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
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
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THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE:
A EUROPEAN PERCEPTION

COLONEL ABRAHAM VAN DER BEEK
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This essay describes the European perception of NATO as a whole and the European perspectives on the nuclear and conventional aspects of the defense of Europe. The distinction between nuclear and conventional defense demonstrates the European perspective. Important aspects of the role of Europe in NATO in relation to the position and interests of the United States are discussed. Misunderstandings exist in this relationship on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, which in turn render limitations upon Europe in its efforts to reinforce the European pillar of NATO.

The essay concludes with a short and long term outlook on the future of NATO. Three subjects directly related to the future of the defense of Europe and of NATO are presented. These are:

- Alternatives to the defense of Europe
- Implications of new technological developments
- Improvement of conventional capabilities.

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THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE : A EUROPEAN PERCEPTION

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ABSTRACT

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Since its foundation in 1949 NATO has achieved remarkable success: the prevention of war with the Warsaw Pact. However, the continuation of relative peace in Europe is not assured. One of the present, disturbing developments is the decline of the cohesiveness of the Alliance. Different perspectives on the defense of Europe in the United States and in the European countries are the main cause for this decline and are not well understood.

This essay describes the European perception of NATO as a whole and the European perspectives on the nuclear and conventional aspects of the defense of Europe. The distinction between nuclear and conventional defense demonstrates the European perspective. Important aspects of the role of Europe in NATO in relation to the position and interests of the United States are discussed. Misunderstandings exist in this relationship on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, which in turn render limitations upon Europe in its efforts to reinforce the European pillar of NATO.

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INTRODUCTION

It is appropriate to note at the very beginning, that the present, sometimes intense, discussions on NATO obscure the very successful accomplishment of NATO's main task: to prevent war. Since the foundation of NATO in 1949, there has not been a direct, armed conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. This result is remarkable if one takes into account the frequency of wars in European history and the current, substantial threat to NATO. The public tends to forget this achievement in the heat of the discussions; it may be because 35 years is a long period of time.

However, it should be emphasized that the continuation of relative peace is not self-evident. The cohesion of NATO is threatened by increasing tensions of the Alliance itself. The political unification of Western Europe is fragmenting, while at the same time severe economic problems evoke a revival of nationalism. The current nuclear debate tends to further erode public support for NATO as a whole. All of this divisiveness occurs against a background of a gradual but consistent, unfavourable shift in the strength relationship between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

It is therefore, I think, necessary to improve the cohesiveness within the Alliance, to strengthen its capabilities and at the same time to consider its direction for the future. This paper is provided as a minor contribution to these objectives.

Consequently, I want to discuss the following aspects of the defense of Europe:

- . European perspectives of NATO and its strategy
- . Europe's role in NATO
- . The future of NATO.

The opinions expressed are personal, unless otherwise stated. Therefore, they do not necessarily represent the actual position of my government.

NATO: A EUROPEAN PERCEPTION

In order to understand the European perspective on the defense of Europe, one has to understand the European view of NATO as a whole. To some degree I am reluctant to use generalized terms such as European perspectives and European views. Perceptions in Europe on security policies differ, depending on the country you are dealing with or the people in whose countries you are talking. Fortunately, this is not unlike the differences of opinion on these subjects within the United States itself.

Since 1967 NATO's security policy has been based on the Harmel Report. People in Europe expect from NATO the successful implementation of the strategy described in this report. This strategy has two pillars: one part of the strategy is to maintain adequate military strength in the Alliance to ensure its defensive capability and to deter any attack on a member state or any political blackmail. The second part is detente, a word that seems to have different meanings to Americans and Europeans. In the European view,

the policy of a balance of power must continue to be supplemented by detente: in other words, 'readiness for dialogue, negotiations and cooperation on equal terms with the East, with the aim of keeping a check on the East-West conflict in reducing tensions'. 1)

Europeans expect NATO to prevent another war and to reduce tensions in Europe. Two World Wars were necessary to definitely eliminate the interest in a third one. For many Europeans the classic objectives of war, as formulated for example by von Clausewitz, no longer have any value. For them NATO is an instrument to deter war, not to fight another one. They recognize that any major war in Europe -conventional or nuclear- would be catastrophic and would bring devastating losses.

So, when a European is asked to give his opinion about the defense of Europe he would change the word defense to deterrence and approach the subject from a wider angle, including the detente pillar of NATO's strategy in his considerations. Americans - and please remember my remark on the inaccuracy of generalizations - tend more to focus on the military-strategic pillar of NATO's strategy, maybe because they are disappointed over the outcome of detente in the seventies. In doing so, Americans think of deterrence too, but as much or even more, of how to defeat a Soviet attack if deterrence fails.

The debate about the distinction between deterrence and defense often has a rather theoretical character. However, the distinction is important. For example, when discussing conventional capabilities, it is often said that a stronger conventional defense is consistent with a greater deterrence. To some degree, this statement

is true. One should recognize however that conventional forces hardly add anything to a specific form of deterrence: deterrence by retaliation against valued assets of the aggressor. This kind of deterrence has always played an important role in NATO and will continue to do so. This retaliatory capability is provided to NATO by the nuclear weapon. Conventional forces cannot deter the enemy use of nuclear weapons and thus have limited deterrence value. 2)

A perception of NATO is indissolubly linked with the perception of the Soviet threat. On this subject too, Europeans have a different perspective than do Americans. The difference is a matter of scale. Perspectives on the general trends are the same. Americans are very worried by the extensive conventional build-up of Soviet forces. The Europeans are worried too. For example, a White Paper on National Security by the Government of the Netherlands, published in December 1983, concludes: ". . . The Warsaw Pact forces have not only been reinforced considerably from a qualitative point of view, but especially in a quantitative sense. Mobility and firepower per unit have considerably increased, and communications and command and control have continuously improved". 3)

However, Europeans perceive the conventional threat to be less dangerous than Americans do, which does not necessarily mean that Europeans are less serious on the subject of national security.

The most important reason for this difference in perception of the threat can be found in the before mentioned fact that most Europeans see NATO as successful only if war is deterred where as Americans, though also desirous of deterrence, would view NATO as

equally successful if capable of defeating the Soviets in case of an attack. The objective of deterrence is perceived to be achieved if a rapid victory in Europe can be denied to the Soviets. A rapid victory is, in the opinion of the Europeans, an imperative for success of the Soviet-Union. If the Soviets do not achieve this objective, they will run into all kinds of trouble. For example, NATO then gets a chance to deploy reinforcements, which cannot be made available in case of a rapid advance of the Warsaw Pact forces. Also, the more protracted the conflict, the greater the chance of a destabilizing crisis in the Soviet rear area. 4) It is obvious that American strategists demand more than just the denial of a rapid victory. American strategy seeks a victory at any point on the conflict spectrum and therefore leads to a more pessimistic assessment of the threat and the related strain on the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Another aspect is that Europeans do not regard the Soviets to be ten feet tall. They point at the limitations Soviet military leaders have to deal with, like the highly pre-planned and rigid nature of Soviet offensive operations, the dependence on an uninterrupted flow of forces and the need to concentrate dispersed forces to effect breakthroughs, thereby offering potential high-value targets to NATO conventional and nuclear firepower. 5)

On the other hand, Europeans are very concerned about the simultaneous, impressive improvements of the Soviet nuclear forces. The deployment of the SS-20's, mostly aimed at targets in Western Europe, causes a lot of Europeans alarm. Moreover, there is, as I will discuss further on, a growing fear of nuclear weapons as such. This fear reinforces the concerns about the Soviet nuclear threat.

The nuclear issue presently dominates the discussions in Europe and tends to force the conventional threat into the background.

So, because of different starting-points, it seems inevitable that the perspectives of Europeans and Americans on the defense of Europe differ. In the next paragraphs I want to analyze some of these differences. In this analysis I will make a distinction between the nuclear and conventional elements of the defense of Europe. Of course, these elements are closely linked together. Therefore, a separate consideration of each of them is not without risk. I realize this quite well. However, as will be explained further on, most Europeans distinguish clearly between the nuclear and conventional aspects of the defense of Europe. The distinction also facilitates a clear consideration of the subject.

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The primary objective of NATO's strategy is to deter war. If deterrence fails, the objectives of NATO forces will be to preserve or to restore the integrity of NATO countries' territory and to terminate the conflict at the lowest possible level of violence.

The strategy envisions three possible responses to aggression:

- (1) Direct defense with the objective of defeating an attack or placing the burden of escalation on the enemy.
- (2) Deliberate escalation on NATO's part, to include escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.
- (3) The general nuclear response : 'the ultimate guarantor of our

deterrence' . 6)

A major starting-point of this strategy of flexible response is the assumption that an optimum deterrent efficiency exists, when the threatened response is in proportion to the provocation and hence is believed by the potential aggressor to be likely, and even inevitable.

Nuclear weapons have played and still play a very important role in NATO by creating a credible deterrent. One important reason for this is that the NATO countries were not able or willing to raise large standing conventional forces. An example of this can be found in the history of the Lisbon-goals, formulated in 1952. These goals asked for 96 divisions for Western-Europe as a whole, and were not met at all. By accepting this deficiency NATO had to rely more heavily on its nuclear deterrent.

Even if large conventional forces were available, nuclear weapons would still be necessary in considerable numbers to achieve a credible deterrent. However, NATO could then be less dependent on them. The necessity of nuclear weapons is caused by the nature of the threat. The opponent has the obvious capability to use nuclear weapons from the outset of a conflict or in a later phase of that conflict. As stated before, strong conventional forces alone cannot effectively deter the enemy's use of nuclear weapons. Without nuclear weapons NATO's options are so limited that the opponent is given an opportunity to achieve its objectives by the use or even the threat of the use of military force.

It should also be noted that nuclear weapons add an essential characteristic to the NATO strategy, namely that the enemy is

uncertain as to how NATO will react in a specific situation. This uncertainty reinforces the deterrence's efficiency.

If deterrence fails, and if an enemy attack cannot be stopped, so that NATO's conventional defense system finds itself in danger of losing its cohesiveness, the capability and will must exist to escalate in a controlled way to the use of nuclear weapons. The same is true if the enemy starts using nuclear weapons. It is consistent within the context of NATO's strategy of flexible response to have various nuclear options available as a possible answer.

Despite the indispensable contribution of nuclear weapons to the success of NATO, more and more people in Europe are concerned about the emphasis on nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy. These concerns range from an uneasiness over the lack of flexibility in NATO's strategy to a straight forward aversion to nuclear weapons as such. Concerns are explicitly expressed by a number of governments and political parties in Europe. The position of my government on this subject can be stated as follows: "The Netherlands will support an active policy on arms control, especially aimed at the decrease of the dependence on nuclear weapons. This decrease has to be concretely expressed in the consultation within the Alliance on the building up of the defense system." 7)

One should remember that some initiatives have been taken by NATO to respond to these concerns. In 1981 NATO withdrew 1000 nuclear weapons from Europe. In October 1983 in Montebello it was decided to withdraw another 1400 nuclear weapons in the near future. A number of programs and initiatives have also been introduced to improve the

conventional capabilities of NATO.

However, under the present conditions, the possibilities to decrease the emphasis on nuclear weapons are rather small.

The first reason for this is to be found in the limitations which are in force in Western Europe on the improvement of the conventional strength of NATO. Generally, a stronger conventional force would give NATO the opportunity to depend less on its nuclear forces. These limitations will be discussed later on.

The second reason a decrease of the role of nuclear weapons is not so likely in the near future, is because of the build-up of nuclear forces in the Soviet Union. Unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union, by neglecting to respond or by reducing the number of nuclear weapons, are highly undesirable and could jeopardize the effectiveness of NATO's deterrent posture because of the loss of credibility.

Accepting that nuclear weapons are indispensable in NATO, and realizing that the role of these weapons in NATO's strategy cannot be played down easily, other European concerns exist.

NATO's strategy is only effective if the linkage between the different steps of the escalation ladder is guaranteed, making a controlled escalation possible. Europeans are worried about this guarantee, because they realize quite well that they do not make the ultimate decision to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the geopolitical situation of Western Europe and the United States differs very much. There is fear in Europe that a conflict between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries would be fought exclusively on Western European soil without the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States being directly involved. This would happen, if the last step in the escalation process - the launching of the strategic systems - is not made. From the United States' perspective it is at least tempting to think in terms of limited wars, limited in the sense that they do not extend to the homeland of the United States itself. The lecture by Mr. Kissinger given in Brussels in September 1979, in which he expressed his doubts about the willingness of the United States to launch its strategic systems in a conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, has not been forgotten in Europe.

Europeans are very aware of a potential linkage problem. When Helmut Schmidt put forward in 1979 the idea of a NATO initiative to respond to the increasing threat of the SS-20's, one of his concerns was to restore in a new situation the linkage between theater nuclear weapons and the strategic systems in the United States. So to be clear: Europeans mean by escalation in the context of the strategy of flexible response, the capability and will to deliberately escalate up to the level of American central strategic systems: 'the ultimate guarantor'.

Another potential difference in perception lies in the fact that the escalation to the use of nuclear weapons is of strategic significance to Europeans, even if it concerns the limited use of nuclear weapons belonging to the so called Short Range Nuclear Forces (SRNF). Reasons for this are the resulting, likely escalation to other, heavier theater nuclear weapons and eventually to the strategic

systems and the great impact even SRNF weapons have in the densely populated areas in the Federal Republic of Germany. Europeans do not look at theater nuclear weapons as just another form of firepower, to be used for achieving tactical objectives. These weapons are regarded as a capability by which NATO can deliberately escalate to a higher level of violence. The only purpose of such an escalation is to restore the deterrent perception of the Soviets in a given situation in order to terminate the conflict and to prevent a general nuclear war. This means that an escalation step like the first use of nuclear weapons should be well defined and recognized as such. It is for this reason that Europeans make a clear distinction between a conventional phase of a conflict and a subsequent nuclear phase. Military, operational doctrines that blur this distinction, are certain to be received with great resistance. I make this point because the kind of thinking, which looks at nuclear firepower as just another form of firepower, sometimes comes up for example when discussing the deep battle feature of the AirLand Battle doctrine.

SOME PERSONAL NOTES ON THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

At this point I would like to insert some personal notes. 'Thinking the unthinkable' is impossible. Nevertheless, I believe that certainly after the deployment of the Longer Range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (LRINF) in Europe, the linkage through all the steps of escalation is guaranteed. I want to mention two arguments to support this statement:

- (1) The presence of 7th US Army in Europe, including its

nuclear systems, is a very important element in the linkage of the security of Western Europe to the security of the United States. As long as these troops stay in Europe, they form the most convincing living symbol of the guarantees by the United States to their commitment to Europe.

(2) I think that the political cohesion within the Alliance is still sufficiently strong that both the United States and Western Europe will respond to an enemy attack in a unified way. This is true because their economic, cultural, social and security interests are greatly intermingled. This political cohesion will be reinforced by the deployment of the LRINF in Europe, because of the strategic threat of these forces to the Soviet Union.

Having said that, a second note should be made. I find it very difficult to visualize how the use of nuclear weapons can be limited to the level of so-called tactical nuclear weapons. Once the first nuclear weapons have been fired the uncontrolled escalation to the level of the American and Russian central systems seems inevitable. I do not mean by 'uncontrolled' that military commanders on their own authority launch additional nuclear weapons, thereby escalating the conflict to a higher level of violence. I mean that the political leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union will probably be forced to escalate quickly from one step to the next one, because the political and strategic situation would quickly deteriorate after the first nuclear weapons have been fired.

If this assumption is true, the escalation process within the strategy of flexible response moves, after the first use of nuclear

weapons, from a controlled process to an uncontrolled one. This would mean at least two things:

(1) The fear of the Europeans that a war would be limited to Western Europe is not justified; however for other reasons than those sometimes perceived. Beyond the conventional level of NATO's strategy, the strategy seems less flexible than is hoped for.

(2) At the same time the enormous danger related to the outbreak of a conflict in Europe is obvious. If deterrence in NATO fails, the world is in deep trouble. A general nuclear war seems inevitable.

This overview would not be complete without reference to the modernization of the LRINF in Europe. Given the uninterrupted build-up of the SS-20's, something had to be done by NATO. To accept an unconstrained increase of nuclear power by the Soviet Union would have been a severe blow to the political and military credibility of NATO.

Unfortunately, although predictably, the issue of modernization of the LRINF has become a testcase for NATO, drawing attention again almost exclusively to the nuclear aspects of NATO's strategy. Certainly in Europe emotions ran high and they still do. Although the modernization has finally begun, one cannot deny the discussions are hurting NATO, at least in the area of public support for the nuclear strategy. It is impossible to assess what the effects will be in the longer term. At the moment, however, the populations, including the political parties representing them, are very divided on this subject.

Going back to Helmut Schmidt's speech in 1977, he said among other things : ". . . . It is of vital interest to us all that the negotiations between the two superpowers on the limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic weapons should continue and lead to a lasting agreement. The nuclear powers have a special, an overwhelming responsibility in this field. On the other hand, we in Europe must be particularly careful to ensure that these negotiations do not neglect the components of NATO's deterrence strategy. We are all faced with the dilemma of having to meet the moral and political demand for arms limitation while at the same time maintaining a fully effective deterrent to war." 8) It is often forgotten that Schmidt mentioned in his speech the need to pursue arms control of the nuclear forces as well as the need to modernize them. One has to understand that arms control, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, is an absolute condition for maintaining a substantial public support in Europe to the modernization process itself and to NATO as a whole.

Of course, to ensure public support is not the only and indeed not even the most important argument for the support of both tracks of the December 1979 decision. To secure the long term safety of this world, it is absolutely necessary to halt the arms race and to establish a military equilibrium at the lowest possible level. The only way to achieve this is via negotiations resulting in verifiable arms limitations and reductions.

As far as the modernization of the LRINF is concerned, the position of the Netherlands is as follows: My government has accepted the NATO-decision of December 1979 with the proviso that the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands will be dependent on

the outcome of the INF-negotiations in Geneva. Meanwhile, preparations for an eventual deployment continue to proceed in so far as they concern certain planning-activities. The deployment base has been assigned. According to the actual time schedule a final decision must be made by June 1984.

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

There are three mainstreams in European thinking on the conventional defense of Europe. They can be summarized very easily: a minority of the Europeans believe we do too much; a rather large group thinks the conventional force for defense of Europe is strong enough; a third group, a minority but growing in numbers, believes we should do more. To be complete: there is a fourth group with only a few followers in Europe, but well represented in the United States, that believes that the conventional defense capabilities of NATO in Europe are definitely insufficient and that these capabilities should be much stronger.

The arguments of the first group are not very interesting from the intellectual point of view. Their representatives are against the presence of nuclear weapons in NATO's inventories and they do not see the need for a substantive conventional capability either. This group denies the threat or believes that traditional military answers to the threat are the wrong approach. Ideas like 'social defense' arise from this mainstream. Many representatives have a strong pacifist attitude. Some subgroups are well organized and, like one group in the Netherlands, use violence (something of a dichotomy) against the

armed forces. One should not identify the entire peace movement with this particular philosophy, although there is some intermingling taking place. The primary objective of the organized peace movement in the Netherlands is to get rid of the nuclear arsenal (if necessary unilaterally), not necessarily the conventional capabilities.

The second group is generally reasonably happy with the effectiveness of NATO. Their representatives point to the long period of NATO's success, they perceive the chance that the Soviets will attack as being very low, and argue that NATO has already substantially improved its conventional capabilities. This group believes that NATO's conventional capabilities are strong enough to deny the Warsaw Pact a rapid victory in Europe. They, of course, attach great value to the nuclear deterrent of NATO and probably do not mind if the Soviets perceive that NATO will be forced to a quick escalation to the use of nuclear weapons in case of a full scale Soviet attack. These Europeans perceive the nuclear guarantee by the United States still to be credible, which means to them that, if deterrence fails and if other means do not have the expected impact, the United States is prepared to launch their central strategic systems. In the opinion of these Europeans a strong increase of NATO's conventional capabilities would have an adverse effect on this credibility because it would evoke the thought that a conflict in Europe could be limited to the conventional level of violence and therefore could be limited to Western European soil. Lastly, financial arguments play a certain role in the considerations of this group because to them there is no need to increase defense budgets. I would like to point out, however, that this latter argument is not

the only, and often not the most important one, aligned against increasing defense budgets.

The third group in European thinking is worried about the present conventional capabilities. Although they do not believe the probability of a Soviet attack at the moment to be high, and although they agree with the argument that the conventional leg of the NATO-triad does not have to be stronger than to deny the Soviets a rapid victory, they are worried about the risk-level NATO presently has to accept. So, these Europeans want to improve the conventional capabilities of NATO to achieve greater crisis stability and lower the current risk-level. By augmenting NATO's conventional capabilities, they believe they would raise the nuclear threshold and escape from an early-use of nuclear weapons. It might be they are worried about the validity of the nuclear guarantee of the United States.

This third group however, does not necessarily go along with some Americans that NATO's conventional capabilities are definitely insufficient and that therefore defense budgets must be increased dramatically to create a more favorable situation. These Europeans, again, do want a conventional capability which assures the implementation of the deterrent strategy of NATO in the context of the strategy of flexible response. They do not want a capability which matches Soviet strength on an almost one-to-one basis and seeks a successful conventional defense against any Soviet attack.

As I mentioned before, this last group of Europeans, although still being a minority, is growing in numbers. Many of the arguments mentioned above can be found in official statements, like the 1983

White Paper of my government. My own position is generally consistent with the opinions of this third group.

Some experts argue that, given the efforts already made, a yearly real increase in the defense budgets of about 4% per annum is necessary to obtain the necessary conventional capability previously mentioned. 9) Most European countries, like mine, presently do not meet the 3% guideline of NATO, due in some part to present economic problems, but also because public opinion is focused very much on the nuclear issue. A further increase of the defense budget is a very sensitive subject in a number of NATO countries, to include mine.

The analysis of the present conventional balance in Europe as expressed by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concludes: "Our conclusion remains that the overall balance continues to be such as to make military aggression a highly risky undertaking. Though tactical redeployments could certainly provide a local advantage in numbers sufficient to allow an attacker to believe that he might achieve limited success, there would still appear to be insufficient overall strength on either side to guarantee victory. The consequences for an attacker would be unpredictable, and the risks, particularly of nuclear escalation, incalculable". 10)

Gen. Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, states: "I am firmly convinced that NATO's military situation, although unfavorable, is not yet unmanageable or beyond restoration if we resolve to act before it is too late". 11)

Given these statements and taking into account what has already been achieved in NATO, I do not believe there is reason for panic at the moment. If, however, the Soviet-Union continues its

build-up of conventional forces in the same way as it has done in the past (which means continuing to spend 13 % of the Gross National Product on defense, despite the consequences this has for its society), further drastic improvements are necessary. Further on I will discuss which actions NATO could take.

From the foregoing can be derived why, as has been stated before, under the present conditions the improvement in the conventional strength of NATO can contribute to a decrease in emphasis on nuclear weapons in only a limited way. At the moment the defense expenditures in the NATO countries are already high. It is very difficult to get general support in Western Europe for further, large increases. Secondly, part of the improvement is offset by the extraordinary build up of conventional forces in the Soviet Union. This is true even if we take into account that NATO, due to its defensive posture, does not need to match the Warsaw Pact forces on a one-to-one basis.

There is a third and very important argument. From the Western European point of view there is a reluctance to create a conventional force so strong that a nightmare looms of yet another conventional battlefield of World War II dimensions in Western Europe, should deterrence fail. This may be perceived as a paradox. What is meant to the Western Europeans is that a direct defense posture with very strong conventional forces resulting in prolonged conventional campaigns, extensively destroying densely populated areas in Western Europe, is unacceptable.

Notwithstanding the limitations previously mentioned, a strong

conventional capability is necessary to adequately respond to a conventional attack without being forced to use nuclear weapons in an early phase of the conflict.

THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF NATO

The key to the success of the Atlantic Alliance has been, and still is, that the bridge over the Atlantic Ocean has not been too long. In other words, despite the differences in perspective, the common understanding that the security interests of the United States of America, Canada and the European NATO-countries can only be safeguarded by the Alliance, holds the Alliance together. Unfortunately, the present discussions within NATO seem to split the members of NATO so deeply, that one sometimes wonders how long the Atlantic Alliance can survive. A major subject in these discussions concerns the sharing of the defense burden between the United States and Western-Europe.

I think that the debate on burdensharing is hampered by a number of misunderstandings. I do not want to mitigate the consequences of these misunderstandings. However, it is important to recognize distorted perceptions as such. The first misunderstanding is the thought that Europe's security is not of vital interest to the United States. This thought seems to gain increasing support in the United States. It leads to statements like: 'Europeans should take care of their own defense'.

Let me bring forward some arguments why I believe this statement to be misleading and a misunderstanding. First, if the

industrial potential and human energies of Western-Europe were to fall under Soviet control, this would tremendously enhance Soviet economic and military capabilities. The United States would, I believe, still quite understandably want to head off such an accretion of power to Moscow.

Second, due to the Marshall-plan and the former successes of the European Community, Western Europe has become the dominant world trading partner, having a share of 40% of the total world trade. It is in the vital interest of the United States to have free and unhampered access to Western Europe.

Beside these broad politico-economic considerations, there are some other arguments of strategic military importance. Without its allies in Europe, and that applies of course to the allies in other parts of the world too, it would be much more difficult for the United States to counter the Soviet Union in a strategic military sense. The allies contribute substantially to the defense of the free world. In addition to that, and this is not meant to be an unkind remark, one is better off defending his own home in someone else's backyard.

Maybe the most important argument why America's interests in the security of Western Europe are beyond doubt, is more psychological in nature. George H. Quester explains this phenomena in his article "The future of the American NATO commitment". Europe is the mother continent for most Americans, in terms of genetic heritage. More important, Europe is the place from which the Americans have drawn their culture and philosophy and the ideas about political freedom and democratic elections. There are no more than twenty-five countries in the world where free election systems still function, and the bulk of

these countries are in Europe. To cite Quester: 'While it is reasonable to ask about the durability of our commitments to NATO, it is misleading to presume that such commitments are somehow "abnormal". The NATO commitment is much more truly in the "fifty-first state" category. 12)

My conclusion is that the United States' interests in the security of Western Europe are beyond discussion. The foundation of the Atlantic Alliance certainly marked a major change in the foreign policy of the United States. It has been a change not only caused by sincere concern for the security of the democracies in Western Europe, but also brought about by reasons of self-interest. That was true in 1949; the arguments are still valid in 1984. Proposals like the idea of withdrawing American soldiers from Europe could damage, if executed, the security of Europe as well as the interests of the United States itself.

The second argument underscoring American misunderstanding is the assumption that Europe's defensive efforts are far below its capabilities and obligations in comparison to the defensive efforts of the United States. My government pays a lot of attention to this subject in the just published White Book on defense. It says among other things: 'In American Congress and in public opinion in the United States a distorted picture sometimes exists concerning the real defense efforts on this side of the Atlantic Ocean.' 13) Europe's share of overall Western defense expenditures (not only those in NATO) has increased from 21 to 42 percent between 1969 and 1980. The share accounted for by the United States decreased to 56 percent in the same period. 14) Of the active forces in Europe, the European allies

provide 90% of the landforces, 80% of the tanks and 80% of the combat planes. Of the warships operating in the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas 70% are European. 15) Mr. Weinberger concluded in a report to the United States Congress of March 1982 concerning the Allied Contributions to the Common Defense that 'the non-US NATO allies in aggregate appear to be shouldering roughly their fair share of the NATO defense effort.' 16) Robert Art concludes in a very detailed article on this subject: 'The ultimate truth on the matter very well may be this: the United States pays the lion's share of NATO defense because it has the largest economy of the NATO allies, but proportionately, measured by the defense dollars as a percentage of GNP devoted to NATO's defense, the Europeans and Americans are roughly equal. Absolutely, America dominates. Relatively, she does not.' 17)

To me, it seems very difficult to define a fair share in NATO's total defense efforts. Nevertheless, if there is a gap between Europe's present contribution and its expected share in the common defense, it is likely not as great as is sometimes perceived.

The third misunderstanding relative to burdensharing is the attitude by some Europeans of taking United States' contribution to Europe's defense for granted. These Europeans should read the American papers and learn that in the United States isolationism is always a dormant danger. They should also realize that since World War II Europe has developed with generous support of the United States from a devastated and exhausted continent to one of the world's greatest economic powers. It is very difficult to explain to Americans why some countries in Europe, including the Netherlands, are not able to meet the yearly 3% increase in defense budgets, as has been agreed on

in NATO.

One can regret the existence of these misunderstandings, but they are a real fact of life. To keep the Alliance alive, it is essential to reinforce the European pillar of NATO. This can be achieved by enlarging the political and military cooperation between the European NATO countries. This would probably lead to a more positive appreciation of the Alliance in some circles in the United States, because of the demonstrated determination to take the defense of Europe serious. Some progress has been made. I refer to the existence of EUROGROUP, a formal organization, in which the European NATO countries work together on subjects like long term defense planning, training, etc.. A further improvement could be achieved, if the European Political Cooperation (EPC), an informal consultation body within the European Community, paid more attention to the political aspects of specific security matters. My government is a supporter of such an approach. 18) Another important step would be if the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) achieved a better cooperation between the European NATO countries as far as the development, procurement and production of equipment are concerned.

A positive impact of a reinforcement of the European pillar in Nato depends very much on developments within the European Community. It is necessary that the present deadlock in the Community on the financial contributions by the United Kingdom and on the agricultural policy be solved. I think it will. The Europeans realize quite well that there is no alternative to greater European unity. However, the problem is how to overcome some very serious structural imbalances in the present economic situation within the Community.

A reinforcement of the European pillar in NATO should not threaten the primacy of Atlantic cooperation in those areas where the security of Europe is indissolubly linked to an Alliance with the United States. Given the Soviet threat, the continued existence of the Atlantic Alliance is vital to all member countries. Europe alone will not be capable of deterring effectively a Soviet attack in the foreseeable future. The United States alone cannot bear the defensive burden either. Therefore, Europe, organized as an independent third power beside the United States and the Soviet Union, does not represent an approach that will survive.

Another very important aspect of the European pillar is the possible sharing of responsibility for nuclear deterrence in the Alliance. This brings me to the subject of a European Nuclear Force. The thought behind this force is to give Western Europe a nuclear role within the Atlantic Alliance, one that fortifies the European pillar in NATO. This force has to be controlled by the European countries in NATO and is thus envisioned as a nuclear force in addition to the nuclear forces of the United States.

Under the present conditions the establishment of a European Nuclear Force is not feasible. There are several reasons for this:

(1) Probably the most important reason is that the political unification of Western Europe is far from being realized. As long as that process is unsuccessful there is no acceptable authority present to control a European Nuclear Force. The EUROGROUP organisation is because of its rather informal nature inadequate for this purpose.

(2) Even if there were some kind of authority established,

important control problems still would likely exist. Consider the situation where, at the crucial moment, the decision making body voted to launch nuclear systems with six votes in favor, four against and one abstaining. Of course, this situation is unworkable. It would be equally difficult to get, for example, the smaller countries to delegate their authority to the greater ones. In a word, introducing a European Nuclear Force is only possible if all the countries concerned give up a substantial part of their sovereignty. It is obvious that we still have to go a long way before that is likely.

(3) There is great fear in Europe that the establishment of a European Nuclear Force will damage relations with the United States and will result in a split or even the end of the Alliance. This is one reason why a force like this has very little public support. A number of countries - among them certainly the Federal Republic of Germany and my country - are simply not prepared at the moment to change the American guarantee of their security for a dubious European one, a view which I personally whole-heartedly support.

(4) A last argument is that such a force would cost a lot of money, which would in turn be detrimental to the improvement of conventional forces.

A next, logical question is whether a separate European Nuclear Force would augment the deterrence of NATO as a whole. Opinions on this differ greatly, just as they do on the value of the British and French Nuclear Forces. Due to great technological improvements, even a small nuclear force has tremendous potential power. As such it certainly has a deterrent capability. On the other

hand these 'third forces' complicate the balance of terror. I think that the existence of a European Nuclear Force increases the danger of miscalculation by the Soviet Union. Therefore, in my opinion, the formation of a force like this is destabilizing, rather than an improvement in deterrence.

Having said this, two possible developments will nevertheless rekindle the debate. First, the subject will arise again the moment there exists a widespread feeling in Europe that the United States' guarantee for the security of Europe (including the use of the 'ultimate guarantor') is no longer credible. As said before, a development like this is neither in the interests of Europe nor of the United States.

Secondly, it will again become a topic if new initiatives give rise to a new round of debate over the unification of Europe.

THE FUTURE OF NATO

Before I draw some final conclusions on the future of NATO, I would like to discuss three subjects, which are directly related to the future of NATO. These subjects are:

- . Alternatives to the defense of Europe
- . Implications of new technological developments
- . Improvements of conventional capabilities.

Alternatives to the defense of Europe . I would like to discuss briefly some more or less radical alternatives to the present strategy

of forward defense within the context of flexible response. The alternatives discussed here are subsequently:

- A defense under the condition of a no-first-use of nuclear weapons
- A defense in depth
- A retaliatory conventional offensive.

Certainly after the famous article of McGeorge Bundy et. al., in "Foreign Affairs", Spring 1982, the idea of a no-first-use declaration on the use of nuclear weapons by NATO received a lot of support in Europe. 19) Steven Canby goes so far as to predict NATO may shift, in say 5 years, to such a declaratory policy. 20)

I am not sure that this will be true. At the moment the NATO countries are against such a declaration. For example, my country declared that a no-first-use declaration is harmful to the security of NATO. 21)

In fairness to the Bundy article, it does not say that NATO should immediately decide in favor of a no-first-use policy. It is recognized that such a declaration would mean a major change in the assumptions of the Alliance and that no such change 'should be made without the most careful exploration of its implications'. It is also recognized that a no-first-use declaration does mean that NATO cannot survive without 'large, varied and survivable nuclear forces'.

Without repeating all the arguments in the article, the authors claim a no-first-use declaration (or its variant, a no-early-first-use declaration) would: reduce the requirement for new Allied nuclear systems; allow a considerable reduction in fears of all

sorts in the world; and reduce the risk of conventional aggression in Europe.

It might be a good idea to look more carefully into the advantages and disadvantages related to a no-first-use declaration. There are, however, some strong arguments which do not support such a policy:

(1) One precondition for a credible no-first-use declaration is an effective conventional capability in NATO. I do not believe that NATO's conventional capabilities are weak. Many improvements have been made. However, the Soviet Union is gaining a substantive conventional superiority. Also, the Warsaw Pact forces have, by nature, the initiative in the beginning of a conflict. So from a military point of view there is no guarantee that a conventional defense will stop an attack under all circumstances. Therefore NATO should not give up its option to deliberately escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. A no-first-use declaration would deprive NATO of this dimension of uncertainty, which is essential for NATO's strategy to be successful.

(2) I fear that a no-first-use declaration would erode the credibility of the guarantee by the United States in relation to the security of Western Europe. Given the lack of confidence in Europe about this, it would be dangerous to give the people, who are suspicious, a new argument.

(3) Going back to the Bundy article, it states: "What the Alliance needs most today is not the refinement of its nuclear options, but a clear-cut decision to avoid them as long as others do". The problem is that NATO is not sure whether the Soviet Union will

avoid the use of nuclear weapons.

The forward defense concept of NATO has been criticized for a number of reasons. The main arguments used against the concept is that it forces NATO to position its army corps in a rather dispersed way in a fairly shallow band of terrain close to the border with the Warsaw Pact countries. This disposition of forces would allow the Soviets to achieve a quick breakthrough because of the inability to absorb a large enemy attack. Of course, opponents of the concept of forward defense particularly refer to the intention of the Soviet commanders to weaken the defense systems by the uninterrupted commitment of follow-on echelons.

A defense line more to the west would certainly offer a better opportunity to slow down the Soviet attack by covering forces, at the same time enabling commanders to gather information on the enemy's main axis of attack. An additional advantage would be that the main forces would have more time to prepare their defensive positions. However, as is well known, such an operational concept would be unacceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany. If positions were taken up 100 kms further west, approximately 30 % of the population and 25 % of the industrial capacity of the FRG would have to be given up at a relatively early stage of the battle. Beside that, NATO would be deprived of the use of a number of airfields and an extensive area in which logistic installations could be deployed.

Another aspect is that the opponents of the forward defense strategy underestimate the defensive capabilities of the deployed army corps in the present planned positions. The now available

capabilities in terms of firepower, mobility and protection, augmented by extensive barriers and the intelligent exploitation of terrain features make it reasonable to assume that the Warsaw Pact forces will not achieve a quick breakthrough. And that is what they require.

There is an often discussed variant of the idea of a defense in depth, based upon a large number of small but very mobile combat units, equipped with very modern anti-tank weapons like TOW and Dragon. These units would be deployed in an area with considerable depth, in which the enemy attack is absorbed. 22)

This idea may be very attractive from the financial point of view. It combines however the disadvantages mentioned before with the very substantial disadvantage of the lack of shockpower; shockpower needed to neutralize the shockpower of the attacker and to execute counter-attacks in case of threatening breakthroughs.

Looking at these arguments, one might expect the concept of forward defense to be the official NATO doctrine as long as the Alliance stays alive.

I want to finish this short analysis on alternatives to NATO's strategy in Europe by making some remarks about the idea of the retaliatory conventional offensive. Samuel Huntington concludes from the perceived deteriorating credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee and the limited deterrence capacity of conventional forces, that NATO has to adopt a strategy of which the key element is a retaliatory conventional offense against the Warsaw Pact, especially directed against the German Democratic Republic. 23)

As far as his assumptions are concerned, for a number of

reasons, as I explained earlier, I disagree with the first one and agree with the second one. Although an offensive, disrupting Soviet attack plans and hitting an assumed Achilles heel of the Warsaw Pact (the disloyalty of satellite countries), has some attractiveness from the political-military strategic point of view, it would inevitably destroy the cohesiveness in NATO, if it was accepted as an official strategy.

NATO has always emphasized its defensive posture and attitude. The great majority of Europeans will not support a more offensive strategy. As explained before, NATO's European support is based on the terrible experiences of two World Wars and the wish not to be involved in a war like that again. It is also felt that a more offensive attitude does not contribute to NATO's security. It is believed that it will further strain the relations with the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries, which in turn might lead to a higher risk of a future war. To me, it even seems possible that the Soviet Union could be tempted to attack pre-emptively, in case NATO puts the concept of a retaliatory conventional offensive in its inventory. Lastly, if executed in wartime, it would result in the escalation it wants to prevent: the use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union.

I think it is not a feasible alternative and an option we should better forget.

To extend this discussion one step further: each move to press an offensive conventional strategy on NATO, not only in the form of a retaliatory conventional offensive, but also in the form of a strategic counter offensive with fargoing objectives, launched after a

Soviet attack has been halted, will encounter the same resistance and inevitably lead to the collapse of NATO. One has to understand that NATO has adopted on purpose limited objective should deterrence fails. NATO's objectives in war are to stop Soviet aggression by collapsing her will and ability to continue combat, by restoring the integrity of the defense and territory and by retaining freedom of action for the Alliance. No where is it stated that NATO seeks a military victory over the USSR. NATO does not, and has good reasons for not doing so.

My conclusion from this short survey is that NATO's strategy of the forward defense in the context of flexible response is not likely to change in the future. I think the basic arguments on which this strategy is based are still valid.

This does not mean, however, that nothing can or should be changed as far as the conventional defense of Europe is concerned. For areas where changes might be possible, one has to look at the operational and tactical levels of war, not at the strategic level.

One of the problems within NATO is that because of the great number of countries involved, the various perspectives of these countries and the related political limitations, changes in doctrine are very difficult to implement. However what might have been a good doctrine ten years ago, does not necessarily mean a sound approach today. Given the continuous changes in the threat and the technological state of the art, adjustments to NATO's doctrine are inevitable and necessary. Such adjustments have to fit within the strategy of flexible response and have to be applicable within the

organizational structure of NATO. Most importantly, these adjustments should be accepted by all concerned member countries. For example, it makes no tactical sense if the two U.S. Army Corps in Europe follow the official doctrine of U.S. Army, the AirLand Battle, as described in FM 100-5, while the adjacent corps of other nationalities are prepared to fight in a different way. This is dangerous, because it could create situations on the battlefield, which can be exploited by the Soviets. This problem is of course not solved by stating in the preface of FM 100-5 that the AirLand Battle doctrine, as described in the manual, is consistent with NATO doctrine and strategy. In fact, that statement is simply not true. 24) What should be done is to allow new ideas like the AirLand Battle doctrine to be thoroughly discussed within NATO, without national emotional feelings obscuring such a discussion. Next, the elements on which you can agree, should be then included in NATO's doctrine. That is the only way to get to a common NATO doctrine which is understood and supported on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. 25)

Implications of new technological developments . I believe that this subject is very important because of its tremendous impact. One should remember that the first atomic bomb exploded in 1945, only forty years ago. In those forty years we have seen a dramatic expansion of technological capabilities, not only in military applications but in the whole society. These developments occurred so quickly that the human mind was hardly able to cope with them. In the past few years for example, we have seen men landing on the moon and computers attaining an almost indispensable position in our society.

Both facts were, like many others, hardly predictable in 1945. It is from this perspective that a safe prediction can be made that our present evaluation of the strategic balance could be outdated by new technological developments. The indications are clear that even before the beginning of the 21st century important changes will have taken place.

In the context of this paper it is impossible to go into much detail. I want to mention two areas which are likely to be affected by new technology and which are relevant to the subject of this paper. The first area is that of the nuclear weapons at the lower end of the escalation ladder: the Short Range Nuclear Forces. Changes in NATO's conventional capabilities due to technological improvements will inevitably have implications for NATO's theater nuclear posture. I particularly refer to the introduction of precision guided area weapons using conventional submunitions and the application of more powerful conventional explosives like fuel air explosives. These technologies demonstrate an effectiveness that is approaching equivalence with the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear weapons used against certain targets. The introduction of the mentioned technologies can allow NATO to de-emphasize the role of the Short Range Nuclear Forces. Reference can also be made to the replacement of the nuclear Nike-Hercules by the conventional Patriot and the phasing out of the Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM's).

The other area in which new technological developments will have a tremendous impact is situated on the other side of the escalation spectrum: that of the strategic nuclear systems. These developments are closely related to the military use of space and

concern the introduction of systems like the anti-satellite satellites, deep surveillance satellites, the application of vastly improved automatic data processing systems getting information from improved electronic sensors and optical tracking systems, and defense systems against ballistic missiles. The exploration of the field of beam weapons using high energy lasers, charged or neutral atomic particles or microwaves, promises the likely deployment of new, powerful weapon systems in the near future. All these developments together will have a synergistic effect, facilitating the production of weapon systems that will cause a revolutionary change in warfare first at the strategic level and later possibly at the operational and tactical levels.

The implications of new technological developments at the lower escalation levels can be welcomed as they raise the nuclear threshold. The implications at the other end of the nuclear spectrum give reason for great concern. Some measures, like the introduction of new, sophisticated warning systems will reinforce the deterrence posture and therefore have a stabilizing effect on the strategic balance. Other developments like the deployment of anti-satellite satellites or defense systems against ballistic missiles could endanger the strategic balance, especially when a breakthrough by one side cannot be answered by the other. An arms race in space seems inevitable, seriously augmenting the problem of how to stop the race. One would hope for a general agreement banning weapon systems from space, for example in the context of the United Nations Outer Space Treaty of October 1967. Current trends do not justify this hope. First, in the area of advanced technology there is often no clear-cut

distinction between military and civilian technology. Second, the prevailing mood is not favorable for a renewal of bilateral negotiations on space weapons. Third, it will be extremely difficult to compare the newly developed systems because they are often the result of completely different approaches. Besides that, verification of these systems seems an almost insolvable problem.

A treaty restricting the military use of space has always been perceived by the Western Europeans as a very important step in the field of arms control. It seems that time has overtaken the possibility of such a treaty. Also from another point of view, present developments are regretful. European activities in space related technologies are limited. If the arms race in space proceeds unhampered, Western Europe will become even more dependent on the United States, unless it is prepared to play a more active role in this field.

Improvement of conventional capabilities . The discussions about the improvement of NATO's conventional capabilities understandably concentrate on the subject of defense budgets. Higher defense budgets might be a possible way of getting things done, but it is not the only way. Looking at NATO as a system that provides nuclear and conventional forces, the output of NATO could be more efficient within the limitations of the existing budgets. When NATO and Warsaw Pact are compared, inevitably manpower, tanks, planes, etc. are compared. Efforts to compare the economic resources, allocated to defense, have failed. 26) If the comparison could be made, I would not be surprised that it would show the Warsaw Pact input-output ratio to be higher

than NATO's.

As everybody knows, the lack of standardization costs NATO money, because it deprives the NATO countries of the economic advantages of producing large numbers of the same item. The reason for this is also well known: protection of the industries in the various countries. Of course, some progress has been made to improve the lack of standardization: there are common funded programs in NATO and some types of equipment are found in different NATO armies. To a large extent, however, lip service is paid to the principle of standardization. However, each military force planner knows that the staggering rise of the cost of new equipment, ammunition and spare parts is severely threatening the modernization of NATO's forces and that rising defense budgets only partly offset this trend. I believe that the phenomenon of rising cost is a more serious problem than the reluctance to increase defense budgets. If nothing happens, the outcome is predictable: equipment gets obsolete or modern equipment is not available in adequate quantities.

I realize quite well that the lack of standardization is a problem that is very difficult to solve. National policies to support internal industries are understandable. However, the problem of rising cost will force NATO to find ways to improve the input-output ratio. Standardization is the main vehicle to achieve this. At least a start should be made somewhere, for example by strongly supporting the efforts presently made in NATO to develop a common planning system for the development and procurement of equipment.

Other measures, relatively cheap, are possible to improve the conventional capabilities of NATO. One is the improvement of

interoperability, especially in the fields of command, control and communications as well as logistics. Furthermore many improvements can be made in the areas of host nation support, mobilization systems, the training of reserve forces and so on. Fortunately, compared to standardization, more progress has been made in the areas mentioned here. More could and should be done.

Still another approach to the problem is possible, but that approach would be even more radical than standardization. It would, however, lead to a quantum jump in NATO's efficiency. I refer to the possibility of force specialization of various member countries on certain aspects of the common defense. Instead of trying to cover the whole spectrum, one or a few countries could concentrate their contribution to NATO on air defense, other countries concentrate on land forces, and still others focus on seapower, etc.. In essence this would mean a partial transfer of sovereignty for the countries involved and therefore demand substantial political trust and cohesion within the Alliance. This philosophy has not received much support in NATO, probably because the transfer of sovereignty is not a popular idea. Nevertheless, especially for the smaller countries in NATO, specialization has some very attractive aspects. It might well be that the combination of scarce resources and rising costs will even make this radical solution popular.

NATO's future: journey into the unknown . Despite the remarkable success of NATO over a relatively long period of time, continuation of this success is not self-evident. I am optimistic as far as the short-term outlook is concerned, despite the rather violent

discussions, certainly in Europe, on the nuclear strategy of NATO and despite the deep economic recession with its related adverse effects on defense expenditures in the light of the Soviet build-up of forces. The improvements in NATO's conventional capabilities are impressive; support for NATO is generally strong and governments in Europe are prepared to take necessary steps, like the deployment of the INF, even if there is a strong public move against it.

The outlook for the long term is more complicated, certainly from the European point of view. The possibility of meeting the growing concerns on the dominant role of nuclear weapons seems to be small. Important questions come forward. How long will the United States be prepared to keep its forces in Europe? How credible will the nuclear guarantee by the United States be in, say, 1990? An alternative to this guarantee does not seem to be available. What will happen if the Soviet build-up continues, if arms control agreements cannot be made and if detente does not get a new chance. If the elements of NATO's policy as recorded in the Harmel-Report of 1967 do not have any success, how long will the public, especially in Europe, be prepared to support ever increasing defense-budgets? Lastly, what will, in this respect, be the reaction in Europe to a sharp, unhampered, destabilizing arms race in space.

I cannot answer these questions, but I believe they need very serious consideration within the Alliance. If this is not done, a substantial loss of cohesiveness and thus of credibility lies ahead. That would represent a disastrous development. We should all remember an expression once written by Hans Dietrich Genscher: "We, the democracies of North America and Europe, are all in the same boat. We

in Europe are perhaps a bit nearer the edge of the boat, but if it sinks we all go under". 27)

NOTES:

- 1) Hans Dietrich Genscher, 'Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace, Freedom and Progress', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, nr. 1, pp. 42 - 66
- 2) For a more extensive discussion on this subject, see: Samuel P. Huntington, 'Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe', International Security, Vol. 8, Nr. 3, pp. 32 - 56
- 3) Defense White Paper of the Netherlands Government, The Hague, December 1983
- 4) See also: Gary L. Guertner, 'Nuclear War in Suburbia', ORBIS, Spring 1982, pp. 49 - 69
- 5) For more information on this subject, see: Report of the European Security Study, 'Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe', New York, 1983, pp. 17 - 18
- 6) Statement by Gen. Bernard W. Rogers to The Netherlands Parliament, The Hague, 13 January 1983
- 7) Government Statement by the Prime Minister of the Netherlands to Parliament, The Hague, 22 November 1982
- 8) Helmut Schmidt, 'The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture', pp. 3 - 4
- 9) For example, see 5, pp. 30 - 31
- 10) The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'The Military Balance 1983 - 1984, London, 1983, p. 137
- 11) Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, 'Greater Flexibility for NATO's Flexible Response', Strategic Review, Spring 1983, pp.

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- 12) George H. Quester, 'The Future of the American NATO Commitment' from 'Defense Planning for the 1990s and the Changing International Environment', 18th National Security Affairs Conference, Fort McNair, 1983
- 13) See 3
- 14) See 1
- 15) See 3
- 16) Caspar W. Weinberger, 'Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense', A report to U.S. Congress, 1982
- 17) Robert J. Art, 'The United States and the NATO Alliance: Managing the Unsolvable', from 'The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation?', Fort McNair, 1983
- 18) See 3
- 19) McGeorge Bundy et al, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace', Vol. 60, nr. 4, pp. 753 - 768
- 20) Statement by Steven Canby to the Netherlands Parliament, The Hague, 14 Januari 1983
- 21) See 3
- 22) Horst Afheldt, 'Verteidigung und Frieden', Munchen, 1976
- 23) See 2
- 24) See Col. Arie K. van der Vlis, 'The United States Army AirLand Battle Doctrine: A European View', Carlisle, 1984
- 25) For an extensive discussion on this subject, see: Col. John B. Landy et al, 'Strategic and Doctrinal Implications of Deep Attack Concepts for the Defense of Central Europe', to be published in a book edited by Keith A. Dunn and William

O. Staudenmaier, 'Strategy in Transition: Defense and Deterrence in the 1980's', Boulder (Col.), forthcoming 1984

26) For example, see 10, p. 13

27) Hans Dietrich Genscher, 'Europe's Role in World Politics', Aussenpolitik, Vol. 33, nr. 2

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