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CHIANG KAI-SHEK, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE
FALL OF THE KUOMINTANG REGIME

BY

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
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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM

CHIANG KAI-SHEK, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE FALL OF THE KUOMINTANG REGIME

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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7 June 1983

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ABSTRACT

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PREFACE

The purpose of this essay is to determine the primary factors influencing the fall of the Kuomintang Regime in China and the impact of US policy on the final outcome of the Chinese Revolution.

In compiling this essay I will conduct a historical review of the period of the Chinese Revolution to provide a structural framework. Using this framework as a point of departure, I will discuss, in detail, the most popular theories used to explain the failure of the Kuomintang. I will discuss each of these theories from the point of view of its proponent. I will then analyze the validity of each theory in light of the other theories and the literature in general. From this point, I will assess the impact of US policy on the fall of the Kuomintang and in a concluding statement attempt to identify the salient factors which best explain the Nationalist failure.

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

The Republic is Born

With the abdication of the last Manchu Emperor in February 1912, the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1912) formally came to an end and the Republic of China was born. From the very first the new Republic was plagued with difficulties. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the titular head of the revolution, lacked the military power to consolidate his victory and to unify China.¹ In fact, no one in China had sufficient power to dominate the field and thereby receive the Mandate of Heaven. Sun Yat-sen was inaugurated as provisional president of the new republic on 1 January 1912, at Nanking. Sun decided to step aside a few weeks later in favor of Yuan Shih-k'ai (1859-1916) who appeared to be the only man likely to succeed in bringing China together.² Yuan and Sun were able to reach an agreement and the Manchu Emperor, Hsuan-t'ung (1906-1967), formally abdicated to Yuan, as provisional president of the Republic of China, on 12 February 12, 1912. The new constitution provided Yuan with a parliament and a cabinet. However, in the three years that followed, Yuan consolidated most of the power in China under his personal control.

Early Problems

Yuan alienated Sun Yat-sen and his followers by attempting to increase the powers of the presidency. He suspended the parliament in 1914 and assumed unlimited executive powers. In 1915 Yuan attempted to proclaim

himself emperor but was forced to abandon this project by the revolutionists. Another problem impacting on Yuan's freedom of action during this period was Japanese political aggression. Taking advantage of World War I, Japan moved against German concessions in China and in 1915 presented China with the Twenty-One Demands. Yuan initially intended to concede to the demands. Pressure from the United States restrained the Japanese but Yuan took a political beating. After his death in June 1916, China was again in need of a leader capable of unifying the country. The office of president changed hands several times in the next few years and the Nationalist government, even though it received international recognition, controlled only Peking and the surrounding areas.³ Due to the lack of a leader capable of unifying China the remainder of the republic was destined to be controlled for the next twelve years, 1916 to 1928, by the new scourge of China, the warlords.⁴

In 1917, in order to gain the return of German concessions in China and the abolition of other foreign privileges, the Peking regime entered World War I on the side of the allies. However, in 1919 the allies, through the Peace Treaty of Versailles, left the German concessions under Japanese control and refused to recognize Chinese demands for the abolition of foreign privileges in China. This refusal led to widespread demonstrations in China known as the May 4th Movement and to an increase in anti-foreign sentiment. At the Washington Naval Conference, however, China received a degree of satisfaction through the cancellation of certain foreign rights and the evacuation of Shantung peninsula by Japan and Britain.⁵

Communists and the Kuomintang

The Kuomintang party, founded by Sun Yat-sen, was able to survive the disunity and political chaos that plagued China during this period.⁶ Sun

continued to work to achieve his revolutionary objectives and attempted, in vain, to unify China in cooperation with various warlords. In 1921, during this same period of disunity and chaos, the Chinese Communist party was founded.⁷ In 1922 Sun had reached a low point in his revolutionary efforts and even though he did not accept the Communist idea of class struggle, he did recognize the usefulness of Communist support. The Communists on the other hand, in an effort to survive and develop, wanted to get into position to seize control of the Kuomintang. These circumstances led to an agreement in January 1923 by which the members of the Chinese Communist party were admitted to membership as individuals into the Kuomintang while the Communist party continued to operate as a separate organization. During the period of internal strife after Yuan's death, the Kuomintang--in alliance with the Communists--built a strong and disciplined party in Canton while the government in Peking continued to deteriorate.

Rise of the Kuomintang

After Sun Yat-sen's death in March of 1925, a power struggle developed among his followers from which Chiang Kai-shek (1886-1975), a long time follower, emerged triumphant. In 1926 Chiang launched the Northern Expedition from Canton to the Yangtze in his first step to reunify China under Nationalist (Kuomintang) control. This expedition proved to be extremely successful in subduing some of the warlords. However, as the expedition progressed, it developed anti-foreign overtones.⁸ In addition, the Communist and the Kuomintang leftists were converting the expedition into a social and economic revolution and were creating many international enemies through their violent treatment of foreigners.⁹ In April of 1927 Chiang dispatched his troops to liquidate the Communists.¹⁰ This marked the beginning of the enmity between Chiang and the Communist. Since Chiang's

coup against the Communists was not authorized by the central committee of the Kuomintang, he was dismissed from his post as Commander in Chief. However, the leftist members of the Kuomintang soon realized that the Communists really were agents of Moscow. This cleared the way for a reconciliation between the left and right wings of the Kuomintang. Chiang returned early in 1928.

During this period, Chiang consciously decided to stop the revolution short of the masses and to preserve the Confucian and traditional order in China.¹¹ His liquidation of the Communists without authority indicates that it was his personal decision. Chiang's refusal to equalize land ownership and to pursue the pro-Soviet policy originated by Sun supports this idea and appears to be a logical extension of his decision to retain the traditional Chinese values.¹²

In the spring of 1928 Chiang continued the Northern Expedition from the Yangtze to Peking. Peking was taken in June. China was finally reunited, at least in name, in December 1928 when Chang Hsueh-liang (1898-) (the Young Marshal) declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang.¹³ This reunification, however, was more form than fact. Chiang, rather than subduing the remaining warlords, created a weak system of alliances. This lack of a firm power base throughout China continually created mutual distrust and resulted in great obstacles to the successful implementation of important reforms and programs. As the radical elements of the regime were purged or voluntarily departed, the new government took on a conservative tinge. The equalization of land ownership and the pro-Soviet policy originated by Sun Yat-sen were abandoned and the new regime received the enthusiastic support of the landowners and the intellectuals. After the Northern Expedition Chiang again stopped short of his logical objective and

failed to follow up his initial victories with the complete reunification of China.

In 1928, although recognized as the legal government of China, the Kuomintang directly controlled only one-third of the nation while the other two-thirds continued to suffer under the control of various warlords. Chiang felt that the warlords could be controlled and easily overcome but decided to tolerate them for the moment and concentrate on his real enemy--the Communists.¹⁴

After the Chinese revolution of 1925 to 1928, Chiang Kai-shek attempted to free China from the oppressive and humiliating unequal treaties forced upon her in the past century and a half. The end of World War I brought with it the end of China's unequal treaties with Germany, Austria and Hungary. The Soviet Union renounced its unequal treaties with China in 1924, four years after China herself had unilaterally abrogated them.¹⁵ Now, Chiang wanted the Western powers and Japan to do the same. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 formalized the Open Door Policy of the United States and the Western powers agreed to consider the problems of tariffs and extraterritoriality.¹⁶ During 1928-1929 a series of treaties were signed between China and the Western powers that returned tariff control to China. However, in the areas of extraterritoriality and the return of Chinese concessions, China did not fare as well. It was to be more than a decade before these problems were finally rectified.

Communist Withdrawal to Rural Bases

In July of 1930 the Communists, under the leadership of Li Li-san, launched an attack on the cities of Changsha and Wuhan for the purpose of building an urban revolutionary base.¹⁷ These attacks were repulsed and the Communists, who were badly beaten, withdrew to rural bases. During

this time Mao Tse-tung's (1893-1976) prestige within the party increased and his ideas, of basing the revolution on the peasants rather than on the workers, and of the control of the countryside rather than the industrial centers, began to gain acceptance. By early 1930 the Communists had already extended their control over much of Kiangsi, Fukien and Hunan provinces.

After the Communists had failed in their attempt to establish a proletarian revolutionary base in Wuhan and had withdrawn into their base areas in Kiangsi province, Chiang attempted to complete their destruction. Between 1930 and 1933 Chiang launched four military operations against the Communist base areas. All of these campaigns ended in failure due to superior Communist intelligence networks and Chiang's ineptitude. Japan inadvertently contributed to the failure of the third and fourth Nationalist operations by invading Manchuria in 1931 and with the attack on Shanghai in 1932-1933.¹⁸

Review of the United States Attitude

The United States Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg (1856-1937) had, since assuming office in 1925, been trying to devise a plan that would lead directly to granting full national independence to China in the shortest possible time.¹⁹ Mr. Kellogg believed, according to his own statements, that a nation of four hundred million people could not be expected to submit to foreign control and that such matters as extraterritoriality were awkward and old-fashioned pieces of machinery which no one could reasonably hope to maintain in a modern world.²⁰ The anti-foreign hysteria during the Northern Expedition indicates that the Chinese shared Mr. Kellogg's views.

During the period from 1925 to 1928, however, Mr. Kellogg avoided any negotiations with China because he felt that neither the government in

Peking nor the government in Nanking under Chiang Kai-shek was representative of the majority of the Chinese people. Mr. Kellogg's desired objectives were further frustrated by the other Western powers and Japan, and by Mr. John MacMurray (1881-1960), United States Minister in Peking, who was opposed to Mr. Kellogg's liberal approach.

CHAPTER II

EARLY PROBLEMS

Russia

Chiang's external problems as leader of the Kuomintang regime began when he attempted to exert his influence in the semi-autonomous region of Manchuria.²¹ This brought him into direct conflict with Russia and Japan, the two powers who had spheres of influence in the area. The Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929 was his first confrontation. This short-lived conflict was the result of a dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railroad. It was settled by direct negotiations which restored the status quo ante bellum.²² The significance of this conflict can be understood only in its relation to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.²³ The ink was hardly dry on the Kellogg-Briand Pact when the Sino-Soviet conflict erupted. Although the United States Secretary of State Henry Stimson (1867-1950) reminded the parties of the provisions of the pact on two different occasions, the pact was never invoked. For those who were following the situation closely, the dualism of Western policy was evident. The Western powers were obviously willing to affix their seals to high sounding and moralistic documents but were unwilling to provide the economic and military power to enforce them.²⁴ The lessons learned during the Sino-Soviet conflict appear to have removed any inhibitions the Japanese may have felt and led to Chiang's second confrontation in Manchuria.

Japan

Apparently unaffected by his previous setback at the hands of the Russians, Chiang next turned his attention on the Japanese controlled areas in southern Manchuria. The Japanese had the majority of their overseas investments tied up in the vast industrial complex built around the South Manchurian Railroad. To safeguard the monopolistic interest of the railroad, Japan had obtained a promise from China in 1905 that China would not construct another line that would be prejudicial to the Japanese economic interests. Another problem in the area evolved from the immigration of Koreans, who were at that time Japanese subjects, into Manchuria.

The situation in Manchuria became explosive when the Chinese, in violation of the 1905 agreement, began to construct a rail line that paralleled the South Manchuria line and encouraged Chinese to immigrate to Manchuria. A conflict between Chinese and Korean farmers led to the Manchurian Incident in 1931.²⁵ Anti-Chinese riots in Seoul and Tokyo were a direct result of this incident. These anti-Chinese riots led in turn to anti-Japanese riots in China. This delicate situation erupted into open conflict on 18 September 1931 by what is now called the Mukden Incident.²⁶ Although this incident was instigated by the Japanese military in Manchuria, the Japanese government, faced with a right wing revolt if it ordered the Kwantung Army to retreat and anxious to protect its overseas investments, decided not to reverse the course the Army had taken. This tacit approval by the Japanese government was followed by the almost unopposed occupation of Manchuria and the province of Jehol by the Japanese Army. Chiang decided not to oppose the Japanese invaders. He was willing to yield to Japanese demands in order to gain time to defeat the Communists.²⁷ This policy incited public anger and demonstrations for Chiang's

resignation and provided Communist propagandists with more ammunition. Chiang did resign, but regained power shortly thereafter.

Unable to resist Japanese aggression alone, Chiang appealed to the League of Nations and the United States for help. Although sympathetic, the Western powers would supply only verbal and moral support. The United States developed the policy of non-recognition of conquests and settlements achieved by other than peaceful means, which was later known as the Stimson Doctrine.²⁸

The Japanese, however, did not relieve the pressure but attacked Shanghai in 1932. By this time it was clear that Japan intended to bring all of North China under its control.²⁹ In fear of losing their concessions in the the port city of Shanghai, the Western powers actively joined in mediating a peace. Unable to match the Japanese on the battlefield, the Nationalists signed the Tangku Truce in May 1933 and agreed to withdraw from the Peking-Tientsin area.³⁰

Fifth Campaign Against the Communists

After signing away part of Northern China in the Tangku Truce, four years of relative peace with the Japanese followed in which Chiang again turned his attention on the Communists. In 1934, with the aid of German advisors, Chiang devised a military campaign against the Communists which was accompanied by an economic blockade that separated and isolated the Communists from the people and almost succeeded in destroying them. Rather than risk total annihilation in a positional battle, the Communists broke out of the encirclement and began the "long march" from Kiangsi province to northern Shensi province. This six thousand mile march ended in the fall of 1935 with 20,000 of the original 80,000 Communists surviving the journey.

During this march, while the Chinese Communists were out of direct contact with Moscow, Mao gained a dominant position in the party.

The Sian Incident

After arriving in northern Shensi, the Communists found themselves opposed by Chang Hsueh-liang (the Young Marshal) who had recently been driven from Manchuria by the Japanese invaders. Through an effective propaganda campaign the officers and soldiers of the Manchurian Army were convinced by Communist agents that the Communists and Nationalists should develop a united front to drive the Japanese from Manchuria rather than fight among themselves. The officers and men of the Manchurian Army, who had recently been driven from their homes by the Japanese, were receptive to this Communist argument. The "Young Marshal" was also convinced by the Communists that Chiang was employing the old Chinese tactic of using one enemy to destroy the other. Tied in with this effort to divert the "Young Marshal" was a call, from the Comintern and Chinese Communists, for nationwide resistance to the Japanese through a new united front.³¹ A general Chinese resistance at this time would serve the dual Communist purpose of preventing the Japanese from attacking Russia and the Nanking government from attacking the Chinese Communists. These Communist offers to join with the Kuomintang were rebuffed by Chiang.

In December of 1936 Chiang flew to the headquarters of the Manchurian Army, at Sian, for a first hand look at the situation. On arrival, Chiang was kidnapped by the "Young Marshal," who demanded a united front against Japan. Chiang refused to negotiate and was released on 25 December, after Chou En-lai (1898-1976) interceded in Chiang's behalf.³² In the summer of 1937 an agreement was completed between Chiang and Chou En-lai and the

second period of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists began. The Japanese struck before the agreement was completed.

First Sparks of World War II

On 7 July 1937 Japanese and Chinese forces clashed south of Peking at the Marco Polo Bridge in Lukouchiao. The Japanese, already alarmed at China's reunification and again at Chiang's rapprochement with the Communists, decided to settle matters in Northern China. Chiang, who could not afford to give in further to the Japanese, decided on all-out resistance and the incident developed into a general conflict. The Japanese eventually gained control of most of the populated areas and economic centers in China and forced Chiang to move his government to Chungking, deep into the interior of China. Even after these defeats Chiang refused to surrender and the Japanese did not have the manpower to occupy all of China. A deadlock ensued and the Japanese installed a puppet government in Peking in an attempt to force Chiang to submit to their terms. The Japanese also tried in vain to have this puppet government recognized by the Western powers in an attempt to legalize their control over China.³³

The Chinese deadlock upset the balance that had existed between Tokyo and Washington since 1933. Secretary of State Cordell Hull (1871-1955) had decided that a free China was essential to American interests and he was determined to keep Japan from dominating the Far East.³⁴ Hull snubbed Japanese offers to divide the Pacific into spheres of influence and made it perfectly clear that the United States would not accept a Japanese Monroe Doctrine over East Asia. However, in the 1937 conflict the Japanese found the Roosevelt Administration no more willing to back up its words with deeds than the Hoover Administration was in the 1931-1933 Manchurian conflict.

CHAPTER III

WORLD WAR II

United States Enters War

Between 1937 and 1941 war in Europe erupted and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Japan continued to try to convince the United States to recognize its influence in Asia, but to no avail. As the United States was gradually drawn into the economic support of England in her attempt to contain Germany and Italy, it gradually found reasons to increase its economic blockade of Japan. Faced with economic strangulation and unwilling to abandon its dream of "a greater East Asian co-prosperity sphere," Japan chose war.³⁵

When the United States entered the war against Japan, both the Communists and Nationalists acted as if the war had already been won and began to think in terms of a postwar struggle between themselves. From the Nationalist point of view, the Communists should be contained and if possible reduced. The Communists on the other hand were anxious to bring as many areas under their control as possible. Both sides became more concerned with their struggle against each other than with their common war with Japan.

When Chiang requested an American general of at least three-star rank to administer his lend-lease and act as his Chief of Staff, he probably envisioned a situation in which the China theater would be the center of the United States effort to defeat the Japanese. In this situation he probably envisioned his American Chief of Staff commanding American troops

in the battle for China and tons of lend-lease supplies to equip the Chinese Armies for the inevitable conflict with the Communists.

It must have been a tremendous shock to Chiang when he became aware of the "Germany first" policy of the Allies and the tactical defeats the Allies were willing to sustain in the Pacific in pursuit of this strategic policy.³⁶ The realities of this policy were quickly driven home by the loss of Burma to the Japanese and the subsequent closing of the Burma Road. Stilwell, who spoke the language and was familiar with China, was probably Chiang's biggest surprise.

Operations in Burma

General Joseph Stilwell (1883-1946) was selected for the China assignment and arrived at his post early in 1942.³⁷ His primary objective after arrival was to keep the Burma Road open so that American supplies could continue to flow into China. His efforts proved to be in vain.³⁸

The inability of the allies to hold the Burma Road was attributable to a number of problems. First, the China-Burma-India theater was under the command of the British, who were not overly impressed with the need for the Burma Road. As far as they were concerned all lend-lease material that reached China was material wasted and subtracted from the lend-lease material available for war against Germany. Second, Chiang was aware of the British feelings and suspected British intentions of providing a determined defense in Burma. Finally, these ill feelings bred mutual distrust between Chiang and the British and precipitated the loss of valuable time in taking the field against the Japanese and a mutual reluctance to commit themselves to the degree necessary for victory. On the battlefield the British doubted the Chinese ability to protect their flank and the Chinese suspected British intentions. This mutual distrust led Chiang to attempt to control

the movement of the Chinese forces engaged in Burma from Chungking, without Stilwell's knowledge, in order to preserve his armies. The outcome of such an operation was bound to be disaster.³⁹

After this initial setback in Burma, Stilwell returned to Chungking through India. He was already planning his return to Burma. Back in China, Stilwell concentrated on improving the quality of the Chinese Army. Convinced that the individual Chinese soldier was as good as any if properly trained, equipped and led, Stilwell, in his capacity as Chief of Staff, set out to improve these weaknesses in the Chinese military. He attempted to set up a valid training program to prepare the Chinese armies to retake Burma and defeat the Japanese. He insured that most of the tonnage flown into China was equipment to support the Chinese armies.⁴⁰ Recognizing the leadership problem that permeated the Nationalist Army, Stilwell attempted to shake up the Chinese command and staff in order to get rid of the deadwood that made up a high percentage of that ineffective system.

Stilwell's Attempt to Improve the Chinese Armies

In pursuing these goals Stilwell immediately ran into difficulties with Chiang and one of his own subordinates, Claire Chennault (1890-1958), the commander of the American Fourteenth Air Force in China.⁴¹ The difficulty between Chiang and Stilwell evolved from a complex of internal Kuomintang problems that were a direct result of Chiang's previous myopia, preoccupation with the Communists, and preservation of Confucian tradition.

Stilwell's initial conflict with Chiang was over the training of the Chinese Army. In the revolution of 1925-1928, as previously discussed, Chiang failed to consolidate and unify China and upon setting up his regime in 1928 had direct control over only one-third of China. The remaining two-thirds of China remained under the control of various warlords that were

designated by Chiang as governors as long as they were not in open rebellion against him. Chiang looked upon these warlords as selfish individuals that could be easily swept away after he had destroyed his real enemy, the Communists. This situation continued to exist when Stilwell attempted to set up a training program for the Chinese armies. Chiang feared, and rightly so, that if the armies of the warlords were as well-trained and equipped as his own, the precarious control he had over them would disappear and the warlords would feel strong enough to exert their own influence and drift away from or challenge Kuomintang control. Therefore Chiang impeded Stilwell's training program and generally restricted it to the forces directly under his control.

In this same light Stilwell's attempts to reorganize the Chinese Army and update its internal leadership were also thwarted. China had an impressive number of divisions, but most of them were at reduced strength levels and poorly trained, equipped and deployed. Stilwell's plan to reduce the total number of divisions and to redeploy them in a tactically sound manner again ran contrary to Chiang's control over the warlords and his preoccupation with the Communists. Chiang feared that any manipulation of the warlord armies would cause control problems that might require him to engage in open conflict with the warlords to the advantage of the Japanese and the Communists. The redeployment of the armies also ran afoul Chiang's desire to isolate and contain the Communists.⁴² These problems also affected combat operations. In many cases Chiang had to use pleas, threats, coercion, promises and bribes to commit a warlord army to battle, especially if the warlord felt that Chiang was attempting to sacrifice his army for political purposes. These political maneuvers caused numerous delays, changes of plans and general confusion. In the final analysis the only forces immediately responsive to the Kuomintang regime were those

directly under Chiang's control and he was not about to sacrifice them in a direct confrontation with the Japanese.

General Stilwell's attempts to weed the deadwood from the upper echelons of the Chinese command and staff were equally frustrated by Chiang. The leaders of the Kuomintang regime and the Chinese Army were essentially the same between 1927 to 1949 and all had one thing in common: they were loyal to Chiang. A shakeup in the leadership of China was not more than the reshuffling of the same people into different positions. Public offices were granted for loyalty, not for competence. This had the effect of frustrating the aspirations of younger, competent individuals and degenerated into a bootlicking and backslapping contest for the most lucrative positions. It encouraged the maintenance of the status quo and discouraged meaningful social and economic reforms. This preoccupation with loyalty was another example of the Confucian tradition, which Chiang preserved, eventually contributing to his defeat.

General Stilwell recognized Chiang's problems and understood his preoccupation with the Communists. However, Stilwell believed that these same problems, if allowed to continue, would mean Chiang's defeat at the hands of the Communists after the demise of the Japanese. He tried to convince Chiang to make the necessary reforms and consolidate his control while the Communists were weak and restricted and the Kuomintang had the active economic and moral support of the Western powers. Chiang was not impressed with these arguments and felt that the accumulation of planes and tanks through the lend-lease program would provide the power he needed to handle the Communists after the defeat of the Japanese.

The supply of lend-lease equipment led to another problem between Chiang and Stilwell. Until late 1944 the supply of lend-lease equipment entering China "over the hump" was relatively small. Stilwell allocated

most of this tonnage to equipment for the Chinese Army. General Chennault, whose air force was also supplied by this source, constantly complained that he should be allocated more of the tonnage. He insisted that if given sufficient tonnage his air force alone could defeat the Japanese without the support of ground forces. This provided Chiang with a convenient face-saving alternative to sacrificing his troops in battle with the Japanese and allowed him to hoard his men and supplies for the inevitable battle with the Communists.⁴³ The fallacy of this solution was that, as soon as the air power began to hurt the Japanese they would take the airfields which were not defensible because of the poorly equipped and deployed Chinese ground forces. This argument was pointed out by Stilwell and promptly ignored by Chiang and Chennault. They refused to understand the tremendous logistics problem involved. Chiang personally blamed Stilwell for the small amount of equipment entering China and accused him of withholding lend-lease supplies promised by President Roosevelt (1882-1945).⁴⁴ Stilwell's inability to convince Chiang to accept his advice led to frustration and bitter feelings between them.

Recall of Stilwell and Arrival of Hurley

Chiang's inability or refusal to engage the Japanese on the battlefield became a source of irritation in Washington.⁴⁵ Officials in Washington, who had earlier elevated China to the status of world power, gradually began to feel that the material allocated to China and the aircraft used to deliver this equipment were a waste. Churchill (1874-1965) and Stalin (1879-1955) had also voiced their displeasure at the poor performance of the Chinese armies. President Roosevelt was finally convinced to dispatch stern correspondence to Chiang recommending that he put Stilwell in command of all military forces in China. Chiang agreed to name Stilwell commander

of all forces in China, however, he felt time was required to make the proper arrangements. In the interim, Chiang requested an intermediary to provide direct contact between himself and President Roosevelt. Although this request was opposed by a number of his advisors, Roosevelt appointed Patrick Hurley (1883-1963) to serve as his personal envoy to Chiang. During early 1944 B-29 bombers from China began to conduct raids on Japan. As a result, the Japanese forces began an offensive against the airbases servicing the B-29's. Chiang requested that Stilwell divert Chinese forces from the Burma theater. When Stilwell refused, Chiang threatened to withdraw them. This resulted in a very blunt communication from Roosevelt, which Stilwell delivered personally to Chiang in front of Hurley and other Chinese officials. At this point, Chiang decided it was time for Stilwell to depart China, and after various diplomatic maneuvers insisted on his recall. President Roosevelt conceded and Stilwell was replaced by Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer (1897-).⁴⁶ After Stilwell's departure in October 1944, Hurley was named ambassador to China. After his appointment as ambassador, Hurley continually tried to arrange a rapprochement between the Nationalists and the Communists. In an attempt to divert the inherent aversion to communism in the United States and China, Hurley tried to convince Washington and Chungking that in the final analysis the Chinese Communist were in reality agrarian reformers. In pursuing these objectives, Hurley was opposed by many of the foreign service officers on his staff and in the end failed to achieve his desired goals.

Problems with Victory

The B-29 campaign which began in 1944 from five airfields in Szechwan Province did not last long. Due to difficulties in supplying them "over the hump" and pressure from the Japanese ground forces,⁴⁷ their base was

shifted to the Marianas, which could be supplied by sea and were closer to Tokyo. This shifting of the B-29 basing, the refusal of the Nationalists to effectively challenge the Japanese, and US concern over involvement in a Chinese civil war ended US intentions and Chiang's hope of a large commitment of American forces in China. One consolation for Chiang, however, was the substantial amount of lend-lease equipment that was then flowing into China.

In early August of 1945 Chiang's position still appeared to be secure. In July he had sent T. V. Soong (1891-1971)⁴⁸ to Moscow to complete the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty.⁴⁹ This treaty was a result of the Yalta Conference, at which Roosevelt had made concessions to Stalin that affected Chinese territory in order to secure a Soviet agreement to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. At that time the war with Japan was still predicted to last through the end of 1946. However, on 8 August 1945 the course of the war in the Pacific was changed by the employment of the first atomic bomb. By 14 August the war was over. Russia entered the war on 9 August and by the fourteenth occupied most of Manchuria.

This abrupt end to the war caught both the Communists and the Nationalists off guard. The Japanese were directed to surrender to the Russians in Manchuria, Karafuto and North Korea, and only to the Nationalists in China, Formosa and Northern Indo-China. The Communists, however, were in a better position to exploit the situation. Their guerrilla forces were operating behind the Japanese lines and controlled large areas inside the territory occupied by the Japanese. The Communist-controlled areas were within marching distance of some of China's large eastern cities and industrial complexes. Nationalist forces, on the other hand, had been driven deep into China's interior. In anticipation of this problem General Wedemeyer had requested that the landing of United States troops along the China

coast be given first priority. This proposal was declined and Wedemeyer made a request to the Joint Staff that the landing of United States troops along the China coast be given first priority. This proposal was rejected and Wedemeyer began preparations to airlift Nationalist forces into the coastal regions after Japan's defeat. This transportation effort was relatively successful except in Russian-occupied Manchuria. In this area the Communists refused to allow United States transports to land Nationalist troops. Most of the military hardware taken from the Japanese in this area was subsequently turned over to the Chinese Communists by the Russians, in violation of their agreement with the Nationalist government.

CHAPTER IV

FALL OF THE KUOMINTANG

Marshall Fails to Secure Peace

On 28 August 1945, through the efforts of Ambassador Hurley, Mao Tse-tung arrived in Chungking to confer with Chiang on a peaceful settlement of their differences. This conference failed to produce any positive results. Ambassador Hurley, who had returned to Washington, abruptly resigned, accusing his foreign service officers and members of the State Department of sabotaging his efforts. On 5 December General George C. Marshall (1880-1959),⁵⁰ at the request of President Truman (1884-1972), departed for China to help mediate the differences between the Communists and the Nationalists. By the end of February 1946 General Marshall had worked out a tentative settlement and the open conflict that had broken out between the Communist and Nationalist forces was halted. This was an uneasy peace with violations on both sides, and by the middle of April the truce collapsed with a renewal of the civil war. Marshall succeeded in establishing another truce on 6 June. This truce lasted until late July when it was broken by Chiang. Behind the collapse of these cease fires was the Nationalists' confidence in their superior numbers and fire power and the Communists' belief in the Nationalists' vulnerability. These convictions prevented either side from agreeing to any meaningful compromise.

Civil War

At the beginning of the renewed civil war, Mao warned his followers that it would probably take 10 years to defeat the Nationalists. This

turned out to be a somewhat conservative forecast. Against the advice of his American advisors, Chiang tried to occupy Manchuria and secure extended and vulnerable lines of communication through a strategy of occupying strong points. As a result of this over-extension, Chiang was unable to maintain support and his forces were isolated by the Communists. Manchuria fell in 1948 and North China followed in 1949.

It appears that the payment for all of Chiang's past sins of commission and omission, stupidity and ineptitude, came due at the same time. The poorly trained, ill-led, half-starved and often abused Chinese armies that Chiang had been hoarding deserted en masse. Entire divisions switched to the Communist side taking their American equipment with them. The Whampoa clique complicated matters by discriminating against provincial commanders.⁵¹ The destruction of Chiang's armies on the battlefield was only part of the overall problem. Due to protracted corruption and gross mismanagement at high levels, the Chinese economy had receded into a state of hyper-inflation. This devastated the Chinese middle class and resulted in increased corruption on a wider scale.

The Nationalist effort was dealt a decisive blow by the Communists in late 1948 and early 1949. Chiang committed some fifty divisions of his remaining two hundred divisions to form a strong point on the plains around Hsuehchow. This decision was contrary to the advice of his staff and his American advisors, who wanted to defend along the Huai River. This force was quickly surrounded by the Communists, as was the 120,000 man force sent out for its relief. After deciding that these forces were lost, Chiang proposed to destroy their heavy equipment by aerial bombardment. The encircled Nationalist troops learned of this proposal and surrendered on 10 January 1949.

People's Republic of China

Chiang resigned the presidency after this battle, and his successor, Li Tsung-jen (1890-1969), tried to negotiate a peace with the Communists.⁵² With complete victory in his grasp, Mao refused to negotiate and in April resumed the offensive. In the meantime, Chiang frustrated Li Tsung-jen's efforts to defend Southwest China. He had already moved China's gold reserve to Taiwan and was in the process of transferring the Nationalist troops and diverting American aid to Taiwan also. On the first of October Mao proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China and by the end of the year all of China proper was brought under Communist control.

CHAPTER V

REASONS FOR KUOMINTANG FAILURE

Overview

The preceeding historical overview will provide the point of departure and the framework from which to review, compare and analyze those factors and events which impacted on the Chinese Civil War and determined its outcome. The literature of the period of Chinese history from 1911-1949 is extensive and provides numerous and diverse reasons for the failure of the Kuomintang regime, the subsequent Communist victory in 1949, and the impact of US policy on the final outcome. Every author seems to have his pet theory on the reason for the failure of the Kuomintang regime. Most of the literature is readable and scholarly, if somewhat narrow. Some authors provide unique insights, most simply report. Some of the literature, due to the subject, is emotional, irrational and unscholarly. In this chapter a general overview of the six most common theories on the Kuomintang failure are presented in order to provide a basis for comparison.

Social and Economic

From the birth of the Republic of China the most pressing problems it faced were social and economic. China was suffering under the burden of unequal treaties, foreign concessions, extraterritoriality, other foreign abuses, and internal division and strife. Most Chinese leaders understood that the reason for China's exploitation by foreign powers was a result of

her military weakness. This military weakness could be traced to technological backwardness which was a direct result of China's economic weakness. China's leadership was divided on the corrective actions that would be required to solve the nation's problems. The conservative wing of the Kuomintang believed that the prescription for China's ills lay in technological advancement and that the old Chinese culture and Confucian tradition could be preserved. The left wing of the Kuomintang, the Communist, and many intellectuals believed that Western technology and modern organizations could not be grafted onto the traditional China. They were convinced that the basic social and economic order of China must change before meaningful modernization could take place.

The Nationalist movement in China was founded by Sun Yat-sen under the philosophy of the Three Principles of the People--nationalism, democracy and the people's livelihood. From Sun Yat-sen's perspective, the requirement of the first principle--nationalism--was the unification of all of China under a Nationalist leader and the termination of imperialism in China. The requirement of the second principle--democracy--was one party control by the Kuomintang with some minor party participation tolerated. The requirement of the third principle--the people's livelihood--was redistribution of land and tax, rent and loan reform. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People were embraced by everyone. It was a philosophy acceptable to the Communists and the intellectuals. The Three Principles were adopted as the official philosophy of the Kuomintang in 1924. In this same year the Kuomintang also adopted the Three New Policies: alliance with the Soviet Union, support for the workers' and peasants' movements, and collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party.⁵³ In the period between the founding of the Republic and the Northern Expedition the political and military realities of the conservative warlord, landowner and

gentry appear to have caused Sun Yat-sen to reassess the implementation of his Three Principles. Most significantly, the implementation of the requirements of his third principle would be delayed at least into a later generation.⁵⁴

The Northern Expedition, although planned prior to the death of Sun Yat-sen, was not begun until 1926. During this expedition the conservative wing of the Kuomintang hoped to realize the unification of China required by the first principle of the people. It appears that the left wing of the Kuomintang, the Communists and large parts of the population expected to realize the attainment of all three of the principles during the Northern Expedition. In conjunction with the Northern Expedition, the membership in labor and peasant unions experienced an explosive expansion. Both unions asserted their strength with great enthusiasm. The Communist-led national labor organization was a powerful rallying point, especially for industrial, handicraft and shop employees.⁵⁵

This extensive expansion in union membership and the beginning of the mass movements created friction in the Communist-Kuomintang coalition. It also frightened landlords, businessmen, moderate and conservative politicians, and military officers.⁵⁶ The left wing of the Kuomintang, supported and influenced by the Chinese Communists, were beginning to dominate the situation. They were pursuing a revolution far more fundamental and extensive than that envisioned by the moderate and conservative wings of the party.⁵⁷ They were planning not just another Nationalist political revolution, but a social and economic revolution as well.⁵⁸ During the spring of 1927, the peasants' aggressiveness in the countryside was threatening to overturn the social and economic structure of China. This presented the moderate and conservative wings of the Kuomintang with a difficult, vola-

tile and unpredictable situation which might result in the ascendancy of the left wing of the party, which was more and more being identified with the Communists. In addition, the foreign powers, reacting to atrocities being perpetrated against their citizens and property, were threatening to retaliate.

In the days just before 12 April 1927 Chiang Kai-shek made a momentous decision. In view of the leftist ability to mobilize the peasant and labor unions, the threat of foreign intervention and the uncertainties involved in a social and economic revolution, Chiang decided to stop the revolution short of the masses and to concentrate on the consolidation of political power. In the early hours of 12 April Chiang attacked, decimated and disorganized the Chinese Communist Party. He effectively ended the social and economic aspects of the Nationalist revolution and based his regime on Confucian traditions and old Chinese values.

Chiang's decision and method of implementation assured the Kuomintang a hostile, covert and armed opposition party that was dedicated to social and economic change. It was also Chiang's first step in losing his legitimacy as Sun Yat-sen's heir by betraying his aims in the very course of achieving a consolidated China. In the final analysis, Chiang's actions to halt the social and economic revolution, his decision to base his power on the landlord and gentry class, and his refusal or inability to implement any social or economic reforms in later years were the keys to the eventual failure of the Kuomintang and the final victory of the Communists. The party that began the Northern Expedition as a revolutionary party, ended the expedition as an arch-conservative and even a reactionary party.

The changes required for Kuomintang survival could and should have been taken in 1927. Chiang's failure to implement basic social and economic reforms and his decision to base his government on the traditional

Chinese values condemned the Chinese peasants and workers to continued exploitation. This social and economic exploitation intensified extensively in the 1930's as business managers increasingly assumed the administration of land management for the landowners. The cold and impersonal methods of the business manager were completely different from the concerned and almost paternal manner that the gentry-landowner had traditionally dealt with the peasant. This new land management method and the extreme taxes⁵⁹ required to support the "extermination campaigns" and other military operations created a peasant proletariat--the unlanded migrant farm laborer.⁶⁰ This group provided eager revolutionaries for the Chinese Communists. The continued exploitation of the peasants and workers, continued population explosion, inadequate educational, and unsustainable modernization programs which resulted from, or were maintained under, the Kuomintang regime condemned China to continued and increasing poverty, technological backwardness, national weakness and external exploitation. It also insured continuous Kuomintang weakness and the concomitant growth of an armed and hostile opponent.

Nationalism

Studies of Communist revolutions in Asia have concluded that whoever dominated the issue of nationalism was most likely to control the fate of the revolution.⁶¹ A review of the Kuomintang-Communist struggle in China reveals a long protracted struggle beginning formally with Chiang's attack on the Communists during the Northern Expedition. The decision in 1923 to allow Communists to join the Kuomintang was beneficial to both parties. After Chiang's purge of the Communists in 1927 their influence declined. In 1929-1934 their popularity rose again until forced from their southern

bases. If nationalism is considered the key factor in the Communist victory over the Kuomintang, then the Communist rise to power would be dated from 1937, in the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War. The Communists' efforts in the previous decade were aggressive and dedicated. However, the earlier Communist attempts to organize the masses were dismal failures when compared to their rapid success after 1937.⁶² Since the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, Japan had continually challenged Chinese sovereignty and since 1928 had conducted an active aggression. Through the early 1930's Chiang routinely met Japanese demands in Manchuria and North China in order to pursue his extermination campaigns against the Communists, part of his strategy of unification and then resistance. Public opinion in China, generally expressed through students and the intelligensia, was beginning to clamor for increased resistance to Japanese aggression.⁶³ The turning point was marked by the Sian Incident which was a Chinese Communist and Soviet-inspired plot to take advantage of the strong Chinese nationalistic sentiments of the period. These sentiments supported a consolidated Kuomintang and Communist effort against the Japanese. The united front would preclude a Kuomintang-Japanese peace, continue to divert Japanese forces, and secure Russia's eastern borders.

A new united front, with its increased resistance to Japanese aggression, was created and did lead to open warfare in 1937. After the Sian Incident, Chiang Kai-shek's popularity and prestige were greater than at any point in his career, and he became the symbol of national unity.⁶⁴ A number of comparisons can be drawn between this period and the Northern Expedition ten years earlier, before Chiang decimated the Communists. Again, great opportunities were available to Chiang Kai-shek. In their first offensive in 1938, the Japanese occupied almost every area in China worth having. The Nationalist Army was no match for the Japanese and Chiang

adopted a policy of trading space for time and waiting for the war to expand and create new allies for China. In reality, the Nationalist armies disengaged from the Japanese. In addition to failing to challenge the Japanese in conventional warfare, Chiang never seriously attempted to organize a guerilla effort in the Japanese-occupied areas. A possible reason for this failure was a fear that the required mobilization of the masses would create a basic change to the social and economic structure. Again, as during the Northern Expedition, Chiang limited the participation and avoided the mobilization of the peasant masses. It appears that almost all of Chiang's actions contributed to the destruction of his image as the focal point of national unity. He actively isolated the Communist forces and through deception, as during the Northern Expedition, destroyed the Communist New Fourth Army. After the United States' entry into the war, Chiang concentrated entirely on isolating and destroying Communists and in acquiring and hoarding lend-lease equipment for future use against the Communists. The Kuomintang's total disregard for the welfare of and exploitation of the Chinese citizen, and especially the Chinese soldier, was a national disgrace and was repaid in full during the civil war.

The Communist Party was the antithesis of the Kuomintang party. They organized base areas in the Japanese rear, conducted active guerilla operations, educated the peasants, provided a stable government, and lowered and stabilized interest rates and taxes. The Japanese response to Communist guerrilla activity was indiscriminate slaughter and destruction which in turn played into the Communists' hands, and forced the peasantry into vigorous resistance.⁶⁵ The prominent position given the Chinese Communist in Japanese publications and propaganda also enhanced their position. The Communists' success was based on mobilization of the peasant masses, social and economic reform, political awareness, and participation and leadership

in the national resistance. These programs allowed Mao to claim legitimacy as the successor and political heir of Sun Yat-sen.⁶⁶

Communist ascendancy over the Kuomintang was established during World War II through the creation of peasant nationalism and the Communist's ability to dominate the nationalism issue. This was especially significant when compared to the bankruptcy of the Kuomintang programs.

Soviet Intrigues, Intervention and Grand Strategy

Throughout its early history, the Chinese Communist Party was a member of and responsive to the Comintern. As such, the Chinese Communist Party suffered through the period of infighting between Stalin and Trotsky during which they often served as a political football.

After Chiang Kai-shek's purge of the Communists from the Kuomintang during the Northern Expedition, the policy and strategy dictated by Moscow and carried out in China resulted in one disaster after another. After the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising, Mao and Chu Teh set up the Kiangsi Soviet and began serious efforts to base the revolution on the peasants. Pressure on their activities in the cities also forced the urban-based Communists into the rural base areas. Chiang's fifth bandit suppression campaign resulted in the forced evacuation of Southern China and the Long March to the Shensi Soviet. It was during the Long March, while out of contact with Moscow, that Mao attained a dominant leadership status in the Chinese Communist Party. During the Sian Incident the Chinese Communists pursued the policy directed by the Comintern--to create a united front, keep China in the war and Japan occupied--but which was also in their own interest. As a result of Soviet interference, Mao continued to have trouble consolidating his power until Chiang, through the New Fourth Army Incident, assisted Mao in attaining undisputed leadership of the Chinese

Communist Party.⁶⁷ It was also during his period that US diplomats in Russia were reporting the Soviet hopes of a United States war with Japan.⁶⁸ There was also great concern during the period over Soviet agents infiltrating the US government.⁶⁹

As the World War progressed, grave concern developed over the requirement to fix the Japanese forces in China and to invade Japan. Events in China created grave doubts concerning the effectiveness of Chinese forces to accomplish these tasks. Agreements were made at the Yalta Conference between Stalin and Roosevelt which provided for the Soviets to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. Certain concessions in Manchuria and Mongolia were required to gain Stalin's agreement. In return, Stalin promised recognition of the Nationalist Government and the return of occupied areas in Manchuria after the war.⁷⁰ Soviet objectives in the Far East were: (1) a defeated and occupied Japan; (2) a sphere of influence in an independent Mongolia; (3) a weak China and (4) an ability to influence affairs in Manchuria. Two days after the first atomic bomb was dropped the Soviets entered the war against Japan and occupied Manchuria. After the Japanese surrender and with US assistance the Nationalist forces reoccupied most of China with the exception of Manchuria. The Soviet forces generally gave the Chinese Communists freedom of movement in Manchuria and freedom to collect Japanese armament and ammunition. When Soviet forces finally withdrew from Manchuria it was conducted in a manner that would maximize Chinese Communist ability to occupy and control the area.⁷¹

Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists probably intensified as the result of two developments. First, as the plans for the occupation of Japan developed the Soviets were refused an active role, and second, the almost friendly manner in which the United States was treating the Japanese

created great concern in Russia. Additionally, as a result of the Chinese Nationalists' success in the summer of 1946, Stalin attempted to negotiate with Chiang over Manchuria. Chiang's refusal of Stalin's request, according to some sources, resulted in a basic change in Soviet policy and significant support for the Chinese Communists which ultimately led to the Communist victory.⁷² In the end the Soviets and the Chinese Communists had conspired together to the disadvantage of the Nationalists. Stalin had taken advantage of Roosevelt's sincerity, anxiety and ill health at Yalta to extract long sought after concessions in China to the disadvantage of the Nationalists.

After occupying Manchuria and Korea, the Soviets and Chinese Communists procrastinated, using bargaining and deception to buy time for the Soviet-supported buildup of Communist Chinese forces which led to their success over the Nationalists.

State Department "Treachery"

As previously mentioned, in the mid-1930's there were indications of Russian desires for a US war with Japan and fear of Soviet penetration of the US government--especially the State Department. The infiltration of the US government in the late 1930's and early 1940's is a matter of record.⁷³ Lauchlin Currie was appointed as administrative assistant to the President in 1939 and was successful, through devious methods, in securing the appointment of Owen Lattimore as an American advisor to Chiang Kai-shek. According to later testimony, Lattimore had been hand-picked to change thinking in Washington and in America on Communist activities in China and US relations with the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ During this period, Communists in the US were working to achieve a change in US policy toward China. In 1942 the American Communists initiated a propaganda campaign

against the powerful appeasement forces in the State Department who were supposedly urging Chiang Kai-shek to use his best combat forces to blockade the Communist forces rather than fight the Japanese in union with the Communists. The charges resulted in prompt denials from the State Department, followed by a formal statement by Under Secretary of State Sumner Wells. His statement amounted to a pledge that State Department policy was not against the Communists in China and that no distinction would be made between the Communists and Nationalists. This statement was used worldwide to support Communist propaganda claims that US policy in the Far East was essentially the same as the Soviet's.⁷⁵

Throughout the war, the realities of the China situation were completely obscured by pro-Soviet elements of the State Department.⁷⁶ This was accomplished mainly through the efforts of John Patton Davies, John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent--men with long service and experience in China. These men, and others, were key players in changing American support from the Nationalists to the Communists.⁷⁷ Their strategy as shown and conducted in their reporting was to be very complimentary and supportive of the Communists and derogatory and critical of the Kuomintang.⁷⁸ The foreign service officers on General Stilwell's staff were determined to destroy the Nationalist government and remove Chiang Kai-shek as head of state. John Davies, General Stilwell's political advisor gave laudatory accounts of the Chinese Communists and bitter criticisms of Chiang Kai-shek's government.

Even though the US policy at the time supported the Nationalist government, the activities of the foreign service officers in China were not supportive of US policy. In their reports they insisted that the Communists were the real nationalistic and democratic force in China and would

inevitably control China; the Nationalist government was considered reactionary, corrupt and oppressive. Instead of fighting the Japanese, the Nationalists were hoarding American supplies for a civil war against the Communists. Agreement could only be reached through Nationalist concessions to the Communists.⁷⁹ The philosophy of the foreign service officers was that the Communists were in China to stay, that China's destiny lay with the Communists and not the Kuomintang, that the Communists could quickly establish control over most of China after the war, and that power in China was on the verge of shifting from the Kuomintang to the Communists.

On 5 January 1945, John Davies reported that if the current situation between the Communists and the Nationalists did not lead to a civil war or a coalition, then there would be two Chinas--a unified and peaceful Communist north and a semi-feudal strife-torn South China.

General Hurley, as Roosevelt's representative to Chiang and later as ambassador to China, felt that the Communists could be forced into accommodation with the Nationalist government. This was contrary to the belief of his foreign service officers. After discussions with Stalin, he was convinced that the Soviets felt Chiang was the only man who could unify China and that the Soviets would recognize only the Nationalist government and would not actively support the Chinese Communists. As a result, Hurley required that all support to China and that all contact with the Communists be conducted through the Nationalists.

The career foreign service officers in China did not agree with Hurley; advised the Communists that his efforts in preventing the collapse of Chiang's government were not the policy of the United States;⁸⁰ and as a group went over his head to the State Department to secure a change in US policy toward China. Although the State Department was sympathetic to

their views, Hurley received Roosevelt's backing to continue to pursue his policy and secured the removal from China of the foreign service officers involved.

Although these officers were removed, they were not disciplined and were given more responsible jobs at the State Department and on General MacArthur's staff in Japan.⁸¹ The Far Eastern Division of the State Department did about everything the Communists would have wanted that division to do.⁸² They discredited warnings that the Chinese Communists were responsive to and in step with the Soviets, were quick to report expressions of discontent on the part of anti-Kuomintang elements and slow to present Kuomintang arguments against the Communists. As a result, the United States based its policy largely on the illusion that the Chinese Communists were "not quite Communist" and that the US and Nationalist governments could work with them nicely.⁸³

Chaos and Corruption of the Nationalist Regime

The Nationalist regime in China was the Kuomintang party founded by Sun Yat-sen. The Kuomintang adopted Sun Yat-sen's philosophy of the Three Principles of the People. During the Northern Expedition Chiang attacked and suppressed the Kuomintang left and Communists, who were conducting a social and economic as well as a political revolution, and, through hostility toward foreigners, were creating international tensions and an excuse for foreign intervention. In suppressing the Communists, Chiang made a conscious decision to preserve the traditional Chinese social and economic traditions and to limit the political revolution to national and regional levels.

After the Northern Expedition, which unified approximately 1/3 of China under the Nationalists, Chiang failed to continue the unification

program in favor of unstable alliances with the remaining warlords, whom he felt he could control and deal with after he had defeated the Communists. These decisions make it clear that Chiang considered the Communists to be both political and military problems. Basing his government on the land-owner/gentry, Chiang's power base was very narrow and in the long-term precluded his ability to make the changes necessary to survive. Although Chiang instituted numerous changes which would have improved the lot of the peasant, the changes were ignored and not implemented by the very group on which his power was based. This is a case where the government's inability to win acceptance of its authority was a result of the excessive independence and insubordination of the masters and ruling class and not the peasants.

As an imperative of his traditional Chinese philosophy and Confucian values, Chiang placed great value on loyalty. As a result, the hierarchy of the Kuomintang was populated by men of great loyalty rather than men of dedication and competence. The ruling circle was generally military men and the inner circle was members of the Whampoa clique. The Kuomintang by its actions routinely demonstrated that it had a poor grasp of reality.

The most pressing problem from Chiang's perspective was always the isolation and destruction of the Communists. Two things are related to this endeavor which are of interest here--increased taxes and centralization of banking. In order to pay for the bandit suppression campaigns in the early 1930's enormous taxes were levied upon the peasants. In most cases they were collected as advanced taxes. In some areas in 1933 the peasants had paid their taxes through 1974. In order to standardize the currency of the country and to gain some semblance of control over the capital reserves of China, the government created and expanded four state banks. These

banks did little to stimulate economic life in China. On the contrary, they helped perpetuate speculation and financed the government's deficit in the most expensive manner possible. They issued bonds on which they paid astronomical interest rates. Many of the bond holders were high officials in the Kuomintang.⁸⁴ It was not uncommon for high officials to exploit state secrets to carry out enormously profitable business transactions. Nearly half of the government's expenditures prior to World War II were on national defense, and corruption made some government administrative posts so lucrative that they were put up for sale.⁸⁵ The obvious and inevitable result of the Chinese situation was inflation. The US provided enormous sums of money, gold and other material aid to bolster the Chinese economy.⁸⁶ There is substantial evidence that large amounts of US aid found its way into private Chinese fortunes.

Inflation had the greatest impact on the salaried workers, to include the government workers and the military. As a result of the concomitant corruption, recruits starved to death or were not equipped; ammunition was sold to the Communists; and officers and men deserted in large numbers.⁸⁷

After the start of World War II, the wartime conditions magnified the Kuomintang weaknesses. The Kuomintang's ineffectiveness and its contradictions were laid bare. Chaos and negligence were descriptive terms used even by sympathetic observers.

Chiang was often under pressure by liberals, intellectuals and allies to reform his government. Although a number of reforms and shake-ups were announced, they only resulted in the shuffling of the inner circle into different jobs. As the situation in China deteriorated and the Kuomintang became more reactionary, with their Tai Li Blue Shirts stifling dissent and brutalizing intellectuals, they often seemed no better than Nazis.⁸⁸ When competent personnel were assigned to important positions, they usually

found they did not have authority compatible with responsibility. On the battlefield, the results of Kuomintang corruption, inefficiency and chaos were disastrous. The abused peasants supported the Communists and filled their ranks. The Nationalist soldier on the battlefield was starving to death. If he served under a general from the Whampoa clique, he was probably poorly led; if he served under a Kwangsi general he may have been well led, but probably suffered from Chiang's withholding of supplies and equipment. Finally, if he were wounded on the battlefield, he would surely die. A review of the treatment of the Chinese soldier from conscription to death reveals a degree of neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation beyond comparison in the Western world. Whampoa favoritism and distrust between central and provincial armies lead to a battlefield situation reminiscent of the pre-Napoleonic period. Soldiers, leaders and units could not be trusted out of sight of superiors. The Nationalist habit of fighting from fortified cities instead of maneuvering outside them was cited by both German and American advisors as one of the primary reasons for their isolation, and destruction, and the resulting Kuomintang defeat, in Manchuria. Fear of soldier and unit desertion or surrender, resulting from Kuomintang bankruptcy, forced this strategy upon the Nationalists.

Military

In the closing days of World War II, the Japanese still occupied all but the interior of China. Russia had agreed to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the defeat of Germany. The quick Japanese surrender caught everyone by surprise and precipitated a race between the Communists and Nationalists for control of the Japanese-occupied areas. With the help of US airlift, the Nationalist forces generally reoccupied all areas except Manchuria and a few contested areas in North China. Two

days before the surrender, the Soviets had invaded Manchuria as a result of the Yalta agreements. US Marines also occupied key locations in North China.

Armed conflict erupted almost immediately between the Communists and the Nationalists with Communists forces prohibiting the landing of Nationalist forces at ports on the Manchurian coast. General Marshall, who had been dispatched to China after Ambassador Hurley's resignation, was charged with the tasks of effecting a truce and working toward a unification of all Chinese parties in a representative government.⁸⁹ Marshall was successful in arranging a truce on 13 January 1946 in all areas except South China and Manchuria where Chinese Nationalist forces were permitted to continue to restore sovereignty over Japanese-occupied areas. Chiang Kai-shek was anxious to occupy Manchuria before Soviet forces withdrew. Chiang's US advisers cautioned against this move because it would overextend his lines of communication and he had not yet gained firm control of North China.

After arranging the cease-fire, Marshall returned to the United States in order to testify before Congress for funds to aid China. During his absence, the unannounced withdrawal of Soviet forces from Southern Manchuria caught the Nationalists by surprise and allowed the Chinese Communists to occupy key locations on the South Manchurian Railroad. The Nationalist, on 19 March, dispatched forces to occupy the cities evacuated by the Soviets. In late April a three-week battle was fought over the city of Shangtuichi and ended in a Communist defeat. On 19 May Nationalist forces pursued the Communists north toward Harbin and captured Changchun by 1 June. On 6 June, General Marshall arranged for another truce.

During May, while Nationalist forces were pursuing the Communists, Stalin had invited Chiang to meet with him to settle the Manchurian problem.

Chiang's refusal of this request resulted in a change of Soviet policy and full Soviet support for the Chinese Communists in an effort to seek a military victory over the Nationalists. General Marshall lost perspective by involvement in day-to-day events and continued to pressure Chiang into a coalition with the Communists believing that a cooperative policy was still feasible. Marshall was concerned that if the situation in North China and Manchuria was not resolved the result would be a full-scale civil war.⁹⁰

Even though there was continuous negotiation during the period, any settlement was unlikely. The Communists who were negotiating from apparent weakness were only stalling for time to regroup and gain strength. The Nationalists who were negotiating from apparent strength were attempting to consolidate the positions they had won on the battlefield.

Chiang, encouraged by early military success, decided that further negotiations were fruitless and ended the truce. Over the next two and a half months Chiang's offensive effort in the North China plain was characterized as very successful. This successful offensive was terminated as a result of US pressure on the Nationalists and a withholding of military equipment from the Nationalist government by the United States. This denial of military assistance and equipment forced Chiang to make a fatal change in his strategy. Chiang's alternatives, given this situation, was to withdraw from positions gained or to hold his position. Chiang chose a defensive strategy of holding key points. Defeat of the Communists was now out of the question.⁹¹

In October 1946, Chiang turned to a defensive strategy, which was designed to gain time to build strength, and declared his willingness to negotiate a settlement. Marshall's success was American's failure since the Communists were no longer interested in negotiating a settlement from their position of relative weakness.

The formal establishment of a constitutional government in China was accomplished on 15 November 1946--without the Chinese Communists. Although Chiang's forces controlled more of China than ever before, he was overextended and the military power of the Chinese Communists had grown. From the middle of 1946 the Soviet Union gave full support to the strengthening of the Communist position in Manchuria. Li Li-san reappeared in Manchuria to assist in this effort and arrange for the transfer of 1,000,000 Koreans to the Army of Lin Piao. In addition to advisers, and quartermaster and medical supplies, the Soviets provided 1,226 artillery pieces and 396 tanks. Almost all of this equipment had been captured from the Japanese.⁹² Chiang did not have the power to maintain the Nationalist position. Just prior to the end of General Marshall's mission in late 1946, the Communists began to move against the Nationalists in Manchuria and North China.⁹³

On 12 March 1947, as a result of Communist activity in Greece and Turkey, President Truman announced the US policy of "providing immediate assistance to those countries threatened with imminent Communist conquest." As a result, on 14 March Chiang ordered his forces onto the offensive believing that the policy would also apply to China. The Truman Doctrine, however, had no immediate effect on China and Chiang's offensive achieved little success.⁹⁴ In April 1947 the Communists were on the offensive on a broad front. In May the United States lifted the embargo on arms shipments to China. This allowed the Chinese to purchase sufficient ammunition to replace reserves but did not allow for an offensive.⁹⁵

Communist efforts in North China produced important gains. By November, the Nationalist forces in Manchuria were isolated in three large pockets--at Changchun, Mukden and Chinchow--requiring aerial resupply. In March and April the Communists conducted successful offensives at Loyang and Yen-an.

In late April Weihsien, which was a strategic point between North China and Manchuria, fell to the Communists. This loss isolated Manchuria and was attributed to a continued shortage of ammunition. Even though the embargo had been lifted in May 1947, ammunition shipments did not begin arriving in China in large quantities until November 1948.

On 8 October Lin Piao opened an offensive in Manchuria and through defeat and defection conquered Manchuria by 2 November 1948. Within days he was moving into North China. Both Communist and Nationalist forces moved into position in the Hsueh area, which was the gateway to the Nationalist capital at Nanking and to the Yangtze River. During this battle, the Nationalists still enjoyed a superiority in men and materiel.

The Huai Hai Campaign was conducted from November 1947 to January 1948. Chiang Kai-shek personally assumed command of the Nationalist forces during this campaign. The Communist conduct of the three battles which made up this campaign was based on the same strategy they used in Manchuria--isolate and conquer.

In the first battle (Nienchuang), Nationalist forces were engaged and isolated prior to reaching their defensive positions. The second battle (Shangtuichi), was a result of a supporting attack to preclude the Nationalists from relieving the forces at Nienchuang. The third battle (Chinlungchi) was an attempt to relieve Shangtuichi. However, the Communist forces had anticipated the move and effectively isolated this force as well. Unable to replenish food or ammunition, and unable to effect a breakout, Chiang's forces were defeated in detail.

On 8 January 1949 the Nationalists requested international mediation of peace negotiations with the Communists. The Communists were not going to agree to mediation and demanded unconditional surrender. Chiang Kai-shek

resigned on 21 January and continued his evacuation to Taiwan, abandoning any attempt to defend Southern China.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF REASONS FOR KUOMINTANG FAILURE

Social and Economic

Social, economic and cultural factors provide the basic elements of not only the Chinese revolutionary period of 1911-1949, but for a century of unprecedented turmoil and unrest in China. Lucien Bianco refers to them as the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist factors or, the struggle against the foreign enemy and against old China.⁹⁶ Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People were the loci of the revolutionary philosophy and spirit. As discussed earlier, the basic difference between the Communists and the Nationalists was recognition of the social and economic changes required to modernize and strengthen China. These basic difference resulted in conflict during the Northern Expedition. Through his suppression of the Communists and refusal to mobilize the masses, Chiang stopped the revolution at national and regional level and preserved the social and economic structures on which the traditional Confucian and Chinese values were based. Chiang, as well as most leaders in China at the time, were a part of what Ishwer Ojha describes as cultural nationalism.⁹⁷ Although forced to accept the necessity to industrialize, Chiang believed he could import Western industrialization while preserving the Confucian cultural base. It was in this context that the rise of Chinese Communism was most significant. Like their intellectual contemporaries, the Chinese Communists of the 1920's--who were incidentally at least a generation younger than their Kuomintang rivals-- shared the conviction that modern institutions could

not be grafted onto the surface of the basic Chinese traditional substructure. This point vividly stands out in studying Mao Tse-tung's conversion from the Nationalist to the Communist view in his formative years.

In view of the above, it appears that Chiang's avoidance of any revolutionary social and economic changes created a natural opposition among the Communists and intellectuals. His method of limiting the revolution assured him of an armed opposition. If the Communists and intellectuals were correct, the Nationalist government under the Kuomintang would not be able to keep pace with the social and economic demands of the 20th century. A historical review would appear to support their position. Chiang Kai-shek established his power base on the landowner and gentry class who had vested interests in the traditional economic and social structures of China. As such, they effectively blocked or ignored reforms proposed or implemented by Chiang. In view of the preceding logic, the failure of Chiang and the Kuomintang began in 1927 during the Northern Expedition.

In analyzing social and economic factors as the cause of the failure of the Kuomintang, the question arises of why these factors did not cause a revolution earlier, and as Chalmers Johnson inquires, "Why were the Communists so ineffective in exploiting these factors prior to 1937?"⁹⁸ A number of factors impacted on China during this period which must be considered in answering these questions. First, there was great turmoil and uncertainty in China during that period. Chiang was still trying to unify China. Nationalism and popular support were high in support of Chiang's subjugation of the warlords. Sun Yat-sen had also called for a period of political tutelage which would provide some expectation and delay. It was probably not obvious or explicitly announced that Chiang had decided to limit the revolution or fail to meet the requirements of the Three People's Principles. Later, during the bandit suppression campaigns, with their

concomitant taxes and the replacement of the traditionally paternal lender landowner-peasant relationship by the cold, impersonal absentee landlord, the Chinese finally started to realize what was happening. The situation was compounded by Chiang's tacit accommodation with the Japanese in the 1934-1935 time frame in order to continue his anti-Communist campaigns.

The complexity, fluidity and confusion of the situation was increased by the Sian Incident and the war with Japan, which tended initially to increase public support for Chiang. In answering Chalmer Johnson's question and addressing his view, of the war as a necessary catalyst to foster the peasant nationalism required for the revolution, the opposite view might well be taken. The Kuomintang failure occurred in 1949, four years after the war, which leaves open the question of whether the war acted as a catalyst for the revolution or did it in fact retard the revolution? Did the war destroy and lay bare the shortcomings of the Kuomintang or did it provide US and Soviet support that extended the longevity of the Kuomintang. Did the war divert Soviet attention and create a condition which retarded a Chinese Communist victory? A review of the situation in China after the war may well reinforce the primacy of the social and economic factors in the fall of the Kuomintang. It is certain that the basic difference between the Nationalists and Communists, and the latter's reason for existence, was social and economic. It is also a fact the Communists were the only group in serious opposition to the Kuomintang. As such, the social and economic factors were the key and without regard to other factors would have, in time, produced similar results.

Nationalism

As mentioned in the previous discussion, a question that must be addressed when looking at the social and economic impact on the Chinese

Revolution is why were the Communists so unsuccessful exploiting those factors prior to 1937 and so successful exploiting nationalism after 1937. Chalmers Johnson appears to be the foremost proponent of the dominant influence of nationalism on the Chinese Revolution. Johnson's thesis is that the Communists were successful because of World War II, not because of social and economic misery. The war was responsible for Communist victory in that it created peasant nationalism, made it possible for the Communists to appear to be and claim to be nationalists, and it allowed Mao to claim legitimacy as political heir to Sun Yat-sen. Chiang's blockade of the Communists and the New Fourth Army Incident tended to portray the Communists as having a monopoly on patriotic resistance.⁹⁹ Chiang's strategy of trading space for time and his refusal to mobilize the masses for a guerilla war behind the lines left these areas open for Communist exploitation and propaganda. The Japanese, through their cruel and inhuman treatment of the Chinese, made the Communist program possible by creating a vacuum in the Japanese rear which was being exploited by Japanese soldiers and Chinese bandits. The Communists protected the population, organized them, allowed them to participate in their local governments, and lowered and enforced land taxes, rent and interest rates by controlling the landlord. As a result of this, their popularity, control of the countryside, and military forces increased tremendously and resulted in their eventual victory over the Nationalists.

At this point we must ask the question, "What came first, peasant nationalism or social and economic reform?" Historically, the Chinese peasant was indifferent to politics. The Japanese invasion did not immediately provoke a great outcry of rage or determination to resist on the part of the peasantry. On the contrary, in some cases, the peasant assisted the

Japanese in subduing the Chinese Army. Japanese brutality, as epitomized in the "three all" policy, virtually forced the peasantry to vigorous resistance.¹⁰⁰ The feeling of belonging and participating in the local governments being set up in the Communist areas was new and provided a sense of self-determination.¹⁰² Wherever the Communists went, their social reforms and popular army was a source of support for the people. The Communists' influence initiated a social revolution in the countryside.

The most significant reason for the rapid expansion of the Chinese Communist movement was that they gained the enthusiastic support of the Chinese peasant by providing for the local and immediate needs of the peasant through reformist and radical social policies, and by providing leadership and protection for the peasant.¹⁰³ In every way possible the Communists helped, educated and gained the support of the peasant. By usurping the gentry's monopoly of power at the local level and by involving the peasant in politically important roles, the Communists created profound changes that signaled the beginning of a social revolution. In addition, Communist wartime propaganda nurtured a national consciousness and thus fostered national integration.¹⁰⁴

The peasants were shamefully abused by the Kuomintang and the Japanese so they turned to the Communists. If the Communists had equally abused them, would the phenomenon of peasant nationalism have manifested itself? If the war fostered nationalism, why didn't the Nationalists also prosper from it? The answer lies in the cruel and inhuman manner the Nationalist soldiers were treated by the Nationalist Government and Army.

The peasant nationalist phenomenon was a result of the social and economic revolution that the Communists were conducting in the countryside and is eloquently described in the following quote:

If you take a peasant who has been swindled, beaten and kicked about for all his working days and whose father had transmitted to him an emotion of bitterness reaching back for generations--if you take such a peasant, treat him like a man, ask his opinion, let him vote for a local government, let him organize his own police, decide on his own taxes, and vote himself a reduction in rent and interest--if you do all this the peasant becomes a man who has something to fight for and he will fight for it against any enemy, Japanese or Chinese.¹⁰⁵

Soviet Intrigues, Intervention and Grand Strategy

To attribute the Kuomintang failure and Communist success to the factors of Soviet intrigues, intervention and grand strategy one must ascribe to the Soviets a degree of influence over the Chinese Communists, Kuomintang and US actions and a degree of insight, foresight and event projection that they never possessed. The Soviet grand strategic plan may well have projected a Communist China, but only in the sense that it projected a Communist world in general. The fact that the Chinese Communists were successful in 1949 was just as surprising to the Soviets as to everyone else.¹⁰⁶ A review of Soviet influences on the Chinese Communists from early 1920 to 1949 reveals a continuum on which Soviet influence steadily declines. Although influential through the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the "Fourth Bandit Suppression Campaign," their prestige and control steadily declines after the fifth campaign until Mao gains complete control after the New Fourth Army Incident. The Soviets were successful in influencing the outcome of the Sian Incident in order to secure Soviet borders from Japanese attack; however, Mao continued to disagree with the united front policy of the Soviets and the CCP internationalist group under Wang Ming.¹⁰⁷ In the early stages of the war, the Chinese Communists were often amenable to Soviet requests, but were just as capable of denying Soviet desires if they were not in the Chinese Communists interests--as Mao demonstrated in 1941 when he refused to initiate an offensive against the Japanese.¹⁰⁸

There appears to be no evidence of Soviet influence over or effective intrigues against the Kuomintang. Soviet influence and intrigue in the United States Government, especially the State Department has been charged but is general in nature; is difficult to tie to specific causes and effects; is often emotional and incoherent; and does not appear to be valid or have any basis in reality.

Events from the end of the war through 1949 appear to contradict the idea that the Soviets were a dominant factor in the Chinese Revolution. Soviet postwar objectives were a weak China, a sphere of influence over Mongolia, and some influence over activities in Manchuria.

The Sino-Soviet Pact of 1945, and Stalin's apparently sincere remarks on Chiang's abilities and the legitimacy of the Kuomintang, confirm the Soviet belief that the Nationalist would continue to maintain control in China.¹⁰⁹ This may have been the sincere desire of the Soviets as well as their objective protection of events. It is obvious that Soviet Russia would have been able to profit more in territory, concessions and ports from a weak Chiang Kai-shek than a victorious Mao governing a unified China.

Soviet actions in Manchuria also cast doubt on the theory that they were instrumental in the Communists' success. If the Soviets had wanted to assist the Chinese Communists in establishing a government or basing their revolution in Manchuria, or if the Soviets really believed the Chinese Communists had a chance of being successful, they would not have dismantled and stolen every factory, industrial capability and financial asset available in Manchuria.¹¹⁰ The Soviets were somewhat helpful in 1946-1947 by allowing the Communist forces to gather whatever Japanese arms and munitions they could find; assisting in Korean support; and providing some medical supplies.¹¹¹ However, it would seem logical that if this were part

of a Soviet master plan it would have been accomplished much earlier and on a much larger scale.

A review of Mao's relations with Stalin also indicates, that even if Stalin had offered massive support Mao would have refused in order to preclude the concomitant Soviet influence in the Chinese Communist government.

State Department Treachery

The serious consideration of State Department treachery as a primary factor in the Kuomintang failure is ludicrous. The theory is based on the charge that the foreign service officers, serving in China during and immediately after the war, provided reports which were continually derogatory to Chiang and laudatory to the Communists. This supposedly resulted in a US policy based on the belief that a Nationalist-Communist coalition government could be formed and operate effectively, and designed to put pressure and restrictions on Chiang in his conduct of the civil war.

In order to determine the validity of this argument one need only determine if the foreign service officers were the only group providing negative feedback to the US policy making body; if their reports were fabricated, falsified or excessively biased for the purpose of doing harm to the Nationalists; whether they proposed an alternative policy; and if their projections and forecasts were accurate.

With respect to the first point, it is obvious that others in China were providing information which was not only negative toward the Kuomintang, but also had more impact on the US policy making body than the foreign service officers. General Stilwell and Ambassador Gaus are examples. The US Treasury Department and other national representatives were also active in reporting Kuomintang problems to Washington.¹¹² After General Stilwell's

recall, the press also began to report freely on the Kuomintang's corruption, inefficiency and cruelty.¹¹³

The foreign service officers were never accused of fabrication or falsification in their reporting on the Kuomintang. The reporting of the foreign service officers on the conditions in China and the effectiveness of the Kuomintang and the ability of the Kuomintang to survive a postwar conflict was accurate. Their reporting of the Communist situation was accused, with some justification, of being overly optimistic and sophomoric.

The accuracy of their projections and forecasts and the validity of their proposed policy, although contrary to Ambassador Hurley's views, was similar to those of Stilwell and other US military advisers in China. It may be that the accusations leveled against the foreign service officers were a direct result of their insights, the accuracy of their reporting, and the validity of their recommendations which have withstood the test of time.

Chaos and Corruption of the Nationalist Regime

Without fail, every reference on the period admits to the chaos, corruption and incompetence of the Kuomintang regime. Most references will also report that it was sufficiently reactionary to rival the Fascist and Nazi parties, but with none of their efficiencies. Some will go so far as to say that the degeneration of the Kuomintang had progressed to the point where revolution and civil war were inevitable and that the Communists simply filled the power vacuum and took advantage of the times. This appears to underplay the impact of World War II and the effectiveness of postwar Communist programs on the final outcome of the revolution. However, it appears probable that even given the basic fundamental social and economic backwardness and problems in China and given the Communist success

in fostering Nationalism and in mobilizing the peasants during the war and even given the enormous problems the Kuomintang faced as the result of the World War and eight years of Japanese occupation, the fact remains that the Kuomintang still should have been able to defeat the Communists or at least have been forced only into some type of coalition restricted to Manchuria.

The complete collapse of the Kuomintang and the relatively quick victory of the Communists, at the point in time when it occurred, can only be attributed to the level of stupidity, chaos, incompetence, corruption, favoritism, reaction, cruelty, suppression and indecision that characterized the Kuomintang in the period 1941-1949 and especially 1945-1949.

Military

The theory that the military factor had a primary influence on the fall of the Kuomintang--and did so specifically as a result of US interference in Chiang's offensives in 1945-1946, US insistence on a coalition between the Nationalist and Communists and on a US induced change in Chiang's basic strategy as a result of the embargo on military supplies to the Nationalist from July 1946 to May 1947,--is very myopic and ignores other factors, some military, to the point of being intellectually dishonest.

At the end of WW II the Communist forces appeared destined for quick defeat. The Nationalists outnumbered the Communists four to one, had modern arms and equipment at its disposal and Chiang's prestige was at its peak. However, under this thin veneer China was coming apart.

After the surrender of Japan Chiang continued to discriminate against non-central Armies. The reoccupation of North China was conducted by Central Army forces at great expense and delay when non-central Army forces were closer and could have occupied the area sooner. These discriminatory actions created wide spread anti-government sentiment and defections and

treacheries in the provincial forces. In one case, an Army group commander deserted to the Communists with his units.¹¹⁴

Much has been said about the Nationalist offensive in April of 1946 during which they retook Changchun and Ssuningchih. Except for Marshall's intervention in obtaining Chiang's agreement to another truce, the Nationalists supposedly would have destroyed all Communist forces in Manchuria.¹¹⁵

In fact, however, the Communists had already agreed to and evacuated Changchun prior to the arrival of Nationalist forces.¹¹⁶ The commander of the Nationalist forces was an incompetent who, after implementing a brilliant plan of his higher headquarters, did not follow up his advantage and allowed the Communists to withdraw to Harbin.¹¹⁷ It is also interesting that during this period the Communist strategy was to avoid decisive battles and the defense of cities.¹¹⁸ Chiang's strategy and the measure of his success was his ability to hold strategic points along the vital rail links from North China into Manchuria generally cities. Through this strategy, as forewarned by his American advisors, he overextended his lines of communication and his ability to secure them. Chiang agreed to another truce on 6 June 1946 which lasted until mid-July. At this point Chiang broke the truce and supposedly experienced success after success finally bottling the Communists up in the mountains of Central Shantung and Shansi. Again, at this point, just prior to wiping out the Communists he had to revert to a defensive strategy due to the withholding of ammunition by the US. The US embargo lasted for a period of ten months during which time the Communists made a miraculous recovery and became an unbeatable military power through the constant and diligent help of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁹

This interpretation is directly at odds with the rest of the literature and ignores military activities throughout the rest of China, assigns

greater influence to the United States than it possessed and fails to recognize the sovereignty and responsibility of the Nationalist government. What appears to have happened was that Chiang for the second time had broken a truce. Both Chiang and the Communists were aware of the Chinese peoples war weariness and the price that would be paid by the side perceived to be forcing further war on China.¹²⁰ However, due to his earlier successes Chiang probably thought he could achieve a quick victory before public opinion could grow significantly. As previously mentioned, Chiang and the Kuomintang leadership were not really in contact with reality. Chiang's initial successes in advancing throughout North China and Manchuria and the capture of Yenan were more impressive on the map than on the ground. Their advances were facilitated by the continuing Communist strategy of avoiding decisive battles, systematic evacuation of cities and concentration on the destruction of forces rather than the occupation of geographic objectives.

The government forces were, as previously mentioned, extended beyond their capacity to maintain support, with garrisons scattered along communication routes the length of the continent. Chiang had envisioned a large scale all out campaign against the Communist in July of 1946 but the sheer inertia of a war weary populace and the rapid deterioration of military morale caused an ever-decreasing momentum in the Nationalist effort and a continuous increase in Communist strength. Behind the scenes, competent and battle proven generals who were not of the Whampoa clique were being given the fast shuffle. Military leadership in the Nationalist Army was in incredible confusion and with the rate of turnover in the key commands soaring, the entire Army was rendered incapable of aggressive action or coordinated offensives against the Communists.¹²¹ Kuomintang generals were chosen on the grounds of political loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek and many who

qualified on this basis demonstrated professional mediocrity or outright incompetence. Some of China's best leaders were denied critical posts.¹²² Those competent leaders who did get command found it difficult to get supplies because they were mistrusted by the Whampoa clique. Most battles that were lost were lost due to incompetence of government officers in command, logistical, operational and administrative positions.¹²³ In addition to incompetence, corruption was also wide spread. Kuomintang generals often sold government property and sometimes traded ammunition to the Communists.¹²⁴

In mid-1947 the Communists took the initiative in Manchuria and against strong advice to evacuate, Chiang maintained his position. At no point does it appear that Chiang changed his strategy because of a shortage of ammunition. Chiang controlled the cities and the Communists controlled the countryside. Chiang was simply incapable of fixing the Communists forces and his Armies were reluctant to maneuver outside the cities because of serious problems with individual and unit surrender and desertion.

In May of 1947 the US embargo was lifted and China received some immediate shipments. However, due to bargaining and procrastination by the Chinese, significant shipments were delayed until 1948. A review of the results of conflict in 1947 reveals that the problem was not a shortage of ammunition but the desire and will to fight. In 1947, the Nationalists abandoned or surrendered to the Communists 1.5 million rifles, 171,000 machine guns, 30,000 items of heavy equipment (to include artillery), 2 million mortar and artillery shells, 250 million rounds of rifle and machine gun ammunition, 2 million hand grenades, 33 airplanes, 242 tanks, 214 armored cars and 9,000 trucks.¹²⁵

Much has been said about the impact of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists effort. The Soviets, prior to 1946, provided nothing of significance. It appears that the only aid provided by the Soviet Union after the war was access to the weapons and munitions abandoned by the Japanese after their surrender.

The Communists did not have an Air Force. The United States, at a great investment of men and money, trained and equipped a large Chinese Nationalist Air Force during the war. For reasons difficult to comprehend, the Nationalist Air Forces' participation in the civil war was negligible. A great deal has been said about the shortage of ammunition. It appears that the problem was not a shortage but distribution and resupply problem. If anyone had an ammunition problem it should have been the Communists. The fall of Manchuria and the rest of China was the result of incompetence, maldistribution and hoarding of supplies, turbulence in high command, massive desertions and surrenders, and an inability of Chiang to implement his plans and have his orders followed.

CHAPTER VII

IMPACT OF US POLICY

Impact of US Policy

United States relations with China prior to World War II were generally understanding and benevolent. The United States persistently spoke out for Chinese interests and proclaimed an Open Door Policy to avoid dismemberment of China, but rarely supported its words with actions that would lead to military or economic commitment. Although the United States profited from the unequal treaties in the same manner as other powers and displayed idealism and dualism in its relations with China, its presence and its policies contributed to the preservation of China's territorial integrity and international prestige. During the Japanese appression of the 1930's the Stimson doctrine frustrated Japanese attempts to achieve international recognition of her conquest and provided moral support to the Chinese.

Upon entry into World War II, the United States had already determined that the main allied effort against the axis powers would be in Europe initially. This, plus the Japanese invasion of Burma, restricted the support the US could provide to China. US policy during the war as to keep China in the war, provide as much support as possible "over the hump," train China's Army and prepare China as a base from which to invade Japan. General Stilwell who was assigned to China to act as Chiang's American Chief of Staff and to supervise lend-lease was completely frustrated by Chiang Kai-shek. After US entry into the war, Chiang was only interested in the training, equipping and positioning of the Central Army forces in

relation to the Communist and non-Central Army forces. Chiang wanted only the Central Army forces to be US trained and equipped. He was very sensitive to the movement of Chinese forces, especially non-central Army forces, and he was always more concerned with isolating the Communists than with defeating the Japanese. The reactionary, undemocratic, corrupt and incompetent nature of his government also began to create concern in United States. Stilwell was completely incapable of influencing Chiang to reform his army, to come to some agreement on the utilization of Communist forces or to effectively challenge the Japanese. Stilwell advocated the US coordination with and the employment of Communist forces with or without Chiang's consent. Chiang's refusal to respond to US desires or to effectively challenge the Japanese created doubts in the Joint Staff as to the Chinese ability to support a US invasion of China or the Chinese ability to effectively tie down the Japanese forces on the mainland during a US invasion of Japan. These doubts and the recall of Stilwell resulted in a basic change in both the US policy and war plans.

The changes in the war plan included the bypassing of China in the approach to Japan, the shifting of the B-29 bases to the Mariana Islands and the agreement of the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan. The change in US policy was instituted by Patrick Hurley upon his arrival as special representative of the President and later as ambassador. Hurley, who had assurances of Soviet recognition of the Nationalist government and of Chiang Kai-shek, from Stalin personally, planned to isolate the Communists and force them to come to terms with Chiang. Hurley restricted US contact with the Communists and required all US communications, support, and dealings with the Communists to go through the Nationalists. Hurley's foreign service officers disagreed with him and wanted to support both

Chiang and the Communists. They were convinced, as was Stilwell, that support only to Chiang would make him recalcitrant and uncontrollable. They believed that aid to the Communists would bring Chiang around and force him to broaden the political base of his government.

Hurley's policy dominated until he resigned and Marshall arrived in China with a new policy. Marshall's mission was to achieve a coalition between the Nationalist and the Communists. This was probably an impossible mission.

The complexity of the Marshall Mission was compounded by Hurley's policy of working only through the Nationalists to address issues with the Communists. This was further complicated by Hurley's removal, prior to the end of the war, of the foreign service officers who were assuring the Communists that Hurley's policy was not representative of the US State Department. These actions effectively isolated the Communists from the United States at a critical time in history. The actions of the United States at the end of the war in airlifting Nationalists forces to North and Eastern China, in extending lend-lease to Chiang after the war and in actively supporting Chiang's position in negotiations created difficult obstacles in the accomplishment of the Marshall Mission. It was difficult for the Communists, the Nationalists and most other observers to understand how the United States could so rapidly change policy. A more confusing question was how could the US, while providing economic and military aid and advisors to Chiang be objective in mediating the formation of a coalition government in China.

Our foreign service officers had provided ample warning during the war of the weakness, corruption and incompetence of the Kuomintang and the rising tide of the Communists. They warned us not to become tied to the Nationalists. Problems with the Soviets surfaced almost immediately after

the war and resulted in programs to counter Communism around the world. Unfortunately in China we were tied to a government that we could not live with, would probably not survive and was worst than the Facist and Nazi parties we had just defeated. Our problem was created by the China lobby and the breakdown of bipartisan politics after the war. We found ourselves saddled with a situation in China was so bad that it could only be salvaged by direct insertion of US military forces. We found ourselves unwilling and unable to use the required force, and because of partisan politics, we found that we could not abandon the Kuomintang party and the Nationalist government.¹²⁶

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The philosophy of the Kuomintang party was based on the Three Principles of the People--nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood. Three times during his regime, Chiang temporarily realized the first principle of nationalism or as Sun Yat-sen described it--unity. These were during the Northern Expedition, after the Sian incident and the forming of the united front and at the end of World War II. Chiang never seriously attempted to achieve the last two principles which would have required extensive social and economic reforms. The Communists claimed legitimacy as the rightful heirs of Sun Yat-sen and built their post war power base by fulfilling the principles of democracy and the people's livelihood in their wartime base areas. Through the legitimacy gained here, the peasants achieved the unification of China by deserting the Kuomintang and supporting the Communists.

The actions and policy of the United States after the war did not have an appreciable effect on either protagonist and as such had little impact on the outcome of the revolution. Neither did it retard or accelerate the fall of the Kuomintang. The only US actions that could have possibly changed the final outcome of the revolution were either to influence Chiang to implement basic reforms or to provide for direct US military intervention.

Although the Communists were presented an organized, armed and dedicated opponent this was only incidental to their success. The underlying and primary reason for the Kuomintang failure was Chiang's refusal to implement the basic social and economic changes that would bring China into the 20th

century and provide for the slow evolutionary and controlled changes in Chinese society. Once Chiang had established his power base on the landowners, gentry and other traditional leaders they were in a position to prevent the implementation of even the modest reforms attempted by Chiang. The only way to get around his power base was to mobilize the masses which Chiang continually refused to do.

The immediate reason for the Kuomintang failure and the Communist victory at the point in time and history that it occurred was the total, raw, unmitigated and almost criminal incompetence, corruption, chaos, stupidity and cruelty that reigned in both the Kuomintang party and military. From this perspective it is easy to see that only direct intervention by US military forces would have been able to alter the outcome of the Chinese civil war.

ENDNOTES

1. Sun Yat-sen was known as the father of the Chinese Republic. His parents were Christians and Sun was educated in mission schools in Hawaii and Hong Kong. In 1892 he was graduated as a medical doctor. After practicing medicine for a year, he turned his attention to political activity. After an unsuccessful revolt in 1895, he fled China. Returning in 1911 Sun founded the Kuomintang party on his three great principles of nationalism, democracy and peoples' welfare. Sun divided the revolution into three stages: military unification, political tutelage and then constitutional democracy.

2. Yuan Shih-k'ai served in the Chinese Army in Korea from 1882 to 1894. From 1900-1907 he was the governor-general of Chihli and concurrently superintendent of trade in the northern ports. During this period he became one of the most powerful men in China. His army, known as the Peiyang Army, provided the defense for the Manchu capital. Yuan's officers were known as the Peiyang Clique. Many of China's warlords came from this clique. Yuan was dismissed from his official positions in 1908 because he was getting too powerful. He was recalled in 1911 and became the dominant force in the Manchu government.

3. For an interesting but general account of this period see Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese, pp. 442-446.

4. Warlords were regional political or military figures in China. They controlled their own armies and employed them in pursuit of personal ambitions. They were sovereign within the territory they controlled. Due to the lack of a unifying principle, no single warlord was sufficiently strong enough to control all of China. The increase of nationalism in China provided the principle that allowed Chiang Kai-shek to accumulate the power to defeat them.

5. See note 16.

6. The Kuomintang, also known as the Chinese Nationalist's People's Party, was founded by Sun Yat-sen in 1911 on the principles of nationalism, democracy and people's livelihood. It was a revolutionary organization composed of various insurrectionist parties.

7. The Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921. Its core was the Marxist Study Association formed in 1920 by a group of intellectuals in Shanghai. For an interesting discussion of Lenin's special interest in China and his view of capitalism's relation to Asian colonialism see John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, pp. 208-209.

8. The Northern Expedition was the apex of a great surge of Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiment. Police gunfire into student demonstrations in Shanghai in May 1925 and in Canton in June 1925 dramatized the unequal treaties and privileges of foreigners. In March

1927 foreign residents were attacked after the Nationalist troops entered Nanking. Six foreigners were killed and the rest were evacuated under the protection of foreign gunboats. The experiences of Joseph Stilwell, who was in China during this time, provides some insight into the anti-foreign overtones of this period. See Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, pp. 118-153.

9. Ibid.

10. Until 1927 the left and right wings of the Nationalist movement had generally been able to coexist. Chiang had been suspicious of Communist aims and methods since his visit to Russia in 1923. In March of 1926 Chiang had arrested leftist elements in Canton to forestall a plot to kidnap him. By March of 1927 the revolutionary government had been moved to Wuhan and was dominated by left wing Kuomintang and Communists. Since Wuhan was an industrial center, it fit into the Communist strategy as a proletarian base for further revolution. Chiang favored Nanking and after securing Nanking, Chiang was able to consolidate his position and thwart the Communists through his powerful military force. In April of 1927 the Communists had seized control of Shanghai. At the orders of the Comintern, they awaited Chiang as an ally. On arrival, Chiang's troops decimated the Communists. Chiang purged the Communists from the Kuomintang and instituted a nationwide campaign to suppress Communism. Chiang was relatively successful in this campaign. Chiang continued the Northern Expedition, in the spring of 1928, from the Yangtze to Peking, which his force occupied in June.

11. In order to stop the revolution short of the masses, Chiang halted the political and cultural change at the national and regional level, which is an intermediate level in the process. The purge of the Communists diverted a social and economic revolution with its inherent class struggle. These actions avoided any alteration of the peasant's lifestyle.

12. John Fairbank, The United States and China, p. 214, recognizes in this period an effort to stop the revolution short of the masses. However, he provides different reasons for Chiang's decision. He indicates that Chiang based his decision exclusively on political considerations rather than the considerations of Confucianism and Chinese tradition.

13. Chang Hsueh-liang was the warlord of Manchuria and possessed the only military force which could threaten Chiang's dominant position. Chang Hsueh-liang was also contending with Japanese influences and pressures in Manchuria. At that time the Japanese were afraid of a strong, united China.

14. For a review of Chiang's decision to concentrate on the Communists, see Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, pp. 166-175.

15. See Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution 1925-1928, p. 51.

16. The Washington Naval Conference was convened in Washington, DC from November 1921 to February 1922 at the invitation of the United States in consultation with Britain. The conference was an Anglo-American effort

to set a balance of naval power in the Pacific without the expense of a naval arms race. Three treaties were produced by the conference: The Five Power Naval Treaty; The Four Power Pacific Treaty; and the Nine Power Treaty on China. Through the Nine Power Treaty, the American policy of an open door in China became an international commitment. The major powers also returned to China some of their territorial concessions and agreed to review the problems of the remaining concessions, extraterritoriality and tariff autonomy. For detailed discussions of this conference see: Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese, pp. 452-454; Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, pp. 106-108; Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, pp. 638-648; Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925-1928, pp. 7-13.

17. Li Li-san succeeded Ch'en Tu-hsiu as secretary general of the Chinese Communist party in 1927. After the failure of the Communist attempts to establish a proletarian revolutionary base and their defeats at Wuhan and Changsha in July 1930, Li was replaced by a group of students who had studied in Moscow.

18. During this same period China was also suffering from a disastrous flood of the Yangtze which left two million dead and countless destitute. Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 166.

19. Frank Kellogg was a diplomat, lawyer and Nobel prize winner. He was United States Senator from Minnesota (1917-1923), a delegate to the Pan-American Conference in 1923 and Ambassador to Great Britain from 1923-1924. He replaced Charles Hughes as Secretary of State from 1925-1929. His greatest achievement was the Kellogg-Briand Pact for which he received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1929.

20. Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution 1925-1928. Mrs. Borg gives Secretary Kellogg's views on this point extensive coverage in the lengthy introduction to this book.

21. China has traditionally had three autonomous regions: Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria. By definition autonomy indicates self-government. Manchuria, during this period of time, recognized the jurisdiction of the Nanking government. Russia and Japan further complicated the situation by claiming spheres of influence in Manchuria.

22. This was a dispute over the control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In 1929 and 1930 it led to Chinese raids on Soviet consulates and retaliatory raids by the Russians on Chinese border towns. It was precipitated by Chiang's efforts to reimpose Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and resulted in instant retaliation by Soviet troops ending in the defeat and humiliation of the Chinese.

23. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, also known as the Pact of Paris, was a result of a call to outlaw war. It was signed in 1928 and renounced war as an instrument of national policy. It was ratified by sixty-four nations.

24. An objective balance of the pro's and con's of our dualistic and idealistic policies with China can be gained by reviewing John K. Fairbank, The United States and China; Herbert Feis, The China Tangle;

Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese; and Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War 1941-1945.

25. The Manchurian incident was a clash between the Japanese and Chinese at Wanpaoshan. It was the result of a dispute over the right of some Korean farmers to build an irrigation ditch across the property of Chinese farmers. The Japanese, who were claiming that the Koreans were their subjects, had invoked their extraterritorial rights. As disputes arose between the Koreans and Chinese, each country used force to protect its own group.

26. The Mukden incident was the spark that set off the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The Japanese claimed that the Chinese had severed the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway and used this as an excuse to retaliate against the Chinese. The incident was actually planned and executed by the Japanese Kwantung Army stationed in Manchuria. The plot was engineered by Colonel Sheishoro Itagoki, a disciple of Kodo, who was anxious to launch a Showa "restoration" which would revitalize the primitive Bushido spirit of classical Japan. For a clear picture of the extent of the Japanese government's lack of control over its military see Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, pp. 168-169.

27. Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 175, provides some insight into Chiang's yielding to Japanese demands.

28. The Stimson Doctrine was the result of an open letter from Secretary of State Stimson to Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The letter was a direct response to Japanese actions in Shanghai. It was a reiteration of Secretary Bryan's statement at the time of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915. It notified Japan and China that the United States would not admit to the legality of or recognize any arrangement which impaired the Open Door Policy, the sovereignty, independence or the territorial or administrative integrity of China, which was brought about by means contrary to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It is also known as the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine.

29. After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, China appealed to the League of Nations. The League appointed the Lytton Commission to investigate and report on the action. For a review of the appointment and progress of the commission, see Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, pp. 165-175.

30. The Tangku Truce between Japan and China halted Japanese aggression in 1933. The truce was accepted by Chiang Kai-shek who was eager to resume his bandit suppression campaigns against the Communists in the south. Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 175.

31. Comintern is an acronym for Communist International or the Third International. It was organized out of Communist groups in various countries after World War I. It was dominated by the Soviet government and was headquartered in Moscow. It was a revolutionary organization directed toward the overthrow of capitalism. It was officially abolished in May 1943.

32. Chou En-lai was a Chinese Communist leader who was born in Kiangsi. He helped start the Communist parties in France and Germany. He was head of the political department and secretary of the Whampoa Military Academy while Chiang Kai-shek was commandant. After the Communist victory in China in 1949, Chou became prime minister and foreign minister of the Chinese People's Republic.

33. For a discussion of Japan's need to legalize their actions in China, see Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, p. 168.

34. Cordell Hull was Secretary of State under Franklin Roosevelt. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945 for his work with the United Nations. Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, provides a detailed account of Hull's determination to prevent Japan from dominating the Far East.

35. The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was the deceptive term the Japanese used to describe Japanese domination of East Asia.

36. This policy was the result of American and British planning prior to United States entry into World War II. This planning produced the "ABC Plan" of which the Germany-first policy was an integral part.

37. Joseph Stilwell was a United States Army general assigned as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and deputy commander of the China-Burma-India theater in 1942. He had several previous assignments in China and had studied the language. Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, provides an interesting and detailed account of General Stilwell in China.

38. Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, pp. 299-385, provides a detailed account of this entire operation.

39. Ibid.

40. After Pearl Harbor the Japanese fleet controlled the approaches to all Chinese ports. With the Japanese attack on Burma and the subsequent closing of the Burma Road, the only method of supplying China was by air over the Himalayas ("over the hump").

41. Claire Chennault was a United States Army general. He was the leader of the famed Flying Tigers, a volunteer group that supported the Chinese prior to Pearl Harbor. This group was later designated the Fourteenth Air Force. He disagreed with General Stilwell's allocation of lend-lease supplies entering China and, with Chiang's approval, convinced President Roosevelt to change the allocation in favor of his air force.

42. Even though the Nationalists and Communists had agreed in 1937 to provide a united front to the Japanese, they utilized every opportunity to improve their position over each other. During World War II Chiang positioned a large part of his forces to contain the Communists.

43. Chiang was receiving pressure from his allies to take the field against the Japanese. Churchill and Stalin had voiced their doubts of Chinese abilities and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were becoming impatient. The aircraft being used to fly "over the hump" were sorely needed elsewhere. Chiang was in a difficult position. If he did not take the field against the Japanese, he would lose face and possibly his lend-lease. If he did take the field against the Japanese, his armies would probably be defeated, he would lose face and his military power would be reduced. If a good share of the lend-lease tonnage went to General Chennault, who stated that he could defeat the Japanese with air power alone, Chiang could rationalize the inactivity of his armies through insufficient supplies and Chennault's claims.

44. President Roosevelt often felt bad about his inability to support the China theater and when approached by the Chinese often promised support that was logistically impossible. This caused Stilwell a number of headaches.

45. See Note 43.

46. Albert Wedemeyer was a United States Army general. He served on War Department General Staff from 1941-1943. He was Deputy Chief of Staff to the Southeast Asia Command from 1943-1944.

47. This was the fulfillment of Stilwell's prediction.

48. T. V. Soong was the brother-in-law of Chiang. He was educated in the United States. Returning to China, he was director of the department of commerce and was instrumental in setting up China's central banking system. From 1941-1945 he was foreign minister and from 1945-1947 he was premier.

49. This treaty was not signed until August 14, 1945, the day of the Japanese surrender.

50. George C. Marshall was Chief of Staff of the United States Army during the war years. He went to China in 1946 at the request of President Truman to mediate a peace between the Nationalists and the Communists. After he returned from China, he became Truman's Secretary of State and held the post from 1946-1949. He was instrumental in developing the plan, which bears his name, that provided for economic revitalization of war-torn Europe. He was president of the American Red Cross from 1949-1950. In 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, he was appointed Secretary of Defense but resigned the next year. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1953.

51. The Whampoa clique was the group of officers who had been with Chiang while he was commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy and who were personally loyal to him.

52. A Kwangsi general and later vice-president under Chiang.

53. Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese-Revolution, 1915-1949, p. 23.

54. George Botjer, A Short History of Nationalist China, 1919-1949, p. 40.
55. James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration, pp. 168-169.
56. Ibid., p. 170.
57. Ibid., p. 172.
58. Lucien Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949, p. 23.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. John Lewis Wilson, Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution, p. 144.
62. Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalist and Communist Power, p. 6.
63. Bianco, Origins of the Chinese Revolution, p. 144.
64. Ibid., p. 148.
65. Sheridan, p. 264.
66. Ibid., p. 151.
67. Richard Thornton, China: A Political History, 1917-1980, p. 124.
68. Anthony Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost., p. XIV.
69. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
70. Thornton, p. 172.
71. Bianco, p. 172.
72. Thornton, p. 195.
73. Kubek, p. 270.
74. Ibid., p. 264.
75. Ibid., p. 266.
76. Ibid., p. 272.
77. Ibid., p. 225.
78. Ibid., p. 226.

79. Ibid., p. 225.
80. Ibid., p. 237.
81. Ibid., pp. 285, 277 and 278.
82. Ibid., p. 238.
83. Ibid., p. 240.
84. Bianco, p. 114.
85. Ibid., p. 118.
86. Botjer, p. 257.
87. Ibid., p. 195.
88. Cohen, p. 158. Tai Li Blue Shirts were a form of Chinese Gestapo. Sheridan, p. 213.
89. Feis, China Tangle, p. 420, Thornton, p. 186.
90. Thornton, p. 198.
91. Ibid., p. 203.
92. Ibid., p. 207.
93. Ibid., p. 208.
94. Ibid., p. 208.
95. Ibid., p. 209.
96. Bianco, p. 201.
97. For an in-depth review of this concept see Ishwer Ojha, Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition. pp. 26-50.
98. Johnson, p. 1
99. Bianco, p. 154.
100. Sheridan, p. 264.
101. Johnson, p. 5.
102. Ibid., p. 3.
103. Sheridan, p. 264.
104. Ibid., p. 266 and Bianco, p. 158.

- p. 201.
105. Theodoe H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China,
 106. Bianco, p. 174.
 107. Thornton, p. 102.
 108. Ibid., p. 132.
 109. Bianco, p. 169.
 110. Ibid., p. 173, White and Jacoby, p. 292.
 111. Thornton, pp. 205-207.
 112. Feis, p. 260.
 113. Tuchman, pp. 646-647.
 114. F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949,
 - p. 229.
 115. Thornton, p. 194.
 116. White and Jacoby, p. 295.
 117. Liu, p. 244.
 118. Ibid., pp. 250-251.
 119. Thornton, pp. 201-205.
 120. Bianco, p. 170 and Sheridan, p. 270.
 121. Liu, pp. 244, 245; Botjer, pp. 256 and 257; Sheridan, p. 272.
 122. Sheridan, p. 272.
 123. Ibid., p. 272.
 124. Botjer, p. 263 and Sheridan, p. 272.
 125. Botjer, p. 273.
 126. A very detailed and readable account of the dilemma faced by the United States is provided by Tang Tsou in his book, America's Failure in China.

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