UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SINCE WORLD WAR II: THREE CASE STUDIES - GREECE, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND VIETNAM

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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This study attempts to analyze the causes and results of U.S. involvement in low intensity conflict since World War II in three case studies to determine if there are specific indicators that would suggest the nature of future involvement of the United States in another low intensity conflict situations. The investigation is focused on an analysis of historical experience within the context of low intensity conflict as depicted on the conflict spectrum and

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Investigation reveals that there are many commonalities as well as disparities among different case studies of low intensity conflict. Further investigation of these case studies with respect to current U.S. doctrine for internal defense and development suggests that the current doctrine is viable, and entails more than a simple military solution to a case of low intensity conflict. Several conclusions are reached which may influence future U.S. involvement in low intensity conflict. These conclusions are concerned with Communist containment, rules of engagement, country team coordination, internationalization efforts, external support and U.S. Army doctrine.

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

UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SINCE WORLD WAR II: THREE CASE STUDIES - GREECE, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND VIETNAM, by Major Ralph W. Hinrichs, Jr., USA, 128 pages.

This study attempts to analyze the causes and results of U.S. involvement in low intensity conflict since World War II in three case studies to determine if there are specific indicators that would suggest the nature of future involvement of the United States in low intensity conflict situations. The investigation is focused on an analysis of historical experience within the context of low intensity conflict as depicted on the conflict spectrum and defined within the study. The case studies include the entire Greek Civil War from 1947 to 1949, the first weeks of the Dominican intervention in 1965 and U.S. involvement in South Vietnam during the advisory effort, 1961 to mid-1965.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Low intensity conflict or LIC, a relatively new term in our vocabulary, is being studied with increasing interest. LIC has become synonomous with the myriad insurgencies that promise to change the political, social, and economic order of numerous countries. It has come to represent everything from invidious terrorist attacks throughout the world to the continuing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan or the insurgency in El Salvador.

After World War II, low intensity conflict became the modern way of war. While the bulk of the military budgets of the superpowers goes towards the prevention of nuclear war, LIC has become the normative form of military activity. For those who cannot afford to wage conventional war, LIC is an adequate substitute for a "poor man's war." While nuclear deterrence strategy has been successful to date, low and mid intensity conflict has been endured in every part of the world; endured some might say to prevent crossing the threshold to nuclear warfare. Just as the advocates of armored blitzkrieg, aerial bombardment, and amphibious landings sought a means to circumvent or nullify the holocaust of infantry stalemate after World War I, so the successful advocates of irregular warfare have used LIC in order to achieve desired social and political change, considering that the major powers would not think the effort a worthwhile cause to escalate into major power confrontation.

Purpose

From the Greek Civil War following World War II to the Grenada incursion in 1983, the United States' recent history is filled with examples of involvement in LIC. There is an abundance of literature concerning this subject. Theories abound on how to conduct irregular warfare in any setting. For the most part, these works are on particular aspects; world regions, types of conflict, personal experiences, and other points of view too numerous to mention. There appears to be, however, no single source that deals with U.S. involvement in this area using a comparative approach from a military point of view. A comparable analysis of U.S. military involvement in low intensity conflict since World War II is, therefore, the purpose of this study.

The following questions will be used to advance this analysis:

1. What conditions prompted U.S. military involvement? Were they political, social, or economic? What were the relations between the United States and the country in question prior to U.S. military involvement? What were the interests of the United States? What was the specific goal?

2. What, if any, were the limitations placed on the involvement? By Whom? Were there troop ceilings, time limits or use of force limitations? Did the scale of U.S. involvement change over time?

3. What was the end product of U.S. involvement? Were military goals and objectives realized? Political goals? Was a problem solved?

4. How was the U.S. military affected? Was there any doctrinal evolution? Were there organizational changes? Did military strategy or tactics change because of the involvement?

These questions will form the basis for analyzing U.S. involve-

ment in low intensity conflict, the answers to which, it is hoped, may give an insight into what can be expected in the future.

The scope of the foregoing questions indicates the need for a study of this nature. While there is abundant material on the subject, there is no particular study that compares historical, U.S. case studies of involvement in LIC with an eye to the future. The utilization of past experiences to predict the feasibility of future U.S. military involvement in this type of conflict is only natural.

Methodology

To accomplish the purpose of this study, three incidents of U.S. involvement in low intensity conflict will be analyzed as case studies to answer the above questions. Following the analyses of these case studies, a correlation will be made to show any commonality that may be present. An attempt to tie the different incidents together with common threads will allow for the understanding of any patterns for U.S. military involvement in low intensity conflict in the past and whether the same can be anticipated in the future, a desired end product of this study.

Before proceeding, necessary parameters need to be established. A working definition of low intensity conflict must be established for use throughout this study. There is probably more disagreement in arriving at a definition than any other issue in the field. To elaborate, a working definition of low intensity conflict from Army FM 100-20 divides the subject into two separate areas as it is addressed solely by the U.S. Army:

> TYPE A. Internal defense and development assistance operations involving actions by U.S. combat forces to establish, regain, or maintain control of specific land areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution, subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power.
>
> TYPE B. Internal defense and development assistance operations involving U.S. advice, combat support, and combat service support for indigenous or allied forces engaged in establishing, regaining, or maintaining control of specific land areas threatened by guerrilla warfare, revolution, subversion, or other tactics aimed at internal seizure of power.[1]

This broad definition separates LIC into a combat and other than combat category. It is only used as it relates to U.S. involvement and is really an internal defense and development definition rather than a low intensity conflict definition. A second, broader definition is provided by Sam Sarkesian:

> Low intensity conflict . . . refers to the range of activities and operations on the lower end of the conflict spectrum involving the use of military or a variety of semi-military forces (both combat and noncombat) on the part of the intervening power to influence and compel the adversary to accept a particular politico-military condition.[2]

In analyzing these definitions, the following questions come to mind. Do both of these require third party involvement? Both definitions indicate intervention, the first case by the U.S. and in the second by a "power." It would seem that both definitions take on certain aspects of ethnocentrism in confronting LIC. An improved definition of low intensity conflict is under study at the present. It does away with the typical U.S. view and appears to cover the entire spectrum. Although not officially recognized by the U.S. Army to date, this definition will be more widely accepted than those listed above and reads:

> The limited use of force for political purposes by nations or organizations in order to coerce, control, or

> defend a population, to control or defend a territory, or to establish or defend rights. It includes military operations by or against irregular forces, peacekeeping operations, terrorism, counterterrorism, and rescues and military assistance under conditions of armed opposition. This form of conflict does not include protracted engagement of opposing regular armed forces.[3]

Since it is the purpose of this study to concern itself with U.S. involvement in LIC, it would seem that a simple adjustment of the foregoing definitions would suffice to allow for the investigation of the problem. The following will be added to arrive at a final definition of LIC for the purpose of this study. The lower limiting factor of LIC will be that with military interest, that is, intervention by the U.S. with military advisors and the upper limitation will be the conventional use of combat forces. The other assumption that is usually made and accepted in the study of LIC is that of the asymmetry of opposing forces, i.e., there is usually a distinct difference between the actors such as well armed conventional forces opposing poorly armed and equipped irregular forces. Therefore, the operational definition of LIC for the purpose of this study will be as stated in the last definition and further limited to fall between military advisors and conventional use of combat forces against opposing symmetrical or conventional combat forces.

Scope

The scope of the study will be, as indicated by the title, U.S. involvement in low intensity conflict since World War II. To further limit the scope for study here, three cases of LIC will be investigated and analyzed. These incidents have been chosen because they fall at different points on our conflict spectrum. The Greek Civil War involved the use of U.S. military advisors to successfully defeat a communist

insurgency in 1949, the first incidence of U.S. involvement since World War II. The Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965 involved the use of U.S. combat forces to intervene and prevent the continuation of a civil war in that country. Finally, the Vietnam War has been chosen because it includes operations through the entire spectrum of the operational definition. The Vietnam War will be limited to that time period where our operational definition of low intensity conflict is valid, the period from 1961 to 1965. With the understanding that conventional combat as well as the advisory effort took place after 1965, the intent is to analyze that period prior to full scale involvement of U.S. conventional combat forces.

Each situation will be addressed independently to answer the questions set forth earlier. Then the situations will be analyzed by comparing and contrasting them to test for similarities and differences among them. In this respect, a prediction of the feasibility of U.S. military involvement in future situations of low intensity conflict may be generated.

Endnotes

[1]U.S. Army, FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (1981): 14.

[2]Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, U.S. Policy and Low Intensity Conflict (1981): 3.

[3]Letter, ATSU-CD-G, HQ, US Army JFK Special Warfare Center, 7 November 1983, subject: Definitions.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In order to set the stage for the study of United States involvement in low intensity conflict, an examination of selected literature is necessary. The literature, in abundance concerning the subject of low intensity conflict, includes conflicting definitions of what it is, what it is not, where it works, where it does not, not to mention the many variations of LIC available within the entire spectrum of conflict.

Low intensity conflict is an amalgamation of many different things. As in the operational definition, LIC involves violence below the level of opposing conventional forces involved in protracted war on the battlefield. Low intensity conflict, in accordance with the definition adopted earlier, is the limited use of force for political purposes. This would lead a social scientist or economist to disagree with the given definition since they would want to define LIC within the scope of their own fields. For example, in the context of insurgency, three primary factors present in developing nations which may lead to it are political, social, and economic.[1] A fourth factor, the military, must be considered since many developing nations are greatly influenced by it. Therefore, LIC is of interest to a broad based audience, hence the difficulty in defining it.

Low intensity conflict, when it has reached the point of visibility so that it may be classified as LIC by the operational definition set forth in the previous chapter, has already progressed through many

levels of violence or levels in which the use of some type of force has been applied. The purpose of this review of literature is to trace some of the major works in this area, including general works on the use of force, levels of violence, works of an historical nature concerning LIC, and finally works that are related to this study. The purpose is not to give a synopsis of those works used in the case studies that follow, but rather to examine the phenomena of low intensity conflict from a threat-counterthreat point of view as given in the literature.

Roots of Political Violence

Serious study of violence on the lower end of the spectrum did not begin in ernest until the decade of the 1960's. There were, however, already books in print concerning revolutionary war, published by those who had been successful in achieving political goals through the use of low level violence, the most notable being by Mao Tse Tung. In Harry Eckstein's book, Internal War (1964), several authors explore the different aspects of internal war. According to the Eckstein, there is no correlation between the obsession we have with internal war, its subordinate forms of political violence and the writings by social scientists in this arena.[2] By observing the date of the book, 1964, one can see that Eckstein was blazing new ground and acknowledging the fact that not much had been written specifically on the subject of internal war, although by this time (1964) it was the most widely accepted form of violence on the world scene. While the overall work is an examination of internal war's many facets, Eckstein himself admits that it is a very difficult subject to theorize about since one has to delimit, classify, analyze and then solve problems with the theory so as to claim

success in the construction of the theory.[3] He indicates that the collection of essays are meant to shape the term internal war so that future scientists may be given the chance to examine the phenomena in more detail and be able to derive conclusions with their studies. The work is an excellent primer on low intensity conflict where it concerns uprisings within national borders and the associated forms of violence that accompany LIC.

One noted author who has concerned himself with the basic nature of violence is Ted Robert Gurr, author of Why Men Rebel (1970). In this work, he investigates the basic causes of violence, how violence is focused on the political system, and what conditions affect the form, magnitude and results of the violence. He examines three forms of violence; turmoil, conspiracy and internal war. In his investigation, he indicates that changes of value expectations (v_e) in comparison to actual value capabilities (v_c) lead to relative deprivation or RD.



Figure 1.

Shown above is the graph of a traditional society in equilibrium. Changes in either value line which separates further the two value lines leads to an increase in RD and possible violence. He further shows how the RD factor of different political groups is related to conflict, and its specific form:[4]

Intensity and Scope of Mass RD

Intensity and Scope of Elite RD		low	high
	low	minimal violence	turmoil
	high	conspiracy	internal war

Figure 2.

The propensity towards violence is not automatic. The presence of relative deprivation, or an increase in RD, is not by itself the final determinant in whether violence will actually occur. A catalyst or accelerator is necessary, in combination with the change in the equilibrium of the society. In addition, the ruling apparatus of the society plays a significant part in the equation. As explained by Chalmers Johnson in his book, Revolutionary Change, the equation for revolution within a society is as follows:[5]

Disequilibrated Society + Intransigent Elite + Accelerator = Revolution

FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (1981) depicts conditions that are similar to the general equation of Johnson. There are general requirements for any insurgency which are a vulnerable population, direction and leadership for the insurgency, and the lack of government control.[6] Although not exactly the same, these requirements can be tied together with the above equation very easily. The vulnerable population represents the disequilibrated society. The intransigent elite, unwilling to change or relinquish its control, in many cases attempts to reinforce its support by violence. Results of the attempts to maintain the status quo by the elite are then represented by lack of government control. The accelerator becomes the direction and leadership for the

insurgency.

The Threat: Strategy and Structure

While there are many other theories concerning the roots of revolution, as valid as those already discussed, they are beyond the purpose and scope of this study. Concerning the strategy and structure of low intensity conflict, it is found again that there is a wealth of literature addressing all forms of LIC. Here, the predominant theories of revolution that have been accepted as valid will be considered.

The U.S. Army considers three types of strategies that can be used by revolutionaries and insurgents to obtain political power. These are the familiar strategies of left, right and mass (united from below) as explained in FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict.[7] The right strategy is based upon infiltration of existing government infrastructure, coalition participation in government and, upon acquisition of sufficient power, direct challenge to the existing governing structure. The right strategy is not violence oriented, although violence can be used to some degree to accomplish specific ends.

The left strategy is based upon violence. Violent acts, meant to polarize the population rapidly to allow the takeover of political power, are the keys to this strategy. Mass organization, i.e., popular support as it will be discussed later, is put off until after the revolution. The dissident element is both the political as well as the armed force within the organization.

The mass strategy is seen as a protracted conflict against the government, with detailed organization of the masses, as well as the insurgent structure. The mass strategy continues until it replaces the

functioning government throughout the country. The mass strategy falls between the right and left on a conflict spectrum, using force when necessary to accomplish its goals.

Other works are available on just about any particular conflict where the strategy is brought out during the analysis of the case study. More recently, scholars have assembled articles and essays in various anthologies. They allow students the opportunity to analyze particular aspects of many conflicts in order to draw comparisons or prove their points.

Sam Sarkesian edited the work Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (1975). A collection of 28 essays, it covers everything involved in guerrilla warfare from the theory of Ted Gurr and James Davies to the problems of counterguerrilla warfare by writers such as George Tanham and Dennis Duncanson. The stated purpose of the work is to provide a thorough survey of modern guerrilla warfare and to provide the student with the requisite scholary tools to examine the entire field. In this respect, he uses portions of essays by noted historical authors such as Sun Tzu.

Another work that is concerned more specifically with guerrilla strategy is Gerard Chaliand's book, Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan (1982). A collection of 23 essays, 13 are concerned with telling a story, followed by ten analyses. Chaliand's work includes such authors as Bernard Fall, Frank Kitson, Che Guevara, Julian Paget, and Abraham Guillen to name just a few. He postulates that three historical factors shaped guerrilla warfare, doctrine, and tactics in the modern period (as indicated in the title). These are (1), the emergence and armed struggle of the peasant,

(2), World War II, and (3), the breakdown of the pre-World War II colonial empires.[9] By reviewing the essays selected, one can readily see that these factors are interrelated.

With regards to the various strategies involved in low intensity conflict, most cases that have progressed to the point where they have been classified as LIC generally follow predetermined phasing. Those cases that fall into the category of a right strategy which do not generally use force are difficult to typify concerning phases since these cases can be said to fall into the realm of legality. Those cases using the left strategy and the mass strategy with violence to accomplish their ends have generally been categorized into three general phases depending upon the activities of the revolutionary organization.

FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, explains the three phases of the mass strategy as (1), latent and incipient insurgency, (2), guerrilla warfare, and (3), war of movement. Each phase is associated with specific activities which in turn is directly associated with the strength of the insurgent organization. All insurgent cases "fit" into this model of phasing and is the generally accepted phase model.[10]

Brian Michael Jenkins, in his 1971 Rand paper titled The Five Stages of Urban Guerrilla Warfare: Challenge for the Seventies, explains that the tendency in many countries is to move revolution into the cities where most of the population is presently located in developing countries. As indicated in the title, he uses five stages in explaining this phenomenon:

1. Violent Propaganda. The use of violence against both real and symbolic targets to gain publicity for their cause.

2. Organizational Growth Phase. Publicity is still one objective,

bigger targets are selected to apply more pressure to the incumbent government by coercing it to adopt a certain policy or annul other policies.

3. The Guerrilla Offensive. Real targets predominate, the main aim is the reduction of effective government control, and replacing government control with insurgent control.

4. Mobilization of the Masses. Repression by the government is provoked in order to gain mass popular support for the cause. Strikes, riots, and barricades become the order of the day to cause the erosion of the regimes power base.

5. Urban Uprising. Full scale urban warfare against the government mark the last phase. The rebels await the capitulation of the government, having their own apparatus standing by.[11]

In recent years, another phase has been added to Jenkins five phases listed above. Although not published in a specific work by Jenkins, this author attended a meeting with him in 1981 in which he gave tacit approval to the overall phasing. The sixth phase, applied Latin America is termed the Communist Consolidation Phase. One can readily see that this phase may or may not be a part of the actual insurgency, however, the actions carried out in this phase are specific. After takeover, society is completely restructured, all opposing elements are neutralized, and social control mechanisms are implemented, such as compulsory group membership in cellular party, labor and neighborhood organizations.[12] As described, this phase does not necessarily need to be termed "Communist." The evolving process of revolutions that are taking place in the world today demonstrate that a better term would simply be Consolidation Phase.

According to the particular strategy adopted by a revolutionary organization, the opposition also develops an organizational structure to carry out its objectives. The organization may be quite simple, as in the case of the left strategy, or extremely complex concerning the right or mass strategy. FM 100-20 describes a model of insurgent organization as involving three elements, leadership, forces, and mass organizations.[13] Simply drawn, it appears thus:



Simplified Organizational Model

Figure 3.

This then is the threat faced by many peoples and governments throughout the world. Now that an examination of literature appropriate to the threat has been made, we now turn our attention to countering this threat.

Counterthreat: Comparative Studies and U.S. Doctrine

Probably the single most important realization that comes from a comparative study of low intensity conflict is that there are no two cases that are exactly alike. Problems arise from this because it is practically impossible to make sweeping generalizations concerning LIC without drawing immediate debate. Conflict itself has assumed new forms

within the last four decades, complicating any generalizations made between more than one case. There are, however, many comparative studies concerning low intensity conflict, the purpose of these being usually to discover a commonality among the cases considered.

Richard J. Barnet, a revisionist, wrote Revolution and Intervention in 1968. Its stated purpose is to trace the development of American commitment in opposing violence and the ensuing radical change in eight countries in the cold war period. A recurring theme which the author recognizes and builds on is how economics has influenced American foreign policy in its approach to low intensity conflict. He offers conclusions, economic, political and moral and ends the work by listing two imperatives; that the world must be made safe for revolution and the second that the world community must attempt to create an environment where revolution will be unnecessary.[14]

Lawrence Wittner compiled Cold War America: From Hiroshima to Watergate (1974), a critical view of American foreign policy in the post-World War II era. While not exactly apropos to this study, it does encompass decisions made concerning counterinsurgency in this critical period. His interpretation of the absence of a concensus in decision-making during this period led to a growth of luxury internally, expansion externally, and a denial of the problems building in the post war world. His conclusions were that America had to reconcile herself with the world and begin anew to pursue her traditional aims of justice and freedom, from which the United States departed after World War II.

Douglas Blaufarb also provides an overall view of counterinsurgency in The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance (1977). His purpose is to depict U.S. performance from 1950 to 1977.

Through personal experience and research, he shows how political and military leaders have failed to recognize insurgency and its value in developing countries and also failed to properly engage in counterinsurgency operations, from a tactical level through the political decisions behind the adopted strategy. He indicates that the military concerns, while necessary, are not the answer to a political problem.

Another comparative work, more precise in scope, is Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966) by Sir Robert Thompson. With more than fifteen years of service in Malaya and South Vietnam, Sir Robert traces the development of insurgency and the tactics and strategy that can be used to combat and defeat insurgency. He also recognizes that the problem of insurgency is essentially political in nature and shows how a persistent approach to insurgency, tempered with the qualities of patience, determination and discrete aggression can defeat an insurgency.[15]

While there are other works in abundance that attempt to examine, analyze, and compare instances of low intensity conflict, they may or may not be beneficial to this study. Let us now examine U.S. Army doctrine for combatting low intensity conflict. While FM 100-5, Operations (1982), is the capstone manual of Army tactics, FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict (1981), is the purported capstone manual for all operations encompassing LIC. A survey of past literature in the Appendix, at first glance, seems to be a "hodge-podge" assemblage of manuals that dates from the early 1950s and seem to go in many directions. It was not until 1981, when the current LIC manual was published that many diverging elements were subsumed into the manual. The manual

does not do a good job of definitions as was pointed out in Chapter 1, and an examination of the rest of the manual leads one to believe that it is a summation of several manuals, with updated language concerning internal defense and development. There are still dissimilarities within the field. While Fort Bragg has the proponency for low intensity conflict and Special Forces operations, Fort Benning has the proponency for counterguerrilla operations. It is interesting to note that FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations, dates from 1967, while the majority of others are quite recent. Another interesting fact is the change in the names that some of the manuals went through during this era. These changes are noted in Appendix A.

The strategy of the United States as an answer to insurgency has evolved over time and is made up of three components. These components are (1) balanced development, (2) mobilization, and (3) neutralization.[16] These components can be traced in doctrinal publications to 1974. Earlier versions of the low intensity conflict manual, FM 100-20, do not exhibit this strategy of three components. In addition to the very cursory explanation of these components in the Army publication, Lieutenant Colonel Larry B. Hamby has further explained these components in his paper "A Realignment of U.S. Army Doctrine" in 1984.[17] Concerning balanced development, Colonel Hamby goes beyond the LIC manual's explanation of having programs which allow for political, social and economic development concurrently by explaining that balanced development "aims at reducing PRD [perceived relative deprivation (Gurr)]. . . .with emphasis on building the institutions required to sustain the development effort". Mobilization of the population "in support of the government," as explained by FM 100-20, is necessary to

provide the manpower needed by the government to build institutions and defeat an insurgency, by denying manpower to the insurgent. Colonel Hamby explains that "successful mobilization allows for the focusing of resources toward neutralizing the insurgent organization and carrying out a balanced development effort." Mobilization is probably the key to a successful counterinsurgency operation conducted in an open society. Neutralization of the insurgent is necessary in overcoming an insurgency. While FM 100-20 explains it as "all lawful activities taken to discredit, disrupt, disorganize, and defeat on organization" and stresses "the need for security forces to act lawfully at all times" as essential, Colonel Hamby further amplifies this by emphasizing the "indirect approach in neutralizing an insurgent organization." He explains this approach by placing emphasis in areas other than tactical combat operations such as intelligence, psychological operations and civil affairs.

As currently employed, this strategy employs specific guidelines within which U.S. agencies should operate to ensure that the strategy is being carried out properly. These guidelines are (1) maximize intelligence, (2) minimize violence, (3) insure unity of effort, and (4) improve administration.[18] Colonel Hamby explains that these guidelines should be more appropriately termed principles since they are "so crucial to a successful IDAD [internal defense and development] strategy."[19] Of particular importance in the Army manual is minimizing violence during the conduct of various military operations. It seems, however, that Colonel Hamby considers unity of effort to be of more importance than minimizing violence. All are important to be sure, but unity of effort on the part of all actors in an IDAD situation will

permit a better approach to the other guidelines and should insure unity of organization as well.

While it is not intended to explain the doctrine to the reader, an understanding of the doctrine is essential to this entire period. Special Forces enters into this study because they received the mission to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Alfred Paddock's U.S. Army Special Warfare, 1941-1952 (1982) explains that counterinsurgency was not considered important during the 1950s. Fort Benning was conducting a staff familiarization course in guerrilla warfare in 1951.[20] When the first Special Forces unit was formed in 1952, it was concerned with guerrilla operations and little attention was given to counterguerrilla or counterinsurgency operations. This mission was received in the early 60s after presentation of the Green Beret to the unit by President Kennedy.[21] Paddock's book is a very interesting account of special warfare units, their contribution to the war effort, the difficulties after the war of continuing the units, ending finally with the formal establishment of the Special Forces and the center at Fort Bragg.

The Future

Most authors writing in this field, if not writing specifically with the future in mind, include some form of conclusion, recommendation or epilogue that is oriented to the future. More studies attempting to address the wide range of issues that confront countries throughout the world are appearing. Sam Sarkesian and William Scully, editors of U.S. Policy and Low Intensity Conflict (1981), address the problem of developing a U.S. policy in order to cope with LIC in the future. Sarkesian points out four predominant reasons for continued instability

in developing regions:

> the diffusion of political power, lack of legitimate governing structures, the politicization in a modern context of historical ethnic and geographic animosities, and the introduction of technology.[22]

The purpose of the book is to determine an answer to the continued violence in the world. He does not pretend to have all the answers, but rather examines all the issues and discusses possibilities.

Concluding, the study of low intensity conflict is one which is changing constantly as conflict changes throughout the world. While the study of LIC leaves little room for far reaching generalizations, it is hoped that some small benefit may be derived from this study.

Source Material

Source material for the following case studies is drawn from several sources. Government documents form the basis for facts which are pertinent to these studies. Other publications, primarily factual in nature or a compilation of facts such as the Facts on File series, are also used as a cross reference. Books and periodicals also provide some information which could not be found elsewhere. A noticeable problem which will become apparent in reading these case studies is the lack of information concerning the Military Advisory Assistance Groups. In addition, information is lacking on the procedures or day-to-day internal operations of the diplomatic mission or "country team" overseas. Conclusions can only be inferred about the operations of these organizations in the absence of more information.

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[15]Robert G.K. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966): 171.

[16]FM 100-20, (1981): 48-49. See also FM 100-20, (1974): 4-3 to 44.

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[18]FM 100-20, (1981): 98. Not included in earlier versions of manual.

[19]Hamby: 19.

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CHAPTER 3

THE GREEK CIVIL WAR, 1946-1949

Overview

> The Greek Civil War allows the historian, as well as the military professional, to analyze the Communist defeat. It does not, however, present a picture of complete victory for anti-Communist forces.[1]

The Greek Civil War was the first confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The British informed the United States in early 1947 that they could no longer assist the governments of Greece and Turkey in their post-war reconstruction. President Truman took this cause to the Congress of the United States where he addressed a joint session and asked for $400 million to assist the governments in reconstruction and in combatting subversive elements within the country. With United Nations commission findings to support President Truman, economic and military aid was granted to both countries. What initially began as strictly economic and logistical aid to the government and the military of Greece was soon determined to be quite insufficient to the task of defeating the Communist guerrillas. The situation was so bad that the Greek National Army (GNA) was almost defeated in its efforts to control the country. Through increased U.S. military assistance, which included advisors with tactical units, the GNA was able to finally defeat the guerrillas and secure the country. United States claimed success in keeping Greece an independent, democratic country that was aligned with the United States and other western European countries with the view of Communist containment.

Background

The struggle in Greece between the right and the left began in earnest during the Great Depression. In 1936, the Greek government was given into the control of a strong-man or dictator by the name of Metaxas. His right wing dictatorship caused the several groups, including Communists, to actively oppose the government. Measures taken by the government caused the Communists to go underground but they continued to oppose the repressiveness of the Metaxas regime.

When the Nazis invaded and occupied Greece in World War II, the Communists found a new enemy to oppose and they fought against the Germans throughout the war. The National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), the military arm of the National Liberation Front (EAM), made plans for post-occupation Greece by agreeing to certain principles on which the German Army would withdraw, such as leaving certain things intact as opposed to destroying everything in the wake of their retreat.[2] Unfortunately, the British and the Greek government in exile had other plans. Talk of restoring the monarchy and of excluding EAM from the government placed the Communists in opposition to the returning powers. Pressure by Russia to the north in the Balkan states caused the British and the Greeks to arrive prematurely after German evacuation without a well organized plan for resuming control of the country. Attempts at restoring control and methods used by the Greeks and the British forced EAM to oppose their efforts, resulting in open civil war after two years.

The Civil War began after the incumbent regime was unable to have all dissident elements lay down arms in support of the reconstruc-

tion in Greece. Measures used by the government had the opposite effect, the KKE (Greek Communist Party), EAM, and ELAS openly opposed the mandate and took to the hills for the third round of fighting in late 1946. This phase of Greek unrest culminated when the British withdrew their assistance in post-war reconstruction and the United States initiated a new era of foreign policy involvement in the region. On March 12, 1947, President Truman asked for congressional approval for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey as he stated the following:

> The very existence of the Greek State is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the Government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A Commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece, and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia on the other.
>
> Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the Government throughout Greek territory.[3]

President Truman also issued the objectives of U.S. foreign policy during his presentation before Congress. His policy can be summed up as follows: "the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a life free from coercion" and "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[4]

President Truman also asked Congress for approval in sending a detail of both civilian and military personnel to Greece, recommending authority for them to provide instruction and training of Greek personnel,[5] ushering in a new political and military strategy for the United

States in the conduct of the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine, as Public Law 75 was known, was to have far reaching effects on U.S. political and military strategy and continues to influence U.S. foreign policy today.

U.S. Assistance

There is no end of information concerning what the Communists or what the Greek National Army subsequently did. Studies abound on different aspects of this civil war. There is very little information, however, on how the United States went about accomplishing the Truman Doctrine. A more detailed look at what exactly happened behind the scenes is required to understand how the U.S. policy was formulated and carried out.

To trace the early accounts of U.S. assistance and the policies associated with it, it is necessary to return in time to Greece about the time when the British delivered their message to the United States. U.S. Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, becoming more and more alarmed over the situation in Greece, telegraphed his feelings on February 20, 1947 to the State Department concerning the imperative for U.S. support to the regime in order to prevent its collapse. As fate would have it, the British delivered their message to the State Department on February 21. Ambassador MacVeagh's conclusions and recommendations were readily accepted and added immediate weight to the argument that action was necessary immediately.[6] Heretofore, throughout the entire second world war and up to this point, Ambassador MacVeagh held to the strict U.S. policy of "hands off," regarding Greece as being within the British sphere of influence.

While MacVeagh was justifiably alarmed over the situation in

Greece, he nevertheless counselled restraint in approaching the "explosive" situation, even recommending that credits be given to the British to assist Greece rather than involve the United States. He was particularly concerned about the U.S. supporting a government which did not represent a majority of the people, an exact description of the incumbent regime at the time. His testimony before Congress on the feasibility of U.S. aid was tempered with a caution that there was a necessity to put conditions on the money with respect to the behavior of the government which MacVeagh considered rightist and reactionary.[7]

Through the normal routine of Congressional action, a report was generated by the House concerning all aspects of the President's request. Specifically addressed were limitations placed on the military. Allowed were "a limited number of military personnel" who could provide "instruction and training of personnel." The report further stated that "combat forces are not to be sent to Greece . . . . Military assistance provided in the bill is to consist only of arms and other supplies for the armed forces of Greece." Also included was the result of testimony indicating that the size of the military mission would not exceed 40 Army personnel and 30 Navy personnel.[8] It is interesting to note that with this report a minority view was expressed that had a strange foreboding for the United States. Representative Lawrence Smith of Wisconsin, who served in Congress from 1941 until his death in 1958, was opposed the idea of Communist containment and indicated, "If the bill is adopted in its present form it will . . . call for military expenditures in an effort to support free peoples all over the world." He went on to state his opposition to the bill because of several factors which he listed as:

1. It is uncertain as to scope and cost.
2. It is a serious threat to our entire social and economic structure, as it will eventually lead to war. It could easily bankrupt the Nation.
3. Aggressive action against Russia will result in dividing the world into two armed forces. This would lead to an unbridled race for armaments. War and bankruptcy would be certain.
4. There is no justification for bypassing the United Nations Organization, even though we believed it was important to act. If we believe in collective security, that Organization should have been requested to act. We have now dealt it a blow from which it can never recover.[9]

Public Law 75 was enacted on May 22, 1947. Two days later, the advance echelon of the Army Component of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) arrived. The stated mission initially was to determine the needs of the GNA, the Gendarmerie, and the Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF). The function of this advance party was to absorb the function of supply from the British Military Mission, allowing them to concentrate on their other functions of training and organization. Additionally, the American mission was to provide technicians and advisors for training in the use of American equipment.[10]

Returning to Athens, Ambassador MacVeagh concerned himself now with the aspects of administering and monitoring the program. His first concern was the control of the program. Antedating national policy or doctrine, he considered it to be his ambassadorial responsibility to manage and control the entire aid program. As such, all decisions concerning Greece would come from the embassy, rather than several smaller agencies within the country.[11] His concepts did not correspond with the prevailing conditions.

There was an immediate problem of responsibility as AMAG began operations. While the ambassador was under the impression that he was completely responsible for all operations within the country, the AMAG,

under the control of Dwight Griswold went its own way. As conflicts occurred, the State Department had the responsibility for resolving them. In July of 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall tried to define the division of responsibilities between the Embassy and the AMAG. Less than a month later, Griswold was openly preaching vigorous moves to further his program while MacVeagh was still cautioning restraint in order to allow the Greeks to attempt a resolution to their own problems. Specifically, Griswold was informed that the British would soon withdraw their troops. Griswold wanted to replace them with U.S. troops. He also wanted to replace a member of the Greek government. MacVeagh contested both solutions and was supported by the State Department.[12] However, the rivalry between the Embassy and the AMAG was to continue until November when MacVeagh, recuperating from recent surgery to himself and grieving over the death of his wife in September, was withdrawn as Ambassador to Greece and transferred to Portugal.[13]

Due to the problem of unity of command in Greece, a new ambassador was not appointed immediately. Griswold stayed on as the head of the mission until August 1948 when he retired. After his retirement a new ambassador was appointed to Greece.[14] Upon the appointment of Henry F. Grady as the new ambassador, the functional lines of authority seemed to have been drawn since he was "dual hatted" as the Ambassador and the Chief of AMAG.[15] This solved the problem of who was in charge. In modern terminology, we had a "country team" under ambassadorial control.

The size of the military mission, as discussed earlier, was to be about 40 Army and 30 Navy. How large did the military mission actually become during the course of the mission to Greece? As of the

end of 1947, the mission consisted of 257 Army and Navy personnel.[16] At the same time, plans were being made to increase the Army's commitment to Greece by 170 personnel.[17] This increase was in response to a Joint Chief of Staff authorization to form the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG). Its mission was to assist Greek Armed Forces in eliminating the insurgency and achieving internal security at the earliest possible date, by providing aggressive assistance in the form of operational and logistical advice. The 170 personnel (90 officers and 80 enlisted men) were assigned in January 1948 when JUSMAPG was established. Functionally, JUSMAPG provided military advisors down to division and squadron level for operational advice and it provided logistical planning advice in the areas of supply, transportation, post exchange, postal, security, communications, and Adjutant General.[18]



The President's report to Congress indicated that there were a total of 256 military personnel in Greece on December 31, 1947.[19] This figure increased to 440 personnel in only 90 days.[20] The highpoint of the American commitment came over a year later when it was reported to Congress that there were a total of 453 military personnel in Greece as of June 30, 1949.[21] This was a 650 percent increase over the 40 Army

and 30 Navy personnel figure which had been indicated before passage of Public Law 75.

Congressional hearings conducted prior to the passage of the Assistance to Greece Bill were very specific as to the mission of the military personnel serving in Greece. In Executive Session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 15, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall reiterated the government's position that there were absolutely no U.S. combat troops or units present in Greece. He made it quite plain that U.S. military personnel were only involved in giving advice to the Greek units in the field.[22]

The JUSMAPG groups were sent out to the different Greek units which they advised during the course of the Civil War. These groups varied in size from 8 to 16 men depending upon the echelon to which assigned. Usually eight men were assigned to a division and 16 to a corps. Organization of a division level detachment consisted of a detachment chief (lieutenant colonel), a major in charge of operations, a captain in charge of supply, and a captain in charge of training. The other personnel include radio operators and clerks. These groups that were sent out with Greek units did not command or lead Greek units, they were there to advise and assist the units in their operations against the guerrillas. It is interesting to note that during 18 months of commitment, only three U.S. officers were killed and one wounded in the performance of their duty.[23]

As U.S. involvement increased, there was never any deviation from the stated objectives or means for achieving those objectives. While there was evidence of over aggressiveness on the part of some American advisors,[24] the overwhelming conclusion of most authors agree

that the advisors were there for only that purpose, to advise, not to impose their will on the forces of the the GNA. In fact, their presence was more or less expected because of the profusion of American equipment that was being used throughout the GNA.[25] At times, when U.S. advice was overly critical of the Greeks and their manner of operation, the Greeks were able to show conclusively that the operations were either approved or suggested by U.S. military advisors.[26]

In conclusion, the Greek Civil War was effectively ended in August, 1949 with the complete destruction of the guerrilla base camps near the northern border. It can be agreed upon that all U.S. support, especially psychological support was more than sufficient to counter the assistance received by the guerrillas from their Communist sources.[27] Rather than "letting the dust settle" as was the U.S. policy regarding China during the same timeframe, the United States took an active involvement in the Greek Civil War. It is rather obvious that Greece would not have survived as a free nation without the help of the United States. The United States mission continued in Greece as did U.S. missions in many different countries but at a much reduced strength. No advisors were necessary and most of the U.S. program turned to economic aspects of reconstruction now that the country was safe from guerrilla activity.

Analysis

The successful conclusion of the Greek Civil War was the first United States "victory" after the second World War. As stated previously, this was the United States first taste of low intensity conflict in the post-World War II setting. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 had given

way to the Marshall Plan and also to the North Atlantic Treaty to further the aims of the United States in its role as global leader of the free world.[28]

Conditions prompting U.S. involvement have been explained very well. The British message in combination with the secret message from Ambassador MacVeagh arriving at the State Department within one day of each other and Greece's urgent request for American aid less than two weeks later prompted the Administration to ask Congress for aid. While it can be said that deplorable social and economic conditions in Greece were reasons for the U.S. involvement, the main reason was political. Several have concluded that the United States filled a vacuum left by the British as they were forced to contract their overseas commitments after the war.[29] On the other hand, Leften S. Stavrianos felt American strategy related more to the newly formed American policy of Communist containment:

> Specifically, American policy makers have formed their strategy chiefly with an eye on Russia. They see each country simply as a potential bastion against Soviet aggression.[30]

Reflecting upon the disregard for the people of Greece, he went on to say that without the hearts and minds of the people, the "bastion" would crumble. Although specific objectives of pursuit of freedom and support of people facing subjugation were announced in the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, the real goal of the United States was the containment of Russia. While Secretary of State Marshall briefed the President and selected Congressional leaders on the situation in Greece and Turkey, his briefing was oriented to the humanitarian aspect. His under secretary, Dean Acheson, took over and reoriented the briefing to

Russia, its containment, and opposition to Communist subversion throughout the world in the name of U.S. security at home, setting the tone of American foreign policy for the future.[31] .

The "country team" may have evolved from this commitment in Greece. The problems of authority and responsibility between MacVeagh and Griswold were finally resolved only by the eventual removal of both individuals from their positions. Although the term "country team" does not constitute an official term that is accepted by the Army, it does appear in many of the Field Manuals published by the Army, notably in most of those manuals concerned with counterrevolutionary warfare. This term, which represents the diplomatic mission in a foreign country, draws its roots from Greece and from there evolved into its present form.

The limitations of the commitment to Greece have been discussed in detail. It is fairly certain that no combat was undertaken by any American soldier in Greece. This was the real limiting factor to the entire operation.

There appeared to be no ceiling as to the number of personnel involved in Greece at any one time since the number of military personnel steadily climbed through the end of the civil war. There was, in a manner of speaking, a limitation placed upon the Greek operation by Congress. The money appropriated for economic and military aid was only granted to June 30, 1948. When it was determined that a resolution was not to be reached by that time, further appropriations were necessary. Before authorizing more money, the Congress conducted hearings on the problems involved in Greece but the money was appropriated as requested. In general, other than the military operational limitations or rules of

engagement that were placed on the personnel in Greece, there were no other limitations of any significance.

The United States claimed success in the Greek Civil War. The military goal of eliminating guerrilla resistance in Greece was accomplished. The military strategy used was new, that of military assistance. It can be successfully argued that the Greek Civil War was fought from the perspective of a strategic defensive on the part of the United States while the Greeks were fighting the civil war from the perspective of a strategic offensive. The limitation to only advisors, unarmed in the field, demonstrates that the United States was not willing to go on the offensive during the conflict.

Political goals were also realized. The Communists were frustrated in their efforts to control Greece and bring it into the Soviet sphere of influence. Consequently, the western powers maintained their hegemony in the Mediterranean Sea. While China was lost to the Communists in 1949 and Russia exploded her first atomic bomb, the United States had a victory to claim in Greece. It was relatively easy to rationalize the importance of Greece over that of China as Russia was bringing the buffer states under its wing throughout eastern Europe. On the other hand, the Truman Doctrine in essence divided the world into two armed camps and initiated the era of the United States as the "world policeman." This would lead, as Congressman Smith had indicated, to the United States opposition of about any and every revolutionary group and its associated movement throughout the world.[32]

The military of the United States was profoundly affected by its involvement in Greece. Military assistance became an important factor in American military decision making. Military Advisory Assistance

Groups were soon implanted in over a dozen countries. Security Assistance was born. Just a few short years later, Special Forces, who were destined to have counterinsurgency as one of their missions in the future, came into actual being at Fort Bragg. In many parts of the world United States military men became the interface between the country and the United States. The U.S. military became operators of foreign policy. From the early beginnings of determining what the Greeks needed in the way of equipment and supplies, the U.S. mission was formed to come to grips with the problem of advising units in the field against the Communist guerrillas. In essence, counterguerrilla tactics also evolved during the conflict. General James Van Fleet, in charge of the military mission for the last 18 months, initiated a program of population control in which the population, the "sea" in which the guerrilla swims, was removed from areas of combat, effectively isolating the guerrillas from their supporters.[33] As a result of this, 700,000 peasants were uprooted during the fighting, which destroyed the YIAFKAs, the guerrilla's network of sympathizers who supplied intelligence, funds and supplies to the guerrillas.[34] In summary, the guerrillas announced a cease-fire on October 16, 1949, demonstrating the American victory but at the tremendous cost of 11,000 villages destroyed and 50,000 total who were killed during the fighting.[35]

Robert W. Selton summed up the Greek situation very aptly when he described emerging trends in U.S. strategy which were products of the Greek Civil War:

> * The provision of large-scale military assistance to a foreign government in "peacetime."
> * The use of military personnel as advisors to indigenous forces in the conduct of active military operations.

* The development of counterguerrilla tactics as a paramount requisite of the cold war.
* The acceptance of U.S. involvement in military hostilities without the commitment of maximum resources.[36]

The Greek Civil War was a first in U.S. history. It formed a watershed in U.S. foreign policy as well as a watershed in military thinking.

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CHAPTER 4

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC INTERVENTION, 1965

Overview

The Dominican Republic intervention in 1965 began as a humanitarian effort to rescue U.S. and foreign nationals requesting removal because of a revolt that was more than thirty years in coming. A successful assassination in 1961 had ended the thirty year military dictatorship of Rafael Trujillo. Elections in 1962 resulted in Juan Bosch, a liberal democrat, winning and attempting to institute sweeping reforms to alleviate the long ignored misery of the population. Unable to proceed with his reforms, due to both internal as well as external pressures, Bosch was ousted by a coup after only seven months in office and the government was given into the hands of a triumvirate which lasted until April 24, 1965. The collapse of the triumvirate led to a confrontation between what were termed rebels or constitutionalists and loyalists (senior members of the armed forces). The intervention occurred when U.S. Marines landed on April 28, 1965 to assist in the evacuation of foreign civilians who wished to leave. This intervention, although it had the same beginnings as the Lebanon intervention in 1958, was different for several reasons and during the course of events more than 20,000 U.S. troops were used to stop the revolt and then maintain an uneasy peace until law and order could be restored and a normalcy of life resumed under civilian control. After approximately 18 months, the intervention was ended and the Dominican Republic was declared safe from communism. In effect, what began as a humanitarian effort, became

massive intervention to thwart alleged Cuban-inspired communism.

Background

The death of Rafael Trujillo caused a dramatic change in the Dominican Republic. During his reign of power or terror, whichever the case may be, he was a staunch supporter of the United States and in return the United States supported him. Economically, the Dominican Republic was a good place to invest money and the United States was the primary foreign investor in the country. Following World War II, Trujillo saw the need to change his practices regarding politics and became a strong anti-communist to continue to conform to the United States wish to oppose all Communist regimes, in accordance with the Truman Doctrine. At one point he even relaxed the political restrictions on opposition parties to demonstrate the progressiveness of his regime, but that only lasted a short period. In the end, the opposition was mainly staged to present the appearance of opposition.[1] Political opposition as well as participation within the country was practically nil. Upon the death of Trujillo, the political naivete of the population resulted in numerous groups clamoring to represent the people while at the same time refuting the claims of the other groups.

Elections in 1962 were classified as fair and impartial as Juan Bosch ascended to the Presidency. He was viewed initially as the man who would transform the country from its past history of dictatorship into a free and open democratic state. However, his immediate efforts towards this end produced an adverse reaction in the United States. His attitude towards the United States ignited controversy over his true purpose as the leader of the Dominican people. Reports started circling

that he was going to nationalize several of the U.S. owned enterprises leading to the fear that the Dominican Republic would swing towards communism.[2] In reality, only the heavy economic U.S. investment in the country was threatened as Bosch attempted to gain more control over what he considered the sovereign rights of the country. His purpose seemed to be simply that to control the country's destiny, the country must control its economic resources.

Juan Bosch was ousted from office about seven months after he became President. The short regime of Bosch can be attributed to several factors. His departure from the status quo of the previous 30 years in the Dominican Republic frightened and infuriated many groups, especially U.S. businessmen. Army officers, politicized as they were, were apprehensive of Bosch's programs, and what they portended for the country and the armed forces. Fearing a reduction in power and rationalizing this prospective loss as another step towards communism, the officers staged a bloodless coup and deposed Bosch. The coup leaders created a triumvirate and disposed of the new Constitution that Bosch had fostered.

The triumvirate exercised control over the government from September 1963 until the rebellion in 1965. Donald Reid Cabral managed the affairs of state during this time and was, after the death of President Kennedy, recognized as the leader of the official government by the new President of the United States Lyndon Johnson. President Kennedy had broken diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic as a result of the coup disposing Bosch even though it was secretly felt that the coup was for the best.[3] Reid Cabral, however, did not have an easy time since he was forced to cope with unemployment, a lower sugar quota to

the United States and a large military budget. By his imposition of an austerity program, the military broke into two separate groups, the "haves" and the "have-nots" and the revolt began on 24 April 1965. The "haves" were the senior officers who were affected directly by the benefits of foreign aid and soon became known as the "Loyalists." The "have-nots" were the younger officers who did not see a future of advancement. The younger officers became the "Constitutionalists," or the rebels, through the rest of the rebellion. The revolt began when Reid Cabral could no longer elicit support from either the rebels or the Loyalists because of his policies and programs that were in effect. Thus began the revolt in the Dominican Republic which, in a matter of four days, would begin to involve the United States.

U.S. Assistance

There was no indication that the revolt was going to happen in April.[4] Intelligence sources and political sources were concerned about the apalling political, economic, and military conditions within the country. The ambassador, Mr. W. Tapley Bennett, had left for Washington on April 23 to discuss the American position on the problems within the Dominican Republic.[5]

Only one day after the rebellion broke out, April 25, the embassy in Santo Domingo was convinced of two things: the return of Juan Bosch would mean communism in six months and that the rebellion would require U.S. forces to reestablish law and order within the country.[6] On April 26, the embassy was directed to request a cease-fire in order to evacuate all foreign nationals residing in the Dominican Republic.[7] Neither side of the rebellion could gain overwhelming combat power to

force the other into submission and both sides refused to establish a cease fire for the evacuation.

Reprinted from Tad Szulc, Dominican Diary (1965)

On April 27, Ambassador Bennett returned to Santo Domingo. The same day the embassy received a cable from the State Department concerning the U.S. objectives to be accomplished in the Dominican Republic. These objectives were to restore law and order, to protect U.S. lives, and to prevent a possible Communist takeover.[8] That same afternoon, Ambassador Bennett was requested to take an active part in the rebellion and to help the rebels negotiate a settlement with the loyalists. Bennett's refusal to aid the rebels caused the Bosch elements within the leadership of the rebels to seek asylum in embassies, leaving a political vacuum that many believed was filled by Communist elements.[9] By that same afternoon, 1,172 Americans had been evacuated from the country by helicopter, truck, bus or embassy vehicle to a point where Navy ships were waiting. These people were escorted by loyalist policemen.[10]

The rebellion continued. The ambassador cabled reports to Washington, indicating that U.S. military assistance was not required. By mid-afternoon, however, the provisional junta (loyalists) requested immediate military assistance, not to protect foreign nationals, but to aid the loyalists in fighting the rebels. President Johnson received word that the situation was desperate at 1730 hours and 30 minutes later he had authorized the landing of Marines to assist in the evacuation of foreign nationals and to protect embassy personnel.[11] Later that evening, President Johnson announced to the nation that 400 Marines had landed to protect Americans and escort them out of the country.[12]

The following day 1500 more marines were landed to assist with the evacuation and protection mission.[13] That same day President Johnson authorized massive military intervention. Following the authorization, the Organization of American States (OAS) Council was

called into session in order to attempt a cease-fire between forces. More importantly, consideration was given to how to use the troops that the president had just authorized. Guidance was issued in Washington to the armed forces to begin planning for the use of troops in isolating the downtown area of Santo Domingo in order to contain the rebels and allow time for the OAS to act.[14] That evening the 82nd Airborne Division was alerted for deployment to the Dominican Republic.[15]

The 82nd Airborne Division began arriving on April 30, 1965. The stated mission was to secure the airport known as San Isidro and to move west to secure the eastern end of the Duarte Bridge over the Ozama River into the city proper.[16] The junta forces were expected to control the other end of the Duarte Bridge and patrol the city. Meanwhile the Marines were establishing a perimeter around the U.S. embassy and the Hotel Embajador (Ambassador Hotel). No orders had been given to the forces to effect a link up. President Johnson did not want to authorize combat but could not rule it out, and the continuing disintegration of the junta's troops made this decision even more crucial. Reaffirmations of no use of forces in combat continued to emanate from Washington along with the promise that no more force would be used than necessary. Later that day, 24,097 troops were on the alert in the United States for deployment to the Dominican Republic.[17]

President Johnson announced later on April 30 to the American people that there were signs of outside control of the rebellion in the Dominican Republic.[18] Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer was ordered to the area to assume control and was given the announced mission of saving American lives. He was also given the unannounced missions of preventing the Communists from gaining control in the Dominican Republic

and to use any means to accomplish either mission. Meanwhile, in the middle of the fighting, there was disagreement among the junta's high level officers over the need for U.S. combat help. Apparently, some felt there was no need for help and others were adamant for obtaining help immediately. U.S. officers on the scene felt that their help was necessary.[19]

During the day of April 30, the paratroopers were given the further mission of crossing the Duarte Bridge to the west side and securing it and an electric plant along the river to the north. Despite some opposition, the mission was accomplished within three hours. Following the seizure of the bridge and the electric plant, the junta forces on the western side of the bridge, who were in contact with the rebels, withdrew across the bridge to their base which was also at San Isidro.[20] Two important aspects of the rebellion immediately came to light: the U.S. forces were now disposed between the warring factions of the rebellion putting them in direct contact with the rebels, and the juxtaposition caused many to believe that the U.S. forces were actually in alliance with the forces of the junta and shielding them.[21] Needless to say, efforts became frantic to obtain a cease-fire as soon as possible to prevent more bloodshed and to extract the American forces from their predicament.

April 30 was a busy day. President Johnson had dispatched former Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Bartlow Martin to achieve two immediate objectives: prevent a Communist takeover while Washington worked on preventing the actions of the United States from isolating it from the rest of the hemisphere.[22] Martin, enroute to the country, concerned himself with four dangers: a Communist takeover, full

scale U.S. occupation, a U.S. supported Dominican dictator (such as Trujillo), and finally the danger of a U.S. Hungary.[23] During the day too, the Department of State cabled the embassy in Santo Domingo, sending a summary of U.S. policy as it pertained to the situation. The policy was that the United States would cooperate with the OAS request for a cease-fire, that the U.S. would insure that OAS action does not allow Communist groups to obtain power, and that U.S. forces were not to join the junta in action against rebels. The objectives accompanying this policy were to (1) establish an International Security Zone under the Council of the OAS resolution, (2) secure the Duarte Bridge and the American positions to the east, and (3) cooperate with the Papal Nuncio to try to achieve a cease-fire.[24] The aforementioned dual objectives of the Johnson Administration, fear of another Cuba and the isolation of the United States in the hemisphere was the driving force behind every decision taken during the emergency.

The next day, May 1, was spent in regrouping and determining positions for the next round. Lieutenant General Palmer, having arrived on the scene and taken charge, was informed of the cease-fire agreed to the day before. He declared that he would not recognize any cease-fire.[25] His rationale probably was that he would do what was militarily expedient as soon as he was completely briefed on the current situation. At the same time, Ambassador Martin was working to insure that the cease-fire worked, preventing more bloodshed. Ambassador Bennett requested more troops, coloring his request with overtones of more Communists in the rebellion. His request was approved, but he too, was directed to press for the observance of the cease-fire.[26] Priority was given to adopting a more neutral stance in the country and avoiding over

identification with the junta.[27] Tad Szulc, in his diary, indicated that the United States was playing into the hands of the Communists by appearing to side with the junta.[28]

While the diplomatic circles were busy conducting their business, the military role was also changing. Troop advances were halted and the troops were returned to their original position, in accord with the cease-fire. Ground rules were tightened. Troops could fire and maneuver in self defense but they had to return to their original positions.[29] Fire was returned only after fire had been received and then only on the orders of the sector commanders.[30] Consequently, maneuvers had to be justified. Restrictions were also placed upon the arms that could be used. The largest weapon allowed for use during the conflict was the 106mm recoilless rifle.[31] General Palmer suggested that the Army and the Marines conduct a link up operation in order to join forces but he received no response from Washington.[32] The day ended with no gains, several cease-fire violations, and a more neutral attitude by the U.S. forces in country.

On May 2, President Johnson addressed the nation again, this time describing how the leaders of the rebellion were trained in Cuba. He indicated that these leaders were taking more control of the rebellion. He also stated his view that America would not permit another Cuba in this hemisphere, indicating that when the objective is the establishment of a Communist state it calls for action,[33] which is what the United States had done. The same day, there was a meeting in Washington to discuss the possibility of establishing a corridor to link the two American forces. Permission was granted to the 82d Airborne Division to conduct the link up operation and approval was received from

the OAS on the issue.[34] There were approximately 9,200 troops in the area on May 2, 1965.[35] Other reports indicate that there were about 14,000 troops involved on that day.[36]

The link up operation began just after midnight on May 3 and accomplished its goal in just under three hours.[37] The establishment of the corridor contained the rebels even more and allowed the forces to assume a better position of neutrality between the rebels and the junta. It can be said that the establishment of the corridor was influential in changing the orientation of the force operational mission from one oriented towards Communist infiltrated rebels to one of a neutral, peace-keeping force.[38] This operation has been termed a key event in that it did separate the opposing forces, even though the fighting did not stop.[39]

Following this key operation, the combat aspect of the intervention tapered off. The United States was successful in calling for and achieving an Inter American Peace Force, under the command of a Brazilian general. The U.S. provided far and away the largest contingent of forces with about 8,500 involved as late as October, 1965.[40] The Inter American Peace Force was deactivated on September 20, 1966 and all foreign troops left the Dominican Republic.[41]

Analysis

The analysis of this action by the military is interesting because of the proximity of the Dominican Republic to the shores of the United States. The Dominican Republic was the first post-World War II action in the western hemisphere involving U.S. troops. Although the U.S. involvement did not, in essence, conform to the premise of an

action in contravention to an insurgency, it does provide the student with some insights into U.S. policy and goals and the ends to which the United States would go to realize those policies.

It is always easy to say that the political conditions prevalent at the time prompted the involvement of the United States. In the Dominican Republic, the political conditions of the country, those of a rebellion or civil war, definitely affected the U.S. decision to act. The political conditions that prompted U.S. involvement in 1965 were different than those of the previous two years as the government underwent change without U.S. involvement. The belief that the rebellion was inspired by Communists drove the United States to intervene. Even though there were many who thought that the rebellion was actually for the good of the country initially,[42] when the United States did act, the rebellion had taken a turn for the worse, albeit that change was greatly affected by U.S. refusal to assist in negotiations for an end to the conflict.[43] The failure of U.S. diplomatic personnel to act at appropriate moments during the conflict led to a massive intervention which resulted from a complex of decisions and actions on lesser matters up and down the line by those not expecting U.S. involvement.[44]

Goals of the United States were specified throughout the operation in the Dominican Republic as (1) the restoration of law and order, (2) the protection of U.S. lives in the country and (3) the prevention of a Communist takeover. These goals were cabled to the embassy and carried to the country by both Ambassador Martin and General Palmer. While these purely U.S. goals were being sought in the Dominican Republic, the United States was also at work on some regional goals. The policy of the United States became one of cooperation with the OAS as

long as any action by the OAS did not allow any Communist takeover. Washington was well aware of the consequences of the massive intervention and did not want to become isolated politically from the rest of the western hemisphere by not adhering to recommendations by the OAS. Even though the OAS was viewed as being dominated by the United States, condemnation of the United States by the OAS may have damaged the United States more than the possible Communist takeover in Santo Domingo. Therefore, U.S. objectives to carry out the aforementioned policy were to establish an International Security Zone under the resolution of the OAS and to cooperate to try to achieve a cease-fire between the warring factions. With the situation as it was, there were many complaints on all sides that cease-fire violations had been committed, again by all sides. In consideration of the overriding fear of another Cuba versus a U.S. Hungary, it is difficult to speculate to what extent the United States may have gone, had the situation been different, toward the prevention of another Communist dominated state in the hemisphere. The actions of the United States, in cooperation with the OAS were sufficient to bring the situation under control and also accomplish the political objectives set forth initially. Considering that the OAS was informed after initial U.S. decisions were made, it is quite possible that the United States would have continued upon the course of prevention of another Communist state, later hoping to explain the actions in a similar manner as the explanation of the initial moves.

The political conditions within the Dominican Republic were influenced heavily by the proximity of the United States. In addition, these conditions were affected by U.S. investment and business within the country. The relations between the United States and the Dominican

Republic had been good, barring the coup that deposed Juan Bosch in 1963. Relations were resumed after Kennedy was assassinated and President Johnson reversed Kennedy's stand on democratic changes in government. The main interest of the United States at that time was to avoid another Cuba in the region.[45] Since Trujillo adopted his anti-communist stance following World War II, U.S.-Dominican relations had been dominated by the desire to create a model for liberalism and democracy in the Caribbean.[46] The involvement of the United States in Vietnam at the time and the "loss" of Cuba to the Communists provoked paranoia concerning communism. The "Johnson Doctrine" of no second Cuba[47] combined with a distrust of Juan Bosch[48] militated in favor of United States support of the loyalists (military junta) rather than a completely neutral stance. Since the establishment of the Cold War camps, democracy versus communism, the two-camp philosophy was not lost to the Latin Americans. Many of the Latin countries, unable to cope with political opposition and generate reform, labeled the opposition as Communists and used that to gain what U.S. aid came their way. Internal problems were then conveniently labeled as problems of attempted Communist domination with the hope that the United States would help the country overcome these problems with dollars. Many times, these problems had no relation to communism, rather they were legitimate problems of developing countries.

Once the United States forces had been committed to the Dominican Republic, efforts concerning troop use then began as noted earlier. To say that there were troop ceilings during the intervention would be wrong considering that over 22,000 troops were eventually employed, discounting the more than 10,000 involved on the ships at sea in the area.[49] Lowenthal notes that almost as soon as troops began arriving,

officers pressed for the commitment of more troops, and the authority to use them, while at the same time efforts were being made to obtain a cease-fire.[50] This was explained by Ambassador Martin when he said that the Department of Defense takes no unnecessary risks.[51] On the other hand, military commanders believe that overwhelming presence reduces the chances of combat by intimidating the opposition, in this instance both opposing groups. Limitations placed upon troops in the Dominican crisis were more of the nature of rules of engagement rather than numbers. Definite rules of engagement were set forth as noted. These rules of engagement did, in some measure, influence or limit the use of force during the troop deployment.

The end product of the involvement of the United States in the Dominican Republic was the fact that the United States would act to prevent another Communist-dominated nation in the Americas. The intervention in the Dominican Republic accomplished the goals of the United States at the time, the removal of foreign nationals from the country and the prevention of a takeover of the country by Communist-inspired rebels. With a view to the specific situation in the Dominican Republic, goals and objectives, military and political, were accomplished. On the other hand, the intervention, in violation of the OAS policy of nonintervention, can be viewed not as a success but as a failure. The unilateral action of the United States convinced other countries that the U.S. would act again in the same manner. The recent incursion in Grenada lends credence to this fact. Tad Szulc pointed to the fact that all three Communist oriented parties in the Dominican Republic gained in strength as a result of the U.S. intervention.[52] The immediate problems, however, that of preventing another Cuba and

removing innocent personnel from the Dominican Republic, were solved between April 28, 1965 and September 20, 1966 by the imposition of overwhelming force between the warring factions in the Dominican Republic.[53]

The military was little affected during this action. The fact that the military was used for more than a year as a peace-keeping force did produce some lessons learned.[54] These were, however, framed in terms of combat in cities, a manual that had first been published in 1952 and then again in 1964. Doctrine, although there was none at the time concerning peace-keeping operations, did not result from the crisis and the military involvement in the Dominican Republic. Peace-keeping forces and operations are briefly described in the current manual FM 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict. This manual brie.ly describes police assistance in an internal security situation. There seems to be no basis for doctrine in this area, as it concerns specific military operations, rather it seems that the rules of engagement become the doctrine under which forces operate, using normal tactical doctrine as required by the situation.

Endnotes

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[9]Martin: 674.

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[20]Lowenthal: 120.

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[23]Martin: 661-662.

[24]Martin: 660.

[25]Lowenthal: 123.

[26]Lowenthal: 124.

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[29]Lowenthal: 127.

[30]Palmer: 44.

[31]William E. Klein, "Stability Operations in Santo Domingo," Infantry 56 (May-June 1966): 37. (Hereafter cited as Klein.)

[32]Lowenthal: 128-129.

[33]Schlesinger: 653-655.

[34]Lowenthal: 130-131.

[35]Szulc: 99.

[36]Mansbach: 32.

[37]Palmer: 44.

[38]Klein: 38.

[39]George T. Schneider, "War Termination: Guerrilla/Insurgent/Revolutionary War," (Student Thesis, USA War College, 1970): 27. (Hereafter cited as Schneider.)

[40]Martin: 699.

[41]Mansbach: 125.

[42]Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J. Kryzanek, The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible (1982): 127. (Hereafter cited as Wiarda.) See also Szulc: 304-305.

[43]Martin: 674. See also Lowenthal: 159.

[44]Lowenthal: 150.

[45]Lowenthal: 151. See also Wiarda: 127.

[46]Wiarda: 127.

[47]Wiarda: 127.

[48]Lowenthal: 136.

[49]Palmer: 136.

[50]Lowenthal: 148.

[51]Martin: 704.

[52]Szulc: 295-296.

[53]Schneider: 28.

[54]Klein: 38-39.

CHAPTER 5

VIETNAM, 1961 - 1965

Overview

Discussion of America's longest and most tragic commitment since World War II, or perhaps in its entire history, is difficult to begin. First of all, the question arises, where to begin? The problems in Vietnam during the time frame 1961 to 1965 did not arise of themselves, rather they surfaced because of normal causal relationships that trace their beginnings to the 1954 Geneva Accords and some even before. Why 1961 to 1965? The United States established a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Indochina in 1950. The MAAG covered all of Indochina, managing U.S. assistance to the countries through the French, who were attempting to reestablish their colonial ties in the region. The French, unable to regain their pre-World War II position throughout the region, accepted the Geneva Accords of 1954, separating Indochina into the countries of Laos, Cambodia, North and South Vietnam. The United States, even before the Geneva Convention, was already concerned over the situation and was making strides to stop the spread of Asian communism by formulating plans to assist the newly formed governments in the region. The MAAG was renamed to South Vietnam only and became responsible for the management of the American military assistance program in the country, that of training South Vietnamese forces for the defense of the country. South Vietnam, under the leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem, became the recipient of many years of American Assistance and several billions of dollars in order to remain a free and

open society in a region that had been plagued by Communist attempts at subversion for many years. Aid to South Vietnam was increased under President Kennedy who wanted to establish a victory for his administration. In countering the new wave of Communist insurgencies, Kennedy's increased assistance to South Vietnam was hoped to be that counter to the Communist elements in the country. The failure of the aid during the period 1961 to 1965 and the subsequent massive troop buildup beginning in 1965 and the following years was still not enough to stem the Communist advance. Following Vietnamization and the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1973, it was only two short years until the Communist flag was hoisted in Saigon and another victory was claimed by the Communists. The period 1961 to 1965 is chosen, therefore, to focus on Vietnam prior to a massive force buildup of conventional U.S. troops. While a discussion of the entire Vietnam Conflict is unmanageable in the context of this study, the period 1961 to 1965 can properly be discussed within the bounds of the operational definition set forward at the beginning of this study.

Background

To simply begin an investigation of the relations of the United States and Vietnam during the period of 1961 to 1965 would not be adequate, in any sense of the word, to a proper analysis. Books have been written on the historical and political aspects in order to acquaint Americans with Vietnam, so that a better understanding could be achieved. To be sure, Vietnam was misunderstood by many, even those who were there to "save" the country from the Communists. A background or prelude to U.S. involvement in Vietnam during the period of 1961 to 1965

is meant to properly set the stage for actions and policies carried out during these years.

United States involvement in Indochina after World War II began in 1950 with the establishment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) that was oriented to the entire region which included Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The French were attempting to reestablish their colonial empire that was abandoned during World War II. That same year, the U.S. began indirect aid to Vietnam through the French. In 1951, direct economic aid to Vietnam was authorized by public law.[1] This situation continued until the Geneva Agreements were signed in 1954. At the time of the Geneva conference there were 342 U.S. personnel in "South" Vietnam.[2]

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 were designed to peacefully transition the region from colonial rule to independent states. Vietnam, actually three distinct regions under the French, was partitioned into North and South along the 17th Parallel with a provision of holding reunification elections in two years, elections which never took place. The United States, concerned still with containment of monolithic communism, made a unilateral statement during the Geneva Conference which was to influence its actions in later years in the region. The declaration stated that the United States would not disturb the agreements by force or threat thereof, that the United States would view any aggression in the region in violation of the agreements, and that the United States would work for free elections, supervised by the United Nations.[3] Article 19 of the Geneva agreements also prohibited the formation of military alliances and/or the accommodation of foreign military bases in either the north or the

south.[4] Finally, of importance here, was the provision in the Geneva agreements that no additional equipment, war materiel or troop reinforcements would be introduced into either the north or the south, over and above those necessary to replace men or materiel already there.[5]

The argument about who violated which portion of the agreements that were signed in Geneva form a moot point which is not germane to this study. Suffice to say that within two years, 1956, events began happening that would lead to the American "debacle." In 1955, as the French withdrew from South Vietnam, the United States MAAG took over the complete responsibility for the training of the South Vietnamese Army.[6] The same year, Diem announced that elections to reunify the country would not be held. In May 1956, 350 more U.S. personnel were sent to South Vietnam to help recover equipment that had been abandoned by the French. Once the mission was complete, these personnel remained as a part of the MAAG. With the Korean War still fresh in the minds of U.S. personnel in the MAAG, the training of the South Vietnamese Army had an inclination towards a conventional force that could defeat a conventional Communist attack across the 17th Parallel, in essence preparing the South Vietnamese Army for the last American war experience.[7]

Events in the south as depicted above did not go unnoticed in the north. As Jeffrey Race points out so dramatically in his book, War Comes to Long An (1972), the north was biding its time, content that the reunification elections would be sufficient to reunify the country under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.[8] Diem's announcement that elections would not be held forced the north to adopt other plans for

the reunification of the country, plans evolving over time to take into account the actions by the government of South Vietnam and the United States actions in support of the government. Planning, according to Race, took into account the U.S. involvement in the south, including the uncertain eventuality of commitment of U.S. forces.[9] Race analyzed this work of the "party" in two different ways. First he discussed the party's action in terms of the concept of balance of forces, indicating that the basic force that the party was attempting to influence was social rather that military.[10] Then later he listed the strategy of the party as preemptive while the government of South Vietnam was following a reinforcing strategy.[11] In this respect, the party worked to bring the target population into alignment with the goals and aspirations of the party while the government worked to retain what control it exercised over the groups in the country from which it had traditionally received its power.

United States assistance continued to be provided to South Vietnam, consisting mostly of advisors and training teams for the South Vietnamese Army. Violence towards the Americans stationed in the country began in 1957 when a bomb blew up in the U.S. MAAG and USIS (United States Information Service) installations in Saigon, injuring several personnel. 1957 was the first year for Special Forces to be employed in Vietnam, where a team trained South Vietnamese troops after the activation of the 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa.[13] An odd incident took place in 1958 which fueled the fires of animosity between the north and south in that President Diem created the Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam.[14] This year was marked by the beginning of selective killings by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.[15] Then in 1959,

two Americans were killed in a bombing incident that took place on a Vietnamese military base.[16] In 1960, Hanoi called for the establishment of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam while 15 village chiefs were being killed each week.[17] Special Forces were becoming more involved as 30 instructors were sent from Fort Bragg in May to set up a training program for the South Vietnamese Army.[18] During 1960, the United States announced that the MAAG in South Vietnam would be increased from 327 to 685 personnel by the end of the year. Finally, on the eve of of his retirement from office, President Eisenhower sent President Diem a letter wishing him well in the future and pledging the continued support of the United States for the freedom of South Vietnam in its struggle for democracy.[19]

U.S. Assistance, 1961 - 1965

1961 began with a new American administration in Washington. President Kennedy was no stranger to Southeast Asia. His views had, however, changed over the years. In 1954, while the French were losing their influence in the region, he indicated that supporting the French further with American aid would not be wise in view of the issues involved. In 1956, he had become a supporter of South Vietnam and President Diem as a means to thwart the buildup of Communist influence.[20] As he assumed office in 1961, he remained a supporter of Diem and became even more concerned about the role of the United States.

Sending a letter to all U.S. ambassadors in May, Kennedy exhorted them to become the "leaders" of their "Country Teams" rather than the managers of U.S. influence in these countries. He wished them to be commanders, forcefully coordinating U.S. efforts.[21] During the

same time, Vice President Johnson was visiting Saigon from which a joint communique was issued to the effect that the United States did not plan to send armed forces to Asia. However, the accord called for a 15% increase in the armed forces of South Vietnam and for 100 "Agrovilles" at the cost to the United States of between $50 - 100 million.[22] About a month later, June 14, South Vietnam requested that U.S. military instructors be used to directly train the South Vietnamese forces, rather than the "train the trainer" concept that had been used for the past three years by agreement.[23] Special Forces were committed to South Vietnam again in 1961 and this time the commitment would become permanent. From a commitment of two, one noncommissioned officer and one medic in October, 1961,[24] to a team of medics deployed to assist the minority groups in the central highlands,[25] the Special Forces began to assume responsibility for a CIA initiated program which was called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) plan.[26] The CIDG program was to be the most significant and far reaching contribution of the Special Forces in Vietnam. In addition to training, 1961 was recognized as the year in which the United States began providing combat support to the South Vietnamese Army. In December, 33 helicopters accompanied by 400 air and ground crewmen arrived with an announcement from that State Department that U.S. personnel would operate the equipment.[27] Figures for the end of 1961 indicate that from 948[28] to 2,000 men[29] were in South Vietnam, men who were training, supporting or even accompanying the South Vietnamese on combat operations. End of year figures also show that 14 U.S. servicemen died as a result of the conflict in 1961.[30]

Agrovilles continued into but were stopped in 1961. First started in 1959 as a means of population control and protection, they

were not enthusiastically accepted by the population, people who had to move at their own expense, buy land to till, leave their good fields, move and leave their family burial places, etc. By 1961, the program was practically nonexistent and for good reason. The initial program was begun as a program of counterinsurgency.[31] Meant to remove the insurgent from the population, and at the same time to mobilize the population for the government's effort in countering subversion, the agroville plan was a part of an even bigger plan to accomplish four ends; security of populace by regroupment and connection of the agrovilles, elimination of corruption with competent cadre for local administrative posts, improvement of local village finances, and the formation of a vigorous youth movement.[32] The results have already been mentioned, results directly affecting the populace. Zasloff concludes that the entire program was undertaken too rapidly, with little if any plan, no popular appeal or rather that instantaneous appeal was expected from the people by the government. In short, the South Vietnamese government suffered from "gross self-delusion" concerning the agroville plan.[33]

The United States was groping for a response to the situation in Vietnam during 1961. It is apparent that nothing much was done during the year as shown above. Most of the year was spent in discussing the problem of insurgency in Vietnam and the more important problem of how the United States was going to respond to the problem. Several authors have offered explanations of what the U.S. was doing and why. Explanations seem to indicate who was politically in favor at any particular time and how U.S. policy and doctrine was influenced or shaped to meet the challenge in South Vietnam.[34] The main emphasis

became one of preparing the South Vietnamese Army to meet the threat of insurgency from within. U.S. combat troops were dismissed as unfeasible after General Maxwell Taylor completed a fact finding tour to South Vietnam in October, 1961. The factfinding tour did produce a state of emergency in South Vietnam which was announced the same day that Taylor began his report to the President.[35] The end result of the mission was that President Diem had been filtering reports to the United States, painting a rosy picture as things went from bad to worse.[36]

The year 1962 brought more help from the U.S. government in terms of combat support. Helicopters grew in numbers during the year in an effort to take the fight to the enemy. In February, U.S. pilots flew helicopters for a surprise attack on a village.[37] In March, it was reported that there were more than 60 helicopters in Vietnam and the concept of vertical envelopment came into use.[38] That same month, the Department of State confirmed that U.S. pilots were flying combat training missions with South Vietnamese airmen over guerrilla held areas, the reason being a lack of qualified South Vietnamese pilots.[39] Finally, concerning combat support from the air, in October, it was reported that U.S. helicopters "fired first" upon suspected enemy. This action was in violation of previous orders "to return fire only."[40]

Special Forces continued in their mission to train minority groups in the central highlands of South Vietnam. Operating during much of 1962 under the U.S. Mission, they were reported to have trained about 5,000 CIDG forces by August, 1962.[41] In September, Special Forces were transferred to the control of the Army and by November, 1962, there was an organization known as U.S. Army Special Forces (Provisional) in South Vietnam, of approximately battalion size.[42]

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was formed on February 8, 1962 under the command of General Paul D. Harkins, former U.S. Army deputy Commander in Chief, Pacific.[43] MACV brought all forces except the MAAG under one command. The MAAG continued to function separately and by the end of 1962, had trained 65,000 Self Defense Corps forces. By the end of the year, approximately 11,000 U.S. military advisors and technicians were in South Vietnam. By the end of the year too, casualties for the United States ranged from 49 to 109.[44] In addition to the U.S. contingent, Australian military jungle fighting experts arrived in August to assist in advising the South Vietnamese.[45]

The agroville plan that was cancelled in 1961 was relaunched in early 1962 as the Strategic Hamlet program by President Diem. It consisted of two types of hamlets, strategic hamlets defended by the people and defended hamlets that were defended by Regional Forces.[46] As a demonstration of the concept, Operation Sunrise was conducted on March 22, 1962 to establish a strategic hamlet in a heavily Viet Cong infested region. The operation was a show piece but under the surface, the previous resistance to agrovilles was still at work.[47] Barely four months after the initial announcement to begin the program was made, it was reported that there were already 1,300 villages complete and by August that number had more than doubled.[48] In September, General Taylor, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that the strategic hamlet program and protection of the people were necessary before turning to more economic and social emphasis in the U.S. aid program.[49] The United States supported the Strategic Hamlet program as well as the British government in regards to the announced aims of the program. The government of South Vietnam, in addition to the announced

goals of the program, used the strategic hamlets as a measure of population and resources control.[50]

Concerning the political scene, 1962 was a year of denial, denial of the use of U.S. personnel in Vietnam as combat forces. President Kennedy declared in March that U.S. forces in Vietnam were not "combat troops." Secretary of Defense McNamara declared in May that there was no plan for combat forces in South Vietnam.[51] The military role was possibly over emphasized and detracted from the fact that the problems in South Vietnam were essentially political ones. The Kennedy Doctrine that evolved since taking office was that of a global threat by communism exploiting modernization in developing countries. The doctrine further stated that the United States had the duty of confronting the threat without direct military forces early to reduce involvement, adopting novel approaches to the problem with the civilian agencies overseas in order to allow the government to govern effectively. A group called Special Group CI (counterinsurgency) was formed to confront the problem at the national level under Robert Kennedy and training for all overseas personnel was soon developed to make everyone aware of the problem from the U.S. perspective.[52]

1963 began on a sour note as U.S. advisors openly criticized a South Vietnamese operation, advocating more operations by smaller units rather than big "sweeps." This criticism was not taken constructively by President Diem who saw it as damaging to his political position. He became suspicious of advisors and soon sought to limit their influence in the affairs of state.[53] Attempts at limiting the influence of U.S. advisors continued until May when the government of South Vietnam agreed to keep advisors at province and district level (approximately 2,000 at

province level).[54]

Concerning military matters, U.S. helicopters were given the authorization at the end of February to shoot first rather than return fire.[55] In April, 100 troops from the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii were assigned to South Vietnam. These men would be used as helicopter door gunners, replacing or freeing the mechanics to devote full time to their assigned jobs.[56] Troop strength grew during 1963 to a high of 16,732 in October.[57] In December, 220 personnel were withdrawn from South Vietnam, leaving about 16,500± at the end of the year.[58] Casualties for the year were listed at 489.[59]

The Special Forces continued their mission of training the Montagnards in the central highlands. Late in 1962 MACV assumed control of the Special Forces, whereas before they had operated under the U.S. Mission.[60] Politics again entered into the assistance program as the South Vietnamese government refused to allow direct aid to the Montagnards, fearing that they would show more loyalty towards the United States than their own government.[61] At the end of 1963, results showed that 18,000 strike force troops had been trained and 43,376 personnel had been trained as hamlet militia.[62] In November, a ceiling of 20,000 was placed on the CIDG program and the hamlet militia lost its emphasis.[63]

The Strategic Hamlet program nearly doubled during 1963, starting at 4,080 in January, the hamlets by August exceeded 8,000.[64] The program was halted one month after the fall of the Diem government because of the continuing resistance to the program and because it was reported that several thousand peasants had left their hamlets since the Diem overthrow.[65] The hamlet program reports were impressive, as far as

South Vietnamese statistics were concerned as eight million people were reported living in these hamlets in May and then ten million were reported living in them in October.[66] Almost every author who has discussed the Strategic Hamlet program has indicated skepticism concerning statistics provided by the South Vietnamese government. It is probably fair to assume that the program was somewhat less than it was reported.

A U.S. Senate report in February indicated concern over U.S. aid and participation in the conflict. The report expressed doubts over whose war it was, U.S. or South vietnamese.[67] As doubts began to present themselves in the United States, the power base of the Diem regime was narrowing. In May, riots broke out between Buddhists and government troops, the latter being used to repress the demonstrations. This was followed a month later in June with the first of several self-immolations by Buddhist monks as a protest against the Diem regime and its repression of Buddhism (Diem was a devout Catholic).[68] General Harkins was reported to have warned against U.S. advisors supporting South Vietnamese units participating in the repression of the Buddhists.[69] In September, President Kennedy denounced the repression, indicating that the government was "out of touch" with the people, and suggested that the government initiate changes to get the support of the people. He also indicated that the United States was prepared to continue assistance to combat communism.[70] Economic reprisals were taken against the Diem government in October as aid was changed or reduced because of the repression of the Buddhists.[71]

For some, it seemed as if the struggle was almost won in South Vietnam. General Harkins announced in March that everything for victory

was present.[72] In October, even in recognition of the grave political situation within South Vietnam, it was reported by the White House that the U.S. would continue aid to gain victory by 1965 and that 1,000 troops would be withdrawn by the end of the year.[73] General Harkins again announced in November that victory was months away.[74]

Then the thread that had been holding everything together since 1954 unraveled. President Diem was overthrown on November 1 and died the next day (or executed as indicated by most). This change in government was to initiate several additional changes in government over the next 13 months. During the year changes took place in the U.S. command and control structure. Ambassador Frederick Nolting was replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge in September, 1963. Less than one month after Diem's overthrow, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Considering all these changes, U.S. aid did indeed continue with little if any interruption caused by the political turbulence.

Political stability was in great demand during 1964 in South Vietnam. As noted earlier, more than half a dozen political changes took place during the year, depending upon the reader's definition of political change. These changes consisted of coups, reorganizations, elections, dissolutions, and declarations as far as can be determined.[75] Throughout all of these changes, although they were not accepted lightly by upper echelon personnel in the United States, the business of the conflict continued as well as the U.S. aid necessary to continue the fight. Changes in Vietnam were not entirely limited to the Vietnamese since changes were made in top level U.S. leadership in the country. Ambassador Lodge was replaced by retired General Maxwell D. Taylor and at the same time General William C. Westmoreland replaced General

Harkins as Commander, MACV.[76]

The United States refused to expand the war to North Vietnam at the repeated urgings of the South Vietnamese government. When U.S. warships were attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats between August 2 and August 4, a state of emergency was declared in South Vietnam and the now famous Tonkin Gulf Resolution was passed by Congress.[77] Specifically. the resolution allowed the President to

> take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. . . .to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any. . . state. . .in defense of its freedom.[78]

The passage of this law widened the war for the United States and the subsequent retaliatory strikes conducted under its auspices came under increasing condemnation, around the world as well as inside the United States.

Special Forces continued with the CIDG program as well as undertaking new missions in 1964. Under MACV, with a limit of 20,000 on the CIDG program, tables of organization and equipment (TOEs) were developed and issued in March, 1964. Heretofore, U.S. advisors had tailored each CIDG unit as necessary depending upon the local situation. With the TOEs came the conventionalization of the CIDG, the same as the overall armed forces.[79] In May, Special Forces undertook Project Leaping Lena under MACV which later turned into Project Delta, operations involving long range reconnaissance patrolling and intelligence gathering.[80] When Montagnards rebelled against South Vietnamese authority in September, Special Forces were instrumental in returning things to normal. Demands included by the minority group included the provision that only U.S. advisors be authorized in their

camps, further fueling differences between the U.S. and South Vietnam concerning this tribal group.[81] During the year, the decision was made to control all Special Forces units under one headquarters. In October, the 5th Special Forces Group became operational in South Vietnam, augmented by a signal, psychological operations and civil affairs element. Duty was also changed from temporary duty to a permanent change of station for the personnel.[82]

By the end of 1964, U.S. forces in South Vietnam were reported to be in excess of 23,000. Advisors present within the country were found as far down as company level. Casualties for the year amounted to 140 in actual combat as compared to 76 for 1963.[83]

The enemy threat became more pronounced in 1964, possibly as a result of political upheaval within the South Vietnamese government. The Viet Cong used frontal assault tactics for the first time during the war on February 26. Two months later, in April, Viet Cong forces fought a four day pitched battle against three battalions of the South Vietnam Army.[84]

Strategic hamlets, on a downhill slide since the Diem overthrow in 1963, were reported to be a complete failure or in desperate need of reform. Reports indicated the as many as 45 percent had been abandoned, soldiers had been stealing from the villagers, and concentrations of arms, ammunition, and medicine had been prime targets for the Viet Cong, with many attacks on the hamlets being "inside jobs."[85] An intelligence study for psychological warfare was completed in early 1964 concerning the program. The name was changed to the New Life Hamlet program after the coup against President Diem. The report indicated that completion statistics were more important than actual hamlet criteria, or

quantity versus quality. The security forces necessary to protect these hamlets could not be trained fast enough to keep up with the building pace, hence no guarantee of protection could be provided to the villagers.[86]

Military operations increased by mid-1965 to the point where the operational definition no longer applies, the Vietnam conflict surpassed the bounds of low intensity conflict and became a protracted conflict between opposing forces. In February, U.S. planes carried out direct attacks on Viet Cong without the participation of South Vietnamese pilots.[87] Less than a month later, the first non-reprisal raid was made on North Vietnam by the Air Force, cancelling the operation Flaming Dart and beginning operation Rolling Thunder.[88] Missile sites were located in North Vietnam in July which began to be used against U.S. aircraft and finally in November, the Air Force bombed its first industrial target of the war.[89]

On the ground, 2,000 South Korean military advisors arrived in January,[90] 800 Australian troops arrived in June and were later joined by a New Zealand artillery unit.[91] In March, two U.S. Marine battalions were sent to Vietnam for limited duty and later in May two more battalions were deployed to Vietnam as the first "combat units." On April 2, 1965, an announcement was made that the United States intended to send several thousand more troops to South Vietnam.[92] On July 12, troops begin arriving from the 1st Infantry Division and on July 28, President Johnson announced the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Division.[93] At this point, no further mention need be made of troop deployments other than the fact that on June 7, it was announced that U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam had passed the 50,000 mark.[94]

Concerning command and control of those troops that were in South Vietnam, June was the watershed in regards to commitment to combat. General Westmoreland was authorized to commit troops into combat if South Vietnam requested same on June 8. Later that month, the first combined operation took place with the U.S., South Vietnamese and Australian troops all participating.[95] Before the end of the year, MACV was directing its own operations without the request of the South Vietnamese government, simply coordinating them with its counterparts in the area of operations.

On the political scene, the first half of 1965 was a continuation of the problems encountered in 1964. Reorganizations and reshufflings continued to plague the South Vietnamese government, impeding the efforts necessary to successfully prosecute the war. In mid-year, Ambassador Taylor resigned and was immediately replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge who had resigned one year earlier from the same post.[96] In the United States, the war became a concern for many and 1965 marked the beginning of several protests against the war, teach-ins, peace marches, suicides, draft card burnings, and civil rights stands.[97] The war had become just that, a war, not an advisory effort to assist a country in maintaining its freedom, but a place where American soldiers were being committed and were fighting and dying without a formal declaration of hostilities.

Analysis

In consideration of the foregoing events that unfolded from 1961 to 1965, not every event was included as that is not the purpose here. Events included here are significant as they formed a turning point or

started something new as far as the conflict was concerned, the case here being one of escalation during this four and one-half year time period. Simply beginning too, with the questions of analysis somewhat begs the question since we are concerned about the middle portion of a conflict that, for the United States, stretched over more than two decades. Therefore, the questions will be answered keeping in mind that some may seem quite irrelevant on the one hand while on the other may seem premature since the entire conflict is not being examined.

The United States had been involved in Southeast Asia since the end of World War II. Upon President Truman's declaration of his doctrine of Communist containment in 1947, subsequent events around the periphery of the world's Communist states were viewed very closely with this doctrine in mind. The Indochina MAAG was established in 1950, following on the heels of the Communist takeover in mainland China. The United States was interested in containing communism on the mainland. The MAAG had already been established in South Korea the previous year with the division of that country. Southeast Asia was simply a continuation of the previously stated policy of containment.

United States interests in the region were therefore mainly political, that communism must be stopped. Socially, that was explained by Truman saying that the United States would support free peoples everywhere in the fight against communism. Economically, South Vietnam was of little use to America, although to some the economic argument was used to explain U.S. commitment. Politically, the domino theory was used by the Eisenhower Administration to foster U.S. involvement while others used the power vacuum theory to justify the U.S. presence after the French moved out. The Kennedy Administration continued the policies

of the previous administration and, as it has been pointed out, soon began the escalation of assistance, finally leading to the commitment of ground combat troops by President Johnson in 1965. Thus the doctrine of "flexible response," which became the doctrine of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, was used to escalate as it became necessary during the conflict meeting force with force and pursuing "victory."

How does one pursue victory? Can a people's freedom be a goal? Can the doctrine of "flexible response" be tailored to meet every threat everywhere? Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. stated in 1966 that the strategy of total military victory would be useless in that it would ultimately leave the country in ruin. He indicated that it would "pulverize the political and institutional fabric" of the country, the same being required to provide for the independent survival of South Vietnam as was the initial goal of the war. In essence, Schlesinger noted that the U.S. method would defeat the goal of the war.[98] It must be noted here that Schlesinger was, in all likelihood, discussing the use of American combat troops in South Vietnam after their deployment. The advisory effort of training the South Vietnamese as depicted, a conventional force oriented along the lines of the U.S. Army, could have produced nearly the same conclusion, as long as the United States was willing to foot the bill.

Douglas Blaufarb points out that the Kennedy Administration doctrine sought to avoid the direct involvement of American forces in counterinsurgency combat. The administration understood that the United States had to be prepared to fight. In searching for a response to insurgency, the Special Forces were favored by the President, so much that they received the authorization to wear the Green Beret. Special

Forces, along with Navy and Air Force organizations similar in nature, became the organizations that were viewed as having a primary role in counterinsurgency barring the introduction of combat units.[99] Schlesinger indicated that following the fact finding mission of General Taylor in late 1961, the responsibility for the effort in Vietnam was given over to the Department of Defense from the Department of State. He further showed that Kennedy believed that insurgency and counterinsurgency was in effect, political warfare, not military. When the problem of Vietnam was turned over to the military, it was still a relatively low-level crisis, reports from South Vietnam were encouraging and it seemed that the support of Diem combined with the military advisory effort was working.[100]

Throughout the period of this study, it can be readily discerned that there were no real limitations placed on the involvement in South Vietnam in terms of absolute numbers.



Figure 1.

As can be seen from the chart, many authors differ on the actual troop strength in South Vietnam. Others authors still may have differing statistics, but that is really unnecessary here since the point has been made concerning the fact that the troop ceilings were very flexible. The major jumps in troop strength also herald the shifting U.S. policy during this time period. For example, the jump from 2,000 to 10,000 in 1962 corresponds with the establishment of MACV and the expansion of the advisory effort throughout the country. Of course, the jump in 1965 is the commitment of combat units to South Vietnam. In terms of restrictions that were placed upon the military personnel that were in the country, the escalation of tactics or rules of engagement in general as portrayed during the years were backed or authorized. In some cases, reporters observed and reported changes in tactics, new or different to previous observations, which prompted government sources to make a statement backing the use of the new tactics.

The end product of United States involvement from 1961-1965 was more involvement, escalating the U.S. role to one of direct combat against guerrilla forces in South Vietnam and air raids against targets, both military and industrial, in North Vietnam. The escalation also shows that the military goals and objectives were not realized, not to mention political goals which were probably more important to the overall conflict. Blaufarb points to high level U.S. problems encountered during the conflict by mentioning that the Department of State, responsible for the management of U.S. programs overseas, had problems in getting other agencies to cooperate.[101] He went on to further state that Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins never did see eye to eye and that the ambassador was not supported in his bid to

exercise control over the military by either the Department of State or the Department of Defense. The absence of unity of command within South Vietnam more or less prevailed until 1965 when combat units were deployed and the military was the predominant actor.[102] Whereas the civilians under State were focused on the population as the heart of the counterinsurgency matter, the military was naturally focused on the destruction of the enemy force. The end result of this period could be described as a failure of U.S. aid and advice for South Vietnam to the point that combat units were necessary to continue the fight to achieve political goals.

Complete blame for this period cannot rest entirely with the United States either. Problems internal to South Vietnam were probably more of a cause for failure than U.S. actions. U.S. failure could be termed as failure to force known, necessary changes on the South Vietnamese government. South Vietnam was using, as Jeffrey Race pointed out, a reinforcing strategy to mobilize the population, and on the basis of city enclaves rather than rural where the majority of population resided. The Viet Cong were doing just the opposite, preempting popular support for the regime by their strategy. After the fall of the Diem regime, matters became so confused that the Viet Cong were easily able to maintain the support necessary from the population. These conditions caused the government, and hence, the U.S. support for those programs to lack the necessary direction and popular support to be successful throughout this period. Faulty reporting and improper use of statistics did nothing to help, but rather impeded efforts to carry out programs.

How was the United States military affected? In the beginning, when the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam was small, compared to the

future strengths found there, Vietnam was a training ground where military advisors were busily involved making the South Vietnamese armed forces into a model force capable of defending the country from external aggression, as was the case in South Korea. As more and more advisors were sent to Vietnam, a pool of expertise was formed that was to provide the U.S. Army with the experience necessary when combat units began to be committed.

Moreover, during this particular period of time, the twelve month syndrome set in. Advisors were with Vietnamese units anywhere from five to ten months, considering inprocessing, outprocessing and the probable staff assignment for half of the tour. How much can be done in this very limited period of time? Consider the time required for the advisor to establish rapport with his counterpart, determine needed changes and then proceed to indirectly influence the commander of the unit in such a way that the necessary changes are implemented. After reviewing several exit briefings of advisors at different levels, these conclusions came to light.

Counterinsurgency happened to the U.S. Army. Counterinsurgency happened from the national level and the Special Group Counterinsurgency down to the smallest unit. With the advisory effort, counterinsurgency was advised to the Vietnamese forces in accordance with training programs that had been set up in the United States for all manner of officials that may or would be going to Vietnam. All this was, as Blaufarb points out very graphically, an undertaking done by the military in what he terms an "additive mode."[103] Counterinsurgency became an additional mission for the Army as a whole, as well as being oriented more specifically toward Special Forces. The advisory effort

with conventional units viewed counterinsurgency through the same eyes as the U.S. advisor since the units were organized, trained and equipped to operate conventionally, making counterinsurgency an additional duty. The obvious result was that units were not prepared for counterinsurgency since they were relegated to roads in many cases and had too much firepower. The mindset was that the primary role of the military in counterinsurgency was that of finding, fixing and destroying the enemy, rather than the more important mission of protecting the population and isolating the insurgent from the populace and his base of support.[104] The Kennedy Administration searched for units that would be able to perform the counterinsurgency mission the best, finally ending with Special Forces and other elite units.

Special Forces became the executive agent for the army in conducting counterinsurgency. Throughout this period, U.S. Special Forces advised South Vietnamese Special Forces, as well as carrying out other missions. They were responsible for unconventional warfare, capable of training partisan or irregular forces to fight conventional forces. In Vietnam, they were fighting counterguerrilla warfare using their knowledge of unconventional warfare in a friendly country.[105] Special Forces also conducted a wide variety of civic action projects, sometimes operating as advance guards for civilian agencies in certain regions. The U.S. was the driving force behind civic action while the South Vietnamese were indifferent, considering manual labor which assists a civilian to be contemptible and beneath a soldier's dignity.[106] Special Forces also encountered special problems, too. Advising the Vietnamese, in many cases U.S. personnel had to lead the irregular forces due to the inability or refusal of the Vietnamese to do

it because of contempt for the minorities.[107] This is not to say that Special Forces dominated the advisory effort in South Vietnam. At the end of the reporting period, only one Special Forces Group was operational in South Vietnam with a strength of less than 1,500 men, compared to overall troop strength of approximately 23,000. Special Forces were mainly involved with the CIDG program and others, usually working with South Vietnamese Special Forces.

Doctrinal development did not seem to keep pace with the situation in Vietnam. As shown in Appendix A, doctrinal publications concerned with counterinsurgency or counterguerrilla operations were three, FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces (1952, 1961), FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (1963), and FM 31-22, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (1963). The first two are tactical manuals, with FM 31-15 probably tracing its roots to the end of the Greek Civil War. The 1961 version includes some discussion on command and control of forces and the lines of authority which are normally in being in a foreign nation, from the national level down to the MAAG and/or U.S. forces operating in the country. FM 31-22, later to become the command and control manual for Special Forces, set forth some policy and guidelines for counterinsurgency.

> A major objective of U.S. policy is to thwart further communist inroads into non-communist areas by safeguarding and assisting the less developed nations in fulfilling their aspirations to remain free, and to fashion ways of life independent from communism or other totalitarian domination or control. The overall U.S. objective in the field of overseas internal defense is to encourage and assist vulnerable nations to develop balanced capabilities for the internal defense of their societies.[108]

The manual then goes into some of the history of insurgency movements since World War II, their causes and prevention, listing military civic

action as the major preventive measure. At the end of the period in question, FM 31-73, Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency (1965) was published, followed two years later by the update or publication of four manuals. As one can see, not much doctrinal literature was available.

Finally, concerning strategy and tactics. The United States entered the war in Vietnam on the strategic defensive as Harry Summers has determined.[109] In consideration of tactics, it has been pointed out how general, conventional tactics had been employed during this period. One concept that was an innovation was the concept of vertical envelopment, or using the helicopter to rapidly move forces and fix the guerrilla, once found. As the complete advisory period ended and combat units were being prepared for deployment to Vietnam, the 1st Cavalry Division was testing the airmobile concept that had been developed in 1962 and it became the first airmobile division to operate in Vietnam in 1965.

Although much can be said for strategy, doctrine and tactics which were developed and found to be efficient in combatting an insurgency, they were not followed in Vietnam or followed for the wrong reasons. Several reasons can be advanced in support of this argument. As has already been pointed out, the essence of this type of war as political was made by President Kennedy but not followed, given rather to the military for a political decision. On a lower level, unity of command in South Vietnam was a problem, the civilians doing one thing and the military another. The security or protection of the population took a back seat to finding, fixing and destroying the enemy. Most of these problems continued throughout the war and we all know the ultimate outcome.

One cannot conclude a review of Vietnam during this period without considering one of the major programs carried out during the conflict, the strategic hamlets. Beginning in 1959 with agrovilles, in 1962 with strategic hamlets, in 1964 with new life hamlets and concluding in 1967 forward with the CORDS (Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) program, some type of pacification program was ongoing throughout much of the conflict. It has been pointed out how these programs (except CORDS) failed to achieve their stated purpose, protection of the population and also the unstated purpose of surveillance and control of the population by the South Vietnamese government. Sir Robert Thompson, British expert on insurgency from Malaya criticized the strategic hamlet program as being defensive and lacking the necessary detailed advance planning considered necessary.[110] He pointed out that the fundamental aim of this program was to isolate the insurgent physically and politically from the population. He listed three objectives for the program. They were to (1) protect the population, (2) unite and involve the population in positive action for the government and (3) develop social, economic and political infrastructures. As demonstrated, these conclusions are valid and show the need to concentrate on quality rather than quantity as was the case in Vietnam.

A summation of this period was also made by Sir Robert Thompson in 1966 concerning his counterinsurgency principles, developed over fifteen years, as they could be applied to South Vietnam.[111]

1. The government must have a clear political aim. South Vietnam's government was characterized as having but one aim, that of survival. So many governments were in control during this period that a clear

political aim was difficult if not impossible to discern.

2. The government must function in accordance with the law. The South Vietnamese resorted to outright repression in controlling the population. The strategic hamlet program was many times forced in order to control the population rather than to combat the insurgent.

3. The government must have an overall plan. As shown throughout this period, the government could not have had an overall plan because plans changed as did the governments.

4. The first priority must be given to defeating political subversion rather than the guerrilla forces. The South Vietnamese government, as well as the U.S. military, attempted to defeat the guerrilla, hoping to eliminate political subversion as a result, rather than as Thompson has stated.

5. In the guerrilla phase, the government must secure its base areas first. The government continued conducting operations in sweeps through areas, maintaining only bare enclaves of major cities in the country which were ineffectual in combatting the insurgency.

All these principles were violated, some consistently throughout the period. These principles also reflect the political rather than military nature of the war. Both the South Vietnamese government, as well as the United States, opted for a military solution to an political problem, the South Vietnamese in 1963 and the United States in late 1961 or 1962 as MACV was formed.

Endnotes

[1]U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (1968): 165. (Hereafter cited as Senate, Background.)

[2]Edgar O'Ballance, The Wars in Vietnam (1975): 21. (Hereafter cited as O'Ballance.)

[3]Senate, Background: 165.

[4]Senate, Background: 74.

[5]Senate, Background: 72-74.

[6]Lester A. Sobel, editor, South Vietnam: U.S. Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia 1961-1965 (1966): 3. (Hereafter cited as Sobel.)

[7]O'Ballance: 21-23.

[8]Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (1972): 34-43. (Hereafter cited as Race.)

[9]Race: 106-107.

[10]Race: 144.

[11]Race: 150-155.

[12]Senate, Background: 5.

[13]Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces: 1961-1971 (1973): 4. (Hereafter cited as Kelly.)

[14]Richard N. Goodwin, Triumph or Tragedy: Reflections on Vietnam (1966): 25-26. (Hereafter cited as Goodwin.)

[15]O'Ballance: 25.

[16]Senate, Background: 5.

[17]Goodwin: 25-26.

[18]Kelly: 5.

[19]Senate, Background: 6.

[20]Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were in Vietnam (1982): 17-19.

[21]Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era (1977): 117. (Hereafter cited as Blaufarb.) See also U.S. Congress, Senate, The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination, Document No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963): 155-156.

[22]Sobel: 21.

[23]Sobel: 25.

[24]Kelly: 14.

[25]Kelly: 7.

[26]Blaufarb: 106-107.

[27]Sobel: 27.

[28]O'Ballance: 43.

[29]Sobel: 27.

[30]O'Ballance: 43.

[31]Joseph J. Zasloff, Rural Resettlement in Vietnam: An Agroville in Development (circa 1961): 2. (Hereafter cited as Zasloff.)

[32]Zasloff: 9-10.

[33]Zasloff: 31-32.

[34]Blaufarb: 59-62, 100. See also Kelly: 6-7. See also Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (1968): 210-212. (Hereafter cited as Barnet.)

[35]Senate, Background: 9.

[36]O'Ballance: 39.

[37]Sobel: 33.

[38]O'Ballance: 44.

[39]Sobel: 37.

[40]Sobel: 51.

[41]O'Ballance: 48-49.

[42]Kelly: 14-15, 30.

[43]Senate, Background: 9.

[44]Sobel: 53. See also O'Ballance: 43.

[45]O'Ballance: 43.

[46]O'Ballance: 47-49.

[47]Sobel: 40. See also Blaufarb: 114.

[48]Blaufarb: 114-115.

[49]Sobel: 49.

[50]Blaufarb: 110-112.

[51]Sobel: 39-42.

[52]Blaufarb: 59, 66-70.

[53]O'Ballance: 45-46.

[54]Sobel: 57.

[55]Sobel: 81.

[56]Sobel: 58.

[57]O'Ballance: 43.

[58]Sobel: 77-78.

[59]O'Ballance: 43.

[60]Kelly: 14-15.

[61]O'Ballance: 48-49.

[62]Kelly: 30.

[63]Kelly: 47-49.

[64]Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966): 138. (Hereafter cited as Thompson.)

[65]Sobel: 85.

[66]O'Ballance: 47-49.

[67]Sobel: 55-56.

[68]Senate, Background: 12-14.

[69]Sobel: 59-61.

[70]Sobel: 67.

[71]Sobel: 70.

[72]Goodwin: 29.

[73]Sobel: 69.

[74]Goodwin: 29. See also Sobel: 70.

[75]Senate, Background: 15-18.

[76]Sobel: 96-99.

[77]Sobel: 101-119, passim.

[78]Senate, Background: 141.

[79]Kelly: 47-48.

[80]Kelly: 53.

[81]Sobel: 105.

[82]Kelly: 63-74, passim.

[83]Sobel: 126. See also O'Ballance: 60.

[84]Sobel: 127.

[85]O'Ballance: 56. See also Sobel: 90-91.

[86]Headquarters, U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific, The Strategic Hamlet (New Life Hamlet) as a Weapon Against Communism (1964): 1.

[87]Sobel: 181.

[88]O'Ballance: 75.

[89]Sobel: 138-142.

[90]Senate, Background: 20.

[91]O'Ballance: 76.

[92]Senate, Background: 19-20.

[93]O'Ballance: 77.

[94]Senate, Background: 20.

[95]Sobel: 182-183. See also O'Ballance: 76-77. See also Senate, Background: 20.

[96]Senate, Background: 22.

[97]Sobel: 216-224.

[98]Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1966 (1966): 47-48. (Hereafter cited as Schlesinger.)

[99]Blaufarb: 74-79.

[100]Schlesinger: 20-23. See also Barnet: 211.

[101]Blaufarb: 87.

[102]Blaufarb: 118.

[103]Blaufarb: 81, 207. Here is a good discussion of additive vs. reductive mode.

[104]Blaufarb: 288.

[105]Kelly: 10.

[106]Kelly: 60-62.

[107]Kelly: 20, 40.

[108]U.S. Army, FM 31-22, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (1963): 3-4.

[109]Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (1981): 69.

[110]Thompson: 123-126.

[111]Thompson: 50-58.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The mere description of three case studies may not seem to be sufficient basis from which to draw conclusions. However, by investigating these cases, certain findings come to light which bear on other studies of this nature. The purpose here is to compare and contrast these three cases in order to find common threads or significant differences from which conclusions can be drawn. The original questions will be addressed again and any commonalities will be noted as well as any widely diverging differences. As an integral part of answering the questions, doctrine will be analyzed to determine its evolution during the period under study. Finally, the current U.S. Army internal defense and development strategy will be examined in light of these three case studies in order to determine its validity.

Findings

The announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, with the underlying implications of Communist containment or Communist denial are common throughout these case studies. To combat Communist efforts in Europe following World War II, Greece and Turkey were chosen to make a stand against the apparent consolidation attempts by the Russians in adjacent east European nations. The Truman Doctrine led to the Marshall Plan and ultimately to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, as well as initiating the military assistance era of U.S. policy. While there are many who question the validity of the Truman Doctrine, as

Representative Smith did, there are others who claim that the United States had no other choice, being the only country in the post-war world able to afford such an undertaking. Had the United States not taken over for the British in Greece, it is a fair assumption that the country would have become another satellite of the Soviet Union.

An update of the containment policy became necessary after the People's Republic of China joined the Communist camp in 1949 and North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950. The USSR and the PRC were viewed as one entity from an ideological standpoint. The results of Korea were instrumental in formulating U.S. policy toward South Vietnam. The domino theory gave rise to containment of the PRC at the 17th Parallel. The fall of South Vietnam would lead to the fall of other states in the region, finally controlling access through the entire Southeast Asia region.

Containment of communism in the western hemisphere became a reality with the Dominican Republic intervention. In actuality, the intervention was more of a denial to communism than containment, although the denial of another Communist state in the hemisphere would in effect contain the bastion of communism already present in Cuba. As can be seen, the containment or limitation of Soviet influence is common throughout.

A second commonality that may seem incongruous at first is that of troop limitations. No mention was made of any final limit of American commitment in any of the case studies. While no real evidence was found to indicate that higher troop levels were requested during the Greek Civil War, it has already been pointed out that the number of personnel was really not an issue, the issue being military assistance

as a whole. The intervention in the Dominican Republic was explosive concerning troop strength, from 400 to 20,000+ in a matter of days, and with pressure to bring in more troops. The limitations during this action were more concerned with the use of force rather than troop strength. Finally South Vietnam, where in the space of four and one-half years, strength went from less than one thousand to over fifty thousand. Again in Vietnam, no mention was made of any final troop strength, rather limitations were placed upon actions.

Lack of troop strength limitations brings out another commonality that was present during each of these studies, that of rules of engagement or terms of reference. There were specific rules of engagement that were spelled out in each conflict. In Greece, they consisted of not carrying arms. In the Dominican Republic, rules of engagement consisted of criteria concerning the application of force and types of operations by the units present. In Vietnam, the rules of engagement consisted of types of action that could be taken and, during the period under study, these rules of engagement were escalated almost as fast as the troop strength was increased. Low intensity conflict, being more political than military, is plagued with rules of engagement that in most cases are much narrower for government forces than the normal laws of land warfare. While the laws of land warfare are meant to be followed in any conflict, insurgents at times seem to bypass or ignore certain laws of land warfare, claiming that the "fight for freedom" should not be constrained by fixed laws that pertain to conflicts between standing armies. Recently, terms of reference have been added to the vocabulary along with rules of engagement. Rules of engagement connote force and violence, engagement being a meeting of

forces, whereas terms of reference do not necessarily contain the stigma of violence. Terms of reference can be expected to supplement both the laws of land warfare and rules of engagement in any action along the entire spectrum of conflict, from strategic nuclear warfare to terrorism, but especially where the conflict is low intensity and the discussion is one of political warfare rather than conventional warfare.

Of particular note in each case study was the lack of single purpose in addressing the problems in the host country by the "country team." While not much information was available concerning day-to-day operations within the diplomatic missions, indications of problems came to light during research which shows that the country team members work at cross purposes at times. The lines of authority within a diplomatic mission are hinged upon statute or presidential directives. That the actual operation of the country team is dependent upon personalities of those present on the team, especially the ambassador. The agencies which he controls within a country answer to him and he coordinates their activities, but they also answer to their parent agencies in the United States. In many missions the lines of authority are blurred to the extent that the country team is unable to put forward a unified effort. Each case study had this problem, some more than others. The Griswold-MacVeagh affair was quite noticeable. Minor problems were experienced in the Dominican Republic between General Palmer and the ambassador. In Vietnam, Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins could not get along together. Dysfunction within the country team will probably be present to some degree in any diplomatic mission. Some dysfunction is naturally healthy, since there will be advocates of other points of view, allowing more courses of action to be examined and a

more rational decision to be adopted. It was found that the U.S. Senate conducted a study in 1963 on the matter of ambassadorial control in 1963 that relates back to World War II, identifies the Griswold-MacVeagh affair, and includes President Kennedy's letter to all diplomatic missions in 1961.[1] This document also explains the concept and history of the country team, indicating that the term came into use in the early 1950s.

Finally, the success or failure in each case is related to the organization of the opposing groups which were struggling for control. More specifically, in both Greece and the Dominican Republic, the lack of organization or control of the forces opposing the government structure was instrumental in their defeat. Most authors have pointed out that the opposing forces supply lines in Greece were terminated by outside sources which led to their defeat. Rebels in the Dominican Republic never had any outside support that aided their cause. It was easy to isolate the conflict because of the insular geographic situation thereby limiting outside interference. In both cases, the United States wielded a tremendous amount of influence, either politically, militarily or both, using it to control the situation. In the opposite manner, the organization of the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front coupled with the disorganization of the South Vietnamese-American effort could only be termed a contributing cause to the decision to deploy combat units to Vietnam. The crisis developed gradually and the South Vietnamese government never seemed on the verge of immediate collapse. Thus the U.S. never gained the control over the Vietnamese government as it did over the Dominican government, and to some extent, the Greek government. Moreover, attempts at isolation required either

massive forces or bombardment and the invasion of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. None of these solutions was feasible, given U.S. politics. As the situation in South Vietnam progressed, support for the Viet Cong in terms of manpower and supplies also increased from outside sources.

Finally, a finding that was common to two of the studies was that of internationalization of forces involved. Since only advisors were used in Greece, a multinational force was neither needed nor used. In both South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, the United States used its political leverage to internationalize the forces fighting against the rebels or Communists. In Vietnam, under the auspices of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, forces from other countries were deployed to South Vietnam to help in the conflict. Efforts in Vietnam did not prove successful since the forces were dwarfed by the American commitment, but additionally, the combined forces in Vietnam were never under the control of anyone other than the U.S. command structure. In the Dominican Republic, the Organization of American States was used to generate a multinational force for the operation there. The Dominican situation was quickly internationalized by OAS involvement and a recognition that a political solution was desirable. However, despite the attempts to internationalize the conflict, it was several weeks before the international force was a reality and then the level of non-U.S. participation was extremely low in comparison to the U.S. commitment. The key to this effort was that the United States was not in charge, officially, of the IAPF. The internationalization effort, including command of the combined force under other than an American greatly assisted in making the Dominican Republic intervention a political

issue rather than the military issue it was during the first week.

Disparity among the cases is also present, tending to demonstrate the uniqueness of each case of low intensity conflict. As was mentioned previously, this disparity is one of the reasons that so much literature has been written concerning the diverse aspects of low intensity conflict.

The consequences, both short and long term, were different in each case study concerning host government domestic politics. It must be noted that American intervention does have an impact that may or may not, in the long term, be undesirable from a U.S. viewpoint. There may be some logic in pursuing this type of investigation in order to ascertain the short and long term consequences of American intervention, good, bad or indifferent. In the case of Greece, almost 20 years after the end of the Civil War, the military took control of the country, giving control back to a civilian government after several years, only to be taken over peaceably by a socialist government a few short years later. Is there a connection between these political events in Greece and American aid that was received from 1947 to 1949? In the Dominican Republic, the nation has been more or less democratic since the intervention by the United States even though the military remains as one of the more influential actors in the political arena, as it does in almost every Latin American country. Is the proximity of the United States a factor? Is the dependence of the Dominican economy on American business a factor in the political life? Concerning Vietnam, the consequences of U.S. involvement were very short term, considering that only two years elapsed between the withdrawal of American combat units and the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists.

The utilization of the Military Advisory Assistance Groups (MAAGs) were different in each of these case studies. In Greece, the MAAG was formed and used under the American Mission for Aid to Greece in order to orchestrate the entire U.S. involvement. In the Dominican intervention, little if any mention was made of the MAAG and its contribution to the resolution of the problem there. In South Vietnam, the MAAG began as the primary tool of military assistance to the country. During the period of the study, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was formed to coordinate all U.S. military activities within the country. There was an indication that the U.S. MAAG to South Vietnam was still functioning at the end of 1962 under a major general, however, no mention of the MAAG was found after that time. Speculation about the function of the MAAG after the establishment of MACV would seem to indicate that the MAAG would have been subsumed under MACV.

These then are the findings from these particular studies, both the commonalities and the disparities from among the cases studied. It is interesting that there were so many commonalities involved in the three cases studied.

Analysis

A discussion of doctrinal evolution or development is particularly important to this study since doctrine determines, to a large extent, how the Army fights or should fight. In order to accomplish this analysis, one is again referred to Appendix A and the listing of U.S. Army publications as the discussion progresses.

The advent of the "Counterinsurgency Era," as Blaufarb terms it, after World War II found the U.S. Army without one publication that was

specifically oriented to countering insurgency or revolution. As Weigley points out in his book The American Way of War (1973), the U.S. strategy for confronting conventional or limited war during the decade of the 1950s was one of massive retaliation, using the nuclear arsenal to cope with any and all emergencies. As he notes, the only problem was one in which the U.S. Army was more or less abandoned as was land combat, all being placed upon the nuclear capability. Until the Army developed a nuclear capability itself, it could not become a credible force in a strategic role.[2] Weigley further points to the military strategy, used successfully in World War II, Korea, and he asserts, promoted in South Vietnam again. The strategy was one of annihilation, destruction of the enemy forces on the battlefield.[3]

Even though Weigley asserts that the U.S. Army concentrated itself on limited war, lacking a large conventional role in the 1950s, the doctrinal literature does not out bear his assertion. During the entire decade of massive retaliation, two distinct manuals were produced that were oriented to guerrilla warfare. These manuals were FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerrilla Forces (1951) and FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces (1953). The plethora of limited war doctrinal literature did not begin until President Kennedy began investigating limited war himself. Efforts did not seem to match the President's interest in this regard, however, because only two new manuals were introduced while he held office, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (1963), FM 31-22, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (1963), and FM 31-15 was updated. The majority of publications on low intensity conflict came after Kennedy; most were published after 1965, the most notable years being 1967 and 1970. Following a simple consideration of the

manuals published during the period of these three case studies, one must also examine the relevance of material contained within these manuals and how the doctrine has changed over time.

According to FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces (1961), the objective of operations against guerrilla forces is to eliminate the guerrilla force. In order to do that specific guidelines are set forth. These are to (1) maximize intelligence, (2) separate the guerrilla from his base of support, (3) destroy the guerrilla, and (4) provide political, economic and social necessities to dissident elements and prevent the resurgence of insurgency. Principles of operation were also set forth. They were (1) the direction of effort at each level must be either civil or military, (2) operations must be conducted within the law, (3) offense is key, (4) police operations, combat, and civic action are conducted simultaneously, and (5) combat forces organization must have more mobility than the guerrilla.[4] These guidelines and principles are very similar to present doctrine and strategy to combat an insurgency, that is (1) balanced development, (2) mobilization (population) and (3) neutralization (insurgent).

FM 31-22, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (1963) is an organizational manual which describes organization for insurgency with a short description of insurgency and its causes. It explains the concept of tiers of forces which has remained essentially the same over the past two decades.[5] This is the very concept which Blaufarb criticized as being "additive" rather than "reductive." He classifies counterinsurgency as the type of limited war where conventional forces are not suited for employment, using Vietnam to prove his case. He considers special units that use primitive means of warfare, similar to the guer-

rilla, to be more suited to the counterinsurgency role.

The third manual from this time period is FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (1963). The mission is described the same as in FM 31-15, the eliminate "the enemy guerrilla force and prevent the resurgence of the resistance movement."[6] The manual also lists general principles which are in some cases similar to FM 31-15. These are (1) prevention of insurgency is easier than fighting an insurgency, (2) counterguerrilla operations must also focus on the civilian underground which supports the guerrilla, (3) policies towards the guerrilla and the civilian supporters must be firm, (4) a guerrilla area must be considered a combat area, (5) offensive action is key, and (6) surprise is essential. Many of the key elements of present day strategy and guidelines are missing in this manual. Considering that this manual was published two years after FM 31-15, and is meant to be used in conjunction with it, it is difficult to understand why there is such a wide variation between the two manuals. While this manual was published by Fort Benning, FM 31-15 was published by Fort Bragg. It seems apparent that there would be some confusion over which doctrine to follow, it being obvious that these two manuals have some basic disagreements in key areas for the prosecution of counterguerrilla or counterinsurgency operations.

With due consideration to the manner in which these cases of low intensity conflict were managed to a successful or unsuccessful conclusion, it is important to note how these studies compare with the current doctrine and strategy of low intensity conflict. The purpose here is to demonstrate whether the current doctrine was followed, and if so, whether it was used successfully in these studies and/or whether it

applied. In this manner, since this strategy and these guidelines were not yet established, one may hope to determine whether the current strategy and guidelines are valid in a low intensity conflict setting. Some may suggest that this may be tantamount to hindsight, using 20/20 vision on a past event in order to vindicate the evolution of current doctrine. We must assume that historical examples form the basis for the development of doctrine, however, the doctrine may or may not be used, in certain cases perhaps being too idealistic to be of any benefit.

The strategy and guidelines of internal defense and development (IDAD) which form U.S. Army doctrine have already been noted in Chapter 2 but will again be listed for easy reference. The IDAD strategy consists of three components, (1) balanced development, (2) mobilization (of the population), and (3) neutralization (of the insurgent). The IDAD operational guidelines for this strategy are (1) insure unity of effort, (2) maximize intelligence, (3) minimize violence, and (4) improve administration. Each case study analysis will be compared to these strategy components and operational guidelines.

Initially, it seems necessary to distinguish between the case studies because they cannot all be considered under the heading of internal defense and development. The Dominican Republic intervention could more properly be considered under the heading of peacekeeping, however, some authors have refused to classify it as such, arguing that the use of violence and partiality displayed during the intervention are not in keeping with concepts of this type of operation. Insofar as the operations within the Dominican Republic reflect on the strategy and guidelines, it will be used in this analysis.

During the Greek Civil War, U.S. assistance was about equally divided between economic and military assistance. While the military assistance was used to develop the military in order to neutralize the insurgent by tactical operations, and to train Self Defense Forces to mobilize the population in support of the government, the economic assistance was used to correct some of the ravages of the second world war and the civil war. Politically, Ambassador MacVeagh and Dwight Griswold, in their own ways, were pressuring for political reform in order to lend more legitimacy to the government and to deny the popular support to the guerrillas, isolating them from the populace. The guidelines are somewhat easier to portray. Unity of effort was not achieved until both MacVeagh and Griswold had been replaced in the U.S. arena. On the Greek side, General Papagos was the one man that could insure unity of effort for the Greeks. Use of violence was a problem since it was noted that 50,000 were killed and 11,000 villages destroyed. As operations became more organized, it can be only be assumed that intelligence collection and use improved, allowing government forces to successfully trap and destroy the guerrillas. As noted previously, political reform pressure can be shown as the attempt to improve civil administration. Again, it must be noted that the disorganization of the guerrillas was a significant factor to the success of the United States and Greece.

The Dominican intervention, a military operation from the beginning, changing to a political operation later as a peacekeeping force, does not "fit" well into the IDAD strategy and operational guidelines. There was no real balanced development, rather action designed to restore peace to a city in rebellion. While the

constitutionalists were attempting to mobilize the populace to support them by the distribution of weapons, U.S. assistance isolated the rebels and neutralized their effectiveness by the establishment of the International Security Zone (ISZ). The loyalists, with the perceived support of the U.S. forces and later the Inter-American Peacekeeping Force (IAPF), were given a free hand to mobilize the population to their support while the IAPF neutralized the rebels. Unity of effort was a small problem initially, however, it did not seem to influence the outcome significantly. Violence was definitely controlled through specific rules of engagement by the U.S. forces. Maximizing intelligence was not significant since the opposing forces were more or less isolated initially by the ISZ and normal checkpoint operations were sufficient to maintain the separation. Improvement in administration cannot be considered to be a factor in this incident.

Concerning Vietnam from 1961 to 1965, while there were many programs ongoing simultaneously to assist in the development of the country, it does not seem that balanced development was followed too closely, with most of the emphasis placed in military channels. While programs were in place to develop the country socially and economically, and pressure was applied to reform politically, political pressure was not sufficient to ensure that other development was carried out. The government had tremendous problems mobilizing the population and neutralizing the insurgent, basically because of the lack of national political development in the country. These problems were apparent throughout the period. Unity of effort, similar to balanced development, was also a problem. Even when the Vietnam problem was given to the military for a solution, unity of effort continued to be a problem,

both within U.S. agencies as well as Vietnamese agencies. Intelligence was a problem through the entire conflict, mainly because the population was not mobilized to support the government. Violence was used to the detriment of the mobilization of the population and the neutralization of the insurgent, instead, violence and the lack of intelligence had the opposite effect, of driving the populace into the arms of the insurgents. Public administration was never improved, rather the actions taken by the government had the opposite effect, degrading public administration to the point that the military had to be called upon to assume civilian administrative duties.

Conclusions

The preceding three case studies, the findings, and analysis all point to six basic conclusions.

1. The United States will continue to limit Soviet/Communist influence where possible within the interests of the United States.

2. Rules of engagement or terms of reference will continue to affect low intensity conflict situations throughout the world.

3. Country team coordination, though mandated by statute, will continue to be personality dependent.

4. The United States will attempt to internationalize a low intensity conflict situation, especially where U.S. combat troops are involved.

5. Outside support will continue to influence and affect the end result of a low intensity conflict situation.

6. Military doctrine, while acknowledging the importance of low intensity conflict, will continue to be a additional mission for most

U.S. Army units.

While the findings, analysis and conclusions of this study point to commonalities that were present in three case studies, it cannot be presumed that on the basis of these studies the United States will act in the same manner again. It is apparent that each case of low intensity conflict is different, formulating its own issues and requiring its own answers. The implementation of U.S. doctrine that has evolved from almost four decades of low intensity conflict has considered both the political and military nuances of the situation, rather than being bound to one simple frame of reference. Low intensity conflict is a complex extension of the political fabric of a country, requiring a multifaceted approach to resolve correctly.

Endnotes

[1]U.S. Congress, Senate, The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination, *Document No. 36, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.* (1963): 8, 155.

[2]Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (1973): 403-404.

[3]Ibid.: 467.

[4]U.S. Army. FM 31-15, Operations Against Irregular Forces (1961): 4.

[5]U.S. Army. FM 31-22, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces (1963): 15-17.

[6]U.S. Army. FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (1963): 20-21.

APPENDIX A



Manual	Year	Title (Significant Title Change)
19-50	1970	Military Police in Stability Operations
30-31	1970	Stability Operations Intelligence
31-81	1970	(Test)Base Defense
31-55	1968	Border Security & Anti-Infiltration (1972)
31-73	1952	Skiing & Snowshoeing
	1965	Advisor Handbook for Counterinsurgency
	1967	Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations
100-20	1943	Command & Employment of Air Power
	1964	Field Service Regulations, Counterinsurgency (U)
	1967	Field Service Regulations, Internal Defense & Development (U)
	1972	Internal Defense and Development, U.S. Army Doctrine
	1981	Low Intensity Conflict
31-15	1953	Operations Against Irregular Forces
31-23	1967	Stability Operations, US Army Doctrine
31-16	1963	Counterguerrilla Operations
31-22	1963	US Army Counterinsurgency Forces
	1969	Stability Operations Forces
	1981	Command, Control & Support of SF Operations



Manual	Year	Title
31-20	1951	Operations Against Guerrilla Forces
	1965	Special Forces Operational Techniques
31-21	1955	Guerrilla Warfare & Special Forces Operations
	1961	Special Forces Operations, US Army Doctrine
31-27	1963	Organization and Development of Guerrilla Forces

NOTE: Manual changes after 1975 not pursued.

APPENDIX B

ABBREVIATIONS

AMAG	American Mission for Aid to Greece
CI	Counter Insurgency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG	Civil Irregular Defense Group
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
EAM	National Liberation Front (Greece)
ELAS	National Popular Liberation Army (Greece)
FM	Field Manual
GNA	Greek National Army
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IAPF	Inter-American Peacekeeping Force
ISZ	International Security Zone
JUSMAPG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group (Greece)
KKE	Greek Communist Party
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MAAG	Military Advisory Assistance Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
OAS	Organization of American States
PRD (RD)	Perceived Relative Deprivation
RD (PRD)	Relative Deprivation
RHAF	Royal Hellenic Air Force (Greece)
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
USIS	United States Information Service

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