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
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
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LONG RANGE STRATEGIC PLANNING:
AN APPLIED MODEL

by

Charles William Kennard Jr.

June 1983

Thesis Advisor:

M. W. Clough

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Long Range Strategic Planning: An Applied Model

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1975

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the issue of long range strategic planning. The model developed in Chapter One is meant to be a conceptual framework around which the complex issues of U.S. foreign policy can be organized. Chapters Two through Five apply this model to U.S./South African relations. Chapter six is a case study of South African Nuclear Capabilities.

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


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I. A STRATEGIC PLANNING MODEL

Strategic planning is essentially a management function that requires intellect as well as imagination. Strategic planners should be concerned with identifying interests, visualizing future scenarios and evaluating alternative ways and means of achieving desired goals. Central to this process should be long term analysis aimed at efficient stewardship of this nation's finite resources.

Strategic relationships, however, are "as much psychological as physical: weapons may finally settle the account but their triggering is the result of the strategies and tactics, myths and logic, fears and hopes, mistakes and talent, and perceptions and misperceptions which exist in the minds of men."¹

Glenn Snyder defined rationality as "choosing to act in a manner which gives best promise of maximizing one's value position on the basis of sober calculation of potential gains and losses, and probabilities of enemy actions."² His definition implies several decision-making characteristics, namely, that all possible alternatives must be considered, that the alternatives are considered on their merits, that

¹Kenneth Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1979 , p. 101.

²Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 25.

calculations are based on accurate information and that decisions will be made based on logic not emotion. Where the danger lies, is the impact of cultural biasing on the decision making process.

While strategic thought is a universal preoccupation, its result, strategy, is always contextual, reflecting cultural biased perceptions, interests, traditions, and ideologies. Calculations of rational behavior are culturally dependent in two ways. First, one nation's cultural heritage may prevent its decision-makers from seeing certain options which might be rational in an objective sense. A good example of this is the Kamikaze pilot of World War II.³ It is highly unlikely that a group of Western planners would even consider such tactics as an acceptable method of stopping enemy warships, although Japanese planners felt the tactic fit their criteria of rationality. Secondly, culture is important because it shapes the ends which create the problem to which rational thinking has to be addressed. If an outsider cannot understand the reasonableness of a particular end, he probably is not going to appreciate the rationality of the means. An example of this is the reaction of the Western military establishment to the Soviet institution of the military commissar.

The net impact of cultural biasing, ethnocentrism, is distortion at all stages of the decision-making process,

³Booth, p. 64


from the gathering and screening of information to the discussion of what is likely to constitute the best (most rational) course of action. Cultural relativism, an effort to perceive and describe social and cultural phenomena in terms of scientific detachment, is the key by which a strategic planner can move from a psychological milieu into the operational milieu.

The utility of a planning model lies in its ability to provide a conceptual framework around which a planner can organize his analysis. Confronting the analysts, are two types of planning, long term vs. short term. The two should not be confused, nor conducted at the same level of analysis.

Short term planning generally involves instrumental goals. Foreign policy objectives/interests are stated confidently and the environment can be described with sufficient certainty to provide the foundations for a rational strategy. At this level of analysis, the area specialist reigns supreme because of the need for expertise in a specific area. The "big picture" however, is often lost under the pressures of day to day decision making. Short term planning is usually characterized by a limited capability to sense conditions beyond the immediate issue.

Long-range planning should be conducted at the macrolevel by strategic planners. The process should: (1) deal with broad terminal goals vice specific interests; (2) conceptualize a preferred long-range environment; (3) enunciate policies to assure the attainment of the preferred environment and;

(4) develop an integrated coherent strategy composed of core, forward-looking, and hedging substrategies. A premium should be placed on intellect, originality, and cultural relativity vice specialization.



The term "national interests" represents an effort to understand the underlying rationale for the behavior of states on the international scene. Proponents of the concept view it as the key to an understanding of what motivates a state's actions, while critics advance the position that the concept is too broad, too vague, or too ill defined to be useful as an analytical tool. The position of this author is that once the national interests in a particular region are identified and categorized, they can serve as a focus around which the complex and diverse issues of U.S. foreign policy can be organized.

Donald Neuchterlein, in his book, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities, presented a conceptual framework that categorizes U.S. national interests into four areas:

1. Defense of the homeland: this interest deals with the defense of the continental United States and the strategic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Issues would include SALT, violations of Canadian air space and security interests in the Caribbean basin.

2. Economic well-being: this interest deals with a wide range of international economic issues which affect the American standard of living. Issues would include the value of the dollar, the price of gold, the ability of American firms to trade and invest overseas, the impact of international cartels and access to foreign sources of oil and minerals.

3. Favorable world order: this interest deals with international security arrangements. Issues would include U.S. security agreements with countries outside of North America, regional balance of power calculations, wars of national liberation, wars between non-communist countries and access to foreign bases.

4. Promotion of values: this interest deals with the question of ideology as a basis of American foreign policy. Issues would include implementation of the Helsinki Accords, pressure on South Africa to alter its repressive racial policies and pressure on authoritarian allies to lessen human rights violations.

Identification of which types of interest would represent only the first step in an assessment of U.S. national interests in a region. Step two would involve assessing

the intensity of those interests with respect to overall U.S. interests. The categories Nuechterlein utilized in his matrix will be used here:

1. Survival issues: the very existence of the state is in jeopardy either as a result of an overt military attack or the threat of an attack if demands are rejected.
2. Vital issues: serious harm will likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military forces, are employed to counter and adverse action taken by another state or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation.
3. Major issues: a state's political, economic, or ideological well being may be adversely affected by events or trends in the international environment, requires actions aimed at preventing them from becoming serious threats (vital issues). Most issues in international relations fall into this category and are resolved through diplomatic negotiations.
4. Peripheral issues: a state's well being is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but the interest of its private citizens or its companies operating abroad may be endangered.

The final phase in the assessment of national interests is to identify where tradeoffs exist between interests. Traditionally, U.S. efforts to realize defense and world-order interests have run counter to U.S. efforts to achieve economic or ideological interests. Current U.S./Japanese

relations exemplify the tradeoffs between economic and world order interests.

With short range planning, interests can be stated confidently and the environment can be described with sufficient accuracy to provide the basis for a sound strategy. With long term planning uncertainty undermines the confidence a planner has in his ability to forecast future interest and future environments. With an interest, the problem can be solved by stating the interest at a sufficiently high level of generality. Access to resources in Southern Africa will likely remain an issue over the long term, while access to Rhodesian chrome or Zairean cobalt may not.

The solution to the problem of portraying the environment over the long term is to develop a range of probable alternative environments. The spectrum of scenarios should be narrow enough to be intellectually manageable, while wide enough to encompass most of the likely variations. The spectrum should reflect present trends not wishful thinking or the use of unrealistic alternatives.

The end objective of long range strategic planning is a strategy capable of generating a set of recommendations to the decision maker. To accomplish this in a dynamic and ever changing world requires an integrated strategy composed of three parts.

1. A core strategy - aimed at achieving our interest, irrespective of changing environments. Recognizes that certain policies remain constant over time.

2. A forward looking strategy - aimed at achieving a favorable environment in the target area. Recognizes that U.S. policy decisions can have significant impact on future events.

3. A hedging strategy - aimed at handling unforeseen contingencies/surprises. Recognizes that many events are beyond the control of the U.S. and that there are surprises in store for long range planners.

Cultural relativity figures prominently in the planning process in three ways. First, in order to forecast future trends in a country, a planner has to understand the forces at work within that society. He has to be able to identify the major actors and determine their objectives. Second, to devise an effective strategy, the planner must know what motivates the major actors. Once this is determined, the planner can then devise a strategy aimed at promoting U.S. interests. Third, U.S. foreign policy operates in a dynamic world. Policy options have to constantly be revised to reflect changes in the operational milieu.

II. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS

In 1969, the National Security Council adopted the second in a list of five alternative options presented as a basis of U.S. foreign policy in Southern Africa. Option Number Two argued that American national interests would best be served "by compensating for, rather than abandoning, tangible U.S. interests in White states". By turning the sights of Black states away from the total liberation of the continent, the U.S. would be free to realize its economic and strategic interests throughout the region. This chapter will address the question of U.S. interests in Southern Africa.

U.S. national interests in South Africa fall into four categories: defense; economic; world-order; and ideological. At present, U.S. defense interests can be classified as "peripheral" while our economic, world-order and ideological are "major" in intensity.

A. DEFENSE INTERESTS

At present, the Republic of South Africa does not represent a threat to the physical well-being of this nation or its citizens. Given the disparity in resource bases and the great distance involved it is highly probable that U.S. defense interests will remain peripheral in nature.

B. ECONOMIC INTERESTS

U.S. economic interests in South Africa can be classified as major. U.S. investment in South Africa is approximately \$3 billion, around 2 percent of U.S. world total, and U.S./South African trade is on the order of \$6 billion a year. This trade, representing less than 1 percent of U.S. totals, is generally identified as the strongest U.S. interest in the area.

1. Strategic Minerals

The case for South Africa's importance to the United States and the West rests on its major position as a non-fuel mineral producer. In 1982 South Africa was the fourth largest producer of nonfuel minerals and accounted for more than half the world's production of gold, platinum, diamonds and vanadium and more than a third of its production of chrome, manganese, aluminum, silicate, and vermiculite. Since the largest single alternative source of gold, platinum, chrome, manganese, and vanadium is the Soviet Union, the continued access to South African supplies is crucial to Western economies.

Discussions of U.S. vulnerabilities are generally confined to five minerals. The following is a brief summary of those minerals.

a. Chromium

Chromium is extracted from the ground as chromite ore and is used principally in its iron-alloy form, ferrochrome.

When combined with nickel, ferrochrome produces stainless steel. Because of stainless steel's high strength and its ability to withstand heat and corrosion, it is critical in the manufacture of jet engines, petrochemical and power plant equipment and other products subjected to high pressure, extreme temperature and/or corrosion. Chromium, in its other forms, is used to produce other heat-resistant, high-strength superalloys essential in defense, aviation, petrochemical, and power-generation industries.

While chromite occurs worldwide, the vast majority of identified reserves are located in Southern Africa. The world's largest known chromium resource is in the Bushveld Complex, Transvaal, Republic of South Africa. South African reserves have been estimated at over 2.5 billion tons of high-iron chromite, with an additional identified subeconomic resource in excess of 22 billion tons.⁴ The second largest known deposits of chromite are in the Great Dyke Region of Zimbabwe; estimated reserves are placed at 560 million tons of high-chromium chromite and 56 million tons of high-iron chromite.⁵

The United States has some chromium ore deposits, but none are economically exploitable at existing world prices.

⁴Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems: 1980 Edition, Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Interior, 1980, p. 170.

⁵IBID.

In 1980, the United States imported 76 percent of its chromium needs, both as ore and ferrochrome, from South Africa. Europe and Japan relied on South African exports for 95 percent of their needs.

The South African government has encouraged on site smelting of chromite. Since two and one-half tons of chromite ore are required to produce one ton of ferrochrome, this on site smelting reduces transportation costs by 30 percent and allows South Africa to under sell U.S. and European processors. In 1980, South Africa's ferrochrome capacity of 700,000 tons was more than double that of the United States.⁶

In the event of a short-term (up to five years) cutoff of supplies from South Africa, the United States would be able to continue to produce essential chromium products. The U.S. stockpile includes a 2.3 year supply of ferrochrome.⁷ America's other major sources of ore are the Philippines, Turkey, the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe.

In response to a medium-term (five to ten years) or a long-term (more than ten years) interruption, alternative sources would have to be developed. New technologies aimed at developing substitute materials and increased secondary recovery efforts would be needed. It is estimated that a

⁶ Subcommittee on Mines and Mining, Sub-Sahara Africa: Its Role in Critical Mineral Needs of the Western World, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 17.

⁷ Foreign Policy Study Foundation, South Africa: Time Running Out, Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1981, p. 314.

threefold increase in world chromium prices would make many of the world's subeconomic resources profitable. This could ease medium-term interruptions but long-term needs require South Africa chromium or new steel-making technologies.

b. Manganese

Over 90 percent of all manganese consumption is used in the production of iron and steel. In addition to manganese's desulfurizing and deoxidizing properties, it is an essential hardening and strengthening agent. Manganese's other uses are the manufacture of dry-cell batteries and in the production of various chemicals. At present, there are no satisfactory substitutes for manganese.

At current prices, the United States has no manganese resources that are economically exploitable. Identified world reserves of manganese ore are about 1.5 billion tons with the Republic of South Africa and the Soviet Union accounting for 1.2 billion tons.⁸ Other major alternative sources of manganese are Australia, Gabon, and Brazil.

SAMANCOR, South African Manganese Corporation, operates two mines in the Kalahari Field near Hotazel, South Africa. These mines, an open pit and an underground mine, account for 25 percent of the free world's manganese production. The Mamatwan open pit mine is advancing at a

⁸Bureau of Mines, p. 550.

rate of 20 meters a year through a deposit that stretches 40 miles long, 5 miles wide and 70 feet thick.⁹ To increase production, the company has to only increase the number of trucks in the pit. The South African Minerals Bureau estimates potential resources in the area at 12.1 billion tons or eight times the amount of presently identified resources.

In 1979 the United States imported 20 percent of its manganese ore from South Africa, while Europe and Japan relied on South African exports for 40 percent of their needs. U.S. ferrmanganese imports reflected a 60 percent reliance on South African sources, 44 percent directly and 16 percent from European processing of South African ore.¹⁰

In the event of a short-term cutoff of manganese from South Africa, the United States would be able to rely on its stockpile (three years-ore and six months-ferroalloys), private inventories and other sources of ore to lessen the impact. Medium-term shortages might prove to be difficult to deal with, unless countries like Australia, Brazil, Gabon, and India were willing to expand their production. A long-term source of manganese is the rich metal-bearing nodules on the ocean floor.

⁹Bureau of Mines, p. 553.

¹⁰Foreign Policy Study Foundation, p. 314.

In the case of manganese, the major concern is an adequate supply, not price, since manganese makes up only 1 to 2 percent of the cost of steel. Given the alternative sources of manganese, the U.S. should be capable of offsetting a loss in the supply of South African manganese.

c. Vanadium

Vanadium is used principally as an alloying element in the manufacture of lightweight, high-strength steels for jet engines, airframes, and oil/gas pipelines.

The Republic of South Africa accounts for over 35 percent of the vanadium produced in the world. The Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corporation is the world's largest producer of vanadium; marketing vanadium-bearing slag, vanadium pentoxide, and ferrovanadium.¹¹

The United States is the third leading world producer of vanadium after South Africa and the USSR. Annually the United States produces more vanadium than it uses. A total South African cutoff would leave worldwide production almost 25 million pounds short of demand, a shortage which could not be made up immediately by substitution or by increased production in the United States.¹² Thus a cutoff in South African supplies would cause short-term dislocations.

¹¹Bureau of Mines, p. 1006.

¹²Ann and Neva Seidman, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations, Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1978, p. 1.

Medium to long term stoppages in South African exports could be made up by increased production in the U.S., the USSR, Australia, Chile, Finland, India, Norway, and Venezuela. Substitution would also be a possible alternative since columbium, manganese, titanium, and tungsten can be used almost interchangeably with vanadium in the manufacture of certain steel alloys. Finally, since vanadium is primarily a by-product of the mining of other ores, notably uranium and secondary recovery from steel-making slag, production could be increased in the United States and other uranium and steel-producing countries.

d. Platinum-Group Metals

The uses of the platinum-group metals in modern industry are related to their extraordinary catalytic properties, their chemical inertness over wide temperature ranges, and their high melting points.¹³ In most applications, it is a combination of two or more of these characteristics, that makes the platinum-group metals uniquely useful.

Since 1975, platinum-palladium exhaust catalysts have been used to reduce the emission of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons from cars and trucks. Currently, this is the single largest use of platinum-group metals in the United States. Other uses include the manufacture of chemicals and pharmaceuticals where they are used as catalysts and the

¹³Bureau of Mines, p. 685.

production of corrosive resistant laboratory and processing equipment.

South Africa and the Soviet Union are the world's major producers of platinum-group metals. Each accounts for 47.5 percent of world production, the only other major supplier is Canada which produces approximately 4 percent of world demand. Canadian production is a by-product of nickel mining.¹⁴

The United States imports about 90 percent of its consumption of platinum-group metals. Of this South African exports account for 67 percent of U.S. imports. Although U.S. reliance on South African platinum is high, the possibility of secondary recovery is good. In the event of a short-term cutoff, the United States could fill the gap by recycling part of the 70 percent of platinum consumption that is used for catalytic purposes. U.S. stockpiles provide for only a four-month supply of platinum itself, but stockpiles of substitutes are greater than a one year supply.

U.S. resources of platinum could ease medium and long term cutoffs in South African exports. Domestic reserves are presently placed at 1 million troy ounces but if exploration and feasibility studies prove that the deposits in the Stillwater Complex, Montana and Duluth gabbro,

¹⁴Foreign Policy Study Foundation, p. 317

Minnesota, are economically exploitable, U.S. reserves would top 300 million ounces.¹⁵ This would provide the U.S. with sufficient reserves to be self sufficient.

e. Gold

Since the 1950's gold has emerged as an essential industrial metal. Electronic computers utilize gold in many parts of their electronic circuitry to insure reliable operation. Gold shielding is utilized to protect against radiation leaks and turbine blades in jet aircraft are bonded to their rotors with high-performance gold brazing alloys. As of 1980, over 27 percent of the gold consumed in the United States went to industrial uses.

South Africa accounts for over 70 percent of gold production in the non-communist world and holds more than 60 percent of the non-communist world's reserves. The West Driefontein mine in Witwatersrand is the most profitable gold mine the world has ever known. This mine alone produces nearly twice the entire U.S. production. The next largest gold producer is the USSR with 21 percent of world production followed by Canada with 4 percent and the U.S. with 2 percent.¹⁶

Current supplies are more than adequate to meet Western industrial demands. The traditional use of gold as a monetary metal, however, holds open the possibility of

¹⁵Bureau of Mines, p. 686.

¹⁶Bureau of Mines, p. 374.

international monetary instability if South African supplies were cut off. Even the prospect of a cut off would prompt private investors and speculators to tie up large amounts of capital in gold holdings. This would reduce the amount of investment capital available in the West and contribute to inflation by damaging the value of paper currencies.

2. U.S. Investments in South Africa

U.S. investment in South Africa is largely in the manufacturing sector of the economy. In recent years manufacturing has grown to 80 percent of total U.S. investment in South Africa. U.S. based multinationals have come to view South Africa as a stable and profitable environment, from which to expand their foothold in the vast potential African market.

Some of the biggest U.S. manufacturing firms have had plants in South Africa since the early 1900's, but recent expansion has resulted from South Africa's Nationalist Government's efforts to spur industrialization. In 1978, South Africa ranked fourteenth among all countries in the world in terms of U.S. investment in manufacturing.¹⁷ South Africa far outranks all the independent nations of Africa, despite their strenuous efforts to attract U.S. manufacturing companies.

There are several reasons for the rapid expansion of U.S. investment in South African manufacturing. First, the

¹⁷Seidman, p. 95.

relatively high incomes of the four million South African whites provide a fairly large local market for multinational goods. Second, the corporate management of large multinationals perceive a community of interests with the South African Government and local business groups in their efforts to expand trading ties northward on the continent. Instead of risking their capital by direct investment in what they consider to be unstable African-governed countries, they can gain a foothold by working within a rapidly growing, business-like economy, run by people very much like themselves.¹⁸ Third, the wages of African manufacturing workers are only an eighth of what U.S. workers receive. This combined with a low tax rate insures U.S. firms in South Africa a large profit margin. Officially, U.S. manufacturing firms reported an average profit rate of around 16 percent, compared to 2.8 percent for the rest of Africa and 11 percent in the United States.¹⁹

U.S. investment in South Africa manufacturing has helped to build an integrated, and increasingly self-sufficient national economy. In other African states, U.S. firms have generally built last-stage assembly and processing plants which continue to import parts and materials from their U.S. based factories. In South Africa, in contrast, U.S. firms have established linkages between their manufacturing plants

¹⁸Seidman, p. 96.

¹⁹IBID.

and the local economy. This has contributed to the building of an increasingly advanced technological foundation for South Africa's industrial sector. In short, U.S. multinationals have contributed significantly to making South Africa's economy sanction resistant.

C. WORLD ORDER INTERESTS

U.S. world order interests in Southern Africa revolve around four issues: (1) the geostrategic importance of maintaining Western control of the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope; (2) the Soviet/Cuban threat to Southern Africa; (3) South Africa as the dominant military power in Africa; and (4) South African Nuclear capabilities.

1. The Cape Route

The argument for the importance of the Cape Route can be stated simply. From the middle of the 1960's onward, and ever higher volume of imports to the United States and Western Europe have transited the southern tip of Africa. Reasons for this are threefold: (1) the overall expansion of imports from the Indian Ocean littoral states; (2) the long closure of the Suez Canal; and (3) the growing use of oil supertankers that are too large to use the Suez Canal.

In 1965 .8 million barrels of oil per day transitted the Cape in route to the West; by 1976 the total had grown to 18 million barrels.²⁰ In a report on U.S. policy toward

²⁰Geoffrey Kemp, "The New Strategic Map", Survival, March 1977, p. 51.

Southern Africa, a map was prepared showing the Cape Route as the shipping lane carrying the largest volume of oil traffic in the world.²¹ But oil is not the only commodity, over 27,000 ships per year transit the Cape, half of which stop at South African ports for logistics.²² In 1978, it was estimated that 70 percent of the strategic raw materials used by NATO are transported via the Cape Route.²³

These figures show that a potential danger for the United States and the West exists. General George S. Brown made the following appraisal:

"The threat to the Atlantic area is primarily from the Soviet Union. Increasing Soviet naval capability to operate along the littoral of Africa have put increasing pressure on our ability to protect important South African trade routes which provide materials essential to the United States and Western Europe."²⁴

2. The Communist Threat

With the success of the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the overall balance of power in Southern Africa changed considerably. Because

²¹Foreign Policy Study Foundation, South Africa: Time Running Out, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, p. 305.

²²Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa, Pretoria: South African Department of Information, 1982, p. 324.

²³John Peel, "The Growing Threat to Freedom and the North Atlantic Alliance", South African International, October 1978, p. 79.

²⁴General G.S. Brown, "Current JCS Theater Appraisals", Commanders Digest, March 17, 1977, p. 21.

the Soviet Union and their allies were willing to supply the liberation movements with arms, they have gained influence with the leaders of those countries. This is particularly true in Angola where Soviet aid and Cuban troops provided crucial support for the MPLA as it consolidated its rule after the Portuguese withdrawal. In Mozambique and Zimbabwe, however, the amount of Soviet aid was far more modest. The Soviet Union was but one of many nations that supported FRELIMO, and until recently the Chinese were the preferred communist benefactor. In Zimbabwe, the ZANU popular front government of Robert Mugabe showed its disdain at Soviet meddling by delaying the granting of diplomatic relations until ties were established with the West.

There are many ideas and theories associated with the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. One realistic appraisal is that if the Soviet Union and its proxies are able to gain access to ports and airfields in Mozambique, Angola, and other African littoral states, they will be in a position to successfully harass Western shipping. Captain J. M. Brink of the South African Navy argues that,

"The strangulation of the merchant shipping flow across the South Atlantic by the Russian Navy would have been completely impossible ten years ago. At present this must be considered a viable possibility."²⁵

²⁵Captain J. M. Brink, "The South Atlantic and South African Security", African Institute Bulletin #16, 1978, p. 55.

3. South Africa as a Regional Military Power

South Africa is clearly the strongest military power on the African Continent. In response to the mandatory arms embargo enacted by the United Nations in November 1977, South Africa's Armament Manufacturing Corporation began domestic production of a vast range of advanced weapons systems, including jet aircraft, armored tanks and fast naval patrol craft. In addition, South Africa may also be a nuclear power. Richard Betts, a leading expert on this subject, flatly asserts that "with their highly developed nuclear establishment, including unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facilities, Pretoria could build a bomb at any time it wishes."²⁶

Many analysts, having observed South Africa's military establishment and sophisticated facilities, quickly conclude that South Africa must be integrated into the Western alliance system. Since South Africa has the desire to carry out regional tasks on behalf of the West, it is simply asserted that this would be beneficial to the West in times of hostility or war.²⁷ In reality, it should not be taken as a foregone conclusion that South Africa's military support would invariably be helpful. In any war in which

²⁶Richard R. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?", International Security, Fall, 1979, p. 91

²⁷Larry Bowman, "The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States", African Affairs, Fall, 1979, p. 167.

South Africa was an ally, her manpower and material would be offset by alienating third world countries. While South Africa has actively courted Western ties, her foreign policy has shown a remarkable disdain for Western views on her strategic interests. In many ways, South Africa's willingness to advance American interests is similar to Israel's willingness to do the same. In short, South Africa is a regional superpower, like Iran or Israel, that is only willing to support American interests provided they coincide with or advance her own interests.

4. South African Nuclear Capabilities

South African nuclear capabilities represent a potential danger to the cause of nonproliferation. This danger manifests itself in two ways. First, South Africa clearly has the capability to build a nuclear weapon any time she chooses. This subject is addressed in Chapter six as a case study.

Second, South Africa is a source of nuclear technology and materials for other states. At present South Africa requires safeguards on all exports of uranium and technology.²⁸ Continuation of this policy is crucial to the cause of nonproliferation. One example of where this is especially true is South African exports of natural uranium to Argentina.

²⁸ Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices, Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977, p. 277.

Argentina operates a heavy water reactor which burns natural uranium. This type of reactor can be operated without undue economic penalty at a low fuel irradiation level. This mode of operation maximizes the production of plutonium.²⁹ With an unsafeguarded supply of uranium, Argentina would need only to build a chemical extraction plant to obtain weapons grade plutonium.

D. IDEOLOGICAL INTERESTS

U.S. ideological interests in South Africa rest with our Bill of Rights and with the transcendent claim of our Declaration of Independence, namely that legitimate government must rest upon the consent of the governed. At present it makes little sense to speak of civil rights in South Africa. In that Republic every civil right can be denied if the authorities so choose. Few safeguards of a substantive or procedural kind exist, in effect, all South Africans are at the mercy of the state. Civil rights have become privileges exercisable at the discretion of the government.³⁰

Two key laws, the Internal Security Act and the Terrorism Act, enable the South African government to prosecute anyone who might present a challenge to their regime. The Internal Security Act of 1976, defines communism as any doctrine which "aims at bringing about any political, industrial,

²⁹IBID, p. 279.

³⁰Foreign Policy Study Foundation, p. 78.

social, or economic change within the Republic by the promotion of disturbance or disorder, by unlawful acts or omissions", or which "aims at the encouragement of feelings of hostility between the European and non-European races of the Republic, where the consequences are calculated to further the achievement of political, industrial, social, or economic change by the promotion of disorder by unlawful acts". Peaceful bus boycotts in response to rate hikes, have been classified as communist inspired seditious acts. The Terrorism Act reduces the burden of proof for the prosecution even further by defining terrorism/sabotage as any act embarrassing the affairs of state. It is hard to imagine any peaceful activity aimed at bringing about reform that would not be covered.

A crucial test of the current status of civil rights in a country is the protection accorded personal freedom. A provision of the Terrorism Act provides for the indefinite detention of any person suspected of terrorism or having any information concerning terrorism. Detention is at the sole discretion of a police officer of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or above.³¹ In such cases, solitary confinement is authorized and the courts are expressly precluded from intervening. In 1976, detention powers were expanded to include anyone suspected as a danger to state security or

³¹IBID, p. 70.

public order. Detainees are treated as prisoners awaiting trial and may not challenge their detention in court.³²

The Internal Security Act authorizes another practice known as banning. A banned person is restricted to a certain magisterial district and prevented from entering educational institutions, publishing houses, courts and other specified places. They are barred from attending political, social, and other gatherings and prohibited from communicating with specified persons. In its most extreme form, banning amounts to house arrest, with the individual usually confined to their residence for twelve hours a day during the work week and twenty-four hours a day on weekends. The procedures are totally arbitrary, with no opportunity to contest the order for those being banned. The courts have no power to intervene, and the authorities need give no reason for the banning.

What has made South Africa the outcast of the entire world is not its civil rights violations, but rather its legislated system of white minority rule, apartheid.

The 1948 electoral victory of the National Party marked a watershed in South African politics. The centuries of subjugation, first to the Dutch East India Company and then to the British throne, were over. The Afrikaner, through the auspices of the National Party, was finally in control

³²IBID, p. 71.

of his own destiny and determined to maintain that control. The manifestation of this feeling marked the transition from an ethnic movement attempting to maintain its cultural purity to an incumbent elite striving for national survival.

The over-riding and ever present threat perceived by the Afrikaner has been a fear of being overwhelmed by the black majority. In response to this fear the Afrikaner has constructed a system that dictates to the majority in South Africa where they must live, what kinds of jobs they may have, and what their behavior toward each other and toward the Whites must be. In short, every aspect of an African's life is defined by the White authorities. Any display of resistance is met by force.

E. TRADEOFFS

Prior to the Portuguese coup in 1974, the United States was able to realize its national interests in Southern Africa through a policy of benign neglect. The sticky dilemmas associated with tradeoffs between categories of interests were largely avoided because attention was focused elsewhere.

Following the rapid Portuguese decolonization, the political context of Southern Africa changed in two ways. First, Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola's civil war introduced the East-West dimension. This focused U.S. attention on the region and elevated the intensity of our

world-order interest to the "major" level. Secondly, the termination of Portuguese rule ended the era of European Colonialism in Africa. With the demise of colonialism, the full attention of Black African states shifted to the question of White minority rule in Southern Africa.

Under the Carter Administration, the intensity assigned to ideological interests rose to the "major" level. This increase in significance reflected both Carter's overall stand on the human rights issue and the growing perception that White minority rule was inherently unstable.

Once ideological interests had been elevated to the same intensity level as economic and world order interests, the question of tradeoffs between the three had to be addressed.

Any discussion of the question of tradeoffs should be at least two dimensional. One dimension deals with longterm vs. shortterm objectives while the other deals with the inherent contradictions of dealing with the Afrikaner regime on economic and world order interest while condemning it for its human rights violations.

Longterm objectives clearly represent the way the United States would like to see the situation in South Africa evolve. This represents the psychological milieu of the planner and may or may not reflect the operational milieu found in South Africa.

Longterm U.S. interests would be optimally served by a peaceful transition from the Western oriented, Afrikaner government to a Western oriented, multi-racial government that protects the rights of all of its citizens. This peaceful transition would ease the tensions between South Africa and the West. Economic and world order interests could then be jointly pursued without the risk of alienating the majority of Black Africans in South Africa or jeopardizing U.S. interest in Black Africa.

The operational environment in South Africa suggests that a peaceful transition is highly unlikely. Without meaningful pressure, both internal and external, there is little motivation for the Afrikaner to relinquish any of his political power. Thus, American pressure is required in achieving the optimal longterm environment. This pressure, though, has certain ramifications for U.S. efforts to achieve its short-term interests.

Over the short term (3-5 years), the pursuit of ideological interest will be at the expense of certain economic and world order interests. A Namibian settlement, expansion of U.S. investment, South African cooperation over uranium shipments and U.S. access to South African bases are examples of areas where close cooperation would serve short term interests at the expense of long range objectives.

III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION

A. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

South Africa's pariah status in the world today is largely the result of its institutionalized form of racism. South African society is divided by law into four distinct groups: Whites, Coloureds, Asians and Africans. Firm social boundaries exist and any interaction between groups is governed by social custom, as well as, a series of laws enacted since 1948. In particular, the dominant White division is totally endogamous by law, Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 and the Immorality Act of 1957, while other groups are largely endogamous by custom.

Within each group, divisions reflect ethnic and class lines. Whites are divided into Afrikaner and English-speaking communities: the Coloureds into Christian and Muslim communities; the Asians into Hindu and Muslim communities, and the Africans are divided along traditional tribal lines. While the group divisions are rigid, community lines are not. Within each of the four groups, social stratification based on education, occupation, and wealth has emerged.

The debate over the basis for apartheid (separateness) can be divided into two main schools of thought. The first, sees racism as the chief determinant of White South African attitudes. This reflects the official position of the

Afrikaner leadership: each individual race has the moral right to ensure the survival of its divinely ordained identity; segregation is the only practical solution to racial tension. The second school of thought, the revisionists, view class struggle as the chief determinant of White attitudes. The system of apartheid was designed primarily to assist the capitalist mode of exploitation in South Africa.

1. The Segregationists

The segregationist line of thought has its roots in nineteenth century South Africa.

"Our forefathers believed, and we still believe today, that God himself made the diversity of peoples on earth ... Interracial residence and intermarriage are not only a disgrace, but are forbidden by law. It is, however, not only the skin of the white South African that differs from that of the non-white. The white stands on a much higher plane of civilization and is more developed. Whites must so live, learn and work that we shall not sink to the cultural level of the non-whites."³³

White South African opposition to the segregationist school of thought can be divided into two groups. The first, sees the system as immoral and, regardless of its viability, insufferable. The second group, which includes the English speaking opposition parties, view apartheid as a great divisive factor in South African society and question its longterm viability. Accepting racism as the basis of apartheid, they prescribe political reform in the hope that the introduction of political liberty and the ending of injustice will sufficiently defuse the present tension, to allow for peaceful

³³ Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African Politics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, p. 112.

change. The costs of maintaining the present system are seen as too high.

2. The Marxist View

The Marxist view is based on a Marxian analysis of the South African economy. The Marxists claim that the South African economy is a classic example of an imperialist economic system, with the exploiter class located partly in South African business, partly in overseas bodies which financed South African economic development, and partly in the White workers.³⁴ South African prosperity is attributable to cheap labor made through the calculated impoverishment of the African Reserves.

Martin Legassick, a Marxian economist, has argued that "whereas the earlier policy of segregation was at the bottom of an attempt to apply a system of extraeconomically controlled labor to mining and farming, apartheid was the application of a cheap forced labor policy to secondary industry."³⁵ Manufacturing, he argued, required the recruitment of semi-skilled operatives for factory employment on a large scale. After World War II, some employers advocated a government-sponsored policy for the settlement of African workers in towns, with houses, amenities and pension rights, while others advocated the intensification of Black labor

³⁴T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, Toronto: Univeristy of Toronto Press, 1978, p. 373.

³⁵IBID, p. 374.

migrancy as an alternative. The National Party victory in 1948, Legassick asserts, represented a victory for the latter group.

The issue, though, is far more complex than either group proposes. Racial prejudice clearly runs deep in the White community and recent events throughout Africa have not eased White fears of majority rule. The economic dimension also figures in significantly. No incumbent elite wants to give up its privileged position. Thus, the basis for apartheid is a combination of the reasons cited by both schools of thought. Which factor is more important is highly dependent upon who is being questioned. Conservative Afrikaners are willing to sacrifice economic growth to maintain segregation, while industrialists are willing to ease segregation to diffuse Black resentment.

B. KEY ACTORS

1. The National Party

The National Party (NP) is clearly the dominant actor on the political scene in South Africa. For the foreseeable future the decisions the NP makes under the leadership and guidance of Prime Minister P.W. Botha will decide the rate and course of change in South Africa. To understand how these political decisions will be reached, one needs to understand how the NP operates.

The NP is a grass roots, ethnic based party. Each province has its own constitution, party machine and annual congress. Candidates for Parliament are nominated by the branch committees of the local constituencies and approved by the provincial leader. The provincial leader is chosen by the annual party congress. The Prime Minister is chosen by the NP caucus.

The decision-making process in Afrikanerdom is neither authoritarian nor democratic. Decisions are generally made by the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Differences in ideology or strategy are hashed out privately by the cabinet. Once a consensus is reached, the Prime Minister, with a united cabinet, presents the decision to the NP caucus for action in the Parliament.

"Both cabinet and caucus operate within the confines of trust and obligation. The caucus has faith that the cabinet with its access to superior information will act in the general interests of the Afrikaner people; the cabinet trusts the caucus members to fulfill their obligation to defend unpopular decisions to the people at large."³⁶

Ultimately a cabinet decision rests on an evaluation of whether the decision can be sold to the caucus and by extension to the provincial congresses.

2. Opposition Parties

a. English-speaking Constituent Parties

The Progressive Federal Party (PFP) is an amalgamation of supporters of the former liberal party, left-wing

³⁶Heribert, Adam and Herman Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979, p. 201.

members of the former United Party and a few former National Party supporters. Since the first Progressive Party member was elected to parliament in 1961, the Party has grown in strength. In 1981, the PFP became the official opposition with 26 seats in Parliament.

The PFP draws its parliamentary support largely from upper class, English-speaking constituencies. It enjoys the support of two influential interest groups, big business, including Harry F. Oppenheimer, Chairman of the powerful Anglo-American Corporation and the English-speaking press. While very few Afrikaners support the party, a third of PFP parliamentarians are Afrikaners, including party leader Frederick van Zyl Slabbert.

During the 1960's and 1970's, the PFP consistently voted against the enactment of National Party legislation aimed at extending the powers of the executive at the expense of the judiciary and the legislature. The PFP has strongly identified itself with the three pillars of Western democracy: freedom of the press, judicial review and the accountability of the executive to the legislative. The party has come out against the system of Apartheid, calling for a repeal of discriminatory laws, protection for all South Africans with a Bill of Rights and a common citizenship open to all regardless of color. The issue of franchisement should be resolved through negotiations between the various population groups. To eliminate the possibility of a reversal from White

domination to Black domination, the PFP recommends a rigid constitutional framework which would allow all South Africans to participate in the political process.

The New Republic Party (NRP) was formed in 1977, when the United Party dissolved. The party draws most of its support from English-speaking constituencies. In 1981, on a platform advocating a loose federal approach with maximum devaluation of power to local communities, the NRP won 8 seats in parliament.

The inability of either the PFP or NRP to gain enough electoral support to become a potential ruling party demonstrates that the NP remains the most effective spokesman for White interests. While this indicates that the initiative for political change rests with the NP, the direction it takes may reflect a response to two Afrikaner parties on its right.

b. Right Wing Parties

By the middle of the 1960's the National Party had clearly established itself as the dominant political force in South African politics. Since then, the only substantial threat to its position has come from its own right wing. During a parliamentary setting in 1969, Albert Hertzog, a former cabinet member, accused the NP of deviating from its original principles. "He labeled English-speaking white South Africans as liberals and maintained that only Calvinist Afrikaners could be entrusted to rule

South Africa."³⁷ Prime Minister B. J. Vorster responded by expelling Hertzog from the party and calling for a general election. Hertzog retaliated to his expulsion by forming the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP).

The underlying rationale for the new HNP was a perception by Hertzog and his followers that the policies of the NP were diluting the core values of Afrikanerdom. The HNP regards English speakers as "Afrikaners in making" and espouses that Afrikaans should be the sole national language. NP economic policies are seen as opportunistic and the position that economic gain should not stand in the way of racial segregation was advanced.

In the 1969 election the HNP made a poor showing with only 3.59 percent of the vote. The NP's share was 54.86 percent, down from 58.6 percent in 1966. The real impact of the split can be better seen in the 1981 election results. The HNP failed to win a seat but the 14.1 percent it polled turned many previously safe NP seats into marginal seats. The HNP attracted 30 percent of the Afrikaner vote. Had the NP not attracted roughly 30 percent of the English-speaking voters, their hegemonic position in parliament might have been in jeopardy.

The early 1980's witnessed the development of an even stronger threat from the right. Dr. Andries P.

³⁷Thompson, P. 105.

Treurnicht, head of the influential Transvaal NP Party, resigned his cabinet seat in protest to Prime Minister Botha's plan to establish a tricameral Parliament. When the NP caucus accepted the Prime Minister's plan, Dr. Treurnicht and sixteen other NPs left the party and formed the Conservative Party.

The Conservative Party, which Dr. Treurnicht claims is the authentic voice of the Afrikaner people, had its first test of strength in the May by-elections. Dr. Treurnicht was reelected to Parliament on a Conservative Party ticket, while Tom Langley of the CP was defeated, in a close election, with Manpower Ministers Stephanus P. Botha. The seat Tom Langley had vacated in Pretoria to run against Botha was won by the NP. While the NP picked up a seat previously held by the Conservative Party, the election demonstrated that the NP has a serious contender on its right for the Afrikaner vote.

3. The African National Congress

The African National Congress (ANC) is the oldest and strongest of the black liberation movements. Formed in 1912, by a group of black middle class South Africans, the ANC operated legally in South Africa until its banning in 1960. The transformation this organization has undergone is representative of the changes in black attitudes during the twentieth century.

Prior to the mid-1940's, the leadership of the ANC believed in the benign influence of Christianity and placed

faith in the promises of trusteeship. The idea of trying to organize mass protest was not only ruled out by the dictates of practicality, but also by a sensitivity to the norms of civilized behavior. Their policy was one of elite advocacy and mass passivity. This middle class elite believed it was far wiser to proceed cautiously and responsibly, addressing appeals to reason rather than emotion. Outbursts of anger would only evoke stronger white repression and delay the day that blacks would be recognized by whites as civilized equals.

The ANC initially sought gradual reform through moral and political appeals. ANC leaders called for an end to discrimination in political, educational, and industrial fields. They accepted as equitable a qualified franchise that would limit black voters to those who could pass a "civilization test" based on education, property or wage qualification.

During the 1940's, the conservative old guard was challenged by a younger more militant leadership. Disillusioned with the failures of the organization's traditional methods, the ANC Youth League began advocating a program of militant African nationalism and mass action. Race conscious nationalism was seen by them as the only force potent enough to inspire the African masses to action. Their goal, as African leaders, was to teach Africans not to be ashamed of being black. Pride in a shared African

heritage, confident expectations of the future and a love for Africa's God given blackness would forge a positive self image that would bond all Africans together. In 1949, the ANC adopted the Youth League's program of militant African nationalism and mass action.

The 1950's represented a period of civil disobedience by non-white. In 1952, the ANC, with Indian support, launched a nationwide civil disobedience movement aimed at challenging white supremacy. Although more than 8,000 Africans and Indians went to jail for defying apartheid laws, the movement never came close to sparking a general strike. Its chief ramifications were an increase in ANC membership from less than twenty thousand to over one hundred thousand and a governmental crackdown on Black leaders and their white sympathizers. Throughout the decade non-violent civil disobedience remained the official policy of the ANC.

On March 21, 1960, an event occurred that changed the context of black/white relations in South Africa. At Sharpeville, an African Township thirty-five miles south of Johannesburg, white police opened fire on a large crowd of antipass protestors; sixty-seven Africans, including some women and children, were killed and 186 were wounded. The incident led to violent confrontations between Blacks and security forces throughout the country. In response, the government declared a state of emergency and ruthlessly

suppressed opposition. The ANC, along with the Pan-Africanist Congress, were forced underground.

The next two decades witnessed the rise of a Black generation more opposed to compromise and more willing to risk armed confrontation than its predecessors. Reflecting this, the official policy of the ANC changed from one of non-violence to one in which violence would be used to advance reforms, not to indiscriminately destroy South Africa. ANC attacks have not been against Whites but have largely been against symbols of White power; the SASOL plant, the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant, and the military base at Voortrekkerhoogte.

At present, the ANC is the most powerful of the exile groups, with offices throughout the world. Its governing council is multi-racial and encompasses western oriented politicians as well as Marxists. Their official position is that the struggle is against White domination not Whites. After liberation, any Whites who accept African rule would be welcomed, those who could not, would be free to leave.

4. Black Consciousness

A development of major significance was the emergence of the Black Consciousness movement during the late 1960's. The movement was founded by Steve Biko on the principles of black solidarity, black pride, self-confidence,

and self help.³⁸ The aim of the movement's leaders was the psychological emancipation of Blacks from the sense of inferiority that centuries of White domination had fostered.

The mode of operation of the movement involved community self-help projects aimed at instilling a sense of self-reliance and community solidarity. The movement was embraced by students (SASO), as well as adults throughout the Black community.

Cooperation with liberal or radical Whites was firmly rejected. Liberals were seen as well meaning but were identified as a force that had traditionally weakened the revolutionary zeal of Blacks. White radicals were to be avoided because of a desire not to become involved with the foreign ideology of Marxism.

Both the movement and the organizations associated with it were banned in 1977. No reasons were given by the government, but it is widely assumed that the banning was in response to widespread resistance to Bantu education among African youths.

Black consciousness as an ideology has survived the banning. The principles which the movement espoused have been adopted by other African political organizations. The real impact though, has been the rise in the consciousness level of the Black people of South Africa. Among

³⁸ Robert Price and Carl Rosberg, The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domination, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, p. 101.

students and Black urban leaders is the perception that they are not helpless and they can change the system is growing.

5. Inkatha

Another Black organization with strong political implications in Inkatha ye Nkululeko ye Siswe (Inkatha). Prior to 1975, Inkatha was a Zulu organization involved in promoting the cultural traditions and national solidarity of the Zulu people. Since then, Chief Buthelezi has attempted to turn his Zulu based organization into a nationwide movement transcending ethnic lines.

In his efforts to appeal to all Africans, Buthelezi has borrowed heavily from both the ANC and the Black Consciousness movements. The aims of Inkatha, (1) to promote cultural liberation, i.e., to overcome dependency and to instill a sense of pride and independence in Africans, (2) to promote community development along lines of self-help and self-reliance in order to combat problems of underdevelopment and poor morale, (3) to work toward a change in the educational system for Blacks in South Africa, (4) to abolish race discrimination, and most importantly, (5) to achieve the full incorporation of Blacks into political decision-making in South Africa, clearly reflected the ideology of the Black Consciousness movement while the

colors, songs, and slogans of Inkatha are the same as those of the ANC.³⁹

Inkatha is predominantly a Natal-based rural organization, with branches outside of Natal in areas where people of Zulu origin are concentrated. Recent growth, however, has shown expansion into urban areas and among the Xhosa. With its current membership of over 300,000 Inkatha is clearly the largest Black political organization in South African history.

C. FORCES AT WORK WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA

The second step in an attempt to achieve cultural relativity is to identify the forces at work within the society. In this case study of South Africa, the forces will be divided into two groups: those favoring change and those inhibiting change.

1. Forces Favoring Change

The strongest force for limited change in South Africa is clearly the government of Prime Minister P. W. Botha. Events during the past decade have led to a change in ideology on the part of the leadership of the NP. Instead of an ideology based on the civil-religious themes of Afrikaner history, the new leadership has adopted an ideology of survival politics. This shift has allowed the

³⁹IBID, p. 111.

leadership to shape internal change without exposing itself to charges of betrayal of doctrine.

Two key speeches by Prime Minister P. W. Botha provide an insight into both the intent behind and the direction of the proposed changes. The first speech was made to the Annual Natal NP Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979. In this speech Botha unveiled a twelve point plan aimed at delivering South Africa from the total onslaught. "A striking feature concerning the 12-point plan, has been the Government's total commitment to it and its attempt to present it as the one and only hope that all South Africans have to deliver them from the total onslaught."⁴⁰ This plan has become the basis of the government's Total National Strategy. The second speech was made at Bloemfontein in August 1982. This speech unveiled the constitutional structure in which Whites, Coloureds, and Indians would share in the political process.

Botha's twelve point plan represents an attempt at defining policy objectives across a wide spectrum of government activities, in response to a diversity of interests. The points are purposely vague to allow for a great deal of political maneuvering in both interpretation and implementation. In short, the plan represents an astute "trial balloon".

The first four points of the plan clearly demonstrates that grand apartheid (separateness) is still the cornerstone

⁴⁰Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's "Total National Strategy", Braanfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1982, p. 11.

of NP policy. The first point deals with "the recognition and acceptance of the existence of multi-nationalism and of minorities in the Republic of South Africa." The second addresses the concept of "vertical differentiation with a built-in principle of self-determination at as many levels as possible." Based on these premises, points three and four deal with the role of the non-whites in South African society. For the blacks, point three provides for the "establishment of constitutional structures by the Black people to make the highest degree of self-government possible for them in states that are consolidated as far as possible." Part of the right of self-determination for Blacks is "to allow them to grow towards independence". Point four addresses the role of the Coloured and Indian communities within the Republic. These communities are treated differently than Blacks, "the division of powers between White, Coloureds and Indians will be conducted within a system of consultation and co-responsibility so far as common interests are concerned."

Points five through seven represent an attempt to minimize the self-defeating effects of petty apartheid without weakening the idea of separate development itself. Point five commits the Government to "the acceptance of the principle that, where at all possible, each population group should have its own schools and live in its own community. In my view (Botha speaking) this is not

discrimination, it is the recognition of each others' rights." Point six calls for the removal of "hurtful and unnecessary discriminatory measures... in particular those that create bad feelings." The seventh point provides the rationale for the easing of petty apartheid, "the recognition of economic interdependence and 'the need for' properly planned utilization of manpower."

Points eight through twelve deal with an outward looking, regional defense posture. Central to strong posture is "the maintenance of effective decision-making by the state, which rests on a strong Defense Force to guarantee orderly government as well as efficient, clean administration" and "the maintenance of free enterprise as the basis of our economic and financial policy."

The fourth point is at the center of the present controversy over change in South Africa. In a speech in August 1982, Prime Minister Botha spelled out the Constitutional framework that would lead to "consultation and co-responsibility" between the Whites, Coloureds, and Indians. His plan, described as simple and understandable, would place consolidated executive powers in the hands of a President and allow for the formation of a tricameral parliaments.

As proposed the new framework would include:

1. A new Office of the President, which would combine the present posts of Prime Minister and State President. The President would be elected by an electoral college consisting of 50 Whites, 25 Coloureds and 13 Indians. The members of the electoral college would be MP's chosen by their respective chambers.

2. A Cabinet appointed by the President. Appointees need not be members of Parliament.

3. A President's Council consisting of 25 Presidential appointees and 20 Whites, 10 Coloureds and 5 Indians elected by their respective chambers.

4. A Tricameral parliament consisting of three chambers, one White, one Coloured and one Indian. MP's would be elected by their respective communities.

Legislative functions would be divided by the President into matters of community concern and matters of common concern. Community matters would be resolved by legislation passed by the relevant chamber. Matters of common concern would require legislation passed by all three chambers voting separately. Conflict between the three chambers on bills of common concern would be settled by an authoritative finding of the President's Council. The initiation of legislation affecting community interests would be handled by Cabinet committees comprised of members of the different communities. While matters of common interest could be initiated by the President or a cabinet committee.

The Botha commitment to change reflects certain factors within the South African society that could be classified as forces for change. The potent Afrikaner nationalism of the recent past has given way to a more pragmatic version. Many Afrikaners, as well as most English-speakers, have begun to realize that a certain amount of change is inevitable.

Demographic forces are changing the face of the population. Since 1948, when the NP came to power, the White population has declined from almost 25 percent of the population to about 15 percent; by century's end it will probably account for no more than 12 percent. This demographic change dictates that the labor force will become increasingly Black. To meet this need, even larger numbers of Blacks will have to be permanently settled and educated in White areas. Changes in White attitudes reflect a willingness to accept this, provided the Blacks are segregated and their economic improvement does not come at the expense of White workers.

The ability of Blacks to realize their power is on the rise. Higher levels of education and movements like Black Consciousness have altered Black perceptions. No longer do Blacks, especially urban educated Blacks, feel that they are helpless to change their position. Growing Black political organizations, like the urban councils and trade unions, are pressing for and obtaining economic advancements.

Ten years ago, the idea of expanding the laager to include Indians and Coloureds was heresay. Botha successors might find the processes of urbanization, education, and socialization have mitigated the opposition to Black participation.

2. Factors Inhibiting Change

Possible factors inhibiting change in South Africa, while varied, can be divided into two groups. The first deals with present attitudes and perceptions. The second encompasses the present power structure in Southern Africa.

a. Attitudes

The most important factor inhibiting the prospects for change in South Africa is the unwillingness of Whites to transition to majority rule. For Afrikaners and the 30 percent of the English-speakers that vote for the NP, this means an unwillingness to accept any Blacks into the central political process, even a federated power sharing arrangement. Other Whites, including supporters of the PFP and NRP, favor some kind of an arrangement that would protect the rights of Whites, while allowing the Blacks a voice in government.

Another factor is the large political and economic investment the present government and the Black homeland leaders have in separate development. Bureaucratic obstructionism can be anticipated by both Whites and Blacks who have vested interests in seeing the present situation

continue. The zeal for the system by Blacks is likely to be stronger, since they would not only lose their jobs but would have to deal with charges that they sold their people out.

Recent public opinion polls show that there is a perception by Whites, especially Afrikaners that the present unrest is the result of outside agitation. This perception is important because it misdirects White efforts to diffuse the situation. Expenditures for Black education and welfare are needed, not increased military spending. The recent constitutional reforms reflected an effort to diffuse the tensions with Indians and Coloureds but ignored the main issue, Black participation in the political process. Outside agitation is not the reason Blacks reject the idea of separate development.

b. The Power Structure

Analogies drawn between Iran or Nicaragua and South Africa fail to recognize the present power structure in Southern Africa. The White regime has both the capability and will to crush any serious challenge to its rule. Internally the coercive apparatus is capable of sealing off Black townships if violence arises. The South African intelligence apparatus has shown the capability to infiltrate Black organizations and has demonstrated its ability to handle any large scale guerilla activity. Random isolated attacks are all the guerrillas can mount.

On the regional scale, South Africa has the military power to dissuade its neighbors from actively supporting guerrilla movements. Cross border raids into Angola, Mozambique and Lesotha have been conducted at will and without any substantial resistance. South Africa is capable of striking the ANC or PAC anywhere in Southern Africa with impunity.

The net impact of the present power structure is a military weak revolutionary movement. Frontline states allow "offices" to be opened in their territories, but active support is mainly in the form of rhetoric. Soviet aid, which proved crucial to the national liberation movements in Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, has reflected tokenism. As long as South Africa is able to retain its present military prowess, external intervention/influence will remain limited.

D. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Any analysis of potential change in South Africa must begin with a fundamental reality, both Blacks and Whites hold certain positions to be non-negotiable. For Blacks, an acceptable solution must give them a share of genuine political power. For Whites, that solution cannot be based on a winner take all form of majority rule.

There is little evidence on which to question the short-term (1 to 5 years) survivability of White power South

Africa. Analogies drawn from Iran or Nicaragua ignore the realities of the power structure in South Africa. Threatening or potentially threatening organizations are ruthlessly suppressed. The regime is backed by a substantial reservoir of trained, well armed, highly motivated Whites. For the foreseeable future, both the will and the means will be present in sufficient quantities to handle any revolt by Blacks.

The ingredients of a potential revolution, however, are present. A heightened level of political awareness and unity among urban Blacks, combined with an unprecedented degree of determination and even optimism about the potential for Black power presents problems for the White regime. The gap between reality and aspirations for Blacks is growing, expanding the level of frustration in the Black community.

Both the government and its opponents recognize that the urban areas with their industrial installations are the primary targets and points of potential vulnerability for political action or physical attack. The short term threat includes mass protests, urban turmoil, strikes, boycotts, sabotage and sporadic terrorist violence. The aim of such actions is not a frontal attack on the system, but rather an effort to wear down White resistance to change, discredit Pretoria in the eyes of the world, instill political awareness and discipline among Blacks, raise the

price of maintaining the status quo and focus attention on specific grievances.⁴¹

In terms of organization, tactics, and resources, the revolt is still in an embryonic stage. While it is too early to predict the course and extent of physical violence by Blacks in South Africa, the foreseeable outcome of violent challenge to the regime is predictable. Physical repression of a scale not yet seen is not only probable but clearly within the capabilities of the Whites. White public opinion would overwhelmingly support repressive measures aimed at maintaining public order.

At present, urban Blacks lack the means to confront the authorities. The government has the ability to cut off Black townships from food, water, electricity, telephone services, transportation and jobs. Spontaneous violence in what amounts to a sealable ghetto could mobilize domestic and international public opinion but probably would not serve as an effective military tactic. "Even under the most extreme assumptions about underground effectiveness in organization and the smuggling of arms and explosives, the current possibilities appear to fall short of enabling insurgents to carry out sustained mass violence in the urban areas."⁴²

⁴¹Foreign Policy Study Foundation, p. 236.

⁴²IBID, p. 237.

In the countryside the threat is in the form of small groups of men trying to infiltrate across the border and make their way to urban centers. To date there has been no evidence of guerrilla cells in rural areas. Popular support for guerrillas had been confined to the politically conscious urban dweller and not the conservative, largely uneducated rural resident. Of no little note, is the fact that little of South Africa's rural landscape lends itself to guerrilla tactics. Desert/semi arid grassland offers no chance to hide.

Outside support for an active guerrilla movement has been limited for two reasons. First, South Africa, possessing a military and economic base that dwarfs the combined totals of the front line states, has demonstrated her willingness to strike any neighbor that supports or turns a blind eye to guerrilla activities. Secondly, and probably more important, is the perception that the time is not right for a military challenge. The costs of unsuccessful attempts appear to far outweigh any potential gains.

The state of flux in South Africa suggests alternative scenarios for the future. Three scenarios, based on different assumptions, will be presented in an effort to establish the probable range of events in South Africa. Regional and international implications will be included. These scenarios are not meant to be all inclusive or

mutually exclusive. Overlap is inevitable and the course of events may include elements of both or elements not found in either.

1. Scenario One

Scenario one represents the optimistic end of the spectrum. In this scenario the reformist movement of Prime Minister Botha is able to prevail over the regressive forces to his right. Black opposition leaders, however, view this reform as merely a modernization of apartheid. Sabotage inside South Africa and guerrilla activity along the borders by the African National Congress and other nationalist movements escalates. Civil disobedience, in the form of boycotts, stay-aways, demonstrations, and strikes continues to be a feature of the domestic scene. The government meets these challenges with overwhelming force. But this coercive potential is selectively utilized by a government that is careful not to destroy the Black leadership and Black organizations it needs to implement its policies and keep the economy functioning.

Vice changing its homeland policy, it is likely that the government will attempt to make the homelands more viable and encourage those not already independent to seek independence. In urban areas, residential segregation will be continued but the resettlement of surplus Africans, Indians and Coloureds might not be pressed. In an effort to co-opt the non-whites economically, the government will

spend substantial sums to improve Black education, housing and job skills.

Outside South Africa, the reforms will be treated with a high degree of skepticism. The Frontline States will find themselves under increased pressure by the ANC, PAC and other nationalist movements to provide bases for guerrilla efforts. The South African government will use its economic and military strength to dissuade its neighbors from cooperating with the guerrilla movements. Communist involvement would vary with the level of tension in the region and with their ties with the Frontline States. As long as the South African government demonstrates it can effectively handle the conventional threat, increased Soviet and Cuban activity will be limited. African pressure will probably focus on efforts in the U N, with Western countries arguing that since reform has started, coercive efforts, such as sanctions, would be counter productive.

At various stages in this scenario, the government would presumably try to co-opt the opposition without granting meaningful political power to non-Whites. Inducements might include offers of financial aid to the homelands, greater political recognition for Indians and Coloureds, government jobs for urban Black leaders, recognition of Black trade unions and greater authority for township councils. Dramatic guerilla attacks by the ANC would continue to enhance their image, but as it became clear that the Whites

were able to suppress the violence, and that the reforms were raising the standard of living, support could gradually shift to Black leaders that were able to deliver goods, not violence.

As internal reform progresses, the racial climate in South Africa will begin to shift. As the Black leaders demonstrate a willingness to work within the system, White fears about political change will become less acute. As time progresses, the regime will realize that it is in its best interests to try to negotiate some form of power sharing with Blacks. White fears will remain strong but will be offset by their fears of what might happen if they don't act. It is unlikely that the Whites will take the initiative, rather Blacks will try to exploit their newly acquired economic and social power. The pattern will probably consist of increasingly forceful Black demands met by cautious and limited White concessions. Eventually, the Whites would see it in their interests to concede some of their power, while Blacks would regard it as in their interests not to demand all of it.

External pressures would continue throughout the negotiations but would abate if substantial political concessions were made to the South African Blacks. This scenario can be characterized as incremental change without sustained, large-scale violence.

2. Scenario Two

Scenario Two is essentially the reverse of Scenario One. The ultra-conservatives (verkrampies) of the National Party or the new right wing parties gain control of the government. Their fear is that any alterations in the fabric of apartheid would make political change inevitable, thereby destroying Afrikanerdom. A verkrampie government would return to a more orthodox apartheid policy with possibly a few cosmetic modifications. Influx control and resettlement of surplus urban Blacks would be more rigorously enforced. Black labor unions might continue to be recognized, but the government would try to limit their effectiveness by driving a wedge between those affiliated with White unions and those trying to maintain their independence. Divide and conquer will be the government's strategy. Townships might be given limited autonomy but would be kept firmly under White administrative control. Some economic and social reforms would be enacted to benefit urban Blacks, Coloureds, and Indians, but their priority would remain low. Black response would be as before but would be more bitter and reflect greater determination. Less concerned with preserving Black organizations, governmental repression would be more harsh and sweeping.

The economy, underpinned by sales of gold and other minerals, would probably remain strong. Despite the absence of major reforms, Blacks would gain a larger role in the

economy, both as productive workers and as consumers with increased buying power. The government would use its power of patronage to try to co-opt Black moderates. Governmental success would depend on how divided the Black community became over ways to achieve their goals. External pressures would escalate as it became evident that no significant changes were taking place in South Africa. The ANC and other Black liberation movements would acquire greater legitimacy and press for greater support from the Frontline states. These states, in turn, might be drawn into the conflict, but at considerable costs to themselves. African efforts at the United Nations would increase, with probable emphasis on communications and oil embargoes. Bilateral pressures might be applied by nations, with key commodities, like Nigeria. The Soviet Union and Cuba would see an increased opportunity and respond with increased military support for the liberation movements. Western nations would be increasingly restrained by the South African government's reactionary policies. The Soviet Union would probably proceed with caution as long as South Africa maintained its military superiority in the region. The fact that the South Africa has a nuclear capability would weight in Soviet calculations.

The South African government might gain time through their policies of co-optation, but without any sustained reform, the polarization of the races would continue.

Coloureds and Indians would align themselves with the Africans and the influence of older Blacks over the younger generation would decline as violence and disruption grew. Labor unrest, boycotts, demonstrations, and other forms of civil unrest would begin to undermine the government. White emigration would increase as individuals' security and livelihoods became threatened. Slowly over a long period of time, the country would descend into a bloody civil war involving massive destruction of life and property. In the end, the Afrikaner belief in victory would collapse, leading to partition, a Zimbabwe type of power-sharing arrangement or possibly a final nuclear act of desperation.

3. Scenario Three

In Scenario Three the reformist movement of Prime Minister Botha is able to prevail over the status quo oriented forces to his right. Black opposition, however, continues to mount. Sabotage inside South Africa becomes increasingly more violent and guerrilla activity along the borders by the African National Congress and other nationalist movements escalates. Civil disobedience, in the form of boycotts, stay-aways, demonstrations, and strikes continues to be a feature of the domestic scene. The government meets these challenges with overwhelming force. Instead of smashing Black resistance, the Government's actions increase Black unity and enhance the perception among Blacks that

fundamental change will come about only through revolutionary violence.

Outside South Africa, reforms will be treated with a high degree of skepticism. The Frontline States will find themselves under increased pressure by the ANC, PAC and other nationalist movements to provide bases for guerrilla efforts. The South African government will use its economic and military strength to dissuade its neighbors from cooperating with the guerrilla movements. Communist involvement would vary with the level of tension in the region and with their ties with the Frontline States. As long as the South African government demonstrates it can effectively handle the conventional threat, increased Soviet and Cuban activity will be limited. African pressure will probably focus on efforts in the U N, with Western countries condemning the violence on both sides but arguing that since reform has started, coercive efforts, such as sanctions, would be counter productive.

At various stages in this scenario, the government would presumably try to co-opt the opposition without granting meaningful political power to non-Whites. Inducements might include offers of financial aid to the homelands, greater political recognition for Indians and Coloureds, government jobs for urban Black leaders, recognition of Black trade unions and greater authority for township councils. Dramatic guerrilla attacks by the ANC would continue to

enhance their image, and promote the perception that change is coming about as a result of their actions.

Coloureds and Indians would align themselves with the Africans and the influence of older Blacks over the younger generation would decline as violence and disruption grew. Labor unrest, boycotts, demonstrations, and other forms of civil unrest would begin to undermine the government. White emigration would increase as individuals' security and livelihoods became threatened. Slowly over a long period of time, the country would descend into a bloody civil war involving massive destruction of life and property. In the end, the Afrikaner belief in victory would collapse, leading to partition, a Zimbabwe type of power-sharing arrangement or possibly a final nuclear act of desperation.

IV. A STRATEGY FOR U.S. DECISION MAKERS

Political instability and armed conflict are clearly the greatest direct threats to U.S. interest in the region. Thus, U.S. policy objectives should be aimed at achieving Scenario One, a relatively peaceful transition to majority rule. Since the area is of peripheral importance, the expenditure of U.S. resources should be kept to a minimum.

A. A CORE STRATEGY

1. Opposition to Apartheid

The basis of any core strategy for the region must be U.S. opposition to apartheid. This is crucial for several reasons. First, is the question of legitimacy at home. The American public is not going to support a foreign policy that overlooks a system that is the antithesis of our own way of life. Apartheid is seen as morally wrong by a majority of Americans. Secondly, demonstrated U.S. opposition enhances the prospects for achieving scenario one. U.S. disapproval would be a source of hope for Black South Africans. That hope combined with our disapproval constitutes a form of moral pressure on the White regime. As long as Black and White South Africans retain the capacity to compromise, moral pressure is likely to increase the chances that apartheid will be dismantled through a process involving less rather than more violence. Finally, it would end a

myth that the South African government has been trying to promote. U.S. opposition would clearly demonstrate that the U.S. does not accept the view that South Africa, under White minority rule, constitutes a bulwark against communism, rather, the U.S. sees apartheid as a target of opportunity for communist inspired instability.

The dilemma confronting U.S. policy makers is how to demonstrate this opposition without damaging the prospects for realizing other U.S. interests in the country. After all, the present regime is firmly in control and the prospects for near term change are small. Thus, actions designed to achieve this instrumental goal must be transmitted across multiple transmission belts, not just the state to state medium.⁴³ The United States should pursue the goal of majority rule through a wide range of pressures and inducements aimed at influencing the actions of the South African Government. Actions the United States government could pursue, all permitted by International Law, are as follows:

1. Publicize the continuing opposition of the U.S. Government and the American people to the system of apartheid; send U.S. officials to the funerals of South African Blacks who die in detention; have embassy staff personnel attend political trials.

⁴³ Robert Bathurst is a leading advocate of this position. Although his work has centered on US/USSR relations, the approach is especially applicable to US relations toward South Africa.

2. Expand contacts with Black South African leaders, both inside and outside the country.

3. Continue to withhold recognition of the "independent" homelands.

4. Support humanitarian aid programs for Black South Africans.

5. Broaden the arms embargo to include foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, insure "dual use" items are not exported to S.A.

U.S. corporations should show their support of U.S. policy by:

1. Enacting a moratorium on new investment.

2. Developing a social development expenditure standard aimed at bettering the plight of their workers.

3. Adhering to the Sullivan principles.

Continued state to state contact is needed to maximize the weight and credibility of the United States' view.

If all contacts were to be severed, U.S. policy makers would lose what few "carrots" they have.

2. Opposition to Nuclear Proliferation

The second issue that should be addressed by the core strategy is the issue of nuclear proliferation. South African capabilities suggest efforts in two areas. First, efforts are needed to bring South African exports of nuclear technologies and/or materials under international safeguards.

Second, continued efforts aimed at persuading South Africa not to overtly go nuclear.

Actions taken by the U.S. government could include:

1. Governmental talks aimed at obtaining a South African signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

- a. U.S. efforts to get South Africa reinstated on the IAEA Board of Directors and U.S. supplies of enriched uranium for SAFARI-1 and the Koeberg power plants could be used as inducements.

- b. Non-public Western pressure on the Botha government aimed at convincing him that the nuclear option would not be politically cost effective.

2. Allow South Africa to join the London Group of Suppliers.

3. Prevent any technology transfers that would enhance South African enrichment capabilities.

B. A FORWARD LOOKING STRATEGY

The second aspect of U.S. strategy should be support for organizations inside South Africa working for change.

Emphasis should be directed toward the development of Black leadership. Efforts by both the U.S. Government and private institutions can be instrumental in this area. Areas of actions to be taken could include:

1. Support public interest organizations in South Africa that are working for change.⁴⁴
2. Encourage antiapartheid activities by private groups.⁴⁵
3. Support programs aimed at providing increased education for South African Blacks; expand Black educational opportunities in the U.S.
4. Encourage links between U.S. labor unions and multi-racial unions in South Africa; effective utilization of economic power would constitute a powerful force for change.
5. Require U.S. corporations to abide by the Sullivan Principles; encourage the idea that they support Black economic development through local investments and loans.

C. HEDGING STRATEGY

A third aspect of U.S. foreign policy should be to reduce our vulnerability to stoppages of vital minerals. This can be accomplished by:

⁴⁴The Legal Resources Center, a public interest law firm representing poor Blacks, in August of 1980 won a legal battle that allowed the families of legal Black workers to live with them in the urban centers. The Center receives funds from at least three U.S. foundations.

⁴⁵South Africa's current racial policy on sports leaves a great deal of discretion to local teams. Pressure by U.S. sports associations has had the effect of multiracial touring teams. Other areas where this kind of peer pressure could prove effective is professional groups: lawyers; doctors; military officers, etc.

1. Instituting a National Minerals Policy.⁴⁶
2. Help develop the infrastructure of Southern Africa; the Nine represent alternative sources of supply.⁴⁷
3. Increase stockpiles of ferrochrome, ferromanganese, platinum, and vanadium.
4. Encourage our allies to take similar measures; it lessens their dependency and it lessens the amount of sources the U.S. has to expend.

D. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS

The previous sections dealt with policy options that were clearly mid spectrum. The underlying assumption was that American foreign policy could play an instrumental role in South Africa, providing it was properly directed. This chapter will address two options that are frequently addressed in the literature and at the UN. The two are at opposite ends of the spectrum.

⁴⁶In 1980, Congress passed the National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act. The act provides for a "continuing long-range analysis of materials used to meet national security, economic, industrial, and social needs; the adequacy and stability of supplies; and the implications of supply disruptions."

⁴⁷Economic aid to the Nine would also serve our world order interests. Aid to them would lessen their dependence on South Africa and the USSR and give the perception of the U.S. aligning itself with the forces of change. These countries also represent the key factors that formulate African policy toward South Africa in the OAU and UN.

The first is the "no policy" policy option. Major objectives of this policy would be to free the United States from any responsibility for the ways in which African States work out their political destiny and to reserve confrontation/competition with the Soviet Union for global issues of paramount importance to the West, avoiding petty contests for leverage in areas of the Third World where our national interests are marginal.

Advocates of this policy emphasize that nationalism is the strongest force on the continent; that the expanded presence of the Soviet Union is a function of its worldwide rivalry with the U.S. and not part of an ideological crusade; and that economic rather than ideological considerations will determine African trade patterns. While there are some elements of truth in this position, it clearly represents a reckless approach for the world's most powerful nation to pursue. The U.S. has legitimate interests in the region and definitely should not abdicate its leadership position to the Soviets.

The second option is the question of sanctions against South Africa. Supporters of sanctions argue that sanctions would have serious economic consequences if they were effectively imposed. Supporters point out that South Africa is heavily dependent upon a relatively small number of foreign suppliers for high technology and investment capital.

They argue that an effective trade embargo against South Africa would have a significant impact on industrial growth, productivity, and unemployment. Economic hardship would lead to political change, either through white actions designed at terminating the embargo or through the collapse of the economy and the creation of a revolutionary situation.

Opponents of sanctions concede that South Africa's dependence on imports constitutes its greatest vulnerability but they argue that South Africa would be able to meet most of its needs through import substitution and conservation. South African exports, principally gold and unprocessed minerals, could be marketed with relative ease. This would provide South Africa with sufficient foreign exchange to purchase commodities through Black market middle men. Instead of leading to change, sanctions would unite the White community, strengthen the reactionary elements and dry up resources that could have been used to ease the plight of Black South Africans. In short, the government would ensure that the White community was adequately cushioned against the economic effects of sanctions, while the Black population would bear the brunt of its effects.

The Rhodesian experience suggests that the more likely result of sanctions would be a more defiant and self-sufficient South Africa. If the current arms embargo is any indicator, the South Africans will bear the added costs and

develop their own capabilities vice caving in to outside pressure.

The strongest case against sanctions can be made over the question of the costs of imposing them. South Africa's landlocked neighbors are heavily dependent on South African ports. It is highly unlikely that the South African government would allow the shipment of oil or other commodities to its neighbors while those items were in short supply at home. Thus, those countries would suffer the effects of a defacto embargo.

In the West, even if an exception was made for the purchase of strategic materials, the cost would be prohibitively high for certain countries. The British government has made it clear that the political and economic costs of sanctions are too severe for them to accept. West Germany, France, and Japan would also suffer losses in export earnings, and more important, an increase in unemployment at a time when those governments are under severe domestic pressure to reduce unemployment.

Without support from all of our Western allies, sanctions would only result in a realigning of South African trade patterns. American interests would hardly be served by an increase in costs for strategic minerals and a loss of trade.

V. IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY

A. THE PROBLEM OF ETHNOCENTRISM

Like most important concepts in international relations, ethnocentrism is more easily defined than recognized or measured. The characteristic features of ethnocentrism include: (1) a strong identification with one's own group and its culture; (2) a tendency to see one's own group as the center of the universe; (3) a tendency to perceive events in terms of one's own interests; (4) a tendency to prefer one's own way of life over all others (seeing it as involving the best and right ways of acting, with an associated bias against other groups and their ways of acting); and (5) a general suspicion of foreigners, their modes of thought, action, and motives.⁴⁸

The primary impact of ethnocentrism is that it increases the distortion between the "psychological milieu" (the world as the decision maker sees it) and the "operational milieu" (the world in which the policy will be carried out).

To minimize this distortion, the decision maker needs to transcend his cultural based bias and see events from the other side's perspective. This does not mean he has to accept the other side's perspective, only understand how it may impact on the attainment of his goals.

⁴⁸Booth, p. 15.

Four questions that should arise when addressing U.S. policy options toward South Africa demonstrate the importance of correctly assessing the other side's objectives and beliefs. First, is the issue negotiable? Second, can the issue be treated in isolation? Is it highly situation bound, or is it symptomatic of an even larger issue? Third, how important is the issue to both sides? Fourth, what threats/promises will be most effective?

American and South African perspectives of the situation in Southern Africa vary considerably. These differences reflect the effects of ethnocentrism on the cognitive structure of Americans and South Africans alike. To demonstrate the importance of cultural relativity to the development and implementation of a strategy, perceptions dealing with the following areas will be addressed: (a) apartheid; (b) the communist threat; and (c) South Africa's efforts at regional stability.

American views of apartheid come from the American cultural experience with Black Americans. Within the context of that experience, a bloody civil war was fought and won by the side that believed that all human beings had the right to be free and free Blacks would not represent a threat to the White's way of life. The century long struggle by Blacks to achieve their political rights has also left the impression that any system, particularly a system of minority rule, that denies rights to a large percentage

of its citizens is inherently unstable. Thus the moral repulsion Americans feel toward apartheid, and the American belief that it is unviable represent a mind set that developed out of our cultural experience.

South African views represent very different cultural experiences. For the Afrikaner, Blacks represent a threat that he has been able to effectively deal with for over three hundred years. Unlike the English, French or Portuguese in Africa, the Afrikaner turned his back on his European origins. South Africa became his country, and Blacks were treated in much the same manner as American Indians. Thus for the ardent Afrikaner, his cultural experience does not cultivate the American perceptions of morality or longterm instability. Apartheid, for the Afrikaner, is a viable option.

English-speaking South Africans did not turn their backs on their European origins. Western political thought is evident in the platforms the English speaking parties in Parliament have adopted. While they agree in principle to Black participation, many English speakers side with the Afrikaner out of a fear of what Black rule would bring.

While differences in opinion exist between the White tribes of South Africa over apartheid, there is a general agreement over the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The idea of a total onslaught has been accepted by the majority of White South Africans.

"The onslaught is a result of the expansionist policy of Soviet Russia and the so-called liberation struggle in which it joins forces with Black Power organization and actually exploits Black nationalism for its own purposes. The fact remains that Soviet Russia has identified that Republic of South Africa as a target area. It has done so, not only because it has got its eye on us, but also because it wants to use us in the struggle against the West. The rationale lies in the strategic position and the mineral wealth of the RSA. Soviet Russia believes that if it can control the supply of oil from the Middle East and of minerals from South Africa to the West, it can dominate the West and force it to surrender. Therefore, the struggle which Soviet Russia is helping to wage and is increasingly instigating in Southern Africa is one which has a bearing on its total onslaught of the West as well."⁴⁹

Viewed within the context of a "total onslaught" mentality, Government actions like: suppression of Blacks, cross border raids into Mozambique and Lesotho, and continued occupation of Namibia are seen as prudent actions.

While Americans will agree that Soviet/Cuban actions in Southern Africa are a threat to the present power structure, the prevailing perception is that South African actions are increasing the opportunities for Soviet interference. South African raids into Angola, and Mozambique merely increase the dependence of those nations on the Soviet Union for arms. South African support for UNITA and the MRM increases the likelihood that those nations will accept larger and larger number of Cuban troops or East German advisors. In short, the belligerent attitudes of South Africa towards its neighbors

⁴⁹ 1982. Southern African Facts Sheet, Number 39, September

has increased Soviet influence by elevating the defense interest of those nations to the vital level, while economic interests remain at the major level.

1. Differing Intensity Levels

Another complexity confronting the implementation of a strategy, is the fact the United States and South Africa view different issues at different intensity levels.

The issue of apartheid is addressed by the United States at the major level. U.S. world order interests and ideological interests are involved with the issue. U.S. policy is aimed at redressing Black grievances and preventing a major flare up that could be exploited by the Soviets. For the South Africans, the issue of Apartheid represents defense as well as ideological interests. Depending on the level of tension the intensity could be vital or survival. Any alterations in the system directly affect the position of the White minority, thus, what the U.S. considers negotiable may not be to the South Africans.

2. Rationality

A major impediment to the implementation of any strategy is the behavior of the extreme elements in a society. In the case of South Africa, the U.S. is confronted with two groups that may prove to be major obstacles to any peaceful resolution.

The first is the ardent right wing of Afrikanerdom, represented by the Conservative Party of Dr. Andries

Treurnicht and the Herstigte Nasionale party. Supporters of these parties believe that any change in the existing system will lead to the ultimate destruction of their way of life. What is needed is a strengthening of the system of apartheid, not a constitutional reform aimed at easing tensions and expanding the laager.

This group is difficult to deal with because incentives designed to promote peaceful changes are ineffectual. Maintaining the status quo is all that matters. Economic growth or peaceful relations with Black Africa would be nice but not at the expense of apartheid.

The second group is Black radicals. They are especially difficult to deal with because the policy options available to U.S. decision-makers fall far short of any position they are likely to accept. As the situation in South Africa evolves they are potentially dangerous because their indiscriminant use of violence tends to polarize that society. For U.S. policy to work, calmer heads in both races have to prevail.

B. DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCIES/CONSTRAINTS

The American public has so far shown little interest in South African affairs. This disinterest has provided both the President and the Congress a freer hand in policy decisions. This lack of strong constituencies, though, has

enabled small special-interests groups to exert decisive influence on policy formulation.⁵⁰

1. An African Constituency

While public interest has been marked by apathy, an African constituency has been taking shape. Beginning in the late seventies, a group of White liberal congressmen joined the Black caucus in an attempt to create a constituency. They organized a loose coalition of labor, Black, and civil rights organizations outside of Congress to take positions on African issues and to generate broader public support for them. Within Congress, the Black caucus has arranged seminars to keep members abreast of current African developments.

The influence of either group is hard to access. Both have taken a strong stand against apartheid and in favor of foreign aid to the Nine.⁵¹ Without a broad multiracial base, however, they have not been able to get any of their own bills passed. Recently they led a successful effort in the House to block the repeal of the Clark Amendment, which prohibits U.S. military aid to guerrilla groups in Angola. In this effort they were joined by the Gulf Oil Lobby and

⁵⁰Two examples of this are the Byrd Amendment, authorizing U.S. imports of Rhodesian Chrome, and Gulf Oil's success at preventing the repeal of the Clark amendment.

⁵¹The Nine consist of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

some conservative White southern members who were seeking to earn points with their Black constituents by voting for Black Africa interests.

U.S. business concerns with South African investments are the other identifiable constituency. The small scale of their investments means that few have a vital corporate stake in the region, and most could pull out without sustaining serious losses. "As one executive put it, the ripple in our profit-and-loss statement would be so small, it could be explained in one sentence in the annual report."⁵² Perhaps this is the reason that U.S. businesses have not formed a strong, permanent lobby to represent their views. When threatened, they have worked throughout the Commerce Department to have their views heard.

2. U.S. Public Opinion Polls

Recent public opinion polls suggest the outer boundaries of a Southern African policy.⁵³ Both polls revealed almost no support for apartheid. Western pressure aimed at greater freedom for Blacks was strongly favored, but sanctions or military force against South Africa were strongly opposed. Less than 3 percent favored an American

⁵²Robert S. Jaster, Southern Africa in Conflict, American Enterprise Institute, 1982, p. 31.

⁵³Discussion will be based on two polls: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Public Opinion Poll on American Attitudes Toward South Africa, 1979, William J. Foltz, Elite Opinion on United States Policy Toward Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, 1979.

military option to halt the spread of Soviet and Cuban influence. The Foltz poll noted that nearly 25 percent of the American public had no opinion on African issues, and 10 percent were badly confused. This suggests that the American public is likely to remain uninterested until a dramatic event galvanizes it.

VI. THE NUCLEAR SOUTH AFRICA

On 20 July, 1977, the Soviets launched a manueverable satellite equipped with high resolution photographic equipment. The mission of Cosmos 932 was to photograph a tower and blocklike structures located by a previous reconnaissance satellite in the Kalahari Desert of South Africa.⁵⁴ On August 6, four days after the satellite was recovered, Soviet diplomats delivered an urgent personal message from Brezhnev to President Carter requesting Carter's help in heading off a South African nuclear test.

Despite South African claims that the charges were trumped-up by the Soviets to coincide with a United Nations conference on apartheid, U.S. officials concurred with Soviet intelligence estimates. Clear, detailed U.S. reconnaissance photographs revealed construction that was typical of a nuclear test site.⁵⁵

During the two weeks that followed, the two superpowers joined by Great Britain, France and West Germany launched a concerted diplomatic effort to convince South Africa that any potential benefits she might gain by overtly testing

⁵⁴Dr. Frank Barnaby, "Nuclear South Africa", New Scientist, 19 October 1978.

⁵⁵Murray Marder and Don Oberdorfer, "How West, Soviets Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test", The Washington Post, 28 August 1977, p. 1.

a nuclear device would be far outweighed by the negative ramifications of going nuclear.

The test site detected in the Kalahari Desert has never been used, but a "mysterious" flash in the night sky of 22 September 1979 suggested that the diplomatic pressure only succeeded in convincing the South African leadership that any future test would have to be conducted in a covert manner.

To support the position that the flash represented a near perfect nuclear test by South Africa, the following areas will be addressed in this paper: (1) Afrikaner threat perceptions; (2) South African nuclear capabilities; (3) the mysterious flash; and (4) the case for strategic deception.

A. AFRIKANER THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Many Western analysts have discounted the likelihood of South Africa going nuclear because of a belief that nuclear weapons would not significantly increase South Africa's security. They point out that nuclear weapons would be of little utility against the two most likely forms of Black resistance: guerrilla insurgency and Black urban unrest. However, a South African decision to acquire nuclear weapons would be based on South African threat perceptions and not Western perceptions of the threat to South Africa. White South Africans view the world differently and their perceptions yield different conclusions.

The White South African view is that the republic stands alone in confronting a communist inspired "total onslaught". General Magnus Malan, South Africa's Minister of Defense, has defined the onslaught as follows:

"The total onslaught is an ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state. The aim is therefore also total, not only in terms of the ideology, but also regards the political, social, economic and technological."⁵⁶

To counter this onslaught, the government has devised a "Total National Strategy" (TNS) aimed at mobilizing the republic's resources. The 1977, South African White Paper on Defense defined the TNS as a

"Comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure."⁵⁷

A further articulation of this strategy is Prime Minister P. W. Botha's address to the National Party Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979. The address centered on a 12-point plan aimed at withstanding the onslaught. Botha's ninth point addressed the determination of South Africa to withstand external interference.

⁵⁶Geldenhuys, p. 3.

⁵⁷White Paper on Defense, 1977, p. 5

"In the ninth place, South Africa's firm determination to defend itself against interference from outside in every possible way. And allow me to say here tonight, not boastfully but we are better able to defend South Africa militarily than ever before in the country's history. And I want to warn those who think that we practise our politics from a position of weakness: we are not speaking from a position of weakness, we are speaking from a position of decency. If they want to test us, our strength, we will hit back for the sake of South Africa's self-respect."

Recent opinion polls of White South Africans show that they not only share the governments view of the threat but support a firm response to that threat. When asked to respond to the statement, "The communist threat against the country is exaggerated by the government", only 5.2% definitely agreed while 79.9% disagreed.⁵⁸ In response to the statement, "South Africa should militarily attack terrorists bases in neighboring states, 81.8% agreed and only 3.4% definitely disagreed.⁵⁹ Support for a strong, forceful governmental approach transcends traditional political divisions.⁶⁰ In short, any government that is perceived by the electorate to be soft, would find its days in office numbered. The mandate is clearly for the strongest, possible, response.

⁵⁸ Deon Geldenhuys, What do We Think: A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues, Braanfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1982, p. 6.

⁵⁹ IBID, p. 10.

⁶⁰ Opposition MP H. H. Schwarz of the PFP expressed support for the government's position this way during a House of Assembly Debate on March 2, 1979: "...in Africa as things stand we are not going to have to deal with a purely African

"I know my own people", said the editor of one of the country's leading newspapers, himself an Afrikaner. "After the Great Trek and the Boer War, the Afrikaner resolved that they would never again allow themselves to be dispossessed. Whatever the cost, they'd see to it that they have the means to repel any new challenge. Believe me, if they had the chance to acquire the ultimate weapon, they'd grab it." ⁶¹

While the onslaught is seen as multidimensional, the military threat is considered to be the most serious threat to the Republic. The importance the South Africans attach to this threat and the impetus it provides in defense planning has largely been ignored by Western analysts. It is here that the rationale for nuclear weapons lies. The prospect of a large scale, communist supported, conventional assault on the Republic is seen as a real possibility by South African defense planners. Small yield tactical nuclear weapons would be useful against massed conventional forces. Even if not employed, the threat of their use would force the enemy to disperse, thereby reducing his effectiveness in the conventional realm.

Skeptics of this position are sure to argue that South Africa can mobilize nearly 800,000 highly trained, highly

situation...we must unfortunately expect to see more foreign troops on our borders. We already have the Cubans; now something else has been added: a second Africa Corps... composed of East Germans...highly trained and experienced... equipped with the most modern weapons."


⁶¹ John Burns, "South Africa's Secret Atom Plant Suspected of Working on a Bomb", New York Times, 3 May 1977, p. 6.


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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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motivated men in the face of any conventional attack. The notion that the South African Defense Force (SADF) would feel that it needed nuclear weapons is absurd, given the disparities in conventional firepower between South Africa and the rest of Southern Africa. The spectre of a Soviet supported conventional attack, while the West stands on the sidelines, is apparently what drives South African defense planning. Given this perception, the only prudent position would be a South African "force de grappe" aimed at convincing the Soviets that the costs of a large scale conventional attack by Soviet proxies would prove to far outweigh the potential political gains. This type of force would be tactical to the Soviets, strategic for the South Africans.

B. SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES

The South African nuclear program can be divided into four distinct stages. Stage one began during the late 1940's and centered on the production of uranium ore. In an effort to ensure adequate uranium supplies for their nuclear programs, the United States and Great Britain established facilities in South Africa for the extraction of uranium ore. These facilities were placed under Pretoria's control, and the flow of American and British technical information regarding ore extraction fostered scientific discussions of nuclear matters among the three nations.⁶²

⁶²Kenneth L. Adelman and Albion W. Knight, "Can South Africa Go Nuclear", ORBIS, Fall 1979, p. 634.

The Atoms for Peace Program, established by President Eisenhower, initiated stage two. Under the terms of a twenty-year agreement signed in 1957, ninety-four South African nuclear scientists and engineers received training at facilities in this country.⁶³ The agreement also authorized the sale and fueling of a U.S. designed research reactor SAFARI-1. In 1977 the agreement was amended to extend the expiration date until the year 2007. All enriched (weapons grade) uranium provided for SAFARI-1 was under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and the spent fuel has been returned to the U.S.

In 1964 the research reactor SAFARI-1 at Pelindaba became operational. Since then South African nuclear physicists have had the capability to conduct two types of nuclear experiments that are crucial to the development of a clean tactical nuclear weapon. The first category of research, commonly referred to as neutronics, deals with neutron activation analysis. The second broad category deals with the properties of certain types of material under the bombardment of neutrons.⁶⁴

⁶³Adelman, p. 635. In addition to the initial training provided by the United States, South Africa has four universities with significant nuclear related programs: the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg; Cape Town University; Stellensbosch University, and the University of Pretoria. Other sources of training and advanced technology include contacts with Great Britain, France, West Germany, Taiwan, and Israel.

⁶⁴Quentin Peel, "Pretoria Nuclear Research Hit by U.S. Fuel Embargo", Financial Times, July 5, 1979.

Utilizing the technology acquired from SAFARI-I, South Africa designed and built a second research reactor, Pelunduna Zero.⁶⁵ This reactor went critical in 1967 and is not subject to any international safeguards.

Stages 1 and 2 provided South Africa with the raw materials and the technological base necessary for stage three, an independent enrichment capability. On July 20, 1970, Prime Minister Vorster announced to Parliament that South African nuclear scientists had developed a new and unique process that would enrich fuel at a much lower cost than existing technologies. Parliament responded by authorizing the construction of a pilot enrichment plant at Valindaba (Zulu for the talking is over). The pilot plant became operational in 1975 and since then its operation has been a state secret. U.S. intelligence sources estimate that Valindaba could have produced as much as 40 kgs of weapons grade uranium by 1979.⁶⁶

Stage four represents the "peaceful" application of a nuclear power program. In 1976, construction of two nuclear plants at Koeberg South Africa began. Designed and built by a French consortium, the plants are due to become operational in the mid 1980's and provide roughly 10% of South Africa's

⁶⁵ Richard Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?", International Security, Fall 1979, p. 92

⁶⁶ N.Y. Times, May 3, 1977.

electrical needs. Each plant will have a 1000 MW capacity and as a by-product produce 200 kg of plutonium a year; roughly enough plutonium for 26 bombs per year per plant.⁶⁷

In summation, South Africa has: (1) a sufficient scientific and industrial base from which to conduct a nuclear weapons R & D Program; (2) access to technology needed for nuclear weapons development; (3) an indigenous source of enriched uranium; and (4) a tightly controlled, efficient agency capable of managing a covert nuclear weapons production program.⁶⁸

C. THE MYSTERIOUS FLASH

U.S. efforts to detect nuclear explosions are geared toward certain characteristic phenomena. Satellites, like the Vela series, are designed to measure the electromagnetic energy produced by the explosion, while seismic and acoustic gear measure the effects of blast/shock waves.⁶⁹ Residual radioactive fallout can be collected, providing the area of the test can be pinpointed and it is accessible to U.S. collection platforms.

Any nation attempting to conduct a covert test would presumably try to prevent another nation from detecting these phenomena. The most obvious factor would be the choice

⁶⁷Barnaby, p. 2.

⁶⁸Aldermann, p. 639.

⁶⁹N.Y. Times October 27, 1979, provides information on Vela Satellite.

of the test site. A remote, relatively unmonitored corner of the world, such as the region between South Africa and Antarctica would be optimum. In addition to the location of the test, the size of yield, the type of burst and the weather conditions at the time of the test would be crucial to efforts at avoiding detection. A small yield air burst conducted at sea under a heavy cloud cover would not only minimize the chances of detection but also would severely hamper efforts to confirm a suspected test.⁷⁰

On September 22, 1979, a Vela satellite detected the unique double pulse signature of a small scaled nuclear explosion off the coast of South Africa. Although the satellite was equiped to sense radiation and other electromagnetic disturbances associated with a nuclear blast, these sensors were either turned off at the crucial moment or were not sensitive enough to register what happened.⁷¹ The satellite's optical sensors had been calibrated for accuracy a week before the sighting and immediately afterward. Neither calibration revealed any malfunction.⁷² Defense officials stated that this was the 42nd time a Vela satellite

⁷⁰For an in-depth source on nuclear effects, see Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, ed, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd Edition, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1977.

⁷¹"Flash Not Missed by Vela Still Veiled in Mist", Science, vol. 206, 30 November 1979, p. 1051.

⁷²IBID.

had registered a double pulse and in the first 41 occurrences the double pulse had been correlated with a known nuclear test.⁷³

Technical experts, analyzing the intensity of light detected by Vela, calculated the size of the explosion to be two to three kilotons.⁷⁴ Efforts to pinpoint the area of the blast, however, proved to be less precise. Since only one Vela satellite was in a position to detect the explosion, the area of probability was 4,500 square miles. If two or more had detected the blast, the area could have been pinpointed to within a couple of square miles.⁷⁵

Another observation made by chance a few hours later at the radio observatory at Arecibo, Puerto Rico, suggested that the Vela satellite had indeed seen a nuclear test.⁷⁶ Scientists were watching the upper atmosphere in an effort to gather baseline data for another experiment. According to scientists who made the observation, a pattern of ducted ionospheric disturbances were observed arriving from the southeast, at a suitable time interval to allow them to have

⁷³IBID.

⁷⁴Richard Burt, "Burst of Light Led to Speculation South Africa Exploded A-Bomb", N.Y. Times, October 27, 1979, p. A5.

⁷⁵IBID.

⁷⁶"Scientists Fail to Solve Vela Mystery", Science, vol. 207, 1 February 1980, p. 504.

originated in the vicinity of South Africa at the time of the Vela sighting.⁷⁷ This phenomenon can be generated by a nuclear explosion sending a shower of beta particles through the ionosphere causing it to oscillate up and down.

The strongest collaborating piece of evidence, however, came from the Naval Research Laboratory.⁷⁸ Dr. Alan Berman, Director of Research for the lab, stated that a hydroacoustic signal was received from the right direction and at the right time to correlate it with the Vela sighting. After receiving the signal, the NRL searched the log for the previous 30 days and monitored for 30 days after the signal to see if there were any comparable signals; there were none.⁷⁹ Dr. Berman stated that the signal was comparable in its "signature" to those that followed recent overt nuclear tests in the Pacific.⁸⁰

During the debate that followed, technical experts from Los Alamos, NRL and the DIA argued that the United States had been lucky to detect the test at all. The Vela satellite had been at the right place, at the right time, to detect the unique double pulse. Others, including the President's

⁷⁷ IBID.

⁷⁸ Eliot Marshall, "Navy Lab Concludes the Vela Saw a Bomb", Science, vol. 209, 29 August 1980, p. 996.

⁷⁹ IBID.

⁸⁰ IBID.

Panel, concluded that since the U.S. had been unable to collect any radioactive debris, the satellite's sighting was probably the result of some yet undetermined natural phenomenon.

To date this undetermined natural phenomenon has defied definition, while a careful analysis of the technical data collected is consistent with the thesis that a small nuclear test was conducted on 22 September 1979. The basis for this analysis will be the answer to the question, what types of evidence would one expect to find following a small yield, air burst, test.⁸¹

In an air burst, an estimated 35 to 45 percent of the total energy yield is emitted as thermal energy.⁸² This energy is divided into two pulses, an initial pulse, lasting a fraction of a second, possessing 1% of the total thermal radiation energy, and a second pulse, lasting for seconds, possessing 99% of the total thermal energy.⁸³ This double pulse phenomena is what the Vela satellite detected. The

⁸¹Nuclear effects of a 3 kiloton air blast include the following: (1) size of fireball, 530 feet across; (2) lines of sight for a 10,000 foot explosion, 200nm; (3) initial nuclear radiation, 1000 rems at 1,200 yds reducing to 2 rems (amount of a chest x-ray) at 6,600 yds; (4) blast effects, 1 psi (crack windows) at 3nm reducing to .1 psi at 5 nm.

⁸²Glasstone, p. 7.

⁸³Glasstone, pp. 40-41. The actual duration of a pulse is yield dependent.

designers of the Vela satellite argue that the uniqueness of the double pulse rules out the possibility of a natural cause.⁸⁴

As much as 50 percent of the energy an air burst is transmitted to the environment in the form of a shock wave.⁸⁵ This shock wave could be felt within the immediate area, but would attenuate greatly with distance from the blast. One possible method of detecting the effects of the shock wave would be through the use of a sensitive acoustic system. The giant acoustic system designed and operated by the U.S. to detect atmospheric tests was inoperative on the morning of 22 September.⁸⁶ Another method could be a hydroacoustic system that was sensitive enough to pick up the shock wave energy that coupled to the ocean below the blast, causing a hydroacoustic signal. This is what NRL states it detected with its gear.⁸⁷

A third phenomenon associated with a nuclear explosion is initial nuclear radiation. This phenomenon takes the form of high energy electromagnetic radiations. One known

⁸⁴Burt, p. A5.

⁸⁵Glasstone, p. 7.

⁸⁶Washington Post, 3 November 1979.

⁸⁷When the incident blast wave from an explosion in air strikes a more dense medium such as the ocean, most of its energy is reflected. The reason that no seismic indications were received is due to the small yield and the fact that energy was reflected twice before being coupled to the earth.

effect of this phenomenon is the ionospheric disturbance noted at Arecibo.

As to the fourth and undetected phenomenon, radioactive fallout, it has been noted by both defense and administration officials that efforts to collect debris following acknowledged Chinese and French tests also failed.⁸⁸ In South Africa case several factors combined to hamper collection efforts. First, the test was conducted in a remote corner of the world. Because of the distances involved it took time to get collection platforms on station. Once there, the high altitude reconnaissance planes had to search large expanses of open ocean. Second, depending on the height of burst, a small yield blast would not have had sufficient energy to boost the radioactive debris into the troposphere. Third, weather conditions (rain) in the area would have washed the majority of the radioactive debris into the ocean within 24 hours. Forty-eight hours after the blast the level of residual radioactivity would have been less than 1% of the 1 hour reading.⁸⁹

In addition to the intelligence data surveyed, two pieces of circumstantial evidence suggest that the South Africans

⁸⁸ Walter Mussberg, "Mystery Explosion off South Africa Stills Fuels Dispute", Wall Street Journal, November 14, 1977, p. 1/19.

⁸⁹ Glasstone, p. 19, Reports of fallout in New Zealand rainwater samples received widespread coverage in November 1979. Subsequent efforts to substantiate the findings failed.

had at least considered the option of conducting a covert test. First, a South African naval attache assigned to Washington requested that the National Technical Information Service conduct a search of the literature on the detection of seismic evidence.⁹⁰ Second, in April 1980, it was reported that an Oxford trained scientist, Dr. Renfrew Christie, had been detained since October 1979 under South Africa's Terrorism Act. His alledged crime was an attempt to pass information dealing with places which the South African Atomic Energy Board considered safe for detonating a nuclear device.⁹¹

Two additional pieces of information point to a South African test on 22 September. The first is the fact that a South African naval exercise was conducted in the same area and at the same time as the blast. These naval units failed to report any unusual sightings. The second is the official South African response to the blast. Instead of a denial, the government hedged its position for several days. Foreign Minister R. F. Botha responded to questions this way: "The whole event is enveloped in mystery. Should one not first establish if such an event took place, then endeavor to trace the origin?"⁹² After a suitable delay, possibly designed

⁹⁰ Betts, p. 303.

⁹¹ The Telegraph, London, April 14, 1980.

⁹² John Burns, "South African Calls Report of Nuclear Test 'Nonsense'", N.Y. Times, October 27, 1979, p. A5.

to see if the United States would be able to prove anything, strong denials were made.

D. A CASE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION?

The point at which the South African leadership first considered the nuclear option is difficult, if not impossible to ascertain. What is clear, is that South Africa is not yet willing to blatantly disregard Western views on the subject. Their official policy remains one of calculated ambiguity.

The reasons for this ambiguity are several. First, any overt decision to exercise the nuclear option would alienate what little Western support Pretoria still has and invite the diplomatic and economic retaliation threatened in 1977.

Second, a demonstrated nuclear capability and would enhance the threat perceptions of South Africa's neighbors, possibly resulting in an even greater reliance by them on the Soviet Union. Third, by maintaining the diplomatic equivalent of a "bomb in the basement", Pretoria is in a position to exchange nonproliferation for passive Western acceptance of the status quo. The implied threat being that if the external pressure significantly increases, the South Africans would be forced into a nuclear laager.

1. A Vertically Integrated Industry

While the official South African line has been that South Africa's nuclear program is geared only toward the

peaceful pursuits of nuclear energy, a careful analysis of the path the South African government chose to pursue suggests a different motivation. From the mid-1960's on, the Afrikaner leadership either intended to develop a nuclear capability or spent considerable sums of scarce capital to keep that option open.

Section three of this chapter traced the development of the vertically integrated South African nuclear industry. During the 1950's, the major emphasis was on uranium ore production. The development of South Africa's uranium mining industry provided South Africa with foreign exchange earnings and the necessary technology to process their uranium deposits.

Level two, peaceful research, was largely a product of President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program. SAFARI-I at Pelindaba has been subject to safeguards from the moment it became operational in 1964. Research conducted with this reactor has included isotope research for medical purposes, food preservation by irradiation, neutron activation analysis, and fundamental materials testing. All clearly have peaceful applications and reinforce the image of a peace-oriented program.

Level two, however, did not stop with one research reactor. SAFARI-2, a research reactor built indigenously with the technology gained from SAFARI-I, became operational in 1967. This research reactor is not subject to

international safeguards and access to its operation is a state secret. Why did South Africa spend considerable sums of scarce capital duplicating an existing capability, unless she wanted to conduct research beyond the watchful eye of international inspections. Neutron activation and materials testings are fundamental prerequisites for clean weapons design techniques.

The official South African position on level three, enrichment of uranium, is that they want to be able to refine their minerals to the highest level possible prior to export. The economic rationale behind this position is valid when applied to the refining of ore into ferrochrome or ferromanganese. The reduction in transportation costs, due to the lighter weight of the processed ore, provides South Africa with a comparative advantage over Western processors of ore. When applied to uranium, the rationale falters. There is no appreciable savings in transportation costs. Uranium ore enriched to 3 percent U235 is not any lighter than natural uranium ore. Additionally, the technology involved with processing ferrochrome is proven and relatively inexpensive, while the development of a new uranium enrichment technology is highly speculative and very expensive. Recent events have provided the South African government with another rationale for an indigenous enrichment capability. South Africa needs the capability to

provide its own reactors with uranium fuel, highly enriched uranium for the research reactors and 3 percent U235 for the Koeberg nuclear power stations.

The relationship between the South African decisions to pursue an enrichment capability, build light water reactors and not to sign the NPT is worth examining. Had South Africa's nuclear strategy totally rejected the nuclear explosives, two alternative courses of action would seem reasonable. First and most obvious, sign the NPT and agree that in exchange for nuclear technology and enriched uranium supplies, South Africa will forgo the nuclear option. This course of action would immediately solve their existing fuel problems for Koeberg and Pelindaba. The second course of action would have been to build an integrated nuclear industry that bypassed the enrichment level. Both of South Africa's peaceful objectives, nuclear research and nuclear power, could have been achieved at considerable less cost by not building SAFARI-2 and Valindaba, and by opting for heavy water reactors which burn natural (unenriched) uranium.

2. The Case for Strategic Deception

If the technical assessments of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of Energy are correct, the events of 22 September represented a unique first test. The blast was estimated at two to three kilotons vice twenty and the blast was an atmospheric blast, meaning an end

line weapon was used.⁹³ These two factors required advanced technology that was not thought to be available to South Africa. Subsequent efforts to confirm the test by collection radioactive samples prove fruitless, largely because the exact location of the blast was not known and the advanced technology that allows a small yield results in a relatively clean weapon.

The rationale for testing a nuclear device lies in the adage that an untested weapon is an unreliable weapon. This is especially true given the highly sophisticated nature of nuclear weapons. The reasons why the South African government would resort to a covert test are even more obvious. The Western powers were very explicit in August 1977. If the South African government went ahead and tested a nuclear device, all nuclear cooperation between the countries would be cancelled. This included nuclear technology transfers, weapons grade uranium for SAFARI-1, uranium fuel for the Koeberg plants and any efforts to reinstate South Africa on the IAEC.

In the book, Strategic Military Deception, Herbig and Daniel define two types of strategic deception. A-type or ambiguity increasing is the type employed by South Africa. Between 1977 and 1979 the South African government attempted

⁹³"Flash Not Missed by Vela Stilled Veiled in Mist", p. 1051.

to increase the uncertainties confronting superpower attempts to determine the intentions of their nuclear program. Four factors are important to the success of a deception plan and will be addressed here.

First, in order to carry out the plan, a certain amount of secrecy, organization, and coordination is required. Decisions in South Africa are made at the top by either the Prime Minister or the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Thus, the number of individuals involved could have been restricted to the Prime Minister, a few members of his cabinet and the scientists at Valindaba. Project secrecy and organization would have merely merged with the tight security measures in effect for the South African nuclear program in general.

The second factor is the plausibility of lies and the credibility of cover stories. From the inspection of their nuclear power program, the official South African line has been that South Africa's nuclear program is geared only toward peaceful pursuits of nuclear energy. Even the enrichment plant at Valindaba has the credible cover story of providing uranium enrichment to 3 percent U235 for nuclear power plants.

Factor three, the use of target predispositions, represents an area of crucial South African efforts. In the aftermath of August 1977, the South African government embarked on an effort aimed at allaying any suspicions of

South Africa going nuclear and advancing the position that South Africa lacked the enriching capability necessary for bomb production. Their objectives were twofold. First, they would reduce the level of surveillance in the area by reducing tensions over nuclear issues and secondly they would foster the image that there were technical reasons why they could not produce a bomb.

Efforts to achieve the first objective, reducing surveillance by allaying suspicions, were made easier by the orientation fo the Carter Administration. In July 1977, the State Department non-proliferation Czar, Joseph Nye, told Congress that it was "essential to bring South African capabilities and motivations within the international safeguard system and the regime of the NPT. Whatever policy choices we make, we most focus our vital interests in keeping Africa free of nuclear weapons."⁹⁴ President Carter in a news conference statement August 22, 1977 stated that the U.S. would renew its efforts to "encourage South Africa to place all their nuclear power production capabilities under international safeguards and inspections and encourage them to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty."⁹⁵

South Africa in August 1977 entered into negotiations to sign the NPT. Their initial demands called for highly enriched uranium fuel for the SAFARI-1 research reactor,

⁹⁴Aldermann, p. 633.

⁹⁵IBID.

low grade fuel for their Koeberg nuclear power plants, U.S. efforts to get South Africa reinstated on the IAEC, and American export permits for non-sensitive technology for South Africa's enrichment plant.⁹⁶ After two years the negotiations floundered because the South Africans claimed that international inspections of uranium ore extraction would breach South African security measures on gold mining and compromise their unique enrichment process.⁹⁷

Dr. Ampire Roux, Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board, was a key figure in advancing the position that South Africa was only interested in peaceful applications of nuclear energy and certain technical deficiencies existed that would have to be overcome before South Africa could build a bomb. "Our entire program", Roux stated, "is devoted to peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Whether that will change depends on the government and I cannot foresee that they will ever change their mind."⁹⁸ Roux frequently repeated a theme that was prevalent in the Western press; atomic weapons would be of little use for South Africa in controlling guerrilla warfare or urban unrest.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Jaster, p. 46.

⁹⁷ Uranium ore mining in South Africa is largely a by-product of gold production.

⁹⁸ "S.A. Can Stand on its Own Nuclear Feet", South African Digest, July 27, 1979, p. 2.

⁹⁹ Burns, p. 6.

In May 1977, Roux acknowledged that the pilot plant at Valindaba could be used to produce weapons grade uranium, but actually producing the raw materials for bombs would require a "much bigger" plant than even the planned commercial facility scheduled for 1986. This statement reinforced Western perceptions concerning the level of South Africa's technology. Previous initial first tests required approximately 48 kgs of highly enriched uranium to achieve a supercritical mass. Intelligence estimates placed the output by 1979 of Valindaba at possibly 40 kgs. However, if the same scientific community that achieved a breakthrough in enrichment technology had merely duplicated Western warhead design techniques, less than 26 kgs of nuclear material would have been required. Valindaba's output would have been more than sufficient.¹⁰⁰

The final factor is strategic initiative or the element of surprise. By September 1979, the South Africans had been successful at allaying the fears of an impending test. Decision-makers in the West were convinced that the South Africans would not test because the costs far outweighed the benefits. As a result, intelligence collecting

¹⁰⁰ In a clean device, advanced design techniques are used to: (a) reduce to a minimum the amount of fissionable material required, and (b) contain within the device the neutrons generated, thereby minimizing the amount of environmental material exposed to those neutrons and becoming radioactive. John W. Cane, "The Technology of Modern Weapons for Limited Use", ORBIS, Spring, 1978, p. 221.

efforts in that remote part of the world were at a minimum. On the 23rd of September it was too late to step up surveillance efforts.

E. THE POLITICS OF PROLIFERATION

The opposition of the United States to nuclear proliferation dates back to the period just after World War II, when the U.S. called for the internationalization of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The Baruch plan was not adopted and the spread of nuclear weapons began. By May 18, 1974, six nations had exploded nuclear devices.

The American position on the proliferation of nuclear weapons is motivated by a belief that the spread of nuclear weapons enhances international instability and increases the likelihood of nuclear war. In the case of South Africa, an additional fear is present; the potential for terrorists groups to seize nuclear materials and/or nuclear weapons during a period of civil war.

The findings by the President's Panel on the blast that a nuclear test could not be substantiated led to a rebuff by parts of the technical community. Their position was that political considerations had forced the Administration to overlook the uncomfortable facts. South Africa had indeed tested a nuclear weapon, and the Administration for political reasons had decided not to press the issue.

Another, less critical view, is that the Administration may have been motivated by two additional considerations. Instead of publicly confirming the test, the decision was made to allow the South Africans a case for plausible denial. By adopting this strategy, the Carter Administration was in a position to privately apply pressure if it was determined that the South Africans were creating a nuclear arsenal. The stiffening of Afrikaner resolve and the rhetoric observed following the public pressure in 1977, could be prevented. Even more important, a position of plausible denial would allow the South Africans the option of privately renouncing nuclear weapons at a later date. The path back would still be open.

VII. CONCLUSION

While it is true that South Africa is not of vital importance to the United States, all the ingredients for a major crisis are present. The dangers of political instability, large-scale racial conflict, and the growth of Soviet influence are real. The initiative presently lies with the White regime in South Africa. Pretoria has the power to diffuse these dangers by adopting policies that lead to constructive reform or she can reject that course and try to reinforce the status quo. U.S. foreign policy must take into account the Afrikaner's reluctance to surrender any of their power, for fear of being swamped by their Black majority.

To deplore or condemn Afrikaner stubbornness will not change attitudes. Only when they see change as a workable alternative to a more frightening fate may they adopt a more pragmatic position on power sharing. The challenge for U.S. policy is to constructively assist the process of change in South Africa.

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