

(2)

DEMOCRACY BY COUP: THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT
UNDER MILITARY CONTROL (1980-1983)

AD-A146 860

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

BURT A. VANDERCLUTE, II, MAJ, USA
B.A., Rutgers University, 1971

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1984

DTIC
ELECTE
OCT 31 1984

B

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

84-3413

84-3737.19

84 10 22 137

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A14686	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) DEMOCRACY BY COUP: THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT UNDER MILITARY RULE (1980-1983). Control		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis
6. AUTHOR(s) VanderClute, Burt A. II., Major, U.S. Army		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GP Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027		12. REPORT DATE May 1984
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 166
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the Masters Program requirements, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Turkish Military Political History		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) See reverse.		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

(27)
This study attempts to explain the causes and effects of the military coup d'etat which took place in Turkey on September 12, 1980. The analysis focuses on the National Security Council government of the period, against the broader historical background of military involvement in Turkish political development.

The research indicates that direct military intervention was necessary in order to avert the real possibility of a calamitous civil war within the republic. Indications are that control is being restored to the elected civilian government under a stronger, more effective constitutional system.

(cont.)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate Major Burt A. VanderClute II

Title of thesis Democracy By Coup: The Turkish Government

~~Government~~ Under Military Control (1980-1983)

Approved by:

Robert R. Cordell, Thesis Committee Chairman
Robert R. Cordell, M.Ed.

Theodore A. Wilson, Member, Graduate Faculty
Theodore A. Wilson, Ph.D.

Gary H. Wade, Member, Graduate Faculty
Gary H. Wade, M.A.

Accepted this 20th day of May 1984 by Philip J. Brooks
Director, Graduate Degree Programs.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DEMOCRACY BY COUP: THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT UNDER MILITARY CONTROL (1980-1983), by Major Burt A. VanderClute, II, USA, 166 pages.

This study attempts to explain the causes and effects of the military coup d'etat which took place in Turkey on September 12, 1980. The analysis focuses on the National Security Council government of the period, against the broader historical background of military involvement in Turkish political development.

The research indicates that direct military intervention was necessary in order to avert the real possibility of a calamitous civil war within the republic. Indications are that control is being restored to the elected civilian government under a stronger, more effective constitutional system.

Accession For	
NTIS	☒
DTIC TAB	☐
Unannounced	☐
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Level and/or Special
A-1	

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study would not have been possible without the assistance, guidance, and cooperation of several people. Their support, in kind or in spirit, greatly contributed to the product. While I am wholly responsible for the contents of this analysis, they deserve recognition for their encouragement and participation in the process.

Among those who merit special recognition are:

-- The Staff and Faculty of the United States Army Command and General Staff College; especially Dr. Phillip J. Brookes, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, and my thesis committee members -- Bob Cordell, Gary Wade, and Dr. Ted Wilson. They provided just the right combination of academic criticism, personal reassurance, and gentle prodding to keep the effort on track.

-- Ms. Linda Green, who typed the manuscript through its several iterations. Her dedication to excellence and cheerful optimism made the mechanics of producing the paper much less painful than it otherwise could have been.

-- Mr. Ali Kiziltun of Ankara, Turkey. An old friend, Ali Bey provided much of the original Turkish material which supported the research for the study. His assistance and personal interest in the project contributed immeasurably towards developing an understanding of the Turkish view of the events.

-- And finally, my wife [REDACTED], who kept the home fires burning in North Carolina. Her excellence as a writer and wordsmith provided inspiration to get the message correctly written. Her dedication as a wife and mother maintained the family across the miles.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Thesis Approval Page	ii
Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	iv
List of Tables	viii
List of Figures and Annexes	ix

CHAPTER

I.	OVERVIEW	1
	Introduction	1
	Purpose of Study	3
	Significance of This Study	5
	Thesis Problem Statement	6
	Methodology	8
	Following Chapters	9
II.	HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	13
	Historical Survey of Modern Turkey.	13
	Ataturk and Kemalism	17
	After Ataturk	24
	Multiparty Politics (1945-1979)	25

III.	HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY	35
	Legal Basis for Military Intervention	40
	The 1960 Coup	41
	Government Under the National Unity Committee	46
	The Rise of the Justice Party	52
	The 1971 Intervention	54
	Military Admonition and the "Coup by Memorandum"	56
	The Finer Model	61
IV.	PRE-1980 COUP SOCIO-POLITICAL CLIMATE	68
	Civilian Coalition Governments	69
	The Ecevit Government	73
	Warning Signals	75
	The New Year's Letter, 1980	75
V.	THE COUP AND THE NSC	80
	Chronology of Key Events	81
	Coup-producing Trends	86
	The Coup	92
	The NSC Government	95
	Program of the NSC	103
	Political Process Under the NSC	104
VI.	NARROW ROAD TO CIVILIAN RULE	111
	NSC Government Trends	116
	The NSC Plan	121

The Constituent Assembly.	124
A New Constitution.	126
1983 Elections.	134
Election Results and Implications	136
Conclusions	139
BIBLIOGRAPHY	154

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>	<u>Page</u>
1. Chronology of Major Kemalist Reforms	21
2. Summary of Turkish Governments (1973-1980) .	31
3. Summary of 1961 Election Results	49
4. Election Results, Selected Years, 1961-1977.	69
5. Chronology of Key Pre-Coup Events	81
6. NSC Council of Ministers	100
7. Historical Summary of NSC Period	112

LIST OF FIGURES AND APPENDICES

	<u>Page</u>
Figure 1 - Proposed Partitioning of Turkey Under the Treaty of Sevres (1920) . . .	16
2 - The Finer Model	62
Appendix A - National Security Council Charter . . .	148

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW

"To understand Turkey from this date forward will require an understanding of what has transpired between 12 September 1980 and 6 November 1983."¹

INTRODUCTION

On September 12, 1980, the Turkish Armed Forces, headed by General Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff, assumed control of the Turkish Government in a coup d'etat. This was the third such coup in the past 25 years.²

Evren and his fellow generals moved quickly to dissolve the parliament and government, and arrested the leaders and key members of all the political parties. The National Security Council, under the leadership of General Evren, took over the administration of the country.

In the midst of the flurry of activity, Evren took time to visit the mausoleum of Ataturk, founder of the modern Turkish nation, and record the following in the Honor Book:

"We, as the loyal and stubborn sons of the Republic you founded and the principles you established, had to take over the country's administration and say 'stop' to those who failed to protect the regime and your principles, and who pushed the country into more and more darkness and helplessness."³

Thereafter, General Evren, now head of state, and the National Security Council set to the task of running the

nation. The arrest of several thousand suspected terrorists was arranged. In several major cities, the elected mayors were replaced by military commanders. Turks were prohibited from departing the country until order had been reestablished. Retired Chief of the Navy, Admiral Bulent Ulusu was appointed Prime Minister and instructed to form a new government. One day later the new government was announced.

The mission of the new government was two-fold: To draw up plans for the reestablishment of an elected government and to continue the bureaucratic functions of the government in the interim. For its part, the National Security Council would restore order to the nation both through the military courts and the existing judicial system, and oversee the process of return to democratic government. "We do not intend to leave any unsolved problems behind," Evren said.⁴

The government achieved some remarkable successes. Economically, it brought inflation under control through stiff financial measures, increased the nation's gross national product, and ended up with a surplus balance of payments within the first two years. The Constituent Assembly, which was appointed to replace the former Parliament Assembly, moved smoothly and efficiently to enact necessary legislature, much of which had been bottlenecked by the political bickering of the previous legislature.

On 7 November 1982, a new constitution was approved by more than 90 percent of the popular vote. The vote was a clear mandate for the Evren government and insured his leadership as president at least until 1989.⁵

Finally, national elections were held on 6 November 1983 to elect members to the new unicameral parliament. As promised early on by Evren, democracy would return to Turkey, although it may not be in the form which he would have preferred.⁶

PURPOSE OF STUDY

The purpose of this study is to examine the Turkish government under military control during the period 12 September 1980, when the elected government was overthrown by coup d'etat, until 6 November 1983, when national democratic elections were again held. It will investigate in depth this latest episode of military rule against the broader issue of the role of the military in Turkish society.

The coup itself was no surprise.⁷ The question in the minds of most observers was when the coup would take place rather than whether. General Evren had several times warned the government that if they could not properly see to the business of running the government and avert a Turkish civil war, then the protectors of the constitution (the military) would.

As background, the study will analyze the historical origins of the 1980 coup in order to place into perspective the products of that coup. It will analyze the questions:

Why did the military intervene?

What were the causes of the coup?

Who were the principal characters involved and what were their motives?

How was the coup staged?

What were the immediate national and international effects?

Next, the paper will examine the structure and operation of the National Security Council (hereafter referred to as NSC) government.

What were the main NSC organs?

Who were the principal administrators?

What were they charged to accomplish?

Was a timetable established?

What were the tasks? Goals?

How were the goals to be accomplished?

What were the products of the NSC?

The paper will continue with an evaluation of the performance of the NSC.

Which goals were accomplished?

Which were not?

What significant legislature was enacted?

What was the social, political and economic impact of the NSC?

The paper will conclude by drawing certain hypotheses on the NSC government; on its effectiveness and validity, and on its implications for the future of Turkey. Two previous coups have been unsuccessful in restoring a lasting and stable representative democratic system to Turkey. Will this third time, as the saying goes, be the charm? Or will it, too, leave behind flaws which will necessitate future (or continuous) military interventions?

SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY

As mentioned in the opening quotation, an understanding of Turkey or the Turks from this time onward will require an understanding of the events surrounding the military intervention and subsequent NSC government. Clearly, the impact of the 1980 coup and its after effects will influence Turkish thinking for the foreseeable future. The new constitution, when approved by national referendum in 1982, at once drastically revised the legislative system and gave sweeping new powers to the president, which heretofore had been largely a ceremonial position with little real power. Additionally, the referendum insured General Evren's continuing influence on matters by confirming him as president until 1989.

Military officers, State Department personnel, and legislators will have to understand the new realities of the political atmosphere in Turkey if they are to conduct business effectively with the Turks. Political observers, analysts, and students of Turkish affairs must also come to grips with the impact of the coup and NSC government if they are to draw any relevant conclusions or predictions concerning Turkey's future.

Any analysis of Turkey's current or likely future courses of action would be incomplete without an analysis of the past three years. Included in that analysis must be an evaluation of the role of the military in Turkish philosophy, society, and government. While certainly this role should not be overstated, it can in no manner be ignored. The dynamics of Turkey's military involvement in the political process is unique in the world.

The study will endeavor to provide the reader with an historical and deductive analysis of the NSC government; its origins, accomplishments and implications for the future. No other single document currently exists which provides this important background. This, then, is the reason for this study.

THESIS PROBLEM STATEMENT

The thesis title, "Democracy by Coup: The Turkish Government Under Military Control (1980-1983)," poses an obvious contradiction in terms: How can a nation have

democracy if it's elected officials are replaced in a military coup?

The thesis will demonstrate that while there were elected representatives in the government prior to the coup, they did little to govern the nation effectively. Political strife was rampant. The legislative process was stalled because of petty political rivalry and bickering among the politicians. Inflation had grown to an annual rate in excess of 130 percent and at least 25 percent of the Turkish labor force was unemployed.⁸ Internal Leftist-Rightist terrorism had left 5,000 dead and 20,000 wounded in less than two years. Terrorist-caused deaths occurred at the rate of about 25 persons each day.⁹ These but highlight some of the difficulties.

More significantly, the politicians seemed to thrive on the misfortune of the nation, each blaming the other for the lack of direction within the government. Tens of splinter factions arose within each political party, each with its own solution to the problems, which further paralyzed the government and paralyzed the people. It appeared that Turkey was likely headed for either a violent overthrow of the government such as occurred in neighboring Iran, or a bloody civil war similar to the one organizing in nearby Lebanon.¹⁰

The Turkish General Staff several times warned the politicians that they had better see to the business of

governing the nation. They warned all to do what was best for Turkey, and not to further divide the population. In a 1980 New Year's letter to the president and major party chiefs, the General Staff called for urgent action by all constitutional institutions and political parties against terrorism and secessionism.

The generals waited as long as they could -- some would say too long -- before staging the coup which brought them to power. The nation, almost audibly, breathed a sigh of relief. The people wanted the return to normalcy which, it appeared, only the generals could provide.

In this context, if the freedom and peace of democracy was what the people of Turkey wanted, it could only be guaranteed by a military coup.

METHODOLOGY

The operative research plan for this study is the historical method. Events are arranged and discussed in roughly chronological order to analyze and synthesize their impact on current and future events.

The analysis draws heavily on my personal opinions and observations as a result of six years in Turkey and 12 years as a Foreign Area Officer. Correspondence with experts, published material, as well as firsthand reports and interviews provide the bulk of background material. The interviews have proven particularly fruitful. Two Turkish

officers and several U.S. officers who have served in highly responsible positions in Turkey have been readily available and willing to answer my questions.¹¹

Inasmuch as the thesis hypothesis is current history, current reports and documents will be cited extensively, with published works and analyses forming the historical framework for the piece.

FOLLOWING CHAPTERS

Subsequent chapters will develop the thesis as follows:

Chapter II - This chapter contains a historical review of modern Turkey, citing existing research on the problem. The information is key in order to understand the events and trends which led to the 1980 coup. The chapter is further broken down into subheadings on:

- Historical Survey of Modern Turkey
- Ataturk and Kemalism
- After Ataturk
- Multi-Party Politics (1945-1979)

Chapter III - The military has held a unique position throughout the development of the modern Turkish Republic. This chapter analyzes that role including the stated legal basis for military intervention. Following a discussion of the causes and effects of the 1960 and 1971 coups, the chapter concludes by using the model of Professor F.E. Finer to analyze the military participation in Turkish politics.

Chapter IV - The degenerating sociopolitical climate prior to the 1980 military intervention is discussed in this chapter. A series of weak coalition governments and political bickering lead to early warnings by the military, foreshadowing the coup.

Chapter V - This chapter analyzes the key events and trends which lead to the coup. Following a discussion of the mechanics of the intervention, the chapter continues with an analysis of the National Security Council government, its program for the country, and a discussion of the political process under direct military rule.

Chapter VI - This final chapter lists significant events during the NSC rule and analyzes certain trends which arise. The NSC plan for implementing key legislation, including preparation of a new constitution, and the new electoral and political parties systems are reviewed. The 1983 election campaigns and results -- and future implications are also discussed in this chapter.

CHAPTER I ENDNOTES

¹Preston Hughes, personal letter, 2 October 1983. Lieutenant Colonel Hughes, U.S. Army, is an experienced Foreign Area Officer with more than six years of in-country service. He is a graduate of the Turkish War Academy, commanded a U.S. Artillery Detachment in Turkey, and was formerly Assistant Army Attache in Ankara prior to assuming his current position as NATO Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) Liaison Officer to the Turkish General Staff.

²The two previous coups (27 May 1960 and 12 March 1971) will be discussed in Chapter 3.

³Maxwell O. Johnson, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," Air University Review, January-February 1982, p. 49 (quoted in).

⁴"Turkish Chief Outlines Tenants of New Charter," New York Times, 4 April 1982, p. 8.

⁵Marvin Howe, "Turkey's Charter Seems to be Winning," New York Times, 8 November 1982, p. A-3; and "Turkey, a Vote for Stability," Christian Science Monitor, 10 February 1982, p. 24.

⁶"Army-backed Party Loses Turkish Elections," Kansas City Times, 7 November 1983, p. C-12.

⁷Experts on Turkey had long predicted a coup if the government could not resolve internal difficulties. One such prediction is found in Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey's Travails," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1979, p. 90.

⁸Constantine Meneges, "The Turkish Opening," New Republic, 22 March 1980, p. 14.

⁹Frederick Bonnard quoting Mr. Haluk Bayulken, Turkey's Minister of Defense, in "The Extended Flank -- Report on Turkey," NATO's Fifteen Nations, June-July 1982, p. 36.

¹⁰One might postulate that the politicians were able to carry on such a wreckless political game only in the sure knowledge that if things got completely out of control, the generals would surely intercede -- just as they had in the past. This is an unlikely scenario, but one possibly worth further investigation.

11Members of the current Command and General Staff
College class include:

Staff Lieutenant Colonel Behzat Bilgic, Turkish Army
Staff Major Erdal Ceylanoglu, Turkish Army
Major Stephen R. Norton, U.S.A. Foreign Area Officer
Major Arnold W. Peterman, Jr., U.S.A. Foreign Area
Officer

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

What follows is a brief synopsis of modern Turkey to place into perspective events which are to be later developed in detail. The Turks, who trace their origins back to the Mongols of Central Asia, list the Ottoman Empire as the sixteenth in the series of Turkish states.

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF MODERN TURKEY

The seventeenth Turkish nation, the current Republic of Turkey (Turkiye Cumhuriyeti) was born out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire on October 29, 1923. The rise of modern Turkey was not unlike the self-determined generation of many new states out of a crumbling empire, but with a different twist. Bernard Lewis called it "a victory of Turks over Ottomans."¹ On the other hand, Turkey's struggle for independence was neither a popular revolt against colonial domination nor a successful separation of a province from the Ottomans as was the case of Greece and Egypt. Rather Turkey was both the victor over the old empire and its linear successor. The leader of this succession and the founder of the new state was the flamboyant, stern, charismatic, and controversial leader, Mustafa Kemal, later known as Kemal Ataturk. While the legacy of Ataturk will be further

developed in the following section, suffice it to say that his impression on modern Turkey persists even today. In a sweeping series of reforms Ataturk strove, almost single handedly, to thrust Turkey into the modern age. He is to Turks what George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt represent to Americans--all wrapped up into into one historical figure.

The Ottoman Empire met its final demise following its disastrous, unintentional participation in World War I. Constantinople's loose alliance with Germany in that war was more a reaction against its traditional enemy, Russia, which was allied with Britain and France, than it was a war pact against the Allies. Nevertheless, the Empire was to be dealt with severely by the Allies under the terms of the Armistice of Mudros, the Empire's instrument of capitulation, signed on October 30, 1918. Under the conditions of this armistice, the Allies--Britain, France, Italy and Greece-- occupied Constantinople and would be permitted "to intervene in areas where their interests appeared to be threatened."² In fact, the Allies had already drawn up plans for the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire including the partitioning of Anatolia and Thrace, which the Turkish nationalists--Ataturk among them--had come to regard as the Turkish homeland.

Under the pre-armistice plans, France would gain control of Syria and the southwestern portion of Anatolia called Celicia. Britain would be given a sphere of influence

in Persia, Palestine, and Mesopotomia. Italy was also to receive a portion of Western Anatolia including the city of Smyrna, although Smyrna was subsequently promised to Greece to lure it into the war in 1917 on the side of the Allies. Greece was also to receive most of Thrace for its efforts. Finally, Russia would be awarded a large portion of Eastern Anatolia along with Constantinople and both straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles). Russia's dream of a warm water passage to the oceans would come true. But Russia's own internal revolution would frustrate this dream.

In a separate peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, the Russian Bolshevik government relinquished its claims to Constantinople in order to concentrate on more pressing domestic matters. The remaining Allies -- Britain, France, Italy, and Greece -- pressed for their own claim in the spoils at the Versailles Conference in 1919. The essence of these arrangements were negotiated by the Allies at San Remo and were published in the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. France, Italy and Greece would each occupy portions of the Turkish homeland, with Armenia and Kurdistan becoming separate states. The straits and the Sea of Marmara littoral would be a demilitarized zone, administered by a European commission with no Turkish representation (see figure 1). Even the national treasury would be placed under international administration. Constantinople and a portion of northern Anatolia was all that would be left to the Turks. The Treaty

of Sevres proved short lived, however, as events in Anatolia would make it impossible to enforce.³

While the Allied diplomats were hammering out the terms of capitulation for the collapsed Central Powers, the Turkish nationalists were organizing in Central Anatolia and elsewhere. In April 1920 those members of the Ottoman national assembly who had escaped the allies in Istanbul, came together in Ankara to declare that sovereignty of the new nation was vested in themselves. As the 'true' representatives of the Turkish people, they formed the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In August 1920 while the Sultan's government was agreeing to the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, it was denounced by the nationalists who quickly organized independent local control.




Figure 1 - Proposed Partitioning of Turkey under the Treaty of Sevres

Source: Richard F. Nyrop, Turkey, A Country Study, 3d Ed., (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1980), p. 45.

Most of the several Allied Entente powers were more interested in consolidating their postwar claims and reparations in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, than in the defeated "sick man of Europe." Only Greece was determined to back her claim to Anatolian territory by force of arms."⁴ The nationalists, under the leadership of Ataturk, were determined not to lose any portion their homeland. During 1921, Greek forces marched from their base in Smyrna to within 50 miles of Ankara. The following year, however, the Turkish nationalists launched a counteroffensive which expelled the Greeks from Anatolia and eastern Thrace. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, assured the international recognition of Turkey and established most of modern Turkey's borders.

Ataturk's victories during World War I, especially his successful defense at Gallipoli, coupled with his victories in 1922 (which would be called the War of Independence), launched him into a position of unquestioned national authority which he would retain until his death in 1938.⁵

ATATURK AND KEMALISM

The new leader of Turkey was born Mustafa in 1881 in Salonika when that portion of Greece was still part of the Ottoman Empire.⁶ His father, a minor customs official, died while Mustafa was still a child. Raised by his mother and an uncle, he completed primary and secondary schooling in

Salonika. Against his family's wishes, he entered and graduated from a military high school, then continued a military career by attending the Harbiye (Ottoman military college in Constantinople). In 1905 he completed training in the national staff college. Throughout his formal schooling he was characterized as an intense and dedicated student.

After graduation as a Staff Captain, Mustafa Kemal served in a variety of staff positions which gave him time to think about conditions in the Ottoman Empire. He was undoubtedly influenced by the nationalistic writings of Zia Gokalp, "who is credited with having single-handedly defined Turkish nationalism within the Ottoman Empire."⁷ Mustafa Kemal and other staff officers in Salonika and Damascus organized a secret "vatan" (fatherland) society which in 1907 merged with other such societies to form the Committees of Union and Progress. This group, which later became known as the Young Turks, wished to reorganize the diverse Turkic elements into a nation under a centralized government using parliamentary principles. Similar nationalistic movements were widespread throughout the Ottoman Empire...the principal difference here was that rather than a revolutionary movement from outside, it was a revisionist movement from within. The educated and elite--especially those educated outside Turkey in Europe--began to say "I am a Turk," instead of "I am an Ottoman."⁸

In 1909 Mustafa Kemal played a minor role in establishing a Young Turk government after deposing the ruthless Abdul Hamid II. The Young Turk government, which was founded on high ideals of political liberalism, failed to provide the freedoms and liberties for which it was formed. After a brief period of constitutional rule, the government degenerated into a military dictatorship with Generals Talat, Cemal, and Enver as the ruling triumvirate.⁹ Mustafa Kemal, who had become convinced that the military should stay out of government once its aims had been achieved, split from the Young Turks and was sent into virtual exile.

In 1910 he represented Turkey's armed forces at military maneuvers in France.

In 1911 he fought against the Italians (who "liberated" Libya from Ottoman rule) in Tripoli.

While serving as military attache in Sophia in 1914, he warned the Young Turk government of the dangers of entering the war on the side of Germany and the Central powers. His warning signals were to go unheeded by Enver Pasha, who had concluded a secret pact with Germany which allowed the Ottomans to remain neutral until sufficient provocation could be found to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. Three months later, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I.

Mustafa Kemal returned to his homeland and became the preeminent leader of the new Turkey. During World War I,

Colonel Mustafa Kemal distinguished himself as one of Turkey's most successful commanders. In his brilliant defense of Gallipol against British Empire Forces in 1915, he became a national legend. Following the war, in 1919, he managed to become appointed as Inspector General of Anatolia -- ostensibly to supervise the terms of the armistice. His real motive was to unify the Turkish Nationalist Movement and to organize an Army to eject foreign occupation forces from Turkey. As Commander in Chief of that army, he directed Turkish forces in the War of Independence on several fronts. On August 30, 1922, the remaining Greek armies were forced to quit Turkey.

Riding high on the crest of his military and political successes, he began a sweeping series of reforms aimed at bringing Turkey into the 20th Century. That he could achieve such drastic change in such a short period of time is witness both to his overwhelming popularity among the people and shrewd manipulation of the politicians.

Table 1 gives a brief listing of Ataturk's major reforms.¹⁰ Obviously, with such a vast agenda of radical reforms, the task was not easy. For Ataturk, modernization meant Westernization and he plunged the country headlong into the process of Westernization -- often against popular protest. Of the collection of reforms, which came to be known as Ataturkism or Kemalism, the religious reforms against Islam evoked the greatest reaction.

Table 1.

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR KEMALIST REFORMS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Reform</u>
1922	Sultanate abolished (November 1).
1923	Treaty of Lausanne recognizes Turkish sovereignty (July 24). Adoption of international (Gregorian) calendar and time. Proclamation of the Turkish Republic with Ankara designated capital (October 29).
1924	Caliphate ("Defender of the Faith") abolished (March 3). Theocratic institutions (Medreses) and traditional religious schools closed; Islamic law (Seriati) courts abolished. Constitution adopted (April 20).
1925	Dervish brotherhoods abolished. "Renewal of Tranquility Law" passed (June) to institute single party system.
1926	New civil, commercial, and penal codes based on European models adopted. Civil code ended Islamic polygamy and divorce by renunciation and introduced civil marriage. Semi-feudal Millet system ended.
1927	First systematic national census.
1928	New Turkish alphabet (modified Latin letters) adopted. Secular state declared (April 10); constitutional provision establishing Islam as official religion deleted.
1931	The "Six Arrows of Kemalism" introduced: republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism and reformism.
1933	Islamic call to prayer and public readings of the Kuran required to be in Turkish rather than Arabic.
1934	Women given the right to vote and to hold office. Law of Surnames adopted. Mustafa Kemal given name Ataturk (Father Turk) by the Grand National Assembly; his chief lieutenant, Ismet Pasha, took surname of Inonu after his victorious battle there.

1935 Etatism (state capitalist control of public sector) written into constitution. Sunday adopted as legal holiday.

1936 Montreaux convention regarding the Turkish Straits signed (July).

Source: Richard F. Nyrop, Turkey, A Country Study, 3d Ed., (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1980), p. 49.

In 1925 a revolt broke out in southeastern Turkey. While the revolt was seen by some as a Kurdish separatist action, it was in fact a revolt against Kemalist secularism. The revolt was led by a chief of one of the outlawed dervish sects in order to end the rule of the 'godless' government in Ankara and to restore the caliphate. The Turkish Army quickly suppressed the revolt.¹¹

In 1926 an assassination plot against Ataturk was discovered. Its leader was a former deputy in the Grand National Assembly who had opposed abolition of the caliphate. A sweeping investigation netted a large number of political opponents, fifteen of whom were hanged. An additional number of Ataturk's former close associates were sent into exile.¹² As we shall see later on, Islamic fundamentalism played a major role in precipitating the coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980, all of which were partially legitimized by citing Ataturk's reforms and his direction for the future of Turkey.

In 1931 Ataturk announced his platform of six "fundamental and unchanging principles." These principles, called the Six Arrows of Kemalism, were later written into

the constitution. They were republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism, and reformism.

On the international front, Ataturk consolidated his position by signing treaties of friendship and neutrality or nonaggression with all of Turkey's neighboring states. His announced foreign policy of "Peace at home, peace in the world," is still widely repeated by current Turkish leaders.

In 1936 Ataturk achieved one of his greatest diplomatic successes by requesting the signatory powers to the Treaty of Lausanne allow Turkish control and remilitarization of the Turkish Straits. In July 1936 the Montreaux Convention regarding the straits was signed and promulgated. The straits would continue to be regarded as an international waterway but Turkey was granted the right to conduct inspections of ships in transit and to charge tolls. Additionally Turkey was permitted to refortify the straits area and, if at war or under the imminent threat of war, to close the straits to warships.¹³

Twice, while Ataturk was in power (in 1924 and 1930) the nation experimented with a multi-party political system. Both experiments resulted in petty plotting and factionalism, and were quickly ended. Turkey did not try the multi-party system again until 1946. The failure of these early attempts at Western-style democracy serve as models for future failures--one of which is the major theme of this paper.

AFTER ATATURK

On November 10, 1938, Ataturk died in Istanbul. The Turkish nation mourned his passing. His legacy of stability was in evidence however, when just one day after his death, the Grand National Assembly elected Ataturk's chief lieutenant, Ismet Inonu, as president.

To Inonu fell the task of keeping Turkey neutral through World War II. The German-Russian prewar nonaggression pacts, which paved the way for Germany's blitzkrieg of Poland, was seen as a real threat to Turkey's security. In response, Turkey entered into a one-way treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France in October 1939. For the allies, this raised hopes that Turkey would stay neutral in the war. For Turkey, an important provision of the treaty provided that she would not have to undertake any action which might result in involvement in a war with the Soviet Union. While Turkey meticulously enforced the wartime provisions of the Montreaux Convention by letting no warships pass, she became a center of international intrigue and espionage. Finally, in February 1945 with Germany's defeat imminent, Turkey declared war on the Axis Powers, but only to establish her status as a founding member of the United Nations. Turkey thereby became one of the fifty-one original members of the U.N. and emerged from the war without having fired a shot in anger.¹⁴

Up to this point, 1946, the government of Turkey had been dominated by two classes of elites -- the military and the bureaucrats.¹⁵ Both Ataturk and Inonu (who had served as Ataturk's Prime Minister) were heroic generals in World War I and the War of Independence. Celal Bayar, who was the new republic's first Minister of the National Economy, was a first-rate bureaucrat and friend of Ataturk. Bayar succeeded to Prime Minister under Inonu from 1937 to 1939. Later, under the multi-party system, these two groups would continue to play the major roles in government -- a trend which was again confirmed by the 1983 elections as we shall see.

Additionally, while two brief attempts had been made earlier to introduce a second political party to the Turkish system of democracy, these trials failed because they introduced a new element of elites -- the politicians. This new class of elites seemingly remained at odds with the other two.

MULTIPARTY POLITICS (1945 - 1979)

"With the end of the war and the triumph of the democratic system over fascism, pressure was made by various groups on Inonu's government to grant economic, political, and religious freedom."¹⁶
"The years from 1945 to 1960 thus brought Turkey's first experiment with a competitive multiparty system."¹⁷

Earlier, Ataturk and Inonu had formed the People's Party (later the Republican People's Party) which was to serve as the single party in the republic. The move to a multiparty system was, as indicated above, largely made in

response to growing internal democratic zeal and as a concession to the democracies represented in the formation of the United Nations. On January 7, 1946 the founding of the Democrat Party (DP) was officially announced. Initially formed as a loyal opposition faction, the Democrats had no recognizable platform (they were, after all, "invented" from within the Republican People's Party) (RPP) and so opposed the RPP simply because they were the opposition.¹⁸ This thread of opposition-for-the-sake-of opposition would set the tone for much of the political friction which has characterized Turkish politics.

The Democrats eventually developed their platform by attacking some of the basic principles of the RPP, Ataturk's famous Six Arrows.¹⁹ The DP proposed more private development and industry as opposed to etatism (or stateism). And, perhaps most dangerously, the Democrats supported a revival of Islam. Both programs, while popular with the peasantry and business class, were anathema to the military whose leaders saw themselves as the protectors of Ataturk's legacy.²⁰

In the elections of 1950, the Democrat Party won sweeping victories with Adnan Menderes, the party's charismatic chairman, leading the way. In the 1954 elections, the DP won by an even wider margin.

Now the RPP was the opposition and they played their role with a vengeance. The RPP protested every government

action, whether good or bad. Menderes reacted by seizing RPP offices and property, silencing the opposition press, and by invoking the National Defense Law to control business.²¹ Unfortunately this act only caused the DP more problems. "Menderes's attempts to suppress the country's newly found political freedom...alienated the university students and middle class" who, at least temporarily, allied with the Army.²²

In May 1960, the Turkish Army overthrew the Menderes government and, after a long trial for "crimes against the constitution," Menderes was convicted and hanged. The Democrat Party was disbanded. The idea here was to extricate the politicians and their parties from participation in petty politics in order to get on with the act of governing. For the next five years the government of Turkey, although outwardly civilian in character, was actually tutelary, under military control. A new constitution was adopted in 1961.

In 1965, the Army felt it was once again safe to return to the multiparty free election system. Although the Democrat Party had been proscribed, its politicians proved remarkably resilient. The heirs to that party, the Justice Party (JP), won a complete victory. While the JP leader, Suleyman Demirel, was far more similar to his mentor, Menderes, than he was different, the Turkish Army, true to its word, honorably stepped aside and abided by the election results.

Again in 1969, in a similar fashion to the earlier Democrat Party victories, the Justice Party won the national elections. While they garnered less of the popular vote, their representation in the legislative branch grew, due largely to changes in the representation system and the outgrowth of several additional political parties.

However--following the elections, and again in a vein similar to the events which led to the collapse of the Menderes government--petty politics led to outbreaks of student violence, leftist-rightist confrontation, and polarization within the country.

General Memduh Tamac, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, warned that "the armed forces, whose mission is to protect the country against any danger from without or within, will smash any action directed against the country." He further declared that the current "clashes between ideologically opposed students" carried the clear risk of civil war. However, Tamac underscored the fact that the Army "believed that this anarchy can easily be suppressed within a democratic order by the responsible constitutional bodies."²³

Three months later, the Demirel government, unable to deal with the nation's internal strife and anarchy, resigned under pressure from the military for a "strong and credible government." This became known as the "coup by memorandum," March 12, 1971. "For the following thirty months Turkey was

governed by what amounted to a series of puppet civilian governments, following the offstage directions of the military chiefs."²⁴

It took the generals only one week to realize that the reforms which they sought after were easier said than done. On the other hand, it may have been the painful memories of the coup in 1960 which caused them to direct from "offstage," rather than replace the civilian government with themselves. President Cevdet Sunay, himself a former Chief of the Turkish General Staff, asked Nihat Erim, a professor of international law at Ankara University and a centerist member of the RPP, to form a national union, above-parties government. The resulting compromise government, formed on March 26, 1971, was a hodge-podge of politicians and technocrats composed of five members of the JP, three from the RPP, one member of the National Order Party (NOP), one non-aligned senator, and fourteen technical experts.

One of the first acts of the new government was to declare martial law throughout much of the country in an effort to crack down on activist terrorism. Several political parties, including the right-wing NOP and the left wing Turkish Workers Party (TWP) were outlawed.

In April 1972, the Erim government resigned when it realized that it would not be able to move any of its programs through the National Assembly in the face of JP opposition. In May 1972, Ferit Melen formed another

above-parties government, but it too resigned eleven months later for the same reason.

In the meantime, important events were occurring in the RPP. Inonu resigned as head of the party--a position which he had held since the death of Ataturk--and was replaced by the party's left-of-center secretary general, Bulent Ecevit. The loss of Inonu as party chief, at once removed an important element of support for the military regime and added another voice of dissention--that of Ecevit. General free elections were called for October 1973.

In those elections, "the RPP succeeded in pushing the JP into second place, with 185 against 149 seats, but the balance of power (rested in) the smaller parties."²⁵ With neither major party having an absolute majority of the National Assembly seats, there followed a series of unlikely coalition governments with either Ecevit or Demirel as Prime Minister and their parties aligned with various combinations of the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation Party (NSP), and right-wing National Action Party (NAP). Table 2 summarizes this series of seesaw governments.

Table 2

Summary of Turkish Governments

(1973-1980)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Government</u>
April 15, 1973 - January 6, 1974	Interim pre-election Government Prime Minister: Naim Talu (Contingency Senator) Deputy PM: Kemal Satir (RPP)
January 7, 1974 - September 18, 1974	RPP-NSP Coalition Prime Minister: Bulent Ecevit (RPP) Deputy PM: Necmettin Erbakan (NSP)
November 17, 1974 - March 31, 1975	Technocrat "above-party" government Prime Minister: Professor Sadi Irmak (Senator) Deputy PM: Zeyyat Baykara (Contingency Senator)
March 31, 1975 - June 22, 1977	JP-NSP-RRP-NAP Coalition Prime Minister: Suleyman Demirel (JP) Deputy Premier: Necmettin Erbakan (NSP) Deputy Premier: Turhan Feyzioglu (RRP) Deputy Premier: Alparslan Turkes (NAP)
June 22, 1977 - July 21, 1977	Interim Pre-election Government Prime Minister: Bulent Ecevit (RPP) Deputy Premier: Orhan Eyuboglu (RPP) Deputy Premier: Turhan Gunes (RPP)
July 21, 1977 - January 5, 1978	JP-NSP-NAP Coalition Prime Minister: Suleyman Demirel (JP) Deputy Premier: Necmettin Erbakan (NSP) Deputy Premier: Alparslan Turkes (NAP)
January 5, 1978 - October 16, 1979	RPP-DP-RRP Coalition Prime Minister: Bulent Ecevit (RPP) Deputy Premier: Orhan Eyuboglu (RPP) Deputy Premier: Turhan Feyzioglu (RRP) Deputy Premier: Faruk Sukan (DP)
October 24, 1979 - September 12, 1980	JP Minority Government with NSP and NAP Spt Prime Minister: Suleyman Demirel (JP)

Key to Political Parties

DP - Democratic Party	NSP - National Salvation Party
JP - Justice Party	RPP - Republican People's Party
NAP - National Action Party	RRP - Republican Reliance Party

(Data compiled from Ilnur Cevik, Turkey 1983 Almanac (Anakara: Turkish Daily News, 1983) pp. 134-141; and Richard F. Nyrop, Turkey A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1980), pp. 216-221.

Thus, in the brief period of less than eight years, the government changed hands no less than eight times. The country was held captive by the politicians who first pulled the nation towards the left, then to the right, allowing no true direction or forward progress. The economy was sent into ruins. Leftist and rightist activists killed thousands of their countrymen and women out of despair and anger. Anarchy was the rule and chaos the order of the day. It was into this arena that the Turkish Armed Forces stepped on September 12, 1980.

CHAPTER II ENDNOTES

¹Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2d Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

²Richard F. Nyrop, Turkey, A Country Study, 3d Ed. (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1980), p. 43.

³Ibid., p. 43-44.

⁴William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 33.

⁵Ibid. The standard biography of Mustafa Kemal is Kinross, Lord, Ataturk: Father of Modern Turkey (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965.)

⁶Surnames were not used in the Ottoman Empire at the time. The second name--Kemal--was added by a school teacher, whose name was also Mustafa, to avoid confusion. Later, Mustafa Kemal decreed that all turks would take surnames. He chose Ataturk--literally "Father of the Turks"--as his own.

⁷Nyrop, Turkey, p. 39.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Frequently the Turkish word for "General" is associated with these names resulting in Talat Pasha, Cemal Pasha and Enver Pasha.

¹⁰Information for the table was drawn from Nyrop, Turkey, p. 49; Hale, Political Economic Development, and Enver Ziya Karal, "Ataturk" in Ilnur Cevik, Turkey 1983 Almanac (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Press, 1983), pp. 17-20.

¹¹Nyrop, Turkey, p. 50.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁴Hale, Political and Economic Development, p. 54.

¹⁵This theme is borne out in Leslie L. Roos, Jr. and Noralou R. Roos, Managers of Modernization (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University press, 1971, and Frederick W.

Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965).

¹⁶George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East, Vol I: The Northern Tier (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1965), pp. 113-114.

¹⁷Dankwart A. Rustow, Middle Eastern Political Systems (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 81.

¹⁸A discussion of this is found in Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1977), pp. 1-25.

¹⁹The Six Arrows, introduced by Ataturk, were incorporated in the RPP emblem--six arrows of gold (for Ataturks' principals) against a field of red (for the blood shed in creating the new nation).

²⁰Dwight James Simpson, "Turkey: A Time of Troubles", Current History, January 1972, pp. 38-39.

²¹Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, pp. 39-55.

²²Simpson, "A Time of Troubles", pp. 38-39.

²³Ibid, pp. 41-42.

²⁴Hale, Political and Economic Development, p. 119.

²⁵Ibid, p. 120.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY

"The more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military."¹

Samuel Huntington in this single sentence provides a thread of insight into the way the Turkish military has behaved since the founding of the modern Turkish Republic. Initially, the military saw itself as the key institution for moving the nation towards western-style democracy and liberalism. The revolution which began with the generals and the Committee of Union and Progress set the stage for Ataturk's series of reforms. In more modern times, the armed forces have served more in a counterrevolutionary or reactionary role as we shall see.

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent occupation of Turkey after World War I, the country was in a state of chaos. The leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress had fled the country in panic and disgrace. The government had departed, but the people and the military remained. Especially in the outlying regions, "the Army often became the only effective authority."² The military, largely serving in dual roles as commanders and provincial governors, quickly sought to restore order to the country, and to block any actions taken

by the foreign usurpers. Once a degree of order had been restored, the civil-military relations sorted out, there arose within the Turkish population the desire to expel the occupation troops, by force if necessary, and to establish their own government. To achieve these two goals, they needed "a combination of military and political leadership."³ Mustafa Kemal emerged to fill this need.

Earlier, Mustafa Kemal had established his belief that the military should remain separate and apart from politics. He probably first articulated this idea when he quit the Committee of Union and Progress in 1909 after the CUP had achieved its goals. At that time he said:

"As long as officers remain in the Party, we shall neither build a strong party nor a strong Army...the party receiving its strength from the Army will never appeal to the nation. Let us resolve here and now that all officers wishing to remain in the party must resign from the Army. We must also adopt a law forbidding all officers having political affiliations."⁴

In 1919, Mustafa Kemal resigned from the Army in order to concentrate his efforts on organizing and orchestrating the nationalist movement in Anatolia. His resignation indicated the strength of his convictions that the military and the political spheres should not be embodied in the same person.

In retrospect, this was a particularly interesting philosophy considering the era and the circumstances. Given his immense popularity with both the military elites and the population, and the directed types of governments which

surrounded Turkey at the time, it would have been easy for Mustafa Kemal to become a military dictator. Instead he sought to keep the military establishment as part of the civilian government, rather than making it the governing body. While he did retain control of the Army as the head of government, the freedom of action which he gained by not becoming embroiled in the day-to-day operations of the military enabled him to solidify his position as the preeminent civilian leader.

Kemal may have been influenced in this decision by his personal observations of the corruption and ineffectiveness of the CUP (military) government, or by his knowledge of western democratic institutions (separate military and political establishments). Whatever the reasons, this action set the stage for the dual role which the military would continue to play to the present. The Turkish officer considers himself certified by tradition, education, and status capable of rule...if not directly, then indirectly as advisor and interpreter of the national will.

This dual role was apparent during the formative days of the First Republic. While Kemal had ostensibly resigned from the Army in 1919, the military leaders of the War of Independence had largely been his subordinates during World War I and still referred to him as "Pasha" (general). Thus, while he was legally a civilian, he was also regarded for his previous military rank as general. Later, as President of

the Republic, Kemal (called Ataturk) took steps to ensure the legal separation of the military from the civilian. Former military colleagues who had either served with him in the war or who sat with him as deputies in the Grand National Assembly (GNA) were forced to choose between continuing their careers as officers or resigning from the Army to pursue politics. Ataturk and his close friend, former general Ismet Inonu, wrote this separation of powers and subordination of the military to the civilian authority into their draft of the 1923 constitution. Article 40 of that document placed the Army under control of the GNA and president. In 1924 a law was passed which prohibited officers from holding seats in the Assembly.

On the other hand, the military's influence still figured heavily in Kemal's decision-making process. Indeed, "for Kemal the military was to be both the agent and the guardian of the reforming ideals of the regime."⁵ By adroit use of coercion and co-option, the military became the willing vanguard of the Kemalist reforms. Many officers, after faithfully completing their military service, chose to become politicians. Noteworthy among these were Inonu (as previously mentioned Ataturk's Prime Minister); Recep Peren, a former general then secretary general of the Republican People's Party; Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, and Refet Bele who were later to become founders of the first opposition political party, the Progressive Republican Party

in 1924. These too, while civilians, retained their close ties to former military classmates and colleagues. Each influenced the other.

Frederick W. Frey's book, The Turkish Political Elite, provides an exhaustive qualitative and quantitative analysis of the military-civilian influences and interactions of GNA period. His study highlights the significant political clout wielded by the military and ex-military assembly and cabinet members. However, a study of the composition of the various assemblies and cabinets leading up to World War II indicates the gradual decline of ex-military officials in the government. The generals were being replaced by the growing elites of politicians and bureaucrats. The military's direct influence was on the wane.⁶

Until the 1960 coup, the military stuck pretty closely to their role as behind-the-scenes advisors with few exceptions. One abortive incident is noteworthy. Towards the close of the single party system a spirit of Pan-Turkism grew in support--especially within certain elements of the military. In 1944 a number of Pan-Turkists were arrested for spreading that doctrine within the military. Among those arrested, tried, and imprisoned was Captain Alparslan Turkes--a name which would figure prominently in future political unrest.⁷

Legal Basis for Military Intervention

The previous discussion demonstrated that the Turkish officer had been at the forefront of modernization since 1923. He perceived himself as the guardian of the Republic and its constitution--and of the Kemalist reforms. On the other hand, it might be effectively argued that he has taken his responsibilities all too literally and seriously by interpreting a portion of the constitution to serve his own interests, while disregarding those portions of that document which clearly subserve him to the state and its civilian government.

Prior to the 1960 intervention, Article 34 (later Article 35) of the military's internal code legally bound soldiers to "protect and look after" (KOLLAMAK VE KORUMAK) the republic and its constitution. This article was one of the arguments used to legitimize the 1960 intervention. Since that time it has been frequently cited as the license for all types of military intervention in Turkey--coups and threats thereof. Most authors also cite this as the legal basis for Turkey's military interventions. How does this article "bind" officers to interrupt the democratic process? Does this constitutional provision give Turkish soldiers more legality for revolutionary action than does the oath "to support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic," give to American soldiers? I think not.

The point here is that all manner of justification has been offered to legitimize the coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980. While drastic military action may have been condoned based on political, economic, and moral grounds, the interventions have been patently illegal. Military coups, while they may be classified as "justifiable" are clearly not legal--although one would be hard-pressed to convince a Turk of this fact! More on this point later.

The 1960 Coup

The major issues which served to precipitate the 1960 overthrow were the increasing polarization between the Democrats (DP) and Republicans (RPP), the role of religion in Turkish life, the maintenance of political freedoms, and economic policy.⁸ As seen by the military, these trends were counter to the directions indicated in the Kemalist reforms.

While both major parties had a hand in liberalizing religious activities in Turkey (state-funded construction of mosques, re-opening of religious schools and sects, religious instructions offered in public schools, return to the Arabic call to prayer, public celebration of Islamic holidays, etc.), the DP took the lion's share of the credit. The Democrats also, in the name of expanding freedoms, moved to suppress dissident press, university instructors, the state radio network and others (at one point, the DP even confiscated all RPP property and records). Economically, the

DP embarked on a series of public works projects which, while undoubtedly contributing to the nation as a whole, drove up the national debt and created a shortage of resources elsewhere--namely in the military.

Each of these reforms/counter reforms did not go unnoticed by the military, but the soldiers continued to confine their activity largely to the barracks and only protested quietly from the wings. But as the polarization and dissent led to open protest and street fighting, the military moved in. This polarization was also evident among the officers as some examples will show.

As the fledgling Democrat Party sought to gain power following World War II, the party leaders openly courted support from the military. This strategy was fairly successful and several military officers resigned their posts to join the party. Shortly after Menderes and the DP were swept into government, they conducted what amounted to a purge of the top military hierarchy by forcing them into retirement--ostensibly to make room at the top for advancement. While this move was initially popular with the majority of the military who had promotion in mind, Menderes selected leaders to the top positions which were sympathetic to his cause. The signal was clear: officers who wished to advance their military careers had to sing the Democrat Party line. This violated Ataturk's principle of an apolitical army.⁹

As opposition to Menderes's repressive policies grew, the Army was frequently called upon to put down the dissent through martial law. This further served to polarize and politicize the military.

"Ironically, the Army was placed in the dubious position of having to intervene to uphold the tradition of non-intervention. Saving civilian dominance of the military required the temporary military rule."¹⁰

The military wrestled with its responsibility to obey the orders of its civilian superiors, while simultaneously questioning in its heart the validity of those orders. One illustrative example: On April 2, 1960, Ismet Inonu, leader of the Republic People's Party, and several RPP deputies were travelling to Kayseri in central Anatolia by train. Shortly before their arrival in that city, the train was stopped by the governor of Kayseri and soldiers acting under his command. The governor entered Inonu's train compartment and handed him written orders to the effect that Inonu was ordered to return to Ankara because of the potential for violent uprisings in Kayseri, "endangering public order." Inonu tore up the order and refused to return. Weiker continues to describe the scene:

"As Inonu sat in his compartment, numerous officers, soldiers, and civilians came to pay their respects by kissing his hand. They made it clear that blocking the road was only to avoid being courtmartialed for insubordination. The governor made several other fruitless attempts to turn the party back to Ankara, but Inonu persisted and continued to Kayseri, passing through ranks of saluting officers and soldiers as if he were still

wearing general's stars as he had during the War of Independence forty years earlier."¹¹

Economically, the military suffered under the Menderes government. The problem arose among all who were on relatively fixed income as they were caught in the squeeze of rising prices. In Ankara, for example, the price index rose from 340 in 1950 (1938 = 100), to 567 in 1957, and to 861 in 1960.¹² This doubling of prices during the Menderes decade was not met with an offsetting increase in salary, resulting in hard times economically for the military and a decrease in morale and prestige as well. The military, as a result of these influences, felt that they had lost their status and were anxious to renew their former prestige.

All of this should not be interpreted as though there was unanimity among the officers, for this was certainly not the case. As previously mentioned, the top military personnel were selected based on their cooperative attitude toward the Menderes government. The next lower level of commanders regarded obedience to their superiors both as an obligation and as the path to promotion. Lower down in the rank-and-file of the military, the picture was not as rosey. While Chief of General Staff Rustu Erdelhun continued to assure Menderes that the military would remain faithful to the government, "army groups were conspiring to intervene in politics."¹³ Indeed, the Commander of Land Forces (Army), General Cemal Gursel had already been recruited by the

conspirators in 1958 and would continue to place officers faithful to him and the conspiracy in top Army positions.

While the military conspirators found agreement among themselves that the government required change, they were not unanimous as to what sort of change should occur. One group held that a directed government was clearly required; that Turkish society was not yet prepared for the demands of full participation in government. Among these radicals was Colonel Alparslan Turkes. Dissent within the ranks had become so widespread that the military academy cadets participated in a spontaneous protest march on May 21, 1960.

In the morning hours of May 27, 1960, the military launched its well organized bloodless coup of the government by securing strategic offices, taking the President, Prime Minister and cabinet into "protective custody," and by placing military commanders in charge of their regions. The whole affair was over in four hours. By mid-morning the armed forces were able to broadcast the following message:

"Honorable Fellow Countrymen: Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, and owing to the recent sad incidents and in order to prevent fratricide, the Turkish Armed Forces have taken over the administration of the country.

Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen and for the purpose of having just and free elections, to be held as soon as possible under the supervision and arbitration of an above-party and impartial administration, and for handing over the administration to whichever party wins the elections.

Our initiative is not directed against any person or class. Our administration will not resort to any aggressive act against personalities, nor will it allow others to do so.

All fellow countrymen, irrespective of the parties to which they may belong, will be treated in accordance with the laws and all the principles of law.

For the elimination of all our hardships and for the safety of our national existence, it is imperative that it should be remembered that all our fellow countrymen belong to the same nation and race, above all party considerations, and that therefore they should treat one another with respect and understanding, without bearing any grudge.

All personalities of the Cabinet are requested to take refuge with the Turkish armed forces. Their personal safety is guaranteed by law.

We are addressing ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbors and the entire world: Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of human rights; the principle of peace at home and in the world set by the great Ataturk is our flag.

We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) and we are faithful to them.

We repeat: Our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world."¹⁴

By 4:00 p.m. the military was able to lift the curfew in Ankara and Istanbul and there followed "a celebration such as (had not been) seen since the victory in the War of Independence."¹⁵

Government Under the National Unity Committee

The Menderes government was replaced by what became known as the National Unity Committee (NUC), which consisted

of the thirty-eight officers who had organized the coup.¹⁶ General Gursel assumed the role as Chairman of the NUC, President, Prime Minister, and Chief of the General Staff. A dictatorship had been established, if only temporarily.

In order to set the moderate tone of the military government, Gursel moved quickly to expel Colonel Turkes and thirteen other radicals from the NUC. With equal haste, the government summoned a group of professors from the University of Istanbul Law Faculty to Ankara to draft a new constitution and election law. On May 28 a seventeen-man cabinet was appointed (fifteen of whom were civilian technocrats who had shown no political party interests) to begin the work of administering the nation. These actions freed the NUC to begin efforts to legitimize their regime and to exact retribution on those who were its cause.

In the trials of some 600 defendants from the Democratic Party, which began in October 1960, the military tried to demonstrate their evenhandedness in prosecuting the cases for treason, violation of the constitution, and for trying to establish a dictatorship. Only about 100 of the accused were acquitted, while fifteen were sentenced to hang. Of these, Menderes and two of his cabinet ministers were hanged. Twelve death sentences were converted to life imprisonment.

From the beginning Gursel and the NUC made it clear that their rule was only a temporary measure until civilian

government could be restored and they hurriedly prepared to meet this objective--perhaps too hurriedly. In January 1961, a constituent assembly was formed and in May they produced a new constitution which was ratified by popular vote in July. The vote, however, (6.3 million "for", 3.9 million "against"), was a great disappointment for the NUC. Even more telling was the fact that 2.4 million voters abstained from casting their ballots for or against.¹⁷ It indicated that lingering popular support for the Democrat Party ideology (or was it opposition to the military?) still existed. Moreover it revealed that a large portion of the population did not recognize the legitimacy of the coup.

Earlier, the military had required the leaders of the five major pre-coup political parties to sign an agreement that they would not participate in political activities until allowed to do so by the military. The Democrat Party was banned altogether and its property confiscated. When, in preparation for the constitutional referendum and general elections, the prohibition on political activity was lifted, it must have seemed like opening Pandora's box. Some twenty parties registered their intent to represent the public.¹⁸ Of these four emerged as the strongest; the Republican People's Party (RPP) led by the venerable Ismet Inonu, the Justice Party (JP) comprised of many of the surviving Democrat Party politicians and led by former Chief of the General Staff

Ragip Gumuspala, the Republican Peasants National Party (RPNP) and New Turkey Party (NTP).

In the general elections which followed in October 1960 the NUC must have been even more dismayed. No party won a clean majority in either house with the newly formed Justice Party picking up most of the outlawed Democrat Party votes (see Table 3).

Table 3.

Summary of 1961 Election Results

(October 15, 1961)

<u>Party</u>	<u>Popular Vote(%)</u>	<u>Assembly Seats(%)</u>	<u>Senate Seats(%)</u>
Republican People's Party	37	38	24
Justice Party	35	35	47
Republican Peasants National Party	14	12	14
New Turkey Party	13	14	14

Source: Data extracted from S.J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol II. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 424.

As no party had a clear majority, a coalition government would have to be formed. For a while the NUC even considered voiding the elections and starting all over again.

It appeared that they had gone so far in structuring the new constitution to prevent dictatorship, that they sowed the seeds for anarchy in its place. Perhaps they had moved with such haste to restore the reins to civilian control, that the NUC would reluctantly end up stuck with the bit in its own mouth. The NUC had genuinely hoped to be out of the capital and back in the barracks following the elections. They had "expected that the public disgrace of the Democrat Party leaders would have persuaded a horrified and enlightened electorate to vote for the People's Party (RPP)."19

The NUC members were not the only officers alarmed by the election results. A powerful rival military group led by Istanbul Martial Law Commander and Commander of the First Army, General Cemal Tural, issued what became known as the "21 October protocol" which threatened another military intervention "to entrust the revolution to the true and competent representatives of the nation, to prohibit all political parties and to annul the election results as well as abolish the NUC."20 Obviously the NUC had failed to live up to its name--even among the military. Finally, a compromise was reached. The NUC would exit center stage, the RPP and JP would organize a loose coalition government with Inonu as Prime Minister, and NUC leader Cemal Gursel would be acclaimed President to supervise the operation. The NUC continued to control the process from off stage. So began a period quasi-military rule combined with increasingly fragile

coalitions which would last until the elections of 1965.

While the NUC was no longer the principal actor, it continued as director.

This four-year period was punctuated by two abortive coup attempts in 1962 and 1963. Both coups were led by Colonel Talat Aydemir in protest of JP and rightist intransigence on Inonu-proposed reforms. For his efforts in these coup attempts, Aydemir was hanged--a signal that for better or worse, the military would stand by its civilian government.

The subject of the 1961 revolution and the National Unity Council government has been dwelt with in order to provide a foundation against which to judge the 1980 coup and subsequent period of military rule. The NUC was not successful in producing the expected ideal framework from which a strong stable democracy might emerge. If, on the other hand, the success of the NUC is measured in terms of its early-stated goal of returning the government to civilian control as soon as possible following free elections, the NUC was surprisingly successful.

Some authors have observed that the struggle for legitimacy may have won over the desire for reform in the minds of the NUC. Weiker suggests that the NUC acted "more like orthodox politicians...than like political, problem-solving soldiers." He goes on to accuse the military junta of "failing to take at least some initial steps in

reform which would be reversible by a successor government only with great difficulty."²¹ Weiker further warns: "If another crisis leads the armed forces to consider intervention once more, what reason have they to believe that dedication to democracy is in the best interest of themselves or their country?"²²

The Rise of the Justice Party

The 1965 national elections marked the real end of the NUC period of tutelary governments. One year earlier, the leader of the Justice Party, retired Chief of the General Staff Gumuspala, had suddenly died. Suleyman Demirel, a noted engineer and former head of the national department of water, assumed control of the JP. Demirel projected the image of a straight-thinking progressive with new ideas and strategies for the country. Moreover, he had demonstrated sympathy and understanding of the military while concurrently appealing to the religious and conservative needs of the peasantry. Thus, as Nye says, "the rise of the DP's heirs was steady and almost predictable."²³

As the JP rose to power, so too did the polarization between it and the RPP. As the JP steadily won converts to its philosophy, the power of the RPP was diminished. Following a vote of non-confidence in February 1965, the RPP stepped down and an all-party government took over as caretaker until general elections could be held. In those elections, the JP won a clear victory with 54 percent of the

vote in a field with five other parties. The RPP had its worst showing ever with only 29 percent. Finally a clear winner had emerged. While the outcome was probably not what the NUC would have preferred, they felt that they could loosen control. Demirel and his JP won over the confidence of the Army by electing another general, Cevdet Sunay, as President following Gursel's death in 1966. The JP continued to woo the military in an effort to establish a *modus vivande*. Demirel pursued "the effort to modernize the Army, improving the conditions of its officers and men and avoiding direct interference in its affairs, while Sunay in turn kept the officers from mixing too much in politics."²⁴

This period of accommodation between the military and politicians was also one of tremendous growth and development in Turkey. Shaw summarizes the period 1962-1970 thusly: agricultural production rose almost 30 percent; government services increased by 67 percent; trade was up by 92 percent; and construction up by 81 percent. The number of schools increased by 61 percent while the number of students shot up by 117 percent. Industrial production rose some 117 percent, and the GNP was up by 65 percent. Although the population exploded from 28.9 million to 35.2 million during the period, real per capita income rose by 35.3 percent.

The only drawback, similar to the earlier Democratic regime, was financial. The rapid growth had resulted in inflationary pressure. While per capita income had risen in

constant terms, current prices (more easily understood by the people) had increased 109 percent.²⁵ Despite these gains, a set of conditions arose in the late 1960s "which led to a general breakdown in civic order and prompted renewed intervention by the military moderates after more than a decade."²⁶

The 1971 Intervention

The increased liberalization and political freedoms granted in the 1961 constitution resulted in an increased almost hobby-like atmosphere of political dabbling, discussion, and debate. Factional elements within the JP and RPP developed which resulted in party disunity, loss of consensus, and consequent loss of power. Extremist political parties arose such as the Marxist-oriented Turkish Workers Party and the neo-fascist National Action Party (led by the indomitable Alparslan Turkes). Workers unions grew in power and generated radical leftist philosophy. Chief among these was DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions). College and university political clubs developed, often with the encouragement and financial assistance of the political parties. These too became havens for political extremists such as the leftist pro-revolutionary Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth), and the rightist ultra-nationalist Komandolar (Commandos). Urban guerrilla groups such as the Turkish People's Liberation Army, which committed sabotage,

bank robbery, kidnapping, and assassination in order to demonstrate their solidarity with the PLO extremist group, alFatah, were on the rise as well.

Leftist-rightist street clashes among university students ensued. DISK staged a series of massive strikes which crippled the country. The DISK demonstration in Istanbul in June 1970 so paralyzed that city that elements of the Turkish First Army had to be called in to restore order and to secure important factories and government buildings from destruction. Martial law was imposed on the city for three months. The intellectuals were also split:

"Indeed in 1969 RPP columnist Metin Toker was distinguishing four kinds of groups of intellectuals who opposed the democratic form of government in Turkey: (1) those who believe democracy and rapid reform are compatible; (2) those who favor a left-wing military administration to effect rapid development; (3) those who feel intellectuals can come to power only outside an electoral system; and (4) Turkish communists who hope a military coup will initiate a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship."²⁷

This polarization within the country was also evident in the 1969 election results. While the JP retained its leadership in a field of eight political parties, there were many intellectual dissenters within the JP who, while elected on the party ticket, did not agree with the party platform or its leader, Demirel. The RPP, which maintained its 27 percent of the vote, was also in disarray. This led to reorganization of the RPP by the party's talented ex-professor and writer, General Secretary Bulent Ecevit. In 1970, Ecevit reshaped the party in a more liberal,

progressive image after driving out most of the older elements, including Ismet Inonu. Also in 1970, and largely in reaction to the rise of liberal leftist elements, the remaining conservative parties (the Reliance, Nation, and New Turkey parties) formed a coalition while their more religious elements combined to form the National Salvation Party (NSP). The chaos in the streets was reflected in the Assembly--and the situation was worsened rapidly.

In spite of the continued expansion, development, and prosperity, the government found themselves unable to effectively deal with the violence in the streets and on campus. Inflation accelerated. JP members, perhaps aware of the party's predicament, began defecting to the newly created parties--including the arch rival RPP. By January 1971, the JP had lost its majority in the Assembly. This, coupled with the RPP's adamant refusal to cooperate in any sort of coalition, sealed the government's fate. With the RPP blocking any JP-proposal initiatives and vice versa, the government lost its ability to govern as far as major decisions or policies were concerned.

Military Admonition and the "Coups by Memorandum"

Throughout this period, the military commanders watched intently from the wings. The top echelon met regularly to discuss the nation's problems. Forums were held in the normal formal organizations such as the Military

Council and the National Security Council, and also in the informal body of the Supreme Council of Commanders. This latter organization, which excluded civilian representation, became increasingly important as the political situation degenerated. Again, however, the generals were not agreed on what sort of action should be taken. On the one hand, in December 1970, the Commander of Air Force sent memoranda to President Sunay and Prime Minister Demirel urging the government to take immediate action to pass necessary legislation to deal more effectively with student violence, and to assign the National Security Council more authority to supervise Turkish political life. On the other hand, Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tagmac emphasized in his New Year's Day speech that the military "firmly believed that this anarchy can easily be suppressed within a democratic order by the responsible constitutional bodies."²⁸

As the situation grew more grave, the generals met more frequently to discuss a solution. At the March 10, 1971 meeting of the Supreme Council of Commanders, it was concluded that some sort of military intervention was necessary. In a compromise measure to avoid direct military involvement, a stern memorandum was sent to both the President and Prime Minister signed by Tagmac and the three service commanders: Faruk Gurler (Army), Muhsin Batur (Air Force) and Celal Eyicioğlu (Navy). The memorandum laid responsibility for the nation's anarchy and unrest squarely

on the government and the parliament. The memorandum went on to threaten that if a credible government could not be immediately established to deal with the problems, then the military "under its duty to 'protect and look after' the Turkish Republic...(would)...take over the administration of the state'."29

Shortly after receiving the ultimatum, Prime Minister Demirel, realizing the hopelessness of his situation, resigned. The armed forces had overturned the government in a bloodless "coup by communique."

Reaction among the civilian leadership was mixed. Demirel protested mildly that the seizure of the government was unconstitutional. President Sunay defended the officers' action by declaring on national radio that the military commanders "had carried out the duties vested in them."30 Inonu initially protested the action but later announced that the military had acted properly--possibly in order to overcome a more serious problem. Nye postulates that the coup by communique may actually have occurred in order to prevent a coup of a different sort (possibly armed intervention) by a group of lower ranking officers. "Some support for this thesis may be found in the large numbers of officers retired, transferred, arrested or otherwise purged from the ranks immediately after March 12 and for several months afterwards."31

For the next two and a half years following the demise of the Demirel government, the nation would be run by a series of "above-party" coalitions. Initially, both the JP and RPP cooperated in this tutelary government but gradually Ecevit withdrew the RPP in his efforts to skew that party to the left and away from any right-wing coalition. At the military's urging, each successive "above-party" government tried to have a number of reforms passed, but was largely unsuccessful in getting anything meaningful through the parliament. For example, in the first thirteen months during which the first (Erim) coalition was in office, it introduced "93 reform bills to the GNA of which only 11 were passed."³² This demonstrated that while the military could, with relative impunity, seat and unseat governments at will, it could not control the machinations of the parliament, or perhaps it did not want to.

Another example of this took place in the spring of 1973. President Cevdet Sunay's term as President of the Republic was about to expire. Two candidates were nominated to succeed to that office: Tekin Arıburun, the JP candidate, and retired Chief of General Staff Faruk Gürler, the government's military candidate. In seven successive votes, neither candidate received the requisite number of ballots and both withdrew (Gürler's number of votes decreased in each successive vote, much to the consternation of the military). Finally, in a compromise effort, parliament elected retired

Chief of the Navy, Admiral Fahri Koruturk, as President. The seventy year old Koruturk's ties with Ataturk (who reportedly gave him his name) and with the armed forces made him acceptable to the military, while his even-handedness in parliament made him acceptable to most of its members.³³

Following the national elections, the military again retreated from its role as "director" in the Turkish political play, to that of behind-the-scenes advisor. Why hadn't the military taken a more militant hand in this affair? Why a coup by communique and not a coup d'etat? Why did they permit the obstructionist tactics of the parliament to continue?

First and foremost the military repeatedly demonstrated that it did not want to rule. It showed conclusively that it wholly endorsed democracy and stepped in only in order to support democratic principals, when those principles appeared to be genuinely threatened. The generals condoned representative government because they believed in it.

Second, a valuable lesson learned in the 1960 coup and NUC period was that it was easier to seize power than to exercise it properly. The military, while trained in martial matters, was ill-prepared to exercise governmental skills in an increasingly complex society.

Finally, there was not anything like a consensus among the generals as to their preferred form of government.

On balance, however, they have behaved moderately throughout and acted decisively only to prevent any more radical intervention. Another example might support this point and introduce some characters who will later play prominent roles.

As mentioned previously, President Fahri Koruturk was elected as a compromise choice over the military-supported candidate, General Faruk Gurler. Three months after this incident, at the instigation of the political leaders and new Chief of General Staff Semih Sancar, thirty-five generals were quietly "relocated" in an effort to displace the Gurler clique of supporters. Prominent among those purged from the military hierarchy were General Turgut Sunalp, who was shifted from Deputy Chief of the General Staff in Ankara to the less influential position as Commandant of the War Academies in Istanbul. Lieutenant General Nurettin Ersin was removed from his post as under-secretary of the national intelligence organization to command of a provincial corps. Meanwhile, General Kenan Evren replaced Sancar as Chief of Land Forces (Army). The effect was to replace possible dissenters with more moderate and thus less threatening officers.

The Finer Model³⁴

At this junction, it is useful to introduce S.E. Finer's model of levels and methods of military intervention in politics. The model provides an easily understood system

to compare relative levels and methods by which military organizations influence (synonymous with intervention in the model) their governments. It will be used here to analyze the coups previously discussed and to provide a means of comparison for the 1980 coup.

Levels and Methods of Military Intervention in Politics

<u>Level</u>	<u>Methods</u>
Influence	The normal constitutional channels. Collusion or competition with the civilian authorities.
Blackmail	Intimidation of the civilian authorities. Threats of non-cooperation with or violence towards the civilian authorities.
Displacement	Failure to defend the civilian authorities against violence.
Supplantment	Violence

Figure 2.

Source: S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 2d Ed., (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 126-127.

In our analysis of the historical role of the military in Turkish politics thus far, we have seen the generals involved in each level of intervention. In the continuing drama of Turkish political democracy, the military has assumed several distinct roles: behind-the-scenes prompter, close observer from the wings, front-row director, and principal "starring" actor. So too the officers have participated in each of the methods of intervention save two:

In the two successful coups thus far analyzed, the military has been relatively scrupulous in defense of the civil authorities against violence and, while the threat of violence loomed over the scene, overt violence was never used at a means to supplant the government.

The Finer model may not fit the Turkish situation neatly in all cases. For example, Finer draws a corollary between the level of "political culture" and level of intervention: the higher the level of political culture (the degree of public attachment to civilian political institutions), the lower the level of military intervention. By implication, in countries with high levels of political culture (the U.S. and U.K. for example), the military restricts itself to the lowest level of intervention (i.e. by constitutional means). Thus, Finer would class Turkey as having a low level of political culture because of its relatively higher levels of military intervention. As we have seen, however, Turkey holds its civilian political institutions in high esteem. Its population has been noted for its remarkable interest and participation in the political process. Indeed it can be argued that the major reason for the relatively minor success of the NUC and 1971 junta was the strength of Turkey's political institutions. Perhaps a better corollary might be that a higher level of political culture (i.e. popular participation in the political process) the higher the level of military

intervention. Thus in countries where the population is relatively disinterested in the affairs of state (i.e. the U.S. and U.K.) the military reflects this disinterest by using only low levels of intervention.

CHAPTER III ENDNOTES

¹Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 221.

²L.L. Roos and N.P. Roos, Managers of Modernization, p. 16.

³Ibid.

⁴Here Ataturk is quoted in Irfan Orga, Phoenix Ascendent: The Rise of Modern Turkey (London: Robert Hale, 1958), p. 38.

⁵Clement Henry Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey (Humberside, England: Eathen Press, 1979), p. 135.

⁶Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, especially the tables on p. 84 and p.

⁷G.S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," Part I Middle East Journal, XIX, 1 (1965), p. 62, cited in C.H. Dodd, op. cit., p. 136.

⁸Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 8-11. Weiker's book provides an excellent analysis of the cause and effects of the 1960 coup, including an excellent chapter on "The Soldiers as Rulers."

⁹Roger Paul Nye, The Military in Turkish Politics, 1960-1973 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1974), p. 54. This doctoral thesis provides an in-depth analysis of Turkish military influence during the period covered, including excellent bibliographic sources.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 54-55.

¹¹Weiker, op. cit., p. 14.

¹²Aylik Istalistir Bulteni No. 61, March 1959, p. 27, as quoted in Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Political Participation and Modernization in Turkey," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 1966), p. 278, ftn 45, cited in Nye, op. cit., p. 55, footnote 31.

¹³C.H. Dodd, op. cit., p. 136. General Erdelhun's obedient assurance of the Menderes regime is in Weiker, op. cit., p. 13, and ftn 17, p. 13.

¹⁴Quoted in Weiker, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁶Weiker lists the members of the NUC and their curricula vitae in op. cit., p. 113.

¹⁷Most authors only cite the number of "yes" and "no" votes when it is probably the number which abstained that is most telling. See Stanford J. Shaw History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 416.

¹⁸Nye, The Military in Turkish Politics, p. 107.

¹⁹C.H. Dodd, op. cit., p. 137.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹W.F. Weiker, op. cit., p. 153.

²²Ibid.

²³Nye, op. cit., p. 116.

²⁴S.J. Shaw, op. cit., p. 426.

²⁵Ibid., p. 427.

²⁶Nye, op. cit., p. 148.

²⁷Ibid., p. 149 and ftn 50, p. 149.

²⁸An excellent synopsis of the situation leading to the coup is in Dwight J. Simpson, "Turkey: A Time of Troubles," Current History, Vol. 62, No. 365 (January 1972), p. 42.

²⁹Nye credits two sources with this information in op. cit., p. 155.

³⁰Simpson, op. cit., p. 42.

³¹Nye, op. cit., p. 156.

³²Ibid., p. 163.

³³Nyrop, Turkey, pp. 61-62.

³⁴The model used here is from S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 126-127. Professor Finer's

work is an excellent reference on how and why the military becomes involved in politics. Both coups (1960 and 1971) are briefly discussed.

CHAPTER IV
PRE-1980 COUP SOCIO-POLITICAL CLIMATE

As shown in the earlier discussion, the 1971 intervention changed little of the political structure (unlike the 1960 coup which produced a new Constitution proclaiming the Second Turkish Republic). While the generals were relatively successful in quashing extremist activities (particularly leftist-Marxist revolutionary groups), the political system of government remained very fragile. As we shall see, the weak series of governments which followed the 1973 elections and their subsequent inability to enact certain necessary social and economic legislation, contributed to the rise of dissatisfaction among the population which in turn fueled the flames of dissent and eventually led to their demise in the 1980 coup.

TABLE 4 - Election Results, Selected Years, 1961-77¹
(Seats won; percent of votes polled in parentheses)

Political Party	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977
Democratic Party	•	•	•	45 (12.0)	1 (1.8)
Justice Party (JP) ²	158 (34.8)	240 (52.9)	257 (46.6)	149 (30.0)	189 (36.9)
Nationalist Action Party (NAP)	•	•	1 (2.6)	3 (3.4)	16 (6.4)
National Party ³	•	31 (6.3)	6 (3.3)	0 (0.5)	•
National Salvation Party (NSP)	•	•	•	48 (11.9)	24 (8.6)
New Turkey Party ⁴	65 (13.7)	19 (3.7)	6 (2.7)	•	•
Republican Peasant Nation Party	54 (14.0)	11 (2.2)	•	•	•
Republican People's Party (RPP)	173 (36.7)	134 (25.7)	143 (27.5)	185 (33.5)	213 (41.4)
Republican Reliance Party (RRP)	•	•	15 (6.4)	13 (5.3)	3 (1.9)
Turkish Unity Party (TUP)	•	•	8 (2.5)	1 (1.0)	0 (0.4)
Turkish Workers' Party (TWP)	•	14 (3.0)	2 (2.7)	•	0 (0.1)
Independents	0 (0.8)	1 (3.2)	13 (5.7)	6 (2.4)	4 (2.5)

¹Nonexistent at the time of election.

²Results shown only for the National Assembly, which is politically more influential than the Senate. The results of the elections in 1950, 1954, and 1957 are omitted.

³Successor to the Democrat Party, in power from 1950 to 1960.

⁴Founded in 1962 by dissident members of the Republican Peasant Nation Party.

⁵Founded in 1961 as a moderately right-wing party; merged with JP before 1973.

⁶Could not take part in 1973 election because of outlawed status.

Source: Based on information from Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1977*, Ankara, 1977, p. 125; and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, London, XXIII, October 7, 1977, p. 28597.

Civilian Coalition Governments

The defection of JP members to the left and right of the party's centrist platform continued and the JP lost much of its political support. Public support gradually increased for Ecevit's revitalized RPP and for the more radical leftist and rightist parties. The result was that it became increasingly difficult for a single party to win a majority or to establish a strong government to pursue a rational political strategy. This condition necessitated the formation of a series of coalition governments, frequently

involving parties with diametrically opposed philosophies, which participated in the coalition in order to further their own pet interests (refer to Table 2, page 30). In the national elections of October 1973, the RPP won only 33 percent of the vote, the JP 30 percent, Democratic Party (which grew out of the old DP and with defectors from the JP) 12 percent, National Salvation Party, 12 percent and the Reliance Party 5 percent.¹

Over the next three months, party leaders tried unsuccessfully to form a government. First Ecevit and the RPP tried to form a coalition, then Demirel and the JP was given the chance. This, too, failed. In a nationally televised address, President Koruturk warned of the consequences of the failure of the politicians to organize a government. He concluded by saying that the army was in its barracks and that its commanders continued to hope "that the parliamentary democracy will raise the country to the level of present day civilization."² Koruturk was only too aware that the army was anxious for a settlement. Naim Talu, Prime Minister of the caretaker government tried to form a "grand coalition" government, but quit his efforts in January 1974. Finally, at the insistent prodding of the military, Ecevit was successful in forming a government with an unlikely ally--Necmettin Erbakan and the National Salvation Party. "This coalition was notable because it was so incongruous. Whereas the RPP was left-of-center and secularist, the NSP was committed to Islamic fundamentalist policies and was

distinctly right-of-center."³ For a time, it even looked as if the coalition might work. The July 20, 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkish armed forces unified the nation against what was perceived as a common threat. Ecevit's political stock rose sharply. Even the military, which largely disagreed with the RPP's left of center platform supported Ecevit for his decision to restore order on Cyprus.

In September 1974, sensing that the successful Cyprus operation had sufficiently rallied political support to the RPP, Ecevit announced that the RPP would withdraw from the NSP coalition in order to form a single-party government. This attempt failed. Ecevit had misread his popularity. In rapid succession the JP, then the RPP, then an "above-party" coalition, followed by a conservative JP, RRP, NSP and NAP coalition failed to win the necessary vote of confidence to form a government. Finally, on March 31, 1975, Demirel was successful in forming a "nationalist front" coalition of the JP, NSP, NAP, and RRP which was approved by the slim margin of 222 - 218. This loose alliance would struggle to remain in power until the general elections in June 1977, but it too failed to unify the people or the parliament. On the contrary, Alparslan Turkes, "the head of the NAP, who acted as Deputy Premier,...used his position to infiltrate the police and security services. This tactic greatly acerbated the violence then and later."⁴

Meanwhile, the situation in the nation was growing continually worse. The Turkish economy was immediately effected by the 1973 drastic increase in crude oil prices. The 1974 Cyprus operation put an additional drain on the struggling economy. The 1975 arms embargo imposed by the United States further aggravated the economic climate. Inflationary pressure rose and the Turkish lira was several times devalued against the dollar. In 1976 thousands of DISK-member workers struck, paralyzing life in Turkey's main cities. In 1977, thousands of rightist students demonstrated in Istanbul. Left-right clashes accelerated resulting in the death of hundreds. Outside of Turkey, Armenian terrorists assassinated several Turkish diplomats.

The June 1977 elections failed to produce the hoped-for single party government. The results, similar to the 1973 elections, showed the RPP with 41 percent of the vote, JP with 37 percent, NSP with almost 9 percent, and the NAP with 6 percent. Independents and the other lesser parties accounted for the remaining 7 percent. Again the major party chairmen were left to cast about for willing partners with which to form a coalition government. In June, Ecevit formed a minority government which lost the necessary vote of confidence in parliament less than one month later. Again, Demirel formed a JP-NSP-NAP coalition which received a 229 - 219 vote of confidence in August, only to collapse in December. As 1978 opened, Ecevit formed a RPP-RRP-DP coalition including nine recent defectors from the JP and won

the requisite confidence vote by a margin of 229 - 218. However, the narrow margin of support would again indicate a precarious future for the government. The tenuous parliamentary majority once again had a self-inhibiting effect on the government which led to a predictable inability of the government to prosecute necessary reforms--a characteristic of the decade.

The Ecevit Government

This 22-month period of government under Ecevit was marked by ever-increasing crisis. Economically, Turkey was on the verge of bankruptcy. Only sweeping economic reforms and massive infusions of aid could save the country from bankruptcy. By the end of 1978 Turkey's external debt had increased to almost \$13 billion of which greater than half was in short-term loans. The recession in the industrialized world made Turkey's exports less attractive. By 1979, "Turkey, Peru, and Zaire were regarded as the three countries least able to meet their obligations."⁵ The cost of living was on a sharp rise matched only by the country's soaring inflation rate. The value of the Turkish Lira (TL) fell from 25.00 TL = \$1 in 1978 to 35.35 TL to the dollar in 1979 to 78.00 TL for July 1980. The "real" growth rate of the GNP declined from about 7.7 percent in 1976 to about 3 percent in 1978 to zero in 1979 when the GNP and industrial production actually decreased. Unemployment conversely rose to about 20 percent or more by 1980.⁶

Politically, factionalism within the parliament continued while terrorism in the streets became a way of life--especially among the youth. During Ecevit's term, more than 2,500 persons lost their lives while in just the first seven months of 1980 the number killed in terrorist activities exceeded 2,000.⁷ One of the bloodiest events of the period occurred in the southeast Anatolian town of Kahramanmaras in December 1978 when rightist Sunni Moslems attacked a funeral procession of left-wing Alevi Moslems -- 111 persons lost their lives. In an effort to end the national reign of terror, Ecevit declared martial law in 13 provinces, including Istanbul and Ankara. By the end of his term, martial law would prevail in 20 provinces. While the army was only marginally successful in its efforts to stem the hit-and-run tactics of the terrorists, they were far more effective than the police or security forces (which had also become politically involved in the national politicization plague).⁸ Polarization and terrorism were by this time endemic and growing increasingly virulent. In August 1979 at the opening day ceremonies of Middle East Technical University in Ankara, students refused to stand for the playing of the Turkish National Anthem and instead sang the communist "International." The military, nearing its breaking point, warned that grave consequences would result if the government failed to immediately restore order.

Warning Signals

On October 6, 1979 a frustrated and disillusioned Ecevit handed in his government's resignation. The following week, President Koruturk reluctantly asked Demirel to form yet another government. Demirel's minority government was formed the following month and Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, a JP Senator, was elected speaker of the senate. The military tried its best to remain calm and confident. Chief of the General Staff, General Kenan Evren said in his October 29, 1979 Republic Day speech:

"The Turkish Armed Forces who assumed responsibility for the Republic and democracy, the system best suiting the Turkish nation,...will protect and safeguard the Republic...and exert every effort to strengthen it. ...The ill-intentioned efforts exerted by those who want to take advantage of the economic and political situation prevalent in the country...disturb and grieve our Armed Forces. ...We firmly believe and ardently expect that our nation, (will stand) together on the issues of the integrity of the country and the indivisibility of the nation. ...With this hope, the Turkish Armed Forces, wholeheartedly believing that...Ataturk's principles are the most real guarantee of our future...looks towards the future with confidence..."⁹

Optimism was the note, but the tone of warning was clear.

The New Year's Letter, 1980

Given this warning, it would appear inconceivable that the politicians would return to their petty partisan politics, but that is exactly what they did. The generals would have to clarify their position. They did so in a

letter dated December 27, 1979 which was handed to President Koruturk. The letter, entitled "The Opinion of the Turkish Armed Forces," reproduced here in its entirety, was signed by the Chief of the General Staff and the Commanders of each of the forces; the Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie.

(Emphasis added by the author.)

"The Turkish Armed Forces have faced the necessity of demanding that the constitutional institutions and the political parties in particular, which are effective in and responsible for the administration of the country, should fulfill their duties in establishing the national unity and integrity to counteract anarchy, terrorism and secessionism that have been rapidly escalating each and every day in the extremely important political, economic and social climate our country is in.

On the anniversary of the Kahramanmaras incidents, our nation observed with alarm the anarchic incidents in which our children at the age of elementary and secondary education were forced to take part by organised terrorists.

Our nation can no longer tolerate those who sing the communist international instead of our national anthem, those who try to establish every kind of fascism in our country instead of the democratic system and those instigators of Islamic law, anarchy, destructionism and secessionism.

The employment of the statecraft of those who act according to the political views of their respective parties in power that hire them will inevitably divide the civil servants and citizens. This division created by the political parties causes the formation and strengthening of domestic sources that support anarchy and secessionism and discrimination among the police, teachers and many other establishments as opposing camps which are each others' enemies.

The Turkish Armed Forces have decided to warn those political parties which could not introduce solutions to the political, economic and social problems of our anarchy and separatism that have grown to dimensions threatening the integrity of

the country. They have given concessions to the secessionist and subversive groups and continued their intransigent attitude as a result of unfruitful political bickerings.

The developments in our region are of such a nature that a hot war may break out all of a sudden in the Middle East. The separatists and anarchists at home are rehearsing a general revolt throughout the country.

Under the present circumstances, taking the necessary short and long term measures in the grand Assemblies for providing unity and togetherness in the country and restoring the security of life and property of citizens is of vital importance.

On the other hand, it is being observed with regret that the Commissions have at least been informed, 1.5 months after the opening of the Assemblies and that a consensus has not been reached yet on an agenda for the discussion in the Assembly of the urgent problems of the country which have long awaited solutions.

It is an obvious truth that uniting our citizens as an indivisible whole around national consciousness and ideals in pride, joy and sorrow with the inspiration and enthusiasm stemming from Ataturk nationalism is the fundamental element in providing peace and tranquility in the country. Saving our country from this situation is the duty of both the government and other political parties.

In the face of today's vital problems in our country, the Turkish Armed Forces, fully conscious of its duties and responsibilities ensured by the Internal Service Code, hereby persistently demand all our political parties unite in the direction of the principles of the Constitution and Kemalism by taking into consideration and giving priority to our national interests, in order to take every measure against all sorts of movements such as anarchy, terrorism and secessionism aiming at the destruction of the State, and all other constitutional institutions extend efforts and assistance to this end."¹⁰

Clearly the military was nearing the end of its tolerance. The situation in Turkey as outlined in the letter and in the preceding discussion begged for decisive action.

Still, the reaction of the politicians was not nearly what the generals had hoped for as we shall see.

CHAPTER IV ENDNOTES

¹Shaw, op. cit., p. 429 and Table 6.1, pp. 406-407.

²Nyrop, op. cit. p. 62.

³Ibid., p. 205.

⁴Morris Singer, "Turkey in Crisis", Current History, January 1981, p. 28, and ftn 4 and 5, p. 28.

⁵Ibid., p. 30.

⁶Authors differ on the figure cited here. For contrasting figures, see Constantine Meneges, "The Turkish Opening," The New Republic, March 22, 1980, p. 14; Joseph B. Treaster, "Turkey in the General's Hands," The Nation, December 11, 1982, p. 616, in addition to the articles cited in the following footnotes.

⁷Marvine Howe, "Turkish Factors Agree on One Thing: Democracy is in Danger," New York Times, August 3, 1980, p. E5.

⁸A student explained to me during my 1979 tour of duty in Ankara, that it was easy to recognize the sympathies of the police and security forces by the shape of their moustaches.

⁹Quote excerpted from 12 September in Turkey: Before and After (Ankara: Ogun Kardesler, 1982), pp. 123-124.

¹⁰Extracted from 12 September, pp. 160-161.

CHAPTER V
THE COUP AND THE NSC

"Everything in Turkey can be settled by full compliance with the Constitution...Our Constitution comprises all remedies."

President of the Constitutional Court,
January 3, 1980¹

"The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect and safeguard the Turkish land and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the Constitution."

Article 35--Internal Service Code of the
Turkish Armed Forces²

On January 2, 1980 President Fahri Koruturk summoned the leaders of the two major political parties to the Presidential Palace and presented them with copies of the Armed Forces "New Year's letter." They reacted almost uniformly. Each one acknowledged that there was a significant problem, and each indicated that it was the other's fault--not their own.

Under the clear threat of overt military intervention, the parties were faced with three choices: (1) The government could resign as they did in 1971. Surely the tone and tenor of the letter was the same as it had been then (Demirel was PM then also). (2) The parties could realize the gravity of the situation and form a united front to work jointly on solving the manifest problems facing the nation. This is what the generals had hoped. (3) The factions could

try to shrug off the implications of the letter and continue business as usual. They chose the latter. Their remarks upon leaving the palace were revealing. JP leader Demirel said:

"...there exists a serious situation...We have not built this fire, we are taking pains to put it out. It is not possible to put us in the same category with those who built that fire...I could understand it if the existing government were the cause of current events..."

RPP leader Ecevit observed,

"...Our party has never, whether in power or in opposition, received a warning regarding the protection of democracy. This government, on the other hand, came face to face with such a warning after only its 51st day in power. This shows the difference between us and them...(this letter has) unfortunately made the crisis in Turkey reach a new dimension..."³

The following day, however, Ecevit did offer some concession by agreeing to support a package of government-proposed bills concerned with security matters. The Army stayed in its barracks and hoped for the best.

The following chronology of key events leading up to the coup serves to outline trends which will be assessed later.

Table 5.

CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (1980)⁴

February 10 -- Premier Demirel challenges other parties to support government-proposed economic package or submit to early general elections.

February 11 -- NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan says he is in favor of early elections.

February 12 -- NAP proposes elections be held in spring.

February 14 -- Government forces put down a month-long occupation by militant workers in a state-owned factory in Izmir: 1500 workers arrested.

Istanbul paralyzed as leftist militants force shop keepers to close shutters to protest economic package and resultant price hikes.

RPP chairman Bulent Ecevit says human rights violations worse in Turkey than in Idi Amin's Uganda.

February 16 -- 3 policemen killed and 7 wounded in fighting with left-wing demonstrators in Gultepe, Izmir: 266 arrested.

February 23 -- Martial Law commander, General Bolugiray says there is "an undeclared civil war in Turkey."

February 29 -- Government budget approved in parliament by a vote of 228-209.

March 3 -- 1,500 workers arrested by security forces in Istanbul for illegally occupying a textile factory to protest layoff of 500 employees.

March 28 -- Ahmet Ozturk, an official of the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT), is assassinated in Istanbul.

April 6 -- President Fahri Koruturk leaves office at the end of his 7-year term. Speaker of the Senate, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil becomes acting President until Parliament elects a successor.

April 9 -- JP supports Saadettin Bilgic, as presidential candidate.

April 15 -- RPP proposes former Air Force commander, Muhsin Batur as candidate in presidential race.

April 16 -- Terrorists kill American Navy Chief Petty Officer Sam Novello in Istanbul. Almost a dozen U.S. military personnel killed or wounded in Turkey in previous 2 years.

April 29 -- Martial Law Government bans May Day celebration in 30 provinces.

May 1 -- May Day passes peacefully as citizens choose to stay indoors fearing terrorist acts.

May 13 -- Chief of General Staff, General Kenan Evren urges parties to elect president without delay.

May 15 -- A small group of Islamic fundamentalists chant anti-Ataturk slogans during prayers in Istanbul. The incident is condemned by all parties except NSP.

RPP-supported presidential candidate, Muhsin Batur, withdraws his candidacy.

May 20 -- Army Martial Law commander, Major General Sabri Demirbag, shot and wounded near Istanbul.

May 27 -- Former NAP deputy and cabinet member, Gun Sazak, is assassinated by terrorist in Ankara.

May 28 -- RPP kills JP-proposed constitutional amendment which would permit direct popular election of president when parliament is deadlocked on issue.

May 29 -- NAP holds RPP chief Ecevit indirectly responsible for death of Gun Sazak and says the party may boycott subsequent assembly sessions.

June 2 -- JP presidential candidate, Saadettin Bilgic, withdraws from elections.

JP assembly representatives call for early elections.

June 3 -- JP names Faik Turun and RPP renames Muhsin Batur as their presidential candidates.

June 8 -- RPP leader Ecevit proposes an RPP-JP-NSP coalition under an independent Prime Minister.

June 11 -- Deniz Baykal, an opposition leader within the RPP, criticizes the Ecevit leadership and calls for more effective RPP opposition in parliament.

June 13 -- Demirel says RPP coalition is not an acceptable alternative to JP government.

RPP introduces motion to censure JP government for failing to curb terrorism and for causing further division in the country.

- June 17 -- RPP censure motion read in the Assembly. JP protests saying there is no required quorum of representatives.
- June 19 -- JP and NSP joint NAP in boycotting Assembly session. Session was to have debated RPP-proposed censure motion against minority JP government.
- June 20 -- Demirel challenges Ecevit to go to polls. Ecevit rejects the proposal saying that elections could not be held under JP government.
- June 20 -- NAP local chairman in Gaziosmanpasa, Istanbul, Ali Riza Altinok, and family murdered by terrorists.
- June 24 -- NSP announces that it is withdrawing "moral" support for Demirel government, but would not be responsible for unseating the government.
- June 25 -- Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (DISK) opens convention with revolutionary songs and slogans.
- July 2 -- Demirel government survives no-confidence vote, 227 to 214, with unexpected support from NSP.
- July 4 -- Two army battalions arrive in Corum to suppress fighting between leftists and rightists. 18 people are killed.
- July 9 -- Fatsa township falls under control of leftist factions and "peoples committees." Severe battles occur between town leftists and village rightists. On July 11, security forces and military conduct security crackdown arresting 300 persons including extremist mayor.
- July 12 -- Acting President Caglayangil appeals to two major party leaders to compromise on presidential elections.
- July 15 -- Terrorists assassinate RPP Istanbul representative Abdurrahman Korsaloglu, who is first "sitting parliamentarian" to be killed by terrorists.
- July 18 -- RPP introduces censure motion against Minister of Interior, Mustafa Gulcigil, for his inability to control the nation's reign of terror.
- July 19 -- Former Prime Minister Nihat Erim assassinated by four terrorists near Istanbul.

July 21 -- Interior Minister, Gulcigil, quits his post after criticism of the growing terrorism.

July 22 -- In Istanbul, the President of the Metal Workers' Union and former President of DISK, Kemal Turkler, is assassinated.

July 27 -- Two rightist terrorists, who were sentenced to die, escape from top security Mamak Prison in Ankara.

July 31 -- Ecevit accuses Demirel of limiting Armed Forces ability to deal with terrorism.

August 1 -- Strike of 2100 workers at OYAK (Renault car factory) begins.

August 4 -- National Assembly fails to convene. NSP was to introduce motion of censure against Foreign Minister. RPP accuses JP of running away from parliamentary supervision by not attending assembly meetings.

August 6 -- Parliament fails to convene. RPP was to introduce censure motion against Finance Minister Ismet Sezgin. Joint Commission deadlocked on measures to increase Martial Law authority.

August 8 -- Prime Minister Demirel challenges RPP to go to early elections. RPP leader Ecevit accuses JP of obstructing parliamentary activities for past 6 months. 22 right-wing terrorists sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of over 100 people in Karamanmaras.

August 15 -- NSP introduces motion to hold early elections in October. RPP strongly objects.

August 19 -- Authorities discover a 60-meter long underground tunnel at Kayseri Prison. Two days later a 30-meter tunnel is discovered at Bayrampasa Prison in Istanbul.

August 22 -- In Ankara, Sadik Ozkan, leader of a 30,000 member union is shot and killed by terrorists.

August 23 -- A Moslem fundamentalist guerrilla training camp discovered in Kayseri.

August 24 -- Six leftist prisoners escape from Sagmalcilar Prison in Istanbul.

AD-A146 860


DEMOCRACY BY COUP: THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT UNDER
MILITARY CONTROL (1980-1983) (U) ARMY COMMAND AND
GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS B A VANDERCLUTE
MAY 84 SBI-AD-E751 154


2/2

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 5/4

NL





COPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

August 30 -- Chief of General Staff Evren visibly angered by absence of NSP chairman Erbakan at Victory Day celebration.

September 5 -- Foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen unseated in 231 to 2 censure vote.

September 6 -- RPP Chairman Ecevit tells Petrol-IS Trade Union meeting that workers need to be more active in politics. In a separate incident a group of Moslem extremists refuses to sing the National Anthem at NSP rally in Konya. Others carry anti-secularist signs and chant similar slogans.

September 11 -- NSP Chairman Erbakan says his party is determined to bring down Demirel government.

September 12 -- The Turkish Armed Forces, headed by General Kenan Evren, take over control of the government.

This list of significant events, while not extensive, points to several important trends which finally resulted in the 12 September coup:

1. Terrorism, while a prominent aspect of the previous decade, was on the rise. Moreover, the terrorists were getting increasingly brazen, sophisticated, and selective in targeting their victims. Prominent leftists were being targeted by rightist elements and the right wing was set upon by the left. Other factions took pride in the assassination of either side. A right-wing terrorist group, the Turkish Revenge Brigade, claimed responsibility for killing leftist labor leader Kemal Turkler.⁵ An extreme leftist group, DEV-SOL or Revolutionary Left, bragged of their responsibility for the death of rightist NAP deputy chairman, Gun Sazak.⁶ The same DEV-SOL group dropped a note at the scene of moderate former Prime Minister Nihat Erim's

assassination which read: "We have punished Gun Sazak. We are now punishing Nihat Erim."⁷

2. The military was becoming increasingly involved in Martial Law matters with greater forces and authority. Two battalions of soldiers were sent to Corum to separate the warring factions. Thousands of soldiers were involved in putting down riots at the Taris thread factory in Izmir.⁸ General Evren said: "To end terrorism, more authority should be given to the commanders and punishments must be increased."⁹ The desired authority was given to the commanders in July 1980."¹⁰

3. Political parties continued their bickering and infighting -- even accelerating the pace, while the wheels of government ground to a halt. Politicians directly contributed to the factionalization of the public. Ecevit accused the Demirel government of terrorizing the population through "the cruelest Nazi methods." Demirel countered that Ecevit's RPP was inciting the workers.¹¹ NAP leader Alparslan Turkes called Ecevit a "moral murderer" for his verbal attacks of the NAP. Ecevit had called the party "the center of right-wing terrorism."¹² Turkish columnist Oktay Eksi had this to say in an article:

"Now everybody is asking each other: Who killed RPP Istanbul National Deputy Abdurrahman Koksaloglu?

Who, indeed? First his own party, the members of that party in parliament, the members in parliament of the Justice Party which sits in the seat of government at the moment, the national deputies and senators of the Nationalist Action Party which is

engaged in a violent quarrel with the Republican Peoples Party, the National Salvation Party which, though it declared from the beginning that this nation would not succeed with the present government, helped form this government, thinking, "Let the country sink a little more and see how valuable we are" -- they all joined hands and killed Abdurrahman Koksaloglu."¹³

Communist Ismail Cem painted an even gloomier picture:

"...the institution of politics, which has assumed one of society's most important functions, is not doing its job properly. Pitted against gigantic problems it is neither generating ideas, proposals and models, nor is it originating practical solutions and putting them into use. Thus, there emerges an example of a society in which the one and only institution--namely politics--trusted with the function of determining the diseases afflicting this society and proposing its own methods of treatment seems to have resigned from its job....The situation is truly worrisome. For example, the institution of politics has not brought a single comprehensive, broad and persistent plan to counter terror. It has left virtually all responsibility to the security forces and the judges and has itself assumed the role of a kind of spectator."¹⁴

4. Security forces, prison guards among them, also had become politicized. Each believed he could violate the law to accommodate his own political (or financial) objectives. The prison breaks and tunneling operations are symptomatic.

Legal court "justice minister Omer Ucuzal announced at the end of July (1980) that 925 prisoners had escaped from different jails since the Demirel government came to office nine months ago. He said, however, that 3,000 had fled prison during Mr. Ecevit's 22-month tenure preceeding Mr. Demirel's."¹⁵

5. The opposition parties changed their tactics in an effort to gain power. Neither the JP with 187 seats, nor

the RPP with 205 seats had sufficient power on their own to win a majority of the 450-seat Assembly. The NSP, with 22 votes constituted the parliamentary balance between the two big parties. Both the JP and the RPP openly courted the NSP for its votes, but NSP leader Erbakan always wanted too much in the way of concessions for his relatively few--but important--votes. Several times the opposition parties tried to unseat the Demirel government, but had been unsuccessful.¹⁶ They therefore adopted a new tactic of censuring the cabinet ministers one at a time. If they couldn't take the government out in one swipe, they'd dismantle it piece by piece.

6. Factory workers and leftist labor organizers became increasingly bold. Violence in the work place became common. A very tender nerve was touched, however, when 1500 workers walked off their jobs at the OYAK-owned Renault car plant. OYAK, the Turkish Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (whose General Committee is comprised of, among others, the Chief of the General Staff, Commanders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Gendarmerie), undoubtably lost income during the period.¹⁷ This could not have had a stabilizing effect on the commanders.

7. In five months of trying, the parliament failed to elect a new President of the Republic. Although the President of Turkey was largely a figurehead, the stalemate over the election blocked other important legislation and was

symptomatic of the rift among parliamentarians. Demirel proposed a constitutional change which would provide for direct election of the president. Ecevit rejected the proposal as a move to set up a presidential system based on the French model. General Evren was personally embarrassed by the impasse when, while attending a NATO meeting in Brussels, the allied chiefs of staff asked him when Turkey would elect a new president. The general responded (some interpreted the statement as a threat): "I believe it's time, in fact the time has passed, for all the parties to get together to resolve this problem."¹⁸

8. A final trend also evident was a philosophical mind-set somewhere between fatalism and masochism--almost a death wish on the part of the major parliamentarians. In the face of repeated significant threats from the population and the military, the politicians continued to lead the chaos -- almost as if tempting fate to intercede. Probably the most striking example of this was NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan. As previously discussed, his party was openly courted by the two major parties for its balance-of-power decisive votes. While Erbakan may have been sought after by the politicians for one reason, he was also pursued by the Army for a different one. Two weeks prior to the coup, at the National Victory Day celebration (roughly the equivalent of the U.S.'s 4th of July) in Ankara, Chief of Staff, General Evren was

perturbed by Erbakan's conspicuous absence. In his address to those present at the gathering, Evren said:

"Those treacherous and stupid creators of anarchy, aiming at the treacherous destruction of the democratic order and integrity of the country through the chaos they are aspiring to, will certainly be punished the way they deserve. Like similar ones who tried the same thing in the past, they will perish under the devastating fist of the Turkish Armed Forces."¹⁹

Later, in responding to reporters' questions, the two had the following exchange:

Evren: "As the Chief of the General Staff, I want to know whether Mr. Necmettin Erbakan is for or against 30 August. This is my question."

Erbakan: "We are neither for nor against but right within the 30 August Victory Day."

Evren: "It is not sufficient to be within 30 August merely with words. NSP Chairman Erbakan should prove with his behavior that he is within 30 August."²⁰

One week later, Erbakan appeared at a political rally in Konya. Participants at the rally shouted slogans such as "Seriati (Islamic Law) will come, savagery will go," "secularism is atheism," and "The Koran is our Constitution." During the demonstration it was announced that the National Anthem would be sung, to which the crowd replied: "We want the sound of the ezan (call to prayer)...we won't sing this march." Erbakan, rather than chastizing the throng, encouraged them, to which some youngsters in the crowd responded "order us to shoot, we will shoot; order us to die, we will die."²¹ To the generals, this was the worst sort of

affront--and neighbor Iran's fundamentalist Islamic revolution was fresh in everyone's mind.

To be sure, the Demirel regime was not completely without some success. The government concluded the Turkish-American Defense Cooperation agreement which reaffirmed U.S. support of the nation. Under the skilled and talented leadership of Turgut Ozal, a financial advisor and under secretary to the Prime Minister, Turkey secured a pledge of \$1.16 billion in aid from the 24-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in mid-April. Ozal said at the time that the loan was equal to about half of Turkey's needs.²² He then engineered a second \$1.6 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund.²³

The Coup

Less than 48 hours before the coup, the "Security Commission" convened for the last time.

"Besides Interior Minister Orhan Eren, other participants in the meeting to discuss public order problems were Undersecretary Durmus Yalcin, Gendarmerie Commander General Sedat Celasun, top officials from the General Staff, Security Directorate General and Interior, Justice, National Education and Customs and Monopolies ministries and the governors of Ankara, Istanbul, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Konya, Samsun, Adana, Gaziantep and Denizli."²⁴

Prime Minister Demirel sent the following message to the Interior Minister concerning the Commission:

"The foremost duty of the state is to ensure the reign of law and order. The result of this is safety of life and property. A nation's government does this by legitimate means, staying on legitimate

grounds and using the legitimate powers of the state. This is the badge of the state.

"If there is any breakdown in the performance of this duty, it must be identified and eliminated.

"Today in Turkey, there is not only a breakdown in the performance of this duty but the quintessence of the legal state and the integrity of the regime, the nation and the people are also being abused and attacked. There is no need to say that this has reached the point of serious crisis.

"The state and the nation have their work cut out for them. No one should pit the resources and capabilities of those who aggrieve Turkey against the power of the state. In the end, the tools of treason, the murderers and criminals will suffer the punishment of the state."²⁵

Earlier, a newspaper columnist had this to say:

"To make a long story short, the real enemy of the state in Turkey is not the street tough. The enemy of the state is the politicians who will not give it guidance, who block its ability to function "impartially." Nothing will change until these men stop selling this state for temporary political gain."²⁶

At approximately 11:00 p.m. on the night of May 11, 1980, the black military sedans of the Chief of the Armed Forces and the four Force Commanders, pulled away from the officers' quarters and moved through the darkened streets of Ankara carrying the commanders to their individual headquarters. The coup was underway. Tanks and armored personnel carriers moved into the capital after midnight to take up their positions at key intersections and buildings, including the offices of the National Radio and Television Network.

The political party leaders received word of the coup from nightwatchmen stationed at their party headquarters. At 3:15 a.m., an hour before the official announcement of the coup, Mr. Ecevit said by telephone that he could see military vehicles all around his home. "I don't know what is happening," he said, "but I am told that the Army has taken over."²⁷ At 4:15 a.m. General Evren began his broadcast discussion of the events which led to the coup. He said:

"...Citizens even in the most remote corners of the country have become the targets of attacks and suppression and pushed into the threshold of a civil war...the Turkish Armed Forces...took the decision to fulfill its duty of protecting and safeguarding the Turkish Republic as laid down under its Internal Service Code...to preserve the integrity of the country...and to avert a possible civil war and fratricide..."²⁸

Evren went on to say that the government and parliament had been dissolved and that martial law and a curfew had been proclaimed throughout the whole country.

The coup itself was a surprise to no one. "Turkey's generals had given ample warning: Five times this year they served notice to the politicians to put aside bickering and face the problems dragging the nation toward anarchy," observed New York Times Ankara correspondent Marvine Howe.²⁹

The generals took meticulous care to legitimize the coup--in fact the word 'coup' is not used to describe the event in Turkish literature. Officially it was called the "Operation for the Protection and Safeguarding of the Republic," in obvious reference to the Article 35 of the

Armed Forces Internal Code. On the other hand, the word 'coup' may not fairly describe the event. As Robert A. Lincoln points out "the tyranny of language is the first problem. English has two standard words when a government is overthrown: coup for the action and junta for the actors.

... Popular reaction to coup and junta is almost sure to be unfavorable."³⁰ The terms surely conjure up visions of dictators wearing their "Sam Browne" belts and hobnail boots posturing in front of the cowering masses. But clearly this was not the case here.

The National Security Council (NSC) Government

The Generals immediately set about the business of running the nation's affairs. The NSC members apparently had learned the lessons taught by the previous coups. Membership in the NSC was limited to the Chief of General Staff, General Kenan Evren, and the four forces commanders: General Nurettin Ersin, Commander, Turkish Land Forces; General Tahsin Sahinkaya, Commander, Turkish Air Forces; Admiral Nejat Tumer, Commander, Turkish Naval Forces; and General Sedat Celasun, Commander of the Gendarmerie Forces. General Evren, Chairman of the NSC, even went so far as to admit that he and the forces commanders had violated one of Ataturk's most espoused principles -- that serving soldiers could not be serving politicians -- but he also cautioned that while they had broken that rule, they would allow no others to follow suit.³¹

A little more than 24 hours after seizing the government, the NSC ordered the tanks off the streets and told the ranking civil servants to take over the day-to-day running of their ministries. Unlike the NUC government two decades earlier, the NSC would not fill the key bureaucratic positions from their own ranks, rather they would allow the professional technicians to get on with the business in their own areas of responsibility. This was a clear indication that they trusted the government workers to proceed with their functions. One day after the coup, life in the capital had returned to normal. Only martial law, which had already been in the city since 1978, and an 8:00 p.m. curfew remained in effect.³²

The politicians did not fare as well as the bureaucrats. The NSC had prepared lists of politicians and extremist group members to be rounded up. While the army was busy rounding up the suspected and known terrorists on their lists, over 100 politicians had already been detained by the military authorities. Most prominent among those being held were Demirel and Ecevit who were held in a military resort camp near Canakkale (Gallipoli). Erbakan was at the island-headquarters of the Aegean Army near Ismir. Alparslan Turkes, leader of the NAP, was still at large. In a proclamation issued by Evren, Turkes was ordered to turn himself into the authorities or be considered a criminal. Two trade union leaders were also detained.³³

On September 16, 1980, General Evren, who was now Head of State and Chairman of the NSC, in addition to retaining his position as Chief of the General Staff, held his first press conference. At the gathering, Evren read a prepared speech which outlined the goals and objectives of the NSC government, consistent with "the reforms and principles of Ataturk." The target programs included:

(1) "To safeguard the national unity." The possibility of a ruinous civil war was on the minds of the generals. As mentioned earlier, they were alarmed about of the potential for a Khomeini-style Islamic revolution. The on-going civil war in Lebanon was also of concern. Both the leftist and rightist extremist groups had indicated their desire for revolution so that a Marxist-Leninist state or a neo-fascist one could result. There were also indicators that the political polarization which had paralyzed the country, had also infiltrated the armed forces.³⁵ At any rate, prevention of a civil revolution topped the NSC's program.

(2) "To establish security of life and property by curbing anarchy and terror." This was a logical choice for second in the NSC's list of priority tasks. Evren had already announced in his national address on the day of the coup that terrorist attacks had already taken 5,241 lives in 1980 alone. In contrast, the general went on, the War of Independence from 1919-1923 took 5,713 lives.³⁶

(3) "To establish and safeguard the authority of the state." By this, the NSC probably meant to consolidate the NSC government, and to enhance the power and prestige of the military as the "authority of the state." The government's Prime Minister and Cabinet were named just five days later, while the armed forces were strengthened by increased Martial Law authority and a proposed modernization program.³⁷

(4) "To establish social peace, national understanding, and unity." As was the case of the 1960 coup, the Armed Forces wanted this operation to be seen as completely legal and necessary. The junta sought not only 'national understanding,' but at least tolerance on the part of the international forum as well.

(5) "To secure the functioning of the republican regime based on social justice, individual rights and freedoms, and human rights." Here is a clear case of appealing to the international arena. All of the requisite wards are there: 'social justice', 'human rights' and 'individual freedom' -- the international equivalent of motherhood and apple pie.

(6) "To reestablish civil administration after completing legal arrangements in a reasonable time." Now this is the key point that the Turkish people--indeed the international community--were looking for. The junta would not install itself as the permanent government, but would eventually turn the reigns over to a civilian administration.

The reference to 'legal arrangements' could imply two things: a revision of the legal structure of government, or trials for those who were the cause of the coup. As it turned out, both were the case.

"They have bitten off a hell of a lot," observed one western diplomat of the NSC. "And they'd better start chewing fast."³⁸ Reaction world-wide was very similar. Most nations accepted the coup as a necessary intervention by the only dedicated and organized patriotic institution remaining in Turkey. Opinion was almost universal that Demirel and Ecevit had been acting out their personal animosities at the expense of the nation. Western reporters expressed the opinion that military intervention was an inevitable evil -- given the situation in Turkey. Warsaw Pact nations reported the event, but reserved comment. All expressed the hope that civilian government would return quickly.³⁹ Domestic (Turkish) reaction was similar. Ironically, the same press which had been egging on the politicians, now roundly condemned them.

The NSC Prime Minister and Council of Ministers

Within the general framework provided in the foregoing six stated objectives, the NSC moved rapidly to begin their program. On September 20, retired Admiral and former Chief of Naval Forces, Bulent Ulusu, was asked to serve as Prime Minister and to form a government. One day later, the 26-man Council of Ministers was announced.

Obviously, most of the ministers were asked to join the NSC government earlier on--some on the day of the coup. The council's final composition was made public on September 21.

Table 6

NSC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
(September 21, 1980)

Prime Minister	Bulent Ulusu
Deputy Premier (economic affairs)	Turgut Ozal
Deputy Premier	Zeyyat Baykara
State Minister	Ilhan Oztrak
State Minister	Mehmet Nimet Ozdas
State Minister	Mehmet Ozgunes
Justice	Cevdet Megtes
National Defense	Umit Haluk Bayulken
Interior	Selahattin Cetiner
Foreign Affairs	Ilter Turkmen
Finance	Kaya Erdem
Education	Hasan Saglam
Public Works	Tahsin Onalp
Trade	Cemal Canturk
Health	Necmettin Ayanoglu
Customs and Monopolies	Recai Baturalp
Transportation and Communication	Necmi Ozgur
Agriculture and Forestry	Regai Baturalp
Labor	Turhan Esener
Industry and Natural Resources	Serbulent Bingol
Rural Affairs	Munir Raif Guney
Tourism and Culture	Ilhan Evliyaoglu
Housing	Serif Tuten
Youth and Sports	Vecdi Ozgul
Social Security	Sadik Side

Source: Extracted from Ilnur Cevik, Turkey 1983 Almanac
(Ankara: Turkish Daily News Press, 1983), pp.
129-130.

In general terms, the ministers consisted of 13 former government officials, 7 retired generals, 4 college professors, a labor union leader, a journalist, and an industrialist.⁴⁰ Apparent from the selection ministers was the NSC's concern for the economy. Both Deputy Premiers were economists: Turgut Ozal was a member of ousted Prime Minister Demirel's cabinet and was the architect of Turkey's austerity program and chief negotiator for the OECD and IMF loans; Zeyyat Baykara was also a former Ministry of Finance official. Ozal would have primary responsibility for economic affairs. Two of Turkey's most accomplished diplomats were also included in the cabinet: Foreign Minister Iltar Turkmen was formerly an aide to the foreign minister and had served as Turkey's ambassador to Athens and Moscow. Defense Minister Haluk Bayulken was a former foreign minister and aide to President Koruturk. He had also served as ambassador to Britain and as Turkey's chief delegate to the United Nations. Nine of the ministers had formerly served as ministers during previous interim governments.

Less than a week after the announcement of the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu announced his government's program. In a speech delivered to the NSC, Council of Ministers, top bureaucrats, diplomats, and generals, Ulusu said that his government's "main mission" was to establish measures, readjust institutions, and amend the law so that the "Turkish republic will not once more fall

into such difficult circumstances." In order to "prepare the ground for smooth functioning of the (forthcoming) parliamentary democracy" the government would carry on with Ozal's economic austerity program and make sweeping changes in the existing legal, education, finance, and labor relations systems.

One of the foremost targets of reform would be 1961 Constitution which Uluusu claimed was far too liberal for Turkey. "The separation of powers introduced by this Constitution degenerated, in effect, into a conflict of powers," he said. Additionally, he promised the government would speed up the work of civilian and military courts, introduce tax reforms designed to relieve low-income workers, and establish a stricter set of rules for labor organizations designed to prevent politicization.⁴¹

In this first official act of the Council of Ministers, the NSC tried to make the point that the government had already been turned over to the civilians--an assertion which few believed. The NSC generals retained veto power over all aspects of Turkish life. They were squarely back in the director's chair and the Ministers and bureaucrats merely actors. On September 22, the Martial Law Commanders, who had taken over the administration in virtually every location in Turkey, were given broad authority in a revision to the Martial Law Act, law number 1402. The powers vested in the Martial Law Commanders

included: censorship of the press, radio, television, books, pamphlets, placards; complete halt or ban on all union activities; ban or require permits for all meetings or demonstrations; close, restrict or control operating hours of all restaurants, theaters, night clubs and other such places of entertainment; and double the pre-coup fines and penalties for infractions of the law. Additionally, the military was generous in rewarding itself for "Martial Law duty." Via a complicated point system, soldiers and selected civilians who participated in the administration of Martial Law could qualify to receive significant tax-free per diem bonuses.⁴²

Program of the NSC Government

The NSC government's program was made public by Prime Minister Bulent Ulusu on September 28, 1980. The major thrust of the program was just what the junta wanted to hear:

"1. The principles of Ataturk will be our guide. The paths we take will illuminate and manifest these principles.

2. Activities of anarchy, religious provocation and separatism aimed at the integrity and indivisibility of our nation will be utterly destroyed.

3. We are determined to disperse every dark cloud looming on the horizon of our beloved homeland. Our constant goal, therefore, will be to strive to assure everyone an income by which he can live humanely, to win the struggle with unemployment, to render the high cost of living ineffectual and to improve the prosperity and welfare of the nation with each passing day."⁴³

The program included provisions for drafting a new Constitution, revamping necessary political, administrative,

economic, social and cultural institutions, and for careful analysis and change of outmoded laws and practices. A State of Emergency law would be prepared as soon as possible; State Security Courts established; fiscal reform and tax practices revised; industry, national resources and education revitalized; and the defense and foreign policy postures strengthened. Additionally, each minister was charged with specific tasks to be accomplished within his own ministry's area of responsibility.

The program was ambitious indeed, but several things had not changed. Most notably, economic boss Turgut Ozal would continue the economic program which he had instituted for the country almost nine months earlier. The government would also take into immediate consideration those bills which had been introduced during the previous regime's watch, but had not been acted on due to the bottleneck caused by the politicians' bickering. Several of these necessary laws were passed in rapid order.

The NSC Political Process

The form which the political process under the NSC would assume was made clear on September 29, 1980, when the 12-section, 24-Article "Charter of the National Security Council" was published in the Resmi Gazete, Turkey's equivalent of the Congressional Record.

"The charter, which was published as Decision No. 1 of the National Security Council, gives the

National Security Council the authority of passing laws and supervision.

According to statutes of the charter, the National Security Council will meet on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays to carry out its legislative duties. Laws will be proposed by members of the National Security Council or by the Council of Ministers. The security council will, at all times, be able to supervise the Council of Ministers and can request from it written or verbal information. The Council of Ministers can be ousted by a simple majority vote of the members of the security council, and investigations of and legal proceedings against council of Ministers' members can be initiated by a decision of the security council."⁴⁴

Obviously, government under the NSC was going to be a one-way street. Because this charter is so important in explaining the NSC political process, it is reproduced as Annex A.

Section One of the charter established the NSC and listed its members. Sections Two and Three established the NSC secretariat and "Expert Commissions" to assist the NSC. Sections Four, Seven and Twelve outlined administrative procedures. Sections Five, Six, Eight, and Nine, the meat of the document, detailed procedures the NSC would use to vote upon and enact legislation, and listed the controls exercised by the NSC over the Council of Ministers. There were no controls listed over the NSC. In Section Eleven, the NSC appropriated to itself the assets of the former legislative bodies which it had displaced. In short, the charter consolidated all state power in the NSC, and specifically in its Chairman, General Kenan Evren. The rule of the generals was now firmly in place. Their subordinates, through the

Martial Law Command, held virtually every key administrative position in the nation. On September 30, the NSC gave its vote of confidence to the Ulusu government.

Evren perceived that only one significant threat to the NSC rule remained unchecked--his own military. In a speech delivered during the ceremony held to mark the opening of the academic year at the Ground Forces War College in Ankara, Evren in effect said: "Do as I say, and not as I do." What he actually said was:

"My sons, beware, in this day and age, against involvement in politics. If we are thrown into politics today it is because we are required to be so in order to extricate our country, as always, from the disastrous situation into which it has fallen..."

He continued:

"...use our takeover as an example, and beware against involvement in politics. We undertook this action within a chain of command in order to save the army from politics and to keep it from being involved in politics. If we had not done this, the army, as it had done previously, would have entered politics. Look carefully. We have accomplished this with a five-person chain of command. We are expending every sort of effort so that the ranks below us do not become involved in politics. And we are determined to return to our basic duties within a short time, when true democratic rule is instilled in our nation."⁴⁵

With this admonition to his fellow soldiers, the consolidation of power was complete. It had been a relatively easy task to seize control of the government. Popular support was squarely behind the NSC and Evren. But now would begin the more formidable task of preparing the country to receive democracy once more.

CHAPTER V ENDNOTES

¹12 September in Turkey: Before and After (Ankara: Ogun Kardesler, 1982), p. 163.

²Ibid., p. 225.

³A more complete text of these statements and others is contained in 12 September, pp. 162-163. An analysis of the text and reactions is in "Turkey: A New Year's Warning," Time, January 14, 1980, p. 40.

⁴Data extracted from multiple sources including Ilnur Cevik, Turkey 1983 Almanac, (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Press, 1983), pp. 43-49; Index of Current History, 1980 and New York Times, 1980.

⁵"Workers in Turkey Protest a Murder," New York Times, July 24, 1980, p. 7.

⁶"Rightist Turkish Politician is Slain," New York Times, May 29, 1980, p. 4.

⁷Marvine Howe, "Ex-Prime Minister of Turkey is Slain," New York Times, July 20, 1980, p. 5.

⁸Details are in two articles by Marvine Howe for the New York Times: "Turkish Troops Quell State Workers' Revolt At a Factory in Izmir," February 15, 1980, p. 7; and "Turkish Armed Forces Chief Seeks Antiterrorist Moves," February 16, 1980, p. 2.

⁹Howe, "Turkish Armed Forces Chief Seeks...", New York Times, February 16, 1980, p. 2.

¹⁰The military's increased powers were the result of a brief joining by Demeril and Ecevit to enact legislature to reinforce the authority of martial law commanders and to streamline the functioning of the courts system. See Marvine Howe, "Turkish Premier and His Main Foe Unite Against Terrorism," New York Times, July 26, 1980, p. 3.

¹¹Howe, "Turkish Troops Quell State Workers Revolt..."

¹²"Rightist Turkish Politician is Slain," New York Times, May 29, 1980, p. 4.

¹³Oktay Eski, "Why Ask?," Istanbul Hurriyet, July 17, 1980, p. 3.

¹⁴Ismail Cem "Politics that Cannot Generate Solutions," Hurriyet, June 6, 1980, p. 10.

¹⁵Marvine Howe, "Prisoners Rule Turkey's Jails and Often Flee," New York Times, August 13, 1980; p. 7.

¹⁶Marvin Howe, "Turkish Government Survives No-Confidence Vote," New York Times, July 3, 1980, p. 6.

¹⁷Oyak or Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu, was set up during the NUC period (1961) when officers did not have an adequate insurance program. It invests capital on behalf of its members, who in turn derive financial benefit. Income is received from the fund's investments and from obligatory payments to the fund of 10 percent of monthly salaries of active officers and civilians. See Roger Paul Nye, The Military in Turkish Politics, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1974), beginning on page 241.

¹⁸"34 Turks Slain in Growing Violence as Generals Demand Political Action," New York Times, May 31, 1980.

¹⁹12 September, p. 210.

²⁰Ibid., p. 211.

²¹Ibid., pp. 215-216.

²²"Turkey Receives Pledge of \$1.16 billion in Aid," New York Times, April 16, 1980, p. A15.

²³Ann Crittendon, "I.M.F. Grants Turkey Record \$1.6 Billion Loan," New York Times, June 19, 1980, p. D1.

²⁴"Interior Minister Addresses Anarchy Issue," Istanbul Tercuman, September 11, 1980, pp. 1, 12.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Oktay Eksi, "Is This Preservation?," Istanbul Hurriyet, July 16, 1980, p. 3.

²⁷John Kifner, "Turkish Coup Chiefs Make Vow to Bring Stability to Nation," New York Times, September 13, 1980, pp. 1, 4.

²⁸The complete text of the broadcast is contained in 12 September, pp. 225-233. It should be compared with the

statement issued following the 1960 coup (pages 45-46 of this thesis) for their remarkable similarity.

²⁹Marvine Howe, "Military's Motives in Turkey," New York Times, September 13, 1980, pp. 1, 4.

³⁰Robert A. Lincoln, "Preserving Democracy By Coup," Army, August 1981, p. 23.

³¹This information was provided by my Turkish classmates. See also Evren's speech, partially quoted on page 106 and footnote 45.

³²"New Turkish Rulers Give Ministry Aides Broad Civil Powers," New York Times, September 14, 1980, pp. 1, 22.

³³Ibid.

³⁴The initial NSC program is recounted in 12 September, p. 237.

³⁵The suggestion that "In acting, as they thought, to save the country, the junta may also have acted to save their beloved army," is found in John Kifner, "The Turks Have a Word for It -- Kemalism," New York Times, September 21, 1980, p. E4.

³⁶12 September, p. 229.

³⁷Morris Singer, "Turkey in Crisis," Current History, January 1981, p. 29.

³⁸Kifner, "The Turks Have a Word."

³⁹An especially interesting article on Turkey's view of the world's opinion of the coup is in "Worldwide Reactions," Istanbul Cumhuriyet, September 14, 1980, pp. 1, 7. The article, in Turkish, quotes reactions from The New York Times, France's Le Monde, Belgium's Le Soir, Germany's Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, De Welt, and Stuttgarter Nachrichten, England's BBC, TASS, and others. A particularly good interview in the German press with Turkish constitutional expert, Aydin Yalcin is in "Like in the Weimar Republic," Hamburg Der Spiegel, September 22, 1980, pp. 145, 148.

⁴⁰"New Cabinet is Formed in Turkey," New York Times, September 22, 1980, pp. 1, 3.

⁴¹The NSC government program is summarized in "New Turkish Premier Promises Range of Changes," New York Times, September 28, 1980, p. 9. It is interesting to compare this

summary with the 'official' summary contained in 12 September, pp. 238-241, and the full program reported in "Provisions of Program Given," Istanbul Cumhuriyet, September 28, 1980, pp. 1, 7.

⁴²Provisions of revised law 1402 are in "Stiffer Penalties Given for Crimes," Istanbul Milliyet, September 22, 1980, p. 7.

⁴³The major provisions of the government's 27-page program are listed in "Provisions of Program Given," Istanbul Cumhuriyet, September 28, 1980, pp. 1, 7 with additional provisions noted in Milliyet, September 23, 1980, p. 9.

⁴⁴This quote and details of the NSC charter are listed without comment in "National Security Council Charter Published," Istanbul Tercuman, October 1, 1980, pp. 1, 9.

⁴⁵General Evren's speech is excerpted in "Evren Speaks at War College Ceremony," Istanbul Tercuman, October 1, 1980, pp. 1, 9. The speech is also found in 12 September, pp. 301-304.

CHAPTER VI
NARROW ROAD TO CIVILIAN RULE

Shortly after the September 12 coup, the German Magazine Der Spiegel printed an interview with the head of the Turkish Department of International Relations of the Political Sciences Faculty, Professor Aydin Yalcin:

"Spiegel: For the third time in 20 years, Professor, the Army has assumed power in a democratically governed Turkey. Why are the Turks having such a hard time with democracy?

Yalcin: To start with: Turkey has had more experience with democracy than Germany. The army intervened in our country in order to save democracy.

Spiegel: Is it necessary to expunge one evil with another? Can democracy really be saved only by undemocratic means?

Yalcin: The Turkish army is not one of coup-obsessed and power-hungry colonels such as exist in other countries...Our armed forces are made of different stuff..."¹

As in a former chapter, it may be useful once again to provide a historical summary of events under the NSC government in order to frame an appropriate perspective from which to analyze key trends and events -- and to draw conclusions. That summary follows.

Table 7.

Historical Summary of NSC Period

- September 12, 1980 - Turkish Armed Forces stage coup d'etat ("Operation for the Protection and Safeguarding of the Republic").
- September 20 - Retired Admiral Bulent Ulusu named Prime Minister and asked to form government.
- September 20 - 26-man Council of Ministers announced.
- September 21 - Martial Law commanders given broad new powers under sweeping revision of Martial Law Act.
- September 27 - Government program announced.
- September 29 - NSC charter published.
- October 1 - Chief of General Staff and NSC Chairman Kenan Evren, warns military to stay out of politics.
- October 6 - Trials of former parliamentarians begin.
- October 11 - Most former parliamentarians allowed to return to their homes.
- October 27 - "Law on the Constitutional Order" enters into effect.
- November 11 - Moderate leftist, pro-RPP newspaper Cumhuriyet closed by martial law command for "exaggerated and baseless" reports. Paper allowed to reopen on November 20.
- November 30 - 1981 budget is announced. 20% of national outlay in defense area.
- January 7, 1981 - Penal Code amended to provide death penalty for killing a civil servant while on duty.
- January 23 - Two retired generals, Cevdet Tanyeli and Necati Ozkaner, assume key positions in the official Turkish Anatolian News Agency.
- February 9 - Economic Affairs Coordination Council established.
- April 24 - Trial of NSP party chief, Necmettin Erbakan and 34 party members begins in Ankara. WAP leader Alparslan

Turkes and 587 party members also go on trial in Ankara beginning April 29.

- June 2 - NSC reminds politicians that all political activity, comment, or speculation is banned.
- June 4 - A rightist terrorist is hanged for killing a lawyer. This marks the fifth terrorist to be executed since the coup.
- June 9 - Martial Law Act again amended. Prior sentences of up to 3 years cannot be appealed.
- June 30 - Law on the formation of the Constituent Assembly takes affect.
- July 10 - NSC announces that Constituent (Consultative) Assembly will have first meeting on October 23.
- July 30 - Economic measures revised in publication of "Capital Market Law."
- August 25 - European economics magazine, Euromoney, selects Turkish Deputy Premier, Turgut Ozal, as "Man of the Year."
- October 15 - Names of the 160 members of the Consultative Assembly are released.
- October 16 - All previous political parties ordered disbanded by NSC.
- October 23 - As scheduled, Consultative Assembly convenes first session. Ex-Prime Minister Sadi Irmak elected speaker.
- October 26 - Conservative pro-JP newspaper Tercuman, is closed by Martial Law authorities. Paper is permitted to reopen on November 3.
- November 25 - The Constitutional Committee of the Consultative Assembly holds first session to draft new Turkish Constitution.
- December 22 - Major reshuffle in Ulusu cabinet. Four ministries change hands.
- December 30 - Head of State, General Evren announces that general elections will be held in fall of 1983 or spring of 1984, depending on how quickly new Constitution is drafted and approved.

January 31, 1982 - General Evren warns that Turkey may be forced to quit Council of Europe if its members do not cease their criticism of the military regime.

February 6 - Martial Law headquarters announces that foreigners may not be invited to Turkey without prior approval of Martial Law command. Also stresses that foreign press reports critical of the regime may not be quoted or reprinted in Turkey.

April 10 - Former RPP chief, Bulent Ecevit, is taken into custody for an article critical of the junta printed in a Norwegian paper. Ecevit is released on June 3.

April 17 - Turkey refuses Danish Prime Minister's request to visit Ecevit on private visit.

April 24 - Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, Orhan Aldikacti, reports draft constitution will be ready by September. Announces that, under new constitution, head of state will have significant power.

May 9 - Martial Law headquarters reports that 43 thousand suspected terrorists had been rounded up since the coup.

June 2 - Consultative Assembly approves law giving wide authority to the cabinet for another 18 months.

June 4 - Ambassadors to Turkey from Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland, and France to Turkey are given warning not to file complaint with European Human Rights Commission about alleged state-condoned torture in Turkey. The 5 states file their well-documented complaint on July 1. Report reaches Turkey on July 13.

July 14 - Deputy Premier and economic boss Turgut Ozal and 2 other cabinet members resign their posts.

July 17 - Draft Constitution is presented to Consultative Assembly for discussion. Turk-Is (Turkey's sole remaining legal labor union) president declares that if approved, the Constitution will mean the end of the labor movement in Turkey.

August 2 - Curfews in Ankara and Istanbul lifted.

August 4 - Former restrictions on political expression are relaxed. Former political leaders still prohibited from political discussions.

- September 23 - Consultative Assembly approves draft Constitution: 120 for, 7 against, 7 abstentions (remaining votes not cast). Draft sent to NSC for approval.
- October 20 - NSC decree number 71 prohibits public comment on series of speeches Evren will give in support of the new Constitution.
- November 7 - National referendum held on new Constitution. Overwhelmingly approved by 91.4% of the votes. General Evren automatically becomes President of Turkey for a 7-year term. Evren assumes additional office on November 12.
- January 22, 1983 - Martial law penalties increased.
- January 24 - Martial law command closes daily newspaper Cumhuriyet and Milliyet. Cumhuriyet allowed to publish again on February 17.
- January 28 - Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe considers Turkey's expulsion from the 21-member council for alleged human rights violations.
- February 5 - Constitutional Committee releases details of new draft political parties law.
- February 24 - Former NSP chief, Necmettin Erbakan, sentenced to four years for attempting to establish an Islamic state in Turkey.
- April 10 - Martial Law headquarters announced that the administration had taken legal action against 203 former parliamentarians since the coup.
- April 24 - New Political Parties Law takes effect. NSC follows up by announcing that political activities are no longer banned -- except in the case of former parliamentarians.
- April 29 - President Evren announces general elections to be held on November 6, 1983.
- May 16 - Political parties begin submitting requests for official registration to Interior Ministry. Nationalist Democracy Party becomes first new party to be officially recognized.
- June 13 - Law on Election of Deputies (Election Law) announced. At the same time, legal arrangements are made to establish limits within which new parties and candidates could campaign.

- July 1 - General Evren retires from armed forces.
Retains titles as President and NSC Chairman.
- October 16 - Parties allowed to begin campaigning prior to
elections.
- October 22 - Nationally televised debate among leaders of
the three main political parties.
- November 5 - President Evren voices support for candidate,
retired General Turgut Sunalp.
- November 6 - General elections for the Grand National
Assembly held. Evren's preferred candidate finishes last in
a field of three. Former Deputy Premier and economic boss
Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party wins.
- November 24 - Newly elected Grand National Assembly conducts
first session.
- December 6 - Generals turn over control to civilian
government.
- December 13 - New 22-man civilian government headed by Prime
Minister Turgut Ozal, takes office following approval of
President Evren.

Source: Multiple sources were used to compile this summary:
Ilnur Cevik, Turkey 1983 Almanac (Ankara: Turkish Daily
News Press, 1983), pp. 49-95, 185-188; and reports from The
New York Times, The London Times, and other sources.

NSC Government Trends

From this historical summary, several important
trends emerge which bear analysis:

- (1) Following the coup, the NSC rapidly imposed
increasingly restrictive measures on the population with a
commensurate increase in penalties and punishments, and then
gradually released the restrictions. The Martial Law
Commanders were given sweeping powers to intervene in

practically every aspect of Turkish life -- both in and outside of the country. Penalties for crimes committed after the coup were simply doubled for crimes committed pre-coup. Principal targets of the restrictions were activities "counter to the interests of the state" such as any sort of terrorist or extreme leftist-rightist activity; political activity of any nature (other than praising the coup and its junta); separatist activities; anti-labor activities such as strikes, walk-outs, or lock-outs; and anti-secular activities.

The military's record of achievement in this area was impressive. In the six months following the coup, a total of 366 persons, 129 of them terrorists, were killed as a result of internal friction. This averaged out to about two persons killed per day against an average of 22 per day prior to the military takeover. The junta had also succeeded in disbanding most of the 40 known leftist and rightist organizations. Arms seized by the military or voluntarily surrendered by the public included some 150,000 machine guns and guns, 35,000 rifles, and more than a million rounds of ammunition. Of the 13,000 active members of terrorist organizations arrested in the first six months, 9,000 were leftists, 2,000 were rightists and the remainder separatists (mostly Kurdish militants). The treatment of these terrorists was rather uniform in contrast to the 1960 and 1971 coups where the main target was the leftists.²

For the most part, these restrictions little affected the life of the average Turkish citizen. "We can send our children to school without fearing that something will happen to them...For more than two years I lived in fear...Now I feel quite secure," said one mother. An officer commented on some of the inconveniences caused by the restrictions: "To overcome a great problem, one has to make small sacrifices."³

(2) Another trend was the on-again, off-again trials of former parliamentarians. The heads of the major parties had been taken into "protective custody" at the time of the coup -- with the exception of NAP chairman, Turkes, who turned himself in to authorities shortly after the coup.⁴ On November 8, it was learned that an additional 34 former members of parliament had been arrested and that 44 former parliamentarians were being tried on a variety of charges for crimes committed while they were in parliament.⁵ Most of the parliamentarians were dismissed or given light sentences, but the impression which the trials created was probably a lasting one. The case of former Prime Minister and RPP chief, Bulent Ecevit, was different. Ecevit was several times jailed and released, mostly for disseminating articles and reports unfavorable to the NSC government.⁶

(3) In the aftermath of this coup, as they had done in the 1960 coup, the Turks brought out the hangman's noose. This time was different, however. In the 1960 coup, the

junta sought revenge against Menderes and two other top officials for "crimes against the state." The NSC sought this time to punish those responsible for terrorist activities and murder directed against the people. By April 1982, the death penalty had been carried out in 14 cases following the coup.⁷

(4) Censorship of expression and opinion during the period was severe. The Martial Law commanders were given relative freedom of action to suppress dissent in the press and on radio and television. In several instances newspapers were closed for a period of time, until the NSC was convinced that the editors were aware of the ground rules, and then allowed to reopen. Additionally, strikes were banned and most unions outlawed. The autonomy of universities was proscribed with academic appointments and decisions closely controlled by the regime. The generals wanted to insure that theirs were the only thoughts and ideas aired by reporters. The generals were determined to snuff out any spark of dissention which might lead to national disunity -- one of the key causative factors of the coup. As General Evren put it: "It must be appreciated that dissemination of unfruitful squabbles through the press will impede national unity during this difficult period."⁸

(5) Accusations of torture of political prisoners with the knowledge and implied consent of the junta surfaced during the period. This led to strained relations between

Turkey and her allies. By the end of March 1981, 68 complaints of torture had been reported. The generals, however, countered by publically condemning the use of torture and ordering punishment for anyone found guilty of its use. By March 1981, criminal proceedings had been ordered in 14 cases of suspected torture, including the trial of a police officer and four soldiers accused of torturing a leftist prisoner and causing his death.⁹ This effort to suppress torture was not sufficient to please the European Commission on Human Rights, however. In July 1982, five countries--Denmark, France, Holland, Norway, and Sweden--joined to present their carefully prepared case against Turkey, accusing the NSC of breaking the Human Rights Convention.¹⁰ The regime subsequently admitted that 15 people had died under torture, but later reduced the figure to four.¹¹ These allegations and confessions undoubtedly did little to endear the NSC to their European associates.

(6) All participants in the effort to return the nation to civilian rule were hand-picked by the NSC. The tendency by the NSC was to select people in their own image. We have already seen that the members of the cabinet, including Prime Minister Ulu, were carefully selected and allowed to sit only at the discretion of the NSC. Later, the members of the Constituent Assembly, and candidates and parties for the general election, were similarly selected, as we shall see. However, some differences of opinion did arise

between a few cabinet members and the NSC. In December 1981, four cabinet ministers resigned their posts, and in July 1982, another three defected--including Deputy PM and economic whiz, Turgut Ozal. At least two of these ministers were subsequently charged with "abuse of office."¹²

These then are some of the trends which characterized the NSC period. Some observers of the reign of the generals, criticized it for being too repressive; for creating a false sense of national unity and security; and for failing to create popular institutions which would eventually lead to a strong democratic and socially aware civil government. Others indicated that the repression was directed against those practices and institutions which had combined to cause the crisis in the first place. They would argue that conditions for the man-on-the-street were never better than they were under the direction of the NSC: Production increased, exports increased, inflation was reduced as was unemployment. They would further argue that the tranquility which the NSC provided was worth the loss of a few freedoms, largely irrelevant to the population--or, as the argument goes, the personal freedoms of a few were subjugated to the greater good of the nation.

Both arguments probably miss the mark.

The NSC Plan

The first 58 laws to be tackled by Prime Minister Uluysuz and his Council of Ministers were made public on

November 7, 1980.¹³ With the typical precision of a military plan, the "government executive plan" listed the laws to be reviewed, revised, or enacted, followed by the agencies responsible for the action, and a deadline for the action to be completed. The plan was ambitious, to say the least. With the typical confusion which accompanies the execution of a military plan, the schedule was constantly revised.

The paragraphs of the plan ranged a whole gamut of interests from "1. New Constitution (Supreme Council for Legal Planning, 2 months)", to "43. Arrangements allowing private enterprise to manufacture cigarettes (Customs and Monopolies Ministry in consultation with State Planning Organization and Finance Ministry, 1.5 months)", and from "45. Land and Agrarian Reform Law bearing in mind national realities (Ministry of State, 3 months)" to "10. Statutes to eliminate unnecessary bureaucracy, red tape, and administrative formalities (Prime Ministry Department of Administrative Reorganization and all agencies, 6 months)."

This "Legal Revisions Schedule" was provided to the Cabinet with instructions to the effect that:

"The Prime Ministry, the Supreme Council for Legal Planning and all other ministries and agencies will complete their work within 6 months at most to allow the prompt accomplishment of legislation, excepting that already accomplished, to ensure political stability, establish social balance, develop labor peace and ensure fair taxation, and of legal amendments to eliminate the major statutory obstacles in political, administrative, economic, social and cultural matters."¹⁴

The plan was grand, to be sure. But I think it indicated a genuine interest on the part of the NSC to fix quickly what was wrong with the machinery of government, and then to return the repaired mechanism to civilian control. It is suspected that the NSC felt these changes were both necessary and popular and would meet with little opposition. Feelings were that the NSC had not initially anticipated such a long period of rule to enact their repairs. This is borne out by the timetable they established for themselves in the plan. For example:

"18. Legal and administrative measures to ensure that courts may give prompt and just rulings, and that they may be implemented fearlessly (Justice Ministry, 2 weeks).

20. Political Parties Law (Supreme Council for Legal Planning (SCLP) in cooperation with Justice Ministry, 2 months).

21. Electoral Law (SCLP in consultation with Justice Ministry, 2 months).

30. Revisions to provide for taxation at reasonable rates of all earnings and income (Finance Ministry, 2 weeks).

49. Revisions in collective labor agreements, strikes and lockout laws (SCLP, Collective Agreements Coordination Board and Labor Ministry, 2 weeks).

56. Revision of National Education Basic Law and Universities Law (National Education Ministry and State Planning Organization, 2 months)."¹⁵

While it is safe to say that the timetable, as outlined, was not met, the important element is that there was a plan for positive, quick action in contrast to the 1960

and 1971 interventions. The NSC had apparently done their homework prior to displacing the government.

The Constituent Assembly

The Constituent Assembly Law, enacted by the NSC at the end of June 1981, was heralded as one of the "important steps taken towards the reinstatement of the Parliamentary Democratic order on a sound basis..."¹⁶ Until the September 12 intervention and subsequent disbanding of parliament, the Grand National Assembly had consisted of the National Assembly (lower house) and the Republican Senate (upper house). Following the coup and until the Constituent Assembly was seated in October 1981, the NSC acted as the sole legislative power. Subsequently, the NSC constituted the upper house and the Consultative Assembly acted as the lower house. Together, the two houses comprised the Constituent Assembly.¹⁷

As its name implies, the Consultative Assembly was a body with which the NSC could consult for advice and opinion. The final word on any matter still resided in the NSC alone, but because of its representation from the provinces, the Consultative Assembly could provide a better evaluation of the needs and opinions of the various sections of the public--at least to a limited degree.

The 160-member Consultative Assembly was hand-picked by the NSC and could hardly be classified as a truly representative body. Forty of the members were directly

appointed by the NSC while the remaining 120 members were selected by the NSC from lists of candidates provided by the appointed governors of Turkey's 67 provinces. The membership included "33 lawyers, 29 engineers, 21 retired officers, 19 academics, 16 civil servants, nine economists, an actor, the former head of the Turkish Secret Service, and a heart surgeon who had worked with Dr. Christiaan Bernard."¹⁸ The Assembly was chaired by Professor Sadi Irmak, who had previously served as interim Prime Minister.

The legislative process then worked like this: Either the upper house (NSC) or lower house (Consultative Assembly) could propose legislation. The matter would first be referred to one of the advisory or professional commissions in the Assembly. Then the draft legislation would be acted upon by the lower house and, if approved, sent to the NSC for final approval. Given their approval, the NSC, in its alternate role as chief national executive, would sign and publish the law. It was neat, uncomplicated (if somewhat less than democratic) system. It must be said, however, that the Constituent Assembly was more democratic than the single NSC-rule, and therefore a step on the return to democratic rule.

The main and most urgent task of the Consultative assembly was to draft a new Constitution to replace the 1961 Constitution. Upon completion of the draft Constitution, and with the approval of the NSC, the Constitution would be voted

on by national referendum. Then the Assembly could begin work on a Political Parties Law and Elections Law in preparation for the national parliamentary elections and the return to civil rule.¹⁹

A New Constitution

The new Constitution was prepared by the Consultative Assembly's Constitutional Committee, chaired by Professor Orhan Aldikacti, who had formerly been Turkey's representative to the Council of Europe.²⁰ The draft of the Constitution was presented to the full assembly on July 17, 1982. Debate on the draft began on August 4th. During the same period, the NSC (perhaps in a move to "test the water") allowed public discussion of the draft by all citizens--except for previous politicians. The reaction may have been more than the NSC had expected, for on October 20, after the final draft of the Constitution had been published, the NSC decreed that all discussion of the Constitution--especially the sensitive "provisional articles"--was banned. General Evren then threw his entire weight behind the Constitution and was charged with the responsibility "to explain the Constitution to the people on behalf of the state."²¹ While Evren sold the Constitution to the public, there could be no public campaign against it.

Evren minced no words in his pitch attacking those who opposed the Constitution as trying to destroy the unity

of the country. "We shall not leave the fate of the Constitution and the future of our country to the designs of the enemies of Turkey," he said in an October 24 televised speech. Evren continued that the campaign against the Constitution had the effect of "discrediting the Constitution to cause its rejection, which would be portrayed as the rejection of the legality of the military takeover and even as a defeat for the armed forces, so that the country will be deprived of a vigilant guardian against evil designs."²² In this he resurrected the specter of the terrorism and anarchy which had preceded the coup. A vote against the Constitution was a vote against Turkey and a step backwards towards violence in the streets.

The criticism leveled at the Constitution stemmed from the unprecedented powers granted to the President, and from the restrictions it would impose on civil liberties, labor rights, and freedom of the press. The "provisional articles" were a separate sensitive bone of contention.

Under the provisions of the new Constitution, the bicameral legislative would be reduced to a single house with the term of office extended from four to five years. The President would still be elected for a seven-year term but would not have to be elected from within the parliament. While the legislature still retained the power to seat and unseat governments, the President was vested with several new and important powers--obviously with the view toward avoiding

the sort of deadlocked government which was displaced by the coup--particularly during times of crisis. Now, the president would "be able to order new elections, if a government falls and no successor (could) be formed within 45 days."²³

The President could veto legislation, but Congress could override the veto with a two-thirds vote (Article 175). A number of additional issues contained in the Constitution were obvious attempts to rectify previous ills. For example, political activity by labor unions or professional associations was banned. Civil servants, members of the armed forces, judges, university instructors, and students were prohibited from joining political parties. Parties could not establish youth branches or auxiliaries, and members had to be at least 21 years old. The Constitution also limited the right to strike, to demonstrate, and the rights of the free press--insofar as they are prohibited from being disruptive to the "requirements of a democratic social order (Article 13)."

Again, with obvious concern to prevent the sort of leftist-rightist-religious-separatist activities which had caused the NSC to step in, the Constitution provided that "no one may exploit or abuse religion...for the purpose of seeking to base the state...even in part, on the rules of religion"(Article 24). As to rights and freedoms: "Everyone possesses inherent fundamental rights and freedoms which are

inviolable and inalienable. The fundamental rights and freedoms also include the duties and responsibilities of the individual towards society, the family, and other individuals" (Article 12). But, "Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted by law...with the aim of safeguarding...the state,...national sovereignty...public order (and) the public interest..." (Article 13). No one may become a union official unless he has been employed as a worker for at least 10 years (Article 51). Strikers must not obstruct workers willing to work (Article 54). The new Constitution is full of examples where the NSC tried to plug up all of the potential loopholes which had caused the previous regime to go bust.

The Provisional Articles of the Constitution probably cause the most heartburn to liberal-minded outside observers. Provisional article 1 "entailed the automatic election of General Kenan Evren as President of the Republic for a seven-year term,"²⁴ while Article 2 elevated the remaining members of the NSC to "the Presidential Council" for a six-year term. Article 4 proscribed political activity by parliamentarians ousted by the coup. The generals would keep their influence for a while--even after the return to civil rule.

In campaigning for the Constitution prior to the national referendum, General Evren clearly linked himself with the document. He bet that his overwhelming personal

popularity would override any opposition to the Constitution--a vote against the Constitution was a vote against Evren and thus, a return to chaos. The tactic worked and on Sunday, November 7, 1982, the Constitution was "endorsed by more than 91 percent of the 20.7 million Turkish voters, surpassing even the expectations of the country's military rulers..."²⁵ The next step toward civilian rule would be the Election and Political Parties Laws.

The Political Parties Law was enacted on April 24, 1983.²⁶ Several prominent and well-known Turks immediately announced that they would lead political parties and would register their party application, when permitted, on May 16. Among those announcing their candidacy were Turgut Ozal, the former Deputy PM and economics tsar, and Turgut Sunalp, a retired general and former Ambassador to Canada.²⁷ The Political Parties Law and the Electoral Law which followed on June 13, 1983, contained certain provisions aimed at reducing the chance of the sort of chaotic political system which preceded the coup. For example, the Parties Law,

"while insisting that political parties are 'indispensable elements of democratic political life' (Article 4) and that they may be formed without prior permission within the framework of the Constitution and of relevant laws (Article 5), it subjects their formation, internal regulation and activity to a mass of bureaucratic requirements and restrictions in an effort to ensure that they operate within the established system."²⁸

To qualify for registration a party must have 30 founding members (Article 8), and all important party data

and records, including membership rolls, must be filed with the Prosecutor General (Article 10). To restate a portion of the Constitution, public servants (bureaucrats, military members, policemen, etc.) teachers and students in universities were prohibited from joining parties (Article 11). Party leaders could not serve more than six continuous 2-year terms (Article 15), while the provisional articles of the law bar certain groups (former politicians) from becoming party members or leaders. The provisional articles also granted the NSC authority simply to ban certain party founders (and, by implication, certain parties) as it saw fit.

In accordance with the Political Parties Law, the parties began the registration process by listing themselves with the Ministry of the Interior. The first party thus formed was Turgut Sunalp's "Nationalist Democracy Party" (NDP). Also among the NDP founders were two former Ulusu cabinet members, Ali Bozer and Rifat Bayazit, who resigned their ministries on May 14, 1983 in order to list with the party. According to party leaders, the NDP would be a centrist party supporting Turkey's membership in the Atlantic Alliance, eventual membership in the European Economic Community, and improved relations with other Moslem countries.²⁹

On May 20, three more parties registered: The "Motherland Party" (MP) led by Turgut Ozal, the "Populist

Party" (PP) led by Necdet Calp, a retired civil servant who had once worked for Ismet Inonu, and the "Great Turkey Party" (GTP) formally led by retired general Ali Fethi Esener, but organized by Husamettin Cindoruk, a former JP organizer. The GTP's linkage with the disbanded JP was confirmed when Demirel's former Foreign Minister, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil and other former JP members joined.³⁰

Two more parties were formed on June 6: the "Social Democratic Party" (SODEP) headed by Ismet Inonu's son, Erdal Inonu; and the "Lofty Duty Party" (LDP), led by former Ambassador to Baghdad, Baha Vefa Karatay.

The proliferation of parties was certainly not what the generals had hoped for. I suspect that they had rather wished for a two-party system to evolve, in which one party would, in any election, clearly emerge winner. The multi-multi party system which appeared to be developing was seen as a threat to all the NSC had worked and planned for. Moreover, as the parties shaped up it looked like the SODEP would sweep the leftist vote by attracting former RPP sympathizers, while the right would be fragmented among the LDP and GTP. What the generals saw, they did not like--and they quickly moved to restore a more suitable order.

On May 31, the NSC invoked those portions of the new Constitution and Political Parties Law which prohibited political activity by former politicians, to close down the Great Turkey Party. They then exiled (within Turkey, close

to Canakkale) two of the party's founders and 14 other former politicians (among them Demirel and Caglayangil).³¹

To shut down the SODEP, the NSC used its extraordinary powers granted under provisional article 4 of the Parties Law to veto 21 of the party's 30 founders, including the party leader, Inonu's son. As other members stepped forward to support SODEP, they were also disapproved so that by the time the deadline came for party registration, set as August 24, the party was still two founders short of the required 30 members and could not register for the elections. Other parties were similarly treated so that only three parties were left to compete in the November 6 elections. Although criticism of the NSC was specifically prohibited, some voiced their objections to the NSC tactics. As a result, the wide-circulation newspapers Tercuman and Milliyet were both shut down for a time.³²

On June 13, the new Electoral Law was published--the final legal instrument leading to the elections.³³ Key provisions of the law were designed to prevent the emergence of small, factional or regional based parties by stipulating that parties which failed to gain at least ten percent of the poll nation-wide, could not qualify for seats in the new Grand National Assembly. The law also provided a fine of TL 2,500 (about \$10) for those registered voters who failed to cast their ballot, and prohibited from running for office anyone who had been sentenced to more than a year in prison,

had not completed primary education, or who had not performed their required military service (Article 11). A provisional article of the law gives the NSC the right to veto candidates put up by their parties for election, but allows that "political parties will be able to nominate new candidates after consulting" with the Council.³⁴

By October 4 the NSC had completed its screening of the parties and candidates that would be allowed to participate in the national elections, and published the final approved list. The list revealed that none of the three approved parties had been able to achieve a full list of 400 candidates,³⁵ but the stage was now set for the November 6 elections. As Andrew Mango suggests,

"Thus, while Turkish citizens have not been allowed to organize in all the parties of their choice, and while the parties have not been able to put forward all the candidates of their choice, electors may well be free to choose among parties and candidates approved by the National Security Council."³⁶

There were even reports that the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly would continue to exclude Turkish delegates from sitting after the voting because the election would be "biased and undemocratic."³⁷

1983 Elections

As the national elections approached, only three parties -- Turgut Sunalp's National Democracy Party, Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party, and Necdet Calp's Populist Party--were left to compete in the elections. While none of

the parties were given any great latitude indetermining their platforms (this having been fairly proscribed by the NSC selection process to a pro-Western foreign policy, law and order domestic policy and open-market economy), there were some subtle differences. The NDP was by far the generals' favorite and tended to be moderately right-wing. Ozal's MP was more centrist, but lacked the open support of the NSC (probably as a result of Ozal's earlier fall-from-grace when he resigned as Deputy PM). That Ozal was not obstructed from forming and registering a party by the NSC, however, indicated that the Council was prepared to work with him, if it came to that. Necdet Calp's Populists leaned more toward the left than the other two.

On October 16, 1983, the three parties began their campaigning efforts. The campaigns, largely because of the similarity of platforms, became one of selling the candidate, rather than his platform. In a nationally televised debate among the primary candidates, Turgut Ozal clearly emerged the victor. From the start he had the experience advantage, having served as Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Ozal knew politics and knew what "sold" the Turkish public. Turgut Sunalp was an ill match for his more politically wary adversaries. In polls published shortly after the debates, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet indicated 37.7 percent in favor of Ozal, 25.1 percent for Calp, and only 14 percent for Sunalp. In a similar poll the following week, Hurriyet

reported 44 percent for the MP, 34 percent for the NDP, and the Populists in third place with 22 percent. Another popular daily, Gunaydin reported Ozal's Motherhood party well in the lead. With this, the NSC prohibited the publication of any more opinion polls.³⁸ Evren, who had done his best to stay in the background during the campaigns, apparently cast his lot openly with Sunalp's NDP in a televised speech just before the elections. In a thinly veiled endorsement of Sunalp, General Evren called upon the population to elect the regime which would continue the military's policies (Sunalp was the only ex-military candidate). Evren went further to indirectly attack Ozal by warning the public not to be seduced by "claims contrary to the truth" and "sweet promises."³⁹ While true the general may have "tilted" in favor of Sunalp's candidacy, it was only a tilt. The NSC was capable of the big push, but chose not to use it.

Election Results

In the elections, with a record 92.9 percent of the 19.7 million eligibles voting, Ozal's Motherland Party received 45 percent of the votes cast, Calp's Populists 30.4 percent, and Sunalp's Nationalist Democracy Party 23.2 percent. In the 400-member Grand National Assembly, the MP captured 212 seats, the PP 117 seats, and the NDP 71 seats.⁴⁰

The results of the elections were flashed across the world with newspaper headlines like "Army-Backed Party Loses Turkish Elections" and "Turkish Military Loses Election."⁴¹ Even the majority of magazines, which normally have more time to consider their stories, posted headlines such as "The Generals' Lost Gamble", "Turkey Talks Back," and "General Rebuff."⁴² The writers and reporters went on to say that Ozal's victory, in the face of General Evren's advice to the contrary, had to be seen as a defeat of the NSC. They went on to say what a triumph it was that the anti-military candidate had won out over the limitations and restrictions imposed by the generals. They heralded the vote as the triumph of representative (if limited) democracy over a repressive regime. Almost all of the reports reviewed echoed these same assessments. All were wrong--except one:

"The idea that the voters were merely giving a thumbs-down to the military seems an inadequate explanation of Ozal's victory. Evren still has widespread popular support; had he made the Presidential election...an open one, he would probably still have won a clear majority of the popular vote. Once the outcome of the general election had become clear, the President welcomed the result and wished Ozal and his party every success."⁴³

The votes for Ozal were simply that. They were not, in the main, cast in opposition to General Evren or to the NSC. The election, as it turned out, was not to affirm or deny any platform or system. It was a personality race. To the general population, the overwhelming majority of which is

rural peasants, all of the candidates had been approved by the government and were equally acceptable. Their vote was cast for the candidate with the most charisma, who best reflected their own ideas and personalities, and the one who appealed to them most. Ozal was all of these. Ozal was a peasant boy who had made it. His father was a Moslem religious teacher (as was General Evren's) and Ozal continued to practice his religion even after "making it." He related to the peasant, poor and religious in both his manner and speech, and (this should not be taken lightly) he had a moustache. To the peasant, a moustache is both a sign of affiliation and of manhood. Ozal, a practiced politician, knew how to campaign. Moreover, Ozal was already a "known quantity." He had already served in two ministerial cabinets and his name was well-known.

Sunalp, on the other hand, while known and respected in the highest circles of government, was relatively unknown to the public. A polished, proficient ex-soldier and diplomat, he failed to make his appeal to the peasant. Some would say because of his series of lofty positions outside of the county in service to the state, that he had lost contact with the peasant. Soldiers and diplomats normally do not make good politicians. Sunalp was not a politician. He started the race with a handicap which he could not overcome. There was even a vicious "whisper campaign" that he was seldom sober.⁴⁴ This was untrue, but possibly effective among

the masses to deter his selection. Nobody knew him well enough at that level--the level which really makes or breaks governments in Turkey.

Conclusions

The events set in motion in Turkey on the morning of September 12, 1980, have been largely misunderstood and misinterpreted by the West. The liberal democracies of the industrialized world (ourselves included) unavoidably compare the rest of the world against our own experience. We tend to protest the dirt in the street more than the dust under our own carpets.

Part of the problem is, as was suggested earlier, the tyranny of language. We don't have an American-English equivalent word to describe accurately what took place that morning. The French word "coup" and the Spanish word "junta" carry with them evil connotations. The Turks appreciate this--they don't have a good word either. They simply call it an operation--"Operation for the Protection and Safeguarding of the Republic." But this long phrase can hardly be used in headlines, so we're stuck with the word "coup." It's like the word "shot." Someone can be shot dead or take a shot of heroine--obviously evil. On the other hand, one can take a shot of penicillin, something good.

The point here is that all coups need not be bad. The one in Turkey was not.

Western democracies tend to visualize the concepts of "individual rights" and "human rights." When we hear that someone's individual rights were violated, we see someone being carried off to a cell in chains. But when someone exercises his "individual right" to rob or rape another, we are quick to demand that the culprit be deprived of his so-called inalienable rights. We are also quick to defend the cause of freedom of speech but quick to condemn anyone who offends us with that freedom. The point here is that yes--some people were deprived of their rights in Turkey. They should have been.

Whose scale should one use to measure "democracy?" It took almost 90 years of American democracy to free the slaves, and an additional 55 years to allow women to vote. Now, after almost 208 years of democracy, we are still debating an Equal Rights Amendment to our founding document. The point here is that degrees of democracy are, at best, difficult to measure with another's yardstick.

The 'operation' (call it 'coup', if you wish), which began on September 12, 1980 in Turkey was launched in order to avert the very real possibility of civil war. The action was taken to separate the leftists from the rightists, the religious fanatics from the secular, the separatists from the unionists, and allow each to cool down. It was staged when

the Turkish Republic was 57 years old. In contrast, we in the United States solved our differences of opinion over separatism and rights in a ruinous Civil War, 90 years after the founding of our republic. The point here is which is worse--a coup to settle differences of opinion in order to create a national union? Or a civil war?

The question of whether there was a real need for a coup in Turkey is like asking if there was a need for an American Civil War. It can long be debated, but probably not surely resolved.

All of this is not to justify the coup or subsequent acts of the junta. Turkey was lucky this time. General Evren and his council had nothing but the best intentions in mind for Turkey when they seized control of the country. They have kept true to their word and are gradually releasing the country back to elected civilian control, making sure that the nation stays on balance as it does. They will gradually release their hold over the next six years. The NSC, in concert with the Council of Ministers and Constituent Assembly vigorously pursued methods and means to insure that balance could be maintained after they completely release the government.

Having spent so much time living among the Turks (seven of the past 15 years), the September 12 operation was seen as yet another step in the continuing process of

the democratic evolution of modern Turkey. It is hoped that the balance is maintained during the evolution.

In the course of doing research, located was a newspaper article from Tercuman, by Nazli Ilicak, in which she quotes the late Turkish Constitutional Professor, Ali Fuat Basgil. The article, written just two days after the coup, captures the essence of the event. The first paragraph is his, the second is hers:

"...democracy is a regime of moderation and balance between despotism and chaos. If despotism is one rung above this regime, anarchy is one rung below. Nations lacking the culture of freedom are prone to lose their moderation and balance and as a result are forced to choose between despotism and chaos. Since chaos is a calamity rightly feared by the people, countries faced with this choice always prefer despotism and take refuge in a Noah's Ark of their own creation to keep from drowning in the flood of chaos. This is, generally speaking, the psychological reason behind their initial welcoming of dictators with the respect due a savior.

The perpetuation of democracy depends only on preserving the balance between authority and freedom. Discipline without freedom is characteristic of a totalitarian regime, but freedom without discipline means disruption and chaos."⁴⁵

As mentioned at the beginning of this study, the 1980 coup was the third significant case of military intervention in less than 25 years. The 1960 coup was staged partly in order to preempt the possibility of a Menderes-led, military-supported dictatorship. The resultant 1961 constitution was written to prevent that possibility from ever happening again. Unfortunately, it went so far to

decentralize authority that the governing bodies became largely unable to execute their designated responsibilities.

The ineffectiveness of the central government was an important causative factor in precipitating the 1971 and 1980 interventions. But this time the military may have achieved their desired results. The NSC has carefully laid the foundation for the continued balanced development of democracy in Turkey. In addition to the 1982 constitution which clearly establishes a workable balance of power between the president, GNA, and the courts, over 630 laws were enacted during the NSC period to support that balance and to provide necessary stabilizing reforms.⁴⁶

As a result, the 1980 coup d'etat in Turkey will likely be the last such intervention by the military in Turkish politics. While the generals will continue to occupy a unique niche among Turkey's elites, and will continue to wield significant influence as the protectors of the nation, any future intervention would likely take place at lower levels within the framework of the new constitution.

Turkey and her people have now become sufficiently adapted to democracy to permit it to work without major retuning. A workable balance has at last been established. The soldiers can return proudly to their barracks and enjoy the fruits of the democracy they worked to preserve.

CHAPTER VI ENDNOTES

¹"Like the Weimar Republic," Hamburg Der Spiegel, September 22, 1980, pp. 145, 148.

²Sam Cohen, "Turkish Terrorism Drops Sharply Under Military Rule," Christian Science Monitor, March 30, 1981, p. 7.

³Ibid.

⁴Details of Turkes' Surrender are in "Turkes Surrenders in Ankara," Istanbul Milliyet, September 15, 1980, p. 6.

⁵The names of the parliamentarians detained and on trial are listed in "Court Cases Opened on Former Parliamentarians," Istanbul Cumhuriyet, November 8, 1980, pp. 1, 7.

⁶I was fortunate in having had the opportunity to read one of Mr. Ecevit's letters to a newspaper editor friend of his in North Carolina. The impression which the letter gave was one of complete repression in Turkey. The editor was shocked, until I pointed out the conditions in Turkey during 1979, when I was stationed there.

⁷"Turks Keep the Death Penalty," London Times, April 178, 1982, p. 5.

⁸Stuart Schaar, "Turkey: Democracy Deferred," Christian Science Monitor, December 24, 1981, p. 27. and Robin Laurance, "Why Democracy Must Wait," London Times, January 29, 1982, p. 10.

The debate on Turkey's freedom of speech, or lack thereof, was even carried on by Turks outside of Turkey. Two letters to the editor of the Christian Science Monitor are illustrative. In the April 13, 1981 issue, A. Akinci wrote on p. 22 about the lack of freedoms in Turkey; while in the June 18, 1981 issue, Ozlan Tuncel rebutted Akinci and defended the NSC on p. 22.

⁹Cohen, "Turkish Terrorism..."

¹⁰Ian Murray, "Five-Nation Protest at Turkish Rights Abuse," London Times, July 2, 1982, p. 8.

¹¹Edward Mortimer, "Any Vote, So Long as its Yes," London Times, November 5, 1982, p. 10.

¹²Two articles from the London Times which discuss Ozal's impact are "Three Quit Cabinet Positions in Turkey," July 15, 1982, p. 6, and Rasit Gurdilek, "Turkey Unravels Itself from Ozal's Laws," July 20, 1982, p. 8.

¹³Saygi Ozturk, "Fifty-Eight Basic Laws to be Altered," Istanbul Hurriyet, November 7, 1980, pp. 1, 15.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶12 September in Turkey: Before and After, (Ankara: Ogun Kardesler, 1982), pp. 289-290.

¹⁷Ilnur Cevik, Turkey 1983 Almanac, (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Press, 1983), p. 120.

¹⁸Laurance, "Why Democracy Must Wait."

¹⁹The new Constitution is reproduced in Cevik, 1983 Almanac, pp. 144-178.

²⁰Sam Cohen, "Turkey Heads Toward Democracy," Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 1981, p. 10.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³An excellent brief comparative explanation of the new Constitution is by Andrew Mango, "The Third Turkish Republic," The World Today, Royal Institute of International Affairs, January 1983, pp. 30-38. Professor Aydin Yalcin, quoted in the Der Spiegel interview at the beginning of this chapter, foresaw many of the articles which became part of the 1982 Constitution--two years before its adoptance--indicating that many of the ideas contained therein were not new.

²⁴Mango, "The Third Turkish Republic," p. 32.

²⁵Rasit Gurdilek, "91% Backing for Evren Reflects Terrorism Fears," London Times, November 9, 1982, pp. 7, 13. The actual vote was 16,945,545 for and 1,594,761 against as reported in "Ankara Vote," London Times, November 11, 1982, p. 6.

26A comparison of the old and new election laws is in Cevik, 1983 Almanac, pp. 189-190.

27"A Ban Lifted, Turks Say They'll Head Parties," New York Times, April 26, 1983, p. A7.

28Andrew Mango, "Turkey Democracy Under Military Tutelage," The World Today, Royal Institute for International Affairs, November 1983, pp. 430-431. This is another excellent article which explains the process under the Parties and Electoral Laws and the formation of the parties which ultimately participated in the elections.

29"First New Political Party Formed in Turkey," New York Times, May 17, 1983, p. 5.

30Mango, "...Democracy Under Military Tutelage," pp. 429-430.

31The exiled politicians were allowed to return home on October 1, 1983. See "16 Turkish Politicians Allowed to go Home," New York Times, October 2, 1983, p. 5.

32Mango, "...Democracy Under Military Tutelage," pp. 429-430. Mango goes into much greater detail on the jostling to found parties and to nominate candidates. His brief article is highly recommended in order to gain a better appreciation of this process.

33A brief review of Turkey's various electoral systems, including a discussion of the new "Election Law" is in Cevik, 1983 Almanac, pp. 191-194.

34"New Law Lets Military Ban Turkish Candidates," New York Times, June 14, 1983, p. 5.

35"Turkey Lists Candidates and Parties It Approves," New York Times, October 5, 1983, p. 5.

36Mango, "...Democracy Under Military Tutelage," p. 433.

37New York Times, October 2, 1983, p. 5.

38"Turks Place Ban on Opinion Polls," New York Times, November 3, 1983, p. 11.

39"Turks Electing First Parliament Since Coup," New York Times, November 6, 1983, p. 6.

⁴⁰Marvine Howe, "Turkish Military Loses in Elections," New York Times, November 8, 1983, p. 13.

⁴¹Headlines from Kansas City Times, November 7, 1983, p. C-12; and New York Times, November 8, 1983, p. 13 respectively.

⁴²Story headings from Maclean's, November 21, 1983, p. 36; New Republic, December 5, 1983, p. 11; and Time, November 21, 1983.

⁴³William Hale, "Turkey After the General Elections," The World Today, Royal Institute for International Affairs, January 1983, p. 1.

⁴⁴Edward Mortimer, "Turkey Talks Back," New Republic, December 5, 1983, p. 11.

⁴⁵Nazli Ilicak, "12 September Operation," Istanbul Tercuman, September 14, 1980, pp. 1, 9.

⁴⁶"...And Now Elections in Turkey," Turkish Government Pamphlet, Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, Ankara, 1983.

APPENDIX A

Annex A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHARTER

Section 1: The Establishment of the National Security Council

Article 1: The National Security Council, which was forced to seize control of the government in the 12 September 1980 takeover and which took an oath before the people of the nation, is composed of Chairman of the General Staff Gen Kenan Evren, Ground Forces Commander Gen Nurettin Ersin, Air Forces Commander Adm Tahsin Sahinkaya, Naval Forces Commander Gen Nejat Tumer, and Gendarmes Commander Gen Sedat Celasun.

Article 2: The National Security Council will meet under the leadership of the Chairman of the General Staff. In the absence of the Chairman, one of the members of the council will serve as chairman of the meetings and sessions with the stipulation that military rank be followed.

Section 2: The Establishment of the National Security Council Secretariat

Article 3: The National Security Council Secretary General will serve as the council's advisor and secretary; will participate in the council meetings, but will not be able to vote; and, when unable to attend, will have a person who represents him participate in the council meetings in his place.

Article 4: The establishment and duties of the National Security Council Secretariat General will be determined by legislation that will be enacted.

Section 3: Expert Commissions

Article 5: In cases deemed necessary by the National Security Council Secretary General, temporary Expert Commissions composed of as many specialists employed in the public sector as are required can be formed in order to study and do research on law bills, proposals, and other subjects.

These commissions will be able to call upon other experts for their ideas, and once their studies are completed, will submit conclusions to the Secretariat General in the form of reports.

The Secretariat General will examine these reports and put them in their final form.

The Expert Commissions' reports will be printed along with law bills and proposals and will be submitted to Security Council members and to the Council of Ministers in sufficient time to be studied.

Section 4: Agenda, Sessions, and Meetings

Article 6: The agenda will be prepared by the Secretary General in behalf of the chairman of the National Security Council. After it is printed, it will be sent to members of the security council and the Council of Ministers in sufficient time to be studied.

If any of the members seeks a change in the security council agenda, this can be done with a simple majority vote of the security council members.

Article 7: A session will be defined as the meetings held by the National Security Council on a single day.

A meeting will be defined as each one of the segments of a session that are separated by a recess.

Article 8: If no other decision is made or if it is not summoned by the chairman, the National Security Council will meet on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays at a time to be determined.

Section 5: Enacting Laws

Article 9: The National Security Council and the Council of Ministers have the power to propose laws

Law bills and their covering memoranda will be submitted to the security council.

In a covering memorandum, information about the entire bill and its articles will be presented. The statutes that are to be lifted or added and the reasons they should be annulled, changed, or added will be explained clearly.

The National Security Council chairman's office can either have the proposals that come before it examined by the expert commissions it deems necessary or it can place them directly on the security council agenda.

The chairman's office will provide National Security Council members with information regarding the bills and proposals it receives.

Article 10: Security council members and the Council of Ministers may withdraw law bills and proposals they have

submitted as long as this is done before they are placed on the security council agenda.

Once a bill or proposal has been put on the agenda, withdrawal requires a security council decision.

Article 11: During discussion of a law bill or proposal in the National Security Council, the Prime Minister or a responsible minister and, when necessary, a public employee from the most responsible office, spokesmen from the related expert commission, and spokesmen appointed by the secretariat general will be present.

Article 12: During discussion of the law bill or proposal, the entire bill or proposal will first be debated. Once this is completed and it is agreed upon to begin discussion of the articles of the bill or proposal, each article will be considered and voted upon separately. Upon completion, the entire bill or proposal will be subject to a vote and, upon approval, will become law.

If an article contains several subjects or paragraphs, it may be proposed that it be subdivided and each part voted upon separately.

Article 13: A written proposal made by security council members, the Prime Minister, the National Security Council Secretary General, or the related minister to reject, amend, or add an article to the text of a law bill or proposal will be voted upon at the conclusion of the discussion. Short proposals may be made verbally.

Article 14: At the written request of a security council member, the prime minister, or a minister, a decision can be made to hold a closed meeting.

Minutes of a closed meeting will be taken by the secretariat general. However, if the security council deems it appropriate, stenographers who have taken an oath may perform this function.

These minutes cannot be made public or published without the decision of the security council.

Section 6: Voting

Article 15: There will be three forms of voting.

1. Show of hands.
2. Open ballot.
3. Secret ballot.

Voting by show of hands consists of members raising their hands.

Open balloting consists of placing a voting ballot on which the member's first and last name are written in the ballot box or of stating, when his name is read, whether he agrees, abstains, or opposes the proposal.

Secret balloting consists of placing a colored marble on which there are no marks into the ballot box.

In cases where no decision has been made to carry out either open or secret balloting, voting will be conducted by a show of hands.

Article 16: The National Security Council will meet with a simple majority of the total number of members. In case of a tie vote, the vote of the chairman will count as two votes.

Section 7: Minutes

Article 17: Two types of minutes will be taken of National Security Council meetings -- complete minutes and summarized minutes.

Complete minutes will be kept by stenographers with the help of a tape recorder.

Minutes will be published in a minutes' journal.

Section 8: Vote of Confidence

Article 18: Discussion of the Council of Ministers' program will begin in the session which follows the reading of the program before the National Security Council. At the conclusion of the discussion, a vote of confidence will be taken.

In order for the Council of Ministers to receive a vote of confidence, its program must be approved by a simple majority of the total number of National Security Council members.

Section 9: Supervision

Article 19: The National Security Council can, at all times, supervise the Prime Minister and his ministers and can request written or verbal information.

Decisions to supervise, by means of general discussion, questioning, and investigation, will be made by a simple majority vote.

While under supervision, the Council of Ministers may request a vote of confidence.

The Council of Ministers or a minister may be ousted with a simple majority vote of the total number of National Security Council members.

Section 10: Minister's Immunity, Initiating Investigations, and Taking Legal Action

Article 20: Initiating an investigation and taking legal action regarding personal offenses or related to the office prior to a member of the Council of Ministers' taking office or while in office requires a decision of the National Security Council.

Requests of this nature will be directed to the National Security Council by way of the Ministry of Justice and the prime minister's office. After the security council places the topic on the agenda, it will hear the defense of the related minister and will make its decision.

Section 11: Administrative Organization and Fiscal Regulations

Article 21: The administrative organizations of the legislative bodies that have been dissolved will be attached to the National Security Council secretariat general.

The security council's administrative organization secretaries general have the function and authority to carry out the National Security Council's commands and decisions related to the fiscal and administrative operations of the administrative organizations of the legislative bodies that have been dissolved. They also have the responsibility and power to implement the decisions that are to be taken by the executive body that will be established by the National Security Council as to the reorganization of the structure and characteristics of the legislative body. The National Security Council secretary general may restrict these duties and powers as necessary.

The National Security Council secretariat general has the authority to examine, before payment is made, orders for expenditures that come from the budgets of these organizations.

Section 12: Final Statutes

Article 22: Proposals to amend this charter may be made by members of the National Security Council. These proposals may be put into effect as a security council decision following discussion and approval.

Article 23: This charter becomes effective upon its approval.

Article 24: This charter shall be enforced by the National Security Council.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Ahmad, Feroz. The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975. Boulder, CO: Westview Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1977.
- Cevik, Ilnur. Turkey 1983 Almanac. Ankara, Turkey: Turkish Daily News, 1983.
- Dodd, Clement Henry. Democracy and Development in Turkey. Humberside, England: Eothen Press, 1979.
- Eren, Nuri. Turkey Today and Tomorrow; An Experiment in Westernization. New York: Praeger, 1963.
- Finer, S.E. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 2d Ed., Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976.
- Frey, Frederick W. The Turkish Political Elite. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1965.
- Haddad, George M. Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East, Vol I: The Northern Tier. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1965.
- Hale, William M. The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
- Harris, George Sellers. Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972.
- Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Kinross, Lord. Ataturk: Father of Modern Turkey. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965.
- Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2d Ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Lewis, Geoffrey L. Modern Turkey. New York: F.A. Praeger, 1974.

Orga, Irfan. Phoenix Ascendent: The Rise of Modern Turkey. London: Robert Hale, 1958.

Ozbudun, Ergun. Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Roos, Leslie L. Jr. and Noralou P. Managers of Modernization. Cambridge, Massachuttes: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics and Influence. New York: Praeger, 1982.

Rustow, Dankwart A. Middle Eastern Political Systems. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1971.

Shaw, Stanford J. History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Tamkoc, Metin. The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and Modernization of Turkey. Salt Lake City, Utah: University of Utah Press, 1976.

Weiker, Walter F. The Turkish Revolution 1960-61: Aspects of Military Politics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1963.

Government Documents

"...And Now Elections in Turkey," Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, Ankara, 1983.

"Coup d'Etat in Turkey", Department of State Bulletin, November 1980.

Nyrop, Richard F. Turkey, A Country Study. DA Pam 550-80, Third Edition. Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1980.

Political Structure of Turkey. Ankara, Turkey: The General Directorate of Press and Information of the Turkish Republic, 1975.

12 September in Turkey: Before and After. Ankara, Turkey: Ongun Kardesler, 1982.

Periodicals and Articles

- Breede, Walter J. "Turkey - Ally in Trouble", Marine Corps Gazette, March 1981.
- Brown, James. "Turkey: A Foreign Policy in Flux", Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, June 1982.
- Burns, Kenneth D. "Turkey: A Challenge, But Not to be Avoided", Air Force Times, March 9, 1981.
- Butler, Francis P. "Reassessing Turkey: A Faithful Ally Disillusioned and in Trouble", Parameters, March 1980.
- Christian Science Monitor. Various articles, 1980-1983.
- "Dateline Turkey: The Case for Patience", Foreign Policy, Spring 1983.
- "Demirel, Baykal, and 14 Others Freed from Canakkale", The Press Digest (Ankara), October 1, 1983.
- Fay, James R. "Terrorism in Turkey", Military Review, April 1981.
- Hale, William. "Turkey After the General Elections", The World Today, January 1984.
- Johnson, Maxwell O. "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics", Air University Review, January-February 1982.
- Lincoln, Robert A. "In Turkey: Preserving Democracy by Coup", Army, August 1981.
- London Times. Various articles, 1980-1983.
- Mango, Andrew. "The Third Turkish Republic", The World Today, January 1983.
- Mango, Andrew. "Turkey: Democracy Under Military Tutelage", The World Today, November 1983.
- Meneges, Constantine. "The Turkish Opening", The New Republic, March 22, 1980.
- Mortimer, Edward. "Turkey Talks Back", New Republic, December 5, 1983.
- New York Times. Various articles, 1980-1983.
- "Order at the End of a Gun", MacLeans, February 15, 1982.

"Politicians Battle for Votes", Briefing (Ankara), October 3, 1983.

"Report Finds Turkey Can Stop Anarchy, Military Dictatorship", Aviation Week, April 21, 1980.

Rubin, Barry. "Turkey's Military Interlude", New Republic, October 7, 1981.

Sabuncuoglu, Mine. "Turkey: A Post-Coup Update", Defense and Foreign Affairs, August-September 1981.

Sezer, Duygu. Turkey's Security Policy. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers #164, 1981.

Simpson, Dwight James. "Turkey: A Time of Trouble", Current History, January 1972.

Singer, Morris. "Turkey in Crisis", Current History, January 1971.

"Sub-Committee Rejects Admiral Tumer's Proposal", The Press Digest (Ankara), September 29, 1983.

Stewart, Charles L. "The Role of the Military in Turkish Society", Joint Perspectives, Summer 1982.

"The Benevolent Despots", Newsweek, April 6, 1981.

"The High Price of Stability", MacLeans, July 19, 1982.

Treaster, Joseph B. "Turkey in the Generals' Hands", Nation, December 11, 1982.

"Turkey's de Gaulle", The Economist, November 13, 1982.

"Yes for Constitution, Evren", Turkish Daily News, (Ankara) November 8, 1982.

Unpublished Material

Hughes, Preston. Personal letter, 2 October 1983.

Nye, Roger Paul. The Military in Turkish Politics, 1960-1973. Ann Arbor, Mich: University Microfilms, 1974.

Reynolds, Fred D. "Turkey, An Interim Assessment", unpublished article.

Other Sources

Bilgic, Behzat. Staff Lieutenant Colonel, Turkish Land Forces.
Interview.

Ceylanoglu, Erdal. Staff Major, Turkish Land Forces.
Interview.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Various 1980-1983.

Norton, Stephen R. Major, U.S. Army. Interview.

Transdex. Bell and Howell series of translated articles,
1980-1983.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
2. Sergeant First Class Robert R. Cordell
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
3. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
4. Department of Area Studies
U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307
5. Lieutenant Colonel Preston Hughes
AFSOUTH LNO to TGS
APO New York 09254
6. Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. Kedzierski
Department of Command
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
7. Mr. Ali Kiziltun
Translation Section
JUSMMAT
APO New York 09524
8. Marquart Memorial Library
J.F.K. Center for Military Assistance
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307
9. Major Gary H. Wade
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
10. Dr. Theodore A. Wilson
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027