Motivation and Politics in Executive Compensation.

Abstract

For the past thirty years, economists and management theorists have empirically investigated the compensation of top executives. An issue that has received critical attention is what appears to be a weak link between top executive compensation and executive performance. In contrast to rational models that have characterized most previous studies, this paper develops a political perspective to explain why the linkage between rewards and performance is weak. Implications for research and management practice are presented. (Author)

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jul 01, 1983
Accession Number
ADA132494

Entities

People

  • Gerardo R. Ungson
  • Richard M. Steers

Organizations

  • University of Oregon

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Business Administration
  • Cognition
  • Economics
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • Management Personnel
  • Military Research
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Naval Operations
  • Organizational Structure
  • Personnel Management
  • Psychology
  • Students
  • Test And Evaluation
  • United States Government

Readers

  • Government Contracting/Procurement.
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Theoretical Analysis.