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
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
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SUBNATIONAL CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Brian Michael Jenkins

March 1983

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PREFACE

This is an expanded version of a paper prepared for a conference on "Growing Economic Interdependence and the Future of Security in the Mediterranean," sponsored by the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Castelgandolfo, Italy, September 6-9, 1982. It will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book by Croom Helm.

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SUBNATIONAL CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Almost since the beginning of Western civilization, the Mediterranean Sea has been a theater of conflict, a boulevard for battleships and invading armies, a moat between great empires, diverse cultures, religions, and political systems. What the nations of the Mediterranean have in common, besides a shoreline, is 25 centuries of warfare--warfare between the Romans and the Carthaginians, between Moslems and Christians, between the corsairs of the Barbary Coast and the merchant fleets of the European kingdoms, between the weaker non-European countries and the colonial powers, between revolutionary regimes in North Africa and the Middle East and the industrial nations of Western Europe.

The Mediterranean continues to be an arena of international and internal conflict. This meeting on interdependence and security in the Mediterranean takes place as Syrian and Israeli troops still occupy Lebanon, and only a week after French Legionnaires, Italian Bersaglieri, and American Marines covered the withdrawal of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Beirut.

PATTERNS OF CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, there have been 49 wars, revolutions, and other armed conflicts involving the countries of the Mediterranean, 36 of them since World War II. (See the chronology at the end of this paper.) In the 16 conflicts which have occurred during the last ten years, 10 of the 18 nations that border the Mediterranean were directly engaged, and three more were indirectly involved.

In reviewing this chronology, one can see several persistent conflicts that repeatedly erupt into open warfare. For most of the twentieth century, Jews and Arabs have fought for control of historic Palestine. With the creation of the State of Israel and the development of a Palestinian nationalist movement, the struggle changed form but continued. Fourteen of the 47 entries in the chronology are related

directed or indirectly to this struggle. Territorial disputes in the Western Sahara have been the source of fighting between Spain and Morocco and Morocco and Algeria since the 1950s. Communal disputes between Greeks and Turks on the Island of Cyprus and between the Greek and Turkish governments over control of Cyprus have caused violent conflict since the 1950s. Friction between the Christian and Moslem communities in Lebanon has erupted into civil war twice since the 1950s and is the source of continuing armed conflict in that country. Radical Arab regimes in Algeria, Libya, and Syria have fought with or attempted to subvert more conservative Arab regimes in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, and have provided support to terrorist groups in Spain, France, and Italy. Moslem fundamentalists have challenged secular regimes in Egypt and Syria. Separatist movements have occasionally appeared in Sardinia and Corsica. These patterns of conflict seem likely to continue.

Many of the conflicts in the region are internal (for example, the 1980 revolt in Syria), and many of the conflicts between nations also involve subnational or nongovernmental forces as we see in the complicated situation in Lebanon. (This does not count the current terrorist campaigns in several Western European nations.) This fragmentation of warfare toward more numerous limited conflicts involving both national and subnational forces is part of a worldwide trend.

In many respects, the future face of war is revealed in the course of armed conflict in Lebanon since the late 1960s. Warfare in that country has continued on three levels: conventional war, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. The conflict is concurrently a war among nations, a war between the State of Israel and a powerful nonstate actor--the Palestine Liberation Organization, a war among Lebanese factions, and a multitude of terrorist campaigns. It involves regular armies, guerrillas, private militias, terrorist gunmen and bombers, some of whom are openly assisted or covertly sponsored by foreign governments, by political or religious factions, and even by other terrorist groups. The conflict in Lebanon is likely to be representative of armed conflict in the last quarter of the twentieth century: a mixture of conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and

campaigns of terrorism, openly fought or secretly waged, often without regard to national frontiers, by armies as well as irregular forces, directly or indirectly.

THE CRADLE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The disputes and conflicts among and within the nations around the Mediterranean Sea have manifested themselves in a high level of terrorist activity. Thirty-six percent of all recorded incidents of international terrorism between 1968 and the end of 1981 occurred in the 18 Mediterranean countries. The same pattern continued in 1982 with 37 percent of the total number of incidents occurring in the region. No other geographic region in the world has experienced such a high level of terrorist activity. This terrorist activity is not distributed evenly among the 18 nations. Some of the countries, like Albania, Algeria, Libya, Malta, Morocco, and Tunisia, have suffered very little or no international terrorist activity within their borders. (Yugoslavia, while relatively free of terrorist activity at home, has been a frequent target of Croatian terrorist activity abroad.) Seven countries--France, Greece, Italy, Israel, Lebanon, Spain, and Turkey--account for 94 percent of the activity within the region and 34 percent of the total volume of international terrorist activity worldwide.[1]

The Mediterranean is the cradle of international terrorism in its contemporary form. Terrorist tactics have, of course, been used for centuries by both governments and revolutionaries. It is, however, in the postwar struggle in Palestine and in the guerrilla campaigns against the colonial powers that we first find campaigns of deliberate terrorism. Terrorist tactics were used extensively by the Irgun and later the Stern Gang as well as by their Arab adversaries in Palestine during the 1930s and 1940s.[2] They were used by Greek nationalists of the EOKA-B fighting the British in Cyprus during the 1950s.[3] They were used by the FLN in its struggle against the French, as well as by the OAS as part of its campaign to keep Algeria French.[4] It is out of these struggles that the ideological and doctrinal foundations of contemporary terrorism emerged.

Colonial insurgents defined colonialism itself as "violence in its natural state, and thus the only possible means of ending it was by greater violence." [5] Greater violence was not only rationalized by the colonial insurgents, but the legitimate targets of violence were potentially broadened to include the entire colonial machinery: government officials whether high-ranking dignitaries or minor bureaucrats, whether civilian or military, policemen, plantation owners, *colons*, indigenous collaborators, just about anybody who participated in the colonial structure; which in its extreme could mean anybody who did not actively participate in the struggle to overthrow the colonial rulers.

In their pursuit of independence, the Algerian nationalists carried their struggle to the French metropole to maintain an impression of war in France as well as Algeria. While terror was employed by all participants in the Algerian conflict--by the FLN against Algerian and French targets in Algeria and France, by the French Army particularly in the battle for Algiers, by the OAS against French and Algerian targets in Algeria and France, by the *barbouzes* (secret French agents) against the OAS-- it is the FLN that provided inspiration and instruction to the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel. The victory of the FLN represented a triumph of Arabs over a Western power. A number of Palestinian leaders went to Algeria in the early 1960s where they met FLN leaders whose doctrines and tactics were later to influence the development of the Palestinian movement, in particular, Fatah. [6]

Frustrated by the failure of Arab military power in the Six Day War of 1967 and by a world that ignored their plight, a new generation of Palestinian groups launched an international campaign of terrorism designed to bring them worldwide attention. [7] The Palestinians did not confine their operations to Israel and the Occupied Territories but carried their terrorist campaign abroad, primarily to Western Europe, where they struck Israeli, Jewish, European as well as Arab targets. This was consistent with the Palestinians' view that Israel was a "colony" maintained by Zionists and imperialists just as Algeria was a colony of the French. In an effort to increase their capabilities and broaden their struggle, the Palestinian groups developed contacts with

other subnational groups in Europe and the Middle East, such as Germany's Red Army Faction, ETA in Spain, the Turkish People's Liberation Army, and later the Red Brigades in Italy and Direct Action in France, and provided them with various forms of support.

Out of the Palestinian training camps and the civil war in Lebanon new groups emerged like the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), closely associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Black June or Al-Assifa, a splinter of Fatah. Both groups have operated worldwide.

Nations of the region thus face terrorism on two fronts: terrorism by indigenous groups using terrorist tactics to obtain independence, overthrow the government, or force it to adopt authoritarian measures, and, foreign or ethnic-based groups carrying out terrorist operations on behalf of foreign causes against foreign as well as indigenous targets. The two often overlap. In the former case, the problem is primarily local. In the latter case, terrorist activity cannot be isolated from other modes of armed conflict among nations or within other nations, but can be seen as another dimension of warfare. Thus, it is not simply that the countries of the Mediterranean individually suffer high levels of terrorist activity. Much of the terrorist activity of the region is inextricably intertwined with international conflicts.

With technological advance and economic progress, has come an increase in movement across borders of persons, news, ideas, money, goods--and conflict. The people come as tourists, students, technicians, workers, exiles, and refugees. Modern communications, in particular the mass media, keeps them informed about the quarrels of their homeland. A quarrel in one part of the world increasingly produces violent echos elsewhere. Conflict in one country often also has effects in other countries. It may imperil investments, cut off sources of vital material, eliminate markets, and put the lives of diplomats or citizens living in another country at risk. One aspect of interdependence is the increased internationalization of conflict.

A LABYRINTH OF SECRET WARS AND SECRET DEALS

Governments have increasingly supported or exploited guerrilla and terrorist groups as a means of waging surrogate warfare against their foes. It may be considered impolite to mention these episodes at an international meeting, but all incidents cited here have been widely reported, are hardly denied, and illustrate a worldwide trend toward exploitation of terrorism by governments. Algeria has provided support in the form of training for Spain's Basque terrorists and France's Corsican separatists, and also supports Polisario guerrillas in their fight with Morocco. Spanish authorities note, for example, that in 1976, approximately 100 members of ETA (*politico-militar*) received basic military training at the Police Academy in Algiers. (Basque separatists also have received training in Palestinian camps in Lebanon.)[8] According to another source, Corsican and Breton separatists were trained at Blida military camp southwest of Algiers.[9]

Libya has provided money, training facilities, and asylum to Basque, French, Italian, and Palestinian terrorists. Libya has provided support to Polisario guerrillas. Libya also backed a plot against King Hassan of Morocco (who provided asylum for opponents of Colonel Qaddafi) in 1971, supported a plot against President Sadat of Egypt in 1974, and sponsored a guerrilla raid into Tunisia in 1980.[10]

Syria supports a number of Palestinian groups including Al Assifa, a splinter group of Fatah which has carried out terrorist operations in Lebanon and Western Europe. Spanish, Italian, French, Turkish, and Armenian terrorists have received training at PLO camps in Syria and Lebanon.

Israel has provided support in the form of weapons, money, and training to Phalangist militias in Lebanon. Israel also may have approached the Red Brigades with an offer of assistance. It is not clear what the Israelis might have been after in the latter case. Perhaps they simply were attempting to garner information about the Palestinians who, it is known, had given the Red Brigades and other terrorist groups in Europe weapons and explosives with an understanding that a portion of these would be set aside for future Palestinian operations.

While not actively cooperating with terrorists, governments have arranged quiet deals with terrorists in return for immunity from further attack. Held hostage by the Red Brigades, Aldo Moro revealed that Palestinian terrorists apprehended in Rome were released as part of a deal with the Black September Organization.[11] According to subsequent revelations in the press, this kind of thing has occurred on several occasions. There are reports that Italy at present has similar tacit arrangements with Fatah, the PFLP, and Al-Assifa. It has been alleged that several other Western European governments had tacit deals of this sort--prompt release of Palestinian terrorists apprehended in return for immunity from further terrorist attacks. Both Spanish and Italian officials have complained at times about the unwillingness of French authorities to move vigorously against Basque and Italian terrorists resting up in France.[12]

French officials allegedly were also involved in arms traffic with the Basque terrorists. According to published accounts, French intelligence officials did business with ETA in order to smuggle weapons through Spain to French-speaking countries of northern Africa.[13]

A number of states have also directly adopted terrorist tactics themselves, sending teams of assassins to silence foreign foes or domestic opponents living abroad. In response to terrorist attacks on Israeli targets abroad, Israeli agents assassinated a number of Palestinians in Europe believed involved in terrorist activities. Syria is believed to have commissioned the gunmen who assassinated that country's former premier in Paris. Libya openly avowed its campaign directed against Libyan "traitors living abroad" and was accused of sending teams to kill American diplomats in Europe. The Spanish have been accused of operating a "parallel police force" in France dedicated to killing leaders of the Basque separatist movement. Yugoslavia has been accused of killing emigre Croatian exiles. Outraged by continuing Armenian terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats, Turkish officials have recently warned that there would be no sanctuary for the Armenian gunmen, implying direct extraterritorial action.

Governments have dealt with terrorists in the last quarter of the twentieth century much as the European powers dealt with the pirates that plagued the Mediterranean in the early seventeenth century. They have simultaneously tolerated, combatted, fomented, supplied, and exploited them.

The European navies could have crushed the pirates if they had been willing to cooperate and cared to make the investment, but the pirates only molested trade, they did not interrupt it. Navies were saved for larger contests. Moreover, the pirates were trading partners. At least until the early eighteenth century, the corsairs of the Barbary Coast bought most of their guns and a large portion of their gunpowder from European merchants, and Europeans bought a number of commodities from the North African states--a profitable trade for some. European renegades trained pirate gunners. And at times, European kings sought alliances with the corsairs to prey upon the shipping or distract the navy of a rival European power.

So it would be equally incorrect today to view the posture of governments, specifically the governments of the Mediterranean countries, or even the governments of those countries that have suffered the most from terrorism as one of unmitigated hostility toward their adversaries. Instead, just beneath the rhetoric, one enters a labyrinth of secret wars and secret deals, of direct action and deliberate inaction.

TERRORISM IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

In recent years, a number of security analysts have warned that terrorists who previously had operated only on land or, considering hijackings, in the air, may turn to targets in the maritime environment. Their reasoning goes that with the increasing importance of offshore facilities to the world's supply of energy, the vulnerability of energy-related marine assets, and inspiration provided by fictional offerings such as *The French Atlantic Affair*, *Shipkiller*, *The Devil's Alternative*, *Seawitch*, and *Firestorm*, terrorists will inevitably turn their attention to harbor offshore platforms, and ships at sea.[14] In support of this thesis, it could also be said that because of the requirements to

capture headlines, terrorists are under constant pressure to do something new, and that while terrorist tactics have changed little, the spectrum of targets attacked by terrorists has steadily expanded. Attacks on targets in the marine environment would provide needed novelty. Moreover, security specialists have in the last five years noted an increase in criminal activity directed against ocean industries.

Certainly, there are ample maritime targets in the Mediterranean. Thousands of vessels--oil tankers, LNG carriers, cargo ships, passenger liners, fishing boats, ferries, naval craft, and pleasure boats--sail its waters daily making it one of the world's most heavily trafficked bodies of water. Its numerous harbors contain oil and LNG terminals, refineries, regasification plants, and huge petrochemical installations. Underwater pipelines and cables cross its bed. In recent years, offshore installations for the exploration and production of hydrocarbons and seabed minerals have proliferated and are of growing economic importance. Italy and Spain lead in the exploration, development, and production of offshore assets. Offshore oil accounted for 90 percent of Spanish production in 1981. Italy began producing commercial offshore oil in 1980. Most Italian offshore activity is concentrated in the waters around the island of Sicily, but in 1982 offshore oil production also began at the heavy oil fields in the Adriatic Sea. Italian offshore gas production also has increased in the last two years. Greece is pumping a small amount of oil from one offshore field near Prinos in the northern Aegean Sea, and is encouraging exploration in the Ionian Sea. Exploration wells will be drilled in 1983. Tunisia's offshore oil production is currently limited, but the recent settlement of a dispute with Libya over the contested Gulf of Gabes will permit development of an offshore field with an estimated reserve of 110 million barrels. Fifteen wells were drilled off Tunisian shores in 1981. Libya's offshore fields are underdeveloped owing to boundary disputes with the country's neighbors and poor relations with major international companies. Turkey and Yugoslavia are still in the exploration phase, but initial indicators suggest the existence of commercial deposits of hydrocarbons.[15]

ARE MARITIME TARGETS ATTRACTIVE TO TERRORISTS?

Although maritime targets may be vulnerable, are they in fact attractive to terrorists? Certainly the seizure of a passenger liner, loader tanker, or offshore platform would be novel enough to capture world headlines, and could give the terrorists some leverage. The destruction of a refinery or terminal at a major port, the sinking of a ship blocking a harbor entrance, or the sinking of a naval vessel have high political value for the terrorists and could impose severe economic losses on their opponents. Extortion involving threats against ships at sea, offshore platforms, or critical facilities--a growing area of ordinary criminal activity--could replace income derived from bank robberies, ransom kidnappings, and foreign patrons. Terrorist groups need large sums of money. Bank robberies entail great risks. Kidnappings are becoming more difficult and ransom payments in general are declining. Corporations faced with credible threats might be inclined to pay off rather than risk critical and costly facilities. Terrorists may also see in maritime targets a possibility to wage economic warfare by attacking port facilities, offshore platforms, shipping, or carrying out actions that may cause great ecological damage. Finally, as they have done in the nuclear domain, terrorists could attempt to exploit environmentalist sentiments, attacking, for example, ships carrying nuclear waste or contaminated soil.

There are also certain constraints. Port facilities, offshore platforms, and ships at sea may be theoretically vulnerable but the ease with which moving ships can be boarded, platforms taken over, or refineries set on fire should not be exaggerated. Terrorists are not, for the most part, highly trained commandos. Taking over ships or platforms may require more men than most terrorist groups generally have fielded. Authorities can more easily cut off communications and isolate a ship or offshore platform from television cameras and all the paraphernalia of modern mass media than they can an embassy in a capital city. Holding a large ship or oil platform is more difficult than holding a building. In short, increased terrorist attacks on maritime targets are not inevitable.

Although subnational groups have not operated extensively in the maritime environment, they have carried out a variety of actions: attacks on port facilities, sabotage or seizure of freighters and tankers, seizures or sinkings of ocean liners. Some examples worldwide:

January 1961: Seventy men armed with machine guns and hand grenades seized control of a Portuguese liner with 600 passengers on board. Opponents of the Portuguese government, they demanded political recognition of "this" liberated part of the national territory. Negotiations ended the episode 11 days later.

June 1971: PELP terrorists carried out an assault on the Liberian-registered oil tanker "Coral Sea." Terrorists on a speedboat fired 10 bazooka shells at the tanker, causing some damage but no casualties. The attack occurred in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea. It was intended to deter tankers from using the Israeli port of Eilat on the Red Sea.

August 1972: Black September Organization set fire to an oil storage facility at the port of Trieste because it supplied oil to West Germany and Austria, both of which, the BSO said, supported Israel. The fire caused \$7 million in damage.

December 1972: A plan by Black September Organization terrorists to hijack an Italian passenger ship between Cyprus and Israel was frustrated by police.

March 1973: A Greek charter ship carrying 250 tourists bound for Haifa sank in Beirut harbor following an explosion. There were no casualties. Black September claimed credit for the incident.

February 1974: Three gunmen seized control of a Greek freighter in the port of Karachi. They threatened to blow up the ship and kill their hostages unless the Greek government freed two imprisoned Arabs terrorists. Greece agreed to commute the sentences of the two and the ship hijackers were flown to Libya.

May 1975: Oil tankers in the Persian Gulf were alerted to reports of a plot by Arab skindivers to hijack a ship, the General Council of British Shipping said.

August 1976: A Greek vessel in Lebanon was sunk by three limpet mines. The attackers were believed to be members of a right wing Lebanese Christian group. The vessel was partly loaded with cargo believed to be arms destined for the Al Fatah organization.

November 1977: The Algerian-backed Polisario Front guerrillas attacked a Spanish trawler with mortar and machine-gun fire, and seized three Spanish fishermen. The guerrillas used a rocket-armed inflatable speedboat in the attack. The guerrillas claimed they had seized the trawler because it had "violated the waters of the Sahara republic to pillage its maritime riches." The guerrillas announced on November 25 that they would release the three Spanish fishermen. On December 23, eight French hostages who had been held captive by the Polisario Front were handed over to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim by a minister of the Polisario Front at the U.N. office in Algiers.

September 1978: The sinking by the Israeli Navy of an explosive-laden freighter foiled a sensational Al Fatah terrorist plot. The terrorists planned to sail the vessel into the Sinai port of Eilat, firing 42 122-mm rockets at the port's tank farm and then ramming the 600-ton boat, crammed with more than four tons of explosives, onto the crowded beach.

July 1980: Police arrested three Corsican separatists of the Front for the National Liberation of Corsica (FNLC) who were planning to blow up oil tankers at Fos, the Marseilles Oil Terminal, and nearby oil refineries. Police officials said that 44 pounds of explosives had been found attached to a pipeline at the Berre refinery near Marseilles.

October 1980: A Libyan ship in for repairs at the port of Genoa almost sank following the explosion of a device that had been attached to the hull below the waterline. The Maltese National Front was suspected of the attack.

These events provide an idea of the range of targets: passenger liners, freighters, tankers, a trawler, port facilities (primarily those associated with the transfer or refining of oil). Except for their size and inherent strength, these things are virtually unprotected. The events that have occurred also provide an idea of the adversaries' techniques and weapons: limpet mines attached by scuba divers, rockets fired from small speed boats, an explosives-filled freighter armed with 122mm rockets.

The PFLP's attack in the Coral Sea in June 1971, along with the August 1972 fire at the oil storage facility in the port of Trieste, were part of a Palestinian campaign aimed at oil supply lines in general and, specifically, oil being shipped through the Israeli pipeline from

Eilat to Ashkelon. The Palestinians were particularly incensed that oil from the Persian Gulf was being transported by sea to Eilat, off-loaded and pumped 153 miles through the pipeline to Ashkelon where it was then shipped by sea again to the ports on the Black Sea and Trieste, thus avoiding the longer route around the African Cape. This arrangement, the Palestinians said, violated the Arab boycott of the Jewish state. Between 1971 and 1973, Palestinian commandos also carried out numerous attacks on pipelines and storage facilities in Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, as well as attacks on oil and gas facilities in West Germany and the Netherlands. The Arab oil embargo negated the need for further attacks.

We have seen few examples of sustained guerrilla war at sea. The American-backed secret war against Cuba in the 1960s comes to mind. In that case, anti-Castro Cuban exiles were trained in navigation techniques, and were provided with small, fast boats, recoilless rifles, machine guns, and mines. For several years they carried on a naval guerrilla war, sinking ships off the coast of Cuba, raiding Cuban ports. The military effect of this campaign was probably negligible, but a similar campaign in the Mediterranean Sea where commercial traffic is heavier, the risks of ecological damage greater, and the political situation more complicated, could cause some problems.

CURRENT AND FUTURE CAPABILITIES

Subnational groups active in Mediterranean countries currently possess a limited capacity for low-level maritime operations. Weapons move by sea from Western Europe to North Africa and the Middle East, or sometimes from the Middle East and North Africa back to Western Europe. Weapons also move from Bulgarian ports on the Black Sea to ports in Cyprus, Lebanon, and Syria. The clandestine trade in guns is only part of a larger contraband trade that includes narcotics and other controlled goods moving back and forth across the Mediterranean. This trade is carried out by small freighters and a vast flotilla of smaller, faster boats able to avoid the detection of customs authorities.

Of all the subnational groups active in the region, the Palestinians possess the most developed maritime capability. Fatah has a small "navy" of *markabs* (500-ton vessels) operating out of Cyprus and

the Lebanese port of Tripoli, and sailing under various flags. The Palestinians have used these as "mother ships" from which they have launched fast boats and dinghies to land commandos and weapons on the Israeli coast. The 1975 seizure of hostages at the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv and the 1978 attack on a tourist bus north of Tel Aviv were carried out by Palestinian guerrillas who came ashore this way. In 1982, there were unconfirmed reports that Fatah had received four one-man submarines from Yugoslavia similar to the one-man submarines employed in World War II. Both the PFLP-GC and the PNF have Frogmen, reportedly trained in Yugoslavia. They are probably capable of operating underwater with open circuit systems (breathing air compressed in tanks, expelling the exhaust into the water). More advanced closed circuit systems recycle the exhaust and are preferable for military purposes not because they improve the divers' range or length of time underwater, but rather because they do not leave a revealing trail of bubbles on the surface. Closed circuit systems, however, cannot be used below 30 feet under the surface owing to the danger of oxygen poisoning.

In terms of explosives, limpet mines have been used by Palestinians as well as found attached to the hulls of ferries running between Spain and Morocco. An interesting use of technology is provided by the Basques who used an explosives-filled, radio-controlled model boat to damage a Spanish naval vessel.

Looking to the future, the growth of an offshore industry will bring with it a corresponding growth in offshore support and service industries and an increase in the number of helicopters, trained commercial divers, and manned and remotely-operated submersible vehicles. As of mid-1982, there were 58 manned submersibles home-ported in Mediterranean countries.[16] Future adversaries, be they terrorists or ordinary criminals, may be able to acquire or draw on these specialized skills and technology to carry out operations against maritime targets.

PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION

While subnational conflict in the region is not a maritime problem but a political one, many of the events described, had they occurred in the Mediterranean Sea, would have had major international consequences. Certainly the hijacking or sinking of an ocean liner filled with passengers, or the hijacking of a loaded oil tanker at sea or in harbor could pose a complex problem involving the governments and possibly the naval forces of several Mediterranean nations.

Looking to the future, naval forces may have to review their capabilities for protecting vital port facilities and shipping from seaborne terrorists, and rescuing hostages held aboard hijacked vessels. Governments may have to examine how they would cooperate in a major incident at sea involving the interests of several nations.

What are the prospects for cooperation? If terrorists were something in the water, the Mediterranean nations might cooperate to combat them as they have agreed to act collectively in cleaning up pollution. But as terrorism is an effluent of the region's many and diverse conflicts, a collective response in this domain seems unlikely. There is at present no Mediterranean political forum. This has not prevented some cooperation among some governments in some areas, but overall that cooperation has been quite limited.

According to information provided by the United States Department of State, all but three of the 17 Mediterranean nations (Albania, Algeria, and Malta) have signed and ratified the three international conventions on airline hijacking (the Tokyo Convention of 1963, the Hague Convention of 1970, and the Montreal Convention of 1971). These conventions certainly have not prevented airline hijackings, but they facilitate cooperation when one does occur. Generally, it has been easier to obtain international agreement on specific terrorist tactics than it has been to obtain agreement on dealing with terrorists.

The Council of Europe, of which seven of the Mediterranean countries are members and two more have observer status, has tackled the problems of terrorism on several occasions. The first effort led to a European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1976). The Convention takes the pragmatic approach by enumerating specific offenses

for which the normal political exception to extradition will not apply. The results, however, were disappointing. Although all of the 21 member states, except Ireland and Malta, signed it, as of June 1982 less than half of them had ratified it.

In 1980, the Council convened a conference at Strasbourg which took a much broader approach to the problem of terrorism. The Strasbourg conference and subsequent meetings produced no new convention but did contribute a number of specific suggestions aimed at combatting terrorism with such measures as public education and the exchange of information among member countries.[17]

In order to maintain the broadest possible consensus, the Council of Europe focused its efforts on how to combat its domestic terrorist groups. It set aside the vexing issue of external support for terrorism. This avoided problems arising from European dependence on oil from the Middle East and other economic interests in Mediterranean countries, European sympathies for the plight of Palestinians, and its desire to avoid blurring the problem of terrorism in democratic societies with the use of terrorist tactics by guerrilla groups in the Third World. Even then, it has been difficult to gain agreement.

It is hard to imagine a cooperative effort among the Mediterranean nations except that which might be hastily nailed together in a crisis situation that involves the interests of several nations. The cooperative effort involved in the withdrawal and relocation of the PLO is an example. It certainly did not solve the Palestinian problem, but it probably did save a great many lives.

Individual national efforts to provide security for maritime targets in the Mediterranean and reaction to any episodes that may occur do not seem to be as well developed as they are in the North Sea countries (Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom) who have developed contingency plans and specialized units for dealing with the threat.

THE OUTLOOK

For the foreseeable future, the security of ships at sea and offshore facilities will remain primarily the responsibility of ship owners and platform operators with incidents handled on an *ad hoc* basis.

As for the future, continued international and subnational conflict seems likely to occur in the region. It remains to be seen whether any new government in Lebanon will be able to mend relations between the Christian and Moslem communities, and continued fighting between Christians, Moslems, and Druzes seems likely. Israel and the Arab countries remain at odds. The Palestinian problem has not been solved.

Their defeat at the hands of the Israelis and dispersal to various countries around the Mediterranean give cause for renewed terrorist activity and make central control and constraint by more moderate elements more difficult. Their presence in North African countries may also facilitate infiltration into Europe. A new coalition of Palestinians, Lebanese, Leftists, and Armenians may be forming with its headquarters on Cyprus. Early reports indicated that Greece would turn a blind eye to its activities. Cypriot officials reportedly deny that Cyprus will provide the base for any Armenian activity as this would only provoke Turkish military intervention in the Greek portion of the island.

Tensions continue between conservative and radical Arab regimes in North Africa and the Middle East. Added to these are the antagonisms between Shi'ite and Sunni Moslems, and between Moslem fundamentalists and secular regimes. The contest between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario has not ended. Turkey and Greece have not resolved their differences over Cyprus. The growing population of large North African, Middle Eastern, and Southern Mediterranean workers and refugees in Europe has provoked right-wing backlash in several countries; these tensions remain. The influx of *pieds noirs* from Algeria to Corsica in the 1960s is seen as provoking the Corsican separatist movement. Right-wing terrorist activity directed traditionally against Jews and also Arabs from North Africa has increased in the 1980s. Overlaying these regional conflict sets is the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

These antagonisms may provoke open warfare between nations and will surely continue to lead to subnational conflict that is at the same time international. Occasionally, these subnational conflicts will spill over into the maritime environment, as they have in the past. While it

is not apparent at present that any of these will lead to protracted naval guerrilla warfare, they conceivably could lead to incidents of serious consequence.

CONFLICT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN[1]

PALESTINE INSURGENCY--1945-1948

Jewish nationalists fought against local Arabs and the British Mandate until achieving independence for the State of Israel on May 14, 1948.

GREEK CIVIL WAR--1946-1949

Armed leftist insurgents of ELAS challenged the government. The insurgents were finally defeated in 1949.

FIRST ARAB-ISRAEL WAR--1948-1949

Israel's existence as an independent state was promptly challenged by the military forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. Israel military forces were successful. The fighting ended with armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.

CYPRUS EMERGENCY--1952-1959

Cypriot nationalists fought British forces. The fighting ended with the granting of independence to Cyprus.

ALGERIAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR--1954-1962

Algerian nationalists under FLN leadership fought French forces. The fighting ended with the granting of independence to Algeria.

SUEZ WAR--OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1956

Israel invaded Egypt in 1956. French and British forces landed to protect the Suez Canal. The fighting ended in a United Nations-sponsored truce.

[1]This chronology is based in part (1945-1967) on the excellent chronology compiled by David Wood in *Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, Adelphi Papers, No. 48, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968.

SPANISH MOROCCO BORDER FIGHTING--1957-1958

Dispute over the status of Spanish Morocco led to fighting between Spain and Morocco in 1957. The fighting ended with the transfer of Spanish Southern Morocco to Morocco on April 10, 1958.

CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON--MAY-AUGUST 1958

Civil war in Lebanon led to intervention by American Marines. The Marines withdrew in October 1958.

BIZERTA CRISIS--JULY 1961

A dispute over a French air-naval base led to the armed occupation of Bizerta by French forces. The crisis ended with the transfer of Bizerta to Tunisia in 1962.

BORDER FIGHTING BETWEEN ALGERIA AND MOROCCO--OCTOBER 1963

Dispute of a border area led to open fighting between the regular forces of Algeria and Morocco in October 1963. Moroccan forces repulsed Algerian forces. The Organization of African Unity intervened diplomatically to end the dispute.

CYPRUS CRISES--DECEMBER 1963-AUGUST 1964

Communal disturbances between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities led to intervention by both Greek and Turkish armed forces. Ultimately, the United Nations dispatched a peace-keeping force to supervise the ceasefire.

SYRIAN COUP--FEBRUARY 1966

After bloody fighting, rebel factions in the Syrian armed forces overthrew the civilian government.

LAKE TIBERIAS INCIDENT--APRIL 7, 1967

A dispute over the demarcation line on Lake Tiberias led to an artillery exchange between Israel and Syria leading to aerial combat.

SIX-DAY WAR--JUNE 5-10. 1967

Following armed provocation by Jordan and Syria, Israel invaded Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The brief war ended with Israeli occupation of vast territory.

WAR OF ATTRITION, OCTOBER 26, 1968-AUGUST 7, 1970

Egyptian military units opened fire at Israeli positions on the east bank of the Suez Canal provoking Israel to launch a series of commando raids against Egypt. Artillery barrages and raids by Egyptian and Israeli commandos continued until July 1969 when the Israeli air force began raids on Egyptian targets along the Canal, and later against military targets deep inside Egypt. Egypt and Israel agreed to a ceasefire on August 7, 1970.

CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN, SEPTEMBER 1970

In the late 1960s, Jordan permitted its territory to be used as a major base for Palestinian guerrillas, but by 1970, Palestinian strength had grown to 20,000 armed guerrillas who were openly challenging King Hussein's authority. Armed clashes between the Palestinians and the Jordanian army escalated into open warfare in September. The civil war officially began on September 17 when Jordanian units moved to clear Amman of all Palestinian guerrillas. The Palestinians were pushed back to an area on the Syrian border where they remained until July 1971 when the Jordanians drove them out of the country.

ISRAELI AIR AND GROUND ENGAGEMENTS WITH LEBANON, SYRIA AND EGYPT, FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER 1972

In response to terrorist attacks on Israeli borders and Israeli targets abroad, Israeli air and ground forces attacked Palestinian guerrilla bases in Syria on February 24, March 1, and September 8; in Lebanon on February 27, June 23, September 16; on June 13, Israeli and Egyptian air forces engage in a brief battle; after three weeks of sporadic clashes, heavy fighting broke out between Israel and Syria on November 21 and continued sporadically into December.

ATTEMPTED COUP IN MOROCCO--AUGUST 16, 1972

Rebel aircraft attacked King Hassan's aircraft and Palace in an unsuccessful coup.

ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA--JANUARY-SEPTEMBER 1973

In response to Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel and against Israeli targets abroad, Israeli jets and Israeli commandos struck targets in Syria on January 8 and September 13 and in Lebanon on February 21 and April 9.

GUERRILLA INVASION OF LEBANON--MAY 9, 1973

Guerrillas with Syrian support invaded Lebanon on May 9. Lebanese armed forces pushed the invaders back to the Syrian border on May 11.

YOM KIPPUR WAR--OCTOBER 6-24, 1973

Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked Israel on October 6, 1973. Israeli forces counterattacked on both fronts and on October 15, crossed the Suez Canal. A ceasefire was arranged on October 24, 1973. A 7,000-man United Nations peacekeeping force was sent to the Sinai on October 27.

ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS IN LEBANON--MAY 1974-AUGUST 1975

In response to continuing Palestinian attacks on Israeli targets in Israel and abroad, Israeli aircraft and commandos attacked targets in Lebanon May 16, 17, 19, and 21, June 18-20, October 31, November 1 and 14, 1974; and January 12-16, May 25, July 4-7, August 5, and August 21-22, 1975.

TURKEY'S INVASION OF CYPRUS--JULY 1974

Following the overthrow of President Makarios of Cyprus by EOKA-B terrorists and Greek officers in the Cyprus National Guard, Turkey invaded Cyprus on July 20 leading to the *de facto* partition of the island into Greek and Turkish sections.

CIVIL WAR IN LEBANON--1975-1976

Tensions between Christians and Moslems, exacerbated by the growing strength of Palestinian guerrilla groups in southern Lebanon, erupted into civil war in 1975. The Lebanese army virtually disintegrated as fighting continued between private militias. Continued conflict led to Syrian intervention on May 31, 1976. Syrian forces entered Beirut on November 10, 1976. The Syrians pulled back to positions in northern Lebanon during Israel's 1982 invasion where they remained at the end of 1982.

FIGHTING IN THE WESTERN SAHARA--1975-

The withdrawal of Spain from its western African colony, Spanish Sahara, set off a war between Morocco and the Algerian-backed guerrillas of *Polisario*. Occasionally Algerian and Moroccan forces clashed directly. Spain's original plan was to divide the territory between Morocco and Mauritania, which *Polisario* opposed. Moroccan forces occupied the capital of Spanish Sahara in December 1975. Mauritania renounced all territorial claims in August 1979. The fighting between Moroccan forces and *Polisario* guerrillas continues.

EGYPT-LIBYA BORDER WAR--JULY 21-24, 1977

Strained relations between Egypt and Libya led to brief clashes involving tanks and aircraft on the Egyptian-Libyan border on July 21, 1977. Egyptian President Sadat ordered a ceasefire on July 24.

EGYPTIAN COMMANDO RAID--FEBRUARY 1978

In an effort to rescue hostages held aboard an airliner hijacked by Palestinian terrorists, Egyptian commandos landed at Larnaca Airport in Cyprus. They were met by Cypriot security forces and a brief gunbattle ensued. All of the Egyptians surrendered to Cypriot authorities and later were returned to Egypt.

ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON--MARCH 14-JUNE 13, 1978

Provoked by an Al Fatah attack on a bus outside Tel Aviv in which 37 persons were killed, Israel invaded southern Lebanon on March 14, 1978. After United Nations forces were sent to maintain peace in southern Lebanon, Israel withdrew on June 13.

LIBYAN INVASION OF CHAD--APRIL 1979

For years, Libya had supported rebels in northern Chad against the French-backed government forces. In April 1979, a small Libyan force invaded the uranium and iron-rich Aouzou strip. They were repulsed by Chad's regular army.

COMMANDO RAID ON TUNISIA--JANUARY 27, 1980

A group of approximately 50 commandos, mostly Tunisian expatriate workers in Libya, launched a coordinated attack on the army barracks and police station in the Tunisian border town of Gafsa. The attack was repelled and most of the attackers captured; 41 persons were killed. Tunisia accused Libya of organizing the raid.

In a gesture of support for the Tunisian government, France dispatched a small rural convoy to show the flag off the Tunisian coast. On February 4, demonstrators in Tripoli stormed and sacked the French Embassy. France charged that the attack on its embassy and its consulate in Benghazi were government organized.

UPRISING IN SYRIA--MARCH 4-9, 1980

Unrest attributed to the Moslem Brotherhood led to antigovernment riots in Aleppo and Hama which turned into a bloody confrontation between armed opponents of Syrian President Assad and 10,000 Syrian troops. The brief revolt was suppressed by March 9. (On March 17, 1981, Syrian gunmen attempted to assassinate the exiled leaders of the Moslem Brotherhood in West Germany.)

SECOND LIBYAN INTERVENTION IN CHAD--JUNE 1980-NOVEMBER 1981

Libyan troops again entered Chad in June 1980 to intervene in Chad's civil war and press Libya's territorial claims. Libyan troops participated in the fighting until December 12, 1980 when they entered Chad's capital on behalf of Chad's president. The Libyan forces remained in Chad until November 1981.

AERIAL CLASH OVER GULF OF SIDRA--AUGUST 19, 1981

The United States has regularly resisted Libyan territorial claims to the Gulf of Sidra by holding naval maneuvers in international waters off the Libyan coast. American F-14 fighters shot down two Libyan fighters that fired at them approximately 60 miles from the Libyan coast.

SECOND ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON--JUNE 5, 1982-

In response to continued Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli targets abroad and continued Palestinian shelling of Israeli settlements near the Lebanese border, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in strength on June 5, 1982. (There had been several Israeli invasions since 1978.) Israeli units pushed Palestinian units back, then surrounded Beirut which was subjected to artillery and aerial bombardment. The Palestine Liberation Organization was permitted to withdraw its remaining forces in Beirut in September under international supervision by Italian, French, and American forces. At the end of 1982, Israeli forces continued to occupy southern Lebanon up to Beirut.

FOOTNOTES

1. These figures are derived from a chronology of international terrorism maintained by The Rand Corporation. Figures maintained by the United States Government differ in the total number of terrorist incidents worldwide, but show a similar distribution pattern among countries.
2. The activities of the Irgun and Stern Gang are described by J. Bowyer Bell, *Terror Out of Zion, Irgun Zva: Leumi; LEHI, and the Palestine Underground, 1929-1949*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. See also Menachim Begin, *The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun*, Tel Aviv: Hadar Publishing Company, 1964.
3. For a description of the EOKA-B, see Charles Foley and W. J. Scobre, *The Struggle for Cyprus*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975.
4. The activities of the FLN are described by Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria. 1954-1962*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. The activities of the OAS and barbouzes are described by Paul Henissart, *Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.
5. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York: Grove Press, 1963.
6. The FLN's influence on Fatah is discussed in John W. Amos II, *Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1980, p. 49; Edgar O'Ballance, *Arab Guerrilla Power: 1967-1972*, London: Faber and Faber, 1974, pp. 23, 26, 49-50; Zeev Schiff and Raphael Rothstein, *Fedayeen: Guerrillas Against Israel*, New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972, p. 8.
7. It is difficult to discuss Palestinian terrorism with Arabs understandably sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. The discussion inevitably becomes adversarial. Indeed, some see the use of the term "terrorism," which is a pejorative, as simply the latest in a series of deliberate slurs calculated to distort the Western image of the Arab: The Arab as terrorist has replaced the Arab as lascivious keeper of harems. Some argue that the tactics employed by the Palestinians are justified since the Palestinians are the victims of greater terror by the Israelis and that terrorist tactics are the only means of struggle available to them--the traditional defense of terrorism. Some Palestinians assert that Palestinian terrorism is, in fact, not Palestinian at all, but rather comprises actions carried out by gunmen in the employ of unscrupulous Arab governments. Yet the fact of Palestinian terrorism remains, and in a sense has been successful. That there is now pressure for an

Israeli withdrawal and the creation of a Palestinian homeland, that the Palestinian Liberation Organization may now be accorded international recognition as the legitimate government of a stateless people, is owing at least in part to the success of Palestinian terrorists in bringing their cause violently and dramatically before the eyes of the world. Without endorsing terrorism, one must wonder what success they could have won had they operated within the established bounds of conventional warfare and polite diplomacy.

8. Andres Cassinello Perez, "ETA y el problema vasco," an unpublished manuscript presented at the *Seminario sobre Terrorismo Internacional*, held in Madrid, June 10-12, 1982.
9. Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, pp. 195-196. Sterling cites "Western intelligence services" for this item. Although I have heard similar reports concerning Algerian support for European separatist movements, like most information about the international connections, it must be viewed with caution.
10. The Libyan involvement in various plots are described by John K. Cooley, *Libyan Sandstorm*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982.
11. The episode is described by Robert Katz, *Days of Wrath: The Ordeal of Aldo Moro*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980, pp. 187-189.
12. Complaints against the French position are found in Cassinello *op. cit.* They were also voiced at Council of Europe's Conference on the Defence of Democracy Against Terrorism in Europe: Tasks and Problems," Strasbourg, November 12-14, 1980.
13. Gerard de Villiers, "The Terrorist Plan for 1982," *Paris Match*, April 16, 1982, pp. 48-51.
14. See, for example, Robert Charm, "Terrorists See Offshore as Tempting Target," *Offshore*, January 1983; Robert W. Denton, "Protection of Offshore Energy Assets," *Naval Engineers Journal*, December 1976, pp. 87-91; John F. Ebersole, "International Terrorism and the Defense of Offshore Facilities," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1975, pp. 54-61; ISIS Associates, Incorporated, *International Symposium on Maritime Security & Terrorism*, Arlington, Virginia, September 21-23, 1981; Merle MacBain, "Will Terrorists Go to Sea?", *Sea Power*, January 1980, pp. 15-24; Douglas G. Macnair, "Terrorism in the Maritime Environment," *Terrorism and Beyond*, The Rand Corporation, R-2714, December 1982, pp. 273-275, and Douglas G. Macnair, "'The Nature of the Beast,' A Soliloquy on Maritime Fraud, Piracy, and Terrorism," *Journal of Security Administration*, June 1982, pp. 41-47.

15. *Offshore*, "Worldwide Exploration and Production: Prospects Bright Off Mediterranean," June 20, 1982.
16. Tim A. Cornitius, "Submersible Fleet Growth Surpasses Early Expectations," *Offshore*, August 1982.
17. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Political Affairs Committee and Legal Affairs Committee; Subcommittee on Terrorism in Europe, Summary Report of the Conference on "The Defense of Democracy Against Terrorism in Europe: Tasks and Problems," Strasbourg: January 9, 1981.

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