


Zimbabwe a country study

area handbook series

Zimbabwe
a country study

AD-A135 022

DTIC
S NOV 29 1983 D
A



This document has been approved
for public release and sale; its
distribution is unlimited.

83 11 22 001

(1)

Zimbabwe a country study

Foreign Area Studies
The American University

Edited by

Harold D. Nelson

Research completed

August 1982



DTIC
SELECTE
NOV 29 1983
A

This document has been approved
for public release and sale; its
distribution is unlimited.

On the cover: A soapstone bird figure once associated with the
ancient ruins of Great Zimbabwe and since April 1980 the official
symbol of the new republic

Second Edition, 1983, First Printing: 1983

Copyright (c) 1983 United States Government as represented by the
Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

Zimbabwe, a country study.

(DA pam; 550-171) (Area handbook series)

Rev. ed. of: Area handbook for Southern Rhodesia.

1975

"Research complete Aug. 1982."

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

I. Zimbabwe. I. Nelson, Harold D. II. American
University (Washington, D.C.). Foreign Area Studies.

III. Series. IV. Series: Area handbook series.

DT962.Z55 1983 968.91'04 83-11946

Headquarters, Department of the Army
DA Pam 550-171

Foreword

This volume is one of a continuing series of books written by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, under the Area Handbook Program. Its title, format, and substance reflect modifications introduced into the series in 1978. The last page of this book provides a listing of other country studies published. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its economic, national security, political, and social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political, and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system and political order within which they live.

The contents of the book represent the views, opinions and findings of Foreign Areas Studies and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in future revisions.

William Evans-Smith
Director, Foreign Area Studies
The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
\$ 8.00	
Distribution/	
Availability codes	
Dist	Avail. and/or Special
A1	24



→ to p. xi

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to those individuals in various governmental, international, and academic organizations who gave of their time, data, special knowledge, and authoritative perspective on Zimbabwe. In particular they wish to thank Jeffrey Davidow, former deputy chief of mission in the United States embassy at Harare, and the Reverend Peter Sanders, who served in the country for many years as a teacher and Roman Catholic priest.

Gratitude is also extended to members of the Foreign Area Studies support staff who contributed directly to the preparation of this book. These persons include Karen R. Sagstetter, Kathryn R. Stafford, Dorothy M. Lohmann, and Andrea T. Merrill, who edited the manuscript, and Harriett R. Blood, who prepared the graphics with the assistance of Farah Ahannavard. The authors appreciate as well the assistance provided by Gilda V. Nimer, librarian; Ernest A. Will, publications manager; Eloise W. Brandt, administrative assistant; and Margaret Quinn and John Dupont, who typed the manuscript.

The aesthetic touches that enhance the book's appearance are the work of Marty Ittner, whose illustrations appear on the cover and the title pages of the chapters. The inclusion of photographs has been made possible in part by the generosity of various individuals and public and private agencies. The authors acknowledge their indebtedness especially to those persons who contributed original material not previously published.

PRECEDING PAGE

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Foreword	iii
Acknowledgments	v
Preface	xi
Country Profile	xix
Introduction	xxvii
Chapter 1. Historical Setting	1

Robert Rinehart

THE ORIGINS OF ZIMBABWE—The Shona Confederacy—Great Zimbabwe—Munhumutapa and Changamire Dynasties—Dombo and the Rozvi Empire—NDEBELE HEGEMONY—Mizilikazi—Ndebele Institutions—End of Isolation—Lobengula—THE MAKING OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA—Rhodes and the British South Africa Company—Settlement, Resistance, and Pacification—Charter Company Rule—Missionary Activities—Black Political Movements—The 1922 Referendum: Company to Colony—THE COLONIAL PERIOD—Early Years of Self-Government—The Land Question—African Political Groups—World War II and Postwar Political Developments—FROM FEDERATION TO REBELLION—Southern Rhodesia in the Federation—The African Dimension—The 1961 Constitution—The Rhodesian Front—Negotiating Independence—The Rise of Ian Smith—Unilateral Declaration of Independence—FROM RHODESIA TO ZIMBABWE—The Republican Constitution—The United Nations and Sanctions—Land Apportionment, Urban Segregation, and Security Regulations—Settlement Proposals, 1971–72—African Nationalist Opposition—The Civil War—*Détente* and Negotiations, 1974–78—Internal Settlement—The Lancaster House Conference and Independence

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment	71
---	----

Irving Kaplan

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT — Geographic Regions—Climate—Drainage—DEMOGRAPHY—Land Allocation and the Rural Population—The Urban Population—Structure: Age and Sex—Internal and External Migration—ETHNICITY AND RACE—Ethnic and Racial Groupings—Race Relations: Blacks, Whites, and Others—Intra-African Relations—THE CHANGING SOCIAL ORDER—African Rural Society—Rearranging Social

Relations—RELIGIOUS LIFE—Christians, Missions,
and Independent Churches—Indigenous Religions—
EDUCATION—HEALTH

Chapter 3. The Economy..... 135

Donald P. Whitaker

LAND USE AND OWNERSHIP—AGRICULTURE—
Crop Cultivation—Livestock—Forestry and Fishing—
MANUFACTURING—MINING—ENERGY SOURCES—
Electric Power—Petroleum Products—TRANSPORTA-
TION—Railroads—Roads—Civil Aviation—FOREIGN
TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS—EMPLOY-
MENT, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND PRICES—
GOVERNMENT FINANCE

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 185

Jean R. Tartter

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK—INSTITUTIONS
OF GOVERNMENT—Executive Branch and Civil
Service—Parliament—Local Government—The Local
System—POLITICS—Parliamentary Elections of 1980—
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front—
Nkomo and the Patriotic Front Coalition—Other African
Parties—White Political Forces—The Government's
Ideology and Program—GOVERNMENT AND THE
NEWS MEDIA—The Press—Radio and Television—
FOREIGN RELATIONS—Neighboring Black African
States—South Africa—United States—Britain and West-
ern Europe—Communist Countries

Chapter 5. National Security 235

Frederick Ehrenreich

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY—Post-
war Violence and Government Security Policy—Dis-
affected Whites—Ethnicity, PF-ZAPU, and the Government—
REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS—THE ARMED
FORCES: ADJUSTING TO NEW REALITIES—Devel-
opment Before 1965—Civil War and the Three Armies—
The High Command and the Government—The Military
and the Economy—Military Manpower: Demobilization
and Integration—Army Organization, Equipment, and
Training—Air Force Organization, Equipment, and
Training—Foreign Military Assistance—STATE SECU-
RITY SERVICES—Central Intelligence Organization—
Zimbabwe Republic Police—The Prison System

Appendix. Tables..... 285

Bibliography 319

Glossary.....	345
----------------------	------------

Index.....	349
-------------------	------------

List of Figures

1 Republic of Zimbabwe, 1982.....	xxvi
2 Shona Peoples and Zimbabwe Sites	6
3 Migration of the Ndebele and the Ngoni, 1822-39.....	12
4 Settlement and Development of Rhodesian Area, 1890-99	20
5 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953.....	37
6 Terrain and Drainage	76
7 Mean Annual Rainfall	80
8 Land Apportionment and Tenure Before 1979.....	82
9 Division of Rhodesia's Land, 1970	83
10 Rural Population Density in the Tribal Trust Lands, 1969	85
11 Age and Sex Structure of African Population, 1980	88
12 Age and Sex Composition of African Population by Residence, 1969	89
13 Distribution of African Peoples, Mid-1970s.....	94
14 School Systems, Rhodesia, Mid-1970s	124
15 Farming Potentials by Land-Use Suitability.....	139
16 Transportation System, 1982.....	172
17 Organization of Government, 1982	191
18 Results of Common Voter Roll Election to House of Assembly, 1980	207
19 Balance of Power in Southern Africa, 1982	247
20 Evolution of Zimbabwe National Army, 1980-82.....	263
21 Zimbabwe Defence Force Officer Ranks, Insignia, and United States Equivalents, 1982.....	267
22 Disposition of Major Units of Zimbabwe Defence Force, 1982	269
23 Organization of Zimbabwe Defence Force, 1982.....	270
24 Organization of Internal Security Forces, 1982	279

from iii

↓

Preface

This study replaces the *Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia*, which was completed in 1974 and published in 1975. In the intervening period a series of momentous events has relegated the earlier book to the status of a historical document. The changes that occurred were the consequences of a seven-year civil war (1972-79) that wrested political control from the hands of the white minority and paved the way for a system dominated by the black majority. In view of these developments, a fresh look at the country's society and its altered role in world affairs is warranted.

The state that serves as the subject of this book has been known by several different names during the course of its modern history (see table A). Claimed in the late nineteenth century by Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company as part of a larger territory designated Rhodesia, it soon became known as Southern Rhodesia to differentiate it from Northern Rhodesia (which became modern-day Zambia). In 1923 the southern territory became the self-governing British Crown Colony of Southern Rhodesia, a status that was unilaterally abrogated in 1965 by the white minority regime of Ian Smith. The breakaway colony proclaimed itself the Republic of Rhodesia, but its illegal move failed to gain diplomatic recognition by any other state and garnered instead world disapprobation. To deal with its mounting internal problems arising from a determined guerrilla conflict waged by African nationalist forces, the territory assumed the name Zimbabwe Rhodesia in early 1979—a contrived solution that survived for less than a year. On April 18, 1980, the colony was granted legal independence by Britain, marking the victory of its African majority, who redesignated the new state the Republic of Zimbabwe in deference to Great Zimbabwe, the historical site of a powerful African confederacy that had existed long before the coming of the white Europeans.

For simplicity and because of common usage in source materials that deal with the colony's preindependence period, this book has used the term *Rhodesia* except in situations where the historical significance of the other designations appears more appropriate to the reader's understanding. Use of the simplified designation, however, should not be interpreted as implying recognition of the claim to sovereignty that persisted from 1965 to 1980.

Like its predecessor *Zimbabwe: A Country Study* seeks to provide a compact and objective exposition of dominant social, economic, political, and national security aspects and to give the reader some idea of the forces involved in the country's development. In presenting this new study the authors have relied primarily on official reports of governmental and international organizations, journals, newspapers, and materials reflecting recent field research by independent scholarly authorities. Detailed information on many

↑

aspects of the society was not always readily available, however, and gaps in the data as well as varied interpretations of certain matters existed among some of the sources consulted. Where appropriate, such gaps and differences have been noted in the text. Should readers desire greater detail on appropriate subjects, the authors have noted the availability of amplifying materials in bibliographic statements at the end of each chapter. Full references to these and other sources used or considered are included in the detailed Bibliography.

Most place-names have been spelled in accordance with those established by the United States Board on Geographic Names in its current gazetteer of June 1973. Exceptions have been made in keeping with the Zimbabwe government's postindependence action to change scores of names (including that of the national capital) associated with nearly a century of white rule. A cabinet committee established in 1980 has examined literally thousands of place-names for cities, towns, suburbs, roads, rivers, dams, mountains, forests, and other natural features. On April 18, 1982, the second anniversary of independence, new names were proclaimed for thirty-two cities and towns (see table B). *Zimbabwe: A Country Study* makes use of these new designations where appropriate. Because the renaming project is an ongoing effort, readers should be aware that additional changes can be expected from time to time in the future.

An effort has been made to limit the use of foreign and technical words in the text of this study. When this has not been appropriate, such terms have been defined briefly where they first appear in any chapter, or reference has been made to the Glossary, which is included for the reader's convenience. All measurements are in metric terms; a conversion table will assist those who may not be familiar with metric equivalents (see table 1, Appendix).

Table A. Chronology of Historical Events, 1000 to 1980

Dates	Events
ca. 1000	Emergence of Shona confederacy centered at Great Zimbabwe.
ca. 1350	Mbire line recognized as paramount chiefs at height of Great Zimbabwe's prosperity and importance.
ca. 1450	Great Zimbabwe abandoned by royal court; Mutota founds Munhumutapa state in Zambezi region; Changamire Dynasty rules satellite chiefdom in Karanga territory.
ca. 1490	Changamire state separates from Munhumutapa.
1513	First documented Portuguese expedition reaches Munhumutapa territory.
1629	Portuguese ascendancy established over Munhumutapa.
ca. 1690	Dombo creates "Rozvi Empire" as expansion of Changamire state, expels Portuguese from upper Zambezi; Munhumutapa continues in Mozambique as Portuguese protectorate.
ca. 1820	Migrations begin, resulting from Zulu ascendancy in Natal.
1822	Mzilikazi leads Ndebele out of Natal after quarrel with Zulu king.
ca. 1835	Great Zimbabwe sacked by Ngoni (Zulu-speaking group) moving north.
1838	Branch of Ndebele under Kaliphi crosses Limpopo River into Shona territory.
1839	Mzilikazi arrives with his party, asserts his authority as Ndebele king.
1840s	Ndebele hegemony extended over Matabeleland.
1853	Treaty with Transvaal Republic admits limited European penetration of Matabeleland.
1859	Robert Moffat opens mission station at Inyati.
1868	Mzilikazi dies.
1870	Lobengula recognized as Ndebele king after disputed succession.
1888	Lobengula accedes to Moffat Agreement, bringing Matabeleland and Mashonaland within British sphere of influence; Cecil Rhodes forms British South Africa Company (BSAC), obtains mining rights from Lobengula through Rudd Concession.
1889	BSAC incorporated under British royal charter.
1890	Pioneer Column enters Mashonaland, establishes Fort Salisbury; company rule begins in region; choice land allotted to European settlers.
1893-94	Ndebele War: Lobengula dies; BSAC rule extended to Matabeleland.
1894	First Native Reserves set aside.

Table A. Chronology of Historical Events, 1000 to 1980 (Continued)

Dates	Events
1895	BASC-claimed territory proclaimed "Rhodesia."
1896-97	Serious uprisings by Ndebele and Shona peoples against European presence put down by British forces.
1897	BSAC establishes separate administrations for Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia.
1898	Constitution provides settler participation in Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council.
1907	Settlers granted majority role in Legislative Council; movement begins for termination of BSAC rule.
1914-18	White Rhodesians serve with British Empire forces in World War I; end of company rule delayed.
1920	Responsible Government Party (RGP) led by Charles Coghlan wins majority in Legislative Council, presses for self-government and crown colony status for Southern Rhodesia.
1922	Referendum favors responsible government as British crown colony over union with South Africa.
1923	BSAC rule ended; Southern Rhodesia becomes crown colony; new constitution provides for self-government by white minority through unicameral Legislative Assembly. Coghlan named prime minister, advocates "partnership" between Europeans and Africans; RGP reorganized as Rhodesian Party; Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association formed.
1925-26	Morris Carter Commission recommends segregated land development.
1927	Howard Moffat becomes prime minister; African labor movement emerges.
1930	Land Apportionment Act establishes areas of exclusive occupation by Europeans and Africans.
1933	Reform Party wins one-seat majority in Legislative Assembly. Godfrey Huggins becomes prime minister.
1934	Huggins forms coalition United Party (UP), which captures commanding majority in new elections; government proposes "two-pyramid" policy of separate development for races; African labor movement suppressed; Bantu Congress founded, forerunner of African National Congress in Southern Rhodesia.
1939-45	White and African Rhodesians serve on several fronts in World War II; right-wing white opposition to UP grows; African labor movement revived.
1946	Right-wing Liberal Party makes major gains in general election, but Huggins retains control of government.
1948	UP majority restored in general election.

Table A. Chronology of Historical Events, 1000 to 1980 (Continued)

Dates	Events
1950	Unauthorized Africans in unassigned lands ordered to Native Reserves.
1953	Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland created; Southern Rhodesian membership approved in referendum; Huggins becomes federal prime minister; Garfield Todd succeeds as prime minister of Southern Rhodesia; UP reorganized as United Rhodesia Party (URP); Huggins forms Federal Party (FP) to contest federal elections.
1955	Youth League founded, demands full voting rights for Africans in municipal elections.
1956	Huggins retires, succeeded by Roy Welensky as federal prime minister; antifederation Dominion Party (DP) organized by Winston Field in Southern Rhodesia, calls for independence with full dominion status within Commonwealth of Nations.
1957	FP and URP merge as United Federation Party (UFP); Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC) formed under leadership of Joshua Nkomo.
1958	Todd ousted as prime minister by UFP convention; Edgar Whitehead named to succeed him; UFP defeats DP by narrow margin in general election.
1959	Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and Emergency Powers Act restrict civil rights and political activity of African majority; SRANC banned.
1960	Monckton Commission studies future of federation, recommends new constitutions leading to eventual majority rule in constituent territories; National Democratic Party (NDP) formed to replace SRANC.
1961	Referendum endorses new constitution creating dual voting rolls; NDP banned, immediately reconstituted by Nkomo as Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).
1962	DP reorganized as Rhodesian Front (RF), wins general election in December; Field named prime minister; Nyasaland secedes from federation; ZAPU banned.
1963	British government establishes "five principles" guaranteeing African civil rights and unimpeded progress toward majority rule as precondition for independence; Northern Rhodesia secedes, federation formally dissolved; Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) formed by ZAPU dissidents, led by Ndabaningi Sithole.
1964	Ian Smith replaces Field as prime minister; referendum in November approves government's application for independence on basis of 1961 constitution; British government reaffirms "five principles."
1965	RF wins all fifty white seats in May general election; in November Smith government makes unilateral declaration of independence from Britain, which regards Southern Rhodesia as in state of rebellion.

Table A. Chronology of Historical Events, 1000 to 1980 (Continued)


Dates	Events
1966	United Nations (UN) Security Council votes mandatory sanctions on selected Rhodesian exports and imports; British Prime Minister Harold Wilson meets Smith in unsuccessful bid to arrange return to legality; guerrillas engage Rhodesian security forces in combat.
1968	UN establishes comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia; Wilson softens terms for return to legality but is rebuffed by Smith.
1969	Two-proposition referendum approves establishment of republic and endorse new constitution; government outlines policy of "parity" calling for total segregation through separate political development; Land Tenure Act imposes segregated land occupancy.
1970	Rhodesia formally (but illegally) declared republic.
1971	Smith-Home Agreement proposes terms for settlement; Bishop Abel Muzorewa forms African National Council to oppose agreement.
1972	Pearce Commission conducts hearings to ascertain public reaction to proposed settlement; Muzorewa organizes African opposition; new phase of guerrilla war opens with stepped-up activity by ZANU.
1974	African nationalist leaders released from prison to attend Lusaka Conference.
1975	Victoria Falls Conference fails; African National Council splits into wings loyal to Muzorewa and Nkomo; Robert Mugabe consolidates leadership over ZANU.
1976	All-party Geneva Conference convened; ZANU and ZAPU merge as Patriotic Front (PF).
1977	Smith rejects Anglo-American initiatives; government seeks political settlement with internal groups. Land Tenure Act amended to open white rural areas to Africans.
1978	Quadripartite Executive Council under Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, and conservative Jeremiah Chirau heads transitional government.
1979	Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1977 repealed; internal settlement constitution establishes Zimbabwe Rhodesia. UANC wins majority of parliamentary seats in April election; Muzorewa installed as prime minister; no international recognition received; at Lancaster House Conference (September-December), internal parties and PF accept British-proposed constitution and cease-fire plan; colonial rule reestablished; UN sanctions terminated.
1980	Mugabe's ZANU-PF wins majority in February election; Mugabe forms coalition government with Nkomo's PF-ZAPU; on April 18 Zimbabwe becomes independent republic.

Table B. Official Place-Name Changes in Zimbabwe, April 1982

New Name	Former Name	Former Name	New Name
Chegutu	Hartley	Balla Balla	Mbalabala
Chimanimani	Melsetter	Belingwe.....	Mberengwa
Chinhoyi.....	Sinoia	Chipinga.....	Chipinge
Chipinge.....	Chipinga	Dett.....	Dete
Chivhu	Enkeldoorn	Enkeldoorn	Chivhu
Dete	Dett	Esservale	Esigodini
Esigodini	Esservale	Fort Victoria	Masvingo
Guruwe	Sipolilo	Gatooma	Kadoma
Gweru.....	Gwelo	Gwelo	Gweru
Harare*	Salisbury*	Hartley.....	Chegutu
Hwange.....	Wankie	Inyazura	Nyazura
Kadoma	Gatooma	Mangula	Mhangura
Kwekwe.....	Que Que	Marandellas.....	Marondera
Marondera	Marandellas	Mashaba	Mashava
Mashava	Mashaba	Melsetter	Chimanimani
Masvingo	Fort Victoria	Mrewa.....	Murewa
Mbalabala	Balla Balla	Mtoko	Mutoko
Mberengwa	Belingwe	Mtorashanga	Mutorashanga
Mhangura	Mangula	Nkai.....	Nkayi
Murewa.....	Mrewa	Nuanetsi.....	Mwenezi
Mutare	Umtali	Que Que.....	Kwekwe
Mutoko.....	Mtoko	Salisbury*	Harare*
Mutorashanga	Mtorashanga	Selukwe.....	Shurugwi
Mvuma.....	Umvuma	Shabani	Zvishavane
Mwenezi.....	Nuanetsi	Sinoia.....	Chinhoyi
Nkayi	Nkai	Sipolilo.....	Guruwe
Nyazura.....	Inyazura	Somabula.....	Somabhula
Sango.....	Vila Salazar	Tjolutjo.....	Tsholotsho
Shurugwi	Selukwe	Umtali.....	Mutare
Somabhula	Somabula	Umvuma.....	Mvuma
Tsholotsho.....	Tjolutjo	Vila Salazar.....	Sango
Zvishavane	Shabani	Wankie.....	Hwange

*National capital.

Country Profile



Country

Formal Name: Republic of Zimbabwe.

Short Form: Zimbabwe.

Term for Citizens: Zimbabweans.

Capital: Harare (known until April 1982 as Salisbury).

Independence Achieved: April 18, 1980

Flag: Horizontal bars of green, yellow, red, black, red, yellow, green; on left, symbolic bird of Zimbabwe superimposed on five-pointed red star centered in half-diamond-shaped white field.

Geography

Size: 390,308 square kilometers.

Topography: Elevated savanna (highveld), above 1,200 meters, runs from northeast to southwest through center of country; slopes on both sides through middleveld (900 to 1,200 meters) to lowveld (below 900 meters) approaching borders marked mainly by river basins or valleys: Zambezi in north, Limpopo in south; granitic outcrops and hills (kopjes) widespread. Mountains along eastern border contrast with plateau that distinguishes rest of country.

Climate: Subtropical; warm rainy season November-March; dry winter May-August; transitional periods April-May and September-October; elevation moderates warm season temperatures in highveld and mountains. Only parts of eastern highlands receive more than 1,200 millimeters of rain annually; two-thirds of country receives less than 800 millimeters. Seasonal nature and uncertainty of rainfall require construction of reservoirs and other conservation measures; drought not uncommon.

Society

Population: Most recent census 1969; official estimate 7.6 million for mid-1981. African population (97 percent of total) growing at average annual rate of 3.5 percent. Whites, never more than 5 percent of total population, declining owing to emigration; estimated unofficially at 170,000 in early 1982. Coloureds (persons of mixed ancestry) and Asians constitute very small, essentially urban groups.

Ethnic Groups and Languages: The two most important ethnolinguistic categories are Shona speakers, about 75 percent of total Africans, and Ndebele speakers, roughly 16 percent of Africans. None of half-dozen other indigenous African groups exceeds 2 percent of African population. Migrants from neighboring countries roughly 5 percent of all Africans in Zimbabwe. Shona speakers divided into regional groups based on dialect similarities: Karanga, Zezuru, Korekore, Manyika, Ndau, and Kalanga. Last group, in far west, separated from main body of Shona speakers by Ndebele and generally oriented politically to Ndebele. Shona, in dialect based on Zezuru, has standard orthography and gradually developing literature. English remains language of government and schools above primary level.

Religion: Roughly three-fourths of all Africans adhere to local variants of indigenous religions. One-fourth of all Africans affiliated with Christian churches of several kinds, of which about 40 percent are Roman Catholic and 36 percent are members of independent apostolic churches emphasizing healing, prophesy, and possession by Holy Spirit.

Health: Water-related diseases common among Africans include enteritis and other diarrheal disorders, schistosomiasis, malaria, trachoma and infectious hepatitis; pulmonary tuberculosis, pneumonia, and measles also common. Lack of environmental sanitation and incidence of undernourishment and protein deficiency contribute to frequency and severity of many diseases. Preindependence health delivery oriented toward whites and urban dwellers and emphasis on curative medicine; postindependence government proposes health care reorientation to rural population and preventive medicine.

Education: In 1982, two years after independence, tremendous growth in African enrollment in primary schools (grades 1 through 7) and substantial growth in secondary enrollment (Forms I through VI), but materials, facilities, and qualified teachers in short supply. Teacher training schools and other teacher training programs in process of development. University of Zimbabwe, multiracial even before independence, increasing its African student body, but more slowly than lower education levels.

Economy

Salient Features: Essentially dual economy comprising mixed urban-rural, private enterprise-dominated modern sector producing most of gross domestic product (GDP) and mainly subsistence sector encompassing rural African population. As of 1982 avowedly socialist government had assumed somewhat larger role in modern sector but had accepted importance of private activities.

Agriculture: Sectoral activities—modern and subsistence—together provide livelihood for over 70 percent of population and an average of about 40 percent of export receipts. Modern sector, consisting of small number of white farmers employing about one-third of wage-earning African work force, accounts for 80 percent of agricultural output. Principal crops: maize, millet, sorghum, groundnuts, and cotton grown by subsistence sector and maize, sorghum, groundnuts, cotton, tobacco, fruits, sugarcane, coffee, and tea produced by modern sector. Both sectors have large cattle herds, but 60 to 75 percent of domestically consumed beef furnished by modern sector. Forest area substantial but gradually diminishing in African communal subsistence areas, mainly result of population pressures causing overuse and destruction of forests to open up new agricultural land. Fishing of minor economic significance.

Manufacturing: Highly diversified manufacturing sector, largely developed during unilateral declaration of independence period (1965-79), provides almost 90 percent of manufactured goods used domestically. Overwhelmingly privately owned, sector is largest contributor to GDP and second largest employer of paid labor.

Mining: Country rich in minerals; mining industry produces more

than forty minerals, of which most important are gold, asbestos, nickel, copper, chromite, and coal. Almost all production exported; exports account usually for about 40 percent of foreign exchange earnings from merchandise sales abroad. Industry largely foreign owned.

Energy: Domestic sources of energy: wood, coal, hydroelectric power; ethanol also produced from sugarcane since 1980. All petroleum products and additional electricity imported despite substantial undeveloped hydroelectric capacity and large unworked coal deposits. Wood almost sole source of energy in African communal areas.

Foreign Trade: Main exports: agricultural products (tobacco, cotton, sugar, maize) and minerals and processed mineral products (asbestos, coal, coke, copper, nickel, tin metal, ferroalloys, iron, and steel). Largest imports: machinery, transport equipment, manufactured goods, and mineral fuels. Principal trading partners in early 1980: South Africa, Britain, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), United States, and Italy.

Currency: Zimbabwe dollar (Z\$—see Glossary) consisting of 100 cents. In mid-1982 US\$1 equaled about Z\$0.75, or Z\$1 equaled about US\$1.33.

Fiscal Year: July 1 through following June 30; in Zimbabwe July 1, 1981, through June 30, 1982, expressed as FY 1981-82.

Transportation

Railroads: Government-owned National Railways of Zimbabwe (2,734 route kilometers in 1982, almost entirely single track) served principally modern sector but covered most of country except large African communal area in northern part. System connects with rail lines in South Africa, Zambia, and Mozambique and constitutes vital transit hub for traffic to and from those countries and to a lesser extent with Zaire. System in generally good condition in 1982 but in need of replacements and new equipment to handle volume of available traffic. First stage of electrification of system begun in 1981.

Roads: Total road network about 85,000 kilometers of which some 12,000 kilometers paved. National road system interconnects main towns, commercial farming areas, and development areas of modern sector. Well-maintained gravel road net serves local needs of commercial farming areas. African communal areas have low-grade gravel and earth roads and tracks.

Civil Aviation: In 1982 government-owned Air Zimbabwe furnished regular flights to eight main domestic airports, three of which (Harare, Bulawayo, and Victoria Falls) were of international class. Local service provided by private charter operations. Air Zimbabwe also operated regional services and international flights to London,

Frankfurt, and Athens. Airlines of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania provided air connections with Zimbabwe. Several international carriers also offered regular service.

Government and Politics

Government: Parliamentary democracy based on Westminster model; president (head of state) elected for six-year term by parliament; prime minister (head of government) and cabinet drawn from parliament; bicameral parliament consisting of 100-member House of Assembly and forty-member Senate; assembly dominant legislative and budgetary authority, Senate having only delaying power; eighty assembly members elected by African voters, remaining twenty elected by whites, Coloureds, and Asians. Constitution, introduced at independence in 1980 as republic's basic law, guarantees civil and political rights, gives prime minister de facto appointive power over department secretaries and heads of police and military services; constitutional amendment requires seventy affirmative votes in assembly and two-thirds of Senate; civil rights entrenched in constitution for ten years; functions of assembly and Senate as well as parliamentary seats earmarked for whites entrenched for seven years.

Administrative Divisions: Governmental authority centralized at national level; the eight provinces lack administrative powers. Predominantly white farming areas divided into forty-five elected rural councils; African communal lands divided into fifty-five elected district councils under appointive district administrators. Municipalities governed by unified urban councils elected by wards in white and African residential suburbs.

Politics: In 1980 parliamentary elections Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), party of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, received fifty-seven-seat majority in House of Assembly; Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU) won twenty seats; twenty white seats divided among Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front (in 1981 renamed Republican Front) and independents; Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) attained three seats. In 1982 ZANU-PF-dominated cabinet included minority membership of four PF-ZAPU and two white independents; discord between Ndebele-oriented PF-ZAPU and Shona-oriented ZANU-PF threatening stability of multiparty system.

Judicial System: Laws based on Roman-Dutch law of South Africa; preindependence legislation valid if not in conflict with Constitution. Supreme court and High Court at apex of judicial system; most criminal and civil cases heard by magistrates' courts; village and community courts, mostly found in African communal lands, try

lesser offenses and civil cases falling under African customary law.

Foreign Relations: Active in Organization of African Unity and Southern African Development Coordination Conference; non-aligned foreign policy, but country dependent on Western aid and investment for economic growth and creation of jobs. As member of front-line states (see Glossary), Zimbabwe opposes white minority rule in South Africa and supports independence of Namibia (South West Africa); close economic links dictate pragmatic policies toward South Africa.

National Security

Armed Forces: In 1982 Zimbabwe Defence Force of approximately 63,000 personnel included National Army of about 60,000 and air force of 2,900; organized army reserve of 7,000 whites. Military service voluntary.

Major Tactical Units: Army organized into five infantry brigades, including thirty-two infantry battalions plus armor, artillery, engineer, and support units. Paratroop battalion, commando battalion, and mounted infantry battalion operated separately. Air force organized into one light bomber squadron, one fighter-bomber squadron, one light attack squadron, one transport squadron, and two helicopter squadrons; equipment in 1982 inventory included approximately thirty-four aging, fixed-wing combat aircraft and thirty-seven helicopters.

Major Military Suppliers: Substantial amount of equipment supplied by Britain before 1965 still in use in 1982, particularly in air force. Light weapons supplied to guerrillas during 1972-79 civil war by African countries, China, Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe still used in 1982. British military advisory and training team assisting in integrating guerrilla armies with former Rhodesian army and in training. British firm involved in first significant postwar purchase of military aircraft. Advisers and equipment from Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) used to train and outfit one infantry brigade.

Defense Costs: In FY 1979-80 (last year of civil war) military budget rose to 25.9 percent of total national budget; expenditures classed as "war costs" accounted for 41 percent of total government spending. In FY 1980-81 military expenditures accounted for 19.2 percent of government total.

Internal Security Forces: National police force (Zimbabwe Republic Police) of about 9,000 included 1,500-man police paramilitary unit (to be expanded); 25,000-man police reserve (half Africans, half whites). Central Intelligence Organization under control of Prime Minister's Office provided domestic and foreign intelligence. National militia being formed in 1982.



——— International boundary MIDLANDS Electoral province
 ⊙ National capital - - - - - Electoral province boundary

NOTE—Electoral provinces have no position in regular structure of government.

Figure 1. Republic of Zimbabwe, 1982

Introduction

FOR ADVOCATES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE and political self-determination, April 18, 1980, was an auspicious occasion in southern Africa, the continent's last outpost of colonialism. On that day Britain formally granted sovereignty to a new country called Zimbabwe, an event that provided the opportunity for a fresh start in a region long riven by racial struggle and bitter civil conflict (see fig. 1). In the brief interval that has transpired, anxious international attention has centered on the newly formed state as its citizens attempt to bind up old wounds and adjust to a reordered future. The society's diverse and potentially troublesome legacies have not made the task an easy one.

Before national independence the landlocked territory was known to much of the world as Rhodesia, a self-governing British colony that had vied for recognized sovereignty for two decades. The multiracial population, estimated at roughly 7.3 million in late 1979, was composed of four distinct and officially recognized groups: at least 7 million black Africans, some 240,000 whites (known locally as Europeans), about 20,000 Coloureds (persons of mixed race), and approximately 10,000 Asians. Given a high natural growth rate, the African component was increasing every sixteen months by a number roughly equal to the entire white population. (Results of the first postindependence census in mid-1982 were expected to reveal a significantly larger total population, a higher annual growth rate, and an even more pronounced contrast in the size of the racial components.)

Most of the Africans belong to one of two major ethnic groups: the Shona speakers (known locally as Mashona) and the Ndebele speakers (usually referred to locally as Matabele). The Shona had lived in the area a longer period of time and were the more numerous of the two groups. The Ndebele, located throughout the western third of the territory, were an offshoot of an ethnic group that had originated in South Africa. In the early nineteenth century the Ndebele had conquered a portion of the Shona and controlled them for a time.

More than half of the white population had arrived in Rhodesia since World War II. They were primarily of British origin, although some were of other European nationalities or were Afrikaners from neighboring South Africa. English, the language spoken by most white Rhodesians, was the official language of the colony.

The society in which these people lived was dominated politically, socially, and economically by the white minority who, through enforcement of custom and law, perpetuated an atmosphere in which race was the determining factor in all relations. The four categories into which the population was officially separated differed markedly in culture, physical characteristics, and core institutions. To a great extent each of them represented a distinct closed society; contacts between the groups were generally confined to economic and administrative matters.

According to the system of social stratification throughout the territory, white Rhodesians had the highest status, followed in descending order by Asians, Coloureds, and Africans. There were comparatively few Asians and Coloureds—together, about 0.5 percent of the total population—and they generally regarded the social and political aspirations of the Africans as a latent threat to their own positions. Most Asians and Coloureds, therefore, tended to identify with white attitudes, values, and institutions. The result was essentially a two-stratum society marked by white supremacy and black subordination. Membership within a particular racial category largely determined status and the ways in which people acted toward one another. In most instances it also regulated access to jobs in government and private industry, as well as the quality of education, modern health services, housing, and social welfare.

Nearly a century of existence as an elite minority group in a black African setting had forged white Rhodesians into a community of privileged members united by shared experience and outlook. Rhodesia's African majority, however, was to a great extent divided. There were a number of separate societies when white settlers first arrived in the area, and the animosity that had existed between the two major ethnic groups at that time still survived in attenuated form. The social, political, and economic institutions introduced by the white community also had discouraged African cohesiveness.

The African social systems based on kinship and stressing the values of communal relationships contrasted profoundly with the individualistic, achievement-oriented Western culture of the white citizens. In striving for upward mobility, large numbers of Africans were attracted to the white way of life and its obvious privileges, a factor that had opened additional gulfs within the black society. Contrasting values and attitudes were apparent between the old and the young, subsistence cultivators and wage earners, rural and urban inhabitants, and the illiterate and the educated.

Although shaped by government policies and management, Rhodesia's economy adhered to the principle of private ownership. Growth of the white-dominated modern cash economy had brought a degree of affluence to the white population that was almost unparalleled in Africa. Since the formal establishment of colonial status under the British, Rhodesia had concentrated on developing the territory's rich mineral resources and agricultural potential, drawing much of its labor from Africans living in segregated areas known as the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) and from neighboring countries. In accordance with the government's segregationist policies, the territory's land was divided about equally in terms of area between whites and Africans. But the portion reserved for white citizens contained all the major cities and towns, the better farmland, most of the developed or known mineral resources, and the modern transportation system.

An essentially subsistence economy prevailed in the TTL where the majority of black Rhodesians lived, but most of them were also

involved to some degree in the money economy. Roughly one-third of the Africans lived and worked in white areas, where they formed the base of the productive structure. Many others depended in part upon their own earnings from seasonal labor and jobs in urban centers or on assistance from relatives employed in the white areas.

In the agricultural sector sharp contrast was apparent between the farming and stockraising activities of whites and Africans. In general white farmers had progressed in less than a century from agricultural practices marked by low yields to more sophisticated mechanized techniques that produced high yields of tobacco, hybrid maize (corn), sugar, and other crops. In contrast the lot of the typical African subsistence farm family was difficult, and its labor was poorly rewarded. The ability of the TTL to feed a growing population had diminished to an alarming degree.

The foundation for Rhodesia's disquieting problems was laid at the very beginning of European penetration of the area, which had long been the scene of mass movements of indigenous African peoples. Although Portuguese explorers came to the region as early as the sixteenth century, the influx of white settlers did not occur until the subsequent surge of profit-oriented explorations spearheaded by Cecil Rhodes, the British adventurer and entrepreneur. Having immigrated earlier to South Africa, where he amassed a fortune in diamonds, Rhodes sent agents across the Limpopo River to seek concessions for mineral rights from local African chiefs as part of his Cape-to-Cairo colonization ambitions. In 1889 he organized the first unit of white settlers and sent them northward from South Africa in search of gold. A year later this Pioneer Column, representing Rhodes' British South Africa Company, established the settlement of Fort Salisbury, a site that later became the capital of Rhodesia.

The gold in the territory's high central plateau failed to meet Rhodes' expectations. But other objectives were achieved, and the region became a commercial territory under the administration of the charter company. The British prospered by extending their empire and, consequently, their sphere of influence. Control over the African majority in the area—a ready source of cheap labor—brought ample rewards to the white settlers.

From the outset, however, the company's practices and methods irritated both the Africans and the settlers, who resented being governed by an organization guided solely by profit motives. In 1923 London abrogated the company's charter and gave the white settlers a choice of being incorporated into the Union of South Africa or of becoming a separate territory within the British Empire. The settlers rejected incorporation, and the crown colony of Southern Rhodesia, named for Rhodes, was formally annexed by Britain. From the beginning of this new relationship, London granted the right of self-government to the white settlers, including permission to form their own legislature, civil service, and security forces. The British retained the right to intervene under certain conditions, particularly

in matters affecting the African population.

In 1953 Southern Rhodesia was joined in a multiracial federation with the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in an effort to pool their resources and markets. The federation flourished economically but was opposed by the Africans, who feared they would not be able to achieve self-determination within a federal structure dominated by white Southern Rhodesians. At the end of 1963 the federation was dissolved in a spirit of bitterness over Southern Rhodesia's racial policies. In 1964 Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became, respectively, the independent states of Zambia and Malawi.

Although prepared to grant formal independence to Southern Rhodesia, the British government was adamant in its insistence that authorities in Salisbury first demonstrate their intention to move toward eventual majority rule. Failure to achieve a compromise on this key point in the negotiations led to a drastic step by Rhodesian leader Ian Smith that attracted attention around the world. On November 11, 1965, the prime minister announced his government's unilateral declaration of independence, a rebellious act that brought the acronym UDI into the international lexicon. From that date until the eve of Zimbabwean independence nearly fifteen years later, the white minority remained in a state of revolt against British authority.

Contrary to Rhodesian expectations, London made public its intention to refrain from using military force against the rebellious colony. Instead the British government imposed a unilateral system of economic sanctions on trade with Southern Rhodesia and appealed for similar action by other nations, anticipating that the move would bring the Smith regime to its knees within a matter of weeks. Negotiations to settle the impasse throughout the following year, however, proved fruitless. In December 1966, for the first time in United Nations (UN) history, the Security Council imposed mandatory economic sanctions. Initially only the colony's principal exports and key imports—arms, aircraft, motor vehicles, petroleum, and petroleum products—were placed on a selective sanctions list, but by 1968 the restrictions had been broadened to a virtual economic embargo. Even though the action disrupted the colony's economy to some extent, the effects were not serious enough to bring about an immediate change in the Smith regime's political attitudes.

A constitution adopted by the local legislature and approved by the white electorate in 1969 declared a republican form of government. Revealing strong bias in favor of the white minority, the document abrogated all former legal guarantees pertaining to civil liberties and established a roadblock to the possibility of majority rule. But the course of maintaining the status quo was a lonely one, and no country in the world community extended formal recognition of the Smith government or Rhodesian independence. Even in the white redoubt of southern Africa, where South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique gave economic support and sympathized

with the regime's political aspirations, approval was couched in tacit terms and covert action.

As international censure persisted, the Smith regime adopted an increasingly repressive policy in defense of its efforts to perpetuate the existing socioeconomic order. Although domestic efforts to change the system were made by a few leaders of the African community, meaningful achievement was limited by the full range of legal instruments and security forces available to the governing regime for controlling political expression and organization. Because of the broad range of laws they risked contravening, Africans lived in a state of constant insecurity. Nearly all black nationalist leaders experienced periods of confinement in Rhodesian prisons, but the government was unable to stifle their aspirations.

The two major groups that formed to give political expression to African goals were the Ndebele-dominated Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Shona-based Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Proscribed in Rhodesia, both political groups established exile headquarters in sympathetic black countries, particularly neighboring Zambia. Despairing of the ability to bring about change through peaceful means, they soon turned to more violent methods, including the formation of military elements trained in guerrilla tactics and armed with the necessary weapons to carry them out. In 1972 ZANU's force, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), operating from isolated bases in Mozambique, began sustained guerrilla operations inside eastern Rhodesia. ZAPU's military force, known as the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), carried out hit-and-run raids from bases in Zambia.

By 1976 embargo-related pressures had increased, and black rule in Angola and Mozambique had diminished southern Africa's white redoubt. The Smith regime was increasingly beset by economic dislocation and sagging white morale. Responding to a series of diplomatic initiatives by Britain and the United States, the Rhodesian government agreed in principle to relax its stand against majority rule, but black nationalist leaders were no longer prepared to compromise over control of government ministries or a prolonged transition period. Two years later the Smith regime engineered a settlement with the African leaders who had remained in Salisbury, a move calculated to preserve white interests even under a black majority government headed by Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The colony was renamed Zimbabwe Rhodesia in early 1979, but the compromise solution failed to appease the ZAPU and ZANU forces or to gain international recognition. The war continued.

When it became evident in mid-1979 that the new Conservative government of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would not recognize the Muzorewa regime, all contending factions joined in renewed negotiations at Lancaster House in London. After three months of bargaining, agreement was reached on a new constitution and procedures for a transfer of power. In mid-December British

authority was reinstated in Salisbury, heralding a brief transition to formal independence. During this prelude a cease-fire in the civil war was effected, and economic sanctions were lifted in the UN by the Security Council. Carefully supervised elections in which nine political parties campaigned actively were held in February 1980, and the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) won by an overwhelming majority. ZANU-PF leader Robert Mugabe, avowed Marxist and early advocate of socialist reform, was asked to form the first government and lead it as prime minister. President Canaan Banana, a Methodist minister who had vigorously opposed Rhodesia's racial injustice, would serve as head of state.

Despite ZANU-PF's early reputation as the most radical of the political parties involved in the 1980 elections, white Zimbabweans' fears of a Marxist takeover have not materialized during the first two years of national independence. Instead the government has adhered generally to Mugabe's announced policies of reconciliation, reconstruction, and moderate socioeconomic change. Integration of the various elements of the armed forces that existed at the close of the seven-year civil war has received primary attention, as has the reestablishment of social services in rural areas. Also high on the list of reforms have been efforts to reverse the discriminatory practices in land distribution, education, employment, and wages that existed before independence.

Change has occurred at a necessarily moderate pace, owing largely to the tasks involved in revitalizing the war-damaged economy, which must provide the revenues to support desired reforms. At independence Zimbabwe was fortunate in having some advantages that few other new African states have enjoyed. Although much of the country remained underdeveloped, Mugabe's government inherited an economy that was more advanced and viable than any on the continent except that of South Africa. Moreover it boasted a certain degree of self-sufficiency derived from fifteen years of resisting economic sanctions through the development of domestic industries. Nevertheless the country has had to cope with a number of economic difficulties. Some new jobs have been created, but unacceptable unemployment has persisted, particularly among Africans. Increased government expenditures, better wages, and a growing demand for more foreign consumer goods—obtainable only at high world prices—have contributed to rising inflation.

Many economists have emphasized the country's shortage of foreign exchanges as its most serious economic problem. This difficulty has been aggravated by a growing domestic market, lower commodity export prices, and transportation bottlenecks in Mozambique that have diverted large shipments of export goods to the longer and more costly routes through South Africa. A shortage of machinery and certain raw materials has impeded industrial expansion, a deficiency that in turn has hindered Zimbabwe's ability to earn needed foreign currency. The Mugabe government has devoted consider-

able effort to assuring foreign investors that the country offers lucrative business prospects. But most foreign companies have been reluctant to invest in Zimbabwe because of misgivings over Mugabe's socialist philosophy. The prime minister, hoping to gain the confidence of foreign investors, has given assurances that multinational companies will not be nationalized and that a joint capitalist-socialist approach will be necessary for some time to come.

The economy has also suffered from the large-scale departure of skilled white workers, who were unable to adjust to loss of status or who foresaw poor promotion prospects as a result of Africanization efforts by the black majority government. Contrary to the preindependence misgivings of many whites, Zimbabwe has not degenerated into disorder and chaos. Africans have acceded to political power, but Zimbabweans who once called themselves Europeans still enjoy the larger share of the economic rewards. Moreover Mugabe and his black governmental ministers have gone to great lengths to assure the white workers that the country needs their abilities and output. This is particularly true of the modern white farmers on whose proven skills the country's food supply will depend for some years to come.

Many of Mugabe's critics have been surprised by the pragmatic manner in which the prime minister has sought to deal with his country's problems. Reconciliation and national unity, however, have been difficult to achieve in a state where legacies of diversity and intolerance are still apparent. Political rivalry that has grown out of historical interethnic tension between the population's Shona speakers and Ndebele speakers has not been laid to rest, nor has the distrust that exists between the young black-governed republic and South Africa, its more powerful, white-ruled neighbor.

By late 1982 the Mugabe government had become increasingly preoccupied with conspiracy theories, chief of which was a charge that the government in Pretoria had undertaken a determined campaign to destabilize its Zimbabwean counterpart because white South Africans could not tolerate success in a multiracial society so close to its own territory. Concern was also mounting over the perceived domestic threat attributed to "dissidents," the term used to denote disgruntled former ZIPRA soldiers and members of rival Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union. Moreover public unease was becoming apparent as the government dealt with its problems by increasingly resorting to the repressive emergency powers it had inherited from the Smith regime of the Rhodesian period. For many Zimbabweans the initial promise of ethnic harmony in a prospering economic atmosphere appeared to be in jeopardy.

Harold D. Nelson

December 1982

Chapter 1. Historical Setting



A nineteenth-century European explorer and his African bearer

ZIMBABWE'S QUEST FOR SOVEREIGNTY in the twentieth century attained success after most of the rest of Africa south of the Sahara had won the right to self-determination. The notoriety achieved by the earlier white minority regime's defiance of international opinion and the subsequent armed struggle waged by African nationalists to gain black majority rule were traumatic episodes in the country's history. Both events have tended to obscure the rich historical heritage possessed by the country's African peoples and symbolized by the impressive ruins of the stone enclosure, called Great Zimbabwe, that has given its name to the modern nation-state.

The early history of the landlocked territory between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers, found in oral traditions and recorded in chronicles dating from the sixteenth century, is one of prosperous tribal confederations whose political and cultural development was centered at Great Zimbabwe. The history of the nineteenth century focuses on the interaction between the Shona people and the warlike Ndebele and of both with European missionaries, hunters, and prospectors who came to the region in the quest for souls, ivory, and gold. The paths that they blazed were followed in the 1890s by British settlers, whose interest was to develop the area's economic potential and to govern it as a "white man's country."

The course of the country's subsequent history can be read in the names by which it has been known—Southern Rhodesia, the charter company concession and later crown colony named for Cecil Rhodes, the architect of British expansion in that part of Africa; Rhodesia, adopted by the illegal white regime after it had seized independence; and Zimbabwe Rhodesia, a compromise name for a compromise regime, used briefly after an internal settlement between moderate Zimbabwean nationalists and the white Rhodesian ruling party. For modern Zimbabwe's white citizens—who never constituted more than 5 percent of the country's total population—the past is, in the words of historian Martin Meredith, that of "another country," known by other names and committed to other goals. For Africans, however, who look back to an older history, the establishment of the modern state of Zimbabwe has meant their coming into an inheritance long denied them.

The Origins of Zimbabwe

A variety of early modern man, representing a human subspecies identified as Rhodesian man (*Homo sapiens rhodesiensis*), inhabited much of central and eastern Africa about 100,000 years ago. Samples of worked stones and other artifacts excavated in the region indicate the presence there of several distinct Stone Age cultures in the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

millennia that followed. From about 20,000 B.C. bushmanoid hunters and gatherers, ancestors of the Khoisan peoples, roamed the plateau in search of their subsistence. The southward migration across the Zambezi River of the Bantu-speaking negroid pastoralists who displaced them commenced some time before the fifth century A.D. The number of newcomers was small at first, but their arrival marked the beginning of a steady and increasing flow into the region of Bantu speakers, whose sedentary metalworking agricultural communities had taken root well before the close of the first millennium A.D.

The Shona Confederacy

A new and numerically significant wave of Bantu-speaking migration, probably originating in the Shaba region of modern Zaïre, broke across the plateau in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Although this influx has been associated historically with the coming of the Shona to Zimbabwe, it was not until the nineteenth century that the name itself was applied to cover all of the several dialect clusters into which the Shona-speaking people had been traditionally divided (see *Ethnic and Racial Groupings*, ch. 2). These clusters, each of which had a well-defined territorial base but were segmented into important subgroups, included the Kalanga, Karanga, Zezuru, Korekore, Manyika, and Ndau. Recent linguistic research, however, has attempted to demonstrate that the Shona language had developed as a distinct branch of the Bantu language family within the region before the tenth century. If accepted, this explanation would indicate that the later Bantu-speaking arrivals, who have been identified as the ancestors of the Shona, adopted the language that had already evolved in Zimbabwe among the earlier Bantu-speaking settlers. Other streams of the same great southward migration of the period flowed across the plateau without stopping and carried the ancestors of the Nguni- and Sotho-speaking peoples over the Limpopo River into the northeastern Transvaal region of present-day South Africa.

The range of Shona settlement eventually extended between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers from the Kalahari Desert eastward to the sea (see fig. 2). By the eleventh century a clan of the Karanga had achieved ascendancy over a loose confederation of chiefdoms that encompassed most of the Shona people. Its dominance was based not only on the clan's military prowess and accumulated wealth in cattle but also on the reputation of its priests as oracles of the spirit world. A king chosen from the clan led the confederacy's military elite in battle, held a monopoly on external trade, and was entitled to collect tribute from subject groups, but the political authority of the monarchy seems to have been nominal outside the limited area under the king's immediate control. The royal clan has commonly been identified as the Rozvi, although there is no record of that term's being in use before the late seventeenth century when it referred to the dominant Karanga group of that period. The political and social

Historical Setting

institutions that evolved under it were to serve, however, as the model for subsequent Shona dynasties whatever their connection with the original rulers may have been.

At the center of the sociopolitical system of the Shona confederacy were the priest-king and the royal cult of Mwari, the creator of things and the sustainer of life. The king's person was sacred, and with few exceptions the ruler lived a life apart from his subjects. His exact role in cult rituals is undetermined, but it was on the basis of these religious celebrations that chiefs of the Shona confederacy expressed their allegiance to him. Although his actual political authority over the various elements that made up the confederacy was severely circumscribed, the king symbolized the unity of the Shona people through the royal cult, whose priests also served as court officials. Mwari, whose cult center was in the Matopo Hills, was all-powerful but remote and could not be approached or propitiated directly through prayers or sacrifices. The petitions of the people and their expressions of thanksgiving were carried to the deity, therefore, by the spirits of dead rulers that sometimes possessed the bodies of lions or, more commonly, of birds. The soapstone shafts topped with finials in the form of birds, seven of which have been found at Great Zimbabwe, apparently represented these royal messengers in rituals associated with such spiritual communication.

Great Zimbabwe

The center of the royal clan's influence was at Great Zimbabwe, the ruins of which lie near the present-day city of Masvingo (formerly Fort Victoria) and remain an impressive monument to the technical capabilities of an indigenous African culture. Although by far the most spectacular of them, Great Zimbabwe was but one of 150 or more *madzimbabwe* (stone enclosures; sing., *zimbabwe*) constructed by the Shona on the periphery of the plateau over a period of several centuries. Great Zimbabwe's twelve clusters of stone structures, covering more than forty hectares on the top of a granite bluff and in the adjacent valley, housed a large population as well as the royal court, markets, warehouses, and religious shrines. Each piece of stone in the elliptical walls and conical towers, some rising to a height of over nine meters, was carefully fitted to the next without the use of mortar, and in some places stonework dovetailed into the cliffs and massive boulders on the bluff. Decorative herringbone and chevron border patterns were skillfully set by craftsmen into the top edge of certain walls and are believed to have had some symbolic significance for the builders.


The origin of the structures at Great Zimbabwe was at one time the subject of much speculation. Their ruins were rediscovered in the 1860s by the German geologist Karl Mauch while he was prospecting in the region for gold. Europeans who in the years that followed viewed the ruins and reported on them resisted the idea that these large and complex stone structures could have been built by

Zimbabwe: A Country Study



Figure 2. Shona Peoples and Zimbabwe Sites

Historical Setting



Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Africans, considering them without any scientific justification to have been the work of non-African settlers from the Middle East or from India and of great antiquity. Even informed investigators were deceived by the frequent discoveries on the site of trade goods from those areas. In 1906, however, British archaeologist David Randall-MacIver published the findings of his systematic excavations, establishing that the stone structures at Great Zimbabwe were "unquestionably African in every detail" and dated, according to European reckoning, from the "medieval" period.

The chronological framework applied to Great Zimbabwe suggests that the earliest habitation on the site dates from the fifth century. The first construction in stone began in the eleventh century after the Shona had occupied the site and has been associated by tradition with the worship of the god Mwari. Walls erected in the late thirteenth century indicate the social and economic transition during that period from an essentially agrarian community to a commercial center and also suggest the growth in prestige of the royal clan. It is not obvious whether the walls were intended for defense, but it is believed that the possession of a walled enclosure at the site of the oracle may in itself have symbolized for the Shona the legitimacy of the king who occupied it. Certainly a building project of such magnitude was also indicative of the surplus of wealth available to the royal clan and of the command that it exercised on the services of a large and skilled labor force. Although the significance of Great Zimbabwe and the other stone enclosures was initially religious and political, some of these sites had by the thirteenth century emerged as commercial centers engaged in trade with the Arab markets at Sofala (present-day Beira) and Kilwa on the coast. Under the supervision of the Shona king, Arab traders carried away gold that usually had been hammered into leaf, as well as ivory, iron goods, cotton cloth, and ostrich feathers in exchange for beads, brass rods, and cowrie shells that were prized both as jewelry and as currency. Quantities of glassware and ceramics from China and Persia were also imported through Arab intermediaries, probably for use in the royal court.

Great Zimbabwe clearly thrived on foreign trade, but there is evidence that *zimbabwe* sites were chosen where arable land for subsistence farming and pasturage for herding existed in proximity to mines, sources of fuel for smelting, and established trade routes to allow for an integrated economy. This in part explains why most known *madzimbabwe* occur in clusters. The stone enclosures were also utilized as corrals for cattle collected in tribute from subject groups and as assembly points for the military expeditions sent out to punish those who had been recalcitrant in their payments.

Despite the emphasis on trade, wealth and status were determined by the size of one's herd, the king being the greatest cattle owner among the Shona because of the tribute paid to him. Members of the royal clan employed others from outside their elite lineage as herdsmen, as ironworkers, and as farmers, who cultivated



*Ruins of Great Zimbabwe, historical site from
which the country derives its name
Courtesy Embassy of Zimbabwe, Washington*

crops of sorghum and millet without benefit of the plow, the wheel, or draft animals.

Within the stone enclosures at Great Zimbabwe, as many as 20,000 inhabitants were housed in clay huts at the height of the settlement's importance. In the mid-fifteenth century, however, Great Zimbabwe was abandoned by the royal court when its population proved too large to be supported by the area's diminishing resources. A picture of severe ecological decay emerges in which the soil was worn out by overplanting and pastures were depleted by overgrazing; timber for fuel and salt supplies were exhausted, the mines petered out, and game disappeared. Great Zimbabwe remained as an important religious shrine, and some new construction was even undertaken in succeeding centuries.

Munhumutapa and Changamire Dynasties

In the fourteenth century the Mbire, a lineage that provided hereditary priests of the royal cult, established their dominance as *vamambo* (paramount chiefs; sing., *mambo*) in the region around Great Zimbabwe. It was Mutota, in the fifth generation of the Mbire line, who ordered the removal of the royal court from its traditional seat in about 1450 after soliciting approval from the spirits of the old kings. Mutota led his followers toward the Zambezi, bringing the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

northern and eastern half of the plateau under his control and commemorating his conquest by taking the name of *munhumutapa* (pillager), which was adopted as the title of his dynasty. The old provinces of the kingdom he entrusted to two loyal chieftains: Togwa, who ruled the Kalanga in the south, and Changa, who received the Karanga heartland that included the sacred enclosure at Great Zimbabwe. Changa's dynasty, called the Changamire (in an adaptation of the Arabic title amir, or prince), competed successfully with rival branches of the royal clan and extended its dominions, eventually absorbing the Togwa kingdom and challenging the Munhumutapa in the north. The Changamire state, like its predecessor, was a confederation of tribute-paying territories ruled by chieftains related to the royal lineage. The Munhumutapa, in the meantime, concentrated on expanding their trade with the Arabs and, later, the Portuguese down the Zambezi.

In 1505 the Portuguese occupied Sofala and took over the Arab trade routes linking the coast with the goldfields in the interior, and for more than two centuries they would remain the only Europeans active in the area. The first documented Portuguese expedition to reach Munhumutapa territory was made in 1513, and it obtained a limited mining concession from representatives of the king. The Portuguese used military force to wrest further concessions from the Munhumutapa in the 1570s and established a network of markets up the Zambezi River where gold and ivory were purchased from suppliers and transported back to Sofala. In 1629 the Portuguese intervened in a Munhumutapa dynastic dispute and installed a puppet king, who increased trading concessions and promised to expel the Arabs from his territory. Along with the Portuguese traders came Roman Catholic missionaries, who established missions to convert the Shona in the trade area to Christianity, but they greatly overextended themselves and had little effect on indigenous institutions.

Dombo and the Rozvi Empire

The Portuguese ascendancy in the Munhumutapa kingdom lasted for sixty years until the Changamire *mambo*, Dombo (Dombolakona-chingwango, died 1695), invaded the north at the head of 2,000 warriors, wiped out the market settlements, and forced the Portuguese off the plateau. Reputedly a wizard whose touch could kill, he ruled the Shona as much through fear as by force. His formidable army, whose weapons included firearms, was composed of warriors who may have belonged to the royal clan or had been adopted into it. But whatever their relationship to the traditional ruling group, they considered themselves a separate and superior breed of men among other Shona. Dombo called his warrior elite the Rozvi (literally, de-

stroyers). Although this was the first recorded use of a name that has important associations in Shona history, it may have been used in the royal clan for centuries or was an old title adopted by Dombo to lend legitimacy to his military-based regime.

The so-called Rozvi Empire that Dombo bequeathed to his successors was a continuation of the Changamire state whose territory was vastly enlarged by his conquests. It was still administered, according to Shona tradition, as a loose confederation of chiefdoms whose leaders traced descent to the royal clan. Like their predecessors, the Rozvi *vamambo* regulated external trade and redistributed a portion of the profits from it among their chieftains and vassals to ensure their loyalty. It was a primary point of Rozvi policy to keep at a distance the Portuguese, who remained their customers for gold and ivory, and to isolate the kingdom from foreign influence.

The Shona people of the Rozvi period had developed a homogeneous culture. The majority were settled agriculturalists, and the skilled crafting of objects of ivory, gold, and other metals, as well as pottery making, were established occupations among them. The power of the Rozvi declined after a few generations, but they maintained their supremacy throughout much of the plateau region. The Munhumutapa had transferred the site of their kingdom to the lower Zambezi entirely within Mozambique where they ruled under Portuguese protection until the royal line of Mbire was suppressed by colonial authorities in 1917.

Ndebele Hegemony

The Shona were unprepared to defend themselves against the series of raids launched from south of the Limpopo River that were the long-range result of a convulsion among the Nguni-speaking peoples of Natal in present-day South Africa. In the first years of the nineteenth century, Dingiswayo, the chief of the Mthethwa, had imposed his rule over a confederacy of related groups in the area. When his general, Shaka, the chief of the small Zulu clan, became leader of the confederacy, he undertook a campaign of conquest that reshuffled the ethnic map of southern Africa as defeated tribes were absorbed or displaced and as others sought to escape subjugation in a historical episode known as the *mfecane* (literally, the crushing). One such group, the Ngoni (a variant of Nguni), fled over the Limpopo and sacked Great Zimbabwe in about 1835 before continuing northward across the Zambezi to form a kingdom on the shores of Lake Nyasa (see fig. 3).

The dissidents who broke away from Shaka's empire formed small groups that survived by raiding the peoples whom they encountered on their march northward. This process was not only self-perpetuating but also resulted in expansion of the group because the war parties often carried off the women and children, as well as the livestock, of those on whom they preyed. Young males were taken as

Zimbabwe: A Country Study




Figure 3. Migration of the Ndebele and the Ngoni, 1822-39

new recruits, and in this way war parties not only maintained their size but also increased it.

Mzilikazi

Among the Zulu dissidents was Mzilikazi (circa 1790–1868), one of Shaka's generals and the chief of the Khumalo, who took his leave of Natal and moved northeast to the highveld with 500 warriors in 1822 after a dispute with the king over cattle to which both claimed title. The war party picked up strength on the march, raiding Sotho and other Nguni-speaking settlements. Within three years Mzilikazi had gathered 5,000 warriors around his kraal (cattle pen) near present-day Pretoria from which he ravaged that part of the Transvaal. His pan-ethnic following became known collectively as the Ndebele (people with long shields). To be Ndebele meant to have allegiance to Mzilikazi and to have adopted his language.

In 1830 Mzilikazi led the Ndebele farther west out of range of the Zulu only to confront the Afrikaner voortrekkers (pioneers), who were putting down stakes in the same territory. After a clash with the Afrikaner settlers in 1836, the Ndebele split into two parties. Under the leadership of a chief, Kaliphi, one group established a base in western Shona territory in the area that would come to be known as Matabeleland (country of the Ndebele); the other remained with Mzilikazi, retreating across a tributary of the Limpopo into present-day Botswana.

Like other Nguni-speaking peoples, the Ndebele celebrated an annual festival, the *inxwala* (great dance), at which all the people of the group came together in the same place to offer thanksgiving to ancestral spirits and to reaffirm loyalty to the ruler. The presence of a king to lead the dancing was considered crucial to assure the efficacy of the event. In Mzilikazi's absence Kaliphi and the other chiefs in the first group recognized his son, Nkulumane, as king when the time for the *inxwala* arrived. When Mzilikazi's party reached Matabeleland in 1839, the king executed the chiefs for treason and probably had his son killed as well.

The Ndebele gradually extended their hegemony over the western and southern Shona, who were made to pay tribute in cattle. Any who resisted were subjected to raids, the regularity of which depended on their distance from the core of Ndebele settlement, located within a radius of about fifty kilometers from the royal kraal near present-day Bulawayo. The Ndebele never penetrated beyond present-day Harare and, although Mzilikazi's successor might claim sovereignty over them, the eastern Shona and those in the north in what was later called Mashonaland (country of the Shona) were not compelled to submit formally to his rule because the Shona there were considered too weak to pose any challenge to the Ndebele. Neither did the restless Ndebele show an interest in operating the local gold mines or in tending to cultivation, but they expected the Shona to perform these services for them as well as others, like the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

manufacture of iron tools and weapons. They were largely indifferent to commerce and, although a royal monopoly pertained on trade in gold and ivory, it was never as systematic an economic activity as it was among the Shona.

Ndebele Institutions

Following the Zulu pattern, Ndebele society was hierarchical and thoroughly militarized and, in contrast to traditional Shona polity, its government was highly centralized. It was a system devised for the making of war and for the domination of conquered peoples. At the apex stood the *ikosi* (king), an autocratic military commander beneath whom were the three classes that initially had represented ethnic components within the Ndebele nation. An aristocratic class, the *zansi*, was composed of the Zulu warriors who had come out of Natal with Mzilikazi and of those who claimed descent from them. The *enhla* were largely representative of Sotho, Swazi, and others conscripted along the march. At the bottom of the social scale were the *holi*, people of Shona background who had been absorbed by the Ndebele. Most of the important Ndebele figures and those closest to the king were *zansi*. But class lines were by no means rigid, and an opportunity for upward mobility was offered through service to the king, especially in war.

Ndebele government was based on the king and the *amabutho* (sing., *ibutho*), military units composed of fifty to several hundred warriors. Each of a number of great chiefs, including the *ikosi*, usually had several of these units attached to his command, and each *ibutho* was in turn led by an *induna* (chief; pl., *izinduna*). At first these ranks were granted by Mzilikazi, but in time they became hereditary. In a similar manner the broad powers at one time exercised by the king were restricted by the growth in influence of a council composed of the *izinduna*. The basis of the king's power was the personal loyalty owed him by the warriors and his great personal wealth in cattle and land, the use of which he allocated to followers who distinguished themselves in his service. Young warriors, who sought the king's recognition through demonstrations of their prowess in battle, were obliged to pass through an arduous period of training under the supervision of royal officers before going on to serve in the *amabutho* of their fathers or being assigned to enlist in newly formed units. Recruits were not permitted to marry or keep their own kraal, the symbols that full manhood had been attained, until they proved their worth as warriors. Available manpower in the *amabutho* numbered about 20,000 warriors by the end of Mzilikazi's reign. Garrison sites often grew into settlements that took their names from the *amabutho* that were quartered there.

The Ndebele lacked an elaborate priestly hierarchy like that found at the Shona courts. In its place was a high priest assisted by members of his family who officiated at the *inxwala*. Although the Shona priesthood was displaced by the Ndebele high priest, the Shona

Historical Setting

oracles were respected as valuable links to local spirits and fertility gods. One result of this was the superimposition of the *inxwala*, the most important Ndebele religious celebration, over Shona rituals in which the Mwari cult was represented.

End of Isolation

The basic Ndebele strategy during the consolidation of the dominance over the Shona was to isolate these people from outside influence. During the first decade of their hegemony this was easily enforced, but after about 1850 demands were increasingly made on the Ndebele to open contacts with Europeans. In 1853 Mzilikazi made a treaty with the Transvaal Republic in which he agreed to protect Afrikaner travelers and hunters who had obtained his permission to enter Ndebele territory. Similar assurances were granted to Griqua (Coloured) hunters and a small number of European traders. Outsiders were closely restricted, however, to routes that were well defined and well guarded, and their presence made little impression on the indigenous population. On only one occasion did a European party traveling in Matabeleland under the king's protection come to harm at the hands of the Ndebele.

The first Christian mission station in Matabeleland was established near the king's kraal at Inyati in 1859 by members of the London Missionary Society led by Robert Moffat, the father-in-law of explorer-missionary David Livingstone. Moffat had first befriended Mzilikazi when the Ndebele were in the Transvaal and, according to Ndebele legend, had advised him to take his followers into Shona territory to avoid further confrontation with the Afrikaners. Although Moffat had come at the personal invitation of the king, any Ndebele who showed an interest in Christianity was sent away from Inyati. Ndebele mission yielded no converts, but the missionaries were called upon to act as interpreters and advisers to the king in his dealings with other Europeans.

Many of the Europeans applying for permission to enter Ndebele territory were hunters and traders seeking ivory. Among them was Frederick Courteney Selous, a British adventurer and author who spent more than twenty years there gaining an intimate knowledge of the country and its peoples. In a matter of years the elephants were virtually eliminated by overhunting, but reports of vast deposits of gold soon attracted a new group of prospectors and speculators who besieged Mzilikazi's successor, Lobengula (circa 1836-94), with requests for mining concessions, and they eventually proved to be his downfall.

Lobengula

When Mzilikazi, the founder of the Ndebele, died in 1868, the council of chiefs agreed that Nkulumane was his rightful heir, even though the old king's son by his senior wife had not been seen for nearly thirty years and was presumed to be dead. A delegation was

nonetheless sent to Natal to find him, but it returned with an unconvincing pretender named Kanda, whose candidacy was promptly rejected by the council. At the next *inxwala* in 1870 one of Mzilikazi's surviving sons, Lobengula, was recognized as the *ikosi* of the Ndebele. The choice of Lobengula was not acceptable to all of the chiefs, however, because his mother was not a *zansi*, according to the dissidents a necessary mark of eligibility for kingship. Furthermore they resented Lobengula's close association with Europeans, whose mode of dress he had adopted. The elite Zwangendaba *ibutho*, which had distinguished itself in battle since the Ndebele's days in the Transvaal, rose in revolt, proclaiming in favor of the false Nkulumane. Forces loyal to Lobengula overwhelmed the rebels and destroyed their kraal at a site that the victors renamed Bulawayo, the "killing place."

The succession dispute highlighted a cleavage between *zansi* oligarchs jealous of their prerogatives and those who sought a broader definition of Ndebele nationhood. Kanda, who escaped to the Transvaal, was joined there by one of Mzilikazi's sons, and for years they remained the focus of an anti-Lobengula faction in Matabeleland. Whenever the British and the Afrikaners were dissatisfied with Lobengula, they would threaten to withdraw their recognition and confer it on a rival claimant.

Despite internal unrest among the Ndebele, their hegemony over the Shona was secure. But the lack of foreign enemies and the scope for new conquests had a destabilizing effect on a militaristic society that had its rationale in aggressive warfare. Lobengula was put in the difficult position of maintaining a precarious balance between the young warriors anxious to achieve status in war and the *izinduna*, content with the size of their herds, who counseled restraint in order to avoid conflict with the Europeans. Old enmities, however, and their reliance on raiding as a way of life and means of income left the Ndebele friendless and without allies.

Without an heir on the spot to claim them, Mzilikazi's cattle had been taken by the chiefs when he died. His family impoverished, Lobengula had also been compelled to concede power to the council in order to guarantee the support of its members. He soon restored his fortunes—and began to consolidate his political authority—by enforcing the royal monopoly on external trade and reaping profits that were also sufficient for him to reward loyal retainers. Although Lobengula continued to grant mining concessions, he placed obstacles in the way of their implementation and invariably delayed negotiations for their extension. He effectively shut off access to Mashonaland by missionaries and most traders, thereby reimposing isolation on the subject peoples and preventing Europeans from becoming involved in Ndebele raids on the Shona. To the further dismay of his European friends, the king exchanged his trousers for traditional Ndebele garb.

Historical Setting

Whatever accommodation Lobengula made with the Europeans in the early years of his reign, it was on Ndebele terms. Traders and mining interests regarded the Ndebele as parasites who inhibited the economic development of the region. For the missionaries, their hegemony stood in the way of converting the Shona to Christianity. British colonial authorities in South Africa cast a wary eye on them because of the disruptive effects of their raids and their dealings with the Afrikaners, who in turn saw the Ndebele as a barrier to their expansion into Matabeleland.

The Making of Southern Rhodesia

Viewed in hindsight, there was little the Ndebele could do except to delay the determined expansion of European political and economic influence. Their traditional warrior society, numbering less than 100,000 in the late 1880s, imposed an oppressive hegemony over degraded subject peoples that was becoming as anachronistic in its way as would be the white minority regime that ruled the country ninety years later. The Ndebele controlled a large territory rich in minerals and fertile soil, but their way of life—with its emphasis on raiding, plundering, and tribute taking—stood in the way of the efficient development of these resources. British interests jockeyed with those of Germany, Belgium, Portugal, and the Afrikaner republic in the Transvaal for a favorable position in what seemed would be the inevitable “scramble for Matabeleland” among the European powers. That Lobengula was aware of rivalries among the various European interests in southern Africa and adroitly exploited them by playing one off against another did not enhance his case with British colonial authorities. The effectiveness of his strategy, intended to minimize the impact of European influence, might have been greater in the short term had he not been confronted by an even more formidable personality, Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902), who saw himself as the champion of British values and interests in Africa.

Rhodes and the British South Africa Company

Born in England, Rhodes had immigrated in 1870 to South Africa where he was first in the Kimberly diamond fields and later invested successfully in gold-mining operations. In 1880 he was elected to the Cape Colony parliament and in 1890 was named prime minister. He used his considerable financial and political power to further his vision of an African empire under the British flag, stretching uninterrupted from “Cape-to-Cairo,” and was instrumental in having a British protectorate established over Bechuanaland (present-day Botswana) in 1885.

Rhodes' critics portray him as an unscrupulous manipulator who employed a network of agents and informers to do his bidding, trampling over every obstacle to his expansive vision for the development of Africa by British interests. Rhodes, for his part, seems never to have doubted the merits of European imperialism or the benefits

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

that British colonial rule would bring to Africa and its people while providing an outlet for the physical and economic energies of the British nation. He and the corps of young men who served him were motivated by intense patriotism, a sense of high adventure, and a desire for profit. The events by which Rhodes became the leading contender for concessions north of the Limpopo were as complex as were his motives.

The discovery of gold in the Transvaal in the 1880s raised expectations about the value of deposits first located in Ndebele territory in 1867. A treaty negotiated by the Transvaal Republic with Lobengula in 1887 granting hunting concessions was the signal for Rhodes that the Afrikaners would attempt to expand there. When the British government hesitated to counteract their influence, Rhodes took an independent initiative. He arranged to have his agent, John Moffat, whose missionary father had advised Lobengula's father, appointed as British representative to the Ndebele king. Moffat was trusted by the Ndebele and reported that Lobengula only wished to be left alone by Briton and Afrikaner alike. Early in 1888, however, Moffat secured a treaty with Lobengula based on an earlier Anglo-Ndebele understanding in which the king promised not to enter into any correspondence or treaties with foreign powers or to transfer Ndebele land to foreign interests without the approval of the British high commissioner in Cape Town. On the basis of this agreement, Britain declared that Matabeleland and Mashonaland fell within the British sphere of influence, and action was taken against Portuguese agents active in the eastern highland region. The official document in which the agreement was set down did not, however, guarantee the Ndebele protection against other European powers as Lobengula had been led by Moffat to believe it would.

Shortly after the Moffat Agreement was concluded, Rhodes set up the British South Africa Company (BSAC) for the purpose of exploiting mining and land concessions, which one of Rhodes' partners in the enterprise, C. D. Rudd, went to Matabeleland to negotiate with Lobengula. Moffat prepared the way by advising the king that it would be better to grant one company exclusive rights rather than to deal with competing concession holders. If Moffat was less than forthcoming with Lobengula, Rudd deliberately deceived him. There were two versions of the so-called Rudd Concession: one written in English that was accepted as official by the BSAC and the British government, and another version that was communicated verbally to Lobengula by Rudd's interpreter. In the written version Lobengula was awarded a monthly subsidy of £100 in addition to 1,000 rifles and ammunition in return for which the BSAC received "exclusive" mining rights in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland and a commitment that the Ndebele would expel other prospectors. But the oral version contained the added—and unrecorded—assurance that the number of Europeans entering Ndebele territory in conjunction with the BSAC concession would not exceed ten at a time.

Historical Setting

The debate over the terms and intent of the Rudd Concession continued into the following year. The agreement contained, for instance, a vague clause authorizing the BSAC to undertake "all things necessary" to implement the concession. On the basis of it, however, Rhodes assumed power not only to construct roads but also to enact laws and regulations in concessionary areas, to engage a police force, and to carry out the basic functions of government in an area that was extended to include a large part of Mashonaland. When Lobengula became aware of the discrepancies between the two versions, he repudiated the concession on the grounds that there had been no independent witness to it. He put to death the *induna* who had counseled him to accept the agreement and then dispatched a deputation to London to bring his case before the British government. The BSAC, which responded that Lobengula had knowingly assented to the conditions of the agreement, soon gained unofficial support from colonial authorities in South Africa to act for British interests in the concessionary territory.

In an apparent effort to play European interests against one another, Lobengula granted a concession for issuing land titles within BSAC-claimed territory to a German speculator, Edward Lippert. But Lippert, who may in fact have been acting as Rhodes' agent in the deal, sold his concession to the BSAC. Moffat wrote a protest over the handling of the affair but seems to have stayed faithful to his instructions to remain silent and not adversely affect the proceedings. Even before the transfer of the Lippert Concession, Rhodes had sought charter status for the BSAC from the British crown.

Settlement, Resistance, and Pacification

By the end of 1889 the British government had approved a royal charter for the BSAC. The charter exceeded the terms of the Rudd Concession on which it was based, and in principle it authorized development of land by white settlers even before Rhodes had extracted grants from Lobengula. The BSAC was instructed to respect African laws and customs, but the charter also prohibited slavery, a clause that would apply to Africans among whom slaveholding was prevalent as well as to the settlers. Provisions for monitoring the company's activities were lacking, however, and the British government was clearly not prepared to enforce restrictions if the BSAC administrators chose to overlook them.

Early in 1890 the BSAC's Pioneer Column, consisting of 200 settlers from Cape Colony and an escort of 400 company police, set out on a 700-kilometer trek across the Limpopo into Mashonaland (see fig. 4). Frederick Selous, the white hunter, scouted for the column, which was commanded by the BSAC administrator for the concessionary territory, L.S. Jameson. A line of forts was built along the route of the march that stretched as far north as Fort Salisbury (named for Britain's prime minister) on the plain called Harare by

Zimbabwe: A Country Study




Figure 4. Settlement and Development of Rhodesian Area, 1890-99

the Shona. Each settler in the column was allowed to stake out 1,210 hectares of land and fifteen mining claims.

The company's forts had hemmed in Matabeleland on two sides, and Jameson seemed determined to provoke a confrontation that would justify taking action against the Ndebele. The showdown that Jameson had looked for came in October 1893 when an Ndebele raiding party was sent to punish Shona in the vicinity of Fort Victoria who had defaulted in their payment of tribute. Although the warriors followed instructions not to attack Europeans, some of the Shona killed in the raid were company employees, and mining operations were disrupted. When members of an Ndebele peace delegation were shot in a misunderstanding, Lobengula summoned the *amabutho* to arms and declared war on the settlers. A punitive expedition organized by Jameson in response to Lobengula's call-up met with only half-hearted resistance from the Ndebele, although for

Historical Setting

the scope of the fighting it inflicted heavy losses on them. Lobengula set fire to the royal kraal near Bulawayo and fled north, where he died a short time later of undetermined causes without having designated his heir.

For the next two years the Ndebele were in a state of confusion. The *amabutho* that had been with Lobengula in the north were not defeated, and no attempt was made to disarm them. But company forces occupied the Ndebele heartland centered in Bulawayo, and some of the leaderless Ndebele there welcomed their presence. In the absence of a king, a ranking *induna*, Mlugulu, claimed authority as regent, but other *izinduna* and the young warriors split into hostile factions over the choice of Lobengula's successor. The BSAC became concerned over the possibility of civil war in Matabeleland and tried unsuccessfully to engineer the selection of a friendly candidate. Rhodes, who had become prime minister of Cape Colony in 1890, intervened to direct the formation of a committee of inquiry, ostensibly to investigate Ndebele grievances against his company. The solution it proposed was the setting aside of so-called Native Reserves, land designated for the exclusive use of the Ndebele.

The question of land apportionment would remain a source of contention between the African and European (white) communities for the next eighty years. In compliance with the recommendations of the 1894 commission, Native Reserves were established, but unassigned property, including most of the prime farmland in Mashonaland and Matabeleland, remained in company hands and was freely subject to acquisition by European settlers, land companies, mining interests, and a small number of African freeholders.

Existing African settlement patterns were usually determined by military considerations rather than by the selection of land most suitable for cultivation and grazing. The Ndebele reserves in the middleveld north of Bulawayo to a large extent reflected these patterns and were characterized by poor soil and an inadequate supply of water. The commission accepted, moreover, unrealistically low estimates of the African population in deciding the amount of land allocated to the Native Reserves. Many were expelled from traditional lands like the area around the Matopo Hills, sacred to the cult of Mwari, where Rhodes had staked out his own estate. But in some instances other Africans who preferred to remain on their holdings rather than move were allowed to apply for grants to them as part of the unreserved land.

Initially the company collected hut taxes in the form of cattle from Africans living on unreserved land, a practice similar to Ndebele tribute taking among their Shona subjects. The *izinduna* were outraged by this apparent infringement on their traditional control over cattle allocation. Individual protests against land encroachment, seizure of cattle by Europeans after the rising, and provocative police actions—particularly those taken by African police—fueled

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Ndebele resentment against company rule. The only bond uniting the kingless and badly fragmented Ndebele factions was the authority of Mlugulu, who laid plans to celebrate an *inxwala* in 1896 at which a new *ikosi*—probably Lobengula's son, Nyamanda—would be installed. Armed resistance to the European occupation was anticipated once legitimate leadership had been restored. A religious revival had also swept the Ndebele and Shona in the midst of their adversity, and oracles had promised the success of the war against the Europeans to whose presence the recent outbreak of rinderpest, a plague of locusts, and drought were attributed.

Mlugulu's carefully plotted schedule was upset by events extraneous to the Ndebele's complaints against the Europeans. With Rhodes' approval Jameson had launched a surprise raid into the Transvaal in the last days of 1895, carrying most of the BSAC police with him to rally British miners and settlers there in an effort to overthrow the independent Afrikaner government. The expedition, a complete fiasco that led to Jameson's arrest and temporarily to Rhodes' disgrace, had not only created disarray in the company's management but also had deprived the settlers of their police protection. Premature actions taken by some Ndebele war parties against settler outposts in the absence of the police set the uprising in motion before the royal installation date, and the anticipated *inxwala* was never held.

Police depots were quickly overrun, farmsteads and mines attacked, and settlers killed or driven to take refuge in Bulawayo, which was put under siege by Ndebele *amabutho* until relieved by a volunteer field force hurriedly recruited by the company in South Africa. But even after the uprising had started, the Ndebele continued to disagree over who should be king—or if there should be a king—and how the fighting against the settlers should be conducted. Three rival groups, one following Nyamanda, carried out separate and uncoordinated operations. The uprising also took on the aspects of a civil war as a number of *izinduna* actively collaborated with the settlers, keeping the route open for reinforcements to reach Matabeleland, while many more remained neutral in the conflict. Fierce fighting followed, however, requiring the intervention of regular British troops in Matabeleland. Rhodes carried on personal negotiations that gradually brought some disaffected *izinduna* to agree to peace, but hostilities continued throughout the rest of the year until the last Ndebele resistance was suppressed.

A parallel uprising in Mashonaland in June 1896 actively involved about a third of the Shona, who were encouraged by the initial success of the Ndebele resistance. The company, its resources strained by the war in Matabeleland, was caught off balance in Mashonaland, whose people were regarded as being too passive to pose a threat to the security of the settler community there. The Shona uprising of 1896 may have had its origins in efforts in the 1880s to enlist Portuguese support to throw off the Ndebele hegemony and

Historical Setting

restore the Shona monarchy. The BSAC was merely viewed as having in the meantime replaced the Ndebele as oppressors, but the company's monopolistic trade policy, which had cut off Shona trade with the Portuguese and caused a sharp increase in the price of goods available to them, was an added irritant. The Shona also shared Ndebele resentment over taxation and the allocation of choice land to the settlers.

Europeans, who failed to understand the depth of African grievances, tended to blame the uprising on the agitation of the "witch doctors"—as they commonly referred to the Shona spirit mediums. The cult priests were not, in fact, agitating so much as they were ritually endorsing a desperate course of action that many Shona believed was worth risking. There were no police in Mashonaland at the start of the uprising, and the settlers were left to devise their own security. A volunteer relief column arrived in August, but British troops were also required to pacify the region, and company police had to deal with remaining pockets of resistance through the next year.

About 10 percent of the settlers lost their lives in the two uprisings. Farmsteads were destroyed and mining operations temporarily abandoned. But immigration was not deterred by the wars, and by 1900 the number of Europeans had increased to more than 10,000. In exchange for laying down their arms, the Ndebele were promised that they would be allowed to retain the land they had held before the uprising—but the BSAC would guarantee them no further allocations. Some *izinduna* were given official titles and stipends, and none were punished for their part in the uprising, but the company declared the Ndebele monarchy to be defunct. The suppression of the Shona was bloodier than that of the Ndebele. In contrast to the conciliatory treatment given to the Ndebele *izinduna*, a number of Shona chiefs and other suspected ringleaders were brought to trial and hanged.

Charter Company Rule

The royal charter authorized BSAC operations in a vast, ill-defined area on both sides of the Zambezi River. As if to emphasize that the river, which followed its course to the sea through territory already claimed by Portugal, was the potential focal point of the charter company's activities, the name Zambezia was proposed at the time to designate the entire BSAC concession. But as early as 1890 Jameson appears to have promoted the use of Rhodesia in honor of the project's guiding spirit, Rhodes. In 1895 Jameson, in a proclamation issued as company administrator, conferred the name on all BSAC-claimed territory north and south of the Zambezi. The distinctive designations of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia were adopted two years later after separate administrations had been established for the two regions.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

From the time that it granted the charter, the British government was faced with the problem of reconciling two contradictory commitments in what became Southern Rhodesia. The first was to maintain a "trusteeship" over the African population to protect it from possible abuse by the company. The other was to assure eventual self-government for a British settler community that viewed the territory as "white man's country." Under the terms of the charter, responsibility for the well-being of British subjects and protected Africans resided with the British government, but the company was delegated authority to provide security and services for them and to collect revenues. Although Britain had the capacity to intervene in Southern Rhodesia to prevent abuses of that authority, it abstained from taking a greater part in the country's affairs out of deference to the settlers and because it was accepted that Southern Rhodesia would eventually be linked to the provinces in South Africa. Consequently the British government never developed an overall coherent Rhodesian policy, although from time to time it was able to deal effectively with particular issues.

In 1898, for instance, a constitution was imposed on Southern Rhodesia similar to that of other crown colonies except that the territory was to be governed through the BSAC instead of the Colonial Office. This measure, which was the basis for further constitutional evolution, provided for a Legislative Council composed of five company representatives, four members directly elected by the settler community, the company administrator (who served as its chairman), and the nonvoting resident commissioner, who was the British government's representative to the BSAC.

The supervision of African affairs was in the hands of the company administrator, who was supposed to be guided by a government-proposed code intended to safeguard basic rights. In practice, however, guidelines set down in London could be skirted, and the code itself became the basis for oppressive legislation enacted later. An independent judiciary was established that adhered to the Roman-Dutch legal code practiced in Cape Colony.

The 1898 constitution extended the suffrage to all literate adult males who were British subjects on the condition that they resided in housing of a certain value or owned a mining claim. In principle the voting register was color-blind, but because of the property requirements no more than a handful of Africans were ever able to qualify. These requirements were upgraded periodically to keep potential African voters off the rolls.

The British order-in-council that embodied the constitution also reaffirmed that "the company shall from time to time assign to the natives . . . land sufficient for their occupation." No formula for determining need was established, however, and the native commissioner in each district was left to decide on the local distribution of land, influenced primarily by existing white claims and African settlement patterns. As a result the reserved areas formed a compli-

Historical Setting

cated mosaic of land allocations rather than a compact unit such as might have been identifiable as a homeland. Furthermore a land commission impaneled to assay the distribution of land urged a reduction of the Native Reserves to facilitate development. In 1908 a development-oriented ordinance was enacted by the Legislative Council that prevented white landholders from allowing African tenants to occupy their land for subsistence farming. Land, its distribution, and the social costs of its development had already become Southern Rhodesia's most vexing and controversial long-term political problem.

Only a small proportion of the European settlers were actually engaged in agriculture. Far more numerous than the farmers and ranchers among them were the miners and mechanics and the merchants who kept them all supplied. The settler population was predominantly an urban one. A limited number of African workers had also been attracted by the lure of the cash economy to the towns as well as to the mines. Salisbury (present-day Harare) had been designated as the seat of government, but Bulawayo developed more rapidly as an industrial and commercial center. By 1900 the town, built near the site of Lobengula's kraal, possessed a main street lined with substantial buildings, boasted the publication of several newspapers, and profited from the rail line that linked it to South Africa. Another line extended from the port of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique to Salisbury. The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) in South Africa, during which more than 1,500 settlers served in the British forces, spurred the development of the railroads in Southern Rhodesia. Although the connection between Bulawayo and Mafeking was cut by the Afrikaners during the early stages of the war, British troops and military supplies in large quantities disembarked at Beira were subsequently transported to the fighting front by rail through Southern Rhodesia.

The year of Rhodes' death—1902—marked the beginning of intensified white settler protests over the company's policies and the high royalties paid for its administrative services and demands for greater settler participation in government. After 1907 the company refrained from naming its quota of members to the Legislative Council, giving the settlers a *de facto* majority there, although it withheld financial control from them. At that time the British resident commissioner predicted that the charter company form of government would be replaced in seven years.

The realignment of the Legislative Council did not calm settler dissatisfaction with company land policy, however, or stem the open criticism of the charter on which it was based. Farmers laid the BSAC's apparent stinginess in allocating unassigned land to the influence of land companies and speculators. Opposition to the BSAC administration was also growing among independent industrial and business interests, reflected after 1910 in calls for union with South Africa. Backers of the company's position responded with talk of a

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

possible amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia, but settler opinion, shaped by Charles Coghlan's Responsible Government Party (RGP), moved toward the concept of self-government as a British colony, which would mean the transfer of the administration of internal affairs—including finances—from the company to their elected representatives.

While acknowledging that the company's days as administrator of Southern Rhodesia were numbered, the British government cautioned that modifications in the structure of government recommended by the RGP were premature and at the outbreak of World War I in 1914 postponed the decision on the introduction of self-government for ten years, although a supplemental charter granted by the crown in 1915 did provide for advance consideration of the question of responsible government should the Legislative Council so request. Action promised by the Colonial Office on the land issue was postponed, however, for the duration of the war. Many officials concerned with the region were convinced that its future lay not as a crown colony but as a province of the Union of South Africa. Others expressed reservations about transferring complete authority over so many Africans to so few whites.

White Rhodesians played a role out of proportion to their small numbers—about 25,000 in 1914—in support of the British war effort. Volunteer units joined South African forces in occupying German South-West Africa (present-day Namibia) and took part in the difficult campaign against German colonial forces in East Africa that brought the world war close to Southern Rhodesia's borders. Nearly 3,000 Africans enlisted in the Rhodesian Native Regiments and served in East Africa under white officers. The war, which increased markets of the country's minerals, meat, and grain, spurred development and brought prosperity to the modern sector of the economy.

Missionary Activities

English Jesuits had established a Roman Catholic mission in Matabeleland in 1879 but, like the Protestant missionaries at the Inyati station who preceded them there, they made no headway among the Ndebele, and Lobengula frustrated plans to extend their activities into Mashonaland in the 1880s. Both the Jesuits and Protestant groups that had attempted with little success to set up missions there saw the Shona as victims of Ndebele oppression and had requested British intervention on their behalf.

When the original Pioneer Column crossed the Limpopo in 1890, it was accompanied by a party of Jesuits who operated medical facilities and the first schools in the company settlements. The growing Roman Catholic mission to the African population was soon joined by missionaries sent out by Anglican bodies, British and American Methodists, Congregationalists, and the Dutch Reformed

Historical Setting

Church. In addition to the services that they provided to both the settler and the African communities, company officials also welcomed the missionaries as agents of social control. In Rhodes' words, "The missionaries are more effective and less costly than the police."

As a result of pressure from the Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference, founded in 1906 by fifteen Christian church bodies, the first provision for African education was set forth in the Native Education Ordinance of 1907. Under the terms of the ordinance, schools for Africans offering a maximum of four years of primary education were established under the supervision of responsible missionary groups. The demand of Africans for education expanded rapidly, and enrollment in mission schools increased from about 4,000 in 1907 to over 40,000 in 1918. The BSAC operated a school inspectorate, but the major responsibility for the development of education fell to missionaries until after World War II. Most of the African nationalist leaders in the 1960s and 1970s (and the leaders of independent Zimbabwe) were the products of missionary education, and important figures among them were themselves clergymen.

Black Political Movements

Although the BSAC had forbidden attempts to restore Mzilikazi's line, monarchist sentiment remained strong among important segments of the Ndebele. Nyamanda, who claimed to be Lobengula's heir, had accepted a position under the company as a salaried *induna* after the collapse of the Ndebele uprising but was deposed and left without property when he became the focus of efforts to restore the monarchy.

The groundwork for the formation of modern political movements had begun to be laid before World War I in Bulawayo by a small, educated, urbanized elite composed of clerks, teachers, and clergymen. Their example was followed in other towns, especially in those places where the *Mfengu* were found. The *Mfengu* were representatives of a mixed group thrown together by the *mfecane* who were regularly recruited in South Africa to fill lower supervisory and clerical posts. They not only gave leadership on their own account but also provided links between traditional Ndebele leaders like Nyamanda and black activist organizations in South Africa. The Ndebele *izinduna*, moreover, had been the first to send their sons to schools in South Africa, where one of Lobengula's sons received a law degree, in order to assure that their families would retain a dominant position in African society even under changed political conditions.

The *Mfengu* and other African settlers, who had at first set themselves above the Ndebele and the Shona, became especially frustrated by restrictions placed on their business enterprises and their ability to obtain farmland. Contacts facilitated by the *Mfengu* continued to develop during World War I between Ndebele leaders calling for the creation of a national homeland for their people in Southern

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Rhodesia and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. The ANC publicized Ndebele grievances outside Southern Rhodesia and helped in organizing forums for Ndebele exiles there. It also provided assistance for Nyamanda and the Ndebele monarchists.

The issue of the rights of the Ndebele royal family led to the formation of the Ndebele Home Society, which pressed for a national homeland—autonomous reserves under the protection of the British crown—and the restoration of the Ndebele monarchy under Nyamanda's leadership. While Nyamanda was making his plea for an Ndebele homeland, however, the Legislative Council revived discussion of introducing responsible government and Southern Rhodesia's application for crown colony status. The creation of a homeland and the transition to responsible government seemed incompatible, and pressure brought to bear on the *izinduna* by white political leaders substantially weakened his movement.

As the hopelessness of the Ndebele Home Society platform became increasingly apparent, other leaders, such as Abraham Twala, a Zulu teacher from South Africa, advocated searching for friends among the white population as the most effective means of furthering African interests. In 1923, after responsible government had become a reality, he formed the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association (RBVA) at whose organizational meeting representatives of the moderate RGP were present. It was one of the first examples of political cooperation between Europeans and Africans in Southern Rhodesia. Twala offered the RGP African support in exchange for the promise of equal legal rights for Africans, improved education, and the right to purchase land when the RGP came to power. Twala's proposal did not win the RBVA as much influence among Africans as many white moderates had hoped, but his organization stood out as the first African group in Southern Rhodesia to focus on political action and to seek participation in the parliamentary process rather than to dream of a national homeland and a return to traditional institutions.

The 1922 Referendum: Company to Colony

Popular backing for internal self-government and colonial status for Southern Rhodesia was reflected in the results of the 1920 election when Coghlan's RGP won twelve of the thirteen seats in an enlarged Legislative Council. But many prominent Rhodesians, equally hostile to the BSAC, argued that termination of the charter should be followed by Southern Rhodesia's accession as South Africa's fifth province. Because a persuasive argument could be made for the economic advantages of union, the outcome of a referendum called to decide between these options was by no means a foregone conclusion. Permanent officials at the Colonial Office were critical of the proposal for union with South Africa, which they considered a surrender of Britain's "trusteeship" over Rhodesian blacks, but members of the Liberal government seemed to assume

that because of its geography and economic orientation Southern Rhodesia would naturally gravitate toward union. They were also hopeful that union would aid pro-British Afrikaner moderates like South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts against the Afrikaner nationalists.

October 1922 was set as the date to determine Southern Rhodesia's political future in a referendum in which voters would be asked to choose between responsible government and union. The referendum campaign demonstrated the existence of a distinctly Rhodesian brand of nationalism that also had populist overtones. Supporters of responsible government denounced big business and organized labor alike, along with the BSAC, the speculators, and the absentee landholders. Anti-Afrikaner feeling ran high among English-speaking Rhodesians and was fully exploited by anti-unionists. Britain's Liberal government was roundly criticized for being willing to sacrifice settler interests for imperial considerations when it advised Rhodesians of their "duty" to vote for union. Seventy-eight percent of eligible voters, who included only about sixty Africans, responded to the referendum. Transition to responsible government was approved by 8,774 voters as against 5,989 favoring union with South Africa. Charter company rule was terminated, and crown colony status was approved for Southern Rhodesia. After the unionist defeat in the referendum, Smuts confided—prophetically, as history proved—to Britain's new Conservative prime minister Andrew Bonar Law, "Rhodesia as a separate state struggling vainly with her task is certain to become an embarrassment to the British government in the end."

The Colonial Period

The constitution of the Crown Colony of Southern Rhodesia went into effect on October 1, 1923, allowing for responsible government "subject to certain limitations" by the British government. These restrictions included safeguards to protect the integrity of the Native Reserves and to preserve the right of blacks to own land, as well as the prerogative to review Rhodesian legislation. In practice the "imperial veto" was seldom used, and the white minority government in Salisbury was left to manage the crown colony's internal affairs unimpeded. External relations were reserved to the British government, although the Southern Rhodesian administration was permitted to conclude trade agreements and to accredit representatives to neighboring countries. The 1923 constitution provided for the unicameral, thirty-seat Legislative Assembly and a Westminster-style form of government in which executive functions were carried out by a cabinet of ministers dependent on the confidence of a majority of the legislators. As under company rule, the franchise was color-blind but based on property, income, and education qualifications that few blacks could meet. The governor general represented

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

the British crown and implemented legislation on the advice of the Rhodesian government of the day.

Early Years of Self-Government

Coghlan became the first prime minister of the new self-governing crown colony. A South African-born lawyer who had defended mine workers against the large mining companies, Coghlan built a coalition of farmers, wage earners, and small business and independent mining interests to oppose the BSAC and to carry the fight for responsible government. But after the referendum rejected union with South Africa, the mining companies courted Coghlan in order to assure themselves political influence in the crown colony similar to that exercised earlier by the company, while many of his working-class backers split from the party in power to organize the Rhodesia Labour Party (RLP).

Released from its commitments made previously to white labor groups, the RGP was reconstituted as the Rhodesian Party, which kept its majority despite the defection of independents who formed the Progressive Party and captured several seats in the 1928 election. The Progressive Party in turn was reorganized as the Reform Party by Godfrey Huggins to press for legislation institutionalizing racial segregation. Coghlan's reputation on racial issues had been that of a moderate committed to "partnership" between the European and African communities in Southern Rhodesia's economic development. His immediate task as prime minister, however, was to assure industry and mining interests of the crown colony's economic viability. When Coghlan died in 1927, he was succeeded as prime minister by Howard Moffat, the son of John Moffat. Although Moffat resisted Huggins' proposals for total segregation, his government nevertheless introduced legislation that enforced segregated patterns of land ownership (see *The Land Question*, this ch.).

With racial issues at the forefront of the campaign, the Reform Party won a one-seat majority in the Legislative Assembly in the 1933 general election, and Huggins, an English physician who had settled in Southern Rhodesia in 1911, became prime minister of a new government, pledging to reverse the moderate policies pursued by the Coghlan and Moffat administrations. Huggins' platform calling for institutionalized segregation had broader acceptance among the European community than the election results indicated, but with its fragile hold on the Legislative Assembly his government encountered difficulty in implementing it. His legislative program stymied in the assembly, Huggins won support within his party for a merger with the defeated Rhodesian Party that resulted in the formation of the United Party (UP). Because of the political realignment, a new general election was called in 1934 that gave the UP twenty-four seats. The RLP, which won only five seats, formed the official opposition. Moffat's subsequent attempt to rally moderate

whites to a revived Rhodesian Party failed.

The UP's program was derived from Huggins' so-called two-pyramid concept of separate development for the European and African communities under a white-minority government that excluded black participation. At the same time, Huggins managed to refashion electoral politics by attaching various economic interest groups to his administration in much the same way that they had once been dependent on the company. Under Huggins' strategy, for example, the farmers' association was allowed to exert considerable influence on, if not control over, the formulation of legislation affecting agriculture. In turn, farmers were expected to support the government and to cast their votes for UP candidates. Groups of this sort had a vested interest in the survival of the Huggins' government, and the government also became accustomed to taking an activist role in the management of the economy.

The Land Question

Land distribution continued as an intractable problem after the transition from company rule to crown colony status. When mineral resources had proved less rich than forecast, European-operated agriculture became the mainstay of the economy. Land occupied by Africans was given over almost entirely to subsistence farming and herding, the result either of an inclination on the part of black farmers to remain in the traditional sector or of obstacles placed in the way of their producing cash crops. Europeans tended to see the presence of black subsistence farming outside the Native Reserves as a waste of land and a hindrance to the profitable development of their own holdings. A series of commissions to study the land question had all been sympathetic to the settler viewpoint and worked against provision of adequate allotments for Africans.

Both communities expressed demands that additional land from the unassigned sector be opened for settlement. Europeans argued that the availability of more land would spur white immigration and increase the production of cash crops, although about half of the land already assigned for settlement in the mid-1920s was still unoccupied. Africans, squeezed out of the land market, complained of having too little land for their increasing numbers and of its poor quality that condemned them to rely on subsistence farming to feed themselves.

Accordingly the Coghlan government appointed the Morris Carter Commission (1925-26) to hold hearings on the basis of which recommendations could be made regarding the disposition of the 45 percent of Southern Rhodesia's total land area that remained unassigned. Testimony was collected from all segments of African society as well as from a wide range of witnesses from the European community. The commission's investigations showed that most of the latter strongly favored segregated land development, it was argued, to consolidate cash crop agriculture. Some moderates sin-

cerely believed that segregated land apportionment was the only way to prevent sales of existing African holdings to whites. Africans, it was found, would accept segregation, to which they were largely indifferent, as long as it brought them access to more land. The commission report duly proposed segregation as a solution that would serve the best interests of both communities.

The government was guided by the recommendations of the Morris Carter Commission in framing legislation to deal with the land question, even though they were generally out of keeping with the concept of "partnership" adopted earlier by the Rhodesian Party. In the final analysis, however, the actions taken by the Moffat government were determined by strictly economic rather than racial considerations, responding to the failure of the tobacco crop—in good years a leading earner of foreign exchange—in 1928 and the subsequent decline in prices for Rhodesian exports attributable to the worldwide economic depression. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 decreed the partitioning of much of the country into areas set aside for exclusive occupation by either whites or blacks and in so doing initiated the subsequent trend toward nationwide two-pyramid segregation along racial lines. Europeans (whites), who numbered about 50,000 at the time of passage, were allotted 19.9 million hectares (50.8 percent of the total land area), while 3 million hectares (7.7 percent) were designated as Native (later African) Purchase Areas and reserved for black freeholders. The Native Reserves were increased to 8.8 million hectares (22.4 percent) on which about 650,000 Africans (60 percent of the black population) lived. The remainder was classified as unassigned land subject to eventual redistribution.

The issue of land reserves was related to restrictions on African residence. From the beginning of company rule, Africans had had to register themselves and obtain passes in order to enter white urban areas. Those who did not were liable to criminal penalties. No African, moreover, could be in white townships after dark without a special pass. Eventually separate African townships evolved for those serving the white communities. After the passage of the 1930 act, steps also were taken to remove African tenants from white rural areas.

African Political Groups

The constitution made no provision for African participation in the government of the crown colony. Outside traditional communal institutions that pertained only in the Native Reserves, whatever African political activity that existed was focused on the RBVA. Whereas Nyamanda had courted mass support among the Ndebele, the RBVA was an elite group with aspiring middle-class values. It was led by black settlers from South Africa who neither had nor sought a following among the Shona majority. Other prominent African political and economic associations of the period were

Historical Setting

equally unrepresentative and consequently ineffectual in presenting the African case to the government. Even Coghlan, who had encouraged the growth of the RBVA before 1923, found that its political backing was of no value to his party after responsible government had been achieved. The RBVA's testimony on land allocation before the Morris Carter Commission in 1925 was completely disregarded. Africans had gained little from the hearings conducted by the land commission, and their associations met with no success when they protested the act's provisions.

In 1927 Robert Sambo, a Nyasaland, was sent by the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) to organize a Rhodesian branch of the then-powerful South African black labor association at Bulawayo. Sambo, who carried out a survey of working conditions and wages on farms and in urban areas, was subsequently deported, but the ICU took root under local leaders and is considered to have been one of the principal forerunners of modern black Zimbabwean nationalism. Sambo's major contribution to the movement had been the organization of public meetings and discussion groups at which radical ideas like the formation of a united black front and the concept of interracial working-class solidarity were introduced. The ICU made no headway in recruiting agricultural workers or mine employees and elsewhere found it difficult to lead workers who were unready to engage in strike actions. Although it was largely ineffective as a labor organization, the ICU provided a training ground for later political activists who used it as a forum to attack the government, to criticize the missionaries, and to condemn the black elite, traditional political institutions, and ethnically based associations. The Huggins government moved against the ICU's leaders after 1933 and imprisoned several of them on charges of subversive activities. Split internally, its leaders dispersed. Short of financial support, the ICU declined rapidly and by 1936 had disappeared in Southern Rhodesia.

The movement toward greater political participation by Africans seemed to be in disarray in the late 1930s. Ndebele nationalism, based on a revival of the traditional monarchy in a separate homeland, was considered an anachronism, while attempts by the RBVA to build a modern political organization based on a black electorate had proved unrealistic because of the limited number of authorized African voters. In quashing the ICU the Salisbury government had demonstrated its determination to prevent radical, politically oriented black groups from gaining a foothold in the crown colony. A new pattern of political activity was beginning to emerge, however, under the leadership of educated Shona and Ndebele, whose perspective was broadly national rather than narrowly ethnic in its scope. In 1934 Aaron Jacha, a farm organizer, founded the pan-Africanist Bantu Congress, which later became the African National Congress and was inspired by the South African organization of the same name. Small in its membership and elitist, the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Congress lobbied for extension of voting rights and the exemption of educated blacks from discriminatory laws.

World War II and Postwar Political Developments

Britain's declaration of war against Germany in 1939 immediately committed the crown colony to involvement in World War II. Segregated Rhodesian contingents served alongside other British Empire forces—the Rhodesia Regiment, a white unit, in the Ethiopian campaign and in North Africa, and the black Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR), under white officers, in East Africa and Burma. Other white Rhodesian personnel who joined or were seconded to the British army and the Royal Air Force saw action in other theaters as well. RAR battalions were later assigned to garrison duty on the Suez Canal and took part in antiguerrilla operations against communist insurgents in Malaya in the 1950s.

On the surface the political situation in Southern Rhodesia appeared to have changed little during World War II. Although it did not become clear until later, however, Huggins' control of the political system had weakened. There was a growing uncertainty among the mining companies and developing commercial and industrial sectors about the benefits of being so closely tied to the government in power, and many had begun to question the benefits of state supervision of the economy. The Huggins government also had to face making hard choices on the divisive issue of Southern Rhodesia's political future—whether the colony would apply for an independent dominion status that would demand concessions to black participation in the political process, seek amalgamation with other British colonies in a proposed Central African Federation, or respond to a renewed campaign for union with South Africa.

During the war years the Labour Party had lost ground and was replaced as the principal opposition party by the Liberal Party, founded in 1943 by Jacob Hendrik Smit, an Afrikaner and onetime UP cabinet minister. The Liberals, who challenged the government's role in regulating the economy and called for more effective barriers against black political advancement, won strong backing from the Afrikaner community and some private-sector interests opposed to the UP government's economic policies. Fearing reverses for the UP at the polls in 1944, Huggins postponed scheduled elections for the duration of the war and used the time to mend fences among the associations that were being wooed by the new party. The Liberals nevertheless captured twelve seats in the 1946 general election. Their strong showing was not sufficient to unseat Huggins as prime minister, but it was enough to deprive the UP, which dropped to thirteen seats, of its overall majority in the Legislative Assembly. Shortly after the election, however, the Liberal Party split when some members protested the heavy-handed Afrikaner influence on its leadership, and the party was reduced to five seats in the 1948 election that restored the UP majority. That

same year a Liberal splinter, strongly supported by Afrikaner groups, formed the Democratic Party, the forerunner of the Confederate Party that opposed Southern Rhodesia's membership in the Central African Federation (see Southern Rhodesia in the Federation, this ch.). Dissidents from the Democratic Party subsequently attempted to revive the old Rhodesian Party, but in 1953 they joined with former supporters of the Liberal and Labour parties in a merger with the UP, which was reorganized under Huggins' direction as the United Rhodesia Party (URP). The opposition was weakened to the point of being ineffectual.

Changes also occurred in African politics in the immediate post-war period. The old Ndebele Home Society had long since given up the idea of restoring the monarchy and establishing a national homeland, but it remained a defender of traditional values and in Bulawayo, where the organization was strongest, provided important welfare services. Some young, radical supporters were attracted to it, although they later shifted their allegiances to more activist nationalist parties that were to evolve. So-called apostolic groups continued to be deeply influential among rural Shona, but there was also a body of independent religious organizations patterned on the missionary churches that gave Africans experience in leadership techniques and demonstrated their ability to organize and operate on such a level (see Christians, Missions, and Independent Churches, ch. 2). Blacks in 1945 were still unable to challenge white domination in a meaningful way, however, and possessed no unity of purpose.

Large-scale arrivals of white immigrants began after the war. During the last half of the 1940s, a net average of 10,000 whites arrived annually. The great majority remained in urban areas, but a significant number became settlers and began developing the land that under the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 had been classified as white but on which more than 300,000 Africans had been allowed to remain. In 1950 all unauthorized blacks were forced to move into the areas designated as Native Reserves, where the available resources were already overtaxed and could not accommodate a sizable portion of the livestock that was the chief form of savings available to them. The expulsion was carried out even though a committee appointed in 1949 had already concluded that existing reserves could not absorb this transfer of population. Only a marginal addition was made to extend the Native Reserves to receive them.

From Federation to Rebellion

Huggins' personal commitment to the creation of a Central African Federation, embracing the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland (present-day Malawi), dated from before World War II. The Southern Rhodesian prime minister avoided relying on his own political party during his campaign to win approval of the federation to keep from making it a partisan issue. But he was able to obtain the aid of some of the most influential associations that had a few years earlier tried to distance

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

themselves from him, and he used them to coordinate the support of their members for his programs. Supporters of federation stressed that there would be mutual benefit to all parties from the merger of three complementary economies and pointed out that new land could thereby be opened for development by European settlers in Northern Rhodesia.

Negotiations on federation had been under way since 1948, but the proposal did not gain official support from the Colonial Office until a Conservative government took office in London in 1951. The federal constitution that was finally agreed to by responsible British authorities provided for a parliamentary system of government in the three federated territories. The British crown would be represented by a governor general. Although his signature would be needed on legislation, he would be required to act in accordance with the advice of the federal cabinet, or Executive Council. Council members would be appointed by the governor general on the recommendation of the federal prime minister, who was to head the government. The Legislative Assembly would consist of three categories of delegates: twenty-six representatives chosen by the white-dominated electorate in each constituent territory, a white representative from each territory charged with special responsibility for local African interests, and two specially elected African members from each territory.

Southern Rhodesia in the Federation

Held with London's approval, a referendum on Southern Rhodesia's membership in the federation in April 1953 carried by a vote of 25,570 to 14,429. White-controlled legislatures in the other two British colonies passed resolutions announcing their intention to accede to the federal constitution. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (referred to popularly as the Central African Federation) was duly created by an order in council dated August 1, 1953, and Lord Llewellyn was named as its first governor general (see fig. 5).

The Southern Rhodesian government and administration remained intact after federation, operating under the 1923 crown colony constitution. Because Salisbury was designated as the federal capital, some sections of Huggins' bureaucracy were transferred to the new federal system, giving rise to complaints in the other territories that it served primarily Southern Rhodesian political and economic interests within the federation. Bureaucratic dislocation and competition between the federal and territorial civil services did occur, but Huggins, who resigned as Southern Rhodesian prime minister to become federal prime minister, was able to maintain control of them both. Huggins organized a separate political party to operate on the federal level. Called appropriately the Federal Party (FP), it was an extension of the URP that was managed by Huggins' trusted lieutenants, and it won a parliamentary majority in the first federation-wide elections.

Historical Setting




Figure 5. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1953

The right-wing Dominion Party (DP) was established in 1956 to oppose the URP for its identification with big business and the multiracial federation. The party, founded by Winston Field, a prosperous tobacco farmer, was nationalist and populist in orientation. Although it enlisted the backing of the white farming community, the DP boasted of its independence from all economic associations. It wanted Southern Rhodesia out of the federation but called for the annexation of a part of Northern Rhodesia to form an independent "white man's country." Field scored an impressive victory over an FP candidate in a by-election in 1957.

Garfield Todd had been handpicked by Huggins to replace him as

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

prime minister of Southern Rhodesia. A moderate by any measure, Todd had come to the country from his native New Zealand as a missionary in 1934. When Huggins retired from office in 1956, he was succeeded as federal prime minister by Roy Welensky, a one-time railroad worker and boxing champion from Salisbury who in the 1930s had settled in Northern Rhodesia. He made his reputation as a labor leader before entering politics. The two prime ministers in Salisbury, who differed greatly in their political inclinations and radically in their personalities, clashed from the start. Welensky insisted on the need to tighten his control over the profederation party to halt the slide in URP popularity that was laid to Todd's moderate stance on racial issues. Late in 1957 the FP and its Southern Rhodesian affiliate were merged as the United Federation Party (UFP), which would contest elections on both the federal and the territorial level.

A crisis was precipitated in January 1958 when the Southern Rhodesian cabinet resigned in protest over Todd's approval of a franchise commission report that recommended increasing the size of the black electorate. Rather than resign as prime minister as expected, Todd formed a new government but was unable to muster a parliamentary majority in support of it. An extraordinary party congress was then summoned that ousted him in favor of Edgar Whitehead, who was considered one of the "old guard." Whitehead returned to Salisbury from his post as the federation's diplomatic representative in Washington to face an electorate that was clearly becoming disenchanted with the UFP. This disaffection from the party that had been in power for a quarter-century arose from suspicions of collusion between economic interest groups and government officials as much as it did from dissatisfaction with Todd's liberalism or membership in the federation.

Whitehead, who failed in his attempt to win a seat in a by-election, dissolved the Southern Rhodesia parliament and called for a general election in June. The UFP won a narrow victory over the DP, which observers credited to a last minute change in the voting system that introduced a second-choice preference on the ballot. The United Rhodesia Party, formed by Todd and touted as a liberal alternative to the UFP and DP, ran a poor third. Confident of its political future the DP merged with two other right-wing parties in 1962 to become the Rhodesian Front (RF).

The African Dimension

The existence of elected African representation in the federal parliament for a time encouraged the cooperation of some members of the black elite. Huggins and Todd appeared ready to end the two-pyramid system of segregation, and to some of the more hopeful blacks, the white electorate's acceptance of a multiracial federation seemed an indication that progressive attitudes might be developing within the European community. Multiracial organizations evolved

as pressure groups for African interests. African involvement with Europeans, however, was taking place only on an elite level. Urban workers and others who felt that black interests could too easily be overlooked by the African elite began to organize under the leadership of George Nyandoro and James Chikerema. In 1955 they formed the Youth League, which attacked the African elite and demanded direct representation for blacks on municipal councils with full voting rights.

In 1957 the Youth League combined with the activist Bulawayo branch of the African National Congress to become the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC). Led by Joshua Nkomo, the new organization quickly established its influence in urban areas and then sought ties with rural activist groups. The SRANC was banned by the Whitehead government in 1959, and several hundred blacks were arrested and detained without trial for their participation in its activities. Among them was Nkomo, who had become the best known black Rhodesian activist. Trained as a social worker in South Africa, Nkomo had risen to prominence as a labor union leader in Bulawayo. He had been nominated by the Colonial Office to represent the African point of view at the conference in London in 1953 leading up to the formation of the federation and had contested unsuccessfully for an African seat in the federal parliament against a pro-FP black candidate. In 1960, while still in prison, he was elected president of the newly formed National Democratic Party (NDP), which was essentially a regrouping of the SRANC under a new name.

Despite the arrests, Whitehead sought to persuade Africans of the government's interest in their advancement through a "build-a-nation" campaign. But UFP moves to reassure its white constituency that it had no intention of conceding any evolution toward power sharing had cost the party the support of the African elite. The NDP united a number of disparate black political groups. A mass movement, it brought together organized labor and unorganized urban workers, farmers, merchants, professionals, other members of the educated middle class, and students. In spite of legal constraints against black political activity, new tactics, including mass rallies and marches, were introduced. Banned in December 1961, the NDP reconstituted itself under Nkomo's leadership as the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which in turn was banned in September 1962.

The 1961 Constitution

A comprehensive inquiry into Central African affairs was ordered by the British government in 1960. Conducted by a commission under the direction of Lord Monckton, it concluded that African opposition to the federation was too pervasive for the federal system to survive unless steps were taken in the direction of majority rule. To this end the commission recommended that new constitutions be introduced in Southern Rhodesia and the other territories, and it also supported giving each the right to secede from the federation. Over Welensky's protests, the British government called a series of constitutional conferences to implement Monckton's plan.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

The document reported out by the constitutional conference was put to referendum in July 1961 and won approval by a vote of 42,004 to 21,846 from a white electorate apparently willing to consider the distant promise of majority rule to blacks in return for ending British intervention in the colony's internal affairs. Nkomo had initially endorsed the constitution but, under attack from other NDP leaders, ordered black voters to boycott the referendum because it did not include a timetable for majority rule.

The salient feature of the 1961 constitution as approved in the referendum was that Britain relinquished its residual right to veto Rhodesian legislation affecting the African population. The last remaining vestige of British control was that of the ultimate sovereignty of the crown. The duties of the governor, representing the crown in Salisbury, were entirely ceremonial, although he was officially the commander in chief of the armed forces. Real power lay with the cabinet, called the Governor's Council, which was responsible to the sixty-five-member Legislative Assembly.

In waiving its responsibility for the African majority, however, Britain had demanded the inclusion in the constitution of a declaration of rights, spelling out rights to life, property, and personal liberty and guaranteeing freedom of association and expression and protection of law. The Constitutional Council, a multiracial, twelve-member panel of jurists chosen by a college of judicial electors, was established to rule on the constitutionality of proposed legislation, specifically that which dealt with items covered in the declaration. The courts were barred, however, from overruling legislation enacted before adoption of the constitution, even when it was in clear conflict with what the declaration was intended to protect.

Another demand made by Britain was that certain clauses in the constitution be regarded as entrenched—that is, that serious obstacles be put in the way of their being amended. These entrenched clauses concerned relations with Britain, franchise qualifications, the status of Native Reserves (latter called Tribal Trust Lands—TTL), civil rights, and the function of the Constitutional Council. They could only be amended by a two-part process in which a two-thirds majority vote for amendment in the Legislative Assembly would be followed by a four-part referendum in which each officially designated racial group—European, African, Coloured, and Asian—was separately polled. Only if the proposed amendment met with the support of a majority in each racial group would it be adopted. Hence, while the legal means were available for altering the entrenched clauses, it would be virtually impossible to do so in practice.

Eventual majority rule was implied in the constitution, but the rate at which it was to be achieved was to be determined by the white minority. The process envisioned was for the gradual extension of voting rights and electoral power to blacks through a weighted dual roll on which variously qualified voters were registered. The qualifi-

Historical Setting

cations required to place a voter on one or the other of the electoral rolls was therefore a crucial matter. In theory the franchise had never been determined on racial lines, but in order to register to vote an applicant had to meet minimum property or income standards. Under the scheme that remained in force under the 1961 constitution, these standards were reduced for persons who had completed the secondary level of education. The net effect of this was to make the upper level, or A roll, largely white (92,405 in 1965, for instance, compared with 2,330 Africans and 2,549 Coloureds and Asians). Lower qualifications would admit an applicant to the B roll. These were still sufficiently high to bar most blacks, but because few whites registered on that roll even if they were eligible, it was limited for all practical purposes to a black middle class separated from the tiny black elite registered on the A roll. In 1965 only 888 of the 11,517 voters of the B roll were non-African.

According to a complicated system of weighted balloting, voters on both rolls cast two ballots in general elections, one for a member to represent their constituency and the other their electoral district. By weighting the value of ballots, A roll voters—who comprised about 90 percent of the total electorate—exercised 80 percent influence in each of fifty constituencies, and B roll voters had an 80 percent influence in each of fifteen electoral districts. This in effect meant that voters drawn from a white population of 200,000 could confidently expect to elect the candidates who would fill fifty seats in the Legislative Assembly while black voters, gleaned from an African population of approximately 6 million, would elect fifteen. Optimistic observers believed that blacks could be integrated into the political process by adding many more applicants to the B roll, while allowing a small number to move from the B roll to the A roll as their level of education and economic status improved, and that in this way majority rule could be achieved. Requirements for the franchise were entrenched in the constitution to eliminate what had been the practice of previous white governments in raising property standards whenever improved incomes or the effects of inflation made it possible for increased numbers of blacks to qualify.

But the fulfillment of the constitution's promise of eventual majority rule seemed too remote to satisfy most Africans. The constitution, which assured the continued domination of Southern Rhodesia by its white minority for an indefinite period, came at the very time when the "winds of change" spoken of by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan were sweeping across Africa, bringing self-determination and independence to former colonies. The NDP called an unofficial referendum of party members in which more than 450,000 blacks voiced their opposition to the constitution, and Nkomo traveled widely to bring black Rhodesian grievances to the attention of the international community. In 1962 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly called on Britain to suspend the Southern Rhodesian

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

constitution and initiate discussions leading to independence with majority rule.

The Rhodesian Front

White moderate Rhodesians expressed disappointment with the hostility that characterized the reaction of African leaders to the 1961 constitution. Meanwhile the country's economy was slow in recovering from the slump in exports caused by the general recession of the late 1950s, and the imminent collapse of the federation threatened guaranteed markets for Southern Rhodesian products in the other territories. Whitehead's land policy and his open bid for African backing likewise alienated many white voters from traditional ties to the UFP. These factors—political, economic and, to a large degree, psychological—combined to persuade the white electorate to throw its support to the Rhodesian Front in the December 1962 parliamentary elections. The RF captured thirty-five constituency seats in races decided by A roll voters, while fourteen of the UFP's twenty-nine seats were won by candidates representing electoral districts where black B roll votes were the determining factor. Field formed a new government with a clear parliamentary majority that was dedicated to obtaining complete independence for Southern Rhodesia with or without British agreement and certainly without granting further concessions to the demands of the black majority.

What limited organized opposition to the RF that existed among the white electorate over the next fifteen years would be divided into two factions. On one side were moderates in the Rhodesian Party, the successor to the UFP, and in the multiracial Centre Party, both of which advocated various degrees of power sharing or the gradual development of majority rule. Neither presented any real political challenge to the governing majority, but the RF was constantly on guard to defend its vulnerable right flank against the extremist Rhodesian Alliance that called for total separation of the races on the South African model and an end to any African participation in the political process. To hold its own right wing within the party, the RF co-opted some of the extremist objectives into its platform and gave prominent attention to them in party statements, pledging to keep Southern Rhodesia a "white man's country" even at the expense of a break with Britain.

The key to the RF's strength on the hustings, however, was less its ideological appeal than it was the party's grass-roots organizational structure. Other parties had always been controlled by a small clique of professional politicians who at elections rallied local party units that had been dormant in the interim. Drawing on its populist roots, the RF developed the idea that the white electorate should exercise a direct and constant influence on the party and the government. Obviously the party performed an important educational function and, given its organization, had easy access to voters to mold public opinion; but it was also responsive to the popular will. Local units in

the constituencies, each of them averaging only about 1,500 voters, were able to make their views known to their parliamentary representatives. The party's organization gave disproportionate influence to rural members rather than to those in urban areas that were considered to be strongholds of moderate opinion. The RF also made a strong appeal to recent immigrants who were anxious to preserve the way of life that had attracted them to Southern Rhodesia.

Negotiating Independence

Despite Britain's desire to end its involvement as a colonial power in the region, its government was unable to leave the problem of Southern Rhodesia to the Rhodesians. In the first place Britain accepted its outstanding obligation to safeguard the well-being of the African population and its commitment to achieve majority rule, at least in the long run. But at the same time it felt responsible for the security of the settler community and the assurance of minority rights; furthermore it recognized the crown colony as a self-governing entity. Once the issue of Southern Rhodesia and the denial of majority rule by the white-controlled government had been raised in international bodies—initially by the efforts of representatives of African nationalist groups—it became a matter of concern to the world community and a source of embarrassment to Britain.

Southern Africa was the last outpost of white minority governments or overseas control on the African continent. As such it was the focal point of interest for newly independent former colonies, whose influence had become important in world forums, notably in the UN but also in the Commonwealth of Nations, where they could be expected to block any application for independence and continued membership by Southern Rhodesia's white government. Nationalist spokesmen like Nkomo testified before the world body's Special Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories, petitioning for UN action, but Britain consistently held that Rhodesian affairs were beyond the organization's competence because Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing territory. Britain also claimed limitations on its own authority to take matters into its own hands and coerce the white-controlled government into accepting a settlement recognizing the rights of the black majority. Summing up the position of his government, Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandys explained in 1963 that "We have long ago accepted the principle that the Parliament in Westminster does not legislate for Southern Rhodesia except at its request."

Britain's Conservative government devoted considerable attention to negotiating a settlement that would smooth the way for the Salisbury government to apply for independence. Nevertheless from 1963 onward Britain would remain adamant that the white government accept what came to be known as the "five principles" proposed that year by Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home as a precondition for beginning formal independence talks. The "five principles" called for

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

a guarantee of unimpeded progress toward majority rule, firm assurance against any future constitutional amendments detrimental to African interests, an immediate token of "improvement in the political status" of blacks, positive moves toward ending racial discrimination, and agreement on a settlement that was "acceptable to the whole population." The Douglas-Home government and the Labour government under Harold Wilson that succeeded it in 1964 insisted that the last point would entail a general referendum or other test deemed satisfactory by Britain to ascertain the approval of all Rhodesians, polled as a body and not by racial category, before an agenda for independence would be adopted.

In the meantime the tenuous structure of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland continued to deteriorate. The 1960 report of the Monckton Commission, which had stated bluntly that no kind of association was likely to work as long as Southern Rhodesia persisted in its discriminatory policies, was rejected by the Welensky government, but mounting black opposition to the report in the two northern territories proved the correctness of its estimate of the situation. Black majority governments came to power in Nyasaland under H. Kamuzu Banda in 1961 and in Northern Rhodesia under Kenneth Kaunda in 1962. In December 1962 Britain allowed Nyasaland to exercise its option to secede, an action repeated by Northern Rhodesia the following March. The British government formally dissolved the federation in June 1963. Nyasaland, renamed Malawi, became independent within the Commonwealth in July 1964 and Northern Rhodesia, renamed Zambia, in October. Negotiations on Southern Rhodesia's independence were stalled, however, on Salisbury's refusal to accept the "five principles" as the basis for London's approval of an agreement.

The Rise of Ian Smith

Dissatisfaction that Field had not taken a harder line in his negotiations with the British government was relayed from the party faithful in the constituencies through their local units to the members of the parliamentary party who represented them, resulting in his ouster early in 1964 as RF leader and subsequent resignation as head of government. He was replaced in both capacities by Ian Smith, the party's deputy chairman who had become the leading spokesman for its right wing. A former Royal Air Force pilot and a severely wounded war hero, Smith was the first native-born prime minister of Southern Rhodesia. He had helped to organize the DP, forerunner of the RF, in protest over Todd's conciliatory approach to African demands, and now he promised white Rhodesians that majority rule would not come in his lifetime. Although undistinguished as a minister under Field and unremarkable as a public speaker, Smith soon came to personify white resistance to the British government and to the black nationalists, attracting what nearly amounted to a cult following.

Historical Setting

Smith categorically ruled out acceptance of the "five principles" as the basis for further negotiations on independence, to which he claimed Southern Rhodesia was legally entitled since its government had exercised de facto sovereignty since 1923. But the Labour government that came to power in Britain in October 1964 was even more outspoken than its Conservative predecessor in its insistence on majority rule and refused to consider any modification of the "five principles." A referendum conducted by the Smith regime in November approved Southern Rhodesia's application for independence on the basis of the 1961 constitution by a margin of 58,176 to 6,101—although only 62 percent of the registered voters participated in the poll. Blacks were "consulted," according to the Salisbury government, "within the tribal structure" when a meeting of 600 government-appointed chiefs and headmen pronounced in favor of independence in their name. In the general election in May 1965, Smith's RF won all fifty A roll seats. The election was boycotted by about 90 percent of those blacks eligible to vote on the B roll.

Unilateral Declaration of Independence

Emboldened by the results of the referendum and the general election, Smith threatened London that his government would now seriously consider declaring Southern Rhodesia's independence without formal British consent. The British government countered the challenge by warning that Britain would find such an action unacceptable, but its response was weakened by Wilson's assurances to a British public divided on the issue that Britain would not resort to the use of armed force against what was popularly referred to as their "kith and kin" in Africa and would rely instead on economic and diplomatic measures. Wilson's rejection of a military option had the effect of encouraging Smith to proceed with his plans. Wilson traveled to Salisbury at the end of October for talks with Smith in a last-ditch effort to head off a break in relations with the crown colony, but the British prime minister's offer of concessions to the white Rhodesians was rebuffed by Smith as a result of pressure from RF hardliners and the apparent will of the party faithful not to accept a settlement from Britain short of complete independence on Rhodesian terms.

On November 11, 1965, the Southern Rhodesian government issued a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). The British government regarded UDI as an act of rebellion and ordered the British governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, to dismiss Smith and his cabinet, whose actions were declared to be illegal. The Southern Rhodesia Act, passed by the British Parliament one week after UDI, proclaimed that Southern Rhodesia was still a crown colony under British jurisdiction and that its legitimate government would henceforth be exercised by a secretary of state in London and the governor in Salisbury. Gibbs, who was himself a member of the settler community, continued to occupy Government House and to act

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

upon instructions received from London. No concrete actions followed to compel a return to legality, however, because the governor, while refusing to recognize the legal existence of the government in Salisbury, directed the civil service, police, and armed forces to continue carrying out their duties so as not to disrupt services or impair the security of the population as a whole. But because these duties included obedience to the minister in charge, this order had the effect of reaffirming the rebel government in office. Furthermore the government ministers, as expected, ignored the notices of dismissal issued by Gibbs and approved the appointment of Clifford Dupont, the RF party chairman, as officer administering the government (OAG) acting on the behalf of the queen as head of state on the advice of her "Rhodesian ministers."

The "independence" constitution ratified by the Legislative Assembly in February 1966 closely resembled the 1961 constitution, but entrenchment clauses were removed to allow any part of it to be amended. Other changes permitted the government to abridge civil rights during a state of emergency declared by the OAG at the direction of the government. The term *Rhodesia*—used informally since Northern Rhodesia had become independent Zambia—was formally adopted and, although it was never accepted officially by Britain, the UN, or the United States, came into conventional usage. By Rhodesian interpretation the new constitution deprived the British government of all residual powers in the country, although the rebel government steadfastly maintained its allegiance to the crown and continued to display the Union Jack.

From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe

The Smith regime based the legality of UDI on Rhodesia's de facto sovereignty as a crown colony. This claim was tested in Rhodesian courts in a series of "constitutional cases," most of which involved appeals of government actions abridging the British-dictated Declaration of Rights. A leading court decision held that the Rhodesian government "could lawfully do anything its predecessors could lawfully have done."

Under successive governments, Britain had sought to minimize its legal responsibility for Rhodesia by deferring authority to the colonial government. However, it reemphasized the constitutional ties that bound the crown colony to the mother country. The British government undertook to arrange negotiations with Salisbury that aimed at finding a formula by which there could be a return to legality, as London viewed it, and the state of rebellion in Rhodesia brought to a conclusion. It continued to insist that any settlement must lead to eventual majority rule, but a sixth principle was added in January 1966 to the five previously enunciated: "It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of the majority by the minority or of minority by majority." Wilson met with Smith twice, once aboard the Royal Navy vessel H.M.S.

Historical Setting

Tiger off Gibraltar in December 1966 and again in October 1968 aboard H.M.S. *Fearless*. Both efforts failed to achieve agreement despite the fact that Wilson had softened his adherence to the "five principles" approach, particularly at the 1968 meeting.

The Republican Constitution

A commission, impaneled in Salisbury under the chairmanship of a prominent lawyer, W.R. Waley, to study constitutional options open to Rhodesia short of a settlement with Britain, reported ambiguously in April 1968 that "Europeans must surrender any belief in permanent European domination and the Africans must surrender any belief in ultimate African domination." It recommended eventual "racial parity" between the white minority and the black majority in the electoral system but, reflecting the RF position, maintained that control of the government would remain in "responsible hands"—a political euphemism for the white minority.

Rhodesian resolve stiffened after the failure of the shipboard talks, and the Smith government, advised of popular support for its stance by the party organization, took up the demands voiced until that time only by its most radical wing for the creation of a republic. In a two-proposition referendum conducted in June 1969, the proposal for breaking Rhodesia's connection with the British crown carried by a vote of 61,130 to 14,327, a greater margin of approval than the 54,724 to 20,716 votes cast in favor of the proposed republican constitution. The latter, which embodied recommendations of the Waley Commission for "parity," was regarded as too "liberal" by some elements who held out for unmitigated white domination. Gibbs, who had remained in Salisbury as the queen's legal representative, formally resigned as the British governor and surrendered Government House to Dupont, who would be named later by the cabinet (officially, the Executive Council) to a five-year term as president.

The new constitution established a republican form of government, signifying the rebellious colony's final rejection of all association with Britain, but its objectives were far more complex. In search of a model for restructuring the country's internal affairs, the white Rhodesians had turned to South Africa. In the name of "parity" the new constitution pointed Rhodesia in the direction of a system of total segregation in which all national institutions and public and private relations would be defined in terms of race.

Under the 1969 constitution the existing Legislative Assembly was redesignated the House of Assembly to act as the lower chamber of a bicameral legislature. The upper chamber consisted of a twenty-three-member Senate that was composed of ten white members elected by the assembly, three persons named by the president, and ten black members: five to represent the Ndebele, who constituted one-sixth of the African population, and five to represent the Shona majority. The African senators were chosen by electoral colleges,

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

composed of members of the Council of Chiefs, who represented each of the two major ethnic groups.

Electoral rolls were revised on the basis of race. All whites, Coloureds, and Asians who met minimum economic and educational requirements were registered on the upper, or so-called European, roll. Africans, who met qualifications that were somewhat lower, could apply to be included on two ethnically differentiated rolls. Fifty seats of the sixty-six-seat assembly were elected by European roll voters. The remaining sixteen seats were reserved for black representatives. Eight seats were occupied by candidates chosen by voters on the two lower rolls, four each to represent the Shona and the Ndebele. The other eight black seats were filled through a special election process in which chiefs, headmen, and elected black municipal councillors picked four members from each of the two ethnic groups.

An elaborate plan was devised by which the number of black voters would increase by stages until parity had been reached with the Europeans. Parity in representation would be achieved as a parallel development. The process of evolution toward parity was scheduled to begin, however, only when the proportion of income taxes paid by Africans reached a certain level—24.2 percent of the total. (In 1969 the relatively few blacks who earned enough income to be taxed paid in less than 0.5 percent of the total income tax collected.)

While it prepared the framework for parity between the races in the political process, the constitution also provided for the ultimate division of the country into three "homeland" provinces: one comprising Shona areas, a second encompassing Ndebele areas, and a third "homeland" reserved for whites that amounted to approximately half the total land area. Each of the three provinces would be internally self-governing and would have its own local legislature. Although the population of the proposed white province would include many more black residents than whites, Africans would have no voice in government as they would be regarded as citizens of one of their respective ethnic homelands. Nowhere, perhaps, was the influence of South African thinking more evident in the republican constitution than in this provision.

The United Nations and Sanctions

Despite British denials that the UN had any competence to discuss Rhodesia as a dependent territory, the Security Council in early 1965 passed the first of many resolutions on the Rhodesian situation, calling on Britain to end minority rule. A stronger resolution was passed in October 1965, just before Wilson's mission to Salisbury, urging Britain to utilize all means at its disposal—including the use of military force—to prevent the white-controlled government from asserting its independence. UDI was immediately condemned by the UN and later in November a further resolution was passed by the

Historical Setting

Security Council at Britain's request advising member states "to do their utmost" to break all economic ties with Southern Rhodesia, including a voluntary embargo on oil and petroleum products as well as on military equipment.

Britain, joined by most other Commonwealth members, had already put unilateral sanctions into effect. Over the next few months it added to an extensive list of embargoed Rhodesian imports and sent a Royal Navy squadron to the Mozambique Channel to monitor oil deliveries to the port of Beira from which a pipeline ran to the refinery at Umtali (present-day Mutare). A subsequent Security Council resolution authorized British warships to impose a blockade to deter "by force if necessary, vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia."

In December 1966 the Security Council imposed a mandatory sanction on selected exports and imports. Embargoed exports to Rhodesia included oil, military hardware, aircraft, and motor vehicles. An embargo was also placed upon purchases of major Rhodesian exports: chrome, copper, iron ore, pig iron, asbestos, tobacco, sugar, meat, and hides. By unanimous vote in May 1968 the Security Council established comprehensive mandatory sanctions, barring trade in virtually all items except medical supplies. In addition the remittance of funds and air travel to Rhodesia were to be halted, and member states were required not to honor passports issued by the Rhodesian government.

Some countries, notably Switzerland and—until 1973—the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), which were not UN members, continued to trade legally with Rhodesia. South Africa and Portugal refused to go along with mandatory sanctions. Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa served as conduits through which illegal trade could be disguised and its certificates of origin and destination falsified. Some member states proposed to make sanctions more effective by extending them to cover South Africa and the Portuguese territories, but resolutions to that effect failed to pass the Security Council.

Because its exports of minerals and agricultural products were competitive and enjoyed preferential treatment on the British market, there had been no need for the colony to force the pace of diversification or industrial development before UDI. But Rhodesia also had the potential to develop a fairly high degree of self-sufficiency. Once incentives were accorded by the government to domestic production, Rhodesia's increasingly diversified industrial output grew dramatically, and the country experienced sustained economic growth. As a result of a strongly administered and rigidly controlled program of counter-measures enforced by the Smith government, sanctions had little impact on the Rhodesian economy during the first nine years after UDI.

The Smith government had begun its economic preparations well in advance of UDI—as soon as the possibility of sanctions was

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

mooted. Whenever foreign exchange was in short supply, for example, some products were removed from the list of essential imports. Foreign-owned firms and investors resident abroad had their assets in Rhodesia completely frozen and were obliged to pay their profits—including dividends and interest for shareholders—into blocked accounts. The government took over direct management of all foreign trading operations and managed the import of petroleum supplies. Industry, commerce, and banking were brought under government control through emergency powers decreed by Smith. This mobilized the compulsory cooperation in sanctions evasion programs of both domestic companies and subsidiaries of foreign-owned corporations operating in Rhodesia.

The thoroughness of the government's measures on the domestic front was paralleled by comparable preparations abroad. In 1964 and 1965 Rhodesia obtained agreements with Portugal and South Africa on preferential trade and on logistical support for a greatly increased volume of transit trade. The Smith government also acted in advance of UDI to find new markets and sources of supply to replace those in Britain. Over the next decade the Rhodesians and various intermediaries perfected numerous techniques of sanction evasion through an effective clandestine trading network. Even after the imposition of full mandatory sanctions in 1968, the press and other concerned sources reported frequent violations to which member states were allegedly turning a blind eye. In the UN debate on sanctions in 1972 the British representative asserted that at least one-third of all Rhodesian exports were reaching member countries that claimed to be observing the sanctions. The Rhodesians confirmed that same year that more than half the country's marketed output in agriculture was being exported.

One of the major loopholes in enforcing sanctions had to do with the activities of multinational corporations with subsidiaries in Rhodesia. Such companies were responsible for almost all of the mining production and an important share of manufacturing. The most serious enforcement problems, however, involved the role of major oil companies in circumventing the mandatory embargo on petroleum products. When the British government for example, took action against the British Petroleum Company and the Shell Petroleum Company after imposition of mandatory sanctions in 1968 to prevent them from supplying Rhodesia directly, the two companies shifted Rhodesian operations to their South African subsidiaries, which were wholly outside the reach of regulation unless sanctions were extended to South Africa. These operations were carried out with the cooperation of the South African government and were shielded from international scrutiny by South African security laws.

The only major publicly acknowledged repudiation of sanctions by a member state was the Byrd Amendment to the Defense Procurement Act adopted by the United States Congress in 1971 over the strenuous objections of the Department of State. This measure

Historical Setting

permitted imports of chrome ore, ferrochrome, and other strategic materials from Rhodesia in explicit exception to the general ban if those same commodities were being imported from communist countries. Between 1973 and 1977, when the measure was repealed by Congress, items on the strategic materials list were imported in large quantities from Rhodesia under the amendment, although virtually all other products identified as of Rhodesian origin continued to be barred from the United States. The value of these imports amounted to over US\$200 million, or approximately 20 percent of the value of Rhodesia's total mineral exports during that period.

Land Apportionment, Urban Segregation, and Security Regulations

The UFP government had reportedly been about to embark on a program of land reform when it fell in 1962. A committee established to investigate the land problem had submitted a report in 1960 that recommended repeal of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 at the earliest opportunity, but it recognized the political difficulties that would be provoked by such a move and therefore counseled progress by stages. Accordingly the size of the Special Native Areas (SNA) reserved for black settlement was increased, and a new category of unreserved land open to both races was to be expanded gradually by the addition of land from the European area. In 1962 about 800,000 hectares of European-area land heavily populated by blacks was transferred to the SNA, which were shortly incorporated with the Native Reserves in a new category: the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL). The UFP government envisioned the country divided into three types of areas: public land, including forest reserves (11 percent); the TTL (37 percent); and the remaining 52 percent open to all Rhodesians.

Land reform was a major issue in the 1962 elections. The victorious RF in advocating segregated landholding had taken a position diametrically opposed to that of the UFP, but no decisive action was taken until 1969 to implement a distinctive land policy, although black resettlement on unreserved land and the conversion of European-area land was halted. The main thrust of the RF government's land policy was not intended so much to achieve more effective utilization of existing European areas as it was to consolidate them. This policy was embodied in the Land Tenure Act of 1969, enacted in conjunction with the republican constitution that had institutionalized racial segregation in a manner not done before in Rhodesia. The act eliminated the category of unreserved land open to multiracial occupation. The country was divided into three classes of territory: public lands, totaling 2.6 million hectares, and separate African and European areas, each comprising 18 million hectares. The apportionment of the latter categories was in keeping with the government's concept of creating "parity" between the country's 6 million blacks and 230,000 whites (see *Land Use and Ownership*, ch. 3).

Africans living within the boundaries of white areas were forcibly evicted and relocated elsewhere. The government also had recourse

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

to an extensive body of security legislation to curb freedom of speech, movement, privacy, expression, assembly, and association whenever the need arose to suppress political activism—and, later insurgency—by Africans. The most frequently used pieces of legislation were the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act and the Emergency Powers Act, both dating from 1959 but subsequently stiffened by amendments. Other restrictions on political freedoms for Africans received wide support among the white population, and government by decree became the government's ultimate legal weapon (see *The Legal System*, ch. 4).

Africans, except for the numerous domestic servants, were forbidden to reside within white municipal boundaries, although these laws were largely disregarded until more restrictive legislation was enacted under the RF after 1963. The roughly 900,000 blacks who lived in urban areas resided in designated African townships outside the municipalities. These townships were administered directly by white officials, and in some instances they were owned outright by the neighboring municipalities, although legally none was considered a part of the administering city or town.

Settlement Proposals, 1971-72

As expected, Smith's RF won all fifty European seats in the House of Assembly in the first republican parliamentary elections, conducted in April 1970. The extreme right-wing Republican Alliance, which had attacked the "liberalism" of the 1969 constitution, made a poor showing everywhere in the country. The moderate, multiracial Centre Party won seven of the eight elective black seats but could not make headway against RF majorities in white constituencies. Dupont was named president of the republic by the Executive Council and in May opened the first republican parliament. In June voters in Britain gave a parliamentary majority to the Conservative Party, but the formation of a new government under Prime Minister Edward Heath did not produce the breakthrough in Anglo-Rhodesian relations that Smith had hoped for once the Labour government was replaced. Although there was an influential Conservative lobby sympathetic to Rhodesia, Heath continued to adhere publicly to the original "five principles." But Douglas-Home, the new foreign secretary, quietly renewed contacts with the rebel government in Salisbury to search for a formula by which Rhodesia could return to legality.

After a year of secret negotiations between British and Rhodesian officials, Smith met for extended formal talks with Douglas-Home, who as prime minister in 1964 had drafted the "five principles." In November 1971 the two governments announced a proposed settlement satisfactory to both sides. The so-called Smith-Home Agreement included a large number of British concessions. The 1969 constitution rather than the 1961 constitution, which Britain had previously insisted was the legal frame of government, was to be the basis for the settlement. Douglas-Home contended that provisions

Historical Setting

in the agreement concerning gradually increased African legislative representation would provide an unhindered advance to majority rule. A careful examination of those terms by the Rhodesian political analyst Claire Palley projected that the earliest possible date on which blacks would obtain even a parity of votes would be the year 2026. Even this distant achievement was dependent on the whites in power not placing obstacles in the way of African advancement. It was also dependent on the successful utilization of a large British aid program to raise African educational and income levels to qualify blacks for the franchise.

Final agreement still hinged on the requirement for popular acceptance expressed in the "five principles," but the Rhodesian government had adamantly refused to consider submitting the proposed settlement to a referendum. The British government therefore appointed a twenty-four-member commission headed by an eminent jurist, Lord Pearce, to ascertain public opinion on the subject in Rhodesia. In January 1972 the Pearce Commission began interviewing representatives of various interest groups and sampling opinion at public meetings held throughout the country.

According to the commission report, the proposals were widely accepted by the white population and received limited endorsement from Coloureds and Asians. The African reaction, however, was resoundingly negative. Even among government-appointed chiefs, as many of those polled rejected as accepted the proposals, and fifteen of the sixteen African members of the assembly refused their approval. The testimony collected by the commission clearly demonstrated that Africans were unwilling to accept minor improvements and that many blacks believed that time was on their side—the side of majority rule and an end to white supremacy. The surprise expressed by the Rhodesian government at this reaction showed its lack of meaningful contact with 95 percent of the country's population. Britain, true to its commitment, abided by the commission's findings and withdrew its agreement to the settlement.

African Nationalist Opposition

It took more than a decade for the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia to recover from the suppression of black political organizations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The bannings of the NDP and ZAPU, moreover, had both been preceded by aimless urban violence—nearly all of it directed against other blacks—that reflected a failure of leadership in those groups. These incidents were the bloodiest outbreaks in the country since the wars of the 1890s, and the government reacted by introducing a series of emergency laws in an attempt to cope with the situation. These included a broader definition of unlawful organizations subject to proscription, provisions for preventive detention, and the granting of extraordinary emergency powers to be used in cracking down on black nationalist groups.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Instead of attempting to give direction to the movement inside the country in the face of government repression, Nkomo had chosen to remain abroad much of the time, lobbying at the UN and courting the support of foreign African leaders. He was away in December 1961 when the NDP was banned and most of its other leaders were arrested. Within days, however, Nkomo had announced the formation of ZAPU from Dar es Salaam and, when ZAPU was in turn banned in September 1962, he regrouped its executive committee there.

Nkomo's diplomatic experience had often been touted as his strong card as a leader, but increasingly criticism was voiced within nationalist circles that he had spent too much time abroad seeking foreign backing and not enough at home confronting the white regime. Nkomo's colleagues consented to his tactics when he assured them that his plan for establishing a government in exile had the blessing of Julius Nyerere, then chief minister of Tanganyika (later president of Tanzania). It came as a considerable shock to those who had gone into exile with Nkomo when he was castigated by Nyerere for abandoning Rhodesia.

Distrustful of his leadership, some members of the executive committee plotted to dump Nkomo and focus ZAPU's efforts on internal organization. Nkomo moved quickly to preempt their challenge to his leadership and returned in mid-1963 to Salisbury where he read the "dissidents," including Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe, out of the organization and portrayed himself as the only figure willing to take on the hard task of establishing the nationalist movement once again on Rhodesian soil. The "dissidents" likewise hurried home and in August founded the internally oriented Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) at a meeting in Gwelo (present-day Gweru). Soon after, Nkomo formed the People's Caretaker Council (PCC) from the loyal remnants of the executive committee as an internal front for the banned ZAPU. Nkomo was arrested in April 1964 and detained, and a few months later the PCC, like its predecessors, was banned. Nkomo's internal following thereafter reemerged illegally under the ZAPU banner.

The split in ZAPU and the founding of the more militant and inward-looking ZANU proved to be the turning point in the history of the nationalist movement. ZANU's agenda, as it developed, was socialist and pan-Africanist in content. It demanded an independent state—Zimbabwe—with black majority rule in a one-party republic, elimination of all racial discrimination, and government control of land use. ZANU had been banned a few weeks after it had been formed, but it continued to operate as an external organization in neighboring black countries and as an underground organization internally. It organized occupational groups representing farmers, urban workers, and miners and also attracted professionals, students, women activists, and even some traditional leaders to its ranks. Although ethnic rivalries were not crucial in the initial split, it

Historical Setting

became evident that, while ZAPU retained the allegiance of the Ndebele and allied Shona groups, ZANU's political base was in the Mashonaland countryside.

ZANU was troubled almost from the start by factionalism. Sithole, a Congregationalist minister educated at Garfield Todd's mission school and later in the United States, was named president of the organization. A founding member of the NDP and ZAPU, he had been in the forefront of the fight to keep the leadership in Rhodesia. His book, *African Nationalism*, in which he had demanded an end to white rule, had become the primer for the nationalist movement after its publication in 1959. Sithole, along with Mugabe and many other party leaders, was arrested in 1964 and for the next ten years would remain with them in prison, where most of ZANU's internal political battles were fought. During the early 1970s Sithole was eased out as the leading figure, his place taken by Mugabe, but he managed to retain ZANU's presidency and continued to be recognized by its chief African allies abroad.

Although a professed Marxist, Mugabe had a reputation as a political pragmatist whose particular skill was as an organizer. Until his release from prison with Sithole and Nkomo in 1974, however, he was little known outside the inner circles of the nationalist movement. Mugabe had been a teacher in Roman Catholic schools in Rhodesia and later in newly independent Ghana. He became the NDP's public relations officer in 1960 and, as the deputy secretary general of ZAPU, had gone to Dar es Salaam with Nkomo. Aligning himself with Sithole, Mugabe had then become ZANU's secretary general and Sithole's rival for power within the new organization.

Both parties had advocated a policy of guerrilla warfare in the hope of precipitating British political intervention. The first attack, directed against white farmsteads, occurred in July 1964, and incidents of this nature increased after UDI. A military engagement between guerrillas and security forces took place for the first time in April 1966. The rival forces conducted raids into Rhodesia mainly from camps in Zambia, but their actions were not coordinated, as each side was anxious to prove its superiority to potential sponsors. ZANU units were armed primarily by China, ZAPU by the Soviet Union. Many insurgents received military training abroad in Algeria, China, and Tanzania (see *Foreign Military Assistance*, ch. 5).

Despite the efforts of Tanzania and Zambia to bring ZANU and ZAPU together, both groups remained more absorbed in recriminations and settling old scores than in waging war in common against the white regime in Rhodesia. Guerrilla activity had virtually ceased by 1968. Disappointment with their weakness led the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to propose a joint military command. When this was rejected by the rival groups, efforts were made by various sponsors to create a new organization to replace ZANU and ZAPU. One such group, sponsored by Zambia's Kaunda to bring them together under one umbrella, was the Front for the Liberation of

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), which appeared in 1971 and gained immediate support among exiles. But it was soon torn by dissensions similar to those that plagued the two older organizations.

After UDI, black nationalist political organizations were not allowed to function legally in Rhodesia. The African National Council was constituted in December 1971 for the sole purpose of opposing the terms of the Smith-Home Agreement before the Pearce Commission. In order to avoid conflict with the government, the new organization adopted the format of a public interest council rather than a political party. The sixteen-member central council was composed of former ZANU and ZAPU detainees, several of whom remained under some form of restriction. Its chairman, Abel Muzorewa, was given chief credit for convincing the Pearce Commission of black hostility to the settlement. Since 1968 the bishop of the United Methodist Church in Rhodesia, the American-trained Muzorewa had no previous record of political activism. His performance made him for the time the leading personality in the nationalist movement and one who enjoyed the backing of both Kaunda and Nyerere.

When the Pearce Commission's hearings were completed, a national convention of the African National Council was called to draft bylaws for a permanent organization. The council merged in May 1972 with internal elements of ZANU, ZAPU, and FROLIZI and was reconstituted as a legal political party after coming out strongly against the guerrilla war. It favored a negotiated settlement with Britain on a basis "acceptable to all Rhodesians." Late in 1973 it was revealed that Muzorewa had been meeting secretly with Rhodesian government officials, including the prime minister, to discuss the terms for a possible settlement, but no details were released because both sides recognized the adverse impact that talk of compromise positions might have on their respective constituencies. In the July 1974 election in which the RF retained all fifty white seats in the assembly, and although the African National Council chose not to take part in it officially, procouncil candidates captured seven of the eight directly elected black seats.

The Civil War

A new phase in the armed struggle against the white regime was opened in December 1972 when forces of ZANU's military arm, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), launched a series of hit-and-run raids in the Centenary area (north of Harare) near the Mozambique border. Acts of terrorism directed against isolated farmsteads were calculated to persuade Europeans to abandon the countryside and to dispel the myth of white invulnerability that had inhibited many blacks from cooperating with the guerrillas. As months passed, operations were expanded to other areas within range of guerrilla camps across the border, and small units established bases on Rhodesian soil. Cross-border activity increased steadily after Mozambique obtained its independence in 1975. Applying

Historical Setting

Maoist concepts of popular guerrilla warfare, ZANLA forces based primarily in Mozambique relied on contacts built up through ZANU's grass-roots political organization to camouflage their movements in Mashonaland. ZANU's overall strategy involved using the black masses to apply constant pressure on the white regime and to defeat it in a war of attrition.

ZAPU's military stance reflected its different political approach, emphasizing external operations that would rely on foreign cooperation to achieve objectives. Its military arm, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), was equipped as a conventional force and conserved its strength in camps in Zambia and Angola while waiting to fight a decisive battle at the appropriate time. Operations were restricted to quick incursions into Matabeleland. Like ZANLA, ZIPRA avoided contact with security forces. There was frequently fighting, however, between and within the two main forces and with splinter groups that conducted independent operations. Efforts to establish a joint military command or to find a "third force" to replace the rival commands were unsuccessful. In 1976, after the failure of FROLIZI to unify the military effort, the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) was organized by commanders representing both major factions, although ZANLA participation was more apparent and its officers held the most important leadership positions. ZIPA effectively ceased to function when its ZIPRA component was withdrawn in 1977 by Nkomo in his drive to build up ZAPU's military arm after failure of the Geneva talks.

Estimates of the size of the insurgent forces vary considerably, but numbers were believed to have been over 50,000 in 1979. Not all of these, however, were sufficiently armed or trained to be considered combat effective. In the late 1970s about 15,000 guerrillas were active inside Rhodesia at any given time, most of them from ZANLA.

Ranged against the guerrillas in 1972 were security forces and reserves that numbered under 50,000 men. These were incorporated in a small, white-officered regular army of 3,400, of whom 80 percent were black, backed up by 8,000 white reservists. Equipment was old but well maintained. The air force inventory consisted of fifty-five aging aircraft that were nonetheless adequate to keep air superiority over any potential African enemy. The air arm could also strike at will against enemy bases in Zambia and Mozambique, and its helicopters were used effectively in counterinsurgency operations. The tough paramilitary police force, 6,400 strong and two-thirds black, was reinforced by a predominantly white reserve of nearly 30,000. Rhodesian security forces expanded dramatically in the late 1970s. By 1979 the regular army consisted of 10,000 men, including 3,200 white conscripts; trained reservists, organized in the Territorial Army, numbered about 15,000. Air strength was enhanced by the delivery of additional aircraft from South Africa.

Rhodesian regular forces had high morale, and all components were well trained for their missions. But the demands imposed by

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

stepped-up guerrilla activity after 1976 stretched meager white manpower resources. White reservists up to the age of forty-eight were liable to call-up for 190 days annually. Long periods of service in the field had a brutalizing effect on the white population as a whole, put strains on family life, reportedly contributed to a high incidence of alcoholism, and late in the war led to an increased emigration of whites of military age. Reinforcements could have been obtained from the large pool of black manpower, but fear of infiltration and mutiny prevented the government from exploiting it fully as a source of volunteers. Attempts to conscript Africans after 1978 met with resistance.

The military situation had seriously deteriorated by mid-1977 as the number of well-armed guerrillas grew measurably. Guerrillas brought the war to the cities and disrupted transportation and communications, but most of their attacks continued to be aimed at psychological targets—remote white farmsteads, undefended black villages, and isolated government installations. Both ZANLA and ZIPRA conducted operations in the TTL, but neither was able to establish liberated zones there. Large areas of land went untended as white farmers left holdings that were vulnerable to attack. Rural unemployment rose, schools and medical facilities were shut down in many areas, and more than 850,000 homeless blacks fled to refugee camps. About 150 “protected” villages containing more than 350,000 black inhabitants were set up by the government under special security precautions intended to isolate guerrillas from their support in the countryside, and “no-go” free-fire zones were established in the northeast. Curfews were imposed as urban violence increased, and systematic identity checks were instituted. Martial law was proclaimed in the TTL in 1978 and the next year was extended to the whole country. Prosecutions under the Emergency Powers Act and the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act multiplied as a result of the crackdown. Among those charged under the latter measure was Donal Lamont, the Roman Catholic bishop of Umtali, who was convicted of not reporting the presence of guerrillas in his diocese.

Estimates of casualties vary considerably as to numbers and cause. The most conservative figures indicate nearly 20,000 war-related deaths over the whole period of the conflict, a number that grew by increments of up to 1,000 a month during the peak of the fighting in 1979. More than half of these were guerrillas killed in combat operations. Losses in the security forces were put at 1,120 dead. About 500 white civilians were killed by guerrillas, including 107 passengers in two Air Rhodesia airliners shot down by Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missiles. The government cited 3,500 black civilians who died as a result of guerrilla actions, many of them as victims of land mines. Another 3,500 dead were officially listed as “crossfire” victims. Figures reported did not include severe civilian casualties inflicted during air attacks and commando raids on guerrilla camps in Zambia and Mozambique. Atrocities and acts of intimidation were com-

Historical Setting

mitted by both sides in the war, notably by security forces during punitive raids on villages suspected of aiding the guerrillas and by guerrillas in dealing with blacks accused of collaborating with the government. Some of the most widely publicized incidents were the murders of missionaries, which the government laid to the guerrillas. Nationalist organizations denied complicity in these actions, and some church officials and missionaries believed that security forces were responsible for them.

Détente and Negotiations, 1974-78

Rhodesia found its only allies in the two other countries, South Africa and Portugal, whose interests—preserving European domination in the region—were similar to its own. Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique were referred to collectively as the “white redoubt.” All faced threats from African nationalists and from externally supported guerrilla forces. All three had been condemned in international forums. Their governments had arranged for joint security planning, and in 1973 the Smith government had made public an agreement that allowed Rhodesian and Portuguese units to operate freely on both sides of their common border. South Africa sent support to Rhodesia in the form of paramilitary police units.

In April 1974 a military coup in Lisbon toppled the Portuguese government, replacing it with a revolutionary regime that began the process of decolonization in Angola and Mozambique. Both countries became independent the next year under Marxist-oriented regimes that profoundly altered the balance of power in southern Africa. Rhodesia, suddenly vulnerable to attack from Soviet-backed forces in Mozambique, became a liability to South Africa, which now sought a settlement that would provide stability on its northern flank even if it came at the expense of the white minority regime.

During a period of détente forced by events on unlikely partners, South Africa's Prime Minister John Vorster and Zambia's Kaunda worked together to bring about talks between Smith and the African nationalists before a deteriorating situation in Rhodesia invited Soviet and East European intervention. As a first step, Kaunda, Nyerere, and Seretse Khama (president of Botswana) sponsored a conference in Lusaka in December 1974 that brought together representatives of the rival nationalist groups to pressure them into devising a common approach to a political settlement. Muzorewa led the African National Council delegation. The Smith government cooperated with Vorster and, buoyed by another clean sweep of white-held seats by the RF in the recent election, felt secure enough in its own constituency to grant an amnesty to a number of political detainees—among them Mugabe, Nkomo, and Sithole—to allow them to participate in the Lusaka Conference.

The conferees agreed to use the African National Council as an umbrella organization and gave it a mandate to seek a political

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

settlement. Although a limited cease-fire was put in place, the conference report also stated that the "leaders recognize the inevitability of the continued armed struggle . . . until the liberation of Zimbabwe." The parties, whose representatives signed the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity at the conclusion of the conference, chose to interpret the document differently in the months that followed. In mid-1975 the Rhodesian government stopped the release of prisoners and ended talks with Muzorewa, citing flagrant cease-fire violations.

Another South African initiative brought Smith together with Vorster and representatives of the Zambian government in Pretoria in August 1975 to arrange for a renewal of contacts between the Rhodesian government and nationalist leaders. Deliberations nearly foundered, however, on finding a meeting place that was acceptable to both sides. A railroad dining car positioned over the international boundary at Victoria Falls allowed the nationalists, who were accompanied by Kaunda, to remain in Zambia while across the conference table from them Smith and Vorster sat in Rhodesia. Despite the elaborate preparations, the Victoria Falls talks broke down in their second day when Smith refused to consider granting immunity to "terrorists" still at large to participate openly in political activities before a cease-fire was instituted.

In the wake of the aborted conference, the African National Council split into two factions, both claiming to be the legitimate organization. Muzorewa and Sithole cooperated closely for a time in what became known as the African National Council (Muzorewa). Discouraged at the prospect of reaching a negotiated settlement with Smith, they left Rhodesia and sought unsuccessfully to build a following among guerrilla groups based outside the country. Meanwhile in October 1975 Nkomo and ZAPU loyalists, operating at that time under the label of the African National Council (Nkomo), had opened regular, informal talks with Smith. In the complex history of negotiations between the nationalists and the Smith government, any faction leader who engaged in bilateral talks with the white prime minister was immediately suspected of trying to make a separate deal that would exclude the others, and Smith took advantage of the opportunity to exploit differences among them. Nkomo's discussions with Smith ended after several months of weekly meetings at which the two remained at loggerheads on the question of a timetable for majority rule. In the meantime Mugabe had gone to Mozambique in a successful bid to build support among ZANU guerrilla forces there.

The United States had always viewed the Rhodesian problem as an element in a larger regional equation involving all of southern Africa. When Nkomo's contact with Smith had run its course without producing results, Washington seized the initiative to head off portended Soviet and East European intervention by way of Mozambique and Angola. Between April and September 1976 United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger conferred with African leaders and with Vorster and Smith, whom he met in Pretoria, to formulate an agenda



*Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith (extreme left) and cabinet ministers meeting with African National Council members in rail car parked on Victoria Falls bridge, August 1975
Source: Rhodesian Ministry of Information*

for a constitutional conference that would bring a settlement to the problem of Rhodesia and stability to the region. The Kissinger plan, which had complete British backing, called for majority rule in two years with an interim government in which blacks participated. Agreement on the terms of a settlement would be accompanied by a cease-fire and an immediate lifting of sanctions. Under prodding from Vorster, Smith accepted Kissinger's "package"—but he did so, he said, with grave misgivings. His acquiescence was taken to be a sign of war weariness and an acknowledgment that the sanctions were having an effect on the Rhodesian economy. It was announced that a conference would be convened in Geneva in October under British chairmanship.

The rival nationalist leaders jockeyed for position in the upcoming conference by rallying their followers in Rhodesia. Muzorewa returned to Salisbury where he was met with a tumultuous welcome that seemed to some observers to catapult him into the leadership of the nationalist movement. In the meantime Mugabe had made good his claim to the leadership of ZANU by deposing Sithole, with the strong backing of ZANLA forces in Mozambique, as nominal head of the organization. At the urging of neighboring African leaders, Mugabe

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

and Nkomo agreed to fuse ZANU and ZAPU as the Patriotic Front (PF) to represent the militant nationalists at Geneva. Armed with the recognition given by the OAU to the PF as the only legitimate representative of the Zimbabwean people, they worked out a common hard-line negotiating stance that added a new dimension to the proposed conference agenda by including demands for the immediate replacement of the minority government and the elimination of "capitalist exploitation" in an independent Zimbabwe.

The Geneva Conference was attended by Smith, representing the Rhodesian government, Mugabe and Nkomo for the PF, Muzorewa, and Sithole, who still had the support of a ZANU faction that had stayed outside the PF. The United States and Britain and several other Commonwealth countries were represented officially, and observers were invited from interested African states. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland proposed the structure of an interim government and extended the promise of a British presence to take responsibility for security during the transitional period to counter nationalist demands for disbanding government forces. All of the groups represented at the conference, including Smith's RF, would be given equal representation in the black majority interim government, leading to complete independence by March 1978. As a precondition for his acceptance of the British plan, however, Muzorewa insisted that whites be barred from retaining control of the defense and internal security ministries during the transition. The rival PF, which had laid claim to those same portfolios in the interim government, likewise resisted the British appeal for flexibility in setting the date for independence beyond the twelve-month deadline demanded by the nationalists. Smith also found the British proposals unacceptable, claiming that the reintroduction of a British presence in Rhodesia departed from the Kissinger "package" to which he had assented. He returned to Salisbury during a break in the sessions, hinting that he would pursue an internal settlement without foreign mediation. For lack of further cooperation, the Geneva process was abandoned after the conference adjourned in December.

Shortly after his return to Mozambique, Mugabe purged from ZANLA leftist radicals who had accused him of surrendering too much ground at Geneva and delivered them into the custody of Mozambican authorities, but the discord within ZANU's military arm had as much to do with the reluctance of guerrilla leaders to take orders from party officials as it did with differences over political tactics or ideology. Indeed Mugabe had stressed his Marxist orientation before and during the conference and, although he had admitted a continuing role for whites in an independent Zimbabwe, he had also taken the position that a multiparty state was a "luxury" that would not be conducive to "transforming society." Nkomo, his PF partner, had already begun to distance himself from Mugabe and played down the PF's Marxist attachment with assurances that he wanted a place for free enterprise in the future of the new state. Like

Historical Setting

Muzorewa, he considered that acceptance of black nationalists as responsible leaders by the economically dominant white community would be an important factor in obtaining their agreement to a settlement.

In April 1977 David Owen, who had replaced Crosland as British foreign secretary, made public a new Anglo-American initiative that proposed a conference to draw up a majority-rule constitution and to organize elections. A joint consultation group that included Owen and the United States permanent representative to the UN, Andrew Young, toured the region to carry on discussions with African leaders on the basis of which a series of proposals for a settlement were introduced in August. When Smith rejected this as offering inadequate guarantees to the whites, Britain and the United States presented an alternate set of proposals the following month. Parts of the revised Anglo-American program won the PF's approval, but on the whole the joint proposal fell short of its demands for the resignation of the white government and the disarming of security forces, as the first step to a return to legality, and a PF role in the transitional government. In the proposed solution a British administration would supervise a cease-fire, disarm combatants, and organize a new national army with the assistance of a UN peacekeeping force. The constitution contained a bill of rights that excluded racial discrimination but also guaranteed minority representation. Britain and the United States pledged to contribute to an economic and social development fund for the country if all parties agreed to the proposals. But Smith, whose RF had once again taken all fifty white seats in the election held in August, characterized them as an "insane . . . attempt to appease the Russian-oriented terrorists," and for the time being he withdrew from talks on the problem. The Rhodesian prime minister conceded, however, that a settlement was desired to end the fighting and lift the sanctions and that it could not be achieved without the end of racial discrimination.

Internal Settlement

Late in 1977 the Smith government once more sought to reestablish contacts with internal nationalist groups. In December intensive negotiations began with Muzorewa, whose faction had become the United African National Council (UANC) after breaking with Sithole earlier in the year; Sithole's group, which identified itself as the African National Council (Sithole); and a group of conservative progovernment chiefs who had allied under Chief Jeremiah Chirau as the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO) but lacked a popular following. An agreement was reached by participating parties in March 1978 to draft a new constitution, which would establish the black majority rule that Smith had once assured his constituency would not occur in his lifetime. A transitional government under an executive board composed of Smith and the three black leaders, each presiding in turn for a period of one month, took over in April with a

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

cabinet in which black and white co-ministers shared each portfolio. It moved deliberately to remove legal restrictions based on race. An undertaking was made to commission black officers in the predominately black ranks of the police and the regular army. About 800 of an estimated 1,000 political detainees were released, and an amnesty was promised to guerrillas who defected to the government side. The PF was offered a cease-fire, acceptance of which would be the first step toward negotiations on the future composition of the armed forces and the release of remaining prisoners.

Smith had concluded that a guaranteed position for whites in a black majority regime could not be obtained if the PF participated in the settlement and that the external parties could not be denied participation if Britain and the United States were involved in reaching an agreement. He had therefore gambled on an internal settlement would at once prove Rhodesia's commitment to black majority rule and also be the means of allowing a more moderate nationalist party like the UANC to preempt the PF's position. His calculations were based, however, on an overly optimistic evaluation of Muzorewa's constituency inside Rhodesia in relation to that of Mugabe. The PF had nonetheless been invited at several stages in the negotiations to take part in an internal settlement, but Mugabe, sensing a military victory, refused on the grounds that the settlement, like the political structure that it left intact, was illegal. Speaking at the UN, he bluntly explained his position: "The situation in Zimbabwe is a war situation . . . The reality is that only those locked in combat are capable of bringing about a settlement."

The new constitution produced as a result of the internal settlement was approved by the RF-controlled legislature in February 1979, creating a multiracial republic—Zimbabwe Rhodesia—in which the black majority shared power with the white minority. Like the 1969 constitution on which it was modeled, it provided for a president as ceremonial head of state and vested executive authority in the Executive Council, or cabinet, which was responsible to a bicameral legislature. The document also contained a bill of rights. The House of Assembly would be composed of seventy-two seats filled by representatives elected by a common roll with a black majority and twenty-eight additional seats reserved for whites, twenty to be chosen by a white roll, and eight by the common roll. Elections were set for April, and an amnesty was offered to guerrillas who came home to take part in them. The PF and other critics of the internal settlement challenged the 1979 constitution for protecting white political and economic control under the guise of a fictitious majority rule. Entrenched clauses guaranteeing disproportionate minority participation bestowed a form of "racial privilege" on whites, it was argued, allowing 5 percent of the population a virtual veto over any essential changes.

Historical Setting

More than 1.8 million voters, or 64.5 percent of an electorate of approximately 2.9 million made eligible by universal suffrage, went to the polls in the April parliamentary elections. Voters cast their ballots for party lists rather than for individual candidates. Five parties contested the seventy-two unreserved common roll seats, which it was understood would go to blacks. The UANC, garnering big majorities in Mashonaland districts, won 68 percent of the total vote and fifty-one seats in the new assembly. Sithole's party, renamed ZANU (Sithole), ran a distant second, attracting only 14.5 percent of the vote, which entitled it to twelve seats. The United National Federal Party (UNFP), an Ndebele party that called for a federal union of two black ethnic states each with an equal voice in government, took 10.7 percent of the vote (much of it from ZAPU supporters in Matabeleland) and won nine seats. The RF came away with all twenty seats from the white roll, winning sixteen of them unopposed. The UANC and the RF swept all thirty Senate seats, twenty of which were reserved for blacks and ten for whites. Muzorewa was asked to form a government by the new president, Josiah Gumede, and named a coalition cabinet with the RF and UNFP. Smith, recognized as the unofficial number-two man, was appointed minister without portfolio. Sithole, who had complained of voting irregularities, turned down an offer to participate in an all-party government, and his party for a time boycotted the assembly.

Delegations from Zimbabwe Rhodesia had visited officials in Washington and London to convince them that the election would allow for approval by all Rhodesian people as demanded in the "five principles," but United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance replied that his government could agree to lift sanctions only if they were UN supervised and involved PF participation. Muzorewa, who came to office stating that his job was "the creation of peace," had pinned his hopes on the American and British recognition of the internal settlement and, in consequence, the lifting of sanctions and progress toward a cease-fire. United States President Jimmy Carter rejected Muzorewa's overtures soon after the voting, however, repeating Vance's earlier judgment that the election had not met standards of international supervision or allowed representation of all the people. In Britain the government of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at first characterized the internal settlement and subsequent election as an advance toward the restoration of legality despite obvious imperfections. But it modified that position when leaders at the Commonwealth Conference, held in Lusaka in August, insisted that recognition not be extended to the Muzorewa regime since it did not represent a real transfer of power to the black majority. Thatcher submitted to the Commonwealth chiefs a list of conditions, including new elections and "genuine black majority rule," that Zimbabwe Rhodesia would be expected to fulfill before legality could be restored. The British formula, approved by the entire Commonwealth membership and forwarded to Salisbury, was to

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

form the basis of a new constitutional initiative.

The internal settlement had not achieved its desired ends—recognition of the regime's legality, a cease-fire, and the removal of sanctions. War and embargo had a telling effect that made even the hard-line RF willing to go to the conference table again. Muzorewa accepted a British invitation to send a delegation to a constitutional conference at Lancaster House in London. Concerned African leaders like Kaunda and Nyerere, who were anxious to end the conflict in the region, also exerted strong pressure on the PF to go to Lancaster House prepared to make concessions to achieve a settlement. The Zimbabwe Rhodesia government was represented by Muzorewa, Smith, Sithole, and Peter Walls, commander of the Rhodesian armed forces. At the conference they met with British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and PF leaders Mugabe and Nkomo.

The Lancaster House Conference and Independence

Lord Carrington convened the Lancaster House Conference in September by tabling for discussion a draft constitution prepared in advance by British officials. Its principal features were a British-monitored transition to black majority rule and assurance of white minority representation for a "specific period after independence." The British proposal was intended primarily as a basis for bargaining, however, and not a settlement to be imposed on the parties involved.

The PF delegation offered an alternative document that demanded a presidential form of government and that did not contain any guarantees to protect minority interests. Under this plan the new government would not accept obligations—to public employees, for instance—made since 1965, nor would it accept automatically the citizenship of immigrants who had come after that date. The PF also demanded that the government security forces stand down and proposed that Britain and the PF share power during the transitional period.

Muzorewa agreed in principle to British proposals on the condition that sanctions were dropped and that Britain would make a commitment to maintain security in the country. The PF in its turn conceded to a parliamentary form of government with temporary reserved white representation up to 20 percent but stopped short at accepting a minority veto on constitutional change. Discussions stalled, however, when the PF delegation refused to compromise further on the land question, particularly on its plans for land redistribution, and left the conference.

On October 3 Carrington submitted what he emphasized was the final version of a settlement, acceptance of which would mean that both sides had given in on some disputed points. All government obligations, including those made by the illegal regime, would be respected. Compensation would be paid for land compulsorily acquired by the government for redistribution. The Declaration of Rights, reinstituted to protect minority rights, would be entrenched for ten



African voters at polling place during the April 1979 parliamentary elections. Elderly man (foreground) reacts proudly over blacks' first opportunity to vote for national candidates.

Courtesy Herbert M. Howe

years and special legislative representation for whites for seven years. Many other questions—such as citizenship—would be left to the new legislature to settle internally. Carrington, who determined not to allow the discussions to be deadlocked, set an October 11 deadline for acceptance by all sides, warning that deliberations on the transitional government would go on without the PF if its full cooperation were not forthcoming.

Carrington's time limit passed without a response from the PF, and on October 16 the British foreign secretary began bilateral talks with Muzorewa on the form of a transitional government. At this crucial juncture in the negotiations the so-called front-line states (see Glossary) served notice on the PF to return to the conference and accept Carrington's compromise on the land question. Without further delay Mugabe and Nkomo rejoined the talks at Lancaster House, stating that their opposition to the proposed land settlement had been mollified by the promise of British and American aid for future agricultural development. An agreement on the constitution was concluded on October 22, and British terms for a transitional government and for disarming combatants were accepted in November after continued discussions.

On December 6, 1979, the British Parliament gave its assent to the Southern Rhodesia Act, which stated that the constitution pro-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

duced during the Lancaster House Conference would come into effect when "Southern Rhodesia becomes independent as a Republic under the name of Zimbabwe." This was followed by the Zimbabwe Act, which recognized the colony's return to legality and marked the end of the rebellion. During the transition period, the crown colony would be administered by a governor instructed directly by the British government. The governor was to be assisted by a staff of British military, police, legal, and political officers. He was to have full executive and legislative authority and responsibility for supervising the operation of government. All ministerial functions were to be exercised by members of the governor's staff. The House of Assembly voted unanimously on December 12 that Zimbabwe Rhodesia "shall cease to be an independent State and shall become part of Her Majesty's dominions." Later that same day the new British governor, Lord Soames, who had held a series of important posts in past Conservative governments, arrived in Salisbury to assume his duties. He decreed from Government House, which he reoccupied, that the crown colony would be known as Rhodesia.

After the vote of the assembly reverting to colonial rule, Britain lifted its sanctions, and its action was soon followed by that of the United States and Commonwealth members. The UN formally terminated its sanctions on December 16. The most serious tasks then confronting Soames were arranging and monitoring a cease-fire, disarming combatants, undertaking their integration into a new armed forces establishment, and facilitating the return of refugees before the proposed election. Military commanders on both sides were made responsible to the governor for the actions of their troops. British police were brought in to enhance security arrangements, and a 1,350-man Commonwealth peacekeeping force was deployed to implement the cease-fire. The British command proposed to keep PF units and government security forces separated. The PF forces were instructed to proceed to sixteen assembly points established in various parts of the country. All movement across borders was prohibited after December 21. Enforcement of the cease-fire was put in the hands of a commission composed of equal representation from both sides and headed by the British military adviser.

One of Soames' first acts was to lift the ban on proscribed political parties. Mugabe announced that ZANU would contest the upcoming election separately, whereupon Nkomo attempted to register the ZAPU contingent under the PF party label. Because both nationalist leaders claimed to be the legitimate representative of the PF, British authorities insisted that their parties be registered respectively as ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU. Nine other parties, including the UANC, proposed candidates for voting that took place on February 27-29, 1980, for eighty common roll seats in the assembly. ZANU-PF won a commanding majority that assured Mugabe leadership in the new government of Zimbabwe. On March 11, Lord Soames summoned him to form a government as prime minister. Canaan Banana, an

Historical Setting

American-educated Methodist clergyman who had been the leader of Mugabe's internal organization, was elected president on April 11 by a joint session of the legislature. A week later—on April 18, 1980—the British flag was once again hauled down in Salisbury in ceremonies that marked formally the inauguration of the independent Republic of Zimbabwe.

* * *

A popular introduction to Zimbabwe's history before independence is provided in Robert Blake's *A History of Rhodesia*. Martin Meredith's evocative and clearly written *The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979* is a scholarly review of the country's history that covers the period from the beginning of European settlement to the internal settlement. For material on important aspects of the country's early history, Peter S. Garlake's *The Great Zimbabwe* provides an accessible and well-illustrated study by a noted archaeologist and Africanist. Martin Chanock's *Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia, and South Africa, 1900-45* is an impressively researched monograph dealing with the political and diplomatic background to the BASC and colonial rule in the broader framework of British imperial policy. Particularly recommended is James Barber's analysis of the politics of UDI in his *Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion*; Larry W. Bowman's *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in An African State*; and Miles Hudson's *Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, an interpretative survey of attempts at a negotiated settlement by a British participant and observer. The armed struggle between Zimbabwean nationalists and Rhodesian security forces is viewed from different perspectives in similarly titled books, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush*, prepared by Lewis H. Gann and Thomas H. Henriksen, and David Martin and Phyllis Johnson's *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War*. R. Kent Rasmussen's detailed *Historical Dictionary of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe* is an indispensable reference tool for any serious study of Zimbabwe's historical development. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment



The unique baobab trees, often more than 1,000 years old, are a symbol of traditional importance to Zimbabwe's African peoples.

INDEPENDENCE BROUGHT a major change in the locus of power with implications for the reordering of the African social system. An African political elite has taken the place of the European ruling class, and its establishment permits the flowering of social differentiation in African society well beyond that possible before independence. The meaning of that differentiation for the development of social classes among Africans remained unclear in mid-1982, given the uncertainty of the country's political and economic direction. Whether Zimbabwe turns to some form of socialism or not, the dominant class is likely to exercise power through direct control of government rather than through private control of economic resources.

The political elite, as well as the administrators, technicians, and professionals who were employed or directed by the elite, were educated and largely urban; their orientation stressed political, economic, and social, i.e., naturalistic, explanations of their experience. Although urbanization was likely to proceed at a faster pace than it had before independence, the bulk of the African population was rural and poor and characterized by a world view that had its roots in indigenous religion or in forms of Christianity quite different from that of the mission Christianity, to which less than one-fifth of the population adhered, including many in the elite. Ordinary Zimbabweans were concerned with getting along in this world, but their notion of how that world worked differed sharply from that of the elite. A vast effort had been launched to give all Africans at least a primary education and many of them more than that. Nevertheless that education, no matter how adequate, would take some time to show its effects. In the meantime the economic and social gap between urban and rural Zimbabweans, particularly between the elite and the masses, would remain wide.

The Europeans have been divested of ultimate political power, although they had a formal role in the government and sometimes a good deal to say in its day-to-day operations. Their way of life remained a model for many Africans, but they were no longer the arbiters of social status. Never more than 5 percent of the population, whites had diminished to less than 3 percent, and there could be further losses. Still they controlled much of the modern economy and were, for the moment, considered essential to its adequate functioning.

The conflict between blacks and whites having been resolved for all practical purposes, the question of the nature and extent of relations between Africans became more salient. Despite the elite's explicit rejection of the relevance of ethnicity to the allocation of rewards and opportunities in the new order, there has been some conflict couched in ethnic terms, and there have been accusations of ethnically biased behavior. Usually the focus has been on the actual-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

ity or possibility of conflict between the two major ethnolinguistic categories—Shona speakers and Ndebele speakers. Other groups were numerically and politically insignificant. The Shona speakers were overwhelmingly the largest group—three-fourths or more of the population—and were by no means a cohesive, undifferentiated people. Given that differentiation and their sheer numbers, the possibility of conflict between Shona groups was at least as likely in the long run as Shona-Ndebele conflict and perhaps potentially more threatening to social peace.

The Physical Environment

Landlocked Zimbabwe, situated in tropical southeastern Africa, has an area of 390,308 square kilometers, approximately the size of California. Its principal geologic feature is a broad plateau that forms an elevated savanna region, or highveld, through the center of the country. Lower plateau regions on either side of it slope to three river basins: the Zambezi on the northern border, the Limpopo in the south, and the Sabi in the southeast (see fig. 6).

On the highveld and in a mountainous area along the eastern border, average elevations above 1,200 meters moderate the tropical climate that prevails throughout the country. The most comfortable area extends from the capital city of Harare (formerly Salisbury) southwestward beyond Bulawayo, the second largest city. These uplands also receive more rainfall than the surrounding middleveld or the lowveld areas near the borders. This somewhat more generous precipitation is limited to the summer season, however, a fact that has a pervasive influence on all life on the highveld as well as on the lower savannas. Plants, animals, and human beings must be able to survive an annual dry season of six to eight months. The original vegetation fostered by this climate was wooded savanna, but in some areas of the highveld and in parts of the middleveld the savanna vegetation has been removed and the land converted to farming.

Geographic Regions

Zimbabwe is marked by four regions defined primarily in terms of relief (or considerations of altitude) but associated in varying degrees with bioclimatic zones. The first of these is the highveld, land between 1,200 and 1,500 meters extending through the center of the country from southwest to northeast. The second region, land between 900 and 1,200 meters, is the middleveld. As the descending plateau approaches the northern and southern borders marked by the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers, it becomes the lowveld—land under 900 meters. The fourth region consists of the eastern highlands, which are mountainous in contrast to the plateau that characterizes the rest of the country.

The highveld, between eighty and 160 kilometers wide and extending for nearly 650 kilometers through the center of Zimbabwe, constitutes between one-fifth and one-fourth of the total

land area. Some of the native vegetation—tall grasses and open woodlands—has been removed to make way for cultivation, but substantial areas (devoted to beef and dairy herding) retain their original vegetation. The redistribution of some of this land, contemplated by the government, may change that picture.

The undulating or flat surfaces of much of the highveld are given character by granite outcroppings in the form of rock towers and hills, locally called kopjes. The central upland is also marked by the Great Dyke, a massive extrusion of mineralized rock that extends generally from north to south for more than 500 kilometers. Only a few kilometers wide in most segments, it rises as much as 450 meters above the surrounding highveld in a series of eroded ridges.

Flanking the highveld and merging almost imperceptibly into it is the more extensive middleveld, constituting nearly two-fifths of Zimbabwe's land. On the southeastern flank of the highveld, the middleveld is never more than 120 kilometers in breadth and often less; on the opposite flank it may be twice that in many places. Natural vegetation on the middleveld is a mosaic of wooded grasslands. In the drier part of the middleveld the grassland persists because the land has been considered unsuitable for intensive cultivation and has been given over to stock raising (see Agriculture, ch. 3). Elsewhere, however, shrubs and trees have been cleared. The kopjes found in the highveld also occur in the middleveld.

Somewhat more than one-third of the total land area consists of lowveld, which is most extensive in the Limpopo and Sabi river basins in the south and southeast and less so in the north. The lowland along the Zambezi River below Lake Kariba is sharply demarcated from the middleveld by the Zambezi Escarpment. The lake itself is separated from the nearby lowveld, particularly in the south. Owing to inadequate soils and rainfall and, in some places, the tsetse fly, much of the lowveld has been unproductive.

The eastern highlands consist of a set of mountain ranges marked by the presence of tropical and subtropical hardwoods. The highest peak, Inyangani, reaches 2,594 meters, and a number of others exceed 1,800 meters.

Climate

Zimbabwe's climate includes a warm, rainy season—the Southern Hemisphere summer—from November into March; a transitional period of diminishing rainfall extending into May; a cool and dry winter season from May to August; and a season that becomes increasingly warm and dry from August through October until both the progressive increase in daily temperatures and the annual drought are interrupted in November by the first rains of the succeeding wet season.

Mean annual rainfall varies considerably from one part of the country to another, but none receives great quantities of rain, and as much as two-thirds of Zimbabwe receives less than 800 millimeters.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study




Figure 6. Terrain and Drainage

The Society and Its Environment



Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Only parts of the eastern highlands get more than 1,200 millimeters of rain annually (in a few places as much as 1,800 millimeters), and substantial areas in the south and some in the northwest get only half that amount or a good deal less (see fig. 7).

The level of rainfall is critically important. In half the country the effective rainfall is inadequate for dependable crop production, and rainfall may vary greatly from year to year. As a general rule, the lower the average rainfall, the lower is its dependability. Thus the lowveld areas—subarid during the best of years—suffer severely from wide variations in total rainfall, which occurs at frequent but irregular intervals.

Although not extreme, slopes in most areas are steep enough that much of the rain flows quickly to stream channels rather than soaking slowly into the subsoil or into subsurface aquifers. Some rainstorms are heavy, and much of their potential value is lost as the water rushes off croplands or grasslands into the rivers, possibly carrying topsoil away as well.

Moderately high altitude, low average cloud cover, and tropical sunshine result in a high rate of evaporation of surface water. Most of the country receives little significant rainfall between May and November, and many streams dry up entirely during this annual dry season. Some water is retained in *vleis* (natural storage pools lying on impermeable soil and rock strata). Many of these have been tapped by boreholes and wells and have become indispensable as water sources for people and animals during the long dry season.

Drainage

Runoff from the entire landmass, excluding only a small area in the southwest, is carried by three rivers that reach the Indian Ocean via Mozambique. Two of them originate outside Zimbabwe: the Zambezi along the Zambia-Angola border and the Limpopo in South Africa. The headwaters of the third major stream, the Sabi, are south of Harare on the eastern slopes of the highveld.

Tributaries of the Zambezi River, which marks much of the northern border, collect runoff waters from nearly all of the land in the western, northern, and northeastern areas of the country. The longest of all African rivers flowing to the Indian Ocean, the Zambezi is already carrying a heavy volume of water as it approaches westernmost Zimbabwe. In this area the river drops over Victoria Falls, a cataract nearly 109 meters high at its maximum and nearly 1.6 kilometers wide.

At Kariba 480 kilometers below Victoria Falls, a major dam on the Zambezi (completed in 1959) created Lake Kariba. This is one of the largest man-made lakes in the world, reaching 280 kilometers upstream and flooding more than 5,000 square kilometers in Zimbabwe and Zambia.

The Zambezi system draws water from all of Zimbabwe lying northwest of the central ridgeline of the highveld except for an area




*This baobab tree in Zimbabwe's lowveld is
thought to be about 1,500 years old.
Courtesy Sheila L. Ross*

of low rainfall near the southwestern border, where the Nata River and a few other small intermittent streams carry the annual runoff to an internal drainage basin in Botswana.

Runoff from most of the land on the eastern and southeastern slopes of the central ridgeline flows generally southeastward through numerous tributaries of the Limpopo and Sabi rivers. Although it is shorter and carries a lesser volume of water than the Zambezi, the Limpopo is also one of Africa's major streams. Its gradient is relatively even except in the Beitbridge area, where it flows through an extensive gorge marked by rapids and several waterfalls. Numerous tributaries carry a heavy volume of water from upper levels of the veld, where annual rainfall is heavier than in the lowveld areas near the Limpopo itself.

Southeastern Zimbabwe, from the towns of Zvishavane and Triangle northward to the ridgeline between Marondera and Mutare (marked by the Mutare-Harare rail line), is drained by the Sabi River and its tributaries. From the upper levels of its watershed west of Mutare, the Sabi flows southward into the lowveld. There it is joined by the Lundi River, which collects water from the Zvishavane and Masvingo areas; it turns eastward at the border, eventually reaching the Indian Ocean in east-central Mozambique.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study



Source: Based on information from George Kay, *Rhodesia: A Human Geography*, New York, 1970, p. 17; and I.M. Hume, *A Strategy for Rural Development and Whitsun Data Bank No. 2: The Peasant Sector*, Salisbury, October 1978, p.47

Figure 7. Mean Annual Rainfall

Demography

Based on extrapolations from the 1969 census the population of Zimbabwe was estimated by its Central Statistical Office at 7.6 million in mid-1981. The first postindependence census of Zimbabwe's population was taken in mid-August 1982, but preliminary results were not available. Despite some difficulties noted in the press, this census should provide a useful basis for social and




*Some 75 million gallons of water every minute
tumble over Victoria Falls on Zambezi River.
Courtesy United Nations/AT*

economic planning. Nearly 97 percent of the 1981 total were Africans. Of the remaining 3 percent, the great bulk— perhaps 200,000 persons—were Europeans (whites), a group that had begun to diminish in size even before independence and in mid-1982 was estimated at 170,000. The number of Coloured (a racially mixed group) and Asians (mainly descendants of persons originating in the Indian subcontinent) was much smaller (see Ethnicity and Race, this ch.).

The vast African majority has grown at an estimated annual rate of 3.5 percent since the 1969 census. The World Bank's *World Development Report, 1982* projected a very high 4.3 percent annual growth rate for 1980-2000, which would yield a population of 17 million at the turn of the century. The Coloured population has been growing at an even higher rate and the Asian population at a lower one. The European segment, net immigration aside, has reproduced itself at an annual rate (less than 1.5 percent) similar to that of most populations in industrialized countries. The age structure of the African population—more than 50 percent was under fifteen—reflected that group's high annual growth rate.

Zimbabwe's overall population density in 1981 was more than nineteen persons per square kilometer, but regional densities varied considerably, affected in part by bioclimatic conditions and in part by land policy under the preindependence regime. That policy had restricted much of the most desirable agricultural land to Euro-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study



Source: Based on information from A.J. Christopher, "Recent Trends in Land Tenure in Rhodesia, 1961-70," *Geography*, London, 1971, p. 142.

Figure 8. Land Apportionment and Tenure Before 1979

peans, thus limiting densities in a large part of the country. Some distribution of that land to Africans was under way in the early 1980s, and population distribution and density at the end of the decade were likely to be much different from that revealed by 1969 census data and still prevalent in the late 1970s.

The Society and Its Environment




Figure 9. Division of Rhodesia's Land, 1970

Land Allocation and the Rural Population

Before Zimbabwe's independence the distribution and density of population, particularly of the vast African majority, were determined to a substantial degree by legal restrictions on the occupation and ownership of land based on race. The Land Tenure Act of 1969 confirmed the racial basis of land apportionment. It divided the territory into three basic segments: African lands and European lands, each 46.6 percent of the total, and National Land, 6.8 percent. Further distinctions were made within the two main divisions (see fig. 8; fig. 9). By far the most significant portion of the African area consisted of the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL), held in a form of customary tenure; the African Purchase Areas, open to freehold occupation by Africans, were much smaller. European General land, available

Zimbabwe: A Country Study


for farming and other exploitation, constituted the largest part of the European area (see Land Use and Ownership, ch. 3). The main cities and towns were located in areas in the European General category.

The European areas included more than three-fourths of the highlands and highveld, roughly two-fifths of the middleveld, and more than one-fourth of the lowveld. Much of the higher land, including part of the middleveld, is most suitable for agriculture, and had it been occupied by Africans living in homesteads of the usual kind, it would have been more densely populated. In 1969, however, Africans (laborers, tenants, and squatters) in the European rural areas averaged five per square kilometer, whereas the mean density in the TTL was eighteen per square kilometer (see fig. 10). Local densities within each category of land varied with its agricultural quality, roughly related to altitude but determined by rainfall and soil quality. In any given agro-ecological region, however, densities in the TTL far exceeded those in the European areas. The densities in the relatively small African Purchase Areas were much lower than those in the TTL but somewhat greater than those in the European rural areas. Europeans did not significantly affect rural population densities inasmuch as less than 15 percent of the European population lived on farms or in very small towns. The small Asian and Coloured populations were even more urbanized than the Europeans.

At the time of independence in April 1980 the African population of the TTL was estimated at about 3.5 million and the average density at between twenty-one and twenty-two persons per square kilometer. Africans in the European rural areas were estimated to number 1.75 million, and their mean density was between eight and nine persons per square kilometer.

From 1977 to 1979 the earlier law governing land apportionment and tenure was dismantled and finally repealed, but there was no significant change in patterns of occupancy until independence. The government clearly intends to resettle Africans on some of the land formerly restricted to Europeans. In addition to the political pressures on an African-led government to give Africans access to such land, there is apparently a practical need to do so. The TTL are overcrowded, and the refugees who fled to neighboring states have returned and need land, as do large numbers of Africans who took refuge in the cities or were compulsorily regrouped in protected villages during the war.

A substantial portion—estimates vary—of the land in the former European areas has been unused or underused, and resettlement of Africans there began soon after independence; squatters had also occupied some of the land. As of mid-1982, however, resettlement had gone slowly—an estimated 14,000 families had been resettled. But at that time it was expected that an additional 164,000 families would be resettled in the next three years (see Land Use and Ownership, ch. 3).



Source: Based on information from I.M. Hume, *A Strategy for Rural Development and Whitsun Data Bank No. 2: The Peasant Sector*, Salisbury, October 1978, Map C1, p. 41.

Figure 10. Rural Population Density in the Tribal Trust Lands, 1969

The Urban Population

Cities and towns of any size were initially established in the European areas, and until the late 1950s African urban laborers were considered temporary residents in them. Only in 1963 were Africans

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

permitted to acquire freehold property in African townships in or near the cities. Even so, laws not repealed until 1979 required that Africans living in urban areas be registered, and they permitted the authorities to send unemployed and unregistered Africans to the rural areas. In 1969, therefore, only 13.6 percent of the African population lived in the main cities and towns, a proportion that rose slightly to an estimated 16.8 percent in 1978.

The European population by contrast has been largely urban from the beginning, a consequence of the typically urban sources and skills of most European immigrants and the scale and mechanization of European agriculture. The typically large European farm or ranch has often provided a home for only one or two white families, but the labor on such a farm has usually been furnished entirely by Africans. In 1969 the proportion of all Europeans living in the main cities and towns was 78.6 percent. The ratio of Africans to Europeans in all urban areas, large and small, listed in the 1969 census was slightly more than four to one (in the main towns, slightly less), whereas the ratio for the territory as a whole was more than twenty to one.

The Central Statistical Office estimated the combined population of the fourteen main urban areas in mid-1981 as roughly 1.5 million (slightly more than 20 percent of the national total). The absolute number was more than 70 percent greater than that for the same towns in 1969, and the proportion of the total population was nearly 25 percent greater than at the time of the census (see table 2, Appendix). In the intervening years, although the numbers in urban areas continued to grow, the rate of growth and the proportion of the total population in those areas fluctuated owing to the civil war and the movements of the African and European populations.

The estimates of the Central Statistical Office do not distinguish the numbers or proportions of the races in the urban areas; but the departure of many whites (most of them urban), coupled with the growth of absolute numbers in the cities and towns, suggests that the ratio of Africans to Europeans is probably much greater than it was in 1969. It did not match the proportion of the two races in the country at large, however, and may not do so for some time.

Structure: Age and Sex

The age and sex structure of the total African population in 1969 may be graphed as a broad-based pyramid with a sharp apex characteristic of a population marked by a high birthrate and a relatively low average life expectancy. The usual differences in sex ratio by age obtained: there were more males than females in the lower age brackets but fewer in the higher ones. The 1980 estimates reflect essentially the same dynamics (see fig. 11)


The structure of the African population was not uniform, however, varying in response to legal, economic, and social constraints on the residence and mobility of Africans. The characteristics of the urban African population differed considerably from those of rural Africans.



*Name of Zimbabwe's modern capital city was changed from Salisbury to Harare in April 1982, second anniversary of national independence.
Courtesy United Nations/Jerry Frank*

Adult males outnumbered adult females in the urban areas and were in turn outnumbered in the rural areas, particularly in the TTL, where most Africans lived. In the African Purchase Areas the ratio of females to males was not quite so great as in the TTL. In the European rural areas adult men outnumbered adult women; the proportion of children was somewhat lower than in the TTL but higher than in urban areas. More distorted than any of these was the structure of the population of foreign-born Africans in which males in the prime of their working life far outnumbered females, and the proportion of children was very small. Inasmuch as most foreign Africans worked in either the urban or the European rural areas, their presence contributed to but did not wholly account for the distortions of age and sex there (see fig. 12). Later estimates of the age and sex structure in relation to residence were not available, but

Zimbabwe: A Country Study



Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Zimbabwe Fact Sheet: Social and Economic Profile (Revised)*, 1981, Salisbury, 1981.

Figure 11. Age and Sex Structure of African Population, 1980


it is likely that these variations persisted at least until independence and had only begun to change as of 1982. The allocation of land to Africans in the European areas and the possibility that a number of foreign Africans will leave should lead to less distorted patterns.

Internal and External Migration

At the time of the 1969 census roughly one-eighth of the enumerated population consisted of persons who were either immigrants or the descendants of immigrants who had arrived at some time between the end of the nineteenth century and the time of the census. Some came with the expectation of permanent residence but did not stay; others thought of themselves as temporary sojourners but lived in the territory for a long time. The two major components of the nonindigenous group in 1969 were the Europeans (228,296) and Africans of foreign origin (362,840). Of much less importance were those of Asian origin (8,965).

Before independence the numbers of whites entering and leaving the country varied in response to the migrants' perceptions of the political and economic situations in Rhodesia and in their countries of origin, principally Britain and South Africa but including other former British colonies and other European states (see *Ethnic and Racial groupings*, this ch.). The European population reached its

The Society and Its Environment



Source: Based on information from George Kay, *Distribution and Density of African Population in Rhodesia*, Hull, 1972, Figure 3.

Figure 12. Age and Sex Composition of African Population by Residence, 1969

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

peak in 1975 at roughly 278,000 and began to decline thereafter, the decline becoming rapid by 1979 after the installation of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. In mid-1980, shortly after independence, the white population was estimated at 223,200. In mid-1982 the whites in Zimbabwe were estimated at 170,000. Net emigration in the two years after independence clearly reflected the impression that many whites could not be comfortable under the changing social and political order even if their jobs and incomes remained, for the time being at least, essentially as they had been before independence (see *Race Relations: Blacks, Whites, and Others*, this ch.).

From the point of view of the Zimbabwean economy and to a lesser extent of government administration, the numbers leaving were not as significant as the loss of the skills of those departing. Most of the emigrants were trained technicians, skilled workers, and supervisory personnel of considerable importance to the modern (and nonagricultural) sector of the economy. Inasmuch as Africans were not given access to apprenticeship and other training programs until the late 1970s, relatively few were in a position to take up the slack in the early 1980s. Some of the skilled emigrants have been replaced by immigrants, but there was a net loss as of 1982. In specific cases, e.g., for the running of the railroads, expatriates (Pakistanis from the Asian subcontinent and from Kenya) have been hired, and others will be, but the government hoped not to have to rely on contracted workers beyond the short run (see *Employment, Income Distribution, and Prices*, ch. 3).

In 1969 foreign-born Africans from neighboring countries constituted 7.5 percent of the total population, having declined in absolute numbers and in percentage—11.3—of the total from 1962 (see *Ethnic and Racial Groupings*, this ch.). Indigenous African wage earners did not outnumber alien wage earners until the early 1960s. For the most part alien Africans were to be found in the European rural areas and the urban centers. It is probable that the absolute numbers of foreign-born Africans have continued to diminish, and it is certain that their proportion of the population has done so. There is no indication of explicit government policy with respect to foreign-born Africans, but they are likely to be in a position of competition with Zimbabweans.

The patterns of migratory wage labor by indigenous Zimbabweans in the preindependence era do not provide reliable guides to possible postindependence developments, given earlier restrictions on African urban migration, the division of rural land into African and European areas, and the state of armed conflict. Nevertheless it is worth noting that 50 to 60 percent of African rural households in the late 1970s depended to some extent in cash earned by migrant laborers. Before independence migration led to distortions of a complementary kind in the age and sex structures of the urban and European areas on the one hand—the dominance of working-age

males—and the African areas on the other—dominance of the very old, the very young, and women. The growth in number of stable (nonmigratory) families in the urban areas had just begun when the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965 led to new distortions generated by guerrilla warfare. Conflict also led to the congregation of refugees, estimated at 400,000, outside the main towns, particularly Harare, Bulawayo, and Gweru.

The new government would like to discourage the influx of large numbers of unemployed, and often unemployable, young males into the towns—so common in developing countries. It has, therefore, emphasized training relevant to rural life and the provision of an opportunity for a decent agriculture-based livelihood for Zimbabweans. Owing to the gradualness of the resettlement process and the difficulties of reorienting the educational system as well as the attraction of the towns, migration may be difficult to control. Moreover in mid-1982 the government was in no position politically to use police methods to exclude African migrants from the cities. An influx may therefore be expected.

Ethnicity and Race

Independence reordered relations between Africans and Europeans in Zimbabwe and provided a new context for the interaction of the two major African peoples: the Shona and the Ndebele. It was also likely to make a difference in the significance of groupings within the preponderant Shona population.

Until 1980 Europeans were politically and economically dominant. They controlled the allocation of resources and benefits and had anchored their status and privileges in the political and legal systems. Except for a few individuals, Europeans were socially isolated from Africans, who related to them mainly as representatives of government authority or as employers and to a lesser extent as missionaries or teachers. In other contexts, such as the marketplace or the clinic or hospital, relations between blacks and whites were ephemeral and impersonal. In all of these situations Africans' deference to Europeans was required. Independence ended European political dominance.

In 1982 the remaining whites were still at the high end of the income scale, and many were still in a position to control economic enterprises of some significance. But they were operating in a society that regarded the Europeans' place in the economy not as an end in itself but as a convenient and perhaps temporary means to other ends. The end of European political dominance, especially after a bitter war, did not bring with it an easy shift to a more egalitarian mode of social relations between Europeans and Africans. With some exceptions Europeans remained isolated, and many sought to maintain an educational and health care system that reinforced the isolation. Some whites seemed to assume that they were entitled to the same kind of deference to which they had become accustomed. Some Africans by contrast felt free to express feelings ranging from

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

indifference to hostility. Adaptation to a new order and forbearance in the first two years of independence were not easily achieved.

In the long run the most important issue has been—and will continue to be—the extent to which ethnicity serves as a basis for division between Zimbabwe's two most important African peoples. The distinction between Shona and Ndebele has been said to account for political alignments in modern nationalist movements and to limit easy social relations between people of each category. In fact the situation has seldom been so clear-cut. Ndebele defeat and domination of sections of the Shona not long before colonial rule was imposed left its residue of bitterness among the Shona and perhaps a sense of superiority among some Ndebele. But many Shona never experienced either conflict with the Ndebele or dominance by them, and the Shona did not at the time see themselves as one people, i.e., the experience of some sections was not regarded as the experience of all Shona. Moreover many of the modern leaders stemming from both groups have considered the ethnic difference irrelevant, although their followers often have not. In social matters different regional distribution and differences of language rather than antipathy have accounted for most social separateness.

In 1982 the sheer size of the Shona—more than 5 million people—and the fact that any acquired sense of unity was relatively recent suggested that sectionalism within the Shona might be more significant for social and political cohesion in Zimbabwe than the Ndebele-Shona division. Differences of dialect, culture, and region that could be used to signal ethnic boundaries already existed and sometimes came into play in political and social relations. But in so large and varied a people, other cleavages, e.g., those of social class and religion or between urban and rural dwellers, might override ethnicity (see *The Changing Social Order; Religious Life*, this ch.).

Ethnic and Racial Groupings

Of the two major African ethnolinguistic categories, Shona speakers, by far the larger, occupied most of the eastern two-thirds of the country and substantial sections of the western one-third (see fig. 13). According to the 1969 census, they constituted more than two-thirds (66.9 percent) of the total population and nearly 71 percent of all Africans. Given the departure of many whites and some nonindigenous Africans (7.5 percent of the population in 1969), it was likely that in 1982 Shona speakers made up 70 percent or more (about 5.3 million people) of the total Zimbabwean population and perhaps 75 percent of all Africans. Ndebele speakers constituted 14.8 percent of the total in 1969 and 15.8 percent of the African population. Their proportion of the total may have risen to as much as 16 percent (about 1.2 million people) by 1982. None of the half-dozen or so other indigenous groups—all living along Zimbabwe's borders and more heavily represented in neighboring countries—came to as much as 2 percent of all Africans in 1969, and they

constituted an even smaller part of the total population. Together they accounted for a little less than 5 percent of all Africans then and probably accounted for roughly the same proportion in the early 1980s. Speakers of foreign languages not indigenous to Zimbabwe constituted 7.8 percent of all Africans in 1969 and 7.5 percent of the total. Nyanja speakers originating in Malawi were the largest single group (more than 250,000) and were 5.2 percent of all Africans. Of the roughly 375,000 foreign Africans enumerated in 1969, an estimated 229,000 were wage workers. Later data on the total number of nonindigenous Africans were not available, but wage workers were estimated at 198,000 in 1976 and a little more than 183,000 in 1979, figures that suggest a commensurate decrease in the total.

Most of the estimated 170,000 Europeans in Zimbabwe in mid-1982 were still concentrated in the urban areas, but the published data on the occupations of postindependence emigrants suggest that the great bulk of those who have left were urban dwellers and therefore that the white population may be somewhat more rural than it had been for some time. The Coloured population, 15,153 persons in 1969 (0.3 percent of the total), was estimated at 25,900 in 1980 and may have risen to 26,000 by mid-1981 (about 0.35 percent of the total at that time). Asians, numbering 8,965 in 1969 (0.17 percent of the total), were estimated at 10,900 in 1980 and were reproducing at a lower rate, perhaps 11,100 (about 0.14 percent of Zimbabweans) in mid-1981.

All Africans in Zimbabwe speak languages of the widespread Bantu branch of the Niger-Congo language family. Except for a few tongues, e.g., Tonga spoken by people whose affinities lie north of the Zambezi River, all are considered part of the southeastern Bantu cluster. In that cluster the Shona dialects (collectively, Chishona) stand alone. The other languages, each with several dialects, together constitute a subcategory, and all have their affinities with languages to the south. Among them are Nguni, a form of which—Sindebele—is spoken by the Ndebele. Others are Tsonga, Venda, and Sotho. Of the languages associated with the two largest groups, only Shona had been provided with a satisfactory orthography and had a written literature in the form of novels, nonfiction, and poetry.

English remains the official language of Zimbabwe, although African primary-school classes are taught one of the two major indigenous languages (incidentally a burden for children of minor groups, such as the Venda and Tonga). Shona and Ndebele may also be used in the Senate of the parliament. Fanakalo, a pidgin compounded of indigenous languages, English, and Afrikaans, was widely used for communication between Europeans and Africans. Its alternative name, Kitchen Kaffir, making use of a pejorative term much disliked by Africans (for definition of *kaffir*—see Glossary) suggests its status.

The term *Shona* has been accepted by many—but by no means all—of the people to whom it has been applied owing to its use by Rhodesian authorities for the groups speaking dialects of the same

Zimbabwe: A Country Study





Figure 13. Distribution of African Peoples, Mid-1970s

The Society and Its Environment



Source: Based on information from Michael F.C. Bourdillon, *The Shona Peoples*, Gwelo, Rhodesia, 1976 (inside back cover).

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

language and characterized by broad similarities of culture. The term was initially used by others—its origin is uncertain—and was taken up by the Ndebele when they came to the area in the late 1830s. Linguistic studies in the early 1930s, directed toward the development of a single language for writing, applied the term *Shona* to that language and to all the speakers of its several dialects. To that point, the peoples so classified had identified themselves either as members of a group speaking one of these dialects or as characterized by specific cultural features or political allegiance. Such groups were marked by geographical contiguity and sometimes referred to themselves by a term derived from their location. In the preindependence era people might have accepted the Shona classification for themselves in the context of relations with Europeans or in interaction with Ndebele. That identity and a degree of unity were further developed in the course of the struggle for independence. Even then, however, more particular loyalties and identities were sometimes more salient. That possibly was still the case in the early 1980s.

These local identities and loyalties have not remained firmly fixed in the descendants of the founders of a local group. The history of the Shona peoples has been one of movement in response to warfare, political and social conflict, and the exigencies of subsistence. Any community or chiefdom or cluster of them has been inhabited by persons of diverse origins, i.e., by persons who have shed local loyalties and taken on new ones or whose ancestors had done so. That process has continued. For example, if resettlement on formerly European lands is carried out on schedule, more than a half-million people (the bulk of them Shona) will have acquired new local affiliations. In some respects these relocations, like the war, may be conducive to a wider Shona, if not to a Zimbabwean, identity.

The areas in which major dialect clusters occur correspond somewhat to regional variations in other aspects of culture but are not coterminous with them. Unlike the term *Shona* the terms used for these dialect clusters and for subethnic identification are indigenous. On the basis of the work of linguist Clement Doke in his *Report on the Unification of the Shona Dialects*, published in 1931, six major dialect clusters have been distinguished. Of these, Karanga (southern Shona) is spoken by the largest number of people. The next largest group speaks Zezuru (central Shona). The Zezuru cluster is geographically central, has the largest number of features typical of Shona dialects, and its speakers live closest to the capital area. Zezuru was therefore chosen as the base for the development of standard Shona for which an orthography was fixed by the authorities in 1955. The third largest group speaks dialects of the Korekore (northern Shona) cluster. The fourth, living in and near the eastern highlands, speaks dialects of Manyika. Roughly a quarter of the Manyika live in Mozambique. The fifth largest group speaks Ndau. Two-thirds of the Ndau live in Mozambique. The Ndau were considerably influenced

in the nineteenth century by the Nguni, who established the kingdom of Gaza in Mozambique and adjacent Zimbabwe. The sixth group consists of Kalanga speakers, who are geographically, linguistically, and culturally isolated from the mass of Shona peoples. This separation is of long standing, but it was reinforced by the fact that the Ndebele situated themselves between the Kalanga and other Shona in the nineteenth century. Some Kalanga have become Ndebele speakers. The northwesternmost Kalanga have also been strongly affected by groups originating in Zambia. Some Kalanga in the southwest live in Botswana.

Scattered through the Shona area are people who, whatever dialect they speak, identify themselves as Rozvi, a prestigious name because of its association with the Changamire state (see Dombo and the Rozvi Empire, ch. 1). The disintegration of that state in the nineteenth century under the impact of Ndebele invasion led to the dispersal of members of its dynasty and others associated with it. The claim to Rozvi identity by some is disputed by others, however.

Ndebele is an ethnic category that grew out of a military state encompassing peoples of different origin (see Ndebele Hegemony, ch. 1). The term itself, in the form *Matabele*, was given the Nguni-speaking warriors, who formed the core of the state, by the Sotho speakers of South Africa, some of whom were incorporated into the society as it moved north. The term *Ndebele* (Amandebele in its Bantu plural form) is the Nguni version adopted by the rulers of the state. The third (and largest) component of the Ndebele were people of Shona origin who were incorporated when the group reached what is now Zimbabwe. In the nineteenth century the Ndebele rulers dealt with these diverse peoples by organizing them into three strata. The first of these, the *zanzi* (people of the south), consisted of the Nguni conquerors and their descendants who held the kingship and most of the significant offices in the state. The second, the *enhla* (people of the north), comprised the Sotho and their descendants who had been brought into the state in its early years. The third, *holi* (uncertain), was made up of the local peoples taken into Ndebele society after it had reached its present location. The term, used initially for all peoples (except the Sotho) whom the Ndebele met on their way to or in Zimbabwe, has been considered pejorative by persons in this stratum, but its use by Ndebele of other strata (and by European authorities) persisted into the twentieth century after the state had been dissolved. The members of this stratum prefer to be called *lozvi* (a variant of Rozvi) or *abantu ba ka mambo* (people of the *mambo*), a reference to the pre-Ndebele state system and its head. By the end of the nineteenth century this lowest stratum constituted a majority—estimated at about 60 percent—of all Ndebele.

The remaining Bantu-speaking groups, all very small, play a geographically, socially, and politically peripheral role in Zimbabwe. The Chikunda, the largest of them (roughly 100,000 persons), appear to be part of a congeries of people living north and south of the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Zambezi River border with Mozambique in an area of limited agricultural potential. (Most of them live in Mozambique.) The next largest group (about 70,000 in the early 1980s) is the Tonga (Valley Tonga), who in the late 1950s lived along the Zambezi River in the area that was flooded by the Kariba Dam to form Lake Kariba. They maintained close ties to the related Gwembe Tonga on the Zambian side of the river until both groups were moved to make way for the lake. The roughly 20,000 Tonga (perhaps one-third to one-half of all the Zimbabwean Tonga at the time) who were moved from their riverine habitat had been heavily dependent on fishing as part of their livelihood, and the areas in which they were relocated had relatively little to offer to cultivators. Some public attention has been given to their plight since the new government came to power.

None of the remaining indigenous groups exceeded 50,000 persons; one, the Tsonga-speaking Hlengwe of southeasternmost Zimbabwe did not exceed 5,000. The Hlengwe are related to peoples in Mozambique. The Venda, who may have had their origins in what is now Matabeleland, are to be found primarily in South Africa. Venda royal clans appear to be related to those of the southern Shona, and Venda have been associated with the cult of the Shona high god Mwari (see *Indigenous Religions*, this ch.). Also in the far south live several groups speaking Sotho languages, the most important of which are the Birwa. Some groups are Tswana (Western Sotho) speakers related to peoples in Botswana and South Africa.

Living as nomads in northwesternmost Zimbabwe (and moving to and from adjacent Botswana) are several small bands of San hunters (uncounted but not more than a few hundred at best). These people are related to the other remnants in southern Africa of the people commonly called Bushmen (a pejorative term) by Europeans.

In the preindependence era the term European was officially and commonly applied to whites whatever the country from which they had emigrated or their place of birth. The Zimbabwean government does not officially distinguish persons in racial or ethnic terms. In 1982 the departure of many whites and the arrival of some made it difficult to determine whether the characteristics of the white population in the early 1980s were similar to those reflected in the 1969 census.

Over the years as immigration and emigration have ebbed and flowed in response to economic and political conditions (or perceptions of them), there have been minor changes in the origins, ethnic composition, and occupational distribution of Europeans. Three-fourths or more have been of British origin, although at various times many had come from South Africa, and some had been born there. Those from England and Wales predominated. There were fewer Scots and an even smaller number of Irish. As time went on a proportion of whites were born in Rhodesia. After World War II there was a substantial influx of British-born persons, some of whom had served elsewhere in the empire, e.g., India and Pakistan. Most,

however, were skilled workers originating in Britain and responding to the opportunities it offered in contrast to the war-damaged homeland. For a few years after the Afrikaner-dominated Nationalist Party took power in South Africa in 1948, fairly large numbers of English-speaking whites arrived in Rhodesia from that country. Through the 1960s smaller numbers of persons of British origin came from the African colonies that had become independent under black rule in that era.

Afrikaners in the European population exceeded 17 percent only for a time before World War II and declined to less than 14 percent by 1951 after the postwar arrival of English-speaking whites from Britain and South Africa. They were much more likely than English speakers to be farm owners, managers, or assistants. Their religious affiliation (Dutch Reformed) differed from that of most English speakers, and they tended to settle in specific areas—chiefly in the southern portion of the eastern highlands and the plateau to the west—where they formed socially self-sufficient communities. There was occasional intermarriage between speakers of English and Afrikaans. But until the formation of the Rhodesian Front in 1962 and UDI in 1965, political antagonism rather than political cooperation marked the relations between them.

In the years after World War I and before UDI, a combination of informal policy and law discouraged the influx of Europeans other than English speakers. Nevertheless both before and after World War II, whites of east European Jewish, Italian, Greek, and Portuguese origin entered Rhodesia, as did a number from northwestern Europe. At no point did these "foreigners" (as whites of British ancestry called them) exceed about 6 percent of the European population. In the pre-UDI period British Rhodesians made immigrants of northwest European origin more welcome socially than they did those of eastern and southeastern origin, and each of the latter communities also tended to be separated socially. After UDI technical obstacles to the immigration of whites of any origin were removed.

The highly urban Coloured population (an official classification before independence) has two sources. The first of these, the result of unions between Afrikaners and indigenous peoples (many of them Khoisan speakers, i.e., the peoples called Hottentot and Bushmen), came north at about the same time that the earliest English-speaking whites entered the area in the nineteenth century, although some came later. In the late 1800s and early 1900s when there were very few European women in the territory, unions between white (and occasionally Asian) males and local African women gave rise to another group of Coloureds. A very few continued to come from adjacent areas in the twentieth century, but at the time of the 1969 census more than 90 percent had been born in Rhodesia.

Except for a few who were brought to work on the railroad from Harare to Beira in Mozambique, most Asians came to Rhodesia from India either directly or from South Africa. Most are highly urban and

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

have been engaged in trade, some as small-scale retailers, others in more extensive economic operations. Asians have also been involved in manufacturing. The government discouraged Asian immigration beginning in the 1920s, and 67 percent of those enumerated in 1969 had been born in the territory, another 9 percent had come from other African countries, and 22 percent had immigrated from India. Of the generation native to the area, many are well educated.

Race Relations: Blacks, Whites, and Others

In Rhodesia before independence race was the crucial criterion for defining social and political relations between members of the four categories established by law and custom and for allocating opportunities and rewards in the economic order. These four categories, in order of descending status, were European (white), Asian, Coloured, and African. The relations of all but a very few members of each group with those of other groups occurred mainly in terms of their roles in economic transactions, e.g., as employer and employee or as seller and buyer and in administrative situations in which, typically, Europeans wielded formal authority and real power. Small in absolute numbers and in their percentage of the total population, even in the cities and towns in which they were clustered, Asians and Coloured people played an insignificant role.

The end of European political dominance left the remaining whites in an uncertain position. In mid-1982 most of those in the private sector (farming, industry, and commerce) were relatively well-off economically. For the time being they continued to own and operate their enterprises, which were essential to Zimbabwe's economic viability under the new regime. In these enterprises they were still employers and supervisors of Africans. Other whites in the private sector were employed as artisans and middle-level supervisors, but for the first time they faced the prospect of competition from or supervision by Africans, a prospect that had apparently led many Europeans to emigrate soon after independence. Those remaining in Zimbabwe may still have a few years before job interaction with blacks who are their equals or superiors becomes commonplace.

What has changed is the fact that the deference expected and often shown by Africans to European employers and supervisors can be demanded now only at the peril of public denunciation. The fragmentary material in the press suggests that for some whites long-term habits have persisted, including use of pejorative terms, such as *kaffir* and *munt* (man, from the Shona word *muntu*), in relation to their employees and other Africans. In the same context—and in other relations between blacks and whites—Africans who gave deference when there was no alternative but to forgo employment or to elicit some other sanction have acted hostilely to whites.

In the public sector some Europeans (and at lower levels some Asians and Coloureds) have already been placed in a position of equality or subordination to Africans in the work situation. This

includes persons ranging from ministers in the cabinet to administrative and technical personnel in ministries and departments. The whites who still function in the government at the highest levels are working with Africans who have university degrees or who have shown their capabilities in other ways. In short they are dealing with men and women at their own educational level, which may make it easier for those concerned to adapt to the change.

Some technical personnel have, however, shown a reluctance to be assigned to tasks that entail regular interaction with Africans. It has been the custom, for example, to assign white nurses to hospitals that cared for white patients. Many white nurses have left Zimbabwe, but some who remain have resisted assignments elsewhere. In the middle and lower ranks of the civil service, the inevitable promotion of blacks over whites has led to whites dissatisfaction. Some sense that their opportunities for promotion have been curtailed; others find it difficult to take orders from blacks.

Many whites who have substantial investments in land and other economic enterprises and have remained in Zimbabwe have nevertheless expressed the feeling that the country is no longer theirs. Other reports suggest that some whites were pleasantly surprised by the fact that Prime Minister Robert Mugabe's government did not intend to nationalize their holdings and was urging them to stay. In both cases, the whites, acknowledging their loss of political primacy, have focused on maintaining their economic status but have made few attempts to accommodate themselves to a changing social order. They have, for example, made an effort to retain their own schools and hospitals. The educational system established by the interim government under the internal settlement of 1979 in effect allowed Europeans to maintain segregated schools. The new government had only begun to change the system in late 1981, and the outcome was not clear as of mid-1982 (see Education, this ch.). Europeans were also considering the establishment of new private hospitals in order to maintain their right to be sick in racially segregated surroundings. In 1982, however, the government ended the construction of such hospitals.

Residential segregation continued to a substantial extent, but it has been breached by the movement of members of the new African elite into some of the white areas, particularly in Harare. That had been out of the question before 1979 when the law governing urban residential segregation was repealed, although there were some Africans who could have afforded it. There have been occasional reports that middle-class whites and blacks shared a common concern for protecting their property from urban criminals, but in 1982 the nature of neighborly relations between them had not been established.

Just as many whites have been slow to adapt to the social implications of their loss of political power, a number of blacks, including some with a public voice in press and radio, have demonstrated their

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

relief at the removal of the white yoke by expressing their hostility to whites. In the two years since the political revolution removed the European-controlled sanctions for the old social order, these reactions by blacks and the slowness of some whites to adapt to their changed situation have not been surprising. In the turbulence of the change, press reports have seized on the melodramatic. The fact and the turbulence itself, as well as some uncertainty about the government's intentions with respect to change, have made it difficult to assess the direction of black-white relations in the immediate future.

In this rapidly changing society the position of Coloureds and Asians was anomalous. They were formally categorized with Europeans for some purposes: their children were in the same school system if not in the same schools as white children; they were permitted unrestricted access to the cities; and they voted on the same electoral roll as whites. They were nevertheless clearly defined as inferior. Thus they were in fact socially segregated and for all practical purposes excluded from European society.

The situation reinforced a tendency among Asians to maintain sharp ethnic boundaries between themselves and all others, although the social boundaries tended to be firmer in relation to Africans than to Europeans. Given their very small numbers and their tenuous position, Asians seem not to have involved themselves in politics either on behalf of their own status or in conjunction with others, as Asians in South Africa have done. Africans have seen Asians as sellers of goods and services and buyers of labor and have considered them exploitative and standoffish. How they have adapted to the new order had not been described in 1982. Many of them had useful skills, however, and it was likely that they would stay in Zimbabwe unless their situation became impossible.

Neither as well-off nor as well educated as Asians on the whole, the Coloured population appeared to have sought to maximize its links with Europeans. There were a few who considered their situation untenable in the long run and identified with African nationalist movements. One of these, David Gilpin, castigated the Coloured community for its opportunism in seeking after independence to have itself reclassified in such a way as to be linked more closely to Africans.

For the purposes of voting and representation, Zimbabwe's Constitution retained the racial distinctions that had been established earlier, but the formal position of the Mugabe government has been that race should be irrelevant to the political, economic, and social order. Except in the context of the narrow range of issues covered by the Constitution, the legal status of racial distinctions and their institutional supports has been erased. In the future, social boundaries are likely to be maintained between most Africans and most Europeans if only because of the great cultural chasm between them. That chasm and the difference in race were defined in terms of superiority and inferiority under the old regime, and privileges were



*Bulawayo, Zimbabwe's second largest city
Courtesy Embassy of Zimbabwe, Washington*

allocated accordingly. In 1982 the nature of the adjustment to the new order still remained to be worked out.

Intra-African Relations

Much has been made of the primacy of ethnicity as a basis for political alignment and as a barrier to easy social relations between persons of different cultures who speak different languages. The relevant categories (or tribes, in common usage) are taken to be Shona and Ndebele. Underlying the use of ethnicity (or tribalism) as an explanation of conflict in African social and political relations are the assumptions that both categories have deep historical roots, that earlier antagonism significantly influences the current perceptions and acts of Shona and Ndebele speakers, and that cultural and language differences necessarily predispose people in both categories to be hostile to each other. Some observers have attributed similar significance to the six regionally localized Shona-speaking categories defined in the first instance by dialect boundaries. The assumptions are questionable in both cases.

The rudimentary self-awareness and sense of unity of the Shona are modern phenomena generated by, among other things, official recognition of the basic unity of their language and its conversion into a written form and the emphasis of the preindependence regime

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

on their differences from the Ndebele. Further, in the years since World War II their awareness of the geographic spread and numbers of persons speaking a Shona dialect and sharing the same (or a very similar) culture was enhanced by their experience as migrant laborers, particularly in the cities and towns, and their participation in guerilla groups.

At the same time, however, they were aware of local identities—of community, chiefdom, or clan—that were in some contexts more salient than a nascent Shona identity. In the ordinary life of a Shona migrant worker, help and camaraderie were more likely to be sought and gained from Shona speakers of one's descent group and local community than from Shona speakers generally or from the speakers of related dialects coming from a large region. Even church membership was sometimes conducive to such local loyalties: mission denominations tended to be localized, and if one went to a church of a given denomination in a town, he or she would be likely to meet people of the same home area (see *Religious Life*, this ch.).

Ndebele society, although not so varied regionally as that of the Shona, and more centralized, was not homogeneous. It had incorporated local Shona-speaking peoples (probably similar to the Kalanga-speaking section of the Shona) into the lower stratum. That lower stratum (a majority of Ndebele speakers) has in fact furnished most of the leaders of modern political movements that have made a substantial showing in Matabeleland, and many of the others have been Kalanga speakers. Those Kalanga speakers who were not directly absorbed into Ndebele society lived under Ndebele hegemony in the nineteenth century. The fact that Ndebele of the lowest stratum and Kalanga have been leaders in political movements usually identified as Ndebele-oriented suggests that the cohesion they may have shown is regional rather than ethnic and that it reflects the ambitious politics of a people who have done double duty as a lower class, first under their Ndebele rulers and then under European rule. A recent attempt by an African to establish a political group expressly oriented to ethnic interests was made by an Ndebele chief in the 1979 elections held in connection with the internal settlement. His apparent appeal to ethnic sentiments (including a proposal for a federation that would give the minority Ndebele half the seats in a federal parliament) seemed to reflect an effort to establish a structure in which the chief's role would be maintained or enhanced.

The incursion of the Ndebele predatory military state into the territory in the nineteenth century led to direct Ndebele domination of some Shona groups, the demand for tribute from others, and intermittent efforts to throw off Ndebele rule. Shona-Ndebele conflict in that form ended nearly a century ago, and white rule intervened. Not all Shona felt the impact of Ndebele domination or were engaged in conflict with them, however, and it is questionable whether historical hostility is a component of the modern attitudes of Shona whose ancestors had no experience of the Ndebele. Even for

those Shona whose ancestors did experience Ndebele domination, there is no direct evidence of residual hostility relevant to late twentieth-century perceptions.

Like the all-Shona ethnolinguistic category or identity, the dialect-based divisions within the Shona did not correspond to self-conscious entities that have long evoked primordial loyalties. The names, e.g., Karanga and Manyika, have been around much longer than the name Shona. At various times, particularly from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century, all or large parts of a region fell under the rule of one dynasty. But dynasties also cut across dialect boundaries, and it cannot be said that a long-departed (and not very long-lived or firm) political order established an ethnic identity that outlived it for 150 years or more.

In the case of the Shona, however, the use of the terms by the preindependence regime, based in part on the scholarly work of outsiders rather than on significant indigenous usage, led to the assumption, particularly among some literate Shona speakers, that they referred to deeply rooted ethnic entities. Of these Shona groups perhaps the Karanga come closest to having a consciousness of their identity. In the complex history of factionalism of political groups and guerrillas made up mainly of Shona speakers, particularly the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), some persons accused others of favoritism for or even conspiracy with groups such as Karanga, Manyika, or Zezuru. Whether in fact such favoritism or conspiracy existed is difficult to determine. The persons alleged to have been involved allied themselves with others in different ways at different times, and it has been argued that whether a faction happened to be composed of Karanga or Manyika was incidental rather than crucial to the alliance of its members.

It has been argued by political scientist John Day that the history of the political alignments of African leaders does not reflect the primacy of ethnicity and that assertions to the contrary have not been proved. He makes the case that quests for personal power, antagonism based on personality differences, disputes over tactics, and doubts of the competence of some leaders were the major elements in the development of factions, the splitting of parties, and the framing of alliances and coalitions. Except for a very few, the leaders or aspirants to leadership did not make ethnic appeals, and many condemned them although some were willing to accuse others of the practice. There is no good evidence that these leaders made such appeals overtly, but it is possible that their lieutenants did so covertly. From the perspective of the ordinary follower it may not have been necessary to make the appeal. The leader's use of the same language as that of his audience and his reference to ideas and symbols understood by one ethnic group and not another may have served the same purpose more effectively.

The closest allies and most trusted supporters of major figures of Shona origin were often Ndebele and vice versa, or where the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

leaders were largely Shona speaking, they came from different regions and chiefdoms. These seem not to have been instances of ethnic balancing for political purposes but a matter of personal and political compatibility. It is more likely that such political balancing has occurred since independence, e.g., it was probably considered desirable, although not acknowledged, that the president of the republic be an Ndebele, given the fact that the prime minister had Shona origins.

Although political leaders did not make blatant appeals to ethnicity, the ordinary African who became a member of or supported a political group or a guerrilla army typically joined his or her fellows who spoke the same language and whose understanding of the situation was influenced by the same cultural background. Thus most members and supporters of ZANU were Shona speakers, and those of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) were either Ndebele speakers or part of the Kalanga section of the Shona (see Politics, ch. 4). Those who were more educated or more committed to some other focus of loyalty and meaning, for example, a particular religious perspective, or who were more mobile might cut across ethnic or linguistic boundaries and give allegiance to some other person or group.

In part ethnic solidarity in a political form reflected the regional location of ethnic groups rather than a devotion to ethnicity as such. Two countries gave a haven to the guerrillas: Mozambique and Zambia. That Mozambique gave support to Mugabe and Zambia to Joshua Nkomo reflected the views of the leaders of these states. But it was in fact much easier for Shona to get to and operate across the Mozambique border and for Ndebele and Kalanga to do so across the Zambia border. And to the extent that either group was to be successful, it had to operate in the territory and among the people it knew.

Even at the level of voting or with respect to other measures of popular support, the Shona-Ndebele line has been crossed, usually from Shona (Kalanga aside) to Ndebele. The direction of crossing reflects the fact that there are many more Shona than Ndebele speakers; no party or leader can satisfy all in so large a group.

Day quotes historian Terence Ranger to the effect that "those who now feel themselves to be Kore-Kore [*sic*], or Zezuru, or Karanga are likely to be . . . unimpressed by a historian's protestations that they can't be." In Ranger's view, there are now in the politics of Zimbabwe "newly invented 'tribes'." Ethnic groups in this sense do emerge in particular historical situations in a competition for whatever rewards are available. Those rewards are either directly gained in the political domain, or political power can be used to gain access to them. Common language and culture do not guarantee the formation of a self-conscious politically active ethnic group, but they provide ready-made symbols for them.

There have been reports, usually in the form of complaints, that

various ministries have shown signs of "tribalism" in their appointments. That nepotism occurs is likely and may be understood by outsiders as ethnic favoritism. Kin of a minister or department head are more than likely to be from the same dialect region if not of the same local community, but obligation to help such kin obtain jobs reflects the significance of kinship rather than that of ethnicity.

The Shona, excluding the Kalanga speakers, outnumber the Ndebele and Kalanga nearly four to one. In these circumstances the fact that Shona outnumber Ndebele in government or other significant positions by a similar ratio cannot, in the absence of other evidence, be taken as anything other than a reflection of the demographic situation.

Most references to ethnicity in Zimbabwe before or since independence have pointed to its political meaning rather than to its effect on ordinary social relations, e.g., marriage, the interaction of co-workers on the job, friendship, and the like. Given the regional character of African ethnic groups and the significance of kinship in all of them, most social intercourse among rural people takes place between persons not only of the same wide ethnolinguistic category but also of the same subcategory. Until some time in the twentieth century, marriage among the Ndebele tended to occur within each stratum, particularly that of the ruling group. Despite the growth of towns and the increasing importance of migrant labor, which usually is conducive to some degree of mixing, the intensity and range of relations between persons of substantially different origins have not been significant in Zimbabwe. Each of the two main towns is embedded in a particular ethnic region and has drawn most of its African population from local ethnic categories—Shona in Harare and Ndebele and Karanga in Bulawayo. In the Shona case, however, people of different regions (or local communities within regions) have occasion to meet, and among the more educated and the generation coming to adulthood in the 1960s and 1970s, socializing and marriage have often ignored ethnic or sectional boundaries.

In the two years since independence there has been fighting in camps to which former members of the two guerrilla armies (the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) have been brought for processing (see Public Order and Internal Security, ch. 5). The background of these people, their relative youth, and the difficult conditions they have endured contributed to the interethnic bloodshed, but these specific circumstances are not likely to persist or recur.

The Changing Social Order

In the roughly ninety years between the establishment of European domination and independence, the several African social systems changed substantially, even in the rural areas. At the same time, some of the features of the older (precolonial) systems, although much modified in some respects, remained. The most basic of these

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

persisting features were groups and relations founded on descent and kinship. The most significant change has been the emergence of a much greater range of social differentiation linked to changes in the economic and political orders. Occupation, education, and wealth of a different kind and with different uses had become important in the ordering of the social relations and in changing the way of life of many Africans before independence. Changes in the distribution of power and influence had also occurred, but in limited ways, constrained by the fact that ultimate power lay with the Europeans. The coming of independence expanded the possibilities for social differentiation and changes some of its most important characteristics. Since April 1980 Africans have been in positions of formal authority and great power, and at other levels opportunities once closed to Africans have been opened or eventually would be. The forms to be taken by new elites and the shape of social stratification were difficult to predict in mid-1982 given the uncertainty about the direction in which the economic and political orders would go.

African Rural Society

The political organization of the African rural community has been substantially altered from its precolonial form during the Rhodesian era. Among the Ndbele, kingship had been abolished. Nevertheless in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) in which a major portion of the rapidly growing population lived, chiefs and headmen, often drawn from the clans or lineages that long supplied them, had varying degrees of formal authority and sometimes a good deal of informal power (see Local Government, ch. 4). They were, however, subordinate to European authority, which had a veto power over initiatives taken by chiefs and over candidates for succession to chieftainship. Over the years various Rhodesian governments were concerned above all with the maintenance of order in the face of changes in the numbers and characteristics of the African population and the diminishing capacity of the land to feed that growing population even if only at a subsistence level. In their efforts to deal with problems arising out of these concerns, they first withdrew and later reinstituted some of the chiefs' precolonial powers, e.g., to deal with some kinds of criminal cases. Further they added new powers and subtracted some that they had introduced earlier.

Rhodesian governments also deemed it necessary or useful to encourage community development and to engage the interest of some of the more educated members of the community (the chiefs were not, on the whole, well educated), and they established councils, the nature and powers of which changed from time to time. For some chiefs the very existence of the Councils was a threat. Others dealt with them well enough, especially after their own authority over them was enhanced. Ultimate authority, however, lay with the district commissioners representing the central government.

As anthropologist Michael Bourdillon has put it, through most of

the period up to independence "the main problem (that faced) modern Shona (and Ndebele) chiefs (arose) from (their) intermediate position . . . between their people and the . . . government . . . " Depending upon their personalities and abilities, their personal relations with their people, and the characteristics of the district commissioner, this system worked with greater or lesser conflict and satisfaction for all concerned, perhaps a little better for Ndebele chiefs having a stronger tradition of secular rule than the Shona. Nevertheless the structure of authority and power was such that stresses and strains were bound to ensue.

Even before World War II some educated Africans had begun to see the chiefs as irrelevant to the modern era, but most people in the rural areas still thought of them in quasi-traditional ways: they were patriarchs and directly or indirectly communicators with their ancestors who were responsible for the welfare of the chiefdom (see *Indigenous Religions*, this ch.). Rural people were not always happy with their chiefs, but their complaints tended to be directed to the unsatisfactory performance of individuals rather than to the institution as such.

With the rise of nationalist movements, particularly after the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (also known as the Central African Federation) in 1963 and the subsequent unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965, the chiefs were threatened from another quarter. Explicitly or implicitly, the leaders of these movements considered the chiefs agents of the white regime and in any case incumbents of institutions inessential to the Zimbabwe they foresaw. Most chiefs, persuaded of their own legitimacy even if they were not necessarily pleased to be under the authority of district commissioners, cast their lot with the Rhodesian authorities. These authorities, in turn, seeing the chiefs as barriers to a rising nationalism, sought to enlist them by raising their status and enhancing their authority, thus confirming the perceptions of modern African political leaders and their followers and of many rural people who were not actively engaged in revolutionary activity.

Despite some doubts of the nature and degree of support it could expect from the chiefs and the role that ought to be allotted to them in the new political order, the Mugabe government had retained the institution of chieftainship in the first two years of independence. During that period, however, the chiefs were divested of many of their powers, although they continued to receive their stipends. The minister of local government and town planning referred to them as a desirable link with tradition and as "the cultural and spiritual leaders" of the people, but their official role in local government was increasingly limited, and they were expected to remain aloof from politics (see *Local Government*, ch. 4).

The major components of rural communities, particularly in the former TTL, have been extended families, the cores of which are shallow patrilineages. These lineages are in turn parts of other

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

patrilineal descent groups (deeper lineages, subclans, and clans) of greater scope but lesser social, economic, and religious importance. Even in the precolonial era members of a clan were widely dispersed, and clans rarely if ever acted as units. Subclans were more likely to be localized, and they typically controlled the range of marriage partners; generally their members were required to marry outside them. Both groups had names (typically clans chose animal names) that allowed members to identify each other even if they could not trace a genealogical connection. Although one section of a subclan might invite members of another section to a ceremony, subclan cohesiveness was not great, and it diminished as people were forced to move to find land or to look for work in the European rural areas or cities and towns.

The most important patrilineal descent group for most purposes in the past and an ideal realized more and more rarely in the present was a patrilineage whose adult males, their wives, and unmarried children either lived in the same homestead or in a set of closely clustered homesteads. The male ancestor of such a group might have lived from three to five generations before the members of its youngest adult generation, but its living adult members rarely ranged over more than three generations (grandfather to adult grandchild). Ideally this group was the unit concerned with marriage and marriage payments, inheritance, disputes in which its members were involved, and the like. It was the congregation in rituals directed to the ancestral spirit thought of as the guardian of the group's welfare. Common residence for three to four generations was achieved only toward the end of the senior male's life. When he died, having fathered males who themselves became heads of nuclear families that had adult offspring and other dependents, the group was likely to split, each of its components beginning the cycle. The more successful the members of the lineage were in reproducing themselves, the sooner the sheer size of the group would force a split. Even after such a split, however, the group tended to maintain its religious coherence.

In some areas the lineage has retained a considerable degree of solidarity, but the exigencies of modern life have tended to diminish it. Labor migration has separated its members, sometimes temporarily, sometimes permanently. Further the nature of wealth and its control and inheritance have changed. Those who have adequate earnings, still a minority, can be independent of their families. Despite these changes the sense of obligation often has persisted, and individuals will come from afar to attend a ritual considered essential to the welfare of the group. If they are in the town, they will often lend a hand and at least temporary shelter to a newcomer who is a close relative. Personal preferences are strongly linked to social mobility but are not wholly determined by it. Educated persons in the cities and even in the African Purchase Areas who have been economically successful tend to restrict their kinship obligations. They focus on



*This African entrepreneur makes and sells tin utensils in a Harare market.
Courtesy Herbert M. Howe*

the nuclear family and its cohesion, and their social lives are centered on a circle of families in similar circumstances.

Rearranging Social Relations

In the era before independence very few Africans distinguished from the vast majority by their educations, occupations, and incomes remained in the TTL. Chiefs aside, there were primary-school teachers (and more rarely secondary-school teachers), clergy of several kinds, a few persons in the health services (nurses and medical assistants), and perhaps a few others at the lower levels of government service. Of varying importance in the traditional social order, exercising different degrees of influence and sometimes disposing of comparatively good incomes, were the spirit mediums and healers of several kinds (see Indigenous Religions, this ch.).

Most Africans distinguished from the mass by their sources of income and their ways of life were to be found in the cities and towns and to a lesser extent in the African Purchase Area. Most urban Africans were poor and unskilled. From the perspective of most of those who had more education, higher paying jobs, and who had adopted many elements of a Western mode of life, this mass was at the lower end of the social scale, although migrants who returned to the rural areas would not, in that context, carry their low urban status with them.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

The structure of status, wealth, and power in African society before 1980 was distorted by the denial to Africans of access to the heights of wealth and power which lay in the hands of Europeans. But it was not only wealth and power that were inaccessible to Africans. Income and education that would have conferred what is ordinarily thought of as upper middle-class status in the society as a whole did not do so for Africans who managed to acquire them. For all practical purposes European society was closed. The then comparatively small numbers of Africans who would have been part of a lower middle class—small businessmen, teachers, and the like—or a steadily employed and stable working class—skilled workers—were also excluded from a comprehensive social order.

The effect of this distortion was that urban African communities tended to give very high status to the few professionals among them—physicians, administrative personnel in the African education system, and the like—and to a few successful businessmen, all of whom could afford a style of life that put them far above most urban Africans and roughly on a level with middle-class Europeans. Many of the wives of such professionals did not work, although most were much better educated than wealthy businessmen and their spouses. Just below this level were secondary-school teachers and others in government with fairly high, steady incomes, secondary or better education, and the ability and desire to maintain a way of life approximating that of Europeans. In this category the women often worked as teachers or in other capacities. A reflection of the limits set on African mobility generally and on that of African women in particular was that state-registered nurses were included in this second highest category.

A much larger third category than the first two consisted of a variety of persons in white-collar work in private (usually European-owned) enterprise and government, primary-school teachers, and similar positions. Not nearly as well-off as the people in the first two categories, those in the third category had, however, opted for as much of a European life-style as they could afford. The fourth category was composed mostly of small shopkeepers, whose wives often worked with them. A fifth comprised skilled workers and the semiskilled and unskilled living in stable families legitimated by marriage between the man and woman of the household. Respectability rather than income alone affected the way persons in the upper strata, particularly the women of those strata, evaluated poorer people in the towns. Outside the pale from the perspective of "respectable" people were households based on irregular unions and prostitutes. In general, families below the third stratum (white-collar workers) were characterized by styles of life and interaction, e.g., relations between men and women, closer to those of the rural areas than that of persons in the upper strata. Outside this system, although many had the education and skills to have filled positions in its upper strata, were men and women who had chosen either to be



*Market in Harare where women often
serve as shopkeepers*

revolutionaries or to live elsewhere. Many of them had high status in the new order.

The shape of the new social order after two years of independence was not easy to discern. Clearly there was a new elite—Africans at the highest reaches of government and politics and many others just below them. Their salaries gave them incomes much beyond that achieved by all but a very few Africans before independence. Proliferating at a somewhat slower rate but certain to be increasingly significant were others at similar levels of income—managers, administrators, professionals, and technicians. There were also going to be many more skilled workers. In a country whose people were still largely engaged in cultivation and herding, a comparatively small number was involved in commercial farming, and some of the most successful commercial farmers were educated men who had first earned incomes in the towns and had invested some of it to provide themselves with

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

security in retirement under the former regime. It is unlikely that many will become farmers on a very large scale.

Although the new regime is tolerating the continued existence of industrial and commercial firms that are already in place, there is a question whether it will encourage or allow the growth of additional large-scale business in private hands, even if the entrepreneurs are Africans. Similarly it is not clear that government service and political power will become a significant path to simultaneous involvement in business as it has elsewhere in Africa. Some Africans have already suggested that the new elite is beginning to be as far removed in income, power, and mode of life as the former European elite, and Mugabe has criticized ministers who are not satisfied with what he has termed their "fat salaries" and desire to acquire farms or businesses. Elsewhere in Black Africa a substantial gap in income, status, and way of life has developed between permanent urban dwellers—whether elite, middle-class, or skilled workers—and the mass of peasants. There were signs of this in Zimbabwe's preindependence era. It remains to be seen whether the new elite will make a point of diminishing that gap.

Religious Life

Christian missions have played a significant role in the education of Africans and the delivery of health care to them beginning in the 1890s. Most of Zimbabwe's leaders have Christian backgrounds and several are ordained clergy. Nevertheless the outlook of the great mass of Africans has been shaped by beliefs rooted in indigenous religious systems, and much of their ritual activity reflects their continued adherence to these systems.

The most recent available estimates of religious affiliation, provided by the officials of the various churches in 1974, put the number of African Christians at nearly 1.4 million, roughly one-fourth of the then estimated African population. It was unlikely that there had been any increase in the percentage of Christians since that time. Some Christians, particularly in the mission churches, disaffiliated during the war, and there is no indication of an upsurge in membership since independence.

More than one-third of the total number of African Christians were estimated to belong to African independent churches characterized by varying degrees of deviation from mission church doctrine and practice or by the incorporation of elements or themes of indigenous religions. Moreover affiliation with a mission church has not precluded participation in indigenous ritual either because a Christian still accepts the significance of such ritual or because participation is considered essential by kin or neighbors.

Christians, Missions, and Independent Churches

Missions began sustained activity among Africans at the close of the nineteenth century, and the obligation to provide a modicum of

education for Africans was soon devolved on them. They also undertook to supply health facilities in the rural areas. By the early 1920s there were fifteen missions working in Southern Rhodesia. To avert conflict between them, the authorities limited specific churches to particular rural areas so that persons adhering to mission churches in any rural locality tended to be of one denomination.

The missions' connection with the provision of education and medical treatment was, in the words of anthropologist and Roman Catholic missionary Bourdillon, among "the reasons in favour of joining a Christian church apart from religious conviction." Despite these attractions and others, missionary successes came slowly, in part because the demands made by most missions tended to wrench individuals from their social and cultural contexts. By the 1930s several varieties of independent churches, the stimulus for which had originated in South Africa, were giving Africans the opportunity to control their own institutions and to formulate their own religious views, sometimes in opposition to missionary doctrine and practice. These churches proliferated, and their membership grew fairly rapidly.

By the mid-1970s the 1.4 million African Christians were divided among a dozen or so mission churches and more than 100 independent churches. Among the denominations generated by mission activity and still dependent on mission personnel and financial support, the Roman Catholic Church was by far the largest (see table 3, Appendix). Its growth took place largely after World War II when missionary orders from Ireland, Switzerland, and Germany entered the field, which had been left to English Jesuits (and Irish and English Dominican nuns) in the first four decades of British rule. Each of the orders was assigned to a different area, and the Roman Catholic Church was one of the few that achieved a significant membership of both Shona and Ndebele as well as a smattering from smaller ethnic groups.

Although the Anglican Church's first mission was in easternmost Zimbabwe (near Mutare), it expanded its activities in various places among the Shona and later among the Ndebele. Between them the Roman Catholic and Anglican churches have counted as members most of the small Coloured population.

Several independent Methodist groups have operated in Zimbabwe. The largest of them originated in Britain as the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society and became the Methodist Church in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The American Methodist Episcopal Church (later the United Methodist Church) began its work in Manicaland and has worked principally among the Shona in the east and northeast. The United Methodists have given rise to the largest women's voluntary organization in Zimbabwe, the Rukwadzano rwe Wadzimayi (Fellowship of Women). Its activities range from the support of evangelism and the maintenance of family morality to national and community issues.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

The African Methodist Episcopal Church (AMEC) came to Rhodesia from South Africa where its black American founders had an early impact. The Rhodesian authorities had forbidden American blacks to enter the territory; thus AMEC's first missionaries and earliest leaders were black South Africans. The Rhodesian government did not permit AMEC activity in African rural areas, and the church therefore concentrated on urban areas and mining towns in contrast to most other missions.

Several other missions have had a more limited distribution. The South African-based Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk—NGK), in addition to serving Afrikaners in Zimbabwe, entered the missionary field early, concentrating particularly in the territory's southeast quadrant. The NGK's mission arm, locally called the African Reformed Church, was highly effective in establishing schools and outpatient clinics and operated a teacher's training institution that accepted Africans living outside its area. The mission's activities attracted many Africans despite its Afrikaner origins, liturgical austerity, and severe Calvinist doctrine. In time, however, these features of the mission seem to have led to a decline in membership. The Evangelical Lutherans (Church of Sweden mission) have made their mark primarily in southern Zimbabwe, particularly among the Sotho-speaking peoples of the area.

None of the remaining mission churches had as many as 5,000 African members. Among the larger groups were the Christian Brethren (London Missionary Society) and the Congregationalists, sponsored by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (known locally as the Rhodesian Mission American Board). The latter operated mostly in the southeast among the Ndau section of the Shona. Smaller groups included the Seventh day Adventists, the Assembly of God, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Faith Apostolic Church.

The economic status of the mission churches in the early 1980s has not been publicized, but they were still dependent to varying degrees on subventions from foreign sources, even in those cases where they were largely staffed by African clergy. Some mission activity in the fields of education and health care continued, and local congregations were not likely to be able to support the entire effort.

African clergy have taken over much of the pastoral work in many churches. Some groups generated their first African clerics in the 1920s. (The AMEC's ministers have always been Africans if not Zimbabweans.) Abel Muzorewa became national bishop of the United Methodist Church in 1968. Perhaps the slowest to do so was the largest group, the Roman Catholic Church. The first of its African priests was not ordained until 1947, and the first bishops were not installed until 1977. A seminary for the training of Roman Catholic priests, which takes longer than that required by most Protestant missions, had not begun until 1934, and there seemed to have been some reluctance on the part of the local hierarchy to undertake the

task. Further, the length and stringency of the training needed for ordination restricted the numbers ordained in a given period, and the requirement of celibacy limited the number of candidates for the priesthood. Therefore the Roman Catholic clergy remained largely white in the late 1970s.

African independent churches emerged in the first and second decades of the twentieth century, not long after the missions had begun to have an impact. Models for their form and content were available in South Africa where such churches had come into being earlier, but the basic stimulus was Zimbabwean Africans' experience of mission Christianity and the conflict between it and their own culture and situation. These churches began to flourish in the 1930s, and by the mid-1970s they comprised more than one-third of the Africans who professed to be Christians.

Analysts have divided these churches into two broad types, although there is considerable variation within each and overlap between them. The first is called Ethiopian because that term has frequently been a part of their names, in South Africa at least. The second kind has variously been called Zionist or apostolic. Typically, Ethiopian churches (also called separatist or secessionist) began when their clerical and lay leaders broke away from mission churches because they thought themselves denied opportunities for leadership and significant participation in them. The founders of separatist churches tended to adhere to the doctrines and practices of the mission groups from which they had split. Their attitudes toward indigenous religion, as Bourdillon points out, ranged from the tolerance exhibited by some white missionaries to the outright rejection exhibited by others.

A common feature of the Ethiopian churches—and of the Zionist or apostolic variety—was their tendency to split. Members who considered their aspirations for leadership unmet or who were impelled by their experience to offer a version of the religion different from that of the group to which they were attached formed new ones. In any case, when a founder of an independent church died, the dispute over succession often led to the formation of autonomous churches stemming from the original one.

The Zionist or apostolic churches, more popular and faster growing than the Ethiopian variety, have in common an emphasis on divine healing and baptism in the Holy Spirit (hence the adjective *spiritist* that is applied to them). The Zionist churches derive their name from Zion City, Illinois, where the black-led Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion was founded in the nineteenth century. That church proved a source of inspiration to the first independent churches in South Africa. Several other apostolic churches founded in the United States also had an influence on these early African groups. The stress on the notion of the apostolate seems to reflect the sense of some of the followers that the establishment of these groups parallels the founding of Christianity.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Prophecy inspired by the Holy Spirit is a central feature of most of these churches, the prophet tending to act in some respects like some diviners in indigenous religion, i.e., seeking to determine the causes of illness or other affliction affecting the individual or the community. Another element common in many apostolic churches is speaking in tongues. Their ritual is much less staid than that of the mission and Ethiopian churches and frequently includes dancing.

The significance of these churches has been variously interpreted. Some have argued that they appeal to followers unable to detach themselves wholly from the indigenous system but who seek an expanded world view represented by Christianity. In this perspective apostolic churches are Christianizing the people. Others insist that apostolic religion is a dilution of Christianity and is paganizing people who might otherwise be converted to Christianity. In fact most of the members of these churches are rural, little educated, and minimally involved in modern politics or the modern economy. A Zimbabwean analyst, Madziwanyika Tsomondo, has claimed that they constitute a movement, however fragmented and inchoate, of cultural nationalists or, more accurately, of rejectors of westernization (represented particularly by the missions). Unlike the nationalist movements that sought to wrest power from Europeans but accepted much of what had been introduced by them, the apostolic movement has not been directly political. Tsomondo points out that these churches have been uncomfortable not only with the missions but also with the nationalist movements and vice versa. In modern Zimbabwe, therefore, they may be an embarrassment to the regime rather than a bulwark.

Indigenous Religions

Zimbabwe's indigenous religions developed in the context of social systems that were much changed by the last quarter of the twentieth century. Some of the patterns of belief and ritual had lost the structural contexts to which they had leant meaning and from which they drew it. Thus some of the rituals connected with the old political order either are not carried out or have a meaning different from that formerly imputed to them. Much religious activity, however, was tied to persistent social arrangements and institutions, e.g., lineage, family, and local community, and ancestral and other spirits are still relevant. Moreover the vagaries of the climate, believed to be subject to the actions of spirits, remain a problem for a still largely agricultural people.

All indigenous religious systems are concerned with this world and with the effects of the spirits on the welfare of the living. Rituals are oriented to seeking the help or forbearance of various kinds of spirits in the course of the life of an individual, family, or community, or to placating them if they are deemed responsible for afflictions of various kinds, such as illness and drought. In these systems rewards and punishments occur in the here and now and are often the

consequences of acts or failures to act with respect to specific spirits or persons. But afflictions visited upon individuals, kin groups, or communities may also be caused by the actions of inherently malevolent spirits or by persons—witches—thought to have extraordinary powers. In such a world view there is little room for chance or for the notion that microorganisms or weather systems indifferent to human beings inadvertently affect their welfare. A Zimbabwean may, for example, make use of modern medicine because it relieves symptoms but may still be concerned to know why an illness was inflicted upon him.

An indigenous religious system is peculiar to specific sections of an ethnic group in the sense that the range and characteristics of spirits and rituals may vary from one group to another, sometimes to the point where the configuration of belief and practice differs substantially. The ingredients are similar, however, and some general patterns may be discerned.

Each system recognizes several orders or categories of spirits. The central category, in the sense that it contains the spirits most frequently dealt with by ordinary Shona and Ndebele in family rituals, is that of the ancestral spirits (or spirit elders—Shona, *madzimu*; sing., *mudzium*; Ndebele, *amadhlozi*; sing., *idhlozi*). Such spirit elders are, for the most part, considered friendly and helpful provided that rituals honoring them are regularly carried out. In many Shona groups a member of the family is a medium for the family's senior or guardian spirit, who is present for some rituals to partake of the offering and to advise. Only when the spirits are offended by an act of a member of the group or by failure to honor them may they be responsible for an affliction, typically a mild one intended a reminder rather than as punishment.

Among the Shona a spirit of the same order—but thought of as angry or dangerous and called by a different term (*ngozi*)—is believed to afflict individuals or families, whether its own or another, because it has been grievously offended in its time on earth or after death. Among the spirits falling into this category are those of murdered persons, abused or neglected spouses, and creditors angry at dilatory debtors. An angry spirit is placated only when serious difficulties befall a family and a diviner capable of coping with such spirits attributes the problem to such a spirit. Sometimes the spirit will possess an individual to make its anger known. Quieting an *ngozi* spirit may be costly in material ways, e.g., payment of substantial compensation to the family of a murdered person or the performance of humiliating acts.

Another Shona category comprises stranger spirits (*mashave*; sing., *shave*) believed to represent outsiders who died in the area and were not buried properly. *Mashave* may also be spirits of Europeans or baboons, among other things. The chief interest of these spirits seems to be to make those they enter dance, but in some areas they are thought responsible for the special skills or talents of the person

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

they possess. By and large they are benevolent, but some may turn malevolent, in which case they are called *ngozi* like dangerous ancestral spirits.

Quite different in their scope from these spirits, all of which are concerned with individuals and specific kin groups, are the community tutelary spirits. Typically such spirits are ancestors of the chiefly lineage, but occasionally they may represent a former ruling group in the area. In either case their jurisdiction is territorial rather than kin based. Some among these communal guardian spirits become lion spirits; they are thought first to possess a lion and then a medium. The term for lion, *mhondoro*, is widely used for the spirit and the medium. Often the lion spirit of a chiefdom has been the founder of a chiefly dynasty; sometimes his sister is another, but some of the historically important ones have not been clearly identified with a known ruler or his sister. When a lion spirit medium dies, the spirit often possesses another in the same chiefdom. Sometimes a lion spirit possesses only one medium and does not manifest itself again when the medium dies. Some historically important lion spirits have entered mediums sequentially in several parts of the country.

The lion spirits are usually concerned with such matters as the land and its fertility and succession to the chieftainship. Some have achieved great fame as rainmakers. The commonest relatively regular ritual honoring the lion spirits of a community occurs at the onset of the rainy season or sometime during it. Other rituals are held as the need is felt, e.g., those organized to ask the spirit's help on the occasion of an epidemic, drought, or plague of locusts. The lion spirits through their medium have been regularly consulted when the question of succession to the chieftainship has arisen. In some areas a lion spirit may be consulted on private matters, such as illness in the family; unlike the usual diviners and healers (*nganga*), however, they do not accept fees or use material means to effect their divinations or cures.

Some lion spirits have played a substantial part in the historical actions of large sections of the Shona people. The spirit Chaminuka first entered a medium early in the nineteenth century and moved from medium to medium in different regions until it possessed Pasipaire, a son of a Zezuru chief. In this guise Chaminuka acquired a great reputation as a rainmaker, developed a large cult, and became a strong element in the resistance to the Ndebele under Lobengula in the 1870s. Lobengula, after deferring to Chaminuka in the person of Pasipaire, began to consider him a threat and had Pasipaire killed in 1883, after which Chaminuka was enveloped in legend and myth. A woman became Chaminuka's medium in 1903 but died after having been imprisoned by the British. In subsequent mediums Chaminuka has maintained a reputation as a rainmaker.

Two other spirits—Nehanda and Kaguvi—played important roles in the Shona resistance to the colonizers that culminated in the 1896-97 revolt (see *Settlement, Resistance, and Pacification*, ch. 1).

The Society and Its Environment

Nehanda was a lion spirit that had possessed a series of female mediums in the Zezuru region for many years and had acquired a status equivalent to that of Chaminuka. Through its medium, Nehanda encouraged the first killings of European settlers in its area and helped to organize the resistance of Zezuru chiefs to white rule. Further, Nehanda insisted that its followers reject European material goods and fight with traditional weapons. Unlike Nehanda, Kaguvi became known as a spirit only when it possessed one Gumporeshumba and in the guise became a leader of the Shona revolt. Gumporeshumba seems to have been directly involved in the mechanics of the revolt in addition to acting as a medium. Both mediums were caught, tried for murder, and hanged; Gumporeshumba converted to Roman Catholicism before he died. Other mediums have since been possessed by Nehanda, but Kaguvi has not reappeared.

During the period from UDI to independence, lion spirit mediums seem to have been involved in politics in various ways. Some remained quiescent, limiting themselves to their usual activities, but others directly supported the guerrillas whether as individuals or as voices of the spirits said to possess them.

Despite their considerable influence, lion spirit mediums are subject to certain checks. One of these is skepticism of the genuineness of particular mediums. In Shona theory once a medium has been accepted as such by senior mediums, he or she speaks with the voice of a lion spirit. In fact, if the spirit medium seems to be insisting on some action that his followers consider harmful or difficult to accept, questions have arisen whether the medium is truly possessed. Another individual may claim to be possessed by the same lion spirit, and members of the community may decide that the spirit has left the older medium. Cases have been recorded where a lion medium has advised against the building of a dam or some other improvement and has been ignored. In short, lion spirit mediums can be leaders or innovators only up to a point. To carry people with them they must articulate a consensus, whether or not it is fully conscious. In so doing they spur people to action.

The religions of all indigenous groups, whatever the hierarchy of other spirits included in them, recognize a high god. The usual Shona term is Mwari; the usual Ndebele name is Mlimo, a term borrowed from the Sotho people absorbed by the Nguni-speaking Ndebele. Both terms have been used by missionaries for the Christian God. The attributes of the high god vary not only from one people to another but from section to section of the Shona. All peoples recognize the high god as a creator; many consider him the ultimate source of the power of the other spirits and of life-giving things, such as rain; some identify him with the sun, thunder, and the heavens. Unlike the other spirits he has not had a life on earth. In general the high god is a remote being, concerned with the welfare of the people as a whole, but seldom is thought of as acting directly and (except for the Mwari cult of the Matopo Hills) is rarely approached

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

directly. His actions are mediated through other spirits, and he is approached through them. Although an African may occasionally attribute something to the high god, e.g., death resulting from old age, he is not often referred to.

The Mwari cult is limited to the southern and southwestern Shona—the Karanga and Kalanga sections—and to the Venda, who also participate in it. The cult is located in the Matopo Hills in an area peopled in large part by the Ndebele, who apparently consulted the Mwari oracle several times but were not significantly influenced by the cult. Priests and messengers serve the cult, which is focused on several shrines, some arranged in a cohesive hierarchy, some apparently in competition. The most important of them is at Matonjeni. The oracles are consulted on public matters through priests but often with the authorization or recommendation of senior spirit mediums in a chiefdom.

As part of an attempt to explain and deal with events, particularly with the relations between people, indigenous systems also invoke the notion of witchcraft. Underlying the attribution of suffering or death to a witch is the assumption that the perpetrator, not the sufferer, is to blame, whereas ancestral spirits are usually thought to cause difficulties because their descendants have committed a transgression of some sort.

The Shona and other groups tend to attribute much disease and misfortune to the action of witches, who are inherently malevolent but whose particular acts may be generated by envy of the person afflicted. Mild illnesses may be attributed to an ancestral spirit, but serious and prolonged sickness rarely is. Death, except that of extremely old people, is usually considered a consequence of witchcraft. Witches may sometimes achieve their evil ends by instigating the activity of a dangerous spirit (*ngozi*), but some Shona think that a witch becomes one because a spirit has invested him or her. In principle anyone may be a witch. In practice witchcraft among the Shona (and to a lesser extent among the Ndebele) is usually attributed to women who may, among other things, be accused of harming their co-wives, husbands, and their husbands' kinfolk. The pattern of accusation of women and the particular kinds of persons thought to be harmed by them gives some support to the idea that powerless persons are often believed to exercise power in obscure ways and that witches use their putative power in situations of actual or potential conflict, e.g., that between co-wives.

The characteristics and behavior of witches include collaboration in covens, trafficking with spirits embodied in animals, the capacity to move about at night over long distances, the readiness to consume human flesh (particularly that of babies), and similar aptitudes and appetites. It is assumed that a witch who has been entered by a spirit, often thought to be the spirit of a female ancestor who was also a witch, cannot and does not wish to be changed and that she enjoys the evil she does. It is, however, thought possible that a woman may

be a witch without knowing it and may perpetrate her evil unconsciously.

The Shona and Ndebele also believe in a nonhereditary kind of witch who uses material objects such as medicines (poisons) and charms or who manipulates objects deriving from the putative victims's body (nail parings and the like) to harm victims. Typically such witches are thought to be males who act with particular goals in mind, e.g., to damage someone disliked or to gain something at another's expense. Often he is thought to acquire the necessary materials and the relevant knowledge from an herb doctor who has become corrupt.

There are ways of finding out who or what is responsible for an affliction and why. Further, there are ways of dealing with community problems such as those posed by succession to political office, that are thought to be the concern of significant ancestors. Finding answers is the province of the diviner. In addition to the spirit mediums who are concerned with wishes of the guardian spirits of families and lineages and the lion spirits that deal with such matters as chiefly succession, there is a range of professional diviners and healers in Shona society (all called *nganga*) who use their skills and knowledge for a fee. Diviners and healers also function in Ndebele society, and there too they are often called *nganga*. Some *nganga* use a variety of techniques for both divining and healing, bringing to bear those considered appropriate to a particular illness and its likely cause. Many, however, specialize. A number are herbalists who provide curative medicines and protective charms. Others are spirit mediums possessed by potent stranger spirits who deal with cases where witchcraft or the activity of a dangerous spirit (*ngozi*) is suspected. Some deal only with specific illnesses.

An *nganga* is usually a male, but a number of women have considerable reputations as diviners and healers. He or she may learn the profession by apprenticeship but frequently is called to it by spirit possession, often associated with the illness of the prospective *nganga*. After the call the techniques must still be learned. The basic skill for diviner and healer, however, is the capacity to be sensitive to the stresses and strains under which the client labors. Diagnosis (divination) and cure are often psychological in character. At the same time, particular herbal medicines are effective.

In the two years since independence, much has been said about the possibility of integrating indigenous healers with Western medicine. This seems to reflect the sense of some Zimbabweans that the *nganga* have something to offer in the form of herbal medicines and in their social and psychological acumen; it may also indicate an awareness that many Zimbabweans may be more comfortable in health facilities where these familiar figures operate. Beyond this, some in government may think that associating the *nganga* with medical institutions will control what they consider some less desirable activities of *nganga*. For example, some of them set themselves

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

African		European, Coloured, and Asian	
University of Rhodesia faculties: Arts: 3 years; Engineering: (4 years); Medicine: (5-6 years); Science: 3 years;		Polytechnics Teacher's colleges	
Bachelor's Degree			
Included: University,	tertiary	Included: University,	
some Teacher training		Teacher training	
		Technical training	
Forms	VI (upper): Cambridge Higher School Certificate	senior	VI (upper): A-levels General Certificate Examination
	VI (lower):		VI (lower): M-levels Matriculation Exemption
	IV Grade II Certificate/Cambridge Overseas School Certificate	secondary	IV General Certificate Examination O-levels/Rhodesia School Certificate
	III		III Rhodesia Certificate of Education
	II Rhodesia Junior Certificate/ Certificate of Junior Secondary Education or Grade 9 Certificate	junior secondary	II Rhodesia Junior Certificate
	I		I
Grades	7 Grade 7 Certificate	primary	
	6		
	5		
	4		
	3		
	2		Sub A
	1		Sub B
Vocational schools only Preparation for Junior Certificate and Senior Secondary Certificate by special classes and correspondence courses		Available after Form III to those incapable of passing General Certificate Examination O-levels after Form IV	
Grade II Certificate for courses in technical subjects only		M-levels at end of Form VI (lower) for students wishing to enter universities in South Africa	

Source: Based on information from David J. Cranmer and Valerie A. Woolston, *Southern Africa*, Washington, 1980, pp. 217-37.

Figure 14. School Systems, Rhodesia, Mid-1970s

up as witchfinders who enter a community and point out people whom they dub witches; they may then propose to cure the witches, i.e., to exorcise the spirits inhabiting them, all for a fee. Whether modern physicians and many *nganga* will find themselves able to cooperate or to define the terms on which they can do so is uncertain.

Education

The postindependence government inherited what had long been (except for the University of Zimbabwe, formerly the University of Rhodesia) two sharply segregated systems of education. In the Zimbabwe Rhodesia era the legislative basis of segregation was abrogated, but the Education Act of 1979 that replaced it did little to change de facto segregation and the dual characteristics of the old system (see fig. 14). The new government had the task of desegregating and expanding the system and of changing the character of education to suit an African-dominated society.

Before independence some free primary education for Africans was available, but fees were required in many schools, and primary schooling was far from universal. Government financial support was far less than that given education for Europeans. In 1976-77, for example, per capita support for white pupils was ten times that for blacks. Much of the responsibility for building and staffing devolved on missions and other organizations (local councils in the TTL). The schools run by these groups—83 percent of all African schools—were deemed private but were required to meet standards established by the central government. Most teachers were Africans, some well trained but many more, less so. Here again government offered comparatively little support and few facilities. In the 1970s roughly half the children in the six-to-twelve- or thirteen-year cohort were enrolled as students. The numbers grew slowly until 1978 when the war led to a decline.

Schooling for European children was free and compulsory to the age of fifteen, i.e., through the ninth grade or junior-secondary school. Fees for most secondary schools were low enough to be affordable by all but a few European families but not by most African ones. The teachers in European primary schools (all Europeans) were better trained than the typical teacher in African schools.

A very small proportion of Africans completing primary school entered secondary school, and most were assigned to a course of study that terminated at the junior-secondary level. An even smaller proportion therefore went beyond that level, and a still smaller group completed the upper year of Form VI and were able to take the examination for the Cambridge Higher School Certificate, the passing of which made them eligible for the university. Talent and application were not enough to complete the full course. Fees were required, and most secondary schools were boarding schools. Only students whose parents were well off and willing to support them or who could obtain other aid were able to undertake six years of

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

schooling when others of their age-group were working. Typically, students and their families saw secondary and higher education as paths to a good job, but even that reward was limited given the de facto reservation of many such jobs for whites.

Most white children attended secondary schools through the age of sixteen or so, i.e., through Form III or IV. Passing the examination after Form IV made them eligible for a range of technical training, apprenticeships, and other jobs not open to those with a lesser education. After 1975, however, the European population began to diminish and with it white enrollment in the primary and secondary schools.

In 1979 the two school systems were technically unified, but the schools were not integrated. Three kinds of schools—government, community, and private—were established. Government schools were differentiated with respect to the fees required. Those assessing high fees were also residentially zoned, thus excluding virtually all Africans. Low-fee schools were to serve substantial numbers of Africans, particularly in the urban areas. Free schools catered to the poorest Africans. Community schools were organized in terms of linguistic, cultural, and religious criteria and were to be administered by boards of governors that set admissions and other policies. Communities could buy existing state schools or establish new ones. Even if an African community could afford the capital and operating costs of such a school, which it rarely could, the school was likely to be exclusively African. Finally, there were mission and other (locally administered) schools that were granted some aid by the government. In effect these were the private schools previously attended by most rural African children.

The exception to the generally segregated character of the preindependence school system was the University of Rhodesia. Established as the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1955, it became the University College of Rhodesia after the termination of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and a full university in 1970. Admission to the university was based on the successful completion of examinations in approved subjects, the precise requirements varying according to the faculty or institute to which the student applied. Despite the limited number of places for them in secondary schools preparing students for university matriculation, Africans constituted 40 percent or more of the student body in the 1970s, in part because those who did complete their secondary education in the face of obstacles were clearly eligible. Moreover financial aid was available to them at that level.

Despite the nonsegregated character of the university, whites seeking higher education were favored in other ways: they received government support to attend South African universities and were prepared for matriculation in a special section of Form VI. The polytechnics were open largely to whites, in part because a technical education was linked to the possibility of apprenticeship for which

Africans were not eligible until the late 1970s and then only in very small numbers.

Initially the new government did little to change the system established by the Education Act of 1979, although its leaders considered much of it unsatisfactory. They wanted first to evaluate Zimbabwe's needs and to assess the costs of change. Some changes in the examination system were made to permit larger numbers of Africans to move into the higher grades. Age limits for entering either primary or secondary school were lifted, and the practice of assigning most African students to a secondary-school course ending at grade nine was terminated. Above all, fees for primary education were eliminated in most schools (all truly private—including religious—schools that charged high fees could continue to do so in conformity with Zimbabwe's Constitution). The community school system, which catered to most whites at primary and secondary levels, remained in place until 1982.

The end of the civil war, the coming to power of the new government, the elimination of fees in primary schools, and the lifting of certain restrictions pertaining to secondary schools led to substantial increases in the numbers of African children in these institutions beginning in the second term of 1980. By the 1982 school year, enrollment in the primary schools was more than double that for 1979. Secondary schools, although still requiring fees, nevertheless drew more than three times the number of students enrolled in 1979 (see table 4; table 5, Appendix). Most secondary-school students who have enrolled since independence were in Forms I and II. After the increase in primary-school enrollments in the second semester of 1980, roughly 78 percent of the six-to-twelve-year cohort was in primary school. It was likely that by 1982 the proportion was more than 90 percent. The proportion of secondary-school students in the thirteen-to-eighteen-year cohort was only 8 percent in 1980. Although substantially higher by 1982, it was probably still under 50 percent.

The surge of enrollment inevitably led to an overload of physical facilities and a shortage of teachers. At the secondary level the need for space was initially handled by instituting double sessions. The traditional emphasis on boarding schools at the secondary level was apparently to give way to day schools, which were cheaper to build and less costly to the student; it might be necessary to provide transportation in the more sparsely settled areas. At the primary level the immediate need for space was met in part by the use of some of the schools hitherto reserved for whites and by ad hoc arrangements. It seems that local communities would be expected to furnish some of the labor and perhaps a portion of other costs of primary-school construction.

The massive growth in enrollments to 1982 and the expectation of continuing growth, even if at a slackening rate, through the 1980s required the training of substantial numbers of teachers. Until independence all but a few secondary-school teachers of whatever race

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

were qualified, and the new government apparently intended to maintain a similar level. In the short run the need has been met by hiring expatriates (mostly Australians). The training level of African teachers in primary schools was more varied. In 1980, after the surge of enrollment, about one-fourth to one-third of primary-school teachers were thought to be untrained and about two-fifths to be not completely qualified, leaving about one-fourth to one-third fully prepared. To raise the qualifications of those already employed and to provide the larger numbers needed in the primary and secondary schools, additional teacher-training colleges and other training systems were instituted. More immediate needs at the primary level were to be met largely by Zintec (Zimbabwe Integrated Teachers's Education Course) colleges. Formal academic training for a period of sixteen weeks was to be followed by four years of in-service training. Field tutors would supervise study and work, and vacation and weekend courses were to be integral to the program.

The growth of the student body at the University of Zimbabwe—from under 2,000 in 1979 to 2,800 in 1982—was less massive than that at lower levels, given the relatively small numbers of well-prepared secondary-school graduates. Even so, the increase in absolute numbers coupled with a change in the composition of the student body implied a substantial number of African students at the university. Less than half African before independence, the student body was 63 percent African in 1980, the last year for which a breakdown by race was available, and the proportion was probably higher by 1982.

Although a survey of manpower needs was still to be completed in 1982, government officials and foreign analysts were agreed that there was a need for technically trained workers at all levels including the highest. To that end the polytechnics in Harare and Bulawayo (particularly the School of Mines in the latter) were being expanded, a new college was opened at Kwekwe, and still another was being contemplated at Mutare.

Before independence a number of Zimbabwean students were studying in Britain, chiefly in its secondary schools. Most came as refugees or exiles from the preindependence regime and were supported by the British Council (a government-supported but independent agency), agencies of the United Nations, and other sources. In mid-1981 there were roughly 3,000 Zimbabwean students in Britain, but support had been drastically curtailed. The newly independent government was granted limited funds by the British government for educational purposes, but Zimbabwean authorities decided to use the funds for the training of persons in skills not available in Zimbabwe, and they urged students in Britain to return to their native land.

Public statements by members of the Ministry of Education and Culture and others have stressed impending changes in the curricula and modes of education of primary and secondary schools. In April 1982 it was announced that a core curriculum was being developed

for all primary schools. Among the changes already under way but not yet universally established was the joining in primary schools of practical and academic training. Students were expected to engage in such activities as agriculture, carpentry, and sewing, not only as a way of acquiring skills but also as a means of contributing to the school budget. This mode of education had been developed in refugee camps in Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique during the war and, with some modifications, was being carried out in a number of pilot programs in Zimbabwe.

There has been an increased emphasis in the secondary schools on the teaching of science, especially that aspect of it pertaining to biology and its applications in the Zimbabwean environment. The lack of laboratory facilities has been alleviated in part by the introduction of special science kits adequate for laboratory work at the junior-secondary level. A major change in substance is taking place in the social sciences. In the words of the Ministry of Education and Culture, "the current approach is concentric, starting with Zimbabwe, then Africa, the Third World, and the international community as a whole." Also given an important role is work in the Shona and Ndebele languages and cultures. English, however, remains the medium of instruction at all levels, and a special program is to be instituted with the help of British experts to improve the teaching of that language.

Health

Before independence, health services were oriented largely to Europeans and were concentrated in urban centers; curative rather than preventive medicine was stressed. Further, many of the limited facilities available to the largely rural African population were damaged during the war. The diseases affecting the bulk of that African population stemmed in good part from inadequate environmental sanitation. The effects of these diseases and others were exacerbated by widespread protein-deficiency malnutrition, particularly among children.

This diagnosis of the situation, shared by government health officials and foreign analysts, led immediately to the first steps toward a national health service. Government planning stressed free health care to the poor, the construction and staffing of village health centers and rural clinics, and preventive medicine. Several foreign and international sources were providing money and skills in the early 1980s, but the staffing at the base of the health services pyramid and at some of the higher levels was to be furnished by Zimbabweans.

Because reports on mortality in the preindependence period included data only from urban and European rural areas and reports on morbidity data only from admissions to Ministry of Health facilities (limited in number and distribution), there was no accurate picture of disease among Africans, and there is not likely to be one until the quality and quantity of statistical reporting improves. Nevertheless,

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

available information does show a marked difference in the major causes of adult death among Africans and Europeans and reveals some of the dimensions of disease among the African population.

Broadly speaking, Africans suffer mainly from infectious and communicable diseases, Europeans from degenerative ones. Thus in 1979 measles, pneumonia, enteritis and other diarrheal diseases, cardiac and circulatory illnesses (other than common heart attacks), and cancers accounted for nearly 43 percent of all registered adult deaths among Africans, whereas heart attacks, other cardiac and circulatory disorders, and cancers accounted for more than 50 percent of European deaths. The principal causes of illness among Africans admitted to Ministry of Health facilities in 1975 and 1978 included malaria—a disabler rather than a killer—enteritis and other diarrheal diseases, pneumonia, and measles. Also important were lacerations and other wounds (causes not specified) and complications of pregnancy and delivery. Estimates based on other sources suggest that trachoma, and pulmonary tuberculosis have a high incidence among Africans. Less frequent as causes of death or for admission to Ministry of Health facilities, but still of some importance, were typhoid, tetanus, infectious hepatitis, and leprosy. Cholera has occurred infrequently in epidemic form.

Except for pneumonia, measles, and tuberculosis, most of the diseases from which Africans suffer are water related. Enteritis and similar illnesses are waterborne, as is infectious hepatitis. Schistosomiasis (snail fever) is water based. The malaria-bearing mosquito lays its eggs in water. And the incidence of trachoma and leprosy could be lowered if clean water for hygienic purposes were available. In all of these water-related cases the establishment of a regimen of environmental sanitation would do much to suppress the diseases. In the case of measles, inoculation would serve the same purpose.

Many of these diseases (particularly enteritis and other diarrheal diseases and measles) that afflict children are more damaging when the infected children are suffering from protein-deficiency malnutrition. In the case of measles, for example, the onset of and recovery from the disease produce demands for protein and energy that are not met by the usual diet, which may be marginally adequate under normal circumstances. Studies seem to show a fairly high incidence of moderate or severe malnourishment, particularly among poorer African children. Starvation has been rare, but kwashiorkor and marasmus have occurred and have resulted in infant and child deaths.

In a 1981 World Bank staff paper, *Social Infrastructure and Services in Zimbabwe*, it was stated that "in many developing countries, the health infrastructure has an urban bias; the Zimbabwean system is extreme." Of the five providers of health services through 1980, three were oriented largely to the urban population: the central government's Ministry of Health, the private sector, and industrial medical services; one, comprising voluntary agencies—mainly churches—furnished hospitals and clinics to the largely African rural

The Society and Its Environment

areas; local councils, again mainly African, provided some services in both urban and rural areas. Many of the rural facilities operated by missions and local authorities were closed from 1977 to 1980 as the war intensified.

The Ministry of Health's four large modern hospitals were in Harare and Bulawayo. Formerly two were allocated to Africans and two to Europeans and other groups. There were eleven Ministry of Health general hospitals in smaller towns, and the ministry operated still smaller hospitals at the district levels and in some rural areas. The seven special hospitals included facilities for mental illness, leprosy, and tuberculosis. In principle, patients entering a lower level facility could be referred to a better equipped hospital if that were necessary to deal with a specific illness. In practice, however, African patients entering rural health clinics (called primary health care centers) were rarely referred beyond local rural hospitals.

The ratio of population to medical personnel in 1977 was roughly 8,000 persons for each physician and 1,000 persons for each nurse or midwife. The ratio was better than that of neighboring states in East and Central Africa, but there was a radical difference between urban areas (2,000 persons for each physician and 320 for each nurse or midwife) and rural areas (33,000 persons for each physician and more than 2,000 for each nurse or midwife). The urban-rural distinction overlapped substantially with a European-African one.

Formerly all Ministry of Health facilities and personnel operated on a fee-for-service basis. Other facilities did the same, in principle, but fees were sometimes waived. Most whites were members of medical aid societies (insurance groups) in which most white practitioners participated.

Soon after independence the government announced that free health care was to be available to all those earning less than Z\$150 a month (for value of the Zimbabwe dollar—see Glossary), a ceiling that in the early 1980s would have made most rural Africans and many urban ones eligible. Those earning more were to pay into an insurance fund on a sliding scale, in any case less than that paid for membership in a private medical aid society. The latter were to be permitted to continue, as were private medical practice and existing private hospitals and nursing homes. In 1982, however, it was announced that no new facilities were to be built.

The expansion of health services, including preventive medicine, was expected to be costly. Even if large central hospitals were not built, numbers of smaller rural hospitals, rural clinics, and village health centers and equipment to furnish them were required. The construction of facilities in rural communities made use of the labor of local people, but some of the people involved in construction and much of the capital were provided by foreign sources.

The new facilities at the base of the health care pyramid were to be staffed by paramedical technicians—medical assistants with a considerable degree of training in the rural health centers and local persons

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

chosen by village people in village facilities. The latter are to be given enough training to instruct villagers in environmental sanitation, to dispense some drugs, and to refer patients to the next higher treatment level. The use of former guerrilla medical orderlies as medical assistants was contemplated soon after independence, but the extent to which they have entered the national health system had not been made public as of mid-1982.

Physicians and nurses will be required to staff facilities at higher levels of the health care pyramid, e.g., rural hospitals and clinics, and to supervise paramedics at the lower levels. Although there was not a net emigration of physicians in the first two years of independence, many physicians were in the private sector and in urban areas; some inducement may be required to shift some of them to smaller towns and rural areas. Some doctors who have come to Zimbabwe as part of the aid furnished by foreign countries were working in rural areas in the early 1980s, but that was a temporary expedient. The intake of the University of Zimbabwe's medical school had been expanded considerably, and it was expected that newly graduated Zimbabwean physicians would be required to serve in the national health program for some time, at least part of it in rural areas.

* * *

As of 1982 no considered analysis of postindependence tendencies in the social system had appeared. Earlier descriptions and analyses provide useful background, but they are predicated on social, political, and economic orders dominated by Europeans. A good survey of the Shona up to the early 1970s is Michael Bourdillon's *The Shona Peoples*, which provides some indication of the range of variation among these peoples and an extensive bibliography. No similar work exists for the Ndebele.

There is a substantial literature on the significance of religion and religious organizations. One is Peter Fry's *Spirits of Protest: Spirit Mediums and the Articulation of Consensus among the Zezuru of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)*. The complex regional relations among spirit cults are dealt with in Kingsley Garbett's "Disparate Regional Cults and a Unitary Ritual Field in Zimbabwe." Bennetta Jules-Rosette's *Ritual and Conversion in the Church of John Maranke* and Clive and Margaret Kileff's "The Masowe Vapostori of Seki: Utopianism and Tradition in an African Church" are but two of many works treating apostolic (or spiritist) churches in Zimbabwe.

Works dealing with social change and stratification in African society before independence are Anna K.H. Weinrich's *African Farmers in Rhodesia: Old and New Peasant Communities in Karangaland, Mucheke: Race, Status, and Politics in a Rhodesian Community, Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia*, and "Social Stratification and Change among African Women in a Rhodesian Provincial Town." Also relevant is Angela P. Cheater's "Aspects of

The Society and Its Environment

Status and Mobility among Farmers and Their Families in Msengezi African Purchase Land."

Two articles approaching African ethnicity and ethnic relations from different perspectives are John Day's "The Insignificance of Tribe in the African Politics of Zimbabwe Rhodesia" and Masipula Sithole's "Ethnicity and Factionalism in Zimbabwe: Nationalist Politics 1957-79." A very useful source for the meaning of names and indigenous terms and as a general research aid (an extensive bibliography is included) is R. Kent Rasmussen's *Historical Dictionary of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 3. The Economy



African workers dumping a carload of coke into a blast furnace at an iron and steel plant

ZIMBABWE BEGAN ITS independent existence in 1980 with a dual economic structure comprising a well-developed, broadly based modern sector dominated by the small white segment of the population and a largely agricultural subsistence sector—since independence generally referred to as the communal sector—consisting of the greater proportion of the majority African peoples. There was considerable interaction between the two elements involving the exchange of goods, the provision of labor by the subsistence sector, and the payment of wages by the modern sector that in part were transferred to the subsistence component.

The modern sector, which accounted for the greater part of the gross domestic product, included most of the country's better agricultural land, mineral resources, and developed transport and electric power infrastructure. Pre-1980 economic development had been centered almost entirely in this sector, which until 1974 had experience relatively constant economic growth at a rate that had substantially exceeded that of population increase. During the latter half of the 1970s, however, this upward trend was reversed, and significant real annual declines in economic activity occurred, largely the result of the accumulating effect of international sanctions, rising petroleum prices, war damage, the need for manpower for military service, and severe droughts (in 1978 and 1979). By 1979 per capita income in constant terms had fallen to the level of about Z\$165 (US\$239) at which it had stood when the unilateral declaration of independence was announced in 1965. Nonetheless, when peace came at the end of 1979, the economy had the potential for rapid recovery and further development based on abundant natural resources, extensive existing physical plant in the modern sector, and the professional, managerial, and skilled personnel (despite losses by emigration) to operate it. The economy's resilience was demonstrated by the high rate of growth in 1980; despite a slowdown in 1981 and early 1982, the basic economic features—and the promise of a better life for most Zimbabweans—persisted.

The pre-1965 modern economy operated as a largely uninhibited free enterprise system, in which the government confined its role mainly to assisting private enterprise operations. Only after the unilateral declaration of independence did government, of necessity, introduce any significant degree of control over the private sector. Government ownership of the railroads, the national airline, the Zimbabwean equity in the Kariba Dam and power plant, the electric power distribution system, and participation in agricultural marketing were exceptions and the result chiefly of historical factors. At independence, control of the government came into the hands of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, an avowed socialist. In conjunction

Zimbabwe: A Country Study


with the immediate issues of reconstruction, war-related refugee resettlement, and the return of combatants to civilian life, Mugabe was intent on carrying out structural changes that would provide the African population with substantially greater benefits from the economy. Government expenditures for social services, especially education and health, were greatly increased since independence in line with this goal. At the same time, Mugabe was faced with the need to promote increased production by commercial farmers and manufacturing and mining entrepreneurs in the modern sector through policies that would provide incentives for these groups to improve their economic position and coincidentally to benefit the economy as a whole.

The new government's first comprehensive economic policy statement, *Growth with Equity*, issued in February 1981, called for development of the economy based on socialist principles and policies. This included the achievements of a more equitable ownership of land and natural resources and the promotion of ownership by Zimbabwean nationals—regardless of race, color, or creed—of a significant portion of the modern productive sector, much of which at independence (and in mid-1982) was in the hands of foreign corporations. In carrying out these policies the government had not as of mid-1982 resorted to direct nationalization. Resolution of the major issue of landownership had been based on purchases in the former white agricultural area from owners willing to sell. In the overwhelmingly foreign-owned mining sector the government had declared its intention to participate both directly and through joint ventures. It had also requested foreign investors in general to include Zimbabweans as equity holders. Acquisition of important holdings in the private sector by the government had not appeared to presage nationalization—the purchase of a majority interest in the country's largest bank from South African tenderers, for example, was stated to be mainly a measure to ensure that the interest did not fall into non-Zimbabwean hands.

From time to time since independence, however, the prospect of eventual full socialization of the economy has been enunciated by Mugabe. But no timetable had been given, and his statements had generally indicated that attainment of that goal would be sometime well in the future. In mid-1982 Zimbabwe still possessed a mixed economic system in which the modern private sector played the major role. Barring political change or compelling political pressures, it appeared that although government participation and communal economic activity would increase, private enterprise would be retained as the mainstay of the modern productive economy. Any change probably would be carried out gradually and cautiously.

Land Use and Ownership

A general survey of the country's agricultural land-use potentials from the viewpoint of commercial exploitation, was made by the



Source: Based on information from I. M. Hume, *A Strategy for Rural Development and Whitsun Data Bank No. 2: The Peasant Sector*, Salisbury, October 1978, p. 53.

Figure 15. Farming Potentials by Land-Use Suitability

Ministry of Agriculture in 1960. Revised in the 1970s, the survey delineates five natural farming regions that in general coincide with rainfall patterns (see fig. 7; fig. 15). Region I is a relatively small region (1.8 percent of the total land area) of higher rainfall in the eastern highlands suitable for the production of diversified special crops such as fruits, coffee, and tea, and intensive livestock raising.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Region II comprises a large area (15 percent) mainly in the eastern highveld where land can be used intensively for crop cultivation or livestock raising or both. Region III (18.7 percent), suitable for mixed farming, is also in the highveld. It is best used for livestock raising accompanied by cultivation of crops that require little rainfall. Region IV (37.8 percent) encompasses much of the middleveld and is considered quite suitable for livestock but also permits the limited cultivation of crops of a drought-resistant nature. Region V (26.7 percent) is largely in the lowveld and unsuited for crop cultivation because of low rainfall; nevertheless it still is considered a favorable environment for extensive livestock raising.

At independence, land actually used for crops amounted to about 6.6 percent (roughly 2.5 million hectares) of Zimbabwe's total land area of about 38.7 million hectares. Another 12.6 percent (about 4.9 million hectares) was permanent pastureland. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 61.6 percent of the country (23.8 million hectares) was occupied by forest, mainly savanna woodland and scattered tree savanna. Included in the forestland classification, however, were considerable areas of grassland from which the tree vegetation had been removed but which were considered likely to be reforested in the foreseeable future. The remaining 19.3 percent (7.5 million hectares) included land occupied by cities, towns, villages, and other man-made features; land unsuitable for farming; and unspecified land (some of which had agricultural potential).

About 65 percent of Zimbabwe's soils have been formed on granite and are light, sandy, and mostly of only moderate to low fertility. Other sandy soils of extremely low fertility, believed to have originated on wind-laid deposits derived from the Kalahari Desert, cover an extensive area of the northwest. Water percolates rapidly through these soils, and they have become highly leached and have minimal agricultural value. Sandy soils of still different origin, also of little value, are found in the southern lowveld. Together these two low-grade sandy soils account for about another 25 percent of the country's land. The best soils and the most important for present-day commercial agriculture are the relatively rich loamy clays (usually reddish in color) found in scattered areas of the highveld and middleveld. Constituting about 7 percent of the country's total land, they developed on the formations that are associated with the so-called gold belts (see Mining, this ch.).

Historically the preponderant Shona peoples appear to have preferred the granite-based light soils that were more easily cultivated with hoes. (Such soils are also preferred in other African countries where people use primitive cultivation techniques.) These soils usually were used for three or four years and then returned to fallow for about fifteen years. Until the twentieth century, Shona agricultural practices using such soils were reported by early travelers, missionaries, and others to have resulted in a moderate degree of prosperity. Present-day commercial farmers also use these soils, but

successful continuous cultivation requires modern management practices. Where such management has not been followed, soil deterioration and serious erosion have occurred, a situation that had arisen in the African Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) before independence, in large part resulting from enforced overuse of the land because of population pressures. In contrast to the Shona, the Ndebele at the time of colonization favored the red loams for cultivation. They were eventually evicted from most such areas, however, and relegated to the Native Reserves as the result of white land acquisitions. Much of the present-day Ndebele rural population works the same soils and faces the same problems as the Shona.

Early white prospectors and pioneers, attracted to the gold belts in hope of major gold strikes, were granted large tracts of land along with mining rights by the British South Africa Company (BSAC), then Britain's administrator of the territory constituting most of present-day Zimbabwe (see *Settlement, Resistance, and Pacification*, ch. 1). By the end of the 1890s more than 6.4 million hectares had been acquired by white colonists, and this total included a large proportion of the more fertile loams. The European area, as it was expanded through further appropriations in the 1900s, also came to encompass a substantial proportion of the granite-based light sandy soils, and much of the African population was left generally with the country's poorer land, although the African Purchase Areas included some moderately good soils. In the late 1970s, of the two natural farming regions having the best quality soils (I and II), whites held 62.6 percent of the land suitable for specialized farming and 73.8 percent of that best suited for intensive crop and livestock production (see table 6, Appendix). Africans held, respectively, 19.3 and 25.7 percent; the remainder was national land (mostly parks, game reserves, and the like). Region III, suited more to livestock production but also able to support crop cultivation, was about equally divided (white, 44.5 percent; African, 46.0 percent). Regions IV and V, whose climatic conditions largely restricted agricultural activities to livestock raising, were held mainly by Africans (53.0 and 46.7 percent, respectively, compared with 27.2 and 34.9 percent by whites).

The African population traditionally had conceived of land as communal property, and every member of a tribal group had use rights to a portion of it. Such rights included continuous possession, full retention by the cultivator of the crops raised, and the right to bequeath the land to heirs. These rights remained contingent, however, on the cultivator's continuing use of the land and acceptance of the individual by the group. There was no conception of land as a marketable commodity; it was used, passed on for use by heirs in conformity with local customary law, or reverted to the community. Freehold land tenure was introduced with the land grants and sales of land made by the BSAC starting in 1891. Subsequent friction, warfare in 1893 with African groups over land, and a developing

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

concern in Britain over African land rights led to the appointment of the Lands Commission in 1894 and the establishment of a number of Native Reserves in which the African population was to have exclusive rights of occupation and use. The assumption then was that all other land was at the disposal of the BSAC. An influx of settlers from the mid-1890s, accompanied by large-scale BSAC alienation of land still occupied by Africans, led to major rebellions. In 1898 the British government directed the company to provide adequate land for Africans for traditional communal occupation. This was carried out by local BSAC administrative officers and resulted eventually in a mosaic consisting of a large number of intermixed African and white areas. The company was also to sell land to Africans who desired it in freehold on the same basis as to Europeans. The BSAC was opposed to this latter policy, and by the end of its control of the colony in 1923 only a handful of Africans had secured freehold land.

By the mid-1920s strong sentiment had developed among white farmers against the purchase of land by Africans in white areas. This appears to have resulted partly from social factors, but the main reason was the fear of economic competition. Consequently the right of Africans to own land in freehold outside the reserves was abolished by the Southern Rhodesian government in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. Instead Africans were given the right to acquire land in freehold tenure in newly established Native Purchase Areas (later known as African Purchase Areas). In 1933 a system of leaseholds was also introduced in these areas. In the reserves, gradual population growth and pressures on the land resulted in many areas in soil deterioration and loss of vegetation cover. Official efforts to improve husbandry led finally to passage of the African Land Husbandry Act of 1951, a major measure designed to change the communal land tenure system into one of individual ownership on the assumption that usufructuary systems of land tenure created serious disincentives to improvement. The act projected the establishment of peasant farming units of standard size to which the farmer would have a registered title. The government was aware that the total amount of land then assigned to Africans throughout the country was not sufficient to provide a farm to everyone who had a claim, but it anticipated migration of the surplus population to urban areas where developing industrialization and other economic activities would provide for them.

There was deep opposition in the reserves to the new concept, and tribal groups, long steeped in customary practices, managed in various ways to circumvent the new system. Urban employment also failed to keep pace with the increase in population, and farming units became overcrowded. By the early 1960s an acute land shortage had developed. Implementation of the act was suspended and a reversion to traditional land allocation methods and shifting agriculture occurred. The Tribal Trust Land Act of 1965 formally reestablished the power of the traditional tribal authorities and left to them control

over the system of land use.

In 1969 the 1930 Land Apportionment Act, as amended, was repealed and replaced by the Land Tenure Act of 1969. The new measure set aside areas of roughly equal size (approximately 18.2 million hectares each) for Europeans and Africans. Some 2.7 million hectares were designated national land; this included national parks, game reserves, and the like (see fig. 8). The act stated that land assigned to the white population was for whites only and that conversely the African area was limited to Africans. In promoting the Land Tenure Act, the government pointed out that it divided land equally between the two groups. But attention was not called to the fact that the apportionment continued tenure of the more fertile land by whites, nor that the latter then accounted for only 5 percent of the total population. Previously a 1963 amendment of the Land Apportionment Act had given Africans the right to acquire freehold tenure of certain urban land in the white areas; other laws had given them the right to own buildings there, but the land on which they were situated was held under lease only. The new Land Tenure Act included a provision for African townships in the white areas in which Africans could own the land. The act further authorized the designation in white areas of special commercial, industrial, and residential zones that were to be open to any race.

In the mid-1970s a government-appointed commission looking into racial discrimination recommended sweeping changes in existing land tenure laws. The recommendations were embodied in the Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1977, which drastically altered the 1969 measure, reducing the areas exclusively for white ownership to somewhat more than 200,000 hectares located principally in white urban areas. More than 15 million hectares of white farming areas were thus opened to buyers of any race. Land in the African Purchase Areas similarly was made available to anyone. In the view of the commission, however, changes relating to land and land use in the TTL would occur only gradually and along evolutionary lines. It therefore recommended that these lands, where over half of the African population was living, be retained exclusively for Africans. This recommendation was incorporated into the new act.

In early 1979 the transitional government passed the Land Tenure (Repeal) Act. This opened to everyone—for occupation, lease, or ownership—the nonrural areas that had been exclusively designated for whites in the 1977 act. Passed at the same time, the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1979 reaffirmed that Africans would have exclusive use of those lands, which covered about 40 percent of the country, but use was to be on a voluntary basis. Under the independence Constitution of 1980, ownership of land was assured, and land could be taken from the owner only with adequate compensation and under certain circumstances and for specified purposes. But in its general economic policy statement, *Growth with Equity*, of February 1981, the government stated that no one should have absolute ownership of

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

land. It was the government's intention, however, to entrust certain rights in the use of land to private individuals and groups of individuals for as long as such trusteeship best served the national interest. In late 1980 the Mugabe government had strongly denied any intention to expropriate unused land from absentee white farmers. Since 1980 land has been purchased from commercial farmers and made available to Africans for settlement. Black Zimbabweans have been issued permits to occupy, cultivate, and graze livestock on these new holdings; however, the permits do not grant freehold tenure or leasehold. But to mid-1982 there had been no clear statement of policy with respect to the form of future rights of occupancy by either individuals or the cooperative and communal farming groups the government was promoting.

Agriculture

Until 1969 the agriculture sector (consisting of crop cultivation, livestock, forestry, and fishing subsectors) provided the largest contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary). Second to manufacturing since then, the sector nevertheless continued in 1982 to be the economy's largest industry (see table 7, Appendix). It remained the principal means of livelihood for over 70 percent of the population, employed a third or more of the wage-earning work force, and accounted for a major share of export receipts (between about 38 and 45 percent of the total annually in the period 1975-80). After the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965 and through 1974, agricultural output, stimulated in part by a drive to attain domestic self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, grew in real terms at an average annual rate of 7.3 percent. From 1975 through 1979 overall performance declined, but much of this was attributable to the intensified guerrilla warfare during the time and to two years of severe drought. A return to peace in late 1979 and highly favorable weather conditions in the 1980-81 season led to what was reported as the best crop production on record.

Farming is a major activity of the African population. Only a very small segment of the white population is directly engaged in agriculture, but during the 1970's white commercial farmers, then numbering about 6,400 (the total reportedly had declined to below 4,000 by 1982), regularly accounted for close to 80 percent of total agricultural output, in the production of which they employed about 350,000 African workers. Some 8,600 African small-scale commercial farmers accounted for another 2.0 to 2.5 percent. The removal in 1977 of racial restrictions on the purchase of agricultural land anywhere within the country had had little effect on this situation because few Africans had the means to enter large-scale production.

Until the start of the African resettlement program in 1980, the white commercial sector had owned overall 14.8 million hectares of farm and grazing land (equivalent to about 2,300 hectares each for some 6,400 farm units). But from the standpoint of size of landholding,

productivity, and income, the major share of commercial farming was accounted for by a relatively small number of white individual farmers and large farm and ranch corporations. A mid-1970's survey found that two-thirds of all white farmland (almost 9.9 million hectares) was owned by 736 farmers and corporations. The top 10 percent of white farmers had holdings that averaged about 12,000 hectares and a third of this group owned farms averaging 26,000 hectares each; this third accounted for an area totaling 5.6 million hectares. In contrast the lowest 25 percent of white farmers had individual holdings that averaged under 100 hectares, roughly the same in size as the African small-scale commercial freehold farmers.

In the communal lands some 750,000 families produced about 20 percent of total Zimbabwean agricultural output. Although production was mostly for subsistence, an unknown number of farmers grew surpluses for marketing. Land distribution in the communal areas also exhibited inequalities but on a much smaller scale. In the mid-1970s about 30 percent of communal farmers held more than 60 percent of total communal land. Individual families in this group averaged about eighty hectares each, including grazing land, but generally the areas occupied had poorer soils. Among all communal families, some 54 percent had holdings of fewer than sixteen hectares, and 17 percent had under half that amount. In 1979 the average size of the communal farm throughout the country (including grazing land) was estimated at about twenty-three hectares. Estimates of the size of actually cultivated family plots ranged between about two hectares and somewhat more than four hectares. The government's land resettlement program that began in late 1980 envisioned an allotment of about fifty hectares per family, of which about five hectares would be cultivated and the remainder would be included in common-use grazing areas. Some 162,000 families were to be resettled by about the end of 1983, but in January 1982 only 13,250 families were reported to have been brought into the program.

Until about World War II commercial farming was oriented toward the domestic market. Farming methods were not advanced—the ox plow still predominated—and the standard of living of many white farmers was at most only slightly better than that of farmers in the African areas. Lack of capital and know-how held back the development of production for export; an effort to compete in the external tobacco market in the 1920s failed after some initial success. The depression of the 1930s seriously affected white farming. Among measures taken to alleviate the white farmer's difficulties, recourse was had to legislation—notably the Maize Control Act of 1931, and an amended act in 1934, which eliminated the strong African market competition in maize. A system of controls aimed at restricting movements in the prices of grains was also initiated in 1931 with the establishment of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). The board, a statutory organization, was required by law to buy at officially set prices all designated controlled grains offered by producers (in 1982

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

the board also handled coffee). The GMB in addition to marketing was the authorized agency for all exportation and importation of grains.

In 1937 control over agricultural commodities was extended with the establishment of the Cold Storage Commission (CSC), which purchased all slaughter cattle offered for sale; however, in this case cattle producers were free to sell their cattle to independent butchers if they so desired. In 1981 CSC abattoirs handled about 80 percent of cattle slaughtered. In 1952 a third agency, the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB), was established to purchase and provide orderly marketing of milk. The DMB also processed milk into other products and was active in the retail market. The final operating unit in the system (to mid-1982), the Cotton Marketing Board was established in 1969. It purchased and ginned all cotton produced for sale and marketed lint and cottonseed. Since 1967 the boards have functioned under the Agricultural Marketing Authority—like the boards, a nonprofit statutory body—which reports to the Ministry of Agriculture.

There appeared to have been little, if any, change in the functioning and aims of the boards since independence. Producer prices, to which commercial crop output has been highly sensitive, were established by the relevant producer groups in the process. Until 1982 it had been usual for boards to set prices for individual commodities. For the 1982-83 season, however, a comprehensive price package covering the range of commodities controlled by the boards was issued which, according to the minister of agriculture, would permit better planning of production.

The first significant expansion of the modern commercial farming sector stemmed from British needs during World War II. It was further encouraged by worldwide shortage of raw materials after the war. Of particular importance at the time was the marked improvement in the quality of Rhodesian tobacco, the development of a preference for it in Britain, and the expansion of markets into Western Europe and Japan. In the second postwar decade new high-yielding varieties of hybrid maize, gradual mechanization, and pesticides for cotton greatly increased production. In 1960 sugar had become a major foreign exchange earner after tobacco and meat (which had developed into the second largest agricultural commodity export). Domestically, growth was stimulated by increased internal demand as activity in other sectors of the economy expanded. The imposition of United Nations (UN) sanctions after UDI in 1965 led to efforts to develop self-sufficiency. A shift from export-oriented goals toward meeting domestic needs required agriculture to replace certain imported commodities, and wheat and cotton became major crops in the process. There was diversification out of tobacco (overproduction in 1964 had already resulted in cutbacks in planting), but tobacco continued to remain the principal crop. Other export crops expanded, however, as ways were found to circumvent sanctions, and South

Africa, which did not participate in the economic pressures, became a major buyer (see *The United Nations and Sanctions*, ch. 1).

The white commercial sector emerged from the guerrilla war in a strong position despite some damage caused by the disruptive action. In 1982 it had the capability to provide not only the food required by the modern economy (including the African wage-earning labor force) and the African subsistence population but also to produce surpluses for export to neighboring countries having shortages of food. At the same time, its ability to produce export crops oriented to world demands appeared undiminished. The loss of many white farmers through emigration reportedly had not appreciably affected the situation. There appeared to be some concern over the land resettlement program on commercial production, however. In early 1982 the Commercial Farmers Union, encompassing most white and some African commercial farmers, stated that adequate land existed for the early phase of the program (about 4 million hectares), but if developed commercial land was then acquired for resettlement, it would have a detrimental effect on overall output.

Crop Cultivation

The country's tropical climate, moderated by elevation in the highveld and enhanced by irrigation in the warm, arid lowveld regions, permits the cultivation of a variety of crops that ranges from tropical to temperate. Among the more important are maize, millet, sorghum, wheat, cotton, tobacco, groundnuts (peanuts), soybeans, deciduous fruits (apples, peaches, pears, plums, and others), citrus fruits (mainly oranges), bananas, coffee, sugarcane, and tea. In all some fifteen crops are grown in significant quantities. Maize, millet, sorghum, groundnuts, and cotton are main crops in the African communal areas. But beans, cowpeas, sweet potatoes, vegetables, and tobacco are also widely grown. Cotton, groundnuts, and tobacco have been the chief African area cash crops; but surpluses of other crops are also sold. In the commercial farming area, the main crops are much the same, although millet is not usually cultivated. Additionally the commercial sector produces in quantity other crops, such as fruits, sugar (sugarcane), coffee, and tea (see table 8; table 9, Appendix).

For many years the seasonal nature of rainfall and the usually rapid runoff have led commercial farmers to construct small dams and weirs to supply water for crops and livestock. By 1978 there were over 9,800 private dams and weirs in the white farming areas, and the government had constructed more than 1,300 in the African communal areas. The governmental Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR), established in 1968, has also built a number of dams for small irrigation projects in the communal areas. The government has additionally constructed several large dams for irrigation, including Kyle and Bangala dams on the Mtilikwe River in the southern lowveld. Water from this latter system provides irriga-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

tion notably for two large private estates at Triangle and Hippo Valley. These estates initially concentrated on sugarcane, but after the beginning of UN sanctions they greatly diversified their crops—Hippo Valley has become famous for its citrus fruits. In 1982, however, sugarcane remained the major crop, and the output of sugar not only met Zimbabwe's total requirement but also provided a substantial quantity for export.

In 1965 the government established the Sabi-Limpopo Authority to promote irrigation in the southeastern lowveld region. Another principal aim was to encourage white settlement in the area. There was relatively little response, apparently in considerable part because of sanctions, which dampened private investment. Available data on the Sabi River valley, where there is a large amount of land suitable for cultivation, indicated that about 15,000 hectares were under irrigation in mid-1982. A contract for a feasibility study on irrigation development on 40,000 hectares in the Chisumbanje region in the valley was reported to have been awarded. The study was being financed by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.

Livestock

Livestock products—mostly beef and milk produced by the commercial sector—accounted for roughly 25 to 30 percent of agricultural output in most years. Sales of livestock and milk by the African subsistence sector through government marketing agencies have amounted to only about 4 to 5 percent of total sales; of the beef consumed domestically, the sector has provided an estimated 25 to 40 percent. This relatively small share (in view of the size of the African herd, which exceeded that of the commercial sector) was related to the widely held belief that a man's status and wealth are associated with the number of cattle he owns.

When the European occupation of the territory began in the late nineteenth century, the cattle herd of the Ndebele was estimated at about 150,000. Thefts by white raiders and confiscations by agents of BSAC after the 1893-94 Ndebele uprising (most of these cattle appear to have been subsequently sold in South Africa) were followed in 1896 by the outbreak of a major rinderpest epidemic and the remaining herd was further drastically reduced. Although effective measures against the disease were started the following year, by the end of the century the total number of African cattle was only about 55,000; European-owned animals numbered roughly 10,000 to 12,000. From the early 1900s, however, the African herd grew at a steady rate that was soon matched by growth in numbers of European-owned cattle. By 1925 Africans had over 1 million animals, the European herd was almost as large, and competition for grazing was intense. One result of the great increase in cattle in the African areas was overgrazing and erosion. During the 1920s and 1930s the government attempted voluntary destocking programs that had little success. They were made compulsory through the Natural Resources Act of



*Tea estate at Inyanga
Courtesy Zimbabwean Ministry of Information,
Posts, and Telecommunications*



*Picking Virginia tobacco near Harare
Courtesy Zimbabwean Ministry of Information,
Posts, and Telecommunications*

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

1941, under which the livestock-carrying capacity of each African area was determined, and cattle owners were forced to sell or slaughter all animals declared surplus. The low price received from buyers, who were mostly white farmers, created wide resentment. The number of African cattle, which was estimated at close to 1.8 million in 1941, appears to have remained relatively constant thereafter until the mid-1960s. In 1967 the total rose to almost 2.2 million and gradually increased to 3.4 million in 1977.

The European cattle herd had declined after 1925, the result apparently of a shift to tobacco growing by white farmers, stimulated by the tobacco export boom of the late 1920s, and a shift to cotton and dairy farming. In 1930 facilities became available for exporting chilled and frozen beef to Britain, but any incentive to increase herd size was almost immediately destroyed by the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease and an embargo on exports that lasted two years. By 1936 European cattle numbered only about 750,000. Exports, which again became a significant factor in the 1950s, and growing domestic demand led to a gradual increase to some 1.6 million head in 1965. Notably, whereas destocking was enforced in the African areas during this time, utilization of white reserved grazing land had reached no more than 60 percent of the stocking capacity by 1965. Stocking had been quite low on grazing land in the better cropping regions to that time, mainly because of the emphasis on cultivation, from which better returns were usually received. An upsurge in cattle numbers occurred from the mid-1960s, however, as many farmers affected by tobacco overproduction and low prices changed to beef production. Moreover beef was found a relatively easily exportable item under sanction conditions.

From about 1976 both the African and the commercial cattle herds were affected by terrorist actions attributed to guerrilla forces that were particularly serious in the African communal areas. Over time, government veterinary and animal health services built up in the communal areas had brought tsetse fly infestations under control and had almost completely eradicated tick-borne diseases. In what appeared to be an intentional effort to disrupt the cattle industry, guerrillas had by 1978 damaged or made inoperable about half the antitick dipping tanks in the communal areas; water sources and fences had also been destroyed. Guerrilla activities, moreover, prevented continuation of efforts against the tsetse fly. The result was net losses of cattle from disease and other causes by African owners estimated at over 1 million head. The white commercial sector suffered much smaller losses estimated at over 170,000. In part these were caused by disease, a spillover effect from the communal areas, but most of the loss was attributed to thefts and killings.

In 1977 and 1978 the number of cattle in the commercial farming areas also declined as the result of prices paid by the CSC for beef that were considered by producers to be too low. Uncertainty over future prospects also played a part, and herds were reduced through



*Aerial view of Mazoe citrus estate
in northeastern Zimbabwe
Courtesy Zimbabwean Ministry of Information,
Posts, and Telecommunications*

slaughtering for beef; some of the breeding herd was also marketed. The total number of cattle, communal and commercial, was reduced between 1977 and 1980 from 6.6 million to 5.4 million. The advent of peace and the economic improvement in 1980 and 1981 resulted in a growing demand for beef, the preferred meat throughout all population sectors. Some rationing occurred in local markets; and exports, normally a major source of foreign exchange, were greatly reduced. By 1982 there were indications of renewed confidence by commercial producers and a start at rebuilding the beef herd. In April 1982 the government also announced significant increases in the purchase prices of beef and milk. But much of the industry was hit by a severe drought that began early in 1982, which was expected to slow substantially the recovery of the national herd.

Sheep, goats, and pigs have been of relatively minor significance. Sheep have been raised primarily for meat rather than wool. Their number declined in the commercial farming areas from about 425,000 at the beginning of the 1970s to 172,000 in 1981. In the communal areas sheep had increased in number from 182,000 in 1965 to 494,000 in 1975. Disruption by the guerrilla war and related activities appear to have resulted in net losses thereafter. Major declines were reported in 1979 and 1980, although the reasons were not given, and in the latter year the total was only 214,000. There were few goats in the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

commercial sector. In African areas the number grew steadily in the period 1965-75 from 599,000 to 1.9 million. The number of animals remained relatively stable thereafter until major drops were reported in 1979 and 1980, again for unstated causes. Pork has not been widely popular, and the number of animals has been small in both commercial and communal areas, under normal conditions averaging about 100,000 animals in the former and fewer in the subsistence sector. Poultry has been kept by both subsistence and commercial farmers for home use. A large commercial industry has developed, aided by shortages of beef in the postwar period; in 1981 some 10 million eggs and over 6 million fowl were sold in urban areas.

Forestry and Fishing

Zimbabwe's natural forests consist almost entirely of savanna hardwood trees of moderate to low height, some in closed woodlands, others in open stands, and in more arid areas widely dispersed. These forests are of major importance to the African rural population for whom they constitute the chief source of fuel as well as timbers for posts, rough construction, and miscellaneous local needs. The modern economy also exploits savanna sources for mine props; railroad ties; wood for furniture, flooring, and veneers; and lumber for crates, boxes, and other packaging. Overall, however, the domestic savanna forests do not meet modern sector hardwood needs, and regular imports are required. In 1982 the largest area of commercially significant natural hardwood forests was in the northwestern part of the country where they included important stands of Rhodesian teak that grow on the Kalahari-sand soils found in the region. Relatively small stands of natural montane forests are found in the eastern highlands. They are not open to commercial exploitation but instead are in protected reserves set aside as scenic and tourist attractions.

Most of the timber secured by the modern sector from domestic sources actually comes from government and private plantations. The first government plantation (of eucalyptus) was started in the mid-1920s near present-day Mutare. By 1980 government plantations (mostly softwoods, although some wattle—an Australian acacia—was also grown) covered a total of 22,000 hectares; the governmental Forest Commission, which controls national forests and plantations, has announced intentions to add over 19,000 hectares during the decade. In the private sector small plantations of eucalyptus have long been maintained on many white farms to provide timber and poles both for the owner's use and for sale. The main sources of plantation timber, however, have been the private commercial stands, which totaled about 72,000 hectares in 1980. About two-thirds of these private plantations grow pines; the remainder, eucalyptus and wattle. The Forest Commission, on its own and through private operators, processed timber from the government plantations. Harvesting of natural forests under the commission's control was mainly accomplished through concessionaires. Commercial operations in-



*Beef cattle are part of a development project
in the Sabi River valley.
Courtesy Zimbabwean Ministry of Information,
Posts, and Telecommunications*

volving African communally owned hardwood forests were carried out by private sawmillers.

Concern for future forest resources led to the setting aside in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 of 239,000 hectares of then-European areas as demarcated state forests. Additions were made in subsequent amendments, and the Land Tenure Act of 1969, which in effect replaced the 1930 measure, established the total forest reserve in the European areas at 754,317 hectares. The 1969 act also demarcated 171,930 hectares in the TTL as state forests. Serious deforestation has occurred in the present-day communal lands outside these forests, and one source has estimated that the tree cover had declined by 50 percent between 1963 and 1978. This has stemmed mainly from the growing demand for fuel, building poles, and cultivable land (for which forested areas were cleared) as the population has increased. The Forest Commission has proposed a major five-year reforestation program to provide stands of fast-growing trees for fuel and building materials in communal areas, especially at points of heavier population concentration. Self-help is involved, and technical assistance is furnished by the commission; but full implementation appeared in mid-1982 to be dependent in large part on the securing of foreign financing.

The fishing industry has remained small, and fishing activities have played only a minor role in the economy. Before construction of

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

the Kariba Dam, the Tonga people living along the Zambezi River derived a substantial part of their diet from fish (see *Ethnic and Racial Groupings*, ch. 2). Other indigenous groups also supplemented their diets through fishing in other rivers. Small dams have been built on many commercial farms, and the ponds have been stocked with fish used to feed African workers. Several lakes formed by the country's large dams, in addition to that at Kariba, also have been stocked, largely, however, for sport fishing.

In 1982 the only commercial fishing of any significance was restricted to Lake Kariba, where in the mid- to late-1970s annual sardine catches of about 1,000 tons were reported. A privately owned fish-canning plant, designed to process sardines and other fish from the lake, opened in 1979. The company operated its own fishing vessels equipped with purse seines and also employed Tonga fishermen, whom it supplied with boats and nets. A commercial operation to produce freshwater prawns in ponds at Lake Kariba was started in 1980, and a freezing and packing plant was under construction in late 1981.

Manufacturing

Zimbabwe has a highly diversified manufacturing sector that provides close to 90 percent of the manufactured goods used in the country. In 1982 an array of some 6,200 products was fabricated, including not only a broad range of durable and nondurable consumer goods but also many intermediate products and capital equipment. The sector has been the largest contributor to GDP since 1969, when it accounted for close to 19 percent of the total. During the 1970s its share rose to over 23 percent (24 percent in 1980), a proportion much greater than that in any other Black African state. The importance of manufacturing to the economy was emphasized by its substantial foreign exchange earnings and its position as the second largest employer of wage labor (after agriculture). It accounted for almost 15 percent of wage labor in the late 1970s and approached 17 percent of the total in the first nine months of 1980, when it employed an average of 173,000 workers. Wages paid amounted to about half the total wages of the productive sectors (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity, and construction).

Manufacturing output is highly concentrated in and around Harare and Bulawayo, which together accounted for more than 70 percent by value of total production in 1979 (Harare, 46.9 percent; Bulawayo, 22.5 percent). Five other towns had a combined output of over 22 percent of the total, but almost half of this was produced in the Kwekwe-Redcliff area. The less than 10 percent remaining came from scattered localities. Before and during the UDI period the government had from time to time attempted to get new industries to locate in places other than Harare and Bulawayo. The success of those efforts was unknown in 1982, but gross production in all other manufacturing areas had increased to nearly 31 percent of total

output in 1979 compared with some 22 percent in 1964.

The development of manufacturing has been in the hands of the private sector since the early days of European settlement. Until the mid-1900s there was little if any intervention by the government in the expansion of manufacturing, and even before UDI the idea of exercising control over development was not part of the government's economic philosophy. During the first four decades of the century the official belief was that growth of the economy was dependent fundamentally on the growth of primary production. There appears to have been in fact, a fear that government encouragement of manufacturing would work against normal development of the colony by resulting in increased production costs for primary commodities. Nonetheless by 1938 about 300 manufacturing operations were in existence, employing some 17,500 workers. World War II stimulated the growth of import-substitution industries. The war situation also led to the government's establishment of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Commission, which initially produced iron from scrap. A lack of transport for exporting cotton and local shortages of textiles prompted the development of a small government-owned spinning and weaving plant.

Contrary to expectations, the end of the war did not result in the demise of many of the new industries from competition with cheap imports. Continued sale abroad of raw materials helped to bolster the economy and the domestic market for locally made goods. Substantial investment from Britain and South Africa (after the change in government in that country in 1948) provided capital for new enterprises. In 1952, the year before formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (also known as the Central African Federation), there were roughly 725 manufacturing establishments having some 68,000 employees. The federation opened large new duty-free markets for manufactured goods. At the same time, the government offered extremely favorable incentives to entrepreneurs to start or expand operations. One result was an influx of foreign private capital, of which the greater amount came from Britain, followed by South Africa, and to a lesser extent the United States and several other countries. Some of the larger industries established during the federation period (1953-63) included a large-scale weaving mill, a ferrochrome processing plant, and a copper smelter. Iron and steel production expanded tremendously; in 1957 the government plant was taken over by a British consortium. A fertilizer plant was opened in the late 1950s, and the assembly of automobiles began in Mutare in 1960 and somewhat later in Salisbury (present-day Harare). When the federation was dissolved in 1963, work was also well along on an oil refinery and a pipeline to supply it. A far from exhaustive list of consumer goods manufactured in 1964 shows the great variety of locally produced items: batteries, bedding, carpets, cigarettes, clothing, coffee, confectionaries, cosmetics, detergents and other household cleaning materials, foods in great number, furniture, ink, paint, paper, pesticides,


Zimbabwe: A Country Study

pet foods, pharmaceuticals, radios, record players, shoes, soap, television receivers, tires, and tubes.

The sanctions that followed UDI caused a temporary setback in manufacturing. In 1966 most of the trade with Zambia, which had accounted for roughly half of Rhodesia's exports of manufactured goods, had ended, as had that with Britain. Many factories reduced work hours, others laid off employees, and some closed. Measured by the production volume index, manufacturing output dropped more than 9 percent during the year. Exchange restrictions were placed on repatriation by foreign firms of dividends and capital, thus forcing reinvestment in the country. Controls had been instituted on imports shortly before UDI to improve the balance of payments position, and soon after UDI tariff protection was increased; both measures were of substantial benefit to import substitution industries. The enlarging of existing operations and the establishment of new industries were encouraged. But for the first time an element of government control was introduced, and each proposal was carefully scrutinized for feasibility, especially with regard to foreign exchange requirements. By 1968 roughly 400 new manufacturing project applications had been approved, and the number had doubled two years later.

In 1967 manufacturing production rose by more than 9 percent, and the sector's contribution to GDP had regained (and somewhat exceeded) the 1966 level. There was steady growth in output through 1974, although this was not uniform among the different manufacturing subsectors. Important structural changes occurred, marked by the rapid development and expansion of intermediate and capital goods industries, including cotton spinning and weaving, iron and steel, machinery fabrication, nonferrous metals, and plastics (see table 10, Appendix). Adversely affected by sanctions were tobacco in particular and motor transport. In 1967 the country's two automobile assembly plants shut down, primarily because of the inability to obtain parts from Britain. In 1969, however, they were reopened and began assembling French, West German, Italian, and Japanese cars from kits. One of the methods used to bypass sanctions—a notable case being the pharmaceutical industry—was to acquire franchises from foreign companies for domestic production of items no longer exported to Rhodesia.

From 1975 through 1978 a gradual drop in production occurred in all major branches of manufacturing except foodstuffs. Strengthened external sanction efforts, the domestic drain on trained manpower as military action increased, transport problems, and especially the much smaller amount of foreign exchange provided for imports (only a little more than half the amount allocated before 1975) were principal causes for a decline in output estimated at about 4 percent annually during the period. There was little physical damage to manufacturing facilities, however, the greater proportion of which were protected by their location in Salisbury and Bulawayo. After



*Steel mill at Redcliff near Kwekwe supplies
many needs of local industry.
Courtesy Embassy of Zimbabwe, Washington*

the end of fighting in 1979, the return of skilled manpower, larger foreign exchange allocations, and available excess plant capacity provided the bases for an increase in output. In that year the volume of manufacturing production increased by 10.7 percent and in 1980 by 14.9 percent. Output continued to increase in 1981 but slackened after midyear as foreign exchange allocations were reduced because of balance of payments problems, shortages of raw materials, and emigration of trained staff. The estimated growth rate for the year, however, was close to 10 percent. In 1981 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) furnished loans to the government totaling the equivalent of US\$65 million to assist in procuring machine spare parts, components, and raw materials. An important factor in continued manufacturing growth in the 1980s, however, will be the replacement of machinery that is obsolete or approaching obsolescence.

Mining

Relative to its size and population, Zimbabwe is one of the world's richer countries in minerals. Its mining industry is diversified and generally efficient. More than forty different minerals are produced, of which the most important in the early 1980s were gold, asbestos,

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

nickel, copper, coal, and chromite (see table 11, Appendix). These six minerals accounted for over 85 percent of the value of total mineral production. Overall, mining has regularly contributed about 6.5 percent or more of GDP, and the industry employs an average of about 60,000 persons. Almost all mineral production is exported and accounts for about 40 percent of total earnings from merchandise exports (the share varies somewhat depending on the production and world prices for minerals). Most exports have been to the Western industrialized countries, for which chromium in particular is of strategic importance.

The greater part of the country's known mineral deposits, except coal, are found in the metamorphosed greenstone areas that stretch across Zimbabwe from southwest to northeast, mainly on the highveld. These areas contain large deposits of the major minerals except chromite, which is found in the Great Dyke, a highly mineralized zone of magmatic origin that extends in a line through the greenstone area for a distance of over 500 kilometers (see *Geographic Regions*, ch. 2). Other areas of metamorphosed rock found in the middleveld and lowveld of the north and northwest also contain a variety of minerals, but little detailed exploration had been carried out by 1982. In various parts of the country, dikes and veins of pegmatite also occur that contain other minerals, among which the most important economically is lithium. Coal is found in extensive deposits in both the northern and the southern lowveld. There were no known resources of petroleum as of mid-1982.

Gold appears to have been mined as early as the seventh century. By the first part of the second millennium, mines were worked in many places by ancestors of the Shona. Most of the numerous early workings by the indigenous populations had been exhausted (within the limits of then-existing technology) by the 1700s, and mines that continued were abandoned during the Ngoni invasions of the 1830s. In the late 1860s reports in Europe of these mines culminated eventually in the gold rush of the 1890s and the territorial takeover by the British South Africa Company (see *Rhodes and the British South Africa Company*, ch. 1). From the 1890s on, gold mining became the territory's most important economic activity; output increased annually until a high of over 23,500 kilograms was reached in 1940, and gold accounted for almost three-fifths of export earnings. In the 1940s, however, production declined, and in 1952 asbestos became the most valuable mineral. During the UDI period gold output again dropped significantly as many mines closed because of security problems. The increase in the price of gold in the late 1970s again stimulated output, and propelled gold to the forefront as the most valuable mineral, a position it retained at the beginning of 1982.

Total gold reserves have been estimated at about 778,000 kilograms. Since the end of the fighting the government has made information available on inactive mines and claims and has provided technical



*Automobile assembly line in Harare
industrial plant
Courtesy Embassy of Zimbabwe, Washington*

assistance as a means of stimulating new development; during 1979 some 200 new claims were reported staked out. Most mines have been small-scale operations, and over time around 4,000 deposits have been worked. After World War II larger firms able to furnish the necessary capital for deep mining gradually took over many smaller operations, and by 1958 only 256 mines were reported active. At the end of the 1970s some 260 mines were in operation, of which less than 10 percent accounted for over three-quarters of output. The larger mines were mostly foreign owned, the largest holdings being those of the Lonrho Investment Group, based in Britain, and Falcon Mines of South Africa.

Asbestos deposits are found in a number of places, but the main reserves are located in an area extending from Masvingo (formerly Fort Victoria) to Zvishavane (formerly Shabani). The largest asbestos mining operation (British owned) is located near Zvishavane and reportedly produces an estimated 90 percent of total Zimbabwean output. In 1965 about 160,000 tons of asbestos were produced. Sanctions had little impact on the industry, which was expanded to over 260,000 tons in the mid-1970s, reaching a peak of more than 281,000 tons in 1976. The expansion was carried out mainly with funds secured within the country. After 1976 production declined somewhat to an average of about 250,000 tons a year. The asbestos produced is of the chrysolite variety, having characteristics considered valuable for certain defense uses. Some of the output is used domestically and in adjacent countries in the fabrication of asbestos cement pipes and for construction, but most is exported, principally

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

to the United States and Britain and other West European countries. The size of the country's reserves in 1982 had not been disclosed, but it was believed to be very large.

Copper is found in several parts of the country, but the main exploited deposits are near Chinhoyi (formerly Sinoia) northwest of Harare. Copper was mined by indigenous peoples from at least the early part of the first millennium. The main present-day mines are located at the ancient workings. Modern production of copper began in 1906, but output did not exceed a few hundred tons until the 1950s when South African interests acquired major holdings in the industry. Production rose steadily thereafter and reached a high of 47,600 tons (copper-content) in 1975. Fluctuating world copper prices since 1973, declining ore grade, and increasing operating costs have been accompanied by a drop in output, which totaled only 24,600 tons in 1981. A number of the principal mines have ceased operations and in mid-1982 were only being maintained. A new copper refinery began operations in 1981, turning out high-quality cathodes that were expected to secure better export prices.

In 1979 nickel production accounted for about 14 percent by value of total mineral output. Nickel had emerged as a major contributor to mineral production only in 1969. Small deposits were worked from 1928, but the nickel content of the ore was never more than a few hundred tons a year. During the 1950s several major new deposits were discovered that were developed after UDI by transnational companies based in Britain; South African investment was also involved. In 1969 production was 5,747 tons (nickel content), compared with 441 tons the year before. In the late 1970s and through 1981 production averaged about 15,000 tons annually. Nickel deposits are located mainly in greenstone areas along the Great Dyke. Those being mined in the early 1980s contained about 60 million tons of ore. In addition about 2 billion tons of lower grade ore have also been found. The nickel ores usually contain varying quantities of copper, cobalt, silver, platinum, and palladium. These are produced as by-products by the country's two smelters located at Bindura (annual capacity about 16,000 tons of nickel metal) and near Kadoma (formerly Gatooma; 9,000 tons); about 3,000 tons of copper have also been recovered annually. Cobalt production was ordinarily small (under thirty tons); but a dramatic rise in world prices for the mineral in 1979 was accompanied by an increase in output to over 200 tons, and 115 tons were produced in 1980. Foreign exchange earnings were significant in both years. Of importance to Zimbabwe's future competitive position in the world nickel market, the kind of ores found in the country can be processed more cheaply than those mined elsewhere, and the nickel metal produced is of high quality.

Zimbabwe's output of chrome ores ranked it fifth among the world's producers in 1980. The country's chromite deposits have been estimated variously at 3 billion to more than 10 billion tons, of which 500 to 564 million tons are exploitable reserves. The ores are



*Chrome mining operations at Shurugwi
Courtesy Union Carbide Corporation*

found associated with and throughout the entire length of the Great Dyke. Mining began in 1906 in the area of Shurugwi (formerly Selukwe) but did not become important until after World War II; in 1982 this area remained the principal source of the ore. Transnational companies, including the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa and Union Carbide Corporation of the United States, owned most of the mines and processing facilities. Processing of the ore into ferrochrome began in 1953 by a subsidiary of Anglo-American. This plant, located at Gweru (formerly Gwelo), had an initial capacity of 9,000 tons that had been increased to 113,000 tons by 1979. Further expansion, expected to be completed in 1982, was to raise total capacity to 163,000 tons. The country's other plant, at Kwekwe (formerly Que Que), taken over by Union Carbide in 1965 when it had a capacity of 15,000 tons, had been expanded to 90,000 tons by 1979. Additions begun in 1981 and to be completed in 1982 will increase the plant's capacity to 180,000 tons.

Chrome ore production continued at a relatively steady level after UDI, averaging over 500,000 tons a year for the period 1965-70, and there was evidence that the UN sanctions were being successfully evaded. Subsequent to passage in the United States in 1971 of the Byrd Amendment (Public Law 92-156), which relaxed restrictions on

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

chrome imports, output increased sharply, reaching well over 850,000 tons a year. After the reimposition by the United States in 1977 of an embargo on this trade, production again declined to about the pre-1971 level (see *The United Nations and Sanctions*, ch. 1). Chrome exports (almost entirely in the form of ferrochrome) in 1979 ranked third after gold and asbestos. Chrome is of strategic importance to the United States and the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). Exports of Zimbabwean ferrochrome increased in 1979 as sanctions were lifted and again rose sharply in 1980. Some decline was registered in 1981, but export earnings in 1980 and 1981 exceeded those of asbestos and were second only to gold.

The country has very large coal resources that have been estimated at roughly 30 billion tons. The deposits are located in both the northern and the southern lowveld areas. Those in the north are found in fields of vast overall proportions that begin in the western part of the Zambezi River valley and stretch eastward for more than 300 kilometers. In the south substantial coalfields exist in the Limpopo River basin. Movable coal employing present-day techniques amounts to about 750 million tons from fully evaluated reserves totaling some 2.2 billion tons. In addition another 5 billion tons of potential reserves have been projected. About two-thirds of the coal believed extractable is thought to be coking coal. The remaining third has a high ash content but is suitable for use in producing steam for electric power generation.

Commercially significant mining of coal has been centered in Hwange in western Zimbabwe since the discovery of the coalfield in that locality in 1864. The first of three underground mines of the present Wankie Colliery Company Limited (WCCL) opened in 1903. The second began operations in 1927, and in that year production exceeded 1 million tons. In 1953 management was taken over by a subsidiary of Anglo-American Corporation, which in 1980 owned a 34 percent interest in WCCL (the second largest interest was the 5 percent share owned by Union Minière of Belgium). A third mine was opened in 1953, and production reached 4 million tons in 1957. A major underground explosion in 1972 led to the closing of this mine and the subsequent opening of a new one. Since 1970 four open-pit mines have also been developed. From 1965 to 1980 total annual production averaged about 3.3 million tons, most of which was used domestically by thermal power stations, Rhodesia Railways, various industrial operations, and tobacco curers. In 1981 WCCL facilities included coke ovens having a capacity of some 216,000 tons a year. In the early 1980s well over 100,000 tons of coke were exported annually, almost entirely to Zaire and Zambia, earning substantial foreign exchange. Another some 100,000 tons were used by domestic industries, the largest user being the ferroalloy industry. In early 1982 WCCL was negotiating a loan from the International Finance Corporation (IFC)—additional funds were also being sought through



*Tapping a ferrochrome smelter furnace at Kwekwe
Courtesy Union Carbide Corporation*

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

the United States Export-Import Bank—for a new open-pit mine that would eventually produce 3.9 million tons a year. This would replace production from existing open-pit mines, which were approaching depletion; about two-fifths of the total would be used by the new Wankie Power Station (see Electric Power, this ch.).

Among other minerals of more than ordinary importance in Zimbabwe are iron, lithium, silver, tantalum, tin, and tungsten. Iron ore is widely distributed and had been mined in the area as early as the first millennium A.D. (see *The Origins of Zimbabwe*, ch. 1). Present-day production is centered mainly at Redcliff, south of Kwekwe. Ores are mainly used domestically to produce iron and steel, which have been exported in substantial quantities and have been major foreign exchange earners. The principal lithium deposit is near Bikita (east of Masvingo), where recoverable ore reserves are estimated at about 8.1 million tons. The ore produced is mostly exported. Silver is produced as a by-product in gold extraction, nickel smelting, and other refining operations. The rise in silver prices in the late 1970s led to increased output and substantial foreign exchange earnings. Tin metal also has been a major foreign exchange earner; tantalum and tungsten ores and concentrates are of lesser significance.

Foreign-owned companies (mainly American, British, and South African) have long controlled mineral production. Private sector involvement in mining has been strongly encouraged since the start of settler self-government in 1923 (see *The 1922 Referendum: Company to Colony*, ch. 1). The Mugabe government in essence continued support for this policy in its position paper *Growth with Equity* of February 1981. However, it has also called for foreign investors to take on local equity partners and to increase the participation of Zimbabweans in managerial and technical activities associated with mining. New energy and strategic minerals undertakings have required government participation. The government has also reserved the right to participate in any other mining venture begun by a company that had not previously carried on mining in Zimbabwe. Of greater significance to the mining industry and potential foreign investment was passage of the Minerals Marketing Act in early 1982. The government marketing corporation authorized by the act will have wide powers, including control of sales of all mineral production except gold, which is sold directly to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, and the size of stockpiles.

Energy Sources

At the beginning of the 1980s about three-quarters of the country's energy was provided by domestic coal, wood, and hydroelectric power. The remaining quarter was imported in the form of petroleum products and additional electricity, the latter secured almost entirely from Zambia. Coal was the largest primary energy source, accounting for roughly one-third of total consumption. But about 10

percent of the coal was transformed into electricity, and that amount would increase after new thermal generating facilities under construction went into operation at the end of 1982 and during 1983. Coal, electricity, and petroleum products were used almost entirely by the modern sector. Wood was used as a source of energy by an estimated 6 million people, and at least 5 million (including virtually the entire 3.5 million population of the communal lands) were entirely dependent on wood for cooking and heating. Commercial agriculture also consumed considerable quantities of wood for curing and, to a lesser extent, for drying tobacco. On the average about 28 percent of all energy used in the late 1970s was derived from wood. Potentially there appeared to be adequate supplies, considering existing total tree stock. But in the many areas of high rural population concentration, the demand exceeded supply because of deforestation, and cost and distance were deterrents to moving in wood for fuel from other areas. In 1981 in communal lands northeast of Masvingo the African population had reportedly had to use cattle dung as fuel. The overall situation was compounded by the general failure to use charcoal, a more readily and cheaply transportable fuel. The government had plans to establish renewable woodlots in communal areas, but the problem was of major dimension, and the program was only in an initial stage in 1982.

Electric Power

Zimbabwe's principal domestic source of electricity in mid-1982 was the Kariba I hydroelectric plant located on the Zimbabwean side of the Zambezi River at the Kariba Dam. Having an installed capacity of 705,000 kilowatts, the plant had furnished about 55 percent of the country's electric power in 1980 and 1981. Kariba I was constructed (after establishment of the Central African Federation in 1953) as the first part of a planned complex at the dam designed to furnish the power needed for the economic expansion of the two Rhodesias. On dissolution of the federation in 1963, operation of the plant—and distribution of power to the two territories—was vested in the newly formed Central African Power Corporation (CAPC), which was jointly owned by the two governments. Under this arrangement, which remained in effect in mid-1982, the plant continued to supply power to Zambia after UDI and the imposition of UN sanctions despite the fact that Zambia was one of the leading advocates of sanctions. About 70 percent of Zambian power needs were met until construction of new facilities inside that country in the early 1970s reduced its dependence. After the operational start of the new Kariba II plant on the north bank of the Zambezi River in 1976, Zambian production of electricity exceeded its own requirements, and power began to be imported by Rhodesia to meet the growing demand. Such imports have increased, and in 1980 and 1981 they accounted for about 38 to 40 percent of the power distributed in Zimbabwe. In 1982 installation of 300,000 additional kilo-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

watts of capacity at the Kariba I plant was contemplated by Zimbabwe, but the project awaited the necessary agreement from Zambia. If carried out, completion would occur in the late 1980s.

In 1982 thermal electricity accounted for only a small part of domestic power supplies. The first thermal plant began operations in Bulawayo in 1897 as a private venture. It was acquired as a municipal facility in 1899, and during the following decades municipal plants were established in many towns (Salisbury in 1913). In 1936 the government-owned Electrical Supply Corporation (ESC) was set up to construct transmission lines, build plants where needed, and develop interconnected systems. New ESC plants included thermal facilities at Zvishavane, Umnati (between Kwekwe and Kadoma), and Mutare. After completion of Kariba I, ESC also purchased power from the CAPC. In the aftermath of UDI the production of thermal power increased, and in 1973 a high of 1.4 billion kilowatt-hours (over a quarter of the domestic electricity distribution) was generated by ESC and other interconnected thermal units. Thermal power input into the system declined thereafter and in 1981 was under 219 million kilowatt-hours. The three ESC plants were old, and only the Umnati plant (installed capacity 120,000 kilowatts) was in regular operation in 1982. Bulawayo and Harare have continued to maintain their own municipal distribution systems and power plants (120,000 kilowatts and 135,000 kilowatts, respectively), and various private firms have operated their own facilities. ESC also directly purchased limited amounts of electricity from sources outside Zimbabwe to supply several remote areas. Included were the Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa, which supplied power for the Beitbridge area, and the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation, which provided power for Victoria Falls under a mutual standby arrangement.

In the early 1970s the anticipated future needs for power led the government to start work on a large thermal plant in the Hwange area that was designed to use the great quantities of low-grade coal usually discarded in open-pit mining but usable as a cheap source to produce steam. Reportedly the international contractor withdrew after a time because of external sanction-related pressures. The government continued construction to 1975; but when stopped for economic reasons, work was well along. Activity resumed in 1980, and in mid-1982 it was estimated that the first of four 120,000-kilowatt generating units being installed would be producing electricity for commercial sale by December. The three additional units were scheduled to be ready for service by about the end of 1983. The cost of this Stage I phase at completion was estimated at Z\$369 million (for value of the Zimbabwe dollars—see Glossary). Financing has been covered through export credits and loans secured through European banks. Local costs were being financed by loans from a consortium of Zimbabwean banks to the ESC. In early 1982 the government announced that two additional units of 200,000 kilo-



*Kariba Dam on Zambezi River, source of over half of Zimbabwe's electric power. The dam and large Lake Kariba are major tourist attractions.
Courtesy United Nations*

watts each would be installed at the power station under Stage II of the project; this was to be completed about the middle of 1985. Design work and specifications for certain items had already been prepared.


The consumption of electricity increased from 2 billion kilowatt-hours in 1965 to over 7.1 billion in 1981. Farming accounted for about 7 percent of the total. One of electricity's important uses in agriculture has been to power irrigation pumps. In mid-1981 the ESC reported, however, that total farm connections numbered only about 6,600, largely in the commercial farming areas. Mining used about 20 percent, and manufacturing, construction, and transport used about 50 percent of the total; domestic use amounted to about 14 percent. The electricity distribution system was confined almost entirely to interconnecting the towns and cities of the highveld and supplying the mining and industrial operations that were also largely located there. The African rural population had little access to electricity. The ESC stated that it was planning the development of distribution to the rural growth centers in the communal lands when these are established as part of the government's rural development program. These centers are to be the nuclei of future towns, which will be provided with full services.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Petroleum Products

At the time of UDI, Rhodesia's estimated requirement for petroleum products was roughly 450,000 tons a year. This was met almost entirely by the Feruka refinery, located near Mutare, which had started operations in 1964. The refinery was run by Central African Petroleum Refineries (CAPREF), a Rhodesian company owned by an international consortium whose major shareholders included Shell Petroleum Company, British Petroleum Company (BP), California Texas Oil Company (CALTEX), Mobil Oil Corporation, and American Independent Oil. The refinery was supplied by a 288-kilometer pipeline from the port of Beira in Mozambique owned by a Mozambican company in which Lonrho, a British-based multinational conglomerate, had a controlling interest. The pipeline was closed in 1966 as the result of UN sanctions, forcing the refinery also to cease operating; subsequently the major owners of the refinery removed a large part of the equipment to South Africa for use there. During UDI, oil imports came largely through South Africa. They appear to have been generally adequate and to have met all essential requirements, assisted by rationing and other measures, such as the rehabilitation of steam locomotives by Rhodesia Railways to replace diesel locomotion. Consumption rose to over 760,000 tons in 1975 but declined thereafter, averaging about 650,000 tons annually through 1980.

In 1980 steps were taken to get the pipeline and refinery back into operation. About forty kilometers of the pipeline had to be relaid and maintenance carried out on the line's two pumping stations. This work and testing of the line were completed in 1981, and by the end of the year the system was reportedly ready for commercial operations. Restoration of the refinery has proceeded much more slowly. In March 1981 a report by CAPREF indicated that the plant could not be ready before late 1982. The government repeatedly expressed strong dissatisfaction at the rate of progress, and in early 1982 it was reported that the new Zimbabwe Oil Procurement Consortium (ZOPCO) had taken over the oil depot and facilities at the refinery and would handle gasoline and diesel fuel imported through the pipeline. An agreement on royalties to be paid to Mozambique on quantities transported was made between Zimbabwe and Mozambique in March 1982, after several months of negotiations, and agreement on Lonrho's charges was reached in midyear. Meanwhile gasoline was sent by rail from Beira to Mutare, and diesel fuel came by rail from South Africa. The petroleum products received through the pipeline, which went into operation in July, were being marketed by the several oil companies, including Shell, BP, CALTEX, and the French-owned Total, which have regularly distributed them. The pipeline's throughput capacity of about 1 million tons per year well exceeded anticipated total annual consumption of approximately 650,000 tons. Minor sabotage of the pipeline by an insurgent force in Mozambique, known as the



*This thermal power station at Hwange uses coal to provide electricity for Zimbabwe's growing economic needs.
Courtesy Embassy of Zimbabwe, Washington*

Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana—RNM), had been reported after its reopening, but the damage had been quickly repaired. There was concern, however, that major supply problems would occur if pumping stations or the storage facilities in Beira were damaged.

Transportation

Zimbabwe's transport facilities—rail, road, and air—are well developed. In 1982 they were generally adequate but in some need of rehabilitation and strengthening. Rail, air, and the better roads served primarily the modern commercial sector, the outcome funda-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

mentally of development that was based almost entirely on economic factors (see fig. 16). A new attitude toward road construction, the transport mode in which significant change is possible, has developed since independence, in which the social requirements of the largely subsistence communal areas have been given consideration along with the economic aspects. The country's railroads have been a vital transit link in the movement of trade in southern Africa especially for Zambia and the southern mining region of Zaïre. Zimbabwean lines to Mozambique also have offered the independent black states of southern Africa the means for reduced dependence on the transport facilities of white-ruled South Africa.

Railroads

Rail lines cover most parts of the country, the major exception being a large region made up almost entirely of African communal lands south of Lake Kariba. The main internal line runs through the highveld from Bulawayo to Harare. Branches and spurs extend from the main line to important economic centers and areas. This core network also connects with the rail system of South Africa directly through Beitbridge and indirectly via Botswana, with the rail system of Zambia (at Victoria Falls), and with lines in Mozambique that run to the ports of Maputo and Beira. Operated by an autonomous state corporation, National Railways of Zimbabwe—NRZ (formerly the state-owned Rhodesia Railways), the system in 1982 consisted of 2,734 route kilometers of 1.067-meter-gauge track, a width originally established for the South African railroads and common to the railroads of all southern Africa. With the exception of short trackage in the vicinities of Bulawayo and Harare, all lines were single track. NRZ also owned and operated the line from the Zimbabwean border through Botswana to a connection with South African Railways near Mafeking. Botswana since the mid-1970s has planned to take over this line, 640 kilometers in length, but it appeared that final acquisition might not occur until after the mid-1980s.

Zimbabwe's railroads originated essentially as part of Cecil Rhodes' grand plan for opening up the interior of Africa for development in which railroads, culminating eventually in a Cape-to-Cairo line, were a major element. In the early 1890s, however, the immediate need was to provide the settlers in the territory of the BSAC with more reliable means of transporting goods and supplies than was provided by ox carts (see Rhodes and the British South Africa Company, ch. 1). Construction of two lines to the territory, both backed by Rhodes, was started in the early part of the decade: one in 1892 from the Mozambique coast near present-day Beira, the other in 1894 from Mafeking in South Africa. In 1898 the former reached Umtali; from there it was extended to Salisbury in 1899; the latter advanced to Bulawayo in 1897. In 1902 Bulawayo and Salisbury were connected, and in 1903-1904 a line was pushed to the Zambian border, passing through the Wankie coalfields where coal mining had started in

1903. Many of the system's spurs and small branches were completed during the next two decades. The two most significant additions thereafter were the completion in 1955 of the connection with the Mozambican railroad to Maputo and in 1974 the direct connection with the South African system at Beitbridge. Beginning in the late 1960s domestic sentiment had grown for construction of the latter line because of uncertainties concerning the route through Botswana. It was not until 1974, however, when the revolution in Portugal opened the possibility of a takeover in Mozambique by a government hostile to Rhodesia—thereby threatening the outlets through Beira and Maputo—that the link was built as a security measure.

NRZ suffered little direct physical damage from the guerrilla war. Tracks continued to be well maintained, but shortages of spare parts and particularly of trained personnel had resulted in a considerable number of locomotives being out of service. This situation continued after independence, and in mid-1981 less than half of the 255 effective diesel locomotives and under fifty of eighty steam engines were reported operational. In early 1981 there was a reported shortage of about 20 percent of the required highly skilled staff, and the total had risen to some 30 percent late in the year. Facilities existed for training Zimbabweans at lower level skills for railroad vacancies and such training was under way, but domestic facilities were inadequate to turn out the needed technical staff. Additional expatriate personnel had to be used and were recruited mainly from India and Pakistan. In early 1981 IBRD approved a loan equivalent to US\$42 million to aid the transport sector. This included spare parts for locomotives and freight cars, machine tools, track equipment, and apparatus to maintain and improve the signaling system. The government also ordered sixty-one new diesel-electric locomotives during the year from the United States and Canada; thirty-five had been delivered by mid-1982, and the others were to arrive in August.

In the 1970s about three-fifths of the 12 to 13 million tons of freight hauled annually by the railroad was for domestic use. A substantial portion of this local movement consisted of bulk goods, including agricultural products, coal, fertilizer, and iron ore. The export-import trade accounted for another third, largely comprising exports of cotton, maize, sugar, minerals, and steel and imports of general goods, fuels, and chemicals. Transit shipments of copper from Zambia and Zaïre made up most of the remaining tonnage carried. After early 1976 when the lines to Beira and Maputo were closed by the independent government in Mozambique, all export, import, and transit traffic had to pass through South Africa. This changed in late 1980 when the route to Maputo was reopened after repairs; the line to Beira was reopened a year later. In late 1981 the minister of transport stated that the railroad had hauled some 13 million tons in the year ending June 30 but that the demand for rail transport was estimated at about 16 million tons. The new locomotives, the new

Zimbabwe: A Country Study





Figure 16. Transportation System, 1982

The Economy



Zimbabwe: A Country Study

expatriate staff, the addition of over twenty locomotives overhauled domestically for operational use, and the freeing of transport by the opening of the pipeline helped greatly to alleviate the situation. The new equipment was also expected to permit the return to South Africa of a number of locomotives on loan from that country.

In late 1981 NRZ began the long-contemplated (since the late 1950s) electrification of the railroad system. The first phase, involving the line from Harare to Gweru, included electrification of about 325 kilometers of mainline track and some 120 kilometers of yard, siding, and station trackage. Assistance in the initial project has been received from Britain in the form of a loan and the guarantee of commercial credits. Thirty electric locomotives had been ordered for the Harare-Gweru section for delivery in 1983.

Roads

In 1982 Zimbabwe's road network totaled roughly 85,000 kilometers. About 12,000 kilometers (or approximately 14 percent) were asphalt paved. Of these roads about 8,000 kilometers were two-lane highways, and the remainder were one-lane roads. Another 46,000 kilometers (54 percent) had gravel surfaces, and the remaining 27,000 kilometers (32 percent) were earthen roads and tracks. The overall network consisted of four separate systems based on primary responsibilities for maintenance and development. A high-standard national road system of some 16,500 kilometers maintained by the Ministry of Roads and Road Traffic, which included a large part of the paved roads, interconnected the country's principal towns and the commercial farming areas. This national road system also served major development areas, such as the Hippo Valley and Triangle agricultural estates in the southern lowveld; provided access to the national parks, game reserves, and other recreational and tourist areas; and at main international border points joined up with the road systems of neighboring countries.

Serving mainly the commercial farming areas was a system of secondary roads totaling some 23,400 kilometers. Consisting mostly of gravel roads, they were maintained—also to high standards—by the local rural councils. Additionally about 5,300 kilometers of roads were the responsibility of the country's seventeen self-governing municipalities within whose individual jurisdictions they lay. The fourth category of roads comprised roughly 17,000 kilometers of low-grade gravel roads and 23,000 kilometers of minor earthen roads and tracks found in the communal lands. These roads and tracks were administered by the district councils, but during the guerrilla war, maintenance was almost negligible, and at independence many were in extremely poor condition. In June 1980 the government had assumed direct responsibility for 4,000 kilometers of roads in the communal areas and for another 2,000 kilometers of roads that tied networks within communal areas to the national network.

Civil Aviation

Scheduled domestic air service has been furnished by the national carrier, Air Zimbabwe (formerly Air Rhodesia), which has a monopoly on the main internal routes. In 1982 regular flights were made between Harare, Bulawayo, Victoria Falls (all three of which were international airports), Gweru, Masvingo, Hwange, Kariba, and Buffalo Range, the latter located in the southern lowveld and serving the irrigated agricultural area around the Triangle and Hippo Valley estates and the town of Chiredzi. There were also numerous small airfields and air strips at other towns, mining centers, and the like that were used by private charter operators providing local services, company planes, and individual pilots.

In 1982 Air Zimbabwe also had international flights to London, Frankfurt, and Athens and regionally to Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, and Botswana. Flights to South Africa were to Durban and Johannesburg; those to Johannesburg, according to Air Zimbabwe's general manager in early 1982, were the airline's basic revenue earner. After the end of sanctions, several international and regional airlines renewed or started flights to Zimbabwe; in mid-1982 they included Air Botswana, Air Tanzania, Ethiopian Airlines, Kenya Airways, Swazi Royal Airlines, Zambia Airways, and the Mozambican national carrier, Linhas Aéreas de Moçambique. Carriers based outside Africa included British Airways, Air India, Swissair, and UTA French Lines. South African Airways, which had continued flights throughout the sanction period, also furnished regular service.

Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments

UN sanctions appear to have had little overall effect on Rhodesia's export trade during the period 1965-79, and in real terms exports actually increased slightly. An immediate decline in the volume and value of exports occurred after sanctions began, but by the early 1970s (as measured by the export unit value index) the 1965 level had been regained, and the index rose rapidly thereafter, in 1979 being double the 1965 figure (see table 12, Appendix). In 1965 tobacco accounted for 35 percent of total exports, and food, mainly meat and sugar, for close to 11 percent. Mining products, including crude materials (asbestos, chrome ore, and others), and processed items (principally copper metal) accounted for roughly 20 percent. Certain major adjustments were forced by sanctions, for instance a decrease in emphasis on the export of tobacco, a commodity relatively easily identifiable as to source. A new stress was placed on other agricultural exports (including cotton, maize, meat, and sugar) that were like those produced in adjacent states and on mining products (including steel, ferrochrome, and nickel) that had widely used standard specifications and were also major exports of neighboring South Africa, Zaïre, and Zambia.

In 1965 six countries had accounted for well over three-quarters of Rhodesian exports. Zambia was then the largest purchaser of the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

country's goods, taking more than one-quarter of the total in 1965, and Britain took almost as much. South Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) were the destination of under 10 percent each, and Japan and Malawi each accounted for somewhat over 5 percent. That year more than half of Rhodesia's imports came from two countries: Britain (30 percent) and South Africa (23 percent). The United States, Japan, West Germany, and Zambia, in that order, accounted for another 20 percent. The trade pattern under sanctions still remained largely speculative in mid-1982. During that period Rhodesia turned to South Africa for greater amounts of both exports and imports, according to a study by the UN Security Council's committee on sanctions, which estimated that by the 1970s South Africa was apparently receiving about one-third of Rhodesian exports and supplying almost half of the imports. Direct trade, largely with the industrialized countries, dropped sharply in 1966 but was replaced by extensive indirect transactions that were estimated to have accounted in 1976 for 42 percent of exports that year and 59 percent of imports. Rhodesia's terms of trade—the relationship between the unit values of exports and imports—deteriorated during this time. This was explained in part by the need to offer discounts in order to sell exports and the requirement to pay premiums in order to secure imports. From the mid-1970s the terms of trade were also adversely affected by increasing world prices for petroleum.

In 1981 the export pattern was substantially different from that of 1965. South Africa was the leading buyer of Zimbabwean goods, the position it apparently had held during many of the sanction years. In 1981 almost 22 percent of Zimbabwean exports went to South Africa; other recipients were West Germany and the United States (about 8 percent each), Britain (7 percent), and Italy (5 percent). The remaining exports, amounting to about half the total, were spread among other countries, each of which took no more than about 3 percent. Exports continued to be mainly agricultural products, which accounted for roughly 48 percent of total exports in 1981, and crude and processed mining products (about 35 percent). Among the latter products were steel, ferrochrome, and nickel metal, the domestic production of which had risen dramatically during UDI.

In 1981 South Africa retained its position as Zimbabwe's principal source of imports, accounting for 25 percent of the total. But the rise in petroleum costs affected by the major price increases of oil in the late 1970s had made the oil-producing countries the second largest supplier—almost 14 percent of the total in 1981. Most noticeable was the drop in imports from Britain, which provided only 10 percent of imports that year. West Germany had increased its role as a supplier, and the United States and Japan had maintained their importance as sources of materials. Neighboring African states (Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique) collectively supplied somewhat over 7 percent, little changed from the 6 percent in 1965. A change had occurred, however, in the composition of imports. The proportion of

consumer goods was only about half the 1965 total in real terms, a result largely of the development of import substitution during UDI. Petroleum products accounted for close to 20 percent of import costs; the need to allocate foreign exchange to petroleum had resulted in reduced imports of intermediate products.

Exports grew during the 1970s at an average annual rate exceeding that of imports. Government restrictions on imports generally helped to produce visible trade surpluses, which met most of the deficit that regularly characterized invisible transactions (services, investment income, and financial transfers). As a consequence, the current account of the balance of payments (the summary in money terms of the country's transactions with the rest of the world) was usually relatively close to a balance. In the cases where the current account was negative (most years from 1965 but in a very moderate amount until 1974), net capital transactions ordinarily covered the deficit, and the overall balance of payments fluctuated moderately between surplus and deficit. Negative factors from the early 1970s included the rise in remittances abroad of investment income and from the mid-1970s an increase in travel as emigration accelerated. Private transfers of funds abroad also rose sharply after 1974 and, although subsequently restricted by controls, remained at a level higher than before 1974.

The current account was sharply in deficit in 1974 and 1975 as services and transfer deficits jumped, but large private borrowings of capital in both years held the overall balance to reasonable deficits. The situation was improved from 1976 to 1979 by greatly increased trade surpluses, and in 1978 and 1979 there were substantial balance of payments surpluses (aided by government borrowing in both years). In 1980 financial transfers abroad rose sharply, as did travel costs. Merchandise goods exports declined, and for the first time since 1968 there was a trade loss. Although more than offset by gold transactions, the total was insufficient to meet greatly increased financial transfers and travel costs, and the current account had the largest deficit on record (Z\$156.7 million). Capital flow, although considerable, did not meet the shortfall, and the overall balance of payments was strongly negative (see table 13, Appendix). A large balance of payments deficit for 1981 was reported without detail in mid-1982. The trade balance that year was unfavorably influenced by a decline in world commodity prices, by the inability to export available goods because of domestic transportation bottlenecks and shipping inadequacies at the ports of Maputo and Beira, and by transportation problems reported in South Africa.

At the beginning of 1980, foreign reserves held by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe were about Z\$200 million. They began declining late in the year and by September 1981 totaled only Z\$145 million—equivalent to the cost of about two months' imports. Zimbabwe has sought external aid, and in March 1981 at the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (usually referred to as ZIMCORD)

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

some Z\$903 million was pledged by a large number of Western, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries. Among Communist states, only China and Yugoslavia contributed. Before the conference Z\$260 million already had been donated, making the overall total nearly Z\$1.2 billion. The largest donors were units of the World Bank (see Glossary), Britain, and the United States. About half the amount was in the form of grants, the remainder in loans. A large part of the funds was to be used for development projects during a three-year period, but the three-year plan to which most funds were committed had not yet been published in mid-1982.

Employment, Income Distribution, and Prices

In the late 1970s the country's work force, according to a World Bank estimate, totaled roughly 2.7 million. A projection by the International Labour Office estimated a work force in 1980 of somewhat under 2.5 million. About half the actual work force was believed to be engaged in subsistence agriculture. Regular wage-earning workers—for whom figures considered reasonably accurate were available—were just over 1 million in 1980. In addition perhaps another 100,000 individuals worked for wages as casual, seasonal, or contract laborers. Of total regular employees about 88 percent were Africans, and the remainder were whites and a small number of Asians and Coloureds (see Demography, ch. 2). In the late 1970s (since 1979, official figures on employment have not given racial breakdowns) about 38 percent of African wage earners were employed in agriculture, 14 percent in manufacturing, and 6 percent in mining. Close to 14 percent were in domestic service, but this proportion may have declined since 1979 as the result of white emigration. Another 6 to 7 percent were in distribution activities and in the hotel and restaurant trades. Relatively small numbers were employed by the other sectors. Almost half of the non-African wage earners were accounted for by three sectors: manufacturing, the distribution and hotel and restaurant trades, and public administration; each sector employed roughly 16 percent of the wage earners. In addition approximately 12 percent of non-African wage earners were in transportation and communications. The remainder were engaged in smaller proportions in the other areas of industrial activity, including under 5 percent in agriculture and under 4 percent in mining.

About half of all regular wage earners have been employed by agriculture and manufacturing. There has been a major shift in relative shares between those two sectors since UDI, but their combined share of total employment has remained constant. In 1965 agriculture provided 39.5 percent of wage employment, and manufacturing represented 10.8 percent (see table 14, Appendix). In absolute numbers agricultural workers reached a peak in 1974, but because of higher rates of growth in other sectors, agriculture's share of overall employment had fallen to 35.2 percent. Manufacturing, which had grown at a faster rate, accounted for 14.5 percent that

year. After 1975 a decline in agricultural employment began and by 1980 agricultural workers made up only 32.4 percent of overall employment. The number of manufacturing workers had also declined from 1976, but recovery had occurred in 1979, the result (at least in part) of the prospects for peace. In 1980 this upward movement continued, and manufacturing's share of employment reached 15.8 percent. A new peak was registered in 1981, and preliminary indications were that workers in manufacturing accounted for close to 17 percent of total wage earners.

Included in the wage-earning force were a substantial number of non-Zimbabweans, most of whom were from neighboring Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. They were estimated to number 198,000 in 1976 and over 183,000 in 1979. A large proportion consisted of agricultural workers, as indicated by figures available for the period 1970-75 that showed an annual average of 118,000 farm wage workers to have been foreigners. During this time they constituted a third of the farm work force. At the same time, a considerable but unknown number of Africans from Rhodesia were employed in other countries. Until 1982 they included individuals officially recruited by South Africa's Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) mainly for work in that country's gold mines. The number secured by TEBA varied, as indicated by the total of 8,622 in 1975 and 32,453 in 1976. In early 1981 the Zimbabwean government banned further recruitment by TEBA. South Africa reacted by refusing to renew work contracts and permits of Zimbabweans, and repatriation began in 1981 of the officially registered approximately 20,000 in South Africa.

Marked differences characterized the cash wages received by Africans and non-Africans at independence. These related in part to the nature and level of work but were mainly caused by restrictions both on job opportunities for Africans and on the amount of wages paid them. The vast majority of African wage earners were unskilled. In 1976 about 50,000 in urban areas were estimated to have been in the semiskilled category (clerks and others at that level), and about 10,000 were skilled (artisans, professionals, and administrators—none of whom were permitted to advance to the top levels). The degree of difference between African and white wages varied by sector. In health services, for instance, the white average wage was three times greater than that paid Africans and three to four times higher in finance, insurance, and real estate. (It should be noted that the number of African employees in these sectors was very small by comparison with the overall total of African wage earners.) In agriculture, the largest employer, the wage difference was more than twenty-six times greater, and in manufacturing seven times (compensation in the form of subsistence would reduce the ratio somewhat in agriculture). The overall annual average wage was over ten times greater for non-Africans (see table 15, Appendix).

Within the African wage-earning population there were also significant income differences between sectors; for instance, employees in

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

finance and related areas received average annual wages almost twice those of manufacturing employees and four times those of agricultural workers. The latter, who constituted 38 percent of all African wage employees, received only about 40 percent of the overall average wage; domestic servants also received less than the average. The African wage sector itself was set apart as a whole from the subsistence sector, individuals working for wages having average incomes seven to eight times greater than the average subsistence income. A study carried out during 1973-74 to determine the minimum consumption needs of urban African families, that is, to determine the poverty datum line, concluded that in 1974 the line was between Z\$660 and Z\$670 a year. In that year the average annual wage of African workers (excluding farm workers) was Z\$556, and almost 80 percent of urban wage earners had incomes below the poverty line.

Independence brought expectations among the African work force that wages would be increased, and in May 1980 the government published an official series of minimum wages for different employment groups. Before, individual minimums had been established within all sectors on an annual basis through agreement between representatives of the employees, employers, and the government. The new minimums grouped workers into three categories: urban, agricultural and domestic, and mining. Effective July 1980 the minimum wage for urban workers was Z\$70 a month; it was increased to Z\$85 at the beginning of 1981. The minimum wage for agricultural and domestic employees was fixed at Z\$30 a month, but no increase was set for 1981. The minimum rate for mining workers took into consideration noncash wages estimated at Z\$27 a month and established an inclusive figure of Z\$43 from July 1980 and Z\$58 beginning January 1981. Some wages already exceeded the new minimums, but in agriculture the new minimum represented a substantial increase from the rate of slightly more than Z\$20 that existed at the time. The government contended that the new urban minimum exceeded wages paid by 80 percent of the country's industries and stated that the minimums were only an interim measure.

In December 1981 the government announced a further step to reduce the income gap between "rich and poor" that included raising the urban worker minimum wage for industrial (mine workers were included) and commercial workers to Z\$105 a month and that for farm and domestic workers to Z\$50 a month, both effective at the beginning of January 1982. Ceilings were also set on wage increases—these largely affected non-African workers—based on annual income groupings and permissible percentage increases within each group. In the group having an annual income up to Z\$1,200, an increase of up to 23.5 percent was permitted. The percentages decreased as annual incomes increased, and from Z\$20,000 upward no raise was allowed. The government also declared that dismissals of workers because of the new minimums were not permitted without the

approval of the minister of labor and social welfare services.

Inflation was not a major problem during the UDI period. In the first five years the urban consumer price index for the lower income group rose at an annual average rate of 1.9 percent and for the higher income group at a rate of 2.6 percent. For the next five years the average inflation growth rate for both was somewhat over 5 percent. Principal reasons for the low increases were believed to be government price controls during the time and the relatively small size of the buying population. Under the conditions imposed by sanctions, attitudes appear to have been very cooperative, and shortages were not reflected in demand pressures. From 1975 to 1979 inflation gradually increased, however, and in 1979 the lower income price index rose by 13.7 percent and the higher by 11.3 percent. But in 1980 both indexes showed declines, in particular that of the lower income group, for which the inflation rate for the year was only 5.4 percent. Indications were that inflationary pressures had actually continued and that government actions after independence, including major reductions in school fees and hospital charges plus reductions in some sales and excise taxes, had been mainly responsible for the drop. Such items as school fees had less impact on the higher income group. This group was also adversely affected by the increase in wages of domestic servants during the year, and although the inflation rate declined, it averaged 9.2 percent for the year. In 1981 the rate jumped for both groups, rising to 13.2 percent for the lower one and 14.6 percent for the higher one. In September the government took steps to curb increases in the money supply, a major factor in the inflationary rise. This was followed in mid-December by a three-month price freeze on all goods and commodities, during which a new overall price control system was to be developed. In March 1982 the freeze was extended to the end of April when the new system was introduced.

Government Finance

The budgets of the preindependence period were formulated primarily on the basis of modern sector operations, from which most recurrent revenue was derived. Recurrent expenditure was strongly skewed toward that sector and disproportionately favored the non-African population. The largest sources of revenue were personal and company income taxes and sales taxes. Income taxes were derived almost entirely from the non-African population (in fiscal year 1976-77 [FY—see Glossary] for instance, some 94,500 non-Africans paid 98.6 percent of total personal income taxes and Africans 1.4 percent). Sales taxes, however, had a substantial impact on the much poorer African population despite the fact that certain basic foods—bread, maize meal, meat, and milk—were exempted. In the early 1970s income taxes accounted for about 55 to 56 percent of recurrent revenue and sales taxes for 16 to 17 percent. (Excise taxes, mainly on

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

beer, liquor, wine, and cigarettes, provided another some 9 percent.)

As the war expanded in the 1970s, additional revenues were needed, and in FY 1974-75 a 10-percent surcharge was placed on income taxes; during that year war costs required about 18 percent of total budget expenditure (see *The Civil War*, ch. 1). The following year, FY 1975-76, no tax increases were projected, but by early 1976 spending requirements led to a doubling of the sales tax to 10 percent and increases in excise and certain luxury goods taxes. The sales tax was again raised—to 15 percent—in early 1977, and projected costs of the war for FY 1977-78 were 26 percent of total expenditure. As of 1978, however, no direct increases in income taxes had been made. But in FY 1978-79 a 12.5-percent levy (a three-year “national defense loan”) was made against incomes on which Z\$100 or more in taxes had been paid the previous year. Meanwhile the impact (especially on the African population) of increased sales taxes was evident in the 31 percent share of sales taxes in total tax revenue that year (excise taxes constituted another 7 percent) and the relative decline of income taxes to about 52 percent (see table 16, Appendix).

The budget had been roughly in balance at the beginning of the 1970s, and only moderate deficits were recorded until the middle of the decade when rapidly growing defense expenditures and increases in grants and subsidies outstripped revenue receipts. Among the subsidies were large amounts paid to white commercial farmers in support of production for the export market. Little if any benefit from the subsidies accrued to the domestic, overwhelmingly African, consumer public. Meanwhile the percentage share of social services in recurrent expenditure decline from over 27 percent of total expenditure in 1975 to about 21 percent in 1978; the education-health component dropped from roughly 25 to 18 percent. Services for the African population mainly bore the brunt of these reductions.

It was only under the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government of Prime Minister Abel Muzorewa that war costs began to consume an inordinate share of the budget. In FY 1979-80 outlays for defense were projected at 37 percent of budgeted expenditure (estimates were increased in late 1979 to 41 percent in a supplementary tax measure), and there was little in the budget to provide the cheaper education and health services anticipated by the African electorate nor much in the way of funds for better housing and rural development, although some increases were included for education and housing. A large budget deficit was projected, but the internal settlement had led to hopes that defense and security costs could be reduced if peace came and that if sanctions were lifted, an economic upturn would produce larger revenues. The government decided to finance the deficit by domestic and foreign loans rather than new taxes. The national defense loan levy was dropped as a measure of relief for the non-African taxpayer, but at the same time, substantial reductions were made in the subsidies to white farmers and to government corporations. The minister of finance called for general restraint on living

expenditures, and African teachers, who had been given a pay raise, were asked not to press their demand for wage parity, for which funds were not available. The African reaction to the budget was perhaps best expressed by one of the African government ministers when he described it as "a white man's budget."

In April 1980 the new government of Robert Mugabe announced almost immediately on assuming office the implementation of part of the fiscal measures it had promised the African electorate during the 1980 election campaign (see *Parliamentary Elections of 1980*, ch. 4). The retail sales tax was reduced from 15 to 10 percent on almost all items, and additional basic foods (including cooking oil, margarine, sugar, and tea) were completely exempted from the tax. In part to offset the resulting loss of revenue, excise taxes were increased on cigarettes, beer, and liquor, and the income surtax, which had earlier been reduced to 5 percent, was again raised to 10 percent. In July it was announced that primary education would be free beginning with the August 1980 term and, that in the case of private primary schools, government grants would be made to permit the remission of fees. From September free health services were instituted for workers who made less than Z\$150 a month (this included the vast majority of African wage earners). These two measures required substantial increases in budgetary allocations for FY 1980-81.

Actual expenditures showed increases over the previous year of 45 percent for health and 75 percent for education (see table 17, Appendix). A large increase was budgeted for the acquisition of land, resettlement, and rural development (almost 54 percent above the 1979-80 expenditure); but delays in the resettlement program slowed implementation, and actual expenditure was under two-thirds of the budgeted amount. The end of the war brought reduced spending for defense and, although this item remained the largest in the budget, actual expenditure declined by almost 13 percent from the year before.

The FY 1981-82 budget emphasis was similar to that of the first Mugabe budget, i.e., on education, health, resettlement, and rural development. The appropriation for education was 31 percent larger than actual expenditures in 1980-81, and projections for health were 41 percent above those of the year before. The appropriation for land acquisition, resettlement, and rural development was 1.5 times greater than that of the previous year and well over 2.5 times the actual expenditure in that year. An expansion of the armed forces resulted in increased spending, which at a projected total of over Z\$280 million was the largest budget item; education was a close second at Z\$272 million. To help finance the anticipated large budget deficit, a main recourse was increases in indirect taxes. These included a rise in sales taxes from 10 to 15 percent on selected items and a general increase on others from 10 to 12 percent; the introduction of a 30-percent capital gains tax; a 5-percent surcharge on customs duties; and increases in taxes on dividends. These new

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

levies affected mainly the non-African population, although the general sales tax increase was also significant for Africans. No increases in either personal or company income taxes were made.

In spite of the government's socialist goals, its tax programs were not intended to be confiscatory, nor were they intended to harm the private sector. Although a greater share was to be assessed against wealth and nonessential spending, the tax burden was still to be spread widely so that everyone would be aware that nothing "was for free," according to the finance minister. The objective was not to bring everyone down to a lower standard of living but to reduce inequality by raising incomes of the poorer sector.

* * *

Studies available up to 1982 on the country's economy consist mainly of sectoral or specific area works. Two wider ranging sources include *Rhodesia: Economic Structure and Change*, edited by G.M.E. Leistner, which offers some background on the economy before UDI and a more detailed presentation of the period from 1965 to 1974, and John Handford's *Portrait of an Economy: Rhodesia under Sanctions*, which incorporates statistical information on the UDI period and varying amounts of history on earlier sectoral developments. Among broader sectoral works is I.M. Hume's *A Strategy for Rural Development and Whitsun Data Bank No. 2*, essentially collation—with minimal analysis—of statistical materials on the peasant sector, for which much of the data is widely scattered. The mining sector is covered in a comprehensive report, *Zimbabwe*, prepared by the United States Bureau of Mines. Anthony H. Croxton's *Railways of Rhodesia* recounts in journalistic fashion the development of the railroads. The all-important matter of land is succinctly discussed in *The Land Question* by Roger Riddell. Available information on the economy since independence has been confined mainly to materials in the *Monthly Digest of Statistics* of the Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office. The new government's economic objectives and the policies to be pursued to obtain them appear in *Growth with Equity*; the problems faced and the program for development are contained in the *ZIMCORD Conference Documentation*. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 4. Government and Politics



*Harare's Milton Buildings, which house the Prime Minister's Office
and the seat of Zimbabwe's central government*

AT INDEPENDENCE on April 18, 1980, Zimbabwe undertook to govern itself according to a system of parliamentary democracy bequeathed by Britain, its former colonial steward. Zimbabwean sovereignty was embodied in the British-sponsored Constitution, which had been accepted by all factions that had contended for authority during the preceding fourteen years. The Constitution ensured a government by the country's African majority. In national elections held as a prologue to independence, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, the most radical of the African nationalist groups during the long fight against white minority rule, came to power under new leadership of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe.

The new prime minister's conciliatory statements and actions made plain that his government did not intend to act hastily in reordering the economy and the society. The reforms he introduced were aimed first at expunging the racially segregated administration of the country formerly known as Rhodesia. White domination of the higher civil service was ended, municipal government was merged into a single structure, and Africans were trained to take up judicial office in a more integrated legal system. In spite of his generous use of socialist rhetoric, Mugabe's economic strategy intruded little on the private sector, which he recognized must be allowed to prosper if jobs were to be created and overseas investors encouraged. Broader opportunities for Africans, narrowing of income disparities, and land resettlement were high on the new government's agenda, but its initial approach was cautious, emphasizing shifts in the tax burden, boosts in education, and higher minimum wages.

Mugabe's government has had to contend with underlying regional and ethnic divisions in the African population and dissatisfaction among radicals of Mugabe's own party over the pace of change. The political influence of the elite white minority has waned, but its power has persisted in other forms. The opposition forces—Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union and the white Republican Front Party—have experienced internal stress, reinforcing the prime minister's commanding position. He was nevertheless provoked by actions of his adversaries that he regarded as negative and disruptive when the republic's tasks demanded unity of purpose. Mugabe has sought to maintain a broadly based government by continuing to include representatives of Nkomo's party and white independents, but he has strongly endorsed a one-party system as a solution to mutual distrust and ethnic and ideological conflict.

The issues at stake within Zimbabwe have received wide international recognition, attested to by the West's commitment from the outset to the republic's development along democratic, multiracial

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

lines. Despite the communist support that was an instrumental factor in the Patriotic Front's guerrilla war against Ian Smith's Rhodesia, relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China have been distinctly of secondary importance.

Zimbabwe's outlook has been consonant with its nonaligned status and its membership in African groupings. Its central location and relative economic weight have endowed the country with a prominent role in the efforts of the states of the southern tier to reduce their dependence on South Africa. At the same time, however, the republic's most challenging foreign relations problem was how to employ its influence against the area's remaining stronghold of white minority rule while dealing with the reality of an economy closely intertwined with that of its powerful southern neighbor.

Constitutional Framework

Between 1923, when Southern Rhodesia attained status as a self-governing crown colony, and 1980, when Zimbabwe became a sovereign republic, political activity has been regulated by six successive constitutions. The one promulgated in 1923 retained residual powers for Britain over relations between the white Rhodesian government and the colony's African majority (see *The Colonial Period*, ch. 1). Under the 1961 constitution Britain relinquished its earlier rights of intervention, which were intended to safeguard the interests of the African population, and extended greater autonomy to the Rhodesian authorities (see *The 1961 Constitution*, ch. 1). The constitutions of 1965 and 1969, which stemmed from Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), reinforced the ruling white minority's primary aim: permanent and total control over the machinery of government in order to avoid or defeat any serious challenge from the nonwhite majority (see *Unilateral Declaration of Independence; The Republican Constitution*, ch. 1).

The 1979 constitution, under which Bishop Abel Muzorewa became the breakaway colony's first African prime minister and a majority of African members took their places in the cabinet and parliament, was in force only a few months. Coupled with laws abolishing most forms of racial discrimination, it represented an effort by the white political leadership to come to terms with the moderate African forces. It failed, however, to end the civil war with the guerrilla insurgents of the Patriotic Front because the document was widely perceived as having been designed to perpetuate *de facto* white control for a lengthy period, if not indefinitely (see *Internal Settlement*, ch. 1).

The Constitution of 1980, which established the framework for Zimbabwean independence, sounded the death knell for white political power and ushered in a new era of self-determination for the African majority. Launched at a British-sponsored conference of all contending parties, which convened at Lancaster House in London in September 1979, the Constitution was similar in many respects to

the preceding internal settlement constitution, retaining virtually the same structure of government and provisions designed to protect the basic rights of all citizens. Both constitutions prescribed dual voter rolls for the electoral process: a common roll for Africans and a separate roll for white, Coloured, and Asian voters. The locus of political power was, however, shifted to the African majority by revoking the veto power of the white minority and the independence of the white-dominated civil service (see Parliament, this year).

In addition to prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of "race, tribe, place of origin, color, or creed," the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution embodies detailed safeguards against the compulsory sale of property except underutilized agricultural land. Pension benefits and the right to remit compensation abroad are similarly protected. These provisions have been viewed as essential features of the 1979 Lancaster House agreement, affording whites an option of emigration without undue hardship should they find life under African rule intolerable. Because of the potential drain on the Zimbabwean economy, Britain gave assurances of aid in fulfilling these promises to the white community.

Amendments to the Constitution generally require the support of seventy members of the parliament's House of Assembly and two-thirds of its Senate. Several sections of the document are nevertheless entrenched (exempt from amendment except by unanimous approval in the assembly). The Declaration of Rights is entrenched for a ten-year period, and the separate non-African voter roll and the functions of the assembly and Senate are entrenched for a seven-year period.

The independence Constitution states that any person who was a citizen by birth, descent, or registration before independence is a citizen of Zimbabwe. Persons who before independence were born of a parent who is a Zimbabwean citizen can apply for citizenship and be registered upon subscribing to an oath of loyalty to the state. Persons born after independence to fathers who are Zimbabwean citizens acquire citizenship by descent. Persons who became Zimbabwean citizens at independence cannot be deprived of their national status by reason of citizenship in another country, nor can they be prohibited from using passports issued by foreign governments. This clause was retained in the Constitution to alleviate concerns of white residents, nearly half of whom, according to one estimate, hold British passports, while a smaller number have South African passports. In 1982 the government introduced a bill to repeal the dual nationality clause, which was not entrenched in the Constitution.

Institutions of Government

The Zimbabwean government, like its predecessors, is organized along the lines of the British parliamentary system in which all political authority emanates from the national legislature. Its struc-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

ture is highly centralized, lacking such federal institutions as separate provincial governments invested with independent powers (see fig. 17). Local governing units are assigned responsibility for a limited range of matters, but the parliament retains the right to extend or restrict the areas in which such bodies may function. Unlike Britain, which does not have a formal constitution defining the form of government or placing restraints on the power of parliament, Zimbabwe's Constitution establishes a fully elaborated governmental structure.

The detailed terms of the Declaration of Rights, the entrenched clauses, and the allocation of a specific number of seats in the parliament to members chosen by the white electorate were included by the document's framers to gain white acceptance of a government in which African majority rule would become a reality. Since independence, however, whites have been able in only a few instances to deter the African majority from prevailing on legislative initiatives. Nonetheless whites as individuals have continued to exercise widespread influence in the administration of government owing to their strong representation in senior positions of the civil service, traditionally an important and effective institution of the public sector.

Prime Minister Mugabe has made it clear on a number of occasions that he does not regard the form of government bequeathed Zimbabwe by the Constitution as fully adapted to the prevailing political and social conditions. The minister of legal and parliamentary affairs, Eddison Zvobgo, has been entrusted with studying major structural changes, some of which might be introduced without delay if the support of seventy assembly members needed for ordinary amendments seems attainable, while others would have to await the expiration of the constitutional entrenchment periods. Changes reportedly under consideration in 1982 included establishing an executive presidency and abolishing the Senate, the seats reserved for whites in the assembly, and the multiparty system.

Executive Branch and Civil Service

According to the Constitution the executive branch is headed by the president who, as head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, serves in a largely ceremonial role corresponding to that of a constitutional monarch. His official actions are based on the advice of the government in power except under limited circumstances, such as the appointment of a prime minister and the dissolution of parliament in the case of a vote of no confidence. The president serves a six-year term, after which he is eligible to be reelected for one additional term. Canaan Banana, a member of Mugabe's political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), became the country's first president after election by a combined vote of the Senate and House of Assembly on April 11, 1980.




Figure 17. Organization of Government, 1982

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

The president acts on the advice of a cabinet consisting of the prime minister, who serves as head of government, and other ministers who are generally delegated responsibility for the various departments of government. Ministers and deputy ministers are members of the legislature. As of mid-1982 the government included thirty ministers and ministers of state and twenty-four deputy ministers, thus comprising a significant proportion of the entire parliament. All cabinet ministers were members of ZANU-PF except for four supporters of the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU) and two white independents (see table 18, Appendix).

Secretaries of departments, who are permanent civil servants, supervise day-to-day government operations subject to the general direction and control of the responsible minister. The preponderance of whites in the higher ranks of the civil service was a contentious issue in the preindependence period. During the transition government in 1978, the African co-minister of justice, Byron Hove, was dismissed after advocating the active recruitment of Africans to the civil service and the police. At the 1979 Lancaster House Conference the British introduced an important modification to previous staffing practices whereby the prime minister could appoint a majority of three suitably qualified Africans to the powerful Public Service Commission, notwithstanding their lack of prior employment in the senior ranks of the civil service. Moreover the commission was enjoined to take account of government policy to achieve suitable representation of all population groups in all civil service appointments. Similar rules were applied to ensure that the Police Service Commission and the Defence Forces Service Commission would not act as barriers to the advancement of Africans to senior positions.


In 1980 the first amendment to the Constitution reduced the length of time the chairman of the Public Service Commission and one additional member must spend in senior civil service positions. Similar changes accommodated African appointments to the Judicial Service Commission and the Senate Legal Committee. With a black majority on the Public Service Commission, the process of realigning the civil service to reflect the racial pattern of the population has been a prime objective of the Mugabe government. Whites have been protected in their terms of service normally through a retirement age of sixty-five. But some white officials have been obliged to accept early retirement at age sixty, which is permitted under civil service regulations when qualified Africans are available to replace them.

By January 1982 thirteen of the thirty permanent departmental secretaries in government and forty-five of the eighty deputy secretaries were Africans. At independence more than 68 percent of the 10,000 officers in public service were white. One year later the number of whites had declined by 2,000, owing mainly to special

*Prime Minister
Robert Mugabe
Courtesy Embassy of
Zimbabwe, Washington*



*Canaan Banana,
Methodist minister and
independent Zimbabwe's
first president
Courtesy Embassy of
Zimbabwe, Washington*



Zimbabwe: A Country Study

retirement incentives, and the number of Africans had increased by 2,200. In the top grades there were 134 African officers and 142 whites.

Parliament

The bicameral legislative system of House of Assembly and Senate introduced by Rhodesia's republican constitution of 1969 was retained under the brief internal settlement government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia and in the governmental structure of independent Zimbabwe. Government ministers are expected to attend debates and to defend government policies and actions that are within the jurisdiction of their departments. Ministers may sit and speak in either legislative body but may vote only in the one in which they are members.

The Senate plays a secondary role in the legislative process. If its members do not approve within ninety days an ordinary bill passed by the House of Assembly, the bill may then be presented to the president for assent. The Senate has the power to delay a money bill for only eight sitting days. An amendment to the Constitution can be delayed for no more than 180 days.

Of the Senate's forty members, the ten white senators are elected by white members of the assembly. Ten senators are elected by the Council of Chiefs, based on a separate poll of Ndebele and Shona chiefs, each ethnic group being assigned five seats in spite of the preponderance of Shona in the population. Fourteen senators are elected by the eighty African members of the assembly. (All those elected in 1980 were sponsored by the prime minister; twelve were members of his ZANU-PF, one was a member of PF-ZAPU, and one, Denis Norman, was a white appointee serving as minister of agriculture.) The remaining six senators are nominated by the president on the advice of the prime minister. In 1982 one of these was Garfield Todd, a former prime minister who had increasingly associated himself with African political aspirations; another was a leader of the Coloured community; two were women; and two were appointees to important cabinet posts. One reason for the government's underlying dissatisfaction with the Senate has been the fact that half of its membership consists of whites and the chiefs who represent more traditional and conservative elements of African society.

The Constitution stipulates that proposed legislation be referred to the Senate Legal Committee for an opinion of whether the bill in question is in contravention of the Declaration of Rights. Although the committee is potentially an important instrument for the defense of the rights guaranteed in the Constitution, its authority is limited by the fact that its membership is determined by the party in power and that its conclusions appear to be only advisory.

The 100-member House of Assembly is the preeminent legislative body in which the government introduces its legislative program and

most debate occurs. Eighty of the members are elected by African citizens registered on the common voter roll, and the remaining twenty are elected by white, Asian, and Coloured voters. This composition is prescribed in the Constitution and is a decisive change from the 1979 document, which allotted twenty-eight assembly seats to white candidates to constitute a blocking minority against legislative reforms in such areas as housing, education, medical services, local government, and voter qualifications.

The term of each parliament is five years unless dissolved sooner by the president. The annual parliamentary session is generally opened in June by the president with an address outlining government policy for the forthcoming year and forecasting the nature of the legislative program. A general debate on the government's program follows and is limited to twenty-two and one-half hours, with each member limited to a speech of forty minutes. The government's budget is introduced about a month after the opening of parliament, followed by a second general debate preceding votes of funds for individual ministries. Although ordinary members are entitled to introduce private bills, in practice virtually all legislation considered by parliament has had official backing.

Action on bills follows the customary parliamentary procedure of three readings, the first constituting the announcement of the government's intentions; the second serves as the occasion for debate on the principles of the bill and is followed by clause-by-clause consideration by the entire house sitting as a committee of the whole. A system of specialized committees has not been introduced, although the government has indicated that it was studying the procedure in other Commonwealth countries where each ministry has its corresponding parliamentary committee.

Local Government

A primary task for the Mugabe government has been the amalgamation of racially differentiated structures of local authority into a single system. As of mid-1982 this had been successfully accomplished in urban communities. In rural areas the distinction in administration between the communal areas (formerly Tribal Trust Lands—TTL) and territory occupied by white farmers had not been wholly eliminated. Before independence African areas, consisting mainly of the TTL, were under control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which closely supervised their rudimentary local government bodies. Local government for urban areas and for white-inhabited rural areas was supervised by the Ministry of Local Government and Housing. African communities adjacent to white cities were under direct control of whites, usually the neighboring municipality.

The most conspicuous change since 1980 has been the integration of white and African residential areas into unified urban councils, which in most cases have African majorities. In the communal areas

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

the post of district commissioner, through whom white authority formerly was channeled, has been abolished and fifty-five district councils created.

The eight provinces into which Zimbabwe is divided have limited administrative significance. Magistrates' courts have been organized on provincial lines, and certain statistics are collected on a provincial basis. For the first national election in 1980, common roll seats in the House of Assembly were allocated by province under a proportional representation system. In future general elections, however, voting will be for individual candidates in eighty electoral districts. During 1981 government leaders indicated that there were no current plans to dissolve provincial authorities. It was envisaged that the provinces would act as conduits through which government funds and effort would be funneled to district councils. Individuals who chair district councils were expected to sit on the boards of the provincial authorities.

Urban Councils

The pre-1980 municipalities were governed by a mayor and a council elected by the white property owners and tenants. The municipalities had wide taxing power and managed nearly all public services within their boundaries and in much of the unincorporated adjacent areas that included the African townships. All African city dwellers, except for the numerous domestic servants, were required to live in these outlying communities. The townships were regarded as separate areas owned by the local white government unit; most housing was owned by the white municipality or by local employers.

In the larger African townships, advisory boards were appointed to make recommendations to the white municipal governments on matters affecting the African residents. In some cases the white city councils handed over to the boards control over markets, libraries, day-care centers, and recreation facilities. In recent years a few elected African urban councils having broader authority were formed. Soon after coming to power, the Mugabe government announced that all municipal government structures would be unified into single urban councils for both African and white living areas. At the central level, responsibility for all local government affairs was to be concentrated in a single agency, the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (later renamed Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning). New elections were held for seventeen urban councils, first in smaller municipalities in October and November 1980, but elections in Salisbury (present-day Harare) and Bulawayo were delayed until 1981 as a result of unrest and clashes between former guerrilla factions. In most cases the African councillors were in a majority and elected African mayors because the populations of the African townships, which were divided into wards, outstripped those of the white suburbs. (Whites

were, however, proportionately more heavily represented.) A candidate could run for election in any ward without being a resident and irrespective of race. In only rare instances, however, did Africans and whites contest the same wards.

In Harare thirteen of the thirty-six seats were filled by whites and twenty-three by blacks. Tizirai Gwata was sworn in as the capital's first African mayor on April 7, 1981. In Bulawayo the new council consisted of fifteen blacks and eight whites. White candidates ran as independents, but most Africans ran on party tickets with the result that the outcomes followed definite ethnic lines. In Harare and other towns in Shona areas, ZANU-PF was overwhelmingly successful. In Bulawayo and Victoria Falls, where the Ndebele were a majority, PF-ZAPU prevailed in the African wards.

Rural Areas

Changes in rural administration proceeded in a more deliberate fashion after independence. The elected rural councils in predominantly white areas were permitted to continue in existence. Most of the forty-five such bodies extended over large areas and were required to deal with local road construction and maintenance; before independence they also managed some small African townships. The minister of local government and housing indicated that qualified Africans such as individual farmers and those in the African Purchase Areas, might be represented on the rural councils. Small African townships could also be represented or form their own councils. The minister warned that the franchise would not be extended to African farm laborers who did not own property in the area.

Before independence African councils were created in the TTL under district commissioners; they were to include both elected members and a smaller number of chiefs and headmen appointed by the government. In many cases the elective seats had to be filled by appointment because resentment against the government resulted in boycotts of elections. Of 242 such councils formed during the 1970s, only three remained by 1980, the remainder having crumbled under the impact of the civil war. In practice the district councils, supposedly concerned with primary education, preventive health care, and feeder roads, were regularly bypassed by district commissioners in dealings with the central authorities. They were not consulted on major rural development projects, such as local industry, irrigation, and main and secondary roads.

After coming to power, the Mugabe government decided to reconstitute local government in the communal areas by forming fifty-five district councils. In August 1981 new legislation was introduced to give the minister of local government and housing the authority to appoint a chief executive officer (known as a district administrator) to each district. (The former white district commissioners either resigned because of their enforced idleness or were

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

transferred to other duties.) The new administrators, who were civil servants accountable to the ministry, were to ensure that the councils operated efficiently and that all funds were properly accounted for. In Shona areas the district administrators were also closely linked with the ZANU-PF party apparatus. They were assisted by local government promotion officers (usually former guerrillas) on rural development projects.

Council seats were filled by direct election, although various voting methods were permitted, including expressions of preference for tribal leaders, acclamation, head count, assembling behind candidates, or secret ballot. In many cases there was only one candidate, which obviated the need for an election. Where elections were contested, they were conducted on party lines with the result that in thirty-seven councils in Shona areas, all seats were won by ZANU-PF candidates. In Ndebele areas all seats were swept by PF-ZAPU. Where more mixed populations are found, as in parts of the Midlands and around Kariba, two or more African parties won council seats.

Chiefs and Headmen

Although often selected from the ranks of those who would traditionally have been chiefs, under preindependence governments the chiefs were appointed officials forming, with their headmen, the lowest level of administration in the TTL. The chiefs, who numbered over 300, were responsible for tax collection, crime prevention, and the maintenance of order, enjoying police power as constables. Some also acted as judges. Headmen, appointed by district commissioners at the chiefs' suggestions, were responsible for supervising a tribal ward. Below them were heads of kraals (villages or hamlets composed of a few households). The kraal head was not an official but, as the recognized senior member or spokesman for his hamlet, was charged with maintenance of peace and enforcement of government orders. Most chiefs and headmen remained on the side of the government during the civil war, being among the more conservative elements in tribal society.

Conscious that the chiefs had served the interests of previous regimes, Mugabe's minister of local government and housing declared that the chiefs would no longer be instruments of the government nor swear allegiance to it. They would, however, continue to receive a government stipend. They were to be confined to traditional and cultural matters and to voicing local concerns, insofar as their people accepted them in these roles. In effecting these changes, the government has proposed new communal land legislation that would transfer authority to issue permits for livestock and allocate land for plowing from the chiefs to the district councils.

The Legal System

Changes in the judicial structure introduced by the government since independence have sought to minimize racial distinctions in

the operation of the courts and to end domination of the higher bench by white jurists. The earlier chiefs' courts that administered customary law were being replaced by village and community courts under newly trained presiding officers in 1982. The same year Africans were expected to constitute a majority on the magistrates' bench; Africans had also been appointed to the Supreme Court and the High Court.

In spite of strong associations with Britain and adoption of many of its judicial forms and practices, the Zimbabwean legal system is based on the Roman-Dutch tradition inherited from South Africa. The Constitution is the supreme law of the republic, and its provisions prevail over all other statutes to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with it. Thus laws enacted during UDI are recognized as valid if they do not conflict with the new constitutional provisions.

Customary law, the body of conventions and practices regulating relationships in the African community, continues to be recognized in civil cases where the parties have agreed that it should be applied. Zimbabwean legal authorities look forward to the eventual unification of elements of customary and Roman-Dutch law into a single body.

Court Structure

When adopted in 1980, the Constitution affirmed the existing court hierarchy headed by a High Court consisting of two divisions; the more senior Appellate Division and the General Division. A constitutional amendment in 1981 renamed these the Supreme Court and the High Court, respectively. In this judicial system the chief justice serves as a member of both courts and has authority to interchange judges between them. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over individuals seeking redress from alleged contraventions of the Declaration of Rights, hears appeals from the High Court, and assumes other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the Constitution or other legislation. It does not have the power to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislative actions.

The High Court is staffed by a number of puisne (associate) judges. It has both original and appellate jurisdiction. Civil cases are heard by a single judge, but criminal matters are tried before a judge and jury or a judge sitting with two assessors. Cases heard before lower courts may be reviewed by the High Court on such grounds as absence of jurisdiction, corruption, gross irregularity, and inadmissibility of evidence.

The use of assessors stems from legal practice in former British India and is an outgrowth of the duality of the law in countries having a British colonial heritage. The assessor is expected to bring to the court hearing a special knowledge of local habits and modes of thought and expression. In a major trial during the early months of the Mugabe government, Edgar Tekere, a cabinet member and leading officer of ZANU-PF, was acquitted of murder on a technical-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

ity when a white High Court judge was outvoted by his Coloured and African assessors (see Postwar Violence and Government Security Policy, ch. 5).

Before 1980 the judicial structure below the level of the High Court was separated into two systems: magistrates' courts under the Ministry of Justice, and district commissioners' and chiefs' courts under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1981 a new system of primary courts headed by laymen versed in customary law was introduced to hear lesser cases. These became part of a single hierarchy of courts under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs that was designed to reduce racial distinctions in the application of law.

The largest number of criminal cases as well as most of the civil cases involving white persons continued to be heard by senior and district magistrates' courts. Under the divided system in effect before independence, white district commissioners heard civil cases involving Africans residing in their administrative areas. A commissioner could summon African chiefs to advise him on African law and custom. The chiefs' courts heard lesser civil cases in which all parties were Africans, although their authority was gradually extended to certain criminal matters during the 1970s; by 1980 all 132 chiefs' courts had been assigned limited criminal jurisdiction.

During 1981 a broad transformation of the system was undertaken. With United States assistance a training program had been launched at the University of Zimbabwe to qualify Africans as magistrates and primary court officers. It was expected that during 1982 a majority of the sixty-nine magistrates in Zimbabwe, heretofore an entirely white judicial body, would be Africans. The chiefs' courts were being replaced by 1,500 village courts, and the commissioners' courts were in the process of being replaced by 300 community courts. The village courts, presided over by village elders chosen by the ministry, were empowered to deal with cases of minor assault, theft of property valued at up to Z\$50 (for value of the Zimbabwe dollar—see Glossary), and contraventions of district council bylaws. In civil matters village courts could rule on claims of up to Z\$200 if the claim was determinable under customary law. They were also empowered to grant divorces. The community courts were vested with limited criminal jurisdiction and acted as courts of appeal for village courts. Their findings could in turn be appealed to the local magistrates' court. Village courts have been established only in communal lands and in the former African townships. Jurisdiction of the community courts also extended to commercial farming areas, but as of 1981 it was still highly unusual for a white person to be brought before them.

The introduction of the primary court system followed an unsettled period beginning in 1978 when some 90 percent of the country had been declared a martial law area and special courts martial

staffed by white military officers conducted political trials. Many Africans, who were not permitted to be represented by defense counsel, were sentenced to death; appeal was limited to referral to a secret review authority. In areas outside government control, illegal kangaroo courts presided over by guerrillas or officials of the African nationalist parties flourished during and immediately after the civil war. Instead of reverting to the former chiefs' courts, these irregular bodies gradually gave way to the new primary courts.

Racial Justice and Human Rights

The pervasive practice of racial discrimination in the country's preindependence era was buttressed by laws and regulations governing nearly every aspect of relations between the multiracial population groups. Much of the legislation regulating or primarily affecting Africans was repealed between 1977 and 1979. The Mugabe government has thus been able to focus its efforts on reducing the continuing wide inequalities in social and economic conditions between Africans and whites, notably in education, health care, and wage levels.

Measures controlling access of Africans to public facilities and accommodations were found in a number of preindependence laws, including the Town Management Act and the Municipal Act. These granted local authorities the right to segregate eating places, parks, sports facilities, theaters, and toilets. Their provisions were invoked with some flexibility in the large cities, but in smaller communities segregation was closely akin to that found under South Africa's apartheid system. In addition to allocating rural land on a racial basis, the Land Tenure Act of 1969 classified all urban land as white, while permitting the designation of sections for African townships. Black males over sixteen years of age were required to carry registration certificates (passbooks) and were subject to a fine of up to Z\$1,000, six months' imprisonment, or both for failure to produce a pass if the police asked to see one. Africans were restricted from entering urban areas by the stringent Vagrancy Law and other measures that confined Africans to the TTL unless they were employed in urban areas.

The five constitutions enacted between 1961 and 1980 all included sections extending guarantees of civil rights. In each case, however, these guarantees were strictly qualified, being subject to abrogation when the needs of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or public health prevailed. Freedom of speech and assembly were among the rights set out in these constitutions, but authority was expressly retained for a government monopoly over radio and television broadcasting. Under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, gatherings and processions required official permission, individuals could be prohibited from attending public gatherings, and publications could be banned. The Unlawful Organization Act of 1959 permitted the president to declare unlawful any group "likely to endanger, disturb, or interfere with defense, public safety, or

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

public order." Although nondiscriminatory in form, these laws were used mainly to ban African organizations, meetings, and journals.

The removal of overtly discriminatory measures was begun in 1977 after Ian Smith had rejected Anglo-American proposals and called for a settlement with the African nationalist leaders. The Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1977 ended racial division of rural land, although it was not until early 1979 that racial restrictions on urban land were repealed. Actual integration of white residential areas was limited by economic factors and by regulations over use, such as the requirement that only one family could occupy each plot. Schools and hospitals remained effectively segregated (see Education; Health, ch. 2). In August 1978 the transitional government of the internal parties announced the opening of hotels, restaurants, swimming pools, beer halls, theaters, and other public places to all races. Owners might still control the right of admission but not on the basis of race or color.

Under emergency power regulations that were brought into effect in Rhodesia in 1965, police were able to detain indefinitely any person or class of persons if this appeared "expedient in the interest of public safety or public order." Martial law regulations, which affected most of the country as the civil war intensified, also permitted indefinite detention. The United States Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979* noted a variety of estimates of political prisoners toward the end of the civil war: convicted political prisoners, whose numbers ranged from 250 to 2,000 depending on definitions employed; about 1,000 prisoners under preventive detention, nearly all of whom were released by the Muzorewa administration; and 12,000 or more held by Rhodesian security forces under martial law. By April 1980 the British authorities had granted amnesty to 11,000 convicted political prisoners and detainees.

The Mugabe government has for the most part observed the individual political rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Free exercise of political association and expression has been permitted, and rights of accused persons have been respected. By mid-1982, however, there were signs of strain as the higher judiciary's determination to uphold constitutional safeguards came into conflict with Mugabe's efforts to suppress dissidence. Detentions of several months without trial, questions of access to counsel, and claims of physical mistreatment have arisen. Detentions without trial are permitted by the Emergency Powers Act, which enables the government, after proclaiming a public emergency, to suspend constitutional protections against detention, search, expression, and assembly (see Government Security Policy, ch. 5). The same law has also enabled the government to require that all political meetings and proposed speakers be approved a week in advance. In general, opposition gatherings have not been impeded, but PF-ZAPU rallies have been prohibited during periods of heightened tension.

The Constitution provides for an independent office of ombudsman to investigate allegations of injustice by any ministry or government official for which a court remedy is not available. Implementing legislation was not introduced by the government until April 1982, and the offices of the president and prime minister, the armed forces, the police, and the prison services were exempted from its application.

Politics

The shape of the Zimbabwean government was largely determined in February 1980, two months before independence, when nine African political parties contested elections for the eighty controlling seats in the House of Assembly. In elections held two weeks earlier, Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front (RF) continued its longtime preeminence, capturing all twenty seats reserved for whites.

The election triumph of ZANU-PF was on such a scale that no other party or combination of parties was capable of obstructing the subsequent enactment of its program. Mugabe could have formed his government strictly along party lines, but as a conciliatory move, several members of the PF-ZAPU opposition as well as two white moderates were brought into his new cabinet. The remaining African parties began to crumble after their severe defeat, and many members announced decisions to join ZANU-PF, presumably to improve their political fortunes and to share in the patronage of the victors. The RF split in 1982 over the issue of cooperating or contending with the ruling party leadership, further enfeebling the whites as a separate political factor.

The coalition between ZANU-PF and Nkomo's PF-ZAPU proved to be a source of dissension from the first. Reluctant to accept a subservient role in spite of the disappointing election results, Nkomo rejected the largely ceremonial post of president and sought to be named minister of foreign affairs. He finally accepted the home affairs portfolio but found that its importance had been downgraded by removal of state security and paramilitary elements from its jurisdiction. The influence of Nkomo and PF-ZAPU in the coalition was further diminished after Nkomo's demotion to minister without portfolio in January 1981 and his ejection from the cabinet a year later.

Since 1980 the dominant political question has been to find a means to prevent differences between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU from hardening into a struggle along Shona-Ndebele ethnic lines. The existing parliamentary format, which contains few constitutional checks against consolidation of power by the numerically dominant ZANU-PF, is seen by many as an inadequate mechanism for reconciling the competing interests of various elements of Zimbabwean society. As of mid-1982 dissatisfactions of the minority Ndebele group were increasingly being reflected in dissident activity. Although Nkomo repudiated lawlessness by Ndebele

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

elements, he was exposed to harsh attacks from Mugabe, leading to speculation that the prime minister was intent on bringing about his political downfall.

Parliamentary Elections of 1980

In the parliamentary elections of February 27-29, 1980, the majority of the population in the crown colony of Rhodesia exercised for the first time in history the opportunity to elect its own government. A total of nine African parties registered for the election by paying the Z\$200 fee for each of the eight provinces in which they planned to enter candidates and by adopting symbols to assist illiterate voters in identifying the competing parties (see table 19, Appendix).

Four of the African political organizations were regarded as serious contenders—the two parties of the wartime Patriotic Front alliance, whose unremitting struggle had forced Smith to the conference table, and two of the parties that had aligned themselves with Smith in the internal settlement of 1978. The parties of the wartime alliance were the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) headed by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Nkomo sought to enhance his chances by registering his party for the election under the label *Patriotic Front*. The British electoral authorities ruled that the party would be listed as PF-ZAPU, and Mugabe's party would appear as ZANU-PF. (These designations have subsequently been accepted in common usage, but the term *Patriotic Front* is frequently used in Zimbabwe to refer to PF-ZAPU.) The two leading parties of the internal settlement were Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) and Ndabaningi Sithole's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). (Mugabe had wrested the leadership of the main ZANU group from Sithole in 1974, but Sithole succeeded in registering his group as ZANU for the election.)

Ideologically the African parties ranged from the Marxist, ZANU-PF on the left to small, tradition-oriented groups on the right. Personal followings of the parties' leaders and ethnic colorations were, however, more pertinent than the vaguely defined programs of the organizations.

ZANU-PF campaigned on a moderately socialist platform calling for peasant agriculture on a collective basis by voluntary agreement; central control of the banking system; public investment in important economic sectors; Africanization of the civil service, army, and police; and removal of racist judges. Mugabe stressed, however, that no vengeance would be sought against whites, and no private property would be seized without compensation. He promised that private enterprise would continue to exist until the circumstances were readied for socialist change. Under the slogan "ZANU-PF started the war of liberation and only ZANU-PF can end the war," the party effectively reminded voters that it would be decisive in bringing an end to conflict.

PF-ZAPU presented itself as the party of peace, national reconciliation, and the burying of sectional animosities. Although his platform had socialist features, Nkomo was regarded as more flexible and less dogmatic than Mugabe. Ian Smith was quoted as having declared that the best choice would be Nkomo, but this endorsement was probably not helpful, as Nkomo was already distrusted for his earlier private contacts with the Smith regime.

The UANC was considered centrist and probusiness, although its platform included land reform, better housing, free education, and free health services. Muzorewa warned that victory by Mugabe or Nkomo would mean widespread nationalization. He predicted that a Mugabe-Nkomo coalition would quickly disintegrate and that civil war would ensue between the rival guerrilla armies.

Charges of intimidation of voters and unfair campaign tactics were leveled by all sides. The former externally based parties of the ZANU-ZAPU coalition complained, for example, of delays by the Rhodesian authorities in providing telephone connections and by customs in holding up imported automobiles and campaign material. Concurrently it was widely reported that the internal parties had difficulty campaigning in TTL that were controlled by the guerrillas. British election supervisors accused ZANU-PF of being the main source of intimidation, particularly in Mashonaland East and in the rural area of Victoria and Manicaland. International observer groups representing the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Ireland, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Australia reported flaws and intimidation but reached conclusions similar to those of a mission from Freedom House, a nonofficial American group concerned with political and civil rights, which found that "the electoral result will approximately represent the distribution of current political forces within Zimbabwe's black population."

The level of participation in the common roll elections was, as expected, very high—2,649,529 valid votes were cast, indicating participation by roughly 87 percent of the eligible African voters. ZANU-PF secured 63 percent of the popular vote, while PF-ZAPU and the UANC won 24 percent and 8 percent respectively. None of the other parties was able to attract more than 2 percent of the total. In addition to ZANU-PF's fifty-seven seats, which were allotted on the basis of proportional representation in each of the eight provinces, PF-ZAPU gained twenty seats, and the UANC (which had enjoyed a majority of fifty-one seats in the Zimbabwe Rhodesia assembly) was reduced to only three seats. None of the other six African parties succeeded in gaining representation in the assembly (see fig. 18).

Mugabe's stunning victory was regarded less as an endorsement of his leftist political philosophy than an acknowledgment by the electorate of the crucial part played by ZANU-PF in the civil war that had brought domination by the white minority to an end. The more radical image projected by ZANU-PF, which excited apprehension

Zimbabwe: A Country Study


not only among the European population of Zimbabwe but also in Britain and South Africa, was a further source of appeal. Nkomo was a more colorful political campaigner and had for long loomed over the African nationalist movement as its senior figure. Yet the less aggressive part played by PF-ZANU in the war and the ambiguous behind-the-scenes negotiations by Nkomo at critical stages of the conflict, as well as his domineering style, were held against him. Muzorewa had pursued an extravagant campaign, purportedly funded by the white business communities of Zimbabwe and South Africa, but his reputation had been irreparably tarnished by his close association with the white minority in the internal settlement government, his prosecution of the war against the external parties, and his failure to persuade the guerrillas to abandon their struggle when he briefly became prime minister.

Because Shona voters accounted for roughly 80 percent of the African electorate, ethnic allegiance was an undeniable factor in Mugabe's victory. Neither party based its campaign on ethnic appeals. ZANU-PF made serious efforts to gain representation from Ndebele areas, and PF-ZAPU nominated Shona candidates to run in Shona-dominated areas. Nevertheless the voting results followed a distinct ethnic pattern. In the five provinces of the north and east where the Shona were heavily predominant, ZANU-PF won forty-eight of fifty-two seats. In four of these provinces where much of the countryside had been contested by guerrillas of ZANU-PF and reports of intimidation were widespread, ZANU-PF was the choice of over 80 percent of the electorate. In the two provinces of the south and west where the Ndebele and the Kalanga predominate, PF-ZAPU won fifteen of sixteen seats. Only in Midlands with its greater intermixture of Shona and Ndebele was there a more balanced result, ZANU-PF winning eight seats and 59.7 percent of the vote; PF-ZAPU won four seats and 27.1 percent of the vote.

In spite of ZANU-PF's clear majority of the seats in the assembly, Mugabe kept his pre-election pledge and formed a coalition government consisting of eighteen members of ZANU-PF, four members of PF-ZAPU, and two whites. PF-ZAPU's representation fell short of being fully proportional to the popular vote it had amassed, and its cabinet representatives held relatively unimportant portfolios. Two senior members of ZANU-PF who happened to be from the Ndebele group were included in the government. One was Mugabe's nominee for president, Canaan Banana, an Ndebele who had swung over from Muzorewa's UANC to ZANU-PF during the Geneva Conference of 1976. The other was Enos Nkala, who had failed to win an assembly seat as a ZANU-PF candidate in an Ndebele area but was appointed to the senate by Mugabe and named minister of finance.

Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

At independence ZANU-PF was by no means a cohesive party. Its leaders had been hastily reassembled, some of them guerrillas who



NOTE-Pie charts show provincial voting proportions and numbers of seats won.

Source: Based on information from Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, New York, 1981, pp. 977-78.

Figure 18. Results of Common Voter Roll Election to House of Assembly, 1980

had conducted years of bitter bush warfare. Many had just been released from political detention; others had been in exile promoting the nationalist cause in Africa and other world capitals. They were not motivated by a single ideology, their attitudes ranging from strident Marxism to old-style African nationalism. ZANU-PF's policymaking body, the central committee, was crisscrossed by conflicting interests, although these could be traced more to tribal and personality clashes than to ideological differences.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Within the predominant Shona group of the ZANU-PF leadership, the leading political figures were loosely identified with either of two factions: the Karanga and the Zezuru-Manyika. A leading figure in the Karanga faction was said to be the deputy prime minister, Simon Muzenda; the leader of the other faction was Edgar Tekere, the party's secretary general and minister of manpower, planning, and development. The Muzenda group was said to be more conservative and cautious and more inclined to cooperation or merger with PF-ZAPU. The Zezuru-Manyika group was identified with the bellicose radicalism of Tekere and his personal animosity toward Nkomo and PF-ZAPU. Tekere's forced retirement from the government and later from his high party post after his acquittal on charges of murdering a white farmer left others of like temperament in the cabinet. They were reputed to include Ernest Kadungura (minister of youth, sport, and recreation) and Herbert Ushewokunze (minister of home affairs). Ushewokunze, an impetuous individual, had been given his important portfolio with responsibility for the police in spite of earlier dismissal as minister of health after accusing white hospital personnel of discriminating against African patients and the Public Service Commission of favoring whites.

Other prominent cabinet figures selected by Mugabe were not closely identified with either of these factions. They included Eddison Zvobgo, minister of legal and parliamentary affairs, who had been charged with recommending revisions in the governmental structure and had been a leading campaigner for a one-party state. Nkala, outspoken on many issues, had a political style close to the Zezuru group in spite of his Ndebele background. Reassigned from finance to the lesser portfolio of national supplies, he was still regarded as politically influential. Several cabinet ministers were clearly selected for their professional and technical qualifications rather than their party standing. Bernard Chidzero, an official of a United Nations (UN) agency, returned to Zimbabwe to accept the portfolio of economic planning and development; this was later combined with finance to give him preeminence in economic matters.

Mugabe, a Zezuru, was regarded as being among those of leftist convictions in the ZANU-PF spectrum. However, he remained above the factionalism, balancing the two tendencies while solidifying his own authority. His tolerance, which was greater than that of some of the more impulsive and radical cabinet members, was evident in his willingness to appoint new PF-ZAPU members to the cabinet even after accusing the party leadership of plotting insurrection.

The party's central committee was subject to election by a national congress of ZANU-PF. The committee had been constituted in 1977, although the only party congress that had been held was in 1964. The committee originally consisted of thirty-three members, but seven denounced as a left-wing clique had been removed and detained in Mozambique. The composition of the remaining twenty-six posts had changed little. Some of the important positions like those of

secretary general and secretary for defense had not been filled after they became vacant pending elections at a party congress planned for 1983. In 1982 most of the central committee members concurrently held ministerial or military positions.

Most members of the central committee had party titles of secretary or deputy secretary and responsibilities roughly corresponding to the various government departments. The president, secretary general, and secretaries comprised a senior group of about ten members known as the national executive. There was little evidence, however, that the national executive acted as an inner core of leaders, such as those in the political bureaus of Marxist-oriented parties elsewhere. Mugabe has indicated that the central committee leadership might be simplified in conjunction with the planned national congress, leaving as its officers only the president, secretary general, national political commissar, organizing secretary, treasurer, publicity chief, and the secretaries for youth and for women.

During the civil war ZANU-PF was effectively organized at the grass roots in the eastern provinces where its guerrilla operations were centered. A network of councils and committees provided supplies to the guerrillas and looked after the needs of the local population in areas where the Salisbury government no longer had administrative control. When Mugabe came to power, many local party functionaries assumed posts in government at the district level. The party apparatus thus has been closely linked with administration in Shona rural areas, and party cadres have been effective in organizing community activity or mobilizing support at election time.

In an effort to reinvigorate the party machinery, the central committee was reported in March 1982 to have called for a new structure whose basic unit, the cell, would consist of 100 people headed by an executive committee comprising a chairman, secretary-treasurer, commissar, and security officer, and two additional members. There would be men's, women's, and youth wings. At the next level a branch would be made up of 500 people and a leadership committee of fourteen individuals. District membership would total 5,000, and province organizations would be formed from the district groups.

Whether or not such an orderly plan could be successfully introduced, Mugabe has advocated a policy of mass membership rather than an elite party where membership must be earned over a lengthy period. Thus former members of other parties, including whites, have been welcomed. The prime minister has declared that white candidates would be put forward in the elections scheduled for 1985. It was conceded that many voters were joining ZANU-PF out of self-interest, but in Mugabe's judgment it was better to have them under the party's control where some kind of transformation might take place. Membership dues were minimal. The party was seeking to pay for its postindependence debts and the reconstruction of party headquarters after it had been bombed by embarking on various business

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

ventures, including farms, real estate holdings, and manufacturing.

In 1982 debate over policy direction of ZANU-PF was confined within the central committee; its conclusions were then expected to be reflected in day-to-day operating decisions of the cabinet. This could lead to difficulties when the government was confronted with realities that resisted solution by doctrinaire approaches and when some degree of acceptance of its policies had to be obtained from other members of the coalition cabinet, from the caucus of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU in the assembly, and from senior administrators of the ministries. There were signs of restlessness by central committee members over whether Mugabe's pragmatic course was consistent with decisions of the committee and the party's socialist principles. After a lengthy central committee meeting at the close of 1981, the prime minister reiterated that the cabinet would only adopt and reflect those policies that the committee had approved. His vitriolic attacks on the RF, on Muzorewa, and on Nkomo in the same period and the announcement of a three-year program for socialization of the economy were similarly regarded as efforts to refurbish his radical image while carrying on with moderate policies as head of the government.

Nkomo and the Patriotic Front Coalition

A charismatic personality to his followers among the Ndebele and Kalanga groups in the western and southwestern sections of Zimbabwe, Nkomo had been an eminent figure in the nationalist movement from the time he assumed the presidency of the African National Congress in 1957. To others Nkomo was sometimes seen as an untrustworthy opportunist. Dissatisfaction over Nkomo's leadership mounted with his decision to move the headquarters of the movement, which had become known as ZAPU, to Tanzania after its banning in Rhodesia in 1963. This step precipitated the formation of a rival nationalist group, ZANU, under Sithole and Mugabe, among others (see *African Nationalist Opposition*, ch. 1).

Detained by the Salisbury authorities for a decade between 1964 and 1974, Nkomo later superintended ZAPU's participation in the civil war from headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia. The group's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was better equipped than ZANU's force, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), being supplied with modern weaponry and training from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Risking only minimal contact with Rhodesian forces from its Zambian stronghold, Nkomo was suspected of being reluctant to commit fully his military power for future political advantage. This belief, as well as Nkomo's private contacts with Ian Smith, were continuing sources of discord. Nevertheless the alliance between the two externally based parties just before the Geneva Conference in late 1976 proved to be a cohesive negotiating partnership through the Lancaster House Conference of late 1979. The coalition government formed after the 1980 elections

*Joshua Nkomo, former civil
war guerrilla leader,
regarded by many citizens
as "father of modern
Zimbabwe"
Courtesy Africa News*



left Nkomo discontented when his party was offered only four lesser cabinet portfolios out of twenty-three and when it secured few civil service and diplomatic appointments. Relations within the ZANU-PF-dominated cabinet were troubled by lingering suspicions over the disarming of ZIPRA units, which were believed to be hiding weapons. Nkomo cooperated, however, in the sensitive process of combining ZIPRA guerrillas into an integrated army with the numerically larger forces of ZANU-PF.

In November 1980 severe fighting broke out between ZIPRA and ZANLA units in and around Nkomo's stronghold of Bulawayo. Mixed army patrols composed of former ZIPRA and ZANLA forces succeeded in imposing a truce. Violence involving several battalions of recently integrated units erupted again in February 1981 on a wide scale (see Public Order and Internal Security, ch. 5). There was no imputation of connivance by PF-ZAPU; in fact Nkomo and the leading ZIPRA general, Lookout Masuku, helped to defuse the conflict. Nevertheless the result was to deepen the rift. In spite of his responsibility for the police as minister of home affairs, Nkomo said he felt like an "ornament" in the coalition after nine senior PF-ZAPU officials were detained without his knowledge.

An attempt was made in early 1981 to reduce the strains in the alliance. A cabinet reshuffling resulted in withdrawal of the home affairs portfolio from Nkomo. Josiah Chinamano (vice president of PF-ZAPU) was added to the cabinet as minister of transport, and three other party members were made deputy ministers, giving PF-ZAPU a total of eight at cabinet and subcabinet level. After

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

rejecting the proffered post of minister of public service, Nkomo agreed to stay on as minister without portfolio with an understanding that he would have special responsibilities in the security area. Several meetings were held on the eventual unification of ZANU-PF with PF-ZAPU, and it was agreed that the two parties would desist from attacking each other publicly.

A major rupture occurred a year later when, after the discovery of several large caches of modern arms on farms owned by PF-ZAPU, the government seized twelve companies controlled by the party on whose properties the arms were found and expelled Nkomo and two other PF-ZAPU ministers from the cabinet. Mugabe said that Nkomo and his party had been like a "cobra in the house." The expulsions seemed at first to portend an end to the tempestuous two-year coalition phase of the independence government. But Mugabe, explaining that he would distinguish between those intriguing against the government and others believed innocent, offered portfolios to two other PF-ZAPU members, leaving the party with four seats in the cabinet. Reflecting a division (or at least uncertainty) over continued participation in the coalition, the 150-member PF-ZAPU central committee at first rejected Nkomo's wishes by allowing its remaining members to remain in the government. Later, however, it condemned the two new ministers for accepting portfolios.

Both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU had sought to maintain a party structure in which each of the two main tribal groups were represented and had not confined their campaigning to the area where their main support was found. In spite of this, tribal affiliations seemed to have become accentuated in voting patterns of the national election of 1980 and in subsequent local elections. The preponderance of Shona over Ndebele in the population condemned PF-ZAPU to the status of a permanent minority party. In not formally repudiating the coalition after the buffeting it received from Mugabe, many on the PF-ZAPU central committee no doubt concluded that this tenuous link was needed if the party was to have any impact on government policies. PF-ZAPU has generally been regarded as subject to stricter central control than ZANU-PF. Nkomo's followers were said to remain loyal in spite of the party's misfortunes. At one time there were reported to be two identifiable factions in the PF-ZAPU leadership: old-guard nationalists and younger doctrinaire socialists. More recently certain leaders appeared more inclined than others to reach accommodation with Mugabe. PF-ZAPU had deliberately appointed a high proportion of Shona to its national executive, but it was problematic whether ethnic origin could be correlated with attitudes toward cooperation with ZANU-PF.

Other African Parties

Aside from ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU, the African political groups that participated in the 1980 national elections have gone into eclipse or been disbanded. Even the UANC, which under Muzorewa won a

majority of seats in the House of Assembly to lead the internal settlement government of May 1979, barely secured representation in the 1980 parliament. While regularly attending sessions of the assembly, Muzorewa's attitude has been described as one of defiance and bitterness over the loss of power that he attributed to illegal campaign tactics by ZANU-PF. Muzorewa has continued to hold party rallies but has complained that he felt free to campaign only in Ndebele areas; fear of ZANU-PF intimidation has limited his contact with the Manyika people where his strength was believed to be centered. Muzorewa has rejected the one-party concept saying that it would lead to a nation of sheep. He has vehemently denied repeated assertions by Mugabe that the UANC was plotting insurrection with South African backing and that UANC paramilitary forces were being trained inside South Africa's borders.

Able to attract only 2 percent of the vote in the 1980 election, Sithole's ZANU failed to qualify for any seats under the proportional representation system in effect. During 1980 and 1981 a number of leading ZANU officials shifted to ZANU-PF, including Sithole's own brother, arguing that they no longer saw a need for the party and recommending its merger with Mugabe's group.

A third African party that joined with Muzorewa's UANC and Sithole's ZANU on the interim executive council of April 1978 was the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO), formed among the traditional chiefs after the failure of the Geneva Conference in December 1976. It did not win any seats in the internal settlement election of April 1979 and did not contest the 1980 elections, supporting instead Nkomo's PF-ZAPU. In March 1982 ZUPO leader Jeremiah Chirau, then president of the Council of Chiefs, announced the dissolution of the party, declaring his support for a one-party state and recommending that ZUPO members join ZANU-PF.

Another veteran African nationalist, James Chikerema, who had been vice president of the UANC, led a breakaway movement of seven UANC parliamentarians in June 1979, accusing Muzorewa of favoring the Manyika over the Zezuru within the party. Chikerema's faction contested the 1980 election as the Zimbabwe Democratic Party but failed to win any seats.

White Political Forces

Since its formation in 1962 the Rhodesian Front (RF)—renamed the Republican Front in 1981—has been the dominant source of political expression among the white electorate. Although small groups have arisen from time to time to the right or left of the RF on the paramount issue of black political rights, the RF has consistently held the allegiance of three-quarters or more of the white voters. In every general election between 1965 and 1979 the party secured all white seats in parliament. In the separate balloting by white voters that preceded Mugabe's victory in February 1980, the RF showed its continued mastery by winning fourteen seats unopposed and over-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

whelming independent candidates in the remaining six seats.

Although Ian Smith conceded that he had been surprised by the moderation and competence shown by Mugabe as prime minister, the white members of the assembly antagonized the government side by adopting the traditional stance of an opposition party under a parliamentary system. The ZANU-PF legislators were exasperated by what they interpreted as white obstructionism aimed at thwarting the fundamental changes in the Zimbabwean economy and society demanded by the electorate. Mugabe refused to acknowledge the RF as the official opposition party, noting that it had no prospect under the Constitution of replacing the existing government. Mugabe urged the whites to abandon "erosion, sneers, insults, and political confrontation" and to emerge from their "fog of racist prejudice" by identifying themselves with his aim of bringing dignity, health, prosperity, and education to all groups.

After two years of groping for its proper role as a minority party, the unity of the RF was finally breached over its leaders' policy of unreconstructed antagonism to the Mugabe government. A series of defections among RF legislators began in June 1981 when Andre Holland resigned his seat to form the Democratic Party, committed to cooperation with the government. In March 1982 nine other RF members defected to sit as independents, including several who had held important portfolios in previous RF cabinets. Their actions were dictated by the belief that they could serve their white constituents better if they enjoyed greater access to the government. They also wished to dissociate themselves from the slurs addressed to African legislators by some of their former colleagues, behavior that they said verged on racism.

With one member in detention and one having fled the country in fear of arrest on a charge of subversion, the RF had only nine active members in parliament as of July 1982. One of the defectors from the party, Chris Andersen, was subsequently taken into Mugabe's cabinet as minister of state in the prime minister's office with special responsibility for the public service. He joined Denis Norman, who had been serving as minister of agriculture since the Mugabe cabinet was formed in 1980. Another former RF member, John Landau, was named deputy minister for trade and commerce.

Disputes among white parliamentarians over their function as a permanent minority body did not appear to extend to the white electorate, which returned RF candidates in the four by-elections held since independence. Apathy induced by the irrelevance of white politics seemed to afflict the electorate, turnouts falling below 30 percent of registered voters. After a succession of by-election failures, Holland disbanded the Democratic Party, citing the unwill-

ingness of white voters to support an enlightened progovernment party.

The Government's Ideology and Program

Preindependence declarations by ZANU-PF nourished fears that the party's objective was a thoroughgoing system of state socialism acting in close association with world communist forces. An official party statement said: "In ideology ZANU is guided by the Marxist-Leninist Principle. ZANU aims to achieve a socialist revolution. . . . All the means of production and exchange will be publicly owned by the people of Zimbabwe. . . . Economic cooperation will be established and strengthened with the socialist world so as to bring capitalist USA, Britain, West Germany, etc., to ultimate doom."

Mugabe himself was regarded as a dedicated Marxist before the Lancaster House settlement, but his statements took on a moderate tone during the election campaign and as he gathered up the reins of office in 1980. Elaborating on his beliefs for Western audiences, Mugabe said that although certain fundamental principles had been derived from Marxism and Leninism, these had been blended with Christian values and those from Zimbabwe's own traditions to produce a distinctive socialist outlook and philosophy.

Mugabe identified his most urgent postindependence priorities as pacifying the former fighting forces, affording relief to the refugees from the civil war, and introducing tangible change in Zimbabwean society that would give substance to the advent of African rule. His forceful suppression of factional fighting between ZIPRA and ZANLA veterans eased the threat to internal stability arising from the coexistence of idled former guerrillas. The integration of three armies recently at war and having unassimilated racial, ethnic, and ideological differences was a noteworthy achievement of the new government. Nevertheless the large army and the assemblages of demobilized guerrillas still receiving generous allowances were economically burdensome and a potential source of disorder.

Checking his socialist inclinations, Mugabe sought to address the pressing issue of disparities between high and low wage earners and between incomes in the modern sector and the communal-based rural economy without causing disruption of existing economic patterns. Reassurances were tendered to the private sector, foreign investors were courted, and it was acknowledged that the Western countries he had previously castigated were indispensable sources of aid for development and resettlement. The needs of landless and impoverished refugees were to be met without dispossessing efficient white farmers, and the acquisition of land was to proceed on a basis of fair compensation. The compelling pressures of the land issue produced many instances of Africans squatting on white-owned farms, which the government firmly resisted. In spite of the government's preference for cooperative farming, it accepted the fact that the majority of the displaced African peasantry desired individual plots. Its main

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

concern was to ensure that the newly allocated land would not be used for subsistence cultivation but would produce reasonable incomes and thereby deflect rural-urban migratory pressures (see Land Use and Ownership, ch. 3).

The government's revenue programs of 1980 and 1981 were designed to bring gradual improvement in economic conditions for the African population. Sales taxes were removed for a number of basic consumption goods but raised on cars and home furnishings, and a capital gains tax was introduced. Steep increases in expenditures for health and African education were needed to finance free medical care for those below minimum income levels and free primary schools for all (see Education, ch. 2; Health, ch. 2; Government Finance, ch. 3).

Measures to increase minimum wages and place limits on wage increases at the upper levels were introduced, factory committees were established to represent worker interests, and dismissals were subjected to government review. Many white employers complained that the government's policies discouraged them from expanding production or providing jobs for Africans who had limited skills. Reports of violations of the new wage minimums, particularly among domestic and farm laborers, were widespread (see Employment, Income Distribution, and Prices, ch. 3).

Concerned over wildcat strikes, which broke out even before Mugabe took office and which reflected pent-up grievances and demands for redress of wage inequities, the government undertook to impose greater control over the labor movement. It encouraged the formation of an umbrella federation, the Zimbabwe Trade Union Congress (ZTUC), by replacing the five existing federations. Four of them had links to African political parties, while the fifth was multiracial but white dominated. ZANU-PF also backed several new unions as rivals to long-standing unions and, on the grounds of bringing greater order to the labor scene, proposed to reduce the total number of unions from fifty-two to about twenty, organized on an industrywide basis. The founding congress of the ZTUC (later renamed the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions) was held in February 1981; Africans held the top positions, but four whites were named to the twenty-five-member general council. Although most of the leadership, including the president, Alfred Makwarimba, was from ZANU-PF, a PF-ZAPU faction was also present, headed by the acting general secretary, Ismael Nedziwe. The government's ultimate objective appeared to be a politically reliable labor movement that would not compound the country's economic problems with unrealistic demands or major work stoppages.

The government continuously sought to reassure foreign investors and the white settler group controlling the country's modern agricultural and industrial enterprises that its goals were pragmatic and that no policy of nationalization had been instituted. Special circumstances had dictated its takeover of a South African-owned bank and a South African-controlled publishing empire, acquisitions that had

come about through equity purchases. The new government corporation for marketing the country's mineral products was said to be needed to reduce abuses in pricing practices, tax evasion, and exchange control violations (see Mining, ch. 3). Unwilling to concede that the government had been diverted from its long-term socialist goals, Mugabe declared in early 1982 that, at the proper time, the country's resources and means of production must move out of the grip of the "capitalist bourgeoisie" into the hands of the peasantry, the proletariat, and the state.

The government's policies had affected only marginally the privileged social and economic position of white society. Nevertheless, reduced subsidies to private schools, desegregation of hospitals, strict limits on the goods and funds that emigrants could export, and plans to revoke the dual citizenship clause of the Constitution contributed to the demoralization of many whites. A number of symbolic acts caused momentary indignation—the removal of Cecil Rhodes' statue from a central square in Harare, the Africanization of names of cities and towns, and the renaming of streets after African nationalist leaders. The partisan nature of the daily press and the broadcast media was a constant reminder of the reversal of white political fortunes.

In spite of the *de facto* concentration of power in the hands of Mugabe and ZANU-PF, party leaders have given unremitting stress to their ambition of realizing a one-party state. They have noted that the multiparty system was imposed on Zimbabwe by the Lancaster House settlement and that such a system has generally proved unworkable in African countries because political parties have almost invariably been ethnically oriented. It has been asserted that in Africa the one-party system can be a device for moderating intertribal conflict in the political process. Terming them a "political luxury," Mugabe has been critical of other parties that have adopted a role of opposing the government's programs during times that call for a strong spirit of national unity. He did not see a one-party system as monolithic, noting that several candidates from a single integrated political party could compete for elective posts, preserving for the voters a choice from left to right in the political spectrum.

The right to form politician associations is guaranteed under the Constitution and cannot be revoked during the first ten years except by unanimous vote of the House of Assembly. Although other ZANU-PF leaders like Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Zvobgo have shown little patience with the existing system, Mugabe has declared that he would proceed constitutionally in introducing any changes. Talks were held with PF-ZAPU in 1981 on the integration of the two Patriotic Front parties, but the heightened distrust after the discov-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

ery of hidden arms and Nkomo's dismissal from the cabinet made an uncoerced merger of the two parties seem unlikely as of mid-1982.

Government and the News Media

Several newspapers, numerous periodicals, and modern radio and television services have long been available to Zimbabweans as primary sources of news and other information. Before national independence most of the print media were aimed at an urban white readership, and radio and television were operated by a government-owned corporation. An obediently progovernment outlook and the tendentious reporting of the civil war greatly diminished the modern media's credibility.

Since 1981 the political tone and content of the press have been reoriented to cater to a growing African readership sympathetic to the government in power. Radio and television have been slanted in favor of ZANU-PF ideology and policies, and their news broadcasts generally have been based on official press releases.

The Press

Until 1981 the country's five main newspapers were owned by South African commercial interests. In fact, almost from the outset of white occupation of the area, the English-language press has been an extension of South African journalistic interests. In 1891 the South African Argus newspaper chain bought the publication rights to a weekly that was appearing in duplicated form among the settlers at Fort Salisbury. A subsidiary firm, the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company, operated the newspaper, which in 1892 was renamed the *Rhodesia Herald*. The company moved rapidly to establish a near monopoly over major press operations in Rhodesia, founding the *Umtali Post* in 1893 and the *Chronicle* in Bulawayo the following year. With the appearance of the *Sunday Mail* (Salisbury) and the *Sunday News* (Bulawayo) in the early 1930s, the dominance of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company was complete except for a few weeklies in smaller communities. The company had generally backed the government until 1964 when it refused to back the Smith regime in its pursuit of UDI. Journalists serving the various newspapers began to be attacked by the security police, and the government sought to discredit the publishing chain. Additional pressures to back the Smith government came from advertisers and business organizations. Under the regime's emergency regulations, censorship was imposed, although it was relaxed somewhat in 1968 on the understanding that editors would exercise tighter self-imposed censorship in consultation with the authorities.

Controls were further stiffened during the 1970s after the press became bolder, claiming that the security restrictions were being used to mask government incompetence and foreign policy blunders. It became an offense to print comments "likely to cause alarm, fear, or despondency" among readers. News items relating to public

incidents, disorders, and economic conditions could be suppressed, and military censorship prevented any reporting on the civil war except official communiqués and pronouncements. Dispatches of foreign correspondents were censored, enabling the Salisbury authorities to interdict reports of brutality by Rhodesian security forces. Even in the late 1970s the Muzorewa government suppressed any except official dispatches on the unsuccessful campaign to win over Patriotic Front supporters.

The *African Daily News*, the first daily aimed at an African readership, was founded in 1956 and purchased by the Thomson newspaper chain of Britain in 1962. With higher professional standards and objective treatment of African attitudes and events, circulation rose rapidly. The newspaper's strong criticism of the RF as well as its support for African nationalism resulted in its being banned in 1964 after the RF came to power, along with other African-oriented journals of the same chain. In 1974 the Roman Catholic weekly *Moto* was banned for calling the guerrillas "liberators" and "freedom fighters." Another African-oriented daily, *Zimbabwe Times*, appeared for seventeen months until it was banned in 1978, reportedly on the initiative of Muzorewa, after opposing the internal settlement and advocating an all-party conference with the Patriotic Front.

After Mugabe's election victory, the daily newspapers made an effort to adjust to the new situation. The *Sunday Mail* editorialized: "We will continue our policy of supporting the lawfully elected government of the day as far as possible—not totally, not without question, but in the interests of the country and all its people." The press continued, however, to orient its coverage toward the small white community. The new government was critical of the attention assigned to matters of importance only to whites and for what it regarded as negative treatment of factionalism and unrest. Ownership of Zimbabwe's newspapers by a South African chain, even one whose publications in South Africa were critical of its government's apartheid policies, was an embarrassment. In January 1981 it was announced that, with assistance from Nigeria, the 42 percent of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company owned by Argus would be acquired by Zimbabwe, giving the government financial control. Promising that freedom of the press would not be impaired, the government brought policy control and senior editorial appointments under the new Mass Media Trust. An African chairman was named to head this body, which included four other African members and two whites, one of whom was the wife of former Prime Minister Garfield Todd; none had strong party ties. A few months earlier the South African Press Association relinquished its interest in the Harare-based Inter African News Agency to the Zimbabwe government. The new national news agency was renamed the Zimbabwe Inter African News Agency (ZIANA).

Soon after the government takeover of the press, the white editors of the two Harare newspapers (the *Herald* and the *Sunday Mail*) and

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Bulawayo's *Chronicle* were replaced by Africans. Feature stories and news reports dealing with African interests were expanded. The editor of the *Chronicle* asserted that the paper's circulation had risen in a little more than a year from 38,000 to 59,000 as a result of the growing African readership. The *Herald* reported that its circulation reached 107,000 during the first half of 1982, nearly 17 percent higher than a year earlier. The United States Department of State's human rights report for 1981 stated that the editorial policy of the daily press was uniformly progovernment. Although some parliamentary and other criticisms of the government had been reported, there were numerous allegations that many events reflecting poorly on the current leadership had been suppressed.

In 1981 the minister of information and tourism explained that the government welcomed discussion and dialogue in the press but that the debate must have certain parameters. Such topics as housing, welfare, the economic system, ideological direction, or the one-party state controversy were acceptable. He defended the removal of the white editor of the weekly *Umtali Post* after publication of an editorial critical of the presence of military advisers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). According to the minister, the editor's expressed attitude, i.e., that anyone from a socialist country represents a red menace in the region, reflected racist, neocolonial, and South African thinking.

In April 1982 the ZANU-PF journal, *Zimbabwe News*, began to appear on a monthly basis, and there were plans to publish it weekly and eventually daily. It was to be produced by the private Jongwe Printing and Publishing Company under a ZANU-PF directorship. Jongwe had also won government printing contracts, including the official record of debates in parliament. A PF-ZAPU newspaper had previously discontinued publication, although it was not forced to do so.

Radio and Television

Radio transmissions could be heard in every part of the country, and this probably has been the most influential modern medium of mass communication in Zimbabwe. In 1981 over 250,000 receivers were in use, and broadcasting was conducted in English as well as the main indigenous languages. The television service, originating from studios in Harare and Bulawayo, provided programming for the country's 70,000 or more television receivers. Before national independence, television catered almost exclusively to the white community.

All forms of broadcasting in Zimbabwe have been a monopoly of the government since 1964 when a private television company was taken over and its board members and news staff were replaced by RF supporters. The Smith government also brought the program content of local radiobroadcasts under its control and reconstituted the board of governors of the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation

(RBC), which had previously maintained its independence. The electronic media became the primary domestic propaganda tool of the RF; in news reports and analysis the Salisbury regime was depicted as the target of a conspiracy headed by world communism, aided by its agents and dupes in other anti-Rhodesian groups. Ian Smith declared openly that radio and television were to be employed to counter what he regarded as a hostile attitude of the domestic press.

After the Mugabe government came to power, the board of governors of the renamed Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation was presided over by Donal Muvuti, deputy secretary general of ZANU-PF. The corporation's membership included four other Africans and two whites, one of whom was the former chairman of the RBC. The former general, African, and commercial services were renamed Radio 1 (general programming and news in English); Radio 2 (for Shona and Ndebele listeners); Radio 3 (a commercial service carrying youth programs, music, and current affairs); and Radio 4 (an educational and instructional service in the planning stage).

Both radio and television relied heavily on official versions of events in their news and commentaries, adopting a pronounced pro-ZANU-PF tone. The Department of State's human rights report noted that the imbalance in radio and television coverage had, if anything, grown during 1981.

Foreign Relations

After independence on April 18, 1980, the government launched a process of establishing contact with the international community, which for sixteen years had subjected its Rhodesian predecessor to economic sanctions and diplomatic ostracism. Zimbabwe's application to become the forty-third member of the Commonwealth had already been approved. Mugabe personally took up Zimbabwe's seat in the UN in August 1980, stressing in an address to the General Assembly his country's commitment to nonalignment with either the West or the communist world. Zimbabwe was admitted to the OAU as its fiftieth member and to the Lomé Convention of Third World states associated with the European Economic Community (EEC).

No country had extended diplomatic recognition to Rhodesia during the UDI period or to Muzorewa's Zimbabwe Rhodesia internal settlement regime. This isolation ended in 1980 with the attendance of many foreign delegations at the independence ceremonies and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic missions in Harare by nearly fifty countries. It was foreseen by the government that during the course of 1982 Zimbabwean missions abroad would be expanded from nine to nineteen.

Having been a focal point in the racial and ideological struggle in southern Africa, Zimbabwe was forced to adapt quickly to a new role as a featured player in the strained politics of the area. It became a member of the informal grouping of so-called front-line states

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

(see Glossary) of southern Africa, which had shifted its attention from Zimbabwean independence to the future of Namibia (South West Africa). The Zimbabwean capital also became the headquarters of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), an assemblage of nine nations seeking reduced dependency on South Africa by intensified regional cooperation in industrialization, energy, food distribution, and animal disease control. SADCC's priority goal was the improvement in transport and shipping networks to bypass South African ports and railroads. In June 1982 Zimbabwe became the twelfth member of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States based in Lusaka, Zambia.

In an early statement on Zimbabwe's policies, the foreign minister told the House of Assembly that, as a newly independent African nation and a member of the Third World, Zimbabwe's primary concern was "to prevent herself from falling into any form of domination, whether by the Western or Eastern blocs." Alluding to the source of support to the Patriotic Front during the guerrilla war, he added that as its first legacy Zimbabwe was heir to ties with the socialist countries and "progressive organizations." He singled out the contributions of China, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Romania, Scandinavia, and the front-line states of Africa. Zimbabwe, said the minister, was alive to the risks of neocolonialism and of accepting Western capitalist aid but added that "the West is by far the best source of material assistance Zimbabwe so badly needs."

A major diplomatic achievement of the new republic was the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD) held in Harare March 23-27, 1981. The purpose of the meeting (attended by the representatives of forty-five countries, fifteen UN agencies, and ten other international bodies) was to secure pledges totaling \$1.2 billion to help finance a three-year program of rural development and postwar reconstruction. It was noteworthy that generous commitments were secured in spite of Zimbabwe's abundant endowment of resources by African standards. This reflected a widely held view that the realization of the government's ambitious economic goals could be a pivotal factor in the stability of the entire southern African region and important to the preservation of its democratic, nonracial society. By far the largest donors at ZIMCORD were the World Bank (see Glossary), Britain, the United States, the EEC, and other Western sources. The Soviet Union was not represented.

The erstwhile white minority regime in Salisbury had been a primary target of the OAU for seventeen years, and Zimbabwe's ultimate independence was treated as a triumph for the organization. Recalling the steadfastness of the OAU's backing of the African nationalists, the government accepted membership on the OAU Liberation Committee to become more closely associated with the struggles against "colonialism and imperialism" in Namibia and South



*International delegates at Zimbabwe
Conference on Reconstruction and
Development (ZIMCORD) in Harare,
March 1981*

Courtesy Embassy of Zimbabwe, Washington

Africa. Zimbabwe supported the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and its leader, Sam Nujoma, in the discussions on Namibian independence. Along with most other OAU members, Zimbabwe committed itself to Afro-Arab solidarity and to Palestinian self-determination under the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); it refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.

Neighboring Black African States

Although Zimbabwe was entrusted with a conspicuous role in the OAU from the outset, that organization's continental-scale politics were less material to the government's concerns than were issues centering on close neighbors. With most of these nearby countries, Zimbabwe had inherited special affiliations from the colonial and civil war periods. For a space of ten years before UDI—from 1953 until 1963—Zambia and Malawi (then known as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, respectively) had been politically bound to Southern Rhodesia in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, generally known as the Central African Federation (see *From Federation to Rebellion*, ch. 1). Although the federation foundered from fears of domination by white Southern Rhodesians over the other two partners, considerable economic interdependence remained. Because of Rhodesian control of rail and road routes, all Zambian exports passed through Rhodesia, and practically all of its imports originated in or transited the southern neighbor's territory. Rhodesia also supplied the bulk of Malawi's imports. The Kariba Dam impounded the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Zambezi River, forming the border between Zambia and Rhodesia, and provided most of the electric power of both territories. Zambia under President Kenneth Kaunda shared the strong hostility of other African states toward the illegal UDI regime and, although unable to sever all trade, greatly reduced imports from Rhodesia. Malawi's President H. Kamuzu Banda, in compliance with UN sanctions, also took a number of measures against Rhodesia, including barring the import of all Rhodesian products except meat and sugar.

During the early phase of the civil war, Zambia's capital of Lusaka was headquarters of both ZAPU and ZANU, although ZANU's base of operations later shifted to Mozambique. Stepped-up guerrilla infiltration led to closure of the Rhodesian-Zambian border in 1973 at severe economic cost to both countries. For Zambia the loss was mitigated to some degree by the fact that it had been gradually reorienting its trade away from transit of Rhodesia, an effort aided by the construction by China of the Tanzania-Zambia railroad, giving Zambia access to the port of Dar es Salaam. Nevertheless Zambia's economy was greatly strained during the civil war in Rhodesia, and the repeated Rhodesian violations of the border in raids against ZAPU concentrations in Zambia contributed to enmity between the two states.

In spite of the important support given by Zambia to the struggle for majority rule in Zimbabwe, relations between the two countries at independence were clouded by Kaunda's close association with Nkomo and ZAPU. Kaunda's breach with ZANU dated from March 1975 when, after the murder of a leading ZANU figure, Herbert Chitepo, in an internal dispute, Zambia detained many ZANU officials and took over their camps. Kaunda made plain, however, that he intended to cooperate fully with the Mugabe government. During a state visit in July 1981, the Zambian president was received with noticeable warmth, and ZANU-PF officials made an effort to dispel the impression that the party harbored resentment stemming from the preindependence period. While speaking in Nkomo's stronghold of Bulawayo, Kaunda, in turn, urged Zimbabweans to unite across ethnic and party lines.

Relations between Zimbabwe and Mozambique have undergone considerable change since the advent of African rule in both countries. As long as Portugal exercised colonial control over Mozambique and Angola, the Smith regime in Rhodesia visualized itself defending a white redoubt in southern Africa against Marxism and radical black nationalism. The Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique in 1975 in favor of a Marxist government under nationalist Samora Machel had major consequences for Rhodesia. The lengthy and thinly populated border with Mozambique enabled ZANLA forces to expand their guerrilla operations. While providing refuge for the insurgents and refugees from the fighting, Mozambique was ill prepared to absorb this further economic burden, not to mention counterincursions by Rhodesian forces. As a result it was prominent among the front-

line states advocating a negotiated solution, bringing pressure on ZANU and ZAPU to submerge their differences in the Patriotic Front and to negotiate with the Salisbury regime. In March 1976 Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia, seizing valuable Rhodesian rolling stock and cutting off access to the ports of Maputo and Beira on the Indian Ocean. Rhodesia was left with only the rail and road routes to South Africa for its external links.

Mozambique gave critically needed backing to ZANLA forces during the Rhodesian civil war, although it was not above intervening in ZANU factionalism, resulting in the detention of Mugabe at one stage. Ideological affinity and common purposes ensured a cordial relationship between Machel and Mugabe after Zimbabwean independence. Frequent meetings of the two leaders have taken place, inspired in part by the need for cooperation in curbing attacks of the Mozambique National Resistance (*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*—RNM) against the rail and pipeline that provide Zimbabwe access to Mozambique's ports. In January 1981 Mugabe signed a defense and security agreement with Machel as well as a five-year pact to further political, economic, and social cooperation.

Tanzania's constancy on behalf of the Patriotic Front and the socialist outlook of its president, Julius Nyerere, produced a welcome comparable to that extended to Machel when Nyerere followed him as the second African leader to visit Zimbabwe in August 1980. Relations were also cemented with Botswana, Zimbabwe's front-line neighbor to the southwest, which had earlier been the victim of many cross-border violations by Rhodesian security forces claiming that its camps for Rhodesian refugees were "terrorist bases." Botswana's policy was to grant political sanctuary but not to allow its territory to be used by active Patriotic Front guerrillas.

South Africa

One of Zimbabwe's most difficult foreign policy problems has been that of its relations with South Africa, which had played a major role in Rhodesia's economic development and had decisively backed the Smith government. As a member of the OAU and an uncompromising adversary of white minority rule in Africa, it was out of the question for Zimbabwe to accept normal political relations with the Pretoria regime. Yet the government in Harare could not ignore the reliance of its economy and transportation system on South Africa. The unexpected postindependence election triumph of the Marxist-influenced ZANU-PF notwithstanding, South Africa seemed inclined to deal pragmatically with Zimbabwe, as it has with other politically unfriendly countries of southern Africa. Its actions have, however, veered between harshness and moderation.

In spite of the prominent South African place in the colonizing and early history of Rhodesia, most white Rhodesians had regarded themselves as Englishmen, looking down on the Afrikaners whose apartheid system produced a somewhat more rigid ordering of race

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

relations than evolved in Rhodesia. Rhodesia's UDI, however, compelled the two countries to cooperate more closely as Rhodesia became increasingly bound economically to South Africa and public sympathy for the fate of Rhodesian whites spread, especially among English-speaking South Africans.

As Rhodesia's civil war intensified, South African assistance became a crucial factor. A South African police detachment of 2,000 men assisted Rhodesian security forces in combating the guerrillas, and forty helicopters and their crews were on loan. Half of Rhodesia's military effort after 1976 was said to be financed by South Africa. Apparently motivated by fear of a widening of the guerrilla war and a resultant need to intervene on a large scale, South Africa brought pressure on Ian Smith to negotiate with the nationalist leaders (see *Détente and Negotiations, 1974-78*, ch. 1). As a pariah state kept viable in the face of UN sanctions only through the South African lifeline of oil and arms, Rhodesia was a political liability. The situation was an impediment to South Africa's efforts to normalize relations with Black Africa and brought the risk of a wider Soviet and Cuban presence in the area.

South Africa lent its firm support to the 1978 internal settlement process but, recognizing its inadequacies, did not oppose the Lancaster House Conference in 1979. The victory of Mugabe and ZANU-PF, which had been portrayed as an extremist, communist-aligned faction, caused consternation in South Africa. Denying reports that he might intervene, South Africa's prime minister warned, however, that he would not hesitate to use force if Zimbabwe allowed its territory to be used by black nationalists to undermine South African security.

As expected, South Africa was not invited to send representatives to the Zimbabwe independence ceremonies in April 1980. Apparently still hopeful of entering into official discussions of future relations, the government in Pretoria reacted indignantly when in July of the same year Mugabe called for the removal of the South African diplomatic establishment in Harare. (South Africa had never extended full recognition to the UDI or Muzorewa governments by consenting to an exchange of ambassadors.) Each country was subsequently to be represented only by a twelve-member trade office. Mugabe accused South Africa of using its mission to recruit opponents of the regime for military training. Later, elaborating these charges, Mugabe claimed that 5,000 of Muzorewa's auxiliaries were receiving training in infiltration and sabotage. South Africa has consistently denied offering sanctuary or training to opponents of Mugabe, and the Zimbabwean prime minister has honored his commitment at the Lancaster House Conference not to allow Zimbabwe to become a base for South African liberation movements, such as the African National Congress (ANC) or the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).

During 1981 South Africa invoked a number of measures that seemed intended as retribution for Mugabe's anti-apartheid rhetoric and to pressure him into accepting government-level ties. In March



*Prime Minister Mugabe (left) and Tanzania's
President Julius Nyerere
Courtesy Embassy of Zimbabwe, Washington*

South Africa gave the obligatory one-year notice of termination of the preferential trade agreement between the two countries. In April twenty-four diesel locomotives were withdrawn from loan, threatening serious impairment of Zimbabwe's transport system at a time of urgent need to move the agricultural harvest. It was also announced that work contracts of Zimbabweans employed in South Africa would be allowed to expire and no new recruitment permitted. South Africa was widely believed to be aiding the RNM in its sabotage operations against Zimbabwe's links with Mozambican ports.

The loss of preferential tariffs and reduced quotas for exports to South Africa would have had a damaging effect on Zimbabwe's industrial sector. In 1980 about 40 percent of Zimbabwean manufactured exports were marketed in South Africa, including 90 percent of all clothing and shoes and 70 percent of all beverages and tobacco. South Africa hinted that the sorting out of economic differences would be facilitated if Zimbabwe would agree to meetings of the responsible cabinet ministers, a step that was consistently rejected by the Mugabe government. Possibly to counteract the impression that it was deliberately seeking to destabilize Zimbabwe, South Africa relented by leasing locomotives to several countries to move their traffic through Zimbabwe and at the last moment (in March 1982) announced that it would extend the preferential trade agreement while new terms were being negotiated.

South African capital remained firmly embedded in the Zimbabwean economy at independence; its investment, estimated at the equivalent of US\$583 million, was on a scale rivaling that of Britain. The dominant South African entity was the giant Anglo-American Corporation, which directly or through such affiliates as Johannes-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

burg Consolidated Investments controlled nickel, copper, and coal mines and was engaged in iron, steel, and ferrochrome production. Anglo-American also owned Hippo Valley, one of the two large sugar producers, and Mazoe Estates, the predominant citrus grower. It was the largest miller and food processor in the country through National Foods. The Delta Corporation, which controlled the brewing industry, retail stores, and hotels, was an affiliate of the South African Breweries conglomerate. Except for the acquisition of the South African-owned Rhobank and Argus newspaper interests, the South African-owned firms had not been threatened as of 1982. Nevertheless it had been reported that the companies had sought to reduce the visibility of their South African interests through increased local shareholding and other measures.

United States

Zimbabwe's relations with the United States were launched on a cordial note at the independence ceremonies, which were attended by a high-level United States delegation led by elder statesman Averell Harriman and former Permanent Representative to the UN Andrew Young. The United States was the first country to establish a diplomatic presence in Harare, announcing the upgrading of its liaison office to embassy status on independence day. At the same time, a grant of US\$2 million to rehabilitate war-damaged medical clinics was extended as a token of Washington's desire to assist the new country in its recovery from the war and to aid its economic development. Testifying before a subcommittee of the United States Congress on March 27, 1980, after Mugabe's election victory, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard M. Moose said: "In the past Prime Minister Mugabe was labeled a dedicated Marxist in many circles. . . . However, I believe we should judge him in an African context and deal with him both on his presently stated intentions and his future actions . . . he has adopted a moderate and conciliatory approach in recent months, and his initial steps in the post-election period have been encouraging."

While visiting the United States in August 1980, on the occasion of Zimbabwe's seating as the one-hundred-fifty-third member of the UN, Mugabe was received by President Jimmy Carter. The Zimbabwean prime minister expressed gratitude to Carter for his "solo effort" of 1978-79 in blocking Washington's recognition of the Muzorewa government. He added that "we need the friendship and solidarity of the United States just as we needed it during the struggle."

Until the mid-1970s United States actions on the Rhodesian issue had been cautious, following the lead taken by Britain against UDI and in the UN urging strong economic sanctions but opposing demands on Britain to use force against Rhodesia. United States embargo measures were gradually tightened until by 1968 all remaining trade and financial links had been severed. The American Consulate Gen-



*Prime Minister Mugabe met with President Jimmy Carter during state visit to Washington, August 1980.
Courtesy Carter Archives*

eral in Salisbury, which provided services to about 1,100 Americans remaining in the country (mostly missionaries), continued to operate under a British exequatur until it was closed in 1970. The Rhodesian Information Office in Washington, staffed by Rhodesian officials formerly attached to the British Embassy, was the focal point of an effective lobbying effort on behalf of the Rhodesian cause.

In 1971 the United States Congress accepted the Byrd Amendment to the Defense Procurement Act, which by removing the embargo on Rhodesian minerals caused the United States to be in violation of UN sanctions against Rhodesia. It was argued that the amendment was necessary to prevent the United States from becoming dependent on the Soviet Union for its strategic stockpile of chrome. This breach in the UN sanctions program had the effect of encouraging the Smith regime and causing nationalist groups in Rhodesia and other African countries to question the United States commitment to majority rule. In spite of efforts by successive administrations in Washington, the Byrd Amendment was not repealed until 1977.

Its concern heightened by massive Soviet arms shipments and the introduction of Cuban troops into Angola, the United States felt compelled by the mid-1970s to adopt a more active role in southern Africa. In an address in Luanda in April 1976, Secretary of State

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Henry A. Kissinger offered a new program designed to foster Rhodesian independence through a negotiated settlement and majority rule within two years. Kissinger's efforts led to the abortive all-parties conference at Geneva later in 1976 and were followed by the joint Anglo-American peace initiatives during 1977 (see *Détente and Negotiations, 1974-78*, ch. 1).

In spite of a determined campaign by conservative forces in Congress, the United States refrained from recognizing the internal settlement and narrowly averted congressional action to remove sanctions against the Muzorewa government. In explaining the United States position before the UN Security Council in May 1978, Young stated that the internal settlement process marked some progress, but certain inadequacies persisted. The agreement did not include all the nationalist leaders; it allowed Smith to hold effective power and to wield a veto; and it threatened to prolong rather than end the violence.

Its outlook molded by ideological leanings and its Third World and African associations, Zimbabwe's views on many international issues have differed from those of the United States. Nevertheless, responding affirmatively to Mugabe's promise of a nonracial, nonaligned democratic society, the United States has made a strong commitment to the future of independent Zimbabwe. In the early 1980s the new republic's stability was regarded as a critical element in the peaceful settlement of remaining tensions in the southern African region. Zimbabwe was widely seen as a test of multiracial collaboration and the preservation of a healthy private sector under a system that had dedicated itself to a socialist course. Mugabe was recognized as a moderate voice in approaching political problems of the region, carrying influence with the front-line group in seeking a peaceful outcome in Namibia.

After President Ronald Reagan assumed office in January 1981, Mugabe expressed concern over indications that the new administration in Washington would move toward friendlier relations with South Africa. Reports that Reagan would propose repeal of the Clark Amendment, which prohibited military aid to the political factions in Angola, were given a negative interpretation in Zimbabwe as a foretoken of aid to the guerrilla forces of Jonas Savimbi operating against the Marxist government in the Angolan capital of Luanda. A continuing United States commitment to Zimbabwe's economic progress and stability was, however, reflected in the rising level of assistance. As of late 1981 the United States had pledged US\$283 million in support of Zimbabwe's ambitious development goals, virtually at the same level as aid from Britain, the leading contributor. Aid was projected to be US\$75 million in each of the fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1984, of which the largest portion (US\$50 million) was allocated for a commodity import program. Domestic sale of these imports would generate local currency to be used for projects in agriculture, education, training, and small-scale enterprises.

In 1982 the United States was the third largest supplier of goods to

Zimbabwe after South Africa and Britain. Its investment in Zimbabwe (also ranked third after these countries) was estimated at 20 percent of total foreign capital in the country. The leading American investor was Union Carbide Corporation, which had a large stake in chrome mining and smelting. In an address in March 1982 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker noted several ways in which foreign capital was being discouraged. American private investment, he said, was a potentially major factor in helping Zimbabwe achieve sustained growth to benefit its society as a whole.

Britain and Western Europe

Britain acted quickly to reinstate itself as a leading foreign partner after the fifteen-year breach caused by Rhodesia's UDI. Prospects of playing a vital role in Zimbabwe's future were fortified by Britain's historical and cultural influence and by intimate economic associations based on British interests in the mining, industrial, and financial sectors of its former colony. In spite of bitter exchanges over British supervision of the 1980 election campaign, harmony had been restored before independence day. Mugabe included in his independence message a tribute to the British governor, Lord Soames, calling him "a good friend and counselor" for his part in guiding the colony to freedom.

Until the latter stages of UDI, relations with Britain were the major foreign preoccupation of the white regime in Salisbury. Close personal bonds between white Rhodesians and the British people had been a paramount cause of the settlers' decision in 1923 to vote for a continuation of colonial status rather than accept union with South Africa. These personal links and political affinities with Britain gradually eroded after World War II. The indifference of the British people to retention of the colonial empire and their growing acceptance of racial equality and the ability of nonwhite people to rule themselves put the British at odds with most of their Rhodesian kin.

Before UDI, London was unwilling to acknowledge that Rhodesian affairs were within the competence of the UN, but immediately after UDI was proclaimed, it turned to the UN to institute worldwide sanctions against the rebellious colony (see *The United Nations and Sanctions*, ch. 1). Various British proposals for replacing the illegal regime with unimpeded progression toward majority rule were repeatedly frustrated, owing either to the adamancy of the Rhodesian Front leadership or, later, to African rejection of any plan that did not ensure rapid ascendancy to power (see *Negotiating Independence*, ch. 1). Considerable sentiment arose in Britain to accept the internal settlement of 1978 and lift sanctions. The Conservative election manifesto of 1979 seemed to foreshadow recognition of the Muzorewa government. Thus, when the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher took office in May 1979, the internal parties were confident that a new approach was at hand. Faced by a major confrontation with other members of the Commonwealth

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

hostile to the internal settlement, Thatcher secured the approval of other Commonwealth prime ministers at a meeting in Lusaka in early August for new settlement proposals that would ensure genuine African majority rule involving all parties to the conflict, with minority safeguards. From this followed the successful Lancaster House Conference.

In spite of serious strains that emerged during the election campaign, the temporary British governor maintained effective control over the process, earning the respect of the African nationalists and ensuring an auspicious beginning to relations between the two countries. The successful transition from bitter conflict to independence was acclaimed as a diplomatic triumph for Britain. It also brought to an end a dispute that had soured British relations with the Third World and had been an unending source of contention within the Commonwealth.

To assist in the transition, Britain supplied teams of experts from the British Broadcasting Corporation, the British army, and the civil service. Financial aid had been pledged to support the land reform program, but Britain's initial contribution of a grant of £48 million (equivalent to US \$93 million) and a loan of £27 million (US \$53 million) disappointed the Zimbabwean leaders. At the ZIMCORD pledging session in March 1981, however, total British commitments were £123 million (US \$284 million), exclusive of debt rescheduling and military training.

Britain's economic stake in Zimbabwe even after the long UDI interlude was greater than that of any other country. The value of its investments was estimated by one source as the equivalent of US\$815 million at independence, exclusive of British-owned firms controlled through South African subsidiaries. Its companies had commanding positions in gold and asbestos mining, the most conspicuous being the Lonrho Investment Group, which had ventures in gold mining, manufacturing, ranching, and forestry plus ownership of the Umtali-Beira pipeline. The three largest private banks—Standard, Barclays, and Grindlays—were British owned. This established British presence, and its strong integration with local capital, although of unquestioned value to the Zimbabwean economy, also presented a potential source of discord if contradictions emerged between foreign ownership in the private sector and the introduction of further socialist programs.

Other Western nations shared with Britain and the United States a sense of commitment to the stability and success of the new regime in Zimbabwe. The desire to assist the country in recovery from wartime devastation and in future economic security was revealed by the high level of pledges at ZIMCORD by countries that did not have previous political attachments. The EEC promised aid worth US\$175 million, while France and West Germany offered the equivalents of US\$104 million and US\$91 million, respectively.

Mugabe's initial coolness toward France was inspired by the belief that its influence had inhibited French-speaking African states from

siding firmly with the Patriotic Front. He was also offended by French objections to the size of the Zimbabwean quota for sugar exports to the EEC, which delayed Zimbabwe's membership in the Lomé Convention. The socialist government of François Mitterand, installed in France in 1981, had greater common interests with the new socialist-inclined government of Zimbabwe, both in economic orientation and in political outlook on southern African issues.

Communist Countries

In establishing contact with the communist world after independence, Zimbabwe exhibited a distinct partiality for China over the Soviet Union. This arose from the fact that during the civil war ZANU-PF was ideologically and militarily closer to China and maintained good relations with Romania and Yugoslavia. PF-ZAPU's forces had been armed by the Soviet Union and helped by countries of Eastern Europe. Nkomo had been a frequent visitor to Moscow and East European capitals. The Soviet ambassador to Zambia, who had been Nkomo's chief contact with his Moscow patrons, attended the Zimbabwe independence ceremonies, but the establishment of a permanent Soviet mission in Harare was deferred until February 1981. The stumbling block had been Mugabe's insistence that the Soviets abandon direct contacts with their former allies in PF-ZAPU. Accordingly the agreement on diplomatic representation included a mutual stipulation against "agreements, arrangements, or negotiations with any organization without prior consultation and explicit approval. . . ." Permission was then granted the Polish and Czechoslovak governments to open missions in Harare subject to the same provision. The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) had been allowed to open its embassy a few months earlier. A determination to cooperate with Zimbabwe in various fields was emphasized by the secretary general of the Soviet Union's Ministry of Foreign Affairs during a visit to Harare in August 1982. It was announced that over 100 Zimbabwean students had been accepted for training in Soviet institutions.

A number of trade and economic cooperation agreements have been negotiated with the countries of Eastern Europe; some of these were concluded in conjunction with a visit by Mugabe in late 1981 to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Yugoslavia agreed to provide training in elements of mass communications and extended credit lines for Yugoslav goods. Romania has sponsored training projects in agriculture, while Bulgaria was to provide assistance in cooperative farming and has committed itself to an increase of imports from Zimbabwe, notably tobacco. Economic exchanges with communist states were, however, overshadowed by trade, aid, and financial

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

links with the West. Among the communist group, only Romania, Yugoslavia and China were represented at the ZIMCORD aid-pledging conference in 1981.

ZANU's wartime collaboration with China was succeeded by a series of postindependence contacts, highlighted by Mugabe's visit to Beijing in May 1981 during which cultural and trade agreements were signed. A Zimbabwean commercial delegation reported that substantial Chinese orders for tobacco had been concluded. The Chinese announced their intention of making a loan equivalent to US\$30 million for Zimbabwean development but, apparently owing to strains on China's own economy, the only project under discussion in early 1982 was a sports stadium to be constructed in Harare.

* * * *

No comprehensive works on postindependence politics in Zimbabwe had appeared by mid-1982, but several brief surveys by knowledgeable specialists are available. Perhaps the most comprehensive is J. Gus Liebenow's *Zimbabwe: A Political Balance Sheet* in the American Universities Field Staff Reports series, which deals with both domestic questions and foreign problems during the early period of the Mugabe government. The events dating from the Lancaster House Conference through the first months of independence are also treated in Xan Smiley's "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa, and the Rise of Robert Mugabe" in *Foreign Affairs* and in Claire Palley's "What Future for Zimbabwe?" in *Political Quarterly*. A sympathetic picture of Mugabe's confronting the acute problems faced by the new state emerges from John F. Burns' "A Delicate Balance in Zimbabwe" in the *New York Times Magazine*.

To supplement these works, domestic political developments and foreign policy issues may be traced through such reference sources as the annual *Africa Contemporary Record* and the monthly *Africa Research Bulletin*. The Rhodesian issue in United States domestic politics and the history of the Byrd Amendment are elaborated in *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia* by Anthony Lake. Harare's daily newspaper, the *Herald*, is a vital source of information on day-to-day administration of the country and the views of leading political figures. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security



The shadowy world of guerrilla operations

IN THE EARLY 1980s the new Zimbabwean government of Prime Minister Robert Mugabe contended with a variety of security problems that, directly or indirectly, had resulted from the seven-year civil war that preceded independence. The war, which had claimed 30,000 lives, also left 150,000 combatants who had served in one of the armed political factions or armies and a like number of unaccounted firearms. With the coming of independence, political and ethnic differences and the struggle for primacy between Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front and his rival Joshua Nkomo's Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union were reemerging after having been overshadowed by the exigencies of war. Tensions between black and white Zimbabweans persisted to some degree at independence: many Europeans resented the loss of their political power, and many Africans resented the fact that the economy, the civil service, and the military remained largely under the control of the white minority. Neighboring South Africa, the ideologically hostile last stronghold of white minority rule on the continent, possessed considerable economic and military power that posed a potential threat to the Mugabe government.

In the two and one-half years after independence Mugabe moved to control his country's national security affairs. To reduce internal dissent, he initially pursued a policy of reconciliation with his rivals and former enemies along with strong legislative and police action to maintain law and order. Combined with a program to integrate former guerrillas into the security forces, the prime minister's policies helped quell a spate of violent crime and interparty clashes that gripped the country in its first year of independence. Serious conflicts remained, however, with some elements of the white community and, perhaps more seriously, with Nkomo's supporters in western Zimbabwe. In mid-1982 the arrest of several of Nkomo's top deputies on suspicion of treason (after the discovery of arms on land owned by his party) led to a wave of violence in Matabeleland, where Nkomo's party was politically dominant.

Mugabe pursued a realistic policy of economic cooperation and verbal confrontation with South Africa while refusing to allow anti-Pretoria guerrillas to operate from his own country. Despite the discovery of several agents working for South Africa and suspicion that Pretoria was behind several acts of sabotage, relations between the two countries remained generally correct.

Mugabe used the security forces both as a means to enforce his security policy and as an object of social reform. The regular national army expanded fivefold to 60,000 in less than two years to absorb guerrillas from Mugabe's and Nkomo's liberation armies. The air force, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and the Central Intelligence

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Organization were also changing to reflect the African nationalists' political victory. The large military establishment proved costly, however, and in 1982 army personnel strength was in the process of being slowly reduced by one-third. Individual units within the security forces were thought to be extremely effective, but most integrated units continued to be troubled by political and ethnic factionalism. In the event of major political or civil strife such divisions would likely strain the effectiveness of the army and could conceivably cause its collapse.

Public Order and Internal Security

In the wake of the 1972-79 civil war, criminal and dissident activity continued at high levels although not on a scale comparable to the wartime violence. Crime and threats to public order during the first year of independence resulted mainly from the large numbers of undisciplined young former guerrillas who lacked jobs or land but possessed weapons. The government was able to exert control by integrating them into the security forces and by acting strongly against criminals and deserters. Later threats to internal security, which appeared more politically oriented, were attributed to a few whites who resented their reduced position in the country and to the political and ethnic conflict between elements of the Patriotic Front: Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU, known officially as ZANU-PF since the 1980 election campaign) and Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU, known as PF-ZAPU since the election campaign).

Postwar Violence and Government Security Policy

In the year following independence, some 500 deaths were attributed to former guerrillas who had fought in ZANU's military wing—the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)—or in ZAPU's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). The postwar violence began during the 1980 election campaign when numerous confirmed instances of intimidation were ascribed to former guerrillas "campaigning" for their parties. The guerrillas were supposed to report to assembly camps as part of the cease-fire arrangement that ended the war, but both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU held back their best troops and cadres. As the guerrillas determined that it was safe to report to the assembly camps, their numbers in the country increased from 22,000 at the time of the elections to 28,700 at independence, to over 35,000 three months later, and to over 50,000 by mid-1981.

Acts of violence continued and even escalated after independence as young former guerrillas, armed and living in overcrowded isolated camps with nothing to do, turned to armed robbery and acts of retribution. There were numerous reports of kangaroo courts that dispensed "revolutionary justice" on political rivals or those accused of collaboration during the war. Political violence included an assassina-

tion attempt, attributed to ZANLA guerrillas, in June against the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, ZANU's leader before Mugabe took over in the mid-1970s. Even Mugabe's minister of manpower and secretary general of ZANU-PF, Edgar Tekere, was arrested in August 1980 for the murder of a white farmer. Mugabe, from the time of his election, called upon the former guerrillas and the rest of Zimbabwean society to unite in "reconciliation, reconstruction, and nation building," but words alone did not solve the problem of violent crime.

To restore public order and assert its authority over the country, the new government initially relied on the laws, institutions, and many of the personnel of the Rhodesian era. Mugabe followed this course partly because as head of government he had more control and power over government forces than over guerrillas in the assembly camps.

Control over the guerrillas was limited in part because about one-third of them were ex-ZIPRA fighters loyal primarily to Nkomo. Moreover the prime minister's restricted power over his own ZANLA soldiers was attributable to the earlier civil war experience in which militarily successful guerrilla tactics placed little emphasis on troop discipline and gave considerable autonomy and freedom of action to soldiers and commanders in the field (see *Civil War and the Three Armies*, this ch.). The result was that during the war the ZANLA soldiers—who often combined revolutionary fervor with their guerrilla tactics—and not the ZANU politicians came to constitute the real power within the ZANU organization. Mugabe had become ZANU's chairman, and the more moderate Sithole was ousted largely because Mugabe was more successful at building ties with the guerrillas and emphasizing his commitment to Marxist ideology and the armed struggle. According to Claire Palley, a noted observer of Zimbabwean affairs, Mugabe's position during the civil war was less that of ZANLA's leader than of spokesman for the guerrillas. Even after he became prime minister in the 1980 victory, Mugabe was still viewed by many in ZANU's collegial central committee as no more than the first among equals. ZANLA commander Rex Nhongo remained loyal to Mugabe, but Nhongo did not have as much prestige among the guerrillas as his predecessor, Josiah Tongogara, who had died in an automobile accident in Mozambique shortly before independence. Mugabe's authority was apparently even more remote to idle young guerrillas in overcrowded assembly camps eager to taste the spoils of their victory and knowing that their weapons were their most important source of political power.

The prime minister, admitting that "no one is blameless, least of all elements within my own party," came to rely on the police and military forces he had inherited from the previous government only when other attempts to control the guerrillas had failed. After six months of a mounting crime wave it was clear that his calls for law and order were to little avail and that the white-led police force was unable by itself to deal with those popularly identified as the "heroes

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

of the liberation struggle" without stronger political support. It was obvious that attempts to demobilize the guerrillas or engage them in economic development schemes were not solving the crime problem (see *Military Manpower: Demobilization and Integration*, this ch.). A policy to improve guerrillas' morale by moving them (and their weapons) from their isolated assembly areas to new quarters in townships on the outskirts of major cities only had the effect of heightening crime in the cities, particularly Salisbury (present-day Harare), Bulawayo, and Sinoia (present-day Chinhoyi).

In October 1980 Mugabe finally cracked down on what he called "dissident elements and misguided party militants" by sending troops from the national army into rural trouble spots and by reinforcing police patrols in the cities. The measures were effective where they were used; but there were not enough troops to police the entire country, and "drunken rampages" continued to be reported as well as major ZANLA-ZIPRA clashes in the Salisbury township of Chitungwiza and in Bulawayo. In February 1981 the prime minister reemphasized his reliance on the national army by calling in the air force, white reservists, and two white-led battalions of what had been the black, elite Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR) to quell a major clash between former ZANLA and ZIPRA members of the national army.

Beginning at about the same time Mugabe moved to bring the guerrillas under direct government control by integrating virtually all of them into the national army. Earlier integration plans emphasized the effectiveness of the army rather than the social problem posed by the guerrillas and envisioned the amalgamation with the former Rhodesian forces of no more than 10,000 ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers. Although the 1981 integration into the national army of most of the remaining 50,000 guerrillas diluted the quality of the army as a whole, it was viewed as a success because most of the civil violence ended and the guerrillas were brought under Mugabe's control. In August 1981 ZANU-PF dissolved its ZANLA military organization, as all the former ZANLA guerrillas had either been incorporated into the national army or demobilized (see *Military Manpower: Demobilization and Integration*, this ch.).

The prime minister, who at the time of his election vowed to uphold law and order and prosecute criminals to the fullest extent of the law, relied heavily on the inherited Rhodesian criminal justice system (see *The Legal System*, ch. 4). Despite an initial preponderance of whites in judicial offices, the court system was allowed to function independently in the first two years of majority rule, most notably in the November 1980 murder trial of Tekere. After the minister of manpower's arrest, Mugabe stayed aloof from the court proceedings. (Tekere was found innocent on grounds that the 1975 Indemnity and Compensation Act, passed by Prime Minister Ian Smith's Rhodesian regime, granted government leaders immunity from prosecution in their actions to suppress terrorism. The act was

soon repealed, and Tekere was removed from his ministerial post and later from his position as ZANU-PF secretary general.) Respect for the criminal justice system was not shared by other partisans and former guerrillas. On at least two occasions in the first months after independence, armed former guerrillas freed accused party members from police or court custody by intimidating guards with their numbers and superior firepower. Such blatant contempt was rare, but in 1982 conflicts between Minister of Home Affairs Herbert Ushewokunze and magistrates over the illegal detentions of black and white Zimbabweans threatened the courts' autonomy.

The Mugabe government took advantage of the strict security laws it had inherited from the Rhodesian government. In July 1980 parliament extended for six months the Emergency Powers Act that gave law enforcement authorities power to detain suspects without trial and to arrest or conduct searches without obtaining a warrant. First imposed at the time of Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965, the act had been renewed every six months since that time. Before renewing the act in 1980, the Mugabe government stripped the law of provisions allowing police confiscation and destruction of property, censorship, police power to impose curfews, and police authority to force civilians to leave their homes. In its first two and one-half years in power, the government continued to extend the act for six-month periods, gradually modifying it to restore government authority to impose curfews and confiscate property from those deemed to have prejudiced state security. The latter provision went beyond the powers held by the Rhodesian government, which could only confiscate property if the owner was convicted in court of a crime against the state. In July 1982 the act was further amended and extended to include new laws, similar in effect to the repealed Indemnity and Compensation Act, that protected government leaders, members of the security forces, and civil servants from criminal or civil prosecutions. There was no indication in mid-1982 that the act would be weakened or rescinded, and there was some support in the government for extending it indefinitely. The number of persons detained under the act varied according to the internal security situation. It was estimated in late 1980 that some 200 people were being held, most of them guerrillas absent from their assembly camps; by early 1982 there were thought to be only about sixty persons being detained without charges, but their numbers increased again during the year as conflict between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU heightened.

Other measures also enhanced the government's security powers. In March 1981 the minister of home affairs stated that all residents of the country would in the future be required to carry identity cards. The government also launched several campaigns to persuade residents to turn in their unregistered firearms. In July 1981 the government announced that owners could turn in their guns without penalty until the end of August, but anyone caught illegally possessing a

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

firearm after that time was to be sentenced to a minimum of five years in jail. Relatively few weapons were turned in, however, and it proved difficult to enforce the law. Gun laws were amended the following year to allow farmers to keep semiautomatic rifles but to require police reserves to turn in their weapons.

Disaffected Whites

Zimbabwe's white minority, who had controlled the country over most of the preceding century, did not pose a challenge to power in 1982. But serious acts of subversion and sabotage were attributed to disaffected whites and were a matter of ongoing concern to government security officials. Such actions were not limited to any known domestic organizations, although South African complicity was suspected.

Upon assuming power, Mugabe had moved to neutralize the latent threat of white reaction by inviting the Europeans to stay on and help build the country as Zimbabweans (see *Politics*, ch. 4). Many whites were encouraged by the prime minister's moderation, but others were discouraged or angered by the economic adjustments the government made, by the inflammatory statements of some government leaders, and by the general influx of Africans into positions of power. In the two years after independence nearly one-quarter of the white population left the country—mostly to neighboring South Africa—but some dissatisfied whites, hindered by restrictions on transferring their capital or other factors, delayed their departure.

The whites were not trusted by many of the former guerrillas in Mugabe's government; suspicions were reinforced when, several months after independence, Lieutenant General Peter Walls, the Rhodesian who had served as commander of the armed forces for three months under Mugabe, revealed that he had asked the British government to annul the results of the 1980 elections. There had not been a coup attempt, and there was no evidence that the general was involved in any coup plots, but he was expelled from the country.

Several acts of sabotage that had significant national security implications were attributed to white Zimbabweans in the thirty months after independence. White soldiers were suspected of being involved in the August 1981 explosion of a large ammunition dump at Inkomo Barracks, which destroyed most of the army's ammunition stock. A year later, in July 1982, observers suspected white involvement in the sabotage of thirteen air force planes. As many as fourteen white servicemen, including the air force chief of staff, Air Vice Marshal Hugh Slatter, and other high-ranking officers, were held for questioning in the incident along with five Africans who had served with Nkomo's ZIPRA. In 1981 and 1982 several whites in the Special Branch of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) security service were implicated as agents of South Africa, including the director

of security in the Prime Minister's Office, who was directly responsible for Mugabe's personal security. Involvement of disaffected whites was also suspected in the December 1981 explosion of fifteen kilograms of dynamite that destroyed ZANU-PF headquarters in Harare.

The inability to distinguish *a priori* between loyal white Zimbabweans and those seeking to undermine the state has complicated relations between the government and the white community. In calling for more circumspection in the appointment of whites, in early 1982 Mugabe stated, "We do not want to prejudice the chances of those who are loyal, but one must now be satisfied that one is not promoting a [traitor]."

In November 1981 the government for the first time used the Emergency Powers Act to detain whites suspected of undermining state security. By the end of the year eight whites were in detention, and twelve had been jailed by February 1982. One was a member of parliament, Wally Stuttaford, who was detained in December on suspicion of "conspiring to overthrow" the government. After eight months in detention Stuttaford was charged with holding two meetings with four others to topple the Mugabe government by force. Dennis Walker, another white member of parliament suspected in the case, returned from abroad after Stuttaford's arrest but later fled to avoid incarceration. The first treason trial held since independence involved a white dentist from Bulawayo (the leader of a fringe rightist political party), his twenty-four-year-old son, and two accomplices. The four were sentenced to prison after being convicted in May 1982 of plotting to foment a secessionist rebellion among the Ndebele, which they hoped would eventually result in a separate, white-ruled Matabeleland. Some observers believed that the threat to Zimbabwean security posed by white dissidents was diminishing, but others thought that disaffected white Rhodesians in southern Africa continued to be a potential source of sabotage, terrorism, or economic disruption to Zimbabwe.

Ethnicity, PF-ZAPU, and the Government

Zimbabwe's most serious security problem in 1982, one that had long-term implications, sprang from the political competition between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU. Conflict began in 1963 after Sithole and Mugabe broke away from Nkomo's ZAPU to form ZANU. Partisan violence between the two groups broke out at the time in townships throughout Rhodesia. Owing to circumstances of history and geography, the rivalry between ZAPU and ZANU took on a regional and ethnic character during the civil war despite the nationalist orientation of the leaders of both parties. ZANU, which operated from Mozambique into Shona-populated areas of east and northeast Zimbabwe, appealed to Shona ethnicity as a tactical necessity in building ties with the local population (see *Civil War and the three Armies*, this ch.). Partly because ZANU was able to capture Shona loyalties and partly because Nkomo was an Ndebele, ZAPU garnered the loyalties

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

of the Ndebele and the Kalanga (a group ethnically classed as Shona but politically aligned with the Ndebele for a century). The regional and ethnic orientations of the two parties as well as Shona numerical dominance in the country were graphically demonstrated by the April 1980 elections (see fig. 18).

The postwar conflict was the result of mutual suspicion on the part of the parties. ZANU-PF members, many of whom wanted Zimbabwe to become a one-party state, suspected PF-ZAPU's desire to retain a separate identity within the country's ruling coalition. According to observers, the ethnic component of the dispute was reinforced because many Ndebele feared Shona dominance represented by ZANU-PF's political power.

The clashes between the two parties were contained by Mugabe's policy of using force against both ZANU and ZAPU dissidents and by government policy to bring all the guerrillas into the national army. That the integration program risked the destruction of the army was demonstrated in February 1981 when the largest ZAPU-ZANU clash since independence involved soldiers from three supposedly integrated battalions. The trouble started on February 7 with a fight between former ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers in a bar at a battalion army camp in the Bulawayo township of Ntabazinduna. When shooting broke out between the factions, most soldiers fled—many ZIPRA soldiers to their homes in the Bulawayo area. Despite the efforts of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU officers to contain the disturbances, within five days the fighting had spread. Two other integrated battalions had broken up; two assembly camps in Entumbane in the Bulawayo area—one ZANLA and one ZIPRA—were attacking each other; armored columns were reported to be traveling toward Bulawayo from ZIPRA camps at Essexvale in the south and at Gwai River Mine in the north. The fighting was stopped by a firm government response. Government officials and PF-ZAPU leaders, including Nkomo and ZIPRA commander Lookout Masuku, called for a halt in the fighting, and two battalions of white-led government troops that had belonged to the RAR along with reserves who had served with the Rhodesian Army imposed order on the situation within a few days. Mugabe also threatened the guerrillas with the use of helicopter gunships and jet fighter bombers circling above the troubled area. As many as 300 were killed, after which some 6,500 guerrillas and soldiers were disarmed, three battalions were dissolved, and most of the combatants were eventually integrated into other units.

After the February 1981 disturbances, open fighting between the two groups practically ceased, and the integration process proceeded without further hitches. Nkomo used his influence to get wary ZIPRA soldiers to surrender their arms and leave their assembly points in order to join the national army, effectively dismantling the army he had built up over a period of years. ZAPU's political position was gradually undermined, however. Nkomo was demoted from minister of home affairs to minister without portfolio even before the

Bulawayo fighting. His lack of influence was further demonstrated in August 1981 when the government announced the creation of an all-ZANU-PF brigade to be trained by North Korean advisers (see *Army Organization, Equipment, and Training*, this ch.). Nkomo protested that he had not been consulted about the formation of a brigade that he feared would be exclusively loyal to ZANU-PF. Despite mounting political difficulties, the security situation was disturbed by little more than isolated incidents of banditry for a year after the Bulawayo disturbances. Government security concerns voiced in July 1981 focused on smuggling, the number of uncontrolled arms in the country, and violence in neighboring Mozambique that threatened to spill across Zimbabwe's borders.

The relatively peaceful interlude in the conflict between PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF ended abruptly in February 1982 when large quantities of arms and equipment were found by the CIO cached on farms owned by companies controlled by PF-ZAPU. The matériel included scores of military vehicles, communications equipment, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, hundreds of machine guns, rocket launchers, mortars, anti-aircraft guns, several thousand automatic rifles, and ammunition. One source stated that the weapons amounted to about one-third of ZIPRA's wartime arsenal. Nkomo denied knowledge of the arms and claimed that weapons had been hidden throughout the country by all parties as insurance against a further outbreak of violence.

Mugabe charged that Nkomo and elements within PF-ZAPU had been planning a coup against his government. He also stated that former Rhodesian military commander Walls had confessed to arranging meetings between Nkomo and South African officials after the 1980 elections in order to support the overthrow of Mugabe. (Nkomo and Walls both denied the charge.) Within days Nkomo and three other PF-ZAPU ministers and deputy ministers were removed from the cabinet, and about a dozen companies owned by PF-ZAPU were outlawed and their assets confiscated. Within a month four prominent PF-ZAPU leaders were detained, including Lieutenant General Masuku, who was then deputy commander of the national army, and Dumiso Dabengwa, a retired officer who had been the ZAPU military intelligence chief during the civil war.

In the wake of PF-ZAPU's humiliation, Ndebele dissidence increased measurably beginning in March 1982. Large numbers of former ZIPRA enlisted men—estimates ranged from 2,000 to 4,000—deserted from the armed forces over the four-month period from March through June. Most of those leaving apparently returned, unemployed, to their home areas, but it was estimated that by June 1982 up to 1,000 deserters were operating as guerrillas or bandits in the bush in the west and southwest of the country.

Most of the deserters' actions were not overtly political in motive or military in execution. Operating in bands of ten to forty, the dissidents resorted to kidnapping and banditry and caused some thirty deaths in the March-July period. The rebels emphasized the

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

political nature of their actions when a group of them kidnapped six foreign tourists in July 1982, prompting a national manhunt. The dissidents, who identified themselves in a communiqué as "Zipra Forces," said they would release their victims only in return for the release of the jailed ZIPRA leaders and the end of government harassment of Nkomo.


Mugabe's government acted sternly against the rebels, making sweeps through guerrilla areas, uncovering several caches of arms, and arresting dissidents. The largest operation mounted in the first months after the renewed violence involved joint sweeps by the police and the army through Bulawayo, spearheaded by the national army's elite, white-led One Commando Battalion. Security forces established roadblocks throughout the city and required citizens to show identification or be detained; house-to-house searches were conducted for arms caches and deserters. Nkomo publicly supported the government's tough policies for dealing with the situation but called for a bipartisan commission to be established to determine the causes of the disturbances.

The government's repression of PF-ZAPU leaders, even if in reaction to a threat posed by the rival party, risked alienating completely the Ndebele and threatened to undermine ZANU-PF as a national party. In 1982 the strife between the two parties did not appear to threaten the government in Harare directly, but an endemic insurgency in the western provinces seemed a possibility.

Regional Security Concerns

In 1982 the government's security concerns were primarily local in scope, whereas during the civil war period external factors significantly shaped the security perceptions of the African nationalist leaders and the Rhodesian government. The Soviet Union, its East European allies, and China had supplied and supported the nationalist guerrillas; the United Nations (UN) had imposed trade sanctions against Rhodesia; South Africa had supported the Smith government; and the precedent of Cuban military intervention in nearby Angola had threatened wider internationalization of the conflict. As the risk of increased international involvement in southern Africa receded after the 1980 election, independent Zimbabwe's external security concerns focused mainly on South Africa, its powerful, white-ruled neighbor.

Zimbabwe's three black-ruled neighbors—Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana—possessed only modest economic and military structures and posed no measurable threat. Having supported the guerrillas to varying degrees in the civil war, they maintained basically friendly relations with Harare. South Africa, however, was a potentially hostile state, having an economy over fifteen times the size of Zimbabwe's and larger, better trained, more modern armed forces (see fig. 19).



Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1981-82*, London, 1981.

Figure 19. Balance of Power in Southern Africa, 1982

Despite a loathing for the apartheid system, Mugabe realized that his country's economy and security were largely dependent on South Africa. On becoming prime minister, he pursued a pragmatic policy of economic cooperation while refusing official diplomatic relations and emphasizing the political differences between his government and the one in Pretoria (see South Africa, ch. 4).

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

South Africa used economic pressure and demonstrated that it could threaten Zimbabwe's national security despite the two countries' economic relations. In 1981 South Africans used their economic leverage against Zimbabwe by announcing that the preferential trade agreement between the two countries would be allowed to lapse, that locomotives loaned to Zimbabwe's burdened national railroads would be recalled, and that Zimbabweans working in South African mines (and earning valuable foreign exchange) would be repatriated. The South African government later consented to renewal of the trade agreement and the lease on the locomotives. Relations improved, but Zimbabwean suspicions were not relieved.

Apart from South Africa's ability to threaten Zimbabwe's government by disrupting its economy, Harare was concerned about Pretoria's ability to use the more direct methods it has employed against other African countries. South African armed forces had openly raided Angola on several occasions in the late 1970s and early 1980s to attack insurgents affiliated with the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), who were seeking independence for South African-controlled Namibia, and South Africa also had supported the antigovernmental National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—UNITA). Although it had accommodated itself to the introduction of a Marxist regime in Mozambique, South Africa was also widely believed by international observers to support the Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana—RNM). An insurgent group originally established by the Rhodesians, the RNM through its operations in Mozambique had damaged Zimbabwe's rail and pipeline links with Indian Ocean ports.

South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha asserted that his country had never interfered in the affairs of its neighbors but warned that it would not hesitate to use its strength if Zimbabwe allowed its territory to be used by black nationalists to undermine South African security. There was no evidence that Zimbabwe had provided a base for anti-Pretoria guerrillas, but because of known South African involvement in other African states and the discovery of undercover agents in the Zimbabwe government who were accused of gathering intelligence for Pretoria, suspicions arose among Harare officials that the southern neighbor was conducting a program of ongoing covert operations in Zimbabwe. On several occasions in 1981 and 1982 the government charged—and the South Africans denied—that Pretoria was training 5,000 black Zimbabweans to carry out acts of sabotage and that South Africa was fomenting the Ndebele disturbances. In August 1982 Zimbabwean troops clashed north of the Limpopo with a patrol of former Rhodesians serving with the South African Defence Force and killed three of them. The South African government, although admitting that the incursion did take place, insisted that the territorial violation was not sanctioned by responsible authorities. South Africa was also linked by Zimbabweans to a variety of acts of

terrorism and sabotage, including the July 1981 assassination in Harare of Joe Gqabi, a senior official in the anti-apartheid African National Congress.

The extent of South African activities having direct security implications apart from intelligence gathering could not be determined in 1982. Although the level of that country's involvement was not comparable in scale to its actions in Mozambique and Angola (which were both supporting anti-Pretoria insurgent movements), most observers believed that South African agencies were at least in contact with opponents of the Harare regime. According to Mugabe in mid-1982, "South Africa continues to carry out its acts of aggression against us and against its other neighbors—and that is happening without any provocation from us. This is a deliberate exercise to disorganize our economies and to upset our newly established political order."

The Armed Forces: Adjusting to New Realities

In 1982 the Zimbabwe Defence Force was in the midst of a transition as the former Rhodesian Security Forces and the former guerrilla armies were adjusting to their reconstitution into a single military organization under a unified command. The primary mission of the defense force was to defend Zimbabwe against outside enemies and, like its Rhodesian antecedent, to back up the national police in the maintenance of internal security. But in actuality the main task of the Zimbabwe Defence Force was the effort to integrate its component parts. Success in this endeavor would support national unity; failure could break it. In mid-1982 most observers were cautiously optimistic, but the long-term result of the amalgamation effort could not be determined with certainty.

Thirty months after independence the national army had a personnel strength of about 49,000—down from 60,000 six months earlier—with the headquarters of major units located in five of the country's major cities. The air force was authorized a strength of 2,900, over twice the size of the service during the civil war, but it was largely composed of trainees and nontechnical ground personnel. Former guerrillas made up the bulk of the armed forces' manpower. Almost all of the more than 7,000 Africans who had served with the Rhodesian army and air force remained; but of the whites who formerly dominated the armed forces, less than 1,000 of 6,000 remained in the regular military establishment, and about half of them were in the air force. During the 1980s it was expected that the character of the Zimbabwe Defence Force would continue to change as white personnel departed, as other soldiers were gradually demobilized and, Zimbabwean officials hoped, as it assumed the identity and military effectiveness of a unified establishment.

Development Before 1965

Some observers trace the development of the modern armed forces to the 1890s when officers trained in British and South African

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

military doctrine led the Pioneer Column of white settlers from the Cape Colony northward to what later became Salisbury. Armed with rifles, machine guns, cannons, and other weapons, the few hundred settlers and soldier-police of the British South Africa Company were able to defeat much larger numbers of African warriors when they moved into Matabeleland in 1893.

Other observers, including many who served in the guerrilla armies in the civil war of the 1970s, prefer to link modern Zimbabwe's military development to the bloody African military resistance to settler rule that reached its height in 1896 and 1897. The uprising, which spread from the Ndebele to the previously peaceful Shona and resulted in considerable loss of life on all sides, proved to be the last major African armed challenge to white rule until the 1960s.

In 1896 the soldier-police were removed from the direct control and employ of the company, and their name was changed from the British South Africa Company's Police to British South Africa Police (BSAP). After their change of status in 1896, they continued to function as a military as well as a police organization, participating as military units in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). In 1900 the still relatively small settlements had 1,700 men under arms in support of the British cause in southern Africa.

BSAP units also served Britain in German South-West Africa and German East Africa during World War I, assisting in the defeat of German forces on the African continent. During the 1920s and 1930s the military role was shifted from the BSAP to the British defense staff and to territorial troops called to duty when needed. The colonial government during this period also appropriated money to form an air training unit that became the nucleus of the air force.

In World War II military service was compulsory for white men between eighteen and forty-five years of age, and some 6,000 of them—two-thirds of the white male population between fifteen and forth-five—served overseas on active duty. The Southern Rhodesian Air Force was absorbed into the Royal Air Force, where it performed with distinction and suffered a 20 percent loss rate. White troops in a unit known as the Rhodesia Regiment spearheaded several difficult campaigns, especially in Ethiopia and North Africa. Two thousand Southern Rhodesian Africans were also enlisted into a separate regiment, the RAR, which was commanded by white officers and achieved notably good combat records in the campaign to recapture Burma.

When the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed in 1953, the military units of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia (present-day Zambia), and Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) were combined. As Southern Rhodesia was the dominant member of the federation, its officers were the senior commanders in charge of all federation units. During this period Southern Rhodesians served overseas on behalf of the British Empire, most notably in Malaya where counterinsurgency tactics later used against Zimbabwean

guerrillas were developed.

When the federation was dissolved in 1963, Southern Rhodesia retained all of the forces that had been raised in its territory—3,400 of the 7,000 men who had been in the army of the disintegrating federation. Over the objections of the black leadership of soon-to-be independent Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as well as other African heads of state, it also kept the majority of the men and almost all the aircraft in the Royal Rhodesian Air Force, the air arm of the short-lived federation; most of the 1,100 personnel in the air force had originally been from Southern Rhodesia.

Civil War and the Three Armies

The civil war, which lasted for roughly seven years until the end of 1979, resulted in the formation of two major guerrilla armies, the growth of the Rhodesian Security Forces, and the militarization of the society. As a result of government policy to integrate the three forces, the Zimbabwean military establishment in 1982 was composed almost exclusively of veterans from the conflict. The structure and performance of the postwar forces in large measure had resulted from the different wartime experiences of their component parts. It was expected that the political and ethnic diversity of the veteran soldiers would continue to shape the character of Zimbabwe's military for at least several years.

Guerrilla Forces

The guerrilla armies that fought to topple the white Rhodesian government were an outgrowth of groups that conducted limited random political agitation and violence for African political rights in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Guerrilla operations began after Zambia's independence in 1964 and, at first, typically consisted of infiltrating a column of soldiers from bases there. Black nationalist fighters were forced to cross the confining Zambezi River valley or Lake Kariba where Rhodesian Security Forces concentrated their efforts and where many of the few local Africans were unsympathetic to them. Often lacking clear objectives, they were invariably routed by mobile Rhodesian troops and their air support or were demoralized and deserted.

With the failure of the African nationalists' policy of inducing "fear and despondency," military operations virtually ceased by late 1968. The externally based nationalist leaders concentrated on rebuilding their forces and reevaluating their tactics. To replace losses and to ensure the continued funding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Liberation Committee, ZAPU and ZANU recruited, often forcibly, black Zimbabweans living in neighboring countries. The guerrilla groups during this period also increased their military training and supply links with other countries. Besides the OAU and the group of countries in southern Africa committed to achieving majority rule in Rhodesia, ZANU developed close links with China while ZAPU strengthened its relationship with the Soviet Union and

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

the East European countries.

ZANLA, ZANU's military wing, began in this period to develop tactics that enabled ZANU to take the initiative in the military struggle against Rhodesia and in its more subtle battle with ZAPU for prestige among Africans. With the cooperation of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—FRELIMO), which was fighting its own guerrilla war against Portuguese colonialist rulers, ZANLA forces were able to establish camps in Tete Province of eastern Mozambique from which they could conduct operations into the lightly defended areas of northeastern Rhodesia. ZANLA did not immediately mount combat operations but, accepting the advice of FRELIMO veterans and Chinese advisers, pursued a Maoist policy designed to gain the moral and material support of the local population, which was predominantly Shona. Before engaging in combat, they sought to build ties with local spirit mediums and respected elders, which enabled the guerrillas to gain the trust and succor of the local Africans and gave ZANU an overwhelmingly Shona power base.

It was not until December 1972, after more than a year of building personal contacts and logistical systems in northeastern Rhodesia, that ZANLA guerrillas launched their first series of attacks on white farmers who were unpopular with local Africans. The guerrillas' subsequent ability to evade detection by Rhodesian Security Force led Ian Smith to state at the time that the security situation in the northeast was "far more serious than it appears on the surface." ZANLA continued to operate successfully, despite its soldiers' generally poor training and discipline and despite political problems within the party organization. The guerrilla army was not easily able to increase its manned strength in the early 1970s, however, as joining *vakomana* (a Shona word meaning "the boys") did not become popular among Africans until the Portuguese announced in 1974 that they were withdrawing from Mozambique. Recruitment increased as a result of that psychological boost, and ZANLA strength inside the country grew (according to Rhodesian estimates) from under 100 in the early 1970s to about 700 in early 1976. By mid-1977 there were as many as 3,000 ZANLA guerrillas operating in the east, north, and south of Rhodesia, by which time it was no longer necessary for ZANLA to recruit soldiers. ZANLA's strength eventually grew to include some 30,000 guerrillas, and more than 10,000 of them operated in the country by late 1979.

The Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)—the military wing of Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU—did not prosecute the guerrilla war as actively as did ZANLA. ZIPRA, well organized and trained along conventional lines with substantial assistance from Soviet, East European, and North Korean advisers, operated under the close control of Nkomo. The army's tight organization and limited operations reflected its secondary place in ZAPU's strategy of pursuing power through political negotiations with Rhodesian, other African,

and international leaders. In 1977, after the failure of peace negotiations in Geneva, ZIPRA began a significant expansion of manpower recruiting that increased its personnel strength from under 1,000 in the early 1970s (and none inside Rhodesia) to some 20,000 by 1980, most of them Ndebele oriented. ZIPRA armed activity also grew during this period. Most notably ZIPRA forces used SA-7 surface-to-air missiles to shoot down two Rhodesian Viscount airliners in 1978 and 1979. ZIPRA was also involved in laying land mines, but it never had the local infrastructure to operate as effectively as its ZANLA counterpart. ZIPRA's increased activity was seen by some as largely a reflection of the ZAPU leadership's realization that ZANLA's military success was giving ZANU new political prestige and legitimacy at ZAPU's expense.

During the guerrilla war the two African nationalist armies rarely operated together because of ethnic and personal animosities as well as differing ideological and tactical concepts. Conflict between the two groups was intense and often violent when they were in proximity but was limited in the late 1970s when they operated from separate bases against different target areas. ZANLA used bases located in Zambia until 1976, but most of its important headquarters and garrisons were in Mozambique (especially after it became independent in 1975) and Tanzania. The major ZIPRA bases were in Zambia and Angola, although there were recruiting officers in Botswana.

From the beginning of the civil war, the leadership of the OAU and the so-called front-line states (see Glossary) sought to impose unity on the African nationalist factions. But their efforts to create a third force—the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI)—proved unsuccessful (see *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, ch. 1). A 1976 attempt by guerrillas from both major factions to unite in the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) and bypass the politicians also failed. ZIPA's central concept—that military men should run the war—came to be adopted by ZANLA, which also absorbed most of ZIPA personnel. Formed in October 1976 to present a common negotiating front at the Geneva Conference, the Patriotic Front alliance gained quick recognition by the African front-line states as the only legitimate Zimbabwe liberation movement. Military cooperation between ZAPU and ZANU, however, never developed significantly during the war.

Despite differences within the liberation movement, the insurgents were increasingly able to escalate the level of fighting against the Rhodesian Security Forces. Using their established network of contacts in eastern Zimbabwe and acting brutally against real or suspected informants, ZANLA was able to build small bases in that area while ZIPRA gradually established its presence in the west. By the late 1970s most of the Tribal Trust Lands had come under the virtual political control of the two guerrilla armies. Although neither guerrilla faction was able to establish and hold a liberated area within Rhodesia, during the later stages of the war the insurgents (especially

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

those of ZANLA) frequently held meetings with African civilians, often in broad daylight, to educate and indoctrinate them. While seeking to avoid direct contact with the government security forces, the guerrillas, by operating conspicuously, sought to demonstrate that white Rhodesian power was not invulnerable. The insurgents often struck isolated white farms, gradually driving the owners from certain areas of the country, lowering morale, and damaging agricultural productivity. Other guerrilla activities, including the widespread use of land mines and the destruction of cattle dips, had their most serious impact on the local African population. Thus, although the guerrillas were generally thought to be confident of success by the time of the Lancaster House Conference in late 1979, the civilian population—Africans and whites—was increasingly war weary and eager for a settlement.

Rhodesian Security Forces

Beginning in 1972 the Rhodesian Security Forces underwent a massive expansion to meet the growing guerrilla threat. The military establishment had changed little since UDI in 1965, although counterinsurgency tactics had been improved as a result of limited experience gained during the 1960s.

In 1971, according to estimates by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Rhodesian military spending amounted to only 8.2 percent of total government expenditures. The personnel strength of the regular army consisted of 3,400 underpaid soldiers, and 1,200 served with the air force. An 8,000-man Territorial Force operated as a reserve element. The paramilitary BSAP had 6,400 active members (two-thirds of them Africans) and a reserve of 28,500 (three-quarters of them whites). Conscription laws required young white males to serve twelve months with the regular army plus three additional years of part-time duty with the Territorial Force reserves.

By 1979 military outlays had increased to 26 percent of central government expenditures, although outside observers were impressed with how Rhodesia was controlling its spending. In that year total government spending classed as "war costs" accounted for 41 percent of the central government budget. The army had increased in strength to 20,000 personnel, including 14,000 conscripts and reserves on active duty at any one time. The armed forces also underwent a complete reorganization after 1971, when the army was composed of two infantry battalions, one Special Air Service (SAS) squadron of elite special warfare troops, one artillery battery, and one armored car unit. (One battalion, the Rhodesian Light Infantry, was exclusively white; the other, the Rhodesian African Rifles [RAR] was manned by African soldiers led by white officers.) Eight years later the army's main units consisted of one heavy battalion of Rhodesian Light Infantry, three battalions of the RAR, and eight battalions of active reserves. The SAS had been expanded to four squadrons and had been joined in special warfare tasks by the mixed-race Selous

*Members of Rhodesian
Security Forces on patrol
Courtesy Herbert M. Howe*



Scouts (of battalion strength), who specialized in counterinsurgency operations. Grey's Scouts was a horse-mounted counterinsurgency and reconnaissance unit. Artillery, signal, and engineer branches were also expanded during the conflict. The BSAP grew to a regular strength of 11,000 and was supported by 35,000 police reservists; Africans dominated the regular force and whites accounted for most of the reserve strength. These diverse commands and others—including as many as 20,000 armed "auxiliaries" loyal to "moderate" nationalist politicians Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa and a 3,500-man (mostly African) Guard Force used for guarding protected villages—fell under the authority of Combined Operations, headed by Lieutenant General Walls.

Rhodesian military equipment throughout the war was often well worn and in many cases obsolete inasmuch as the trade and arms embargo imposed by the UN at the time of UDI limited the country's ability to modernize its arsenal. But Rhodesians showed resourcefulness in modifying commercial vehicles to serve as mine-resistant transport trucks and armored personnel carriers. They also produced light ammunition and several models of 9mm guns, including a copy of the successful Israeli Uzi submachine gun, known locally as the Rhuzi. Rhodesia was forced to buy most of its arms from South Africa and from international arms dealers willing to violate the UN embargo.

It was estimated that by early 1979 the Rhodesian Security Forces

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

were able to mobilize 100,000 soldiers for short periods of time. According to a 1976 law, all white males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five were required to serve for eighteen months in the military and subsequently in military or police units on a periodic basis. The following year, men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-three were called up for 190 days annually, and men aged thirty-eight to fifty were required to serve seventy days each year. In January 1979 the call-up was extended to include males aged fifty to fifty-nine who lived in urban areas. From early 1977 the call-ups included Asians, Coloureds, and some Africans, as well as whites.

Africans served in the security forces, initially as volunteer enlisted men and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). As the war expanded, barriers to African advancement fell away, and by 1980 about 10 percent of the officer corps was black, serving at junior levels. In the last stages of the war, immediately before and during the period of Muzorewa's internal settlement, government conscription was broadened to include Africans, but relatively few reported for active duty.

Although their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, Rhodesian forces were credited with waging a counterinsurgency campaign with great professional competence, adapting their tactics and force structure to meet new contingencies. Excessive violence against guerrillas and noncombatants, rare before 1974, heightened afterwards as Rhodesian casualties and terrorist acts by the guerrillas mounted. The Selous Scouts counterinsurgency unit was frequently blamed for atrocities against civilians and missionaries—actions that were made to appear as the work of nationalist guerrillas. In retrospect the security forces were weakened most severely by lapses in their intelligence estimates: they never recognized ZANLA infiltration into the northeast until after the guerrillas were well integrated into the local society and striking Rhodesian targets; later they consistently overestimated Muzorewa's popularity and underrated Mugabe.

The High Command and the Government

In 1982 it appeared that Mugabe had established his civilian authority over the three military forces his country had inherited. Before the transition to majority rule, the respective military establishments had played a central role in white Rhodesian political affairs and in the African nationalist political organizations. Before the 1980 elections ZANU-PF officials had refused to commit themselves to unification of the armed forces, but Mugabe's first order of business after his decisive victory was to announce that the two guerrilla armies would be integrated with the former Rhodesian Security Forces. Further he asked that Lieutenant General Walls, the senior Rhodesian military officer, remain at his post to supervise the transition. Mugabe's appointment of Walls was an astute move that contributed to stability in the immediate postindependence period. The general's presence eased the fears and hostility of whites,

who still controlled government security operations and the civil service. Moreover Walls was neutral in the political skirmishing between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU; his appointment did not exacerbate the rivalry in this critical period as the appointment of a ZANLA or ZIPRA commander might have done.

The 1980 Constitution gives the prime minister significant powers over the armed forces. He provides binding advice to the country's largely ceremonial president regarding the appointment of commanders of the army, the air force, and any other branches of the armed forces that might be formed. The prime minister or a minister of his choice also has constitutional authority to give "general directions of policy" to a commander of a service who "shall comply with such directions or cause them to be complied with." If he is dissatisfied with the performance of a commander of one of the services, the prime minister can advise the president to dismiss the incumbent, providing the cabinet is consulted and parliament is informed. In 1982 discussions were ongoing regarding proposals to rewrite the constitution in order to center political authority in an executive president who would, in name as well as in fact, be commander in chief of the armed forces (see Executive Branch and Civil Service, ch. 4).

Mugabe's constitutional power over the armed forces as prime minister has been reinforced by his concurrent position as defense minister, a portfolio he retained for himself from the outset. Operational control of the armed forces, from four days before independence until August 1981, was vested in the Joint High Command (JHC). The JHC was composed of the ZANLA commander, Lieutenant General Nhongo; the ZIPRA chief, Lieutenant General Lookout Masuku; high ZIPRA official Dumiso Dabengwa; and the heads of the former Rhodesian army and air force. The commander of the British military advisory group served as a nonvoting member of the JHC. A small supporting staff dealt with specific areas such as plans, manpower, and training and was directed by a former Rhodesian army major general, who served as chief of staff. A white civil servant, Allan Page, served as permanent secretary in the Ministry of Defence. Walls initially presided over the JHC, but that body made its decision collectively. Walls' lack of authority and his differences with some former guerrilla leaders—notably the mercurial Nhongo—caused him to step down in July 1980.

After Walls' departure the armed forces continued without a supreme commander until the JHC was dissolved in August 1981. Walls' former deputy, army commander Lieutenant General Alexander MacLean, was subsequently considered the senior military officer, and Page served as chairman of the JHC until Emmerson Munangagwa, a Mugabe loyalist and minister of state in the Prime Minister's Office, assumed chairmanship of the JHC in January 1981. Throughout the transition period, however, command of the former Rhodesian Security Forces—into which the former guerrilla armies were

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

being integrated—remained in the hands of whites, as did command of most of the major units. Seeking to create a competent, loyal national force, Mugabe relied heavily on impartial British military advisers and generally avoided actions that would antagonize soldiers who had fought under Nkomo.

It was not until the Unified High Command was established in August 1981 that Mugabe began to appoint former ZANLA officers to the most important command positions and to place former ZIPRA officers in secondary posts. MacLean was named supreme commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Force and was promoted to the rank of general. He did not command troops, however, and had limited authority. Command of the army was held by Nhongo, and Masuku served as deputy commander. The air force continued to be led by Air Vice Marshal Norman Walsh; both he and his deputy were white.

Under the new system Mugabe held ultimate authority over the country's defense and security organization, and Munangagwa continued to be his most prominent deputy. Sydney Sekeramayi was promoted to minister of state in the Prime Minister's Office and was primarily responsible for functions relating to the armed forces. The Unified High Command also included three army chiefs of staff of major general rank. Thirty-year-old Major General Josiah Tungamirai, a former ZANLA commander well respected for his leadership and organizational abilities, served as chief of staff for operations. A white former Rhodesian was chief of staff for administration, and Major General Javan Maseko (formerly of ZIPRA) was chief of staff for procurement and logistics (quartermaster).

In early 1982 as violence in Matabeleland began to mount, the high command was further modified to reflect the military's role in maintaining domestic order. The Joint Operations Command was established on an ad hoc basis, and its staff included those serving with the Unified High Command as well as the heads of the police and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) (see State Security Services, this ch.).

Shakeups in the high command continued during the year, and former ZANLA officers became increasingly prominent in the top military echelons. Masuku was arrested in connection with the discovery of arms caches in Matabeleland, and MacLean went on leave pending his retirement in May, frustrated after it became obvious that his position as supreme military commander was powerless. Officials announced that MacLean would not be replaced, and his staff was put at the disposal of Minister of State Sekeramayi.

The Military and the Economy

Since independence the defense budget has been prepared by civilians in the Ministry of Defence under the authority of the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Defence. Neither the army nor the air force had a budget office, but the service chiefs and

commanders of major units were closely consulted, as were political authorities while funding levels were being determined. After its acceptance by the prime minister, the defense budget was debated and voted on by parliament where the Mugabe government had no trouble getting its defense priorities approved. During Zimbabwe's 1981-82 fiscal year (FY), Z\$280.5 million (for value of the Zimbabwe dollar—see Glossary) as authorized for the Ministry of Defence, accounting for 17 percent of Zimbabwe's total government spending and for 8.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1980 (see table 17, Appendix). Military spending had increased from Z\$163.0 million in 1978-79 and Z\$266.2 million in 1979-80, the last two fiscal years of the civil war, but the higher costs were, to an extent, the result of Zimbabwe's inflationary trends. During this period, when the defense budget increased by 67 percent, spending on health and education rose by 80 percent, and total government expenditures grew by 92 percent (see Government Finance, ch. 3).

Zimbabwe's continued high defense costs resulted largely from the government's reluctance to demobilize significant numbers of the 50,000 former guerrillas (see Military Manpower: Demobilization and Integration, this ch.). It was estimated that over 75 percent of the FY 1981-82 defense budget was devoted to personnel costs. Spending on military personnel had been limited during the civil war because the Territorial Army reserves, who constituted most of Rhodesia's military personnel, were rarely mobilized all at the same time, and they were paid only for their time on active duty. By contrast, the reserves in the Zimbabwe armed forces (mainly unintegrated former guerrillas in assembly camps) constituted a full-time force that had to be paid and housed. In FY 1980-81 there were Z\$33.3 million plus Z\$18.9 million in supplementary funds authorized to pay the reserves, compared with a total of Z\$21.1 million authorized during the last year of the war. The costs of the reserves declined by some Z\$44 million the following year as the guerrillas were brought into the regular army, but army salaries rose from Z\$55 million to Z\$117 million. Maintenance costs also increased, and some capital spending, including Z\$10 million in FY 1980-81 supplementary spending for building additional barracks, resulted from the army's expanded personnel strength.

Military expenditures in 1982 had only begun to be affected by the costs of replacing obsolete and worn-out Rhodesian equipment that continued to serve the Zimbabwean military. The air force was most in need of an expensive reequipment program, as all of its first-line jet aircraft until 1981 had been delivered before UDI in 1965 and had been used almost continuously since. The sabotage in 1982 of thirteen aircraft, including the first four new jets delivered in nearly twenty years, accelerated the need for new planes while increasing the costs involved.

Continued high levels of military spending adversely affected the economy. Increased military spending in FY 1981-82 was funded, in

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

part, by indirect taxes, which were expected to result in an immediate 5 percent increase in the cost of living. Military spending was a partial reason for an expected Z\$312.1 million budgetary deficit which, although not as high as some feared, contributed to the weakening of the currency and to increased borrowing on international markets. Moreover military equipment purchases after independence included few, if any, domestically produced goods other than uniforms and other personnel equipment items; vehicles and weapons produced domestically during the war ceased to be demanded by the military after independence.

Partly to ease the burden of defense spending, Mugabe has expressed the desire that Zimbabwe's armed forces, like those of other socialist and African countries, actively engage in economic development schemes. Operation SEED (Soldiers Engaged in Economic Development), launched shortly after independence, was the first large-scale development project involving the military. But three pilot farms involving 10,000 former guerrillas from the assembly camps proved less successful than the government had hoped, and the program was gradually phased out. According to Mugabe, the farming efforts were hampered primarily by a lack of tools and equipment. Even at the most successful Operation SEED site, located near the Gwai River assembly camp in the northwest, former ZIPRA guerrillas cultivated 600 acres of maize with no more than a few horses and wheelbarrows. Other observers blamed the guerrillas' resentment of white supervisory personnel, their lack of farming expertise, and the feeling, prevalent among many, that farming was a demeaning activity for soldiers.

In 1982 it appeared that programs to engage the military in productive tasks would continue to be developed. Military vehicles were used to transport maize when plentiful harvests combined with transportation bottlenecks in 1980 and 1981. During a critical drought in Matabeleland in 1982, the government called upon the army to transport emergency water and food supplies to 120,000 of the people most severely affected and food aid to 2 million others. In addition to agricultural projects, elements of the army were reportedly engaged in the construction of roads, bridges, and schools as well as in other public works projects. According to Mugabe in late 1981, every brigade would, in the future, be expected to engage in productive work "as a matter of discipline and [as] a way of life. . . ." He stated that the army should and would produce for itself and for the country.

Military Manpower: Demobilization and Integration

The new government, through its restructured military high command, undertook to change the racial and political composition of the armed forces, an effort designed to reflect the nationalists' political victory. By 1982 the process of integrating the two guerrilla armies with the former Rhodesian Security Forces had been offic-

ially completed, and the steady departure of white servicemen continued. Concurrent government attempts to demobilize significant numbers of soldiers proceeded despite constraints imposed by political, administrative, and security considerations.

In 1982 the Zimbabwe army was being reduced in size from 60,000 to an eventual level of 40,000. In a total population of some 7.5 million, one out of every 125 Zimbabweans was in uniform. Conscription, which had been practiced in the Rhodesian era, had been abolished by Mugabe in March 1980. Reserves included the all-white Territorial Army of approximately 6,000 members, down from 10,000 at independence. The Zimbabwe Republic Police also served as a military reserve and, in the case of domestic unrest, the first line of response. Plans were under way in 1982 to form a paramilitary training program for army veterans and youths that would function as a military reserve in emergencies.

Demobilization

The number of soldiers in the country was reduced considerably after the end of the war mainly by the demobilization of units in the Rhodesian Security Forces that began shortly after the 1980 election. During that year police and military reserves were released from active duty, and several active units were disbanded; some 90 percent of the African auxiliaries loyal to Muzorewa and Sithole were released, as were the Guard Force and smaller specialized paramilitary forces. As a result the erstwhile Rhodesian component of the Zimbabwe armed forces was reduced to a core of 12,000 army regulars—7,000 Africans (mainly enlisted men) and 5,000 whites (a large proportion of whom were officers).

Demobilizing or integrating the former guerrillas in fourteen assembly areas was more difficult; their numbers had risen from nearly 3,000 at independence to more than 50,000 over the next eighteen months. The first groups of guerrillas to report to the assembly camps included a high proportion of *mujibas* (young followers of the guerrilla armies), as both ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU held back their best troops. After independence 3,000 ZIPRA troops returned from Libya, 1,000 from Yugoslavia, 1,000 from Romania, and 2,000 from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; an additional 2,000 returned from Angola in October 1981. ZANU-PF likewise withheld some 5,000 of its troops in Mozambique until mid-1981. The demobilization and integration plans thus had to be constantly modified and adapted to fit the changing situation. Initial assessments by British military advisers, who played the central role in rebuilding the army, indicated that a combined program of integration and demobilization would take six months to complete with nearly 10,000 former guerrillas integrated into an army that would have a total personnel strength of about 20,000.

A phased demobilization of the guerrillas (two-thirds of whom were members of ZANLA) was to coincide with the integration program.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Of those not integrated, some were to be released outright, while the rest (approximately 20,000) were to be placed in paramilitary service in agricultural camps (under the short-lived Operation SEED). The initial guerrilla demobilization effort in May 1980 involved the outright release, with a Z\$350 bonus for each man, of approximately 8,000 former insurgents. The program was quickly suspended when officials realized that the economy and society could not readily absorb large numbers of Zimbabweans trained only in weapons handling. Most of those released were reported to have returned to the assembly camps when their bonus money ran out, blending back into the army.

In August 1981 the government announced that it would begin a Z\$116 million program to reduce the national army by as many as 30,000. Each demobilized soldier was to be given Z\$185 each month for up to two years in addition to educational and training benefits. Roughly 6,500 soldiers—3,000 men and 3,500 women—were demobilized during the last three months of 1981. (The women, all of them former ZANLA guerrillas, were released with only a small monetary bonus.) The program was suspended, however, when the Demobilization Directorate within the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare was unable to work out a system to trace, identify, and pay the veterans who had left the service. Demobilization was resumed several months later when nine infantry battalions (about 9,500 men) were demobilized between May and August 1982.

Further reductions in the army's personnel strength were likely to be made in the context of the formation of a paramilitary training program and in the expansion of a 1,500 police paramilitary force (see Zimbabwe Republic Police, this ch.). The paramilitary training program, to be administered by the Ministry of Youth, Sport, and Recreation, was aimed at Zimbabweans aged eighteen to thirty-five, including demobilized veterans. The program was to be established by soldiers giving paramilitary instructions at training centers located in each of the country's eight provinces. The eventual size of the force was not known, but the government appeared to be serious about the program as a means of reducing unemployment and was seeking to ensure its success by careful planning and assessment of its goals and resources.

Integration

Integration of the three armies, although a difficult and in 1982 an inconclusive process, was considered by some to have been the Mugabe government's greatest success (see fig. 20). Integration of the armed forces actually began on an experimental basis before the 1980 elections when 600 ZIPRA guerrillas were retrained by a contingent of thirty British soldiers from the Commonwealth force monitoring the cease-fire that ended hostilities. An attempt by former Rhodesian officers in April and May 1980 to integrate a company each of ZANLA, ZIPRA, and former Rhodesian troops to form a new




Figure 20. Evolution of Zimbabwe National Army, 1980-82

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

battalion collapsed in insubordination and violence.

The major, British-run effort at integration commenced in May 1980. In its initial phase, nine battalions to be reorganized into four brigades were established. ZANLA and ZIPRA officers and NCOs were given eight weeks of training by the British at the Zimbabwe Military Academy/School of Infantry at Gwelo (present-day Gweru). The top graduate of the officers' training course was named battalion commander, regardless of whether he had served in ZANLA or ZIPRA. If a ZANLA trainee graduated at the head of his class, the most successful ZIPRA officer—irrespective of his overall class standing or his previous wartime experience and position—was named deputy commander and vice versa if an ex-ZIPRA officer became battalion commander. ZIPRA officers, having had conventional East European training during the war, generally performed better than ZANLA officers in this formal instruction. As a result of their classroom performance, eight of the first twelve battalion commanders reportedly were former ZIPRA officers. Four weeks of working with the enlisted men followed before the battalion "passed out." The battalion was then moved to the brigade training area, where it joined with engineer, artillery, and support units, most of which had served the former Rhodesian army. "Passing out" at two-week intervals, the first nine integrated battalions had been formed by the end of September 1980, and the program was considered to be largely completed.

When the scheme for outright demobilization failed and difficulties arose with Operation SEED (which were evidenced by riots by former guerrillas in Bulawayo in October-November 1980 and the continuing crime problem), government attention again focused on integration. Mugabe was reminded of and affirmed an earlier promise that no guerrillas would be demobilized against their will. The integration program was restarted on an accelerated basis in January 1981 and was designed to bring most of the former guerrillas remaining in the assembly camps into the army. The revised program featured a reduced four-week training period for officers, followed by four weeks of the battalion exercises before "passing out." Battalion commanders were also appointed for political reasons in addition to their classroom performance, and the proportion of ZANLA commanders increased. PF-ZAPU political leaders at first held ZIPRA soldiers out of this second stage of integration. But as the program continued without them and three all-ZANLA battalions were formed in January 1981, the party saw the possibility of its exclusion from the army and allowed ZIPRA veterans to rejoin the process.

By the end of September 1981 there were thirty-four infantry battalions composed of about 37,000 ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers. (Thirty-seven had been formed, but three had been disbanded after the February 1981 riots at Bulawayo.) Approximately 14,000 guerrillas were integrated into established artillery, engineer, and support units where they were given on-the-job training by former Rhode-

sian members of the units and the British. Two of the three all-ZANLA battalions were grouped with 3,000 other unintegrated ZANLA soldiers to form the unique Fifth Brigade, which in August 1981 began training under North Korean advisers with North Korean equipment (see *Army Organization, Equipment, and Training*, this ch.). African soldiers who had served with the Rhodesian Army before independence remained in three crack, unintegrated battalions of what had been the RAR. Three special warfare battalions—the commandos, the paratroopers, and the mounted infantry (formerly Grey's Scouts)—received ZIPRA and ZANLA veterans and in early 1982 continued to be led by whites.

The air force, unlike the army, did not undergo an extensive integration program in the first two years after independence. In mid-1982 the air force commander and his deputy were whites, as was the overwhelming majority of pilots and technical personnel. The Mugabe government apparently decided that a degradation of quality in the technically oriented air service was not worth the political benefits of a rapid integration. The air force was reported to be understaffed in 1982, however, as whites left the country or took better paying jobs with private business. In mid-1982 the service had only 100 of the 180 pilots authorized. Attrition among technical support personnel was higher but was partially relieved by an influx of white technicians from the army who transferred to the air force. Africans, most of them former guerrillas, performed security duty and manned antiaircraft artillery defenses at the two major air bases. In mid-1982 only five African pilots—four from ZIPRA and one from ZANLA, who received pilot training in Romania and Cuba respectively—served with the air force. If the government continued its policy of maintaining the high standards of the air force, it was expected to take as long as five to ten years to train enough black Zimbabweans to operate the air force without white assistance.

Composition and Ranks

The most conspicuous change in the armed forces manpower composition has been the steady departure of white service personnel. It was estimated that some 3,000 whites of all ranks were in the regular army at the end of 1980, and they dominated the officer corps; by mid-1982 there were fewer than 500. After the civil war those who remained were primarily engaged in technical and logistical specialties. To replace the skilled white personnel who had departed, the air force and the army, in a controversial move, advertised in 1981 for foreign technicians to serve in Zimbabwe under contract. For political reasons, however, few West Europeans were hired, and reportedly only a limited number of Indian technicians were contracted for the air force.

Since independence, information on the ethnic composition of the armed forces has been limited. It was possible, however, to make generalizations based on what was known about the ethnic composi-

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

tion of the Rhodesian Security Forces and the guerrilla armies during the civil war. Shona speakers were believed to constitute some 70 percent of the postindependence army. These included significant members of the Zezuru and the Manyika, but the Karanga—the country's most numerous Shona-speaking group and well represented in both ZANU and in the Rhodesian Army—were thought to be predominant. About 30 percent of the army in early 1982, before the desertion of large numbers of ZIPRA veterans, was believed to be Ndebele or Kalanga. Most of them were veterans of ZIPRA, which had been 90 percent Ndebele and Kalanga, although some were from the Rhodesian Security Forces.

On July 8, 1981, as the integration effort neared completion, former guerrilla officers were officially commissioned into the new national army. Before that time the guerrillas serving in the integrated army did not have official ranks but only titles indicating their responsibilities, e.g., battalion commander, company commander, and so forth. Subsequently their position and seniority were designated according to the British system of ranks that had prevailed in the Rhodesian Security Forces (see fig. 21). Under General MacLean, in August 1981 both of the army's lieutenant generals were former guerrillas, as were two of three major generals and eight of thirteen brigadiers (the remainder were whites). There was approximately one commissioned officer for every fifteen enlisted men.

Most of the top command positions in the army were held by former ZANLA officers. But because of their good performance in the battalion officer training courses, former ZIPRA officers were reported to command 40 percent of the integrated battalions, even though ZIPRA veterans accounted for no more than 25 to 30 percent of the army's manpower (still less after the 1982 desertions) and although after January 1981 former ZANLA officers were appointed to lead battalions for political reasons. Virtually all of the 7,000 Africans who had fought in the regular Rhodesian Army during the civil war remained in the national army after independence, but they were not in top leadership positions. In addition to dominating the former Rhodesian battalions, many of these veterans were in the special warfare battalions. These Africans were also well represented in administrative and logistics units where they kept the army functioning on a day-to-day basis as adjutants, pay officers, quartermasters, and the like.

Promotions continued to be based on the Rhodesian Army system, which required officers below the rank of lieutenant colonel to pass a proficiency test for advancement to the next grade. In addition, as a means of cutting the army's size and increasing its competency, the Zimbabwe army command also required that officers failing their examinations be given the choice of immediate retirement or reduction in grade to second lieutenant. Because of their success on the examinations and opportunities for eventual promotion, morale among former ZIPRA and black Rhodesian officers reportedly was high in

ARMY											
RANK	Second Lieutenant	Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General	General	
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General	General	
AIR FORCE											
RANK	Air Subaltern	Air Lieutenant	Flight Lieutenant	Squadron Leader	Wing Commander	Group Captain	Air Commander	Vice Marshal	Air Marshal		
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General		

Figure 21. Zimbabwe Defence Force Officer Ranks, Insignia, and United States Equivalents, 1982

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

early 1982, despite the increased ZANU-PF control over the political process. Many former ZANLA officers, however, were reported to be dissatisfied with the system and saw it as a means for white officers to put "their" Africans into favored positions. Despite ZANU-PF complaints, Mugabe and Munangagwa reiterated that the examination-based promotion system would remain in effect.

Low morale among many ZIPRA enlisted men was believed to be the result of PF-ZAPU's political eclipse and harassment inspired by some ZANU-PF political cadres against former ZIPRA troops stationed in Mashonaland where the ruling party was dominant. It was estimated that as many as 4,000 ZIPRA enlisted men—one-quarter of the total—had deserted from the national army in early and mid-1982. Although there were no overt signs of disenchantment among the ZIPRA elements of the officer corps, the situation may have been affected adversely by the dismissal of some forty of their number during the security force's sweeps through Bulawayo in June and July.

Despite the desertions, major ethnic disputes within eight battalions, and the disbanding of three others involved in the February 1981 riots at Bulawayo and elsewhere, the integration program was considered a success in 1982 because most of the thirty-four integrated units were still holding together peacefully. Most soldiers appeared to have taken the attitude urged by Mugabe: "Whichever route you followed into the national army, whether it was ZANLA or ZIPRA or former Rhodesian Army, you have . . . now come to the same destination—the Zimbabwe national army, which demands that you disregard your party political garb and instead wear the national uniform."

Army Organization, Equipment, and Training

When army unification was completed in September 1981, the outcome was viewed as a political success. However, most of its elements lacked unit cohesion, adequate training, shared experience and equipment, the Zimbabwe national army was not considered, at that time, to be as capable a fighting force as its predecessors had been. Army efforts after integration focused on training, drill, and education to raise gradually the level of competency and cohesion.

The field units of the army were divided among five regionally based brigades: First Brigade located in Bulawayo, Second Brigade in Harare, Third Brigade at Mutare, Fourth Brigade in Masvingo, and Fifth Brigade, which was to be based in Gweru (see fig. 22). Each under the command of a brigadier, the brigades also contained a squadron of engineers as well as units from the artillery regiment, signal corps, and most of the various support services (see fig. 23).

After nine battalions were demobilized in mid-1982, twenty-nine infantry battalions, each commanded by a major or lieutenant colonel, were distributed among the first four brigades. The British-trained battalions into which former ZANLA and ZIPRA fighters were inte-




NOTE—Fifth Brigade moving from Inyanga to Gweru in 1982.

- | | |
|--------------------------|----------------|
| — International boundary | ☒ Army brigade |
| --- Provincial boundary | ✈ Air base |
| ● National capital | |

Figure 22. Disposition of Major Units of Zimbabwe Defence Force, 1982

grated comprised the main numerical strength of these brigades. The three former RAR battalions were distributed among the First, Third, and Fourth brigades; these troops were highly disciplined and trained to follow orders—whether from Smith or Mugabe. The Zimbabwean prime minister had depended on battalions of RAR veterans in the First and Fourth brigades to put down the February 1981 riots and fighting among ZIPRA and ZANLA troops being integrated into the national army at Bulawayo. By all accounts the battalions performed quickly and well. The integrated battalions,

Zimbabwe: A Country Study



NOTE — Since General Alexander Maclean's early retirement in May 1982, position of supreme military commander, an essentially powerless one since Zimbabwean independence, has remained vacant.

Figure 23. Organization of Zimbabwe Defence Force, 1982

however, had relatively little training together; they were short of transport and frequently did not have enough weapons to equip all their troops.

The existence of the army's Fifth Brigade, known in Zimbabwe as the Gukurahundi (a Shona word meaning "the storm that sweeps my enemies away" or "people's storm"), was revealed in August 1981

when a large contingent of North Korean military advisers arrived in Harare (see Foreign Military Assistance, this ch.). Mugabe announced that the advisers were part of a package to arm and train 5,000 troops, which included three full battalions (two of them already formed and trained by the British) plus support forces. Some Zimbabweans, particularly in the white community, objected to the presence of communist North Koreans when the British training mission appeared adequate for the army's needs. Others, however, observed that the formation of an entirely new brigade with its own training facilities would ease the overcrowding in the other brigades and allow all the units to be trained more efficiently. But most ominously in the eyes of PF-ZAPU leaders and the whites, the new brigade was to operate outside the command structure of the rest of the armed forces and was to be composed almost entirely of former ZANLA troops, who it was feared would be exclusively loyal to ZANU-PF and Mugabe. The unit was to be trained in counterinsurgency tactics and, according to the prime minister, would "only be used if there are disturbances."

The Gukurahundi was equipped to be the army's only mechanized brigade, and it included a relatively strong armored component. Soviet-designed T-54 tanks, BTR-152 armored personnel carriers (APCs), scout cars, and a variety of antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, and "Stalin Organ" rocket artillery exceeded the capabilities of most other ground weapons in the national army inventory (see table 20. Appendix). The brigade underwent training at a well-equipped Rhodesian-built base at Inyanga, isolated in the mountains near the border with Mozambique. It "passed out" in June 1982 and was moving to a permanent base at Gweru. The brigade remained shrouded in controversy, and the government was forced to deny press reports that the unit had performed inadequately and that the North Koreans had been asked to leave the country.

In addition to the brigades, fighting units also included three special warfare battalions that had roots in organizations of the former Rhodesian Army. The new army's One Mounted Infantry Battalion was in effect the former Grey's Scouts redesignated. The new One Parachute Battalion was organized around a core of former Selous Scouts while the One Commando Battalion was built around the former Rhodesian Light Infantry. By 1982 these highly trained elite units were composed of former guerrillas from both camps, as well as former Rhodesian Army personnel. The paratroopers and commandos, still led by whites, served as the spearhead of a military-police sweep through Bulawayo in June-July 1982 "for the purpose of clearing this area of dissidents and armed robbers," according to government reports. The government apparently trusted the special forces more than troops from the integrated First Brigade or at least preferred not to test the loyalty of the brigade's ZIPRA elements in the PF-ZAPU-dominated area.

The army, overburdened with men, was short of equipment for all, despite the plethora of arms in the country after the war. The

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

army and the government decided shortly after independence to simplify maintenance and logistics by issuing weapons and equipment of Western design formerly in the Rhodesian military inventory. The guerrillas' Soviet-designed equipment, which was of different gauges and calibers than Western models, consisted mostly of smaller personal weapons that were put into storage after independence. As the Rhodesian weapons were insufficient to supply the expanded national army, the Soviet-designed varieties were brought out of storage to relieve the shortage and were supplemented by deliveries of Soviet-style weapons from North Korea. Serious logistical difficulties resulted from using such a variety of equipment, often within the same battalion. In the short run the army intended to standardize equipment within brigades by redistributing the weapons it had. Plans for future procurement were held in abeyance in 1982, as the army and government appeared uncertain of future manpower levels and the amount of funding available for a reequipment program. The eventual decision on the source of future Zimbabwean imports of small arms was influenced by the August 1981 explosion of Inkomo Barracks, which destroyed most of Zimbabwe's ammunition supplies. Before that time it was thought that the army would look to Western suppliers because most of its stored ammunition was of the 7.62 mm NATO type, but the destruction of the ammunition negated that factor. Eventually the army command was hoping to acquire all its weapons and equipment from domestic producers. According to one leading officer, "We plan to make all our weapons, from the largest to the smallest."

The newly integrated army suffered from a lack of training and unit cohesion. The amalgamation had provided only the rawest of training; it was largely an exercise in reorganization. To improve the army's performance, training on a large scale was conducted with substantial British and North Korean assistance. Unit training was focused at battalion and company levels. Brigade-scale maneuvers were not thought to be practical in 1982. Drill, weapons handling, and physical training were stressed for enlisted infantrymen, and specialists learned their tasks through on-the-job training.

Officer training was centered in Gweru. The Zimbabwe Military Academy/School of Infantry (formerly the Rhodesian School of Infantry) initially concentrated on giving four-week and eight-week courses to 8,000 officers and NCOs as part of the battalion integration program. As the program neared its completion in July 1981, the military academy enrolled twenty-four cadets in the first all-African class of its two-year officer cadet training program. Several British officers served as instructors at the school where course work was in part patterned on that offered by Britain's Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.

The Zimbabwe Military Staff College, also at Gweru, provided advanced training and instruction to officers in mid-career. In 1982 the college generally trained junior officers for staff duties, but it was being upgraded and expanded under British direction to take the most senior officers. The British role was significant in that instruc-

tors operated under the command of the head of the military assistance team. Course work and the syllabus for the four-month senior officers' course were patterned on those given at the British Staff College at Camberley, and some of the instructors also came from that institution.

Air Force Organization, Equipment, and Training

After independence the air force, under the command of an air marshal, continued to be staffed largely with white pilots and technicians who had served with the Rhodesian Air Force. Their future role became questionable in 1982, however, when white involvement was suspected in the sabotage of thirteen of the service's combat aircraft at Thornhill and when the air force's deputy commander, Air Vice Marshal Hugh Slatter, and other high-ranking officers were subsequently arrested. Regardless of the outcome, it was thought that their detention would have a potentially damaging effect on morale and could lead to increased attrition as the service contracts of whites expired.

In the two years since independence the air force, which was heavily involved in counterinsurgency operations against Matabeleland dissidents in 1982, worked to maintain combat effectiveness. An extensive training program designed to bring Africans into the service aimed at providing the new personnel a high level of proficiency. The task was a difficult one: of a total authorized manned strength of 2,900, less than 900 were pilots and technicians, and many of these were trainees. (Four hundred others, all of them non-Africans, continued to serve in the volunteer reserve.) In 1982 more than thirty fixed-wing combat aircraft and thirty-seven helicopters as well as transport and training aircraft were divided among seven operational squadrons (see table 21, Appendix). Air units were located primarily at New Sarum Air Station near Harare and at Thornhill near Gweru. They also had access to numerous smaller civilian and military airstrips around the country, including several equipped with hard-surfaced runways.

Because of the difficulties of procuring new aircraft during the period 1965-79 when international sanctions were used against Rhodesia, the air force operated an exceptionally old fleet of aircraft. Most of them had been delivered in the 1950s and early 1960s to serve with the Central African Federation and were kept functioning by superb maintenance that combined with a dry but dust-free climate, which minimized abrasion and corrosion of equipment. Four reconditioned Hawker Hunter FGA.9 fighter-bombers joined others in Number One Squadron in 1981, giving the air force a total of thirteen aircraft of that type, but about six of these were destroyed in the sabotage action at Thornhill in 1982. A bomber unit (Number Five Squadron) operated seven English Electric Canberra medium bombers of early 1950s vintage; these had been kept operable during the war by cannibalizing several others of the type that had been

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

grounded owing to main spar fatigue. Vampire strike-trainer jet aircraft, of a type that had first become operational in 1946 and that had served in the country for nearly thirty years, were finally withdrawn from service with Number Two Squadron in mid-1982, after which the first four of eight British Aerospace Hawks were delivered as replacements. The new planes became victims of sabotage within days after their arrival.

The air force also operated a squadron of ten propeller-driven Lynx aircraft, providing observation and a light strike capability, a transport squadron equipped mainly with twelve Douglas C-47s of pre-World War II design, and two helicopter squadrons of French-built Alouette IIIs and American/Italian Bell 205s, which Rhodesia had received in violation of sanctions. Base security was the primary responsibility of an air force regiment of 1,000 former guerrillas divided into two physical security groups, one stationed at Thornhill and one at New Sarum.

Most of the veteran white pilots and technicians serving in the air force at independence had been trained primarily by Britain and, after UDI, by South Africa. In the early 1980s a new generation of airmen was receiving most of its instruction in Zimbabwe. The air force had received offers of training from a number of countries, including Pakistan, Romania, the United States, Canada, Egypt, Nigeria, and Britain. The high command, however, was examining the cost-effectiveness of such training in terms of its relevance to aircraft in Zimbabwe's inventory and to the air force's organizational patterns and operational concepts.

The Air Force School of Flying Training operated at Thornhill where Number Six Squadron, equipped with propeller-driven SIAI-Marchetti SF.260s, was oriented entirely to flight training. In 1982 carefully selected recruits aged seventeen to twenty-five went through a one-month basic training course followed by six months of general military classroom instruction. Only after that point did ground school begin; it was followed by 225 hours of flight training—including twenty-five hours of weapons familiarization and fifty hours in jets—after which the cadet received his wings. In 1982 five African pilots who had previous flight training from Romania and Cuba had received their wings. The rest of some 100 pilots in the force were white, although roughly half the pilot trainees at that time were blacks.

The School of Technical Training was located at New Sarum air base. After independence an extensive air force campaign was launched to recruit young Africans with high grades and ability in mathematics or science. Recruits were supposed to undergo a two-month regimental basic training program followed by four months of extensive course work in sciences and technical subjects. At that point the recruit was to become an apprentice specializing in air frames, engines, radio and radar electronics, aircraft electrical systems, mechanics, or metalwork. If after thirty months of apprenticeship a trainee's performance was deemed unsatisfactory, he was to be

dismissed from the service. If successful, he could receive further instruction and experience for thirty months before becoming a journeyman. In the two years after independence, some specialized training was done abroad in Britain, the United States, and other countries to relieve overburdened Zimbabwean facilities. The air force suffered from a dearth of trained technicians lured away by lucrative opportunities in the private sector and in other countries. To retain its technically qualified people, the air force required recruits to sign a contract binding them to serve for ten years. In addition a law passed in 1981 prohibited veterans who left the service from working for a private Zimbabwean company until six months after their discharge.

Because of its wartime experience, the air force was thought by observers to be highly qualified in its ground attack role, but because of the lack of an effective radar network, the limitations of its old aircraft, and the destruction of several of its relatively powerful Hawker Hunters, the service's air defense capability was weak. Nonetheless air defense was boosted somewhat with the formation in 1981 of two air defense groups having a combined manned strength of about 1,000. The two units, largely composed of former guerrillas based at Thornhill and New Sarum, used Soviet-designed antiaircraft artillery: ZPU 14.5mm heavy machine guns and various types of ZSU 23mm guns and 37mm guns (none of them self-propelled) from guerrilla stocks. To improve its capabilities further, the air force had contracted with the British firm Plessey to establish a new airborne early warning radar system to be based at Gweru. The government was also seeking to acquire modern fighter interceptors and reportedly had expressed an interest in the United States-made F-5E as an eventual replacement for the Hunters, but despite the increased need after the sabotage, funding problems could delay a decision on the choice of aircraft indefinitely. Observers expected that the resulting combat force, if morale improved after the 1982 upheavals, would be more powerful than the forces of all the country's neighbors except South Africa—and even in the latter case strong enough to pose a credible deterrent to possible intimidation by the South African air force.

Foreign Military Assistance

Zimbabwe relied heavily on foreign sources, particularly Britain and North Korea, to supply training and equipment for its reorganized armed forces. Britain's military involvement, suspended for nearly fifteen years after UDI in 1965, was reestablished by the 1,300-man Commonwealth force that monitored for three months the cease-fire in the civil war. After independence a sixty-man British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) remained to assist with the integration process, which initially was being run largely by former Rhodesian military officers. Dissatisfied with the way the operation was being conducted, the Mugabe government

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

requested the British to send more military personnel to Zimbabwe to step up the pace of the integration program.

The British military presence in the integration operation, according to Mugabe, "Gave us an element in the army that could be relied upon by all parties." The training program, moreover, was mounted at no cost to Zimbabwe. The BMATT's services, which cost Z\$5 million in the first eighteen months of operation, were entirely funded by the British government. (About Z\$1 million was spent inside Zimbabwe.)

The number of British servicemen in Zimbabwe reached 185 in late 1980, remained stable at 160 throughout 1981 and, after the end of the amalgamation, was to be reduced gradually. Approximately seventy advisers were expected to remain with BMATT to serve for an indefinite period at the military schools and to assist in training at battalion and brigade levels.

In the first year after independence Zimbabwean officers and NCOs were sent to Britain for training funded by the government in London. This included specialist courses as well as temporary attachments to British training programs, schools, and army units. The training visits continued two years after independence, but fewer were being paid for by the British government.

Britain was also involved in supplying military equipment to Zimbabwe, but financing was arranged on a commercial basis between the government in Harare and the British contractors. The most notable commercial transaction of a military nature during the first two years after independence was Zimbabwe's purchase of Hawk attack/trainer jets from British Aerospace Corporation at a cost of some Z\$35 million.

Britain remained the only significant source of foreign military assistance until the arrival of the North Korean training unit. A visit by Mugabe to P'yongyang in October 1980 had resulted in a North Korean offer of Z\$12 million worth of military equipment to outfit a mechanized brigade. The acceptance of North Korean military aid after more than a year of British preeminence was seen by some as a demonstration of Zimbabwe's nonaligned status. The training team, which officially included 106 members (including a general and four colonels) and the military equipment (which included ten T-54 tanks), was allocated solely to the controversial all-ZANLA Fifth Brigade. The Koreans were reportedly handicapped by a language barrier, as few of them spoke English. Some political problems also arose owing to the fact that the Zimbabweans initially did not expect to pay the salaries of the North Korean advisers and the costs of transporting the military equipment into the country from the Mozambique port of Beira. After the Fifth Brigade "passed out" in June 1982, most of the North Koreans left, but about fifteen remained to continue training and to assist in maintaining equipment.

The Mugabe government's policies of military cooperation with foreigners complemented its commitment to Zimbabwe's indepen-

dence and its policy of nonalignment with either of the superpowers. Zimbabwe limited its foreign military cooperation because of its desire to standardize equipment and training where possible. ZIPRA and ZANLA guerrillas had received military support from a wide variety of sources, including the front-line African states, the OAU Liberation Committee, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, China, North Korea, the Soviet Union and its East European allies, and Yugoslavia, but support from these suppliers was not significant after the war. The Soviet Union and its close allies had given substantial support to ZIPRA and none to ZANLA until the last two years of the conflict, and postwar military aid from Moscow was specifically rejected. Shortly after independence Mugabe reportedly turned down an offer by Nkomo of a limited number of tanks and APCs supplied earlier by the Soviet Union to ZIPRA because they would make Zimbabwe's armed forces dependent on the Soviet Union for spare parts. In mid-1982 large-scale military cooperation with either the Soviet Union or the United States had not materialized.

Limited military cooperation between the United States and Zimbabwe commenced in United States FY 1982 in the form of a US\$65,000 grant under the International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP). Zimbabwean army engineers were sent to the United States to be trained in American military techniques and practices in civil engineering. The following year the United States Department of Defense guaranteed a US\$3 million loan under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and granted US\$150,000 under IMETP. The FMS funds were to be used, according to the United States Department of State, to provide communications equipment, improve ground transport, and supply military uniforms in order "to support what Britain is doing there."

Zimbabwean authorities, seeking to integrate the three former armies, were understandably reluctant to undermine the process by exposing too many soldiers to the different training and equipment of too many prospective donors. Even so, a number of other countries also gave military aid to Zimbabwe on a small scale. According to officials, Libya had delivered a number of tanks (believed to be ten T-34s), which had been diverted from Uganda. Training, funding, and equipment were also made available on a limited scale by Bulgaria, Canada, Egypt, Greece, Nigeria, Pakistan, China, Romania, Syria, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia.

State Security Services

To preserve public order and internal security, the Mugabe government relied heavily on the organizations inherited from the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith. With the prime minister and his trusted deputies providing policy guidance, these specialized services—still largely staffed by former Rhodesians in 1982—were able to perform effectively in crime control, security, investigations, and intelligence roles.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Munangagwa, a minister of state in the Prime Minister's Office, served as Mugabe's overall chief of security after the 1980 elections. A lawyer trained in Zambia, Munangagwa had undergone guerrilla training with ZANLA but had never served in combat. A longtime Mugabe loyalist, he was not thought by observers to have acquired any political following of his own.

Although Munangagwa exercised considerable policymaking influence over the army and the air force, he concerned himself primarily with internal security matters. He exercised overall authority over the CIO and operational authority over the Zimbabwe Republic Police, while the minister of home affairs was more directly concerned with police administration. From the standpoint of domestic security affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs was not as important in the Mugabe government as its predecessor, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, had been in the Smith regime. During the UDI era the minister of internal affairs had responsibility for the Special Branch, the domestic intelligence-gathering arm of the national police; in 1980 when Mugabe named political rival Nkomo to the post, the Special Branch was eliminated from the police force, integrated with the CIO, and put under the direct authority of the Prime Minister's Office and Munangagwa (see fig. 24).

In early 1982, when political violence was increasing in western Zimbabwe, the government formed the joint Operations Command to coordinate the operations of the CIO and the Zimbabwe Republic Police with those of the armed forces. The Joint Operations Command included the commanders of the various military and security forces as well as Munangagwa, who was believed to be its chairman.

Central Intelligence Organization

Originally established in 1963 by the first Rhodesian Front government of Prime Minister Winston Field, the CIO concentrated on gathering foreign intelligence. Under the leadership of its first inspector general, the British-born Ken Flower, the CIO played a central role in acquiring data on the African nationalist guerrillas in other countries, their plans for infiltration, definition of targets, and conduct of operations against rival groups. One of the CIO's operations having long-term effect was its original establishment in 1975 of the RNM resistance movement in Mozambique.

Upon assuming power, Mugabe retained Flower as head of the CIO and also placed the Special Branch under its auspices. The two services continued to operate semiautonomously, however; the Special Branch was primarily concerned with domestic matters while the CIO continued to concentrate on external affairs. Each organization operated separate provincial offices in 1982, although there was some integration when Flower retired in late 1980 and Mugabe replaced him as CIO head with Derrick Robinson, the former head of the Special Branch.

In the early 1980s the two branches of the CIO were believed to be




Figure 24. Organization of Internal Security Forces, 1982

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

relatively small, each consisting of approximately fifty to 100 officers (many of them white) and larger numbers of agents and informants. Despite some attrition after 1980, whites remained prominent in the CIO. Several, however, were found to be working for South Africa (with whom the Special Branch and the CIO had cooperated extensively during the civil war). The most serious breach of security involved Geoffrey Price, a Special Branch officer in charge of Mugabe's protective service, who fled to South Africa after he was discovered to have been working for the government in Pretoria. As a result of the security problems, the CIO was often distrusted in matters where the loyalties of whites might be tested. But the CIO was believed to be used extensively by the Mugabe government in matters related to domestic insurgency problems. Moreover in the first two years after independence the CIO's South African connection was reportedly used as an informal means of communication between the two governments through which, among other things, Harare assured Pretoria that anti-South African guerrillas were not based in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe Republic Police

The Zimbabwe Republic Police, whose name was changed from the British South Africa Police three months after independence, operated as the country's sole civil police force with headquarters in Harare. The police had a budget of Z\$82.7 million in FY 1980-81, which accounted for 90 percent of the appropriations for the Ministry of Home Affairs. Unlike the army, the national police never officially undertook to integrate its manpower within a specified time frame, and its 9,000 members in early 1982 included about 3,000 whites who continued to hold important positions. But the appointment of black officers to the top positions highlighted a policy of accelerated Africanization of the police force. The regular force was supplemented by a 25,000-man police reserve consisting of an almost equal number of whites and Africans.

The role of the police had altered several times since the service was first formed in 1890, reflecting the country's changing security situation. Established originally as the British South Africa Company's Police, the force was removed from company control six years later and assumed the BSAP designation. It became a truly national police force in 1909 when it amalgamated with the Mashonaland Mounted Police, the Matabeleland Mounted Police, municipal police in Salisbury and Bulawayo, and several smaller forces. The BSAP was a paramilitary organization whose personnel served as both policemen and soldiers until the military call-ups of World War II when it became essentially a civil police force. (It did not, however, officially surrender its military role until after the formation of the Central African Federation in 1953.) Under Smith's Rhodesian Front government, the police again assumed a paramilitary role at the onset of guerrilla activity, eventually operating as part of the armed

forces under the authority of Combined Operations and as a civil force under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under the Mugabe government the police concentrated on their civil duties, but in the event of violence the force could again assume a prominent paramilitary role.

According to the 1980 Constitution the national police operated under the command of a commissioner of police appointed by the president on the prime minister's recommendation. In July 1982 Wiridzayi Nguruve, who had first joined the BSAP as a constable in 1960, was appointed Zimbabwe's first black police commissioner. In practice the commissioner of police was assisted by two deputy police commissioners—one responsible for operations relating to crime and security, the other in charge of personnel and training. The first African deputy commissioners were named in May 1982.

In 1982 the national force was territorially divided into nine police provinces commanded by assistant commissioners or senior assistant commissioners. Except for Harare, the nine police provinces corresponded to the eight political provinces, although plans were under consideration for dividing three of the larger police provinces to make them a more manageable size. Provincial forces were divided into rural and urban districts. In each province there were between one and five districts, which were commanded by superintendents or chief superintendents. Each district was in turn divided into a number of police stations, each commanded by a section officer, an inspector, or a chief inspector.

The main body of the Zimbabwe Republic Police was the Uniformed Branch, which was responsible for routine patrol, crime prevention, traffic control, and so forth. There was also an Administrative Branch, a Criminal Investigation Division, a Signals Branch, a Canine Section, an Air Wing, and a boat squadron operating on Lake Kariba.

During the civil war both white and African women performed effectively as patrol officers, as detectives in undercover roles, and as specialists in administrative positions. Their numbers and duties in the postindependence police force were not known, but they were the responsibility of the Women's Branch.

The elite Police Support Unit, whose 1,500 members were trained as infantry, was the only paramilitary unit in the postwar police force. Known locally as the Blackboots, the support unit had distinguished itself during the war as the BSAP element primarily responsible for tracking and engaging the guerrillas. The Blackboots, an almost entirely African unit by 1982, were based in Harare and were transportable to trouble spots elsewhere. They were used primarily in riot control, in patrolling the game parks where they searched for poachers, in apprehending smugglers along the border with South Africa, and in operations against guerrilla dissidents. In mid-1982 Mugabe announced plans to expand the support unit by integrating into it large numbers of former guerrillas who, it was thought, would be

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

transferred from the army. Observers thought the move could dilute the quality of this highly professional force.


The national police did not practice an official policy of integration, although mounting political pressures were forcing significant changes in 1982. Before 1980 all promotions, up to and including the rank of commissioner, were entirely from the ranks and were based on competency tests, which remained the basis for advancement in the first two years after independence. About 1,000 ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres trained in police science in Yugoslavia during the war were inducted into the national force, but only 10 percent of them passed the competency tests required for officers; the rest entered the force as constables. Other former guerrillas were enrolled in entry-level training programs, but the force remained dominated by veterans from the BSAP.

In the first two years after independence the government, especially Minister of Home Affairs Richard Hove, who held the job after Nkomo, sought to maintain police efficiency by instituting intensive training programs and striving to retain the services of "senior, competent and experienced personnel," most of whom were white. According to Hove in 1981, the police would "not have a black commissioner just because he is black. We will want one who is trained and able to motivate the whole force so that it remains what it is—an efficient police force." Under Hove, Africans (most of them BSAP veterans) advanced into the middle levels of the officer corps of the force in substantial numbers. But white attrition remained high, and Hove's relatively slow integration policy and rhetoric proved controversial within the party. In early 1982 he was replaced as minister of home affairs by Herbert Ushewokunze, a ZANU-PF "radical" whose inflammatory statements had led Mugabe to remove him from the cabinet the previous year. It thus appeared that, with the ascension of the new minister and the commissioning of Africans for the top positions in the force, Africanization of the police was accelerating.

The Prison System

The Zimbabwe Prison Service operated under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs and was funded by an annual budget in FY 1980-81 of Z\$13.7 million. The service in 1982 was run by a director of prisons who was white, but Africans filled 98 percent of the prison service staff positions and comprised 85 percent of the senior officers, including the deputy director. In January 1982 the prison service officially ended racial discrimination by replacing a two-tiered system of ranks employed by the Rhodesian government in which all Africans, regardless of their duties or experience, were classed as wardens, and all whites were officers.

Prisons were located throughout the country in rural and urban areas. Major facilities included Khami Prison near Bulawayo, Gorge Grange Prison near Mutare, Chikurubi Prison in Harare, and a new



Traffic control is responsibility of Uniformed Branch of multiracial Zimbabwe Republic Police. Courtesy Embassy of Zimbabwe, Washington

complex at Wha Wha near Gweru. There were separate facilities for women and young offenders.

Prison conditions were, in the words of the United States Department of State's annual human rights report for 1981, "spartan, but not unusually harsh." Many prisoners were required to perform manual labor, but prisoners were not deprived of necessities as a disciplinary measure. Among the first acts of the new government, many of whose members had spent time in Rhodesian jails, was the ending of racial discrimination in the prisons by ensuring that all prisoners were fed the same meals and given sufficient bedding. Before independence African prisoners slept on reed mats and blankets, but by late 1981 mattresses had been provided for roughly 60 percent of the prison population.

Overcrowding remained a serious problem despite the new government's grant of amnesty to some 11,000 prisoners (about half of the total prison population) when it assumed power in April 1980. It was not known how many people were being detained in Zimbabwe's prisons in mid-1982.

* * *

Readers who wish to conduct further research on matters of national security in Zimbabwe will find a number of useful sources available.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Among the most informative volumes on the civil war is *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* by David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, which discusses the conflict from ZANU's perspective. John Lovett's *Contact: A Tribute to Those Who Serve Rhodesia* contains useful information on the war from the viewpoint of the Rhodesian military. Other interesting works include Paul L. Moorcroft's *A Short Thousand Years*; Miles Hudson's *Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*; and *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush* by Lewis H. Gann and Thomas H. Hendriksen.

No comprehensive volumes dealing with Zimbabwe's changing contemporary national security situation were available in 1982, and scholarly literature on the subject was not extensive. But important information could be found in the press, especially the Harare publications. The daily *Herald* and the weekly *Sunday Mail* report important domestic security developments and occasionally publish extensive features on the armed forces and the police. *African Contemporary Record*, produced annually by noted Africanist Colin Legum, and the monthly *Africa Research Bulletin* are indispensable reference works. (For further information see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table

- 1 Metric Conversion Coefficients
- 2 Population of Main Towns, Selected Years, 1969-81
- 3 Christian Affiliation, Mid-1970s
- 4 Enrollment in Primary Schools, Selected Years, 1972-81
- 5 Enrollment in Secondary Schools, Selected Years, 1972-81
- 6 Holdings of Natural Farming Regions by Racial Group, 1978
- 7 Gross Domestic Product by Industry at Factor Cost, 1971-80
- 8 Principal Crop Production in the African Communal Areas, 1975-80
- 9 Principal Crop Production in the Commercial Farming Areas, 1975-80
- 10 Index of Volume of Production of Manufacturing Industries, 1965-81
- 11 Mineral Production, 1965-81
- 12 External Trade—Volume and Unit Value Indexes and Terms of Trade, 1965-80
- 13 Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1975-80
- 14 Wage Employees by Industrial Sector, 1965-80
- 15 Average Annual Cash Earnings of African and Non-African Employees by Sector, Selected Years, 1965-78
- 16 Central Government Revenue and Expenditure, Summary, Fiscal Years 1978-79 to 1981-82
- 17 Central Government Expenditure by Appropriation, Fiscal Years 1978-79 to 1981-82
- 18 Cabinet Members and Political Affiliation, August 1982
- 19 African Parties in 1980 Election
- 20 Major Army Weapons, 1982
- 21 Major Air Force Weapons, 1982

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients

When you know	Multiply by	To Find
Millimeters.....	0.04	inches
Centimeters.....	0.39	inches
Meters.....	3.3	feet
Kilometers.....	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m ²)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms.....	2.2	pounds
Metric tons.....	0.98	long tons
.....	1.1	short tons
.....	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius.....	9	degrees Fahrenheit
(Centigrade)	divide by 5 and add 32	

PRECEDING PAGE

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 2. Population of Main Towns, Selected Years, 1969-81¹

Town ²	In Thousands					
	1969	1975	1977	1979	1980	1981
Bindura	10,320	15	16	17	18	18
Bulawayo	245,040	359	348	363	373	400
Chegutu (Hartley)	8,630	12	13	15	15	14
Chinhoyi (Sinoia)	13,360	20	24	27	27	28
Gweru (Gwelo)	46,170	68	69	70	72	78
Harare (Salisbury)	386,040	626	610	627	654	686
Hwange (Wankie)	20,190	28	31	33	33	33
Kadoma (Gatooma)	20,940	33	34	33	33	36
Kwekwe (Que Que)	32,880	49	50	51	52	62
Marondera (Marandellas)	10,940	18	22	23	23	30
Masvingo (Fort Victoria)	11,380	18	22	24	25	24
Mutare (Umtali)	45,610	65	61	63	64	74
Redcliff	8,560	15	17	19	19	20
Zvishavane (Shabani)	15,820	16	18	20	21	21
Total	875,880	1,342	1,335	1,385	1,429	1,524
Percentage of national total	17.0	21.4	19.9	19.4	19.4	20.1

¹ Estimates do not include refugees from rural areas.

² Names in parentheses are those in use before April 1982.

Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Zimbabwe Fact Sheet: Social and Economic Profile (Revised)*, 1981, Salisbury, 1981.

Table 3. *Christian Affiliation, Mid-1970s*

Institution	Africans			Europeans			Total Membership ¹		
	Number (in thousands)	Percent of all Africans	Number (in thousands)	Percent of all Europeans	Number (in thousands)	Percent of all Christians	Number (in thousands)	Percent of all Christians	Percent African
Roman Catholic	555	9.3	37	14.8	592	9.5	592	9.5	93.8
Independent African churches.....	500	8.3	—	—	500	8.0	500	8.0	100.0
Anglican.....	150	2.5	79	31.6	229	3.7	229	3.7	65.5
Salvation Army	68	1.1	1	0.4	69	1.1	69	1.1	98.6
Methodists (British)	40	0.7	21	8.4	61	1.0	61	1.0	65.6
African Reformed	30	0.5	—	—	30	0.5	30	0.5	100.0
Lutheran	23	0.4	2	0.8	25	0.4	25	0.4	92.0
Methodists (American)	24	0.4	—	—	24	0.4	24	0.4	100.0
Dutch Reformed	—	—	19	7.6	19	0.3	19	0.3	—
Presbyterian.....	3	0.1	9	3.6	12	0.2	12	0.2	25.0
Christian Brethren (LMS) ²	4	0.1	—	—	4	0.1	4	0.1	100.0
Other	n.a.	n.a.	47	18.0	47	0.8	47	0.8	n.a.
Total³	1,397	23.3	215	86.0	1,612	25.8	1,612	25.8	86.7

n.a.—not available.

— means all or negligible.

¹ Includes Asians and Coloureds.² London Missionary Society.³ Percentages do not add to totals because of rounding.Source: Based on information from Ian Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, London, 1980, pp. 298–99.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 4. Enrollment in Primary Schools, Selected Years, 1972-81

Grade ¹	1972		1975		1977	
	Africans	Europeans ²	Africans	Europeans ²	Africans	Europeans ²
Grade 1						
Sub A	151,721	5,789	163,224	5,779	169,162	5,295
Grade 2						
Sub B	128,914	5,421	148,492	5,546	149,686	5,273
Grade 3						
Std 1	118,413	5,605	134,803	5,485	136,561	5,945
Grade 4						
Std 2	102,396	5,610	120,058	5,443	119,475	4,951
Grade 5						
Std 3	93,438	5,949	105,361	5,292	106,720	5,016
Grade 6						
Std 4	67,227	6,026	83,290	5,673	92,558	4,970
Grade 7						
Std 5	53,479	5,949	68,636	5,655	80,867	4,951
Total	715,588	40,349	823,864	38,873	855,059	36,401

Grade ¹	1978		All Zimbabweans ³		
	Africans	Europeans ²	1979	1980	1981
Grade 1					
Sub A	158,259	5,178	170,090	376,392	455,536
Grade 2					
Sub B	139,845	4,891	139,968	207,899	370,141
Grade 3					
Std 1	125,541	4,806	130,106	170,420	236,901
Grade 4					
Std 2	110,129	4,696	109,552	144,746	182,348
Grade 5					
Std 3	97,233	4,803	98,649	125,977	160,447
Grade 6					
Std 4	84,682	4,788	88,287	112,890	145,378
Grade 7					
Std 5	77,256	4,750	82,210	97,099	128,647
Total	792,945	33,912	818,862	1,235,423	1,679,396

¹ Does not include a small number of students in special classes.

² Coloured and Asian students are statistically combined with European students but constitute only a small portion of the total.

³ Since 1979 racial distinctions have not been made in official statistics, but estimates indicate that 97 percent of all primary school students in 1980 were Africans. Given the growth of African enrollments and emigration of Europeans, the proportion in 1981 was probably greater.

Source: Based on information from Australia, Parliament, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, *Zimbabwe, Canberra, 1980*; and Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Zimbabwe Fact Sheet: Social and Economic Profile (Revised)*, 1981, Salisbury, 1981.

Appendix

Table 5. Enrollment in Secondary Schools, Selected Years, 1972-81

Grade ¹	1972	1975	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
Africans							
Form I	12,290	13,688	14,350	14,073			
Form II	10,903	12,789	12,351	12,603			
Form III	4,190	7,634	8,918	9,554			
Form IV	3,069	4,906	7,506	7,987			
Form V ⁴							
Form VI-M ⁴							
Form VI Lower...	293	372	467	551			
Form VI Upper...	221	354	434	444			
Total Africans...	30,966	39,743	44,026	45,212			
Europeans²							
Form I	6,196	5,992	5,030	4,675			
Form II	5,982	5,978	5,198	4,882			
Form III	5,694	6,076	5,494	5,053			
Form IV	4,966	5,576	5,221	5,181			
Form V ⁴	1,977	2,169	2,375	2,381			
Form VI-M ⁴	975	1,229	1,139	1,136			
Form VI Lower...	1,060	1,102	1,104	1,208			
Form VI Upper...	726	838	863	948			
Total							
Europeans....	27,576	28,960	26,424	25,464			
All Zimbabweans³							
Form I				18,352	22,201	82,262	
Form II				16,031	17,125	24,855	
Form III				13,614	15,891	15,478	
Form IV				12,201	12,926	15,547	
Form V ⁴				2,141	1,815	1,893	
Form VI-M ⁴							
Form VI Lower				2,393	2,641	2,751	
Form VI Upper				1,067	1,413	1,667	
Total all Zimbabweans				65,799	74,012	144,453	

¹ Does not include a small number of students in special classes.

² Coloured and Asian students are statistically combined with European students but constitute only a small proportion of the total.

³ Since 1979 racial distinctions have not been made in official statistics, but estimates indicate that nearly 83 percent of secondary students in 1980 were Africans. Probably over 90 percent were Africans by 1981.

⁴ Form V was not applicable to African students until 1979. Form VI-M, intended to prepare European students for matriculation in South African universities, was also not applicable to African students and was phased out of the system in 1979.

Source: Based on information from Australia, Parliament, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, *Zimbabwe*, Canberra, 1980, Table 13.1; and Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Zimbabwe Fact Sheet: Social and Economic Profile (Revised)*, 1981, Salisbury, 1981.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 6. Holdings of Natural Farming Regions by Racial Group,
1978
(in thousands of hectares)

	Natural Farming Region			National Land*	Total
	African	European			
I. Diversified special crops and/or intensive livestock raising.....	135.6	440.2		127.6	703.4
II. Intensive crop and livestock farming.....	1,507.2	4,324.5		29.7	5,861.4
III. Mixed farming based on livestock complemented by fodder crops and selected cash crops.....	3,350.8	3,240.6		696.3	7,287.7
IV. Livestock raising, drought-resistant fodder crops, and limited drought- resistant cash crops.....	7,830.3	4,025.8		2,926.2	14,782.3
V. Extensive livestock raising.....	4,871.6	3,648.4		1,921.1	10,441.1
TOTAL.....	17,685.5	15,679.5		5,700.9	39,075.9

*National parks, game reserves, and other nonfarming land.

Source: Based on information from I. M. Hume, *A Strategy for Rural Development and Whitsun Data Bank No. 2: The Peasant Sector*, Salisbury, October 1978, pp. 54, 57.

Table 7. Gross Domestic Product by Industry at Factor Cost, 1971-80
(in millions of Zimbabwe dollars)¹

Item	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Agriculture and forestry.....	200	234	215	315	323	350	334	305	316	469
Mining and quarrying.....	72	76	104	136	131	152	149	158	188	264
Manufacturing.....	251	297	343	421	447	480	460	514	679	786
Electricity and water.....	34	38	41	42	50	57	56	64	71	87
Construction.....	58	74	81	82	94	88	84	68	75	96
Finance and insurance.....	41	53	59	73	86	92	102	109	159	159
Real estate.....	35	39	43	46	44	47	47	45	44	45
Distribution, hotels, and restaurants.....	171	192	198	258	258	262	242	296	367	466
Transport and communications.....	103	114	122	138	159	172	184	191	211	257
Public administration.....	71	79	93	109	130	163	204	241	286	287
Education.....	40	43	48	55	65	73	76	86	98	169
Health.....	25	27	28	33	38	43	49	54	63	73
Domestic services.....	33	35	37	40	45	49	52	54	53	65
Other services (n.e.s.) ²	57	65	71	85	98	105	113	120	147	185
Less imputed banking service charges.....	-23	-30	-33	-42	-52	-56	-65	-69	-82	-106
Gross domestic product at factor cost.....	1,168	1,336	1,450	1,791	1,916	2,077	2,087	2,236	2,655	3,312

¹ For value of the Zimbabwe dollar—see Chapter.

² Not elsewhere specified.

Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, March 1982, p. 10.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 8. Principal Crop Production in the African Communal Areas, 1975-80*
(in tons)

Crop	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Maize	435,000	550,000	450,000	450,000	420,000	600,000
Groundnuts (unshelled)	158,499	172,908	130,000	100,863	100,000	67,000
Cotton	35,241	26,600	30,584	25,004	25,455	45,739
Sorghum	105,000	120,000	36,000	57,000	30,000	66,000
Soybeans	500	600	3,000	8,600	6,000	8,000
Tobacco (burley)	424	349	128	129	195	198
Wheat	6,273	5,601	7,626	8,439	6,497	8,619
Coffee	1	5	10	4	2	2
Munga (cereal)	160,140	191,400	77,500	83,200	88,300	123,450
Rapoko (cereal)	23,515	4,860	8,800	11,300	58,500	64,700

* Termed Tribal Trust Lands before independence.

Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Zimbabwe Fact Sheet: Social and Economic Profile (Revised)*, 1981, Salisbury, 1981, Table Ec7.

Appendix

Table 9. Principal Crop Production in the Commercial Farming Areas, 1975-80
(in tons)

Crop	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Tobacco.....	86,328	112,430	85,010	85,242	114,310	125,041
Maize.....	1,311,683	1,236,123	1,205,222	1,168,392	729,842	939,164
Sorghum.....	5,959	15,796	14,915	16,654	20,036	16,714
Wheat.....	123,885	141,564	163,775	195,464	155,466	155,180
Rice.....	482	310	260	453	389	298
Barley.....	13,717	27,408	20,296	19,047	23,116	24,122
Coffee.....	3,727	5,127	3,649	4,947	4,246	5,336
Tea.....	6,929	6,009	6,200	8,675	9,843	9,712
Groundnuts						
(unshelled).....	19,265	16,684	14,332	14,719	10,253	14,112
Soybeans.....	28,707	44,522	44,047	66,940	80,339	93,612
Sunflower seeds ...	2,833	6,436	5,718	4,081	2,270	2,898
Cotton.....	126,582	107,422	116,053	138,679	142,155	138,987
Sugar (raw).....	382,100	284,118	302,706	310,459	299,266	339,247 *
Dried beans.....	854	1,167	1,055	795	1,569	1,580
Potatoes.....	20,495	24,078	21,950	21,161	22,802	20,686
Maize (seed).....	13,270	16,269	13,988	13,200	18,366	24,360

* Provisional.

Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Zimbabwe Fact Sheet: Social and Economic Profile (Revised)*, 1981, Salisbury, 1981, Table Ec6.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

**Table 10. Index of Volume of Production of
Manufacturing Industries, 1965-81
(1964 = 100)**

Year	Foodstuffs (including stockfeeds)	Drink and Tobacco	Textiles (including ginning)	Clothing and Footwear	Wood and Furniture	Paper, Printing, and Publishing
1965	110.2	95.7	114.1	105.5	109.7	112.5
1966	113.4	91.6	115.2	105.0	115.5	97.2
1967	116.7	92.0	142.1	123.3	120.0	103.3
1968	124.1	92.2	151.9	122.4	123.8	106.0
1969	132.8	97.8	217.6	129.5	134.3	117.6
1970	155.9	108.7	200.9	130.5	154.4	141.6
1971	169.0	112.7	222.8	138.9	166.6	150.6
1972	184.7	125.6	259.4	151.8	177.9	167.7
1973	206.9	145.1	276.7	152.5	190.2	173.9
1974	210.2	157.4	291.0	159.7	202.7	192.6
1975	212.5	163.7	282.2	150.6	184.1	177.9
1976	224.3	169.2	257.1	142.8	169.9	162.1
1977	244.7	158.2	259.1	137.4	143.8	152.6
1978	234.7	159.8	252.6	124.8	141.9	162.1
1979	252.3	165.7	274.1	138.8	177.1	181.7
1980	267.6	196.9	320.2	163.9	222.9	212.1
1981	292.9	182.5	363.0	211.4	236.6	242.0

Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, March 1982, p. 39.

Appendix

Table 10. (Continued)

Chemical and Petroleum Products	Non- metallic Mineral Products	Metals and Metal Products	Transport Equip- ment	Other Manu- facturing Industries	All Manu- facturing Industries	Year
119.1	103.2	109.3	113.7	82.9	108.9	1965
93.5	97.2	100.5	79.4	79.7	96.9	1966
98.7	110.7	118.5	76.2	83.4	107.7	1967
113.5	154.6	134.0	89.9	92.7	117.8	1968
127.3	162.2	154.5	105.0	93.5	132.9	1969
156.1	195.7	186.6	107.2	116.4	148.7	1970
169.0	226.4	216.1	123.1	118.0	160.3	1971
191.4	251.4	247.6	131.6	170.8	184.3	1972
191.0	272.4	281.3	117.4	190.1	199.3	1973
208.7	301.4	307.0	123.3	195.1	213.2	1974
219.1	276.6	305.0	128.7	180.2	211.2	1975
194.5	238.9	281.6	101.2	180.9	199.1	1976
192.0	194.1	244.1	96.2	192.3	187.4	1977
192.8	155.3	241.4	83.9	191.1	182.5	1978
199.0	193.7	277.4	95.8	206.0	202.1	1979
239.7	225.8	307.9	117.8	268.9	232.2	1980
278.9	272.4	323.9	159.0	247.9	255.2	1981

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 11. Mineral production, 1965-81¹
(value in thousands of Zimbabwe dollars)²

Year	Asbestos		Gold		Chrome Ore		Coal		Copper ³		Nickel ³	
	Thousands of Tons	Value	Thousands of Ounces	Value	Thousands of Tons	Value	Thousands of Tons	Value	Thousands of Tons	Value	Tons	Value
1965.....	150.8	17,062	550	13,786	585.6	5,248	3,509	7,742	18.0	12,566	n.a.	418
1966.....	162.9	17,170	541	13,450	586.0	5,543	3,103	7,034	16.0	13,706	n.a.	445
1967.....	154.1	14,020	493	12,504	557.8	5,062	3,206	8,638	22.2	16,078	400	214
1968.....	167.7	15,860	467	11,822	432.5	4,386	3,203	9,294	21.0	15,138	441	760
1969.....	178.9	17,062	446	13,062	370.5	3,784	3,289	9,136	28.7	24,470	5,747	9,386
1970.....	187.7	17,913	438	11,494	503.8	5,440	3,520	8,762	30.0	24,767	8,585	16,514
1971.....	205.6	21,657	389	11,917	671.7	9,421	3,360	8,087	34.4	20,456	9,278	16,720
1972.....	205.9	20,765	349	13,220	755.1	10,689	2,908	7,388	46.5	25,826	10,115	17,675
1973.....	261.9	26,044	338	19,018	780.4	10,196	3,536	10,275	51.9	39,869	10,873	18,388
1974.....	261.4	32,375	335	29,829	703.0	9,647	3,105	10,859	47.5	45,796	10,694	20,456
1975.....	261.5	41,701	354	31,956	875.7	22,056	3,300	18,677	47.6	24,686	9,121	19,616
1976.....	281.4	61,077	387	30,116	863.9	26,858	3,583	23,297	41.3	29,457	14,604	35,237
1977.....	273.2	67,032	402	37,214	677.3	19,917	3,029	21,051	34.8	21,964	16,671	42,886
1978.....	248.9	67,007	399	51,855	477.8	13,452	3,065	23,708	33.8	23,044	15,701	39,456
1979.....	259.6	65,864	386	80,912	541.8	16,139	3,188	25,843	28.6	35,149	14,591	45,077
1980.....	250.9	70,201	367	144,875	553.5	18,447	3,134	28,001	27.0	35,380	15,074	55,571
1981.....	247.6	91,279	371	117,380	536.1	20,405	2,867	29,469	24.6	27,900	13,018	51,733

Table 11. (Continued)

Year	Iron Ore		Silver		Cobalt		Tin Metal		Other ⁴		Total ⁵
	Thousands of Tons	Value	Thousands of Ounces	Value	Tons	Value	Tons	Value	Value	Value	
1965.....	1,287	1,948	83	38	—	—	511	1,386	3,752	63,948	
1966.....	869	1,248	87	40	—	—	689	1,704	4,377	65,208	
1967.....	1,228	1,656	113	105	—	—	875	2,024	5,847	66,748	
1968.....	1,028	1,512	202	215	—	—	928	2,014	6,489	67,432	
1969.....	749	1,121	167	201	—	—	972	2,356	7,397	87,706	
1970.....	813	1,134	210	250	—	—	1,094	2,499	9,929	98,702	
1971.....	818	1,146	252	277	—	—	1,118	2,461	9,089	101,230	
1972.....	723	1,224	271	203	43	34	990	2,202	8,148	107,376	
1973.....	735	1,326	270	223	23	19	1,138	2,509	8,002	135,866	
1974.....	715	1,271	240	356	28	55	1,089	3,752	10,757	165,154	
1975.....	1,246	3,033	242	607	18	24	997	3,971	11,513	177,838	
1976.....	1,353	5,829	200	541	—	—	915	4,935	13,140	230,477	
1977.....	1,176	6,833	207	599	—	—	920	6,149	13,901	237,489	
1978.....	1,123	7,851	1,109	4,043	17	69	945	8,206	13,505	252,196	
1979.....	1,201	7,387	977	7,256	205	5,223	967	9,946	16,005	314,801	
1980.....	1,622	14,815	949	13,003	115	2,725	934	9,870	21,862	414,760	
1981.....	1,096	14,841	857	5,998	94	1,415	1,157	11,279	21,827	393,524	

— means none.

n.a.—not available.

¹ Does not include production from sand and stone quarries.² For value of Zimbabwe dollar—see Glossary.³ Metal content.⁴ Mainly limestone, lithium, magnesite, phosphate, precious stones, and tantalite.⁵ Figures as published.Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, March 1982, pp. 35-36.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 12. External Trade—Volume and Unit Value Indexes and Terms of Trade, 1965–80*
(1964 = 100)

Year	Volume Indexes		Unit Value Indexes		Terms of Trade
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	
1965	106.9	112.8	103.5	104.1	100.6
1966	68.7	72.3	114.0	94.6	83.0
1967	76.0	75.0	113.8	91.4	80.3
1968	85.4	74.0	112.0	93.3	83.3
1969	80.8	84.5	114.1	99.3	87.0
1970	91.0	92.1	119.2	102.2	85.7
1971	102.7	101.6	127.1	103.9	81.7
1972	102.0	121.7	124.4	104.4	83.9
1973	110.0	124.3	129.6	113.9	87.9
1974	114.6	129.5	176.6	149.2	84.5
1975	109.3	121.2	195.1	159.5	81.8
1976	79.9	121.8	221.1	166.5	75.3
1977	73.6	115.7	243.6	173.2	71.1
1978	67.3	120.3	276.9	184.2	66.5
1979	66.4	118.7	379.0	211.7	55.9
1980	91.4	113.0	406.1	280.6	69.1

* Does not include transactions in which no currency was involved.

Sources: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, March 1982, p. 15.

Table 13. *Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1975-80*
(in millions of Zimbabwe dollars)¹

Item	1975		1977		1979		1980	
	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit
Goods, services, and income								
Merchandise ²								
Exports and imports	477.7	461.9	500.8	388.1	645.4	549.3	787.5	860.5
Re-exports	8.2	—	4.4	—	3.7	—	6.5	—
Gold	45.3	—	45.7	—	66.6	—	115.2	—
Internal freight	10.7	32.3	15.1	33.6	18.3	45.6	19.7	51.1
Total merchandise	541.9	494.2	566.0	421.7	734.0	594.9	928.9	865.5
Shipment services								
Port dues	—	12.0	—	16.4	—	21.7	—	21.0
External freight	13.6	21.7	12.1	22.2	18.8	24.7	25.9	44.1
Total shipment services	13.6	33.7	12.1	38.6	18.8	46.4	25.9	65.1
Other transport services								
Passenger fares	4.5	16.8	3.8	21.3	4.3	21.4	11.0	21.5
Port services	7.0	3.6	10.4	6.2	20.6	17.9	27.7	29.9
Total of all transport services	11.5	20.4	14.2	27.5	24.9	39.3	38.7	51.4
Travel								
Business and holiday allowances	—	48.2	—	48.1	—	63.7	—	92.3
Tourism	7.2	—	4.1	—	5.5	—	15.7	—
Other	0.2	3.4	0.1	5.3	0.1	8.1	0.2	10.1
Total travel	7.4	51.6	4.2	53.4	5.6	71.8	15.9	102.4
Direct investment income								
National railroads	13.7	—	17.6	—	22.9	—	26.0	—

Appendix

Table 13. (Continued)

Item	1975		1977		1979		1980	
	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit
Dividends and profits from companies and persons	0.5	36.9	0.2	31.1	0.5	42.0	0.7	50.0
Total direct investment income	14.2	36.9	17.8	31.1	23.4	42.0	26.7	50.0
Other investment income								
Interest								
Public sector	1.4	3.4	1.7	5.4	10.3	4.1	22.7	5.9
Private sector	0.7	7.5	0.4	8.5	1.0	5.5	1.5	8.9
Dividends from persons	2.9	—	4.0	—	6.5	—	9.0	—
Former residents' remittances	—	2.3	—	9.2	0.6	14.7	0.6	18.1
Other	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.0	—
Total other investment income	5.0	13.2	6.1	23.1	18.4	24.3	37.8	32.9
Other goods, services, and income								
Official	0.5	4.4	0.5	0.4	0.7	2.1	15.8	3.6
Private								
Labor income	0.8	11.0	0.6	12.3	0.8	23.4	2.5	23.5
Property income	0.8	4.3	0.5	5.6	0.7	7.0	1.8	8.8
Other	7.9	10.5	9.5	17.0	9.3	21.3	10.9	23.0
Total other goods, services, and income	10.0	30.2	11.1	35.3	11.5	53.8	31.0	58.9
Unrequited transfers								
Private								
Migrants' funds	0.1	15.6	—	12.8	0.7	13.7	0.3	23.9
Noncommercial transactions	6.9	—	3.3	—	4.5	27.0	2.1	38.9
Workers' remittances	1.7	0.2	7.2	0.2	7.2	0.4	6.0	0.8
Pensions	4.0	3.9	3.7	6.3	5.1	13.5	3.5	29.7

Table 13. (Continued)

Item	1975		1977		1979		1980	
	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit	Credit	Debit
Other	5.6	9.9	6.8	11.3	12.2	13.1	21.1	17.2
Total private	18.3	29.6	21.0	30.6	29.7	67.7	33.0	110.5
Official								
Government	—	—	—	—	—	—	33.5	—
Noncommercial transactions	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.6	—
Total official	—	—	—	—	—	—	37.1	—
Net balance on current account	—	87.9	—	8.8	—	73.9	—	156.7
Capital account								
Government	—	3.9	0.1	5.7	128.6	10.6	33.0	54.6
Other public authorities	21.3	23.7	3.7	5.4	0.5	6.9	0.7	3.7
Private transactions including statistical discrepancy	133.8	40.5	26.7	16.2	81.5	19.4	126.5	26.1
Net balance on capital account	87.0	—	3.2	—	173.7	—	75.8	—
Net balance on current and capital account	—	0.9	—	5.6	99.8	—	—	80.9

— means none.

! For value of the Zimbabwe dollar—see Glossary.

‡ The value of noncommercial exports before 1978 is unknown.

Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, March 1982, p. 13.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 14. Wage Employees by Industrial Sector, 1965-80¹
(average annual number in thousands)

Year	Agriculture and Forestry	Mining and Quarrying	Manufacturing	Electricity and Water	Construction	Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	Distribution, Hotels, and Restaurants
1965	295.6	47.1	80.7	4.9	27.2	7.9	60.8
1966	278.4	48.5	80.5	5.1	27.8	7.9	56.1
1967	277.6	50.5	86.3	5.2	28.5	8.1	58.0
1968	288.6	51.7	95.8	5.5	34.2	8.2	61.8
1969	307.5	54.2	104.2	5.3	39.6	8.9	65.4
1970	297.8	57.2	114.7	5.6	42.4	9.0	65.6
1971	310.9	58.0	121.6	5.8	46.8	9.4	67.5
1972	342.3	58.4	130.7	6.1	49.5	10.4	72.1
1973	356.6	58.1	139.4	6.6	56.8	11.1	76.7
1974	365.6	62.0	151.3	6.9	64.3	11.6	76.2
1975	363.8	62.6	156.0	6.9	60.8	12.1	77.3
1976	356.1	63.8	153.6	6.7	51.6	12.1	74.7
1977	348.2	61.6	145.1	6.6	46.5	12.2	72.5
1978	341.4	58.1	139.3	6.5	40.9	12.0	69.1
1979	335.2	59.5	144.7	6.6	40.6	12.1	67.6
1980	327.0	66.2	159.4	6.7	42.2	12.5	70.3

¹ Does not include employees of small agricultural units and small rural businesses.

² Figures may not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, March 1982, p. 6.

Table 14. (Continued)

Transport and Com- muni- cations	Services					Total ²	Year
	Public Adminis- tration	Edu- cation	Health	Private Domestic	Other		
35.3	29.9	29.1	9.1	94.7	25.2	748	1965
35.8	31.8	30.2	9.4	95.7	27.8	735	1966
36.4	33.9	29.3	9.8	97.8	29.2	751	1967
36.2	35.5	30.2	10.2	102.0	30.1	790	1968
35.4	37.6	30.9	10.2	105.4	30.9	835	1969
36.5	39.0	31.0	10.7	109.3	34.5	853	1970
38.9	39.6	31.0	11.4	114.0	36.1	891	1971
41.0	40.1	31.9	12.1	119.4	38.9	953	1972
42.3	41.4	33.3	12.5	122.6	40.1	997	1973
43.8	43.4	34.7	13.0	124.4	42.7	1,040	1974
45.3	48.9	36.0	13.5	124.1	42.9	1,050	1975
45.7	53.8	36.9	13.5	122.8	42.1	1,033	1976
45.5	60.6	36.6	14.5	120.0	42.3	1,012	1977
44.0	68.3	34.9	14.7	115.9	41.1	986	1978
43.4	73.7	33.8	14.8	110.4	42.3	985	1979
45.6	71.1	41.9	15.2	108.0	43.8	1,010	1980

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 15. Average Annual Cash Earnings of African and Non-African Employees by Sector, Selected Years, 1965-78¹
(in Zimbabwe dollars)²

Sector	1965	1971	1973	1975	1977	1978
Agriculture and forestry						
African	123	132	144	180	232	249
Non-African	2,729	2,889	3,424	4,817	5,737	6,600
Mining and quarrying						
African	298	353	387	507	659	721
Non-African	3,438	4,811	5,278	6,949	8,488	8,763
Manufacturing						
African	416	483	569	724	918	1,039
Non-African	2,874	3,812	4,471	5,818	6,678	7,281
Electricity and water						
African	378	488	532	680	894	1,130
Non-African	3,361	4,294	4,842	6,421	7,579	8,158
Construction						
African	361	472	482	656	739	817
Non-African	2,787	3,644	4,164	5,533	6,438	6,667
Finance, insurance, and real estate						
African	524	760	862	1,176	1,725	1,933
Non-African	2,584	3,348	3,817	4,931	6,000	6,408
Distribution, hotels, and restaurants						
African	344	473	497	647	809	932
Non-African	2,161	2,940	3,322	4,250	4,939	5,279
Transport and communications						
African	623	735	780	961	1,195	1,342
Non-African	2,930	3,812	4,525	5,404	6,343	6,831
Public administration						
African	344	520	676	852	1,099	1,240
Non-African	2,684	3,618	4,669	5,739	7,665	8,531
Education						
African	468	758	823	1,092	1,271	1,600
Non-African	2,258	3,121	3,616	4,740	5,437	5,957
Health						
African	438	620	698	934	1,186	1,447
Non-African	1,904	2,686	2,974	3,614	4,279	4,467
Private domestic service						
African	224	289	302	356	424	449
Non-African	960	—	—	—	—	—

Table 15. (Continued)
(in Zimbabwe dollars)²

Sector	1965	1971	1973	1975	1977	1978
Other services						
African	318	421	470	579	745	830
Non-African	2,289	2,710	3,339	4,080	4,781	5,190
All activities						
African	246	326	359	464	588	663
Non-African	2,575	3,386	4,081	5,093	6,152	6,696

— means not reported.

¹ Non-African includes white, Asian, and Coloured.

² For value of the Zimbabwe dollar—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Rhodesia, Ministry of Finance, *Economic Survey of Rhodesia 1973*, Salisbury, April 1974, pp. 22–23; Rhodesia, Ministry of Finance, *Economic Survey of Rhodesia 1977*, Salisbury, July 1978, pp. 21–22; and Rhodesia, Central Statistical Office, *Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, October 1978, p. 4.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

**Table 16. Central Government Revenue and Expenditure,
Summary, Fiscal Years 1978-79 to 1981-82
(in thousands of Zimbabwe dollars)¹**

	1978-79 Actual	1979-80 Actual	1980-81 ² Actual	1981-82 Estimated	July-December 1981 Actual
Revenue					
Taxes on income and profits					
Income tax	247,582	298,446	418,866	571,000	306,331
Nonresident shareholders' tax	12,179	15,533	16,706	24,500	14,068
Nonresident tax on interest	—	—	—	2,000	272
Resident shareholders' tax	—	—	—	12,000	398
Branch profits tax	1,523	1,885	1,880	2,500	717
Total	261,284	315,864	437,452	612,000	321,786
Taxes on goods and services					
Sales tax	148,494	171,114	180,427	288,000	126,060
Customs duties	21,950	22,195	59,465	140,700	67,945
Excise duties	35,354	42,309	83,199	128,800	60,700
Betting tax	1,176	1,433	3,992	4,400	2,076
Other	882	923	896	815	394
Total	207,856	237,974	327,979	562,715	257,175
Miscellaneous taxes					
Stamp duties and fees	4,266	5,576	9,542	10,400	5,444
Estate duty	1,476	2,326	2,159	6,600	910
Other	8	4	7	5	4
Total	5,750	7,906	11,708	17,005	6,358
Revenue from investments and property	44,475	48,190	62,402	53,634	12,857
Fees from departmental facilities and services ...	14,910	17,314	13,674	16,720	6,780
Recoveries of development expenditure	1,855	622	941	700	393
Other	44,064	48,021	94,953	84,200	28,966
Total Revenue	580,194	675,891	949,109	1,346,974	634,335
Expenditure					
Recurrent expenditure					
Goods and services					
Salaries, wages, and allowance	274,019	331,143	374,763	442,012	236,105
Subsistence and transport	28,552	37,392	33,306	42,127	18,957
Incidental expenses	18,504	19,975	21,835	34,922	10,329

Table 16 (Continued)

	1978-79 Actual	1979-80 Actual	1980-81 ² Actual	1981-82 Estimated	July-December 1981 Actual
Other recurrent expenditure.....	160,758	225,077	176,286	242,685	110,465
Total.....	481,833	613,587	606,190	761,746	375,856
Transfers					
Interest	53,754	70,431	99,815	136,836	62,327
Subsidies	122,799	91,376	106,418	160,570	91,552
Parastatal bodies.....	2,201	4,097	10,731	26,255	5,766
Pensions	55,613	69,653	72,259	75,980	33,264
Grants and transfers	89,308	122,305	242,443	355,944	127,295
Total.....	323,675	357,862	531,666	755,585	320,204
Capital expenditure					
Land purchase	307	2,061	3,839	13,966	3,177
Buildings	20,213	16,022	26,051	66,376	15,871
Land development	1,205	1,388	1,839	4,270	1,144
Civil engineering	21,760	20,746	25,751	43,493	13,688
Plant, machinery, and equipment	10,513	14,141	6,207	9,060	2,680
Office equipment and furniture.....	358	514	1,445	4,154	747
Other capital expenditure.....	42	48	28	398	11
Total.....	54,398	54,920	65,160	141,717	37,318
Total					
Expenditure	859,906	1,026,369	1,203,016	1,659,048	733,378
Less Revenue	580,194	675,891	949,109	1,346,974	634,335
Budget account deficit (-) or surplus.....	-279,712	-350,478	-253,907	-312,074	-99,043

— means none.

¹ For value of the Zimbabwe dollar—see Glossary.² Provisional

Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, March 1982, p. 55.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

**Table 17. Central Government Expenditure by Appropriation,
Fiscal Years 1978-79 to 1981-82¹
(in thousands of Zimbabwe dollars)²**

	1978-79 Actual	1979-80 Actual	1980-81 ³ Actual	1981-82 Estimated	July- December 1981 Actual
Appropriation (constitutional and statutory)					
President.....	44	39	52	50	29
Parliament of Zimbabwe	39	39	63	74	35
Public Services	—	—	26,748	56,486	27,080
Treasury.....	106,756	137,297	141,930	142,481	64,130
Audit.....	22	25	29	29	15
Local Government and					
Housing.....	—	—	349	430	153
Labour and Social Services .	3,787	3,988	7,570	19,496	6,184
Justice and Constitutional					
Affairs.....	277	382	480	534	278
Roads and Road Traffic,					
Posts and					
Telecommunications	281	308	349	430	153
Appropriations not repeated					
Home Affairs.....	38	105	19	—	—
District Administration ...	529	598	174	—	—
Total	111,773	142,781	177,763	220,010	98,057
Appropriation (voted)					
President.....	121	147	323	455	201
Parliament of Zimbabwe	1,458	1,692	2,072	2,117	1,241
Prime Minister	—	—	—	10,112	6,233
Cabinet Office	16,278	6,041	8,228	1,063	839
Public Services	3,306	3,915	4,717	6,953	3,386
Defence	168,024	266,205	231,812	280,461	152,923
Treasury.....	32,197	27,219	19,010	38,519	5,410
Customs and Excise	2,540	2,785	2,871	3,448	1,546
Taxes.....	3,056	3,295	3,716	4,841	1,881
University	8,450	8,832	12,915	16,334	7,500
Audit.....	585	654	781	1,008	414
Economic Planning and					
Development	—	9	542	871	366
Central Statistical Office..	633	645	745	987	462
Industry and Energy					
Development	—	—	1,174	1,558	639
Trade and Commerce.....	33,791	19,204	39,493	83,022	27,781
Agriculture—General.....	46,968	37,595	34,023	44,579	44,200
Research and Specialist					
Services	5,323	5,830	7,972	8,411	5,155
Conservation and					
Extension	3,346	3,734	4,083	4,481	2,672

Appendix

Table 17 (Continued)

	1978-79 Actual	1979-80 Actual	1980-81 ³ Actual	1981-82 Estimated	July- December 1981 Actual
Marketing and Cooperative Services	510	559	855	1,331	496
Veterinary Services	5,649	6,082	8,793	19,551	6,951
Mines	2,348	2,619	3,576	4,072	1,716
Transport	46,881	48,872	52,811	56,932	32,641
Foreign Affairs	1,290	1,415	5,277	13,732	2,953
Manpower, Planning, and Development	—	21	1,200	2,649	776
Vocational Education and Training	3,883	4,388	6,043	7,382	3,042
Local Government and Housing	41,038	43,333	35,321	43,322	19,079
Lands, Resettlement, and Rural Development	8,732	12,952	19,922	53,013	11,909
Labour and Social Services ..	—	7,159	21,626	52,804	5,008
Health	45,621	52,852	76,769	107,936	47,304
Education and Culture	89,967	118,705	207,693	272,031	121,363
Youth, Sport, and Recreation	—	21	2,405	10,000	1,448
Community Development and Women's Affairs	—	—	67	2,186	637
Home Affairs	4,204	5,279	5,476	5,686	2,438
Zimbabwe Republic Police	72,111	92,048	75,898	81,780	39,082
Justice and Constitutional Affairs	3,754	4,117	5,398	7,469	3,316
Zimbabwe Prison Service	8,512	12,052	12,646	14,952	7,237
Information and Tourism	4,697	5,138	4,611	5,166	2,997
Natural Resources and Water Development	1,540	1,611	3,383	5,488	2,473
National Parks and Wild Life Management	3,575	3,959	6,382	8,107	3,914
Water Development	9,272	9,313	10,401	18,323	5,658
Roads and Road Traffic, Posts and Telecommunications	27,812	31,626	40,300	56,029	23,731
Works	34,724	32,164	43,923	78,875	26,303
Votes not repeated Executive Council	173	—	—	—	—
Combined Operations	231	161	—	—	—
Manpower, Social Affairs, Youth, and Rehabilitation	5,523	—	—	—	—

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 17 (Continued)

	1978-79 Actual	1979-80 Actual	1980-81 ¹ Actual	1981-82 Estimated	July- December 1981 Actual
Total.....	748,133	884,448	1,025,253	1,439,038 ⁴	635,321
Total					
Expenditure	859,906	1,027,229	1,203,016	1,659,048	733,378
Less Revenue	580,194	674,363 ⁴	949,109	1,346,974	634,335
Budget account deficit (-) or surplus	-279,712	-352,866	-253,907	-312,074	-99,043

— means none.

¹ Excludes loans and debt appropriations.

² For value of the Zimbabwe dollar—see Glossary.

³ Provisional.

⁴ As published.

Source: Based on information from Zimbabwe, Central Statistical Office, *Monthly Digest of Statistics*, Salisbury, March 1982, p. 56.

Table 18. Cabinet Members and Political Affiliation, August 1982

Office	Officeholder	Political Affiliation
Prime Minister	Robert Mugabe	ZANU-PF ¹ (president of ZANU-PF CC ²)
Deputy Prime Minister	Simon Muzenda	ZANU-PF (deputy president and secretary for foreign affairs, ZANU-PF CC)
Ministers		
Agriculture	Denis Norman	Independent
Community Development and Women's Affairs	Teurai Ropa Nhongo	ZANU-PF (secretary for women, ZANU-PF CC)
Construction	Callistus Ndllovu	PF-ZAPU ³
Defence	Robert Mugabe	ZANU-PF
Education and Culture	Dzingai Mutumbuka	ZANU-PF (secretary for education, ZANU-PF CC)
Finance, Economic Planning, and Development	Bernard Chidzero	ZANU-PF
Foreign Affairs	Witness Mangwende	ZANU-PF
Health	Oliver Munyaradzi	ZANU-PF
Home Affairs	Herbert Ushewokunze	ZANU-PF
Housing	Simbarashe Mumbengegwi	ZANU-PF
Industry and Energy Development	Simbi Makoni	ZANU-PF
Information, Posts, and Telecommunications	Nathan Shamuyarira	ZANU-PF
Justice and Constitutional Affairs	Simba Mubako	ZANU-PF
Labour and Social Welfare	Kumbirai Kangai	ZANU-PF (secretary for social welfare, ZANU-PF CC)
Land, Resettlement, and Rural Development	Moven Mahachi	ZANU-PF
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs	Eddison Zvobgo	ZANU-PF (deputy secretary for publicity and information, ZANU-PF CC)
Local Government and Town Planning	Enos Chikwore	ZANU-PF
Manpower, Planning, and Development	Frederick Shava	ZANU-PF
Mines	Maurice Nyagumbo	ZANU-PF (national organizing secretary, ZANU-PF CC)
National Supplies	Enos Nkala	ZANU-PF (treasurer general, ZANU-PF CC)

Appendix

Table 18 (Continued)

Office	Officeholder	Political Affiliation
Natural Resources and Tourism	Victoria Chitepo.....	ZANU-PF
Roads and Road Traffic	Daniel Ngwenya	PF-ZAPU
Trade and Commerce	Richard Hove	ZANU-PF (deputy secretary for foreign affairs, ZANU-PF (CC)
Transport and Power	Farai Masango.....	ZANU-PF
Water Resources and Development	Cephas Msipa.....	PF-ZAPU
Youth, Sport, and Recreation	Ernest Kadungura.....	ZANU-PF (secretary for finance, ZANU-PF CC)
Ministers of State: in the Prime Minister's Office.....	Emmerson Munangagwa..... Sydney Sekeramayi.....	ZANU-PF ZANU-PF (special assistant in the office of the president, ZANU-PF CC)
in the Prime Minister's Office (National Coordination).....	Tarisayi Ziyambi	ZANU-PF
in the Prime Minister's Office (Public Service).....	Chris Andersen.....	Independent
to the Deputy Prime Minister	John Nkomo.....	PF-ZAPU

1 Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

2 Central Committee

3 Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union

Table 19. *African Parties in 1980 Election*

Political Party	Leader	Comment
National Democratic Union	Henry Chihota	Conservative; Zezuru-oriented.
Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU)	Joshua Nkomo	Largely Ndebele support; left of center; part of Patriotic Front alliance of externally based parties.
United African National Council (UANC)	Abel Muzorewa	Majority party of 1979 internal settlement government; centrist; support among Manika of Mashonaland.
United National Federal Party	Chief Kayisa Ndiweni	Traditionalist and conservative; favored federation of Matabeleland and Mashonaland; support sought among Ndebele; on ballot in five provinces.
United People's Association of Matabeleland	Frank Bernard	Ndebele separatist campaign under former member of right-wing white Rhodesia Action party; on ballot in two provinces.
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)	Ndabaningi Sithole	Slightly left of center; won eleven seats in internal settlement government of 1979; mixed support, Nda subgroup of Shona predominating.
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)	Robert Mugabe	Marxist-oriented, mostly Shona backing; part of Patriotic Front alliance of externally based parties.
Zimbabwe Democratic Party	James Chikerema	Conservative; Zezuru-based; split off from UANC in 1979.
Zimbabwe National Front	Peter Mandaza	Campaigned against ZANU-PF among Karanga subgroup of Shona.

Source: Based on information from "Rhodesia: Ceasefire and Election Campaign," *Africa Research Bulletin*, Exeter, 17, No. 1, February 15, 1980, pp. 5547-5555.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Table 20. Major Army Weapons, 1982

Type and Description	Supplier	Estimated in Inventory
Armored fighting vehicles		
T-54/-55 main battle tank with 100mm quick-firing gun	North Korea, Libya	16
T-34 medium tank with 85 mm gun	Libya	10
AML-90 armored car ¹	South Africa	28
BTR-152 six-wheeled scout car ²	Soviet Union, North Korea	20
BDRM-2 scout car ²	Soviet Union	10
Buffalo, Crocodile, Hippo, Hyena, Pig, and Leopard armored personnel carriers of indigenous design ¹	Rhodesia, South Africa	several hundred
Artillery		
5.5-inch gun/howitzer ¹	Britain	4
122mm gun/howitzer	North Korea	8
25-pounder gun ¹	Britain	18
82mm B-10 antitank gun ²	Soviet Union	n.a.
76mm gun ²	Soviet Union	4
107mm rocket launcher ("Stalin Organ")	North Korea	6
120mm mortar ^{1, 2, 3}		6
82mm mortar ^{1, 2, 3}	Britain, China, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia	60
81mm mortar ^{1, 2, 3}		30
60mm mortar ^{1, 2, 3}		35
37mm towed antiaircraft gun ^{1, 2, 3}		n.a.
23mm ZU 23-2 towed antiaircraft gun ² ...	Soviet Union	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

¹ Formerly used by Rhodesian Security Forces.

² Formerly used by Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA).

³ Formerly used by Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA).

Table 21. Major Air Force Weapons, 1982

Type and Description	Supplier	Estimated in Inventory ¹
Combat aircraft		
English Electric Canberra B-2/T4 medium bomber, subsonic ²	Britain	7
Hawker Hunter FGA.9 fighter-bomber, Mach 0.95 ²	Britain	13
BAC Hawk attack/trainer, Mach 0.95	Britain	4 (4 on order)
Cessna 337 (0-2) Lynx, piston-engine light attack aircraft ^{2, 3}	n.a.	10
Transports		
Douglas C-47 twin piston-engine transport ²	Britain	12
Britten-Norman Islander twin-engine light transport ^{2, 3}	n.a.	6
Training and liaison aircraft		
SIAI-Marchetti SF.260 ^{2, 3}	n.a.	17
Aermacchi AL.60 Trojan ^{2, 3}	n.a.	9
Helicopters		
Bell 205A ^{2, 3}	n.a.	10
Aérospatiale SA.313/SA.318 Alouette II ²	South Africa	27
Aérospatiale SA.319 Alouette III ²	South Africa	

n.a.—not available.

¹ Totals include eight Hunter, four Hawk, and one Lynx aircraft destroyed or damaged by sabotage in July 1982.² Formerly used by Rhodesian Air Force.³ Procured from unknown source in violation of sanction during civil war.

Bibliography

Chapter 1

- Abraham, D.P. "The Roles of 'Chaminuka' and the Mhondoro Cults in Shona Political History." Pages 28-46 in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown (eds.), *The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966.
- Alpers, Edward A. "Dynasties of the Mutapa-Rozwi Complex," *Journal of African History* [London], 11, No. 2, 1970, 203-20.
- Atmore, Anthony, J.M. Chirenje, and S.I. Mudenge. "Firearms in South Central Africa," *Journal of African History* [London], 12, No. 4, 1971, 545-56.
- Australia. Parliament. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. *Zimbabwe*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980.
- Axelson, Eric. *Portuguese East Africa, 1600-1700*. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1960.
- . *Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1488-1600*. Mystic, Connecticut: Lawrence Verry, 1973.
- Barber, James. *Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Beach, D.N. "Ndebele Raiders and Shona Power," *Journal of African History* [London], 15, No. 4, 1974, 633-51.
- Bhebe, Ngwabi M.B. *Lobengula of Zimbabwe*. (African Historical Biographies series.) London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977.
- Birmingham, David, and Shula Marks. "Southern Africa." Pages 567-620 in Roland Oliver (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Africa, III (from c. 1050 to c. 1600)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Blake, Robert. *A History of Rhodesia*. New York: Knopf, 1978.
- Bourdillon, Michael F.C. "The Manipulation of Myth in a Tavara Chiefdom," *Africa* [London], 42, No. 2, April 1972, 112-21.
- . *The Shona Peoples: An Ethnography of the Contemporary Shona, with Special Reference to Their Religion*. Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1976.
- Bowman, Larry W. *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.
- Brown, Richard, "Aspects of the Scramble for Matabeleland." Pages 63-93 in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown (eds.), *The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966.
- Bruwer, Andries Johannes. *Zimbabwe: Rhodesia's Ancient Greatness*. Johannesburg: Keartland, 1965.
- Bull, Theodore (ed.). *Rhodesia: Crisis of Color*. Chicago:

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Quadrangle, 1967.
- Bullock, Charles. *The Mashona*. Westport, Connecticut: Negro Universities Press, 1970 (reprint).
- Cairns, H. Alan C. *Prelude to Imperialism: British Reactions to Central African Society, 1840-1890*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965.
- Carrington, C.E. *The British Overseas: Exploits of a Nation of Shopkeepers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950.
- Caton-Thompson, Gertrude. *The Zimbabwe Culture: Ruins and Reactions*. London: Frank Cass, 1970 (reprint).
- Chanaiwa, David. "The Army and Politics in Pre-Industrial Africa: The Ndebele Nation, 1822-1893," *African Studies Review*, 19, No. 2, September 1976, 49-68.
- . "Politics and Long-Distance Trade in the Mwene Mutapa Empire During the 16th Century," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 5, No. 3, 1972, 424-35.
- Chanock, Martin. *Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia, and South Africa, 1900-45*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977.
- Clark, John Desmond. *The Prehistory of Southern Africa*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1959.
- Clements, Frank. *Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society*. New York: Praeger, 1969.
- Cloete, Stuart. *Against These Three: A Biography of Paul Kruger, Cecil Rhodes, and Lobengula*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975.
- Cobbing, Julian. "The Absent Priesthood: Another Look at the Rhodesian Risings of 1896-1897," *Journal of African History* [London], 18, No. 1, 1977, 61-84.
- . "The Evolution of Ndebele Amaburtho," *Journal of African History* [London], 15, No. 4, 1974, 607-31.
- Daneel, Marthinus L. *The God of the Matopo Hills: An Essay on the Mwari Cult in Rhodesia*. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1970.
- Day, John. "The Insignificance of Tribe in the African Politics of Zimbabwe Rhodesia." Pages 85-109 in W.H. Morris-Jones (ed.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- . *International Nationalism: The Extra-Territorial Relations of Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.
- Denoon, Donald. *Southern Africa since 1800*. New York: Praeger, 1973.
- Fagan, Brian M. *Southern Africa During the Iron Age*. (Ancient Peoples and Places series.) London: Thames and Hudson, 1965.
- Flint, John E. *Cecil Rhodes*. (Library of World Biography series.) Boston: Little, Brown, 1976.
- Frank, Thomas M. "Southern Rhodesian Nationalism in the East Central African Conflict." Pages 121-37 in John A. Davis and

Bibliography

- James K. Baker (eds.), *Southern Africa in Transition*. New York: Praeger, 1966.
- Franklin, Harry. *Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of the Central African Federation*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963.
- Galbraith, John S. *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company*. (Perspectives on Southern Africa series.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Gann, Lewis H. "From Ox Wagon to Armored Car in Rhodesia," *Military Review*, XLVIII, No. 4, April 1968, 63-72.
- . *A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934*. New York: Humanities Press, 1969.
- . "Rhodesia and the Prophets", *African Affairs* [London], 71, No. 283, April 1972, 125-43.
- Gann, Lewis H., and Michael Gelfand. *Huggins of Rhodesia: The Man and His Country*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964.
- Gann, Lewis H., and Thomas H. Henriksen. *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush*. (Praeger Special Studies series.) New York: Praeger, 1981.
- Garbett, G. Kingsley. "Religious Aspects of Political Succession among the Valley Korekore (N. Shona)." Pages 137-70 in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown (eds.), *The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966.
- Garlake, Peter S. *The Great Zimbabwe*. New York: Stein and Day, 1973.
- . "Pastoralism and Zimbabwe," *Journal of African History* [London], 19, No. 4, 1978, 479-93.
- Glass, Stafford L.D. *The Matebele War*. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1968.
- Good, Robert C. *U.D.I.: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- Gregory, Martyn. "The Zimbabwe Election: The Political and Military Implications," *Journal of Southern African Studies* [London], 7, No. 1, October 1980, 17-37.
- . "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation Through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilisation," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* [London], 19, No. 1, March 1981, 63-94.
- Hall, Richard. *The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969.
- Hassing, Per. "Lonbengula." Pages 221-60 in Norman R. Bennett (ed.), *Leadership in Eastern Africa*. Boston: Boston University Press, 1968.
- Henderson, Ian. "White Populism in Southern Rhodesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 14, No. 4, September 1972, 387-99.
- Henderson, Ian, and Philip R. Warhurst. *Revisions in Central African History*. Salisbury: Central Africa Historical Association, 1965.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Hills, Denis. *The Last Days of White Rhodesia*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1981.
- _____. *Rebel People*. New York: Africana, 1978.
- Hodder-Williams, Richard. "Political Scenarios and Their Economic Implications." Pages 55–68 in W.H. Morris-Jones (ed.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- Howe, Russell Warren. "War in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, 48, No. 1, October 1969, 150–65.
- Hudson, Miles. *Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981.
- Huffman, T.N. "The Rise and Fall of Zimbabwe," *Journal of African History* [London], 13, No. 3, 1972, 353–66.
- Hull, Galen. "The Political Economy of Zimbabwe: Implications for the Internal Settlement," *Africa Today*, 25, No. 1, January–March 1978, 27–44.
- Inskip, R.R. *The Peopling of Southern Africa*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979.
- Joyce, Peter. *Anatomy of a Rebel: Smith of Rhodesia, A Biography*. Salisbury: Graham, 1974.
- Kay, George. *Rhodesia: A Human Geography*. New York: Africana, 1970.
- Keatley, Patrick. *The Politics of Partnership*. London: Penguin, 1963.
- Kirk, Tony. "Politics and Violence in Rhodesia," *African Affairs* [London], 74, No. 294, January 1975, 3–38.
- Kuper, Hilda, A.J.B. Huges, and J. van Velsen. *The Shona and Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia*. London: International African Institute, 1955.
- Lake, Anthony. *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
- Lamont, Donald. *Speech from the Dock*. London: Kevin Mayhew for the Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1977.
- Lessing, Doris. *Going Home*. New York: Popular Library, 1968.
- Leys, Colin. *European Politics in Rhodesia*. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Linden, Ian. *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London: Longman, 1980.
- Lockhart, John G., and Christopher Montague Woodhouse. *Rhodes*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1963.
- Lovett, John. *Contact: A Tribute to Those Who Serve Rhodesia*. Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1977.
- Lye, William F. "The Ndebele Kingdom South of the Limpopo River," *Journal of African History* [London], 10, No. 1, 1969, 87–104.
- Marks, Shula. "Southern Africa and Madagascar." Pages 389–468 in Richard Gray (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, IV (from*

Bibliography

- c. 1600 to c. 1790). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Martin, David, and Phyllis Johnson. *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War*. Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981.
- Mason, Philip. *The Birth of a Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia*. (Institute of Race Relations series.) London: Oxford University Press, 1958.
- Maxey, Kees. *The Fight for Zimbabwe: The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI*. London: Rex Collings, 1975.
- Meredith, Martin. *The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979*. London: Andre Deutsch, 1979.
- Moffat, Robert. *The Matabele Journals of Robert Moffat, 1829-1860*. 2 vols. (Ed., J.P.R. Wallis.) (Government Archives of Southern Rhodesia, Oppenheimer series, No. 1.) London: Chatto and Windus, 1945.
- Moorcroft, Paul L. *A Short Thousand Years: The End of Rhodesia's Rebellion*. Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1979.
- Mudenge, S.I. "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Rozvi Empire: A Reappraisal," *Journal of African History* [London], 15, No. 3, 1974, 373-91.
- Murphee, M.W. *Christianity and the Shona*. London: Athlone Press, 1969.
- Murray, David J. *The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Mutambirwa, James A. Chamunorwa. *The Rise of Settler Power in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1898-1923*. Rutherford, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1980.
- Newitt, Malyn Dudley Dunn. *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambezi: Exploration, Land Tenure, and Colonial Rule in East Africa*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1973.
- Northcott, Cecil. *Robert Moffat*. London: Lutterworth, 1961.
- Nyagumbo, Maurice. *With the People*. London: Allison and Busby, 1980.
- Nyangoni, Christopher, and Gideon Nyandoro (eds.). *Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Select Documents*. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979.
- O'Callaghan, Marion. *Southern Rhodesia: The Effects of a Conquest Society on Education, Culture, and Information*. Paris: UNESCO, 1977.
- Oliver, Roland, and Brian M. Fagan. *Africa in the Iron Age, c. 500 B.C. to A.D. 1400*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- . "The Emergence of Bantu Africa." Pages 342-409 in J.D. Fage (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa, II (from c. 500 B.C. to A.D. 1050)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- O'Meara, Patrick. "Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: Guerrilla Warfare or Political Settlement?" Pages 18-56 in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.
- Omer-Cooper, John. "The Nguni Outburst." Pages 319–54 in John E. Flint (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Africa*, V (from c. 1790 to c. 1870). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- . *The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa*. (Ibadan History series.) Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
- Owen, Christopher. *The Rhodesian African Rifles*. (Famous Regiments series.) London: Leo Cooper, 1970.
- Palley, Claire. *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888–1965*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.
- . "Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front from 1963 to 1969," (Part 1), *Race* [London], XII, No. 1, July 1970, 15–47.
- . "Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front from 1963 to 1969," (Part 2), *Race* [London], XII, No. 2, October 1970, 139–67.
- Palmer, Robin. *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
- Park, Stephen. *Business as Usual: Transactions Violating Rhodesian Sanctions*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1973.
- Perham, Margery. "The Rhodesian Crisis: The Background," *International Affairs* [London], 42, No. 1, January 1966, 1–16.
- Phillipson, D.W. *The Later Prehistory of Eastern and Southern Africa*. New York: Africana, 1977.
- Pollak, Oliver B., and Karen Pollak. *Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*. (World Bibliographical series, 4.) Oxford: Clio Press, 1979.
- Posselt, J.W., and Margery Perham. "The Story of Ndansi Kumato of the Matabele Tribe, Southern Rhodesia." Pages 63–79 in Margery Perham (ed.), *Ten Africans* (2d ed.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964 (reprint).
- Raeburn, Michael. *Black Fire: Accounts of the Guerrilla War in Rhodesia*. London: Julian Friedmann, 1978.
- Randall-MacIver, David. *Mediaeval Rhodesia*. London: Frank Cass, 1969 (reprint).
- Ranger, Terence O. "African Politics in Twentieth-Century Southern Rhodesia." Pages 210–45 in Terence O. Ranger (ed.), *Aspects of Central African History*. London: Heinemann, 1968.
- . "African Reactions to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa." Pages 293–324 in Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignan (eds.), *The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870–1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- . *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898–1930*. London: Heinemann, 1970.
- . "The Last Word on Rhodes?" *Past and Present* [Cambridge], 28, July 1964, 116–27.
- . "Nineteenth Century in Southern Rhodesia." Pages

Bibliography

- 112-53 in Terence Ranger (ed.), *Aspects of Central African History*. London: Heinemann, 1968.
- . *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-97: A Study in African Resistance*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967.
- . "The Rewriting of African History During the Scramble: The Matabele Dominance in Mashonaland," *African Social Research* [Manchester], IV, December 1967, 271-82.
- . "Traditional Authorities and the Rise of Modern Politics in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930." Pages 171-93 in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown (eds.), *The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966.
- Ransford, Oliver. *The Rulers of Rhodesia from Earliest Times to the Referendum*. London: Murray, 1968.
- Rasmussen, R. Kent. *Historical Dictionary of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*. (African Historical Dictionaries, No. 18.) Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1979.
- . "A Lost Man in Southern African History: Kaliphi Gundwane of the Ndebele," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 10, No. 1, 1977, 96-110.
- . *Migrant Kingdom: Mzilikazi's Ndebele in South Africa*. London: Rex Collings, 1978.
- . *Mzilikazi of the Ndebele*. (African Historical Biographies series.) London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977.
- Riddell, Roger. "Zimbabwe's Land Problem: The Central Issue." Pages 1-13 in W.H. Morris-Jones (ed.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- Robinson, K. R. "The Archaeology of the Rozwi." Pages 3-17 in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown (eds.), *The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966.
- Saint Brides, (Lord). "The Lessons of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia," *International Security*, 4, No. 4, Spring 1980, 177-84.
- Samkange, Stanlake J. W. *On Trial for My Country*. (African Writers series, No. 33.) Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1967.
- . *Origins of Rhodesia*. New York: Praeger, 1969.
- Sithole, Ndabaningi. *African Nationalism*. (2d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- . *Letters from Salisbury Prison*. Nairobi: Transafrica, 1976.
- . *Obed Mutezo: The Mudzimu Christian Nationalist*. Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- . *Roots of a Revolution: Scenes from Zimbabwe's Struggle*. London: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Spady, James G. "The Ancient Zimbabwe Empire," *Negro History Bulletin*, XXXV, No. 2, February 1971, 3-34.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Strack, Harry R. *Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1978.
- Summers, Roger F. H., and C. W. Pagden. *The Warriors*. London: White Lion, 1974.
- Sutherland-Harris, Nicola. "Trade and the Rozwi Mambo." Pages 243-64 in Richard Gray and David Birmingham (eds.), *Pre-Colonial African Trade*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Tabler, Edward C. *Pioneers of Rhodesia*. Mystic, Connecticut: Lawrence Verry, 1966.
- Todd, Judith. *Rhodesia*. London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1966.
- . *The Right to Say No*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972.
- Tredgold, Robert C. *The Rhodesia That Was My Life*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968.
- U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of Media Services. *Southern Rhodesia: The Question of Economic Sanctions*. (Current Foreign Policy series.) Washington: GPO, 1974.
- Vambe, Lawrence, C. *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976.
- . *An Ill-Fated People: Zimbabwe Before and After Rhodes*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973.
- Wallis, John P. R. *One Man's Hand: The Story of Sir Charles Coghlan and the Liberation of Southern Rhodesia*. London: Longmans, Green, 1950.
- Wannenburgh, Alf. *Rhodesian Legacy*. Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1979.
- Warhurst, Philip R. *Anglo-Portuguese Relations in South-Central Africa: 1890-1900*. London: Longmans for the Royal Commonwealth Society, 1962.
- . "The Scramble and African Politics in Gazaland." Pages 47-62 in Eric Stokes and Richard Brown (eds.), *The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966.
- Weinrich, Anna K. H. "The African National Council: Past Performance and Present Prospects in Rhodesia," *Africa Today*, 22, No. 1, 1975, 5-29.
- Walensky, Roy. *Walensky's 4,000 Days*. London: Collins, 1964.
- Wilkinson, Anthony. "The Impact of the War." Pages 110-23 in W. H. Morris-Jones (ed.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- . *Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-1973: An Account and Assessment*. (Adelphi Papers, No. 100.) London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973.
- Wilmer, S. E. (ed.). *Zimbabwe Now*. London: Rex Collings, 1973.
- Windrich, Elaine. *Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence*. London: Croom Helm, 1978.

Bibliography

- _____. *The Rhodesian Problem: A Documentary Record, 1923-73*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.
- Wiseman, Henry, and Alastair Taylor. *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition*. New York: Pergamon Press for the International Peace Academy, 1981.
- Young, Kenneth. *Rhodesia and Independence: A Study in British Colonial Policy*. (2d ed.) New York: Heineman, 1969.
- Zacklin, Ralph. *The United Nations and Rhodesia: A Study in International Law*. New York: Praeger, 1979.

Chapter 2

- Ashton, Hugh. "From Spears to Ploughshares: Changes in the Political Structure of the amaNdebele." Pages 66-92 in William A. Shack and Percy S. Cohen (eds.), *Politics in Leadership*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
- Australia. Parliament. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. *Zimbabwe*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980.
- Beach, D.N. "Ndebele Raiders and Shona Power," *Journal of African History* [London], 15, No. 4, 1974, 633-51.
- Bourdillon, Michael F. C. "Religion and Authority in a Korekore Community," *Africa* [London], 49, No. 2, 1979, 172-81.
- _____. "Religion and Ethics in Korekore Society," *Journal of Religion in Africa* [Leiden], 10, No. 2, 1979, 81-94.
- _____. *The Shona Peoples: An Ethnography of the Contemporary Shona, with Special Reference to Their Religion*. Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1976.
- _____. "Social Relations in the Understanding of Physical Events among the Eastern Korekore," *Zambezia* [Salisbury], 3, No. 2, December 1974, 61-70.
- Callear, Diana. "Resettlement: Zimbabwe's First Step," *Food Policy* [London], 6, No. 4, November 1981, 266-70.
- Cheater, Angela P. "Aspects of Status and Mobility among Farmers and Their Families in Msengezi African Purchase Land," *Zambezia* [Salisbury], 3, No. 2, December 1974, 51-59.
- _____. "Bond Friendship among African Farmers in Rhodesia." Pages 118-33 in F. Argyle and E. Preston-Whyte (eds.), *Social System and Tradition in Southern Africa*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Christopher, A.J. "Recent Trends in Land Tenure in Rhodesia, 1961-70," *Geography* [London], LVI, No. 3, 1971, 140-44.
- Clarke, Duncan G. *The Distribution of Income and Wealth in Rhodesia*. (Mambo Occasional Papers, Socio-Economic Series, No. 6.) Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1977.
- Cranmer, David J., and Valerie A. Woolston. *Southern Africa*. (World Education series.) Washington: American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, 1980.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Dachs, A.J. *Christianity South of the Zambezi*. Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1973.
- Dachs, A.J., and W.F. Rea. *The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe, 1879-1979*. (Zambezi series, No. 8.) Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1979.
- Day, John. "The Insignificance of Tribe in the African Politics of Zimbabwe Rhodesia." Pages 85-109 in W.H. Morris-Jones (ed.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- . "Zimbabwe's First Year," *Contemporary Review* [London], 239, No. 1388, September 1981, 113-19.
- Fry, Peter. *Spirits of Protest: Spirit Mediums and the Articulation of Consensus among the Zezuru of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)*. (Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, No. 14.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Garbett, Kingsley. "Disparate Regional Cults and a Unitary Ritual Field in Zimbabwe." Pages 55-92 in R.P. Werbner (ed.), *Regional Cults*. New York: Academic Press, 1977.
- Gelfand, Michael. *The Spiritual Beliefs of the Shona*. Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1977.
- Hawkins, Tony. "Why Mugabe Needs the West," *Financial Times* [London], May 18, 1982, 18.
- Holman, Michael. "Resettlement and Land Reform Is Government's Top Priority," *Financial Times* [London], April 22, 1980, X. (Survey.).
- . "Split Between Shona and Ndebele Widens in Zimbabwe," *Financial Times* [London], May 18, 1982, 18.
- Hughes, A.J.B. *Development in Rhodesian Tribal Areas: An Overview*. Salisbury: Tribal Press of Rhodesia Research Foundation, 1974.
- Hume, I.M. *A Strategy for Rural Development and Whitsun Data Bank No. 2: The Peasant Sector*. Salisbury: Whitsun Foundation, October 1978.
- Jakonya, T.J.B. "The Effects of the War on the Rural Population of Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, 5, No. 2, April 1980, 133-47.
- Jofman, John E. "Language Attitudes in Rhodesia." Pages 277-301 in Joshua A. Fishman et al. (eds.), *The Spread of English*. Rowley, Massachusetts: Newbury House, 1977.
- Joint Publications Research Service— JPRS (Washington). The following items are from the JPRS series:
- Sub-Saharan Africa Report*.
- "Catholic Commission Plans High Reconstruction Programme," *Herald*, Salisbury, February 10, 1981. (JPRS 77490, No. 2365, March 2, 1981, 202.)
- "Historical Role of Venerated Shona Prophets Reviewed," *National Observer*, Salisbury, May 23, 1980. (JPRS 75884, No. 2257, June 16, 1980, 115-59)

Bibliography

- "Law Against Witchcraft, Role of Mediums, Ngangas Discussed," *Herald*, Salisbury, March 13, 1981. (JPRS 77691, No. 2383, March 27, 1981, 88.)
- "Mediums Forbidding Use of Fertilisers," *Herald*, Salisbury, December 29, 1980. (JPRS 77253, No. 2249, January 27, 1981, 150.)
- "Role for Traditional Healers in Hospitals Planned," *Herald*, Salisbury, September 9, 1980. (JPRS 76510, No. 2297, September 26, 1980, 178-80.)
- "Witch-Hunting Wave Sweeps Mrewa District," *Sunday Mail*, Salisbury, June 21, 1981. (JPRS 78453, No. 2442, July 6, 1981, 88-91.)
- Jules-Rosette, B. "Family and Ceremonial Authority: The Sources of Leadership in an Indigenous African Church." Pages 123-44 in C. Oppone et al. (eds.), *Marriage, Fertility, and Parenthood in West Africa*. Canberra: Australian National University, 1978.
- Jules-Rosette, Bennetta. *Ritual and Conversion in the Church of John Maranke*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975.
- Kay, George. *Distribution and Density of African Population in Rhodesia*. Hull: Department of Geography, University of Hull, 1972.
- _____. *Rhodesia: A Human Geography*. New York: Africana, 1970.
- _____. "A Socio-Geographic Survey of Salisbury, Rhodesia," *Zambezia* [Salisbury], 3, No. 2, December 1974, 71-88.
- _____. "Towards a Population Policy for Zimbabwe Rhodesia," *African Affairs* [(London)], 79, No. 314, January 1980, 95-114.
- Kileff, Clive. "Black Suburbanites: An African Elite in Salisbury, Rhodesia." Pages 81-97 in C. Kileff et al. (eds.), *Urban Man in Southern Africa*. Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1975.
- Kileff, Clive, and Margaret Kileff. "The Masowe Vapostori of Seki: Utopianism and Tradition in an African Church." Pages 151-67 in B. Jules-Rosette (ed.), *The New Religion of Africa*. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex, 1979.
- Kosmin, B.A. "A Note on Southern Rhodesian Jewry," *Jewish Journal of Sociology*, 15, No. 2, December 1973, 205-12.
- Lancaster, C.S. "Brideservice, Residence, and Authority among the Goba (N. Shona) of the Zambezi Valley," *Africa* [London], XLIV, No. 1, January 1974, 46-64.
- _____. "The Zambezi Goba Ancestral Cult," *Africa* [London], 47, No. 3, 1977, 239-41.
- Legum, Colin (ed.). *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1979-80*. New York: Africana, 1981.
- Lelyveld, Joseph. "Deep Roots and Faith Bind Afrikaners to Zimbabwe," *New York Times*, October 21, 1980, A2.
- Liebenow, J. Gus. *Zimbabwe: A Political Balance Sheet. Part 1: Consolidation and Integration*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. Africa, No. 14.) Hanover, New Hampshire:

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- AUFS, 1981.
- Linden, Ian. *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*. London: Longman, 1980.
- Miller, Valerie. *Urban Commitment and Involvement and Black Rhodesians*. Durban: Center for Applied Social Science, University of Natal, 1978.
- Moyana, Tafirenyika. "Creating an African Middle Class: The Political Economy of Education and Exploitation in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, 4, No. 3, July 1979, 325-46.
- O'Callaghan, Marion. *Southern Rhodesia: The Effects of a Conquest Society on Education, Culture, and Information*. Paris UNESCO, 1977.
- Rasmussen, R. Kent. *Historical Dictionary of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*. (African Historical Dictionaries, No. 18.) Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1979.
- Rhodesia. Central Statistical Office. *Rhodesia: 1969 Population Census, Interim Report*, I and II. Salisbury: 1971.
- Riddell, Roger. "Prospects for Land Reform in Zimbabwe," *Rural Africana*, Spring-Fall 1979, 17-31.
- . "Zimbabwe's Land Problem: The Central Issue." Pages 1-13 in W. H. Morris-Jones (ed.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- Schutz, Barry M. "European Population Patterns, Cultural Persistence, and Political Change in Rhodesia," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* [Montreal], 7, No. 1, 1973, 3-25.
- Seager, Diana. "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Low-Income Housing for Blacks in Salisbury," *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, 12, No. 3, 1979-80, 313-28.
- Sithole, Masipula. "Ethnicity and Factionalism in Zimbabwe: Nationalist Politics 1957-79," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* [Henley, England], 3, No. 1, January 1980, 17-39.
- Smout, M. A. H. "Urbanization of the Rhodesian Population," *Zambezia* [Salisbury], 4, No. 2, December 1976, 79-91.
- "Staying On under Black Rule," *Times* [London], (Focus on Zimbabwe.) February 10, 1982, I.
- Stephen, David. "Mugabe and Zimbabwe's Whites, Two Years On," *New Society* [London], 60, No. 1015, April 29, 1982, 167-69.
- Stopforth, P. "Some Local Impediments to Social Change among Urban Africans," *Zambezia* [Salisbury], 5, No. 1, 1977, 31-40.
- Tlou, J. S. "Rhodesia, Religion, and Racism: Christianity's Dilemma in Southern Africa." Pages 182-205 in E. H. Berman (ed.), *African Reactions to Missionary Education*. New York: Teacher's College Press, 1975.
- Tsomondo, Madziwanyika S. "Against Alienism: The Response of the Zionist and Apostolic Independent 'Christian' Church Movements to European Capitalism in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, 4, No. 1, January 1979, 5-28.
- . "The Zionist and the Apostolic Prophetic Churches in

Bibliography

- Zimbabwe: A Critical Conceptualization of Cultural Nationalism," *Ufahamu*, 6, No. 3, 1976, 3-29.
- Weinrich, Anna K.H. *African Farmers in Rhodesia: Old and New Peasant Communities in Karangaland*. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- . *Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia*. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1973.
- . "The Closed Society: White Settlers in Zimbabwe," *Tarikh* [Lagos], 6, No. 2, 1979, 17-29.
- . *Mucheke: Race, Status, and Politics in a Rhodesian Community*. Paris: UNESCO, 1976.
- . "Social Stratification and Change among African Women in a Rhodesian Provincial Town." Pages 99-128 in F. Meer (ed.), *ASSA: Sociology South Africa*. Durban: ASSA, 1973.
- . *The Tonga People on the Southern Shore of the Kariba*. (Mambo Occasional Papers, Socio-Economic series, No. 8.) Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1977.
- World Bank. *Social Infrastructure and Services in Zimbabwe*. (Staff Working Paper, No. 495.) Washington: October 1981.
- . *World Development Report, 1982*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Zimbabwe. Central Statistical Office. *Zimbabwe Fact Sheet: Social and Economic Profile (Revised)*, 1981. Salisbury: 1981.
- "Zimbabwe." Pages 2013-26 in *Encyclopedia of the Third World*. New York: Facts on File, 1982.
- "Zimbabwe's Biased Health Service," *New African*, No. 155, August 1980, 40-42.
- Zimmerman, Richard Z. "Life's Uneasy for Zimbabwe Whites," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, June 19, 1982, B1, B2.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Africa Research Bulletin* [Exeter], January 1980-June 1982; *Financial Times* [London], January 1980-August 1982; *Herald* [Harare], March-June 1982; Joint Publications Research Service, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, January 1979-September 1982; *New York Times*, January 1980-August 1982; and *Washington Post*, January 1980-August 1982.)

Chapter 3

- Africa South of the Sahara 1980-81*. London: Europa, 1980.
- "Airline is Flying High: Sky's the Limit as AZ Looks to the Future," *Herald* [Salisbury], (Supplement) April 17, 1982, 15.
- Australia. Parliament. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. *Zimbabwe*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980.
- Ballance, Frank C. "Rural Reform in Zimbabwe," *Africa Report*, 26, No. 4, July-August 1981, 9-14.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Bratton, Michael. "Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics," *Journal of Modern African Studies* [Cambridge], 19, No. 3, 1981, 447-75.
- Callear, Diana. "Resettlement: Zimbabwe's First Step," *Food Policy* [London], 6, No. 4, November 1981, 266-70.
- Carter, Gwendolen M. "Zimbabwe: The First Year," *Africa Report*, 26, No. 3, May-June 1981, 62-66.
- Charlton, G.R. "Wankie Power Station, Stage 1: 480 MW," *Zimbabwe Engineer* [Salisbury], 19, No. 4, July 1981, XXXIX-XLIX.
- Clarke, Duncan G. *Agricultural and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia: A Report on Conditions of Labour and Subsistence*. Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1977.
- . *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Unemployment Crisis*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1978.
- . *Unemployment and Economic Structure in Rhodesia*. Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1977.
- Croxton, Anthony H. *Railways of Rhodesia: The Story of the Beira, Mashonaland, and Rhodesia Railways*. Newton Abbot, England: David and Charles, 1973.
- Cubitt, Verity S., and Roger C. Riddell. *The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia: A Study of the Minimum Consumption Needs of Families*. Salisbury: Faculty of Social Studies, University of Rhodesia, June 1974.
- Davies, Rob. *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe—The Informal Sector: A Solution to Unemployment?* London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1978.
- Dunlop, H. *The Development of European Agriculture in Rhodesia, 1945-1965*. Salisbury: Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1971.
- 50 Years On: 1978, Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Rhodesian Tobacco Association*. Salisbury: Rhodesian Tobacco Today, n.d.
- "Focus on Zimbabwe," *Times* [London], February 10, 1982, I-IV.
- Food and Agriculture Organization. *FAO Production Yearbook, 1981*, 35. Rome: 1982.
- German Development Institute. *Perspectives of Independent Development in Southern Africa: The Cases of Zimbabwe and Namibia*. Berlin: 1980.
- Girdlesone, J.A.C. "Industry Survives Seven Years of War," *Financial Times* [London], April 22, 1980, Section III, XII (Survey).
- Grundy, Trevor. "Zimbabwe: Battle to Preserve Stocks of Wood Fuel," *African Business* [London], No. 30, February 1981, 24.
- . "Zimbabwe: Massive Investment in Future Power," *African Business* [London], No. 34, June 1981, 31-32.
- . "Zimbabwe's Rich Coal Potential," *African Business* [London], No. 46, June 1982, 43.
- Hackwill, G.R.J. "Zimbabwe." Pages 1-93 in Albert P. Blaustein

Bibliography

- and Gisbert H. Flanz (eds.), *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1980.
- Handford, John. *Portrait of an Economy: Rhodesia under Sanctions*. Salisbury: Mercury Press, 1976.
- Harbeson, John W. "Land and Rural Development in Independent Zimbabwe: A Preliminary Analysis," *Land Tenure Center Newsletter*, No. 69, October-December 1980, 1-3.
- _____. "Land Policy and Politics in Zimbabwe," *Current History*, 81, No. 473, March 1982, 121-24, 138.
- Hawkins, Tony. "Zimbabwe Keeps Coast Line Open," *Financial Times* [London], August 4, 1982, 4.
- _____. "Zimbabwe: Minerals Corporation Conflict," *African Business* [London], No. 43, March 1982, 31.
- _____. "Zimbabwe: Shortages of Vehicles and Fuel Hold Back Economic Growth," *Financial Times* [London], September 24, 1981, Section III, VII (Survey.).
- Howden, R. "The Communal Farmers Can Overcome Need for Aid," *Herald* [Salisbury], April 17, 1982, 11 (supplement.).
- Hume, I.M. *A Strategy for Rural Development and Whitsun Data Bank No. 2: The Peasant Sector*. Salisbury: Whitsun Foundation, October 1978.
- Industry and Commerce of Rhodesia*, 1978. Salisbury: Thom's, n.d.
- Industry and Commerce of Zimbabwe Rhodesia*, 1979. Salisbury: Thom's, n.d.
- Kay, George. *Rhodesia: A Human Geography*. New York: Africana, 1970.
- Leistner, G.M.E. (ed.). *Rhodesia: Economic Structure and Change*. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1976.
- Liebenow, J. Gus. *Zimbabwe: A Political Balance Sheet. Part 1: Consolidation and Integration*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. Africa, No. 14.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.
- Manning, Robert. "Turning Point for Zimbabwean Economy," *Africa: An International Business, Economic and Political Magazine* [London], No. 117, May 1981, 52-53.
- Morris-Jones, W.H. (ed.). *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- Muskett, H.B. *Steel Highway: The Story of the Rhodesia Railways, 1897-1957*. Salisbury: Rhodesian Graphic, n.d.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. *Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1977/1980*. Paris: 1981.
- Palmer, Robin. *Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
- Phimister, I.R. "Meat and Monopolies: Beef Cattle in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1938," *Journal of African History* [Cambridge], XIX, No. 3, 1978, 391-414.
- Rasmussen, R. Kent. *Historical Dictionary of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- (African Historical Dictionaries, No. 18.) Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1979.
- Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. *Quarterly Economic and Statistical Review, December 1981*. (Vol. 2, No. 4.) Salisbury: n.d.
- Rhodesia. Central Statistical Office. *Agricultural Production in European Areas, 1976: Livestock*. Salisbury: n.d.
- _____. *Census of Livestock in European Areas, 1975*. Salisbury: n.d.
- _____. *Supplement to the Monthly Digest of Statistics*. Salisbury: October 1978.
- Rhodesia. Forestry Commission. *Annual Report and Accounts, 1972/1973*. n.pl.: n.d.
- _____. *Annual Report and Accounts, 1973/1974*. n.pl.: n.d.
- Rhodesia. Ministry of Finance. *Economic Survey of Rhodesia 1973*. Salisbury: Government Printer, April 1974.
- _____. *Economic Survey of Rhodesia 1977*. Salisbury: Government Printer, July 1978.
- Riddell, Roger. *The Land Question*. (From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe series.) Gwelo, Rhodesia: Mambo Press, 1978.
- Rotberg, Robert I., and William H. Overholt. *A Symposium on Zimbabwe's Economic Prospects*. Mt. Kisco: Seven Springs Center, 1980.
- Seager, Diana. "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Low-Income Housing for Blacks in Salisbury," *A Current Bibliography on African Affairs*, 12, No. 3, 1979-80, 313-28.
- "Second Anniversary of Independence," *Herald* [Salisbury], April 17, 1982, (supplement.).
- Simson, Howard. *Zimbabwe: A Country Study*. (Research Report, No. 53.) Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1979.
- Spray, Paul. "Zimbabwe's Blueprint for Change," *Manchester Guardian Weekly* [London], 125, No. 2, July 12, 1981, 8.
- Stinson, F. A. *Tobacco Farming in Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1889-1956*. n.pl.: Tobacco Research Board of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, n.d.
- Stoneman, Colin. "Foreign Capital and the Reconstruction of Zimbabwe," *Review of African Political Economy* [London], No. 11, January/April 1978, 62-83.
- _____. *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Skilled Labour and Future Needs*. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1978.
- Summers, Roger. *Ancient Mining in Rhodesia and Adjacent Areas*. (Museum Memoir, No. 3.) Salisbury: The Trustees of the National Museums of Rhodesia, 1969.
- Tanser, G.H. "Early Years of Agriculture in Rhodesia, 1890-1923," *Rhodesia Agricultural Journal* [Salisbury], 75, No. 4, July/August 1978, 79-81.
- Thompson, J.G., and W.D. Purves. *A Guide to the Soils of Rhodesia*. Salisbury: Information Services, Ministry of Agricul-

Bibliography

- ture, 1978.
- United Nations. Security Council. *Tenth Report of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia*, I. (Document No. S/12529.) New York: January 24, 1978.
- _____. *Tenth Report of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia: Addendum, II* (Annexes I-V. Document No. S/12529/Add. 1.) New York: March 1, 1978.
- U.S. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Zimbabwe*. (No. FET 82-041. International Marketing Information series.) Washington: GPO, June 1982.
- _____. *Marketing in Zimbabwe*, (OBR 81-21. International Marketing Information series.) Washington: GPO, August 1981.
- U.S. Department of the Interior. Bureau of Mines. *Zimbabwe*. Washington: GPO, August 1981.
- U.S. Embassy in Pretoria. *Zimbabwe: Agricultural Situation*. (Agricultural Attaché Report, No. ZI 0027.) Pretoria: December 22, 1980.
- _____. *Zimbabwe: Situation*. (Agricultural Attaché Report, No. RH 2007.) Pretoria: March 5, 1982.
- _____. *Zimbabwe: Tobacco (Annual)*. (Agricultural Attaché Report, No. RH 2013.) Pretoria: April 26, 1982.
- Universidade Eduardo Mondlane. Centro de Estudos Africanos. *Zimbabwe: Notes and Reflections on the Rhodesian Question*. Maputo: March 1979.
- Van Slambrouck, Paul. "Zimbabwe Plows Ahead on Its Ambitious Land Resettlement Program," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 1, 1982, 3.
- Whitlow, J.R. "A Scenario of Changes in Subsistence Land Use and Its Relevance to the Tribal Areas of Zimbabwe," *Zambezia* [Salisbury], VII, No. ii, 1979, 171-90.
- Zimbabwe. *Estimates of Expenditure for the Year Ending June 30, 1981*. Salisbury: Government Printer, 1980.
- _____. *Financial Statements 1980 (Presented to the House of Assembly by the Minister of Finance, July 24, 1980)* n.pl: Government Printer, n.d.
- _____. *Financial Statements 1981 (Presented to the House of Assembly by the Minister of Finance, July 30, 1981)*. n.pl: Government Printer, n.d.
- _____. *Growth with Equity: An Economic Policy Statement*. Salisbury: Government Printer, February 1981.
- Zimbabwe. Central Statistical Office. *Monthly Digest of Statistics*. Salisbury: March 1982.
- _____. *Zimbabwe Fact Sheet: Social and Economic Profile (Revised), 1981*. Salisbury: 1981.
- Zimbabwe. Electricity Supply Commission. *Annual Report and*

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Accounts for the Year Ended 30th June 1981*. Salisbury: September 30, 1981.
- Zimbabwe. Ministry of Finance. *Economic Survey of Zimbabwe 1979*. Salisbury: Government Printer, April 1980.
- Zimbabwe. Ministry of Information and Tourism. *Independent Zimbabwe*. Salisbury: Government Printer, n.d.
- Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Ministry of Finance. *Economic Survey of Zimbabwe Rhodesia 1978*. Salisbury: Government Printer, April 1979.
- "Zimbabwe," *Financial Times* [London], April 22, 1980, Section III, I-XVI (Survey.).
- "Zimbabwe," *Financial Times* [London], September 24, 1981, Section III, I-VIII (Survey.).
- "Zimbabwe Focus," *Africa: An International Business, Economic and Political Magazine* [London], No. 128, April 1982, 67-83.
- "Zimbabwe: One Year After," *African Business* [London], No. 32, April 1981, 41-63.
- "Zimbabwe Special," *African Business* [London], No. 45, May 1982, 61-76.
- "Zimbabwe Survey," *Africa: An International Business, Economic and Political Magazine* [London], No. 109, September 1980, 49-56.
- "Zimbabwe Survey," *Africa Now* [London], No. 9, December 1981, 117-22.
- ZIMCORD Conference Documentation, Part I: Policy Overview and Sectoral Strategies*. (Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, Salisbury, March 23-27, 1981.) Salisbury: 1981.
- ZIMCORD Conference Documentation, Part II: Project Descriptions*. (Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development, Salisbury, March 23-27, 1981.) Salisbury: 1981.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Africa: An International Business, Economic and Political Magazine* [London], November 1979-June 1982; *African Business* [London], September 1979-August 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin* (Economic, Financial and Technical Series) [Exeter], July 1973-August 1982; *Herald* [Harare], March 31, 1982-June 25, 1982; Joint Publications Research Service, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, January 1980-August 1982, Nos. 2185-2683; and *Standard Chartered Review* [London], March 1980-July 1982.)

Chapter 4

- Alperin, Robert J. "The Distribution of Power and the (June 1979) Zimbabwe Rhodesia Constitution," *Journal of Southern African Studies* [London], V, No. 1, January 1980, 41-54.

Bibliography

- Amnesty International Report 1981*. London: Amnesty International, 1981.
- Australia. Parliament. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. *Zimbabwe*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980.
- Bowman, Larry W. *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.
- Bratton, Michael. "Development in Zimbabwe: Strategy and Tactics," *Journal of Modern African Studies* [Cambridge], 19, No. 3, 1981, 447-75.
- . "The Public Service in Zimbabwe," *Political Science Quarterly*, 95, No. 3, Fall 1980, 441-64.
- Brayton, Abbott A. "The Future of Zimbabwe: An Overview," *Africa Today*, 27, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1980, 5-20.
- Burns, John F. "A Delicate Balance in Zimbabwe," *New York Times Magazine*, December 7, 1980, 46.
- Carter, Gwendolen M. "Zimbabwe: The First Year," *Africa Report*, 26, No. 3, May-June 1981, 62-66.
- Crocker, Chester A. "Role of the U.S. Private Sector in Zimbabwe," *Department of State Bulletin*, 82, No. 2063, June 1982, 47-49.
- Day, Alan J., and Henry W. Degenhardt (eds.). *Political Parties of the World*. Essex, England: Longman, 1980.
- Day, John. "Zimbabwe's First Year," *Contemporary Review* [London], 239, No. 1388, September 1981, 113-19.
- Fisher, Harold A. "Zimbabwe." Pages 1059-60 in George Thomas Kurian (ed.), *World Press Encyclopedia*. New York: Facts on File, 1981.
- Goldin, Bennie, and Michael Gelfand. *African Law and Custom in Rhodesia*. Cape Town: Juta, 1975.
- Gregory, Martyn. "Rhodesia: From Lusaka to Lancaster House," *World Today* [London], 36, No. 1, January 1980, 11-18.
- . "The Zimbabwe Election: The Political and Military Implications," *Journal of Southern African Studies* [London], 7, No. 1, October 1980, 17-37.
- . "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation Through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilisation," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* [London], 19, No. 1, March 1981, 63-94.
- Hackwill, G.R.J. "Zimbabwe." Pages 1-93 in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz (eds.), *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1980.
- Hudson, Miles. *Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981.
- Lake, Anthony. *The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.
- Legum, Colin (ed.). *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents. 1979-80*. New York: Africana, 1981.
- . *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and*

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Documents, 1980-81.* New York: Africana, 1982.
- Liebenow, J. Gus. *Zimbabwe: A Political Balance Sheet. Part I: Consolidation and Integration.* (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. Africa, No. 14.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.
- . *Zimbabwe: A Political Balance Sheet. Part II: Party Politics and Foreign Affairs.* (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. Africa, No. 15.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.
- Meredith, Martin. *The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890-1979.* London: Andre Deutsch, 1979.
- Moorcraft, Paul L. *A Short Thousand Years: The End of Rhodesia's Rebellion.* Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1979.
- O'Meara, Patrick. "Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: Guerrilla Warfare or Political Settlement?" Pages 18-56 in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.
- Palley, Claire. "What Future for Zimbabwe?" *Political Quarterly* [London], 51, July-September 1980, 285-302.
- "Rhodesia: Ceasefire and Election Campaign," *Africa Research Bulletin* (Political, Social and Cultural Series) [Exeter], 17, No. 1, February 15, 1980, 5547-5555.
- Simson, Howard. *Zimbabwe: A Country Study.* (Research Report, No. 53.) Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1979.
- Smiley, Xan. "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa, and the Rise of Robert Mugabe," *Foreign Affairs*, 58, No. 5, Summer 1980, 1060-83.
- U.S. Congress. 96th, 2d Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. *Results of the Recent Elections in Zimbabwe.* Washington: GPO, March 27, 1980.
- U.S. Department of State. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979.* (Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, February 4, 1980.) Washington: GPO, 1980.
- . *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.* (Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, February 2, 1981.) Washington: GPO, 1981.
- . *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981.* (Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, February 1982.) Washington: GPO, 1982.
- . "Internal Situation in Zimbabwe." (Letter to the Congress, November 5, 1981.) *Department of State Bulletin*, 82, No. 2058, January 1982, 26-27.
- U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. *The New*

Bibliography

- Situation in Zimbabwe.* (Statement by Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Current Policy series, No. 155.) Washington: 1980.
- _____. *Rhodesia.* (Statement by Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Current Policy series, No. 59.) Washington: 1979.
- _____. *Rhodesia's Internal Settlement: The U.S. View.* (Speech by Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the United Nations.) Washington: 1978.
- U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of Media Services. *Background Notes: Zimbabwe.* Washington: GPO, January 1981.
- Weiss, Ruth. "Zimbabwe: Black Editors In," *Index on Censorship*, 10, No. 3, June 1981, 27-31.
- Windrich, Elaine. "Controlling the Media: Rhodesian Style," *Journal of Southern African Studies* [London], V, No. 1, January 1980, 89-100.
- _____. "Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a One-Party State," *African Affairs* [London], 78, No. 313, October 1979, 523-34.
- Zimbabwe. *Growth with Equity: An Economic Policy Statement.* Salisbury: Government Printer, February 1981.
- "Zimbabwe," *Financial Times* [London], April 22, 1980, Section III, I-XVI (Survey.).
- "Zimbabwe," *Financial Times* [London], September 24, 1981, Section III, I-VIII (Survey.).
- "Zimbabwe's Open House," *African Index*, IV, No. 3, February 28, 1981, 9-12.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Africa: An International Business, Economic, and Political Magazine* [London], January 1980-July 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin* [Exeter], August 1979-July 1982; *Baltimore Sun*, January 1981-August 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, January 1980-August 1982; *The Economist* [London], January 1981-August 1982; *Financial Times* [London], January 1980-August 1982; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa*, January 1982-August 1982; *Herald* [Harare], October 1981-July 1982; Joint Publications Research Service, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, October 1979-August 1982; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* [London] 1980-82; *Manchester Guardian Weekly* [London], January 1980-August 1982; *Le Monde* [Paris], April 1980-August 1982; *New Africa* [London], January 1980-August 1982; *New York Times*, April 1980-August 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, April 1980-August 1982; and *Washington Post*, January 1980-August 1982.)

- Africa South of the Sahara 1980-81*. London: Europa, 1980.
- Amnesty International Report 1979*. London: Amnesty International, 1979.
- Amnesty International Report 1980*. London: Amnesty International, 1980.
- Amnesty International Report 1981*. London: Amnesty International, 1981.
- Les Armées et la défense*. (Annuaire de l'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient, 1980.) Paris: Jeune Afrique, 1980.
- Australia. Parliament. Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. *Zimbabwe*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980.
- Barber, James. "Zimbabwe's Southern African Setting." Pages 69-84 in W. H. Morris-Jones (ed.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- Brayton, Abbott A. "The Future of Zimbabwe: An Overview," *Africa Today*, 27, No. 4, Fourth Quarter 1980, 5-20.
- Burns, John F. "A Delicate Balance in Zimbabwe," *New York Times Magazine*, December 7, 1980, 46.
- Carter, Gwendolen M. "Zimbabwe: The First Year," *Africa Report*, 26, No. 3, May-June 1981, 62-66.
- Chapman, Dennis. "Rhodesia: Standing Alone," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal* [Devon], 108, No. 3, July 1978, 257-63.
- Cramer, James. *The World's Police*. London: Cassell, 1964.
- Day, John. "Zimbabwe's First Year," *Contemporary Review* [London] 239, No. 1388, September 1981, 113-19.
- Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1980*. Washington: Copley and Associates, 1980.
- Dodd, Norman. "Training of Junior Leaders," *Defence Africa* [Winchester], 8, No. 2, January 1982, 12-13.
- "Focus on the Air Force," *Herald* [Harare], May 11, 1982, 4-6 (supplement).
- Gann, Lewis H., and Thomas H. Henriksen. *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush*. (Praeger Special Studies series.) New York: Praeger, 1981.
- Gregory, Martyn. "The Zimbabwe Election: The Political and Military Implications," *Journal of Southern African Studies* [London], 7, No. 1, October 1980, 17-37.
- . "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation Through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilisation," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* [London], 19, No. 1, March 1981, 63-94.
- Grundy, Kenneth W. "The Social Costs of Armed Struggle in Southern Africa," *Armed Forces and Society*, 7, No. 3, Spring 1981, 445-66.
- Gunston, Bill (ed.). *The Encyclopedia of World Air Power*. New York: Crescent Books, 1980.

Bibliography

- Hackwill, G.R.J. "Zimbabwe." Pages 1-93 in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz (eds.), *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1980.
- Hewish, Mark, et al. (eds.). *Air Forces of the World*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.
- Hudson, Miles. *Triumph or Tragedy? Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981.
- Ingleton, Roy D. *Police of the World*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979.
- Joint Publications Research Service—JPRS (Washington). The following items are from the JPRS series:

Sub-Saharan Africa Report.

- "Details on National Army Given," *Herald*, Salisbury, October 6, 1981. (JPRS 79283, No. 2508, October 23, 1981, 53-65.).
- "Home Affairs Minister on Development of Police Force," *Herald*, Salisbury, May 7, 1981. (JPRS 78160, No. 2416, May 28, 1981, 78-80.).
- "North Koreans Train, Equip Autonomous Brigade," *Le Monde*, Paris, December 30, 1981. (JPRS 80128, No. 2572, February 18, 1982, 84-85.).
- Legun, Colin (ed.). *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1979-80*. New York: Africana, 1981.
- . *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1980-81*. New York: Africana, 1982.
- Liebenow, J. Gus. *Zimbabwe: A Political Balance Sheet. Part I: Consolidation and Integration*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. Africa, No. 14.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.
- . *Zimbabwe: A Political Balance Sheet. Part II: Party Politics and Foreign Affairs*. (American Universities Field Staff. Fieldstaff Reports. Africa, No. 15.) Hanover, New Hampshire: AUFS, 1981.
- Lovett, John. *Contact: A Tribute to Those Who Serve Rhodesia*. Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1977.
- Marston, R. "Resettlement as a Counterrevolutionary Technique," *RUSI* [London], 124, No. 4, December 1979, 46-50.
- Martin, David, and Phyllis Johnson. *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War*. Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981.
- Mathews, L.L. "Rhodesia." Pages 587-93 in John Keegan (ed.), *World Armies*. New York: Facts on File, 1979.
- The Military Balance, 1971-72*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971.
- The Military Balance, 1979-80*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979.
- The Military Balance, 1980-81*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980.

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- The Military Balance*, 1981-82. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981.
- Moorcroft, Paul L. *A Short Thousand Years: The End of Rhodesia's Rebellion*. Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1979.
- Mugabe, Robert. "Tribute to Zimbabwe's Heroes," *Africa Currents* [Huntingdon, England], No. 23, December 1980, 2-5.
- Nelson, Harold D., et al. *Area Handbook for Southern Rhodesia*. (DA Pam 550-171.) Washington: GPO for Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1975.
- O'Meara, Patrick. "Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: Guerrilla Warfare or Political Settlement?" Pages 18-56 in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.), *Southern Africa: the Continuing Crisis*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.
- Owen, J.I.H. (ed.). *Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the Armies of Africa, the Orient and Latin America*. London: Brassey's, 1980.
- Palley, Claire. "What Future for Zimbabwe?" *Political Quarterly* [London], 51, July-September 1980, 285-302.
- Raeburn, Michael. *Black Fire: Accounts of the Guerrilla War in Rhodesia*. London: Julian Friedmann, 1978.
- Ranger, Terence. "The Changing of the Old Guard: Robert Mugabe and the Revival of ZANU," *Journal of Southern African Studies* [London], 7, No. 3, October 1980, 71-90.
- Schutz, Barry M. "The Military Dimension in Zimbabwe: Some Policy Perspectives." (Paper Presented at the Conference on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and U.S. Policy, July 12-13, 1979.) Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1979.
- Simson, Howard. *Zimbabwe: A Country Study*. (Research Report, No. 53.) Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1979.
- Singh, Harjinder. "Armed Struggle and Zimbabwean Independence," *Africa Quarterly* [New Delhi], XX, No. 3-4, 1981, 88-105.
- Smiley, Xan. "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa, and the Rise of Robert Mugabe," *Foreign Affairs*, 58, No. 5, Summer 1980, 1060-83.
- Soames, Lord. "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe," *International Affairs* [London], 56, No. 3, Summer 1980, 405-19.
- Stephen, David. "Mugabe and Zimbabwe's Whites, Two Years On," *New Society* [London], 60, No. 1015, April 29, 1982, 167-69.
- U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973*. Washington: GPO, 1975.
- . *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1970-1979*. Washington: GPO, 1982.
- U.S. Congress. 96th, 2d Session. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. *Results of the Recent Elections in Zimbabwe*. Washington: GPO, March 27, 1980.
- U.S. Department of State. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979*. (Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 4, 1980.)

Bibliography

- Washington: GPO, 1980.
- _____. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*. (Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, February 2, 1981.) Washington: GPO, 1981.
- _____. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981*. (Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, February 1982.) Washington: GPO, 1982.
- _____. "Internal Situation in Zimbabwe." (Letter to the Congress, November 5, 1981.) *Department of State Bulletin*, 82, No. 2058, January 1982, 26-27.
- _____. *Report on Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid*. (Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, February 8, 1979.) Washington: GPO, 1979.
- Wilkinson, Anthony. "The Impact of the War." Pages 110-23 in W.H. Morris-Jones (ed.), *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House*. London: Frank Cass, 1980.
- World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1980*. London: Taylor and Francis for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1980.
- World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1981*. London: Taylor and Francis for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1981.
- "Zimbabwe: Birth Pangs," *New African* [London], No. 152, April 1980, 12-23 (Survey.).
- Zimbabwe. Central Statistical Office. *Monthly Digest of Statistics*. Salisbury: March 1982.
- "Zimbabwe: Election Focus," *Africa Currents* [Huntingdon, England], Nos. 19 and 20, Spring/Summer 1980, 2-25.
- Zimbabwe. *Estimates of Expenditure for the Year Ending June 30, 1981*. Salisbury: Government Printer, 1980.
- _____. *Estimates of Expenditure for the Year Ending June 30, 1982*. Salisbury: Government Printer, 1981.
- "Zimbabwe," (Survey.) *Financial Times* [London], April 22, 1980, Section III, I-XVI.
- "Zimbabwe," (Survey.) *Financial Times* [London], September 24, 1981, Section III, I-VIII.
- "Zimbabwe: Politics of Change," *Africa: An International Business, Economic and Political Magazine* [London], No. 128, April 1982, 14-21 (supplement.).

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Africa: An International Business, Economic and Political Magazine* [London], January 1980-July 1982; *Africa Research Bulletin* [Exeter], August 1979-July 1982; *Baltimore*

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

Sun, January 1981–August 1982; *Christian Science Monitor*, January 1980–August 1982; *The Economist* [London], January 1981–August 1982; *Financial Times* [London], January 1980–August 1982; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa*, January 1982–August 1982; *Herald* [Harare], October 1981–July 1982; Joint Publications Research Service, *Sub-Saharan Africa Report*, October 1979–August 1982; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* [London], 1980–82; *Manchester Guardian Weekly* [London], January 1980–August 1982; *Le Monde* [Paris], April 1980–August 1982; *New African* [London], January 1980–August 1982; *New York Times*, April 1980–August 1982; *Wall Street Journal*, April 1980–August 1982; and *Washington Post*, January 1980–August 1982.)

Glossary

Afrikaner—White South African descendant of that country's early Dutch, German, and French Huguenot settlers; language is Afrikaans.

apartheid—Literally, separateness; originally an Afrikaans word having application to South Africa, referring to the doctrine that the different races should be geographically and socially separated to the maximum feasible extent; has come to mean the structure of policy and law resulting in racial segregation and white domination.

Asian—A person mainly of Indian or Pakistani ethnic origin, although the term is also applied to others of Southeast Asian ancestry.

clan—A descent group (*q.v.*), the members of which are putatively descended from a common ancestor; often comprises several subclans (among the Shona), which in turn consist of lineages (*q.v.*), or the clan may comprise lineages and lack subclans.

Coloured—Generally accepted official designation in South Africa and Rhodesia of person having mixed racial ancestry; usually European (*q.v.*) and African, sometimes Asian (*q.v.*) and African; term still used in Zimbabwe, but racial categories no longer have official status.

communal lands—Zimbabwean term usually used after independence in place of Tribal Trust Lands (*q.v.*), a Rhodesian term that in 1982 remained the legal designation of certain African-occupied rural areas.

descent group—A unit whose members are putatively or actually descended from a common ancestor. For most Africans in Zimbabwe descent occurs, in principle, exclusively through males (patrilineal) or through females (matrilineal); most Shona and all Ndebele are patrilineal; a few Shona-speaking groups show signs of matrilineality, and some minor groups are matrilineal. The basic descent group is the clan (*q.v.*), which may be divided into subclans and lineages (*q.v.*).

European—Standard Rhodesian term applied to a white person, regardless of the country of origin; its use persists in Zimbabwe.

fiscal year (FY)—The Zimbabwean fiscal year extends from July 1 to the following June 30; July 1, 1981, through June 30, 1982, is expressed as FY 1981-82.

front-line states—Countries of southern Africa (Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, and Botswana) whose leaders maintained common policies on transfers of power in Namibia (*q.v.*) and Rhodesia. After national independence Zimbabwe became a member of the group.

gross domestic product (GDP)—The total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders during a fixed

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form of compensation of employees, profits, and depreciation (consumption of capital). Subsistence production is included and consists of the imputed value of production by the farm family for its own use and the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

gross national product (GNP)—gross domestic product (*q.v.*) plus the income received from abroad by residents, less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of whom are developing countries. In late 1982 the IMF had 146 members.

kaffir—Term derived from Arabic word meaning “infidel” or “heathen”; once used by Rhodesian and South African whites to designate a black African; term is highly pejorative, and Africans resent its use; also used at times in a term denoting a local pidgin sometimes used among Europeans and Africans: Kitchen Kaffir.

lineage—A descent group (*q.v.*), the members of which can, in principle, trace their descent from a common ancestor; lineages of great generational depth may include lineages of lesser depth.

Namibia—Name given to South West Africa by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1968 after creation of a council of eleven countries authorized to administer the area as a trust territory; South Africa refused to recognize the UN action.

parastatal—An autonomous government-owned enterprise.

Patriotic Front—Negotiating alliance that brought together ZANU (*q.v.*) and ZAPU (*q.v.*) for the Geneva Conference of October 1976 and subsequent preindependence conferences. Beginning with elections in February 1980, the term sometimes has been used in referring to Joshua Nkomo's political party, the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU).

Tribal Trust Lands (TTL)—Specifically delineated rural areas occupied by Africans mainly under customary systems of tenure. In 1982 these areas, constituting about 40 percent of Zimbabwe's total area, by law remained exclusively reserved for African use. Since national independence the TTL have ordinarily been referred to as communal lands (*q.v.*).

UDI—Unilateral declaration of independence; refers to Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith's action of November 11, 1965, which was taken on behalf of the British crown colony without the concurrence of Britain.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. In 1982 the IBRD had over 140 members, the IDA had 130, and the IFC over 120. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—*q.v.*).

ZANU—Zimbabwe African National Union, one of two African nationalist movements directed in the 1970s toward liberating Rhodesia from white minority domination. Illegal under Rhodesian law, the movements were directed from headquarters in sympathetic neighboring countries. Active in infiltrating Rhodesia after training as insurgents, ZANU and ZAPU (*q.v.*) guerrillas were referred to by white Rhodesians simply as "terrorists."

ZAPU—Zimbabwe African People's Union. *See* ZANU.

Zimbabwe dollar (Z\$)—National currency unit; comprised of 100 cents. At the time of UDI (*q.v.*) the currency unit was the Rhodesian pound, divided into twenty shillings and having a value equal to US\$2.80. On February 17, 1970, a decimal system was introduced; the new currency unit, the Rhodesian dollar (R\$), consisting of 100 cents, was officially valued at US\$1.40. During the Zimbabwe Rhodesia interlude the Rhodesian dollar was referred to abroad as the Zimbabwe Rhodesian dollar (ZR\$), but no new currency was issued. Similarly, after national independence the term *Zimbabwe dollar* was applied. However, the Rhodesian dollar continued as the sole money in circulation until early 1981 when a start was made on the issuance of a new series of notes and coins bearing the name *Zimbabwe*. Replacement of the Rhodesian dollar had been essentially completed at the end of August 1982. After devaluation of the United States dollar in December 1971, the official Rhodesian dollar rate was R\$1 to US\$1.52. During the 1970s the official rate varied from a high of R\$1 to US\$1.77 in 1973 to a low of R\$1 to US\$1.45 at the end of 1979. In late 1980 Z\$1 equaled US\$1.59 but began declining in early 1981, and in mid-1982 Z\$1 equaled US\$1.32 (US\$1 equaled Z\$0.76).

Index

- African National Congress (ANC): 28, 33, 39, 210, 226
 African National Council: 56, 59, 60, 63
African Nationalism (Sithole): 55
 African Purchase Areas: 82, 83, 141, 197; land ownership, 142, 143; population, 84, 87, 89; society, 110, 111
 African society: xviii, 107-114; chiefs and headman, 198; clergy, 116; elite class, 39, 113, 114; middle class, 41, 112
 Africans: 144, in the government, 32, 36, 192, 194, 199, 200; land ownership, 31, 140-143; urban elections, 196-197; voting rights, 24, 29, 38-39, 102; wages, 179, 182
 Africans of foreign origin: 89, 90, 93
 Afrikaans language: 93
 Afrikaners: xvii, 13, 15, 99, 225; churches, 116
 agriculture (*see also* communal lands; farmers, livestock): xxi, 25, 155, 233; commercial farming, 113, 138, 145, 147, 174; employment in, 178; farming regions, 139-140, 292; national land, 143; subsistence farming, 178, wages, 180
 air force: 242, 249, 258, 259, 265, 267, 317; organization, 270, 273-275
 Air Rhodesia: 58
 Air Zimbabwe: 175
 airlines: 175
 airports: xxii, 172-173, 175; military airfields, 273
 Algeria: 277
 Amandebele: 97
 American Independent Oil: 168
 ancestral spirits: 109, 110, 118, 119, 123
 Andersen, Chris: 214, 314
 Anglo-American Corporation: 161, 162, 227
 Anglo-Boer War: 25, 250
 Angola: 37, 59, 230, 247, 253, 261; Cubans in, 229, 246; guerrilla base, 57; trade, 49
 anthropology: 3, 5
 area: xx, 74
 Argus newspaper chain: 218, 228
 armed forces (*see also* conscription; defense expenditures; guerrilla forces): xxiv, 238, 249, 263, 316, 317; black officers, 64, 266; economic development activities, 280, 262; during civil war, 55-59; of neighboring countries, 247; organization, 191, 268, 270
 asbestos: 157, 158, 159, 175, 232, 298
 Asians: xxi, xviii, 81, 84, 93, 99, 255; education, 124; social status, 102; voters, 189
 Australia: 205
 automotive assembly: 155, 156
 balance of payments: 156, 157, 177, 301-303
 Banana, Canaan: xxxii, 68, 190, 206
 Banda, H. Kamuzu: 44, 224
 Bangala dam and lake: 76-77, 147
 banks: 164, 177, 216, 232
 Bantu language: 4, 93, 97
 Barwe: 7
 Basutoland: 37
 Bechuanaland: 20, 37
 Beira: 7, 25, 168, 177, 225
 Beitbridge: xvi, 79, 171, 173
 Belgium: 162
 Bernard, Frank: 315
 Bindura: 77, 160, 173
 Birwa (Sotho): 94, 98
 Botha, P. W.: 248
 Botswana: xvi, 13, 17, 176, 225, 246, 247, civil war and, 253; people, 97, 98; railroad through, 170
 boundaries: xvi, 6-7, 12, 20, 37
 Bourdillon, Michael: 108-109, 115, 117
 Britain: xxix, 17, 24, 29, 231-232; aid, 174, 178, 189, 222, 230; influence, 20, 40, 188, 189, 199, 205; investment by, 155, 159, 160; military training by, 263, 264, 272, 274, 275, 276; obligations of, 43, 46, 53, 62, 63, 65, 66-69; trade, 146, 156, 176
 British Broadcasting Corporation: 232
 British Petroleum Company: 50, 169
 British South Africa Company (BSAC): xiii, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 30, 148, 158, 170; charter company rule, xiv, 23-29; mining rights, 141, 142; police, 22, 250, 253, 280
 British South Africa Police (BSAP): 250, 255
 Buffalo Range: 173, 175
 Bulawayo: xvi, 6, 13, 20, 21, 25, 27, 76, 91, 107, 139, 172, 244; crime, 240; health services, 131; industry, 154,

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- 155, 166; press, 218, 220; schools, 128; town council, 197; troop riots, 211, 264
- Bulgaria: 233, 277
- Bushmen: 98, 99
- Byrd Amendment: 229
- cabinet: 191, 192, 208, 211, 214; member affiliations, 313-314
- California Texas Oil Company: 168
- Cambridge Higher School Certificate: 125
- Canada: 171, 274, 277
- Carrington, Lord: 66, 67
- Carter, Jimmy: 65, 228
- censorship: 218-219, 221, 241
- censuses: xx, 80, 86, 88
- Central African Federation. *See* Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
- Central African Petroleum Refineries: 168
- Central Intelligence Organization (CIO): 237, 242, 245, 278-280
- Centre Party: 42, 52
- Chaminuka: 120
- Changamire dynasty: xiii, 10, 97
- Chegutu: 77
- Chidzero, Bernard: 208, 313
- Chihota, Henry: 315
- Chikerema, James: 39, 213, 315
- Chikowore, Enos: 313
- Chikunda people: 97
- children: 129, 130
- China: 188, 222, 233, 251; aid, 224, 234, 246, 277
- Chinamano, Josiah: 211
- Chinhoyi: xxvi, 77, 160
- Chirau, Jeremiah: xvi, 63, 213
- Chiredzi: 175
- Chirundu: 172
- Chisumbanje region: 148
- Chitepo, Herbert: 224
- Chitepo, Victoria: 314
- Chizarira Range: 76
- chrome ore: 158, 160, 161, 162, 175, 298; United States and, 229, 231
- Chronicle*: 218, 220
- citizenship: 67, 189, 217
- civil rights (*see also* censorship): xv, xxx, 40, 46, 64, 201, 202, 221; political freedoms, 51-52, 205
- civil service: 198; personnel, 101, 187, 189, 190, 192, 194
- civil war: xxxii, 64, 237, 243, 251-256; demobilization, 261-262; refugees, 58, 84, 91
- climate: xx, 74, 75, 147
- coal: 158, 162, 164, 166, 228, 298
- coffee: 139, 146, 147, 294, 295
- Coghlan, Charles: xiv, 26, 28, 30, 33
- Coloureds: xx, xxviii; education, 124; population, 81, 84, 93, 99, 255; religion, 115; social status, 102; voters, 189, 194
- Commonwealth of Nations: 43
- communal lands: 137, 141, 142, 145, 147, 165, 170, 174, 195; government, 197, 198, 200
- Confederate Party: 35
- conscription: 255, 261; of Africans, 58; of whites, 250, 254
- constitutions: 36, 39-42, 46, 47, 52, 63; crown colony, 24, 29, 32; current, xxxi, 66, 187, 188-189, 256, 281; political rights, 202, 203
- consumers: 155, 167, 177
- copper: 158, 160, 228, 298
- cotton: 146, 147, 294, 295
- Council of Chiefs: 191, 213
- courts: 191, 199, 200-201
- crime: 199, 200, 245; guerrillas, 238, 239-240, 241
- Crocker, Chester A.: 231
- crops: 139, 147, 148, 294, 295
- Crosland, Anthony: 62
- Crown Colony of Southern Rhodesia: 29
- Cuba: 265, 274
- currency: xxii
- Czechoslovakia: 233
- Davbengwa, Dumisc: 245, 257
- dams: 147, 154
- Day, John: 105, 106
- Declaration of Rights: 66, 189, 190, 199
- defense expenditures: xxiv, 182, 183, 254; budget, 258, 259
- Defence Forces Service Commission: 191, 192
- Deka River: 76
- Delta Corporation: 228
- Democratic Party: 35, 314
- Denmark: 205
- diamonds: xxx
- diet: 154
- Dingiswayo: 11
- diseases: 129, 130
- divorce: 200
- Doke, Clement: 96
- Dombo: 10, 11
- Dominion Party (DP): 37, 44
- Douglas-Home, Alec, 43, 44, 52
- Dupont, Clifford: 46, 47, 52
- East Germany: 233
- education: xxi, 125-129, 259, 290, 291; military schools, 264, 272, 274, 276; mission schools, 26, 27, 114, 115; School of Mines, 128; training for demobilized soldiers, 262
- Egypt: 274, 277
- electric power: 137, 162, 165-167, 224
- elephants: 15

Index

- levations and drainage: xx, 6-7, 74, 75, 76, 78
- Emergency Powers Act: 52, 53, 58, 241, 243
- emigration by whites: xxxiii, 58, 90, 100, 177, 178, 242
- energy: xxii, 162-169; wood fuel, 152, 165
- English language: xx, xxvii, 93, 129, 276; press, 218; radio and television, 220, 221
- Ethiopian churches: 117
- ethnic tensions: 103-107, 237, 238, 243, 253
- European Economic Community: 162, 221, 222, 232, 233
- European General land: 83, 84, 89
- Europeans. *See* white minority
- exports: 171, 175, 176, 177; agriculture, 144, 146, 147, 148, 176; chrome, 229; livestock, 150, 151; minerals, 50, 51, 158, 159, 162, 164
- external security: 246-249, 277-278, 279; Mozambique and, 225; South Africa and, 226
- Falcon Mines: 159
- Fanakalo: 93
- farmers: black, 144; white, xxviii, xxxiii, 31, 150, 178, 182, 195, 252, 254
- Federal Party: 36, 38
- Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: xv, 35, 36, 37, 42, 44, 223, 250-251
- Feruka refinery: 168, 173
- Field, Winston: xv, 37, 42, 278
- fishing industry: 153-154
- flag: xix
- Flower, Ken: 278
- foreign aid (*see also* United States; Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development): 148, 153; from Britain, 174, 232; health services, 131, 132; military assistance, 275-277
- foreign exchange: 50, 160, 177; from manufacturing, 154, 156, 157
- foreign investment in enterprises: 216, 227, 232; mining, 138, 159, 164, 228, 231
- foreign relations: xxiv, 221-234
- foreign trade (*see also* sanctions): xxii, 173-178, 222, 227, 228, 233, 276, 300
- foreign workers: 171, 179, 265
- forestry: 140, 152-153
- Fort Charter: 20
- Fort Salisbury: xiii, 19, 20
- Fort Tuli: 20
- Fort Victoria: 20
- France: car assembly, 156; economic co-operation, 168, 232
- Francistown: 20
- Freedom House: 205
- freehold land tenure: 141, 142, 143, 145
- Front for the Liberation of Mozambique: 252
- Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI): 55-56, 57, 253
- Gairezi River: 77
- game parks and reserves: 141, 143, 174, 281
- Gaza people: 12, 20
- Geneva Conference: 61-62, 230, 253
- Gibbs, Humphrey: 45, 47
- Gilpin, David: 102
- gold: 5, 8, 11, 14, 18, 157, 158, 159, 164, 177, 232, 298; mines, 10, 13, 16, 20, 179; strata of, 6-7, 15
- government: xxiii, 52, 189, 191; Africans in, 36, 192, 194, 199, 200; colonial era, 23-26, 29; revenues and expenditures, 182, 183, 195, 308-312
- government role: (*see also* censorship): 137, 147, 156; ideology, 215-217
- Gqabi, Joe: 248
- Great Dyke: 75, 76, 77; minerals, 158, 160, 161
- Great Zimbabwe: xi, xiii, 3, 5, 6-7, 8-9, 12
- Greece: 277
- Grey's Scouts: 263, 271
- Griqua (Coloured): 15
- Gross Domestic Product: agriculture, 144; industry, 154, 156, 158, 293
- Growth with Equity*: 138, 164
- guerrilla forces: 251-254, 268; integration into the army, 211, 215, 237, 240, 244, 256, 259, 260-261, 262-265; violence, 55, 56, 57-58, 150, 151, 201, 209, 238, 255
- Gukurahundi: 270, 271
- Gumede, Josiah: 65
- Gwai River: 76
- Gwali River: 76
- Gwata, Tizirai: 197
- Gwelo River: 76
- Gweru: xxvi, 77, 91, 161; transportation, 173, 175
- Harare: xxvi, 7, 19, 91, 107, 139, 154, 166, 220; health services, 131; housing, 101; local government, 197; police, 279; schools, 128; transportation, 173, 175
- Harriman, Averell: 228
- health care: xxi, 129-132, 183, 216, 228, 259; indigenous healers, 123, 125; missions, 115
- Heath, Edward: 52
- herbal medicine and healers: 123, 125
- Hippo Valley: 148, 173, 174, 175, 228
- historical chronology: xiii-xvi

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Hlengwe (Tsonga): 95, 98
 Holland, Andre: 214
 hospitals: 101, 130, 131
 Hottentot: 99
 housing: 101
 Hove, Byron: 192
 Hove, Richard: 282, 314
 Huggins, Godfrey: xiv, xv, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38
 Hunyani River: 77
 Hwange: xxvi, 76; airport, 172, 175; coal, 162, 166

 identity cards: 241
 import substitution industries: 155, 156, 177
 imports: 152, 171, 176, 230; restrictions, 156
 independence: ceremonies, 221, 228; changes in racial relations, 91-92, 100
 independence talks: 66-69; British five principles, 43-44, 45, 47
 independent churches: 35, 117-118
 India: 171
 indigenous religions: 5, 15, 110, 111, 114, 118-123, 125
 Industrial and Commercial Workers Union: 33
 inflation: xxxii, 180-181, 259
 internal security (*see also* guerrillas; sabotage): 201, 202, 215, 236, 241, 279
 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: 157, 171
 International Development Association: 157
 International Finance Corporation: 162
 Inyanga mountains: 77, 271
 Inyangani: 75, 77
 Inyati: 12, 20, 26
 Ireland: 205
 iron and steel industry: 155, 156; ore, 164, 228, 299
 Iron Mask Range: 77
 irrigation: 147, 148
 Italy: 156, 176
 ivory: 10, 11, 14, 15

 Jacha, Aaron: 33
 Jameson, L. S.: 19, 20, 22, 23
 Japan: 156, 176
 Jongwe Printing and Publishing Company: 220
 Judicial Service Commission: 191, 192
 judicial system: xxiii, 24, 198-201, 240

 Kadoma: xxvi, 77, 160
 Kadungura, Ernest: 208, 314
 Kachi River: 77
 Kaguvi: 120-121

 Kalahari Desert: 4, 6, 12
 Kalanga people: 4, 6-7, 10, 94, 95, 104; in the army, 266; language, 97, 206; politics, 244
 Kaliphi: 12, 13
 Kanda: 16
 Kangai, Kumbirai: 313
 Karanga people: 4, 6-7, 10, 94-95, 104, 208; in army, 266; language, 96
 Kariba: airport, 172, 175; dam and power plant, 76, 78, 137, 154, 165, 223; lake, xxvi, 75, 98, 281
 Kaunda, Kenneth: 44, 55, 56, 59, 60, 66, 224
 Khama, Seretse: 59
 Khoisan peoples: 4, 99
 Khumalo: 13
 Kildonan Siding: 173
 kinship and descent groups: 110, 111
 Kissinger, Henry A.: 60-61, 230
 Kitchen Kaffir: 93
 kopjes: 75
 Korekore people: 4, 6-7; language, 94-95, 96
 Kuwait: 148
 Kwekwe: xxvi, 128; industry, 154, 161
 Kyle Dam: 77, 147

 labor associations: 33, 216
 labor force: 158, 171, 178, 179; agriculture, 144; domestic servants, 180, 181; manufacturing, 155
 Lake Macdougall: 77
 Lake Ngami: 12
 Lake Nyasa: 11, 12
 Lamont, Donal: 58
 Lancaster House Conference: xvi, 66-69, 188, 189, 192, 210, 217, 226, 232
 land apportionment: Africans versus whites, xiv, 21, 24, 25, 26, 31-32, 35, 51, 66, 81, 82-84
 land ownership: 19, 29, 30, 141-144
 land use: 138-139, 140, 144
 Landau, John: 214
 languages (*see also* English language): xx, 93, 220
 Law, Andrew Bonar: 29
 laws: African Land Husbandry, 142; customary law, 200; education, 27, 125; emergency powers, 52, 53, 58, 241, 243; land apportionment, 32, 35, 51, 142, 143, 154; land tenure, xvi, 83, 153, 202; minerals marketing, 164; natural resources, 148, 150; racial discrimination, 201-202; Tribal Trust Lands, 142, 153; veterans employment, 275
 Liberal Party: xiv, 34
 Libya: 261, 277
 Limpopo River: xx, xxvi, 6-7, 12, 74, 76-

Index

- 77, 78
 lion spirit mediums: 111, 120-123, 252
 Lippert, Edward: 19
 livestock: 75, 148-152; cattle as wealth, 8, 13, 21, 35; marketing, 146; raising, 139, 140, 141, 145
 Livingstone, David: 15
 Llewellyn, Lord: 36
 Lobengula: xiii, 15-17, 18, 19, 20-21, 26, 120
 local government: 109, 190, 191, 195-196; African townships, 52
 Lomé Convention: 221, 233
 London Missionary Society: 15, 116
 Lonrho Investment Group: 159, 168, 232
 Lundi River: 77, 79
 Lusaka: 224
 Lusaka Conference: 59-60, 232
- Machal, Samora: 224, 225
 MacLean, Alexander: 257, 258, 266
 Macmillan, Harold: 41
 Mahachi, Moven: 313
 maize: 145, 146, 147, 294, 295
 Makoni, Simbi: 313
 Makwarimba, Alfred: 216
 Malawi: 44, 93, 176, 179, 223
 Mandaza, Peter: 315
 Mangwende, Witness: 313
 Manicaland: xxvi, 20, 115, 205, 207, 269
 Manjirenji Dam: 77
 manufacturing: xxi, 154-157, 296-297; electricity use, 167; employment, 178-179
 Manyika people: 4, 6-7, 95; in army, 266; language, 96
 Maputo: 177, 225
 Marico River: 12
 Marondera: xxvi, 77
 marriage: 107, 110
 Masango, Farai: 314
 Masoko, Javan: 258
 Mashonaland: 13, 18, 20, 22; politics, 55, 65
 Mashonaland Central: xxvi, 207
 Mashonaland East: xxvi, 205, 207, 269
 Mashonaland West: xxvi, 207
 Masuku, Lookout: 211, 244, 245, 257, 258
 Masvingo: xxvi, 5, 7, 77, 139, 173; airports, 175
 Matabele: 97
 Matabeleland: xiii, 13, 15, 19-20, 26, 98, 104; British influence, 18, 22; terrorism in, 57, 237, 243, 258
 Matabeleland North: xxvi, 207, 269
 Matabeleland South: xxvi, 207
 Mateke Hills: 77
 Matonjeni shrine: 122
 Matopo Hills: 5, 6, 20, 21, 76, 121
 Matusadona Range: 76
- Maunch, Karl: 5
 Maungwe: 7
 Mavuradona Mountains: 77
 Mazoe Estates: 228
 Mazoe River: 77
 Mbire people: xiii, 9, 11
 medical personnel: 131, 132
 Meredith, Martin: 3
 Methodist churches: 115-116
 metric conversion coefficients: 285
 Mfengu: 27
 Midlands: xxvi, 206, 207, 269
 migrations (*see also* emigration by whites): immigration, 19, 23, 35, 88, 89; internal, 11, 12, 51-52, 90-91
 military aircraft: 273-275
 mining and minerals (*see also* individual minerals): xxi, 138, 157-164, 167, 228, 296-299; exports, 50, 51, 175, 176, 229; foreign investment in, 232; marketing, 217; wages, 180
 ministries: political affiliation of ministers, 313-314
 Ministry of Agriculture: 139, 146
 Ministry of Defence: 191, 257, 258, 259
 Ministry of Education and Culture: 128, 129
 Ministry of Health: 129, 130, 131
 Ministry of Home Affairs: 191, 278, 279, 280
 Ministry of Internal Affairs: 195, 200, 278, 281
 Ministry of Justice: 200
 Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs: 200, 282
 Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare: 262
 Ministry of Local Government and Housing: 195, 196
 Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning: 191, 196
 Ministry of Roads and Road Traffic: 174
 Ministry of Youth, Sport and Recreation: 262
 missionaries: 10, 15, 16, 17, 26-27, 114-116, 229; during civil war, 58-60
 Mitterand, François: 233
 Mlughulu: 21, 22
 Mobil Oil Corporation: 168
 Moffat, Howard: 30
 Moffat, John: 18, 19
 Moffat, Robert: xiii, 15
 Moffat Agreement: 18
 Monckton Commission: 39, 44
 Moose, Richard M.: 228
 Morris Carter Commission: 31, 32, 33
 Mozambique: xxvi, 11, 12, 20, 25, 37, 59, 247, 261; guerrilla bases, 56, 58, 106, 224, 253; people, 96, 98, rail lines to, 170, 171; relations with, 168, 225, 246;

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- trade, 49, 176; workers from, 179
- Mozambique National Resistance (RNM): 225, 227, 248, 278; sabotage, 169
- Msipa, Cephas: 314
- Mthethwa people: 11
- Mtilikwe River: 147
- Mubabko, Simba: 313
- Mugabe, Robert: xvi, 54, 59, 61, 137, 138, 208, 215, 217, 221, 225; armed forces and, 256, 260, 268, 270; 1980 elections, 203, 204, 205, 213-214, 315; policy of reconciliation, 237, 239, 240, 242; political leader, 55, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 106, 187, 190, 204, 210, 313
- Mugabe government policies: 109, 183; economy, 164; foreign policy, 226, 228, 230, 231, 247; land reform, 101, 144; political rights, 202
- multinational corporations: 50
- Mumbengegwi, Simbarshe: 313
- Munangagwa, Emmerson: 257, 258, 268, 278, 314
- Munhumutapa people: xiii, 7, 9-10
- Munyaradzi, Oliver: 313
- Mutare: xxvi, 7, 173; industry, 155, 166
- Mutoko: 173
- Mutota, King: xiii, 9
- Mutumbuka, Dzingai: 313
- Muvuti, Donal: 221
- Muzenda, Simon: 208, 313
- Muzorewa, Abel: 116, 210, 226, 255; government of, xvi, 182, 188, 204, 205, 219, 230, 231; 1980 elections, 206, 213; political leadership, xxiii, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 213, 315
- Mwari royal cult: 5, 8, 15, 21, 98, 121, 122
- Mzilikazi: xiii, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 27
- names: for the area: xii, 3, 23, 46, 64, 69, 98; place name changes, xvii, 217
- Namibia: xxvi, 222, 230
- Nandi Mill: 173
- Nata River: 76, 79
- Natal: 12
- National Democratic Party (NDP): 39, 41, 53, 54, 55
- national health service: 129
- National Land: tenure rights, 82, 83
- National Railways of Zimbabwe: 170, 171
- Native Purchase Areas: 32
- Native Reserves: 40, 142, land set aside, xiii, 21, 25, 29, 32, 35, 51
- Ndebele Home Society: 28, 35
- Ndebele peoples: xxvii, 3, 4, 6-7, 11-13, 14-17, 20, 21, 94, 97, 104, 106, 107, 141, 148, 253; areas, 48; in government, 194, 197, 198; in the army, 266; language, 93, 95, 96, 129; politics, 65, 203, 206, 243-244; population, 92; religion, 115, 116, 119, 122, 123
- Ndiweni, Chief Kayisa: 315
- Ndlovu, Callistus: 313
- NDP. *See* National Democratic Party
- Nedziwe, Ismael: 216
- Nehanda: 120-121
- New Sarum: 274, 275
- newspapers and periodicals: 218-220
- Nganga: 123, 125
- Ngoni people: 11, 12
- Nguni people and language, 4, 11, 13, 93, 97
- Ngurube, Wiridzayi: 281
- Ngwenya, Daniel: 314
- Nhongo, Rex: 239, 257, 258
- Nhongo, Teurai Ropa: 313
- nickel: 158, 160, 228, 298
- Nigeria: 219, 274, 277
- Nkala, Enos: 206, 208, 313
- Nkomo, John: 314
- Nkomo, Joshua: 59, 106, 277; army and, 57, 66, 244, 245, 246, 252; 1980 elections, 204, 205, 206; party leader, xv, 39, 40, 41, 60, 62, 66, 67, 187, 203, 210-212, 315; travels, 41, 43, 54
- Nkulumane: 13, 15
- nonaligned status: 188, 276, 277
- Norman, Denis: 194, 214, 313
- North Korea: 220, 222; advisers from, 245, 252, 265, 270, 275; training by, 263, 276; weapons from, 272
- Northern Rhodesia: 20, 23, 37, 44
- Nuanetsi River: 76-77
- Nujoma, Sam: 223
- Nyagumbo, Maurice: 313
- Nyamanda: 22, 27, 28, 32
- Nyamapande: 173
- Nyandoro, George: 39
- Nyanja speakers: 93
- Nyasaland (*see also* Malawi): xv, 35, 37, 44
- Nyerere, Julius: 54, 56, 59, 66, 225
- Odzi River: 77
- ombudsman: 191, 203
- Operation SEED: 260, 262
- Organization of African Unity (OAU): 55, 62, 205, 221, 222, 223, 253; funding from, 251, 277
- Owen, David: 63
- Page, Allan: 257
- Pakistan: 171, 274, 277
- Palestine Liberation Organization: 223
- Palley, Claire: 53, 239
- Pan-Africanist Congress: 226
- parliament: 191, 194-195
- Pasipapire: 120
- Patriotic Front (PF): 62, 63, 64, 66, 67,

Index

- 68, 204, 217, 253
Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF-ZAPU): xxxiii, 68, 220, 233; ethnic base, 197, 212; leadership of, 187, 192, 217, 245; 1980 election, 203, 204, 205, 207; political rivalries, 243, 244, 246, 264, 271
Pearce Commission: 53, 56
People's Caretaker Council: 54
petroleum: 158, 168-169; imports, 164, 177; oil pipeline, 232; refineries, 155
Pioneer Column: xiii, xxix, 19, 20, 26, 249
Plumtree: 172
Poland: 233
police forces: 19, 23, 191, 279, 280; after civil war, 237, 239, 240, 241, 261, 262; during civil war, 57, 64, 250, 255; provinces, 279, 281
Police Service Commission: 191, 192
political parties: 203-218; 1980 election, 315
political prisoners: 202, 243, 283; former guerrillas, 241
population: xx, xxvii, 80-82, 114; African age and sex structure, 86-88, 89; rural density, 83-85; urban areas, 85-86, 288
Portugal: 59, 224; trade, 49, 50
Portuguese traders: xiii, 10, 11, 18, 20, 22, 23
presidency: 190, 191, 194, 256
Price, Geoffrey: 280
price controls: 181
prime minister: 191, 192, 194, 256
prison system: 282-283
Progressive Party: 30
Protestant mission churches: 15, 26-27, 115
provinces: electoral areas, xxvi; homelands, 48; local government, 196
Public Service Commission: 191, 192, 208

race relations: 100-103, 201, 202, 214, 282, 283
radio and television: 201, 218, 220-221
railroads: 20, 25, 170-174; locomotives on loan, 248
rainfall: xx, 74, 75, 78, 80, 140, 147
Randall-MacIver, David: 8
Ranger, Terence: 106
RBVA. *See* Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association
Reagan, Ronald: 230
Redcliff: 164, 173
Reform Party: 30
religion (*see also* indigenous religions): xx, 5, 15, 35; churches, 114-118, 289; concept of god, 121-122
Republican Alliance: 52
Republican Front Party: 187, 213
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: 164, 177
Responsible Government Party: 26, 28, 30
RhoBank: 228
Rhodes, Cecil: xiii, xxix, 3, 17-18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27; plans, 170; statue, 217
Rhodesia Labour Party (RLP): 30, 34
Rhodesia Railways: 168
Rhodesian African Rifles (RAR): 240, 244, 254, 263, 265, 268, 269
Rhodesian Alliance: 42
Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association (RBVA): xiv, 28, 32, 33
Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation: 220-221
Rhodesian Front (RF): 38, 42-43, 52, 56, 59, 213, 214; land reform and, 51; 1980 elections, 203; press and, 221
Rhodesian Information Office: 229
Rhodesian man: 3
Rhodesian Party: xiv, 30, 31, 32, 35, 42
Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company: 218, 219
Rhodesian Security Forces: 249, 251, 252, 253, 253-256, 257, 261, 266
RNM. *See* Mozambique National Resistance
roads: 170, 172-173, 174
Robinson, Derrick: 278
Roman Catholic Church: 10, 26, 115, 116
Romania: 222, 233, 234, 261; military aid, 265, 274, 277
Rozvi Empire: xiii, 6-7, 11; royal clan, 4, 10; Shona speakers, 95-97
Rudd Concession: 18, 19
Ruenya River: 77
rural areas: 108-111, 167; health services, 115, 131-132; local government, 197-198
Rutenga: 173
Ruya River: 77

Sabi-Limpopo Authority: 148
Sabi River: 74, 77, 78, 79
sabotage: 242-243, 253; airplanes, 259, 273, 274
Salisbury (*see also* Harare): 25, 36, 156, 240
Sambo, Robert: 33
San hunters: 98
sanctions: xvi, 49, 50, 51, 66, 68, 231, 274; effects of, 146, 156, 159, 161, 175-176
Sandys, Duncan: 43
Sanyati River: 76
Savimbi, Jonas: 230
Scandinavia: 222
school fees: 125, 126, 127, 183, 216
segregation: 91, 201; schools, 124, 125, 126; townships, 32
Sekeramayi, Sydney: 258, 314
Selous, Frederick Courtney: 15, 19
Selous Scouts: 254-255, 263, 271

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- Senate Legal Committee: 191, 192, 194
 Sengwa River: 76
 Shaka: 11
 Shamuyarira, Nathan: 313
 Shamva: 173
 Shangani River: 76
 Shashe River: 20, 76
 Shava, Frederick: 313
 Shell Petroleum Company: 50, 166
 Shona peoples: xvii, 3, 4-5, 8, 12, 14, 48, 92, 104, 105, 107, 140, 252; in government, 194, 197, 198; in the army, 265; languages, 93, 94-95, 96-97, 103, 129; politics, 203, 206, 208, 209; religion, 115, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123
 Shona written language: 96, 103
 Shurugwi: xvi, 161, 173
 silver: 160, 164, 299
 Sindebele language: 93
 Sinoia: xvii, 240
 Sithole, Ndabaningi: xvi, 54, 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66; assassination attempt, 239-240; party leadership, 204, 210, 243, 253, 315
 Slater, Hugh: 242, 273
 slavery: 19
 Smit, Jacob Hendrik: 34
 Smith, Ian: xv, 44-45, 52, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 205, 210, 214, 226, 230; majority rule and, 202, 224, 229; press and broadcasting, 218, 220-221; unilateral declaration of independence, xx, 46, 49
 Smith-Horne Agreement: 52, 56
 Smuts, Jan: 29
 Soames, Lord: 68, 231
 social status: 100, 101, 112-113; soldiers, 260
 soils: 140, 141
 Sotho people and language: 4, 12, 14, 93, 97, 121
 South Africa: xvi, 24, 25, 28, 29, 37, 59, 126, 171, 177, 247; economic relations with, 138, 155, 159, 160, 161, 166, 248, 249; people, 11, 98, 99, 116; political relations with, 59, 213, 225-228, 237, 242, 246, 247, 274, 280; trade, 49, 50, 146-147, 176, 227, 255; transportation link, 170, 225; workers in, 179
 South-West Africa (*see also* Namibia): 26, 37
 South West African People's Organization (SWAPO): 223, 246
 Southern African Development Coordination Conference: 222
 Southern Rhodesia: xi, 3, 17-26, 37
 Southern Rhodesian African National Congress: 39
 Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference: 27
 Soviet Union: 60, 188, 210, 222, 229, 233, 261; guerrillas and, 246, 251; military equipment, 272, 277
 Special Native Area: 51
 spirits and witches: 119-123, 125
 students abroad: 126, 128, 233
 Stuttaford, Wally: 243
 sugar: 146, 147, 148, 175, 295; exports, 233
Sunday Mail: 218, 219
 Swazi people: 12, 14
 Swaziland: 37
 Switzerland: 49
 Syria: 277
 Tanganyika: 37, 54
 Tanzania: 55, 210, 225, 247, 253, 277
 taxes: 181, 182, 183, 216, 260
 tea: 139, 147
 teachers: 112, 125, 127, 182; training, 116, 124, 128
 technical and vocational education: 124, 126-127, 128, 274
 Tekere, Edgar: 199, 208, 240-241; violence, 239
 Territorial Army: 57, 261
 Territorial Force: 254
 Textiles: 155, 156
 Thatcher, Margaret: xxi, 65, 231-232
 Thornhill: 274, 275
 tobacco: 147, 150, 156, 165, 294, 295; exports, 145, 146, 175, 233, 234
 Todd, Garfield: xv, 37-38, 44, 194, 219
 Togwa: 10
 Tonga speakers: 93, 94, 98
 Tongogara, Josiah: 239
 transportation: xxi, 169-175; reliance on South Africa, 225, 227
 Transvaal: 4, 12, 13, 22; Republic, 15, 18
 Triangle: 148, 173, 174, 175
 Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) (*see also* Native Reserves): 51, 58, 62, 63, 111, 147; civil war and, 253; land overuse, 141, 142, 143; local government, 108, 197, 198; population, 84, 85, 87, 89
 tsetse fly: 75, 150
 Tsonga language: 93, 95
 Tsomondo, Madzibanyika: 118
 Tswana speakers: 98
 Tuh River: 76
 Tungamirai, Josiah: 256
 Twala, Abraham: 28
 UANC. *See* United African National Council
 UFP. *See* United Federation Party
 Umankati River: 77, 166
 Umtali: 20
 Umsingwane River: 76-77
 unilateral declaration of independence

Index

- (UDI) (*see also* sanctions): xv, 45, 48, 180, 188, 224; problems, 168, 221; relations with Britain, 231; relations with South Africa, 226
- Union Carbide corporation: 161, 231
- United African National Council (UANC): 63, 65, 68, 204, 205, 207, 212-213
- United Federation Party (UFP): 38, 39, 51
- United Methodist church: 56, 115, 116
- United National Federal Party: 65
- United Nations (*see also* sanctions): Rhodesian problem and, 41-42, 43, 48; seat in, 221, 228
- United Party (UP): 30, 31, 34, 35
- United Rhodesia Party (URP): 35, 36, 37, 38
- United States: aid from, 67, 178, 200, 222, 228, 230; investments by, 155, 161; military aid, 274, 275, 277; Mugabe and, 228, 230; relations with, 60-61, 62, 63, 228-231; trade, 171, 176; United Nations sanctions and, 161-162
- United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: 254
- United States Congress: 50-51
- United States Export-Import Bank: 164
- United States State Department: report on human rights, 202, 220, 221, 283
- University of Rhodesia: 124, 125, 126
- University of Zimbabwe: xxi, 125, 128, 200; medical school, 124, 132
- UP. *See* United Party
- urban areas: 110, 111; health care, 130; local government, 195, 196; population, 85-86, 87-88, 89
- Ushewokunze, Herbert: 206, 241, 282, 313
- Vaal River: 12
- Vance, Cyrus: 65
- vegetation: 75
- Venda people: 12, 94-95, 98, 122; language, 93
- Victoria: xrv: 269; elections, 205, 207
- Victoria Falls: xxvi, 76, 78; airport, 172; conference site, xvi, 60
- Vorster, John: 59, 60, 61
- voting system: 24, 29, 38-39, 41, 65, 194, 195; by Africans, 29, 102; electoral rolls, 48, 189, 196, 197; 1980 election, 204-206, 212
- Vumba Mountains: 77
- wage labor: 90, 154, 178, 179, 305
- wages: 179, 306-307; minimum, 180, 216
- Waley Commission: 47
- Walker, Dennis: 243
- Walls, Peter: 66, 242, 245, 255, 256, 257
- Walsh, Norman: 258
- Wankie Colliery Company Limited: 162, 170
- Wankie Power Station: 164
- water supply: 78, 130
- weaponry: 255, 271-272, 316, 317; guerrilla firearms, 241-242, 245
- Welensky, Roy: xv, 38, 39
- West Germany: 156, 205, 232; trade, 49, 176
- West Nicholson: 172
- wheat: 146, 147, 294, 295
- white minority: xxvii, 150; education, 124, 125, 126; emigration, 189, 242; homeland areas, 48; in armed forces, 249, 265, 271, 273; land ownership, 31-32, 82, 83, 142, 143; Organization of African Unity and, 222; police officers, 280, 282; politics, 189, 190, 192, 203, 209, 213-215; population, xx, 81, 84-86, 90, 93; post-war attitudes, 242-243; press and, 218-220; settlers, 19, 88; status, 15, 73, 91, 100, 122, 187, 217; tribal resistance to, 22-23.
- Whitehead, Edgar: xv, 38, 39, 42
- Wilson, Harold, 44, 46, 47
- women: 112, 262, 281; attributed witchcraft, 122, 123; voluntary organizations, 115, 209
- workers abroad: 179, 227, 248
- World Bank: 81, 130, 178, 222
- World War I: xiv, 26, 250
- World War II: xiv, 34, 146, 155, 250
- Young, Andrew: 63, 228, 230
- Youth League: 39
- Yugoslavia: 222, 223, 234, 261, 277, 282
- Zaire: 162, 171
- Zambezi Escarpment: 75, 76-77
- Zambezi River: xx, xxvi, 6-7, 12, 20, 23, 74, 76-77, 78
- Zambezia: 23
- Zambia (*see also* Northern Rhodesia): xxvi, 44, 60, 170, 223, 233, 246, 247; electricity from, 164, 166; electricity to, 165; guerrilla sanctuary, 55, 57, 58, 106, 253; people, 97, 98; trade, 156, 162, 171, 175, 176, 224; workers from, 179
- Zawi: 173
- Zezuru people: 4, 6-7, 94-95, 105, 206; in the army, 266; language, 96; religion, 208
- Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA): 61, 62, 240, 252, 263; base of support, 210, 224, 225; integration with the army, 256, 261, 262, 264, 276; threats to public order, 56, 57, 58, 107, 238, 239
- Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU): xxxi, 54, 224; ethnic base, 105, 106, 243, 251; leadership, 61, 62, 68,

Zimbabwe: A Country Study

- 204; party ideology, 215; political base, 55, 56, 57, 65, 210
- Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF): xxii, 68, 187, 190, 206-210, 243; ideology, 233; ethnic rivalries, 244; in government, 192, 197, 198; journal, 220; leadership, 213, 224; 1980 election, 203, 204, 205, 207; other parties and, 212, 214; post-war violence, 238
- Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU): xxxi; ethnic base, 106, 238, 243, 251; headquarters, 210, 224; leadership, 39, 53, 54, 55, 60, 68, 253; political base, 56, 57, 62
- Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation: 221
- Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD): 177, 222, 232, 234
- Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity: 60
- Zimbabwe Defence Force: 249, 258; disposition of major units, 268, 269; officer ranks and insignia, 267; organization, 270
- Zimbabwe Democratic Party: 213
- Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions: 216
- Zimbabwe Inter African News Agency: 219
- Zimbabwe Oil Procurement Consortium: 168
- Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA): 57, 253
- Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA): xxxi, 57, 263; base of support, 210; civil war and, 58, 252, 253; integration with the army, 256, 261, 262, 264, 268; violence, 107, 211, 238, 239, 244
- Zimbabwe Republic Police: 237, 261, 278, 279, 280-2nd
- Zimbabwe Rhodesia: xi, xxxi, 125, 221; immigration and, 90; republic, 64, 65, 66, 68, 182
- Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO): 63, 213
- ZIMCORD. *See* Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development
- Zionist churches: 117
- Ziyambi, Tarisayi: 314
- Zulu people: 12, 14
- Zvishavane: xxvi, 159, 166, 173, 177
- Zvobgo, Eddison: 180, 208, 217, 313

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65	Afghanistan	550-87	Greece
550-98	Albania	550-78	Guatemala
550-44	Algeria	550-174	Guinea
550-59	Angola	550-82	Guyana
550-73	Argentina	550-164	Haiti
550-169	Australia	550-151	Honduras
550-176	Austria	550-165	Hungary
550-175	Bangladesh	550-21	India
550-170	Belgium	550-154	Indian Ocean
550-66	Bolivia	550-39	Indonesia
550-20	Brazil	550-68	Iran
550-168	Bulgaria	550-31	Iraq
550-61	Burma	550-25	Israel
550-83	Burundi	550-182	Italy
550-50	Cambodia	550-69	Ivory Coast
550-166	Cameroon	550-177	Jamaica
550-159	Chad	550-30	Japan
550-77	Chile	550-34	Jordan
550-60	China	550-56	Kenya
550-63	China, Republic of	550-81	Korea, North
550-26	Colombia	550-41	Korea, South
550-91	Congo	550-58	Laos
550-90	Costa Rica	550-24	Lebanon
550-152	Cuba	550-38	Liberia
550-22	Cyprus	550-85	Libya
550-158	Czechoslovakia	550-172	Malawi
550-54	Dominican Republic	550-45	Malaysia
550-52	Ecuador	550-161	Mauritania
550-43	Egypt	550-79	Mexico
550-150	El Salvador	550-76	Mongolia
550-28	Ethiopia	550-49	Morocco
550-167	Finland	550-64	Mozambique
550-155	Germany, East	550-35	Nepal, Bhutan, & Sikkim
550-173	Germany, Fed. Rep. of	550-88	Nicaragua
550-153	Ghana	550-157	Nigeria

550-94	Oceania	550-27	Sudan
550-48	Pakistan	550-47	Syria
550-46	Panama	550-62	Tanzania
550-156	Paraguay	550-53	Thailand
550-185	Persian Gulf States	550-178	Trinidad and Tobago
550-42	Peru	550-89	Tunisia
550-72	Philippines	550-80	Turkey
550-162	Poland	550-74	Uganda
550-181	Portugal	550-97	Uruguay
550-160	Romania	550-71	Venezuela
550-84	Rwanda	550-57	Vietnam, North
550-51	Saudi Arabia	550-55	Vietnam, South
550-70	Senegal	550-183	Yemens, The
550-180	Sierra Leone	550-67	Yugoslavia
550-184	Singapore	550-67	Zaire
550-86	Somalia	550-75	Zambia
550-93	South Africa	550-171	Zimbabwe
550-95	Soviet Union		
550-179	Spain		
550-96	Sri Lanka (Ceylon)		

END
DATE
Filmed
1-84