Ballistic Missile Defense, ICBM Modernization, and Small Strategic Attacks: Out of the Frying Pan?
Abstract
The current Western strategy of Flexible Response represents a delicate balancing of the various interests and concerns held by the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic. The West's ability to launch small nuclear attacks--including attacks by U.S. central strategic systems--against a full range of militarily relevant targets currently is a keystone of the Flexible Response concept. To erode that strategy by undermining even in part our limited strategic attack capability could lead to a number of potentially severe political and military problems. For this reason, great caution is warranted as we consider certain strategic policy issues, most notably, whether to include active defense as a component of some follow-on U.S. ICBM system configuration. The author concludes that, as we make critical strategic choices over the next few months and years, it is vital to recall that U.S. and Soviet strategic aims and contexts are by no means symmetric ones. Certain key asymmetries--relating to the conventional theater balance, our need to achieve a political consensus for important weapons and strategy choices, and the like-should inform our ICBM modernization decisions in the near-term. Based on the discussion presented in this report it would seem that the net effect of such considerations would be to support every effort possible to devise an MX basing concept that does not rely on active defense.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1983
- Accession Number
- ADA145170
Entities
People
- K. N. Lewis
Organizations
- RAND Corporation