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
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THE RESULTS OF AN EXPERIMENTAL RESTRUCTURING
OF EO STAFFING PATTERNS IN AN
INFANTRY DIVISION

Dale K. Brown
Human Sciences Research, Inc.

ARI FIELD UNIT AT PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

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during the experiment; interviews with selected commanders at these levels nine months into the experiment; interviews with key EO staff members; and observations by contractor staff.

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**THE RESULTS OF AN EXPERIMENTAL RESTRUCTURING
OF EO STAFFING PATTERNS IN AN
INFANTRY DIVISION**

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October 1979



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Equal Opportunity Management

FOREWORD

Since 1972, the Army Research Institute (ARI) has been active in research on the policy, operational problems, and programs of the Army Equal Opportunity Program. In 1977, at the request of DA/DCSPER, ARI, under contract, had developed the initial version of the Unit Equal Opportunity Training Diagnosis and Assessment System (TDAS), an experimental system for acquiring unit-specific data at company level concerning unit members perceptions of actions and potential problems in areas relating to race relations and equal opportunity. During the early part of 1978 a field test of this system was to be conducted at several installations, one of which was Fort Stewart, Georgia. Headquarters FORSCOM had planned to conduct an experimental reorganization of the equal opportunity staff called "the Fort Stewart Experiment" at Fort Stewart during the same period of time, and had requested that ARI provide an evaluation of the reactions of commanders and EO personnel to this experiment. Since the two activities were scheduled to take place simultaneously ARI tasked the contractor to conduct the evaluation in addition to the field test of the TDAS.

The research was conducted under project 2Q263744A769, Army Contemporary Issue Development, in the FY 78 in progress as an in-house effort augmented by a contract with Human Sciences Research, Inc. under contract DAHC 19-78-C-0030.

Special appreciation is given to MSG Jerome Bettis and SFC Sammie Boyd for their assistance and technical inputs in support of this contract at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

THE RESULTS OF AN EXPERIMENTAL RESTRUCTURING OF EO STAFFING PATTERNS IN AN INFANTRY DIVISION

BRIEF

Requirement:

To determine reactions of commanders (company and field grade) and EO personnel to an experimental reorganization of the equal opportunity staff in an infantry division.

Procedure:

An experiment was implemented in the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Air Field, Georgia, at the request of Headquarters FORSCOM. The experiment involved a restructuring of the equal opportunity programs staffing plan in which all primary duty EO staff were removed from brigade level, consolidated at division level and organized into three sections, Affirmative Actions Plan, Operations, and Training. Within five days of the beginning of the experiment every company, battalion, and brigade commander at Hunter/Stewart was asked to complete a questionnaire concerning the utilization of the EO staff. A second questionnaire containing many of the same questions was administered to the same group after the experiment had been in progress nine months. In addition, interviews were conducted with all brigade- and battalion-level commanders and with a sample of company commanders and EO staff personnel to ascertain their views of the staff consolidation experiment.

Findings:

Commanders and EO personnel passively accepted or encouraged the division level consolidation of the EO staff; the most outspoken critics of the operation were brigade-level commanders.

Utilization:

Findings were used to assist Headquarters FORSCOM in the decision regarding the consolidation of EO staff at Headquarters level on FORSCOM installations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Results of an Experimental Restructuring of EO Staffing Patterns in An Infantry Division

Author: Dale K. Brown
Human Sciences Research, Inc.

Contract: Contract No. DAHC 19-78-C-0030

Contracting Officer's
Technical Representative: Dr. James A. Thomas

In April 1978, an experiment was implemented in the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Air Field (FS/HAAF), Georgia, at the request of Headquarters, FORSCOM. The experiment involved a restructuring of the Equal Opportunity Program's staffing plan in which all primary-duty EO staff were removed from brigade level and consolidated at division level. Key results of the experiment are summarized below.

- Brigade-equivalent commanders interviewed before the experiment expressed negative views of the value of the proposed reorganization; they were concerned over the possible loss of direct contact with and access to EO staff.
- The reaction of both company- and field-grade commanders was generally favorable after the experiment had been in progress for about nine months.
- Commanders generally reported that the experiment had not had any detrimental effect on their ability to carry out their EO responsibilities, but neither did it have any positive effect.
- Access of commanders to EO staff did not appear to have been diminished to any significant extent as a result of the reorganization.
- However, several brigade and battalion commanders still objected to the aspect of the reorganization having to do with loss of direct and immediate access to and control over the activities of the EO staff.

- Those who expressed a preference for retaining a brigade-level primary-duty EO staff did so for these reasons:
 - The commander has direct access to the EO staff without any need to go through channels.
 - The commander can control EO staff activities.
 - Absence of EO staff from the brigade relieves the pressure on the commander to attend to EO; that pressure is a desirable force in causing the commander to place high priority on EO.
 - Brigade staffers are "insiders," division staffers are "outsiders," "inspectors," "spys," "tattletales," etc., or are at least perceived that way by the troops.
 - Staff in the unit are constantly in contact with the soldiers and the chain of command. They can, therefore, anticipate and prevent or circumvent incipient EO problems. A division-level staffer can only react to a problem which is already large enough, serious enough to draw attention.
 - The company-level unit EO training program may suffer because of the lack of a clear mandate for a specific person or persons to be responsible. When it is "the commander's responsibility" and has low priority, it may turn out to be nobody's responsibility.
 - Additional-duty EO staff are seen as having neither the depth nor the time to attend to EO adequately.
- From the EO staff perspective, the primary dichotomy of opinion is between:
 - administrative personnel who see the consolidation as allowing them the flexibility to set their own schedule and to produce such products as Affirmative Actions Plans and training courses in a maximally efficient way; and
 - operational personnel who fear isolation from both commanders and junior enlisted soldiers.

- Those EO staff members who prefer the division-level consolidation do so for reasons having to do with:
 - the fact that consolidation and co-location of staff members leads to a healthy exchange of ideas that was not possible when they were separated;
 - the advantage of each individual being able to benefit from the strengths of others to overcome his own weaknesses in specific areas;
 - the ability to plan a systematic course of action for the entire division, as compared to an unplanned, "reactive" mode of operation at brigade level;
 - the opportunity for each person to concentrate on one type of activity (education, development of AAPs, etc.), until it is mastered, then move on to another section and master a second activity, etc., as compared to the brigade-level situation where one person was expected to perform all functions simultaneously, to the detriment of all of them;
 - the idea that this is a "real job," with demands on the individual's skills, rather than simply a duty assignment which included either having to "look for work" or simply "stay out of the commander's way."

The conclusion is drawn from the results of the study that most people involved, commanders and EO staff alike, would either passively accept or actively encourage a division-level consolidation of EO staff. Those who resist such a structure, however, are likely to be brigade and battalion commanders, and careful attention must be given to the reasoning behind their resistance if and when a permanent change to such a structure is attempted.

Another important factor in the decision process has to do with the possibility that EO will become a low- or zero-priority program at company level under such a restructuring, with its concomitant loss of EO presence in the units. Upgraded training and guidance materials for company commanders would provide a partial safeguard against this outcome, however.

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A Research Report on
THE RESULTS OF AN EXPERIMENTAL RESTRUCTURING
OF EO STAFFING PATTERNS
IN AN INFANTRY DIVISION

Background

From its beginnings in the early 1970's, the Army's race relations/equal opportunity (RR/EO) program suffered from a number of problems, not the least of which was the negative image that the program acquired, especially in the eyes of command, particularly those at company level. Although most command personnel in the early days of the RR/EO program seemed to recognize the need for some effort on the Army's part to alleviate the racial tensions which were so widely prevalent at that time, they often were dissatisfied with the people selected for placement in that program and with the methods employed. Some of the most common complaints were:

- that those selected for RR/EO assignments were largely misfits who could serve no useful purpose in other assignments, and were, therefore, "volunteered" by their commanders;
- that the training received at the Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI) served to "radicalize" those selected to attend;
- that graduates of DRRI were interested in conducting "witch hunts" to identify racists in the chain of command rather than serving as advisors to commanders;
- that the RR/EO staff structure served a negative function in that it was a "stovepipe," i.e., a channel outside the chain of command, which tended to circumvent the command structure as a problem-solving mechanism; and
- that education and training methods employed had the net effect of creating problems where none had existed or at least exacerbating problems which had been dormant.

Leaving aside the question of the validity of these perceptions, it must be recognized that the RR/EO program did have an image problem and was viewed negatively by

large numbers of commanders. As these complaints began to surface, cognizant personnel at Department of Army level recognized the need to address these critical issues. The major effort in this direction was the revision, in late 1976 and early 1977, of the Army's policy statement concerning the RR/EO program. The revised AR 600-21, which became effective in September 1977, had as two of its major thrusts:

- emphasis on the leader's responsibility for the Equal Opportunity Program; and
- emphasis on the role of the EO staff as being in support of (not a surrogate for) command action.

Obviously, these factors are directly relevant to the alleviation of certain of the negative command perceptions noted above.

In recognition of this explicit statement portraying EO as a command responsibility, the Human Resources Division at Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), developed a plan for restructuring EO staff organization to make more efficient use of personnel resources in the EO Program while institutionalizing EO in the chain of command.

The efficiency aspect of this plan takes on additional meaning, of course, when viewed in light of the declining population of qualified military available from which the Army must draw, and the concomitant competition for a scarce resource, *viz.*, people. This is a special problem for a program such as the EO Program which is viewed as only peripherally relevant to mission preparedness by many Army leaders and decision makers. The question then becomes: What is the smallest organization that can be used to accomplish the EO mission of command advice and support?

In the final quarter of 1977, the objectives and procedures for accomplishing such a staff reorganization were defined, and it was determined that an experiment would be conducted at one major FORSCOM installation to test the concept. Acquiescence to a request for participation in the experimental program was received from the Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division, located at Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Air Field (FS/HAAF), Georgia.

The three-month period prior to initiation of the experimental program was devoted to preparing for the test. During that time, every brigade commander in the division

was briefed on the plan, and their reactions to that plan were solicited and recorded. This activity was performed by personnel from HQ, FORSCOM, ODCSPER/HRD. The thrust of the plan was the consolidation of all primary-duty EO staff members within the division into a single Human Resources Directorate to serve the entire division. This meant that the EO personnel previously assigned at brigade-equivalent level were to be removed from those brigade slots to the Division HRM. At division level they would be organized into three sections, an Affirmative Actions Section, an Operations Section and a Training Section. An outline of the proposed reorganization appears in Table 1. The actual staffing patterns for the Division before and after the reorganization are described in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.

A letter dated 22 March 1978, signed by the Chief of Staff of the 24th Infantry Division, directed that the experimental staff consolidation begin on 3 April 1978.

Concurrent with that consolidation, which took on the informal title of "the Fort Stewart Experiment," a second research study was also being undertaken within the 24th Infantry Division. This second study, under the direction of the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI), involved the field evaluation of an experimental system for acquiring unit-specific data at the company level concerning unit members' perceptions of actual or potential problems in areas relating to race relations and equal opportunity. Because the two activities were occurring simultaneously, the contractor for the ARI field test, Human Sciences Research, Inc., was tasked with an evaluation of the staff reorganization, as well.

The primary objective of this report is to describe the reactions of commanders and equal opportunity personnel to the experimental reorganization of the division EO staff. An additional objective is to describe commanders attitudes toward and perceptions of the Army EO program.

Table 1.
Outline of Proposed EO Staff Reorganization for
Fort Stewart/Hunter Army Air Field.¹

PURPOSE: To institutionalize EO in the Chain of Command.

PLACE: Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Air Field

PREPARATION FOR EXPERIMENT: Three months

LENGTH OF EXPERIMENT: Twelve months

PROGRAM THRUST:

1. Make EO Program more effective.
2. Make it a commander's program.
3. Eliminate stovepiping.

DESIRED OUTCOMES:

1. To determine the amount of assistance needed from EO staff to accomplish AAP objectives and maintain the degree of troop harmony necessary to accomplish a given mission.
2. To determine the future minimum EO staff necessary to achieve combat readiness of a Division-size unit.
3. To determine the best utilization of EO personnel.
4. To determine the amount of EO training necessary to maximize the effectiveness of the chain of command.

FUNCTIONS:

- **AAP Section**
 - Develop Division AAP
 - Monitor Division AAP progress.
 - Assist Brigade in developing AAP *when requested*.
 - Collect and maintain statistical data.
 - Consolidate and brief data down to all levels of input.
 - Collect and report statistical data to FORSCOM as required in AAP.
 - Distribute copies of consolidated FORSCOM statistical data to each subordinate commander.

(Continued—)

¹SOURCE: Undated briefing notes acquired from HQ, FORSCOM, ODCSPER/HRD.

- Operations Section
 - Outline division program.
 - Develop lesson outlines.
 - Develop EO training doctrine.
 - Develop civilian training programs.
 - Develop orientation for new personnel.
 - Develop UDLC if required.
 - Assist in developing Executive Seminars.
 - Review and maintain training aids.
- Training Section
 - Conduct training for civilians.
 - Conduct orientation for new personnel.
 - Conduct UDLC.
 - Assist in conducting Executive Seminars.
 - Assist subordinate commanders in developing and conducting unit training *when requested*.
 - Conduct formal presentations at unit level *when requested*.
 - Conduct training for supervisors and managers *when requested*.

Table 2.
EO Staff Assignments Prior to the Reorganization

Unit	EO Staff Assigned
● 24th Infantry Division Human Resources Management	Chief, HRM (04) Deputy Chief (GS-11) Chief EO (03) E7 (2) E6 (2)
● HHC, 24th Infantry Division	E7 (1) E6 (3)
● First Brigade	E6 (2)
● Second Brigade	E6 (2) SP4 (1)
● DISCOM	O2 (1) E7 (1) E6 (1) SP5 (1)
● DIVARTY	O3 (1) E7 (1) E6 (1)
● 504th ASA Group	E6 (1)

Table 3.
EO Staff Assignments After Reorganization

24th Infantry Division Human Resources Management

Chief, HRM (04)
Deputy Chief, HRM (GS-11)
Chief EO (03)
O2 (1)
E7 (1)
Clerks (3)

- **Operations Section**

- E7 (1)
 - E6 (2)

- **Training Section**

- E7 (1)
 - E6 (4)

- **Affirmative Actions Section**

- E7 (1)
 - E6 (3)

Methodology

The major source of information concerning the success of the experimental reorganization was through interviews and questionnaires administered to several groups, including brigade commanders, battalion commanders, company commanders and section leaders within the EO staff organization. The very short lead time between signing of the contract for the study (24 April 1978) and the effective date of the consolidation of EO staff (1 May 1978) precluded the possibility of collecting data on the type and frequency of EO activities undertaken by primary duty EO staff before the experiment. Some evidence concerning the consolidated staff's ability to handle the workload experienced after the consolidation is reported here, however.

As noted above, the brigade-level commanders' anticipatory reactions to the reorganization plan were obtained and recorded by FORSCOM staff. Then, within five days of the beginning of the experiment, every company, battalion and brigade commander at Hunter/Stewart was asked to complete a questionnaire concerning utilization of the EO staff. The questionnaire contained no reference to the experiment, and was administered in conjunction with training sessions associated with the unit EO diagnostic system field test. A copy of this questionnaire, referred to as the Time One Questionnaire, appears at Appendix A to this report. A second questionnaire, containing many of the same questions, was administered to the same group in January 1979, after the experiment had been in progress for almost nine months. This Time Two Questionnaire is contained in Appendix B. In addition, also in January, interviews were conducted with all brigade- and battalion-level commanders and with a sample of company commanders to ascertain their views of the staff consolidation experiment. At that same time, interviews were conducted with several EO staff members at Division HRD, including the NCOIC and the various team leaders. The two questionnaires and these commander and EO staff interviews constitute the data base for the evaluation. Results of the two questionnaire administrations are included as Appendix C.

The Time One Questionnaire data served as a baseline for comparison with Time Two data, obtained after the experiment had been underway. Because of turnover among brigade, battalion and company commanders between Time One and Time Two, the same individuals were not surveyed both times. In effect, the positions were surveyed, not the individuals. As a result, there was some overlap, but for reasons having to do partly with logistics and partly with protection of confidentiality through anonymity, it is not possible to state the exact amount of overlap.

The major dimension on which the Time One and Time Two leader groups differed, in fact, was length of time in present assignment (see Table 4). This was especially true for brigade and battalion commanders of whom 86 percent at Time One, but only 27 percent at Time Two, stated that they had been in their current assignments longer than one year. Almost 40 percent of this group at Time Two had taken over their commands after the start of the experiment, 27 percent had been there at the start, but it is unclear how much the remaining segment had been involved. The biggest difference between the company commander group at Time One and Time Two is the number who had held their commands for less than three months at the time of the respective surveys. This proportion was much larger at Time Two.

Table 4.
Description of Questionnaire Respondents

A. Race	Field Grade ¹		Company Grade ¹	
	T ₁ (N=22)	T ₂ (N=26)	T ₁ (N=70)	T ₂ (N=69)
White	95%	88%	87%	91%
Black	5	11	6	6
Neither White nor Black	0	0	7	3

B. How long have you been in your present assignment?

	Field Grade		Company Grade	
	T ₁ (N=22)	T ₂ (N=26)	T ₁ (N=70)	T ₂ (N=69)
Longer than 1 year	86%	27%	28%	26%
6-12 months	14	35	39	35
3-6 months	0	15	23	14
Under 3 months	0	23	10	25

On other dimensions, the two groups were quite similar. All respondents at all levels of command were males; most were white. In terms of rank, the major difference between Time One and Time Two is that there were fewer lieutenant company commanders (O1 and O2) and more captains (O3) at the time of the second administration of the questionnaire.

¹The numbers of field grade and company grade commanders at T₁ and T₂ apply to all subsequent tables unless otherwise indicated.

A word of explanation is called for here concerning the absence of statistical tests of significance of change between Time One and Time Two for the two groups of commanders. First, it must be recognized that the essence of this report is to describe the results of an experimental program at a single FORSCOM post. Any attempt to generalize from that single installation to all other FORSCOM installations is done at the reader's own risk, on the assumption that Fort Stewart/Hunter Army Air Field and the 24th Infantry Division are in some way typical or representative of FORSCOM, and that the units which took part in the experiment, and their commanders, constitute a representative sample of all units and commanders in FORSCOM. These assumptions may or may not be valid; we have no empirical basis on which to base an assessment of the assumptions. In other words, we are not estimating population parameters from samples in this case. Also, it must be pointed out that the sample of field grade commanders at Time Two is not independent of the sample at Time One; the same can be said for the company commander samples. In addition, numerous cell frequencies in the data reported are extremely low, i.e., less than five. What all of this means is that the chi square test for independence is not an appropriate test because of the correlation between samples, and because of the small cell frequencies which distort the computation of the chi square statistic. Neither is the chi square test of goodness of fit appropriate, for these reasons as well as the fact that there is no known empirical or theoretical distribution whose characteristics we would like to compare with those of the observed distributions.

Because the purpose of this report is purely descriptive, and because the questionnaire whose results are reported here was administered to all available company and field-grade commanders at Fort Stewart, the percentage distributions reported stand on their own, as reflecting the opinions of the two commander groups. There are a few instances in which it is appropriate to use the chi square statistic as a test of independence. In those cases, the statistic is reported as computed from raw cell frequencies, where those frequencies were of sufficient size to permit the test, or could be brought to sufficient size by collapsing response alternatives without losing the logic of the question.

Summary of Findings from Commander Questionnaires and Interviews

The comments of brigade commanders in response to initial briefing prior to the experiment can be summarized as conveying agreement with the concept of institutionalizing EO in the chain of command, but also conveying reluctance to give up the presence of primary-duty EO personnel within the brigade staff. Thus, although all five brigade-equivalent commanders agreed to participate in the experiment for the sake of testing the reorganization concept, for the most part they did so with grave reservations over losing their primary-duty EO staff. The prevailing opinion was that the chain of command can best receive the professional support it needs from EO specialists by keeping those specialists within the direct line of access and control of the brigade commander.

This line of thought was supported by the results of the Time One Questionnaire, which show only 18 percent of the field-grade commanders stating a preference for a division-level EO organization, under a hypothetical circumstance where only one organizational echelon would house primary-duty EO staff (see Table 5). Among company commanders, division/installation was the preferred location for some 36 percent, followed by battalion, then brigade. Between Time One and Time Two, however, a sizeable shift occurred among field-grade commanders, with 42 percent selecting a division-level organization at Time Two. The response pattern for company commanders was almost identical across the two times. Apparently the reorganization experiment did have an impact on the perceptions of some battalion and brigade commanders about the value of a consolidated division-level EO program.

Table 5
Preferred Location for EO Staff

If primary duty EO staff were to operate at only one level of command, where should these staff personnel be assigned?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
5%	8%	7%	6%	Company level
23	19	32	32	Battalion-equivalent level
50	31	25	27	Brigade-equivalent level
18	42	36	32	Division or installation level
5	0	0	3	Other

This modification of perspective was certainly not universal, however, since over 30 percent of field-grade commanders still prefer an EO organization based at the brigade level, and over one-fourth would prefer a still lower echelon. The interview results at Time Two help to elaborate on these various sets of perceptions. Some of the reasons provided by command personnel to back up their preference for a brigade-level EO organization are described below:

1. The commander has direct access to the EO staff without any need to go through channels.
2. The commander has more direct control over how the EO staff operates.
3. Absence of EO staff from the brigade relieves the pressure on the commander to attend to EO; that pressure is a desirable force in causing the commander to place high priority on EO.
4. Brigade staffers are "insiders," division staffers are "outsiders," "inspectors," "spys," "tattletales," or are at least perceived that way by the troops, and perhaps by commanders themselves.
5. Staff in the unit are constantly in contact with the soldiers and the chain of command. They can, therefore, anticipate and prevent or circumvent incipient EO problems. A division-level staffer can only react to a problem which is already large enough or serious enough to draw attention.
6. The company-level Unit EO Training Program may suffer because of the lack of a clear mandate for a specific person or persons to be responsible. When it is "the commander's responsibility" and has low priority, it may turn out to be nobody's responsibility.
7. Additional-duty EO specialists (unit discussion leaders) are seen as having neither the depth nor the time to attend to EO adequately.

It is obvious, however, that those who would accept a division-level consolidation are willing to overlook these factors.

The results presented in Table 5, above, reflect a hypothetical situation in which the restriction was stated that only one level of organization would have EO staff. Table 6

shows data from a somewhat different perspective. Here we see that only about one of every five commanders, either field- or company-grade feel that there is no need for an EO staff at brigade level. While there is a consistent increase for both groups from Time One to Time Two in the proportion who chose that response, it is still far from the modal response.

Table 6
"Minimum Adequate" and "Preferred" Staffing Patterns
for EO at Brigade Level

Which of the following staffing patterns do you think would be the minimum adequate *to operate the Equal Opportunity Program* at brigade level?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
54%	35%	28%	22%	One officer and two NCOs, all with primary duty in EO.
9	19	29	22	One additional duty EO officer and two primary duty EO NCOs.
27	23	15	26	No officer and one or two primary duty NCOs.
0	0	3	9	No officer and one or two additional duty NCOs.
0	0	4	1	More staff than any of the above options.
9	19	15	20	No EO staff is needed at brigade level.
0	4	6	0	Other.

Using those same options, what would be *your preferred staffing pattern* for the EO Program at brigade level?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
62%	38%	35%	26%	One officer and two NCOs, all with primary duty in EO.
14	15	22	29	One additional duty EO officer and two primary duty EO NCOs.
19	19	16	10	No officer and one or two primary duty NCOs.
0	4	0	10	No officer and one or two additional duty NCOs.
0	0	9	4	More staff than any of the above options.
5	19	10	19	No EO staff is needed at brigade level.
0	4	9	1	Other.

The decided preference among those who do see a need for a brigade-level EO staff is to have at least two primary-duty EO staff members at that level who are NCOs, and many would also prefer at least one officer with additional-duty EO responsibilities, perhaps even a primary-duty EO officer. There is also an indication that commanders' preferences are in the direction of having more than the "minimum adequate" staffing for a brigade EO organization.

One might ask about frequency of utilization of EO staff before and after the consolidation, and about the level of commander satisfaction with the assistance rendered. Table 7 shows the results of two such questions. We see from that table that company commanders' use of division EO staff is virtually unchanged from Time One to Time Two, but that the average level of satisfaction with EO staff advice declined considerably during that period. For field-grade officers, utilization dropped sharply, but average level of satisfaction remained very much the same.

Table 7
Utilization of and Satisfaction with Consultation Received
from Division-Level EO Staff

In the past six months how many EO-related questions or problems have you dealt with where you consulted a primary duty EO staff member at *division/installation level*?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
50%	73%	79%	81%	None
41	19	15	19	One or two
5	4	6	0	Three or four
5	4	0	0	More than four

If you have consulted a primary duty EO staff member at division/installation level in the past six months, how satisfied have you been with the results?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
(N=11)	(N=7)	(N=11)	(N=14)	
36%	43%	55%	28%	Very well satisfied
45	43	36	50	Somewhat satisfied.
9	14	0	14	More dissatisfied than satisfied.
9	0	9	8	Very dissatisfied.

Table 8 reports similar data for brigade-level EO staff consultations. This table shows that some five field-grade and 12 company-grade commanders purport to have consulted with *brigade-level primary-duty EO staff* during the period of the experiment, when there was no primary-duty EO staff at that echelon. The most likely explanation for this apparent contradiction comes from commander interviews which show that some brigade commanders still consider the EO staff members from their units to be on loan to the division organization, while retaining a brigade staff status in the mind of the commander. In other words, those who sought help "at brigade level" may simply be indicating that they informally sought the advice of EO staffers "from their brigades" rather than formally seeking consultation from "division EO." Whatever the case, the level of satisfaction reported here is considerably higher, on the average, for Time Two than for Time One, and for "brigade level" than for division.

Table 8
Utilization of and Satisfaction with Consultation Received from
Brigade-Level EO Staff

In the past six months how many EO-related questions or problems have you dealt with where you consulted a primary duty EO staff member *at brigade level*?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
68%	81%	78%	84%	None
9	11	18	12	One or two
9	4	3	3	Three or four
14	0	1	1	More than four.
(0)	(4)	(0)	(0)	(No response)

If you have consulted a *primary duty EO staff member at brigade level* in the past six months, how satisfied have you been with the results?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
(N=7)	(N=5)	(N=16)	(N=12)	
71%	80%	13%	45%	Very well satisfied
29	20	69	45	Somewhat satisfied
0	0	13	5	More dissatisfied than satisfied
0	0	6	0	Very dissatisfied.
(0)	(0)	(0)	(5)	(No response)

For what purposes are EO staff members most likely to be consulted? Tables 9 and 10 show some figures on this topic for brigade and division level, respectively. These data show that:

- for Time One, both company- and field-grade commanders expressed greater willingness to deal with brigade than with division EO staff for almost any type of EO consultation;
- for both Time One and Time Two, company commanders were less likely than higher echelon leaders to be willing to call on EO staff for assistance, no matter what the problem;
- company commanders are least likely to call on EO staff for problems which reflect poorly on the unit chain of command, but if they did so, would be more likely to consult with brigade-level than division-level staff;
- more field-grade and company-grade commanders expressed willingness to consult with division-level EO staff at Time Two than they did at Time One.

Table 9
Reasons for Which Primary Duty EO Staff at
Brigade Level Might Be Consulted

How likely would you be to seek out the services of a *brigade-level* primary duty EO staff member in each of the following situations?*

Definitely/ Probably Would		Not Sure		Definitely/ Probably Would Not		
F-Grade	C-Grade	F-Grade	C-Grade	F-Grade	C-Grade	
72%	34%	5%	9%	23%	57%	To help you investigate an allegation of race or sex discrimination against a member of your unit's chain of command.
95	80	0	10	5	10	To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session concerning Army and installation EO policy.
95	65	0	19	5	16	To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session aimed at reducing high racial tensions in your unit.
100	73	0	13	0	13	To provide EO training to the chain of command in your unit.
90	78	5	12	5	10	To provide advice on dealing with your unit member's complaints about race or sex discrimination off post.

*This question was asked only at T₁, i.e., prior to the removal of primary duty brigade EO staff.

Table 10
Reasons for Which Primary Duty EO Staff at Division Level
Might Be Consulted

How likely would you be to seek out the services of a division/installation level primary duty EO staff member in each of the following situations?

	Definitely/ Probably Would		Not Sure		Definitely/ Probably Would Not		
	F-Grade	C-Grade	F-Grade	C-Grade	F-Grade	C-Grade	
T ₁	45%	23%	9%	7%	46%	69%	To help you investigate an allegation of race or sex discrimination against a member of your unit's chain of command.
T ₂	58	44	8	14	35	41	
T ₁	81	68	5	9	15	23	To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session concerning Army and installation EO policy.
T ₂	89	88	8	1	4	10	
T ₁	72	54	14	16	15	30	To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session aimed at reducing high racial tensions in your unit.
T ₂	84	80	4	9	11	10	
T ₁	81	57	5	17	15	26	To provide EO training to the chain of command in your unit.
T ₂	84	74	4	14	11	11	
T ₁	86	72	0	10	14	19	To provide advice on dealing with your unit members' complaints about race or sex discrimination off post.
T ₂	92	84	4	7	4	8	

One final set of questions on the reorganization issue should be acknowledged (see Table 11). These questions were asked only at Time Two, since they require some experience with the new organization in order to be answered in a valid way.

These results show that only about one-third of commanders who responded feel that the reorganization created an added burden for the company commander, while well over half did not think this was true. When the same question is asked with battalion and brigade commanders as a point of reference, again about one-third of commanders at that level indicated the feeling that their jobs were made more difficult by the reorganization. Here also, however, the majority of both levels of command do not feel that this is true.

The final question indicates that large numbers of respondents are unable, due to lack of direct experience, to judge the differential convenience and access to EO personnel before and after the reorganization. Of those who expressed an opinion, there were more field-grade commanders who acknowledged added inconvenience than there were who denied it. The exact opposite is true among company commanders, and to a greater extent. This may be due in part to the feeling of some company commanders that they did not have convenient access to EO staff even when the organization was based primarily at brigade level.

The message which emanates from commanders on the question of accepting a reorganization which would remove primary-duty EO staff from brigade to division level is mixed. Overall, however, there is an increase in the commanders' willingness to accept such a reorganization as a result of the experiment. Even those who, when interviewed, expressed strong negative sentiment toward losing "their" EO people often accepted such a move as inevitable. Sometimes this was done very philosophically, as with the brigade commander whose stated preference was for at least one primary-duty EO specialist in the brigade, but who acknowledged that "any organization can be made to work if you try hard enough." Others were less compliant, as one brigade commander who stated he would create a "shadow EO program" at brigade level, if necessary.

Overall, a relatively small group of field-grade officers strongly resisted the reorganization, for the reasons listed earlier, despite the fact that they generally had not found division-level staff to be inaccessible and that their experiences with the reorganization had been either neutral or positive. Most company commanders would accept the reorganization without complaint, as would the remaining field-grade commanders.

Table 11
Commanders' Perceptions of the Effects of the
Reorganization of EO Staff

- A. The removal of EO personnel from brigade to division level places an added burden on the company commander.

Field Grade	Company Grade	
4%	10%	Strongly agree
31	23	Agree
38	40	Disagree
15	17	Strongly Disagree
11	9	Don't know.

- B. The removal of EO personnel from brigade to division level places an added burden on battalion and brigade commanders.

Field Grade	Company Grade	
11%	4%	Strongly agree
23	22	Agree
42	45	Disagree
15	6	Strongly Disagree
8	23	Don't know.

- C. It is less convenient to consult with EO staff now that they are all assigned to division level than it was when they worked at brigade level.

Field Grade	Company Grade	
15%	6%	Strongly agree
23	11	Agree
11	38	Disagree
15	6	Strongly Disagree
35	39	Don't know.

Summary of Results from EO Staff Interviews

The perspectives of brigade, battalion and company commanders were described and discussed above. But what of the EO staff members themselves? How do they feel that the reorganization affected them and their performance? Interviews with key EO staff members focused on these and other questions. Here, again, there is not a situation where total consensus exists. There is, however, a greater degree of agreement among EO staff than there was among commanders. The more senior members of the staff gave some rather compelling reasons for their preference for a division-level consolidation. These had to do with:

1. The fact that consolidation and co-location of staff members leads to a healthy exchange of ideas that was not possible when they were separated;
2. The advantage of each individual being able to benefit from the strengths of others to overcome his own weaknesses in specific areas;
3. The ability to plan a systematic course of action for the entire division, as compared to an unplanned, "reactive" mode of operation at brigade level;
4. The opportunity for each person to concentrate on one type of activity (education, development of AAPs, etc.), until it is mastered, then move on to another section and master a second activity, etc., as compared to the brigade-level situation where one person was expected to perform all functions simultaneously, to the detriment of all of them;
5. The idea that this is a "real job," with demands on the individual's skills, rather than simply a duty assignment which included either having to "look for work" or simply "stay out of the commander's way."

On the negative side, there is some recognition of the fact that contact with brigade commanders is not as frequent nor of as good quality as previously. The staff perception is that battalion commanders, on the whole, never did have much contact with the EO staff, and company commanders even less. This has not changed much; or, to the extent

it has, has only changed by virtue of the unit diagnostic survey field test, not the reorganization, *per se*.

One other negative perception, more prevalent among the junior members of the staff than among section leaders, is that there is a noticeable decrease in the quantity and quality of personal contact with "the troops." This distance results in less of a direct understanding of what the junior soldiers are thinking, feeling and doing, and can be quite detrimental in the area of anticipating and dealing with personal discrimination and in understanding the enlisted soldiers' perspectives on institutional discrimination in the units.

Finally, a comment unique to the Stewart/Hunter situation has to do with the inconvenience of operating a supposedly consolidated organization when one major segment of that organization is spatially removed from the main body. Staff meetings or other conference-type activities must be accomplished by telephone or by having the Hunter AAF office close down for a time so that the staff can travel the 40-odd miles to Stewart. Another side effect of this spatial separation problem involves staff members formerly assigned to Hunter, who secured housing in nearby areas only to be reassigned to the Division HRD office at Stewart. These few individuals now find themselves being inconvenienced by an 80-mile daily round trip commute. Again, however, these are not major criticisms of the reorganization concept so much as individual comments unique to Stewart/Hunter.

To summarize, then, from the administrative perspective there appear to be far more advantages than disadvantages to the consolidation, making it a more efficient operation than the prior structure allowed. There is a noticeable decrease in frequency of contact with brigade commanders and with the junior enlisted troops, however, which cannot be ignored. In addition, the amount of contact of EO staff with battalion and company commanders, which was never enough in the eyes of some of the EO staff, certainly is not helped and probably is hurt by the staff consolidation.

The dichotomy of opinion among EO staff members, then, seems to be between the program administrators' preference for consolidation as a means to more efficient, more effective production of program outputs—AAPs, training sessions, etc.—and the operational-level EO staff members' preference for decentralization as a means to better contact with the military community as a whole.

Findings Concerning Staff Size

One stated objective of the consolidation experiment was to determine "optimum staff size to maintain unit readiness and performance." This objective of the study was difficult to achieve, primarily because of the simultaneous implementation of the unit diagnostic survey field test with the consolidation experiment. The field test was a totally new responsibility for the Operations Section of the program and, because of its status as an untested system, required a considerable amount of staff time in learning and implementing the system. The Operations Section is reported to have been suffering from overload because of that situation.

To all indications, however, many procedural improvements have been made so that the diagnostic system now requires much less time, overall. It is known, for example, that as a result of the initial round of unit diagnostic surveys (April to October 1978), only about 42 percent of the unit data were found to be usable, and the surveys resulted in 69 requests for assistance from unit commanders in interpreting their reports and in preparing actions to address problem areas identified. Later, during the period 26 January through 23 March 1979, 92 such requests were received and handled. A third round of surveys in the period 25 June through 31 July 1979 resulted in 198 requests for assistance.

The current arrangement has two members of the Operations Section planning and scheduling unit surveys and receiving and coordinating requests for assistance. The Training Section has responsibility for administering surveys and for providing assistance to commanders in interpreting survey results. This is in addition to that Section's normal training responsibilities. It is unlikely that more staff than currently available would be necessary, even if the unit EO diagnostic system were to become institutionalized in the program.

Overall, there is no reason to believe that the staff that was available during the experiment was unable to manage the work load during that time period.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In conclusion, it appears that, while the idea of removing brigade-level primary duty EO staff in favor of a division-level consolidation has a few outspoken opponents, most commanders and EO staff members would either passively accept or openly welcome such a change. The fact that the most outspoken critics of the modification are brigade-level commanders must be acknowledged, however. In order to gain their full acceptance of such a

move, some form of compromise may be necessary. For example, each member of the consolidated EO staff might be designated as primary point of contact for a specified brigade-equivalent unit, with a concomitant commitment to spend a specified (though necessarily small) number of hours each month on activities in that unit, to supplement activities of additional-duty EO personnel in the units.

Another consideration seems to be that those who resist the change have an unspoken fear that if they lose the EO staff slot, their unit size will be diminished by one person. While this may seem unimportant to the outsider, the brigade commander considers it very important. Anything that can be done to alleviate this type of fear will increase the acceptance of any reorganization.

Company commanders, in general, would not resist the change in staff structure. It would seem to be a desirable tactic, however, to see that some attention is paid to monitoring EO activities at company level. This could be done by the commanders themselves and their additional-duty EO staff only if the EO training and guidance materials provided to commanders are upgraded over their present quality and quantity. Without either this or some external monitoring by trained EO specialists, it is likely that the EO program will revert to a low-priority (and in many cases a no-priority) program at company level, not by design or intent to sabotage the program, but simply by default. This can only be harmful.

From the point of view of effective performance on the part of EO staff, the consolidation would appear to be superior to the decentralized format. The advantages of specialization and of ease of access to specialists in areas other than one's own could be considerable. For example, some DRRI graduates may be very good at advising commanders concerning affirmative actions, but only minimally acceptable as platform instructors, and *vice versa*. The consolidation of staff can take best advantage of the skills and abilities of all staff members, within the constraints of number of positions available. Even if an individual must be assigned outside his or her area of special expertise, however, that person still has access to specialists in the assigned area and can learn new skills by working with those others on a daily basis.

Overall, the consolidation of EO staff at post/division level undoubtedly can be made to work effectively, but careful attention must be paid to the factors mentioned above in making any such transition, to assure acceptance of the change and to insure the continuity of EO program activities in the units.

Commander Perspectives on the Army EO Program

At the time of the Time Two survey, the opportunity was taken to ask a series of questions concerning some general aspects of race relations and equal opportunity in the Army. A core set of such questions has been used as often as possible in ARI-supported EO research since about 1972. The following section presents data from those items and some others.

Purpose and Value of the EO Program

Commanders were asked what they thought is the real motivation behind the Army EO Program. Table 12 displays the distribution of responses to that question. The majority of commanders at both levels selected the "textbook answer" to this question, but a relatively small number in both groups still feel that the Program's purpose is to prevent violence. A few company commanders chose the more cynical answers from among those available, i.e., that the Program is a sham or a "numbers game."

As to whether or not the current Army EO Program is the best way to achieve good race relations and equality of opportunity, senior leaders are split into three groups (Table 13). The largest of these (38%) feel this is probably *not* the best effort the Army could make; a second group (31%) feel that the program is adequate, and ostensibly as good as any available alternative. The third group (30%) declined to express an opinion. Company commanders show a somewhat different pattern, though the difference is not statistically significant. Among this group, the largest subgroup (38%) endorses the current program, while somewhat fewer (28%) feel that the program is not the best possible way to achieve the stated goals.

When asked what would happen to the Army if the EO Program were to be eliminated, both groups were split, with about two-thirds predicting no change and one-third predicting a deterioration of racial climate over the six- to twelve-month period following cessation of program activities (Table 14).

EO Training in the Army

The data in Table 15 show that most field-grade unit commanders express a higher opinion of the relative importance of EO training to the Army than is true for company-level commanders. This is the only item in this section of the survey which resulted in a statistically

significant difference between the two groups of commanders. Table 16, showing data on the perceived effectiveness of EO training for reducing racial tensions, shows a similar, though much less pronounced, response pattern, with over one-fifth of company commanders saying that EO training is not at all effective for that purpose.

The data in Table 17 indicate that one-fifth of all company-level commanders admit that no EO training took place in their units in the six months preceding the survey. The most frequently-reported type of training, where EO training was given, consisted of monthly sessions conducted by members of the chain of command from the unit (Table 18). It is noteworthy that many field-grade commanders seem not to be aware of the type of training given within their units as measured by the general lack of agreement between that group and company-level commanders who are ostensibly more aware of what goes on at company level, where EO unit training takes place.

Table 19 shows that half the field-grade commanders questioned, and over a third of the company commanders, do not feel they can adequately judge whether or not EO training in their units has produced positive results. In both groups, those who expressed an opinion on this subject felt that EO training had been beneficial, although there is a sizable minority of company commanders who would disagree with that assessment.

Perceptions of Racial Climate

Slightly more company commanders than battalion or brigade commanders rate the status of race relations in their units as "very good." No commander in either group gave anything less encouraging than a neutral answer to that question, as reported in Table 20. The data in Table 21 indicate that the majority of both junior and senior commanders have seen no change in the status of race relations in their units since the time of their initial assignments. The remainder report only improvement in racial climate. Remember, however, that almost four of every ten commanders surveyed had been in their companies less than six months. This has the effect of increasing the number who see no change.

Commander Commitment to EO

The majority of members of both junior and senior groups agree that, if a commander does not take an active part in the Army's EO Program, it can have a detrimental effect on career aspirations (Table 22). The vast majority in both groups also indicate the perception that field-grade commanders have a firm commitment to achieve the objectives

espoused by the EO Program, as seen in Table 23. In contrast, however, 65 percent of the senior leaders and 64 percent of company-level commanders agree that EO is usually assigned a relatively low priority by company commanders (see Table 24). This is paradoxical in view of the perception that taking an inactive stance on EO matters can hurt one's career, and especially in view of the conventional wisdom in the Army that each Army member will attend to the things which his or her commander places high on the priority list. We see here that senior leaders are seen as "committed to the objectives of EO," but that company-level leaders place a low priority on EO.

The figures shown in Table 25 indicate that field- and company-level leaders alike strongly endorse the use of unit chain of command members to solve "people problems," including EO problems. This is in consonance with the Army's trend toward institutionalizing EO in the chain of command, and demonstrates once again the commander's resistance to a program with the appearance of circumventing the chain of command, i.e., a "stovepipe" program.

Summary of Findings

The results of this portion of the survey indicate that most of the commanders who are questioned are rather well satisfied with the Army's racial climate, understand the objectives of the Army EO Program, but attach marginal value to EO training, as currently conducted. EO training is ostensibly being conducted in the vast majority of units, under a variety of formats with mildly positive results, but results which are not seen as overwhelming. A strong commitment to the Army's EO objectives, if not to the exact format in which the program operates, is seen as prevalent among battalion and brigade commanders, but that commitment appears to be considerably weakened at the small unit level where it has very widespread practical implications, but where EO must also compete with a myriad of other activities for the attention of the commander.

Table 12
Commander Perceptions of the "Real Motivation"
Behind the Army's EO Program

Which one of the following comes closest to describing what you feel is the *real* motivation behind the Army's EO Program? (Mark one.)

Field Grade	Company Grade	
11%	16%	To prevent racial violence in the Army.
81	65	To eliminate all forms of discrimination in the Army.
0	6	To give the <i>appearance</i> of promoting EO without having to change anything.
4	11	To play a "numbers game," even if it hurts whites and men, to create "equality" through statistics.
(4)	(1)	(No response.)

$$\chi^2 = 2.831, df = 1 \text{ (NS)}$$

Table 13
Opinions Concerning the Army's Current EO Program

The Army's EO Program as it is now conducted is probably not the best way to ensure good race relations and equality of opportunity.

Field Grade	Company Grade	
4%	11%	Strongly agree
27	17	Agree
23	32	Disagree
15	6	Strongly Disagree
27	33	Don't know.
(3)	(0)	(No response.)

$$\chi^2 = 0.453, df = 2^* \text{ (NS)}$$

*"Strongly agree" and "Agree" were collapsed as were "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree."

Table 14
Commander Perceptions of the Outcome of
Eliminating the Army EO Program

If the Army's entire EO program were eliminated today, do you think conditions in the Army six months or a year from now would be:

Field Grade	Company Grade	
65%	67%	about the same as now.
0	1	better than now.
35	30	worse than now.
(0)	(1)	(No response.)

$$\chi^2 = 0.686, df = 3 \text{ (NS)}$$

Table 15
Importance of EO Training

Compared to all the different kinds of training the Army conducts, how important do you think EO training is?

Field Grade	Company Grade	
31%	11%	Extremely important
50	38	Important
19	43	Not very important
0	7	Not important at all

$$\chi^2 = 7.684, df = 1^* \text{ (} p < .01 \text{)}$$

*The first two categories were collapsed into one, as were the last two, to eliminate the zero value.

Table 16
Effectiveness of EO Training

In general, what is your opinion about the value of EO training for reducing racial tensions in the Army?

Field Grade	Company Grade	
11%	11%	Very effective in reducing racial tensions
85	64	Somewhat effective in reducing racial tensions
4	22	Not effective at all in reducing racial tensions
0	3	No opinion

$$\chi^2 = 4.693, df = 2, * (NS)$$

Table 17
Frequency of EO Training

During the past six months, have race relations training sessions been held for personnel in your unit?

Field Grade	Company Grade	
85%	80%	Yes
11	20	No
(4)	(0)	(No response.)

$$\chi^2 = 0.851, df = 1 (NS)$$

*The "no opinion" category was dropped due to low frequencies.

Table 18
Type of Unit EO Training Given

What kind of EO training was given?

Field Grade	Company Grade	
58%	39%	Monthly sessions given by someone from the unit chain of command.
0	10	One 6-8 hour session given by someone from the unit chain of command.
4	11	One 6-8 hour session given by trained RR/EO specialists.
4	13	No training was given.
8	4	Training was given but I don't know what kind.
15	19	Other
(11)	(3)	(No response.)

$$\chi^2 = 7.126, df = 5 \text{ (NS)}$$

Table 19
Results of EO Training

During the past six months, EO training sessions in my unit have generally produced positive results.

Field Grade	Company Grade	
4%	9%	Strongly agree
35	38	Agree
8	14	Disagree
0	3	Strongly Disagree
50	35	Don't know

$$\chi^2 = 2.614, df = 2^* \text{ (NS)}$$

*“Strongly agree” and “Agree” were collapsed, as were “Disagree” and Strongly disagree.”

Table 20
Status of Unit Race Relations

In general, race relations in my unit are:

Field Grade	Company Grade	
19%	27%	Very good
54	51	Good
19	20	Neither good nor bad
0	0	Bad
0	0	Very bad
(8)	(1)	(No response.)

(No test of significance was performed due to high number of cells with zero frequencies.)

Table 21
Change in Status of Unit Race Relations

Since I joined this unit, in general, race relations:

Field Grade	Company Grade	
23%	38%	have been getting better.
73	61	have not changed.
0	0	have been getting worse.
(4)	(1)	(No response.)

$\chi^2 = 1.641$, $df = 2$ (NS)

Table 22
Potential Effect of EO on Army Career

There is a real danger that a commander's career can be badly damaged if he does not take an active part in the EO Program.

Field Grade	Company Grade	
11%	25%	Strongly agree
58	46	Agree
19	23	Disagree
4	4	Strongly Disagree
8	1	Don't know

$$\chi^2 = 2.482, df = 2^* \text{ (NS)}$$

Table 23
Commitment of Field Grade Commanders to EO

Most field grade commanders are firmly committed to the objectives of the EO Program.

Field Grade	Company Grade	
15%	12%	Strongly agree
54	62	Agree
8	10	Disagree
4	4	Strongly disagree
19	12	Don't know

$$\chi^2 = 0.982, df = 2^* \text{ (NS)}$$

*"Strongly agree" and "Agree" were collapsed, as were "Disagree" and "Strongly disagree."

Table 24
Priority of EO for Company Grade Commanders

Among all the things a company commander has to do, EO usually has a relatively low priority.

Field Grade	Company Grade	
0%	9%	Strongly agree
65	55	Agree
31	27	Disagree
4	7	Strongly disagree
0	1	Don't know

$$\chi^2 = 0.004, df = 1 * (NS)$$

Table 25
Opinions Concerning Unit Chain of Command
Handling EO Problems

Chain of command personnel should be used to solve "people problems," including race relations and equal opportunity problems, rather than having an outside agency do it.

Field Grade	Company Grade	
50%	42%	Strongly agree
38	42	Agree
8	14	Disagree
4	1	Strongly disagree
0	0	Don't know

$$\chi^2 = 0.291, df = 1 * (NS)$$

*"Strongly agree" and "Agree" were collapsed as were "Disagree" and "Strongly disagree."
"Don't know" was dropped due to zero or low cell frequencies.

EO QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMANDERS

Your views on the following questions are being solicited to assist the Equal Opportunity staff at FORSCOM to make some judgments about the staffing of local EO programs within the Command. Please answer by putting an "X" in the box that comes *closest* to describing how you feel or how you see things.

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. Data collected in this research are not being identified with specific individuals; that is, there will be no way of matching the information you provide with your name or any other means of identification.

The data collected with the attached form, are to be used for research purposes only.

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals of not providing all or any part of the information.

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1. If primary duty EO staff were to operate at only one level of command, where should these staff personnel be assigned? (Mark one.)

- ☐ Company level
- ☐ Battalion-equivalent level
- ☐ Brigade-equivalent level
- ☐ Division or installation level
- ☐ Other

2. Which of the following staffing patterns do you think would be the *minimum adequate* to operate the Equal Opportunity Program at *brigade level*? (Mark one.)

- ☐ One officer and two NCOs, all with primary duty in EO.
- ☐ One additional duty EO officer and two primary duty EO NCOs.
- ☐ No officer and one or two primary duty NCOs.
- ☐ No officer and one or two additional duty NCOs.
- ☐ More staff than any of the above options.
- ☐ No EO staff is needed at brigade level.
- ☐ Other

3. Using those same options, what would be your *preferred staffing pattern* for the EO program at *brigade level*? (Mark one.)

- ☐ One officer and two NCOs, all with primary duty in EO.
- ☐ One additional duty EO officer and two primary duty EO NCOs.
- ☐ No officer and one or two primary duty NCOs.
- ☐ No officer and one or two additional duty NCOs.
- ☐ More staff than any of the above options.
- ☐ No EO staff is needed at brigade level.
- ☐ Other

4. In the past six months how many EO-related questions or problems have you dealt with where you consulted a primary duty EO staff member at *brigade level*? (Mark one.)

- ☐ None (go to Question 5)
- ☐ One or two
- ☐ Three or four
- ☐ More than four.

4a. If you have consulted a primary duty EO staff member at brigade level in the past six months, how satisfied have you been with the results? *(Mark one.)*

- ☐ Very well satisfied.
- ☐ Somewhat satisfied
- ☐ More dissatisfied than satisfied
- ☐ Very dissatisfied.

5. In the past six months how many EO-related questions or problems have you dealt with where you consulted a primary duty EO staff member at *division/installation level*? *(Mark one.)*

- ☐ None (go to Question 6)
- ☐ One or two
- ☐ Three or four
- ☐ More than four

5a. If you have consulted a primary duty EO staff member at *division/installation level* in the past six months, how satisfied have you been with the results? *(Mark one.)*

- ☐ Very well satisfied.
- ☐ Somewhat satisfied.
- ☐ More dissatisfied than satisfied.
- ☐ Very dissatisfied.

6. In the past six months have you tried to consult with a primary duty EO staff member at *brigade level* but found that none was available? *(Mark one.)*

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

7. In the past six months have you tried to consult with a primary duty EO staff member at *division/installation level* but found that none was available? *(Mark one.)*

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

8. How likely would you be to seek out the services of a *brigade-level* primary duty EO staff member in each of the following situations? (Mark one box for each part.)

Definitely Would	Probably Would	Not Sure	Probably Would Not	Definitely Would Not	
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	a. To help you investigate an allegation of race or sex discrimination against a member of your unit's chain of command.
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	b. To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session concerning Army and installation EO policy.
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	c. To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session aimed at reducing high racial tensions in your unit.
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	d. To provide EO training to the chain of command in your unit.
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	e. To provide advice on dealing with your unit members' complaints about race or sex discrimination off post.

9. How likely would you be to seek out the services of a *division/installation-level* primary duty EO staff member in each of the following situations? (Mark one box for each part.)

Definitely Would	Probably Would	Not Sure	Probably Would Not	Definitely Would Not	
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	a. To help you investigate an allegation of race or sex discrimination against a member of your unit's chain of command.
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	b. To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session concerning Army and installation EO policy.
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	c. To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session aimed at reducing high racial tensions in your unit.
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	d. To provide EO training to the chain of command in your unit.
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	e. To provide advice on dealing with your unit members' complaints about race or sex discrimination off post.

10. Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing what you feel is the *real* motivation behind the Army's EO program? (Mark one.)

- ☐ To prevent racial violence in the Army.
- ☐ To eliminate all forms of discrimination in the Army.
- ☐ To give the *appearance* of promoting EO without having to change anything.
- ☐ To play a "numbers game," even if it hurts whites and men to create "equality" through statistics.

11. If the Army's entire EO program were eliminated today, do you think conditions in the Army six months or a year from now would be: (Mark one.)

- ☐ about the same as now.
- ☐ better than now.
- ☐ worse than now.

12. Compared to all the different kinds of training the Army conducts, how important do you think EO training is? (Mark one.)

- ☐ Extremely important.
- ☐ Important.
- ☐ Not very important.
- ☐ Not important at all.

13. During the past six months, have race relations training sessions been held for personnel in your unit? (Mark one.)

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No.

14. What kind of training program was given? (Mark one.)

- ☐ Monthly sessions given by someone from the unit chain of command.
- ☐ One 6-8 hour session given by someone from the unit chain of command.
- ☐ One 6-8 hour session given by trained RR/EO specialists.
- ☐ No training was given.
- ☐ Training was given, but I don't know what kind.
- ☐ Other (please specify: _____);

15. In general, what is your opinion about the value of EO training for reducing racial tensions in the Army? (Mark one.)

- ☐ Very effective in reducing racial tensions.
- ☐ Somewhat effective in reducing racial tensions.
- ☐ Not effective at all in reducing racial tensions.
- ☐ No opinion.

16. In general, race relations in my unit are:

- ☐ Very good
- ☐ Good.
- ☐ Neither good nor bad.
- ☐ Bad.
- ☐ Very bad.

17. Since I joined this unit, in general, race relations:

- ☐ have been getting better.
- ☐ have not changed.
- ☐ have been getting worse.

18. In general, race relations at this post outside of my unit are:

- ☐ Very good.
- ☐ Good.
- ☐ Neither good nor bad.
- ☐ Bad.
- ☐ Very bad.

19. What is your rank?

- ☐ O1-O2
- ☐ O3
- ☐ O4
- ☐ O5
- ☐ O6
- ☐ above O6

20. What is your race?

- ☐ White
- ☐ Black
- ☐ Neither White nor black (specify _____)

21. Are you:

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

22. How long have you held your present assignment?

- ☐ Longer than 1 year.
- ☐ 6-12 months.
- ☐ 3-6 months.
- ☐ Under 3 months.

APPENDIX B
TIME TWO QUESTIONNAIRE

EO QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMANDERS

Your views on the following questions are being solicited to assist the Equal Opportunity staff at FORSCOM to make some judgments about the staffing of local EO programs within the Command. Please answer by putting an "X" in the box that comes closest to describing how you feel or how you see things.

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. Data collected in this research are not being identified with specific individuals; that is, there will be no way of matching the information you provide with your name or any other means of identification.

The data collected with the attached form, are to be used for research purposes only.

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate information in the interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals of not providing all or any part of the information.

PT 5210

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

1. If primary duty EO staff were to operate at only one *level* of command, where should these staff personnel be assigned? (*Mark one.*)
- ☐ Company level
 - ☐ Battalion-equivalent level
 - ☐ Brigade-equivalent level
 - ☐ Division or installation level
 - ☐ Other
2. Which of the following staffing patterns do you think would be the *minimum adequate* to operate the Equal Opportunity Program *at brigade level*? (*Mark one.*)
- ☐ One officer and two NCOs, all with primary duty in EO.
 - ☐ One additional duty EO officer and two primary duty EO NCOs.
 - ☐ No officer and one or two primary duty NCOs.
 - ☐ No officer and one or two additional duty NCOs.
 - ☐ More staff than any of the above options.
 - ☐ No EO staff is needed at brigade level.
 - ☐ Other
3. Using those same options, what would be your *preferred staffing pattern* for the EO program at brigade level? (*Mark one.*)
- ☐ One officer and two NCOs, all with primary duty in EO.
 - ☐ One additional duty EO officer and two primary duty EO NCOs.
 - ☐ No officer and one or two primary duty NCOs.
 - ☐ No officer and one or two additional duty NCOs.
 - ☐ More staff than any of the above options.
 - ☐ No EO staff is needed at brigade level.
 - ☐ Other
4. In the past six months how many EO-related questions or problems have you dealt with where you consulted a primary duty EO staff member *at brigade level*? (*Mark one.*)
- ☐ None (go to Question 5)
 - ☐ One or two
 - ☐ Three or four
 - ☐ More than four.

- 4a. If you have consulted a primary duty EO staff member at brigade level in the past six months, how satisfied have you been with the results? *(Mark one.)*
- ☐ Very well satisfied.
 - ☐ Somewhat satisfied
 - ☐ More dissatisfied than satisfied
 - ☐ Very dissatisfied.
5. In the past six months how many EO-related questions or problems have you dealt with where you consulted a primary duty EO staff member at *division/installation level*? *(Mark one.)*
- ☐ None (go to Question 6)
 - ☐ One or two
 - ☐ Three or four
 - ☐ More than four
- 5a. If you have consulted a primary duty EO staff member at division/installation level in the past six months, how satisfied have you been with the results? *(Mark one.)*
- ☐ Very well satisfied.
 - ☐ Somewhat satisfied.
 - ☐ More dissatisfied than satisfied.
 - ☐ Very dissatisfied.
6. In the past six months have you tried to consult with a primary duty EO staff member at *brigade level* but found that none was available? *(Mark one.)*
- ☐ Yes
 - ☐ No
7. In the past six months have you tried to consult with a primary duty EO staff member at *division/installation level* but found that none was available? *(Mark one.)*
- ☐ Yes
 - ☐ No

APPENDIX A
TIME ONE QUESTIONNAIRE

8. How likely would you be to seek out the services of a *division/installation-level primary duty EO staff* member in each of the following situations? (*Mark one box for each part.*)

Definitely Would	Probably Would	Not Sure	Probably Would Not	Definitely Would Not
---------------------	-------------------	-------------	-----------------------	-------------------------

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

a. To help you investigate an allegation of race or sex discrimination against a member of your unit's chain of command.

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

b. To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session concerning Army and installation EO policy.

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

c. To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session aimed at reducing high racial tensions in your unit.

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

d. To provide EO training to the chain of command in your unit.

☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

e. To provide advice on dealing with your unit members' complaints about race or sex discrimination off post.

9. Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing what you feel is the *real* motivation behind the Army's EO program? (*Mark one.*)

- ☐ To prevent racial violence in the Army.
- ☐ To eliminate all forms of discrimination in the Army.
- ☐ To give the *appearance* of promoting EO without having to change anything.
- ☐ To play a "numbers game," even if it hurts whites and men to create "equality" through statistics.

10. If the Army's entire EO program were eliminated today, do you think conditions in the Army six months or a year from now would be: (*Mark one.*)

- ☐ about the same as now.
- ☐ better than now.
- ☐ worse than now.

11. Compared to all the different kinds of training the Army conducts, how important do you think EO training is? *(Mark one.)*

- ☐ Extremely important.
- ☐ Important.
- ☐ Not very important.
- ☐ Not important at all.

12. During the past six months, have race relations training sessions been held for personnel in your unit? *(Mark one.)*

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No.

13. What kind of training program was given? *(Mark one.)*

- ☐ Monthly sessions given by someone from the unit chain of command.
- ☐ One 6-8 hour session given by someone from the unit chain of command.
- ☐ One 6-8 hour session given by trained RR/EO specialists.
- ☐ No training was given.
- ☐ Training was given, but I don't know what kind.
- ☐ Other (please specify: _____);

14. In general, what is your opinion about the value of EO training for reducing racial tensions in the Army? *(Mark one.)*

- ☐ Very effective in reducing racial tensions.
- ☐ Somewhat effective in reducing racial tensions.
- ☐ Not effective at all in reducing racial tensions.
- ☐ No opinion.

15. In general, race relations in my unit are:

- ☐ Very good.
- ☐ Good.
- ☐ Neither good nor bad.
- ☐ Bad.
- ☐ Very bad.

16. Since I joined this unit, in general, race relations:

- ☐ have been getting better.
- ☐ have not changed.
- ☐ have been getting worse.

17. In general, race relations at this post outside of my unit are:

- ☐ Very good.
- ☐ Good.
- ☐ Neither good nor bad.
- ☐ Bad.
- ☐ Very bad.

Place an "X" in the box which indicates how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

Strongly Agree
 Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree
 Don't Know

- | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----|--|
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 18. | There is a real danger that a commander's career can be badly damaged if he does not take an active part in the EO Program. |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 19. | The removal of EO personnel from brigade to division level places an added burden on the company commander. |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 20. | Most field grade commanders are firmly committed to the objectives of the EO Program. |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 21. | Among all the things a company commander has to do, EO usually has a relatively low priority. |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 22. | Chain of command personnel should be used to solve "people problems," including race relations and equal opportunity problems, rather than having an outside agency do it. |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 23. | During the past six months, EO training sessions in my unit have generally produced positive results. |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 24. | Members of my unit's chain of command took part in more EO training sessions in the past six months than they did in the previous six months. |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 25. | It is less convenient to consult with the EO staff now that they are all assigned to division level than it was when they worked at brigade level. |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 26. | The Army's EO Program as it is now conducted is probably not the best way to insure good race relations and equality of opportunity. |
| ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | ☐ | 27. | The removal of EO personnel from brigade to division level places an added burden on battalion and brigade commanders. |

28. What is your rank?

- ☐ O1-O2
- ☐ O3
- ☐ O4
- ☐ O5
- ☐ O6
- ☐ above O6

29. What is your race?

- ☐ White
- ☐ Black
- ☐ Neither White nor black (specify _____)

30. Are you:

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female

31. How long have you held your present assignment?

- ☐ Longer than 1 year.
- ☐ 6-12 months.
- ☐ 3-6 months.
- ☐ Under 3 months.

APPENDIX C

**RESULTS OF COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRE
CONCERNING EO STAFF STRUCTURE
BEFORE AND NINE MONTHS AFTER THE
EXPERIMENTAL REORGANIZATION**

**Results of Commander Questionnaire
Concerning EO Staff Structure
Before and Nine Months after the
Experimental Reorganization**

Data are presented below for the EO Questionnaire for commanders, administered at Fort Stewart and Hunter Army Air Field (GA) on two separate occasions: before implementation of the experimental reorganization of primary duty EO staff (Time One, April 1978); and after the experiment had been in effect just over nine months (Time Two, January 1979). The data, presented in the form of percentages, are based on the following numbers of respondents:

	Battalion and Brigade Commanders	Company-level Commanders
Time One	n = 22	n = 70
Time Two	n = 26	n = 69

The terms "field grade" and "company grade" are used to distinguish the two respondent groups, even though this is not an accurate use of those terms. In reality, there were twelve officers in grade O-4 who were company-level commanders in the Time One survey, and nine in the Time Two survey. Their responses are included with other company-level commanders under the heading "Company Grade".

If primary duty EO staff were to operate at only one level of command, where should these staff personnel be assigned?

Field Grade		Company Grade	
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂
5%	8%	7%	6%
23	19	32	32
50	31	25	27
18	42	36	32
5	0	0	3

Company level.
Battalion-equivalent level
Brigade-equivalent level
Division or installation level
Other

Which of the following staffing patterns do you think would be the *minimum adequate* to operate the Equal Opportunity Program at brigade level?

Field Grade		Company Grade	
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂
54%	35%	28%	22%
9	19	29	22
27	23	15	26
0	0	3	9
0	0	4	1
9	19	15	20
0	4	6	0

One officer and two NCOs, all with primary duty in EO.
One additional duty EO officer and two primary duty EO NCOs.
No officer and one or two primary duty NCOs.
No officer and one or two additional duty NCOs.
More staff than any of the above options.
No EO staff is needed at brigade level.
Other

Using those same options, what would be your *preferred staffing pattern* for the EO program at brigade level?

Field Grade		Company Grade	
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂
62%	38%	35%	26%
14	15	22	29
19	19	16	10
0	4	0	10
0	0	9	4
5	19	10	19
0	4	9	1

One officer and two NCOs, all with primary duty in EO.
One additional duty EO officer and two primary duty EO NCOs.
No officer and one or two primary duty NCOs.
No officer and one or two additional duty NCOs.
More staff than any of the above options.
No EO staff is needed at brigade level.
Other

In the past six months how many EO-related questions or problems have you dealt with where you consulted a primary duty EO staff member at brigade level?

Field Grade		Company Grade	
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂
68%	81%	78%	84%
9	11	18	12
9	4	3	3
14	0	1	1
(0)	(4)	(0)	(0)

None
One or two
Three or four
More than four
(No response)

If you have consulted a primary duty EO staff member at brigade level in the past six months, how satisfied have you been with the results?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
(N=7)	(N=5)	(N=16)	(N=12)	
71%	80%	13%	45%	Very well satisfied.
29	20	69	45	Somewhat satisfied
0	0	13	5	More dissatisfied than satisfied
0	0	6	0	Very dissatisfied

In the past six months how many EO-related questions or problems have you dealt with where you consulted a primary duty EO staff member at *division/installation level*?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
50%	73%	79%	81%	None
41	19	15	19	One or two
5	4	6	0	Three or four
5	4	0	0	More than four

If you have consulted a primary duty EO staff member at division/installation level in the past six months, how satisfied have you been with the results?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
(N=11)	(N=7)	(N=11)	(N=14)	
36%	43%	55%	28%	Very well satisfied
45	43	36	50	Somewhat satisfied
9	14	0	14	More dissatisfied than satisfied
9	0	9	8	Very dissatisfied

In the past six months have you tried to consult with a primary duty EO staff member *at brigade level* but found that none was available?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
14%	11%	3%	6%	Yes
86	89	97	94	No

In the past six months have you tried to consult with a primary duty EO staff member *at division/Installation level* but found that none was available?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
5%	0%	0%	0%	Yes
95	100	100	100	No

How likely would you be to seek out the services of a division/installation level primary duty EO staff member in each of the following situations?

	Definitely/ Probably Would		Not Sure		Definitely/ Probably Would Not		
	F-Grade	C-Grade	F-Grade	C-Grade	F-Grade	C-Grade	
T ₁	45%	23%	9%	7%	46%	69%	To help you investigate an allegation of race or sex discrimination against a member of your unit's chain of command.
T ₂	58	44	8	14	35	41	
T ₁	81	68	5	9	15	23	To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session concerning Army and installation EO policy.
T ₂	89	88	8	1	4	10	
T ₁	72	54	14	16	15	30	To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session aimed at reducing high racial tensions in your unit.
T ₂	84	80	4	9	11	10	
T ₁	81	57	5	17	15	26	To provide EO training to the chain of command in your unit.
T ₂	84	74	4	14	11	11	
T ₁	86	72	0	10	14	19	To provide advice on dealing with your unit members' complaints about race or sex discrimination off post.
T ₂	92	84	4	7	4	8	

How likely would you be to seek out the services of a *brigade-level* primary duty EO staff member in each of the following situations?*

Definitely/ Probably Would		Not Sure		Definitely/ Probably Would Not		
F-Grade	C-Grade	F-Grade	C-Grade	F-Grade	C-Grade	
72%	34%	5%	9%	23%	57%	To help you investigate an allegation of race or sex discrimination against a member of your unit's chain of command.
95	80	0	10	5	10	To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session.
95	65	0	19	5	16	To help you design or conduct a unit EO training session aimed at reducing high racial tensions in your unit.
100	73	0	13	0	13	To provide EO training to the chain of command in your unit.
90	78	5	12	5	10	To provide advice on dealing with your unit member's complaints about race or sex discrimination off post.

*This question was asked only at T₁, i.e., prior to the removal of primary duty brigade EO staff.

Which one of the following statements comes closest to describing what you feel is the *real* motivation behind the Army's EO program?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
14%	11%	26%	16%	To prevent racial violence in the Army.
82	81	57	65	To eliminate all forms of discrimination in the Army.
0	0	6	6	To give the <i>appearance</i> of promoting EO without having to change anything.
5	4	12	11	To play a "numbers game," even if it hurts whites and men to create "equality" through statistics.
(0)	(4)	(0)	(1)	(No response)

If the Army's entire EO program were eliminated today, do you think conditions in the Army six months or a year from now would be:

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
50%	65%	49%	67%	about the same as now.
0	0	4	1	better than now.
50	35	47	30	worse than now.
(0)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(no response)

Compared to all the different kinds of training the Army conducts, how important do you think EO training is?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
19%	31%	11%	11%	Extremely important.
76	50	52	38	Important.
5	19	34	43	Not very important.
0	0	3	7	Not important at all.

During the past six months, have race relations training sessions been held for personnel in your unit?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
91%	85%	87%	80%	Yes
9	11	13	20	No
(0)	(4)	(0)	(0)	(No response)

What kind of training program was given?

Field Grade		Company Grade	
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂
56%	58%	67%	39%
9	0	6	10
5	4	5	11
-	4	6	13
14	8	5	4
18	15	11	19
(0)	(11)	(0)	(3)

Monthly sessions given by someone from the unit chain of command.
 One 6-8 hour session given by someone from the unit chain of command.
 One 6-8 hour session given by trained RR/EO specialists.
 No training was given.
 Training was given, but I don't know what kind.
 Other (please specify):
 (No response)

In general, what is your opinion about the value of EO training for reducing racial tensions in the Army?

Field Grade		Company Grade	
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂
24%	11%	10%	11%
71	85	72	64
5	4	13	22
0	0	4	3

Very effective in reducing racial tensions.
 Somewhat effective in reducing racial tensions.
 Not effective at all in reducing racial tensions.
 No opinion.

In general, race relations in my unit are:

Field Grade		Company Grade	
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂
14%	19%	25%	27%
68	54	61	51
18	19	13	20
0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0
(0)	(8)	(0)	(1)

Very good.
 Good.
 Neither good nor bad.
 Bad.
 Very bad.
 (No response)

Since I joined this unit, in general, race relations:

Field Grade		Company Grade	
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂
41%	23%	29%	38%
59	73	71	61
0	0	0	0
(0)	(4)	(0)	(1)

have been getting better.
 have not changed.
 have been getting worse.
 (No response)

Place an "X" in the box which indicates how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
FG	11%	58%	19%	4%	8%	
CG	25	46	23	4	1	

There is a real danger that a commander's career can be badly damaged if he does not take an active part in the EO Program.

FG	4	31	38	15	11	
CG	10	23	40	17	9	

The removal of EO personnel from brigade to division level places an added burden on the company commander.

FG	15	54	8	4	19	
CG	12	62	10	4	12	

Most field grade commanders are firmly committed to the objectives of the EO Program.

FG	0	65	31	4	0	
CG	9	55	27	7	1	

Among all the things a company commander has to do, EO usually has a relatively low priority.

FG	50	38	8	4	0	
CG	42	42	14	1	0	

Chain of command personnel should be used to solve "people problems," including race relations and equal opportunity problems, rather than having an outside agency do it.

FG	4	35	8	0	50 ¹	
CG	9	38	14	3	35	

During the past six months, EO training sessions in my unit have generally produced positive results.

FG	0	11	23	0	61 ²	
CG	9	14	32	6	39	

Members of my unit's chain of command took part in more EO training sessions in the past six months than they did in the previous six months.

FG	15	23	11	15	35	
CG	6	11	38	6	39	

It is less convenient to consult with the EO staff now that they are all assigned to division level than it was when they worked at brigade level.

FG	4	27	23	15	27 ³	
CG	11	17	32	6	33	

The Army's EO Program as it is now conducted is probably not the best way to ensure good race relations and equality of opportunity.

FG	11	23	42	15	8	
CG	4	22	45	6	23	

The removal of EO personnel from brigade to division level places an added burden on battalion and brigade commanders.

¹Non-response = 3%

²Non-response = 5%

³Non-response = 4%

In general, race relations at this post outside of my unit are:

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
5%	4%	3%	14%	Very good.
62	38	52	36	Good.
33	46	35	36	Neither good nor bad.
0	8	11	6	Bad.
0	0	0	6	Very bad.
(0)	(4)	(0)	(1)	(No response)

What is your rank?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
0%	0%	40%	11%	01-02
0	0	42	75	03
0	0	18	13	04
86	81	0	0	05
14	19	0	0	06
0	0	0	0	Above 06

What is your race?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
95%	88%	87%	91%	White
5	11	6	6	Black
0	0	7	3	Neither White nor Black (specify)

Are you:

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
100%	100%	100%	100%	Male
0	0	0	0	Female

How long have you held your present assignment?

Field Grade		Company Grade		
T ₁	T ₂	T ₁	T ₂	
86%	27%	28%	26%	Longer than 1 year.
14	35	39	35	6-12 months.
0	15	23	14	3-6 months.
0	23	10	25	Under 3 months.