The Politics of Arms Control and the Strategic Balance,
Abstract
This paper critiques the Carter Administration's strategy for managing the domestic politics of its arms control efforts. It maintains that the Carter Administration made a series of political misjudgements and mistakes, largely prior to the June 1979 signing of SALT II, which undermined congressional and public confidence in the executive branch's stewardship of strategic issues and significantly hurt the treaty's chances for ratification. The author suggests for the Reagan Administration seven lessons learned from the Carter-SALT II experiences. 1) Persuading the Senate to ratify a new SALT agreement will require the direct, continuous, and active participation of the President. 2) Persuading Congress to approve a new SALT agreement must be viewed early on by the President and his administration as a major political campaign. 3) Future SALT agreements must be positively presented as reducing the level of armaments on both sides, rather than merely capping them at relatively high levels. 4) The administration should have its most trusted political professionals continuously and intimately involved in managing the politics of strategic arms control. 5) One senior official should coordinate the political effort. 6) The administration must be clear about the linkage between strategic arms control and the overall context of U.S.-Soviet relations. 7) The administration will have to plan and implement an effective strategy to deal with the legislative branch.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1982
- Accession Number
- ADA142288
Entities
People
- A. Platt
Organizations
- RAND Corporation