Military Intervention in Latin America: Analysis of the 1965 Crisis in the Dominican Republic.
Abstract
On 28 April 1965 the Sixth Marine expeditionary unit commenced operations in the Dominican Republic. For the first time since 1924 the United States Marines were back in that troubled nation. This action ended the Good Neighbor policy of non-intervention in Latin America for the United States and established a precedent for intervening in the affairs of any Latin American country that threatens to become a second Cuba . The purpose of this study is to show that, in spite of post-Vietnam trauma, a tightly controlled military intervention in Latin America can successfully end an armed insurrection with favorable political results. The essential conclusions drawn from this study are: (a) if the United States must intervene it must do so rapidly and massively with its Latin American allies in order to prevent any side in the conflict from gaining a quick military advantage; (b) Once in the country the U.S. must maintain as neutral a stance as possible; (c) Washington must absolutely keep its military means subordinated to a clearly stated, attainable, and negotiated political end; (d) rather than attempting to destroy the insurgent, intervening forces should isolate him on the ground and then include him in negotiations; (e) time must be allowed to work against the contending parties and in the favor of the intervening regional peacemakers. The U.S. response to the Dominican crisis clearly shows that the often violent forces of change in Latin America can be controlled by intervention with the relative certainty of gaining a political solution acceptable to everyone.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 03, 1983
- Accession Number
- ADA133268
Entities
People
- Frank E. Galati Jr
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College