-133) in 1982.

It is natural then to include Australia in plans for defense of the Indian Ocean (especially the eastern approaches) and to offer appropriate levels of military assistance to ensure that she becomes a capable partner in carrying out these plans. The United States has already adopted a liberal technology sharing policy with Australia,¹² and within the limits of her resources Australia has done much in modernizing her forces.¹³ Recent purchases include four FFG frigates, 75 F/A-18 fighters and ten P-3C LRMP aircraft. If we desire or expect Australia to perform missions in the Indian Ocean such as SLOC protection and sea control, then the United States must consider assisting its southern ally to ensure a meaningful defense capability in the region. Nothing would contribute

more to that goal than to help Australia obtain a proper aircraft carrier.

Australia's effort to replace HMAS Melbourne has been extensively reported.¹⁴ The consensus from the outset has been that airpower is critical to a nation's defense, and to a maritime nation such as Australia, the case for airpower over the seas surrounding their island continent was overwhelming. The original decision favored a carrier because of the unique advantages accruing from its operational versatility, defendability, mobility and the political flexibility inherent in naval forces.¹⁵ Britain's experience in the Falkland Islands War served to reenforce the Fraser government's resolve to acquire a carrier, even as it forced Britain to withdraw the offer to sell HMS Invincible, Australia's best hope for obtaining a carrier at an affordable cost. Other carrier procurement options were being weighed with the selection process gravitating toward some sort of vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft carrier, either used or new. But as Invincible at \$478 million was palatable, a new U.S. designed LPH-class light carrier was hard to justify and invited a reopening of the whole question of need.¹⁶

The United States has a stake in the carrier decision. In an era when the United States cannot meet its peacetime carrier commitments except through contrivances such as FLEXOPS, we need to encourage our allies to augment our carrier forces where possible. In support of Australia's search for a light carrier the U.S. has proposed four designs ranging in cost from

\$1.4 billion to \$2.2 billion (1982 U.S. dollars). Each design would be capable of operating V/STOL aircraft with the most costly design also able to operate F/A-18 (fighter/attack), E-2C (early warning) and SH-60 (anti-submarine warfare, or ASW) aircraft.¹⁷ From the standpoint of capability and interoperability there is no question that the U.S. Navy would prefer Australia to procure the latter class of carrier. However, when (and indeed if, given the ALP's rejection of the idea) Australia decides to purchase a carrier, we can expect a decision based on lower cost rather than desired capability. This will be true as long as the current domestic economic and political climate exists.

To assist Australia in providing a common defense effort in the Indian Ocean, the United States should offer the transfer or favorable lease to the RAN of an Essex-class carrier presently in the U.S. reserve fleet. In 1981 the United States Navy estimated it would take 34 months and \$503 million (excluding an air wing) to return the USS Oriskany to service.¹⁸ Of the \$503 million, \$170 million was required to make her seaworthy and \$333 million was to be used for modernization.¹⁹ Subsequent studies indicated that USS Bon Homme Richard was in better material condition and thus a better candidate for refurbishment but costs were not estimated.²⁰ The USN dropped the idea of bringing an Essex-class ship out of mothballs when the two nuclear aircraft carriers were approved in the FY83 budget. There is no claim on

these ships now save for a wartime contingency role which seems implausible in light of the 34 months required to make them ready for service.

Irrespective of Australia's decision, the idea of Australia having an Essex-class carrier as the centerpiece of its fleet is certainly favorable from a U.S. perspective. Consider:

--The roles and missions expected of Australia in wartime would greatly benefit from a carrier-oriented fleet. While a V/STOL-capable design would suffice, there can be no question that a conventional carrier provides the best mix of power projection, self protection (early warning and ASW) and survivability. There are those who point to the success of the British Sea Harrier V/STOL aircraft in the Falklands War as evidence that V/STOL carriers and aircraft are adequate to the task of projecting power at sea. However, the British fleet suffered heavily because it never gained air superiority. Even as the Sea Harriers handled themselves well in one-on-one engagements, the V/STOL carrier task force could not prevent Argentine aircraft from penetrating British defenses and releasing their ordnance against the Royal Navy's ships. Thus, a conventional carrier in the Australian fleet is the best way for that nation to put fighting power to sea.

--Given the formidable presence of an Australian carrier in the Indian Ocean, the United States could lower its commitment to the Indian Ocean and perhaps see one of its CVBGs relieved periodically by the RAN. The capability of Australian naval assets to supplant those of the U.S. would be especially

beneficial in times of crisis elsewhere in the world requiring redirection of our resources.

--An air wing for a conventional carrier can be provided relatively quickly and economically due to the availability of surplus A-4 and A-7 aircraft being phased out of the USN inventory for newer aircraft.

--Finally, and not to be overlooked, is the lasting good will and friendship to be created by this assistance to an old and trusted ally. The impact of transferring this ship would be especially salutary if it were timed to coincide with the Australian Commonwealth Centennial in 1988.

The idea of transferring an Essex-class carrier is not without its drawbacks. Beyond the obvious problem of cost, Australia anticipated replacing HMAS Melbourne with a ship that would require about the same manpower (1200 men)²¹ while an Essex-class ship requires up to 2090 men, or 3200 men including the air wing.²² On the other hand, Australia would have three years to build up the additional manpower if needed. Also, as was done when the USS New Jersey was returned to service, reductions in command and control and ship defenses could significantly reduce the designed manning requirements.

Technical Transfer/Cooperation

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economic base, while U.S. efforts in the region must contend with the realities of our commitments around the world.

One possibility for improving the U.S./Australian capability in the Indian Ocean would be to increase the resources Australia provides for her defense and which would be available to support joint objectives. Since the size of Australian defense spending is rigidly defined by domestic political considerations and GDP, an alternate way to increase the size and/or capability of her armed forces would be to increase the efficiency with which weapons are procured and supported. While there are valid reasons for the strategy now used to accomplish these tasks, a bit of background will lead to suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of this system.

During the early days of World War II prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor Australia began the licensed production of several British-designed aircraft. Certain components were to be manufactured in Britain and shipped to Australia for use on the aircraft being assembled there. However, in the summer of 1940, just as the Australian assembly lines were coming up to speed (and the Battle of Britain was about to begin), the Australian authorities received a message from the British government stating that, until further notice, no more aircraft parts could be expected.²³

Australia was able to mobilize its own resources and produce the needed components in time to meet the Japanese threat in early 1942, but this episode left an indelible mark on Australian defense policy. To this day, Australia goes to

it would take from three to five years (to order machine tools, tool up and start production) before domestically produced high technology aircraft spare parts would be available should overseas sources be cut off.²⁶ Similar pictures can be painted for ships, missiles, and other weapon systems. The premium Australia pays for a broadly based industrial capability may not be worth the high price required to achieve it.

As a principal supplier of Australian weapons, the U.S. works very closely with that country to assure equity in all arms contracts and to provide a guaranteed source of spares and technical support. The two nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Logistic Support (March, 1980) in which the U.S. pledged to "make its best endeavours [sic] to provide assistance sought by Australia" in meeting the latter country's logistics needs in peace and war.²⁷ These words have not been totally reassuring, and the Australians have continued with their efforts to be as self-sufficient as possible in defense material. The Canberra government is realistic enough to recognize the limits on Australian defense industrial capability. Rather than attempt to provide all material needs of the armed services from domestic sources, it has opted instead to aim for a reasonable level of support for major weapon systems from local sources as well as on-shore manufacture of all high usage munitions.²⁸

Where overseas purchase of a weapon is deemed advisable, the Government of Australia insists that an Australian

Industrial Participation (AIP) plan be part of any competing proposal in an effort to keep the domestic industrial base active and current. Under guidance established by the Australians in 1970, 30 percent of the price of any major acquisition must be included as AIP offsets in the form of designated (directly related to the weapon being purchased) or nondesignated (nonproject related but at a comparable level of technology) work.²⁹ The Australian government subsidizes the added cost associated with establishing the offset. In many cases the contract is executed only with the contractor's promise to do everything possible to secure the desired level of AIP, but history has shown that the actual offsets have not met the 30 percent goal.³⁰

The effort to provide a high level of industrial self-reliance along with the relatively low-level of offsets gained with foreign weapon purchases are placing a heavy burden on Australian defense budgets. Not only must our ally pay a penalty to maintain a relatively small force and to establish offset production capability, but by not meeting desired offset levels the industry is deprived of the additional economic activity which would have been generated. As the largest weapon supplier to Australia, the U.S. needs to take the lead to remedy this situation and allow the Australian government to provide more defense capability from its limited budget.

Improvements in the efficiency of Australian logistics can be made on both sides of the Pacific. The Australians can drive a harder bargain in establishing guaranteed offsets as a

part of major weapon contracts. Promise of future offset work is not enough; the contractor must provide actual offset work or agree to pay monetary concessions if such offsets are not forthcoming prior to delivery of the weapons. Also, Australia needs to identify its weapon requirements earlier so that its industry can qualify as a supplier of components for an entire production run rather than just those units going to Australia. This would provide a sustained level of work and reduce cost through learning curve efficiencies and by spreading sunk costs over a larger base. Here the U.S. can help by establishing closer coordination with Australia on coming weapon development programs beyond that called for in the 1980 logistics MOU.

The U.S. Department of Defense can also take the lead to promote regional cooperation for production and support of weapon systems. The scope of this paper does not permit detailed discussion of this point, but a basic outline can be provided. The U.S. should invite friendly industrialized nations in the Pacific region (Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, perhaps Malaysia and Singapore) to join a Pacific Armaments Coordination Council (PACC) to provide mutual cooperation in the production and support of common weapons from the earliest possible moment. Where common requirements exist, the interested countries can form a consortium for development, production and support such as was done by our NATO allies for the F-16. For example, Korea, Japan and Australia are all purchasing modern fighter aircraft (F-16,

F-15 and F/A-18, respectively); the last two countries will assemble their aircraft domestically. Had these nations been encouraged to select a common design, the three strong trading partners might have been able to negotiate higher percentages of offset production, secure a greater regional support capability, and still be able to assemble their own aircraft. Similarly, New Zealand, Australia and Japan all purchased or are purchasing P-3 Orion LRMP aircraft, with Japan undertaking coproduction. Here again, regional cooperation would have been economically beneficial to all concerned. The list of weapons and country combinations is limitless, but a mechanism for discussion at an early stage--the PACC--must be provided. Since the U.S. sells weapons to all these countries, it would be a logical leader in such an effort. Obviously there would be some limitations imposed by considerations of U.S. security and domestic employment on this scheme. But much can be done to foster allied interoperability and improved military capability at minimum cost through even a partial implementation.³¹

Increased U.S. Land-Based Air Presence

The Australian government has granted the U.S. permission to operate B-52 bombers over training routes in northern and western Australia and to use Darwin as a staging base for these training flights as well as for surveillance flights over the Indian Ocean. Beginning in 1981, the surveillance missions have provided an important new U.S. capability in the region. In addition to furnishing information on the movement of Soviet

and other forces in the Indian Ocean, the flights provide experience to aircrews which will be invaluable in time of crisis or conflict. These periodic B-52 flights also serve as a graphic demonstration of Western presence and resolve in the region.

The Australian press has reported that up to sixteen B-52 surveillance or training missions have been authorized every month, but as publicly stated by MGen Ruben Autry, USAF, commander of the SAC 3rd Air Division on Guam, an average of only one surveillance mission per quarter is actually flown.³² The U.S. would do well to take greater advantage of the opportunity to operate B-52 LRMP missions and their supporting tanker aircraft from Darwin or other Australian bases. Not only would such missions permit more of our aircrews to gain experience in the region, but a higher sustained tempo of operations would promote greater acceptance of such activity during a crisis or time of rising tension. Australian citizens are sensitive to the U.S. presence on their soil. Our government needs to do everything possible to promote a business-as-usual appearance to our operations to assure needed freedom of action in all situations.

The benefits from operating B-52 LRMP missions from Australian bases could also be realized in the staging of USN P-3 Orions from airfields in west or north Australia. The P-3 is in service with the RAAF and is well suited to its LRMP and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) roles over the Indonesian archipelago and straits and the sea approaches to Australia.

In the event of a crisis in the Indian Ocean, unimpeded access to these waters also would be required by the USN. This may demand more resources than are available in the small force of Australian LRMP aircraft. The USN may have to operate its own P-3 aircraft in some strength in the region, and Australian bases would prove invaluable.

The U.S. Government should work closely with the Government of Australia to reach an agreement for regular deployments of USN P-3 detachments (approximately three aircraft and four crews) to bases in north or west Australia (Darwin or Learmouth being the most favorable choices). Such operations could use the same modus operandi as the B-52 surveillance flights with the aircraft deploying to a base, conducting operations for a period of time, then returning to their home base. Of more value to joint U.S.-Australian defense cooperation would be the establishment of a permanent operating location to support detachments on deployment from their home base. The operation would involve a permanent cadre of perhaps a few dozen maintenance and administrative personnel to support the deployed aircraft and crews. A stock of high-use spare parts should be established to permit a limited maintenance capability. The operating location could be run as an all-USN operation with the capability of supporting RAAF Orions as needed, or it could be established as a jointly manned and funded facility with a more formally scheduled mix of RAAF and USN deployments. The common P-3C aircraft operated by the two services would facilitate such joint operations and support.

USN participation in a project of this nature would, like the B-52 deployments, provide valuable aircrew experience while creating a visible and credible presence in the region. The establishment of a joint use LRMP base in north or west Australia would enhance RAAF maritime capability in the Indian Ocean/Indonesian archipelago and thus encourage our ally to realize a long-stated defense objective. The increase in personnel and flight activity to support such an operation would have positive economic impact on the area of the base and would be in keeping with the desires of the Government of Australia to encourage development in north and west Australia. The relatively small number of permanently assigned U.S. personnel involved with such an operating location would not be politically offensive to the Australians. The fact that no military aircraft were being permanently based in Australia and that the aircraft participating in such deployments would be visibly similar to Australian aircraft operating from the same base would further serve to promote the acceptability of such an arrangement.

We see no overriding case for permanently basing U.S. air assets in Australia. While the movement of large numbers of people and resources into an underdeveloped area would have a positive economic impact, such a move would only serve to make U.S.-Australian defense cooperation a political issue; the ALP has already taken a clear public stand against American bases in their country. Also, the U.S. would be hard-pressed to find funds for major base development in an already over-extended defense budget.

The present arrangements for operating U.S. aircraft through Australian bases appear to be working quite well. So long as the Government of Australia will permit us to continue exercising this capability, U.S. forces can remain deployed as they are and still retain the option to operate from Australian bases as the need arises. The U.S. would do well to take every opportunity to use Australian bases, particularly with LRMP and tanker assets, and exercise regularly in close cooperation with Australian forces to enhance mutual capabilities in the region.

Regional Diplomacy and Military Cooperation

Australia has played an impressive diplomatic role in the region in recent years, and the U.S. should encourage continued activity. Perhaps most important, Australia injects a Western perspective into regional affairs. The Australians have worked particularly well with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, all of which are capable of playing important parts in any Indian Ocean drama. We may see some change in policy on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace with the election of an ALP government, but we should try to foster a viewpoint compatible with our own and not lose sight of Australia's overall diplomatic worth to us even if an unfavorable change on the Zone of Peace should occur.

Australian participation in the Five Power Defense Arrangement and the cooperation it provides for Singapore and Malaysia has great value.³³ We should quietly encourage its continuation. The Australian P-3 detachment at Butterworth Air Station merits special mention for its surveillance and ASW

capability as well as its ability to support U.S. flight missions in the area. The Australian government is withdrawing its Mirage fighter units from Butterworth for refitting with F/A-18s.³⁴ No decision has been made to return F/A-18 units to Malaysia, but such a deployment would be desirable, both in terms of force projection and as a sign of western interest, and should be encouraged. Australian participation in the Sinai Multinational Force has also been most valuable, and we should strive to convince the Hawke government to maintain it.

Australian military assistance in the region is limited but meaningful, both in practical and symbolic terms. Australian military assistance totaled A\$35 million in 1982 with the largest recipients being Papua/New Guinea, Indonesia and Malaysia.³⁵ The U.S. exchanges assistance information with Australia, but the two countries do not coordinate their military assistance programs in advance. It would be useful and cost effective to do so, especially with respect to countries of special importance to Australia. This is yet another domain in which joint planning would make sense and in which a stronger ANZUS structure might play a role.

Australia has managed well the question of the future status of the Cocos Islands and thereby defused a potential uproar in the United Nations. Having bought out the interests of the British owner, Canberra is permitting the small, largely ethnic Malay local community to freely decide its own future. The Australians have, however, made clear to the inhabitants that their best economic option is integration with

Australia.³⁶ The islands have strategic value in support of allied Indian Ocean ASW operations and, one hopes, will still be available for that role after the self-determination process concludes. Perhaps the most important element of all is to prevent Soviet presence or influence.

Encouragement of a Stronger Australian

Defense Budget

In 1982 the Australian defense budget totaled A\$4.1 billion, about 2.7 percent of GDP.³⁷ Prime Minister Fraser's program to increase defense spending in real terms by 7 percent a year for five years from 1979 reflected his own view of the inadequacy of the commitment to defense. The percentage of Australian GDP dedicated to security has increased slightly but is still less than half the comparable U.S. figure. Australians, like many other allies, are reluctant to increase defense spending when their economies are in difficulty, the threat seems remote, and any additional contribution they can make seems negligible when compared to U.S. or Soviet military might. They, like many of our allies, sometimes fail to appreciate that the combined effort of all acting together substantially adds to allied flexibility and capability and, perhaps even more important, signals resolve to the Soviet Union and its surrogates. In the Australian case there are countless gaps which increased expenditures could address, such as force structure, major acquisitions (including an aircraft carrier), logistic support and secure communications equipment

compatible with ours. Obviously it is up to the Australian government to decide how it will shape and equip its armed forces. We should not, however, shrink from reminding the Australians (and our other allies) that they, too, must carry a fair share of the mutual defense burden. While not downplaying what Australia is doing already in terms of facilities they provide and their attempts to modernize, we should encourage further progress.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Australians and Americans have a unique relationship due to shared political, social and economic aspirations and a frontier experience which has profoundly affected national development and outlook. The two countries have worked closely to strengthen the Free World and have fought to defend common security interests. The U.S. accepts the global responsibilities inherent in the leadership of the Free World and, realizing its own limitations, looks to allies such as Australia to play an increased role in regional affairs. The Indian Ocean is, in fact, a perfect example of an area where available U.S. forces are stretched beyond acceptable limits. Australian-American cooperation is already at a high level, but much more can be done. A stronger, more vigilant Australia is in the interest of Australians, Americans and the entire Free World. It is not only a question of encouraging Australia to devote more of its resources to security requirements, although that is part of the answer. It also means planning and working together more closely to ensure a cost effective deterrent to aggression.

Basic U.S.-Australian interests are so similar that they should not be affected by partisan politics. Strategies to achieve fundamental objectives will vary, however, depending on political developments in Canberra and Washington. The results of the March 5, 1983, Australian election will, therefore,

influence the way in which the U.S. government implements any part of the program suggested by this paper.

The U.S. should not seek any significant changes in the form or substance of the current relationship for several months. Prime Minister Hawke will need time to consolidate his position and will give priority to domestic issues. ALP rhetoric has called for review of various aspects of our defense arrangements, and Hawke will be obliged to take this into account. This seems unlikely to result in any essential change in the substance of our bilateral relationship or in the current level of cooperation. During the initial phase of the new government, Washington should expect minor adjustments in Australian foreign or defense policy which are intended to satisfy certain elements in the party and underscore the change in government.

A good starting point on the path to greater cooperation would be to improve consultations. An initiative in this area might be carefully taken during the early days of the new government. The ALP leadership may well appreciate an invitation of this type for domestic political reasons. Likewise, the opportunity to place Australian representatives at CENTCOM and CINCPAC to improve military liaison may be seen as desirable. We should take advantage of contacts with senior officials in the new government to encourage them to look beyond a fortress Australia approach to security matters.

After sufficient time it might be appropriate to proceed with other initiatives which clearly promise a net gain to

Australia. Greater use of HMAS Stirling by USN vessels and an arrangement for larger naval fueling facilities in the Perth area would help build up valuable Australian owned and controlled security infrastructure at reduced cost to Australia. The development of regional coproduction of defense items is a more complex and long term issue but would certainly benefit Australia through reduced unit costs, job creation and enhanced prestige in the region. We should also act reasonably early to encourage a continuation of an active defense role vis-a-vis important neighbors and offer to coordinate more closely on military assistance to these nations. Continued Five Power participation is especially important. The replacement of Mirage fighters with F/A-18s at Butterworth appears less likely under Hawke than under Fraser, but we should do what we can to convince the new government of the value of such a deployment.

On other, more controversial initiatives, we must take a wait and see attitude. For example, the timing of a strong pitch for an increase in the share of Australian GDP devoted to defense expenditures will depend on many factors--but it should be made and relatively soon. The recent indications that Hawke will bolster the defense budget may make this less controversial than might have been anticipated prior to the election. Joint planning is an area that might be seen as politically controversial by some ALP members because of their advocacy of a more independent defense posture. Nonetheless, if presented as prescribed in Chapter III, the new government

may be able to put rhetoric aside and accept as logical and beneficial our proposal for limited joint planning in the eastern Indian Ocean. We will have to play a passive role for the present on any change in the number or form of joint exercises, ship visits, P-3 or B-52 missions. One hopes that the Hawke government will pose no obstacle to the continuation of such activities or to their eventual increase. Any suggestions to add to current agreements, for example, by increasing P-3 or B-52 missions or by organizing an ANZUS secretariat should be deferred until the new government has settled into office.

The proposal to assist Australia in obtaining an aircraft carrier is the most doubtful of all. Hawke has confirmed earlier ALP statements which opposed the acquisition of a carrier. It seems unlikely, short of a dramatic change in the security situation, that he would entertain the idea of investing any Australian funds in such a venture. The U.S. should not push hard on this issue. On the other hand, an Australian fleet with a carrier at its heart would be of significant benefit to all involved and is worth proposing at the right moment.

This paper has outlined modest but concrete ways in which allied capabilities, infrastructure and cooperation in the Indian Ocean can be improved to meet U.S. goals in the Indian Ocean region. These suggestions take into account fiscal realities of both countries and possible public relations problems. Most of the proposals are noncontroversial. The

authors believe that the two governments would be able to obtain public approval for all these measures without great difficulty provided the will to do so exists. No serious international opposition is foreseen to a strengthening of an already existing alliance.

On a global basis the time has come for a reexamination of the importance of continued survival of the Free World and the contribution each of its members must make to ensure that survival. In many ways our relationship with Australia is less in need of improvement than those with our other friends. So perhaps Australia is a good starting place for a broad revitalization of Free World vigilance.

NOTES

CHAPTER I (Pages 4-7)

1. The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Recast As Unified Command (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 10, 1982).

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CHAPTER II (Pages 8-17)

1. Henry S. Albinski, The Australian-American Security Relationship: A Regional and International Perspective (St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1982), p. 116.
2. Overseas Trade of Australia: Comparative and Summary Tables II (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1982).
3. See Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1980).
4. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Threats to Australia's Security: Their Nature and Probability (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), pp. 40-42.
5. John McCarthy, "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy," The Australian Journal of Politics and History, December 1977, p. 337.
6. The CY1982 inflation rate was 11 per cent and GDP dropped 2 per cent. Prospects for a rapid turnaround remain dim. Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics; The Mid-December Treasurer's Report, 1982; and The Melbourne University Economic Forecast for 1983.
7. RAN 17, 626; RAAF 22, 707; Army 32,850. International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 1982/83," Air Force Magazine, December 1982, p. 127.
8. Rt. Hon. Ian Sinclair, Speech to The Australian Defense Association, November 19, 1982.
9. "The Hornet Keeps Its Sting", Pacific Defense Reporter, November 1982, p. 59.
10. VAdm Sir James Willis, RAN, "Why We Bought Invincible," Pacific Defense Reporter, April 1982, pp. 61-62.

11. A.W. Grazebrook, "After Invincible--Where Next?," Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1982, p. 32.
12. Gary Brown and Derek Woolher, A New Aircraft Carrier for RAN? (Canberra: Australian National University, Strategic and Defense Center, July 28, 1982).
13. Sub. Lt. J.V.P. Goldrick, RAN, and Sub. Lt. P.D. Jones, RAN, "The Royal Australian Navy--A Progress Report," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1981, p. 112.
14. A.W. Grazebrook, "Australia's Maritime Airpower: Where Next?," Pacific Defense Reporter, July 1982, p. 10.
15. The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Threats to Australia's Security, p. 94ff.

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CHAPTER III (Pages 18-45)

1. For a succinct description and analysis of the ANZUS Treaty, See Thomas Durell Young, ANZUS in the Indian Ocean: Strategic Considerations (Geneva: Institut Universitaire De Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1982), pp. 48-71.
2. Information based on interviews with USN OPNAV staff (OP-60).
3. Haslim Djala, Chairman of the Indonesian Delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference, in an address entitled "Economic Zones: The Concept and Its Implications." to the Pacific Symposium, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1983.
4. Alvin J. Cottrell and Robert J. Hanks, The Military Utility of the U.S. Facilities in the Philippines (Washington: Georgetown University Center of Strategic and International Studies, Significant Issues Series, 1980), p. 27.
5. "Phase-out of bases predicted," Washington Times, September 7, 1982, p. 6:1-4.
6. John Edwards in the Bulletin, June 17, 1980; and Denis Warner in the Melbourne Herald, July 21, 1980; quoted in Henry S. Albinski, "Australia and U.S. Strategy," Current History, April 1982, p. 151.
7. Information based on interviews with USN OPNAV staff (OP-60).
8. Ibid.

9. Interviews with staff members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5), November 17, 1982.

10. Interview with Captain James Major, USN, CINCPAC staff, February 10, 1983.

11. Interview with Mr. Robert Brand, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, December 3, 1982.

12. Interview with USN OPNAV staff (OP-63).

13. Australia ranks second only to Saudi Arabia in active foreign military sales (FMS) transactions with the United States, Ibid.

14. The two sides to this issue are best covered by Gary Brown and Derek Woolner, A New Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy? (Canberra: Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University, Working Paper No. 57, July 28, 1982) and by VAdm Sir James Wil'is, RAN, "Why We Bought Invincible," Pacific Defense Reporter, April 1982, pp. 61-61+.

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16. Sydney Morning Herald, August 27, 1982, p. 2:1-4.

17. Interview with USN OPNAV staff (OP-63).

18. Captain John E. Moore, RN, FRGS, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships (London: Paulton House, 1982), p. 619.

19. Ibid.

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21. Telephone conversation with Commodore John P. Snow, RAN, Attache, Embassy of Australia, Washington, D.C., March 8, 1983.

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26. Peter A. Smith, "Defense Industry and Mobilisation [sic]," quoted in Desmond Ball and J.O. Lantry (eds.), Problems of Mobilisation [sic] In Defense of Australia (Manuka, ACT, Australia Phoenix Defense Publications, 1980), p. 103.

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28. D.J. Killen, "The Philosophy of Australian Defense," Pacific Defense Reporter, June 1981, p. 6.

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31. Dr. John N. Ellison, Mobilization Concepts Development Center, National Defense University, has advanced a related idea to utilize the defense industrial capability of Australia and other Pacific basin countries to augment American industry during a defense emergency. See "Hands (Defense Industrial) Across the Pacific", Pacific Defense Reporter, November 1982, pp. 14, 16-17.

32. Speech to Council on Northern Australia, Port Hedland, NT, October 20, 1981.

33. The Five Powers are Australia, New Zealand, UK, Singapore and Malaysia. For background, see Henry S. Albinski, The Australian-American Security Relationship, p. 88.

34. Michael Richardson, "The RAAF's Role in South-East Asia," Pacific Defense Reporter, October 1982, p. 47.

35. Australian Yearbook 1981-82 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1982), pp. 63-64.

36. Frank Cranston, "Defense Interests a Major Influence," Canberra Times, December 1, 1982, p. 13; and M. McKinnon, "McVeigh Spells Out Cocos Islands Options," The Australian, November 30, 1982, p. 3.

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