Plausible Outcomes for Games in Strategic Form,
Abstract
This is the first in a projected series of papers on solutions to games in matrix and extensive form. The predominant solution concept in the literature is that of the noncooperative equilibrium put forward by Nash (1951). The major virtue of a noncooperative equilibrium is that it satisfies a form of circular stability or self fulfilling prophecy. If i thinks that j will follow his noncooperative equilibrium strategy then i's best response is to select his noncooperative equilibrium strategy and vice versa. The well known Prisoner's Dilemma game provides both an easy example and considerable experimental evidence that the noncooperative equilibrium strategies are frequently selected.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 1984
- Accession Number
- ADA147383
Entities
People
- Martin Shubik
Organizations
- Yale University