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**THE MALVINAS/FALKLANDS WAR OF 1982
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA**

by

Gabriel Marcella

1 August 1983

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
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FOREWORD

This memorandum distills the policy lessons of the South Atlantic war of 1982 for the United States and Latin America. The conflict constituted one of the few military tests between a European and a Third World power. For the United States, it matched as antagonists its closest NATO ally and a key member of the inter-American community, forcing a difficult choice in strategic priorities. The findings underscore the need for developing sophisticated policy responses to the growing conflictual interstate relations in the Western Hemisphere. They also urge closer coordination between the United States and Latin America in security affairs. Policy prescriptions are indicated in the areas of military diplomacy, arms transfers, relations with military governments, territorial disputes and the potential for conflict, and the agenda for inter-American security.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

RICHARD D. LAWRENCE
Major General, USA
Commandant

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**THE MALVINAS/FALKLANDS WAR OF 1982
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA**

INTRODUCTION

On March 19, 1982, a contingent of Argentine scrap workers on a contract mission to dismantle the whaling station raised their country's flag in Port Leigh on the island of South Georgia. On April 2, numerically superior Argentine military forces with specific instructions to avert bloodshed overwhelmed the defending force of 79 British marines and thus made good the recovery of the Malvinas Islands that had been in British hands since 1833. This action provoked the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to undertake the difficult task of recapturing these islands, 8,000 miles away in the South Atlantic. The military phase of the conflict was consummated by the fall of Port Stanley on June 14, 1982. Though British prestige and control was thereby reasserted, the basic issue is not ended and awaits a permanent political solution.

The South Atlantic conflict of 1982 constituted one of the few decisive and major naval actions since 1945, one of the few tests

between a European and a Third World power, and one of the few uses of European military power in Latin America since the nineteenth century.' From the perspective of the United States, it matched as antagonists its closest NATO ally and a member of the inter-American community. There was a sad toll of approximately 3,000 Argentine and British casualties, as well as awesome costs to the principals' national treasuries. The United States made available its good offices to avert war through the shuttle diplomacy of Secretary of State Alexander Haig. This ended unsuccessfully on April 30 when the United States reluctantly announced that since mediation was no longer possible, it considered limited support of Great Britain to be the correct stance to take.

It was a tragedy for both sides. Both badly miscalculated each other's intentions and did not foresee the consequences of conflict. Moreover, each made grave strategic errors in the conduct of diplomacy and war, confusing means and ends and turning their back on the Clausewitzian admonition that war is politics by other means. The British won the war, but they have yet to win permanent peace. As an astute historian observed: "The Falklands dispute illustrates a curious feature of modern politics: namely, politicians who manipulate passions in their own countries usually underestimate those passions in other nations."²

This essay will examine the South Atlantic conflict of 1982 in terms of its implications for the inter-American system and for the United States. To do so requires an understanding of the origins and status of the dispute in early 1982 and some appreciation of the motivation of the principals. Accordingly, the succeeding sections will discuss the history of the dispute; the factors that motivated the Argentine and British actions; the prospects for a long-term solution; the response of the inter-American system, and the policy implications for the United States.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE

The origins of the Malvinas/Falklands dispute go back to contending British and Spanish claims of discovery in the sixteenth century. In 1767, the Spanish Crown gained possession of the islands from the British, who withdrew from them in 1774. Exercising the principle of *uti possidetis juris*, the newly

independent Buenos Aires government claimed the right of inheritance from the Vice-royalty of La Plata. In 1820, the Anglo-Argentine David Jewett took possession of the islands in the name of the Supreme Government of the United Provinces. In 1833, a British frigate commanded by John Onslow dislodged an Argentine colony begun in 1826 and established the long period of British control. Argentina never reconciled itself to British occupation, and there was, at least, some disparate opinion in the British government. For example, in 1920, Sidney Spicer who was head of the Foreign Office's American Department wrote, "... it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Argentine Government's attitude is not altogether unjustified and that our action has been somewhat highhanded."

The United States itself became involved in 1831 when its warship the US Lexington destroyed the Argentine settlement in retaliation for the seizure of three American sealing ships. There followed a 12-year break in US-Argentine relations. Argentina continued to demand reparations for decades to no avail, because the United States did not want to commit itself on the sovereignty issue. Since 1945, the United States has maintained strict neutrality on the sovereignty issue and called for a peaceful settlement. According to the Department of State: "With the Falklands in mind, it abstained or voted against resolutions calling for a definitive end to colonialism in the Americas, self-determination for the colonies of extracontinental powers, and the monitoring of dependent territories by the Organization of American States."

Since 1964, Argentina has sustained a vigorous twin-track international campaign for the recovery of the Malvinas, based, on one hand, on the strategy of gaining world attention against "colonialism" and, on the other, proposing negotiations with Britain. After 1971, Argentina followed the strategy of cooperative relations with the long-term objective of absorption. In that year, the two sides agreed to increase commercial, communications, social, and cultural links between the islands and Argentina—including airline service. In the meantime, the British government was becoming convinced that hanging onto the islands would not be in its interests. It hoped, therefore, to find a method of unburdening itself gracefully of both the political and economic liability. The Shackleton Report of 1976 supported this judgment by underlining the pessimistic economic prospects for the islands and

emphasized the need for Argentine cooperation in its future economic development, particularly when applied to the possibility of offshore oil.

In this context, the British Foreign Office developed a mechanism for devolution of Argentine jurisdiction, known as the lease-back or Hong Kong solution. By this arrangement, Argentina would be given sovereignty while the British would retain control, and the 1,800 Kelpers would be left undisturbed for a number of years, varying between 25 and 50—permitting them to be absorbed into Argentine society or to seek another home. This relatively humane and sophisticated approach did not receive the approval of the majority of Falklanders or the influential Falkland lobby in the British Parliament. Subsequent negotiation efforts were repeatedly vetoed by representatives of the Falklanders or headed off by sympathetic elements in the British Parliament.

Matters stood at this impasse when the final negotiating between British and Argentine representatives was held in New York in February 1982.⁵ This final failure apparently activated a decision made earlier by the Argentine high command to recover the island by force if necessary. British journalists from the London *Sunday Times* assert that the decision had been taken by early December 1981 by President-to-be Army General Leopoldo Galtieri and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jorge Anaya. The decision was apparently accepted by the Air Force commander, Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, and endorsed by Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez later that month.

THE DECISION TO RECOVER THE MALVINAS

Geopolitical Perspectives and Strategic Considerations. The Malvinas military action of April 2 should not have surprised anyone. Signals of an imminent military move had apparently been developing for some time. The British ambassador in Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams, is reputed to have been sending cables on a possible invasion since his arrival in 1980.⁶ In a major meeting of June 30, 1981, the Foreign Office reviewed the options available in case the lease-back proposal failed. The implications of Argentine military action were considered.

Argentine newsmen began openly speculating and, indeed, advocating the action in January and February 1982. As an

example, on January 17, the influential columnist, Jesús Iglesias Rouca, writing in *La Prensa*, compared the Beagle Channel and the Malvinas issue. He echoed the sentiments of many Argentines who regarded them crucial to the defense of the South Atlantic. The taking of the Malvinas would be "a far less costly option than war with Chile, and one which would enjoy international consensus." On January 24, he continued: "The United States . . . would support all acts leading to restitution, including military ones As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, there might be a freezing of relations for a while, but in the context of Western strategic interests, it seems that the situation would not be prolonged."⁸ This line of reasoning closely paralleled that of the Galtieri government, as will be demonstrated later in this essay.

Another source, *Convicción*, the Argentine newspaper, indicated that "taking the Malvinas would actually help resolve the Beagle Channel issue, since it would strengthen Argentina's negotiating hand."⁹ Trusted journalists continued their consultations with government sources about the possibility of military action. On March 1, the Argentine Foreign Ministry announced that "if a solution should not be reached, Argentina maintains the right to end the system and freely choose the procedure it may deem most convenient to its interests."¹⁰ Another source, *The Latin American Weekly Report* of April 9, 1982, reflected on "The Tell-Tale Signs" and reiterated its earlier report that on February 12 "President Leopoldo Galtieri is said to have obtained a promise of neutrality from his Uruguayan opposite number, Gregorio Alvarez, in the event of an invasion of the Malvinas/Falklands."¹¹ It also reported the emergency landing of an Argentine Air Force Hercules C-130 at the Port Stanley airport the week of March 12. Buenos Aires observers corroborated that the "incident was planned . . . the air force was 'testing' the feasibility of landing troops on the island"¹² Putting all the information together, British intelligence predicted on March 24 that an invasion of the islands would occur precisely on April 2. British statesmen took some measures as the result of this information—a detachment of marines was enroute in Montevideo.

This historical background is provided in order to suggest that the opportunities for a peaceful settlement of the dispute were cast aside on a number of occasions. A final verdict on who was to

blame for the lost opportunities awaits the release of the official records by Argentina, Britain, and the United States. Only then can it be properly ascertained whether the diplomatic signals were clear and to what degree the antagonists understood each other's intentions. It also remains to be seen what role the United States played in the fateful months of January, February and March. Perhaps if intentions had been better understood, the Argentine high command would have been better prepared for the British counterattack or adopted a different strategy for the recovery of the Malvinas.

At this point, it can be stated that both Argentina and Britain gravely miscalculated each other's domestic and international situation. Clearly, the British failed to comprehend the depth of public support for the recovery of the Malvinas enjoyed by the Galtieri government (or any other, for that matter), a government that was dismissed derisively in Britain as a fascist dictatorship out to trample the democratic rights of an "island people" (the Kelpers). The British government also failed to consider the domestic political predicament of the Galtieri military government and its need for a political victory to rally national support. Poor economic performance and the issue of the disappeared victims of the guerrilla war of the 1970's had severely diminished its popularity.

Argentina made the gravest strategic miscalculations. What is regarded as a small group of decisionmakers failed to anticipate adequately British resolve as well as to understand the character of the Prime Minister and the domestic factors that might produce a bellicose response. The Argentine high command also failed to understand the possible international response. It counted on support from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the international community, little of which materialized. These failures suggest inadequate intelligence and insufficient consultation with the professional diplomatic corps which is a commentary on the astuteness of decisionmakers. It is known that the Argentine Army Staff was not consulted on the impending operations and that the deployments and logistical support for the troops proved inadequate to repel a modern and professional force. The static defense strategy of the Argentines surprised the British command and facilitated the surprise landing at San Carlos and the collapse of the Port Stanley garrison.

These considerations are secondary since the fate of the military enterprise rested on the singular and erroneous assumption that there would be no British reaction. The British maintain that the Argentines simply forced the UK response because of the size of the occupying force, at least 12,000. This probably offended British pride. Why the Argentines attacked with such a force is not known. It would have been different, some argue, if the Argentines had sent a small force, quickly set up a civil administrative structure, then withdrawn its forces and thereby rallied world opinion against a possible British counterattack. Said a high-ranking British officer: "It would have been extremely difficult to respond militarily to the *fait accompli*."¹³ The Clausewitzian notion of proportionality was violated by the Argentines.

Why such a course of action was not implemented awaits the outcome of further research and the statements of the leading Argentine participants. One possible explanation for the large Argentine show of force is related to the internal politics of the military—a large force would provide higher political profile, improve the political legitimacy of the military government, or demonstrate political competition among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. On balance, however, the Argentines seem to have had ample reason to believe that their military action could be conducted with impunity. After all, the British had given consistent indication of wanting to divest themselves of the islands. On the other hand, had the Argentines waited, the British were scheduled to get rid of their aircraft carriers within a year or so and would not have the capacity to respond in the manner they did. These facts support the conclusion that the timing of the recovery was based on the Galtieri government's perceptions of the requirements of the immediate internal political situation and its convergence with a perceived favorable international situation. The high command may have been correct on the first assumption, but totally erroneous on the second.

At this juncture, it is important to understand more fully the foreign policy perspectives of the Argentine government and its relations with the United States. An important conclusion that derives from this analysis is that in presuming the support of the United States, Argentina failed to understand the imperatives of US foreign policy by forcing the United States to weigh the importance of its North Atlantic interests—that is, the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization—over its other international interests. For its part, the United States may have underestimated the importance of the issue to Argentina and to Latin America. It may have also provided unclear political signals to Buenos Aires during the first two years of the Reagan Administration. During this period, Washington and Buenos Aires had a number of high-level consultations, involving civilian and military officials, ostensibly, to coordinate foreign policy positions in Latin America (General Edward Meyer, US Army Chief of Staff, visited Argentina in April 1981; General Galtieri himself attended the annual Conference of the Chiefs of the American Armies, held in Washington in October). An Argentine journalist maintains: "The plan (to recover the Malvinas) was formed when Galtieri participated in the Conference of the Chiefs of the American Armies . . . the possibility of Washington pressuring London to accelerate the transfer of the Malvinas to Argentina was discussed."¹⁴

The intended and unintended understandings that ensued from these consultations, of course, will have to await the release of official documents. Nonetheless, certain hypotheses are possible. In an insightful and provocative article developed, in large part, on consultations with Argentine military authorities, Carlos J. Moneta, an Argentine political scientist, examined the geopolitical and foreign policy perspectives of the high command. He argued that these perspectives were influential in the decision to recover the Malvinas. The international strategic environment at the time of the consultations was one of heightened Western preoccupation with the Soviet naval threat to Persian Gulf oil transiting the South Atlantic and the Soviet-Cuban supported insurgencies in Central America. This provided the military government with an opportunity for an outlet from the isolation imposed by the Carter Administration and by its own internal political isolation. Accordingly, Argentina aligned itself with the United States and Western Europe, hoping for a distinct role in Western security "by means of an active cooperation and participation in the North American security scheme in Latin America and Southern Africa (e.g., Central America, the South Atlantic Treaty Organization)."¹⁵ The foreign policy plan included the diversification of trade with the socialist bloc, but "avoidance of any ties that could lead . . . to potential Soviet penetration of any kind in Argentine."¹⁶

As for the Malvinas, Moneta asserted that there was a fear that Britain would offer them to NATO for use as a base if that organization were to extend its jurisdiction to the South Atlantic, thereby frustrating Argentine hopes for recovery. This background apparently helped convince the military that if Argentina controlled the islands, it could play a role in Western defense, accordingly improving its prestige and the legitimacy of taking the islands.¹⁷ This background is important because Galtieri has often expressed the view that Argentina was betrayed by the United States because it ended its mediation on April 30. It is alleged that Argentina assisted the United States in Central America by sending military advisors to Honduras, a nation with which Argentina over a number of years maintained a military assistance relationship. Was this viewed as a *quid pro quo* for US assistance or compliance on the Malvinas action of April 2, enhanced by the apparent convergence of anticommunist ideological frameworks in Washington and Buenos Aires? Again, the answer to these complex questions depends partly upon the release of official documentation and the testimony of the participants in US-Argentine diplomacy in the period 1980-82. Galtieri indicated in postwar interviews that he believed that the United States would be equidistant.

THE CONFLICT IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

The Argentine military action of April 2 set into motion the international machinery of peacemaking. On April 3, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 502 which called for the immediate end of hostilities, the withdrawal of Argentine troops, and diplomatic negotiations between Argentina and Britain to resolve their differences. Resolution 502 became the foundation of British diplomacy, the basis for numerous efforts to avert hostilities, and may yet form the basis for the permanent solution of the dispute. It also formed a basis for a draft resolution of the conflict proposed to the United Nations General Assembly in November 1982 by 20 Latin American nations which was supported by the United States.

Argentina reacted to the dispatching of the British fleet by mobilizing a diplomatic effort to bring into play the collective security machinery of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

Assistance (Rio Treaty). Argentina argued that an American state's security was being menaced by an extracontinental power, requiring that treaty signatories come to the assistance of the threatened member. The Organ of Consultation for the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance met at the Organization of American States (OAS) on April 26-28. The ensuing diplomatic debates within this forum demonstrated the historical Latin American solidarity with Argentina's claim to sovereignty. Nonetheless, the majority took exception to the use of force to resolve the dispute. The compromise outcome was a resolution recognizing Argentina's sovereignty, and the "interests" of the inhabitants, calling for Britain to cease hostilities and for compliance with Resolution 502, while deploring the coercive economic measures taken by the European Economic Community against Argentina.¹⁸

These diplomatic maneuverings culminated before the United States formally withdrew from the mediation effort on April 30, and before a last ditch Peruvian plan of compromise was scuttled by Argentine intransigence on prior acceptance of Argentine sovereignty. The British sinking of the cruiser, *General Belgrano*, on May 2, quickly followed by the Argentine sinking of the British destroyer the H.M.S. *Sheffield*, intensified passions and made the search for peace more elusive. The San Carlos Bay landings would take place on May 21.

The Latin American community reacted in three modes. First, each of the Latin American states (the English speaking and Haiti excluded) demonstrated political solidarity on the sovereignty issue. Some even went beyond rhetorical support and provided a modicum of military and economic support—mostly symbolic and not of the quantity to materially support Argentina's war effort. Secondly, some principal countries, such as Mexico and Colombia expressed profound misgivings about the use of force to solve the dispute. A third mode of response demonstrated continuity with previous crises within the inter-American system—pessimism, denunciation, and critiques that the system did not work effectively to protect the interests of Latin America and only served to protect the interests of the United States.¹⁹ This phase continued, reaching a particular virulence in summer 1982, with denunciation of the role of the United States accompanied by demands for a new security system with or without the United States.²⁰ As the fighting phase of the conflict abated and as the United States undertook

steps to rebuild its bridges to Latin America in the summer and fall of 1982, such as the vote cast in support of the November resolution at the UN General Assembly, this type of rhetoric died down.

The Twentieth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Relations, April 26-28, provided the venue for the fullest discussion of the issue. The ministers met in response to what the Argentines considered: "This grave and imminent threat of the use of force by an extracontinental power, to which is added the formal establishment of a naval blockade, constitutes a situation which places in danger the peace and security of America and affects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Argentine Republic."²¹ The most extensive and considered judgments were rendered by Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. Each one presented views that brought into play a combination of their traditional juridical position, their historical experience, and their perceptions of the exigencies of their national interests within the international nation-state system.

On behalf of Mexico, Ambassador Rafael de la Colina eloquently reiterated his country's support for the Argentine claims of sovereignty and lamented the "excessively long negotiation" to settle the issue. He condemned the use of force to resolve international controversies, "whatever the motives used to justify them." Moreover, there were too many territorial conflicts extant in Latin America that needed solution by means other than those taken by Argentina. In summing up, he urged support for the UN Security Council Resolution 502 for a negotiated solution.

Colombia, through its Minister of Foreign Relations, Carlos Lemos Simmonds, made the most severe condemnation of the Argentine action of April 2. Lemos articulated support for Argentine sovereignty, but accused the sister republic of using the protection of the inter-American system to justify the use of force:

It is strange that Argentina asks for the convocation of the Organ of Consultation and the application of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, after it itself used force to resolve the until now diplomatically unsolved problem of the sovereignty of the Malvinas. This mistake in procedure presents Argentina . . . in the posture of seeking the protection of the inter-American system by an act of force.²²

Balancing these critiques was the unconditional support given by

Venezuela. Its Minister, Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco, delivered a thorough denunciation of the British "aggression" and unabashed support for Argentina.²³ Venezuela's leadership role in promoting the Argentine cause and its vituperation against Britain and the United States can be explained in part by its desire to lay the political-diplomatic basis for a favorable outcome of its own claim to five-eighths of Guyana.²⁴ Perhaps just as important was its desire to distance itself from its support of US policy in Central America. Similarly, Colombia was concerned about not condoning the use of force in order not to set a precedent for Nicaraguan claims on its San Andrés and Providencia archipelago.²⁵

Debate on the issue thus illuminates some of the harsh realities of inter-American relations, with its multitude of territorial disputes, and the strange alliances resulting from the opportunity of the moment. As an example, Nicaragua's triade against Britain and its unqualified support for Argentina appeared incongruous when juxtaposed with alleged ongoing Argentine military assistance to neighboring anti-Sandinista Honduras. Similarly, Ecuador and Peru, bitter enemies because of their old territorial differences, supported Argentina politically and with some military aid.

The United States, speaking through Secretary of State Haig, and trying to maintain its neutrality and find the elusive compromise, recognized the merits of both positions as follows:

All of us know that we are dealing today with an enormously difficult and sensitive problem. Both the Republic of Argentina and the United Kingdom assert that their rights to the islands have been denied. Argentina is motivated by a deep national commitment to establish possession of the islands. It is frustrated by years of what it considers to be fruitless negotiation. Britain emphasizes its longstanding possession of the islands and asserts that the wishes of the inhabitants must be respected in any settlement.²⁶

Haig argued against treating the dispute within the collective security framework of the Rio Treaty and counseled that any resolution considered for adoption should be "examined against the criteria of whether it contributes to the peace process."²⁷

Throughout this process the Organ of Consultation identified neither the aggressor nor aggressed in the conflict. In the final resolution it recognized the existence of a serious situation, yet no concrete measures were taken. Instead, the following terms were in evidence in that resolution: deplore, urge, recommend, take note,

express, encharge, and maintain. This is not the language of collective security measures; it is the language of pragmatic compromise about an action that violated the first article of the Rio Treaty—the renunciation of the use of force.

The South Atlantic conflict forced nations within the inter-American system to publicly take positions that were often uncomfortable. Voting against Latin American solidarity was impossible for a Latin country, perhaps just as impossible as taking a public attitude favorable to the United States. In the end, what carried the day were the pragmatic determinants of national interests and the convergence with universal longings for peace and justice. Brazil's Foreign Minister, Saraiva Guerreiro, neatly summed up his country's pragmatic approach on this in his speech to the Brazilian Senate on May 9:

Our great concern . . . is to slow down the spiral of violence and to see if we can reverse this process, return to negotiations within the spirit of conciliation and justice. All that we have done . . . does not avoid this objective; this essentially explains what our hope is."

One of the pragmatic considerations was the possible implications for the many territorial disputes in the region. Those nations that strongly supported Argentina (Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Panama) clearly had a territorial cause to advance against a neighbor, or with the United States, in the case of Panama. Those that stood to lose from a neighbor's territorial claim weakly supported Argentina (Chile, Colombia)." All these nations can probably claim vindication for their individual case in the compromise struck by the inter-American system on April 28, 1982. For the United States, it represented the best possible outcome from a difficult, perhaps no-win situation. The second meeting of consultation under the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance took place May 28-29. The rhetoric was similarly impassioned against the United States and the final resolution provided for no specific measures, other than calling upon the United States to stop aiding the British and to lift sanctions against Argentina.

TOWARDS A PERMANENT SOLUTION OF THE ISSUE

With a land, air, and naval presence that in early 1983 numbered

about 3,000, the effort to preserve the self-determination of 1,800 Kelpers and to safeguard the principle of not using force to resolve political disputes could surely be, on a per capita basis, the most expensive military garrison in the world. The effort is also counterproductive to the interests of Great Britain, the United States, the inter-American community, and, of course, Argentina.¹⁰ The reasons for this follow.

It will be difficult for the British to sustain the large defense effort for a long period of time. According to a radio account reporting a London *Sunday Times* article of February 6, 1983, the islands will be an albatross for Britain. Defending them will cost approximately \$1.5 million per islander, with an eventual total cost estimated at \$4 billion. The "correlation of forces" favors Argentina in the long term by virtue of the single fact of geographic proximity. Great Britain, as a South Atlantic power poised on the threshold of the twenty-first century, is indeed absurd. The political and economic stakes involved are not worth such a long-term commitment. A continuing British military presence fuels the potential for conflict in the region, especially given the Argentine preoccupation with the Beagle Channel issue and its sensitivities about Chilean-British intentions. This is so, despite the fact that it would make little sense for the latter two, given the asymmetry of their very distinct geopolitical situations and the possible Argentine reaction, to provide any pretense of provoking Argentina.¹¹

There are precious few economic stakes worth defending. The tenuous economy of the islands will, according to the 1976 Shackleton Report and its 1982 sequel, require major investments to develop the tourism, cottage industries, and seafood potential in addition to the wool industry. The Thatcher government announced an ambitious development program to improve the islands' infrastructure. There is no assurance, however, that these expenditures will pay off economically or are even prudent in view of Argentine determination to "recover" the islands. The potential of offshore oil development is an important element in the future of the islands. If indeed the US Department of Interior speculation about large deposits of hydrocarbons in the continental shelf prove correct, their exploitation faces the technological challenges posed by the difficult South Atlantic maritime environment. Even if these were overcome, without Argentine acquiescence and participation, such exploitation will be difficult. Thus, it can be seen that the

longer term economic value of the islands to the Kelpers and to the British is neither promising nor secure enough to justify the large investment and to stem the decline of the population base, which declined steadily from 2,400 in 1940 to 1,800 in 1982. Since the end of the war, not one new settler has arrived on the islands.

Emotional nationalism is a critical constraint to the search for a solution. Both Argentina and Great Britain lost treasure and human lives, while the Thatcher and Galtieri governments staked political survival on the success of the enterprise. Recovering the Malvinas will unquestionably remain an objective of Argentine nationalism, but it will hardly occupy center stage in British politics for the foreseeable future, given the domestic economic imperatives and the country's fundamental orientation towards European affairs. Military defeat has not convinced the Argentines to acquiesce to the loss of the Malvinas, for as Galtieri is attributed to have said "we won't wait another 149 years."¹³ There is every probability that Argentina will rearm and strive to achieve military superiority. By early 1983, Argentina had already replaced much of the equipment lost in the war.

These considerations make a pragmatic and prudent approach to a permanent solution mandatory. Great Britain's ambassador to the United States during the conflict, Nicholas Henderson, recognized the policy dilemmas involved in the search for a solution as follows:

... (1) without a negotiated settlement with Argentina, the economic development of the Falkland Islands will remain stultified, and Britain will be saddled with a continuing military threat that can only be met by a considerable diversion of military resources; (2) no negotiation can succeed unless the Argentinians get some satisfaction on sovereignty¹⁴

The interests of the United States are also bound to suffer as long as the dispute persists, since the issue will interpose itself as an irritant in overall US-Latin American relations. US support¹⁴ for the Argentine proposal at the November 4, 1982, United Nations General Assembly Meeting to resume negotiations for a permanent solution, helped to restore some confidence in US-Argentine relations and boosted hopes for a democratic outcome in Argentine's domestic politics. It also upset the British government. Prudence and pragmatism dictate that once the generation of participants in the conflict are no longer commanding the heights

of government in Buenos Aires and London, once some equanimity is restored, the two parties should return to the negotiating table to hammer out the solution. There is no reason that 1,800 people should determine the policy of a major NATO ally, complicate the relations of the United States with Latin America, and constitute a source of tension in the South Atlantic. An amicable and graceful solution could include guarantees and financial incentives, giving the islanders guarantees if they remain or financial incentives to migrate to a suitable home in the context of a phased devolution to Argentine administration.

Prudence and pragmatism need not be viewed as appeasement by either party. Elimination of the conflict will permit all parties concerned to devote their efforts to more important concerns and, hopefully, establish a positive precedent for the solution of Latin America's many territorial disputes. Independence is not an option for the islands, since it runs counter to the expectations of Argentina, and also because they do not have the minimal basis for independence, being practically an economic dependency of the Falkland Islands Company. Put even more simply, the islanders do not want independence.³⁵

The shape of the future settlement can follow the framework of the realistic and balanced Peruvian Plan that was almost accepted by both in early May 1982,³⁶ as follows:

- The ceding of formal sovereignty to Argentina.
- The withdrawal of all Argentine and British troops and police—the demilitarization of the area.
- Local self-government and an elected council with a representative of the Argentine government.
- The guarantee of the Falklanders' rights, laws, and customs.
- The appointment of an international commission to supervise these arrangements.

At some point in the not too distant future, the United States should once again offer its good offices as a mediator. There ought to be no *quid quo pro* about it. British magnanimity could obviate the need for a return of the United States to a mediating role, but such an attitude is not likely in the short term nor likely under a Thatcher government. A US role is desirable because of the need to return US-Argentine relations to a more normal pattern. Those relations have always been cool and the United States should not

expect any great display of affection by Argentines if it, indeed, persuades London to compromise. A final solution will assist the democratic restoration in Argentina since it will allow a deep wound in the body politic to heal. Such an outcome would be favorable to the overall interests of the inter-American community.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CONFLICT FOR US POLICY

Importance of Military Diplomacy. Military to military relations are an important policy instrument for the United States in Latin America. Here, the United States has developed a complex web of military relations since the postwar period, with the following elements: the defense attache system, the military advisory groups, US military area specialists, a regional unified command in Panama—the US Southern Command—annual conferences of the Military Chiefs of the Americas (Army, Navy, Air Force, and lately, the Coast Guard), multinational military exercises such as UNITAS, military student exchanges, general officer lecture exchanges (the Mascarenhas de Moraes—Mark Clark series between the US and Brazilian armies), the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American Defense College, programs of security assistance, exchange of doctrine, and intelligence exchanges between the United States and certain countries.³⁷ In recent years, the level of military diplomacy, particularly the security assistance component has, for a number of reasons, been reduced to the point where Israel is selling more arms to Latin America than is the United States, while US military advisory personnel have also been reduced in numbers. This has had profound implications for US interests in the region, since it implies the loss of contact with the younger elements of the officer corps. In Peru, for example, there is a 12-year gap between contacts. There are similar situations with other countries. In this context, misperceptions about the United States are bound to occur.

Military relations are a legitimate component of diplomacy between friendly nation-states, and of particular importance in Latin America because the military plays a pivotal role in national political affairs. Military to military relations provide a channel for both professional and political communications, and serve as a

bridge spanning across military elites. For the United States, they provide presence and access for the purpose of influencing the predispositions of the military elites about the values and objectives that characterize US foreign policy." They also provide a means for imparting respect for US military professionalism, and increase confidence in US leadership. More concretely, this means promoting attitudes favorable to American values such as democracy, human rights, and support for US foreign policy. One of the unintended consequences of the reduction in military diplomacy in recent years has been the loss of access to a generation of Latin American officers, thus rendering more difficult the sustained and sophisticated communication required for the achievements of foreign policy objectives.

The South Atlantic conflict demonstrated the importance of open lines of communication and of unambiguous signals. Obviously, the Galtieri government misinterpreted the signals emanating from the Pentagon and elsewhere in Washington about US intentions. Perhaps the United States misinterpreted the signals coming from Buenos Aires about Argentine intentions. In a crisis situation such as the South Atlantic conflict, established and confident communication is fundamental to effective diplomacy. A respected Argentine journalist commented on the miscalculations that ensued in bilateral communication:

- There is no evidence that the State Department gave the wrong signal with respect to the Argentine position. However, the large number of visits to Argentina made in recent years in high-ranking officers of the American military establishment did contribute to the Argentine military government's misunderstanding of the eventual US position in the Malvinas crisis. These visits gave the Argentine military an unrealistic sense of Argentina's comparative strategic importance in the world.

- On the Argentine side, these visits were interpreted as evidence of the country's strategic importance, a conceit that started to gain currency towards the end of the Carter Administration when the US appeared to soften its Human Rights stance in response to Argentina's refusal to participate in the US-sponsored grain embargo against the Soviet Union.

- In the first year of the Reagan Administration, this conceit was strengthened by talk about US-Argentine cooperation in protecting the shipping lanes of the South Atlantic; by US efforts to obtain Argentine cooperation in a peacekeeping force for the Sinai and by a request for Argentine help in Central America.

- Furthermore, these visits and requests led the Argentine military to believe that it had significant leverage in Washington. The belief became a factor in the overthrow of President Roberto Viola in December, 1981."

The above considerations underline the urgency of having for the critical communication and assessment missions sufficient military personnel that are linguistically capable, culturally sensitive and politically sophisticated to carry out their missions. The political-military sophistication required can only result from years of education, field experience, familiarity with the complexities of the interagency policymaking process in the US government and interaction with leadership groups in Latin America. To acquire these cadres of political-military specialists also means that they must be properly incentivized and stimulated by personnel systems which, unfortunately, regard the low-intensity conflict assignments to Latin America as not career-enhancing.

US Policy and Latin America Military Governments. Latin American leadership elites must understand the complexity and the checks and balances of the US policymaking system, if for no other reason than to learn how to deal with it to achieve their national interests and to avoid miscalculations which hurt the climate of bilateral relations. They must also take into account the worldwide responsibilities of the United States. The Argentine military government made assumptions about US support without proper appreciation of this complexity and forced upon it a difficult choice in strategic priorities. For its part, the United States must weigh carefully the potential impact of its statements and initiatives on nations with decisional, elite structures so different from its own. Narrowly based military governments often have a closed decisionmaking process involving only a few people. This was the case with the Argentine government of 1980-82. Governments which lack public accountability and are without institutionalized and open channels of consultation and communication with their own people and the external world, are more likely to make facile decisions and, thus, miscalculations.

What does this imply for the United States? The United States must deal with governments as they are, but in doing so, it must adopt policies that maximize chances for a political opening and not adopt those policies which reinforce the exclusionary tendencies of governments. The South Atlantic conflict provides painful reminders that an embrace of narrowly-based military governments in Latin America carries the great risk that the United States will be the scapegoat for their failures once the delicate edifice of cards collapses. This counsels caution, prudence, and

pragmatism. It also counsels continuity in US policy. Americans must prescind from the ideological and rhetorical excesses of the right and left, stop regarding the Latin American nations as passive recipients of US initiatives and of moral crusades intended for other purposes. Finally, the United States, with due respect to its societal and bureaucratic complexity, must stop "tilting at the windmill" of Latin American militarism. It need not condone or accept the military in politics, but at least recognize it as a political reality that will not go away until cohesive and more integrated national entities emerge. The military institution is often the most cohesive national organization, and, paradoxically, may be the last bulwark of democracy, even the weaknesses of civilian institutions.

A New Agenda for Inter-American Security. One of the lessons relearned in the South Atlantic conflict is that Latin Americans and the United States have different perceptions of each other's security needs. The Latin Americans have for the last two decades been advocating an integrated notion of security—with socioeconomic as well as military components. This is not totally an anathema to the United States, but the United States finds it difficult, particularly in an age of deep economic recession and a diminishing economic pie for the American people, to make the concept of collective economic security operational since it implies redistribution of international economic power. Moreover, Latin American military security concerns and their limited capabilities are more directed to internal, local and, at best, regional requirements. The East-West security framework is important to Latin Americans insofar as it affects their own security. There is nothing irrational or new about this, but the United States seemed to have forgotten this in recent years. The asymmetrical perceptions on security will persist as Latin Americans evolve their geopolitical frameworks and defense policies away from the bipolar division of the world, and as long as the United States remains locked into an exclusively East-West perspective of national security.

The South Atlantic conflict demonstrated once again an inescapable fact of inter-American relations: what is important to Latin America may not be as important to the United States. This is not to say that the United States was not interested in a just and peaceful solution of the conflict. Indeed, the conflict brought to the surface important disagreements between the Atlanticists

(reputedly Haig, *et al.*) and the Americanists (US Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs at the State Department) in the policymaking community over the priorities of US foreign policy. The reality is that the Atlanticists always predominate in the US government. This should be viewed by Latin Americans as a geopolitical reality and not as evidence of a lack of interest in Latin America. It is often stated that there is no natural constituency in the United States for a Latin American policy. While this may for the most part be true, confrontational tactics on the part of Latin America may diminish the effectiveness of these sectors in American society that advocate activism in favor of Latin America.

The United States ought to adjust to these security concerns and be prepared to deal with an agenda that stresses interdependence in economic affairs as a subcomponent of security. Once the reality of interdependence is accepted, mechanisms ought to be developed to encourage it. This will require a new consensus in the United States and in Latin America, one that stresses the long term over the short term, accommodation over confrontation and consensus over "scapegoating."

Tactically, this means that the Latin American countries must temper their confrontational style toward the United States, demonstrate sensitivity to US global responsibilities and to the limits of US power, particularly in the context of the current world recession. OAS Secretary General Orfila captured the imperative very well for a new regional dialog in the aftermath of the conflict:

... the dialog should focus on promoting mutual understanding among ourselves about our principal concerns. For the United States this implies looking at Latin America not only as the source of raw materials, but also as a principal actor in world affairs and as a creative and dynamic force in the international economy. ... Latin America and the Caribbean must recognize the problems which the United States faces because of its global responsibilities, as well as acknowledge the particular form that its people live the democratic experience."

The South Atlantic conflict brought to the surface serious questions about the utility of the inter-American security system, considered by most observers to be the most sophisticated regional arrangement for solving conflict. Indeed, there were many voices that advocated fashioning new security relations which excluded

the United States and which made Latin American solidarity into a defense system. As the passions of the moment died down, extremist notions of the OAS without the United States were discarded. The cause of peace and security and development in the Western Hemisphere is simply not advanced without the participation of the United States. Moreover, a broader view of security will recognize that all nations of the region have mutual concerns. Perhaps now, more than ever before, the United States and Latin America are intimately interested in resolving the external debt crisis that threatens the liquidity of the international financial system. This mutual interest should contribute to the following areas of cooperative efforts—energy, food, production, employment, trade, investment, and the financing of economic development. Revolutionary movements in Central America and the Cuban-Soviet role in Caribbean Basin security are also of paramount interest. This urges that there ought to be a careful balancing of the East-West and North-South strategy approaches.

These are then the major issues on the inter-American agenda for the 1980's. The system of institutions and organizations is sophisticated and flexible enough to undertake the prudent and pragmatic dialog in the search for solutions, if the member nations are willing to subordinate themselves more to international cooperation. Indeed, this is how the inter-American system set the standard in the international community as the most sophisticated regional system for the resolution of conflict.

Latin American Arms Needs and US Policy. One area which should be of increasing concern for US and Latin American policymakers is the impact of Argentina's military defeat on the defense plans of Latin American (as well as Third World) nations. British technological and professional superiority barely won out over one of the most sophisticated military establishments in the region. The South Atlantic conflict accelerated a reassessment of equipment needs that had been underway for some time. The high professional competence of the Argentine pilots in their sorties against the British fleet demonstrated not only the lethality of modern military technology, but also the obsolescence of certain weapon systems, and the technological dependence upon external sources (including British in the case of Argentina). The reassessment underway may lead to a new arms spending spree as nations identify their deficiencies and as they strive to reduce their

military technological dependence—what Peruvian General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin once called the cruelest form of dependence—by developing indigenous military industrial capabilities. Brazilian military officials, for example, have indicated that the South Atlantic conflict demonstrated for them the need for more naval equipment to secure their country's sea lines of communication.⁴¹

The modernization of defense establishments will pose challenging policy choices for the United States as Latin American nations will once again undoubtedly come calling for US equipment and training.⁴² Will the United States continue to exercise a paternalistic, selective and moralistic approach to arms sales and assistance? Will it judge the merits of these requests in the East-West strategic context or the North-South? And how will it influence the direction of acquisitions so that regional military balances are not upset? The answers to these questions will go a long way in determining whether the United States can reestablish relationships of mutual respect and confidence. They will also help to determine what policy instruments the United States can apply to ameliorate the increasing conflictual interstate relations of Latin America.

Territorial Disputes and Conflict Potential. The war over the dismal islands also focused attention on one of the most dangerous legacies of European control in Latin America—territorial disputes. Recovering national territory alienated by what are perceived to be unjust or ambiguous settlements imposed in the past by either unsympathetic outsiders or by the force of arms of neighbors are emotional issues which elicit deep nationalistic sentiments. Claims as well as emotions are often fanned by the mass media and politicized by national leaders in need of a cause or a foreign enemy. The claims for territory may merge with the competition between neighboring states for presumed or real subsoil and maritime resources. These disputes are becoming prominent at a time when the leaders of the Latin American states are better able to articulate national interests and mobilize public support in defense of them. This means that historical antecedents and the objective justice of the claim may not be the central determinants of a state's behavior vis-a-vis the neighbor in the dispute. A central determinant may in fact be the willingness to resort to force. Territorial issues, therefore, will continue to

endanger the peace and security of the region unless permanent solutions based on compromise and adjustments of conflicting national interests are found.

Besides the Argentina-Britain dispute, two more are particularly dangerous and have in recent years resulted in the mobilization of troops—Chile-Argentina, over the Beagle Channel and Ecuador-Peru, over the unmarked border in the Cordillera del Condor. There are other disputes that engage nationalistic passions: Colombia-Nicaragua, Venezuela-Guyana, Colombia-Venezuela, Guatemala-Belize, Peru-Chile, Bolivia-Chile, El Salvador-Honduras, and Panama-the United States. Overlapping Antarctic claims and mineral exploitation rights are also cause for concern and could be discussed when the Antarctic Treaty signatories meet in 1991 to resolve Treaty problems. Will the South Atlantic tragedy of 1982 encourage further forceful resolution or will it serve to remind nations of the disutility of force?

The inter-American system ought to give these territorial disputes the highest policy priority. One way to give peaceful solutions a chance is through the establishment of a permanent inter-American commission to study the territorial problems, be they about jurisdiction on land, sea, or air. The commission would simply have an advisory authority and, accordingly, accumulate the technical data to be made available for statesmen's use. Such an arrangement would also draw from the vast experience of the inter-American community in negotiating solutions to disputes. The Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American Defense College could contribute valuable expertise to the commission. Multilateral discussion of territorial rights, often, can help defuse irrational nationalistic passions before these lead to miscalculations. A distinguished group of statesmen from North and South America in April 1983 recommended freezing boundaries where they are, separating territorial claims from resource exploitation, and urged the admittance of Guyana and Belize into the OAS as a means of enhancing the potential for solving the border problems.⁴³

SUMMARY

The South Atlantic conflict of 1982 was a historical event that for a brief and intense period of time illuminated the landscape of

inter-American relations, laying bare all the imperfections of a system that had been developing problems for some time. The conflict didn't cause the demise of the system. The fact that the system is not particularly robust in 1983 is not due to its response to the conflict. Those causes antedate the conflict. Moreover, US-Latin American relations respond to imperatives that were not in any way diminished by either US or Latin American behavior in response to the events of April 2, 1982.

It is remarkable how rapidly the Malvinas/Falklands affair was superseded in the agenda of inter-American relations after mid-June 1982 by the dominant priority of financing national development. For Argentina and the United Kingdom, it served to confirm the wisdom of seeking closer cooperation with the Latin American community. This strongly suggests that the community of nations overestimated the damage to the inter-American system. Though in hindsight the United States may have committed tactical errors before and after April 2, it reacted quickly and strongly to head off conflict and acted honorably. There is little question that grave errors in strategic calculation were made by the three principals—Argentina, Great Britain, and the United States. However fateful the decision to recover the islands by military force, it was made by the Argentine government. Two errors do not make a right. The United States should not be blamed, however, for the Argentine military defeat nor for the collapse of diplomacy. The only plausible criticism of the US diplomatic effort must be made in the form of a hypothesis. Once having entered the mediation effort and raised expectations so high, the United States should have continued its efforts until the bitter end, rather than hastily retreating from its efforts on April 30. Whether this was possible, given the intransigence in Buenos Aires and London, remains to be seen pending the release of the diplomatic exchanges and a thorough assessment of the domestic political predicaments of the main actors.

The policy lessons of the conflict for the United States and for Latin America are many and complex. The most compelling is the need for clear and unambiguous communication to avoid miscalculation. In the long, often difficult but always ambivalent, relationship between the two major poles of the inter-American community, no other lesson has been learned and unlearned so frequently.

ENDNOTES

1. For the military aspects and lessons learned see, for example: Michael Moodie, "Six Months of Conflict," *The Washington Quarterly*, "Falklands War," pp. 43-51; Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Island, 1982," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Fall, 1982, pp. 196-210; Tony Boam, Major General, "Lessons Learned from the Falklands War," lecture given at the Regional Meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Washington Navy Yard: November 30, 1982. For an Argentine perspective see: Juan E. Gugliamelli, "The Malvinas War: False Political Assumptions Lead to Defeat," *Estrategia*, Vol. 71-72, April-September 1982, pp. 19-90. See also the excellent political-military analysis by John F. Stewart, "The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Cynosure For US-Latin American Relations and Regional Security," Thesis, Inter-American Defense College, Washington: April 1983.

Recent writings on the war include: Peter Calvert, *The Falklands Crisis: The Rights and the Wrongs*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982; Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*, New York: Norton, 1983; Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1983, pp. 5-35; Anthony Parsons, "The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations, 31 March - 14 June 1982," *International Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2, Spring 1983, pp. 169 - 178; Viron P. Vaky, "Inter-American Society: Lessons from the South Atlantic," *Worldview*, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 1983, pp. 17-19. Useful background is by Andrew Hurrell, "The Politics of South Atlantic Security, a Survey of Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization," *International Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2, Spring 1983, pp. 179-194. See also the forthcoming: Harry Summers, "Strategic Lessons Learned: The Falkland Islands Campaign," Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

2. Bernard Norling, "On the State of Nations," *Notre Dame Magazine*, Vol. 11, No. 5, December 1982, p. 67.

3. Cited by the Sunday Times Institute Team in *War in the Falklands: The Full Story*, New York: Harper and Row, 1982.

4. Neal H. Peterson, "Background on the Falkland Island Crisis," *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1982, p. 89. For more background to the sovereignty issue, see Julius Goebel, *The Struggle for the Falklands Islands*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, p.408 (a reprint of the 1927 issue with a new introduction), which vindicates Argentine claims: "The right of the Argentine nation to stand in the place of Spain with reference to the sovereignty over the Falklands was established by the successful revolution, and by the assertion and maintenance of sovereignty over the Falklands as against Spain." See also Jhabvala Farrokh, "Two Hundred Islands of Soledad: International Law of the South Atlantic," *Caribbean Review*, Vol. XI, No. 3, Summer 1982, pp. 8-11, 42-43: (favorable to the British claim). For Argentine views: Bonifacio Del Carril, *The Malvinas Question*, Buenos Aires, EMECE, 1982; Isidoro Jorge Ruis Moreno, *The Right of Sovereignty to the Malvinas Islands and Adjacences of the Argentine Republic*, Buenos Aires: University of Buenos Aires, 1982.

5. On the lease-back proposal and the era of cooperative Argentine-British relations, see: Peter J. Beck, "Cooperation in the Falkland Islands Dispute: The

Anglo-Argentine Search for a Way Forward, 1968-1981," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. 24, February 1982, pp. 37-58; and The Sunday Times Insight Team, pp. 21-30. For the background to these negotiations and the misunderstandings between London and Buenos Aires, see the Sunday Times Insight Team, pp. 21-26.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 26-27.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
11. *Latin American Weekly Report*, April 9, 1982, p. 11.
12. *Ibid.*
13. "Why Argentina Lost the War," *Latin American Weekly Report*, July 16, 1982, p. 2.
14. Adolfo H. Terragno, "Why Does London Want the Islands?" *Clarín*, June 2, 1982, p. 15, cited in Carlos Moneta. "The Malvinas Conflict; Its Role in Argentine Foreign Policy and in the World Context," *Estudios Internacionales*, Vol. XV, No. 60, October-December 1982, p. 378.
15. Moneta, pp. 361-409.
16. Moneta, p. 365. On this point, see also: Oscar Camilión, "Argentine Foreign Policy after the Malvinas Conflict," lecture given at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington: November 8, 1982. On the prevailing Argentine and Western geopolitical views, see Carlos de Meira Mattos, "Strategic Considerations Concerning the Malvinas War from the Viewpoint of the Western Powers and the Latin American Countries, Particularly Those of South America," paper presented at the conference of the Section on Military Studies of the International Studies Association (ISA), "The Future of Conflict and Strategic Responses to the Year 2000," US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: October 20-22, 1982; also at the ISA, Howard T. Pittman, "Geopolitical Projections from the Southern Cone: Implications for Future Conflict;" and Wayne A. Selcher, "Interstate Conflicts in South America's Southern Cone." For an excellent Argentine analysis, see Maria del Carmen Llaver, "The Superpowers and Power Politics in the South Atlantic," *Revista Argentina de Relaciones Internacionales*, Vol. VI, No. 18, September-December 1980, pp. 5-26.
17. Moneta, p. 365.
18. To those considerations Moneta, p. 366, adds the following on the military's views:

To the sketchiness and rigidity of the prevailing ideological concepts, the result of the internalization of the thesis of the 'internal enemy' and the overwhelming doctrinal impact of the North American armed forces about the crusade against the Soviet Union, is added a provincial view of world affairs, which is perhaps explained by the distance from the centers of power, by the relatively marginality of the country with respect to these, and by the lack of political sophistication among major elements of the armed forces, particularly the Army. If indeed there are officers who brilliantly transcend these limitations and who base their concept of the world and the role of Argentina in a more modern democratic, and cosmopolitan framework, they have not been able to, because of various circumstances, exercise a decisive role in this process.

19. *Project of Resolution on the Grave Situation Posed in the South Atlantic.*, Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Relations, April 28, 1982.

20. For an excellent analysis of these various phrases, see: Jack Child, *The Inter-American Peace and Security System after the Malvinas-Falkland Crisis*, paper presented at the conference: "Trade, Investment and Public Policy in Latin America: Trends and Prospects," American Enterprise Institute and Forum das Americas, Washington: September 20, 1982.

21. As examples, see: Antonio Salum-Flecha, "The Hour of Latin America" *ABC*, Asuncion, September 26, 1982, p. 11c; Helio Jaguaribe, "Reflections on the South Atlantic, Latin American and Brazil Face the Disarticulation of the Inter-American System," *Estudios Internacionales*, Vol. XV, No. 60, October-December 1982, pp. 443-461. Jaguaribe's assessment is very pessimistic, advocating in place of the OAS and the Rio Treaty and the "false Inter-American rhetoric, realistic relations that operationalize Latin American solidarity," and the integrated system of defense for South America. Venezuelan ex-President Carlos Andrés Pérez proposed the creation of a Latin American Treaty of Security and Defense. Ecuadorian President Osvaldo Hurtado said that the South Atlantic events "have warned us that our security is precarious and risky, that is why we must revise the systems of collective defense in which we had entrusted our confidence." *El Universal*, Caracas: August 6, 1982, no page given, as cited in Moneta, p. 402.

22. *Speech by the Minister of Foreign Relations of Colombia, Doctor Carlos Lemos Simmonds at the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Relations*, April 27, 1982, p. 3.

23. *Intervention by the Minister of Foreign Relations of Venezuela, Doctor José Alberto Velasco Zambrano, at the Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Relations on the Malvinas Situation*, Washington: April 26, 1982.

24. On the Guyana issue see, Republic of Venezuela, Minister of Exterior Relations, *The Guyana Essequibo Claim: Documents, 1962-1981*, Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1981.

25. On Colombia's territorial question with Nicaragua, see: Gerhard Drekonja Kornat, "The Dispute Between Colombia and Nicaragua," *Foro Internacional*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, October-December, 1982, pp. 133-145; Jorge Olavarria, "We Should, but Can We; Reflections on the Guyanese Proposal to Submit to Judicial Review the Claim to the Essequibo Territory," *Resumen*, September 5, 1982, pp. 7-11. On the Ecuador-Peru question see: Jorge Pérez Concha, *Historical Critical Essay on the Diplomatic Relations of Ecuador with Neighboring States*, 2 Vols., Guayaquil: Banco Central del Ecuador, 1978; Alfonso Barrera Valverde, *Men of Peace at War*, 2 Vols., Salamanca: Gráficas Ortega, 1982; for the Peruvian position see: Exterior Minister of Relations, Peru, *The Border Incident Between Peru and Ecuador in the Cordillera of the Condor*, Lima: 1981.

26. Secretary's Statement, Organization of American States, April 26, 1982, *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1982, p. 85.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

28. "Speech of Chancellor Saraiva Guerreiro in the Federal Senate," in *Diary of National Congress*, May 6, 1982, p. 1393, as cited in Celso Lafer, "Brazilian Foreign Policy and the South Atlantic Crisis: An Assessment," *Estudios Internacionales*, Vol. XV, No. 60, October-December 1982, pp. 468-469.

29. See also the comments in Child, appendix.
30. For a Colombian viewpoint of the impact of the conflict on Britain's interests in Latin America, see: Germán Santamaría, "England After the Malvinas: In Search of an America Lost," *El Tiempo*, Bogota: p. B-7, November 14, 1982.
31. On this point see "Thatcher's Little Helper," *Latin American Weekly Report*, June 25, 1982, p. 8.
32. "The Names of the Defeat," *ABC*, Asuncion: December 1982, p. 8.
33. Nicholas Henderson, "The Falklands Dilemma," *The Washington Post*, January 23, 1983, p. C-7.
34. Peter Osnos, "Thatcher is Disappointed by US Vote on Falklands," *The Washington Post*, November 6, 1983, p. A-19. In the nonbinding resolution, 90 nations voted in favor, 51 abstained, and 12 opposed it.
35. Anthony Barnett, "Iron Britannia," special number of *New Left Review*, No. 134, July-August 1982, p. 73. Englishman Barnett provides a bitter attack against his government's reaction to the dispute and conflict. As an example, he argues that it was hypocritical of the House of Commons to come to the defense of the self-determination of 1,800, when both Labor and Conservative parties had approved the removal of 1,200 Diego Garcia islanders to Mauritius in order to facilitate the construction of an American military base. The former inhabitants of Diego Garcia were paid an indemnity of 4 million English pounds for their confiscated homes.
36. The Peruvian plan proposed by President Fernando Belaúnde Terry contained the following provisions:
- a. Immediate cessation of hostilities;
 - b. Mutual withdrawal of armed forces;
 - c. Installation of representatives of countries other than the parties involved in the conflict to govern the islands temporarily;
 - d. The British and Argentine governments would recognize the existence of differing and conflicting claims over the islands;
 - e. The two governments would recognize that the viewpoint and interests of the islanders must be taken into account in seeking a peaceful solution to the problem. (This clause was modified, replacing "viewpoint" with the word "aspirations," and "seeking a peaceful" with the definitive.)
- As reported in *Latin America Weekly Report*, May 21, 1982, p. 9.
37. For an analysis of the importance of these institutions, see Jack Child, *Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978*, Boulder: Westview, 1980; Gabriel Marcella, "Military Relations Between the United States and Latin America, Crisis and Future Questions," *Estudios Internacionales*, Vol. XIII, No. 51, July-September 1980, pp. 382-400; César Sereseres, "Inter-American Security Relations: The Future of U.S. Military Diplomacy in the Hemisphere," *Parameters*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1977.
38. On this aspect see my recent "Security Assistance Revisited: How to Win Friends and Not Lose Influence," *Parameters*, Vol. XII, No. 4, December 1982, pp. 43-52.
39. US Congress, House, Subcommittee of Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Prepared Statement of Mario F. del Carril, Argentine Journalist," Hearings, House of Representatives, Ninety Seventh Congress, Second Session, July 20, 1982, pp 71-72.

40. Alejandro Orfila, "Latin America and the United States: Permanent Compromise or Temporary Disagreement?" Speech given to the Foreign Policy Association, New York: July 22, 1982, p. C-7.

41. For an excellent analysis of Brazil's naval situation see: Domingos P. C. Branco Ferreira, *The Navy of Brazil: An Emerging Power at Sea*, Washington: National Defense University, 1983.

42. This is already happening as the Reagan Administration has adopted a more pragmatic approach to arms sales to Latin America, as it attempts to regain access.

43. Article eight of the OAS prohibits admittance to a state with territorial differences with a member state. For the specifics of these recommendation see: *The Americas at a Crossroads*, Report of the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington: Wilson Center, 1983, pp. 49-50, 56-57.