

**E. C. MEYER**
**General, United States Army**
**Chief of Staff**
**June 1979—June 1983**

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**General, United States Army**
**Chief of Staff**
**June 1979—June 1983**

# Preface

What follows is a chronological extract from General Edward C. Meyer's term as Chief of Staff of the United States Army from 19 June 1979 to 21 June 1983. The material is drawn from his public record as contained in speech transcripts, annotated drafts, published articles, Congressional testimony, and selected correspondence.

The only portion that falls outside these parameters is the initial entry, a single paragraph from his Kermit Roosevelt lectures of early 1979, delivered while he was still a Lieutenant General designated as the next USAREUR Commander. It seems to capture best the thrust of his subsequent four years of service—a focus on enhanced military professionalism.

This collection is intended for use in libraries of the war colleges, staff colleges, service and branch schools—those institutions key to General Meyer's concerns about professional development.

The table of contents lists all of his public appearances. Those from which extracts are drawn are in bold face and contain a page reference. The index is another entry into the assembled material.


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## Excerpt From the KERMIT ROOSEVELT LECTURE

Sandhurst, England
8 May 1979

. . . As one currently scans the spectrum of violence can we identify clear advantage, clear leverage anywhere in strategic nuclear, or tactical nuclear, or conventional capabilities? We are in an era where old solutions grounded in the confidence of overwhelming military means must be rethought. We no longer have the luxury of relying on raw strength to the neglect of the brain. The military profession needs rejuvenation!. . .

## Message to the Army Upon ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE

22 June 1979

Today I assume office as the twenty-ninth Soldier privileged to serve as United States Army Chief of Staff. I fully recognize the great trust and confidence placed in me and pledge my dedication to you as we work together to serve our nation.

This nation faces many challenges—some very evident, others yet beyond the horizon. When required, our fellow citizens expect us, with our sister services, to be ready to go to war. They should expect no less. This is our mission.

In return for your dedicated service, I pledge my complete support to your welfare, in peace and war.

Let us together continue the work so well begun by General Rogers.

## Initial Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS

27 June 1979

The *sine qua non* for the Army's existence is its ability to go to war, a condition not of our making, but within our influence to affect if our Army is indeed perceived as ready. We must be ready today, and we must be astute enough to be ready tomorrow.

. . .We must create a climate of leadership that allows our units to excel, one day at a time. We must shield the Soldier from simultaneous and competing demands. We must express a trust in our subordinates which nourishes their confidence that they can achieve their assigned missions. Our commanders at all levels are the teachers, our noncommissioned officers are the trainers. Keep it simple. Reward integrity. Cultivate trust. Stress fundamentals.

In moving toward tomorrow, our collective leadership must deal with one of the most complex problems to confront a peacetime Army in our country's history—modernization to meet the challenges of the final decades of this century. Our ability to make the correct decisions to guide the Army through the period of modernization that lies ahead will be a product of both effective leadership and good management. . . .

These are exciting times. Let us convey our optimism to our Soldiers and our civilians. The

heart of our Army is within our squads and platoons—listen to them and allow them to excel. Support PFC Marne, the individual Soldier and his family, as well as the individual civilian. Let me know when we have not measured up to our goals and objectives. Without open communications there can be no integrity. Call it like it is.

Most importantly, let us take this opportunity to individually rededicate ourselves to the fundamentals of our profession—service to our God, our country and the people in our Army. There we will find the strength to address the challenge that awaits us.

## Address to the ANNUAL COMMAND CHAPLAINS CONFERENCE

Washington, DC
17 July 1979

"Preachin to the choir" is a favorite pastime of many, and in my time I've done my share. On several occasions I've even had the opportunity to preach from the pulpit. Today I have the opportunity to preach to the pulpit, in the person of the command chaplains from around the world. I'm delighted to be with you this morning.

You and I share a mutual concern for the people of the Army. As Creighton Abrams reminded us, "People are not in the Army, they are the Army"—so it's difficult not to have this concern if one wears the uniform honestly. . . .

My assumption of command message to PFC Marne, to his civilian counterpart, and to the military family, carried a pledge on my part for complete support to the Soldier's welfare—in peace and war. I do have a fear that too many of the recipients will read that pledge too narrowly. We all tend to put a rather narrow definition on the word "welfare". I do not restrict it to quality of life issues. It is not simply family housing, commissaries, health care, and junior enlisted travel entitlements. It would be nice if all the things necessary for a Soldier's welfare could be purchased. They can't. We can't buy dedicated noncommissioned officers. We can't buy personal satisfaction. We can't buy competence. And yet these ingredients are all important to the Soldiers' welfare—ultimately more important.

I believe that the welfare of the Soldier, and of the Army as well, is best served when we balance our efforts on his behalf to create an environment which nurtures his aspirations. Eric Hoffer has written about the situation of man, following his creation. He said,

> "The God who created nature was above all a supreme technician. But once He had created nature and automated it, God lost interest in His creation. It bored Him, and in His boredom God became an artist— and He created man in His own image—the image of an artist. All other animals are perfect technicians, each with its built-in tool kit, each an accomplished specialist. Man is a technically misbegotten creature, half finished and ill-equipped, but in his mind and soul are all the ingredients of a creator, of an artist. And it was God's mark as a supreme artist that He refused to automate man."

The canvases man is capable of creating from the talents provided him are painted in many shapes, hues, and intensities. There are, I believe, four dimensions to the creation we are each permitted to join in: physical, mental, spiritual, and social. The man who is able to fully expand in each category to the full capacity of his being, I call the "whole man."

For me, the whole man is mentally sharp, physically sound, spiritually and ethically motivated, and socially attuned to the needs of our times. Becoming a whole man is not an easy task. Most of us work our whole lives trying to reach the goal. The Soldier is just beginning his life, and he begins it with no lesser opinion of his potential and no lesser enthusiasm than you or I when we were young.

The young men and women who join the Army are at a point in life where they are leaving dependent status and proceeding on a journey to comprehend how they fit into an interdependent



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world. That journey is entitled independence. It is a time of growing up. It is a time when commitment has not yet been established. This period in life, ages 18-23, at the same time securing a more effective Army. Or we can ignore this individuality and reap the bitter fruit of disillusionment, discontent, and listlessness. We need to capitalize on our youth.

It may not help much to say that PFC Marne will exhibit the strengths and weaknesses of our society. There are many contradictions. Materialism is a prevalent aspect of that society, yet we know considerable sympathy for some greater good has wide appeal, especially to the idealism of the young.

It is an age of permissiveness—attitudes regarding sex and marriage are certainly less constraining than were yours and mine. Yet there is strong evidence that youth crave reasonable guidance and admirable leadership.

There is an ethic of individualism—though I suspect that is more a statement of what might be rather than a statement of what exists. Peers exert strong pressures for uniformity.

There is certainly a questioning of individual self-worth, of value to another: a member of the opposite sex, one's peers, an organization. For many this will be an unvoiced concern. Some come to us with crusted ambitions—hardened by frequent failure in adolescence—frustrated because the attractive models held up for emulation in popular literature or television are obviously unattainable.

The individual expects to be treated with dignity—even if he or she cannot yet return the same.

Lastly, the individual has spiritual needs—not often well articulated. In fact, most of your ministry will respond to needs found outside the formal chapel surroundings.

There are times when you will have no difficulty being a spiritual counselor—war has a way of heightening the relevance of ideas pertaining to eternal life or damnation. "And it shall be when ye are come right into battle, that the priest shall approach and speak unto the people." (The Pentateuch, Deuteronomy 20:2-4) The roots of the Chaplaincy are as ancient as the frailty of man facing death. Unquestionably, helping one to face the threat of death is a difficult challenge—but the challenge of helping PFC Marne to face life may in fact be greater. I hope each of us in our particular way will be deserving of the eulogy offered of the Reverend Mr. Moore by William Somerville more that 200 years ago: "He taught us how to live and how to die." Certainly that is the great calling you have answered in entering the ministry.

Now let me put this in the perspective of the entire Army.

The same characteristics which mark the "whole man" are ones which we seek for the Army as well. We need an Army that is mentally sharp, well trained, sufficiently educated, innovative yet intelligent enough to recognize that only disciplined application of our collective efforts will permit us to reach organizational goals. We need an Army that is physically ready to undertake the rigors of combat, which by its appearance inspires the confidence of our citizenry and which eschews the debilitating effects of drugs and alcoholic excess. We need an Army where every action demonstrates moral and ethical standards beyond reproach, a spirituality which fuses trust between Soldier and citizen. We need an Army socially viable, which comprehends and exhibits sympathy to the social issues of our time, which internally has a fiber open to new ideas, and which cultivates the traditional pride and spirit of a caring military community.

I'm here to tell you that this "whole Army" I envision will never be achieved if you and I can't reach out and touch the Soldier in some meaningful way: to meet his needs, and those of his family, and assist his working toward the goal of becoming a "whole man."

If we don't reach today's Soldier, the search for higher organizational goals will be frustrating, and the resultant Army only a shadow of what it might be.

This can occur in three ways:

First, the people we have on board today will work at an efficiency level well below their capacity. Soldiers who are assumed to know their job, Soldiers who are assumed to understand the role they play, Soldiers who are assumed to solve their own problems will in turn assume nobody cares. The lack of concerned leadership is poisonous to any unit and its capability to go to war today.

Second, the collective impact of a failure to actively engage each Soldier as an individual can result in our loss of too many good Soldiers—Soldiers who need to be replaced. To the degree we are forced by necessity to divert monies currently programmed to materiel acquisition for force modernization, we jeopardize our ability to go to war tomorrow.

Third, we run the risk of doing damage to our public image as a socially responsible institution. In the final assessment generations of Americans have rated experience in the service as a productive factor in their lives. If we expect to have appeal to tomorrow's youth, we need to nurture and improve the image, based on the reality that we as an institution contribute meaningfully to the maturation process of youth. Without such continued good will we run the risk of becoming an institution foreign to the society, and unappealing as a prospective way of life.

. . . I've put enough burden on you. But it's an exciting time. The chaplain, like the artillery, is never held in reserve. His place is with the Soldier. To be effective he remains habitually with him, attending to his instruction both by example and counsel, and seeking for his comfort. Along the way he considers the commander a Soldier as well—who needs his advice, his honest appraisals, his constructive criticism, his untarnished standards, and his spiritual strength.

I pray that God will give you the strength and wisdom to accept these challenges willingly.

## Hearing Before The SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE On the Military Implications of the SALT II Treaty

Washington, DC
24-25 July 1979

. . . I subscribe to the judgment made in [General Jones'] statement that the [SALT] agreement is in the U. S. national interest and merits your support. . . .

In the face of U. S. restraint [The Soviet Union] has pursued what can now be clearly seen as an aggressive program to achieve maximum force advantage. As a consequence, the position of strategic nuclear advantage enjoyed by the United States in 1972 has been eliminated. . . . I do not believe that SALT II precludes an adequate basis for the pursuit of required actions on the part of the United States to reverse the trends of the last decade or more . . . SALT and the resulting strategic balance does not and cannot stand alone. Deterrence requires a clear and evident capability and resolve to fight at any level of conflict. . . .

SENATOR THURMOND: Do you agree with your colleagues that essential equivalence with the Soviets in the strategic area will be lost in the 1980's?

GENERAL MEYER: We will go through a period of strategic disadvantage in the early 1980's. I would like to express a view which I think is a bit different than those which have been expressed today.

First of all, I think the discussion of essential equivalence that has taken place at this table, among Senators, and between us . . . could lead to some very damaging perceptions that over the next 5 to 10 years the United States will not be capable of deterring the Soviets from using strategic nuclear weapons, will not have the capability of carrying out its targeting objectives, and the like. If that perception gains credence as a result of these hearings, solely from discussion of the issue of essential equivalence, that discussion—of and by itself—would be harmful to our interests. So while I agree that we will be at a strategic disadvantage during the early 80's, I also want it understood that this nation does have the ability, in my judgment, to carry out its targeting objectives. . . .



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As we go into a period in which we no longer have strategic superiority, and that is going to be a condition which we and our children are going to live with, it is far more likely that conventional forces will be employed. . . .

# Address to the ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CLASS OF 1980

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 August 1979

As you can well imagine, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army gets a lot of questions in the course of an average week. Some are easy—a request from a school child seeking help for a class report or a query from a citizen on an Army policy. Some, on the other hand, are quite difficult—raised in the highest councils on delicate national security issues.

Occasionally, the questions are new ones; although they are likely to be not truly new, just ones we have not thought about in a while. Other times, the questions are clearly old ones, with the asker expecting a new answer. In the last category, I would place the question: "General, what are your goals for the Army?"—because that is asked most frequently of a new Chief of Staff.

The fact is that armies have always existed for one ultimate purpose: to go to war. For the U.S. Army, fulfillment of our major mission—deterrence—depends on our possession of real military power capable of effective employment. If our interest is to dissuade an aggressor of the utility of war, he must be convinced that we are prepared to respond under circumstances of his choosing. . . .This very institution, the Army War College, was founded by Elihu Root ". . . not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression." In a nutshell, then, the United States Army must be ready to go to war today, tomorrow, whenever challenged. And in that mission statement we have the crux of what you and I and PFC Marne must prepare for.

It is not new. It is the constant echo of my predecessors. It rings through the halls of the Pentagon as though its repetition can make it happen. What truly makes it happen today and tomorrow is leadership, resources and hard work (spelled training), applied at each level throughout the active and reserve structure according to a discriminating order of priorities.

Today we have passed the point where heightened effort alone can achieve the desired results. The time has come to narrow the focus of the Army's activities, especially in this era of restricted national resources and burgeoning national commitment. It is incumbent on each leader to clearly articulate the essential nature of his organization's contribution to a war effort, the peculiar characteristics which comprise that contribution, and the bare-bones costs which assure continued viability.

Comprehension of such factors as these is invaluable for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is identification of the nice-to-have—the nonessentials—which do not contribute proportionally to the mission considering their costs. Post beautification, for example, is a flagrant waste anywhere so long as heating plants, plumbing and other Soldier-oriented services are substandard. In the end, what is more important: manicured posts or well cared-for Soldiers?

As you may know, I do not normally preschedule my visits to installations about the country. While this may cause increased anxiety levels for post and unit commanders, it minimizes the potential diversion of Soldier assets to externals. The focus is the man and his mission. It will be clear enough talking to the private, his NCO's and Commander whether or not the command is doing its job.

When organizational activities are not undertaken with a clear sense of order and perspective, their zealous accomplishment can prevent minimal progress toward the larger goals. In this

sense, the best is frequently the enemy of the good. Brought up as we are in a profession which seeks excellence, it is often difficult to accept anything which is less than perfect. Yet I must tell you that if we intend to field an Army capable of going to war today or tomorrow, we are going to have to accept a lot that is imperfect.

In a perfect Army all units, including even the esoteric ones on our national force lists, would be at full strength; all units would be uniformly equipped with the newest, most effective weaponry; all would be fully trained and ready to go; adequate stocks of sustaining materiel and supply would be prepositioned, and enough strategic lift would exist to deploy the entire standing force rapidly to any point on the globe. Surely, we can all add further to this list, for we all have our descriptions of perfection.

But even as described, the economic expenditure would be enormous, far beyond the practical means or immediate needs of this country. Am I happy about the current status of the Army today? No. I think we have tended to perfect many nonessentials and paid lip service to absolutely critical tasks. The challenge to the leadership is to identify, justify and articulate those essential aspects of the perfect Army which we need to capture in peacetime.

Given today's imperfections in manpower and resources, very real challenges exist in ordering the process of how we go to war. The focus and unity of effort needed for effectively ordering the priority of the Total Army's needs is embodied in the prescription of force readiness:

- Organize the Total Army
- Man it.
- Equip it.
- Train it.
- Plan and exercise mobilization.
- Plan and exercise deployment.
- Sustain it.

Juxtaposed to force readiness, the traditional concept of unit readiness when applied to an imperfect Army represents a potential for suboptimization, with an accompanying waste in capability. While it is obviously desirable to have all units achieve and maintain C1 readiness ratings, an imperfect Army needs to order the priorities of equipment and personnel distribution so as to orient the entire force for more effective commitment to war. The focus must be on those actions which best enable us to go to war. . . .With comprehension that the entire Army is working to a common goal, that shortages are to be coped with and do not excuse any unit from participation and preparation, the stage is set for exciting times, meaningful responsibilities, and the self-rewarding satisfaction on the part of every Soldier which comes from hard and dedicated service.

As I told one recent brigade commander who was thoughtfully concerned about shortages and their potential impact, I have gone to war twice in units that were short the stuff of a perfect Army, and we did well. The nation could demand the same from us in the future. We need to approach our business deliberately and in earnest. That takes discriminating leadership. . . .

Those who view the Army as simply a job, a place of temporary employment, need to be wakened to their contract and the fact that life on the battlefield is short for the unprepared. The commander leads by assessing his resources and establishing his goals and tasks sufficiently ahead to focus the organization on accomplishment of the mission. Those who long for the "good old days" neglect the opportunity to write their own chapters in history. . . .

You might keep in mind the experience of one of our great Soldiers, Creighton Abrams, following his graduation from Leavenworth in 1949. You may recall that War College classes were suspended in 1940, not formally reinstituted until 1950, and then initially at Fort Leavenworth. Hence in 1949 an augmented staff college was the senior Army school, and that is the course General Abrams completed.

". . . Well, I remember in 1949 I went over to Germany and it was a tremendous disappointment. I had just graduated from Leavenworth. It was really the first school I had been to. I thought, well, great things are in store now. I am prepared to be up with the intelligentsia . . .study great plans, contemplate the future. . . .Well, they assigned me to command a tank battalion in Germany. A job, you know, I had had about 3 1/2 years doing when it counted. That is the way I look at it.

"I went to this tank battalion. That was in 1949. I will never forget it. Right after my first day I

got a letter from the division commander. It said something like this, 'The 63d Tank Battalion which had previously held the high record for venereal disease of any battalion-sized unit in Europe, broke that record in the month of August. This has raised serious doubts about your qualifications for command.' "

Subsequently he found the battalion was selling rations and black-marketing about 100,000 gallons of POL monthly.

He went on to say that:
"... the battalion I ... joined in August of '49 was not typical of every battalion in the American Army, but it wasn't far from it...."

One message from General Abrams is that the common gripe about a return to the wonderful days of yesterday is a reminiscence not well founded in fact. The Army of 1949 was imperfect, it was not ready for war. There were nagging loose ends that demanded time and leadership concern and detracted from the mission.

A second lesson is that you will only be away a short time from the "hands-on" problems with which the Army must tussle. Use your time wisely. Think about this Army of ours, build your concepts, deepen your convictions about where we need to go and what we can practically hope to achieve. The year will go by too quickly....

When you return, I hope sincerely you'll bring back not only a heightened awareness of the complexity of world society today, but also a perspective that can relate what you have learned to meaningful initiatives toward a more perfect Army, one capable of going to war.

These are exciting times to be a Soldier. No profession was ever founded on easy tasks and today is no exceptiuon. While as Chief of Staff, I fully intend to make the most persuasive case for our needs, we must not as a profession entrench ourselves behind our deficiencies. Rather we must recognize our imperfections, focus our efforts, and mold our Soldiers into units prepared to go to war. It's in that task that we must earn the honor to be called professionals.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On General Officer Responsibilities

3 August 1979

. . . General Officers are the more visiible embodiment of the military profession. As such, at the top echelon of Army leadership, we represent our service wherever we are—no matter what the time or subject. We live in glass houses and our decorum, genuine concern for the people whom we serve, integrity, and perceived unselfish devotion to duty and the Army are constantly under the close scrutiny of our Soldiers and America's citizenry. We must be the Army's best qualified representatives in terms of experience, demonstrated abilities, and potential. Generals must manage intelligently, creatively, and professionally the manpower, money, and materiel allocated to the Army by Congress. The fact that we are so few in number makes it important that we not only insist on the highest qualifications for entry, but that we also place our [member] in those positions in which they individually can make the greatest contribution to our national service.

## Address to the
## ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
9 August 1979

. . . your selection marks recognition of the general excellence of your past performance. More important, it reflects a special confidence by Mother Army that individually you possess unique qualifications and the potential to occupy increasingly important posts in tomorrow's leadership. My congratulations to each of you.

. . . part of this experience is the opportunity to share professional viewpoints with seasoned officers from allied nations around the globe. This year, 97 officers from 45 nations are a part of the class. My special welcome to each of you and to your families. Undoubtedly you will discover much about us as a nation. You will discover the peculiarities of an Army in our society. And you will have the opportunity at first hand to learn about our people. At the same time I hope you will actively assist us to understand your views, and perspectives about our mutual relationship. Americans are increasingly aware of the critical and complicated nature of our mutual interdependence on this "spaceship earth." As a group you are clearly marked for military leadership in the service of your respective nations. To some degree that's a result of pre-selection, but we hope your year with us is also a time for your growth We sincerely welcome your presence. . . .

. . . In simplest terms, this school is dedicated to producing the tactical leadership and expertise of the Army for immediate use. . . .When you leave here you will go to commands around the world, stamped indelibly as a Leavenworth product. At one time, that stamp may have carried not much more value to the gaining command than the distinction of your having passed a quality screen. You would have been the new boy to a unit—those there possessing an advantage of seniority and an easy familiarity with equipment and procedures smooth with age.

It's quite a different story today—one of rapid advancement and technical change. Now when you report in, you are likely to be the only person whose mind has grappled with the new concepts, new systems, new weapons, and new procedures. You will shape the attitudes and capabilities of that Army on our horizon. There is in the Army an expectation that you will bring with you talent and knowledge that can be plugged in and used immediately. Some of you may have the luxury of an assignment where the time and the opportunity is available to find a manual, locate an expert, or muddle through to some level of competence. But let me suggest that the kind of competence that's needed could also be demanded instantly—that you cannot discount the possibility at any moment of Mother Army counting you a thorough, accurate professional who really knows his or her business and is ready to go to war. . . .

## Address to the
## MACOM COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR CONFERENCE

27 August 1979

There are many dimensions to the Army mission, but none are as dominant as the need to see to it that we expertly develop an ability to wage war. The Army can be accused of many deficiencies, many imperfections, and still retain the respect of its nation. In the long course of history much that we do in a normal day won't matter. But an Army not fully prepared to go to war and win is an event of historic proportions, and we can never let that be.

We are an imperfect Army today by many measures, and we will likely be an imperfect Army tomorrow. For the next year and a half we will be

plagued by a large trained end strength shortfall. That makes our job a challenge, but not an impossibility. When you see shortages, I sympathize . . . but I don't excuse you from the performance of your duties. I've been to war before with units short men and short equipment. So have you. We both know units can function well, provided they have some basic and essential ingredients. They need to be well led. Good leaders recognize that the Soldier's welfare is first served by developing those skills which will permit him and his unit to survive on the battlefield. Those skills are developed through training. And tough training coupled with concerned leadership builds competence and cohesion into units, units ready to go to war.

I know you agree with General "Ace" Collins, of whom I'm an admirer, that:

> When the Army has to fight or go on a peace-keeping mission, the soldiers down in the companies are the ones with the toughest jobs—and they had better know how to do them well."

Your job and mine is to ensure that happens. We need to work to do this, to provide focus to our efforts. The "can do" demands which are imposed by all command layerings, with the best of intent, must be stripped away from the burdens placed on PFC Marne. I will do my part—and I expect you will do yours—and remind me directly, or through the SMA, should I violate that obligation. . . .

I must tell you I am troubled by the tales I hear of soldiers "too dumb" to train—"untrainables" they are called—when in the same breath from other sources I hear that the officers are too busy outside their units on other chores, and the NCO Corps in general doesn't know its job. There's not a single "Sgt Morales" in the Battalion. My God, what a prescription for disaster—when each group—officers, NCO's, and other ranks—bind themselves in isolation and demean the capabilities of others. Gen Zais told me recently it was his perception that the Army doesn't like itself very well. While the picture is, I'm convinced, an exaggeration, it's not an exaggeration without enough truth to give us all room for a lot of hard work to improve. We must break down the barriers to effective communication if we expect to field units worthy of fighting under our flag.

Today's Soldier needs a challenge. He will respond to a tough demanding way of life. We need to blend time and the trainer skills of the NCO Corps to structure that challenge properly. It requires that the NCO must be master of his trade. . . .He must be tough, demanding, fair, and most of all, concerned. He needs to be savvy about the tools available in Soldier's Manuals and SQT's [Skill Qualification Tests]. He also needs the security of knowing that he is valued, and his ranks limited to those who demonstrate skill, leadership, and concern.

But, all of this, when we have it, will be for naught unless his officers define the job and find the time for him to be professional. They must focus on what needs to be done, blocking out time for the NCO's to train their Soldiers. They must teach the NCO Corps. They must select the NCO Corps, easily one of their most important jobs. They must direct the unit's efforts, and critique and integrate the operations of the separate sections into an effective whole.

These linkages are absolutely critical. We can't secure them by business as usual. Real action needs to be taken.

I can't tell you how or where to act in your command. I can tell you the traditional interests of a visiting Chief of Staff are going to see a change. I'll be asking you what you're doing to help PFC Marne along. I won't want to hear of new programs which add more to his burdens. I'll want to know what you've decided is more important than training. Very few items fall into that category.

I'd like to say a few words about the responsibilities I have leveled on Sergeant Major Bill Connelly. I've given him two principal tasks. First, I asked him to be my link to the outside world. . . .Second, I have charged him with the responsibility for the NCO development system—from top to bottom. That's a massive task—all the way from the quality and selection of the new E-5 we bring aboard, through his schooling at the basic level, to the selection for Command Sergeant Major. I expect him to come to me with a systematic outline of how this is to be done, because the NCO Corps is the backbone of this Army and it needs sturdy fiber. . . .

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Command Responsibilities

29 August 1979

In speaking to our future battalion and brigade commanders at the pre-command orientation, I made it a point to emphasize that their job is to be the teacher of their officers. The details of leading and administering our Army occasionally cloud the issue for those soon to accept command responsibility and, consequently, emphasis on the essence of command responsibility is needed. . . .

The profession of arms is a noble profession. The great task of each professional officer is to preserve our institutions through his teaching and example, and to pass on to those who follow his dedication to the profession of arms. . . .

## Address to the INDIANA CHAPTER OF THE AUSA

Indianapolis, Indiana
7 September 1979

It is a distinct privilege for me to be with you this evening, and to have had the opportunity to sample firsthand the characteristic strength and hospitality of the Hoosier State. There is an obvious pride which runs deep within your citizenry—a spirit of patriotism, self confidence and optimism. Physically a visitor sees it in the imposing Soldiers and Sailors Monument, or in this very building in which we gather, a testimony to continued and justifiable confidence about the future.

More important it is reflected in the quality of your people, and their contribution to the national ethic. . . .

At a time when threnodic prophesies about the quality of today's America seem the most assured way to gain national audience, I think it well to reflect on the contribution of [Well known Hoosiers], and like them, to approach life in the confident spirit of challenge, cautious about reaching preemptory and false conclusions of foreboding doom. No generation has been without its ills, and ours is no exception. My view is that the problems and difficulties of life are present to test our mettle as rational creatures. The winners in this challenge are not those who contentedly curse the darkness, but those who in their own way light a small candle toward improvement of the general welfare. . . .

My job, and the task of my major commanders and their staffs, in your service, is to judge what is accurate about the darkness and fashion some light about the subject so that the citizenry, who are truly responsible for the forces at my command, can make enlightened decisions.

As citizens, many of whom share some tie with the military, I know you recognize that a viable Army is important to this nation. All of you are aware of Fort Benjamin Harrison some 10 miles northeast of here, where I place heavy responsibilitiy not only for instilling efficient management practices throughout the Army, but for creating an environment which says to our lowest ranking Soldier: "We care."

Periodically, sectors of the state have seen other portions of the Total Army contributing directly to civil needs. The floods in Milltown, English and Princetown in July; in Shelby County in March; and the truckers strike in June were occasions where Guardsmen were called in to assist directly in rescue, in security, in road clearance. So the Army is not absent from you. In fact, the Army is very much part of the scene in Indiana.

I am deeply appreciative of the respect and consideration the Army receives, especially from employers who support our Reserve component program by assuring military leaves of absence exclusive of earned vacation time, and equal job and promotion opportunities to employees who are in Guard and Reserve programs.

These are important contributions to the health of our Reserve components who, together with the Active Army force, seek to be ready for those vital instances when their existence is essential to our survival as a nation. . . .

Is the Army prepared today?. . . Obviously this kind of assessment is one I spend a lot of time considering. You must recognize that the natural bent of any military man is to want to minimize the risk to our national security. In that search for absolute security the military could spend this nation into the poorhouse, but only at the risk of seriously jeopardizing the very lifestyle we seek to defend.

The real question is, how much is enough? If you followed the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Senate Armed Service Committee, you will know that as a corporate body the JCS concludes that the answer is "more than we currently have, "that over the past 15 years we have, relative to the Soviets, not maintained the pace of investment which they have pursued. Real growth in expenditures is absolute necessary if this nation intends to remain prepared for the three days of war.* The Army has in its plans equipment whose characteristics will recapture the qualitative edge which a smaller force, such as we have in NATO, needs to survice and win on the modern battlefield. There is good prospect that this nation will commit itself to a real growth in military expenditures which I and my colleagues on the JCS deem absolutely necessary.

Outside of the levels of monetary support, there is another debate surfacing in the nation which causes me some concern, and I would like to discuss it briefly with you because I think there is considerable confusion in that debate. Clearly the Army is committed to the Volunteer Force. While we are experiencing difficulties in meeting our strength requirements, we are proposing solutions to the problems we face to the President and to the Congress, all within the bounds of voluntear service. Manning the force, so that we can be prepared to meet the three days of war, is a major problem, perhaps the largest and most important which I face as Army Chief of Staff. Obviously there are many kinds of alternative solutions other than strictly volunteer service. Regrettably I find that many people throughout the country expect the Army to be promoting those alternatives. I think that kind of expectation is based on a total misunderstanding of the role of the military in this country. The decision to allow induction authority to lapse was a political decision reflecting, I believe, either broad national sentiment against the draft or a broad national sentiment to avoid a debate which at the time might have further fractured this nation. With that decision came implications of citizen responsibility, the redefinition of which is outside the bounds of my office.

My specific responsibility, shared by my officers, is to articulate what the requirements are and whether or not we are able to do the job with what we have and are given. That's the way our system works. Congress is charged with raising and manning an Army. I am not.

To a degree I believe the Army is finally maturing when it comes to soldiering with a completely volunteer force. Initially, when faced with that task, we took a searching look at ourselves. Based on our perceptions of what was necessary if we were to subsist in a volunteer environment, we made a number of changes. Some, such as improved pay and greater trust in the maturity of our people, were excellent and long overdue. Others were, in retrospect, not desirable. They not only appealed to the wrong instinct, but they tended to detract from a necessary focus on the business of soldiering. The correct focus must permit us to create and maintain unit cohesion, a quality invariably essential to successful military units.

What we're finding now is that the vast majority of youngsters who join the Army are not coming to us for any free ride. They want all the things which have typically and traditionally been part of military service—discipline and hard work toward worthwhile objectives. And they want to feel the pride and satisfaction which accompny membership in any proud organization. We did these folks and ourselves no favor when we, in false anticipation, began to design a non-

* The Three Days of War are discussed in General Meyer's 20 November 1979 remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations.

traditional Army in our early All-Volunteer years. The most persistent complaint from Soldiers is not what hours the PX is open, but personal concern that not enough time is dedicated to realistic training.

It's interesting that today's Soldier is reinventing Field Marshal Rommel's understanding that: ". . . the best form of 'welfare' for the troops is first class training."

While you will hear many opinions about the quality of today's Soldier, let me quote from a recent note sent me by a young Major in Korea. He writes:

> The Soldiers here are some of the finest I have seen in quite awhile (even better than the Soldiers we had in the 2nd Div.) and all are truly remarkable in their motivation to serve their country well. This is the first time I have ever had female Soldiers under my command and I am pleasantly surprised. They are all doing an outstanding job and are very competitive with my male Soldiers. Although the job is tough and demanding and the hours long, morale in the division, especially the aviation battalion, is high. All the talk about the low quality Soldier is hogwash and inevitably springs from the mouths of those that know not of which they speak. Personally, if things got any better, I couldn't stand it!

Thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you this evening.

## PENTAGON PRESS CONFERENCE

Washington, DC
17 September 1979

This is my first opportunity to have a chance to speak to you. I suppose some of you wonder why I haven't been here sooner. For those of you who know, I have had primarily a background in the operational arena. During my first 100 days, which still aren't completed, I have been out assessing as best I can what's going on in the Army—as best I guess generals are allowed to assess what is going on in the Army—because there are a lot of . . . baffles which tend to prevent us from finding out what's really going on out there. . . .

I thought that before I opened it up to questions, I would outline the two basic goals that I have for the Army. The first is to ensure that we have an Army that is capable of going to war. It has to be capable of going to war today and it has to be capable of going to war tomorrow—responsive to the 1990's. . . .

The other goal that I have set is to create a climate within the Army that permits each individual to have the opportunity to fulfill himself to his total capability . . . I hope that I am able to carry that forward because it means that we have the kind of leadership climate out there which permits us, during this period, to maximize the capability of the force.

Now, there are clearly obstacles to my being a successful Chief of Staff . . . the biggest problem I face now is the ability to man the force, the total force—the Active Component, the Reserve Components, and the Individual Ready Reserve. The other huge obstacle that lays in my path is the modernization elephant. The United States Army is going to go through a modernization era unlike any we've seen in the past except perhaps in World War II. To bring [that equipment] in and to ensure that it creates the kind of Army that we need seems to me to be the principal task I have from a management point of view. So I see those two challenges, if you will, to creating the kind of Army that can go to war today and tomorrow and the climate that I want to create. . . .

QUESTION: General, what do you see as the need for modernizing the tactical nuclear forces in Europe?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, I am absolutely convinced of the necessity for the continuum between the conventional, the theater nuclear, and

the strategic nuclear. And to do that we have to modernize the tactical nuclear force—the Army element of that tactical nuclear force—because it is aging and requires modernization. So it's just one of those legs of the triad in NATO that's essential and therefore has to be modernized.

QUESTION: General, a series of civilian and military leaders of the Army since 1972 have been grappling with this problem of manning the force, not only the Guard and Reserve, but the regular force with quality people. Bonuses have been used, all manner of approaches, except the draft, of course. What possible avenues are still open that haven't been tried?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . It looks now as though at the end of the fiscal year, we are going to end up somewhere around 13-15,000 short of our accession goal. And that's the first time we have been significantly short in the Active Component. You all are aware of the current status of the Reserve Components—the National Guard and the USAR—and of the Individual Ready Reserve. . . .

There are three ways that you can man the Army. One is that you can go out and provide incentives to try to get folks to come in. The second way that you can go about doing it is to draft for it. And the third is to go to the marketplace and just have an Army of the size that you are able to recruit without trying to establish a requirement [beforehand]. The third option is clearly unacceptable to me. We have to establish what we need in the way of an Army and determine as a nation that it's worth going out and getting. So we end up with two basic options then: One is to come up with some form of draft or, two, to come up with sufficient incentives to be able to man it.

I guess, if you went out and asked most Soldiers, they would say that they would prefer a volunteer to a draftee, just on balance, because you have an individual who is there who wants to be there. So I think there is merit in pursuing that particular approach toward manning the force.

I do believe that we have been the victim in the past four or five years of an unwillingness to permit the Army to go forward with a total package, totally resourced, which permits us to determine whether or not we can in fact access the quantity and quality of force that we have to.

So my bottom line then, as far as the programs, I think we need, is a more comprehensive approach [including] the same types of resources that we had at the early stages of the all volunteer force. If you look at how much we had then as compared to now, you will find that in real dollars we are significantly short of what we had in the early stages. It has been sort of a selective piecemealing of a total package which has prevented us, in my judgment, from giving the all volunteer force as clearcut a try as we should.

QUESTION: Could you give us specific examples of approaches? As I recall your testimony on the Hill, you did not favor the draft at that time.

GENERAL MEYER: I will speak to the draft and the registration separately. I did not favor the draft when I was over on the Hill as "the" solution because I don't believe a Soldier should be the one who decides whether or not we have a draft. I think that's a national decision. I think it's wrong to put Soldiers out in front to determine whether or not there should be a draft. I believe that my responsibility is to state as clearly as I can to the American people, to the President, to the Administration, and to the Congress, what the requirements are, what we are able to get through the incentives that we have, what the shortfalls are, and lay that out as clearly as I can.

It's a national responsibility to determine how we do that, whether we go to an all volunteer force, or whether we go to a draft for that force. . . .

QUESTION: General, the last time a Congressional delegation went to the White House, it was led by Senator Jackson, to ask that President Carter increase his proposed budget for defense by a billion dollars. The President turned that down. In the proposed budget for the Army, at least, is it satisfactory—is it something that you can live with or is it going to only contribute to problems that you have mentioned today?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . clearly, in my judgment, we have to have the 3 percent [real growth in the FY 80 budget] so that we don't have to take some $700 million out of our hide for inflation, and for fuel and to give us the initial dollars to get us on with FY 80 recruiting. So clearly those dollars are essential or some of the modest initiatives which we are beginning could not be supported

. . . that 3 percent has to be supported.

QUESTION: As a followup on that question, on the Hill at least, some of the opponents of increased defense spending are implying or saying that most of the increase would come for weapons rather than for money earmarked for personnel.

GENERAL MEYER: That just flat is not so. . . .My focus within the Army would be on the near-term readiness, the ability to go to war today. Some of it, however, would go to modernization, but it is a balance.

If I have to draw the line, it is going to be in terms of focusing on going to war today so that we are able to deter war through what I consider to be a critical period.

QUESTION: General, when you talk to some sergeants and captains in a non-scientific survey, you hear an awful lot about young Soldiers not being up to the technology of the equipment that they have now. If you lower your standards even further, isn't that going to be (inaudible)?

GENERAL MEYER: I don't know the answer to that . . . hopefully, we're making equipment that is more maintainable because you pull out a box that you then pass to a guy who is told to follow a sequence to determine whether or not it's acceptable then pass it on to somebody who is more skilled and more trained. So it's a combination of both simplifying maintenance procedures in the forward area and the quality of the individual that we get.

There is concern within the Army—I would be remiss if I told you that there was not—concerning the quality. I don't know exactly how to assess that, to be very candid at the present time; I mean to assess that in its totality, I know how to assess each individual report. Clearly there is some level at which the Army has to say, that's far enough, we can't take any more of category IIIB's, or we need X number above the 50 percentile. Right now we are looking at about 55 percent above the 50 percentile for FY 80. We are trying to look at tests which give us a better insight. . . .But it does concern me, the quality. But also, as I looked at—I've forgotten which paper over the weekend—where it indicated the level of mathematical ability of students within the country. That is part of what we are getting into the Army at this instance in time.

So we have a responsibility to take them. I think if we are able to assess the equivalence of their IQ, their AFQT, we have a better handle on whether or not they are trainable and have the capability of handling the equipment.

But there is no one who has a scientific answer to that question. What I have to do is to try to—we have to somehow try to come to grips with what is the minimum level we can accept and still have that equipment out there [operable].

QUESTION: While you testified on behalf of registration, you did avoid—on the question of the draft—coming out in favor or against it because you said that was a national problem. But in your heart of hearts, wouldn't you favor a renewal of the draft in combination, perhaps, with incentives?

GENERAL MEYER: No. . . .I think registration and draft are two separate issues. I am on record on registration and I continue to believe that way. First of all, registration has to do solely with mobilization, in my judgment, and our ability to go to war if we are called upon to do so. It provides you with ready access to the manpower—womanpower, if that were to be decided—resources of our nation. At the instance in time when our nation, as a corporate body, makes the decision to mobilize, to go to war if you will, you're able to compress the time that it takes you to do that by having registration. To me that's prudent military planning; that's prudent deterrence on the part of a nation. So that's why I support registration.

I think some of the objections to registration are directly linked to the draft and you know I understand why folks do that. But I think you can make a case for registration, exclusive of draft, which has to do with the ability of this nation to mobilize. Also, since the time we had the Selective Service and registration in the past, we've passed a bill over on the Hill which does in fact protect young people. It says they can't be called in and sent off to war in less than 90 days because Congress and the will of the nation has to speak out and in support of the President's commitment of force at that point in time.



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...So I support registration because, as a military man, I am responsible for mobilization, and because I believe that the cushion of warning has been compressed, as General Haig said many times, and therefore we have to be able to respond more rapidly than we have.

Our FORSCOM Commander uses the analogy of December 7, 1941, and says that from December 7, 1941, you had until D-Day before we had to put forces into Europe. Today, you have from—if you believe a scenario—from December 7 1979 to December 31 1979. So the time is compressed. [also our need] to be able to respond during a mobilization period is different because we already have forces committed over there. We are already committed to reinforcing....

On the draft, I just come down purely and simply as I indicated before that I continue to believe my responsibility is to articulate the need, how well we are filling that need, what it costs to do that, and that it's the national concensus which has responsibility for that. I believe that in my heart of hearts as well.

QUESTION: General, would you give us your assessment of concerns expressed that the Army today is being micro-managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and by Congress?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, I would have to say that I share the concern expressed by many in the past that the staffs of Congress, the staffs of the Office of Management and Budget and the staffs within the Secretary of Defense have been expanded to the point that each of our programs today is managed minutely....In my personal view, much of my analytical resources and much of the effort that I feel I could devote to focusing on what I consider to be the essential elements of how to go to war and how to create the Army of the future are spent in responding to a host of micro-managed questions.

QUESTION: Sir, I don't quite understand what you meant a while ago when you said the Army has been the victim of four or five ways. Are you talking also about politics?

GENERAL MEYER: Was the victim of four or five—

QUESTION: You said the Army curtailment of the Army manpower had been the victim.

GENERAL MEYER: Oh. It has been the victim of a host of reviews as the packages went forward. In the summer of 1977, we developed what we considered to be a comprehensive reserve component package which laid out a whole host of proposals with the dollars that were attendant to them. As they went forward, the various elements—within OSD, within OMB and within Congress—took out pieces of the warp or the woof of that fabric so that you ended up, in my judgment, with a ball of fluff there instead of a comprehensive program. So that is what I meant.

QUESTION: Do you think that the American people really fully understand the danger we are in because of the short-manpower Army?

GENERAL MEYER: I don't believe they do, no, ma'am.

QUESTION: Well, why don't you all talk and do more about that?

GENERAL MEYER: I am doing that today, ma'am

QUESTION: But, sir, the public doesn't get the message.

GENERAL MEYER: Well, that's part of my responsibility, to get out and speak out for what we need, and I intend to do that.

QUESTION: General, how important is the Pershing II missile for the defense of NATO and where could such a missile be depioyed in Europe?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, first, a Pershing II missile or some other follow-on type missile—I think you need both a re-entry ballistic missile as well as a cruise missile, in my own personal judgment, but that's a decision which not just our country has to make but it also has to be made by the Alliance itself.

I consider the longer-range Pershing II to be an important upgrading of our theater nuclear force. Where it should be stationed is clearly a political issue which the Allies have to address....Each one of those nations, as you know, has tender balances as far as their parliaments

are concerned, so they have to come to grips with their own problems. But I clearly favor a theater nucelar force, forward deployed, in those nations which are able to accept it so that we have a credible theater nuclear deterrent. . . .

QUESTION: Sir, could you talk a little bit about just how dangerous this period is and why you think it is, where, and so forth, the current period?

GENERAL MEYER: As far as the current period [is concerned], I debated when I went over to speak as the Kermit Roosevelt lecturer in England whether to speak on what I called the "critical window." Then Sir John Hackett wrote "World War III" which indicates the war starts in August of 1985, and so he kind of closed the critical window. So I decided to speak on political-military interface.

The critical window, in my judgment, exists between now and that time frame. I probably focus it more in the 82-83 time frame as the strategic balance changes; as the theater nuclear balance alters so that it is significant; where the Soviets perceive us in the process of building up where they are also under pressures as they look ahead economically, where they start to get pressures from the satellite nations; where they begin to have to look toward fuel for the future. So that as you look at that whole time frame, in my judgment, you are going through what I call a critical window in that particular instance in time. That's why I feel it is important that we have an Army that can go to war today, that's able to respond to those particular challenges in that time frame.

QUESTION: When you look at those challenges, what do you think is the most likely situation in which U.S. Army troops would be committed?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . I don't know. Again, you have to go back to the deterrent value. My hope is that we're able to create an Army in conjunction with our Allies that convinces him, as I think he is today, that he can't succeed in Central Europe. We have to continue that pressure, although we're sort of on the edge of prudence. We have to continue that pressure to ensure that he is convinced that he can't do that. The alternative for him is to use his perceived capabilities in some other mode—using . . . one of his arrows in his quiver of warfare that he uses selectively.

QUESTION: General, then you support the quest for a 5 percent real increase?

GENERAL MEYER: I am on record in the SASC as a member of the JCS supporting that.

QUESTION: General, how are you doing on unilateral corps or the quick reaction corps? Is it moving along?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes.

QUESTION: What's its status?

GENERAL MEYER: We called that—and I suppose I am the culprit in calling it—the Unilateral Corps, and it was merely an effort early to attempt to identify a force that was capable of responding somewhere other than Central Europe should we be called upon to do that. We had created down at Forces Command a composite which we protected. . . .Then when this current Administration came in, the requirement was laid on us to have the capability of going somewhere aside from Central Europe, and so we called that particular force a Unilateral Force. It is now very properly called a Rapid Deployment Force, and it's a force that is capable of responding elsewhere.

In addition to taking the forces that we have and planning them, we are also programming the dollars to ensure that we are able to maintain them in the reading status and with adequate support that they can continue the fight for a period of time. We hope to have that in effect, I hope, early in FY 80 and --

QUESTION: Will they go on an exercise to show that they can do this? What will happen? How will people know that this force exists and that it works?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, one of the ways that people will know that it exists will be through JCS, through the alerting of all the unified commanders that such a force does exist, and they will begin . . . including that in some of their contingency planning. So that is one of the ways. Then the next question as to whether or not they will be exercised, that is an [activity] which I would hope

would occur, that you would at least see initially command post type exercises for it, and then ultimately other types of exercises to indicate to the world that we do have the capability of projecting power. . . .

QUESTION: Did you say this force is to be a reality in the early 1980's?

GENERAL MEYER: I said that I expect the planning force for it, the headquarters, and so forth, as far as the Army element is concerned, to be well on its way toward—I guess the better way to say it, Fred, would be well on its way toward reality at that time . . . the headquarters identified and some of the planning beginning. We've already had people working on some of the details.

QUESTION: General, "if" you were to get your 5 percent, what difference would that make to the 1982 window that you were talking about?

GENERAL MEYER: Again, it's all a question of judgment and balance. But, as you take a look at the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact's improvement, for example in Central Europe, the 5 percent would [permit us to] begin to more [closely] parallel their expenditures and, therefore, would permit us to fill in some of the voids that we have that I won't identify; there are some voids that we have that I think we could fill in, that would tend to, if not shut the critical window, would at least close it a little bit so that he is less likely to want to stick the bear's paw through it.

QUESTION: Would you discuss some of those voids, General?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, I think that some of the voids that I would work on are the same voids that have been enunciated by SACEURs, past and present: the command and control; our ability to operate in not just the conventional environment, but also the theater, nuclear, and chemical environment in which the Soviets have a tremendous capability; and then the ability for rapid deployment. Clearly, the United States Army can't get anywhere without air or Navy support. You know, it doesn't do any good to rust out at Fort Carson. We have forces in being so they can go somewhere and do something . . . we have to be taken there; we don't have our own organic air force anymore.

QUESTION: When you say command control, what problems or what solutions do you say are (inaudible) better at command and control?

GENERAL MEYER: Some of the command and control problems that we have to focus on are principally those which permit us to better operate with our Allies in Europe. It's a question of interoperability today . . . the ability to have some sort of black box which permits us to change the signal that is coming in from a U.S. system into a German System. We think we can do more of that . . . anything you can do that improves the command and control of the forces is going to increase combat capability. We don't even know today how to quantify command and control and its impact. We end up talking about what a tank can do or what artillery can do, or what an armed helicopter can do. But the ability to pull them together, all of that, is dependent upon command and control . . . I have been spending the last three or four years up at DCSOPS trying to get some smart folks out there to help us in better articulating the impact of command and control. It is tough to do but I can just assure you, as a commander . . . that command and control, both tactical and strategic, is an area we need to put dollars [into] to improve our capability.

QUESTION: General, did you mean to say that for the Army—for your troops to be ready and fight as necessary, that the airlift capability of the U.S. Air Force is not sufficient for your armed forces?

GENERAL MEYER: What I would say is that in order for us to surge to the degree that we need to, to be able to get there as rapidly as we do, we need more airlift.

QUESTION: Any proposal to bring in Vietnam era veterans back in the service if you don't get the troops that you need?

GENERAL MEYER: One of the proposals which has been made is to call back those who have already served. During this period of time where we have no individual replacements, the argument is that you have no other source [if] in conflict with the Soviets. . . .The only place you [could] go under our current situation where we have said we don't have a large individual replacement group would be to those who had some training. . . .So there are those who propose that.

I consider that to be unfair to those who have already served, to ask them to step up to bat twice before some folks have stepped up to bat once.

QUESTION: You would have to have Congressional approval to do that.

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, ma'am, you would.

QUESTION: General, would you please describe the Unilateral Corps, what the Army's segment would look like, how many troops?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, it is a rapid deployment force and it is the Army element of the Rapid Deployment Force. Clearly, every rapid deployment force that you look at is going to vary. It is going to vary based on the contingency that you are called upon to respond to. So it contains in it a potpourri of forces, all the way from very limited war type forces all the way up through a corps consisting of both armored and light infantry and anti-air, Army air and so on.

QUESTION: How many?

GENERAL MEYER: It depends on size. From a management point of view, we are looking at supporting somewhere in the neighborhood of about 100-thousand.

QUESTION: . . . why don't you get part of the budget that now goes to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for education?

GENERAL MEYER: I think that is a fine idea.

One of the proposals, which you have clearly seen, which I have supported . . . is the one made by Professor Moskos out at Northwestern who says that we have some—I think it is $7.8 billion—that goes out to educational loans for which no one has to do any repayment. . . .Some of that is already committed to paying back veterans who have already been in, so it is precommitted. But there is about $3 billion plus, for which no one has to provide any service in exchange. To me, that is an area that would be fruitful in helping us solve our recruiting problem, in getting the quality we need.

QUESTION: General, what do you mean? By having those people pay off the loans by serving?

GENERAL MEYER: Right. Service, either in the Army or somewhere else, but through service.

QUESTION: General, do you advocate a buildup of this Nation's common air defense system for this Nation as the Air Force is proposing? Should we take a new look at it again because of the Backfire bomber?

GENERAL MEYER: I think we have to look at it. . . .the arguments against it in the past have been that the principal threat is the ICBM, . . . rather than the air-breathing bomber. I do believe it is something that we have to look at as part of the whole strategic equation that we are currently re-evaluating.

QUESTION: General Meyer, most of us here worry about high policy decisions and all that but the Soldiers seem to be worried about other things and one of them is that beret that he wears on his head and which the last Chief of Staff ordered the Army to stop using. What are your views on the Soldier wearing that beret and are you planning to make any changes in the rules?

GENERAL MEYER: I have had more advice, guidance and counsel on the beret than I have had on whether or not we go to war, whether or not I accept the job, whether or not I support SALT, whether or not we have a problem with manpower or anything else since I have come in. All my old friends from the airborne days have written me or called me. I have gotten lots of advice, guidance and counsel on the beret.

I have two basic policies as far as the beret—as far as any accoutrements are concerned. One, Soldiers won't wear anything that they have to pay for out of their own pocket. If a guy is going to wear it, it is going to be issued to him. So it has to be part of the bag. We can say that Soldiers like to go out and spend $25.00 for something. Some do, some don't. But I think that is placing an inordinate financial requirement on PFC Marne that, because of peer pressure, he has got to go out and spend that kind of money. So whatever it is going to be, it is going to be an item of issue.

Second, any unit that decides to come in with a request for a change in the uniform as far as their particular unit is concerned, I will run it through the Uniform Board and make an indepen-

dent assessment of it. I could have been a great hero by jumping into Bragg with a maroon beret . . . I would be the hero forever. I am not sure that is good at Fort Hood. Thanks.

## Address to the ARMY RESERVE FORCES POLICY COUNCIL

Washington, DC
20 September 1979

Your schedule of briefings focuses on the kinds of issues I've been associated with as G3 of the whole United States Army for the last three years, and hopefully will remain involved with for the next four years if they can put up with me around here as the Chief of Staff of the Army. These are the kinds of issues . . . which very candidly are exciting, and all supportive of my two basic goals for the Army. The first is simply to have an Army that can go to war today and tomorrow. Any Army that goes to war has to go to war in totality. Going to war is a function of mobilization and mobilization is a function of the Reserves and the National Guard. I say an Army that can go to war today and tomorrow because that means we must focus on the things that we have to do today while understanding we have to create an Army that can be ready to go at some time in the future.

The second goal that I've set for myself is to create a climate in which each one of us, and those in the pieces of that Army we're individually responsible for, are able to find fulfillment. Just what constitutes fulfillment varies for each and every one of us. It varies for an Active Component unit at Fort Campbell, or a Guard or Reserve unit in Alabama, Utah, wherever it happens to be. Each one of us has a different piece of that, but our job is to create a climate out there where an individual in a unit—whether it be TO&E, TDA, whatever—has an opportunity to feel he or she is contributing and able to fulfill themselves to their totality.

. . . .Moving units somewhere to train—whether they be Active Components or Reserve Components to do their job somewhere in Colorado or Utah, or somewhere else—isn't enough. That doesn't get you to war. It's how we take those pieces, pick them up and move them somepiace, and once there having the ability to support them, that constitutes mobilization. That's going to war, and that's why we have Reserve Components. And that's the mission and function you've got to help us work through. That's the most critical area that we need help in—this whole issue of how to go to war.

I must say that two and a half years ago, or a year and a half ago, when I had all of the agencies of government over at Rosslyn trying to convince them that it would be useful for the JCS to conduct the mobilization exercise, "Nifty Nugget", so that we would be able to address some of our problems, there were people who said we don't have any problems on how to go to war—we've been there once or twice before.

Well, as everyone here knows those are the kinds of fragile bits of expertise that just fly by the board very quickly. I happen to have had the good or bad fortune of having deployed with divisions to war, once in Korea and then again in the First Cavalry Division. And in each instance, considering the relatively short period between World War II and the Korean War and the longer period between the Korean War and the Vietnam War, getting the division ready to move was a major trauma. We lose the expertise of how to deploy very quickly. And they're the kinds of hedges against failure that we've just got to be able to do well in peacetime. So that's the area I need to focus your help on more than anything else: helping our Army to improve its ability to go to war.

. . . I'll be honest with you, when this new administration came in, there was a challenge as to whether or not there was a role for the Reserve Components. That's gone now. There is an acceptance of the requirement, and it's our job now to be able to show how the Reserve Components fit into what many of you have heard me call "the three days of war": the day before the war, where you're there as a deterrent; the day of the war,

where you've got to fight; and the day after the war, where you're a chip on the negotiating table.

So you can't let the folks think we just need Reserve Components only upon mobilization. They have a very meaningful purpose today, during the war, and after the war. And you have to continue to emphasize the other two days of war, where the Reserves serve a purpose not fully recognized.

Now, as you and I work to create this Army that can go to war, there are serious obstacles. As a prelude, I see how one could dwell on the downside aspects of yesterday. But Meyer's motto says that today's the day and you can't worry about what happened yesterday and you've got to go from where you are. You've got to do the best with what you have....

Clearly, the most serious problem we have is strength—across the board. It's probably healthy for the Reserve Components that the Active Component is currently having a strength problem itself. It gets more attention when they find that the Active Component is going to be 20,000 to 30,000 short in strength in units by the end of this month....The fact that we are short provides us with an opportunity to focus people's attention on the deficiencies of the total package....

When I was the G3, the first time I came down here four years ago, I said we cannot let the Guard strength go below 400,000. We've got to adequately budget, because as soon as we let the strength go, we'll be stuck with the lower strength and the implication that we can accept an even lower figure. I said I won't do that—as a G3 I won't go below 400,000. Well, we finally had to do that. We kind of let the strength float to what we [were] able to get. That's a hell of a way for a great country to have to decide what forces it needs and what forces it's going to have. I just personally object to that. We need to focus on total requirements, get the facts, and then to go in with a comprehensive resource package.

If I had that, all the other things would be great. I've told many of you before, I almost cry when I think of how great Steadfast, the Readiness Regions and training would be out there if we didn't have the strength problems we have today. The Army's Active Component has contributed, by putting high quality folks out in the Readiness Regions and Readiness Groups....

The other two obstacles are training and equipment. Training is very, very spotty in the Active Components and particularly spotty in the Guard and Reserves. The only issue that I'll raise regarding equipment is the concern about the drawdown to ensure that we have adequate POMCUS. We will not permit anything dumb again to be done as far as drawdown on anybody for POMCUS. I have my own game plan on how we're going to handle the POMCUS. The 50 percent and 70 percent that you hear bandied around, those are the kinds of tools the programmer uses. That's the way we lay it out to get our dollars.

They're not the goals of the Chief of Staff. Don't let the damn programmers confuse you. The whole United States Army, the G3 and G4, are going to make sensible decisions about equipment distribution. We don't move equipment that way. I've made no commitment to either reduce the Active Component units with POMCUS overseas to 70 percent for certain line items, and simultaneously, no commitment to 50 percent for Reserve units. The commitment today is to see what the impact of equipment withdrawals is on the units themselves—their ability to train. That's the only commitment the Army has....

We are given the dollars, and you get so many dollars and you have to decide what you're going to do with them once you get them out in the organization, and that's the responsibility of the planners and the people that then have to turn the program in to the real world, on-going viable organizations.

I'll give you a prime example of how that works in this great Pentagon here. When we were starting out with this new administration, and started talking about the one-and-a-half war, we said we wanted to [plan on] a half war in the Persian Gulf, Middle East, or Northeast Asia. I said OK. They said we've got to write consolidated guidance. I said what's consolidated guidance? They said, Well, that's how we're going to tell you how to fight the war in the Persian Gulf. I said, Who's going to do it? This guy just came down from Columbia University, he said: "Well, I'm going to do it. I'm going to tell you how to run the war." (Meyer:) "Do you want any help?" "No, I think I can...."



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I said "Wait a minute, I'll tell you what you do. I've got some reasonably smart guys down here in DCSOPS, young majors and lieutenant colonels. If you don't think I'm smart enough to know how to do it, I'll give those guys to you and we'll write a scenario for you, and make some basic assumptions, size a force and we'll use that as our starting point."

So that was where we came up with a specific threat in the Middle East and we said all right, we'll look at that. What we would deploy would be the airborne division, the mechanized division, and an armored division. Those would be the programs we'd look at.

Well, do you know two years later my staff, the Army Staff, the G3 staff when I was G3, came to me and said those were what we needed then. You know that was the requirement for over there. It had suddenly been translated from a program that was designed to provide the resources into what you actually need without anybody ever having done any sort of a military assessment.

So I just tell you don't let the programmers of the world who serve the purpose of getting the dollars and so on, try to tell you how you're actually going to have to use the dollars when it gets to contingencies, or plans, or so on.

That's why when I hear that 50, 70, that's bandied around now, I get kind of concerned. I don't know how it's going to work out. . . .

I have a responsibility to convince you and to convince all of your Soldiers that we're serious about the Total Army. That's my responsibility. I continue to work on that. Those of you who don't believe it, I've just got to convince you. I've got to convince you through actions, not words.

. . . this summer we used all the directors in DCSOPS as reserve evaluators. We had the Director of MILPERCEN out as an evaluator. In fact, I met with him and someone else, and he told me how much he had learned about that aspect of the Army—by going out as an evaluator this summer.

I've tried to impress every action officer coming into the Pentagon with the need for the importance and comprehension of the Reserve forces. That's why we shipped some 300 evaluators out of the Pentagon this summer. . . .I speak to every new action officer to remind him that when he picks up a hunk of paper that he's not just in the Active Army, but also in the Reserves.

That's difficult, you know. Last week I asked a few questions of the group of new action officers—about some terms, . . . familiar to you all, and I must say I was very disappointed in the small number of hands that went up of those who understood some of the basic terms. . . .

If there's any common complaint I receive, it's the administrative overload in the companies and everywhere. I just don't know why, with all the brains we have and all the experience we have, we can't go through and just cut out all those things. We may have to create some of the administrative packets out there to take some of those administrative functions away. I'd like to pledge myself to cut out that overload but I need your help in doing that. Everywhere I get complaints on the inordinate amount of time spent on the administrative side. You end up with Guardsmen and Reservists who don't feel they have the opportunity to do what they came in the Guard or Reserve to do, and they become dissatisfied.

It's one area I could focus on, and using your insights, there must be a way.

Those are the introductory scribbles that I wrote down so you might understand what I'm trying to do with the Army, and how I see your fitting in to help me do it. We'll work on the war functions. We're well on the way to handling it.

# Address to the
# FOURTH ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE CORPS BALL

Fort Meyer, Virginia
21 September 1979

. . . Frankly, I was under the impression that dark fedoras, trench coats and sunglasses constituted your dress uniform. In fact, looking for room full of such stereotypes we almost didn't find our way here, until Carol reminded me that in Ian Fleming's books the ladies are always smashing, and then looking about it was clear we'd really found the celebration we were invited to. I think it's appropriate . . . that we pause to recognize that our successes are often made possible and our disappointments tolerable because of the support given us by our spouses. In chauvinistic days of olde I'd ask the men to stand and give the wives a well justified ovation. That's still entirely appropriate, but it fails to recognize that we have female professionals who also draw support and sustenance, and so I ask the professionals to stand and join me in expressing thanks to our partners. . . .

. . . From my view intelligence today is healthy, moving in the direction it needs to move, and has demonstrated the kind of independent judgment which is required to earn the plaudit: "WHEN M.I. SPEAKS, THE ARMY LISTENS."

EXAMPLE: The creation and fielding of CEWI battalions to Europe which will at long last pull intelligence services into organizations responsive to the field commands.

EXAMPLE: In 1962, the imagery capabilities of the U2 were not available to field commanders. Today, we have procedures to make available to field commanders products far superior in quality and responsiveness to that which the U2 provided.

EXAMPLE: It was Army Intelligence that initiated and pulled together the reexamination of the North Korean order of battle which lead to a reversal of administration policy.

Yet, there are challenges which both you and I recognize need resolution.

- First, we haven't yet fully codified in doctrine all the strides we've made in organization. This gap is most pronounced in echelons above the corps.

- Second, we need to lay out the issues of interoperability with our allies to determine how we protect national interests, while at the same time enhance alliance capabilities. Such issues of interoperability need to be addressed prior to the acquisition of new systems.

- Third, as a part of the composite manpower problem facing the Army, we need to ensure you are manned fully. Your skilled enlisted needs are short almost 2000.

- Fourth, we need to sever the minds of analysts from the constraints of "conventional wisdom."

Let me illustrate this last point more fully . . . When [Major General] Ed Thompson [the ACSI] leads off every staff meeting, or when assessments are presented in the forum of the JCS, I expect that the intelligence is as incorruptible as possible. Have you read General Sir John Hackett's book, The Third World War? There is near the conclusion an excellent vignette of the fate of those who defy "conventional wisdom," and I'd like to read that portion to you—

> "There was once a political prophet in Munich in 1928, who was asked to prophesy what would be happening to the burghers of his city in five, fifteen, twenty and forty years' time. He began: 'I prophesy that in five years' time, in 1933, Munich will be part of a Germany that has just suffered 5 million unemployed and that is ruled by a dictator with a certifiable mental illness who will proceed to murder 6 million Jews.'
>
> His audience said: 'Ah, then you must



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think that in fifteen years' time we will be in a sad plight.'

'No,' replied the prophet, 'I prophesy that in 1943 Munich will be part of a Greater Germany whose flag will fly from the Volga to Bordeaux, from northern Norway to the Sahara.'

Ah, then you must think that in twenty years' time, we will be mighty indeed.'

'No, my guess is that in 1948 Munich will be part of a Germany that stretches only from the Elbe to the Rhine, and whose ruined cities will recently have seen production down to only 10 per cent of the 1928 level.'

'So you think we face black ruin in forty years' time?'

'No, by 1968 I prophesy that real income per head in Munich will be four times greater than now, and that in the year after that 90 percent of German adults will sit looking at a box in a corner of their drawing rooms, which will show live pictures of a man walking upon the moon.'

They locked him up as a madman, of course."

I'm saying, I guess, that the world never stands still, and you must have the courage in observing that world to recognize change and by such recognition willingly hazard being called a "madman" if you are to serve and earn the praise, "WHEN HE SPEAKS—I LISTEN." That requires that you anticipate, not react; speak up, not remain quietly skeptical; and most importantly that you exhibit the highest personal integrity. . . .

## Address to the
## HENRY LEAVENWORTH CHAPTER, AUSA

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
27 September 1979

. . . What can the Leavenworth Chapter of the AUSA do for me?

- Stand tall for our Army and our Soldiers, be they Active, Reserve, or National Guard.

- Encourage young people to take a look at the Army. It not only offers a challenging and exciting career. It still represents an entryway to maturity, as it did for generations of draftees.

- Speak out for a strong national defense.

I think all of these are necessary supports to prepare an Army which is capable of going to war—for it is only in having that capability that we are enabled to preserve the peace. . . .

## Address to the
## DEFENSE ORIENTATION CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

Washington, DC
28 September 1979

Because this address is rotated among the services from year to year, it seems to me that it may be appropriate to review a little of where the Army has been since General Fred Weyand spoke to you in October of 1975. A little more than a year earlier (September 1974) the Army grieved the death of its great leader, Creighton Abrams. General "Abe" was faced with the difficult and

unpleasant task common to every Soldier after a major war: how to stem the total collapse of a military structure created for that conflict. His task was made larger because of three factors: First, we were, as a nation, in great haste to disengage from that conflict, with no clear concensus about the dimensions of the force which were legitimate for the national needs. Second, for a time, there were those who even questioned the [need for] an Army, on grounds that an Army was either irrelevant in an age of nuclear weapons, or only the foot in the door to escalation in another Vietnam-like contingency. Can't let that happen again—so cut! Last, we were in the process of transition to a volunteer force.

General Abrams' personal integrity was, in an era of many tarnished images, without blemish. With this as his bedrock, and though stricken with the cancer which ultimately killed him, he asked Secretary James Schlesinger to visit with him on the porch of Quarters 1 at Fort Meyer, the CSA's residence. There, one afternoon, they discussed the fate of the Army. And out of that came a commitment to hold the active strength of the Army to a level of 785,000 foregoing further strength reductions.

So, when Fred Weyand spoke to you he was in a period he properly labeled "stabilization"—the Army could, after having gone through the trauma of losing 700,000 in strength, stop the footrace downhill, sort out its missions, reexamine its organization, and begin to rebuild units previously traumatized to ineffectiveness by wholesale release of personnel to meet lower and lower strength ceilings. In General Weyand's early days the number of ready divisions among the thirteen on the books could be counted on one hand. Today, we have a force of sixteen divisions—three more divisions than we initially were able to field under a steady strength level four years ago. General Weyand forecast this for you four years ago. I'm happy to say we're there today. Not without some problems, you understand, but measurably better than at that time.

I think the lesson to be made is a major one, that effectiveness can best be enhanced where there is some predictable assurance regarding resource expectations. Dollars are always an uncertainty. Where manpower as well becomes subject to unpredictable fluctuations, rational planning regarding force structure is difficult.

As it is, the Army is capable of meeting the kinds of scenarios one can conceive only through full integration with the Reserve Components, an integration which demands more from them than we have ever asked in the past. Only by demonstrated ability on their part can the nation be ready for those three vital instances when an Army is essential to national survival; namely the day before the war, the day of the war, and the day after the war. . . .

## Article in
## ARMY MAGAZINE 1979-80 GREEN BOOK ISSUE

1 October 1979

. . . I recognize that commanders at every level are relatively rich or poor in personnel, equipment and dollars based on decisions beyond their immediate control. It makes little sense to me that having removed most resource decisions from their hands, we also too frequently squander the only resource the combat commanders at the battalion and lower levels have available to them to compensate for shortages, namely the commodity of time. Commanders at successive levels must carefully consider this resource, for failure to do so can be devastating to any well-conceived training program.

Commitments of higher headquarters must be projected accurately and sufficiently ahead of time to permit subordinates an opportunity to plan. Once fixed, this allocation should represent commitment of a resource to the subordinate command which is not capriciously withdrawn. Last minute meetings announced at mid-day are illustrative of violations of a prior allocation of time, and are serious infringements upon the functions of leaders. . . .



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# Address to the ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Washington, DC
16 October 1979

It's been a number of years since any Chief of Staff has sought his exercise and relaxation in the equestrian skills. General George C. Marshall was probably the last to do so. But, regardless of how we have individually sought diversion, the name of General Marshall's mare, I am quite certain, has been the focus of each occupant of the position I'm privileged to occupy. His horse was named "Prepare." Clearly, that is my focus as Chief of Staff: to prepare the United States Army for war—for the challenge that could come today, for the challenges that may come tomorrow. . . .

Too often as a nation we have abandoned the security necessary to preserve that freedom to the hazard of mere hope or chance. The fall of 1939 was a perilous time of slow awakening for this nation. That we eventually weathered the storm that followed was due mostly to the tenacity of our allies and the faulted judgment of our enemies. Those were bleak days of ordeal and hope for the uniformed man.

On 1 September 1939, the very day when Germany marched on Poland, General Marshall became Chief of Staff. The threat was clear to him; the manpower and materiel at his disposal inadequate by any soldierly judgment. The Army of 1939 was below its authorization of 165,000, in fact ranking seventeenth among the world's armed forces. Its equipment was largely World War I in vintage:

- The French 75 was its standard field artillery piece; while several nations possessed an effective 105-mm weapon.
- The infantry was armed with the Springfield rifle, inferior to the Garand; its mortar inaccurate and outdated.
- The basic anti-tank weapon, the 50 caliber machine gun, was ineffective at best.
- There was but one 37-mm anti-tank gun in the entire force!
- We lacked adequate R&D, much less procurement, in the area of modern tanks, signal equipment and anti-aircraft weapons.
- Motor transport was short.

While progress was great over the next two years, by August 1941—only four short months prior to Pearl Harbor—Fortune magazine still judged America's preparation for war a failure.

- No plan existed to organize manpower.
- Materiel shortages abounded.
- Shipping capacity was short.
- Power generating capacity for industrial expansion was lacking.
- No scheme for national prioritization existed.
- The threat of destabilizing inflation hung over the nation.
- An integrated political-military game plan was non-existent.
- The common man lacked understanding of the tasks ahead, and the national will was uncertain.

Fortune concluded that "America the country had not yet been asked to do what is necessary to win."

In September 1941, General Marshall, realizing progress but recognizing that the Army remained an imperfect instrument at best, spoke to the first graduating OCS class at Fort Benning. He charged them to remember that

". . . the truly great leader overcomes all difficulties, and campaigns and battles are

nothing but a long series of difficulties to overcome. The lack of equipment, the lack of food, the lack of this or that are only excuses; the real leader displays his qualities in his triumph over adversity, however great it may be."

If there is a parallel to be drawn between the situation facing the nation then and the situation facing us today, then the lessons I would draw from that parallel would be these:

First, the professional military, and those allied with his community, need to lay on the table the full dimension of the problems regarding national defense so that Americans can make the appropriate choices regarding these issues. It's difficult to fault the support rendered the military if, in fact, the needs have not been expressed with utmost candor and clarity.

Second, this kind of dialogue is not enhanced by living in the past. Morose introspection about what might have been, complaints of those who want to be martyrs for stale answers to yesterday's problems, people who entrench themselves behind existing deficiencies, tend to talk past people concerned with the present and the future. We are where we are. We must go where we must go.

Third, ... resources are not boundless. Hence, the forging of a national defense program is best served by proposals whose logic and integrity is unassailable. There is a structure and forum for our concerns today, just as there was for the pre-war Army of 1939-41. The process is somewhat more rigorous today. The number of "me-firsters" seeking favorable consideration for their programs has grown. Criticism not well thought through, or proposals which are oriented more to personal gain than general betterment of the Army's capability to fight are dysfunctional. I implore you, the friends of the United States Army, to support an adequate defens · in constructive and supportive ways. Our credibility depends on this.

It's an exciting time to be a Soldier. I relish the responsibility for an Army prepared for war—prepared today, and prepared tomorrow. I relish the opportunity to watch our superb young leaders—officers and NCO's—infuse into our units not only the competence to survive and win on the modern battlefield but the pride of being a Soldier and the enjoyment and genuine fun such associations create.

Today I would judge the Army to be at that point where it possesses *a solid core;* the sound foundation for answering today's needs, and building toward the challenges of tomorrow. Obviously, we are imperfect--tell me when we weren't. But I sense strengths today:

I sense strength in the quality of our officer and NCO corps.

I sense strength in the attitude of Soldiers whose principal complaint is that they want to "soldier" more. . . .If the Soldiers we're getting are inadequate, the Army needs to know and act on that. But what we need are informed judgments based on a look at the whole Army—not just its bottom ten percent. Is the Army perfect? No, but the spirit and attitude are there if we properly harness them to move the Army in the direction we need to go.

I see strength in the kinds of weapon systems near or in early production. Of course we have a very difficult task ahead in managing this period of massive modernization. It's a challenge of immense proportion which will tax the resources and ingenuity of our entire corporate leadership. I'm comfortable that we will make the best of this opportunity, face the difficult decisions, and bring to reality the hopes and dreams of those before us who labored so that we could recapture technological excellence on the battlefield.

I see strength in the steps we are taking to actualize the Total Army concept. I see strength in our adoption of a resource distribution scheme which optimizes force readiness despite less than optimal resource levels.

I see strength in having challenged complacency regarding mobilization through the conduct of major inter-agency exercises.

And finally, I see strength in the fact that the need to satisfy the demands of the "other Army," the non-NATO army, are understood.

Let me tell you that in each of the above areas we are ahead of where General Marshall was a mere four months before Pearl Harbor. But

being ahead is a relative thing. Today's technology has dramatically altered space factors, thus compressing the time cushion between mobilization and possible conflict. The mobilization process used by General Marshall, which counted on fighting with divisions created from whole cloth in a "tight" one year training program, is largely irrelevant to the urgent scenarios we face which demand rapid force generation in a matter of days, or weeks at best.

So while progress is being made, there remain some very serious concerns, the foremost of which is manpower. The shortfalls which my predecessors suffered, in the National Guard and in the USAR, have been extended now to include the Active force. As you get beneath the recruiting numbers and understand the time lag in the distribution of new people to the forces, you must understand that the actual effect on the force is really worse than the simple figures themselves. The strength of the deployed forces has been protected, but as you might guess, CONUS troop duty is "sporting." However, the Active shortfall may be a blessing. Clearly, people are more concerned about it than the recitation of Reserve Component deficiencies they have grown numb to. My intent is to provide to the powers that be a comprehensive package of resource remedies by which we may solve the problem. The Total Force depends on having all components well. Without adequate manpower, training is difficult and modernization begins to lose its point. If we are to continue the Volunteer Force as a viable concept to meet today's needs, the full dimensions of the cost to fully meet requirements needs to be made clear. That is my job and it will be done. If the climate within the Army is the healthiest we can make it, and if the dollars we seek from Congress to attract and retain the force are forthcoming, we will hopefully remedy today's situation. I expect that the Congress will fulfill its constitutional authority to raise armies.

For the next couple of years it will require an all out effort on the part of many elements of the Army not closely involved in the past with recruiting—the CONUS forces, the schools, ROTC units, engineer districts—and a concerted effort to creat a climate in which our recruiters and others have free access to our high schools. We still have schools refusing access to our recruiters from the Army at large, the National Guard, the Reserves, and the ROTC. I respect everyone's right to their own view, but we have a right—indeed a responsibility—to talk about the advantages of a military profession to all Americans. All of us must give high priority to explaining to young men and women that service to the country can be productive and uplifting for the individual. I believe that. I hope you truly do as well, or we're playing a shell game for stakes not in the nation's best interest.

The second major concern I'd like to discuss is the Army of the future. Throughout the Army creative minds are working to lay out the basic skeletal structure of the Army of '80's—to ensure that we package the kind of exciting innovations now on the horizon into a force which guarantees an Army prepared for this coming decade—an Army prepared for war. TRADOC is actively engaged with "Division 86" and the "Battlefield Development Plan", laying out alternative structures for the Army of tomorrow. Not only are we looking at more productive alignments to improve the capability of our heavy divisions, but we are assessing the creation of light divisions made more effective through technology. Such divisions will permit us to project power rapidly through exploitation of their strategic mobility. We are addressing concerns where we see deficiencies. Foremost are the areas of command and control, air defense, and air and sea lift. Finally, we recognize that divisions alone can accomplish very little when it comes to fighting without adequacy in combat support, combat service support, and the logistics, training, and development bases.

From an addressal of these and other issues we will lay out for everyone the skeletal structure for the Army of the 80's. To it we need to add the muscle, the nerve and the cardiovascular system—much of which already exists in some form. Understanding clearly the conceptual arrangement and linkages of that structure, we will have a clearer idea of what further R&D work is essential; we can construct the procurement schemes to husband critical resources—expediting, stretching, or cutting as necessary. With the vision set, we will have the means not only to better prescribe procurement and equipment distribution, but a clearer logic of personnel needs both quantity and quality also should become evident. Additionally, we should have a better understanding of training demands and how to distribute more effectively our trained

Soldiers.

The Army of the 80's will place heavy demands on the officer, the NCO, and the Soldier. I expect that initiatives proposed to improve our officer education program, including expansion of the pre-command courses at battalion and company levels, and those which provide for broader officer exposure to the wisdom of Leavenworth will be carried out. I expect similar efforts to enhance NCO development under the guidance of the Sergeant Major of the Army. All of these efforts will focus on leadership that responds to Soldier needs, enhances unit cohesion, and consequently improves effectiveness on the battlefield.

The bottom line of the Army of the future is that the corporate leadership of the Army will validate the vision of what is needed through the coming decade. That decade will be one in which we flesh out and fully furnish a new and modern Army, responsive to this nation across its spectrum of military needs.

If it doesn't show, let me tell you I'm very proud of this Army, the men and women, in and out of uniform, spread across this globe. We have in the past faced dangerous times. I believe this coming decade to be as critical a one for the nation as that it entered into 40 years ago. For that reason I have outlined the two issues which I consider most pressing for the Army:

First, the need to resolve the perplexing issue of manning the Army in peace and war, today and tomorrow.

Second, the need for a clear vision—understood by everyone—of the Army of the 80's. In both of these areas we will be ensuring that you are kept informed, so that better informed, you can help in resolving these critical issues.

At the close of World War II, General Marshall concluded his six years in office by penning these opining words in his final report to the Secretary of War:

> "For the first time since assuming office... it is possible for me to report that the security of the United States of America is entirely in its own hands."

It is unlikely that it will be possible for me to report with such absolute certainty my stewardship four years from now. But, with your help, our Army will come as close as it can to that kind of service in the preservation of this nation and its ideals.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On "Joint Duty"

17 October 1979

The Secretary of Defense has reinforced the importance of experience in *joint duty* by specifying that officers must have served such a tour while in the field grades to be considered qualified for promotion to brigadier general. Limited exceptions to this policy are authorized in specific cases, but our goal is to reduce the necessity for such exceptions to a minimum.

Professional development of officers with this experience cannot begin after they have attained the rank of general. We must each encourage our top notch young officers regarding the significant opportunities which exist in assignments to joint duty....



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# Address to the
# CENTRAL TEXAS CHAPTER, AUSA

Fort Hood, Texas
22 October 1979

I have a lot of reasons why I wanted to come to Fort Hood. My first assignment in the Army was here with the 1st Armor Division— in the 25th Armored Rifle Battalion. So I had that background. Second, this is the largest post in the U. S. Army, with the largest number of combat troops on it. Third, it also happens to have in this particular corps the 1st Cavalry Division in which I spent two years of combat. So I have lots of reasons for wanting to come back to Ft. Hood. . . .

When I was first assigned to the 25th Armored Rifle Battalion, the commander had been in the Army a long period of time. But he hadn't learned very well how to remember things, so he used to jot down notes on 3x5 cards. Whenever he'd get up to speak, he'd always use these 3x5 cards. We were having our first Hail and Farewell and he was saying goodbye to his Adjutant who, at that time, had been his Adjutant for four and a half years. He said, "We're gathered together tonight to say goodbye to er—(glancing down at his cards)—Major and Mrs. Smith. Major Smith has been my, er (glancing down at his cards)—Adjutant—for the last, er (glancing down at his cards)—four and a half years. While he was the, er (glancing down at his cards)—adjutant—he did, er (again glancing down at his cards)—a very good job. He's going off to, er (once again, glancing down at his cards)—Ft. Lewis, Washington. He goes with our best wishes and those of our Lord, er (finally, a last glance at his cards)—Jesus Christ." [The lights went out briefly at this point.] I'm sorry Father, and you too, Lord. . . .

When I was first at Ft. Hood, there was a war going on that stimulated what I was doing while I was here as a young 2nd Lieutenant, [getting] ready to do the kinds of things that I was called to do in 19 and 52. . . .

What's stimulating us today is the war that you and I and the rest of us interested in a strong national defense are trying to avoid. So our job is to create an Army with the support of all our citizens and the rest of the services that will, in fact, ensure that we are able to preserve peace. . . .

. . . [To do that we] have to be able to project power anywhere in the world across the whole spectrum of warfare. Now, we're able to reinforce NATO. We just had the 1/66th Armor Battalion from the 2nd Armored Division—you're allowed to stand up and cheer and keep warm—off on a special exercise to reinforce NATO. They did it in an uncommonly short period of time and the reports coming back from Europe say that they performed that mission superbly. That's one element of deterrence. The better we're able to do that, the better off we are.

[But] we need help in that area. We need help particularly from the Air Force. And we need help particularly in fast sealift. It doesn't do any good for General Fuller to have the world's greatest Corps sitting here at Ft. Hood if it can't go any place and do anything. We're trying to ensure that we get better airlift and rapid sealift so that we're able to respond around the world in a timely manner. That's very high on our priority. We've asked that elements of the National Reserve Defense Fleet be stationed down at Houston, and already some of those ships are going there so that we're able to increase the outload capability of III Corps in that regard. . . .

Now, modernization is one of the key changes that's going to be taking place in this Army—one of the largest modernization efforts we've ever been through. Here at Ft. Hood you are intimately involved in that, whether it be in the tests related to the Divisional Restructure Study, or in the exercises and testing that takes place at TCATA, or through the operational effectiveness management practices which have been instituted in the way we run our posts, or in how we integrate the 13th COSCOM into maintaining the kind of equipment we need for the future. All those kinds of things are helping us to ensure that we are able to carry off the modernization effort on time. . . .

I visited the 1/77th Artillery today, and one of the complaints of a battery commander was the unit's shortfall in NCOs. This is a very real problem. And yet, this specialist fourth class, who was in charge of one of the gun sections there, had been there for four and a half years. At Ft. Hood and on that same gun for most of that time! Now four and a half years of experience in that particular speciality is something that we just can't go out and buy. That's the kind of expertise that we must build on to develop and create our NCO Corps.

The challenge for us is to take the human material that we have and develop the qualified NCOs who will lead us through this period of shortage, and enable us to expand rapidly when we are again to fill the coffers with the qualified young men and women that we need.

It's not something that we ought to panic about. I went into combat in the Korean War with a division in which I told you earlier I was a 2nd Lieutenant, commanding a company. I had a corporal as a platoon leader, a sergeant as a platoon leader and one other sergeant in the company. That's not the way you want to go to war, but that's the way you may have to go to war. So we have to train our people the best we can so we're able to perform in whatever manner we're called upon. I've always been amazed at what individuals can do when they have to when called upon, particularly in combat.

When Bill and I were battalion commanders in the 1st Cav, we went through tremendous changes in those battalions from the time we first took them over. At first, we had NCOs that were all about the same age as [we were. Later] we were filled up quite quickly with much lesser skilled NCOs, until by the time I left three years later, we were down to the point where we had a lot of "shake-n-bake" NCO platoon leaders. So, I'm not concerned about that—providing we have a cadre of qualified, trained officers and NCOs. That's where our efforts are going to have to focus.

. . . .Now what can you expect of me? Well, first of all, I can assure you that, basically, Meyer is a meat and potatoes guy. I believe essentially in trying to take off the frills and focus on fundamentals. I believe it's my job to get the resources we need. To do that, I have to have your assistance in ensuring that every day, in every way, out in your particular unit, you're making the Army just that much tougher, so that it's easier to explain to Congress and to the American people that we're not wasting the dollars and resources and manpower that they give to us.

Now, in summary, I wasn't sure I wanted to be Chief of Staff of the United States Army. There were a lot of things I wanted to do. I was on orders to go to Europe and I wanted to go there. I wanted to sit on the banks of the Neckar River and drink Rhine wine and Wurtzburger beer. But, that didn't work out. Now I have been tapped to be Chief of Staff of the Army and I'm proud of that because I'm proud of the U.S. Army and I'm proud of our Soldiers. I will say again that the first week after I'd been told that I was to be Chief of Staff, I was just a little bit scared and awed by the job. Then I realized that Meyer couldn't do it alone, that he had to rely upon all of those great folks that are out there running squads, running platoons, running divisions, running corps, and providing the kind of civilian support that our Army needs. Suddenly that mantle that was pressing down on my shoulders shifted to all your shoulders. Our job is to ensure that we have that great Army that both you and I want to be proud of. I'm sure that with your help, even I can be a reasonably good Chief of Staff. Thanks for letting me join you here tonight.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Training

31 October 1979

. . . Our training today is spotty—we are not maximizing our efforts to achieve enhanced effectiveness across the board.

Good divisions are composed of good crews, squads and platoons. It is at this level that marked improvement is required. Training in units must stress individual, section, fire team, squad and small unit training. We must enfranchise our NCOs with responsibility and we must give them the opportunity to exercise it. However, we must be equally aware of NCO needs and shortcomings and not turn an untrained NCO loose without help and guidance. . . .

The leadership challenge is particularly great in these times of constrained training resources, particularly in the energy arena. Our leaders must ensure we have effective, imaginative training, despite reduced energy resources. Good training challenges Soldiers. Making it happen challenges leaders.

## Address to the 1979 ARMY WORLDWIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS CONFERENCE

Alexandria, Virginia
8 November 1979

. . . The Army can be only as good as the men and women who comprise it. . . .

As I've visited schools and troop units around the country, I've spoken to the basic strength of the Army's core—the good health of its officer and NCO ranks and the eagerness and desire of the young Soldier to excell and seek challenge. I recognize and understand the Army's many imperfections, and caution those in our units not to use these imperfections as excuses. Most of us have been in units or know units which were committed to combat despite significant shortages and substitutions against MTOE's. On tomorrow's D-Day we'll find it necessary to again make that commitment. Therefore, units need to ensure the maximum proficiency for combat with what they have. Commanders at every level need to become "heatshields" so that the precious time necessary for training is not squandered away by piecemeal demands. Well thought through, well conceived, tough training is the heart's blood of our ability to overcome and abide for a while those imperfections we have. . . .

We have a major problem in manning the force. Serious shortfalls exist across every component of the Army. . . .

Many aspects of the manning problem suggest that we have not done a satisfactory job in portraying ourselves to Mr. and Mrs. America, to our institutions, and to our youth. For example, Army recruiters are excluded from 25 percent of this nation's high schools, and permitted in another 25 percent only on days of general job fairs. This is clearly wrong. Is this a USAREC problem? Yes. But the responsibility for solving it doesn't reside exclusively at Fort Sheridan. Each command represented here, and especially the public affairs machinery of each command—which means each of you personally— shares the burden of reestablishing our public credentials. Those credentials are tarnished. It's past time we took off the ash and sackcloth, got off of the defensive, reactive mode we've been in and rekindle some of the old zeal to get out and tell the candid, positive image of today's military. You're the experts. I'd like you out front with the innovative

ideas, the creative means of getting our story across. The credibility of our message is an important first principle we need to keep constantly in mind. . . .

As I remarked to the AUSA, I see many striking parallels today with the environment which faced the Army in the immediate years preceding World War II. I have suggested that the problems which George Marshall faced are worthy of study by the Army for the insights they provide. The early expansion of the Army in the period 1939-1941 was accommodated, in the absence of a draft, by a call to federal service of National Guardsmen. Their period of service was initially limited to one year—the call-up having occurred in October of 1940. By August of 1941, disturbing signs of troop unrest were evident. A movement called OHIO ("Over the Hill in October") had wide notoriety. The nub of troop concern, boiled down to this statement in an August 1941 edition of Life magazine:

> "The most important single reason for the bad morale of the divisions appears to be national uncertainty. As far as the men can see, the Army has no goal."

The point I'm making is this: We have a goal. Very shortly it will be articulated in a white paper so that we can move together toward its achievement. I want PFC Marne to understand his or her role in that Army of the 80's. The Soldier needs to understand in his or her own language. They need to see that in a way that makes them understand they are not indiscernible parts of a giant machine, but recognizable and essential cogs in an organization whose complexities are understood and widely comprehended, and whose parts are individually respected and valued.

Based on some things I saw in Sweden, I've asked General Sullivan to take the lead in developing techniques which explain our modernization program to the Soldier—its phasing, its rationale, and the Soldier's personal role in making it happen. This is an example of how you need to be way ahead of me. . . .

My bottom lines are these: we can't exist without public understanding and support; we can't fight without Soldier understanding and support; a commander cannot command without a good public affairs effort.

You've got an essential challenge. . . .

## Sermon at the ANNUAL ARMY DAY SERVICE Washington National Cathedral

Washington, DC
11 November 1979

Today we celebrate Veterans Day, remembering the veterans of our Army—past and present. I'd ask you to join with me in a moment of silent prayer for six of our Soldiers who are held captive in Iran—and pray that their captors will be touched with the basis of all religions: love of the Master and love of our fellow man.

Two years ago at this same Service here at the National Cathedral honoring the United States Army, I also had the opportunity to present the sermon. In that homily I discussed the whole man, the whole person, and the challenge to each of us to develop fully in our mental, physical, spiritual and social dimensions. My focus that day was on the individual. Today, I thought it would be useful if we began again with a narrow focus on the individual, gradually broadening the focus for parallels applicable to the Army.

When I was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the Army, I asked that the Bible be opened to Chapter 25 of Matthew. I selected that chapter because it has great meaning for the Army and for us as individuals—regardless of our religious persuasion.



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I'm sure that it is not necessary for me to develop for this audience the details of the three parables in that chapter. Therefore, I will refresh your memory. Recall that the first parable is that of the foolish virgins who fail to provide adequate oil for their lamps and therefore are not ready when the wedding occurs. The lesson Christ teaches us in this story is the need for every individual to be continuously prepared, for there is no way to predict when one will be called to answer the demands of the Creator.

In the second parable, Christ speaks to the various talents that are given to individuals, with the moral being that each of us is charged by Him to take the talents we have been given and to use them to the best of our ability.

And the third parable is that in which He sets the standard against which He will judge us. You will recall His explanation of that standard:" . . . Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me."

Hence, the three parables in this chapter capture for us as individuals, and particularly for those of us who have a relationship with the Army, very meaningful and significant insights with which to approach life as well as the means by which to assess our stewardship here on earth.

First, for an individual, there is the need to be ready at all times. In living our lives we strive to develop so that we are prepared for its minor and major benchmarks. Parents teach their youngsters basic skills for physical well-being, and introduce them gradually to associations with others in preparation for that day when they must stand alone. We educate ourselves so that we may assume a productive role when called to support a family of our own. We invest and save to protect against the unseen future hazards. We adopt social, moral and ethical codes so that we are prepared to account for our behavior to either Caesar or God.

For a Soldier, similar demands exist because the Soldier never knows when he is going to meet the enemy. He learns his chain of command, becomes expert in his specialty, and establishes close ties and relationships with buddies on whose performance his own life may one day depend. The Soldier, as are all of us, is challenged by both the here and the hereafter to be ready to stand judgment.

In the second parable Christ talks about the responsibility each of us has—given that our individual mix and quality of talents varies widely. I am reminded of one of the most influential individuals in my life, a man who was my scoutmaster in my hometown, Saint Marys, Pennsylvania. His name was Chess Robacker, and he died a little more than a year ago. These lines written to the Editor of The Daily Press begin to say what kind of man Chess was:

> With the passing of Scoutmaster Chess Robacker, St. Marys lost one of the biggest men of our town. For it is truly said, "No man is ever so big as when he stoops to help a boy." And Chess' life was given to helping boys.
>
> Chess never gave publicity to the many times he met and pleaded with probation officers, with teachers and parents, with police officers, because one of 'his boys' was having trouble. . . .
>
> Those who worked with him know how big a man he was. And we know too, that of the prominent and important people of our town, well, they will be gone with their passing, and little mourned. But Chess will live in the hearts and minds of the hundreds of boys for as long as they live, and can tell of his kindness and decency.
>
> There will be Scoutmasters and Scoutmasters. And some of them will have the troubles and difficulties he had and overcame. And then the Good Lord will let Chess stand at that one's shoulder and say, "This is how I met that problem." For surely He will not cast off what Chess learned over those long years, and learned to do so well.
>
> Ave, Salutari, Little Man. You, whose heart was large enough to hold safe the dreams, and the love of so many.

You see, the thing that made Chess extraordinary was that physically he had a major obstacle to overcome. Yet, despite this, he earned the love and respect of an entire town. He was seen as a big man—despite the fact that he was a dwarf.

But in essence Christ expects you to take the same steps—to take the talents you have been given and maximize those talents to ensure that you are able to be as great as you can be. Each of us is given different challenges and different resources with which to meet those challenges. Christ demands that we use those resources fully.

The same is true of the Soldier. Some are expected to be more ready to meet the immediate challenge of combat tomorrow. Others prepare to join him, or support him in other ways—as signallers, warehousemen, trainers, planners, pilots, drivers. Each of us as Soldiers is charged to use the resources we possess to respond when committed. In Army parlance, the Soldier is using his talents well if his Readiness Condition equals the Authorized Level of Organization.

The final parable is the one in which Christ established the standard against which we will be judged. It's a relatively simple rule which says that personal response and commitment to the needs of our fellow-man, and love for one another, is more important than material gain. It says that care and concern for your children and the consolation we can offer in the many adversities of life are more central to his or her welfare than expensive playthings. It says that kindness and generosity, love and selflessness are the heartbeat of real life—not arrogance, acquisition, ambition or self-fulfillment at the expense of others.

Likewise, the Soldier of today, the nation's peacemaker, is given various standards according to which his performance will be judged. Those standards exist at many levels. As an individual, he must learn well his specific tasks against tough standards, and his unit must endure continuous evaluation against stern tests which image its role in combat.

For Christ, the Soldier always occupied a special role. Clearly, the Lord had a special affinity for him. Perhaps it was the Soldier's selflessness, his obligation to service, and his disciplined obedience which established such a regard.

## SELFLESSNESS

• It was love and concern for a dying servant—"the least of one of my brethren"—that led to an act of faith and humility by a Roman Centurion, (Lord—I am not worthy that thou shouldest enter under my roof). And Jesus marveled: "I have not found so great a faith in all of Israel." (Luke 7:1-10)

## SERVICE

• Or on the Mount, where Christ called the peacemakers blessed, and the children of God.

## DISCIPLINED OBEDIENCE

• Or from the cross, the dying Christ forgave those Soldiers who slew Him in the performance of their duty.

So as we gather today on the 11th of November to celebrate Veterans Day, to remember not only those Soldiers who have fallen in duty but all of our citizens who have served selflessly in uniform in the service of our country and in service to our fellow-man, it is appropriate that we take from these three parables the following lessons:

- the need for an Army to be ready,

- the need for an Army to be able to use the resources which it has to the maximum effectiveness to support the needs of our nation, and, finally,

- the need of an Army to be fully responsive—prepared for the test of combat.

Pray with me that this nation will always find the Army its willing servant—prepared, as were the wise bridesmaids; mindful of its stewardship toward the national resources entrusted to it, as was the good and faithful servant; and willing to stand beside the least of Christ's brethren in their moment of need.



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# Address to the
# ARMY OPERATIONS RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM

Fort Lee, Virginia
14 November 1979

Thank you very much for asking me to help you kick off this, the 18th Army Operations Research Symposium. Wilbur Payne suggested in his invitation that my presence might lend value and pertinence to the program. To that I can only respond that the program, integrally tied to essential areas of Army interest, already has pertinence. As for my presence lending value, only you can give it value—though I may be able to help you "E"-valuate where the institution of Army operations research stands today and how it needs to proceed if its best efforts are to be valued by the Army as a whole. . . .

I recall Glenn Kent some years ago warning against limiting analysis to only those areas of certain success. He believed the typical researcher to be a man who persisted in searching for a lost needle, not where he lost it, but instead where the light was good. And Seth Bonder proposed defocusing the same light so that some of it would fall on the darkness of our ignorance. And so when I was asked to address the Military Operations Research Symposium at Monterey several years ago, I added my own contribution to the "special light theory," and urged that group to remove the light-limiting filters which were clouding their vision. Those filters I labeled "too sensitive," "too political," "too parochial," and "too tough." They were, and remain, built-in protection to help us avoid many difficult issues.

I feel comfortable at long last abandoning the metaphor of light for one more appropriate to what I now perceive to be the real issues at hand. First, my credentials:

"A"—I was, as the G-3 of the whole United States Army, rather intimately involved with the initiation, substance and implementation of the Review of Army Analysis that Dave Hardison and Van (Vandiver) made last year. In fact, I fought for the proposals at a time when they were not universally accepted and I like to believe that my support had something to do with their ultimate acceptance.

"B"—That encounter was not one of simple parochial interest. Indeed as the G-3, I saw merit in the proposals to shift certain resources for greater effectiveness, and concurred fully in the separation of the Concepts Analysis Agency from my exclusive control. So my stance for the issues was not one of protecting turf. The direction is good for the Army.

"C"—As a member of the SELCOM, I have participated frequently in the articulation of major deficiencies under each of the Priority Problem Areas that you will be addressing in detail over the next few days—deficiencies of major import to the Army and the nation which need light shed on them.

Excuse me, there's that metaphor again. I told you we needed a new one and since I believe we have a cacophony of sound coming from our analytical community I'll select music, because it allows me to illustrate what I think the communities' greatest needs are today.

Any truly great orchestral performance begins with talented musicians, and imposes on them an organization which groups their talents by function: the woodwinds, the brass, the strings, the percussion, etc. There must be a score, and there must be a conductor. And to assure critical acclaim, there must be an audience. The Army, OSD, OMB and Congress will be the audience—a very critical audience with an inordinate number of reviewers!

Obviously, you are the musicians—very talented, sometimes temperamental, but professionally dedicated to your work. Clearly, there is some particular composer, some tonal style which you individually prefer—BUT—if it's Mahler tonight, Beethoven tomorrow, you are professionally competent and amenable to the advertised selection, which, after all, brings in the audience.

The organization of the orchestra into its sec-

tions we'll leave to your imagination. I realized immediately I'd have difficulty making the assignment: would TRASANA like the inference that it is the voice booming in the desert (the timpani), or would Wilbur insist on first violin. (There's clearly no marimba in most classical symphony orchestras!) Suffice to say, there's a discrete real number of distinct participant cohorts randomly arranged—you know, a lot of people in diverse groups looking for guidance, e.g.:

- Strategic Studies Institute
- Logistic Evaluation Agency
- Military Personnel Center
- Army Research Institute
- Engineer Studies Center
- The various schools and centers
- Battlefield Systems Integration Directorate
- Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
- Concepts Analysis Agency

In the musical sense, a score provides the guidance which pulls all the diverse components of the orchestra together to achieve the full effect of the tonal poem intended by the composer. The conductor understands that occasionally it is necessary for the viola section to separate itself from the orchestra to hone individual skills, to iron out problems unique to that section. But the performance of the total symphony orchestra cannot tolerate it's perpetual absence.

In the same light, Mother Army understands that each command has difficult and pressing issues which require resolution. So some study effort needs to be placed on those problems, and that's right and good. But not to the neglect of issues which preclude the entire Army from moving forward. This year, for the first time, the study program guidance will go to the field woven into the program and budget guidance package. The critical areas which demand study, and hopefully resolution, are identified. These Priority Problem Areas must be addressed. The score we are asked to perform is already laid out.

Just as the performance of a symphony's score requires balance, clarity of tone and disciplined orchestration, so too does the functioning of the operations research community. As a body which has the opportunity to write, underwrite, or rewrite the way the Army does business, the institution of Army Operations Research can do a better job against each of these performance criteria.

• Balance. There is not any remote semblance of balance in our study program if one measures the level of effort across the identified Priority Problem Areas. Doctrine and tactics, the twin fountainheads of how we conceptually tie the organic pieces of the Army into a rational operation, and how we fight to win at the cutting edge of that operation, receives a mere three percent of the total level of effort. And personnel, the Army's -1 problem, receives but four percent of the total level of effort! Here we are, the most manpower intensive of the three departments, and it appears that the level of effort outside the Army (AF, Navy, OSD) surpasses what we do internally by a wide margin.

At the same time we devote at least half of our study effort to THINGS. The absolute figures behind that may be at the right level—it just strikes me we haven't balanced our program very well.

Another effort I'm concerned about is our threat analysis. Some important steps to improve our capability have been taken. But more remains to be done. Too often a lack of good information on the threat—materiel, structure, doctrine, capability—limits both the credibility and the utility of other study efforts which use that information as a point of departure.

• Clarity of tone. For one reason or another—but clearly reflective that we've got some unhealthy cross-training going on—bassoons trying to sound like flutes, the cymbals trying out the cello's notes—we can see a lack of clarity in the way each section of the community perceives its role. There is an unhealthy duplication in the modeling capabilities which muddies the essential focus of each section.

- CAA, which should be dealing with issues pertinent to echelons in and above the corps, uses models which reach down to the single item level.

- Simultaneously, AMSAA, whose work deals primarily at the item level, uses models which reach up to the division level of combat. There should be an appropriate level of overlap to allow for correlation and data transfer. But every agency cannot have a top-to-bottom, stand-alone

capability. It's undesirable and too expensive. We must develop an integrated hierarchy of models and studies, and the different study agencies are going to have to depend on one another to make it work.

• Orchestration. There will be no studies tsar imposed on you—but there will be a conductor, the Study Program Management Office, whose task is to crystallize problems, act as a catalyst to unify the effort, and ensure for me that—with the resources we are able to bring to problem solutions—we are doing the job as well as we can. I believe that independence is essential if we are to get people to enthusiastically think about problems. At the same time there is a need for everyone to recognize the great interdependence which exists, of which we must take advantage.

- How many separate data bases do we have, and how legitimate is the information in these bases?

- To what degree do we use history for credible information bases?

- To what degree are we creatively gathering data about today's Army? Where? How is it shared?

- To what degree are we hung up on studies searching for the A + paper, but ignoring the essential parameter of timeliness. Sometimes a C+ paper with original thought, available at the time of decision, can prevent me from making a decision which history will grade an "F." Sometimes I cannot await the perfect product of a patient research effort.

Well, I've had fun stretching the metaphor. It has not been my purpose to persecute. The real message I'm carrying to you is no different than that which I have labored over with the major commanders just a few days ago. During this year's Army Commanders' Conference, we worked hard to hammer out a corporate vision of where this Army is going. We succeeded, and you'll be hearing much about it soon. If the pachyderms can agree to work together, to pull up their shirt sleeves to lean into the solution of problems so we can weather a time of great national peril, I suspect I am not asking too much of you to join that effort of pulling together.

You've been helpful and sometimes brilliant in the past. The Army needs that effort redoubled, within a framework of interdependence and orchestrated effort.

## Address to the NEWLY ASSIGNED ACTION OFFICERS

Washington, DC
19 November 1979

. . . Full attainment of our goal, the Army prepared for war, depends on the synergism of our cumulative efforts. The whole will exceed the sum of its parts. Each of you will develop some special expertise in the course of your assignment here, be it nuclear weapons, or rations control. Each of you must become what I call an "Island of Competence." That is the cornerstone upon which we will build the Army of tomorrow. . . .

The keys to your responsibility are as follows:

C - coordinate
A - anticipate
V - verify

If any one of these areas is shortchanged, your staff work is not complete. Likewise, if a staff action has a failing, I can assure you it will manifest itself in one of those areas.

Your absolute honest appraisal is what is needed—unaffected by doctrinal adherence to popular themes, rigid pessimism, or rose-colored glasses. Explain your points in credible, lingo-free language so that a variety of audiences can understand. And, above all do not sacrifice your ideas to convention. Your views are needed. Alternative solutions should be presented no matter how unpopular. . . .

# Address to the COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

New York City, New York
20 November 1979

In 1972, while I was the Deputy Commandant at the Army War College, there was very serious questioning in this country about why we needed an Army. In two years our strength had plummeted 600,000. We had just weathered a directed reduction of 50,000 below what we had planned as the Army's desirable peacetime strength. Senator Mansfield and others were shifting the attack to withdrawals from Europe. There was no telling where, in our eagerness to avoid future Vietnams, this would all end.

General Abrams called me and asked that I give some thought to how we might articulate the nation's need for an Army; and ever since then I have found it very useful when trying to describe the purpose and function of the Army to talk about it in terms of *the three days of war,* those three vital instances when an Army is essential to national survival; namely, the day before the war, the day of the war, and the day after the war.

The *day before the war,* military forces must be in being to deter war from occurring; the day of the war, for however long that day may be, they must provide decisive warfighting capability; and the day after the war they must again be capable of providing a deterrent, of renewing the war at a more intense level should that be necessary, or of being available as a bargaining chip in any negotiations toward conflict termination.

The task of being ready for war is not one invented by me, nor self-assumed by the American military, nor is it rooted in warlike intentions toward any nation. It grows from the persuasion eloquently voiced by our first American President, who in 1783 wrote to Congress as follows:

> "There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness—if we desire to avoid insult we must be ready to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful institutions of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."

What President Washington said essentially, is that the first stage of combat is fought in the minds of prospective opponents. I am anxious to maintain an understanding in the mind of my counterpart in the Kremlin that this nation is prepared to defend itself and its allies, both through possession of the means of waging war, and the will to exercise those means. He must perceive very clearly that all aspects of preparing the American Army for combat are in place and well oiled. It must have a sufficient number of units, active or reserve, properly balanced by type to meet the full demands of his war-fighting scenario. It must have ample, modern, well maintained equipment, appropriately distributed to those units. It must be manned with sufficient onboard strength in all components and a trained filler pool to top off strengths. Its troops and units must be expert on their equipment, and skilled in its coordinated employment, and well-practiced in procedures for call up, equipment issue, loading, packing and movement to specified embarkation stations.

Additionally, we must have the physical means to deploy them in priority to the designated area of operations, by means which assure timely linkup with equipment and early availability to the command authority. Lastly, we must be able to sustain them in combat with plentiful stockages of ammunition, food, repair parts, replacement equipment, and personnel.

Now, as I look across the "spectrum of conflict" from counter terrorist operations through World War III, the most demanding challenge to our Army is war in central Europe.

The Soviets have improved both their strategic and conventional forces. Long dominant in their quantity of conventional weapons, they have in many areas wrested qualitative superiority from us as well. More significantly, they have achieved essential equivalence in central strategic forces and have far outpaced our capabilities in long range theater nuclear forces. These facts heighten my concerns that we and



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our allies face a critical time of testing in the decade ahead.

Soviet conventional doctrine stresses the virtues of cover, deception and surprise. They can attack with little warning, concentrating forces for intense offensive air and ground battles. They are structured to attack and exploit early success. They preach in their doctrine the full integration of nuclear and chemical warfare. They continue to upgrade their logistic support networks, improving their capacity to sustain continuous combat operations.

Understanding this, effective deterrence by NATO on the day before the war—today—requires clear perception by the Warsaw Pact that NATO possesses sufficient force in being to counter an attack with very limited warning, a capability from Europe and North America to rapidly increase combat power to respond flexibly to any Soviet initiative, and the will to counter any thrust they—the Warsaw Pact—might make.

As the Soviets judge their prospects for military success in Central Europe and on the flanks, these elements of NATO deterrence will surely be carefully evaluated. They will also look carefully at several aspects of the US-only deterrent on that day before the war. They will look for weakness in our strategic nuclear capability. Has the United States maintained essential equivalence? Is our strategic deterrent credible? Have we, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other agencies of government, taken adequate steps for civil defense—survivability and recovery? Has the United States a credible plan for the mobilization of its military force? Its manpower? How rapidly can its industry be brought to bear in a conflict?. . .

Beyond central Europe, the elements of successful deterrence are less tractable. Some non-NATO contingencies are clear—like the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Korea. Others can arise quite unpredictably. We can influence them by being attuned to the factors which act on the minds of belligerents, especially where such events have Soviet sponsorship. Three factors affect a nation's ability to project power: geography, capability, and will. The Soviets have an advantage in many areas by virtue of their central geographic location. They clearly have developed the capability to support peripheral conflict through military aid and assistance programs, the use of surrogates, and the capability to extend their lines of communication via air or merchant sea. Most important, the Soviets have shown the will to act in support of those who aggress.

We cannot hope to counter directly their geostrategic advantage, but we can compensate for it by development of the means to project and support our power about the globe. This requires improvements to our strategic mobility forces, both air and sea lift, and development of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

The key question is, will we have the will to act? There are signs of a national awakening. Though memories of Vietnam linger, certainly we're all aware of the economic and political realities of the future.

The issue of will, of resolve, plays less in the NATO arena because the very survival of the coalition is so central. There I believe we have done much to convince the Soviets we are serious. Over the past several years we have concentrated on bolstering the combat readiness of the forward deployed forces and improving our capability to reinforce NATO. We have worked to improve the overall combat effectiveness of the alliance through greater commonality in doctrine, tactics, techniques and equipment. Our fielded forces will achieve enhanced operating capabilities by virtue of our current modernization program. Lastly, the mobilization capability of the entire nation has been tested and is better understood today.

Despite these improvements we continue to have challenges which must be met if we are to be able to portray a true deterrent posture on the day before the war. These challenges include:

- Improving the alliance's ability to respond to short warning attack.

- Correcting North-South mal-deployment of forces in Central Europe.

- Forward stationing of deployed combat elements in Central Europe.

- Addressing concern about NATO's flanks, particularly in the south.

- Increasing stockage levels of ammunition and other consumables in Europe.

- Bolstering our support structure directly or through increased use of host nation support.

- Improving the readiness of Reserve forces so they can be in Europe early enough to influence the outcome of any conflict there.

- Eliminating the significant shortfall in individual replacements .

- Improving our efforts to rationalize doctrine, standardize equipment, and enhance the interoperability of units.

- Modernizing theater nuclear forces.

- Improving our secure communications capability, and

- Enhancing our capability to collect intelligence, to employ electronic warfare devices, and to defend against nuclear, biological or chemical attacks.

Should NATO lose the battle of wits integral to the day before the war and deterrrence fails, the Pact's ability to attack with little warning puts a premium on the ability of forward deployed forces to absorb the first attack, halt the attacker, and reinforce and recover battlefield integrity. Once recovered, NATO forces must repel the Pact or defeat it by offensive action to end the day of the war, however long that day might be.

The combat Soldier will find that this is a very long day. The modern battlefield is lethal; combat is intense and extremely complex.

The key to success on the modern battlefield will be the ability to sustain the intensity of combat. The strategy of forward defense is geared to accepting penetrations at one point while holding firm elsewhere. Within the penetration, the Pact force will be defeated by a combination of firepower and maneuver Additionally, this strategy calls for offensive action by unengaged units. The tactics employed demand maximum use of the mobility and flexibility of mechanized forces to conduct a truly active defense Casualties are expected to be high, equipment losses great and ammunition expenditures unheard of [compared to] past wars.

In addition, a theater nuclear capability is an essential element of successful deterrence and defense. Theater nuclear forces (TNF) provide an essential linkage between conventional and strategic nuclear foces. In the event aggression cannot be contained conventionally, theater nuclear forces provide a warfighting capability which can influence the outcome of the battle, thus permitting termination of the conflict short of strategic nuclear war. Theater nuclear weapons are deployed as an integral part of U. S. theater forces to strengthen the deterrent effect of forward defense and to augment conventional forces.

We are in the process of modernizing our TNF. In the shorter range tactical weapons we need to overcome deficiencies in response time, security features, and command and control caused by the fact that much of the fielded technology is old—of 1940 vintage. In the long range weapons we need to improve NATO's capability for selective longer range nuclear strikes thereby strengthening the link between NATO TNF and U.S. central strategic systems.

The steps that have been taken to improve our capabilities for the day before the war will determine how well we do on the day of the war. The challenges we face in deterring war are the same ones which must be met if we wish to assure ourselves and our Soldiers that we have a capability of winning the first battle and all subsequent battles of the next war. Several move to the fore, however, especially our command and control mechanisms, and our means to ensure a continued flow of men and materiel through the ports, airfields, rails and roads of both Europe and the United States. This is utterly dependent upon adequate airlift and sealift.

For the day of the war outside of NATO, where we must be capable of a rapid buildup in order to defeat the enemy, we are challenged by a need for access to critical base areas and improved air and sealift. We need to develop lighter forces, more easily sustainable and more easily deployed, which are capable of defeating the sophisticated Soviet equipment prevalent in many potential contingency areas.

*The day after the war* looms as the most challenging time we may have. There is little written about this day, too little thought been given to how war ends. This is in sharp contrast to the many speculative scenarios on how war might begin. While it is clear that predicting how the war will end is very low on the scale of certainty, and probably should continue to be low on the scale of effort we expend, nonetheless there are several elements which appear to be quite evident.

We must have forces in-being, capable of fighting again if needed. The nation must be sufficiently mobilized to provide personnel and equipment. The industrial base must be producing adequately to sustain a renewal of conflict. Combat equipment and materiel must be available and we must have the means to move it to the combat zone.

Possessing the capability to achieve the foregoing provides credible deterrence against an enemy who paused for a longer view under a flag of truce. The capability to renew the fighting is a deterrent to continued conflict. If neither side is totally spent, and the war can be settled through negotiations, having formidable forces in being makes for a position of strength at the bargaining table.

The Army's responsibilities for the security of our nation are to provide forces for all three days of war in Europe or elsewhere. Thus the focus of the Army efforts has been to improve the capability of the force on the day before the war to ensure success during the first hours of the day of the war in Europe—while retaining the capability to respond to challenges outside the NATO arena . . . and all this within limited resources.

## Address to the ARMY LADIES OF ARLINGTON

Fort Myer, Virginia
5 December 1979

I'm very glad to have the chance to express first hand not only my personal appreciation, but that of the entire Army community, for the service you daily render on our behalf—regardless of weather, regardless of what I am certain is frequent personal inconvenience, regardless of the difficult nature of the task itself.

There's not one among us who can easily accommodate the loss of an entire Army family, killed in a small plane accident on Thanksgiving Day. . . .It's not easy at that moment when personal grief burns worse than tears can drown that you step forward to offer a gesture of understanding, respect, and support on my behalf and that of the entire Army community. Each day you Ladies of Arlington earn my respect and admiration . . . your act . . . begins that painful healing process for those that remain behind. For them, for me, for Carol, for the Army, I thank you.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On the Modernization Challenge

5 December 1979

. . . The strength of the Army of the 1980's hinges upon the collective manner in which we address [the modernization] challenge. . . .The size, complexity and corporate nature of today's Army demand the orchestration of many contributors in the molding of a superior force. No single leader can modernize the Army of the 1980's. If we capture the great talent in our ranks and focus it upon the task that confronts us, we can lay the foundation for tomorrow's leadership to make its mark upon future battlefields, should the Army be called upon to secure the vital interests of the Nation.

## Letter to the
## ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS
## On Professional Competence of Junior Leaders

9 January 1980

. . . The heart of our Army is in our companies, troops and batteries. . . .The professional competence of our leadership [is] built upon experience at [that] level. The future potential of each leader is ultimately predicated upon hard experience in unit administration and technical proficiency gained in our troop units at firing ranges, maneuvers, shops and motor pools. The officer or noncommissioned officer who has mastered the school of hard knocks in mud and dust and knows the Soldier, our equipment and administration, develops priceless assets which become the foundation of professional competence. . . .

## Address to the
## GREATER GULF COAST CHAPTER, AUSA

Mobile, Alabama
17 January 1980

We Americans call ourselves by many names, group ourselves in many organizations, and espouse diverse causes, but as a nation we find our true strength in unity. Today, in these very troubling times, unity—national unity—is a resource of incalculable value. I have seen the course of a war fought in the context of national disunity, and so have you. There is no fulfillment in leading American Soldiers into combat while the nation still debates its own conscience—unsure of its goals, and uncertain of its priorities.

Nothing so disturbs the Soldier's dedication and service to the ideals of this nation than an insecurity in the domestic support extended to him. As Winston Churchill said to the House of Commons in September 1941, "Nothing is more dangerous in wartime than to live in the tempermental atmosphere of a Gallup Poll, always feeling one's pulse and taking one's temperature."

Historically, our unity in crisis has been assured by foes who repeatedly have given us the tools to forge that unity—Pearl Harbor, the sinking of a capital ship, the conduct of unrestricted submarine warfare, the impressment of U. S. merchantmen at sea, the overt blatant invasion of a small trustful nation. Cultural ignorance of the United States often mistook our preoccupation with domestic affairs as a sign of weakness, apathy or indifference. In each instance in the past, buttressed by factors of time, distance, faithful allies, and massive—although latent—industrial capacity, we rose to effect appropriate retribution.

Vietnam was not such a war. How historians will portray it is not easy to predict. I fear though that the "domino theory" has reached prophetic reality today: the annexation of South Vietnam by North Vietnam, the collapse of Laos and Cambodia, the massive migrations of people in small boats from the 'socialist democracy', while famine consumes hundreds of thousands in Cambodia, or Kampuchea, as it is called today. These are not the legacy any sector of America intended or sought.

The lessons of that time for America, insofar as the application of military force is concerned, are that such future engagements—involving as they do the very soul of America—must be accompanied by three criteria:

First, there must exist the military capacity for engagement. We possessed this in Vietnam.



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Second, we must share a clear idea of what constitutes the essential national interests.

Third, there must be a willingness on the part of the nation to sacrifice in order to ensure maintenance of those interests which we declare essential. There are no "cost-free options."

The shruken dimensions of time and distance no longer provide us the luxury of being an observer-nation on the world scene. We are not merely one among many strong nations, but a true international superpower to whom both the free and uncommitted nations of the world look for initiative. Like it or not, the United States is now the point man in the world; with interests and relationships that span continents, and the nation to whom other nations look for leadership and response against the carousing aggressiveness of the Soviet Union.

As we look into the decade ahead, it is impossible to see any basis for believing that these factors will change. The Soviets, for increasingly evident reasons, have invested immense resources in the development of powerful military forces in search of the superior "correlation of forces" so central to their thinking. The humiliation of the 1962 Cuban crisis, where the "correlation of forces" was not in their favor, is widely taken as the genesis for their almost blind race toward domination across the spectrum of military means—strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional. The power they have succeeded in building in this narrow sector of national achievement forms the backdrop against which the drama of the next decade will unfold. The preliminary indications are, judging by recent events, that the decade of the 80's will be a time of intense challenge for Americans. Consider only the past 75 days:

4 November - Taking of hostages in Teheran

21 November - Burning of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan and a Soldier and a marine killed.

2 December - Sacking of the U.S. Embassy in Libya

3 December - Killing of 2 sailors in Puerto Rico

14 December - Killing of 4 Americans in Turkey

27 December - Russian invasion of Afghanistan

Through all of this, there has been the steady national implication that military options exist—and they do. But military action is not of itself always the correct tool. The issue is much broader. Possession of the means to go to war is not the only basis upon which to judge our capabilities, for you will recall that we possessed superior means in Vietnam. To strike out in vengeance today without a clear understanding of our essential national interests and an assessment of the nation's willingness to go the full mile for maintenance of those interests would be foolhardy.

Our commitment to NATO will remain the cornerstone of U. S. foreign policy in the decade ahead. But the challenges likely to emerge to U.S. interests outside of Europe in that period will be extraordinarily diverse, bringing with them an obvious requirement for flexibility in the design of Army forces. The quest then, in the decade of the 1980's is to develop the capability to successfully meet threats to vital U.S. interests outside of Europe, without compromising our ability to respond in conjunction with our NATO Allies in the decisive theater in Central Europe.

I know that a principal concern of yours is just how well we're doing—how strong are we?. . . Compared to where we were only a few brief years ago, we are in a much improved posture except for the manpower problem. Compared to where I think we need to be to counter the threat, we need immediate and continued improvement in our ability to be able to go to war so that we don't have to go to war.

Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, the Army has been mightily involved in improving the capabilities of our forces earmarked for Europe. In this era of nuclear parity, an urgent need exists to rapidly bolster our forward deployed forces to forestall Soviet temptation to take conventional action. Together with our allies, we have made great strides in correcting the problems there, though much remains to be done. And what remains will be on the front burner throughout my tenure as Chief of Staff.

The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have, over time, developed a qualitative ground force advantage in addition to their historic numerical advantage. They have enhanced their capability to initiate attack from a near standing start—eliminating the lengthy warning periods we have counted on since World War II. Our emphasis over the past five years has been to focus on improving the capabilities of our forward deployed forces and our ability to more rapidly reinforce NATO with sufficient strength to prevent major breakthroughs in the early stages of World War III. To accomplish this within reasonable active duty strength ceilings, we have had to take some rather unorthodox steps.

First, we have packaged the Total Army so that the emphasis in the Active Component is on immediately usable heavy combat power—while the support structure needed to round it out fully is contained in the Reserves.

Second, in addition to sizable forward deployment of units to Europe, we are prepositioning heavy equipment in Europe for early linkup with dedicated troop units flown in from the United States.

Third, we have charged the National Guard and the Army Reserve with extremely demanding wartime missions to rapidly reinforce the deployed force.

Fourth, we are exploring every feasible alternative for using existing NATO structure for essential support to the combat elements: beer trucks to haul ammo, laborers to assist, use of barges, railroads, communications, etc.

Many of these steps—essential and prudent if we are to meet the critical demands of Central Europe—impact on the Army's flexibility to respond elsewhere. As we increasingly heavy-up the force, we make a deliberate trade-off with light, easily transportable units, capable of employment elsewhere on short notice. As we increase the stocks of prepositioned materiel in Europe, we obviously surrender some flexibility regarding its potential use elsewhere. As we tailor the force to the explicit objective of achieving maximum early combat power in Europe, we risk introducing conscious imbalances in the force structure of the Active Component thus making it more difficult to support contingency operations without mobilization.

These are the kinds of dilemmas the Army is coping with as the capability of the nation's Rapid Deployment Forces are improved. Veterans here . . . know that when the claxon of war sounds, the U. S. Army—in whatever its state of imperfection—goes. As Chief of Staff of the Army, I am charged with [minimizing the risk of having to commit ill-prepared forces]. That is one reason you hear so much today about improving our capability to respond with Rapid Deployment Forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.

Where does the Army stand in that effort today?

As far as forces are concerned, we have identified the combat elements which are available without jeopardy to our NATO commitment. Properly manned and equipped, they constitute a reservoir of units with a variety of capabilities which can be packaged to meet the specific nature of the contingency. [These] units run the gamut from light, easily introduced, counter terrorist, ranger and airborne forces to much heavier elements capable of tackling massed armored threats. Obviously, each type [of unit] possesses unique deployment characteristics, some capable of closing within only a few days; others taking longer. Those forces are in being today and have been exercised for several years.

Having optimized the Army's structure for the major threat in Central Europe, we face a major challenge in constituting the combat support and combat service support elements needed. It must be done without exceeding current manpower constraints, without jeopardizing our NATO commitment—that is, without imposing dual missions on units—and without building in a necessity to mobilize.

We need—and are planning for—improvements in strategic mobility forces, both air and rapid sealift. These efforts include not only the ongoing enhancement program for the Air Force's existing fleet, but also the generation of a new outsize aircraft as well. The Navy's sealift package needs expansion to include sealift initiatives appropriate to the early introduction and sustainment of heavy forces. We are currently looking at some Roll-On Roll-Off Ships which ap-

pear well suited to the mission.

To the degree that strategic lift resources pose a constraint, we must seek compensation of some sort. Improving the anti-armor capability of our light forces or decreasing the weight of our heavy forces can improve our ability to get their "firstest with the mostest" as Nathan Bedford Forrest is supposed to have said. We can, and we are, exploring initiatives which could move us in this direction.

In brief, a rapid deployment force capability exists today. It must be honed to perfection if we are to be able to use it effectively in the national interest. The fundamental design centers on the rapid introduction of a formidable combined arms team—Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps—capable of independent operations or operations with allies and which is capable of being sustained as long as necessary.

Historians have remarkably clear hindsight. They are able to identify features of change and challenge which daily escape us as we ply our respective trades. American historians generally record the beginning of World War II as December 1941. But there are European historians who record it variously: its political roots in the burning of the Reichstag; its military roots in the invasion of Poland, or earlier in the occupation of the Sudatenland, or even earlier in Italy's incursion into Ethiopia. World War II became a reality for us with the attack upon our forces at Pearl Harbor.

In a recent best seller by General Sir John Hackett, "The Third World War", the author posed the question of how future historians might date the beginning of that hypothetical conflict—one I earnestly hope never comes. He concluded that historians will date it from the first day of direct conflict between the two superpowers, though ". . . as far as the people of Africa and Arabia were concerned it had already been in progress for more than a quarter of a century." The Soviets are astute enough historians to recognize that a direct assault on an unmistakably essential element of our domain will draw powerful and angry American response. And I believe the Soviets will try to avoid actions which will cause Americans to unite toward such a common goal. The lessons of history—not lost on them—teach of the tremendous capacity of this nation when focused on a worthwhile single goal. Herb Lockett's efforts to restore and finance housing of the WACO combat glider is a small example of the kind of leadership and collective energy possible here in America.

I sense a gathering coalescence in the spirit of America. The Army's efforts, and those of its sister services, are designed to ensure a capability to respond to whatever our nation demands of us. By having a real and visible military capability, supported by the will to use it if necessary, we are far more likely to get through the decade of the 80's without war and with America's basic liberties intact. The some one million nine hundred thousand men and women of the Total Army are dedicating their energies to attaining that goal for you. . . .

## Hearing Before the HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE Subcommittee on the Department of Defense On the FY 81 DOD Appropriations: Army Posture

5 February 1980

Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my prepared text very briefly, if I might.

. . . I do appreciate this opportunity, my first, to appear before this committee. During my confirmation hearing I pledged to work with Congress towards ensuring that we have the kind of Army that is essential for the survival of this nation. I intend to carry out that legal responsibility.

In putting the budget together this year, three areas of prime concern to me as Chief of Staff of

the Army are the ability to *man the force*, the ability to *modernize it* quickly enough to ensure that we are able to be competitive with the Soviet Union, and the ability to be able to *mobilize and sustain* ourselves if we are called upon to carry out any of our war plans.

Those are the three principal areas where I think we have additional work to do. I do not want to leave you with the impression that I think this budget solves those three problems. They still are serious problems for the Army. . . .

I would add just one word on the importance that we attribute to ensuring that as we work on the Active Army problems, we also work on the Reserve Component problems. Those become increasingly important as we look to the days ahead and the need for a mobilization capability. Effective Reserve Components indicate to the Soviets that we are serious about what we are going to do, and that we have a capability to respond.

Again, I would reiterate that the Army is not perfect, but we have fine young men and women out there. and I am proud of them, I am proud to be Chief of Staff of the Army. All I can to is pledge that for the four years they keep me in that position, I am going to make it a better army with your help.

MR. ADDABBO: Thank you very much, General. May you serve in peace.

GENERAL MEYER: Amen.

MR. ADDABBO:. . . .General Meyer, in your professional opinion do you feel that if control [of strategic mobility forces] was under the Army rather than having to rely in many cases upon the Reserves or other services for that capability, that there would be greater efficiency and greater capability for rapid deployment?

GENERAL MEYER: I think we would have been under the same pressures as the other services. As the G3 of the Army, I have supported the Air Force to increase both strategic airlift and intratheater airlift.

I have also testified in support of the Navy on the requirement for the naval reserve fleet, which was supported by Congress.

Regarding the past, I don't know the answer to your question. In the future, I think the answer is no because there is now enough attention being focused on the importance of airlift and sealift. I don't think putting it under the Army is necessary or would be an advantage today. . . .

MR. ADDABBO:. . . .General Meyer, earlier I asked the Secretary about the size of our ground forces, and the fact that this budget does nothing of significance to increase those ground forces.

Do you feel that the present numbers are sufficient to meet our needs?

GENERAL MEYER: As a member of the JCS, I would say that I am not satisfied that we have sufficient air, land or sea forces to respond to the needs of today.

MR. ADDABBO: Well, as Chief of Staff of the Army, do you feel you have sufficient ground forces in the allocated number?

GENERAL MEYER: No. I do not personally believe that there are adequate land forces to meet our portion of the defense requirements today. . . .

MR. DICKS:. . . .One of the areas of concern is the retention of noncommissioned officers. How many people are you short in this area?

GENERAL MEYER: We are short some 11,000 NCOs.

MR. DICKS: What would you suggest that we try to do about that particular problem?

GENERAL MEYER: I think the items that [the Secretary of the Army] talked to on retention—variable housing allowances, bonuses, giving a Soldier enough for PCS so he doesn't have to take dollars out of his pocket every time he moves, these and other elements that are included in the compensation package, it seems to me, are reasonable incentives to assist us in the retention of middle-grade management.

MR. ROBINSON:. . . .One more general area of questioning. In your joint statement you say that the Army must be ready to go to war today and tomorrow. You then proceed to discuss the organization, manning, equipment and training re-

quirements and deficiencies at the present time.

But I am not at all certain that you have made clear your view as to whether, in fact, the U. S. Army is ready to go today, go to war, and fight a war in a successful manner or if we can even get there in time to be a factor in that war depending on where it might occur—thinking, well of an outbreak in the Far East, for example, Korea or something like that.

Would you address the way that you view the readiness situation right now. . . .

GENERAL MEYER: There is no one Army out there. Right now the forward deployed units are in excellent condition. . . .

That is true in Korea. That is certainly true in Panama. That is true in Europe. We have been able to maintain them in manpower and in equipment. Basically they have been getting the priorities. . . .the later deploying units are less ready. So, in responding to your question, it depends upon the scenario. There are certain shortfalls and I won't get into details, that responds to specific scenarios. . . .

MR. EDWARDS:. . . .General, do you have any strong position with regard to arming other helicopters in addition to the AAH?

GENERAL MEYER: I am, and have been for a long time, a strong proponent of an attack helicopter that can survive on the future battlefield. The attack helicopter that we are working on has that capability. Therefore, I have supported getting on with its development. It has survivability and a capability that I haven't seen in alternatives.

MR. EDWARDS: What about arming others, such as the Blackhawk?

GENERAL MEYER: I would be opposed to arming other helicopters as a substitute for the attack helicopter. Other ships do not have the survivability built into them that it has. It is like taking a cargo aircraft, putting attack systems on it and using it in the attack mode as opposed to taking a fighter aircraft and using it in the attack mode.

They are designed for different missions. . . .If we have the opportunity to upgrade some of the current fleet in addition to developing the attack helicopter, there are advantages to that. . . .

MR. ROBINSON:. . . .To what degree have the field manuals had to be restructured and rewritten in order to accommodate the lack of reading [ability]?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: First, I would like to put the [skill qualification test] in the proper perspective, if I might, Mr. Robinson, and I am responsible for it, so I am being hoisted upon my own petard.

We have tried for a long time to understand and be better able to provide sufficient resources to people in the field to improve training. I will be candid with you; training in the Army went through a very low period in Vietnam, and the knowledge of the young lieutenants and captains and sergeants as to how to train went down just as did many of the other aspects of the Army.

I am speaking as a brigade commander, as an assistant division commander in the United States, and as a division commander in Europe. I did not do as good a job in training my division in Europe as I should have, and I realized that then. We have therefore developed a single set of training standards for the whole Army.

If you are in one of the units at Fort Campbell, or if you are in a unit at Fort Carson, or overseas, there is now a common standard. . . .They are not Meyer's standards, or somebody else's standards, or sergeant so-and-so's standards, but Army standards. They were set at a high level in order to teach NCOs what their Soldiers need to know for the kind of war they might face today. It is not like World War II. A Soldier has to be able to pack up and go to war in Europe on instant notice. Once there he has to be able to get into a tank that belongs to someone else, and he has to know what to do.

We have higher standards in training today with those skill qualifications tests than we have ever had.

Those results are the first attempt at seeing what happened out in the unit the first time. The figures are essentially correct. I directed that test so I would know where we were. I had responsibili-

ty for individual training. What we have done in the last year and a half or two years, since that test, is to focus on basic training—doing three things with an individual when he or she comes into basic training.

One, get them in good physical condition. We have a little more to do on that. No man or woman should leave basic training without feeling he or she has been both challenged and improved physically.

Second, instill discipline so that the Soldier is able to fit into the unit. It is not harsh and tyrannical, but discipline that explains what to expect when he or she goes to a unit.

Third, teach the Soldier the basic skills. I just talked to General Starry last week about his principal responsibility in training new Soldiers. When Soldiers report to their unit, the sergeant is responsible for further training in their specialty skills. The unit NCO is responsible for teaching them how to deal with the tank, up and down, and how to set the mortar tube and how to do all those other things.

So we are trying to raise the training expertise of the NCO as well and that is more critical, in my judgment. As the NCO and the junior officers develop they are better able to train people and we can expand more rapidly if we go to war. That is another purpose of the SQT system.

I would only say to you, as one involved in training, when I look at those figures you quote, I am very concerned. But they were intended to tell us what we need to do so we can train Soldiers to essential levels.

I will take you out, if you like, or one of your staff, to a unit anywhere you pick and look at an SQT being run. I assure you there has been a quantum improvement over time. The officer who conducted that study, General Brown, has a critical and demanding eye. He is now an Assistant Division Commander in Europe and he told me that the training in that division is the best he has seen in the 25 years he has been in the Army. It had a superb trainer before him, and Brown is a good trainer. He has never been in a better trained unit. Why? Because the NCOs are learning and his units have all their NCOs.

I would be lying if I said that is the way it is everywhere in the Army. Back in other units in the United States, where we do not have the full number of NCOs, it is not going that well. Training is spotty in the Army today. But the Skill Qualification Tests will help us have a better trained Army.

That doesn't respond to the basic issue of IIIA, IIIB—the quality of the individual as you defined quality. . . .in the field you really don't know who is a mental category I or II, IIIA or IIIB. So you evaluate Soldiers on how well they do the job. Over all, what it means out in the field, in general, is that the forgetting-curve of some individuals is steeper than others.

Our forgetting-curves are all different. . . .when the forgetting-curve is deep, you have to take Soldiers back out every two weeks instead of every three weeks. . . .

Sergeants, who are most critical, have said to me that in their evaluation of the Soldiers coming in, about 80 percent are no different than their predecessors. About 20 percent are a bit more difficult to train, but they said they are trainable. That was at Fort Polk. I have been asking that question because I think it is one I have to understand. . . .

MR. CHAPPELL: How does TACFIRE enhance or detract from the mobility of Army forces?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, I would like to define mobility differently . . . because I think it is changing in warfare.

In the Civil War, mobility was based on a cavalryman going out, finding the enemy, and then taking weapon systems out there that could attack the enemy. That is essentially what mobility was. It was being able to move out and find the enemy and being able to move firepower out to hit the enemy. There also was a survivability aspect to it. If you were being shot at, mobility allowed you to move more quickly.

As technology has advanced in the Army, there is a question as to whether or not you still need to send people out to find the enemy—or whether you do it with drones, or sensors or with moving target indicators from Air Force aircraft,

radars, and everything else. You have other means now to find the enemy.

That is a part of mobility, and so is the way of putting firepower on them by longer-range weapons systems. I am merely saying that, in my judgment, while you may degrade the ability of a unit to move quickly from one place to another, you have improved mobility on the battlefield because you can now take a target under attack more quickly.

So I just want to be careful. I believe there is a dramatic change taking place in the role of mobility on the battlefield. It is different now than it has been in the past.

MR. DICKS:. . . .Has there been any consideration given to create a mixed division which would include say one mechanized battalion; would such a force mix offer any operational advantages?

GENERAL MEYER: One of the proposals we looked at was combining an infantry brigade, a mechanized brigade, and armored brigade, in what we called a tri-capability division. That was about five or six years ago.

My view is that it is better to train divisions in their infantry mode and then to provide infantrymen to the armored divisions, rather than mix things up. You cannot predict ahead of time exactly what mix an army that gives you enough tanks and enough infantrymen. . . .

I am concerned that we are getting so few Soldiers on the battlefield, that we won't be able to see in the dark, in periods of limited visibility, where you need Soldiers out in the area to see.

MR. DICKS: Since light infantry is easier to move, why not put more heavy divisions in Europe and reduce your airlift requirements.

GENERAL MEYER: That is essentially what we are doing. Our heavy divisions are in Europe, and the light divisions are back here capable of deployment. . . .

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Mobilization

6 February 1980

. . . . In meeting the Army's strategic requirements, it is essential that our war-fighting capability is clearly manifested in forces in being, as well as rooted in concrete and pragmatic plans to mobilize the latent strengths of our industrial society. A deterrent force that is perceived as shallow, having inadequate sustainability as the result of inadequate mobilization plans, may well invite conflict at a level of violence designed to exhaust our forces in being. Such perceptions could constitute a grave danger to the Nation and our vital interests, eventually inviting the wars we seek to deter.

Recent mobilization exercises have revealed serious faults in the mobilization posture of the Services. A comprehensive review of these faults has been conducted and planning has been initiated to correct the deficiencies identified. . . .

Accordingly, it is imperative that we in the Army move with deliberate and sure steps to promptly correct the mobilization problems we have detected. . . .

# Address to the
# THE ATLANTA VI CONFERENCE

Atlanta, Georgia
14 February 1980

. . . this gathering between the Army's procurement experts and industry [provides] a unique opportunity to engage in creative and essential dialogue.

. . . .The genesis of these seminars was the perception that inadequate understanding existed at the top executive levels of industry and the Army regarding one another's goals, means, problems, intents and commitments, as they impacted upon the individual health of our separate, yet interwoven, destinies. . . .

But let's go back to that first Executive Seminar [in 1974]. . . .It was a cloudy time for industry—especially for those civilian industries allied with our [Army's] destiny. Faced with unpredictable national commitment to defense expenditures, there was a clear need to examine the prospect of continued profitability through continued and substantial interest, association, or dependence upon the military customer. I understand well the disincentives when private investment gears up to meet government demand—to find that expectation tail off into excess plant, bloated engineering staffs, wasted labor pools, and dissastisfied investors.

. . . .I do not know the degree to which changing national directions or lack of service "constancy of purpose" in specific programs can be effectively compared with the alternative hazards of the civilian market place: the fickle taste of the consumer, bloc obsolescence of plant through technological advancement, the impact of regulatory action, foreign competition, and the like. Perhaps because business schools are founded on the private economy, these latter hazards are taken better in stride—more predictable and perhaps somewhat more controllable. I can't judge.

Neither am I able to judge well to what degree we have actually experienced non-recoverable loss of domestic productive capacity through flig[illegible]lternate markets, obsolescence, or environmental closures. But I am concerned about our industrial base, not only because of its capacity to meet our needs for that first day of war, but for companion capabilities to support the Army through the other two days of war as well. I don't know how long the second day of war—the time of actual conflict—may last. But I hope it's not long, because my perception today is that the Arsenal of Democracy is in an alarming state of despair and obsolescence—certainly not up to the prodigious efforts of the past.

The effort to bring on today's equipment for the day before the war presents real challenges: the duration of the acquisition cycle; the quality of the product, its cost, contracting deficiencies and disincentives; concerns about schedules, affordability and the like. But there are people interested and actively working on these problems—certainly hopeful of solution before (Norm) Augustine's VIIIth Law takes effect. ("In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one tactical aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared between the Air Force and Navy 3-1/2 days each per week.") Someone, somewhere, is interested and dedicated to solving managerial problems pertinent to the day before the war.

But who is preparing for the contingency that we may miscalculate the length of the future conflict we seek to deter? Who outside the workgroup that will meet there this afternoon is examining the larger ramifications of the day of and the day after the war?

There are precedents for miscalculations as to how long wars might last. . . .The only reason we were marginally prepared for World War II, as I discussed at an NSIA session in November, was because we had a few years to contemplate and had ocean barriers to provide the luxury of time. With time one can build production facilities, tool up and convert industrial plants. . . .

Obviously, readiness of the force today—maintenance of the deterrent—is the preeminent



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factor in our planning. But the ability to sustain intense warfare must be taken into consideration as well. The brevity of the last two wars in the Middle East may be a harbinger of things to come, but we cannot count on it. There is an adage: "He who prepares only for a short war is likely to get one."

I am not proposing a massive refurbishment of the industrial base at this time; the costs would undoubtedly be staggering. I am proposing a rather rigorous inventory of critical production capacities in machine tools, casting and forging capacity, precision bearings, semiconductors, strategic metals (e.g., titanium, cobalt, and chromium) and technical manpower skills; as well as civilian oriented output with immediately transferable military use (e.g., truck production, light aircraft, constructive equipment) as the initial basis for national industrial contingency planning. The Army intends to seek industrial participation in the next major mobilization exercise, MOBEX 80, and these kinds of data can provide the primer for the industrial planning which should accompany such national mobilization exercises. As General of the Army Omar Bradley said some years ago: "Nations, not armies, go to war." We need to fully open our eyes to those problem areas which must be rapidly addressed on the second day of the war. Congressman Santini recently highlighted the uncertainty of materials' availability: "Defense has been accustomed to say to industry, this is what we need, build it and until now industry has always had the materials to produce. The question we must explore is not only availability, but the vulnerability of strategic minerals essential to our productive capacity. None of you need reminding that industry figures already show greater than 50 percent dependence on foreign sources for most of the key minerals essential to industrial production.

When the Russian begins to act in the marketplace procuring minerals in which we believe him to be already self-sufficient, and when the major sources of such materials as cobalt (Zaire) and chromium (Rhodesia and S. Africa) lie in the eye of potential disruptions, we ought to critically examine our own posture relative to those materials and their impact on our production capabilities in wartime.

. . . I must [also] admit to concern as my eye passes over economic reports on the health, or lack thereof, of industrial sectors which bear heavily on land combat potential: steel, automotives, electronics, shipbuilding, as well as service sectors critical to their expansion, such as rail.

None of what I've discussed represents a totally neglected area. We all know that. But what we need to do is to preclude surprises under actual conditions of emergency, and to find the kind of incentives which will ensure that U. S. industry is in the best state possible to respond when called upon.

With an eye to maintaining a capacity for some surge production in wartime, the Army's procurement program over the next 5 years will deliberately hold production rates of some systems to rates less than economically optimal. In part this is dictated by our desire to field simultaneously, at least in some quantities, the entire family of new weapons whose full effectiveness depends upon their complimentarity on tomorrow's battlefield. The most critical systems will be procured at near maximum rates, but there will be a residual production capacity in other systems which can come into play quite quickly. This assures maintenance of a warm base across the spectrum of new systems, a procedure we judge superior to a buy[illegible] and subsequent plant retirement.

The major issue beyond this is what can we do together on a low cost basis to further enhance the industrial ready reserve available to the nation?

I recognize that the private enterprise system was not built on charity—rather on a hard-nosed, profit-oriented environment. Can we put dollars and cents down against some set of priorities—based on the kind of groundwork survey I've talked about—which could serve as a prospective claimant for federal dollars—e.g.,

- multi-year procurement budgeting

- tax reform to promote more liberal writeoff of capital investment

- others?

Let me leave you with the simple words of an American President, infrequently quoted (Calvin

Coolidge), who in dedicating the battle monument to the First Infantry Division in Washington after the Great War said:

"For each of us, our country will be about what we make it."

## WHITE PAPER 1980

25 February 1980

A Prefacing Letter to the
Soldiers and Civilians of the U.S. Army

This white paper is my effort to explain to you my view—my vision if you will—of the Army of the 80's.

Some have asked why such a white paper is needed. They have contended that the posture papers which go to Congress from the Defense Department lay out the Army of the future. There is an element of truth to such contentions.

However, I believe at this juncture in history I owe it to you to lay out my vision of the Army of the 80's. If you understand the big picture, you are far more likely to understand how important your particular role is in causing that vision to materialize.

This white paper will not quell challenges—from without or from within—nor should it. What it does do is provide a framework through which the Army of the 80's can be molded into the disciplined, well-trained force it must be if it is to join with the other Services in providing the defense establishment our nation needs in the critical decade ahead.

## OVERVIEW OF STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

THE "THREE DAYS OF WAR." In the most basic sense, the strategic requirements of the 1980s are to prepare for the "Three Days of War": to *deter* the day before war; to *fight* the day of war; and to *terminate* conflict in such a manner that on the day after war, the United States and its allies enjoy an acceptable level of security.

The U. S. commitment to the NATO Alliance will remain the cornerstone of our foreign policy during the 1980s. The future credibility of deterrence in Europe is directly related to the NATO nations' willingness to meet Warsaw Pact improvements through the dedication of manpower and the modernization of weapons. To the extent we do not structure and posture forces in accordance with our declaratory deterrent policy, we invite the very war we seek to deter.

The threats to U. S. interests beyond Europe likely to emerge in the decades ahead will be extraordinarily diverse. The increased demand for limited resources worldwide is likely to undergird confrontations. They include not only the USSR, but heavily armed Soviet surrogates and independent, militarily sophisticated Third World nations. Threats to U. S. security outside of Europe in the 1980s will span an increased spectrum of conflict ranging from terrorism to insurgency to highly intense conventional warfare. Such contingencies could occur in a variety of militarily demanding environments, from deserts to mountainous regions to tropical rain forests. The requirement for flexibility is apparent.

THE CHALLENGE. The most demanding challenge confronting the US military in the decade of the 1980s is to develop and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside of Europe, without compromising the decisive theater in Central Europe.

This challenge will force the American military to set priorities and to accept risks which it would prefer to avoid. But the erosion of the strategic force balance, significant growth of Soviet power projection capabilities, and the emergence of regional threats place new demands at a time when all Services face severe and prolonged resource constraints. In such an environment, our requirements for additional resources must be matched by the demonstrated

ability to use more wisely those provided to us.

In short, the Army of the 1980s faces a strategic requirement for unprecedented flexibility: flexibility in tactical employment options; in strategic deployability; in our thinking, as well as in our force structure.

## FORCE STRUCTURE

The challenge that confronts the Army is to bring the force structure into harmony in terms of its manning, equipment, and training—all keyed to missions. The basic tasks for the Active and Reserve Components are relatively clear; the active forces maintain our overseas commitments, respond on short notice to non-NATO contingencies, and provide the initial surge forces until the reserve forces can be mobilized and deployed. On the other hand, the mix of heavy and light forces, the appropriate support structure, and the degree of modernization are areas where difficult tradeoffs must be made. An optimum response to these diverse demands on the Army is the central issue. Clearly, the problems of limited strategic lift and the loss of flexibility which result from expanded prepositioned sets of equipment force us to maximize the utility of light forces both in NATO and in other contingencies. Conversely, where heavy forces are required, both in NATO and elsewhere, we must recognize the need, carefully determine when those forces are required, and make the difficult decisions necessary to make their employment possible.

We must enhance readiness in three key areas now:

1. The capability of the Active units of the Rapid Deployment Force to deploy by both sea and air must be improved significantly. The capability of these forces to counter the more sophisticated threat in regions other than Central Europe also must be enhanced through near-term and long-term improvements.

2. The active units with unit sets in NATO must continue to improve their capability to deploy, draw their equipment, and prepare for combat.

3. Reserve units reinforcing NATO must continue to focus on readiness in order to improve their capability to meet the requirements for rapid mobilization and deployment.

Our capabilities to project combat power worldwide must be improved. We are approaching the upper limits of feasibility in the POMCUS programmed for Europe. Further improvement must come from improved strategic mobility (particularly fast sealift), force structure changes, Host Nation Support, and, where possible, lighter more capable forces. The strategic deployability of the Army's rapid deployment forces must make a quantum improvement. There will be no major near-term improvement in the capability of airlift to move heavy forces. We must seek alternatives such as deployment by fast moving Roll-On Roll-Off ships, and light, mobile anti-armor capable forces that can be deployed by air.

The present 24 division structure (16 Active and 8 Reserve Component) remains a minimum prudent force, but must be continually examined and refined to ensure that forces are designed and allocated properly. In order to avoid having to go to war with a pickup team Army forces must be structured based on warfighting requirements—preferably in separate packages geared to distinct contingences, but all with utility in the NATO environment.

FORCES FOR NATO. The defense of NATO will continue to be the most demanding scenario facing us in the 1980s and will remain a keystone of our national military strategy. NATO provides the central focus for land forces and will have the ultimate impact on the force structure of the Army.

1. Our current program for the rapid reinforcement of NATO has focused on the early deployment of heavy forces. However, we must continually examine the utility of light, rapidly deployable divisions in Central Europe to achieve a balance of heavy and light forces that will provide a better overall defense posture given the terrain variations and urban sprawl that exists and is projected in much of the region.

2 As we refine the structure of the Army's objective division for the 1980s (Division 86) and the significant force structure pressures resulting from it, we shall consider variations of the roundout concept. To retain 16 active flags and accommodate Division 86 structure requirements, we must consider wider use of Reserve Component

round out units (companies, battalions, or brigades) to fully structure the divisions. With the exception of the rapid deployment forces, CONUS-based units may have to be structured with a mix of Active strength and Reserve strength keyed to their deployment sequence.

3. To maximize our early combat power, we must continue to seek ways to take advantage of the extensive European infrastructure and the potential for additional Host Nation Support. However, essential Active and Reserve support units must be retained in the structure.

FORCES FOR NON-NATO CONTINGENCIES. The forces identified for non-NATO contingencies must be designed to fight and win quickly and decisively against a sophisticated enemy. While the packages for non-NATO contingencies must allow for a continuum of responses ranging from counterterrorism through a light show of force to a heavy corps-size force, or even more, the emphasis must be on rapid and successful accomplishment of the task.

In order to ensure U. S. domination of the battlefield and rapid termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States, rapid deployment forces must be designed to optimize the capability of select combat forces.

It is essential that we organize our force packages to be tailored efficiently and rapidly to meet the threat, accommodate the terrain, and avoid piecemeal commitment of inadequate forces.

*Light Infantry Force Packages.* Light infantry force packages for rapid deployment missions should be aimed at regions characterized by mountainous terrain, urban areas, tropic rain forest, and arctic climates. The light package should include air mobile/air cavalry units and supporting arms and combat service support essential for the theater and threat composition.

*Medium Force Packages.* Medium force packages for rapid deployment missions should be capable of rapid response worldwide and capable of countering initial armored threats until heavier force packages can reinforce. These forces will be characterized by tactical mobility and armor defeating capability. Such forces should include air assault/air cavalry and light, mobile anti-armor capability.

*Heavy Force Packages.* Heavy force packages for rapid deployment missions should be oriented upon desert and steppe regions such as those found in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. They also must be able to counter a sophisticated Soviet or Soviet supported threat outside of Central Europe.

Given the limited sustainment capability of most potential adversaries, the critical phase of the conflict is likely to take place within the first few weeks as enemy forces attempt a quick, decisive victory. In most cases where a sophisticated threat is present, there will be a need for some anti-armor capability early. The limitations posed by strategic airlift argue in favor of further development of fast sealift and some form of limited prepositioning. A force element, incorporating new technologies in conjunction with light infantry, could enhance flexibility and achieve the early presence necessary to preclude an unopposed threat victory and permit U. S. forces to gain the initiative. This concept would be enhanced by designing follow-on heavy forces that could begin immediate movement on positioned Roll-On Roll-Off ships when the decision to commit forces is made.

*Balanced Force Packages.* Balanced force packages for rapid deployment missions should be oriented upon that range of terrain (environments) that encompasses both the characteristics of inaccessible or mountainous regions and of steppe regions or broad armor avenues of approach. Such force packages should consist of select light infantry formations, select armored formations, air, and armored cavalry suitable for dominating a range of environments appropriate for classic light infantry and combined arms roles. The unique capabilities of the other Services will play an important role in determining the precise force for a specific operation.

Simply stated, the forces committed should be designed to facilitate rapid deployment, exploit technological advantages, and meet the requirement for lean, hard-hitting combat forces. They must be capable of the full range of combined arms operations to carry the fight to the enemy, quickly dominating the battlefields, and decisively defeating the opponent in a highly mobile environ-

ment against sophisticated enemy forces.

THE INTEGRATED BATTLEFIELD. We must aggressively define our nuclear and chemical doctrine, articulate it clearly, and gain its acceptance by the national leadership and our allies. This doctrine must be accompanied by the necessary force structure, equipment, supplies, and training to provide credible deterrence. The doctrinal thrust for use of nuclear weapons delivery systems and second echelon forces. We must continually train to operate in chemical, nuclear and conventional environments.

These objectives can be achieved by fielding a survivable and highly accurate mix of tactical nuclear forces and retaliatory chemical weapons systems. Targeting cells at division, corps and echelons above the corps will translate doctrine into capability as well as maximize the potential use of air and ground systems. There is a commensurate need for an upgraded communication system to connect these targeting cells with the target acquisition systems and nuclear delivery units.

DIVISION 86. The Army will move ahead with the Division 86 Study and the concept of a standard heavy division with flexible tactical organizational structure. Division 86 will provide an objective force from which analysis of the equipment and personnel requirements can be conducted, and the necessary follow-on decisions made. Specifically, it is the vehicle for addressing such major force structure issues as the size of the division, its required administrative and logistical capabilities, its aviation structure, and the allocation of responsibilities at each echelon.

In addition to Division 86 (Heavy), the Army 86 studies also encompass the light division, corps, and echelons above corps. Force structure requirements resulting from these studies must be viewed from a Total Army standpoint to ensure proper force balance.

Current battlefield technology has dictated a major review of structural requirements. Clearly, the roles of brigade and division commanders have expanded. The brigade commander will be required to take on more of the first echelon fight, while the division commander must see deeper and be capable of also engaging the second echelon regiments. As a consequence, the Army must focus on determining the proper division of functional efforts and responsibilities among corps, division and brigade.

SUPPORT STRUCTURE. The Active Army will continue for sometime to experience an imbalance in combat to support ratios, and must rely on the Reserve Component and negotiated Host Nation Support to compensate for support shortfalls. This imbalance must be continually examined and reassessed to ensure that needed combat service support requirements are identified and improvements made.

The functions of combat and support are interdependent; each is an integral part of the total combat power equation. Requirements for both must be expressed in a reasoned and convincing way that enhances deterrence and demonstrates that we are not building a hollow force; rather, our Army in the field must be able to fight and sustain itself. We must strive to continually improve our development of support requirements based on definitive workload factors and credible analytic processes. It is essential that we complement this unilateral endeavor with a concerted joint effort to develop increasingly detailed contingency plans that identify explicit support requirements and shortfalls.

The corps will remain a tactical and administrative headquarters. There is a pressing need to better assess the functional relationships not only between division, corps, and echelons above corps level, but also to optimize their interface with the U. S.-based wholesale systems. The wholesale and retail support relationships within the United States must be examined more carefully from installation, support, deployment, and sustainment perspectives in order to assure the Army's effectiveness to deploy forces rapidly.

A key to winning the first battle, as well as the second and the last battle, is an adequate sustaining capability. Maintenance, transportation and other service support gives us this needed dimension. We need to quantify the workloads so that we can better define the needs for this support. Moreover, we should be prepared to show how service support and sustainability add a combat multiplier to our total battlefied capability. The sinews of support are a basic ingredient for the U. S. Army's combat muscle.

## MANNING THE TOTAL FORCE

Manning the total force is the major challenge the Army faces today. In the near term we must focus our attention on the special problems of recruiting and retaining sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to meet our immediate needs. In the longer term we must develop a more effective personnel management strategy, one which more accurately identifies requirements and better articulates resources necessary to satisfy those requirements. We must recruit and retain those personnel who possess the motivation and qualifications necessary to make a positive contribution to the Total Force. And we must recruit and retain them in the numbers necessary to man the structure required in the 80's and 90's. Concerned leadership and attention to the needs of the individual will continue to be major determinants of the success of our recruiting and retention efforts. Commitment on the part of the Army's personnel—uniformed and civilian, Active and Reserve Component—demands our reciprocal commitment to improved quality of life of the individual. Positive leadership, retention of the tie between the Soldier and his leadership over time, concern for the individual, and improved quality of life offer the framework within which esprit and cohesion are built.

Our immediate concern is accessing to meet our requirements today by balancing qualification and potential capability in our new recruits. The recruiting message must include the profession—as well as the occupation—and the positive image of service to the nation and pride in that service. Recruiting is not only the job of the recruiter, but also the responsibility of the commands, the commanders, and the individual members of the Army team.

Additional resources are required to build and sustain a recruiting system which will produce the accessions required; progress is possible given adequate funding. The FY 80 Budget Amendment and FY 81 Supplemental request seek sufficient resources for our initiatives. Bonuses for critical skills, 2-year and 3-year enlistment option programs, split training, and direct enlistment into the IRR offer prospects for strength increases in the Active, Reserve Component and trained manpower pool over the next several years.

Army civilians are also a vital part of the Total Army, but external constraints on grade limitation and hiring ceilings have impacted adversely on their retention. We must be able to indicate clearly the impact on readiness of changes in civilian end strength. Additionally, each military manager must take an active interest in the professional development of civilian employees. In order to retain our civilian employees, we must display the highest level of human concern and provide a climate for personal growth and job satisfaction.

Cohesion is a product of policy and actions at all levels to establish strong interpersonal bonds which mold a unit into a cohesive team. Officers must understand that loyalty downward breeds cohesion and must ensure that a climate of loyalty—upward and downward—is established. NCOs need to be developed to a higher degree than ever before and the NCO must train, lead, and care for his Soldiers. We must focus on teamwork at the lowest level of our organizations where cohesion is most essential. We must begin to think, for example, in terms of increased unit training—emphasizing the individual as a member of the team.

Our success in manning the Total Force in 1980-82 will determine the base for the Army in the years beyond. The Army must compete successfully for and judiciously apply the required resources while examining alternatives to existing policies for future applicability. Developing cohesive units over time must be the central focus of such efforts. Leaders in the field must lead, motivate, and help mold our Soldiers and civilians into cohesive units capable of accomplishing wartime missions under what may well be the most demanding circumstance any army has ever experienced. Recruiting and retention are everybody's business.

## MANAGEMENT OF MODERNIZATION

Next to manning the force, the management of modernization is the most complex challenge facing the Army in the 1980s. Modern weapons systems will be integrated into the force at an unprecedented rate. However, current economic in-



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flationary trends raise the price of the Army-preferred modernization rate above provided resource ceilings. Consequently, if we are to exploit the technological advantages of these modern weapons and support systems, we must make the hard decisions that maximize the return on the defense resource investment.

The Army is making a concerted effort to attain a required rate of modernization within the limits of constrained dollars. The resultant Army Modernization Program is the largest in peacetime history and is *intended* to achieve at least technological equivalence in fielded systems by 1985 and superiority by 1990. However, while planned procurement for modernization during the FY 81-85 period is on the order of $33 billion, it will not buy all the required systems.

To improve the return on investment, the Army is developing a comprehensive acquisition plan which prioritizes resources for those systems which enhance force capability by the greatest amount. The plan will provide a mechanism to develop a common denominator for comparison of dissimilar systems. Since no such mechanism currently exists, one which will optimize return on investment needs to be developed. This plan will be translated into a long range research, development and acquisition plan against which we can measure progress and weigh the value of making changes. Furthermore, the acquisition plan must be consistent with sound tactical and logistical judgment. We should invest the necessary resources in systems which exploit our strengths and our adversary's weaknesses. In this regard, priority of resources should be assigned to those items which provide a force multiplier effect for combat, combat support, and combat service support mission areas. For example, our ability to counter enemy command, control and communication systems will compete with our ability to counter armor vehicles.

The acquisition plan also needs to be based on sound business principles. Specifically, the most efficient buy should be the rule. Therefore, only selected *economic buys* should be accelerated. Conversely, programs with marginal returns on investment should be delayed or deferred. With regard to trade-offs, we should invest in modernization areas where significantly larger readiness dollars would otherwise be required. Another essential component of acquisition planning is a provision for time-phasing of major programs to allow for continual improvement in all mission areas at coordinated rates of advance. Finally, the acquisition plan should recognize the activity of the private sector and elect either not to compete for scarce production capacity during a given period or to recognize the increased cost when such competition is necessary.The acquisition plan, once developed by the Army leadership, requires total Army support and necessary discipline to ensure that we do not decrement our programs in a piecemeal fashion.

The Army must take a broad perspective and properly integrate our acquisition plan into overall Army plans. Inherent in this concept is the identification of total requirements to support each new system. Mutually coordinated commitments must be obtained from both Project Managers and the Major Commands. As we field new systems, the importance of integrated logistics systems, manpower and training requirements, and maintenance needs must be recognized. Manpower requirements must define numbers, skills, grades, and costs to recruit, train, and retain Soldiers to man the systems. To ensure this coordination, the Army Force Modernization Coordination Office has been created with the responsibility for integrating all training, logistics, and personnel plans to support fielding of the new systems. Finally, our perspective should reflect trade-off considerations for maintaining an industrial mobilization base. Our procurement plan must accept the short term cost of a broad based modern industrial mobilization capability. This base may, of necessity, include producing some new equipment on a less than optimal basis.

The Army must consider the *total system.* A comprehensive, coordinated acquisition plan is needed to provide not only efficient development and acquisition but also successful fielding—a total systems approach.

## TRAINING THE FORCE

Training in the 80's continues to be the priority effort of commanders. Their focus must be the total preparation of each Army unit to go to war—and win.

Constraints on people, dollars, and time have

led us to a training strategy which will optimize force readiness through careful coordination among the components of the Army training system: individual training, unit training, and training support. Fully trained individuals and fully trained units are a corporate responsibility.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. The first task of individual training is to properly match the new Soldier to a targeted skill needed by the force. To do this well—fulfilling the needs of both the individual and the Service—requires that we refine and standardize our understanding of and measure of such things as trainability, motivation, and aptitude, as well as the optimal method for conduct of training.

The object of the individual training phase is to graduate motivated, disciplined, and physically capable Soldiers who are equipped with those specific skills they need to survive in combat. Additionally, it must be a tough and challenging experience by which each new Soldier gains an appreciation that unit success comes only from individual commitment to a team effort. Both the individual training effort and team-building demand a strong cadre of qualified trainers. These are the Army's noncommissioned officers. To ensure their effectiveness, we must provide comprehensive training and education equal to the complex nature of the Army of the 1980's. NCO development programs pointed to molding effective leaders and trainers have top priority, not only in formal courses but also in unit schooling under the tutelage of officers and experienced NCOs.

Throughout, we must make better use of the wealth of training materials available. Realistic training at much reduced cost is of obvious benefit to the entire Army.

And we must act to minimize diversions from training. Time is a nonrecuperable asset we cannot afford to waste.

Finally, we must devise more effective mechanisms to regularly advise the training base about the quality of performance of its graduates. In turn, the Training and Doctrine Command must find means to rapidly adjust training programs in response to such input from the field. The potential to refine the qualification tests now available within units must be fully explored for these purposes.

UNIT TRAINING. Because of resource constraints, the training base will not be able to train Soldiers in all required tasks. Consequently, individual training will consume more of the unit commander's time. His challenge is to integrate this into unit training to mutual benefit. Concurrent and reinforcement training is much preferable to any "back to basics" approach. With time of the essence, commanders must determine their priorities and lay out training programs at least 90 days in advance at the brigade level. Once the commitment of time is made to companies—and it should be no less than 30 days in advance—each level of command must act to protect that commitment so that our junior officers, their NCOs, and the individual Soldier understand the task at hand. The Soldier needs to know that his time is valuable and so regarded by his leaders. Commanders at each level, having done their best to forecast demands, must act as "heat-shields" to ensure adherence to such projections.

The cohesion that matters on the battlefield is that which is developed at the company, platoon, and squad levels. We cannot afford to place the burden of adjusting to "brush fires" on those fragile organizations. They must be protected by higher echelons fulfilling their coordinating roles so that changes to training schedules become the exception, not the rule.

The standards contained in the unit evaluation programs will remain the principal guidelines for the unit proficiency so vital to success in combat.

Techniques to allocate, use, and account for all available training resources obviously need work. The Battalion Training Management System provides an effective vehicle to train officers and NCOs in the planning, conduct, and evaluation of training. The Training Management Control System also assists in getting the most out of available resources. Its full implementation will assist units in scheduling training and in identifying costs associated with training events.

Units' training objectives must emphasize the capability to deploy rapidly in support of contingency plans and the ability to fight as cohesive combined arms teams. Simulations and wargaming provide alternative means to train commanders and staffs while NCOs take Soldiers through multi-echelon training.

What is true for the Active Army is equally true for the Reserve Components. To meet their unique situation, they need clear linkage to their wartime missions, planning, and command relationships for those missions, and hands-on skill training with that equipment which they will be assigned upon mobilization. Such a linkage recently has been developed.

TRAINING SUPPORT. Our plans for the National Training Center rapidly are becoming a reality. It will provide two weeks of realistic combat training for our heavy battalions, to include air deployment, movement of equipment from prepositioning, and engagement against a sophisticated opposing force in a sophisticated electronic warfare environment. Full integration of artillery and air support with the ground maneuver is part and parcel of this program. This collaboration with the Air Force in continuous development of air/land tactics and doctrine is an important side benefit.

Worldwide, ranges and training areas will be managed under the Army Master Range Plan—a plan which will match the training demands of new equipment and force structure with well-designed ranges and training areas.

Ammunition is expensive. The desirability of minimizing the diversion of dollar resources to ammunition consumption for training purposes challenges us to use substitute training devices for development of weapons proficiency wherever possible. Training ammunition will be managed to obtain the maximum training value from each round expended.

Over the decade the Army will invest several billion dollars in research, development, and procurement of training devices. These devices, which are intended to reduce fuel usage, cut training costs, and improve training effectiveness must be integrated aggressively into training programs lest they become themselves wasteful expenditures.

To maintain readiness during receipt of new equipment, innovations in training transition strategies are required. Intensive training in newly equipped units is essential if we are to benefit fully from the capabilities of new systems. *In any epoch, the difference between a rabble and an effective professional Army is training. No task is more important* than training as we face this decade.

## MOBILIZING THE FORCE

The current and projected growth and readiness improvements of potential adversaries have narrowed the gap between warning and attack times. This places enormous requirements on the Army's capacity to mobilize rapidly, deploy, and sustain the land battle. The Active force is dependent on a responsive Reserve Component which is dependent on a ready mobilization base; additionally, we must have an adequate national preparedness capability to sustain the Services.

In the post-Vietnam period, mobilization exercises have greatly expanded current mobilization experience on a Defense Department-wide basis. The results of these exercises candidly revealed significant deficiencies that are now being addressed by remedial planning and programming actions and span the entire spectrum of mobilization requirements for the Army.

The Army's mobilization objective is to assure the Army is postured *in peacetime* to mobilize its forces in wartime in accordance with established and exercised plans to include expansion of the training and support base. The Army will continue to work on assuring this objective can be met. The Army strategy for mobilization includes: providing the capability to plan flexibly and implement rapidly partial or full mobilization by maximizing force responsiveness in the early periods, emphasizing execution through effective command and control, and using existing facilities to limit peacetime costs.

Near term programs to implement the strategy include increasing the equipment fill and readiness of early deploying Active Component and Reserve Component units, conducting mobilization training, preparing for mobilization manpower replacements and training requirements, and limited preparation of the mobilization stations' capability. Long term efforts seek to integrate the planning and allocation systems and to provide a comprehensive framework for improved mobilization capability.

Despite these actions, it is likely that resources committed to this aspect of deterrence

will need to be increased. The Army is continuing to refine estimates of its mobilization capability under emergency conditions and is evaluating the price tag for corrective actions.

Lack of adequate pretrained manpower is a continuing problem which needs attention if the Total Force is to be properly balanced. This issue is directly related to the President's decision to register as a step toward improving our mobilization capability.

Automation and communication equipment to link existing mobilization systems and facilities needs modernization and expansion. Some of these modernization projects are in current programs, but other critical needs remain to be supported.

A program designed to align Reserve Component units in peacetime with their wartime chain of command is being introduced and should improve the mission orientation, readiness, and transition of all Reserve Component units.

Medical support requirements in mobilization exceed the CONUS-based medical capacity of the Army. Shortfalls exist in pretrained personnel and facilities. Even using temporary facilities, a significant percent of the patient bed load will be obtained from non-Army sources under current casualty projections. This area requires continued review and effort to ensure adequate medical support for our Soldiers.

The early demand for trained personnel will cause demands for training base expansion. The Army must be prepared to train sufficient personnel to meet the manpower requirements of the forces as they are committed on the battlefield. Planning initiatives and program proposals are being developed to increase early trainee input and compress training time.

To provide a mobilization surge capacity, a "warm" industrial base is needed to include not only the government owned base, but the much larger privately owned industrial base as well. Planning agreements must be obtained and other variations of production preparedness must be investigated for the Army's most critical needs. The transportation system—including reception and outloading capacities at depots, arsenals, ports, and airheads—requires an indepth appraisal. Use of nondeploying Reserve Component units to satisfy wholesale base manpower requirements also requires consideration. Finally, construction requirements at Army installations must be identified for contracts by the Army Corps of Engineers.

While many mobilization requirements are long range issues, there are many tasks which will upgrade the immediate capacity to go to war despite current mobilization shortfalls. These include: resolution of the distribution plans for equipment left by units falling in on prepositioned sets; refinement of expansion requirements for civilian and military personnel at mobilization stations; determination of drawdown policies for emergency fill of early deploying units; provisions for continuity of garrison command at mobilization stations; resolution of personnel allocation and cross-leveling authority; and advance provisioning for individual clothing and equipment, unit replacement parts, and required packing and movement materials.

Once mobilized, forces in combat must be sustained. Doctrine indicates reliance upon prepositioned war reserve stocks until normal resupply is established. Prepositioning levels must be raised if we are to support our forward deployed units. Stocks in U. S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) depots must be adequate to meet the demands. Filling any war reserve shortfalls will compete for the limited lift required to rapidly deploy forces. Some improvement in prepositioning levels will occur during the next few years, but other program trade-offs may be required if critical items needed in the early days are to be stocked adequately.

Mobilization potential and sustainability are critical elements of strategic deterrence. Shortcomings in either act to undermine the credibility of our forward deployed forces and compromise the utility of CONUS-based reinforcements.

## SUMMARY

The decade of the 80's, beginning as it does with evident hazard to critical national interests, looks to be a time of challenge, a time of continuing potential crisis. Such situations pose great dangers. For the nation prepared, they also pro-

vide great opportunities. The U. S. Army—by its preparations toward a real and visible military capability—seeks to see the nation and its values sustained through the critical decade of the 80's.

## Hearing Before The SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE On the FY 81 DOD Appropriation: Army Programs

26 February 1980

## PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL EDWARD C. MEYER, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the posture of the United States Army and the impact of the proposed fiscal year 1981 budget and out-year programs on this posture. During my confirmation hearings before this committee last June, I stated that I intended to work with and assist the Congress, which shares with the President the responsibility for our common defense. It is in this context that I welcome this opportunity to be with you today. I am particularly pleased to have with me Major General Walker, Director, Army National Guard; and Major General Berkman, Chief, United States Army Reserve. The more than 535,000 citizen Soldiers of the National Guard and Army Reserve represent a critical and integral element in the readiness equation upon which the Total Army concept relies.

The Army's mission, along with that of our sister services, is to defend the territorial integrity and national interests of the United States. The threat to world peace posed by the growth in Soviet military capabilities, and that state's willingness to use those capabilities both directly and indirectly, is increasingly obvious. Anyone who might previously have doubted the Soviet Union's historic and ideological commitment to global expansion and Soviet willingness to apply military force in its pursuit today faces hard and contrary evidence. Along with 20,000 Cuban troops, Soviet forces underwrite the communist-backed regime in Ethiopia and Soviet agents actively foster regional instability in other areas of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and in the Middle East. Afghanistan is today the unwitting host of a 60,000 man Soviet invasion force—a force which poses a serious threat to neighboring Pakistan and to the energy lifeline of much of the free world.

Today, a precarious imbalance exists between our conventional warfighting capability and that of the Soviet Union. The $39.1 billion requested for fiscal year 1981 and the programs included in subsequent years are aimed at redressing this imbalance by the mid-1980's. Our continuing goal ... is to improve Army Force Readiness—the way we organize, man, equip, and train Army forces and how well we can mobilize, deploy and sustain those forces in combat, if required. In each of the measurable areas of force readiness we seek both near and long-term improvement. I would like to briefly highlight some of those improvements and the challenges which remain.

Our objective in organizing Army forces is to achieve the optimum number and the right type of maneuver and fire support units with the requisite support structure to assure their success in battle. This requires a continuous evaluation of the increasingly dynamic battlefield environment and encompasses the Total Army, its Active and Reserve units, and its military and civilian members. In the near-term we seek continuing improvements in our chemical defense capabilities, adding additional companies, teams, and specialists to units in the field. We are also add-

ing to our electronic warfare and intelligence gathering capabilities in the Active Force and plan similar improvements in our Reserve Components.

Two principal thrusts have characterized Army force structure initiatives in recent years. The first has been to improve the combat-to-support or tooth-to-tail ratio. This was accomplished largely through internal management actions, reducing headquarters and logistics structure and transferring residual functions to the Reserve Components. The second principal thrust has been to "heavy-up" the force, increasing tank and mechanized infantry forces through unit activations and conversions from light infantry. Unfortunately, this second initiative increased support requirements while the first reduced support capabilities, producing a force structure imbalance. We are now beginning to redress this imbalance, with the restoration of some 2,600 support spaces in fiscal year 1981.

We also seek to further improve the planned wartime integration of Active and Reserve forces and to expand those programs which contribute to the Total Army as a reality, not simply as a concept. . . .

In the long-term, my concern is that the modernization of Army force structure keep pace with the modernization of Army equipment. It is not a matter of designing equipment which "fits" Army forces, nor of organizing forces to use new equipment, but of designing both equipment and forces which satisfy the projected demands of future battlefields. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command has been tasked to develop an "objective" force structure for the 1986 timeframe. That effort, designated the Division 86 Study, will help us understand the kind of heavy and light divisions needed in order to operate effectively in the environment of the mid-1980's and the nature of support they will require. It will also help affect the timely integration of modern weapons and equipment into organizations compatible with the full potential of those new systems.

*The most urgent challenge* facing the Army today is that of adequately manning the Total Army—our ability to attract and retain qualified men and women in the Active and Reserve Components and in the civilian workforce. As you know, the Army has recently experienced difficulty in recruiting new Soldiers to the Active Force. In fiscal year 1979 we fell short of our end strength by more than 15,000 Soldiers. Several factors contributed to this situation—ranging from an apparent disinclination of youth to serve their country to the effects of inflation and repeated pay caps on the attractiveness of Army service. The fiscal year 1981 budget request seeks to reestablish recruiting resources at a level comparable to our more successful years. It also supports initiatives aimed at retaining the best Soldiers beyond their initial term of service, and initiatives to continue the modest but encouraging strength increases recently achieved in Army National Guard and Army Reserve units.

Equally important as our Active and Reserve Components is our dedicated civilian workforce which unfortunately faces continuing reductions in both number and grade structure. Our civilian employees are not peacetime augmentation. They are a very real part of the Army's warfighting capability. We rely on civilians for a major share of our total peacetime support effort and to perform nearly three-quarters of the tasks needed to run Army bases. That reliance will not decrease during a national emergency.

In the longer term, the successful future of our volunteer force must rest on an expanded national spirit within which Army service is viewed as a meaningful and productive endeavor. Once Soldiers are recognized as exceptional citizens, and they deserve to be, others will join their ranks. Until then, manning the force will continue to be difficult and expensive.

Training, the Army's principal activity in peacetime, is intended to raise individual and unit proficiency to the levels necessary for mission accomplishment. We have higher standards in training today, through the Skill Qualification Test, than we have ever had before. But I will be the first to tell you we are not yet where we need to be. Training in the Army today is spotty. One of the factors contributing to the spottiness is the shortfall in late deploying units of NCOs and Soldiers. Units which are short key NCOs find it more difficult to continue in units the training process which begins at our training centers. We are committed to Initial Entry Training which will produce Soldiers who are physically fit, disciplined, and can perform basic common military skills. We look to the squad leader and platoon sergeant to

teach new Soldiers what is expected of them as unit members. The Skill Qualification Test provides a common, measurable, performance-oriented standard to train to—you either do it or you don't. If you don't, you are retrained.

Resources are proposed to improve unit training, particularly overseas. The continuing development of the National Training Center through the program years will produce long and badly needed new training capabilities. When it is fully operational in fiscal year 1984, the Center will support 42 maneuver battalions a year in an opposing-force environment realistically simulating actual battlefield conditions.

In the long-term, our training doctrine, programs, facilities, and devices must be as modern and effective as the weapons and equipment our Soldiers will employ on the battlefield.

Equipping the force requires that we produce and field the modern weapons and equipment the Army needs to fight effectively if called upon to do so. Nearly one-half of the fiscal year 1981 investment account is devoted to the purchase of such weapons and equipment. This is the forward edge of a 5-year $33 billion modernization program aimed at regaining technological equivalence and hopefully superiority over the Warsaw Pact on the conventional battlefield.

Of particular concern to me is the area of command and control. During budget deliberations last year the Army lost both the Tactical Operations System (TOS) and the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE). The TOS program has been re-directed and I believe you will now find it acceptable. With TACFIRE, the situation is more serious. It was terminated in the midst of fielding, with about half of the Active Force equipment sets already procured. The training base is in place and Soldiers are being trained. TACFIRE is at the heart of our efforts to modernize and make more effective our field artillery. Other systems have been designed to interact with it. TACFIRE works and should be fielded now or we will be set back many years while we pursue a totally new alternative. I intend to be back with proposals to restore this key program.

When fully realized, our modernization plan will produce the effective fighting force we need. But the interim period concerns me. Because other programs vital to today's Army readiness compete for finite resources, we are not able to modernize as fast as we could. But the potential for acceleration is there.

The XM1 tank now being produced, and its companion Infantry and Cavalry Fighting Vehicles, scheduled for production this year, will provide unparalleled maneuverability, firepower, and protection to our mechanized forces. Other improvements will soon be realized in the protection we provide our Soldiers from air and chemical attack. This budget request continues the effort to improve selected equipment already in the field, such as the M113 family of vehicles and the CH-47 medium lift helicopter. It also provides for the upgrade of the AH-1 attack helicopter while pursuing development of its successor.

Credible deterrence rests on the capability to project military force of adequate size, composition, and capability to protect vital national interests wherever in the world they are threatened. The principal focus of the Army continues to be Central Europe, as it should be. But the military threat to world peace represented by the Soviet Union and its allies is not confined to the NATO area. That threat is significant and it is real. It is as real as the Soviet soldiers in Cuba, and the Cuban soldiers in Africa. It is as real as the airplanes and tanks that delivered Moscow's Christmas greetings to the people of Afghanistan. I do not take that lightly, I assure you. As long as other nations, large or small, choose to ignore long-standing precepts of international law or to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of weaker neighbors, then our own military strength and national resolve must clearly signal the inviolability of our vital interests abroad.

While I am not satisfied with the Army's current mobilization and strategic deployment capability, I believe that we are moving in the right direction. Without de-emphasizing our NATO commitment, we have designated specific tactical and support units for rapid deployment missions elsewhere. I strongly endorse the strategic airlift improvements now being sought by the Air Force, including the new C-X aircraft development program initiated in this budget. These initiatives, and those which will improve the ability of Army and Marine Corps forces to be deployed by sea, are important adjuncts to a capability this nation must approve—the effective and responsive rapid

deployment of our forces.

In terms of expanded mobilization, the steps we are taking to enhance the integration of Total Army forces—which I described earlier—will be helpful. The proper mix of Active and Reserve Component combat and support elements must be achieved. One recently implemented program, called "Capstone," builds upon the many existing efforts to affiliate Active and Reserve units which share similar wartime missions. Other steps designed to improve our pool of trained military manpower are beginning to pay dividends, though much more progress is necessary. The proposal by the President to reinstitute registration will improve the Army's ability to meet, upon mobilization, our early wartime needs.

As you know, mobilization exercises such as Nifty Nugget have been invaluable in sharpening our focus on the problems we are likely to encounter during a national emergency. The next such exercise is scheduled for this fall. In addition to a large number of federal agencies, including the recently established Federal Emergency Management Agency, heads of private industry have been invited to participate for the first time. I am confident that this exercise will produce further understanding of the challenges entailed in mobilizing our national resources, particularly our industrial resources.

In summary, the $39.1 billion requested by the Army for FY 1981 and the follow-on programs planned for subsequent years continue the momentum which will lead to improved Army force readiness. There is no doubt that we live in dangerous times. Any confidence I have in our nation's ability to get through the critical window ahead rests in my knowledge of the community of Army people, the Soldiers, their families, and our civilian workforce—nearly three million Americans constituting a mosaic of individual talents, concerns, and capabilities united by a shared sense of purpose. Many things have changed over the years—the uniforms Soldiers wear, the tools of their trade, the way we are organized to do the job. But there is a fundamental spirit unique to Americans at war which transcends every generation of Soldiers. Our Army today is a fine Army; one I am immensely proud of. It deserves your continued support.

## OPENING REMARKS TO THE COMMITTEE

I would like to repeat what I said last summer when I came before this committee for confirmation, and that is: I accept my responsibility to work with the Congress in determining the proper military force requirements. I recognize my dual responsibility to the administration and the President and to the Congress, to present what I consider the military needs of the Army. . . .

All of us in the Army understand our mission today, as we have in the past. I think that those outside the Army who might have forgotten what that mission is have had it clarified for them precisely in the past four or five months. The challenge which faces the defense establishment is one which we take very seriously.

I would be misleading you if I told you that the $39.1 billion we have requested in this budget will correct what I consider to be an imperfect Army, but it will begin making corrections in what I consider to be the right direction.

The basic thrust of the budget is to ensure that we have the organization, the manpower, the equipment, the training, the mobilization capability, the deployability and sustainability which we need so that we have an Army capable of going to war. . . .

For a long time, in the area of equipment, the Army has been attempting to recover from its lack of modernization. We are now in the forefront of a huge modernization bow wave. . . .Modernization is absolutely essential. Today we are at a qualitative disadvantage with the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union in most weapons systems. That has to be redressed. Hopefully, with this program we can do so by the mid-eighties. If we are smart enough we can end up with better equipment than they have in that time frame. . . .

In summary, despite the fact that the Army is not manned to the degree that it should be nor does it have the modern equipment that I feel it needs in order to be able to respond in the future, I will tell you that those young men and women who have raised their hands and volunteered for the Army are doing a fine job for you and deserve

your support. I earnestly beseech you for that support at this hearing. . . .

SENATOR JACKSON: In your judgment, in light of the President's important statement of policy as it pertains to the Persian Gulf area, are the funds requested adequate to implement that policy if the Army is called upon to implement it as part of the Defense team?. . . I would like a broad, general response.

GENERAL MEYER: Very well, sir. This budget was put together prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That, and other events, have focused attention on the importance of and the need for military forces and, specifically, for land forces.

I understand the economic constraints and I am sure they are even greater today than when the budget was formulated. Nevertheless, I personally believe that the Army's portion of the budget is inadequate in several areas. It is inadequate in the resources needed to man the force during the time frame we are talking about.

The rate of modernization is not as rapid as it needs to be so that we can adequately respond to threats in Central Europe and elsewhere. Finally, the ability to mobilize and deploy Army forces is inadequate to the variety of threats we may face.

That is an overview. I can give you specifics when we get into closed session. . . .

SENATOR WARNER: . . . On the assumption that the Congress does come forward and gives you a pay raise this year, in order to compensate for those dollars I anticipate a proposal by which we reduce the 16 divisions in the Army to, say, a figure of 13 divisions—that would be a three-division reduction—then trying to add those numbers in both the Guard and the Reserve. What comment would you have with respect to that approach?

GENERAL MEYER: I would be violently opposed to it. First I will become emotional and then I will become objective. Emotionally, every time I stand at a retirement ceremony for someone and look out on the parade field, I realize that those 16 flags of the active components and those 8 flags of the National Guard, those 24 flags are all this great nation has in the way of land forces, exclusive of Marines, and I realize what a great burden the Army faces and the small numbers we have to carry out its mission. That is the emotional aspect of it.

The objective aspect of it is this: the JCS have consistently indicated that our worldwide requirements are far greater than can be met with land forces currently in the Army or in the Marines. I would worry about the signal which would go first and foremost to the Soviet Union if we were to draw down on the number of Army divisions. People read the Institute of Strategic Studies figures. To see that the United States was cutting back on the number of divisions would be a signal of weakness to everyone.

It would also, in my judgment, be the beginning of a slippery slide that would be difficult to stop. Our country either does or does not need adequate land forces. In my judgment it does. The United States is already at what I consider to be a prudent risk force. . . .

SENATOR COHEN:. . . .You have also talked about a comprehensive modernization program that will cost something like $33 billion over a 5-year period. How do you forsee the distribution of that equipment going into the Guard, Reserve and Active Forces? Would $33 billion be sufficient to cover the complete modernization of the program with Active, Reserve, and Guard?

GENERAL MEYER: The $33 billion will not be adequate to complete modernization of all of the Active, Reserve and Guard forces. We will never have a totally modern Army nor do we want one. Such a force would become entirely obsolete at the same point in time. You need a phased program, what many have called a high-low mix. I imagine in an ideal world you could modernize simultaneously but there would be a great waste in such an approach.

SENATOR COHEN: How do you foresee the distribution?

GENERAL MEYER: The distribution of new equipment will first be those units that are in the early deploying package. The 48th National Guard Brigade, which is a regimental brigade of the 24th Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, would get the same equipment priority as the 24th Division

would get. That holds true for the 41st Brigade in Oregon as well. Later deploying units in both the Active and Reserve Components would be lower in priority and therefore would get the less modern equipment.

Just as an example, sir, in 1985 we will have in the field M-48A5's, M-60's, M-60A1's, M-60A3's and the XM-1 and XM-1 with the 120-millimeter gun—six different tanks. So the question of having something all at once is just not, in my judgment, a sensible management objective.

SENATOR COHEN: Has the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the requirements of your force planning? We have always counted on the massive land invasion in Europe. Now we are looking toward third world rapid deployment forces. How will this change your procurement requirements in that modernization effort?

GENERAL MEYER: The focus of the Army will continue to be on Central Europe because the greatest challenge to us is there. What has happened as a result of Afghanistan is that attention has been focused on what I have called, for a long time, the other Army—the Army that has to be able to be projected rapidly to counter threats in other parts of the world.

I would like to see more dollars applied to technological options—near-term, mid-term and long-term—that would permit us to have a more capable force that can be more rapidly deployed because of its lighter weight.

SENATOR NUNN: . . . What do you think about the quality of the people coming into the Army today?

GENERAL MEYER: The most difficult problem I will face in the time I will be Chief of Staff in the Army is that assessment. Let me describe how I am trying to get an answer to that same question, Senator Nunn. First, I don't ask a second lieutenant the question because he has no sense of perspective. Second, I don't ask a general because he is too closely involved in all of its aspects. The best source, in my judgment, is the noncommissioned officers who are able to compare today's situation with ten years ago. You have to go back almost that far to really understand what has happened over time.

The consensus I get from the senior noncommissioned officers, whose judgment I respect is that about 80 percent of our Soldiers are no different than they were before; that 20 percent are more difficult to train because their retention curve is steeper. . . .

SENATOR JACKSON:. . . .The committee will come to order.General Meyer, again asking for your personal, professional judgment, in the light of our commitments to NATO and other treaty commitments and in light of the new policy doctrine laid down for the Persian Gulf, could you outline to us the deficits that exist, or shortfalls, in the various categories that are involved in implementing that policy should you be called upon by the President to move forces of the U. S. Army as required by the international situation?

I am interested in our current state of readiness, deficiencies in equipment stocks, manpower, mobility and so on. I am saying this in light of the policy recently announced which you might be called upon to implement tomorrow.

GENERAL MEYER: I would reiterate my initial comment in open session that the Army's principal focus is still central Europe. . . .Our forward-deployed units in central Europe are essentially at 100 percent strength, with some exceptions. As far as equipment is concerned, they are receiving the modernized M-60A3 tanks. We are increasing artillery and electronic warfare equipment and adding chemical defense elements at the present time. So the status of our forward-deployed force in central Europe is improving. . . .Regarding supplies, they have roughly [deleted] days of ammunition available, although it varies by type. Across the board there is a need for approximately [deleted] million short tons of ammunition. In the area of spare and replacement parts they have about [deleted] days on hand. War reserve stocks, those major equipment items needed to replace battlefield losses, are at lower levels. Some items, such as armored personnel carriers, 155-millimeter guns, and trucks are at [deleted]. . . .

There are some types of ammunition which are now stocked at less than [deleted] days supply—some of the more modern ammunition. But that is a bit misleading because there is less modern ammunition available which will do a useful job. For example, while we are moving



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more to the improved, conventional munitions with increased lethality, we have warheads which don't do as much but are still effective. The situation varies for each type of equipment. . . .

Regarding our ability to reinforce NATO, early-deploying forces in the United States are not at full strength Even those units which have prepositioned equipment in Europe are short manpower. While we try to keep them at the highest state of readiness, we simply do not have enough manpower to fill those units, plus our later-deploying units. So despite their high priority, we are not able to man all the squads or all of the platoons in all of those divisions at the present time.

The status of equipment is about the same. We would also want their stocks forward deployed, and we are about [deleted] through doing that.

Important also is the ability to rapidly deploy those units. We have two techniques for doing that. For those units with forward-deployed prepositioned equipment, the people fly over and fall in on it. We have three division sets of equipment prepositioned at the present time and another one in the process of going in this year. The other technique is rapid sealift to move other units, bulk ammunition and pieces of equipment that are not prepositioned. However, our present capability in rapid sealift is not adequate, in my judgment.

That, then, is our currrent status regarding Central Europe. I can get into specifics if you would like. Now, let me turn to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area.

SENATOR TOWER: Are these shortfalls the result of an inadequate industrial base?

GENERAL MEYER: I can think of none that are, sir.

SENATOR LEVIN: Can we ask what they are the result of?

GENERAL MEYER: They are the result of priorities and resources.

SENATOR LEVIN: Shortage of resources?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir.

Now, looking to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, that is scenario driven. Were you to take a scenario in which someone other than the Soviet Union made an overt grab for one of the oilfields, rapidly deploying forces would be required to stop those forces, hopefully at the invitation of an ally. We have in the 82d Airborne Division a force that can get there quickly and, with the Air Force, can secure airfields. That is very important. We also have in the Air Assault Division what I consider to be the most important single military capability for that area of the world—the ability to kill tanks with a weapon system that is already in being and that can be moved rapidly around the battlefield. The 82d Airborne Division is roughly at 100 percent strength. We keep that division as close to that deployment status as we can. The 101st is at about [deleted] percent strength right now.

In a different scenario, as suggested by the question that was raised by Senator Tower, we have to rely upon heavy backup forces which essentially are committed to NATO. They would have to be withdrawn from that NATO commitment to be committed in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area. That is a decision I would have to be involved in making at that instant in time. It depends on a whole host of different things, but it would be necessary that it be done.

The [deleted] is presently at about [deleted] percent strength. We have also ensured that there is combat service support available to support a force of about 100,000. Some of that will require the callup of National Guard and Army Reserve units. In any event, I would never consider deploying such a force without recommending that the President invoke his 50,000 man callup authority for several reasons:

First, we need the backup forces to fill in for those forces diverted from their commitment to NATO; we would want them in.

Second, there are Guard and Reserve forces essential to those deploying packages that I think should be called up. . . .

SENATOR NUNN: . . . What is your view about moving toward—for the rapid deployment force—a higher tank procurement program, but in the meantime buying from the shelf lighter tanks for rapid deployment for the Marines and

the Army?

GENERAL MEYER: First, I believe in a lighter, more rapidly deployable tank, and I always have. Second, I think that whatever you buy off the shelf should be able to respond to the likely threat. That may be different for the Army than it is for the Marines. If the Marines want a vehicle that goes across the shore and provides the ability to bust bunkers and do those kinds of things, that may be a slightly different vehicle than the Army needs—albeit a light one—to take on a T-72-type tank or other weapons of that type in the early stages of a contingency.

But in both cases, Senator Nunn, I believe that there will be a lot of aficionados pushing their programs, and I think the military should look very closely at what they have available in the way of attack helicopters to do that job.

SENATOR NUNN: Instead of tanks?

GENERAL MEYER: In the near-term the attack helicopter is available and can do the same thing. It is flexible in its ability to respond over greater distances and at greater speeds and it can do what you need in the early stage until you are able to build up. That is as far as the Army is concerned; I will not speak for the Marines. The Marines have a unique problem. But rather than buy something which gives you a very marginal increment of capability, you may be better waiting a year or two in order to get something that can defeat a T-72 tank, because we will run into them for the next 20 years. I question putting dollars into something that will not be able to do the job. . . .

## Interview in the ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, MARCH ISSUE

1 March 1980

AFJ: You are only a few months into your stewardship and may have only a few years to go: if you could accomplish just one thing for your Army, what would it be?

GENERAL MEYER: I'd have to say two things because I think there are two absolutely essential elements: to ensure that we have a coherent manning plan and program so that we're able to man the force, and to modernize the Army quickly . . . in order to respond to the threat.

AFJ: In your White Paper—it's the first Chief of Staff's White Paper, I believe, since MacArthur's—you address that second problem and talk about "a more effective personnel management strategy." What's wrong with the present one?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, for a long time we've had a personnel management strategy that has been basically centralized. Everything was done at MILPERCEN [the Military Personnel Center] in Washington. The commanders in the field have very little to do with the way in which promotions are provided to the individuals within their units; they have little to do with telling officers where they are going to go. If a young man wants to know whether or not he should follow particular course of action as far as his career is concerned, he doesn't ask his commander, he asks the folks back in MILPERCEN. This forces our young men and women to look in two directions. They look to MILPERCEN for advice, guidance and counsel. But unfortunately when they are out in the unit, they just look to the commander for a good fitness report.

In my judgment, that has had an impact on cohesion. No longer does a Soldier look to his boss, he now looks back to Washington to tell him what good things he ought to do. Somehow I've got to get into that system and sort it out so that the good aspects of centralization continue and the bad aspects that have had an impact on cohesion within units are done away with. And that's going to be very sensitive. We've become so centralized in the way we approach personnel management today that we really have taken steps which have decreased unit cohesion. They are having an impact out in the field on how the NCOs and officers are able to command their units and influence them.

AFJ: In reference to your other priority, modernizing the force, do you have the same conflict bet-



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ween centralization and cohesion in your dialogue with the Office, Secretary of Defense, that you do internally on personnel management?

GENERAL MEYER: I think it goes beyond that even. I think it gets to the point of ensuring that we're providing the best defense for the dollar, as far as the country is concerned. . . .Our force design is based on a whole host of different capabilities—indirect fire, direct fire, intelligence, surveillance, mobility—and if all of those things don't come in at the same time, you're likely to have fire power that can't be directed, mobility that can't be commanded and controlled, and so on. So, it's very difficult when you're designing a force to have certain elements of it changed by outside agencies or pressures. . . .

AFJ: What do you as Chief of Staff want to do to help the Army regain control of its own destiny in that respect?

GENERAL MEYER: I'm not sure that over time we have been as articulate as we ought to be in explaining the rationale behind the various force elements necessary on the land battlefield. It's easy to explain to anyone what happens up in space when two airplaces meet one another or what happens on an ocean. But when you start talking about what happens when an individual fires a rifle and another guy fires an indirect mortar and another guy fires a direct fire anti-tank missile system and someone else is flying helicopters behind it, and you have to have command and control and radars that see over the hills, it's very difficult to explain what takes place on the ground to somebody who has never been in that environment.

We have to do a better job explaining . . . all the facets of land warfare. . . .

AFJ: . . . What is it that you suggest that would save the Army from the agony we understand it has been through the last two months?

GENERAL MEYER: I hope that in the future we would get an earlier, firm agreement by everyone involved—the Army, OSD, OMB, and Congress—so that we won't go through this kind of last minute change in purpose, or rehash of old issues at the last minute, which then puts all of your programs in jeopardy— not just the single program that is pulled out for high level visibility. . . .

In the case of the AAH, there has always been a question in many minds as to the trade-off between the attack helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft. That argument has always been raised. . . .I think that it has been pretty well put to bed; today we have acceptance that there is a need for an armed helicopter. . . .

AFJ: Who do you have the greatest problem with, OSD or Congress?

GENERAL MEYER: In my view, the greater problem comes from our relationships with Congress in many instances, rather than with OSD. With OSD, you work on an annual basis; you're able to explain your views; there can be honest disagreements on purposes; there can be honest disagreements on the dollars needed for the various weapons systems; there can be disagreements on priorities. But with Congress, very often, it tends to become more system directed, and therefore more difficult to explain the purpose at the last minute. And it has a far more significant impact throughout the entire organization.

AFJ: What are you doing in the area of electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures?

GENERAL MEYER: What we are trying to do is ensure that we are using [it] as a weapon system on the battlefield today . . . to do one of two things: either blot out the enemy's capability to use his electronic [systems], or use our own systems in the face of his capabilities. . . .We're trying to get people in the field familiar with EW and then force the new systems in as quickly as we can. In the last two years, our procurement of jamming systems has taken a big jump both in quantity and quality. We also have a substantial investment in counter-countermeasures. We've put the new CEWI (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence) elements into all the units and we have created the new CEWI battalions so there is a focus on how to employ the systems that we have.

That has been a major change in approach within the Army. When I was in Europe as a division commander, we weren't allowed to do any of that kind of business within the division; it just wasn't "any of your business." So our efforts have been to decentralize, to try to get the systems into being through procurement and then to try to take what we have and improve the capability of the troops to use extant systems . . . [The Army has] been out in front in that area working hard

. . . trying to knock down the "green doors". . . .

AFJ: Sir, your White Paper repeatedly places emphasis upon the need for the Army to be able to deploy its Active units faster, and talks in a number of places about "lighter, more capable forces." May we ask you, what, for instance?

GENERAL MEYER: Some things we have in mind are . . . lighter, more technologically capable forces that can move more rapidly than the heavy armored unit, but which have greater capability once they get there than the light airborne or airmobile units. So some of the options we are looking at are things like Copperhead, increasing the number of anti-tank weapon systems that we have, looking at high mobility vehicles.

We clearly have to do three things. Get a better capability for target accession at greater distances; be able to attack those targets more quickly with either precision-guided missiles or mines and stuff that you can get out at great distances; and then use our mobility to move that force around. We haven't designed a force to optimize all of those technological capabilities. . . .
AFJ: It seems that you despair of the Air Force ever getting you a plane to move the heavier equipment.

GENERAL MEYER: It is going to be a long time to get to the CX. You're talking about 1985 or 1986. I have always contended that sealift is something that you really have to look at, because sealift has such great potential for the future. Consider hydroskis, which essentially take you out of the effects of the waves, so that you can get up to 65 knots with a ship. . . .

Well, once you get into that sort of capability, you have to look carefully at what the tradeoff is between having airlift to get you there, or getting all the big heavy stuff there aboard ship. Sealift is a very viable alternative. You clearly need the combination of the two, but sealift has always been underrated. Today SL-7s which are roll-on, roll-off ships that are available now, become a very attractive option to give us a capability to be able to move equipment very, very quickly.
AFJ: Are they going to do that?

GENERAL MEYER: I hope so. . . .

AFJ: What is the status of Division 86, and what does it show so far? Where is it leading in terms of the new divisional structure? You talked also in the White Paper later on about a "standard division." Like what?

GENERAL MEYER: Today we have both a mechanized division and an armored division. The question is, why do we have a mechanized division and an armored division? Would it be better to have a standard heavy division and a standard light division? A light division being one that we talked about earlier, which was technologically more capable—not just in a rapid deployment role in the Middle East of Persian Gulf, but also equally as useful in the Central European battle. The question is, would it be better to have a standard heavy division as opposed to having a mech division and an armored division? If you had a standard division, there would be advantages. You'd have everything the same throughout the Army. If a guy moved from Ft. Hood to Ft. Knox to the Third Armored in Europe, he'd be going through the same organization. He wouldn't have to relearn, and we'd begin to standardize some things within all organizations. There is literally no difference between a mech division and an armored division today. . . .The more we can standardize in battle drills and organization, the better off we're going to be in the future. So that is what I'm talking about when I talk about a standard heavy division.

As for where we are with Division 86, I had a review at the Army Commander's Conference of a proposed organization—of how we are going to maximize the capabilities of our new weapon systems over time. And the thing that you have to remember is that Division 86 is not a division that would come into effect at that point in time—1986. It's what we are going to do to the Army over time as we improve the division. Clearly, the XM-1 comes in 1981 or 1982, so we have to be sure we are ready for that when it comes in; the AAH comes in a couple years later; we get a DIVAD gun, for example, that requires some organizational changes. So you have to look at the division over a period of time. You have to be smart enough to bring the systems in and have, for example, an XM-1 able to operate with IFVs or APCs someplace, because that is just the way it is going to be as we modernize the force.

AFJ: Is the DIVAD gun going to fly or not?

GENERAL MEYER: I think so. I just think the requirement is so clear for a gun in addition to missiles—and that's the conclusion of every military analyst in England, in West Germany, and everywhere else—and I think it will fly.

AFJ: So as you go through this transition, when conceivably will the Army have a "Division 86"?

GENERAL MEYER: Never. It will continue to change over time. We picked 1986 because that was as far out as we could project the threat. We wanted to get out about 10 years ahead to see what the threat was, and then to design all of these new pieces of equipment coming in to counter that threat. Where there was equipment that we were considering trying that was marginally effective against the threat in 1986, we decided to cut that out and focus on the kinds of equipment that would be most effective aginst the projected threat. So, it was an attempt to focus on an organization which would maximize the new equipment rather than just taking the current organizations and changing M-60 tanks for XM-1 tanks, or changing DIVAD guns for Vulcans, and so on. . . .

AFJ: . . . Are you suggesting that the Chief of Staff of the Army isn't really concerned about possibly having lost a mission—the air defense of Air Force main operating bases in England—with OSD's guidance a few months ago to let the Air Force buy and field Rapier instead?

GENERAL MEYER: The Chief of Staff of the Army is concerned about that—because the dollars that would have to go to that particular mission might better be spent in the total air defense picture elsewhere. If there were enough dollars to do everything, I wouldn't be concerned. As I look at the total air defense requirement and the limited number of dollars I am concerned. I also look at that as being more of a responsibility for the Brits. To me, that is clearly something for which we ought to be relying upon host nation support. It's their country! As a matter of fact, I can make a strong case in the air defense field that we ought to be trying to get our allies to pick up a larger share of air defense, because if they ever decide they don't want or need us anymore, they still have a requirement for defense of their own air space. So, I can make a strong case for going to specialization rather than rationalization, standardization, and interoperability--where you had specific nations specializing in certain functional areas of combat. . . .

AFJ: . . . What does the Chief of Staff want to do . . . to make life in the US Army more rewarding, more challenging, and more satisfying for its Soldiers? And to what extent do you, as the Chief of Staff, have the authority to do those things?

GENERAL MEYER: One of the biggest complaints that you hear from Soldiers and commanders in the field is that they're not able to get their views to a responsible commander. That is what I call *vertical discrimination*. Vertical discrimination is created in many ways by large staffs outside your office; by an environment in which the young Soldier is not able to raise his problems—which for him are for the first time, and which for the first sergeant are for the thousandth time—up the tape. . . .I'm working on it by speaking to every battalion commander, every brigade commander, every division commander, every corps commander. And in the course that we now have out at Ft. Leavenworth, we are focusing on the need for the commander himself to be willing to be the heatshield. And to stop passing on down to the Soldiers everything that comes from the top, and very candidly being able to say "horse shit" if he believes what he is told to do is unnecessary. In the German army they call that "selective disobedience." That term was used at a recent commander's course, and several of the subsequent speakers who went out there became violently upset that the Chief of Staff of the Army was proposing selective disobedience. But the purpose is to ensure that there is a free flow of information up as well as down.

We have one thing going for us, and this may be hopeful dreaming, but the new Officer's Efficiency Report requires that the rater and the ratee sit down with one another and discuss goals and objectives, and what they can and can't do, and then reasonable goals and objectives are established. This starts to develop a cascading effect throughout the organization that what the Chief of Staff wants is somehow translated into what the individual Soldier is able to do.

To me that is part and parcel of breaking down barriers, explaining to a Soldier why he is important, making it more challenging, therefore, by permitting and forcing the commander in between to do away with the unessential, the unimportant—the kinds of things that you and I

always bitched about, that we think we ought to do away with. So, that is one answer—breaking down that barrier of vertical discrimination.

Another key area where we can strengthen the Army today is in the NCO and junior officer fields. We're designing programs to work on NCO development, not just classes, because today NCOs attend Basic NCO courses and PNCOCs and NCOESs, and all that alphabet soup which TRADOC and the units run. They learn by having a role model in a good NCO who is in the unit. They learn by having explained what they are doing well and what they are doing poorly. So, a lot of focus is going into the development of the NCOs and the young officers within the units. . . .

AFJ: . . . Could you give us an example, with respect to junior officers, of what you as Chief of Staff, believe you can do soon to make his life more rewarding, challenging, satisfying?

GENERAL MEYER: I think the most important thing I can do is to identify for him, out of all the balls that he has to juggle every day, which ones are critical and which ones aren't—so that he isn't wasting his time on all of those unimportant things that are lower priorities. My job is to attempt to prioritize for him what I consider to be important, and I consider training and readiness efforts to be important. I'm trying to get that idea through and I'm trying to get people to understand that they should focus on fundamentals and quit working on that, that, and that. That is what I think I can do in establishing an environment that will be rewarding and challenging to the young lieutenant. . . .

## Address to the CHICAGOLAND O'HARE CHAPTER OF THE AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION

Chicago, Illinois
1 March 1980

It is my conviction that if there ever was validity to trumpeting the supremacy of one service over another as the most effective means of bringing this nation's armed might into play, such a view today is blind to the realities of the decade of the 80's. I make no bones of the fact that *the United States Army is critically dependent upon effective air power for the execution of national strategy. But it is not a one-way street.* Neither the Army nor the Air Force exist or were created to function alone.

The Army depends critically upon air power for the transport of troops and combat materiel to distant battlefields and for continued resupply. On the other hand, the very size and capability of Military Airlift Command is in large measure justified on the requirement to carry out that explicit task.

The Army depends on the Air Force for sweeping the sky of hostile air so that our land forces can be brought to bear fully and effectively; you depend on us for point defense of designated airfields and for airfield construction.

The Army depends on the Air Force for close air support in the forward battle area; in turn, we provide a broad and increasingly capable curtain of ground-based air defense weapons to limit hostile air penetration and anti-radar surface-to-surface systems which help to unpucker aviators operating in that forward area.

The Army depends on the Air Force for fulfilling the traditional interdiction mission; the Air Force depends on us to assist in providing secure corridors with our suppressive fires.

We are working together to counter the echeloned attack formations of the Warsaw Pact, to more effectively manage the masses of battlefield information and intelligence, to provide sure command and control of both land and air forces, and to win the battles of the electronic spectrum which will be a critical aspect of any



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future war.

This partnership exists not just in the tactical arena but also in the strategic arena. The Army will do the contracting and construction of MX facilities. Additionally, we are jointly exploring the potential for operational pairing of ICBM systems with some form of ballistic missile defense. Your Secretary, Hans Mark, underscored the need to look at this interface at your national convention.

To today's partnership—to the challenges which face us in the future—the Army brings a record of solid achievement--not the stereotype of an Army preparing for the last war; not a bastion of callous or unthinking regimentation; not a service unwilling to recognize error or unwilling to set new direction when such direction is evident.

While structured for land warfare in World War II, the Army nonetheless demonstrated its capacity to execute amphibious invasion frequently, and on a massive scale. We developed the parachute regiment and employed it in operations whose magnitude was unparalleled in military history. We read Rommel's book on mechanized warfare and turned the tables massively in execution. In the age of nuclear warfare, we entered very early into experimentation and fielding of new divisional concepts capable of fighting in that environment, and integrated small tactical weapons into our operational kit bag. Called to service in South East Asia, we read the history of Dien Bien Phu and pioneered infusion of the helicopter onto the battlefield for combat assault and the delivery of firepower. When the North committed its mainline battle units, we demonstrated that the helicopter is a potent tank killer. We did it so successfully that today we find ourselves mirrored in Soviet forces fielded in Afghanistan. That's the highest form of flattery. Our missions have never stagnated into a single expectation and neither have we.

Today we are in the midst of exploiting the technological changes so dramatically evident in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, where precision guided munitions and the capacity to interrupt and confuse the electronic command, control, and communications spectrum marked a new phase in the evolution of warfare. Today our tactical doctrine reflects [many of these innovations]. . . .The TOW guided missile and our newly fielded Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) battalions set contemporary world standards. And yet it has only begun—in terms of fielded modernization and fielded doctrine.

Only the day before yesterday I was at Lima, Ohio, for the acceptance of the first two production models of the Abrams tank, an occasion which symbolizes the start of a massive modernization program—the largest ever for our ground forces. Some 43 major systems will be coming on line over the next 5 years—an investment of some $30 billion. I'd like to say that that will quickly restore qualitative superiority to our ground elements. Unfortunately, it will not—though I am hopeful that with constancy of purpose it will be possible to gain at least qualitative parity and, if we're smart enough, qualitative superiority by 1985.

We do have exciting equipment in the wings—but very little of it moves at MACH 1, or has ejection seats, or aerial refueling capacity, so I won't bore you with the details. I do think, however, that how we employ this materiel—how we hope to integrate it on the battlefield—may be of interest because the demands of the scenario I envision, especially in Central Europe, will require greater comprehension, understanding, and teamwork between he U. S. Army and Air Force and the land and air forces of our allies than ever before. Succintly, neither of us has enough to do the job alone, BUT there may be just enough between us if, and I emphasize *if*, we can find the right formula for putting it together.

A little over three years ago we revised our doctrine to focus on "how to win the first battle of the next war." Oriented at the division level, it was new and it was innovative. Together with the Air Force, we are improving on that doctrine and the tactics necessary to make it successful every day. The important point is that the Army has made very fundamental doctrinal changes in the way the division will fight. As we better see the synergisms of the new systems, we will amend doctrine and organization. The vehicle we have for plotting our transition is Army 86, keyed to the organization of heavy and light divisions, and the structure needed to support those divisions all the way back to our industrial base here in the U. S. We will be making choices regarding the size of the division, it's required administrative and logistical organization, its aviation structure, and explicit decisions regarding the allocation of com-

mand responsibilities at all echelons. . . .

The battalion commander [on the ground in Europe] knows his job well. He couldn't avoid it if he wanted to—a Regiment of Soviet T-72 and T-80 tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles grinding toward his position. That Regiment represents the leading echelon of the Soviet forces, and it deserves that lieutenant colonel's full attention. Behind it comes the 2d echelon—but that Lieutenant Colonel commanding his battalion is far too busy with what he has on hand. He knows though that if someone doesn't take action against that 2d echelon, he'll soon have that outfit to contend with too; and the rest of that Soviet Army—some 36 hours deep in march time—all descending on him.

The means are near at hand for each level of command to reach into that echelonment of hostile forces—the division commander to the elements within 60 to 100 kilometers and the Corps Commander out to the 150 or more kilometers of that combined arms army. The time-distance factor of mechanized warfare make it imperative that they do so.

Now this complicates the conduct of the air-land battle because we have previously been content to leave the deeper area to the fellows in blue. We could affort to do that once. But not today!

As I indicated earlier, the means are at hand for effective use of ground weapons in that portion of the battlefield—not exclusive entry, because as I mentioned before there's not enough air or land forces to do all the jobs. The ground weapons are not all weapons of destruction—they include the sophistication of disruption through the electronic attack of command and control nodes, and weapons designed to delay and disrupt the enemy forces so they can't close so rapidly on that battalion commander who already has his hands full. Fitting them all together for greatest effectiveness is the challenge.

These issues are being explored today by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and the Air Force Tactical Air Command and by the Army and Air Force elements in Europe. Resolution of these and other interface issues are critical for the successful defense of Europe. They deserve the best minds we can put to the task. It is not time to stake out turf—it's time for a resolute partnership, a time to face these challenges and solve them using all the innovation our past achievements give us the optimism to expect.

Another area in which our fortunes are tightly linked is the assured delivery of adequate ground combat power to whatever locale national authority may direct. For us, the focus on initiatives leading toward an assured defense of Europe has been moving us to a position of less and less flexibility for deployment elsewhere.

Meeting the challenge of Central Europe with available resources has been possible only by accepting risks. Audacious risks some may call them. Given the unacceptability of not doing all in our power to bolster NATO, I judge them reasonable. However, the degree of inflexibility we have consciously accepted to date bears full reexamination before proceeding any further down the path. . . .

Recognizing that the global realities need no retelling to this audience, I have not dwelled on the threats across the broad spectrum of potential conflict—in many geographical environs—spurred on by diverse political, economic, and regional issues. I obviously support the imperative of national security resting on a sure foundation of confidence in the strategic nuclear dimension. However, I am certain that under the umbrella of strategic nuclear parity, conventional forces will play a greater role in the decade of the 80's. Being able to get there "fustest with the mostest" will be the determinant in great power struggles. Strategic air and sea lift will be critical. Therefore, I support the earliest introduction of the CX as one of the means to secure greater national flexibility in responding to contingencies.

Coupled with this is an effort which has my fullest support: development and funding of land forces which can arrive quickly by air and which have organic mobility, firepower and survivability to counter sophisticated threats in a variety of geographical areas.

I am convinced that a force possessing these characteristics will improve the defense of Europe as well, by easing the demand for more heavy forces which further burden the available strategic air and sea lift and do little for flexible response elsewhere. . . .

# Hearing Before The
# SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
# Subcommittee on HUD and Independent Agencies
# On Military Draft Registration

11 March 1980

GENERAL MEYER: . . . Mr. Chairman. I wasn't asked to come here. I volunteered because the Chiefs of each of the services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have said consistently for the last three years that peacetime registration was necessary in order for this Nation to mobilize. . . .There has been some confusion about what the basic issue is and I feel it important that I lay out clearly the military imperatives of the President's request.

There is a book entitled: *The History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775 to 1945,* which I think everyone ought to read as they get into the details of this issues. In the summary lessons of what has happened from the Revolutionary War through World War II, it says:

> It can still be said that the United States never adequately and fully planned for mobilization before it occurred.

Regarding the responsibilities of Congress, it goes on to say that:

> It has never been historically proven that Congress and the people of the United States cannot be told bad news in advance of war itself. It has been proven, however, that Congress has many times failed to enact mobilization legislation in good times because of the lack of adequate information that such legislation was necessary.

My charge here today is to explain to you that it is necessary that you pass mobilization legislation in peacetime. This is mobilization legislation we are talking about right now. It does not solve the problems of the near-term Army.

From as far back as the Revolutionary War, the lesson can be drawn that—

> A mobilization accomplished during a war is wasteful, clumsy and potentially disastrous. . . .

Historically, it has been proven you cannot do it once you start to mobilize. It must be planned well in advance, and that is the issue before us today. Do we, as a nation, want to have a registration which provides us the insurance so that when we go to war we have sufficient manpower to support the Guard, to support the Reserve, to support the Active Component in a timely manner? That is the issue before us. I submit it is essential that we have registration if we intend to act responsibly as a major power. . . .

SENATOR PROXMIRE: . . . It is interesting, General, that you mentioned a whole series of wars that we won without an advance draft. When we go back through our history, I cannot think of any war where we had an advance draft except Vietnam, and we lost that war. That does not mean if we have a draft in advance, we will lose the war. What makes the difference is motivation. If our peoole are convinced we are in a just war, if you have the kind of morale in this country that comes from thinking a war is worth fighting and winning, we will win it. Otherwise, we will not.

GENERAL MEYER: That is why I believe registration is so critical. The Soldiers of the U.S. Army do not seek war. Registration provides them assurance that at the point in time when you in Congress—when the American people through you—make the decision that our vital national interests truly are at stake, that . . . the Nation as a corporate body will come to their support.

Soldiers need that support. . . .

SENATOR SCHMITT: . . . Mr. Chairman, . . . this registration issue, as I indicated before, is a smoke screen that in my opinion diverts public and congressional attention from the real issues of the military and mobilization.

The volunteer concept is not working and the Reserves and National Guard are undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained . . . I think you will find this subcommittee, myself, and, I believe,

Senator Hatfield, very sympathetic to being ready in the mechanical sense to handle registration and the draft when a national emergency exists.

The question is, what do you gain other than occupying a lot of our time by talking about registration at this point over what the volunteer force, Reserve and National Guard, and that mechanical preparation will give you at a lower cost?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . if I thought, Senator Schmitt, that registration was a smoke screen which diverted attention from the needs of the Active Army, the National Guard and USAR, I would not be here supporting registration.

SENATOR SCHMITT: Then you ought to get up and leave because that is exactly what it is doing.

GENERAL MEYER: It only does it in the minds of those who are not able to understand—

SENATOR SCHMITT: That happens to be in the minds of the public, the press, and this Congress.

GENERAL MEYER: That is my job to try to explain it, and I would like to try to explain the need—

SENATOR SCHMITT: I hope we can get as much emphasis out of you and your colleagues when we start to get to the hard issues of national defense.

GENERAL MEYER: I contend you have, Senator Schmitt. You have heard recommendations of my colleagues on this particular issue before in contradiction to what the administration proposed last summer, on registration. . .The military is hard on line for registration for mobilization and we all came out in opposition to the administration on that issue.

We will come to Congress in our constitutional responsibility and give you the advice we feel you need.

I would like to remind you in September of 1941, just less than 3 months before Pearl Harbor, Congress passed by only one vote the continuation in-being at that time. So the more you leave that kind of decision to the last minute, the more difficult it makes the job of assuring the Nation that we have the capability to mobilize.

SENATOR SCHMITT: I am not sure the two situations are analogous, General.

GENERAL MEYER: I would propose for your reading the book where in 1939 and 1942—

SENATOR SCHMITT: I propose for your consideration the fact that we are confronted by a very different set of national and international conditions today versus those in 1939 and 1940. The only analogy is that we are in trouble.

GENERAL MEYER: The analogy is we are in trouble and have to be ready to respond to it. That is the analogy.

SENATOR SCHMITT: I assume we are not going to have a year or two to get ready, and that is what we had after Pearl Harbor. We are not going to have that luxury. That is why you have to have a volunteer force and a Reserve and National Guard that is ready to move on a moment's notice in large numbers.

GENERAL MEYER: Plus registration to back them up.

SENATOR SCHMITT: Registration will be there, General, it will be there. If you depend on registration, you "ain't" going to make it.

GENERAL MEYER: That is what I said. I will go back to my initial comment, Senator, and that is if I thought registration would divert attention from this issue, then I could not support registration. . . .

SENATOR PROXMIRE: . . . You have already told Senator Schmitt that you agree wholeheartedly that we need to strengthen our Reserves, National Guard, and our Regular military force but you say in addition to that we need a backup force through registration.

It is beyond me to understand why we need that backup force on a premobilization basis in view of all the testimony we have that premobilization would save very, very little time, and that we would have ample time to provide necessary manpower following mobilization in the event we need it.

GENERAL MEYER: Let me respond with three points. One, history proves those who say we can be as effective in planning in the post-mobilization phase are wrong. Two, those who contend you can even do it in the short period of time available in those kinds of scenarios are wrong. I don't believe that—and I have made that statement prior to the time I became Chief of Staff of the Army last summer, before another committee. And third, the ability of the Nation to be able to mobilize effectively—and registration only relates to mobilization—is a deterrent to the Soviets. If my counterpart, sitting in the Kremlin, knows that this Nation willingly maintains not only the in-being Active Forces but the backup Active Reserves and National Guard, and also the backup capability to sustain those forces, then he recognizes that he faces an effective deterrent. It is not simply the in-being forces, but all three together that are important. . . .

SENATOR MATHIAS: . . . Well, that raises the question of women, which I think is an important question. You do find women on airplanes as part of the active crew of the plane. I think that is some indication to us just as a practical matter of the kind of talents we are going to need in a war if, God forbid, we have one.

If you are really serious about sending a message to the world, and if we are prepared to make an expenditure of millions of dollars in sending that message and at the same time accumulating some information, why isn't it sensible to make a more thoroughgoing inventory of national talent that may be needed in a conflict in the future? . . .

GENERAL MEYER: May I comment? The only added thing you should put into the equation, Senator Mathias, is that today the shortfalls in the Active Component, Reserve Components—USAR, and the National Guard—are primarily young combat arms men, infantrymen.

You don't see 50-year-old infantrymen running around out there. I am not saying they couldn't. I am saying that physical stamina is necessary. Many of the skill shortages we are talking about are principally in those areas.

While I agree completely with what you say about evaluating the total capability of the Nation to be able to support our needs of mobilization, and until we are able to fix the Active component—the USAR and the National Guard—that the need is principally in the area of combat arms men. . . .

## Hearing Before The SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE Subcommittee on Defense On the FY 81 Appropriation: Army Posture

1 April 1980

SENATOR YOUNG: . . . Explain the manner in which the capabilities/employment of the Army's Pershing II missile will be complementary with, rather than duplicative of, the Air Force's ground-launched cruise missile.

GENERAL MEYER: The Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile will each be capable of attacking deep targets. The difference between the two is in the defense that the enemy has to put up against them. The Pershing II has a ballistic trajectory, one which, simply stated goes up and comes down. The GLCM poses a different problem for the enemy. It must be attacked in a ground environment, because it flies very low to the earth.

The advantage of the two is that they provide two different threats to the enemy; he therefore has to be prepared to defend against both.

They both have an effective capability against similar targets, but each presents a different threat to the enemy.

SENATOR YOUNG: . . . What is the purpose of continuing this level of research and development in ballistic missile defense unless the United

States intends to deploy another ABM system?...

GENERAL MEYER: The ABM is insurance. As you look to the future in the strategic equation, one of the great hedges against an increase in Soviet offensive delivery systems is our ability to counter them with a ballistic missile defense....This BMD program gives you several options if we suddenly find the Soviets have made a breakout in the numbers of re-entry vehicles they have. The program permits us to bring in quickly a defense against them—a capability which, in my judgment, we should retain.

## Hearing Before The SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel On the President's Plan for Registration Under The Military Selective Service Act

2 April 1980

GENERAL MEYER: . . . the cumulative experience reflected in that history across all our wars is that "Volunteering will not produce sufficient military manpower for a large-scale protracted war," and that "A system of selective service is mandatory." It advises us that "manpower in a major way is so scarce that plans to utilize it must be comprehensive and must be prepared well in advance of mobilization."

It is well to review the more recent report of the Gates' Commission, the Presidentially-appointed Commission which in 1970 proposed the current All-Volunteer Force. That report clearly recommends that the All-Volunteer Force be supported by legislation to provide—

> A register of all males who might be conscripted when essential for national security; a system for selection of inductees; specific procedures for the notification, examination, and induction of those to be conscripted; and an organization to maintain the register and administer the procedures for induction.

SENATOR NUNN: In other words, those who favor the volunteer force would really have to reject one of the fundamental underlying assumptions of the very Commission that proposed the volunteer force?

GENERAL MEYER: That's correct. Registration was recommended by the Commission. And today, the need for a rapid mobilization capability is even greater than it has been in the past. We have deployed in Europe 300,000 Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. We must have full confidence that if this Nation decides to mobilize, that it can provide sufficient manpower to reinforce these and other forward deployed forces in time to make a difference.

Clearly, the cushion of warning is compressed greatly from what it was in World War II. With forward deployed forces and reduced warning, we do not have the luxury of time that we once had. Hence, peacetime registration and other improvements to the Selective Service System are vital to this Nation's ability to sustain its Armed Forces during a war. The proposed actions will provide inductees for training and deployment 73 days earlier than is possible with the current Selective Service System capability.

Today, the Selective Service System in deep standby status, would require 85 days to deliver the first inductees from a cold start. Approximately 100 additional days are required to process, train, and transport these inductees to their assignments in theater. This permits 12 weeks of predeployment training as required by law.

The President's plan would assure the Selective Service System a capability to deliver the first inductees 12 days after mobilization. Delivery of

the first trained inductees to theater would be improved from M + 185 to M + 112, for a saving of 73 days. . . .

If peacetime registration is not reinstituted and the Selective Service System is not improved, the cost would be a loss of at least 73 days of vital time in providing newly trained manpower to sustain our fighting forces. To compensate, we would find it necessary to draw down the strength of the support base and later deploying units to meet the trained manpower requirements of the engaged forces. Such expedients would not only destroy the effectiveness of follow-on combat formations, but would also degrade the ability of the base to generate adequate trained manpower from the inductee pool once they come aboard. . . .

The Army's training base is capable of accepting large numbers of new inductees during the first month of mobilization. It can accommodate 133,000 new trainees by M+30 days, and up to an additional 30,000 by M+90. Although this training would be conducted under more austere conditions than ideally desirable, it would provide the trained personnel needed in our fighting forces. . . .

Registration will provide the means to ensure an unbroken stream of replacement personnel to permit this Nation to go to war when it determines it must to protect its essential interests. . . .

The position of the Department of the Army is that there is a need for registration and that the marginal gains which you might get from classification are outweighed by the social impact such action might have on the country. The JCS position and my own are that classification would help us to conduct a more rational transition from peace to war.

SENATOR COHEN: So you personally feel that we should have classification?

GENERAL MEYER: As do the Chiefs who support a preliminary form of classification. . . .

## Address To The WEST POINT CHAPTER, AUSA

West Point, New York
15 April 1980

It is pleasant for me to have this time with you to talk about today's Army—a topic somewhat broader from your normal focus as West Point's Quarterback Club. But there are many parallels, I assure you. The Army's critical role in securing this nation and its vital interests demand:

- that we fully understand the competition,
- that we set clear objectives and maintain a well-thought through "game plan",
- that we build cohesive teams, skilled and agressive when called to play,
- that we elicit the fullest support of our "fans," and
- that we secure a reasonably competent "coaching staff."

I believe that the decade of the 80's holds great danger for us as a nation; that there will arise many crises—most of which lie beyond our means to either accurately foretell or meaningfully control. They can stem from economic, social, or religious aspirations within the expanded family of states. Or they can occur as calculated, or miscalculated, initiatives sponsored by the Soviet Union.

The features which make this decade unique, though, lie not in the mere existence of a principal villian or in the universal pressures for change—these have always been. What makes the era one of extreme hazard is the elimination through technology of those time and distance factors which historically have been intrinsic elements of our national defense. No longer do oceans provide a barrier to hostile weapons, or a guarantee of a respite for preparation following hostilities. Today, more than ever before, we must be prepared in peace to avoid the occurrence of war.

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Coupled with this factor in complicating the future is the attainment by the Soviets of essential nuclear equivalence. No longer are we blest in a one-on-one showdown with that confidence of unassailable military strength we once possessed.

And to these I would add one more concern which I feel citizens must somehow address since it poses a significant handicap when in competition with an autocratic Russian empire, capable of total resource mobilization and central direction toward a specified agenda. I am concerned about the reluctance of the nation to fully trust its institutions by failing to grant them the planning flexibility so necessary for the kinds of challenges which assuredly are going to come our way this decade. The distrust endemic from an occurrence such as Watergate is understandable. But the increasing tendency of lodging individual loyalties at some intermediate social or sectional level seems to me to be leading to a weakening of national authority and diminished capacity to govern at precisely the moment when stronger and more effective national cohesion is necessary. I'd say we have ample demonstration of strong national tendencies toward the virtues of hope and charity. I personally would like to see more thought given to the virtue of faith.

This decade calls for enormous dedication by many to a wide variety of difficult tasks. Recently, I produced a White Paper, my "game plan" if you will, whose purpose is the mobilization of our Army's leadership to the essential tasks. We must pull together toward some common vision. Equally important is the need to give the Soldier a framework against which he can understand his individual importance. The White Paper is entitled "A Framework for Molding the Army of the 1980's into a Disciplined, Well Trained Fighting Force", and I'd like to touch on a few of its highlights. Like any good appetizer, my comment is designed to simply whet your appetite so you'll read it yourselves.

Actually, the paper is incomplete, though the thrust is there. The team of authors I'm assembling to complete the work will include some of you here and assuredly the Class of 1980 that I'll speak to this evening. All on active duty will touch and improve upon the framework I've laid out in that document.

For the past three or four years, the Army's effort has clearly been on "heavying-up" the force for a war in Central Europe. That has been, and remains, an essential task; both because of the importance which Western Europe holds in our external relationships and because of the Soviet threat so evident there. We have made many meaningful improvements there, but we still have some very large, expensive, and time-consuming tasks ahead to overcome what I consider the critical window in the offing. We must weather that threat posed to us and to our allies.

As we have worked to meet the evident hazard there, we have failed to act as cleverly as we might. Where we have seen a heavy armor threat, we have worked to respond in kind. But because there is a limitation to the number of troops we can deploy to Europe in peacetime, and because airlift—the only available means for rapid reinforcement in the very early days of a war—is limited, we have set about prepositioning large quantities of heavy equipment in Europe. That's obviously a very good way to reinforce rapidly because when war is evident, we simply fly Soldiers to their equipment and present the maximum initial combat posture very early. If we had to fly the tanks over too, we'd never make it. The disadvantage to this approach is that when we withdraw equipment from stateside troops for prepositioning (we can't afford a pair and a spare) those units are then ill-prepared to be employed rapidly elsewhere, should the need arise in the interim.

In our headlong charge toward heavy mechanization, we have forgotten that throughout our offensive operations on the European continent in World War II, we never employed

> "... An armored corps of the type the Germans used in early breakthroughs in Poland and on the Western front, partly because of the antipathy toward specialization, and partly because the American infantry division with a light mobility and with attached tanks and tank destroyers was essentially the equivalent of the German panzer grenadier division."

Recall that Patton's 3d Army was preponderantly infantry—three Armor and five Infantry divisions at the time he reached the Rhine. He needed light forces to secure his flanks in ex-

ploitation, but even then he frequently relied on the infantry up front.

It is also of interest to note that the terrain in Europe has changed markedly in the post-World War II era, growing more urban, becoming increasingly hostile to the tank, and receptive to infantry warfare.

Hence, I anticipate that we will eventually settle on a balanced force structure, consisting of heavy divisions built around the new Abrams tank, the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), and all of that mechanization and sophistication necessary on the integrated battlefield; and a reasonable number of light divisions—rapidly deployable to Europe, or elsewhere, and capable of defeating the Soviet T-72 tank.

We have recently designated the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, as the test bed to evaluate a variety of force design and equipment options, all aimed at the early fielding of a light, tough, technologically advanced division. We will experiment in the infantry battalions and cavalry units with a variety of wheeled vehicles and armored cars as carriers of antitank weapons, automatic cannon, ground laser location designators and mortars. We will evaluate the M551 Sheridan as a surrogate tank against both the Improved TOW Vehicle and armored cars, which are available in the commercial market. Engineer digging machinery tested in a variety of organizational configurations will enhance the survivability of rapidly deployed infantry units. And we will continue to exploit the intelligence, target acquisition and electronics warfare systems coming out of development.

These improvements will enhance our capability to react across the spectrum of challenge, without degrading the utility of any element of the force for employment in Europe.

The Army is no stranger to participation in the kinds of scenarios envisioned for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. With our sister services we have always possessed that capability—our Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) and it's successor, the Unilateral Corps (ULC), have been visible examples of earlier contingency planning by the Army.

A study by the Brookings Institution several years ago (Blechman and Kaplan's *Force Without War*, 1978) looked at the historical use of military force in support of national objectives. You might be surprised that there have been over 200 separate instances of actual deployment or enhanced alert status, in support of explicit foreign-policy goals over the past 35 years. Interestingly, the Army was used least of the services as a discrete instrument for attaining political objectives—Army ground combat elements partaking in only some thirty-nine of these incidents. When we did become involved, however, it was typically in force.

I do not believe these findings are inconsistent with my own expectations of our utility, as beyond the contiguous boundaries of the United States the Army is wholly dependent upon mobility provided to us by our sister service. Hence, a decision to employ Army ground power is probably taken at a point in time when the situation is adequately advanced to require the launching of a dedicated task force; a clear escalation of any signal which might be implied through initial insertion of a fighter squadron or an on-station seaborne force. While the Army does possess the capacity for initial insertion using airborne forces, our forte is sustained land combat. Clearly an unmistakable national commitment is made where one sees the U. S. Soldier on the ground—in Europe and in Korea, for example.

That American Soldier is the heart and soul of all that we aspire to accomplish, and so I'd like to spend a few moments with you—and a substantially longer time with the Class of 1980 this evening—discussing the responsibilities of our leadership towards that Soldier. . . .

Soldiers who must subsist through moonlighting and food stamps are rightly apprehensive that their leadership gives a damn. Our commitment must be complete, if we expect dedication returned in kind. And we have a way to go. . . .

. . . our ability to go to war hinges critically on the quality of leadership within the United States Army—leadership founded upon consideration and respect for the Soldier. . . .There are no tricks or gimmicks in the watch words of General John M. Schofield, which I hope are still prominently a part of each new Fourth Classmen's Bugle Notes.

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"The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself."

I hope that particular page is a dog-eared one by the time the Class of 1980 begins to stow its cadet gear and begin to partake of the excitement which lies ahead for them.

Let me adjourn my remarks to you today on a note closer to that which routinely dominates the gathering of this group; namely intercollegiate athletics.

Whether full participant or spectator, I believe that intercollegiate athletics are an indispensable adjunct to training here at West Point, and at the other service academies. The success or failure of Army squads has always had a distinct impact on the morale of the Corps—as well as upon the men and women of our career force, and the national perception of the Army as a winner. (Why else a Red Army hockey team?)

I want you to know that I regard a winning tradition, honestly pursued, as important to the Army as a whole. Obviously, we haven't done well of late in the most visible symbol of this tradition—West Point football. With General Goodpaster, and the help and assistance of graduates around the world, I'm going to change that.

- We need to make the nomination process more responsive to the needs of the Academies, and in this regard I will be addressing selected Congressmen.

- We need legislative changes; specifically, we seek to establish 50 candidates-at-large, controlled by the Academic Board for the purpose of better meeting class composition goals—one of which can be explicit scholar-athlete representation.

- Each of you should have received a letter from the Superintendent seeking your direct involvement in the recruitment process—not limited to athletes, but all varieties of candidates. I urge your participation.

I believe these actions are in West Point's and the Army's best interests, and I look for your wholehearted support. West Point must by a symbol of legitimate and rugged play. . .

## Address to the
## GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL ROTC AWARDS CONFERENCE

Virginia Military Institute
Lexington, Virginia
18 April 1980

. . . . In thinking of what I might say to you today, I was reminded of something that happened during a visit to Fort Benning in January. There, one of the lieutenants in a class asked me what I thought a career enhancing assignment for a second lieutenant might be? I happened to have gone through that mental thought process with some recently commissioned friends of my daughter who were visiting us in Quarters One at Fort Myer over the Christmas holidays. So, I told this young Lieutenant that I had thought about it and that there was no such thing as a career enhancing assignment for a Second Lieutenant—you had to go wherever you were told and do the best you could. With that he got back up and said, "Sir, I beg to differ with the Chief of Staff of the whole United States Army."

Well, I figured I'd better listen to this Lieutenant if he had the guts to stand up and differ with me in front of that whole audience. So I said, "All right Lieutenant, what do you consider a career enhancing assignment?" He answered, "To marry your daughter!"

I happened to mention that story before another group and some of the young female lieutenants asked if I had any sons. . . .

## Uncertainties

These kinds of concerns lead me to believe that it might be worthwhile to reflect with you about the future—specifically about the next ten years of your life, a period of time during which most of you will advance from second lieutenant to major. Admittedly, it will be a perspective looked at through a very cloudy crystal ball, but I think it will give you a vision—my vision, if you will—of what I see for our country, what I see for the Army and what I see for you. Then, I'll give you a bit of advice on how you can be a success without marrying one of my sons or daughter. . . .

You have had the opportunity to look at a whole host of different subjects while participating in the various roundtable discussions—the political factors, the economic factors, the psycho-social factors, as well as those military factors that will have an influence upon our nation in the decade ahead. I'm sure that with the insights you have gained from the professors and leaders who have worked with you in those roundtables that you have a far greater appreciation for what the future is likely to hold in any one of those areas than I do. Nonetheless, since I'm not necessarily shy, I'll go ahead and give you my certain view of the very uncertain decade ahead in those areas, sketching them only very hastily, because my true purpose is to arrive at a construct into which I can fit the Army in this decade ahead, and your relationship to that Army.

In the political arena we can expect to find continued and diverse relationships between nations of the East and the West. We will find confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the greater uncertainties developing in this decade will result from interactions between the northern tier nations and their southern tier counterparts—uncertainties which will have great portent for our country and our Army as well. And there is China—of immense significance and immense unpredictability.

In the economic arena, it's clear that the interdependence of nations will continue to grow, and that access to resources will be a dominant concern of all industrialized societies. That dependence of the industrialized nations on the southern tier, and the leverage available through resource controls, will largely drive the strength and effectiveness of the world's economy in the decade ahead.

In the psycho-social arena we will see increased desire for independence on the part of many of the nations of the world—nations that today are under the hegemony of the Soviet Union as well as nations that are bursting with national pride and the desire to have their individual nationality fully understood and respected.

And finally, in the military realm, we will continue to have, in this decade, strategic nuclear parity at very best; tactical nuclear parity at very best; and the hope, on our part, that we are able to improve qualitatively our conventional military capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, who at this point enjoy significant advantages. We can also expect to have the ranks of nations in possession of nuclear weapons spread well beyond those that possess them today. In summation then, we can expect that the demands placed upon our military forces will be as great, or greater, than they have been in any decade since the 1940's.

What this portends is a decade of change, a decade of challenge, a decade of crisis, and a decade of confrontation. One doesn't need . . . credentials as a soothsayer to envision that it will also be a decade of conflict, for no decade since the 1940's has escaped that plight. These are some of the parameters into which you and the Army will be thrust.

## You and the Army in this Decade

Now with that as a backdrop, let's talk just a minute about what these conditions may mean for you as you advance from second lieutenant to major in this decade. In just twenty years from now, it will be a new century. In the year 2000, you will probably look back over your career and reflect that those first ten years, the decade of the 80's, were the best years of your life. Most likely, you will reflect on the same things all of us old Soldiers hold deeply about that period of time when we served as company commanders and

platoon leaders at the cutting edge of the United States Army—because that period is really the best. It's that exciting time when you're developing personally, the time when you have the opportunity to work hand-in-glove with young Soldiers, and of course, the old NCO's, who teach you at their knee or with the tip of their boot—whatever way suits best. That's the opportunity you have during this decade. The opportunity to learn the tools of soldiering, to become professional, and to contribute to this great nation in that role. That's a sizeable task, and a challenging opportunity. I'm confident each of you is up to it.

What kind of an Army are you likely to be part of in this decade of uncertainty, this decade of change? I would say the circumstances demand that you will have to be a better Lieutenant than I had to be. And a better Lieutenant than General Starry or General French, or any of the others who have spoken to you during the conference because the era in which we entered the Army was markedly different from the one you face. The changes, the uncertainties, the crises, the challenges have an edge of time-sensitivity far greater than those which we faced. And mind you, this is advice from a Soldier who went to war following his commissioning!

## Flexibility

Today's Army itself will focus, as it must, on ensuring that it possesses the capability and responsiveness to meet the challenges about the world which can result from the economic, political, and psycho-social factors which I hastily outlined for you. At the same time, we cannot lose sight of our central responsibility to stand by our NATO Allies in Central Europe. That calls for an Army that is flexible, that is capable of doing more than one thing. It demands flexible means for strategic deployment, flexible tactics, and a flexible force structure. Even more important, it requires mental flexibility. We need people who can think in terms responsive to the divergent needs of many different world arenas, with weapons systems and mobility appropriate to unique threat, environment, and terrain considerations—all without sacrifice to rapid employment. . . .

## Modernization

Regarding equipment, the Army is commencing a modernization effort as large, or larger, than that which accompanied World War II. The initial element of that effort became evident in February with acceptance of the first production models of the Abrams Tank. Forty-four major new weapons systems will be coming into the Army: new tanks, new infantry fighting vehicles, new attack helicopters, new electronic surveillance systems, to name a few. These new systems will give us the ability to offset some of the recent qualitative advantages, and hopefully, if we're smart enough, the historic quantitative advantage possessed by the Soviet Union.

The introduction of new weapons systems means that instead of merely learning how to handle a rifle as I did upon entering the Army, you will be required to orchestrate a host of different weapons: armored personnel carriers as well as infantry fighting vehicles, anti-tank guided missiles, night-vision devices, and so forth. If you are going into armor there will be five different tanks in Mother Army's inventory by 1985, which means that, as we go through the period of modernization, you will have to be proficient in moving from one unit to another and mastering the variety of weapons that greet you. So, as you can see, both the structure and modernization of the Army will have a significant impact on you.

## Manning

One of the shibboleths that accompany this process of modernization is that our modern technology will require a Soldier that possesses an IQ of 260, who is 6 feet 10, and who can run the 40 yard dash in 4.2 seconds. Well, even Bear Bryant doesn't get that type at Alabama. In reality, those are not the kinds of needs that the technology being built into today's weapons demands. The new Abrams tank is actually easier to operate than is the M60 tank. If we continue to be smart enough, our weapons design for at least the basic weapons should make them easier to use. On the other hand the maintenance structures that back them up are going to require more technically proficient and capable people than we've had in the past. So on balance, modernization has not been accompanied by massive growth in unreasonable personnel qualification requirements.

And that's good, because I wouldn't want to compound the biggest problem that faces us today, namely: our ability to man the force. Today, we are short in the Active Component, short in the National Guard, short in the Army Reserve, and short in all areas of trained military manpower. Because of this fact, you will find that we have drawn down platoon and squad strengths in some of the units to which you may be assigned, especially in stateside units. Hopefully, by the time you get out of school this fall, most of the manpower problems of the Active Component, stateside, will be resolved. The difficulty is normally focused here because we must keep our overseas units filled—in Europe, Panama, Korea, Alaska. This necessitates accepting shortfalls in some of the late deploying units here in the United States. . . .

## Cohesion

Another key area that will be different for you than it was for me, and generations about me, is the disappearance of many factors which assisted us directly in building strong group loyalties and which worked to assist cohesion within organizations. Some have been taken away through societal change, others through modifications entirely self-imposed. To give you an example of a significant societal factor, let's consider the prevalence of married Soldiers in today's Army. When I left command of a company at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, back in the 1950's, there were 187 people in that company of whom only nine were married. Today, you will find that between 40 to 50 percent of the members of any platoon you may command will be married. What does that mean as far as building units, as far as building morale, as far as loyalty and cohesion are concerned? Back in my day, everybody lived together in the barracks. The squad members were together. They spent weekends together simply because they didn't have enough money to go downtown. They didn't own cars. They didn't go home each night to their family. The squads, the platoons were their families. Today, you will have Soldiers who will go home every night and come back the next morning. So your task in building cohesion today will be much different, much more challenging.

As I said, we also did some things to ourselves. We've built small two-and three-man rooms for our people to live in. And that's fine, it provides them with privacy. But it does something to our ability to build cohesion and bonds of loyalty within our organizations. We have large consolidated dining facilities today, instead of company mess halls where individuals ate together as units. You will no longer pay your Soldiers directly, whereas I had to stand there and not only make sure that George McCuen, who couldn't spell George, signed and spelled it right so he could get paid but also made sure he knew I was responsible for his pay.

These are just some of the things missing today that once helped us build cohesion and loyalty within the Army. What we must do in this decade is structure back into the Army organizational props that will assist us to improve cohesion within our units. What that could mean for you might involve some conscious program of company level stability, forming units and keeping them together for longer periods of time, perhaps packaging units for three or four years duty overseas, and following that with other steps which consciously honor the special bonds of that relationship. We're examining a whole host of ideas that could assist us in building loyalty and cohesion, accepting the fact that there are some things that cannot be undone. . . .

## Mobilization

Our success in all of these challenging areas is brought together in the crucible of national means for mobilization—our ability to be able to go to war. While General George Marshall was at The Infantry School his constant teaching point to young officers was: "Prepare for the first six months of the next war." He gave that advice in the assurance that there was a time for preparation. You, on the other hand, have no guarantee of a six month cushion to prepare for the next war. The warning time, the distance, the oceans that existed prior to World War II are no longer six months wide. We have to prepare every day for the next war, because the cushion has been so compressed that it virtually no longer exists. We are counted on to be able to respond more rapidly than we ever have in the past. . . .

In the mobilization exercise we conducted two years ago, we found many, many shortcomings in the Army. We're enroute to solutions to

many of the uncovered problems. We've created a state of mind that recognizes in peacetime that mobilization—going to war—is a tough task that calls for broad expertise across the whole spectrum of the nation and its capabilities. We are going to have another exercise this year. I hope it will show that we have corrected many of the shortfalls, and that it will uncover other deserving candidates, in manpower mobilization and in industrial mobilization, so that we are better able to respond on short notice to the challenges of being prepared to go to war.

## Role of the Leader

With whatever improvements we make, I recognize that the Army is not likely to be perfect soon. It has never been perfect while I've been in it, and despite our efforts, it will never likely be. But we have the opportunity to make it as perfect as possible in each of those areas where we individually have an opportunity for influence. I adhere fully to the thrust of General Marshall's comment to the first graduating OCS class at Fort Benning, where he said:

> "The truly great leader overcomes all difficulties, and campaigns and battles are nothing but a long series of difficulties to overcome. The lack of equipment, the lack of food, the lack of this or that are only excuses. The real leader displays his qualities in his triumph over adversity, however great it may be."

That doesn't negate the responsibility of the Army to provide you with the best equipment or the best quality manpower. I use it to remind you that when you face shortages and other difficulties, don't throw up your hands in despair and say, "I'm the first guy who didn't have a full squad" or "full platoon." Remember that recognition of adversity and persevering to overcome it as outlined by General Marshall, is the mark of a leader.

## Three Keys to Success

. . . By now, you are probably asking yourselves, "With all those crises, all those challenges, all those changes, how can I be a success without marrying General Meyer's daughter or son?" I'll tell you. The keys to success are reasonably simple. First, *be the most knowledgeable person around in your area of expertise.* Very simply, know your job. Learn. Study. Innovate. This is going to be a decade in which you are going to have to stay abreast, be ready to go from place to place, equipment to equipment, and be able to respond. So the challenge for you is to be a professional—in whatever branch—in whatever assignment. So that's my first key.

Second, *maintain the inward enthusiasm toward your profession, toward the Army.* It's amazing how much success comes from enjoying what you do. As I told you, in the year 2000 you'll look back on the best days of your career—back to that decade of the 80's. It is in the enjoyment of being a Soldier and the understanding that being a Soldier is different —not an occupation, but a profession, a calling. We are different. Never forget that and act at all times in that manner. Take it into account in all you do as your success is based upon your dedication to the Soldier's way of life and enthusiasm toward your profession.

Third, remember that the Armed Forces are servants of the nation and you must be a servant of your Soldiers. *Your single watchword must be selflessness.* It cannot be "what's in it for me?" It has to be: How can I best respond to the needs of those individuals that trust in me—the Soldier, the nation?" That's the way in which you will be able to motivate them. . . .

With your help, God's help, with your dedicated professionalism, the Army will be able in the decade of the 80's, to contribute to ensuring that, at the end of this decade and at the end of this century, the nation is preserved and our values—those values which were expressed so well through the life of General Marshall—are preserved. Thank you very much.

# Article in
# ARMY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL

1 May 1980

The management of *public* resources brings with it a unique set of responsibilities:

-the responsibility to justify the need for resources,

-the responsibility to compete for their allocation, and

-the responsibility for scrupulous stewardship.

These responsibilities are not distinct and separate from the Army's mission of being prepared for war, rather they are integral aspects of that preparation. If we hope to be ready, we must justify our resource needs (plan), successfully compete for allocation of those resources (program and budget), and then account for the public trust expressed in such allocations.

These functions take organizational form through our Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)—a process whose intricacies I suggest will be more expertly addressed by a host of future authors in this new professional journal. I hope, however, that in our pursuit of managerial excellence, we never lose sight of some key principles. I would like now to share these principles with you.

- The ends must justify the means.

Human enterprise is structured around the central issue of satisfying human needs. In the absence of need, an enterprise (embodied in some organizational form) has no justification. Too often, an organization formulated to meet one set of needs survives in the smugness that "because it has always been, it will continue to be so." The private sector's corporate graveyard offers ample proof that responsiveness to public need is essential. Even among those who survive, adaptability to changing needs is imperative for success.

The absence of a profit-oriented performance system in government makes it conceivable, indeed inevitable for a time, that governmental organizations will live beyond their useful lifetimes. Our own horse cavalry persisted well beyond its usefulness to the nation. We cannot afford sponsorship today or tomorrow of structures moribund with marginal capability. Such tolerance not only bleeds off valuable assets needed to provide resources for more critical tasks, but it erodes our public credibility in espousing quite legitimate enterprises, which are clearly linked to essential national needs.

Our value system must be rooted in a hard-nosed, practical, and non-parochial evaluation of existing and proposed structures and systems against their utility in war. Continued sponsorship is warranted only when these structures and systems can be shown to contribute to the ends we seek.

A major premise of PPBS, as envisioned by Secretary McNamara back in 1961, was to orient defense management on outputs, i.e., the creation of specific national capabilities. There was then, and there is today, a certain perfection to the input/output linkages obtainable in the deliberation of what the strategic forces should be. Certainly it was not then believed, nor is it believed today, that general purpose forces could be as easily accommodated. Nonetheless, numerical weapons comparisons given in terms of strategic systems counts, have too often been our surrogate output despite the fact that the countable systems are merely inputs to the broader issue of total force capability. We need to develop parametric tools that integrate such "inputs" and establish their relative value among force enhancement proposals if we hope to succeed in simplifying the incredibly difficult task of relating resource inputs to warfighting capability. The ends we seek are truly the only real basis on which to make clear demands on the body politic for resources.

This is one reason I am so eager to pursue efforts toward a true Mission Area Analysis capability. While each of us understands almost intuitively the contribution of factors within our domain, we still need the additional insights which analytic tools might provide as we forward

proposals to our board of directors, the American people.

• Wars *are* uncertain things.

It will come as no surprise that the fundamental basis upon which the Army must be structured, outside of defense of the homeland, is the security of Central Europe. Our political, social, and economic bonds within the NATO Alliance run deep. If, however, we attain minimal adequacy there only by virtue of an optimization process that makes the force unsuitable to application across a wider range of conflict, then we will have betrayed the fundamental utility ascribed to the existence of an Army, namely its nature as a general purpose force. Hence, optimization according to a single clear-cut set of guidelines cannot be the unalterable rule for Army resource allocation. Linkages of resources to explicit objectives must be understood and clearly laid out as they impact on the flexibility of the force this nation chooses to purchase.

We could, of course, adopt a single track approach aimed at some point on the distant planning horizon, much as one might plot a worldwide trip with American Express from Washington, to Paris, to Istanbul, etc. If the task of managing the Army were as effortless as the small enterprise of a single world traveler, there would be little expense and minimal discomfort in reordering the trip as its purpose, or the traveler's whim, suited.

In all bureaucracies there are strong pressures to go too far in the quest for single track planning. For the military, such adherence ignores the lessons of history, for war is a very unpredictable business. Never does it follow a prescribed scenario—for as von Moltke said: "No plan survives contact with the enemy."

Appropriate planning is conducive to (1) facing uncertainties (not pushing them aside), and (2) hedging against uncertainties. Fielding an Army at a time and place not of our choosing is a very different task than constructing a highway, staffing a department store, or designing a specific national program to meet some social ill. Each of these operates in a much more certain environment. For us, the road ahead is less clear.

We must look as far down the pike as necessary, seeking to be mostly correct. Our travel plans will of necessity resemble a satellite photo of the Mississippi River with its panoply of tributaries—the main stream of activity clear, but diverse branches indicating options along which our minds and efforts wander so that if what we thought was the main stream becomes shallow and stagnant, we do not flounder.

• The Natives here *don't* all speak English.

Let us recognize our resource management system for what it is. Its progenitor, Charlie Hitch, explained it as an attempt to bridge the "almost complete separation between substantive or military planning and fiscal planning," a means for achieving balanced interservice approaches to design the outputs necessary to support national military and foreign policy objectives.

It is intended as a structured means for a debate in which the value of each program must stand the test of its adequacy in bridging the gap between the realities of political philosophy (what is government? what must it do?) and the scarcity of resources. This means that managers at each level must not only service the system so that it can function in a timely and responsive fashion, but that managers must also be able to step outside the particular idiom of their area of expertise and present their rationale in a language that can be understood by diverse audiences.

Too often we place the burden of comprehension on those above or below us--assuming both the existence of a common language and a motivation for those at other levels to reason our way. This is as unrealistic an expectation as that of Captain John Smith at Jamestown had he anticipated his first landing party reporting back that: "All the natives here speak English!" It would have amazed him. It amazes others that we make that type of assumption today.

• The Mind is a terrible thing to waste.

A cynic, who also happened to be a resource management expert, once observed that the ideal way for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to maintain an upper hand in dealing with the service was to preoccupy the users with enough changes to the resource management system to divert their attention to the process instead of the substance of resource allocation. Certainly that has not been the motivation for the many im-

provements to PPBS. But it cannot be denied that there has been ample change, as well as considerable effort in keeping pace with and anticipating change.

Both institutional and personal hazards occur here for the participants.

- Does the system serve us, or we it?

- Do we attribute intelligence to the system, rather than intelligently approaching problems for full comprehension?

- As we define individual roles of authority to make the system function, do we collapse the bounds of our individual and organizational responsibilities?

There is a story about a young major on the Army Staff, who, proud and ready, with a perfectly staffed action, was called into General Maxwell Taylor's office. The officer was totally conversant with the recommended position, as well as the positions of every major agency. But he was aghast when the Chief asked him: "Major, what do *you* think about this issue?" The action officer had not formed his own opinion—a sin of omission.

The action officer, whether at the installation or at Department of the Army, must be "an island of total competence" in his area. But if we want the action officer to think, it's not inappropriate to expect his superiors to also exercise their intellect on issues.

Too often supervisors, rather than properly responding at their level, automatically refer issues down to the action officers. The consequence of this practice results in the potential for an Army structured on the basis of disjointed viewpoints at the action level. Synthesis, innovation, and direction are imperative management ingredients. We cannot afford to have intermediate managers (and higher) become overly concerned with the administration of, rather than the substance of, actions—sins of very grave commission.

If ever there was a need for mental adroitness and clear thinking, it is now. . . .

We cannot approach resource allocation and management systems in the old fashion described by Aaron Wildavsky as the "art of muddling thru."

## SUMMARY

I've attempted to lay out four thoughts for you as we proceed through the next few years together.

First, we need to clearly comprehend the linkages between the resources we need and the national capability we expect to achieve. The ends are the *only* justification for the means we seek.

Second, wars are uncertain things. We can't set up single rationales for justifying our case, content that having done so our job is finished. Be daring—pursue a vision.

Third, by the grace of God, this is a diverse world of many challenging minds, only a few of whom understand our case from our perspective. We need to clearly articulate what we believe in.

Last, the system must serve us, not we it. Don't become so automated that you restrict your responsibility to some systemic definition—the mind is a terrible thing to waste.

# Letter to an Army Officer on LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

2 May 1980

Thanks for taking the time to write. I appreciate your views and perspectives, and I do agree with many of them.

Intrinsic in my personal goals is recognition that the organizational/leadership climate in today's Army is deficient. We need to break down barriers to vertical communication, establish greater awareness and concern in our interpersonal relationships, and create opportunities for individual growth and self fulfillment. Through these means lie the basis for enhanced organizational loyalties, greater unit cohesion, and the resultant benefits they lend to effectiveness in our business of war.

Having said that, I am not at the same time willing to accept broad assertions that there exist uniformly better climates at Xerox or within other corporate structures, which place greater value on personal responsibility toward these objectives than we do. Let's not confuse more generous private compensation packages with leadership climate. The test of corporate concern for the individual is still rooted in the cost center and performance against profit objectives. Similarly, we cannot and will not consider affable camaraderie and personal satisfaction a substitute for combat performance and readiness.

I am a believer that preparation for war (readiness) goes hand-in-hand with our "corporate climate". Obviously we can struggle toward and perhaps achieve certain readiness standards while neglecting such responsibilities for climate, but there is no question that such achievements will be markedly less than that which a healthy, supportive climate can nurture. So while I am not willing to agree with the broad premise that accepts an unfavorable comparison with corporate industry, I can observe that:

-Through a combination of conscious "effective management" actions and individual inattention to traditional responsibilities senior to subordinate, we have bred an unhappy state in today's Army which we need to rapidly and adroitly attack. A sizing-back of several decades of overcentralization needs—and is getting—attention as is a refocusing of our officer corps on duties and people at hand, rather than on subsequent career aspirations.

-There are lessons we can learn from our civilian sector. The principal speaker to this year's Brigadier Generals' Conference was an old friend from Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company who gave some well deserved advice from outside. But, I don't want to carry emulation to unhealthy extremes. We are different in too many important ways from industry (e.g., unlimited liability).

-There are things we can learn from OE, and I'm willing to listen and learn. But I caution you that . . . it will not be your reputation with academic and external organizational effectiveness circles that will ensure OE's continuance in the Army. . . .[influence comes from a] demonstration of pertinence to the Army and its problems. Hence, I urge you to be attentive to speak the language of the Soldier, translating the good ideas of the community into words which are understandable and usable. OE is not well served by such tendencies as are evident in your own letter, to wit: "interpersonal influence (how to get people to do what one wants done)"—aren't we talking about leadership? The burden of translating [good ideas] into adoptable schemes falls on the OE community.

Rest assured that I don't plan any hasty action to eliminate what I consider a program of great potential value to the Army. I would, however, like to see more of achievement and less of potential.



★ ★ ★ ★

# Hearing Before The
# HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
# Subcommittee on Personnel
# On the New Educational Assistance Program

7 May 1980

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee I volunteered to come over here because I feel so strongly about the importance of educational incentives to assist us in having the kind of Army that we need to defend this Nation in the decade ahead.

You have heard me say before that one of the key problems we face is manning the force. . . .

Since 1970, when the Gates Commission proposed an All-Volunteer Force, the Army and the Department of Defense have initiated a series of proposals in an effort to recruit adequate numbers of Soldiers and to retain experienced Soldiers in critical military occupational skills. Bonuses have also been provided to retain critical noncommissioned officers—NCO's. Additionally, our recruiting resources have been greatly expanded over those of the draft era.

However, two things have given us a problem. One is the fact that we have gone through a period in which military pay has been capped, and second, we have done away with the GI Bill. Those were two great incentives which provided young people coming into the service with the opportunity for upward mobility.

We replaced the GI Bill with a less attractive contributory program, and that has provided some opportunities during the period of time that we have had to test it. However, last year, as you know, we ended up some 15,000 short in high school graduate enlistees, and 17,000 short of our overall recruiting objective. This is an indication that the Veteran's Educational Assistance Program (VEAP), as a substitute for the GI Bill, has not done what we had hoped it would do.

That should not surprise us because we are asking the young enlistee coming in, who is already at the edge of poverty, to take $50 to $75 out of his pocket and put it into education. If you wonder why we are only getting 30 percent involvement in the "VEAP" program, it is because at the [earnings] level of the individuals we are interested in, it is not possible for them to take $50 to $75 out of their pay because that is the difference between surviving and not surviving.

We have looked at what the impact of the GI Bill was. Three years ago, when we still had it, it was No. 1 as the type of incentive that attracted quality people to the Army. Today, as we look at the "VEAP" program, we find it 32d out of 37 on a priority list of incentives. So I can tell you that the substitute programs for the GI Bill have not solved the problem.

I believe we need a new comprehensive Soldiers' education benefits package. . . .We need it to provide high school graduates with a strong incentive to enlist. We need it to retain career Soldiers, such as the middle-manager, noncommissioned officers who train and lead the force. We need it to provide qualified personnel to man and maintain the new equipment and systems of the 1980's. We need it to provide a credible package of post-service educational benefits which will meet individual educational aspirations.

We have been looking into a number of alternatives which we believe will more nearly meet the needs of the country, the Army and the Soldiers who voluntarily make up that Army. We are ready to work with your committee in any follow-on that you have in this area, and we know that this bill has been put together to lay out the basic needs for increased educational assistance to the Soldier.

I have said for many years that the one area where you can find absolute congruence of interest between the Army, the Soldier, and the country is in education. The Soldier wants to be educated. . . .

I believe the proposal is a step in the right

direction. Let me state the case in essence. There are two ways you can have Armed Forces. One, you can go out with adequate incentives to get sufficient volunteers. The other is you can conscript for it. Today, we have neither. We do not have adequate incentives or conscription. So we have neither as a basis for raising an army.

The GI Bill is one way to give you the possibility of being able to man the force with the quality and quantity we want. . . .

MR. NICHOLS: General Meyer, there is a great deal of grousing today about the All-Volunteer Force. I belong to the philosophy that the defense of this country is everybody's responsibility. I would personally support some type of universal military service, but it wouldn't pass.

Do you see any possibility in the immediate future of us going to any other form of service other than the all-volunteer concept?

GENERAL MEYER: It seems to me that we have two requirements for manpower. One is in peacetime and one is in wartime. You have accomplished the first step toward the wartime problem, and that is support of registration. We cannot go to war without registration. Manning the force in peacetime, I believe, as you have heard me say before, requires a national decision as to whether the country is going to provide manpower through draft or through incentives. I believe that it is possible with incentives to do it, but that is a decision which the country has to make. . . .

MR. HOPKINS: . . . .I went to Fort Knox and visited with the general down there, and had a great day and so forth. I spent time with some of the enlisted personnel, . . . we really got down to what it is all about, and I asked them if the all-volunteer service was working. Without exception, all of them said "no" and many of them were getting out. They said that what you are getting today are your streetwise kids who know how to sell drugs, and were selling them. In fact, they were selling drugs right then at Fort Knox. If that is what we have for the defense in this country we are in very deep trouble. That is how I personally feel about it. I want to correct that, and I want you to help me do that.

GENERAL MEYER: I would merely say in defense of the 80 percent of the great young Soldiers out there—from your district and Mr. Nichol's district and from others—that if you were to view them in our forward deployed areas, such as Berlin, Europe, or Panama, where they are fully manned and equipped, you would find a different situation. But it is spotty and those situations you describe do exist. *It is in essence what I call a hollow army in the United States today because we have not been able to provide the NCO's and manpower to fill it with both the quantity and quality we need, and this bill begins to do that.* . . .

MR. HILLIS: . . . it seems to me we have always in the last decade or so been able to somehow rationalize a little less defense every year, we can get by with a little lower percentage of Reserves, and this sort of thing, until finally we find ourselves in the position you are talking about of a hollow army.

We live in a competitive society, sir. . . .

The question I want to ask you is whether you think this bill will work. If I were a young person and could enlist and thereby earn an opportunity for an educational grant or could borrow the funds and go to school and become a doctor and pay it back, I would be in a quandary as to which way to go. So you can see that you are in competition with a lot of other programs that will give a B.S. or A.B. or whatever kind of degree the person wants. Do you think this will work? Have you analyzed this in light of how many other Federal programs there are competing with this one?

GENERAL MEYER: There are about $4.4 billion worth of Federal programs for which the individual does not have to pay back through service. I think you know I have proposed in the past to offer this all under a GI Bill so that the country was in effect getting back service for the use of these funds.

MR. HILLIS: To pay back after education?

GENERAL MEYER: No; that the funds they are currently giving away in a grant loan are given away for individuals who provide service. That would be the way I would go about funding this bill. . . .

# Address to the
# AUSA NATIONAL SECURITY SEMINAR

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
22 May 1980

. . . . I know many of you, as executive officers or chief operating officers of various companies, find your time and your focus largely controlled by others. There are board meetings you have to go to, financial meetings, directors' meetings, stockholders' meetings, loans due, labor contracts and everything else. I find similar kinds of demands within the Army. I decided early that I had to be able to focus certain periods of my tenure on specific subjects if I hoped to make a dent. . . .Now Bill [Fulton] told me that I'm already a failure because I'm eleven months into this business and I don't have everything sorted out. Well, I'll just point to some of the retired out here and say I couldn't police up after all of you in that short period of time.

As I looked at what I had to do, I decided that during the first quarter, I'd devoted my time principally toward finding out where all the latrines were in the Pentagon—particularly those I had not seen before—go into the DCSPER (Personnel Management) latrine, the Comptroller's latrine, the Research and Development latrine—those arenas so different from the Soldiers' latrine over on the operations side of the house. I had to learn about [them].

The next quarter, the last three months of 1979, I focused on bringing in all the Army's senior leadership—our commanders—to get their views on critical subjects. And then I decided to lay out my vision of what the Army would have to be in order to respond to this decade of the '80's. I did that in a White Paper, which we will cover with you tomorrow. It's my vision . . . of what [the] Army of the 80's has to be in order to respond to the challenges and threats we face.

Now the question is, how do we get that Army? And we'll talk a bit about that later this evening and tomorrow.

During their first three months of this year, the 2nd quarter of FY 80, I had to focus on my responsibilities to the Congress, in testimony and a variety of other ways, to insure availability of the resources for the Army. I used to tell General Weyand when he was Chief of Staff of the Army that he was like the President of a University: his responsibility was to get money to run the university, and leave to the various deans of the colleges the responsibility to run the colleges and interact with the faculty members and students. Now my responsibility clearly is to go over and articulate [to Congress] the needs of the Army and that took up the second quarter of the Fiscal Year. Complementary to this was the major dialogue with [the] Defense Department to convince them that what I had written in the White Paper was what they agreed to. I would be less than candid if I [said] there was wholehearted agreement at these sessions, but I would say that the Army's major views prevailed. So, in general, there is agreement between us and OSD regarding the basic approach toward the kind of Army that we are moving to create. That doesn't at all mean that the dollars and full resourcing necessarily follow—that's a different matter. But, at least in a basic sense, there's agreement on what characteristics we want that Army to possess.

This quarter, between now and the first of July, I'm focusing principally on personnel matters. We've grave problems in the Army, as all of you know, in our ability to be able to man the force: its Active, Reserve, and National Guard components. It goes beyond just whether we have or don't have the draft. It goes beyond whether or not we get the dollars to ensure that we have the kind of mid-level management that we need. It gets to the very basic question of whether or not the Army is fully adapted to America's changing society. It's not clear we're adapted to a married Army. We met the call for individualism by constructing different kinds of barracks offering increased privacy. We achieved economy by feeding in consolidated dining halls. Much of what you may remember of what was out there when you were in the Army—those things that built cohesiveness, that built loyalty, that built teamwork—no longer exists. In some cases these are changes in society itself. In other instances they result from the way we've gone about doing business. One might say we've been entirely too reactive—'til today we need to stop, take stock

of all factors and put back those things which ensure cohesiveness, loyalty and teamwork. There's some rebuilding necessary. That's sort of where I am.

But now I'd like to talk to you about the quarter starting in July—the quarter I will devote to the whole Research, Plan which permits us to be able to articulate more clearly and firmly to ourselves, to industry, and to Congress, a balanced approach toward our total Army acquisition program. Today, right or wrong, the perception exists in many quarters—in OMB, in industry—that the Army does not have a viable and steady long-range acquisition plan. The concerns are expressed in many different ways: that the Army says one thing and goes ahead and does another; that it doesn't speak with one voice; that it lacks resolve about what it wants in terms of characteristics, or kinds of systems, or quantities; or that it manages badly; that it's not as good as the Air Force; that its costing is poor, that we don't interface well with industry; that we don't provide stability to our people at the program manager level and so on. Those are the kinds of challenges I might hear in conversations with many of you. . . .While I don't agree with all of those concerns, in some cases I recognize truth. In others, I have to recognize that the solution is beyond my ken. . . .So what I have to do is focus on those legitimate concerns we can change, on those in which we can do something which will make a difference.

Some of the concerns that I've outlined are, in my judgment, ill-founded. One of the areas which I believe we can prove categorically that we have a better record than others is the area of costing, where we are frequently criticized. . . .I believe that when you look at our costing compared with the other services, you will find that about 81 percent of our cost growth is directly attributable to inflation. . . .

Now the other 19 percent not directly attributable to inflation is something that we have to worry about. I have to ensure that we act to minimize cost increases as a result of such things as changes in our scheduling, engineering, support design, and programmed buy. . . .

I will say that we are taking a hard look at program manager tenure. Jack Guthrie, Don Keith, Bob Yerks—those vice presidents and corporation and sub-corporation directors out here tonight—are working to improve our ability to retain program managers in their positions for longer periods of time. Our system is somewhat different from the Air Force where individuals come in and stay within that system forever. We feel that there is merit in bringing in people who understand the way systems must interact in units, and then picking the best man and keeping him there as long as we can. And while we're looking at extending them, we feel that the success of their programs, and a positive reflection on the way we go about selecting our managers is indicated by the fact—as you look across all of the various Selected Acquisition Reports—that we have a better record than the other services. And that means that despite the fact that we aren't leaving these people out there as long as some people think we ought, that we're doing something right. And while I don't mean that we ought not to be willing to accept legitimate change, we ought to first look at what the actual facts are.

. . . .one thing I find is that there is a great demand for us to impose some sort of discipline on our system. I've looked back over some of the historic references about what kind of discipline [was] placed on the system in the past. You can go back to 1938 or 1939 when George Marshall said to the Air Corps Tactical School that it is just not possible to come up with a balanced force based on full agreement across the board. Further, he said, short of war there is no method for testing a solution. The decision will be based largely on opinion, and opinions will vary. . . .

One of the things that is always attractive to the new man when he comes in—according to that old saw about the new commander at his first encounter with difficulty—is to open up the first of the envelopes your predecessor left you, and follow his advice: blame the situation on your predecessor. At the next sign of major trouble, you open up the second envelope which tells you to reorganize. And finally, when thrice blessed with problems, you open up the third envelope which instructs you to prepare three envelopes for your successor. Certainly one of the attractive alternatives is always to go ahead and reorganize. Well, in my judgment, the wrong thing that we can do right now—at this particular instance in time—as far as DARCOM and everything is concerned, is to go through a reorganization. We're

complex animals and it takes us a long time to be able to understand how we go about doing business together—within the Army itself, and between the Army and industry. I would rather have the organization not quite right and let people make it work, than try to go through some sort of major change. Although Jack Guthrie is making some internal changes which make sense . . . in general the greatest need we have now, particularly in the acquisition area, is for organizational stability.

Another area that we need to work on more closely is in the area of trying to make perfectly clear to industry the risk that we ask it to undertake in our programs. That's been very difficult for us in the past, in my judgment, because we have not been able to clearly lay out with assurance what our goal is.

Now why do I think that I'm going to be able to do better than my predecessors? I only hope that I can.

. . . .Until this year, until right about this time of this year, we have not had the doctrine, the tactics, and all of the other factors laid out to permit us to be able to decide among weapon systems. If you've followed the Army's progress, you recognize that most of our focus has been on the basic doctrine of how to fight in Central Europe, FM 100-5. And that was important. But in that focusing process, we lost sight of much of what takes place behind the battle positions: the corps itself and the Echelons Above Corps, and the doctrine that supported that. That doctrine is all coming into being today in TRADOC's proposals for tomorrow's Army: the heavy division, the light division, the corps, the support base. All of that will be coming up for decision within the next month. So by July I will have—the Army will have—a doctrinal basis against which we can measure the forces which we're going to have, and from which we can project on out into the future our prioritized needs. That doctrine gives us the basis for the identification of the weapons systems, the basis for the identification of the length of the logistics supply system, for the training system, and so on. Some of that will be presented to you tomorrow so that you will be able to take a look at it with us, see what it looks like, and then get into the implications.

So we have two things today that we didn't have in the past —my personal vision of what I see as essential for us in order to fulfill our role to the nation over the next decade. . . . and an articulation of the doctrine and tactics for the various types of divisions, the corps, and the Echelons Above Corps. To say that it has taken us from 1973 until 1980 to develop doctrine and tactics for Echelons Above Corps doesn't make me very proud as the former DCSOPS of the Army. But that's how long it has taken us to come to grips with the problem, and to articulate the totality of the change that occurred when a basic decision was made back in 1973 to change the way in which we fought on the battlefield. Other factors from that time also have had great impact. The year 1973 happens to be the same year that we decided to go to an All Volunteer Force. It was also the year of an Arab-Israeli War in which many of the lessons we're trying to orchestrate now were made so evident to the world. So it's taken us that long to get the house in order to be able to draw up a road map that might permit us to be able to respond to tomorrow's challenges. . . .

We've got a major undertaking ahead of us. . . .

Now what does its achievement require? It requires two things. First, it requires a very careful prioritization of our whole program for modernization. It's going to require a tight well-thought out acquisition management program that permits us to attack the whole problem more meaningfully than we've been able to do in the past. Don Keith and some of the others will talk a bit about that tomorrow. Additionally it's going to require a decision on procurement strategies as to whether or not we go ahead and buy out some of the more critical pieces of equipment which have the most immediate impact on the battlefield, or whether we continue the system of simmering or bubbling a host of systems, bringing them along simultaneously so that we achieve maximum gain out of the location radar, the tank, the artillery piece, the electronic warfare item—all committed at the same time.

That strategy [does] preserve a capability, in the event of war, to turn those simmering production lines up so that you can surge equipment into the pipeline to support a war effort. . . .Now that's a major decision that we're going to have to make, and we've got to make it in the last quarter of this year. That's one of the reasons I

volunteered to come to Carlisle when Bob [Cocklin] indicated that he was setting this seminar up. I wanted the principals of the Army Staff to take advantage of this time with you, to get your views and your ideas as we go through our litany of where we are, what it is we're trying to do, where it is we think we ought to go. We need to air some of the problems we face and look at our ability to get the kind of equipment we think we need. And then we need to translate that into an . . . acquisition strategy that we are able to follow.

I will tell you that once we have done that, by the end of September, the product will be *the* Army's acquisition policy and strategy. Those who cannot agree with it, or who will not wholeheartedly support it, will be asked to leave the Army because we are not going to speak with five or six voices. That doesn't mean there can't be dissident voices out there freely articulating their views. But the Army cannot have an approach to where it's going if internally we continue disruptive debate about how nice it would be if we had this or how it would be better if we had that. We don't have that luxury. We may be only 80 percent right when our plan is firmed, but I'd rather be 80 percent right and have that 80 percent in the hands of Soldiers, than wait to be 100 percent right and have only 20 percent in the hands of our Soldiers. . . .That's where we are today, in incessant dialogue about well, don't you think you ought to do this or don't you think you ought to do that, instead of getting on with securing those pieces of equipment that are going to give us the capability of responding adequately to early challenges in this decade. So, creation of a master acquisition plan is an absolute necessity as far as I'm concerned—something which we *must* do.

One other area that troubles me, which I wanted to expose this evening, is the whole issue of the adequacy of resources devoted to national defense. The resources that are devoted to defense are inadequate. Let me just tell you what it looks like as far as the Army is concerned.

In the 1960's and the 1970's the Air Force and Navy had the opportunity to go through their modernization period. They had the opportunity to bring in the aircraft which you built to gain a technologically superior position relative to the Soviet Union. The flurry of expenditures in the Navy and Air Force immediately following Vietnam gave them the opportunity to modernize their forces, to be able to meet and modernize to the new technological demands of those services. The time for Army recovery is now. We are qualitatively behind the Soviet Union in almost every area and now we must be given the opportunity to recover. But what's happening? Traditionally, the Army has had about 25 percent of the defense budget. As I look to what we are likely to get today in the budget—instead of getting 25 percent if you went according to the current program—and I don't agree with the program being developed now—that percentage would go down to 21 percent. Clearly there is no way that the Army can modernize, even with all the great wisdom of prioritization and everything else, with that smaller share of the budget.

In essence, the capability we will have in real buying power in the timeframe we're talking about will be even less. The current budget—just so all of you have some understanding of the figures we're talking about—the current budget between fiscal years 79 and 80, as far as real growth is concerned, increased only one-tenth of one percent in spite of all you read in the newspapers. And if inflation continues, it's going to be negative growth. The growth that's projected in the FY 81 budget will be around 6.8 percent for the FY 81 Army, but that's based on a 9.3 percent inflation rate. For every percentage increase in inflation, we're going to realize less growth. So that gives you some insight into what it means as far as real growth is concerned.

I don't mention this to you purely to depress you—as it depresses me sometimes—because as I pointed out, I'm the president of the university. My job is to go up and somehow convince the gentlemen in OSD that the share of the budget that they are allocating to the Army is inadequate, that the needs and requirements of a technologically more capable conventional force in these early years of the decade of the 80's is much more critical than they give credence to. I believe the case for that can be made. . . .We are beginning to have support from Congress to assist us. I'm convinced that we will be able to do better than what the current projections forecast for the Army.

But the key from where I sit is securing your help in attempting to throw off a bit—you may have heard me say this before—some of the



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parochialism of your particular corporate interests. Some measure of success will only be possible when we rise patriotically to the higher needs of this nation, in our dealings with one another and the Congress, and seek the full means to accomplish the task at hand.

Following World War I, Hindenburg paid the highest compliment to American industrialists when he said of the War Production Board led by Bernard Baruch: "These men understood war." I hope we can similarly unite about the interest of fielding a viable Army for this nation's security. End-running to Congress on issues of narrow interest will only undermine the Army program and erode national support of the entire package. To make our acquisition plan work, we'll need your unstinting support.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Professionalism

4 June 1980

There is little need for me to elaborate greatly on the contents of FM 100-1. . . .It is brief but profound. I have used it often as a primer for conveying to civilians who and what we are as an institution, and I commend it to your personal library if it is not already present, for these purposes. It is also my persuasion that each of us can profit by sober reflection on its contents, those fundamentals which drive our profession and which mark us individually as unique contributors to the nation and its security.

The keystone of our contribution toward peace is total competence in waging war. That expertness can only come from an ardent study of tactics and strategy. It demands that we develop a full appreciation for applying the principles of war in our decision process, and that we cultivate a full comprehension of both the positive application of military power and its evident limitations.

The modern professional is diverted from full time pursuit of any such study because of the simultaneous demand for specialization—both administrative and technical—without which we could not field an adequate force. But it is clear that unless we consciously pursue a continuing process of professional search and reflection, we risk losing the broader vision, the creativity, the sense of purpose which military leadership demands, and upon which our success in combat depends.

Frankly, I am troubled when I observe apparently competent officers who apply the tools of our trade inappropriately in operational situations, or who fail to scrutinize rather basic but critical assumptions underlying our plans, or who substitute program guidance in situations which clearly demand military judgment.

We seek from our units—their Soldiers, NCOs and officers—an instant capability to take the field in mortal combat. The concomitant obligation of the Army's senior leadership is to be prepared to lead those units wisely.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On the Articulation of Needs

11 June 1980

Defense of the United States has become a global task. DOD has to coordinate and integrate the efforts of all Services and develop reasonable priorities for each. In this regard, the Consolidated Guidance (CG) is a fundamental document charting the direction for each Service. Naturally, the Services each provide significant input to the CG.

This year the Army made substantial progress by gaining recognition in the CG of the need for a flexible and balanced force. This is a positive step. The problem of insufficient funding . . . remains. Defining the Army's objectives and obtaining the necessary resources to achieve those objectives are parts of a dynamic and continuous process.

The first responsibility of the Army's senior leadership is to provide the President and Congress with the best possible professional estimates. It is incumbent upon us to be competent and aware of our shortcomings, and what it takes to fix them. These estimates must not be colored by existing policy or by what is immediately available. We need to be able to speak rationally and clearly about what is necessary in a long-range, fundamental global context. In addition to determining what we feel is necessary, we need to present our case effectively, recognizing that resources are not unlimited and there are legitimate claims to those resources from other sectors. Our purpose is to provide for the common defense. And we must be intelligent and persuasive in making our case. Finally, as Soldiers, we need to make the best possible use of available resources. We need to train those we lead to maintain and fight the equipment we have with imagination and skill.

Defending this country is a full time task. The Army's general officers rightfully shoulder a large part of the burden. This year's CG is a step in the right direction. We still have a lot of work to accomplish.

## Interview with the PENTAGON PRESS GROUP

Arlington, Virginia
13 June 1980

QUESTION: General, when you were up doing your testimony before Senator Stratton, you commented that you had a "hollow Army," that the budget didn't meet the needs of the 80's. I wonder if you could expand and elaborate on that. What do you mean by a hollow Army?. . .

GENERAL MEYER:. . . The hollowness is in the fact that the CONUS forces are not full strength. The CONUS forces, if you go around, vary from 75 to 80, 85, or 90 percent based on where they are in priority to go to war. We send people out there based on their priority to go to war. And that means that out in the last priority unit . . . you find squads and platoons zeroed out. Across the board, wherever you go in the United States, you have hollow units. Zeroed out squads, zeroed out platoons, zeroed out fire teams. So that is part of the hollow Army other part of the hollow—the NCO problem—exacerbates that. Not only are you short people, but you're also short NCO's. We've kept Europe at 105% strength in NCO's; at the same time we're sending more sergeants out to recruiting and more sergeants out to work with Reserve Components. So that has cut down on NCO's serving in the units here in the States. So if you go to a Stateside unit today, you'll find them in that sort of a condition.

In addition, you've got the Reserves and the Guard and the trained manpower pool, the IRR. All of those are short. So when I talk about a hollow Army in the manpower area, that's what I'm talking about.

QUESTION. But you have entire units that are not, there's nobody in? Platoons—

GENERAL MEYER: The way you do it if you get down to about 80% is you zero out—first you zero out squads, then you zero out platoons. . . .That's better than keeping a whole bunch of units at 70%.

QUESTION: . . . Is there a hollowness also with respect to equipment?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, in my testimony over on the Hill I said . . . I'm not satisfied that we're modernizing quickly enough to respond to the threat and challenge. . . .But I don't believe we could have made the kinds of [equipment] decisions that people would like us to have made a year or so ago. . . .



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The Army that we were headed for was almost exclusively a mechanized Army for central Europe, and there was not a careful look at where else the Army might have to go and what other kinds of forces the Army might need. . . .I think now we're past that argument against having a flexible force that can go to NATO and which can contribute elsewhere. Now it's clear that you can use light forces in Central Eruope and you can use light technologically-capable forces in other areas of the world.

A year ago, if you were to have made a decision on what pieces of equipment to buy, you would have bought nothing but tanks and fighting vehicles and big heavy stuff. There would have been no focus on trying to look in the electronic warfare area. There would have been no focus on looking at what you can do with light, more mobile forces. There would have been a lesser look at what you can do with helicopters. So all of those things would have been a lower priority.

Now we have a reasonable agreement with OSD to have the balanced force—at least the need for the light force so that we're able to look at it. We have a chance to do that.

Second, the studies that we've been doing out at Leavenworth on the heavy force, on the heavy division, are just about to be completed. It's time to take a look at all the new equipment that is coming in and decide what gives you the most, the best return on investment. . . .So, my argument is that until this summer, no Chief of Staff had the tools to make the kinds of trade-offs logically that you had to make. Now I've got the tools . . . very hard decisions have to be taken. . . .

QUESTION: What are one or two of the things you have to decide?

GENERAL MEYER: Let me just give you a couple of areas. The air defense area is going to be very difficult because . . . those things are very high-dollar pieces of equipment. The trade-off between what the Air Force does and what we do in that area is going to be very critical to how much of that we buy. Clearly, there is a trade-off between how much you protect the tanks and the fighting vehicles and everything else with air defense, and how many of the systems themselves you need on the ground. . . .

The whole area of electronic warfare, in my judgment, provides us great opportunities. . . .The trade-off between electronic warfare and tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and so on is something that we have to look at as well, and we have the tools to do that now. We didn't before. Those are two examples. . . .

QUESTION. Maybe you would explain why you made the choice [or General Vaught]?

GENERAL MEYER: Sure, I'd be happy to. When I had to pick someone, when I was asked to pick someone, there were only three people in the Army that I considered who had the background in conventional and special forces, working with the airborne, working with the airborne, working with the rangers, and working with the Air Force. Jim Vaught was one of those three. We have very very few people in the Army who understand the unconventional side of warfare. Jim Vaught had worked with the rangers and with the Delta [Force]. For the two years that he was down in the 24th Division, he was a Joint Task Force Commander for Ranger emergency deployment exercises, for the interface with Delta; he was involved in the validation exercise—the man on the Army staff who was directly interfacing with them as they got their equipment, as they did their training and everything else. So that's his unconventional warfare credentials. His Army credentials—he was in an infantry division. He's served in an air-mobile unit, where you're dealing with helicopters—he was in the First Cavalry. He was in the airborne division—worked day in and day out with the Air Force. And he was with the light infantry and worked with Rangers. So in foresight there was no doubt in my mind that he had the right kind of qualifications to do that.

QUESTION: How about hindsight?

GENERAL MEYER: In hindsight, I would still recommend that he go. . . .

QUESTION: . . . How are you going to heavy up for Europe and lighten up for the Middle East at the same time? Can you do it? You don't have enough money and it looks like they're not going to give it to you. . . . What are you going to do about tanks, for example? Is this bad news for the XM-1?

GENERAL MEYER: No, we have to have a

tank in Central Europe. What we have to do is somehow be able to do a balancing act between what we need in Central Europe and [what we need] to go to those other areas of the world we might be called to. And I will have to tell you that I do not know how I'm going to do that. I could give you some smoky answer, but I don't know. The biggest management challenge that I face is . . . trying to do the balancing of resources between Central Europe and [our other] requirements. . . .

I believe personally, however, that light divisions are absolutely essential in Central Europe. If you look at what Patton used when he was going across Europe—when you think of those tank thrusts—his tank thrusts consisted of three infantry divisions and one armored division. The infantry divisions held the points so he didn't have to put tanks and APC's into fixed positions. The way we are now, we have all of our forces in Europe mechanized. That means that when the infantry [dismounts to] go into the woods and hold, or go into a city, and then you've lost your mobility.

What you need is a mix of infantry and mechanized so that infantry can be holding strong points or working in the woods and [still retain] the mobility of the mechanized force. Today the mechanized force has to become unmechanized to do certain tasks in Europe. . . .If we're smart enough, we can show that the same kinds of light forces, technologically capable, using precision guided munitions and stuff like that, can be as effective in Central Europe as they can elsewhere and [that] gives you a dual capability.

QUESTION: Doesn't this reverse the trend of the last decade or so?

GENERAL MEYER: It doesn't reverse it. . . .We're just starting into the modernization. We haven't done anything stupid yet is what I'm saying. If you looked at the Consolidated Guidance, it forces you to go to a heavy force. We're still so far up at the front end that there haven't been enough dollars spent to do anything dumb. You still need a tank. You need a new XM-1. You need an infantry fighting vehicle. . . .

QUESTION: What is the chief characteristic of the 1980 light division? Is it a walking Soldier?. . . .

GENERAL MEYER: . . . The 9th Division is where we're going to try to decide exactly what it is. That's going to be a total test bed. We're going to bring stuff in from other nations, [and our] own industry. . . I hope to give the 9th Division Commander what I call "screw-around money". I don't know if I can get a line for that in the budget. When I was in the 11th Air Assault in the First Cav, General Kinnard had money to go out and buy stuff and see if he wanted it. That is a way to overcome some of the problems we have in modernizing the force quickly. . .

QUESTION: General, is the concept going to change with each new Chief of Staff?

GENERAL MEYER: No, I don't think so. . . .I wouldn't characterize it like that at all. . . .In trying to decide what kind of Army you need, you have to be looking out about eight to ten years ahead. The individuals who were looking eight to ten years ahead in 1972 and '73, saw an Army coming out of Vietnam which was all light, which had no heavy equipment at all, which was not oriented toward Central Europe, and where no dollars had been spent at all on Central Europe. . . .You remember the state of Europe in 1970-72? It was a replacement depot for Vietnam. All of the money we spent in that time frame focused on the Army for Vietnam. So when that ended, the Army focused on what they were told was to be the principal focus—Europe. And we needed to do that. We were so far behind on equipment and doctrine, tactics, and everything in Central Europe that we needed to focus there. That was very healthy.

Like any other organization, the pendulum sometimes swings too far in one direction, and there are those who thought that [focus] meant you went [exclusively] to heavy forces. I don't believe everybody in the Army believed that. . . .There has always been a need for balance. General Rogers, you know—you talk about lack of consistency—talked about the Unilateral Corps. The unilateral corps is no different than the RDF, the requirement to have forces that can be projected elsewhere. It's that balance. And what you have to do, Fred, is look out that eight years ahead. The divisions we have now and the equipment we have now, with minor exceptions, are the kinds of things that you're going to have out in that five year period, so you've got to be out ahead in trying to get the right balance. . . .With 16 divisions, we were being

directed to go to 14 heavy divisions, the airborne division and the air assault division. Now we are going to stay at 11 heavy and five light. And one of those heavies is the division in Korea. So that means three divisions are not being heavied up.

QUESTION: General, is the Army's approach impacted at all by the Marine Corps? They are going through the same kind of thing, not knowing whether heavy, light and so forth. How do you work that out?

GENERAL MEYER: Whenever I talk or think about land forces I always [factor in] three light Marine divisions. [The] Marines need to focus on the unique qualities they have for amphibious operations and warfare in the light to medium spectrum. If you start turning Marine divisions into mechanized divisions, you'd have to question the purpose of the Marine Corps. . . .It would be very easy to [ask] why can't that mechanized division be an Army division instead of a Marine division. . . .The reason you've got a Marine Corps is because they have a unique capability that we need. I believe we need to keep it.

QUESTION: Was the new focus on the Persian Gulf and the problems . . . the chief driving factor both in the new orientation of the Army division structure and your new concern about broadening the unconventional warfare?

GENERAL MEYER: No. I wrote my White Paper in October . . . Afghanistan occurred in December.

## Article in
## MILITARY REVIEW
## "Leadership: A Return to Basics"

1 July 1980

When I became Chief of Staff, I set two personal goals for myself. The first was to ensure that the Army was continually prepared to go to war and the second was to create a climate in which each individual member could find personal meaning and fulfillment. It is my belief that only by attainment of the second goal will we ensure the first.

The most modern equipment in the world is useless without motivated individuals, willingly drilled into cohesive unit organizations by sound leadership at all levels. Expert planning, Department of the Army pamphlets, regulations and field manuals will not of themselves rescue the disaffected Soldier from apathetic performance of his or her duty. Neither the Soldier nor his comrades will survive the first challenge of either the modern world or of the battlefield outside a climate of active and concerned leadership. Because we are a community, a way of life, we cannot isolate our concern to only one of these environments. Our commitment must be complete if we expect dedication returned in kind.

The clear linkage is that our ability to go to war hinges critically on the quality of leadership within the US Army; leadership—what James MacGregor Burns called "one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth."

Napoleon listed 115 contributing qualities in trying to define the essentials of leadership. We have no way of knowing if his description was complete at number 115 or if he was otherwise distracted. Some authorities focus on three, five or 10 aspects, while others, perhaps more wisely, begin and end their list with only one, or describe broad theories about leadership. None of these efforts is complete, yet none of them is useless either if they assist the professional who already has a firm grasp on fundamentals to better understand and practice leadership.

### NEED FOR A RENAISSANCE

Is there a need for a renaissance in the art of military leadership today? I think so. Not because

I sense an Army starved for adequate example, but because the circumstances have been such over the past several decades that confusing models vie for attention. Some are woefully deficient and totally inappropriate for tomorrow's battlefield.

We need to discuss openly the fact that we have been lavish in our rewards to those who have demonstrated excellence in sophisticated business and management techniques. These talents are worthwhile to a leader, but—of themselves— they are not leadership. We need to discuss openly the impact that six-month command tours in Vietnam may have had on the perception of a commander's commitment. Under the circumstances of that war, it may have been unavoidable. In the process, have we eroded essential values?

We need to recognize that we have lived through an era in which this country enjoyed massive nuclear superiority. Previously, it was possible to accept less than optimal decisions in the certainty that very few things relating to land forces could be of critical consequence. That is, given our massive nuclear advantage, only a madman would have challenged us directly. That is no longer the case. Today, we need sensitivity and backbone beyond that which the past several decades have demanded.

We need a renaissance in the art and practice of leadership because this country cannot suffer through the same agonies in a future mobilization which time permitted us to correct the last time around.

The early maneuvers of 1940 turned a harsh spotlight on the then current "training weaknesses of the Army; lack of equipment, poor minor tactics, *lack of basic leadership in many units, and some inept command leadership by officers of high rank.*"

This [occurred] despite the pre-1940 emphasis of the Regular Army on leadership, administration and technical skills. What was uncovered was a proficient relationship between the leader and the led, rooted in peacetime administration—but insufficiently developed to withstand the rigor of combat.

General George Marshall's strategy was to correct the weakness "by arduous training and by the more drastic solution of eliminating the unfit." We are precisely on that track today. But the climate is somehow different. The leader of the 1940s was training to go to war with his unit for the duration. There was no certainty that at some point he would be plucked out of his situation in adherence to a rigid career development pattern. His career extended only to the bounds of developing his unit so it could survive in combat. He would likely see it through there or at an echelon or two above that unit, still dependent upon its continued excellence.

We would be wrong today to invoke a "for the duration" mentality which excluded preparing the force for its future. That is an essential. But we need to root out those situations where such progression denies full loyalty and devotion to the Soldier and the unit.

Despite some of its narrowness—for there was only one way, "the Army way"—the Army of World War II was a professional force of immense energy whose traditions were strong and whose values were clear. Service parochialism and narrowness helped to spawn a revolution under Robert McNamara in the early 1960s which sought to rationalize inter-service resource demands by the adoption and adaptation of business-oriented management techniques. The intent was that the Department of Defense could and should operate as effectively and efficiently as private enterprise.

Ironically, some of the techniques were ones developed by the military during World War II to achieve high-priority goals in specific sectors of our war machine (strategic bombing, weapons development, antisubmarine warfare).

At no time did anyone say, "Let's have an Army of managers—leaders are passe." However, once the system became firmly entrenched, its power and grasp implied to many that the newly arrived technocrat was an attractive alternative career model. Imperceptibly at first, then with a rush, the traditional focus of leadership slipped for many into the abyss as increasing emphasis was placed on management and specialization. Excellence in its theories and principles became for many an alternative to leadership. Unfor-

tunately forgotten was the fact that employees of Sears, Roebuck and Company or General Motors Corporation were not asked to give up their lives for corporate cost-effectiveness!

Leadership and management are neither synonomous nor interchangeable. Clearly, good civilian managers must lead, and good military leaders must manage. Both qualities are essential to success. The size and complexity of today's Army—given no overabundance of resources—requires the use of managerial techniques. Their use is essential if we are to maintain and improve our posture.

Accordingly, such training and practice are important. But the leader must know when and how to apply them, never forgetting that the purpose of an Army is to fight. And, to fight effectively, it must be led. Managers can put the most modern and well-equipped force into the field. They cannot, however, manage an infantry unit through training or manage it up a hill into enemy fire to seize an objective.

## TWO LESSONS

In this context, two lessons are important. . . .Techniques which work well for the management of resources may prove disastrous when substituted for leadership on the battlefield. Conversely, techniques which work well for the battlefield may prove disastrous when substituted for management. Management and leadership are coequally important—not substitutes for one another.

Strong personal leadership is as necessary today as at anytime in our history. That for which Soldiers are willing to sacrifice their lives—loyalty, team spirit, morale, trust and confidence—cannot be infused by managing. The attention we need to invest in our Soldiers far exceeds that which is possible through any centralized management system. To the degree that such systems assist efficient operation, they are good. To the degree that they interfere with essential relationships between the unit and its leader, they are disruptive. Management techniques have limitations which leaders need to identify and curb to preclude destructive side effects.

Just as overmanagement can be the death of an Army, so can undermanagement which deprives units of essential resources. Leaders need to be active to identify either extreme, for either can impact on the ultimate success of committed forces.

The kind of leadership we need is founded upon consideration and respect for the Soldier. That thought is not new. Over 400 years ago, Machiavelli's prince was taught that:

> . . . in order to retain his fidelity [he] ought to think of his minister, honoring and enriching him, doing him kindness, and conferring upon him honors and giving him responsible tasks. . . .

Repeated through the ages by others, the message—like an overworked popular recording—may have lost its freshness. Societally accustomed as we are to discarding the old for the cleverness of the new, we weary of redundancy and look for the new buzz word, the new turn of phrase: VOLAR (Volunteer Army), DIMES (Defense Integrated Management Engineering Systems), Zero Defects, Management by Objective, Organizational Effectiveness, and so forth. Again, let me remind you, these are all good management-related programs, but not if they replace the essence of leadership essential to an effective Army.

There are no tricks or gimmicks in the watchwords of General John M. Schofield and I commend them to you. . . . [His] summation of leadership leaves the reader to supply his personal "tag line." The premise involves a cultivated feeling by the leader for the attitudes, needs, desires, ambitions and disappointments of the Soldier—without which no real communication can exist.

Leaders cannot, must not, blind themselves to a one-answer, one-method scientology. They must discover the method best suited to motivate and employ each Soldier. Time and one's earnest interest are necessary regardless of method. The end result is an organization which is ready and willing to follow despite hardship or adversity.

In our business, these are much more prevalent than elsewhere in our society. There are the obvious hardships associated with battle;

there are also the hardships of peacetime duty—coping economically in a foreign land, coping with old and run-down facilities, coping with constraints on training resources, to name a few. All these will be accepted and creatively overcome by units whose members sense their leader's genuine interest and commitment to their welfare. Abraham Lincoln said that "You can't fool all the people all of the time." To that, I would add that *you cannot fool a Soldier anytime!* The leader who tries chooses a hazardous path.

## TYPES OF LEADERSHIP

How concern and respect are manifested by each of us is the essence of leadership. Just as there are two types of diamonds—gem and industrial quality—there are two types of leadership. The first type, the gem quality, is functional if we only desire our leadership to appear beautiful. The second, or industrial quality—though not cleaved, faceted and polished—is the more functional because its uses are creative. The Army's need is for the industrial quality, the creative quality of leadership.

Just as the diamond requires three properties for its formation—carbon, heat and pressure—successful leaders require the interaction of three properties—character, knowledge and application.

Like carbon to the diamond, *character* is the basic quality of the leader. It is embodied in the one who, in General Bradley's words, ". . . has high ideals, who stands by them, and who can be trusted absolutely."

Character is an ingrained principle expressed consciously and unconsciously to subordinates, superiors and peers alike—honesty, loyalty, courage, self-confidence, humility and self-sacrifice. Its expression to all audiences must ring with authenticity.

But as carbon alone does not create a diamond, neither can character alone create a leader. The diamond needs heat. Man needs *knowledge,* study and preparation. The novice leader may possess the honesty and decisiveness of a General Marshall or Patton; but if he or she lacks the requisite knowledge, there is no benchmark from which that character can take form. A leader must be able to choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong—as it says in the Cadet Prayer—but the distinction cannot be made in practice unless the leader possesses knowledge equal to the situation.

General Patton, once accused of making snap decisions, replied:

> "I've been studying the art of war for forty-odd years. When a surgeon decides in the course of an operation to change its objective . . . he is not making a snap decision but one based on knowledge, experience and training. So am I."

To lead, you must know your Soldiers, yourself and your profession.

The third property, pressure—acting in conjunction with carbon and heat—forms the diamond. Similarly, one's character, attended by knowledge, blooms through *application* to produce a leader.

Generally, this is expressed through teaching or training—grooming and shaping people and things into smoothly functioning units. It takes many forms. It begins by setting the example and the day-to-day development of subordinates by giving distinct, challenging tasks and allowing free exercise of responsibility to accomplish the task. It extends through tactical drill, weapons operation and maintenance, operational planning, resource management, and so forth. Finally, it is the imparting of knowledge to superiors, for they must digest the whole of their organizations and rely increasingly on judgments from below.

## INDIVIDUAL GROWTH

These three properties, brought together, form—like the industrial diamond—a hard, durable creative leader. As the industrial stone is used to cut glass, drill for petroleum products and even for creation of the brilliant gem diamond, leadership works to create cohesive, ready, viable units through a climate which expresses itself in its concern for the growth of the individual.

Growth in a single dimension—that limited to excellence in applied military skills—is only part of the challenge to today's leadership. Alone,

it runs the risk of buying single-dimensioned commitment. Full dedication comes by providing a basis for rounded individual development pertinent to survival in life in its broadest aspects.

Today's Soldiers seek to become capable citizens across the four critical dimensions of man. The Army, through its leaders, can assist their development mentally, physically, spiritually and socially, equipping them for survival in and out of uniform. Each Soldier meaningfully assisted toward development as a whole man, a whole person, is more likely to respond with his or her full commitment.

The leader who chooses to ignore the Soldier's search for individual growth may reap a bitter fruit of disillusionment, discontent and listlessness. If we, instead, reach out to touch each Soldier—to meet needs and assist in working toward the goal of becoming a "whole person"—we will have bridged the essential needs of the individual to find not only the means of coming together into an effective unit, but the means of "holding together."

Then, we will have effected a tool capable of fulfilling the purpose for which we exist—our ability to go to war. We can then hopefully influence the decision of those who might be tempted to challenge our nation.

As with all scientific and artistic endeavors, one begins with basics. We must get back to the established basics of leadership. They provide the foundation from which our Army draws its inspiration, its capability and, ultimately, its effectiveness.

## Address to the PERSONNEL OF 8TH U. S. ARMY

Seoul, South Korea
1 July 1980

In August of 1975, I returned to the Pentagon from Germany. The entire thrust of the building, in the aftermath of Vietnam, was geared wholly to regeneration of a viable structure for the Central European scenario; an effort clearly focused on the urgent business of meeting on short notice a Soviet threat made more sinister by virtue of qualitative improvements in techology, command and control. . . .

The Army has made great strides, but throughout, there has always remained in my mind the troubling considerations of "the other Army"—the non-European Army, the flanks of NATO, the 1/2 war contingencies, the vagaries of changing economic and social movements which suddenly congeal into regional, if not global crises. One must be struck by the fact that in this period our casualties have occurred not in Central Europe, but in the "other Army"—Major Arthur Bonifas and Lieutenant Mark Barrett in the Joint Security Area, August 1976; CW2 Joseph Miles, SGT Robert Haynes, SGT Ronald Well, helicopter downing in Korea, July 1977; WO Brian Ellis, Islamabad, Pakistan, November 1979. These deaths result from passions less controlled, whose near-term hazard to the belligerents is less obviously linked to a potential Armageddon.

My concerns are no longer isolated ones in Washington: real resources, real units, real capabilities are being structured into a viable Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, a force deployable on short notice to points around the globe. . . .

# Address to the PRE-COMMAND COURSE

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
25 July 1980

. . . Each of you represents a tremendous national investment. The sunk cost (MPA, OMA, retirement obligation) for a lieutenant colonel about to enter command is about two and one-half million dollars. If that's valid, then we in this room represent a lot of money. Certainly industry wouldn't spend that kind of money developing middle level executives and plant managers. Why should we?

Well, obviously we're different from industry. The talents we seek are not available on the open market. Robert E. Lee, in a letter to Major General John Hood in 1863 wrote that his ". . . Army would be invincible if it could be properly organized and officered." And Napolean said: "There are no bad regiments; there are only bad colonels." What our Army is, what our Army can be, is very much dependent upon you—the colonels and lieutenant colonels in this room. The nation's investment in you is cheap by any measure if the 40 battalions and 16 brigade equivalent commands which this class will command are prepared to undertake their only mission: be prepared to go to war.

Where? The answer to that question is not as easy as it would seem. Clearly our major planning is geared to a European conflict, but that does not obviate planning and thinking for other possible scenarios such as the Middle East or Persian Gulf or anywhere else. Some of you brigade commanders who will be going to units earmarked for RDF missions must not be trapped into thinking that what will work in the Fulda Gap can be successfully employed in other parts of the world. In other words, planning and thinking for contingencies outside of Central Europe.

Let me make it a little clearer. Today, wherever you go, Ft. Carson or Baumholder, you're aware of a large support establishment upon which you can call for resolution of problems as they occur. Obviously we can't afford to replicate those kinds of units in CONUS or Germany in contingency areas. Therefore, it as vitally important for you as professionals to identify explictly the specific support functions which need to accompany you under emergency deployment in a contingency. There is no need for an entire Maintenance Battalion to deploy with your tank battalion, but there is a need, for example, to deploy 2 mechanics, a fire control expert, and a hydraulics expert with you. That's the kind of specificity we need to become expert at. Failure to think through these types of problems with the staffs above you may lead to a conclusion that we can't move to a contingency in a reasonable time frame, when the real answer may be more simple: we can do it and we need a maintenance platoon to make it work.

Maintenance of a continuous ability to go to war is my foremost goal as Chief of Staff. Integral to that preparedness is my second goal—the creation of an environment within which each Soldier and each civilian finds fulfillment through individual development, both personal and professional. You gentlemen are key to attainment of these two goals.

*Personal Motivation.* Individually, your performance to date has marked each of you as winners—professional Soldiers who have demonstrated the potential to take on new, increased responsibility. I would hope your perspective is one of anticipation, enthusiasm, and confidence—and I hope that attitude is shared by your families as well. If there's a tinge of concern, a bit of anxiety, don't worry about it. You'll do fine. You're about to walk one of the most challenging, personally rewarding paths a man can be called to: *leading* the American Soldier. If taking command is something you fear, or if it's simply a ticket punch—an ego trip—you owe it to the Soldier, to the nation, to yourself, not to take that trip. The job I'm assigning you can't afford either the timid or the prima donna. Your charge from me is succinctly this: *prepare your units to go to war. No mission or requirement precedes this.*

*Threat.* William Safire recently critiqued 70 years of Russian leadership, and concluded that Mr. Brezhnev's legacy to Soviet history may well be one of economic failure, but military

supremacy. In Europe, and increasingly around the globe, the nation is awakening to a Soviet Union which--while bankrupt socially, politically, and economically—has continued to invest tremendously in a vast, highly capable military machine. Their almost blind race toward dominance across the spectrum of military means forms the backdrop against which the drama of this decade will unfold. The events today—most notably the Russian invasion of Afghanistan on 27 December—must convince the concerned man that the Russian will not shrink from using his force directly, or through bluster, bullying his way into regional or global hegemony. Either way, I feel that the 80's will be a time of critical testing.

*Our Responsibilities.* Our response to the threat occurs on many levels. An officer, as a representative of the nation's military power—whatever the level of his office—acts to ensure possession of a viable national military power. As Chief of Staff, I have the responsibility for shaping tomorrow's capability—effecting the structure, the manning, the modernization of the force. I'm buoyed by the fact that we begin with a sound core: the young NCO's, the lieutenants, and captains. At the same time I am deeply aware that major actions need to be taken to man, modernize, and sustain tomorrow's force. While I am responsible for today's Army, I recognize that I have far less direct leverage to affect its character, its capability. Like the coach on the sidelines, I can advise, encourage and make minor adjustments. But the game plan is largely irrevocable in the short run from my level.

Against that view of my office let's look at your responsibility. Today's Army, its capability, is in your hands. The vast majority of Soldiers you will command are already on board. The equipment you will operate is already in the system or in the production pipeline. In general, the die is cast for your tour—with all its obvious features clear. Some of you will find plentiful raw material at your command: adequate personnel assets, weapons, spare parts and the other paraphernalia of war. Others of you will hit the ground and find many shortcomings: missing equipment, an absence of key leaders, inadequate enlisted strength, and many of your assigned Soldiers lacking qualifications which permit flexible assignments. I expect you will make your views known regarding the shortcomings you observe—that's healthy and desired. Mother Army needs to be exercised by concerned commanders to remain aware and responsive.

*An Imperfect Army.* But don't think for a minute that the shortcomings whatever they may be, excuse you from the mission of preparation for war. We are an "imperfect Army" today and we will be an imperfect Army tomorrow, not because that's what we want. The goal of perfection is valid, but let's not wait for that day to arrive to get on with our mission. . . .

Let me just talk to you about shortages—in equipment, in people, in quality.

*Short in Equipment.* Two factors impact on the situation as it is today, and as it is likely to be tomorrow. *First,* there is the imperative for a credible D-Day posture in Europe. To accomplish this, given the imperfection of today's Army, we are moving enormous quantities of major equipment items to Europe for POMCUS and war reserve stockage, drawing down the equipment levels in specified CONUS units. The test run at Fort Carson predictably indicates that such drawdowns, even to 70 percent of authorized equipment level—while not desirable--are solvable. . . .I still look for unit training on full sets of equipment—either on pooled sets or by fleshing out what you own by borrowing for major exercises. You brigade-level commanders in particular will find this an immense challenge.

*Second,* I expect that there will be some turbulence regarding the introduction of new weapons systems. The Viper is a case in point. That system, initially programmed for fielding in FY 79 as a replacement for the LAW, has slipped for technical reasons. Simultaneously we had begun the process of phasing out LAW, the projected inventories already over-committed to foreign military sales. To recover, we looked to procurement of foreign LAW production and reprogramming to obtain an appropriate subcaliber device to permit maintenance of a reasonable proficiency when we constrain practice firing of the HEAT round to shove up operational inventories. Even when this program becomes unsnarled, there may be periods where you may have the challenge of building proficiency in two systems. These are the hazards of modernization.

I think we have been heard loud and clear in the Congress regarding the need to increase weapons investments, balanced across conventional forces as well as strategic. Given the current mood, I'm hopeful of sustained support, but I must caution you not to take action prematurely to jettison care, concern, and proficiency in those weapons you'll have on board at your arrival.

*Short in People.* Along with the equipment, the emphasis on troop strength is to Europe as well. So if you're not going to Europe or if your FORSCOM unit is not early deploying or keyed to contingency standby—such as the 82d Airborne—you will find yourself short people. . . .Manning the force is the major issue facing the Army. With adequate resources, and everyone pulling together, we may expect recovery a year from now. But the task is immense. In a smaller market, we will seek to draw in 35-thousand more non-prior service (NPS) accessions in this fiscal year than we succeeded in getting in FY 79 (170K v. 134K).

*Short in Quality.* This is a tough issue—one with no easy answers. Is the quality we're getting adequate? If not, we hazard the Army in a number of ways. FIRST, there is a penalty because too many resources will be required to screen larger quantities of men to find and fix that subset which is effective and trainable. SECOND, lower quality will carry training penalties; either increased resources for the training base, or increased demands on our units for more frequent recycling to shore up steeper learning-decay curves. THIRD, we hazard the Army's future if tomorrow's NCO Corps is drawn from a base which lacks the requisite quality needed in the NCO Corps. We cannot let that happen.

. . . it is my impression that today's Soldier is adequate to the task of becoming an effective Soldier. From what I've seen in my field visits—and I've been to every CONUS division, and dozens of our installations—there is optimism about the young people we are getting. It's not universal, but let's not draw our conclusions based on the bottom 10 percent, and that's who I think some judgments are being based on. We need to draw a distinction between predictors of quality ( n school diploma graduates? high mental category?, etc.) and measures of operational performance in the field, which is really the quality you and I care about.

On the predictor side—and these may not be the legitimate predictors we need—we are seeking higher mental category content in FY 80 (55% CAT I-III versus 42.2% achieved in FY 79). We also seek 57 percent high school diploma graduates (HSDG), down somewhat from the 64 percent achieved in FY 79, and we'll use the Military Applicant Profile (MAP) test for the non-high school graduates (NHSG) to weed out high attrition risks. Apart from the percentages however, I want to enlist 80,000 HSDG every year!! That's what we need to maintain and improve our base across the Army.

Obviously, there are certainly differences in the flexibility certain categories of Soldiers give you. Some can do four or five jobs well, others only one. What we appear to lose by accepting too many slow learners is the luxury of being lazy toward the training mission, but—more important—we may be losing the fungibility of resources on the battlefield. I'm told the Soldier who has a steep learning-decay curve has difficulty in the collective training environment, which more closely mirrors how we will need to perform in battle.

While it's understandable that we would like the ultimate flexibility afforded by having all Soldiers capable of doing many jobs, we haven't made our case yet, that is—where we have established standards, they have not been analytically defensible, etc.

The other side of the coin is that overqualified personnel can be a problem as well; easily bored by routine tasks and prone to indiscipline. So the quality issue is a difficult one. I believe we have a quality Army today. I look for the feedback from your operational involvement with today's Soldiers. In short, the jury's still out. For the moment let me tell you my approach, were I you.

*Training the Individual.* Don't assume too much about the qualifications of newly assigned Soldiers. Identify standards for performance, examine individual qualifications, motivate the man and charge the NCO with his development. We've grown accustomed to assuming that Soldiers from the training base are ready to join the team



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with individual skills already developed. That's simply not the case today. With that in mind, I've taken steps to lengthen and toughen initial entry training, (IET) from 7 to 8 weeks and an increase to 9.2 hours per day. At the same time, I've directed the officer basic course (OBC) be lengthened by 4 weeks in keeping with RETO recommendations. In addition, you must consider that good training bears repetition. Slow learners tend to have more rapid decay in the information they master at a point in time. So maybe we've grown lazy. The school of the Soldier is still the unit—explicitly his NCO. It's his primary reason for existence: to train the individual Soldier and to mold him into a team operator in the squad, the gun section, the fire team. Make use of the Soldiers' Manual, SQT tools, and integrate them into collective training experiences.

*Multilevel training.* One tip from my experience is that if your unit has problems at one level, you should train at the next higher level for best results. That is, if you have weak platoons, conduct your training at the company level. If weak at the company level, train at the battalion level. Sequential training through each successive level is wasteful of time. It's a precious commodity, best used by conducting multi-echeloned integrated training.

*Unit training.* The Brigade should allocate resources. The Battalion Commander should be the grand integrator, the teacher of his company commanders, the provider of an environment in which they can train their units. You've got to block out their time, advise them of your standards, teach them, screen them from distractions so they have the opportunity to command companies. An officer in this year's Leavenworth class put it so well—I told him I'd be using his words in future talks. He said:

> "I think it's vitally important that we stop messing around with the training schedule because some mayor comes through and wants to see an M-113 or some piece of equipment. Until we address the issue of time and allow that company commander to do what he needs to do, then force readiness and all those good things aren't going to happen."

If there is an inversion of priorities at the command level, it will wash through a unit and lead to hasty, frustrated, wrong conclusions about the state of today's Army. Priority inversion occurs when you can't distinguish between rubber and glass balls. *Training and readiness are the glass balls!* You've got to let those people who want to steal your time know that you have battalions or companies in training, its your time, it's the time to prepare for your mission—to be ready to fight!! I have and will continue to work on your bosses to become *heatshields.* In turn, you need to do the same. Together we'll create an environment where we focus on becoming Soldiers. . . .

Many of the better units looked at during the Army Training Study effort were going through their training with 30 percent of their strength absent from the field. That's unsatisfactory. *When you go to the field, take your entire command.* That's not easy to do—but a unit that trains with 70 percent of its strength isn't training. This requires that you plan ahead and lay it out—3 months—6 months—9 months, in advance. I expect training schedules—usable training schedules—to be posted and used. The Soldier needs to know, as well as his officers and NCO's what you expect ahead of time.

*Loyalty.* Let's discuss for a moment where your loyalty will lie. It should be to the Soldier. Too often the loyalty is up—because we're looking at our report card. You earn your grades down there at the individual and small unit level! That's where I'll be judging you, not in the officers' mess or based on your briefing proficiency. Keep in mind General Bradley's admonition:

> "No man is a leader until his appointment has been ratified by his men."

I personally am convinced that the Soldier of today wants to be trained, wants to know that he has a difficult but important task, wants to work and measure up. People want to be recognized. We may, to an excessive degree, attract young men who haven't yet struck a responsive note in society, who thus far have been losers. In a society such as ours that's anathema. We're a nation that likes to win, and there's something peculiar in you if you don't win. I think we need to reorder

our priorities, create the climate and the organization for individual and unit development, and get on with it. The most significant "people problem" is to provide the job satisfaction which can be significantly enhanced by quality training to a standard of excellence.

. . . .I don't find shortages an adequate excuse for not being ready to go to war. My personal experience in two wars, Korea and Vietnam—deployed into combat in each with units as much as 50 percent short--is that understrength units, properly trained, can fight like hell. Let's not confuse readiness reports—very valuable *management* tools at the DA level—with our professional responsibility to fight. The responsibility for your fighting mission remains. I may have to commit units with readiness ratings of 3 and 4 to war, given the need, and you need to know that. I tell you that because I think the advice of "Light Horse" Harry Lee is sobering:

> "A Government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle."

Or Confucius, who said:

> "To lead an untrained people to war is to throw them away."

We don't want that. We're concerned with PFC Marne's welfare. Erwin Rommell said:

> "The best form of 'welfare' for the troops is first-class training."

. . . Cohesion. Taken together, the things we've talked about today point to one conclusion: your subordinate units must be given the opportunity to develop into cohesive organizations if we are to have an Army prepared for war.

The cohesion I'm talking about is that which results in and, in turn, is a result of commitment, trust and loyalty—superior to subordinate, peer to peer, leader to led—stemming from common sharing of experiences and understanding. In its most basic form it is a bonding together of Soldiers through commitment, trust and loyalty to each other, the unit, the Army, the nation, for the sustainment of comrades during combat. It manifests itself in viable fighting organizations—platoons, squads, sections—able to withstand the rigors of combat and the uncertainties and challenges of peacetime.

Cohesion as an entity can't be built in Washington or legislated. But each of us can contribute to its development. It's rather like building a house of bricks. Individual bricks are merely bricks. Stacked in the shape of a house, they have a form but are susceptible to collapse. However, if mortared, they retain the form of the house—the walls made strong through the bonding of brick to brick.

One of the keys to developing cohesion—more fundamental than any of the environmental aspects I can control, for example, stability and decentralization—is the existence of a common threat; or in its absence, the structuring of a common challenging experience for your units. The company on the DMZ in Korea or the Armored Cavalry Regiment on the border in West Germany have clear and unmistakable challenges which act to foster trust and loyalty among their members. The evident hazard and the mutual experiences provide ideal circumstances within which astute leadership can act to bond men tightly together. Cohesion needs the heat of stress to take effect. In the absence of such situations. The confidence that flows from an Airborne class, a Ranger graduation, the gun sections of a successful battery ARTEP are all manifestations of relationships brought to a fine tuned sharpness. Tough, well-planned, stressful training can breed an infectious confidence among your Soldiers, their sergeants, and your junior lieutenants. . . .

At my level, I'll be considering—among other things—some form of unit rotation to Europe and Korea, so that we can provide a more stable environment for the growth and maintenance of these relationships. While I can act to provide the environment for cohesion, I cannot effect it. That is your task—a function of the care, concern and dedication you, your company commanders, NCO's, squad leaders—all who lead the Soldier—give to today's Soldier.

OK, I've given you my pitch. Establish a sound moral climate. Be leaders, not managers of men. I trust you understand my priorities: Prepare to go to war. Accomplish this by good

training. Within that environment you cannot avoid a dedication and sense of loyalty to the Soldier.

You're heading into an exciting period. If your priorities are set correctly, it will be an enjoyable time. Command should be fun, not in a cavalier sense, but in a professional way. It is the fulfillment of a Soldier's career. If you work to give your subordinates their due, I am convinced the rewards you will receive from your units will in themselves be ones which far outshine any outside praise.

Enjoy yourselves. I don't promise it will be easy. I do promise it will be satisfied.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Innovation

30 July 1980

A central theme in my dialogue with you has been the need to escape the in-box mentality and to get our management and thinking out on the horizon. Daily requirements, demands and obligations often result in long, mind-numbing days that capture us and our subordinates totally unless we fight back through judicious delegation and disciplined time management.

The principal casualties of the in-box mentality are creative thinking, innovative application and reasoned discourse. The assumption that someone out there is doing the thinking and writing is not necessarily correct since subordinates tend to follow leaders' priorities and emphasis.

In vital areas such as national interests and priorities, strategy, and even planning and operations, we hand over the initiative to less qualified writers and thinkers and then find ourselves defending our positions or refuting simplistic solutions.

I encourage you to get yourself and your subordinates out in front of the Army's problems and to nurture the development of original thought and active discourse on the issues we face. The Army's professional journals need and welcome the results of innovative thinking and unorthodox applications at all levels. Reward the original thinker.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Electronic Warfare

20 August 1980

I have become increasingly concerned that not only don't we aggressively plan for and employ our *electronic warfare* (EW) assets, but also that many of us who grew up in a different environment aren't able to think in terms of EW as a weapons system with dramatic battlefield impact. We need to understand more fully the unique capabilities of EW and to educate our officer corps so that using EW on the battlefield becomes as automatic as using artillery fires.

In a European scenario, we know the Soviets have planned and rehearsed an attack that provides very little opportunity to jam their communications. However, because of their rigid top-down command and control procedures, jamming should be possible and very effective when the preplanned operation becomes stymied. It is at this instant when we have the greatest capability to disrupt his $C^3$ and his operations.

Operations in other areas of the world where the Soviets have not had an opportunity for extensive preplanning provide exceptional EW opportunities. A contingency operation, which is put together quickly, is highly dependent on voice communications. Here, intelligent planning and use of our EW assets can create a more decisive force multiplier than in more set piece situations. With demands placed on our supply lines to support adequately deployed forces, we have a capability in EW that is readily transportable and can provide a significant force multiplier. . . .

Though we don't have as much equipment as we would like, we can train our personnel, educate ourselves in the use of the equipment we have and—with a little imagination—train and be ready to fight in an EW environment. Our priorities should be:

—Educate ourselves in the use of EW.

—Train subordinate commanders and officers in the value of EW as a combat force multiplier.

—Train jammer operators and conduct training and exercises in a free play EW environment; train communicators to operate in spite of intense enemy EW.

—Raise the priority of EW equipment RDT&E and production.

## Press Conference on COHESION AND STABILITY

Washington, DC
5 September 1980

Since I took over as Chief of Staff last year . . . I've stated [consistently] that the key problem that the Army faces today is its ability to man the force. I continue to feel that that is a key problem as we look to the future, both the quantity and . . . the skills to take care of the equipment as it comes in. . . .

[It's] not just a question of can you get the people . . . there are three aspects to it. One is [recruiting], two is training, and three is ensuring that we have a system that brings [units] up to full readiness, keeps them together and maximizes their combat capability. . . .

We will get the [recruiting] data to you next week. . . .

. . . one thing that really troubles me is when I hear a Soldier saying as he goes through basic or advanced individual training (AIT) that he's not been pressed hard enough—not had adequate discipline, not had adequate physical training, nor learned the skills which he is charged with doing. [That says] I've failed and the system has failed. . . .[Hence] after the first of the year, we will be extending the amount of time the individual spends in initial entry training. We intend to put . . . more experienced leaders in training installations. We are going to make training tougher. . . .

I've had General Ace Collins, one of our premier trainers, out as my personal quality control man, out looking at both the training base and training [in our] units . . . to give us a better handle on what steps we might take to improve initial entry as well as unit training and the interface between the two. . . .Our hand-off between individual training and unit training needs strengthening.

Those are two steps in the three-pronged attack: recruiting and training. The third is what we do about stability and cohesion.

So you might understand the problem and why . . . something needs to be done now, I had a little quick line which went like [this]: never since the Roman Empire has any army had over 45 percent of its army overseas, as we do. That's almost correct; there are two other instances in history when the United States had a slightly larger percent—but never for such an extended period of time. That creates unique problems in the rotation of people and stability within units.

. . . if we are going to stay in a mode like this, we need to . . . come to grips with the way in which we deal with replacements. A combat division in the States replaces each Soldier in just a little under one and half years . . . so you continually have different faces within that squad, within that platoon, and within that company, and that has a big impact upon small unit leadership, upon cohesion, upon teamwork, upon all of the elements that are critical to the potential and capability of our units.

At the same time, we have been short for the past year of filling units in the States, so that we have platoons and squads zeroed out. We have also been short of NCOs in the States primarily because we have kept our overseas units filled. . . .

Those are obstacles to personnel stability. It forces [us] to move those people who are available [with great frequency]. Squad leaders, back from Europe for only 10 or 11 months, get their orders telling them in another five or six months they have to go back to Europe. So we have a large turnover in NCOs and they are not with the same people for a long period of time. That has an impact on how well we are able to train new Soldiers. . . .

Additionally, coming out of Vietnam where we had very, very short tours, we had officers and commanders only spending six months in command of units. We extended that over time to 12 months and 18 months, but there is still a [belief] within the Army that unless you go out and get that particular . . . ticket punched on your card, that you are not going to have an opportunity for advancement. . . .So that problem contributes to this lack of stability. . . .

We have no home for our organizations today. People go from Fort Hood to Wuerzburg, back to wherever it happens to be in the States that they are sent, [unable] to establish any kind of community tie. . . .

[But] biggest change has been down in the company. . . .When I was a rifle company commander at Fort Campbell, about 10 percent of that company was married. We all lived in the same barracks. They didn't have enough money to go into Hopkinsville or Clarksville on the weekend, so I was responsible for giving them some sort of a form of recreation on the weekend—games and sports and teams and so on.

I fed them in my mess hall; they knew I was responsible for them; I paid them, they came through the pay line and I made sure that they got paid—I'm saying I did, but I am saying "I" as the company commander did—so there was a sense of togetherness—all of the people lived in the same platoon bays. The platoons stayed together, worked together and lived together. You had built-in elements that gave small units cohesion. Today, we have taken many of those away. We've build three-men rooms. We pay everybody by check. Orders come out of our Military Personnel Center, and the Soldier eats in a consolidated dining facility. . . .

Many of those things can't be reversed—many of them we wouldn't want to reverse. The biggest factor is that now roughly 50 percent of that company is married, and the young man or woman goes home each night and comes back the next morning, and is gone all weekend. So you've got a totally different problem out there within the small unit than I had. It's a different problem in developing cohesion and unity than in the past. In my judgment it requires that we take some steps to build rods back to undergird the unit's stability, cohesion, or if you will, the teamwork, the loyalty—whatever word you choose to use there—within the squads, the platoons, and the companies. That is essentially what we are trying to do with many of the on-going programs.

We've started some things that I believe will help. We have extended the battalion and brigade commanders' tours to 30 months, plus or minus six months. . . .That will ensure that we ha[illegible]talion and brigade commanders out there lon[illegible] enough to be responsible for what they do ov[illegible] a period of time. They will have to learn to pace themselves and to focus on the important things. I believe it's possible that if an individual is there for that period of time you can develop and create within an organization a teacher-pupil relationshhip in which the leader feels a greater responsibility for training because he knows he is going to be in touch with that individual for a longer period of time.

We are sending new battalion and brigade commanders through courses so that they are better prepared to work with the young men and women for whom they will be responsible.

We are establishing standard operational procedures that will be the same in Europe as they are at Fort Hood. For example, the loading plan for the armored personnel carrier will be standard, all of the equipment will be stored within the armored personnel carrier the same way. Now, you say, "What does that do as far as stability and cohesion and standardizing?" It means that if a Soldier goes from Fort Hood to Europe, that when he gets there and he turns around in the APC, he knows where everything is immediately. . . .

Since we are short NCOs, we are focusing on an NCO development program . . . [to] teach these younger E-4s and E5s so they are able to fill in some of the E-6 areas.

One of the biggest obstacles about telling an officer that he is no longer going to have an opportunity to command a battalion is that he feels that he has been cheated out of something that he has looked forward to if he really wants to command. Then he says to himself, "Well, I don't have an opportunity for advancement now." [I] have to assure him that whatever his alternate specialty—a personnel specialist or an operations research specialist, or whatever—that there is an opportunity for advancement. We began putting floors on specialties in the last promotion lists to lieutenant colonel and colonel so that there is the opportunity. People need to see that they can get promoted under alternative schemes. . . .I have to prove that over time, I know. . . .

We have also begun testing platoon packages. This summer it turned out that we were short of [capacity] in the training base, so we had to ship platoons out to places such as Fort Polk and Fort Carson to train as platoons. We began to [see] what happens by keeping a unit together from its inception. . . .

We are doing this more on a test basis now, but I think it has opportunities for the future. We intend to go to company fill. The proposal is that we will bring a company together and keep them together for three years. They will rotate to Europe for the last 18 months of their tour . . . and at that point they will be broken up and a new company will be created and brought over. We will create new companies back in the States.

. . . .We are looking at a regimental system to see if we can have a greater association between the individual and a unit over [an even longer] period of time. . . .

In the past we have always filled units up just before they went on an exercise. [This creates instability]. We are not going to do that any more. Units will go just the way they are. The Reforger units went just as they were this year. . . .

Where we have kept Europe at about 102 percent strength; we will not do that any more. . . .

We have directed 18-month company command tours. . . .Today it's averaging about 11 months. . . .

Right now we are short about 7,000 NCOs. We have authority to promote that number. What I don't want to do is just promote. I want to be sure that the people we are promoting are qualified or else it's a facade. . . .We have to look at that very carefully.

In general, as I've talked to the NCOs out in the field, there are very few of them who don't think there are half a dozen people within their platoon or company who are deserving of promotion to E-5. I am still looking at decentralizing both E-5 and E-6 promotions, particularly E-5 promotion, to the field. The arguments against that go something like this: in the past, when we had it decentralized, skilled individuals in units felt that if the billet or space wasn't available in their unit, then they didn't have a chance to get promoted. And the way it is now, everybody is measured against a common standard and you have an opportunity for promotion. . . .In the current system there is probably less chance for personal adjustments out in the field. . . .

[on] the other hand, it does [detract from] the commander's ability to provide awards to people that are doing the job in the field. That is one I have to wrestle to the ground. . . .We are looking at incentives for NCOs in specialty skills so that

they get something extra for spending the amount of time that they do overseas. . . .

We are also looking at a few distinctive accoutrements. One thing we will do—it's just a question of time—we will put shoulder boards on all of our NCOs. . . .We are looking at some other ways so that you can tie the regiment and the branch to which they belong to it. . . .

I am looking at the issue of berets and I will make a decision on that one . . . but I want to do it in a total Army context. . . .

So, those are a few items . . . to give you a flavor for what we are trying to do, trying to build back in the kinds of leverage that give us cohesion within organizations and trying to cut down on the things that detract from stability. . . .That will pay off in better trained units. That will pay off in sergeants and Soldiers who feel that they have a greater sense of accomplishment because they have full units that work together for a period of time and are able to develop as a unit. . . .

QUESTION: General, what were you talking about when you say extending basic and AIT?

GENERAL MEYER: Right now, as a preliminary step, we will increase initial entry training by one week and we will increase additionally on a daily basis by another couple hours—one and a half hours per day, which will give us a total, over time, of about 95 or 96 additional hours. . . .

QUESTION: General, I always find a certain zig-zag effect in policies of different Chiefs of Staff. Several years ago when I was in Europe, the big emphasis was on bringing units up to and over-strength. Generals Rogers and Blanchard thought it was a very important thing to administer in Europe. Now, your philosophy goes the other way.

GENERAL MEYER: My philosophy goes the other way because we have had an opportunity to do that now for five or six years and we understand what it is doing to the rest of the Army. What is important is the whole Army and its ability. . . . .

QUESTION: Will these requirements be paper requirements?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .No . . . I'm looking at a regimental system that can be used throughout the country. It will be similar to the way the British are . . . there will be nothing paper about it. The First Battalion of the Fifth Cavalry will be just like it is, but it will have a home. . . .

QUESTION: It seems that there are a lot of details yet to be worked out in this plan. Why announce it today? Why not wait until it's finished?

GENERAL MEYER: . . .because I've had queries from people about what's going on in this area. Some things are already going on and I had to have support—I've had to take steps which people need to understand fit in a master plan that we are working on. Let me give you an example: The issue of a three year tour for battalion and brigade commanders—that's a major wrench in the Army. I have had more complaints from wives of lieutenant colonels and colonels on that issue than any other. . . .They say, "Why are you trying to stabilize the Army with my husband?" Well, you know, the answer is that I had to make a decision on that before I got into a host of other items. . . .I can't continue to do things piecemeal. . . .I have to tell people what we've done, where we are, and where we are trying to go so they have an understanding. . . .

QUESTION: Most of thse people won't be able to go to a different command as they used to be able to do, very often times?

GENERAL MEYER: No, that means that some lieutenant colonels and colonels now will not get a command who were able to get commands before. . . .When you go to three years, you just have half as many commands.

QUESTION: General, have our NATO allies been consulted on this draw-down in Europe, and if so, what kind of reaction?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . we're not cutting our commitment over there. We have purposely kept our level above 100 percent. All we are trying to do is . . . bring them down to their authorized level. . . .I am going to keep them at 100 percent, but I'm not going to keep them over-strength.

QUESTION: I can harp one more time on the beret issue, being from Fayetteville. I was wonder-

ing, could you give me an idea of a time frame on the decision, what you meant by the Army context you want to put it in?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: It will be October, November ... after the Commanders' Conference. I feel very strongly that they should be issued and the individual should not have to pay for it. . . .

## Address to the CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM AND LOW LEVEL CONFLICT

Santa Monica, California
10 September 1980

Ambassador Quainton, ladies and gentlemen. I'm indebted to George Tanham and Brian Jenkins for this opportunity to share some views and ideas with you in this conference dedicated to terrorism and low level conflict—a subject with immense implications, both nationally and internationally. I am aware of the broad levels of intelligent understanding possessed by those present in this room, and I'm an admirer of the works of many who are here this evening. My personal credentials are those of a Soldier. My interests are in the practical realm of forecasting potential challenges to our nation which might arise through terrorism and low level conflict, and of designing appropriate military responses to those challenges—where military response is both advisable and affordable.

Most of you, I'm certain, are familiar with Edgar Allen Poe's macabre tale, *The Pit and The Pendulum,* where the unfortunate prisoner tied to a table is subjected to the threat of a razor sharp pendulum which is gradually lowered toward his body, bound to a table. Freed before the fatal moment by rats, who chew loose the constraining ropes, he faces a new challenge wherein the very walls of the cell are set in motion to crush him. Written in 1847, Poe's tale was probably right for the time—an uncomplicated period where threats had the good grace to queue up and present themselves singularly. Were the tale rewritten today, given the pace and complexity which our societies have achieved, the pendulum, the walls, and the rats would assuredly be conducting a simultaneous assault upon the hero.

Using Poe's tale as a metaphor, I would characterize the intended victim as western democracy, the pendulum as thermonuclear war, the walls as the potential theaters of large-scale conventional warfare, and the rodents as diverse threats on the lower specturm of conflict where the potential for damage runs the gamut from the nuisance of terroristic nibbles at the fringe of our political sovereignty, to the spawning of physical threat to the society itself through insurgency, civil war—perhaps even a lunatic use of biological or radiological weapons. Together these three—the pit, the pendulum, and the rodents—portray the broad spectrum of conflict faced by the modern world.

Today, we see an increase in both national awareness and interest at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. This conference is an obvious example. The recent book, *The Fifth Horseman,* is an indicator of the popular flirtation with the topic. I even note a local junior college in the Washington area offering an undergraduate course on Terrorism. Intellectually, though, I would say that relative to the issues of strategic nuclear war, we have barely scratched the surface of comprehending the theoretical strategies and counter-strategies of the lower levels of conflict. In fact, if we were to overlay upon the spectrum of conflicts a histogram indicating the nation's intellectual investment, it would be heavily skewed to show emphasis on the careful examination of the highest levels of conflict, and diminished commitment against each successive category of lesser violence on the spectrum.



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I might add that this is a relatively new phenomenon, you'll recall that 15-20 years ago there was a sizeable community investigating the topics of rural insurgencies, counter guerrilla warfare, and nation building.

Were a second histogram created to depict relative expenditure and commitment to national capabilities to meet the various categories of violence, I would judge that it would show our physical investment to be somewhat more balanced. There would be some broadening and flattening of the curve; with large scale conventional war—to include forces for regional conflict—more credibly funded, but still a tailing off in the lower reaches of the conflict spectrum. The kinds of capabilities which are less adequately supported than desirable are those which have exclusive application in unconventional warfare scenarios, such as regional assistance activities, civil emergency preparedness and certain intelligence functions.

What makes these two histograms so startling is consideration of them against a third chart we might construct—one illustrating the frequency of conflict occurence—once again across the spectrum of violence. Such a chart would clearly indicate that the frequency of incidence, both real and anticipated, is today skewed markedly toward the lower end of the conflict scale: terrorism and low level conflict.

So a conclusion could logically be constructed that we are investing heavily to prevent the unlikely, while essentially ignoring much of what is necessary to meet that which is certainly unavoidable. For there is a tinder box out there in the world which increasingly possesses all the necessary attributes for self-ignition—for spontaneous combustion—with or without any direction or assistance by third parties hostile to the democracies. Obviously, where such support is provided, there are the added hazards of increased lethality through access to better technology and the potential for heightened effect by global orchestration. But the projections through the year 2000 clearly place the USSR and Eastern Europe in the camp of the "haves," a fact which will not forever escape the notice of the "have-nots." The potential scenarios are such that no nation will be capable of isolating the effects of spillover from conflict which might arise from the maldistribution of global resources, populations, and income. These points are clearly evident through consideration of such studies as *The Global 2000 Report to the President*, an assessment of the positions to which current trends are likely to lead as we enter the twenty-first century. Unless states act to foster responsible change, that future promises to be a world increasingly vulnerable to both natural disaster and to disruptions from human causes, to include terrorism and low level conflict.

-By every measure of material welfare—per capita GNP, food, energy, and minerals—the gap between the richest and the poorest will have increased. In GNP per capita, for example, the current gap between the lesser developed and the industrialized countries will grow from its approximate level of $4000 in 1975 to about $7900 in the year 2000.

-Further, the great disparities which exist within countries is expected to continue.

-And urbanization will increase—with massive agglomerations in most key developing nations, for example:

**Population in Millions**

| | 1975 | 2000 |
|---|---|---|
| Calcutta | 8.1 | 19.7 |
| Mexico City | 10.9 | 31.6 |
| Greater Cairo | 6.9 | 16.4 |
| Jakarta | 5.6 | 16.9 |
| Seoul | 7.3 | 18.7 |
| Teheran | 4.4 | 13.8 |
| Bogota | 3.4 | 9.5 |

-And [finally] the majority of this urban growth will occur in "uncontrolled settlements" or slums—fertile ground for the urban guerrilla.

Of course the challenge is to meet global needs, to attempt to orchestrate reform peacefully within existing governmental, and government-to-government structures, but

-Frustrations—or an inability to afford conventional force structures—could lead to a state's adoption of conflict on the lower end of the conflict spectrum; for example, terrorism or surrogate terrorist attack against critical portions of the highly centralized and

vulnerable nervous systems of the industrialized states, or

-Internal frustration with the existing governmental structures to deal effectively with meeting the needs of its citizens could result in accelerated global fractionation along tribal, ethnic, religious, or cultural lines—increasing the roster of identifiable claimants and further complicating any accommodation. Terrorism, insurgencies, civil wars, and regional conflicts could dot the landscape.

For us, it is necessary that:

-To the degree that the Soviet Union makes use of, fosters, or orchestrates terrorism and low level conflict within a scheme directed toward the isolation of the United States it is incumbent upon us to maintain a capability to intervene.

-To the degree that friendly states request our help and assistance, we must be ready and responsive.

-To the degree that our domestic scene is threatened by violence, we must be prepared to act to meet our obligations to the Constitution and its authorities.

These are not unfamiliar responsibilities for the Army. Reflection on the Army as merely the instrument for massive involvement in two continental European wars and three Asian wars tends to overshadow the historical fact that our more typical involvements have focused on lower levels of conflict:

-Directed intervention during domestic strikes

-Riot control—Bonus Marchers, anti-Vietnam protests, urban disturbances

-Border patrols. In 1914, more than half the Army was on the border with Mexico in pursuit of rural guerrillas—Poncho Villa, and the punitive expedition into Mexico

-The Indian Wars

-The Philippine Insurrection

-Nation building—both our own, and others through military advice and assistance

-Civil Wars—our own, and the Dominican Republic

-Counter insurgency activity e.g., Greece, the early Vietnam years

The trick—strategically, politically, and economically—is to blend continued maintenance of this capacity for reaction across the spectrum of violence in the context of today's "pit and pendulum"—to ensure we are not prepared simply for one or two of the contingencies.

We do have many of the necessary military capabilities today. Since Vietnam, we have acted in concert with our NATO allies to bolster our conventional forces targeted on Europe. Nevertheless, I believe we have been myopic in structuring the force for a single scenario and not having forces capable of responding to threats throughout the world. I have long contended that we need to pay attention to the "other army," the army traditionally ready to respond to the full spectrum of threats against this nation and its friends anywhere, not just in the Fulda Gap.

Fortunately, we have succeeded in convincing the right people that this is essential. We have the mandate to create a technologically sophisticated division of lighter forces. We are balancing our heavy and light forces so that they can respond across the entire spectrum of warfare. Obviously, there are limits on the total resources available. But that means that we have to be canny enough, with your help—with everyone's help—to ensure that the forces we build to respond in one area can respond equally well in others, wherever that is possible. We have to be sensitive enough to design the force structure so that we get the maximum use and flexibility from our fungible forces. In some special instances that is not possible. Unique capabilities, such as that embodied in the Delta Force and in the joint mechanism for command and control of service counter-terrorist capabilities as recommended in Admiral Holloway's critique, are exceptions that we must protect.

As I indicated earlier, we had for some time been too focused on a single scenario with the



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consequence that we prepositioned a lot of equipment in one area. We're changing that. We're looking at other alternatives that will yield greater global mobility; which permit us to respond more quickly to challenges elsewhere.

These efforts will not have full utility until we are able to correct some severe limitations. We need a cadre of experts to train U. S. and friendly nationals in techniques of insurgency/counter-insurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. We need improved HUMINT, human intelligence capabilities. We need materiel and personnel to bolster our support of internal security-assistance programs. We need an enhanced personnel exchange program with the armed forces of friendly nations. We need continued support from multi-national schools, such as the School of Americas in Panama. We need a stockpile of low-level conflict weaponry. We need legislation to enhance reasonable external programs that permit use of all these tools in sustaining nations critical to our own well-being.

But above all these, we need concepts, doctrine, theories for structuring the kinds of forces that can face the challenges of this critical decade ahead. That is why I believe that the activities of this conference are so important. What emerges from them may help provide that kind of conceptual structure.

One author has described our contemporary experience in these words: "Step by step, almost imperceptibly, without anyone being aware that a fatal watershed has been crossed, mankind has descended into the age of terror." I am not that fatalistic about our situation. A threat of international anarchy can be fashioned. But I do not believe that reasonable men anywhere—regardless of their political, economic, religious, or ethnic persuasions—see advantage in that condition, and I'm persuaded that the means can be fashioned by which mankind will avoid that kind of degeneration. We are capable of acting to shape the future. We are engaging in that process through gatherings such as this.

## Article in
## ARMY MAGAZINE
## 1980-81 Green Book Issue

1 October 1980

Arnold Toynbee once wrote that "uncritical toleration is the most consistent mark of a decadent society." Certainly, these are not times which will be charitable to either ethical floundering or to careless or inept professional misjudgments. Our nation is at a crossroad which demands the utmost from all professions, not the least among these the military.

The reasons are clear. The nation is challenged by a need to cope with pressing problems across the full spectrum of international relations.

- *Politically*, we face uneasiness within the industrialized West, among old friends who are today reevaluating once unquestioned common outlooks and programs; with the third world, whose leaders are understandably seeking (or employing) new leverage for a brighter place under the sun; and with the imperialistic Soviet Union, and the coterie of socialist states, whose outlook toward Western democracies remains fundamentally hostile.

- *Economically*, there is the fact of growing resource scarcity, most notably in energy (but not limited to that), and changing patterns of production, productivity and markets access which have visited on us the twin dilemmas of inflation and unemployment.

- *Technologically*, there is advancement in all basic and applied sciences, and an accompanying certainty that destructive applications will be more broadly available worldwide.

- *Legally*, there is tortuous progress toward meaningful international agreement on issues as diverse as arms control, ownership of and movement over the seas, and the use of space and environment.

- *Socially*, there is a divergent clamor for more open societies based on rules yet to be written,

much less clearly comprehended at this continuing stage of our development.

- *Militarily*, there is the perception, if not the reality, of an eclipsed superiority and a proliferation of low-grade threats to our national well-being, threats made larger by the demonstration of Soviet willingness to employ their forces actively beyond their borders.

These instabilities are cause for concern, but not despair, for each hazard is accompanied by less evident but equally powerful opportunities for beneficial change and growth. Sound stewardship by professional Soldiers is an intrinsic part of the national means for resolving the major issues before us.

Over an extended period of time we have succeeded in building some erroneous expectations into the fabric of our institutions—which are injurious to many values we hold traditional in military service. Today, the Army is in the process of working to untangle some of the vexing issues which affect these values. The deleterious effects of these issues, unless remedied, could carry over and undercut the whole tone and quality of the Army.

....we must stay in touch with this set of values keyed to the fulfillment of our constitutional obligations. The heart of that task is the support and defense of the Constitution; ergo, the preservation of our national values through preparation for war.

It is from the stark reality of the battlefield—where our lives and the lives of those about us may be hazarded to shield the republic—that we must firmly establish the validity of our institutional standards. Thereafter, we must rigidly guard their preservation in all that we do as Soldiers, lest we erode that which will see us, and the nation, safely through mortal combat.

We all recognize the accuracy of Gen. Walter (Dutch) Kerwin's view that in a democratic society "the values necessary to defend the society are often at odds with the values of the society itself." The Supreme Court, in *Schlesinger vs. Councilman* (1975), has similarly recognized that "to prepare for its vital role, the military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life."

How wide the actual gap is between essential military values and those of the civil sector is conjecture. Columnist George Will believes that "never before in the nation's experience have the values and expectations in society been more at variance with the values and expectations indispensable to a military establishment." His assessment assumes a widening gap....

Indeed, there is an ebb and flow to the national spirit which practiced sociologists continually work to measure. Their reviews of the 1970s variously characterize it as an era of distrust, one in which an anarchist spirit and philosophy emerged to severely test our social cohesion, in which the role of authority both in our lives and among our institutions was challenged, the "in" decade, the Age of Narcissism.

Some, such as Eugene Kennedy of Loyola, now conclude that at the beginnings of this decade a bittersweet truth may have been reached, "...wrested from a thousand disappointments, that nobody can have it all in life ... that trying to be happy without giving something for others is impossible.

This is not entirely congruent with the military value of selfless service, but it is considerably closer than the prevalent social ethic of the 1970s—doing your own thing.

A few years back, the nation was cautioned by Archibald Cox that "... in our enormously complex society ... the moral precepts and sense of ultimate purpose necessary to preserve and renew those establishments which have a dominant share in begetting a civilized society require steadfast attention."

The Army is such an establishment. It is appropriate that we question the possibility that we may have accommodated over time to prevailing societal trends; and in the process compromised values essential to our mission performance.

What are the essential professional military values?

Scholars have focused on our institutional value set in varying ways. For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on only four—two related to the institution and its organizations, and two related to the individual—which I believe capture the

essence:

• *Loyalty to the unit, or cohesion,* is an absolutely essential value for small unit success in combat and in the preparation for war. It is a function of strong personal loyalties to small groups, developed through and maintained by a feeling that all participants are united by similar hardship, risk, fear,and by the understanding that their leaders will endure similar conditions.

It is not epitomized by the soldier in S.L.A. Marshall's *River and the Gauntlet,* who watched alone as an entire regiment of enemy soldiers filed by his outpost in the Korean hills. It is not nourished by wartime rotation policies which appear to accord privilege to officers in their exposure to hazard.

Cohesion is the quality of the artillery gun sections on LZ Bird, and the intrepid performance of medical evacuation teams in Vietnam. It is marked by the kind of small unit performance that took place around Arracourt in the Lorraine campaign of World War II, where tank crews and infantry under Col. Bruce C. Clarke (Combat Command "A", 4th Armored Division) and Lt. Cols. Creighton Abrams (37th Tank Battalion), and Arthur West (10th Armored Infantry Battalion) laid waste elements of the 11th Panzer Division. It was a case of U.S. technical inferiority overcome by magnificent crew performances which caught and destroyed the superior Mark IV Panther through deadly mousetrap tactics.

Cohesion, as illustrated by these examples, is an objective which can only be achieved by conscious attention to the ingredients of its makeup: a proper environment and concerned leadership.

The environment must protect the opportunity for proximate relationships to occur. It must provide time for the bonding process of trust and commitment. It must provide for shared common experiences which yield a group identity. And it must provide frequent challenge, recognition of achievement and success.

Leaders have a special role, for with or without them, Soldiers will bond into cohesive groups. The leader sets the standards, provides the example, and moves the group to actions consistent with the larger organizational goals. Hence, leaders who are inept, whose ethical fibers are weak, whose human instincts are callous, or whose actions connote acute self-centeredness, betray the value of cohesion. Such leaders must be identified and rooted out of our system

• *Loyalty to the institution* is the second major institutional value I would cite. It is that which permits coordinated application of the power we derive from cohesive units to some larger function of service to the nation. Obedience and disciplined performance, without debate or vote, and despite difficulty or danger, are its traditional hallmarks. Disagreement is in full accord with this value—up to the decision point.

Within a democracy, the unwarranted usurpation of power is checked by the transcending personal obligations of loyalty to the Constitution and to one's conscience. In the normally healthy state, where options have been fairly and fully considered and where ethical considerations are not at issue, the Soldier's role is clearly one of full support and compliance with both the letter and the spirit of a decision.

Loyalty is founded on a base of common objectives, with clear organizational goals and responsible individual participation in the achievement of those goals—be they the development of a new weapons systems, the consolidation of a platoon's night defensive position or the reconciliation of a property listing.

Since the days of Baron Friedrich von Steuben, it has been clear that the allegiance of the American Soldier is to purposeful activity. Hence a vision of the common objective is essential.

In another sense, this value obligates every level of the chain of command to a genuine concern for the total welfare of subordinate units and the Soldier, not only to ensure competence in military skills, but development across the full spectrum of "the whole man."

• *Personal responsibility* lies at the heart of the military profession. Epitomized by mission-type orders—whether to Lewis and Clark to explore the great Northwest or to Dwight D. Eisenhower to land Allied forces on the European continent, or to PFC Marne in the 3rd Squad of the 3rd Platoon to escort a ration run—this value underwrites a special trust and an assured con-

fidence of dedicated and competent performance by the nation's military.

It begins in the early days of training where the raw recruit and the young officer aspirant are taught to understand that the lives of fellow Soldiers depend upon the full and complete discharge of assigned tasks, however small. It develops further as young NCOs face the challenge of being the one turned to by the squad when faced with an unfamiliar situation, faulty equipment, injustice or personal problems.

The need for total emersion in the specialties of our trade grows as we come to recognize how totally committed units depend upon self-contained and self-developed skills and procedures, and how fully the nation trusts us with stewardship over vast national resources and critical tasks.

This value of personal responsibility is the vehicle for action, which otherwise bogs down through committees and other bureaucratic encumbrances. It is both the reward for the capable and the vehicle for self-fulfillment across the diverse demands of our Army. It imposes upon each of us a need to be certain of our priorities and to act accordingly.

• *Selfless service* is the value characterized in the story of Robert E. Lee who, when asked his opinion of a fellow officer by President Jefferson Davis, spoke of the man in highest terms. This greatly astonished another officer, who said to Lee afterwards, "General, don't you know that the man of whom you spoke so highly to the President is one of your bitterest enemies and misses no opportunity to malign you?"

"Yes," replied Lee, "but the President asked my opinion of him, not his opinion of me."

The obligation of service and commitment inherent in the military ethic imposes burdens not customary in the larger society where obligations are normally contractual in nature and limited in the degree of personal sacrifice expected. For the Soldier, the obligation is complete: to death if necessary.

The expenditure of life for personal gain is not licensed by any moral code. The right of self-defense for the common good of a society, on the other hand, is justifiable. And it is in that ultimate sense of service that our military and civilian members must submerge self-interest. For if [self interest] is evident in any of the lesser tasks we assume, what is to assure its absence when the ultimate sacrifice is asked?

. . . .These values ought to govern all of our actions . . . [unfortunately] we have not been alert to viewing change from the perspective of our intrinsic value system. Too often we have adapted to arguments couched in cost-benefit terms or other rational social criteria which govern the customary affairs of our society. This fails to recognize that we are called upon to accomplish a task which is fundamentally antisocial by all measurements, and not easily reconciled to counterpart functions in the civilian world. . . .

Only by being true to what we know to be in the best interests of a professional force can we confidently stretch our full capabilities to accomplishment of the difficult tasks at hand.

We are an institution strengthened by our values.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Being "Heat-Shields"

9 October 1980

After more than a year of talking individually to general officers selected for division command and to newly designated brigade and battalion commanders at the pre-command courses, I am frustrated that one of my central themes is apparently not being emphasized. At every opportunity I have stressed the absolute criticality of discriminating between our real missions of training and maintaining and the ubiquitous conflictors such as administrative workload and

unscheduled events that detract from primary mission accomplishment.

Visits to the field and reports from commanders reveal lack of understanding and inability to cope with the problems of managing time and deconflicting unit commanders' workloads.

I am loath to tell people precisely how workloads should be reduced, but if necessary I will issue definitive guidance regarding time management and require the Inspector General to report on compliance.

Commanders must get down to company level and determine conflictors as perceived there. Once identified, conflictors must be tracked upward to determine where they originated and for what purpose. The reason that we must involve ourselves rather than direct our staffs to address conflictors is that many, if not most, conflictors originate from within our own headquarters, ostensibly to meet the commanders' needs as perceived by the staff.

We must all be heat shields for our subordinates and must insist they be the same for theirs. Commanders must know that of all the balls in the air at any time, only two are glass—training and maintenance.

## Address to the ARMY FAMILY SYMPOSIUM

Washington, DC
11 October 1980

. . . While the corporate leadership of the Army can do much to effect readiness of the Army by tougher training, through new and more modern equipment, and by revamping some of our people programs—with the thought of creating greater stability and unit cohesion—our Soldiers will not be well prepared unless they know that their family needs are being equally well supported. . . .

Therefore it is incumbent upon . . . the Army to show our Soldiers that their families count, that they are cared for, and that their needs are considered in our overall scheme. At the same time, the family members must know they count and are considered; for if they do not, the Soldier will look elsewhere for an environment which gives the family fuller consideration and support.

In assessing the Soldier and the family, two basic facts emerge:

- We recruit Soldiers, but

- we retain families!!

Consider today's Army. It is roughly 60 percent married—far different from the Army I joined, which was about 1/3rd married, and that primarily focused in the officer and senior NCO ranks. Today, over 50 percent of our junior Soldiers—E5's, E4's and Privates—are married. That is the pool from which we draw our NCO leaders. So you can see that the urgency of retaining families has become more and more evident. Where formerly a Soldier decided to make the Army a career and then after that decision turned to become a head of household, today the Soldier comes to us with a family, with the choice of a military career contingent upon its agreeability to the entire family unit.

Our retention of the military family—the Soldier and dependents—depends upon a myriad of factors. Certainly the 11.7 percent pay raise, coupled with the benefits package of the President's Compensation Package and Nunn-Warner Bill, are steps in the right direction. But if we rely totally on outside help to make service to country more attractive, we are abandoning the time honored philosophy that "the Army takes care of its own". . . .

Our families are exposed to many internal and external pressures; external, in terms of frequent moves, separations, lack of adequate facilities such as housing—and internal pressures such as finances, children's education, married life styles. Frequently, the external and internal factors combine to add more stress. If we

expect to continue the tradition of caring for our own, then we must be smart enough to recognize circumstances where our policies create undesirable situations for the family unit, or in which they add to stress factors [already present in] the society around us.

The officers and noncommissioned officers who propose, draft and ultimately decide our policies relating to personnel, housing, transportation—to name just a few—do yeoman's work in attempting to reconcile institutional requirements with the needs and desires of our Soldiers and their families. Obviously, their efforts are reflective of their own experience—or lack thereof—relating to the stresses on the Army family. That is why your thoughts, your ideas during this symposium are extremely important. Each of you here today, because of unique sets of experiences, possesses ideas on how we might make our programs more responsive to family needs. The addition of a symposium on the Army family is a fresh and exciting opportunity and I'm grateful to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) for their support.

The Army family is becoming much more varied than some of our traditional views would tend to tell us. We have Soldiers who are single parents. We have situations where both husband and wife are in uniform. But the larger family numbers are still of the traditional variety, and in that context—as a husband in an Army family--I can speak lovingly and admiringly of the Soldier's partner and confidant—the Army wife. In her diversity, she has shared through all the years of our Army, through countless hardships, and has added grace to what often is a difficult profession. That same Army wife has also demonstrated an ability to make the best of trying times and as such her ideas and counsel are valued highly. But here, too, change is present; as for reasons of self-fulfillment or economic necessity, increasing numbers of Army wives are working women as well.

The Army wife has always sought to reach out to her Army community, as you are doing today. I know that changing dimensions of a woman's role or the appeal of two paychecks have impacted markedly on the willingness or ability of Army wives to invest some effort toward that community. As a result there is an erosion to our sense of community which causes concern.

As you go through your activities today and tomorrow, I think it important that you understand that you are vital members of this Army team. Your judgments are valued and necessary if we hope to rejuvenate a sense of community and cohesion to this life we have chosen. Your efforts, continued at the posts from which you came, can give our institution ways to build back that spirit of mutual support that has been our hallmark through succeeding generations of Army families.

## Address to the ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Washington, DC
14 October 1980

. . . What is reinforced by all that we see about us, is the need for well conceived American land power, capable of providing an appropriate response where our essential national interests are challenged. . . .

Our goal for the Army, as always, is a disciplined and well-trained force equal to the peculiar challenges of our times. . . .

We are now almost one year into the eighties. Almost one year of labor toward that vision in our White Paper has passed. What I can tell you—the staunch supporters of our Army—about our progress?

. . . a comprehensive assessment is not easy to arrive at. There is no single correct vantage point from which to judge today's Army. An accurate assessment is not fostered by the selective amnesia of some of our critics, nor is it enhanced by the annual budget debate over



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resources—a debate which focuses on unfulfilled needs rather than on achievement and direction. The assessment is not balanced when it deals exclusively with either an accurate and complimentary report of a well conducted exercise, or by a vignette which illustrates the abysmal hardship which many within our ranks endure.

There are harsh facts of life today—the fact that the Army's share of the Defense budget has shrunk to just a littlu??aover 24 percent, the lowest in more than 16 years. The last thing you need from me is a Panglossian view of our condition and prospects. But the reality of well recognized and serious deficiencies, should not obscure full tribute to the efforts of those Soldiers and civilians who have contributed to major progress in our efforts toward meeting the rigid demands of the eighties.

. . . .I want to elaborate on the foundation that has been put into place by you—the accomplishments which are real and tangible in our corporate labors toward the necessary land force. Where we plan to go from here is a matter of record which will be influenced by internal and external factors. Where we have gone thus far, despite the obstacles, is a matter in which all of us can take great pride.

## Force Structure

For years, through such efforts as the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), the heavy-light corps, or the Unilateral Corps, the Army's leadership has sought legitimacy for the "other Army"—my shorthand for an effective capacity to conduct operations outside of Europe or Northeast Asia. Recently, there has been considerable pressure to move toward a heavy mechanization of the total force, a reasonable pursuit given the evident thrust of Soviet tank density and modernization in Europe. In league with this heavying-up of the force structure, we adopted a program of prepositioning equipment sets in Europe—largely to compensate for deficiencies in our strategic lift capacity in mobilization. Cumulatively, the trends were toward a greatly diminished capacity to field forces adequate for those missions most appropriate to the "other Army"—a very dangerous situation, especially in light of the diverse kinds of lower order threats evident in the decade ahead.

The key to resolving this dichotomy lies in the fusion of high technology with lighter force packages to . . . provide us not only a force capable of rapid deployment world-wide, but a force of considerable value in Europe as well. This is the kind of flexibility we need, if under fixed authorizations we are to be prepared to meet tomorrow's contingency without sacrifice to our NATO commitment. The latitude we have been given on this issue is a major accomplishment of the past year.

How we will use this freedom will become increasingly evident at Fort Lewis, where we will retain the 9th Infantry Division unmechanized as a light high-technology test bed division. "The Old Reliable" will be the bridge to future light organizations spawned by TRADOC's recently approved examination of what is possible in light division organizations. The immediate emphasis is to upgrade the 9th Infantry Division's operational capabilities in the areas of command and control, electronic warfare, intelligence and target acquisition, anti-tank weaponry, logistic support, air defense, and implementation of the Air Cavalry Attack Brigade (ACAB). Concepts, force design, and equipment changes will be exported to other divisions—both light and heavy—as appropriate and as they are judged successful. What we have going on today at Fort Lewis is exciting evidence that we do have some viable means at hand to improve the total capability of the force.

True force effectiveness, however, depends upon a comprehensive plan legible to a very broad audience—a blueprint that reflects the full understanding of all parties so that in war our efforts are orchestrated to a successful conclusion. Elements of that blueprint which are particularly critical ingredients in our preparation for war include:

- Firm policy guidance for contingency planning—without which *ad-hoc-ism* would proliferate.

- Army-Air Force dialogue on the conduct of the critical air-land battle, including joint measures for air defense suppression, and the attack of Soviet second echelon formations.

- FORSCOM's *CAPSTONE* program which assigns every National Guard and USAR unit

in CONUS—all 4400 of them!—a clear wartime mission, with identification of their headquarters within the mature theater and assignment to one of our 53 mobilization stations.

- [Upgrading] the mission of the 9 Readiness Regions to include detailed mobilization planning responsibilities.

- The conceptualization going on within TRADOC's *Army 86* Studies, where two of the four major pieces—the heavy and the light divisions—are essentially completed and approved. . . .These force design efforts give us the basis for a clear and coherent force structure upon which we can prioritize a materiel acquisition master plan to make the whole system work. It is a major accomplishment.

- That master acquisition plan will call for a prodigious increase in support by DARCOM if the modernization process is to come off effectively. General Guthrie has looked at ways and means to reshape his organization for enhanced effectiveness through improved productivity. His plan is a first rate effort which offers some hope of coping with the immense future task of that organization, an increase of 125,000 line items [in our inventory] by 1985. It's the kind of thoughtful "preplanning" that must permeate our efforts.

## Manning

Of course, none of these initiatives will bear fruit unless we are successful in adequately manning the force. In this regard we have witnessed a bonanza . . . which few here could have predicted with any accuracy one year ago.

- The resuscitation by the Congress of the Selective Service System through reintroduction of peacetime *registration* is a very positive step toward ensuring that this nation has the machinery in place to permit it to be able to mobilize and face the long haul in the event of war.

- Two other significant actions have addressed critical needs that impact on our peacetime manning.

The passage of the *Nunn-Warner Act* and the 11.7 percent pay increase begin a process of rectifying a steady decline in the military benefits package. . . .

We did not succeed in getting reinstitution of the *GI Bill*, but the seed has been planted and I am hopeful.

What has been accomplished this year is that we have reversed the deficiencies we suffered in recruiting in 1979 and we have attained our Active end strength. And for the second consecutive year we have seen growth in our selected Reserve strength. Last year, for the first time in six years, the paid drill strength showed a real increase of 8700. This year's gain exceeded 25,000. None of these have been easy accomplishments; and while there remain deep and justifiable concerns about manpower mobilization shortfalls—and some confusion and uncertainity on the quality issue—the men and women of the Recruiting Command (USAREC) and all those involved in military retention can stand tall.

Last year at this time, the prospects of a viable reinforcing Active Army in CONUS were dim indeed. The customary operational shortfalls which accompany any recruiting deficiency were washing though the digestive tract of the Army forcing CONUS units to accommodate to a real reduction in strength which at its peak reached over 30,000. The effect of the poor recruiting was exacerbated both by our distribution plans which force-fed overstrengths to our deployed forces, and by critical NCO shortages—especially in the combat arms grades, E6 to E8. A number of urgent steps were necessary:

- First, of course, we needed to succeed in our numerical recruiting goals. This we have done.

- Second, we needed to distribute the assets on hand more equitably to prevent the kind of feast/famine dichotomy that existed within our ranks. Our program to effect this was announced in early September, and we anticipate its completion by the end of this calendar year.

- Third, we just flat needed more NCO's. So in the course of this year we reprogrammed

FY 80 money to accommodate a total increase of 11,000 noncommissioned officers— advancing a goal we had not anticipated reaching until 1984.

These measures will result in a better situation regarding the lower enlisted ranks and improvement in on-hand NCO strengths, especially in combat support and combat service support skills. We still have a very large problem in fully staffing our NCO requirements in the critical combat arms. As you know, NCO's are grown, not hired. Retention and motivation are areas in which we must continue to focus attention.

- . . . With extension of the reenlishment bonuses to career-oriented people with 10-14 years of service, we have a major new incentive to help us meet our needs.

- In addition, we have decided to change our promotion policies sufficiently to permit preferential promotion in those skill areas where we have the most critical need.

While the immediate prospects hold promise now, we must note carefully that manning of the forces cannot be succeccful if it commands only intermittent attention.

There must be a constancy of purpose in the attention we give to this elemental sector—in pay, in re-enlistment benefits, in recruiting resources, and in the quality of life we provide for the Soldier and his family.

In this vein, let us recognize that the end product is, of course units—cohesive units, well-trained and disciplined, and manned by effective and satisfied Soldiers. Prideful service does not come from being a digit in a large organization, however well managed it may be. Over time we have loosed many of the ties which helped bind one's loyalty and service to the unit. We have begun to implement some corrective actions to rekindle an environment that foster those close bonds which help hold people in service in peacetime, and which bind them together for sustained performance in war.

## Training

The most evident success thus far in these efforts can be seen today in the platoon, company, and battalion training of new accessions within FORSCOM. Partly as a result of a deliberate strategy to move toward some concept of unit fill, initial entry training in units, and retention of personnel in that unit through deplopyment for a full 3-year cycle; and partly as a result of accessions beyond the capacity of the TRADOC's training base, we have funneled over 3,000 new Soldiers into CONUS divisions on a "train and retain" basis. Initially conceived as a platoon oriented program, it is also being carried out as a company program. . . .

There is an infectious enthusiasm among the officers and cadre when the character and capabilities of their unit is placed entirely into their hands under provisions which permit them to train and retain. It affects the Soldiers as well, as I can testify from earlier visits to platoon sized efforts in the 5th Mech and company sized programs in the 4th Mech. There I met Soldiers whose enlistment contracts called for subsequent assignment to the 82d Airborne. Yet, the opportunity to remain in their platoons, with comrades of shared experiences, was exciting enough for them to elect to return to their platoons following their completion of jump school.

As I indicated in early September, we will be lengthening and toughening Initial Entry Training. We intend to ensure uniform standards of excellence are applied to each of our new volunteers, regardless of where trained. The Soldier must understand his (or her) important role in the Army, and have that role reinforced throughout the initial "soldierization" process.

This year has also marked a very successful Annual Training program in the Reserve Components, especially in the area of effective training management. That, at least, is the initial assessment I've received. It reflects the consensus of judgments from the Mobilization and Readiness Region commanders, and it mirrors my own judgment derived from numerous field visits this summer. Today we are seeing the fruits of such initiatives as the Active/Reserve Partnership and Affiliation programs, and the enlightened use of the Battalion Training Management System throughout FORSCOM.

Now the proof is in the eating, and the results of these training efforts have a good taste.

- There is the traditionally superb response of all components to unpredictable national disasters and other civil contingency needs. During FY 80, more than 4000 Soldiers of the Total Army were engaged in supporting the resettlement of some 116,000 Cuban refugees at locations in Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. One clear example of can-do competence.

- Another: paratroopers of the 82d Airborne Division, boarding Air Force planes at Fort Bragg, conducted the first ever transcontinental drop in support of the Autumn Forge exercise Spear Point. Prior exercises necessitated transfer to local tactical transport for a drop. Not this one. The unit exited directly into simulated combat in Northern Germany, while the C-141's refueled in mid-air and returned directly to CONUS.

- Another: this involving the 2d Arrnor Division, a relatively low priority unit considering all those whose resource demands precede it. "Hell on Wheels" deployed to Spear Point with two brigades and a scaled-down DISCOM and DivArty. From the time they boarded planes in CONUS to commitment into "battle," 13 days elapsed. That's a [dramatic] improvement over what we have come to accept with reluctance in the past. I could speak to their performance, but the words of an ally are more convincing. Sir Peter Leng, Commander of the 1st British Corps, the unit that formed the bulk of the exercise force, remarked in a German television interview that:

"I have heard various reports in the past over the worry of U. S. Forces. Let me put the record straight . . . (my) battle commanders were highly impressed by the tactical handling of the various American forces . . . in front of us they employed telling tactics, excellent maneuvers, and were fast and quick in reaction. . . .I was highly impressed by the remarkably high serviceability of the equipment . . . their counterattack was quite 1st class . . . so let me put it like this, I would welcome the 3d Panzer on one flank and the 2d U. S Armored Division on the other flank . . . we are indeed an effective deterrent."

- Another example. I hope all recognize the extensive participation of the ARNG/USAR in our REFORGER Exercises. More than 3000 Soldiers in 33 units took part this year. Most impressive was the 3d Battalion, 178th Field Artillery, an Army National Guard unit from South Carolina, the first RC combat battalion ever to fall in on and draw from POMCUS stock. Their performance was brilliant, their time in drawing equipment surpassing performances by the Active units Why? Because drawing equipment is no big deal for our Reserve Components. It is, in fact, a customary way of life for them in training.

I haven't wanted to steal any of General Kroesen's message to you, and yet, our performance under conditions of realistic combat have been so gratifying that even if I have delved into material which he will revisit, the story bears retelling. I believe too that these exercises demonstrated that regardless of where we looked for performance—whether it was from the more exclusive units [enjoying] resource priority, or from units more accustomed to short rations—we came up with superb execution.

## Mobilization and Sustainability

Of course, it's the integration of all of our capabilities into one smooth operation, coupled with the ability to sustain the operation, that constitute our real warfighting capability.

Standard battle drills and standard loading procedures in fighting vehicles are ingredients. So too is a standard for wartime repair parts based on anticipated combat usage and damage. The DCSLOG is moving out on this effort, developing logical stockage add-on's beyond that which units can justify using peacetime criteria. We're seeking realism and practical adequacy wherever it is called for.

Last month marked the implementation of an operational capability to triple the number of individual accounts in our automated personnel systems, so that we can handle the volume of data required in mobilization. Another automated system preloads contingency orders, tickets, and administrative information for delivery to Soldiers

needed to meet [known] deficiencies of units destined for mobilization stations.

These are the kinds of systems that will get a heavy workout in this year's mobilization training exercise. I look to it being an excellent a workout as was LOGEX 80, which took place at Fort Pickett in August. LOGEX involved 3,300 players: Active, Reserve, Air Force, Marine, Navy, and German Territorial Forces. It exercised a 3 1/2 division corps in a mature theater. Combat was played down to the brigade level, and support down to the battalion level. It was a superior exercise, well conceived, from which all participants benefitted considerably. . . .

## Modernization

I will talk about modernization last, because it needs the least trumpeting. The bow wave we have spoken of for so long has arrived, and the first splash of its crests is touching our motor pools, just as it touched our airfields last year with the introduction of the *BLACKHAWK*. . . .

In June of 1979, the M60A3 attained its first operational capability in the 1st Battalion, 32 Armor of the 3d Armored Division. Today, more than 400 M60A3's are in the hands of forward deployed forces.

In February of this year I was privileged to be present as Mrs. Abrams christened the first production models of the XM1 tank. By December, *the Abrams*—the world's finest main battle tank—will have attained operational status in the 1st Cav Division's 2-5 Cav. The tank has weathered the storm of much anxious criticism.

Early last year (April 1979) the new M198 155 Howitzer became operational with the 1/73 FA in the 18th Field Artillery Brigade. Soon it will be coupled with the Copperhead to provide us a new and potent tank killer, particularly in contingency situations.

TACFIRE is now in the force and operational (April 1979), as is QUICKLOOK II, an integral part of our electronic warfare capabilities in USAREUR.

Production runs on the first series of the IFV and CFV for delivery early next year, have been placed with the FMC Corporation. And the Patriot system has gone into limited production (15 Sept 1980).

Our efforts are coming to fruition. The R&D of the 70's is beginning to pay off in the 80's. Our concern is the rate at which available resources will allow us to deliver these badly needed new systems to our Soldiers.

## Closing

As I said at the start of my talk, I recognize that we have a host of serious issues. . . .

- Ambitious plans and programs for a modern force are essential precursors of, not substitutes for, the capabilities we need.

- The fact that we have achieved some numerical success in manning the Active Army cannot blind us to the arithmetic that tell us we are still significantly short of our manpower needs in mobilization.

- The attention paid thus far to the Soldier's welfare is gratifying, but still begs the issue of Soldiers continuing to apply for food stamps.

These kinds of issues—and I could go on—are being addressed in many forums and at many levels. The point that needs to be made at the same time is that the U.S. Army today despite many evident shortcomings, is a proud and going organization. The bulk of the Army—our Soldiers and civilians—are out there doing their job, and doing it well. And they deserve our thanks and full recognition—a recognition at least equal in its intensity to that which we devote to our problems. . . .

We need spokesmen. We need supporters. We need to tell the Army story—a story of people devoted to the defense of this nation. A story which I'm proud to repeat because it's about an Army of people of whom I'm very proud.

# Address to the WARRANT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

Washington, DC
15 October 1980

. . . . As I pointed out earlier, this decade is one which is going to require great professionalism in every way of life. . . .

We're going to have a host of new technologies: new aircraft, new air defense systems, new tanks, new ADP systems and new management problems—some the like of which we have never encountered before. Much of this calls for new specialization. The Patriot is a good example. Its complexity required that we develop an entirely new warrant officer MOS to accomplish special maintenance. . . .Terrain Analysis Technicians are another specialty we've had to introduce to ensure that the commanders out in the field are helped to understand all aspects of the terrain over which they have to move. And as the Army took over the veterinarians' responsibility, we needed to introduce a . . . [warrant officer speciality in] Veterinarian Food Inspection. . . .

Our warrant officer pool has increased in the last year alone from some 13,000 to some 14,000. So you can see a clear trend which is going to become increasingly difficult to manage. We're going to have to understand how to introduce and manage those technician requirements to our mutual satisfaction—to make the most efficient use of our officer corps, and to promote and maintain personal satisfaction.

Today we have shortages, particularly in aviation. . . .About 50 percent of our first term warrant officer aviators leave at the end of their four year tour. That requires some corrective measures because it's not economical for the Army to bring in an individual, train him, and then lose him as quickly as we are.

. . . I need your advice on means by which we can enhance the prestige of the CW4; where we stand on guaranteed concurrent travel, field grade housing, and equality in flight pay—which, as you know, we've gone up for twice already. We need to address more uniformly applied professional development programs and opportunities for all the MOS' in the WO Corps. . . .14 specialties have no advanced course today, and the figures show that in total only 50 percent of our warrant officers actually attend advanced courses. We need to consider a transition course for new warrant officers, just to name a few of the things I see that you need to consider in the context of improving the way we access and retain warrant officers in the future.

. . . we haven't addressed the warrant officer program in the same fashion as we have looked at the noncommissioned officer and the commissioned officer programs. Part of that is because many don't understand the warrant officer and his or her important role *as officers* in absolutely vital sectors of our Army. What I need from you then are ideas . . . [and] you are going to have to prioritize those which you feel are really essential, and those which are on the fringe. You know every step we take in one direction has an equivalent impact somewhere else, and that will remain true anytime there's not an overflowing bag of resources.

In closing, I want to reiterate that this decade will be a great challenge for the Total Army. The only way we'll get through it is if we individually strive to be more professional in all that we do. When I was a student over at the National War College, Mr. Bill Bundy came to speak to us and he talked about the fact that organizations don't run based on organizational wiring diagrams. . . .Organizations work on what he called, "islands of competence." You go to the guy you know will give you the answer. You quickly find out who he is! More than likely he won't be the person that's in that box, but he's the guy that can give you the answer anytime you want it and that's where you go. . . .To create "islands of competence" in all of the various jobs in which our warrant officers serve—that's the real challenge for us. If you take that challenge and are able to present reasonable proposals, then we may have



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the opportunity together to be able to ensure that we have the warrant officer properly fitted to the rest of our programs and leading to the kind of Army that will get us through this next decade. . . .

## Address to the AMERICAN DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION

Annapolis, Maryland
21 October 1980

. . . Out of the reports you will delve into there will hopefully emerge something which I and other Soldiers can comprehend: an improved capability to operate land forces in the NBC environment.

You and I recognize that it is national policy to take all reasonable measures to prevent the occurence of war at any level, and that includes nuclear or chemical variants. Sound deterrent measures, as politically difficult as they sometimes may be, are assuredly the path favored by the professional Soldier. We prepare for what we pray will never come.

In that preparation the lessons of history tell us that as we hone those skills typically identified with the known conventional battlefield, that we cannot exclude from the outset full integration of all the ingredients of the battlefield—to include new developments in electronics, propulsion, materials, optics, aeronautics, engineering, and chemistry. We dare not ignore any of these.

Many, I fear, still picture war in Europe today romantically—the magnificent spectacle of rapid armored columns slicing deep into the rear of an enemy force—Patton-esque, hell bent for leather. They forget in their romanticizing that:

- We generally controlled the air overhead in those days— we may in the future, but it won't happen overnight, and will assuredly be contested.

- There was no likelihood then of the nose of the attack being blunted or wiped out by tactical nuclear weapons.

- There was only minimal capability to interfere with our radio nets.

- Rudimentary camouflage techniques could not easily be compromised, and

- Relative to today, the opposing enemy force was deployed in shallow formations to the front

And while the Germans possessed new and possibly decisive technical superiority in chemical weapons—due to their accidental discovery of nerve agents in 1937 while pursuing some experimentation on insecticides—they were persuaded that their first use would lead to massive retaliation. Our rather massive chemical facilities for the production of DDT and other insecticides needed for the tropical climates of the Pacific war were mistakenly credited with the manufacture of nerve agents . . . a fortunate error and due I'm told to the fact that the manufacturing process is similar.

Well, much of that has changed today. The key to successful operations on future battlefields is to be structured and equipped from the outset with the operational means to anticipate and to be prepared to meet the full threat. It demands that we posture ourselves in peace to fight in a fully integrated way—not presupposing a posture which some escalation could compromise and defeat. We can't afford, for example, to pause in the course of a battle to revise command and control or redeploy units to react to the reality of Soviet first use of nuclear weapons. And we dare not enter battle unprepared for immediate entry into the chemical environment. All of this must be a part of our doctrine—our operational planning—and become an integral part of our training as well.

But the human being is a creature of habit and experience. . . . If we issue a piece of equipment that has utility, the Soldier will know and will use it. I have seen analyses of World War I units that broke in battle. When the stragglers were reassembled in rear areas, inventories showed that of the equipment brought out the last item

abandoned by those Soldiers who had experienced gas warfare was their mask. Among one such sample of 10,000 British soldiers driven before the German advance on Amiens, in March 1918, more that 6,000 abandoned their rifles; over 4,000 their helmets; but only 800 had discarded their gas masks. So, we are creatures of our experiences. Most people have not suffered a debilitating injury while driving a car. So—most Americans do not use their seat belts. Our training faces the same challenges.

The chemical threat is real. We must respond to it in everything we do. Emphasis is required to ensure that our units train in a mission-oriented posture where they become accustomed to the physical constraints of protective devices. . . .

History tells us that it is in the initial use of chemical weapons—the transition phase—where the greatest advantage accrues to the adversary. This was true at Ypres on the Western Front, at Bolimow on the Eastern Front, and on the Plateau of Doberdo on the Italian Front. In subsequent battles, despite the employment of vastly increased volumes of chemical agent, the casualties declined dramatically. Why? Again, the Soldier as a creature of his experience, realized the hazard of being separated from his life support means.

Transition to the nuclear or chemical environment is a potentially traumatic event, one which can only be overcome by training emphasis training which breeds confidence in the equipment on the part of the Soldier, and training which assures a rapid and knowledgeable response. . . .In the event of imminent combat we probably ought to adopt standing procedures to keep certain percentages of troops masked and in protective clothing. How dramatic an effect would it have on initial Warsaw Pact operations if from the outset we engaged them wearing full protective gear—a clear indication that we are prepared to fight on an integrated battlefield.

Well, you and I know that such an action is not very practical. It's not practical today because we don't have the means to fight continuously in chemical defensive gear. Additionally, there are physical and psychological limits which degrade the effectiveness of the individual Soldier. That is the first order effect of chemical warfare which engages most of our attention. . . .We need lots of help here—in better individual equipment, in sensing and warning devices [which alert] us to threat, and in agent antidotes or preferably prophylaxis when we can't avoid the hazards.

There are second order effects which concern me as well. They have to do with cohesion of the units, for that is how we fight and win—as units, not as individuals.

We normally speak of humans having five senses: sight, taste, smell, touch and hearing. Consider the individual wearing his chemical protective gear. Much of his peripheral vision disappears. His ability to distinguish his companions and to identify his leaders is gone as they don their protective clothing. He can't smell what's going on outside of his own personal incubator. His sense of direct touch is blocked. His ability to understand others is greatly hindered. So is his ability to communicate. His ability to taste, to eat, is physically blocked. C-rations can't be consumed with the current mask.

Since his contact with the outside world is going to be blocked, we've given him guidelines to tell him when he might be under nerve agent attack: sweating, a dimness of vision, a tightness of chest, and difficulty in breathing. Unfortunately, these symptoms provide the potential for misreading what is happening to him, for these are the same symptoms that we associate with fear. Since the symptoms are similar, and ones which are associated with combat on any battlefield, we risk the possibility of premature use of an antidote in the hands of that Soldier. Returning again to WWI, it's reported that 30-40 percent of the Soldiers arriving at the aid stations showed absolutely no exposure to gas. The phenomenon was called "gasomania."

Even if mental anxiety doesn't lead to individual incapacitation or collapse, what will be the impact on unit effectiveness as the normal senses that link people together in units are restricted? Well disciplined, the individual might survive—but will his unit?

General S.L.A. Marshall wrote of an earlier war, that one of the simplest truths of the battlefield is the need to ensure that the Soldier knows where his comrades are if we want to keep the unit going. The Soldier must experience that sixth sense, the belonging to a group, to a unit.

I'm not sure the Russians understand this very well either. Russia may be better able to rationalize chemical training for their soldiers. They have the memory of 475,000 Russian casualties and 56,000 deaths from chemical agents in WWI. They use dilute agents in training. And certainly they have advantages in any transition phase since the United States has rejected first use of adequate agreement eliminating the threat of chemical warfare and in view of the improving Soviet chemical warfare capabilities, we must maintain a credible retaliatory capability to ensure that there are no real or perceived advantages to them in initiating a chemical attack. I, for one, want our deterrence to be based on more than a mis-interpretation of American capabilities such as occurred in WWII. . . .

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS

On Doctrine Development
29 October 1980

. . .We must ensure that reports and lessons learned from training experiences are captured, codified and institutionalized. We must overcome the tendency for units to start from "square A" every time they go out. I am reminded of a battalion commander who recently informed me that he had discovered night training.

TRADOC is ultimately responsible for doctrine development. But units in the field are both beneficiaries and contributors in that process. While TRADOC schools are the focal point for such non-branch unique areas such as MOUT, EW, air assault, amphibious, jungle, mountain and night operations, specified units have doctrinal responsibilities in these areas as well. These units are charged with being the Army's "experts" in their areas of responsibility. . . .

## Article in the UNIFORMED SERVICES JOURNAL - NOVEMBER ISSUE

1 November 1980

. . .This might be the time and the place for a capsulized view of where the Army stands today, and why, on the issue of manning the force.

I am not sanguine on the desirability of one means over another for providing us the raw makings of future Soldiers. We have demonstrated

success with conscripts and volunteers alike throughout history. In the years following World War II, we were the major direct beneficiary of conscription—having inducted over 4 1/2 million men into service in its last 10 years alone—before adoption of the volunteer concept. By comparison, all the other services combined drew in 400,000 over the same period. Hence, while they were beneficiaries of the pressure generated by the conscription system on the pool of eligibles, the Army is the service in the best position to make a direct comparison of volunteers and conscripts and their impacts on operational military capabilities.

Let me make clear at the start my conviction that the "quality" of today's Soldier is not an issue. We are no less concerned today than we were in the days of the draft with weeding out the unfit, the incapable, or the poorly motivated. In fact, we are better able to do this in the volunteer environment than we were in the days of the draft—through administrative procedures, both in training and in units, for speedy elimination of those who can't cut it. Were we to return to an Active Army whose ranks were filled through conscription (either directly, or through draft-pressure), we could have these very useful tools turned against us as easy escapes from an imposed obligation. Consequently, we would be forced to rely more heavily on pre-testing for assuring ourselves of the innate potential of new accessions—a process demonstrably inferior to the honest face-to-face evaluations which our leadership is capable of making today in the working environment. Our task is to train the material we get in Soldiers, and I believe we are accomplishing this quite well.

In summation, I'm proud of today's Soldier.

Does this say then that I believe that the volunteer concept is an unqualified success? No. But then I hope the above example makes clear that return to a draft would not be an alternative without blemishes either.

Our entry into the volunteer era has meant that we have had to get seriously involved in attracting young men and women into service, and in offering them a continually competitive benefits package throughout a career. We've had some growing pains in this unaccustomed role. We didn't make our recruiting goal last year and some of the ill effects of that shortfall are still with us. But today I can tell you that numbers-wise, our active recruiting effort is in excellent shape. I'm very proud of our recruiters.

But numbers are only one part of the challenge. We did not, for example, meet our Active Army goals for high school graduates in FY 80. That is a concern because the credentials of a high school diploma, along with specific achievement on pre-entry tests, provide us the fundamental criteria by which we assure both high likelihood of individual trainability in the specific skill needs of the Army (which converts to lower costs and higher effectiveness) and an adequate pool of talent from which tomorrow's enlisted leadership will emerge. The continuing challenge is to attract large numbers of our nation's secondary school graduates, and to do this in the face of heavy competition.

Obviously, there is a linkage between entry standards and the ease with which we attain our numerical goals. The long term health of the Army demands close and careful consideration of the selection screens which we set in place. Once set, they fix the size of the target population. In this regard, standards provide one important constraint on our success in recruiting a volunteer Army.

Meeting the needs of the Active armed services for qualified male high school graduates in FY 81 requires that we attract one of every six qualified males. This is not an easy or inexpensive venture. Success demands a fully funded recruiting effort. Further, it requires the availability of compensation and benefit levels, both at entry and throughout a career.

The fact is that we have not kept pace with other alternatives open to our people, and that cannot be tolerated regardless of the means which the nation adopts to bring people into service. I'm encouraged by the recent Nunn-Warner amendment, and the Administration's action on pay. I'm encouraged by the possibility that we may be testing some new educational proposals in FY 81. The educational incentive is, I believe, a strong one. These kinds of positive acts can make a difference for those motivated to serve.

The major manning issue which we face is that of ensuring that *the total force* stands ready to react capably in an emergency. We have numerical deficiencies which I have addressed candidly in all appropriate decision-making forums. The gist of the difficulty is that the volunteer concept was entered into either without adequate consideration of the needs of the Reserve Components, or conceivably in a frame of mind which accorded (in the practicce and aftermath of Vietnam) too little importance to the essential roles which they have traditionally occupied within our military structure. The upshot was in the absence of draft pressure, a drastic falling off in Reserve Component strength. The unavoidable consequence has been a reduction in our capability to sustain [combat operations] in many scenarios. And while real improvement has occurred from the depths of the trough into which our strength levels sank, the pace of rectification is slow and measured. This causes me very deep and real concern.

At the present time we are working a variety of initiatives in the hope of accelerating improvement. As you know, the U. S. Army Recruiting Command has assumed the major role in recruiting for the Army Reserve. To the extent we are able, we are structuring improved bonus and benefit packages to assist that effort.

Some have espoused a draft for the Reserves. It may be the very quickest way to remedy an unsatisfactory situation. But filling the Reserve Components through draft pressure and filling the Reserve Components by a direct draft on a fair and equitable basis are two very different things. How to achieve a fit between those who are drafted and identified deficiencies in unit strengths poses a real problem primarily because of geographical factors. Certainly we can solve that if the nation chooses to [do so]. . . .

In a strategy of deterrence, the absence of on-board trained reinforcements is one risk among many. It's in the event of deterrence failing that an inability to sustain defensive warfare becomes critical. Today, we have laid the basis for longer term reinforcement in any protracted conflict through resumption of a national registration. Registration is not a cure for the individual and unit deficiencies that currently exist within our Reserve structure, unless a protracted interval would occur between a declaration of war and the actual initiation of hostilities to permit large numbers of inductees to complete training—the so-called "false wars" that marked the early stages of both WWI and WWII. I would count a repeat of that as highly unlikely in the next decade.

In the absence of corrective action, our Reserve Components will continue to have major deficiencies (although of decreasing magnitude) for some time into the future.

These deficiencies have been clearly identified to the Congress. At the end of FY 79 we calculate the pre-trained military manpower mobilization deficiency three months after the initiation of hostilities to be approximately 270,000. Based on increased incentives and improved management, we hope to reduce this shortfall. But the measure of improvement we are able to bring to the problem is dependent upon resources.

There are certainly a variety of options which could more rapidly resolve the risky status of military manpower. A broad range of alternatives has been aired by parties in the public debate. These range from some quid pro quo for the extensive program of existing federal education benefits to selective use of the draft to a variety of proposals for broadened national service. The problem is clear; the remedy less evident. Which, if any, of these best suit the national purpose is for our Congress to determine. . . .

# Address to the
# INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

Arlington Hall Station, Virginia
4 November 1980

. . . I regard intelligence, properly applied, as one of the key force multipliers available to the nation. The marriage between operations and intelligence is so total in my mind that I could be guilty of what one intelligence devotee observed: that nowhere in my White Paper do I mention "intelligence." To me, intelligence is a given—a factor in the total equation.

The gist of the paper, the vision of where to go in the 80's, is the creation of a flexible force—manned, equipped, trained, and mobilizable—that we turn over to operators, who with proper foresight can win regardless of where employed. There are some structure decisions which affect that function. Here I am on record as being willing to divert manpower from combat formations to the creation of better intelligence organizations military intelligence battalions, for example. Some people appear skeptical when I say that I would exchange tank battalions for Combat Electonic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) capability, but I mean it!

On the other hand, intelligence—improperly structured or applied, either at the tactical level, or in areas where INSCOM's expertise comes fully into play—can be an expensive waste of time, talent, and direction. . . . I want to implant, unmistakenly, the message that *your performance is going to be measured by the provision of timely, accurate, and germane information to the nation and Army commanders whatever their place in the echelonment of forces.*

Many organizational measures have been effected at the tactical level toward this end:

- The folding of distinct intelligence capabilities into our CEWI battalions.

- The recognition of a similar concept in CEWI groups at the Corps level, and the integration of data up and down through the All Source Analysis Center so that appropriate service can be rendered to all subordinate levels in their respective "areas of interest"—a brigade out to 70, a division out to 150, and a corps out to 300 miles.

These are means by which we can open or close the commander's "window of opportunity" to plan his tactical response or his tactical initiative. Closed, we place him in jeopardy—strictly reactive. Open, we give him the essentials for success—time and knowledge.

In Jackson's valley campaigns, his cavalry—magnificently employed by Ashby—provided a "window of opportunity" by which his small force of 17,000 decisively defeated three northern armies totaling 40,000. Jackson's performance was marked by three distinguished characteristics:

- Surprise, made possible by the supreme OPSEC— seldom did he tell anyone (including General Ewell, his principal subordinate) his intention.

- Rapid movement, through punishing marches of his infantry, to attain superior mass at the critical point of conflict.

- And excellent logistics.

But "Stonewall" grew presumptuous about the speed with which he could move his forces. When Lee ordered him to close on Richmond to help repulse McClellan's forces gathering on the peninsula, Jackson misjudged by a day his ability to move to the offensive on the left flank of the southern force. Not only was the image of Jackson clouded for a time, but Lee's plan was endangered.

What happened?

First, there was the secrecy of his moves. He characteristically ordered his forces to Gordonsville, a location equidistant between Washington and Richmond, without anyone knowing his destination. The intent was to hold the Union forces in place around Washington by

preserving to the last moment his true destination. The Union had every reason, given Jackson's successes thus far, to expect a move on Washington.

Second, because no one knew where they were going, no one bothered to advise Jackson that the roads between Gordonsville and Richmond were markedly worse than what he had known in the valley—where in fact, many surfaces were macadamized. As it turned out, the roads Jackson anticipated using were quagmires.

Now, what's the lesson?

Well, for me, given the leaky environment of "paper Washington," I believe that for the sake of achieving surprise we must exercise pragmatic security measures in operational planning. The cut-outs we set up to protect sources can also act to impede access into the data bank of gathered intelligence. The remedy is not to remove those cut-outs, but to develop in the G-2 a greater sensitivity to the likely train of thought of the force commander. Likewise, we also need to develop in the commander an appreciation of the fragileness of his own "window," the classic example being code-breaking in World War II. . . .

That's the whole thrust and direction of our efforts at the Corps level and below—to provide real time awareness to the commander about his combat environment and to give him the means for limiting the enemy's freedom of action. We still have a long way to go. But in spite of equipment and manning limitations, and known deficiencies in communications, genuine progress is evident in the completion of our plans for the structure, doctrine, and training of CEWI units. . . .

Now let me turn to strategic intelligence. With a great deal of INSCOM's effort directed to the national intelligence effort, there is a certain cloak of anonymity which settles over much of the recognition which ought to be accorded to Army intelligence. . . .Exceptions, such as that in your re-look of the North Korean threat, are too rare—and that is regrettable. I want your people to know that the rest of the Army accords you and your people great respect. . . .There remain problems, though, which we need to resolve:

- I am concerned about rejuvenation of the specialist inventories—linguists, collectors, analysts, and security experts in every field. . . .

- I'm equally concerned about contingency planning for your wartime employment. While your operations already mirror fully the kind of intense application the rest of the Army experiences only in war, have we thought through how we will maintain or refocus your involvement, either in a major war or in a contingency? How do we redistribute assets? How do we assure continued operation outside the confines of your current fixed site base? Have you fully projected yourselves beyond the peacetime mission into the environment of a shooting war? Have we progressed as well as we might in our interface with allies?. . .

At a level between your daily tasks and the tactical Army's wartime tasks, we have the challenge of constructing an appropriate interface. . . .I'm talking about that animal called Echelons Above Corps (EAC). . . .Today, we are in the process of reconstructing a Theater Army to unburden the Corps Commander. . . .

One of the key elements for the Theater Army will be some kind of intelligence command whose principal tasks will be to cross-fertilize with the other services through an organic Joint Theater Intelligence Center, and to interface with our allies—both critical goals.

This reconstitution, though, must of necessity be of a different construct from what we once had—large, ponderous, a plumbing nightmare. It's going to call for innovation—innovation which does not build new and impressive cathedrals to your intelligence function, but instead small serviceable chapels for your curia. When TRADOC briefed me on EAC and all the full creations of the Army 86 family of studies, I was impressed with the structure, but appalled by the cost of manpower. EAC has been approved for the purpose of defining a requirement for NATO, but the issue for us now is how to build an appropriate structure from which we can get more for less. The [intelligence portion] must be driven by an overriding requirement of being useful, of working to avoid intelligence for intelligence sake, and of preparing to answer queries derived from perceptions of the commander's needs. Remember Jackson!

Those are not easy tasks. . . .Without [a proper structure] there will remain a cleavage where there should be a bridge between the tactical and strategic application of military intelligence. I look to you as my experts to help design this needed architecture. . . .

## Address to the WORLD PEACE LUNCHEON, 34th ANNUAL NATIONAL VETERAN'S DAY OBSERVATION

Birmingham, Alabama
11 November 1980

As I was preparing to come down here from Washington, I had a chance meeting with a former non-commissioned officer at Fort Myer. After the normal exchange of pleasantries, this trim, still youngish retired Soldier—a veteran—volunteered: "General, I got a letter from you the other day that scared hell out of me." "Oh—what letter was that?" I responded. "Well," he said, "I received orders telling me where I'm to report in the event of war." "Well, that's quite likely," I explained. "We're working to take full advantage of every skilled Soldier at our command to ensure that in an emergency our forces are as ready as possible. Your recall to service would release active Soldiers to flesh out our combat units."

He didn't need my explanation. "Oh, I understand that General, and I'll be happy to go. I just hope the rest of the country understands. . ."

"So do I," I replied, as we parted. "So do I". . . .

I truly hope the nation understands that the threats to us today are very real, that national security can not come cheaply, and that citizen involvement must be far more than just passive support for Congressional increases to our defense expenditures.

A sturdy national defense demands as well the individual commitment of its citizens to service and sacrifice. We cannot derive strength "on the cheap." It is grounded in a firm national will to prevail in times of challenge and crisis.

I need not remind this audience of the millions of individual sacrifices which have permitted the idea that is America to prevail for more than 200 years. We were, at our birth, a challenge to every civilized nation in the world because we brought into being the first modern democracy which gave unbridled freedom to individual hope, growth, and achievement. We remain today—despite our shortcomings—a viable social experiment, the most noble vision of man's potential.

Since our Declaration of Independence we can count over 410 million Americans who have proudly owned citizenship in this great nation. Of those, more than one in ten have seen service in military uniform during the conflicts which helped sustain our vision intact. Yet we are so young a nation that the majority of all of those who have been privileged to be citizens are alive today. We, the living, must look back with gratitude to those earlier Americans who by their efforts gave us unparalleled accomplishments across the spectrum of human endeavor—in industry, in science, in politics, in religion, and in social development. We must also accord full partnership to the 1,200,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines who died in combat so that the dreams of others could be brought to fulfillment.

Today we count more than 29 million veterans among our living Americans. These are people who know the taste of self-sacrifice, who know the bitter fear and frightful damage which war can bring. It is they who can tell us in human terms that if it is in our power to influence the future, that our influence should be keyed more to avoiding the loss of a peace than to the winning of a future war.

I suppose it is within the realm of our productive capacity to construct a military machine so awesome that no rational power on earth would

or could oppose us, regardless of how our will to unleash it was measured. But the calculation of the cost, both in monetary terms and in terms of the impact on our domestic values, is beyond me. A militant power, with a regimented population, with confiscatory taxation, with the manipulation of information, with internal suppression—in short, a totalitarian regime—could construct or attempt to construct such an engine of military power, but not America. Such measures are repugnant to us. We are not now, nor can we ever be, a garrison state without risking surrender of those very values we seek to protect.

We were not a garrison state during our involvement in Korea, when the national expenditures on defense rose to 13.8 percent of our Gross National Product. Today, with defense spending at a level of about 5 percent of GNP, the likelihood of our transitioning to a militaristic society is even more remote. There is the possibility for additional expenditure for our forces without hazard to our national character. And while we have a base of military strength today, there are urgent additions we must act on across the board—for strategic systems, for our air and naval elements to control global access routes, and for modernization of vital elements of our land force--a modernization which is long overdue.

But I must caution you that no additional investment has merit if unaccompanied by a full national commitment to defend our vital interests. The perception that we can buy our security is wrong. The task cannot be exported to only a portion of the population. Our Soldiers, in all they do, are merely representatives of a power vested in them by the citizenry. Their presence represents a pre-commitment by their fellow citizens to that ultimate obligation prescribed by our first President, George Washington, that:

> "It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it."

In this regard, the task of the Soldier is one of representation of a large national body fully committed to the mission assigned our forces. It is this linkage which guarantees international credibility to our deterrent posture. If ever there is a perception on the part of an adversary that such is not the case, that this nation will renege on its commitments, then I believe we will find ourselves in an immensely more dangerous situation worldwide than that already posited in many forums today.

Let me recast this in quite clear terms.

-The potential which the United States could bring to bear—drawing on the full measure of our economic, social, cultural, political, scientific, and diplomatic sinews— is immense. In the absence of mobilization, however, this potential is structured to meet a broad variety of tasks, only one of which is defense.

-We have strength today in our existing military forces. But they are not adequate to simultaneously meet the demands of all the likely scenarios.

-American military power today is comprised of two components. One is real and usable military capability. The other is the existence of credible American commitment. Erosion of either component jeopardizes deterrence. Erosion of either makes it more likely that we could once again lose a peace, and be required to win a war.

It strikes me that these are the real issues involved in observance of Veterans Day. It would be pointless to recognize the achievements of those who have served our nation so proudly without educating ourselves fully in the lessons of their service. America's commitment to its goals, its almost spiritual role as a world model for human achievement, has seldom been questioned.

However, the days when our power to affect situations abroad could be backed by America's potential strength alone have gone. The lesson of these past 30 years is that power in today's tumultuous times must be backed by ready components of force. We cannot vest these components with a capacity to be more than what they are, mere figments of a nation's expressed willingness to act. Nor can we bolster our forces materially and hope that such physical investments substitute in the long haul for our per-

sonal commitments. That is not possible. We cannot buy our physical security without the willingness to stand ourselves on those ramparts with our volunteer Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen. . . .

These are the kinds of things which that veteran at Fort Myer meant, I believe, when he said he hoped that the rest of the country understood.

These last few months have been times for renewed debate on our nation's goals, our progress toward those goals, and the course ahead in this critical decade. The most demanding challenge confronting your military is to develop and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital U. S. interests outside of Europe, without compromising that decisive commitment to our NATO allies.

Today there is well deserved focus on Southwest Asia. It is a region where a clear threat to a vital U. S. interest is evident—not only for us, but for the entire developed and developing world. At our current stage of technology we know that the eventual solutions for answering many of the issues of global need spurred by enormous population growth is rooted in assured access to energy sources. But there are other chokepoints as well—in raw materials, in trade routes, in access to markets, in the expectations accompanying social development [in many Third World Nations]. These potential triggers for regional conflict are geographically diverse. We must not become obsessed today with designing and deploying our forces so inflexibly that they cannot be used to react rapidly in some alternate setting.

Seared by our involvement in Vietnam, our subsequent actions in the military realm seemed almost deliberately focused on precluding ever again any peripheral involvement—or even of recognizing the possibility that we might at some future time find our vitals exposed elsewhere than in Europe. And when it became clear that we needed the flexibility to react somewhere other than where we were, we found ourselves focused on the self-defense measures tailored to a European war. I would suggest that *the real message of Southwest Asia for the military is that Southwest Asia is not the message.* The message is that the United States has a variety of foreseeable situations which could call for the leverage of credible military force. The response being tailored today in the Rapid Deployment Force to meet the needs of Southwest Asia is very important, but we must be alert to preclude in our response, adoption of initiatives which cannot be swiftly refocused elsewhere. The consequence of not doing so could be sequential response to a series of SWA-like contingencies, each different, each requiring extensive adaptation—exceedingly expensive, and slow to realize.

The Army today is embarked on building a flexible force alert to the needs of this decade—capable of rapid adaptation to a variety of scenarios. An adequate military response depends upon a partnership among all the services; Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

- Rapidly deploying and sustainable air power from fixed but austere Air Force bases and Navy carriers.

- Transcontinental air lift for initial deployment of land forces, Army troopers, Marines, and the initial introduction of heavy equipment and supplies to support them.

- Secure ocean passage for appropriate reinforcements aboard more rapid ships capable of loading and offloading under varying conditions.

- Throughout it depends upon a check placed on any aggressor's tendency to escalate by maintenance of ready strategic systems.

The objective is to maintain a ready American commitment wherever our strategic interests may be at stake. The essential partner in all of this is the American fighting man—today's volunteer Soldier, tomorrow's veteran—in a peaceful world made better by his commitment and that of his nation.

## Letter to a
## STUDENT AT PRINCETON

13 November 1980

As a student at Princeton, generally considered one of the finest of American universities, you've probably not been able to avoid an occasional query from friends or relatives, or even a stranger, about Princeton: how is it there? Is it really as good a school as "they" say it is?

Your answer could be: you bet it's great—not delving into the fact that you may wonder how some of the freshmen got in, despite the fact that there may be some tenure issues among the faculty, and despite the fact that dormitory maintenance and institutional food leaves something to be desired. Because that's really the answer that best conveys the true strength of your conviction. The blemishes can be explored once that basic faith is understood to be the clear point of departure.

On the other hand, you could begin by describing the blemishes in infinite detail: the plumbing's bad, the food's not so hot, too many graduate students as profs, too many of the freshmen aren't qualified. By the time you reach your bottom line: Princeton's great, your audience has long concluded that it must be a pretty mediocre place.

Now to your question. Is it inconsistent for me to express confidence that the U. S. Army is the best in the world, and at the same time admit to imperfection? I don't think so. I've made it abundantly clear in all of my Congressional testimony that there are many aspects of the Army where we have severe deficiencies. Yet, I firmly believe that our forces in Europe and in Korea are ready for war today, at a state of readiness not duplicated by any similarly sized Army in peacetime. We exist for those deployed forces, and our ready combat elements in the U. S.

Now the *Newsweek* excerpt which you quote gets into the sticky issue of quality—*at entry.* Certainly I'd welcome the incoming class at Princeton as volunteers. Most of you aren't doing that. But if you did you'd be subject to the same kinds of screening devices which those who do volunteer must pass. I'd wager that a good number in your Princeton class couldn't make it. Many procedures are at work to screen out the unfit, the undesirable, and the incapable so that those volunteers who do go on to our units are disciplined, qualified, and well-motivated Soldiers. We are tasked to take what the Congress provides us and mold an Army. We've done that successfully for over 200 years, with volunteers and conscripts alike, and I believe we're still accomplishing that task well. . . .

Thanks for taking the time to write of your concerns. I enjoyed being with your group in March, and I hope this information is of some help to you.

## Address to the
## INDUSTRIALISTS PARTICIPATING IN MOBEX 80

Washington, DC
13 November 1980

. . . . Having somewhat of an appreciation of your daily schedules, I am personally grateful to each of you for taking this time so that we can come together more fully in supporting our Soldiers and in serving the nation in the vitally important task of preparing in peace for the possibility of war. Only by credible preparation for war can we hope to avoid it, and only by realistic planning can we hope to assure success in war should our best efforts to deter its occurence fail.

In this decade there is a distinct possibility that confrontation and ultimately conflict involving United States forces could erupt. The massive build-up of Soviet weapons--well beyond any conceivable inventory required for purely defensive purposes—gives credence to this possibility. Active Soviet entry into combat in Afghanistan furthers the realization that we could be severely tested in this decade in accordance with an overall Soviet strategy aimed at subjugation, if not capitulation, of the industrialized West.

Based upon what the Soviets term a "correlation of forces"—the interaction of political, psychological, economic and military means for positive gain at critical instances—the Soviet strategy appears to be geared to several simultaneous long-term objectives:

- The isolation of America, both from Europe and within our own hemisphere.

- Increased Soviet influence, if not actual control, over the Persian Gulf, Middle East

- Neutralization of China's and Japan's potential countervailing presence in Asia

- Continual propagandization of a "peace" theme, and

- Continued investment to bring superior forces to bear, whenever and wherever necessary, in any direct confrontation with the United States.

With that continuum of strategic Soviet goals overlaying a global situation already marked by many pressures for change, by regional challenges, and a willingness in many sectors to rapidly escalate demands to crisis proportions, the nation and its military forces must be prepared for many eventualities in this decade. Specifically, the Army must create a force possessing unprecedented flexibility to respond to diverse challenges outside of Europe, beyond the defined NATO arena, without compromising our interests in that vital area. The bottom line is our ability to respond quickly and effectively. Our warfighting machinery, extending from the point of attack back through the boundaries of "division rear" and into the Board Rooms of Corporate America, must be well thought through by a host of Americans from many walks of life. As Howard E. Coffin, then Vice President of the Hudson Motor Car Company remarked in 1916:

> 'Twentieth century warfare demands that the blood of the Soldier must be mingled with from three to four parts of the sweat of the man in the factories, mills, mines, and fields of the nation-in-arms."

In World War II, given time and resources, we simply out produced our enemies in every critical area. The American Soldier was equipped adequately and sustained magnificently. Of course we had a two-year period of warning.

Today it is not possible to expect a replay of our WWII experiences. Time, distance, ocean barriers, raw materials, human resources, and technology—once all in our favor—then permitted expansion of the American industrial base to meet the demands of training and deploying a ninety-division American Army; not to mention the needs of allied armies once agair that size or more. Today we no longer possess those advantages. Technology has bridged the geographic isolation which once afforded our citadel a measure of useful protection. Trends in consumption have made us more dependent than ever upon imports for 50-percent or more of our needs in at least twenty critical raw materials. Much of our productive capacity has fled to locations abroad because of attractive economic incentives. And much of our manufacturing plant has succumbed to obsolence because of age or closure through regulation targeted on specific social reforms.

I, for one though, believe that America's industrial base is still vital and recognized...as awesome in its potential... I do think that the Soviets fear igniting our war production base prematurely:

- Either because ignition could abruptly change basic assumptions in their master plan, if there is such a thing, or

Because it would signal a race which in the long run they could not win. I have a great deal of confidence in what we are capable of, *properly funded.*



★ ★ ★ ★

It's still too early to tell what explicit direction President-elect Reagan will choose. Because military superiority was a feature of his campaign, we can expect some tempered reordering to a revised balance in national spending, but still one that is bounded by a resource level beyond which he will not go. President Eisenhower's caution is as respected today as it was in 1963, that:

> ". . . there is no safety in arms alone. Our security is the total product of our economic, intellectual, moral, and military strength. . . .there is no way in which a country can satisfy the craving for absolute security—but it easily can bankrupt itself, morally and economically, in attempting to reach that illusory goal through arms alone."

Consequently, while the Army's list of needs is great and I look for relief, I also can envision a plausible scenario in which the major pieces of additional funding are funneled into strategic weapons first.

Now I didn't ask you to join me so that I could grouse about current budgeting. But as I think the problem through, especially in light of the certain fact that we cannot count on any lengthy transition from peace to war, the issue of mobilization needs is inextricably tied to the strategies we pursue with our peacetime funding.

Therefore, I need to address myself to you briefly on today's situation, a situation of tight budgeting for conventional forces and a need for rigid prioritization. That can be called the now case. Of course we will lay out our claims for a larger slice as articulately as we are able. And if successful, we may be able to afford a different strategy.

In our current budget we must judiciously apply funds to achieve the best possible balance between near-term readiness, total Army modernization of our equipment to close the qualitative gap between us and our potential adversaries, and enough sustainability to at least match the staying power of any aggressor. We have traditionally used 180 days of supplies and munitions as a planning goal. Obviously, industrial preparedness greatly affects the viability of our sustaining base and the credibility of our mobilization planning.

In the best case, with adequate funds, I'd clearly opt for an investment strategy which satisfies all of our needs, to include adequate sustainability. However, competing resource demands make that infeasible. We have had to focus first on achieving a high state of near-term readiness. At the same time our successful R&D of the 70's gives us the capability to pursue our badly needed modernization in the 80's. But the cost is high and its purchase, coupled with existing defense guidance, virtually assures us of only a "short war" capability unless we can devise "hedges" in our investment strategy to prepare the industrial base for very early participation in supplying the force. Our own internal audit reveals, for example, that only for a few cases do we have enough stockage on hand to last until the industrial base can begin replenishment; and only about one-quarter of those items considered critical to sustaining deployed forces can be produced in sufficient quantities by six months after mobilization.

The problem is, therefore, how to do all three: maintain readiness, modernize, and build a sustaining capability—through a combination of advance procurements and industrial preparedness—to undergird our capabilities, all within a resource constrained environment.

I'm hopeful that we can gain some insights . . . and maybe even some answers through your participation in this exercise. Clearly, the report from this exercise is going to have more impact on what we do to correct mobilization deficiencies than any single action in recent years has had. It is, therefore, important that we get at the key issues and make some proposals that are realistically achievable.

Some specific challenges I'd like to lay down are these:

- *What are the critical chokepoints that demand attention for enhanced industrial preparedness?* Raw materials, existing plant capacity, modern facilities, competition for scarce skills in the manpower base, subcomponent manufacture, off-shore component manufacture, lack of accurate data, lack of defense planning, lack of both industrial and public awareness, transportation, energy?

- *What no cost/low cost options are available to unchoke the system?* Tax incentives for investment in defense preparedness, multi-year contracting, stockpiling of long lead items?

- *What peacetime policy and planning initiatives should be pursued by defense/industry to revitalize the nation's industrial preparedness program?*

These challenges are certainly not all inclusive but if we address only them during this exercise we will have made a noteworthy start. I say "start" because I fully intend to follow through on things that offer promise—and I fully intend to involve industry actively as we move to improve our posture in this dangerous decade of the 80's. Again, I really appreciate your taking time to join us in this worthy endeavor. It's going to require the best efforts of us all to make progress. I pledge mine and ask yours.

## Interview with
## RICHARD HALLORAN
## Correspondent, New York Times

Washington, DC
25 November 1980

. . . . Let me talk philosophically about the people side of things first. . . .

. . . Many of the criticisms of the Army in the press, in books and in other media—while they may have upset people and may not have been right on target, nonetheless had argumentation which . . . was in my judgment correct as far as leadership at the company, battalion and division level [was concerned]. . . .This is the argument that says we really have to ensure longer time interfacing with Soldiers as opposed to merely going in and punching tickets. That has always been a concern to me, and I think to most people in the Army.

We have moved slowly in changing that thrust because it really does have an impact on individual motivation.

If you change the length of command tours, it means fewer people will have an opportunity to command and that is a demotivator. If you want to try to create a plan for leadership, you [must] have longer tours, but you also have to understand that in an army in which people have been used to going over a series of hurdles—for promotions, for school, for command—then you are going to have to change that somehow so that they aren't running quite as fast and that people see alternate opportunities for advancement and satisfaction aside from the command route.

The other thing that happened was that we had a whole group of young officers and young NCOs that grew up not understanding their proper roles. When I first went to Vietnam as battalion commander, every sergeant that I had in the battalion that I commanded was as old as I was, so I didn't have to go down and tell them what to do or check on. . . .I knew that they would check . . . the company commander had the benefit of their developed skills.

By the time I went back to that same division three years later, there were "shake-and-bake NCOs" commanding platoons. They were the same age as their Soldiers. In the absence of experience down in those platoons, what happened was that more and more guidance came down from the top.

It wasn't a deliberate effort on the part of the leaders to get down into that detail, but there was an appreciation of the simple fact that we just didn't have experience on the ground in the kind of environment in which we were operating, and hence needed to exercise more supervision over those young, inexperienced officers and NCOs than was necessary when you had people who had been in the Army 4, 5, 6 to 15 years.

As a result, the people that grew up in that environment developed a poor understanding of

what the NCO is responsible for and what the officer is responsible for.

What we are trying to do is go back to a clear identification of what the NCOs' responsibilities are, lay out what they are, put them out clearly so they understand them, train them so they are able to perform and then if they are not able, be reasonably ruthless in getting rid of those who can't cut the mustard. . . .That has been our whole focus, to turn that around to focus on bringing the NCOs to do their job and to give them the opportunity to be able to play the proper role. . . .

. . . The area I have been least successful in and which has troubled me the most is that I have not been able to slow down the pace out in the units sufficiently so that the focus can be on training to the degree that I think it must be. That has been my—if you want to say my biggest failure my first year in office. I want to slow down the pace out there so the people will do it well. . . .By now I thought I would be farther along in getting rid of the detractors to unit training, those things which hamper the ability of companies and batteries to train. Too many external factors show up in the company for the 1st Sergeant and the Company Commander to keep track, . . . such as requirements to provide people for surveys, requirements to provide demonstrations for oberburgermeisters, requirements [which] pull people out to go through special [classes], . . . insufficient advance notice to support joint training exercises. . . .

If you can't lay out your [training] program at least five weeks ahead of time, you are going to have poor training. . . I found that I was contributing. I had all the division commanders in the States up at Carlisle last week to go over training and they said I wasn't helping them by laying requirements on them late for joint exercises. So we just said we're not going to accept requirements for joint exercises unless we get them 90 days ahead of time. It's just poor planning when you lay something on a guy at the last minute. . . .

I am encouraged by the way [our people] initiatives are going and are being accepted. . . .

Going to a company [replacement] system is going to take us three or four years. Changing from the individual replacement that we have used is going to be a major wrench for the Army. I know we can do it in the combat arms. Whether or not we can extend it to the combat services, I don't know. That's something we have to work on. . . .I could read you letters I have from battalion commanders and company commanders—and again you have to be careful that you don't become overly exuberant because any time somebody does something new they are naturally excited. . . .The signals coming back from the field tell us we are going in the right direction.

But changing the management system back here so that it can respond to that system is the biggest problem. We have had an individual replacement army since World War II. Each time we have tried different programs, whether it's been battalion rotation or division rotation, the system itself didn't change—the basic system on which the Army depended didn't change. So that is going to be a major effort this time.

The climate we want to create is one of stability, one in which people are put in to train and maintain the equipment, one in which a close relationship is permitted to develop between the Soldier and his NCO and his officer, one in which he feels a kinship with his unit, and one in which we are able to show the country that we are a disciplined, trained force. . . .

We have to do something about the difference between the careerist and the first-termer, as far as getting a greater pay differential. . . .Right now, the difference between a careerist and a first-termer is about three to one. A senior master sergeant only gets three times what a first-term sergeant gets. It used to be about seven or eight to one. We have to focus the dollars on the careerist and use the incentive of a GI Bill for the volunteer who is just coming in for two or three years and not give him a lot of other incentives. Once he becomes a careerist then he is entitled to a bigger package in the way of dollars and bonuses. I'm not sure that would solve the reserve strength problem and that's one we have to look at—whether or not we have to do anything at all on the reserve side, as far as draft.

# Interview on
# "GOOD MORNING AMERICA" WITH DAVID HARTMAN, ABC-TV

5 December 1980

DAVID HARTMAN: President-elect Reagan thinks that our country should spend more money on defense, but so far he hasn't said exactly how much more. He hasn't given us any numbers.

Well, General Edward Meyer is the Army Chief of Staff. He is talking some numbers, and big numbers, as a matter of fact. He's with us this ed a naval force in that area for the past three or the way, this is the General's first television interview since he took his job last year.

General Meyer, good morning. Welcome. Nice to have you with us.

GENERAL MEYER: Good morning. Thank you very much. I'm very happy to be here.

HARTMAN: Not too long ago, you said that the United States had what you called a hollow army. And it's been reported that six out of our ten combat divisions really aren't combat-ready. Hollow army. That's frightening. I think it would be to most people across the country. What do you mean by a hollow army? And do you stand by the statement?

GENERAL MEYER: Sure. As I spoke to a "hollow army," I was talking about the fact that, in an effort to maintain our forces overseas in a ready status, that is was necessary for us to have to draw down on our noncommissioned officers and our Soldiers here in the States. So as a result of keeping that army up to date as far as equipment and manpower in our forward deployed areas in Europe, in Korea, in Panama, in Alaska. . .we've had to draw down on the forces here in the United States. And therefore, we have companies and platoons that have not been up to strength, and we're short noncommissioned officers out there to be able to train them.

HARTMAN: General, excuse me. As an example, President Carter has said, essentially, that if anybody tries to gain control of the Persian Gulf area that we will use any means necessary, including military, to repel any attack in that part of the world. Can we back that up?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, I think it depends upon the particular scenario that you draw, David. If you're outlining a scenario in which we have time in order to deply forces over there to respond, we can do that. As you know, we have maintained a naval force in that area for the past three or four months on a continuing basis.

HARTMAN: General, yesterday an Egyptian general suggested or asked the United States to consider putting arms, materiel in the Middle East area, Egypt particularly, and perhaps Saudi Arabia, because he says we need to. . .preposition a lot of materiel in that part of the world. Is that needed?

GENERAL MEYER: As you take a look at our ability to be able to project power, it's limited by a couple of factors: one, geography; two, our capability; and three, our will. Geography favors the Soviet Union, their ability to project power in that area of the world. So it's important for us, if we're able to be able to project power rapidly, that we have forward deployed equipment that we can pick up. That'll cut down the amount of time that it takes for us to move forces into that area to respond to whatever threat we might be called upon to respond to by national authorities.

HARTMAN: So you'd recommend to the President that we go ahead and consider that as an option, to put materiel in the Middle East?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, I believe that's an important adjunct to our ability to be able to maintain security in that region of the world.

HARTMAN: You'd like to increase our budget by 18 percent, I'm told, eight billion dollars a year for the next five years for the Army. What would you use the money for?

GENERAL MEYER: When I spoke to that, I was asked the question: If we were able to do what I thought we needed to do with the Army, how would I go about doing it? And I said that I would ensure that we were able to modernize the force, to give the Soldiers the kind of equipment they need.

The Army, as a result of Vietnam, has not had the opportunity to modernize, and it now needs that opportunity. The equipment is there. It's ready to be provided to the Soldiers in the field. And in order to do that, we need the dollars to modernize.

The second area is in the area of manning the force. And there, clearly, we're going to have to take care of providing for middle-grade NCOs, and we're going to have to do that, in my judgment, through educational benefits, both for accessions and for retentions.

And then, finally, I think we're going to have to get on with increasing the numbers of civilians that we have. Today, I have to take Soldiers out of divisions around the word to pull normal jobs that could be better handled by civilians. And that has a detrimental effect upon the readiness of your army.

BELL: General, you're talking about [illegible]

GENERAL MEYER: Yes.

BELL: If every service came through with a request like that, we'd be right out the top.

GENERAL MEYER: Well, I think the key is whether or not—I was asked the question of whether or not—what was needed in order to have the kind of army that we need in the time frame we're talking about. I'm telling you—you and the American people—that in order to do that, in order to modernize it as quickly as I feel it's necessary to modernize it, that's what's necessary.

BELL: Realistically, though, you're not going to get that kind of an increase. Senator Tower this morning talking about what he calls a whopping eight to nine percent increase, one year only. Would that be enough?

GENERAL MEYER: It depends upon how it's broken out across the defense establishment. If it's broken out across the defense establishment so that we're able to ensure that we're able to modernize the Army as quickly as possible, then that would be adequate.

BELL: Now, I understand one thing you need, put emphasis on is what you call light forces that can get places that can get places fast, to react to trouble spots around the world.

GENERAL MEYER: Right.

BELL: Yet the Army has been criticized for putting too much emphasis on big, heavy super-sophisticated tanks that wouldn't even fit that pattern.

Is this a reassessment of Army strategy?

GENERAL MEYER: . . .I think it's a reassessment of Army strategy and an understanding of the fact that the Army and land force have to be flexible enough to respond across the entire spectrum of warfare and across many geographical areas. We still have to have the heavy tanks in order to respond to the central NATO challenge.

BELL: And now you mentioned manpower. Senator Sam Nunn, Armed Services Committee, says that manpower is the biggest problem you have right now. He says, "There's an alarming deterioration of the quality of new personnel. We must not permit the U.S. Army to become a Job Corps equipped with tanks and nuclear missiles."

Is that a major problem?

GENERAL MEYER: I believe that manning the forces—and I have said so for the last four or five years—that manning the force [and] equipping the force are the two major problems that we face. And the efforts that we're [pursuing] now, with a GI Bill, with other efforts like that, to bring in more qualified Soldiers, will help us to solve that problem. . .This year we expect to get in the neighborhood of 65 to 70 percent high school graduates, as opposed to the 55 percent we got last year.

We're also trying to relate the needs of the new equipment to the Soldier, so that we're able to say that this Soldier is good enough to handle that equipment. And that's the challenge for us.

BELL: And for the more sophisticated equipment, obviously, the more...

GENERAL MEYER: Well, as it turns out, if we're smart enough to design the equipment for the user...then we don't need the more sophisticated Soldier down on the piece of equipment. What we need is the noncommissioned officers and the civilians who are able to handle the maintenance. At that level, they're going to have to be more sophisticated. But if we're smart enough we can design it so it's simple enough the individual Soldier. Then the modules that come out can to be repaired elsewhere.

HARTMAN: General, finally, Robin Beard, Congressman Beard of the Armed Services Committee in the House, said that most of the major members of that committee agree with him. Quoting him, he said, "The political appointees at the Pentagon have stymied and prohibited true statements about our defense capabilities," unquote.

Is that a problem?

GENERAL MEYER: I haven't felt that to be a problem. I have told Congress that; I have a responsibility to speak to Congress. I've never been stymied by anyone in the Pentagon from saying to Congress what I'm charged with doing. And...that's a mandate that I have, to tell Congress exactly what I tell the President and the Secretary of Defense. And I do.

HARTMAN: General Meyer, nice having you with us this morning...

## Interview with
## RICHARD BARNARD
## Defense Week Correspondent

5 December 1980

QUESTION: Let me ask you about the light tank program. The Army and Marine Corps are both looking at a light tank. The Marine Corps wants something very, very light, the Army has said they want—I don't know, I have heard 20 and 25 tons with a larger cannon than a 75, and I haven't heard anything about a middle ground. Is there any middle ground?

GENERAL MEYER: ...Obviously it is to our advantage to come to some sort of middle ground with the Marines...

The difference between their requirements and our own at the present time is that we need the, quote, light tank to be able to kill another tank. The Marines want to use it for different purposes. If you take away...the mission of killing T-72 tanks, then you can come in with a lighter tank, down in the 12 to 14 ton [range] as opposed to the 20 tons.

The only reason we are at 20 tons is because the experts tell us that mass is necessary to hold the type of a gun that can give use penetration capability on a T-72 tank. We are looking at other options....

It is a question of whether or not you want the vehicle to be able to kill another tank. If you don't it's to have to leave the battlefield when there are tanks on the battlefield, because it can't survive.

It is really the tactics of employment. The Marines have a different problem. Their problem is projecting power ashore, taking under attack bunkers and things like that for which you need a mobile platform that can destroy whatever the principal threat would be...Their requirement is that is has to be lifted by helicopter to get a ship to shore. We do not [have] do that requirement...

QUESTION: The Army has been criticized repeatedly by Senator Hart's office and others for relying on a combat document of attrition at the expense of mobility. . .Is that a valid criticism?

GENERAL MEYER: I think the issue of attrition versus mobility is directed specifically at Central Europe where the forward defense. . .is the NATO strategy. To meet them at the border requires forces in being to meet the enemy when he crosses the border.

I think it is unacceptable to the strategy of the alliance to be willing to give up large chunks of Germany. In my judgment that is an unacceptable way to start the war, to accept major penetrations. Therefore it is essential that you begin to destroy the enemy when he reaches the border and start to reach back to his rear echelon early.

I'll give you a thesis on mobility. . .In the traditional sense of mobility we had to move things. We had to move firepower, cavalrymen, whatever it was, to locate and then to bring fire on the enemy. Essentially that is mobility [in one sense], moving forces so that you are in a position to mass fire. . . .

As we have improved our ability to see in depth on the battlefield with satellites or with radar, that gives you movement [of another sort] on the battlefield. We can today with other methods identify enemy forces and as we have improved our precision guided munitions, we can go out and neatly destroy the single vehicle or use scatterable mines to disrupt the thrust of his advancing forces. It may be that this represents mobility today in the traditional sense—finding the enemy, bringing fire on him, and destroying his forces prior to the time he even gets to you.

So the whole concept of why we move forces and so on tends to change as you get a different ability to see, a different ability to destroy.

Now I still believe you need mobility within the battle area. . .and that is one of the reasons I am such a bug on putting light infantry forces into Europe so that you can release the mechanized and armor forces, to use their mobility.

Today, with the few forces there, our only option is to use them in reasonably static positions because you aren't going to be able to respond otherwise.

The reason you see that happening now is, as you look at the front that the Third Division has, they have an 80-kilometer front. The only way that guy is going to be able to really hold forward, which he is charged with doing, is to stop the enemy from making major penetrations and buy time for the reinforcements to come in.

Again, if you give up that land, your reinforcements can't come in. People talk about letting them penetrate and then move and attack. But that's not possible if you can't bring in your reinforcements. . . .

. . .If I had 60 to 90 days [warning] and was able to build up the force over there with reasonably immobile forces in the forward area, I would then be willing to go in for more mobile type operations with my mechanized armored forces and I think that is what you would see over time.

I guess my argument with those who say we've lost the art of mobility, I would have to say, rooted in the way in which our doctrine was written four years ago in FM 100-5. That focused on what we could do with what we had at that time.

The new FM 100-5 is refocusing on attack, and how you go about reaching out in the enemy's depth, . . .getting the enemy before he gets to your positions.

QUESTION: Tell me about light forces for the Third, for example.

GENERAL MEYER: . . .the quote, North German Plain is no longer the North German Plain. It is a series of urban areas, a series of canals and so on.

As you go on down into Southern Germany, you come into forested areas of the Spessarts. . .and if you have the ability to put infantry into these wooded area to assist in the defense of any key communications nets, it seems to me and to the commanders in Europe to be an essential adjunct to capitalizing on the use of mobile forces. . .

When I commanded the Third Division, I had to take mechanized infantry, dismount them, put them up into the mountainous areas, so I had lost the mobility of a mechanized infantry, and yet my whole area on one side was all mountainous; and if the Soviets decided that was the way to come through, they could have come through, because I didn't cover it.

Are there areas in each one of the divisions or corps where you can clearly infantry to free your mobile forces.

QUESTION: I would like to ask about the weapons development. I read that the Soviets do a better job, thanks to their design bureau, that the evolution of weapons there is better than ours.

Is that an accurate view?

GENERAL MEYER: . . .Once they make the decision that they are going to have a weapons system nobody interferes with that decision and the resources are applied to that weapons system to ensure that it comes in. . . .

We have the advantage on our side of high technology and so on, but it does take longer. . .and it can be turned off by [many] different individuals if there is some disagreement with the weapons system as a system, or if there is some disagreement as to whether or not it is ready to go into engineering development.

I think the big things they have going for them is the constancy of purpose and the fact that in general they product improve equipment rather than trying to make that leap forward.

QUESTION: One of the things you are modernizing is the attack helicopter. . .I see it as a fairly complex machine—why it is important to have this in view of the capability of the advanced Cobra?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, first of all, it will have an increased capability. The advanced Cobra still will not be able to operate at 4,000 feet and 95 degrees with the same response time. . .The Cobra does not have survivalability built in, or the day/night capability. We are adding some of it to the Cobra today.

I'll tell you in my judgment that until such time as we get a light tank that the attack helicopter is the light tank for the kinds of battles you are talking about. . .

QUESTION: I'm interested in your priorities, where the problems are. I would anticipate that you're expecting a more favorable climate on the Hill and in OSD over the next—at least, the next 18 months to two years—before the punch comes, and that's a resource problem. The budget can only take so much. . .You have a new Secretary who will have his own way of operating.

GENERAL MEYER: Someone asked me down in Columbia, South Carolina yesterday what I thought of the new Secretary, and I said I didn't really know the new Secretary, and they said, well, how are you going to enjoy working for him. I said, well, first of all, since I don't know him, it's pretty hard for me to say how I'm going to work for him. Of course, I don't really work for him. I work for the Soldier, and, second, I'll just tell you, he's going to have to be one of the greatest secretaries Defense has ever had. He really is, because he's coming in at a time when he [must] prioritize among a large number of competing demands.

It's going to tax the talent of anybody at this particular instance, because if you just look around, there are demands, as you say, all around. How they prioritize those in that first year. . .By next June or July the future of the Army is going to be generally have been decided, and that's why it's important that they [understand our needs.]

. . .I think as you take a look at the demands for forces in the world, it's clear that you can't focus on any given area of the world and say that's the only area in which we're going to need forces—whether it's air power, naval power, land power, whatever it happens to be. . . .We have to able to respond with across-the-board strength, with flexible force wherever it is, and it's going to require land, amphibious, field, naval forces. They've got to be put into the right packages and sustained for however long. . . .

. . .Past administrations have identified NATO, the Persian Gulf area because of the oil resources, and Northeast Asia, clearly as areas where we had to have forces to respond.

But the design of the forces to respond there has never been clearly articulated. Now I'm going to spend a little time on how I think you might go about doing it, because it's a change in the way the government has done business. . .so that if you were the Secretary of Defense, you would feel you had a means for prioritizing among the services, among the competing strategic, tactical, nuclear and conventional defenses, among the requirements for prepositioning and strategic airlift, among the demands for vast sealift—all of those. We have to have some mechanism for doing this.

I would contend that the mechanicism that has been used in the past has been vertical addressal of specific weapon systems and of specific elements of the force. [If you decided] they're marginal, you could increase their capabilities by changing the system, changing the specific capabilities—vertical addressal.

No one has looked horizontally across the capability of the force to be able to carry out the contingencies that the national [command authority might direct.] How capable are the national defense forces of carrying out the mission?

Let me just take a hypothetical case and look at it. How capable are they of assuring the access of free world nations to oil? How capable are our forces, in conjunction with whatever forces we feel will be aligned with us, in the mission of doing that for a given period of time? That's a question which tells how you design the forces, how you introduce them into the theater, how they're supported once they get there—either by host nations or by our own combat support force. . . .

In my judment, [we must get] acceptance that that's the way we're going to look across forces: to determine whether they can carry out [specific contingencies]. The one we do the best on is Europe, and we know there are shortfalls there, but the others we don't [approach in this way. consequently] the Secretary of Defense, when he hands out dollars, doesn't know how much better the armed forces are going to be in carrying out the contingency plans that are generally accepted among the administrations as those which they might put into [motion]. There's no way for him to get that kind of thing today, and his people don't help him.

His programming people look vertically down into systems. Nobody is looking across systems. Nobody is looking across the whole program to say that in carrying out a contingency in the Middle East, the biggest shortfall is strategic mobility with all of its inherent parts, prepositioning or basing or fast sealift or fast airlift or whatever that happens to be. Nobody is able to tell him how much more important that is in getting forces there quickly, and having forces floating around in the Indian Ocean or whatever else, that's not the way in which the adequacy of the force question [is addressed].

Somehow that addressal of. . .how much more ready they are with the dollars that are assigned [to carry out contingencies] seems to be a more logical way for us to respond to the Secretary of Defense, to the President, and ultimately to Congress.

Isn't it better for Congress to know how much more capable we are of doing that than whether or not we have X number more tanks or Y number more this or we have X amount of capability. . .and it cannot be just within the Defense Department. It has to be the President, OMB,—and there has to be some agreement from Congress—that we're willing to look at the capability of the forces to carry out a mission in this way. . . .

To me it's a way that you would put the military back into their proper role of providing the most appropriate military advice. . .[It would] put the civilian hierarchy into their more proper role. . .of defining the political parameters under which those forces would be introduced, the degree to which bases are important to us and what political price we're willing to pay to assure those bases are available around the world, the political prices exacted [and so forth. But this] isn't done today.

. . .It lays out a more coherent framework. . .My contention is if they don't do that, we will continue to flounder and throw bucks into different concepts without really [knowing much about the] forces developed. . . .

And there has to be a continuity to the way in which we go about doing it. From then on the job of prioritizing and managing within the Army becomes much easier, because. . .there would be

a clear objective. . . .We manage too much on a sine wave today in our support of different systems. . .Under this approach, we could go back to the Secretary of Defense and Congress and say here is where dollars will have the biggest effect on our ability to be able to carry out types of contingency plans and operations. . .[It] has to be an iterative process between the civilians who are articulating the political objectives that we want to reach, and the military telling them here are two or three options and the way in which we can go about doing it. . .a force heavy option, a firepower heavy option, or a support outlined option, as three basic approaches. . .

. . .If I sketched this out, up here the civilians are required to decide what are the long term requirements, the areas of the world which we hold [to be vital] and where we clearly might consider using military force as one of the elements of national power to assure our access to whatever it is, to that particular area of the world. That need to be worked out.

The military then has to able to say what our capabilities are, develop alternatives, and then come back to the civilians, and say, okay, here's what we can and can't do today, and here's the first priority if you really want to do that. Here's an alternative way of doing that. . .This gets the military into their proper role, providing military [advice for achieving] our national security objectives.

QUESTION: Sooner or later, you get down to numbers, money.

GENERAL MEYER: And that's what this will do. This will help. If you prioritize, this will rationalize the way in which the dollars are spent instead of just more tanks. . . .

Now the problem here is you're going to have to keep the front end of this, you know, what your base plan is quite closely held amongst the very senior leadership, among the senior people in OMB and, of course, the White House, and among the senior people in the Senate. You're not going to go over there and lay out your whole damned contingency program to them. But a process like this in which the senior leaders are involved in the front part of this, and in the development, and see the feedback coming which says we are more ready to be able to carry it out. It seems to me it provides a rationalization for the way in which you prioritize requirements.

They may decide after they see the cost of doing this that literally there may be better ways to do it. It may be that you're just going to have to cross that off the list and say that you're going to have to handle that through economic and political and other elements of your national power.

QUESTION: What you did was take a ball I gave you and drop kicked it upstairs.

GENERAL MEYER: What I'm telling you is it's a bigger problem than the Army. If you could get somebody to accept the ball upstairs, then when it comes down to the Army managing priorities, I've got a coherent approach in which to manage instead of today trying to manage based on guidance that I get from the Senate, OMB, or from OSD.

You know, I accept the fact that I have to do that, but that, plus some of our own internal inefficiencies in the way in which we do things, our ability to ensure that we get the right equipment, the people and the force posture set for the kinds of wars, and the kinds of contingencies we might have to respond to. I'm just concerned. . . .

I would say in this current administration, the attempt was made in PD-18 to identify three or four areas, but then the follow-on implementation which would do this front end up here and identify specifics hasn't been done. . . .

We really talk by one another, because until you tie it to a specific contingency, you can't talk in specifics [such] that you really understand what the impact is. . . .

# Address to the
# COLUMBUS-PHENIX CITY-FT BENNING CHAPTER, AUSA
# Columbus, Georgia

16 December 1980

It's always a pleasure to come back to The Infantry Center, and especially to the communities around it which justifiably pride themselves in the spirit and the strong grass roots support they provide to the Soldier and his family. In the neck of the woods I've just come from, there is no end of talk about defense, and its critical nature, and certainly there appears to be a mood to more generously meet defense needs. But most of the folks up there simply do not know, or understand, the special nature of the Army as you do. And creating that understand is, I believe my principal task over the next crucial months as the incoming administration grapples with the course it will pursue come January.

On the surface of it, an Army is fundamentally a simple mechanism, one with which most Americans can associate so they think. It's a company or platoon, or squad of disciplined men, responsive to strong professional leadership, whose main problem has been to overcome differences of background—a farm boy, a streetwise city youth, a college dropout, a high school athlete, etc.—so that collectively it becomes skilled enough to be capable of closing with and defeating an opposing ground force. It's not so difficult, at least as we follow it through its many TV scripts: The Longest Day, The Deer Hunter, A Bridge Too Far, The Big Red One. The tasks involved are simple enough, the hardware not much more complex than that needed for a deer hunting trip. We've always been able to piece it together in the past, so why the urgency now when there are so many other priorities more complicated: the ICBMs, nuc subs, strategic bombers, large naval fleets? These are complicated systems! Difficult to construct. Difficult to operate. Difficult to orchestrate.

How many would feel at ease in the transition from citizen to jet pilot or citizen to ocean navigator compared to what we know of the Army? Any of us can pick up a rifle and go hunting. Surely the latter is one easy task whose needs are greatly exaggerated.

Well, if you agree with what I've said, then I've more missionary work to do than I thought. For there is a challenge in creating and shaping a land force which exceeds by many magnitudes the problems associated with the preparation for either air or sea battle—among these being the fact that we are entirely dependent upon air and sea forces being structured correctly as well, so that we can get where need to be, and be sustained thereafter. So we not only have to make certain of our own capabilities, but we have to be terribly concerned about air and sea capacities to support us as well—in mobilizing, in firepower, etc.

There are *shiboleths* about the Army, which I've alluded to. And we need to dispel others of them if we hope to command any priority for resources in the next few yeas. Let me categorize three principal misconceptions:

The first I'll talk to the *Lee Marvin Syndrome,* in honor of his squad in the movie, "The Big Red One." The portrayal typifies the national focus when one discusses the Army. It's a good focus. It's where our attention needs to be as we construct the force. But the answer to a better national defense is, as often as not, the need to boister support to the squads we already have, putting into place the many pieces of the Army that stand behind Lee Marvin and his squad—the Army that for many is either invisible or incorrectly labeled as tail or fat. I'm talking about the combat support and combat service support, that stretches back behind the squad, all the way to the Army's depot system and the national industrial base. For as good as our squads might be, they won't last long without rations, fuel, ammo, replacement, communications systems, medical support, water purification points, traffic control and rear area security—all relatively invisi-

ble, but nonetheless essential in the typical portrayal of the Army.

For years now we have been on a binge of making the Army better by making it leaner. In the process we have fan danced our way around many of the support issues. That has to stop if Lee Marvin's squad of PFC Marnes is to be the viable cutting edge it must be on tomorrow's battlefield. We urgently need:

- Activation of some critical support units
- The renovation of our truck fleets
- An increase in our civilian workforce to eliminate the borrowing of military manpower and to strengthen logistics and base operations
- A reduction in our real property maintenance backlog
- Improved fill of war reserve stocks
- Acceleration of fast sealift and logistics over-the-shore capability, and
- A build-up in our selected reserve units

The second shiboleth I'd like to talk to has to do with the Army's weapons systems—their density and complexity. I might call it *Mauldin's Revenge,* because while coverage of the Vietnam war did expose the nation to an Army which had transitioned to a complex age of helicopters, smart bombs, and electronics on the battlefield, the overwhelming majority of Americans are still likely to believe that Mauldin's Willie and Joe will be capable of miracles once again, as in WW II with their M-1 rifles, a case of C's, and P-38 can opener. Well, I want to tell you that Yankee ingenuity is a great thing—when you've had three years to crank up the nation's industrial base as we did in WW II, and when you were able finally to produce equipment in such volume that we could overwhelm opponents with technical superiority.

Today, we face an immense challenge, whose genesis lies in Soviet Weapons Bureaus, compounded by the proliferation of their sophisticated weaponry world-wide. The construct of our forces is no longer manpower intensive. Superiority on the battlefield of tomorrow will only be attained by fielding weapons better than those of the opponent. The infantryman today must manage the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), high-velocity cannon, TOW's, Dragons, and night vision devices as well as his rifle. He must also master the use of these weapons in an environment involving electronics, chemicals, and perhaps nuclear weapons. If we wanted to, we could not reverse the trend.

Now if we were to review defense spending over the past decade, we would come up with a surprising fact. We would find that counter to what our intuition might suggest, spending for manpower, operations, construction, and research and development has been about the same over the past decade for each of the services. That's rather a surprising thing. Surely one would expect that if the Army is truly a manpower intensive force—the one we remember from Bill Mauldin—that the expenditures on our people would have been, in total, much larger than for either of the other services. That's not been true.

Where we differ has been in the procurement categories, where what we have received has not approached 1/3 to 1/2 of what either of the other departments received. And as I look about and see the tremendous needs of our ground forces I have to say that it's not because we've had a meager shopping list. As almost anyone can testify today, we have an extensive list of needs, especially so as the fruits of our weapons development process now make available the means to regain technical equivalence on the battlefield. Today, we have our critical systems identified. Manpower will not compensate for their absence. We know what we need, and we're hoping for the funds to proceed.

We need some priority here urgently:

- In the basic equipment of Soldiering.
- In economic buys of tanks and combat vehicles
- In helicopters,
- In air defense weapons,
- In chemical warfare improvements,
- In our electronic warfare means, and
- In full modernization of our theater nuclear forces and our stockpiles.

The last shiboleth I would discuss deals with the Army's state of mind—let's call it the *Fulda Gap Syndrome.* A perennial academic issue is that a nation's military is perpetually focused on refighting the last great war, I must say that I find this a quality less imbedded in the military

than elsewhere. And there is a simple reasons why this is the case; because if the military can be focused on a single scenario, then. . .the resulting resource demands can be more easily curtailed.

As I go about the country, to our war colleges and to the staff colleges, I do not find any preoccupation with refighting the last war. If anything, there is too great an assumption about which of today's scenarios may rise up into a conflict. But even here there is a healthy diversity. Clearly Europe is one focus, Korea another, SWA another. So the focus today is not on refighting the last war, but on focusing in too much on the lastest and greatest scenario and not maintaining sufficient flexibility—of mind, of design, of capability—to react elsewhere.

This is the Army's greatest challenge. For none of us is prescient enough to forecast with accuracy the direction, thrust, or location of the next conflict. We can be assured of certain things about the decade ahead: it is *a time of change, of challenge, of confrontation, or crisis,* and perhaps of *conflict,* for no decade has witnessed its absence.

But I must caution you, that no additional investment has merit if unaccompanied by a full national commitment to defend our vital interests. The perception that we can buy our security is wrong. The task cannot be left to only a portion of the population. Our Soldiers, in all they do, are merely representatives of a power vested in them by the citizenry. The task of the Soldier is one of representation of a large national body fully committed to the mission assigned our forces. It is this linkage which guarantees international credibility to our deterrent posture. If ever there is a perception on the part of an adversary that such is not the case—that this nation will renege on the apparent commitment—then I believe we will find ourselves in an immensely more dangerous situation world-wide than that already posited in too many forums today.

In this climate, today's Army is working to make itself a flexible element of effective American military power. We will attain that if the shiboleths are recognized, exposed, and corrected.

- We need good infantry squads—fully supported
- We need modern equipment
- We need flexible organizations

Given this, I can assure you that the infantrymen who you train and care for here at Fort Benning and in the surrounding communities will prevail, when conflict comes our way.

Thank you all for permitting Carol and me to come home. I wish you and your families a very blessed Christmas.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Speaking with One Voice

17 December 1980

The next few months are critical. We must present our vision for the Army of the 1980's persuasively to the new Congress and new Administration. . .By articulating our needs and the supporting rationale, we can make a quantum leap forward in obtaining the kind of Army the nation needs. We must speak as a corporate body with one voice. We must be seen as a competent, motivated force that can and will accomplish its responsibilities. We must succeed because failure to make our case during this transition period condemns us to fighting a rear guard action to avoid an undernourished and obsolescent Army.

Together we must take full advantage of the opportunities to make our case. . .

## Interview in
## BUSINESS WEEK

5 January 1981

MR. CANAN: . . .Who's controlling the RDF? How bad a problem is that?

GENERAL MEYER: . . .There is no argument between the Army and the Marine Corps about who should command or about the need for land forces to do the job. If there's going to be an argument, it is going to be a one-sided argument, because the Army will not become involved in that. There [is] not a sufficient combination Marine and Army divisions to handle all of the possible contingencies that you can look at around the world. . .The specific service of the commander to me is immaterial, if the individual himself, has the kind of background and experience that's necessary to manage.

MR. CANAN: It's a matter of pride of which general officer is handling which RDF unit.

GENERAL MEYER: Not as far as I'm concerned. Not as far as the Army is concerned. The Army's principal concern in the RDF is that. . .we, the United States, don't waste resources, designing into any one service resources or capabilities that already exist in a service today.

In other words, what we have to do in using our forces is apply all of the forces. Anywhere you go in the future, you are going to need Rangers, special forces, airborne, air assault forces, heavy forces. You are also. . .going to need amphibious force. So, the combination of them is what to be put together. . .

## Interview with
## MARVIN KALB, NBC NEWS CORRESPONDENT
## Washington, DC

9 January 1981

MR. KALB: . . .In talking about NCO's, how serious is the problem?

GENERAL MEYER: . . .In the Army right now, we are between six and seven thousand short. That covers up a more serious problem which is the problem in the combat arms—armor, artillery, air defense, and some of our intelligence NCO's. That is where shortfalls are focused which greatly affect our ability to turn out well-trained tank crews, well-trained air defense units, and well-trained artillery crews. . . .

MR. KALB: You gave us an absolute figure there. What is the percentage short?

GENERAL MEYER: The percentage shortfall at the present time is in the neighborhood of about 3 percent.

MR. KALB: It doesn't sound like very much.

GENERAL MEYER: It doesn't sound like very much until you translate it into what happens out in the units. And you see that at the present time in a division—well, let's take last summer. The two divisions at Fort Hood were running about two-thirds of their NCO's. One of the divisions, the 24th Division, which is part of the Rapid Deployment Force, was running about 60 percent. . . .I don't think that the American people realize that some 43 percent of the United States Army is overseas today. . .We do not have a large enough base here in the United States to provide adequate turn-around. And as a result, we have the situation where armor NCO's, artillery NCO's, air defense NCO's, and particular [skills] we are

short, come back, are here [in the states] for sixteen or seventeen months, and immediately have to go back because of the demands. . .We have to correct that.

MR. KALB: General, isn't a hollow Army really the other side of the coin from a national hollow commitment? Aren't we in a sense asking of the military more than they are capable of producing; and you end up then with rhetorical commitments on the part of the White House that cannot be backed up realistically by the military strength that is required?

GENERAL MEYER: I think there is a very serious mismatch between what our stated strategies are, where are force designs are, and what our capabilities are. Those have to be brought into some sort of congruence; and that means either adjusting the strategy downward or ensuring that we have the forces postured and capable of reinforcing to support that strategy.

## Adress to the AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Washington, DC

27 January 1981

When I speak to commanders before they go out to assume command of brigades and battalions, I tell them that the Army of the future is essentially what I will be charged with by history—whether or not the Army created during my tenure is up to the task of the decade ahead. The commanders, in turn, are charged with the Army of today. What they have in their battalions in their brigades today, is what we will go to war with today. What they are armed with, the type of people that we have been able to get as a result of whatever means is provided to us by Congress, the equipment that they have, the barracks in which they live--all of that is preordained. The Army that will fight for America is essentially the one that is there today, with some minor modifications that we can make in the future. For me and for that portion of the Army that deals in where we are going, the greatest challenge is to determine how best to make appropriate adjustments to our Army so that we are prepared for the difficult and challenging decade ahead.

When I took over as Chief of Staff, I established two basic objectives: to ensure that we had an Army that could go to war; and to create within the Army an environment in which each individual has the opportunity to develop to full potential. There are undeniable linkages between those two objectives. We must bind our Soldiers and their families to us through some sort of mututal commitment if we expect full adherence to the traditional military ethics of selfless service and sacrifice. About three months ago George Will wrote that he was not sure there had ever been a time when the values of the nation and the values required of an Army had ever been so disparate. That creates a unique problem for us. The values of a profession that heretofore were part and parcel of a cumulative adolescent experience today can no longer be taken for granted. That is an unfortunate fact, but it is a fact that we must take into account as we look at what we can and cannot do with the Army of the future.

. . .today we face an immense challenge. It's genesis lies in the massive Soviet buildup in weapons. It is compounded by the proliferation of their sophisticated products around the world. In the television coverage of the fighting in Iraq and Iran, we can see sophisticated tanks, sophisticated air defense systems, and sophisticated artillery. I will not comment on how they are employed; I will only say that the sophisticated equipment is in those environments. Five years ago, I would have put a different kind of force into the Middle East or into the Persian Gulf than I would today, because there was far less sophisticated equipment in that area than there is today. We must keep in mind that we do not decide what type of equipment we need, that decision is made for us by the Soviets and the equipment they are proliferating. . . .

It is a popular misconception that lots of cheap weapons will solve the problem. Lots of

cheap weapons would provide the same type of systems that extend in 1951, when I went into Korea as a young second lieutenant. Our troops fired rockets against Chinese tanks, and the rockets bounced off the tanks. That is exactly what we could end up doing again. An infantryman has to have a reasonable amount of courage to shoot at a tank with a rocket launcher, but when the round bounces off, his muscles tighten up very, very quickly. . . .

The introduction of the helicopter revolutionized warfare. It revolutionized it for us; it is doing the same thing for the Soviets in Afghanistan. Today the Soviets have more helicopters than we do. They are at least equal or better. They are learning tactics and doctrine in Afghanistan that will make it more difficult for us to operate against them in the future. . . .

We have to be careful that we do not become so obsessed with perfection in a single scenario that we do not maintain sufficient flexiblity. We need flexibility of mind, flexibility of design, flexibility of capability to react elsewhere. This flexibility is the Army's greatest challenge and, in the area of national defense, the nation's largest challenge: building a reservoir of flexible national initiatives during this decade of great uncertainty. The decade ahead is characterized by change, by challenge, by confrontation, and by crisis. On a probability curve, conflict is likely because there has been no decade since the 1940s in which our nation has not been in conflict. I pray that is not so. . . .

I had to look at what it would cost to have that kind of an Army. To develop a perfect Army, an Army that each one of you here would be absolutely satisfied with, that would be adequate to the job, would probably cost, over the next seven or eight years, something like $200 billion more that what the administration is currently planning to spend. That is about what if would cost to modernize, to do all the things that are necessary. Clearly, that is out of the question. There must, therefore, be trade-offs, there must be certain increases. I have identified in my own mind the key problems that could be ameliorated with $40 to $50 billion additional. At that point we would have an Army acceptable to meet the challenges of the decade ahead. . . .

I hope I have touched on enough issues on values, on goals, on needs to pique your interest. I would be delighted to respond to questions.

DALE TAHTINEN, American Enterprise Institute: You mentioned, General, that the war reserve stocks are very low. This would be apt to be one of the areas that would need immediate improvement. If we consider that there would be an increase in the production of necessary reserve stocks, how much can we continue to send to friends and allies, for example, if military assistance is going to be increased? Is our industrial base going to be able to produce, within a reasonable time, the increase in stocks that will be necessary for the armed forces and at the same time provide for friends and allies?

GENERAL MEYER: Let me talk to two specific issues there—one regarding our friends and allies, and the other the capacity of the base. If by capacity of the base, one means its capacity to do what it is asked to do in peacetime to meet our modernization needs, whether it is adequate to mobilization—that is a different issue—then the answer is yes. The reason is that at present we are buying in a very cost-inefficient way. For example, the tank line is producing well under what if is capable of doing. The helicopter line is producing well under what it is capable of doing. We have built within the industrial base $33 billion of fungible production capability right now that it could absorb as a result of the inefficient rates at which we are procuring materiel. So, in general the answer is yes. In specific cases the answer becomes more complex. In some specific areas like artillery, the answer is no, because there is only one place in the world that makes tubes.

If foreign military sales were handled properly, there would be no problem at all over the next three of four years in meeting their requirements either, if we had set-asides for foreign military sales. Then such sales would not be taken directly out of the Army, Navy, or Air Force hide. What is happening today, however, is that equipment sales come out of supplies initially planned for the Army. Since we are already underequipped, it would be more prudent to provide contingency stocks that are available to go to our allies. That would give industry a signal that there was a steady rate at which they could produce. We

would buy the equivalent equipment at lower costs, and it would be available for our allies. Over time the entire system would be improved by such a policy change. It has been proposed in the past.

HERBERT STEIN, American Enterprise Institute: I wish you would say a few words about those figures you mentioned: the $200 billion over present projections that it would cost to give us an Army that we would all be satisfied with. You said that was out of the question, and I wonder why you think it is out of the question. I also wish you would explain what the acceptable risk is that the $40 to $50 billion would give us. That implies that the present projections involve an unacceptable risk. Is there some intermediate position, say $100 billion, that might not be out of the question, but which would give us a smaller risk? What do you think about these?

GENERAL MEYER: The larger figure, $200 billion, represents the cost of equipping 24 divisions with modern equipment—providing them all with new XM1 tanks, with new infantry fighting vehicles, with air defense weapons systems, and so on. That is what that figure represents. That is not a realistic objective, however, because if we did that, all the equipment would obsolesce at the same time. A better system, similar to the system we use now, would be to have a mix. We have both the XM1, which is the new tank, and an older tank, which is in the reserve forces or mixed in with some of the other forces. That is acceptable. It is acceptable to have a mix of those kinds of forces. It is not the perfect Army that would be absolutely sure of success, but it is an Army with some risk in having less efficient equipment. The Soviets will have the same problem to a lesser degree. If we could be smart enough to assign our low against their low, then we would be all right. Unfortunately, the initiative is theirs. The low risk position for us is one in which we would fully modernize the Active and early deploying Reserve Components. It would give us this high-low equipment mix and sufficient stocks to permit us to be able to operate for ninety days. After that we would be out, and we would not have the capability developed in our production base to provide support from its assembly lines. Clearly, in between this case, which I've costed roughly at an incremental $50 billion, and the ideal case are alternatives that would further lessen the risk. I just took those two extremes as a basis for discussion.

MR. STEIN: Do you have in mind some conception of what is economically possible or politically salable.

GENERAL MEYER: I have my own perception of what is economically possible. I believe that we have to increase the defense budget to at least 6 percent of gross national product, as opposed to about 5 percent now. That has been possible in the past; I do not know why it is not possible for the decade ahead.

WALTER BERNS, American Enterprise Institute: General, I would like to take you back to the first subject you discussed, the incompatibility of the American way of life. You identified it as the value problem and commented on the notion of what is required of an effective Army. Will you comment on the volunteer Army as opposed to a system of selective service in that context?

GENERAL MEYER: As a citizen, I believe that there has to be a linkage between the individual and the state. There has to be a sense of responsibility for each individual to give of himself to his nation. I do not define that directly or explicitly as military service, but I define that as service to nation, through some means, through some period in one's life. That argues for a national service of some sort that is manageable. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would argue that our current situation, in which we do not have the reservoir of trained military manpower to sustain our forward deployed forces, is unacceptable. The all-volunteer force today has not kept our reserve components and our trained military manpower pool up to date.

As Chief of Staff of the Army, I have a different view, or a different set of problems . . . if we go from an all-volunteer force to a conscripted Army, the Army will get all the draftees. Historically, it has; I find it illogical to believe that this will not be the case in the future. For the first year or two of a draft, the draft itself will be perceived, regardless of how it is operated, as discriminating—discriminating in that it certainly cannot draft all of the two million men in that 18 or 19 year-old age group. If we were to permit no enlistments and to draft everyone we could handle in that two million, we would draft every year about 150,000. Those new draftees go immediately to one of the training brigades. They start out by feeling that they have been singled

out. We would have to do away with all the filters that we have today that permit us to get rid of the people we do not want. We currently have training discharge programs that permit us to throw out anybody we do not want to keep, anybody we do not think can live up to it. We have expeditious discharge programs once they get to the unit. We would have to take away some of those baffles.

There are pros and cons across the board. Social scientists say that a draft does get a cross section of society within the Army. Certainly, not many young men from middle- or high-income families enlist in the Army. That is unfortunate, but I have to be a realist as well. That aspect is missing.

Let me say a few words about the all-volunteer force. There is no way that a draft will pass the Congress this year or perhaps next year. Efforts to create incentives for enlistment and to create incentives for retention will be the priority of this administration. Mr. Weinberger in recent testimony before the Congress confirmed that. In 1977 we stopped the GI Bill. Ever since then we have been having problems acquiring quality high school graduates. With the reinstitution of the GI Bill, we have an opportunity to begin to bring in more high school graduates and more quality. Over time that may change the representation of the social strata within the Army somewhat, but it will not change it completely.

The broader issue is the issue of retention. Let me cite a statistic. Today the salary difference between an apprentice Soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and the senior noncommissioned airman, sailor, marine is 3.3 to 1. That means that a young man coming into the Army gets one-third what the noncommissioned officer who is his leader gets. No business could run on that kind of ratio. That is the far greater problem that we have today: the retention of those critical middle-grade leaders. In the compensation packages that we are reviewing, that must be addressed more quickly. If we make a mistake of attracting people to the Army through competitive wages and then find that we cannot keep them because of inadequate growth potential in the compensation we offer to career Soldiers, then the nation may decide that a draft is necessary. Even then the services will be very ineffective if the essential middle-grade leadership is missing.

MR BERNS: One comment, General, with respect to this particular question. What concerns me in our present situation, with the all-volunteer Army, is that the law as a whole makes no demands on its citizens. On the contrary, the law says, in effect, that one has no duty to serve one's country. That seems to exacerbate this very problem that you identified at the outset, this tension that exists between the way of life that we expect in this country and what is in fact required to retain that way of life.

GENERAL MEYER: I agree with that.

MR. BERNS: All other things being equal, I would expect this administration to rid itself of this silly notion that manifests itself in opposition to military service as a national requirement.

CAMPBELL JOHNSON, American Enterprise Institute: General Meyer, with regard to the question of our advanced technology getting into unfriendly hands, we have seen a major problem in Iran with the change in leadership there and we are seeing increasing instability in Central and South American countries. We used to be able to give our obsolete equipment to friendly nations. There has been a growing tendency to share with other countries state-of-the-art equipment. Will you share with us your views on this situation, and will you comment on how this affects your plan?

GENERAL MEYER: There are stringent laws regarding the transfer of equipment. Let us take the example of a neutral country in Northern Europe where it would be to our advantage to provide a weapons system that would improve their defense capability. The decision to pass on or not pass on that particular technology is one that must be addressed in the context of whether there is a likelihood of that particular technology being transferred quickly to the Soviets or to the Warsaw Pact. . . .Most of our allies today have most of the technology as a result of the international business community, where corporations have foreign members.

Decisions in that category must be taken on a case-by-case basis. They do present a real problem for us. In many cases, the Chiefs end up on different sides of the street regarding whether a particular technology should be shared because of the impact it might have on our own Sailors,

Airmen, Marines, and Soldiers in the next few years if that technology were lost.

Overall, we have not protected our technology as closely as we must if we are to maintain our technological advantage. Some recent reports indicate that in some areas where I thought we had vast technological advantages over the Soviet-Warsaw Pact, that advantage has been cut in half. That changes all our planning; it changes the way in which we will address our needs and demands.

ROBERT PRANGER, American Enterprise Institute: General Meyer, I wonder if you would comment for a moment on the future of the Army in terms of inter-service politics within the Department of Defense budget. Ever since conscription ended and the Vietnam War ended, the Army seems to be the least favored of the services. That tendency has even shown up in the new defense talks about buildups and so on. Much of this buildup was what someone might call antiseptic war—bigger navies, more strategic weapons for the Air Force. Does the Army really have a future, without conscription, to rival or to stand equal with the other branches of services?

GENERAL MEYER: Let me start by articulating quickly my view of the situation and the types of forces that are going to be required. The access to resources will be perhaps the dominant factor in the decade ahead. It will flow from oil to bauxite to whatever else it happens to be. That is one absolute. A second absolute is that the world is geographically different: there is water, there is land, there are deserts, there are mountains, there are all sorts of areas that have brought those very critical resources that are going to determine whether or not our society is able to maintain its basic values. No single service is capable of responding to the variety of challenge simply because no single service possesses the flexibility to respond to all those potential challenges.

The Soviet Union, by itself or by proxy, shows increasing will to project power. Some of you who are historians will have to decide whether I am right or wrong in my opinion that World War III started on December 27, 1979. The days and months ahead will increasingly place greater demands on us to project power to counter such thrusts around the world. That requires a spectrum of force. In addition to the amphibious force that the Marines have, our response to those challenges around the world will require airborne forces, it will require mobile forces, it will require heavy forces. Unless our country makes a conscious decision that we will not counter those threats elsewhere, or that our counter will be tactical nuclear warfare—which I cannot envision any president being able to posit as a thesis—then there will be a requirement for land forces, for Army forces in the decade ahead.

Saying all that does not get us dollars. It is essential, therefore, that from the very beginning this administration has a clear understanding of what we will use land forces for. Let me posit a thesis on how the Senate, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the President should look at the dollars that they apply to the military. There ought to be some mechanism requiring the military to show the administration the greater capability provided by those dollars, the capability to carry out the specific contingencies, the specific scenarios that the government expects the military to carry out. For example, if the National Command Authority expects us to operate in Central Europe alongside our allies, we should be able to articulate to the authority how much more able we are to do that with the dollars we get. If the National Command Authority expects us to be able to permit the continued flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf and to prevent the Soviets from expanding into Iran and into Southwest Asia, then it should have us explain how much more capable we are of doing that with the dollars we receive. If it expects us to operate in Korea, and to play a role in that area of Northwest Asia, we should explain how much more able we are to do that with the dollars. If it expects us to operate in a strategic nuclear environment, we should be able to explain how we are better able to do that with the money it has provided. Nobody does that today. Nobody explains how much more capable we are of carrying out specific contingencies.

Everybody looks at systems vertically. How many more tanks, how many more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, how many more B-1 bombers, how many more infantry fighting vehicles, how many more ships—but those things are never examined in the context of improved capability to carry out the nation's will with regard to the use of its power. If we address the issue

of distributing resources in the way I suggest it will mean that the amount the Army gets is not itself material. It will get its proper share. For example, I am willing to give Army dollars to get fast sealift, because the ability to project troops is more important than having Army divisions and Marine divisions sitting at Camp Lejeune or at Fort Stewart where they cannot go anywhere or do anything. But nobody can answer that question for a President or for a Secretary of Defense or for a Congress trying to oversee what happens, because the services are not asked to address it in the context of how much more quickly troops can respond to the threat in Central Europe, or how much more quickly can they carry out a contingency in Southwest Asia or Northeast Asia. I believe the discipline similar to that brought to the resource allocation process would provide leadership with the opportunity to make more up-to-date decisions than just buy more of this or buy more of that.

MR. PRANGER: A follow-up on conscription. Do you feel that conscription will be necessary?

GENERAL MEYER: The answer is yes, but that is not a decision that I can make. The decision about conscription is not going to be made by the uniformed military. The decision about conscription is going to have to be made by the nation as a whole for all the reasons that were outlined earlier.

MR. PRANGER: It is easier at this point for an individual congressman or senator to vote larger sums of money than it is to defend conscription. I wonder at what point you feel these people have to put their political lives on the line on the issue of whether conscription in necessary under certain circumstances, which is something different from voting these large sums of money. Won't that apply to the new administration somewhere in this four-year period?

GENERAL MEYER: I indicated previously that I thought this was a watershed year. I still believe it is, but with the new administration, it will be a year and a half before the GI Bill is enacted and it will be longer before we see clearly whether or not the impact of that solves the problems of the National Guard, Reserve, and sustaining bases. That is really the gut problem. Those have to be kept in the forefront of people's minds. It is easy to say that there is a solution to the problem of the Active Army, but that is not the manpower solution for our total force.

ROBERT GOLDICH, Congressional Research Service: I do not want to beat the all-volunteer force to death—actually, maybe I do—but I have one question. The Army needs to have authoritarian values. It needs to have a strong element of compulsion. It needs to have the attributes of what some people call the total institution. Do you think fundamentally that that can be reconciled with one of the central assets of the Army today, the egalitarian and free-choice nature of voluntary military service? Particularly, do you think this is possible in terms of the rigors of discipline, in terms of the austerity or liberality of conditions of service and of training? Regardless of the amount of resources that are devoted to the Army and regardless of numbers, in terms of quantity or quality, I sense here a fundamental institutional dichotomy between a strongly disciplined armed force that can stand under the rigors of combat and the kind of volunteer force that we have now.

GENERAL MEYER: Let me make sure I understand your basic premise. A volunteer as opposed to a conscript out of that same society would be different as an individual. I do not know that the people we get today would be different if they were drafted or if they volunteered, so I am not sure how to answer that part of it. Let me try to answer a different portion of the question. That goes back to linkage of individual to state. That is essential. As soon as we do that we will strengthen much of society. I say that as a citizen. I also feel that as a Soldier, but I stated that more broadly as a citizen. We can have the discipline that we need, and we can have the disciplined elements within the force that we need. Why do I say that? Historically, our airborne units have been volunteer. They have been all volunteer forever. It is possible to do that. I am going to put it to a test this year, because we are increasing individual training, we are tightening the discipline, we are tightening the training. At the end of the year, if we have only half an Army left out there, then I will know it cannot be done. But I will find out.

MICHAEL WEST, House Armed Services Committee: You expressed a problem in trying to

communicate to the policy makers the amount of additional capability, the type of program you need to balance and so forth. I was part of a readiness panel last year, and that was largely our focus; namely, how do we do a better job in balancing the program. In this case, the way we have always done in the past has been more or less oriented toward procurement, research, and development, which would not be bad for this year. Overall, however, the difficulty is that we do not seem to have any way that this is communicated to us at this point. We asked the Army in September for a readiness template, which would help us to ask those questions or to measure those things, and we never got it back. We also are not privy to those things that are done in the budgeting and in the programming part of the House, where they supposedly are achieving this balance and coming up with a program that will give us the most readiness for the dollar. How do we do this in the future? If we cannot get that readiness template from you, if we cannot gain access officially to the internal documentation, how are policy makers in the Congress going to be able to address these needs?

GENERAL MEYER: Of course, you can get the readiness template. As a House staffer, you may not be entitled to get it, but your boss is. I am just telling you how it may work out. Let me propose an example. One way is for us to brief all of the House Armed Services Committee with selected staffers. I say selected, because the more people are brought into it, the more the war plans themselves have to be exposed. I think we need to be selective; war plans cannot be passed out indiscriminately to a whole host of people. The key people could be briefed on the basic contingencies.

We have to look at the ability of the armed forces to go to war. The Army in Europe is in good shape. It is up to strength in manpower, it has all of its noncommissioned officers, it has the most modern equipment we have, but it is poorly supported. The divisions over there, the battalions over there, the companies over there are in great shape. There are noncommissioned officers standing in line to get to be tank commanders. But behind them, in sustainability, is where the problems are. Part of that the Army [cannot] control. The problem is whether equipment can, in fact, be gotten over there in time, whether the allies can be made to do their share, and so on. Unless decision makers look at the broad context of the armed forces' ability to carry out that mission, they will continue to be frustrated by their attempts to look at specific systems.

I applaud the efforts of the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee and their reorganization to try to take the broader look at things. I have been working with Senator John Tower on how he can get that broad look that he needs. Melvin Price and some of his key people need the same sort of approach. Senator Tower said he was going to talk to them about it. That gives us an opportunity to get that kind of look. Barring that, we will continue to argue over the wrong kinds of issues. . .

## Letter to an ARMY OFFICER

On Reserve Component Duty
27 January 1981

. . . While images and perceptions die slowly, we're going back to an Army where command is a privilege (not a right, or a stepping stone), where the commanders' focus is on their units, not promotions; where staffs stay up front and out of the way, rather than interfere; and where selflessness, not selfishness, is the dominant characteristic of service.

The lengthening of command tours is one example. Those not disposed to the values I've cited will wither in that environment. But lengthened tours also involve a measure of self-sacrifice for non-commanders as well: the understanding being that we will continue to select those uniquely qualified for troop command. That should not affect the self-esteem of those not selected,

because service in any capacity in the Army I envision, should have its own rewards.

In my vision of the Army there are no "losers" as a result of selection or promotion boards, but a culling of talent against the best measure of the Army's needs against the individual's ability to contribute. That contradicts the contemporary image, which I must admit is difficult to root out. We can and will recognize excellence, though here too we need time to internalize a recast self-image. (The evidence visible from the last brigadier general's board is less than I had hoped for—only one combat arms officer selected who never commanded, but who has been contributing superbly in another useful way.)

Responding to [your young officer's] charge of an ascendency of management over leadership, I can only say that if true, we did it to ourselves over time, and it will only be over time that we will undo it.

There is immense talent out there [which] wants to concentrate on the fundamentals of going to war: training and maintaining, and it wants the burden of distractors lifted. Let me tell you that I have no higher aspiration for today's Army. Unfortunately, distractors don't read my correspondence. Nor can they respond to a General Order outlawing their continued interference. *They are inbred in us*—and *we need to get rid of them, or rid ourselves of their masters who recognize their foibles but won't reform. And we're going to do that.*

*The problem then, belongs to me, to you . . . because we're going to ensure that this Army is the kind of Army of which all of us—citizens and Soldiers—can be proud.*

## Hearing before the SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

On the FY 82 DOD Authorization Request:
Readiness and Budget Allocations
29 January 1981

. . . . I believe there is a mismatch today between what the Army has been directed to do in response to the strategy, and the forces and resources we have available to ensure that we are adequate to the task. That is at the heart of my concerns about the current budget and the proposals to fix it.

As the chairman indicated, we have maintained our forward deployed forces at a high state of readiness, both in Europe and in Korea. With the exception of [deleted] we have also managed to ensure that those forces involved in the Rapid Deployment Force are in a high state of readiness. But the rest of the Army has suffered. . . .

Unlike the other services, we are not in good shape in equipping the force. We do not have equipment quality equivalent to that of our adversaries, and, in fact, our Active and Reserve units are not equipped with a full complement of what they need just to go to war—even counting our outdated equipment. This year we did not help the problem significantly, because, like the rest of the services, we focused the bulk of our real growth—56 percent—on readiness of the current forces. So, the equipment problem is a very real one for the Army.

The manpower problem is equally difficult for us. We need to man the Active Components, the Army Reserve, the National Guard and the trained military manpower pool with both the quality and quantity of Soldiers and NCO's that we need. We do not have the same level of problem that the Navy has with petty officers, but we do have a significant shortfall in our NCO's. Basically, that is the prime reason that we find the Active Component in a lower state of readiness.

The Guard and Reserve manning problems are not focused at the NCO and officer ranks, but rather in the Soldier ranks. . . .As a broad overview I would like to say that the Army can't go to war alone. I am not sure that any of the services can go to war alone. . . .We must look across all of the

services to insure a composite ability to carry out whatever contingencies this Nation expects us to meet. That is the only way we are going to be able to come to grips with how to prioritize our scarce resources. This broad perspective is necessary so that we don't do something dumb and put dollars in the wrong pocket at this particularly critical instance in history.

It seems to me that what we need is an agreement within the Congress, within the administration, and among those of us who are responsible for planning the use of military forces, on what priorities are; and then we must continue our commitment to fulfilling them. If we can do that, then I believe that a few years from now we will have the kind of Armed Forces that this Nation needs for the decade ahead. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: We have 16 Active Army divisions and [deleted] rated "C-1", and [deleted] were rated essentially not combat ready. Will you describe that trend over the last couple of years and what you project?

GENERAL MEYER: I will be happy to. About 4 years ago, the forward deployed units were all at C-2. Please understand that normally we do not expect a C rating at an authorized level of organization 1 (ALO-1) in peacetime, because it would require putting people in units who are not needed except in wartime. So, as a management tool we keep them at ALO-2. This enables us to maximize our readiness from available resources.

When I commanded a division in Europe, we were supposed to be C-2 and we were. We had the resources and manpower to do that. I left there in 1975. In 1977, as the available manpower began to dwindle, as the loss of NCO's began to be felt in the force, and as we began to use acting NCO's in the National Guard, in the Army Reserves, and in the Recruiting Command, and so on, we had to draw down our forces everywhere except in Europe, in Korea, and in [deleted] divisions assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force. This reduction had a tremendous impact on the readiness of these forces. So, the principal shortcoming today in the active component divisions is middle-grade leaders, NCO's, principally in the combat arms—infantry, artillery, armor, and air defense. Reason: today's Army maintains 42 percent of its forces overseas. That means that the NCO in a critical skill experiences frequent and repetitive tours overseas. After a while he is apt to say, "I am not going to stay in the Army if I have to keep going back and forth so often". . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: You mention the problem of retention of these people and General Meyer stressed the frequent reassignment. What do you propose to about that?

GENERAL MEYER: There are several things we are trying to do today within the Army. One of the most important is looking at changing our whole way of managing people. Since World War II we have had an individual replacement system. That means that an individual comes in and goes from one unit to another throughout his career. We are going, over time, to a unit personnel system where an individual joins and stays with a unit, is assigned to a specific post, camp, or station so that his family can grow some roots, build equity in a home perhaps, and decide to stay in because the individual and his family find in the Army a concerned community.

It is things like that we must do. However, there are other actions we must take to stabilize the force internally: That is, we cannot permit some units to be overstrength at the expense of shortages in other units. We have to correct this imbalance in the force so that everybody shares in the shortages and learns to work with them, not simply to cope with feast or famine.

Those are some of the steps [illegible] taking, but it is a major change in the [illegible] done business in the past. . . .

SENATOR LEVIN: First of all, [illegible]al Meyer, if I could ask you a question: Do you believe that each of the services should be required by law to recruit a fixed percentage of high school graduates annually?

GENERAL MEYER: I don't think we should be required by law to do that, but I believe that we should be required to bring into the service the adequate quality and quantity to provide the forces necessary for the decade ahead.

Senator Levin. Why do you not believe you should be required by law?

GENERAL MEYER: I just believe we should be given a mission-type order and directed to carry that order out—to insure that the quality and quantity are adequate. . . .

SENATOR LEVIN: Do you think it is a fair description to equate high school graduation with quality? Is it harmful to morale to do so?

GENERAL MEYER: I don't think it is the sole determinant of quality. Clearly, there are young men and women who have not graduated from high school who are quality individuals and who, if given the opportunity, will develop. I think, however, it is one of the valid screens for judging applicants. . . .How you evaluate quality is basically determined by how well the individual does within the squad or platoon. If you want to judge the quality within the Army, you need to go out and look in squads and platoons and see how well they perform their missions.

Quality is a function of three things: it is a function of the ability of the individual; it is a function of the leadership he receives; and it is a function of the environment within the organization. Those three things all contribute to how well an individual does as a member of the team.

Two of those three things are primarily the responsibility of the leader down in the unit: the right kind of leadership and the quality of the environment. We will never have a good environment in the Army if we are continually forced to divert the very NCO's who are charged with leading our Soldiers to jobs in base operations and other things like that because of civilian shortages. That causes instability in organizations.

Senator Levin. . . . .The Secretary of Defense said yesterday that we occupy an inferior position to the Russians in military capability. I wonder, first of all, General Meyer, whether you agree with that overall assessment relative to the Army?

GENERAL MEYER: With regard to the Army alone, qualitatively and quantitatively, yes--without regard to our total force capability. . . .

Senator LEVIN: General Meyer, including the allies on both sides, would your answer be the same?

GENERAL MEYER: If you are looking at it purely from a qualitative and a quantitative point of view, yes. But, Admiral Hayward has pointed out an important aspect of how I believe the Senate and military talk by one another too much. That is, unless we speak to a specific contingency and specific scenario, in which you address, across the board, what the capabilities are to respond in that specific situation, it is hard to define.

Let me respond with a quick scenario.

In the central European conflict, considering both U.S. forces and the NATO allies, we have the capability of beginning the fight. But we do not have the capability of continuing the fight. . . .

## Hearing before the SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

On the FY 82 DOD Authorization Request:
Army Programs
3 February 1981

GENERAL MEYER: . . .I believe this is a watershed year for the Army. I also believe that it is a watershed year for the Defense Establishment. The decisions that are made this year are going to have an impact on the size, the shape and the composition of the Armed Forces for the rest of this century. Therefore, it is going to require close cooperation among the Congress, the administration and the military and civilian leadership of the Armed Forces to ensure that the kind of Armed Forces we need for the rest of this century is clearly defined and agreed upon.

The posture paper we gave you presents a pretty bleak picture. I debated providing that kind of aid to the enemy, but I believe it is important that as we attempt to assess where we are that we have a common base from which to start—so

that we know precisely what remains to be done. What we have outlined for you essentially is where we stand, what this budget does and what we believe remains to be done. . . .I did want to point out that I believe there are great strengths in the Army today on which we can build. . . .

CHAIRMAN TOWER: General Meyer, would you comment on what I believe is the projected plan of yours to rotate units rather than individuals and maintain some degree of continuing unit integrity?

GENERAL MEYER: As I indicated, the biggest obstacle to readiness is turbulence. That means that in a tank crew, for example, only one or two Soldiers stay with that crew for any reasonable time. In our squads, the situation is the same. In fact, our divisions turnover once every 18 months at the present time. That means that 18 months is as long as the individuals in the division stay together. This problem is due primarily to the fact that we have 43 percent of our force overseas.

What we intend to do is to bring individuals in and assign them to a company, where they will remain for the full term of their enlistment. These companies will have an NCO cadre with them, and will rotate, as units, overseas to Europe during the latter stages of their existence as a company. Last year, on an experimental basis, we did about a dozen such rotations. This year we intend to do 19 to 21 of those companies to truly begin this program. . . .

SENATOR THURMOND: . . . .General Meyer, I want to propound a few questions. . . .I have been informed many platoons have to train with 60 percent or less of the personnel due to Soldiers being used for special duty support assignments. I just wonder why this condition has been permitted?

GENERAL MEYER: The basic cause has been the drastic reduction in civilian support throughout the Army. If you wanted to make a move that would have an immediate readiness impact, it would be to provide the Army right now with about 10,000 additional civilians to do the traditionally civilian kinds of jobs that would then release our NCO's and Soldiers back to their squads and platoons so that they could get on with doing the jobs they came into the service to perform. We have just been cut back on civilians to the point where many of the normal housekeeping jobs have to be done by Soldiers. . . .

SENATOR THURMOND: I have also been informed that NATO has a shortage of support units and sustainability of ground fighting units, that could maintain and support the ground units for only a brief time. Can you comment on that?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes. I will speak to the Army forces there, not to the other NATO forces. We have converted our forces in Europe from a balanced force to principally a combat force, at the expense of our combat support and combat service support elements. For these vital functions we rely upon a combination of host nation support and reinforcing support from the Active Army and the U. S. Army Reserve and National Guard. It is a very risky reliance with that kind of imbalance among the combat, combat support and combat service support forces. It is one of the major concerns of both General Rogers and General Kroesen. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Let me turn to the area of force structure. General, does the Army place a higher priority on increasing the capability of our current forces or on building additional divisions to increase our force structure?

GENERAL MEYER: I believe it is absolutely essential that we fix what we have first, sir. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: General, Meyer, what are the major stumbling blocks to increasing the Army's force structure in the area of personnel?

GENERAL MEYER: The first major stumbling block in the area of personnel is the availability of middle grade leaders. I have recommended against increasing the number of tank battalions and other like organizations because we don't have enough tank commanders—NCO's—to go out and man additional battalions. The principal obstacle to increasing the force structure would be the lack of middle grade leaders. The second stumbling block is the nonavailability of equipment. We should not create new organizations while our current Active National Guard and USAR units aren't equipped fully.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: No matter how we phrase the questions or how varied the questions are, the answers always seem to come out the same. I guess that tells us something. What are the stumbling blocks regarding slow rates of equipment modernization?

GENERAL MEYER: It seems to me that here again there are two major stumbling blocks. One is insufficient resources, which forces us to buy at uneconomical rates. The second is our inability to enter into multi-year contracting. If the Congress and the Defense Department could agree upon provisions for multi-year contracting, with incentives to industry to go out and procure long lead time items, then I believe we could achieve more economical rates through better cost estimations at the front end and fewer hidden costs each year. If we can overcome these obstacles, then we can accelerate our rate of modernization. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: As a followup to the question I asked earlier, is the Army committed to reducing problems in the Reserves before a decision is made to man and equip more active units?

GENERAL MEYER: I would say that we are resolved to fix the Guard and Reserve but it has to be done concurrently with what we are doing in the Active Forces. I would say, however, that there are some kinds of Active units that need to be organized, equipped, and manned before all of the problems of the Reserve are fixed.

For example, we cannot wait to bring some electronic warfare systems into the Active Forces because they will have such a great payoff on the future battlefield. We need to do that for example, before we fix all of the tank battalions with guns or tanks in the Reserves. But it is a combination of the two. Clearly we have to improve the Guard and Reserve because we are so heavily reliant upon them.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: I did not phrase my question carefully enough. Is there a commitment on the part of the Army to address the problems in the Reserves and the Guard before consideration is given to the creation of new divisions?

GENERAL MEYER: The simple answer would be yes. That is the best way to say it. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: My question is that before we build more than the existing 24 total divisions, will you address the problems in the Guard and Reserve first?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: Yes. . . .

SENATOR COHEN: What is the Army's view of its role in the RDF? For example, do you feel that the Marine Corps and Navy ought to be the cutting edge of any RDF, or do you see a more predominant role for the Army? If so, under what circumstances?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .There is no one force that can respond to all challenges. What the unified commander, or whoever is directed to run it, needs is the ability to be able to select forces uniquely suited to the challenges of a particular environment. If you tried to prepackage where a specific force would go, my guess is 90 percent of the time you would be wrong.

You can't be precise in being able to determine where you are likely to go. The unified commanders need a bag of various capabilities from which to draw. I believe the Army has a responsibility for providing in that bag such things as a skilled counterterrorist capability, special forces which provide a capability both in training indigenous forces and in conducting long-range reconnaissance and strikes; rangers, [who] possess a unique capability for special operations; airborne units which provide highly skilled reaction forces to move rapidly and secure an area; air assault forces which to me provide tremendous capability in almost every environment today; . . . and, finally, conventional light infantry, mechanized and armored forces [with] the capability to slug it out with more potent adversaries.

SENATOR COHEN: When you talk about the perceived role of the Army it obviously has an effect on priorities. You said we have to be ruthless in setting up a priority system. The question is should we put more priority on mobility such as the helicopters you just mentioned or on sus-

tainability? Right now, how do you see that matching up in your budget, considering the Army's role and what you are going to protect?

GENERAL MEYER: Right now in the budget there is more focus on the cutting edge and less focus on the sustaining edge and it is not as balanced as it should be.

SENATOR COHEN: That again gets me back to more emphasis on the cutting edge. To what extent does that conflict with the Marine Corps function?

GENERAL MEYER: Not at all. With three Marine divisions in the active component, and all of the potential requirements that I see them—the contingencies in Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, I still don't see enough land forces. When I talk of land forces I am talking of both the Army and the Marines.

SENATOR COHEN: To what extent do the support items required for the RDF drain away from the support items and functions other than the RDF?

GENERAL MEYER: At the present time, since we have a stated 1 1/2 wars strategy without the capability of supporting 1 1/2 wars simultaneously, anything that we assign to support the contingency outside of Central Europe degrades our capability in Central Europe.

SENATOR COHEN: What do you project now as the cost for creating or beefing up our present structure to have an effective RDF? Over a five-year period what would your cost estimate be?

GENERAL MEYER: I would have to break it out specifically for the RDF. What I have said is that in order to have the Army properly balanced, so that it can do the things it needs to do as part of the RDF and be able to respond in Central Europe as well, it would take, in my judgment, between $40 and $50 billion for the Army alone over the next 5 to 6 years.

SENATOR COHEN: The paper quoted Secretary Brown as saying it would take $17.4 billion.

GENERAL MEYER: Again, as you know, my view is that before you accept any dollar estimate, there has to be an agreement on what you want those forces to do. My concern is that people may suddenly decide they want to put a Marine unit here, an Army unit here and an Air Force unit here without deciding what it is they want those forces to do once they get there. If there can be agreement among the administration, the Congress and the Defense Department on what that purpose is, then I can respond more specifically to that question. . . .

SENATOR JEPSEN: General Meyer, the OSD recommended that pay scales be restructured for greater steps between enlistee grades and career grades. Do you agree with that?

GENERAL MEYER: Absolutely. I believe that it must be done. I believe that the pay differential between the first-term enlistee and careerist has been compressed to the point where we don't have a viable option or program for our middle grade leaders. The way it needs to be done, in my judgment, and as Secretary Marsh outlined, is to introduce the GI Bill and let that become the deferred payment for the individual who comes into the Service with no intention of becoming a careerist. He need not be paid at the same level as those who are careerists, because he will be getting deferred payment through the GI Bill; and, I believe, he will understand that.

A second aspect of all this is that we must address not just the problems of the pay differential and compression, but also the problems of the overseas requirements. At the present time a major problem is the 43 percent of the operating force which is overseas. That translates in our middle grade NCO's going back and forth every 20 months. We also need to provide a responsibility pay to ensure that they are paid for the increased responsibility that they accept when they take leadership positions. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: General Meyer, in your view, is the operation and support funding, . . . including training and other procurement, contained in the current 5-year plan for the Army's major new weapon systems sufficient to support the initial cost of fielding these systems?

GENERAL MEYER: No, sir; it is not. . . .

SENATOR DENTON: . . . .General Meyer, do you hope, personally, that the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army will come to see a need for some form of universal military training or some of draft limited or otherwise?

GENERAL MEYER: I hope that not only those three gentlemen but, more importantly, the American people, come to an understanding of the importance of linkage of national service with defense of the Nation. . . .

SENATOR DENTON: Do you hope that they would see a need for universal military training?

GENERAL MEYER: Universal military training of some form to resolve the near term Reserve Component shortfall should be considered i. we wish to fill our current void in our reinforcing capability. . . .

SENATOR JEPSEN: In your prepared posture statement, you conclude that in the 1980's:

"In the spectrum of warfare, nuclear war is the least likely occurrence" and thus . . . "the importance of conventional forces has moved to the front."

I believe this is consistent with what our Chairman has previously alluded to with respect to "lowering the threshold of risk" of conventional warfare. You have perhaps stated it more strongly. How do you arrive at this conclusion?

GENERAL MEYER: Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff see serious shortcomings in our strategic nuclear forces which need to be rectified as a matter of high priority, I do feel that our strategic nuclear forces are sufficient for deterrence. Our strategic forces will continue to threaten the Soviet Union with unacceptable retaliation. Therefore, nuclear war will remain the least likely occurrence.

However, we cannot count on our nuclear forces to do anything but deter nuclear war. Our interests remain threatened in a world beset by violence, instability, and the potential for conflict below the nuclear threshold. The Soviet Union continues its massive military investment in conventional forces and has demonstrated an increased willingness to use its military power. Soviet military surrogates are employed in large numbers. Intra-regional strife continues in the Persian Gulf, Latin America, and Africa. Large standing conventional forces face each other in Europe and on the Korean peninsula. The diversity and complexity of threats to U.S. interests, quite apart from Soviet Forces—such as terrorism and the turbulence in the Western Hemisphere—further suggest the need for credible, capable forces to meet these exclusively conventional threats.

We may be in the nuclear age; nevertheless the potential for crises involving conventional forces remains high.

SENATOR JEPSEN: What does this mean then with regard to where we put our priorities in accelerating defense program, or initiating new programs if we were to increase defense resources?

GENERAL MEYER: As far as the Army is concerned, if defense resources were increased, we would place emphasis on accelerating our existing programs before we would initiate new programs. As I told Senator Humphrey, I believe it is absolutely essential that we fully develop the potential of what we have first. . . .

SENATOR STENNIS: . . . .I know you agree that it is critical for the Army to get the most for every dollar it spends. Yet, the Army's fiscal year 1982 program for the procurement of major systems . . . shows: substantial quantity reductions and growth in unit costs that suggests lack of cost control in major weapons programs. General Meyer, to what do you attribute [this]?

General Meyer: . . . .there are several reasons for the increase in unit costs for Army procurement programs when compared with unit cost estimates submitted in last year's authorization request. The portion of the industrial sector producing our equipment is experiencing inflation rates which are higher than those experienced in other sectors of the economy. Part of this problem can be attributed to the rapidly escalating prices of several critical materials used in manufacturing weapon systems. . . .Additionally, insufficient

levels of Total Obligational Authority force us to purchase quantities lower than the contractor's optimal production rate. Such reductions cause increases in unit costs for the Army since the contractor's fixed costs are prorated over fewer items. Finally, the inflation rates used for programming have generally lagged the actual annual rate of inflation. This results in cost estimates which are consistently understated. Technical, management, and production problems have also played a part, but I believe I have addressed those which are most significant.

SENATOR STENNIS: ....Could we obtain cost savings through the so-called multi-year procurement approach?...

GENERAL MEYER: ....The multi-year contracting is sound and used to our advantage on smaller programs. However, its use in acquisition of new weapon systems is limited by the $5,000,000 cancellation ceiling and its coverage of nonrecurring costs only. The House Armed Services Committee is considering a bill, H.R. 745, which the Army strongly supports, that would permit the use of multi-year contracts under less restrictive conditions....

SENATOR JACKSON: What does the Army believe are the specific operational advantages to having the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) comprised of elements of all four services and what is the Army's recommendation as to the organizational structure and chain of command for the RDF?

GENERAL MEYER: The principal advantage of a four service Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) is simply that no single service possesses all the capabilities to respond to the variety of threats that confront us. Each service has unique capabilities which properly combined form the basis for the flexibility to cope with a wide spectrum of contingencies. Specific operational advantages accrue to a four service RDF by virtue of the operational capabilities inherent in established Service roles and missions and in how each organizes, trains and equips its forces. For example, only the Air Force can conduct long range, all-weather interdiction strikes or high altitude precision area bombing. Similarly, the Army possesses strategic and tactical forcible entry capability by airborne assault and the Marines a capability to conduct amphibious assault. These Service-unique capabilities translate into several additional operational advantages. They:

- Provide a greater range of response options to the National Command Authorities (NCA).

- Provide more flexible crises reaction and pre-conflict deterrence signals.

- Provide the basis for force buildup if required, particularly if the required force exceeds a uniservice capability or the contingency leads to sustained land combat.

- Provide the basis for an efficient, integrated and expendable logistic effort.

- Increase and complicate adversary's incertainty.

Indeed, the structure of our unified and joint commands has been carefully developed and tested over the years to ensure that the contributions of our services would be mutually reinforcing, not competing, and thereby achieve a properly balanced military force. Clearly, the national interest is best served and deterrence best supported where we publicly display the strengths of our joint military team.

I support the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) current organizational structure which provides a joint task force headquarters with coequal subordinate service component commanders. To achieve flexibility and a broad spectrum of capability, the joint task force and component commanders are provided a force list from which to draw specific forces deemed necessary to accomplish assigned missions. This concept allows the task force to be specifically tailored for the mission at hand.

For the Southwest Asia region the RDJTF serves as an interim means to focus our planning efforts and improve our ability to project force to this remote region. In the long term, however, we must look to establishing a [deleted]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are addressing this issue.

SENATOR JACKSON: ...Does the Army regard the enhanced radiation warhead and shell as being an urgent requirement in order to restore

the credibility of our deterrent in Europe?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes. The Army strongly supports the production and deployment of 8" and Lance warheads in a Reduced Blast/Enhanced Radiation (RB/ER) configuration.

The Army needs the additional military effectiveness the RB/ER provides our forces against the large Soviet armored threat they could face in Europe and elsewhere. The increased warfighting capability provided by RB/ER weapons would enhance our deterrent.

The Army recognizes that the RB/ER issue raises several important domestic and international political questions. We need to consider Allied sensitivities, which could have potential effects on other theater nuclear force programs and arms control talks. However, the Army believes the RB/ER warheads can be produced and deployed in a manner which minimizes possible adverse political effects while providing the Army a critically needed capability.

SENATOR NUNN: . . . .You mention in your statement the various pay and benefit elements passed by the Congress last year. The 5-year budget costs of all these together is approximately $32 billion. Has there been any valid measurable effect of these benefits yet? Do you think additional measures should be added or should we wait until we can determine which measures are most effective?

GENERAL MEYER: I was just down at Forces Command. General Shoemaker down there did a quick analysis on what is taking place. The retention rate for infantry junior mid-career sergeants—for fourth quarter fiscal year 1980 compared to October and November 1980—went from 28 percent to 57 percent; for the armor, 27 to 48 percent. So there has been a marked increase. What caused the increase is probably a combination of factors such as significantly increased promotion opportunity for NCOs—particularly in the combat arms—the 11.7 percent pay adjustment, more adequate reimbursement for PCS travel, the Variable Housing Allowance, and raising the value of the reenlistment bonus.

How many of those NCO's, those who were waiting until the Nunn-Warner/Fair Benefits decisions were made by Congress, I still don't know. I haven't heard from the field. The bottom line is that early indications are good. However, we can better assess the full impact further downstream. . . .

SENATOR NUNN: As you know, the committee directed a joint study of our overall requirements in conjunction with the CX proposal. Did the Army provide input for this study and what do you see as the Army position in terms of tradeoffs among prepositioning, airlift and sealift?

GENERAL MEYER: . . .The Army is participating fully in this important effort which should be completed in the near future. I believe that sealift, airlift and prepositioning are complementary given the proper mix. We have reached the point where trade-offs favor additional outsize airlift and fast sealift while relying less on prepositioning of entire units. Some additional prepositioning may be needed in the future but at a level which will not tie us to one region or area of the world thereby degrading our flexibility and capability to meet worldwide contingencies.

Prepositioning of equipment in Europe has been and continues to be a major DoD effort to improve our capability to reinforce NATO while reducing heavy airlift requirements. However, even with the current prepositioning program, strategic airlift is not adequate to lift the troops, accompanying supplies and non-storable equipment in time to meet our reinforcement objectives. We are developing alternatives which will offset current deficiencies and improve our NATO reinforcement capability. In addition, prepositioning is costly because of the near term requirement to withdraw equipment from active and reserve units, [the] loss of force flexibility, and [the] impact on morale, training and readiness associated with these withdrawals. We can ill afford to bear these costs in face of the challenges we may have to meet in this decade.

Rather than expend additional scarce resources prepositioning equipment in several areas [where] we anticipate crises, I favor accelerating the acquisition and conversion of the SL-7 containerships, increasing our outsize airlift capability, and acquiring additional fast roll-on/roll-off ships. We need a serious and accelerated research and development program for Surface Effect Ships to give us a future capabili-

ty to rapidly project heavy forces worldwide and complement forces being airlifted. . . .

SENATOR EXON: . . . General Meyer as you know, there are a number of proposals already introduced in Congress to reinstitute some form of a GI bill. You have been supportive of additional educational benefits, and the test program enacted into law in last year's authorization bill included most of our suggestions, including authority to pass the benefits along to dependents. Have you decided on the specific provisions of a new GI bill that you think would work best?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes. There have been numerous congressional proposals that address a new form of GI bill. Thus far none of these fully satisfy the needs of all the Services. Within OSD, the Army is the proponent for this action and we have developed a GI bill proposal. The key features of the Army proposal are as follows:

1. Noncontributory education benefits available to all military personnel as a recruiting and retention enhancement. Provisions for active duty service members to transfer from VEAP and Vietnam Era bill with an obligation for service. In-service use authorized after completion of one year of service.

2. Benefits available only to those receiving an honorable discharge after completion of service.

3. Total program administered and basic benefits funded by the Veterans Administration.

4. Benefits earned at rate of one month of education entitlement for each month of active service up to a maximum of 36 months, [or] four academic years.

5. Basic benefit consists of a monthly entitlement of $300 for completion of less than 6 years of service; $600 per month for completion of 6 or more years of active service.

6. Transferability of unused benefits to dependents authorized after completion of ten years of active duty service while remaining on active duty; otherwise within ten years of retirement of service member.

7. Selected Reserve benefits authorized at half the active duty rate. Transferability option is not available to Reserve personnel.

8. Delimiting date for benefits is 10 years from service-member's final separation from service.

SENATOR EXON: Have you seen evidence of the effect of the test program authorized last year that is currently in effect?

Do you think Congress should wait for the results of those tests before enacting additional legislation?

GENERAL MEYER: The full test did not begin until December 1980. We do not have any evidence of the test effects yet. The test design is quite complicated and the results when complete may not prove to be conclusive. As I have testified before, I believe the Congress should immediately move to enact legislation for the institution of a GI bill.

SENATOR LEVIN: . . . .Do you consider the XM1 tank has proved itself sufficiently to permit its continued production at even higher rates? Do you consider that its technical problems have been solved or are well on their way to being solved? Please provide details in each area in which the XM1 has been criticized.

GENERAL MEYER: Yes Senator, I believe the Abrams tank is mature enough to proceed with higher production rates.

Our development and operational testing in 1978 and 1979 disclosed that some of the tank's components required further design maturity. This was reflected in unsatisfactory ratings in mission reliability, power train durability and track durability. Changes were made, and the Abrams tank was put through a demanding test at Fort Knox, Kentucky, from June to December 1979. That test demonstrated that the engineering design problems had been overcome except in the area of track durability. In the case of track durability, the engineers have concluded that we will not be able to meet our requirement until advances are made in the state of the art. . . .

Our current test program is demonstrating that the Abrams tank is meeting our expectations. . . .The majority of the tanks produced to date have been issued to the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry at Fort Hood, Texas, for our final operational test before fielding. . . .

## Hearing before the HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

On the FY 82 DOD Budget Allocation
4 February 1981

MR. HOPKINS: . . . do you think that we ought to escalate our presence in the Mideast and in the Indian Ocean? If so, why; an if not, why not?

GENERAL MEYER: I think it is long overdue. I have to make a comment which is slightly at odds with [Admiral Hayward]. . .and that is, that naval presence can sail away as easily as it came, and hence its presence does not necessarily spell commitment in bold letters to the countries there. Second, its presence is not necessarily visible to all the people in that area. We need to get access to facilities. And if we are serious about the . . . phase . . . that General Barrow talked about, we have to be able to support it, and that is going to require more visible presence in that area.

GENERAL JONES: . . . I would like to have General Meyer take the questions on personnel and the mental category, the retention of Army people, and the category of people, if you would.

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .Let me go to the . . . [alleged coverup of entrance test results] I do not believe there was a coverup on the part of the former Secretary for four years. . . .The data that we provided was the best the uniformed military had. It was what we believed accurate until about last January or February when displays of the new categorization were given to the Congress—before I saw them, I might add. Before that, we were getting signals from the field indicating a growing perception that many soldiers out there were more difficult to train. We told you that in committee. . . . We told other committees that an added 20 percent—an estimate based on what I was being told by NCO's in the field—over and above the normal 10 percent—were more difficult to train out there. Those were my first estimates from the sergeants, the only reliable source for that kind of answer. . . .I think you will find that, while we perhaps were not smart enough to translate those perceptions into hard data preceding the actual recategorization, at least the signals were coming to us. . . .

MR. HILLIS: General. . .My understanding is you recently appeared on "Good Morning, America" and said it would take a minimum of $44 billion over the next 4 to 5 years over and above the last administration's 5-year defense plan to build the Army into a modern, flexible force capable of meeting the Soviet threat in Europe and other contingecies. . . .

GENERAL MEYER:. . . When I appeared before this committee or the Subcommittee on Readiness last year I talked of the hollow Army, in the context of personnel availability and our ability to be able to support and sustain the Army, once it was projected. That continues to be the problem today.

We have a great army overseas in Europe . . . but only at the expense of all of the rest of the units back in the States . . . we simply do not have enough equipment to go around to provide for the other active divisions, the Guard, and Reserve. So the hollow Army was not just in the context of people, but equipment as well, which would permit the total force to be able to train and be sustained.

Let me talk about the major features of what I envisioned in my remarks on "Good Morning, America." They have to be interpreted as a measure of goals unachieved in the current 1981 and 1982 budgets . . . where dollars need to go to improve the readiness of the Army.



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. . . there is inadequate strength, military and civilian. I have already talked about the Reserve Components. They have to be brought up to strength, and we need an additional 10,000 civilians in fiscal year 1981 and another 20,000 in fiscal year 1982 to release soldiers and NCOs to go out and train soldiers and make other readiness improvements.

We need a better balance between combat support and combat service support—the wrench turners, the petroleum distribution trucks . . . and we need a compensation package that addresses retention of middle-grade leaders in an Army that has 43 percent of its force overseas. . . .

We have training base deficiencies which preclude us from giving any more than 7 weeks of training to new soldiers. That is inadequate time to soldierize a volunteer. The Marines have never been forced to cut their 12 weeks in basic training. I have to steal 1 extra week to get up to 8 weeks. We need more time to effect that transition from a volunteer to a trained and disciplined Soldier. . . .over time, we have been forced to cut back. Someone asked earlier what happens when you lose [operational and maintenance] funds. The answer is, you do not train.

In the equipment area I am talking about dollars to buy the equipment we seek at economic rates. That needs to be done. Part of the bill you have proposed lets us contract on a multiyear basis. We need to achieve qualitative parity in battlefield systems by 1985 to ensure that the American Soldier has as good a weapon as the Soviet soldier does by the time frame. Today, we are behind in many areas. Measures to help us catch up are included in that package.

We need to provide sufficient support across the board so that soldiers over in Europe don't run out of bullets and spare parts prematurely. That has to be done. There has to be that kind of balance.

We need to provide adequate resources in our mobilization base and in the industrial sector. That is part of the package. And we need to fix up our current facilities, especially in Europe where it is the highest priority item for General Kroesen. . . .

In the deployment area I have already indicated there is no sense having an Army or Marine Corps which grinds into the sands of Lejeune or into the sands of Fort Bragg or into the forests of Kentucky. We have to be able to project them somewhere, so I have included in my package the totality of strategic mobility: airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning necessary to offset the lift requirements for outsized loads, and so on. These are the major aspects of my proposal, which I can prioritize, if asked.

MR. BRINKLEY: . . . .General Meyer . . . Unfavorable readiness comparisons have been made between our forces in Korea and those in Europe. What lessons would you draw from the disparity of readiness between our forces in Korea and those in Europe?

GENERAL MEYER: The basic difference in Korea is that we have a relatively small element there and they are able to train day to day in a realistic environment to a far greater degree than those in Europe, using facilities and training areas made available to them by the Koreans.

MR. BRINKLEY: They are well disciplined, battle-ready in Korea?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes; I don't accept the premise that they are not ready in Europe, though.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, every scenario calls for them to fall back.

GENERAL MEYER: The question is, are they ready? That is different than the actions they might be forced to take upon initiation of war.

MR. BRINKLEY: What degree of importance would you attach to civil servants within the military, General Meyer?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: The U.S. Army is absolutely dependent upon its civil servants to ensure the sustainability of the force through our depot and base systems and to ensure the readiness of the force. They are an integral part of our capability. . . .

MR. LEATH: . . . General Meyer, in reading through your recent statement and some of the

comments that you have made today on Army requirements, I am delighted to see your concern about civilian manpower shortages.

Could you elaborate just a little further on the nature and extent of this problem?...

GENERAL MEYER: The main reason that I address civilians as an urgent priority is that [if] we want to have the most immediate beneficial effect on the readiness of our forces, that can be obtained by giving us additional civilian authorizations. Today in the Army, we have more than one division's worth of soldiers who daily are diverted to jobs normally authorized civilians. These are principally NCOs, which means at the same time we are trying to train an Army, we draw the NCO trainers away to work in supply rooms and other areas where things have to be done.

The immediate impact of additional civilian authorizations would be one of enhanced readiness. . . .While the other agencies of Government have shown growth in civilian manpower, the Defense Department has gone down, and that has had a direct impact on readiness of the force.

The Army is proposing an increase in authorized civilian end strength, and the Secretary and I are hopeful that the new Administration will support that increase. . . .

Regarding, contracting out and CITA (commerical-industrial type activities) that has had varying impact. On some installations, it reduces the flexibility of the commander to divert his civilian work force to handle a specific requirement. Contract civilians are there to run a specific function, like the laundry. With a civil service work force, he has a flexible force which he can apply across the base to provide additional help under mobilization.

We have to watch very, very carefully as we get into the contracting. The commanders out in the field are rightfully concerned about it. We have to watch that contracting does not degrade our mobilization capability.

MR. MONTGOMERY: What do you consider the single most pressing problem facing the U.S. Army today and what proposals would you make to our committee to solve this problem?

GENERAL MEYER: Unlike some of the other services, who can summarize a new capability in a single capital ship or bomber, successful land warfare requires that the Army pursue balanced improvements across all the functional areas: people, equipment supplies, procedures, and frequently assistance not under our direct control such as airlift and sealift. It would do us little good to argue for spare parts to improve readiness and not have the civilians to turn the wrenches; or economic buys of our key major systems, without ammunition to sustain those weapons, or viable reserve support units to move their supplies. So, while we must get on with modernization, if we do so without the structure to support it—the people to man it, or the lift to move and deploy it—what have we gained?...

In summary, my answer to your question cannot be easily synopsized. We must see balanced improvements across the range of pressing deficiencies. These will be presented to you in our supplement and amendment to the fiscal year 1981 and 1982 budgets—a careful enumeration of needs, individually not very glamorous, but which, in their totality, are geared to balanced improvement.

If forced to a single pressing need, then that answer would have to be expressed in the common denominator of dollars—about $50 billion over the 5-year program currently forecast within the Defense Department

MR. BAILEY: . . . One of the things that concerns me . . . is the lack of appreciation in our overall strategic thinking of a proper relationship between the role and function of ground forces, the kind of investments we make in that role, and the kinds of investments we make in other areas. . . .

GENERAL MEYER: . . . I agree with the basic thesis that you have outlined. I have contended that regardless of who had won the elections of the 4th of November, it was essential that the administration and the Congress understand that it is time to get serious about having ground forces, or tell me I should do something else in Pennsylvania—hunting or fishing or something else—because I am not going to stand around and preside over the demise of our ground capability. A serious approach requires a commit-

ment to the kind of ground force which is flexible, and which has the capability of going somewhere and staying there to a successful conclusion.

You have identified a very serious problem and one which I believe is the reason that Congress and the military many times talk past one another. We tend to talk in functional areas: How many tanks do you have, how many ships do you have, et cetera, not whether we can project power into a particular area . . . or whether we possess an adequate combination of Marines, Navy, Air Force, and Army, to do the things they have to do jointly in that area. I believe that is the only way that we can address the broad scope of how you get there, how you reinforce once you get there and how you stay there, and whether a Soldier with a rifle can, in fact, be placed on the ground where you need him. . . .

## Letter to the CONFERENCE OF THE ARMY'S DIRECTORS OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

27 February 1981

. . . the Army's civilian workforce is absolutely critical to the successful accomplishment of our mission. Consequently, we have embarked . . . on the gradual "ramping up" of our civilian strength. The administration has responded sympathetically, and I believe the Congress will follow suit. The case has been convincingly made that increases to our civilian end strength represent the best opportunity for short-term enhancement of our combat readiness. Thus far it appears that we will receive our requested increase of 10,000 in FY 81, and an additional increase of 16,200 in FY 82, for a total of 26,200 civilians. That's a source of gratification, a good sound beginning, *provided* we demonstrate that we can put all of our resources to good and effective use.

. . . the Congress has been made aware of the facts that over the past six years, despite a growing work load, our civilian strength has declined 12 percent:

- That readiness of the force today, and in the future through modernization, depends heavily on an adequately sized civilian structure keeping pace,

- That in many sectors managers have already made the most of in-house initiatives toward increased efficiency, and

- That the best evidence of the adverse civilian workforce trend is the daily diversion of thousands of soldiers to post, camp and station duties; a diversion which absents them from the urgent task of readying their units for war.

We've been heard, and we are getting help. The burden is now ours—to demonstrate effective implementation. There will not be a free lunch!

. . . .The increases have been targeted to those problem areas most vital to readiness improvements; wholesale logistics and accounts fed by borrowed military manpower. I expect all commands to attack these special areas so that we can build on a credible performance in our presentations to Congress in future years. . . .You and I both recognize the catastrophic results were I to return to the Congress two years hence and recite ills identical to those the Congress thought they had acted on this year.

I know I can count on your full support.

# Address to the
# ASSOCIATION OF GRADUATES, USMA FOUNDER'S DAY

West Point, New York
12 March 1981

At an earlier and more tender age it had been my impression that Founder's Day was a very specific date each year, sacrosanct on the calendars of West Pointers around the globe—sort of a major feast day. Instead, I find today it is one of the moveable feasts—like those of the minor saints of the Catholic Church—which permits me to pass many international date lines, coming to roost this year on five separate Founder's Day celebrations throughout the month of March: giving me the opportunity to share and renew, with groups such as this, a very special relationship with a very special institution. And to be at West Point is something very special. For here indeed is the home station of many ghosts of West Point Past whose achievements and wisdom help us keep the Army pointed on course in turbulent and unsettled times.

There is the ghost of a national prominence in football, the reality of which we will once again recognize because the image of a reliably victorious Army through reliably excellent performance on the athletic field is important.

There is the ghost of countless professional soldiers exhorting the nation to preparedness. . . .

There is the ghost of concerned professionals who seek to embue graduating cadets with the spirit of service that must mark our unique profession. There was a time once, you know, when the commission was not automatic with most diplomas. Now of course, we look for payback. Then we looked for commitment first. In part, the remarks to the graduating class of 1906 by the Army's Adjutant General, General Corbin, reflect the challenge laid down:

> ". . . during the leave which you are about to avail yourself of you should take pains to determine whether the Service appeals to you so fully that you are willing to give it your life's work. . . .the Service calls for many sacrifices and hardships. On the matter of compensation, your [daily wages] will be less for years to come than now paid skilled mechanics. Those entering the foot service will receive $3.89 per day, while mounted officers will receive $4.17 per day. The present pay per day of bricklayers is $6.00; of plasterers, $6.00, or carpenters and painters, $4.50. . . .[Our profession—that of soldiering] is a contract that should not be entered into lightly, and once made should be kept in letter and spirit." Of note, only one cadet declined service; and admirable service was the mark of that class; Wainwright, Andrews, Westover, and Chaffee being in their number.

Here at West Point today, you have the task of breeding that same devotion into youngsters who come to us from many environments. Our obligation must be to breed into them a thirst for a life that is in many important ways apart from the life-style of the society at large. The image of West Point, conveyed by General Pershing as the model for his forces in France, is one dimension of our responsibility. He said:

"The standards for the American Army (the AEF) will be those of West Point. The rigid attention, the upright bearing, attention to detail, uncomplaining obedience to instruction, required of the Cadet will be required of every officer and soldier of our armies in France."

Obviously the need goes deeper. We need intelligent officers as well who can think, and write, and speak. You'd be amazed how short the world is in those essential commodities. So our graduates need a good grounding in fundamental skills. Further they need an easy facility with numbers, with data, with automation, and the new orders of the physical, electronic, and social world.

They need to develop a personal sense of well-being and confidence as well—not focused on rewards conferred on them by someone else, but self-rewarding because what they seek and accomplish meets internal goals. There is too

much grief in today's Army because too many officers have been brought up to believe that only promotion or selection boards confer honor. I'd have to say that if we individually have to turn to boards and other fabricated measures for personal satisfaction—for a measure of our worth—then somehow we have sighted on the wrong target. By that measure, every one of us will be counted failures eventually.

It follows, then, that the most valuable thing we can give to our graduates is a sense of values—internalized—and hopefully fully compatible with the Army's ethic. Here at West Point we seek to imbed deeply in them an abiding faith in our motto of "Duty, Honor, Country." That will remain with them through a lifetme, as it does for all graduates. But we must ensure that their transition into an Army with many imperfections, an Army buffetted by value sets frequently at odds with the clarity of the Cadet motto, is not accompanied by only selective referral to it as the bedrock of professional behavior. That ethic must be understood and fully a part of us at every level of our operations—from the soldier on point, to the field commander, to the general officer in testimony to Congress. And it is bred into the Army as a whole, and understood, though a translation of sorts is necessary. Our individual tasks may differ, but our aims become congruent and our efforts as one through its application. It is in the transition from the idylic environment that is West Point to the realities of an Army that is less than perfect, and within a society that has little genuine regard in peacetime for those values which matter most to a fighting Army, that we as graduates must be most concerned. It is imperative that each of us, in every avenue open to us, demonstrate a oneness with the ideas of West Point, and the thorough compatibility of those values with the ethic that inspires an Army to devoted service.

Let me review the Army ethic as I see it, and its relationship to our motto at West Point. . . .

. . .My charge to West Pointers, wherever they serve today—active or retired—at the unit or on a staff, serving in the Army or in a joint or allied command—is to insure a continuing translation of the values of West Point into all the operating elements of our profession; to demonstrate in all that we do our abiding belief in their legitimacy; and to acknowledge with pride the strength we derive by being different in many was from the broader society about us. Our graduates must view models within the Army worthy of emulation. The alternative is their adoption of norms corrosive to a viable military establishment.

In the end, we all know that dollars can't create an Army. Our strength in crisis is derived from a distinctive ethic; one entirely compatible with the motto of our Alma Mater, and one which needs our watchful attention: selfless service, personal responsibility, loyalty to our units, and loyalty to our nation and its institutions, especially the United States Army. . . .

## Interview with
## MORLEY SAFER
## CBS Evening News Correspondent

Washington, DC
13 March 1981

QUESTION: Are you satisfied with the quality of the Army?

GENERAL MEYER: There were not enough high school graduates recruited last year to assure young professionals for the Army in the future. This year I am more hopeful. I am enough of the realist to know that in a period of economic need, in which young people are looking for jobs, that the army is attractve to them . . . so I'm not certain there are clear signals that we've solved the problem.

QUESTION: Does the state of the economy really make a difference? The reason I ask this is that a recent report cited Hawk crewmen failing their Skill Qualification Tests (SQTs) at an 85 percent rate, Artillery Crewmen at an 82 percent rate,

tracked vehicle mechanics at a 42 percent rate. This must make for a lot of sleepless nights.

GENERAL MEYER: . . . let me tell you about the statistics you're quoting . . . so you understand what is going on. Those statistics have to do with a new approach we're taking for evaluating the skills and abilties of individuals. . . .Like any internal test that you take, we're still trying to develop it and be sure we understand what it means. A factor that is very critical to those statistics is that during this period of time . . . we were critically short of NCOs and the Soldier who was supposed to learn had no one there to teach him. He was being taught by his peers. That's why we're workinq within the Army to retain NCOs, to fi11 back up that very critical part of the Army. Regardless of what kind of young people you bring in, if we don't have that critical mid-level NCO, we can't have an Army. . . .So what I'm telling you is; one, you have to be concerned and. two, they're more a function of the availability of teachers and trainers and a function of the test itself than they are of quality of Soldiers.

QUESTION: Where will you get NCOs who can read above the 5th grade level?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . if you look at a profile of the Army today, you'd find that as we reach the E-5 buck sergeant rank, we only have 5 percent who are not high school graduates or who have a GED equivalent. What that tells you is that those . . . who aren't up to the standards that we need . . . wash out I believe there's enough of a pool there to be able to keep the kinds of NCOs we need.

QUESTION: It could be argued that those with the least at stake in the society, the poor and the black, are charged with defending the others with the most at stake, the middle class and white. About half of the lower ranks in a couple of years time will be black or minority by 1983.

GENERAL MEYER: No. The surveys now are running about 30 percent, not half. Right now we're at 30 percent black in the active Army and 25 percent black in the Total Army. But let's go to the basic issue, and that is whether or not there is concern as to whether or not . . . there is a disproportionate demand on one segment of society. I think that is a very critical issue the nation as a whole has to decide—whether or not segments of society are not going to be [excused from a role in] the defense of the Nation.

QUESTION: Can you as a Soldier with your hand on your heart say the Army is better off, can get better material without the draft?

GENERAL MEYER: Better material without the draft? The answer is no I cannot. Let me make a critical point—I don't know what kind of draft you're talking about.

QUESTION: Any draft.

GENERAL MEYER: An unfair draft? A draft that only takes high school graduates? A draft that only takes college graduates? Only takes medics that we seriously need? Those are the kinds of things people don't talk about in specific enough terms. They talk in generalities. I've already told you what I think about it in generalities but I caution you that as the debate on the draft comes to a head, people in the country need to focus on specifics. . . .If we need skilled electronic engineers, do we go out and draft for those? If we need medics, do we draft for those? Those are the kinds of questions I think ought to be in the discussion. If you go to a *selective* service, it's going to have to be a selective service, in my judgment.

QUESTION: The current push these days is for some kind of Rapid Deployment Force, to accomplish something very quickly. The British seem to have achieved this. The Germans and Israelis seem tc have achieved this and have had spectular successes. Our one attempt failed—what went wrong?

GENERAL MEYER: First, you have two items confused. The RDF and counter-terrorist force are two totally different things.

QUESTION: You'd think they would rely on the same sort of men.

GENERAL MEYER: Not at all. The RDF may be ships at sea that provide presence in the Indian Ocean to prevent or deter war, whereas the counter-terrorist force requires surgical, specially skilled type people with capabilities that far ex-

ceed those of the average Soldier. The Germans have created that capability. The British created that capability, and *we* have created that capability ... [as] a result of the hostage rescue experience and the critique of its results. In my judgment, today we have a credible counter-terrorist capability that is the equal of the British and Germans.

QUESTION: Can't blame everything on dollars. How did the Armed Forces get to this state?

GENERAL MEYER: In the case of the Army, we reached our current situation as a result of the end of the Vietnam war and the introduction of the All Volunteer Force without a clear understanding of what an All Volunteer Force would do to the total fabric of an Army. As we went through that introduction, the various perturbations and aberrations started to pop up all over. And those kinds of things have taken inordinately long -- six to seven years—to be corrected. That is what we are in the process of doing at the present time.

QUESTION: Vietnam experience as an impact on morale.

GENERAL MEYER: I think it was the lack of support of the American people. I think that one of the greatest detractors from morale is the fact that a young man saw his brother come back, where previously they had invited him down to the bar in St. Mary's, Pennsylvania, and he wasn't given that same [recognition]. So the young brother or son said, I'm not sure I want to go into an Army where I'm not appreciated by the citizens.

QUESTION: Don't you think a lack of performance in Vietnam has something to do with today's recruiting problems.

GENERAL MEYER: I really don't think those actions that took place 12 years ago had any impact on an 18 year old who was 6 then. I think more important is what he heard from his brothers and uncles when they came back.

QUESTION: You saw traditional Army discipline decline in Vietnam?

GENERAL MEYER: Traditional Army discipline declined as the level of NCO leadership withered in Vietnam.

QUESTION: Have something to do with the lack of a victory?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . I'm not sure you could focus it on . . . whether there was success of failure. In units I was in—I happened to be very fortunate as I served the full time in the Ist Cavalry Division—there was a focus on each individual unit's definition of victory. So I'm not sure, outside of a company or platoon, that victory is sensed in [its] total context . . . more importance is placed in "did I survive today and did I do what I was charged to do?"

QUESTION: You don't think the shadow of Vietnam hangs over recruiting offices as far as dictating the quality of young men?

GENERAL MEYER: Only in the context I outlined. He's not certain he has the backing of the American people.

QUESTION: One chance for spectacular success would have been a successful mission in Iran. Why did it go badly?

GENERAL MEYER: I think the recommendations of the Holloway report outlined very critical [factors] that have to be taken into account in the future. There must be a joint organization in peacetime. That exists today. I think that was outlined in the Holloway Report as the prime reason for failure. This gets back to cohesion, people working together on a full time basis.

QUESTION: Wasn't it also bureaucratic, everyone trying to get their oar in the water?

GENERAL MEYER: To me, that is absolutely impugning the honor and patriotism of the military of this country—to think that anybody would want Soldiers to go off and be killed, or consider they go off and be killed, just to have your flag there. I can just assure you that as far as the Army is concerned, and I never heard anybody down in the JCS wanting their people to be involved in that particular operation because it was a very dangerous operation. All of this continued harping on inter-service desires to be somewhere, I can just tell you I haven't seen that in the JCS. . . .

QUESTION: If 100 percent is ideal, where does the Army stand today in percent of effectiveness?

GENERAL MEYER: My estimate is somewhere between 60-70 percent of what I would like to see. . . .Now that is effectiveness in people, equipment, sustainability, training and deployability.

QUESTION: How do the Soviets stand?

GENERAL MEYER: Against my standards of perfection, their category I units probably stand at 75 percent—others at 50-60 percent. . . .

## Address to the GENERAL JOSEPH W. STILWELL CHAPTER, AUSA

Fort Ord, California
16 March 1981

. . . Let me give you my grading of your Army today on a scale of A to failure. The highest grade I would give in the B-plus area is to the forward deployed units around the world and in the rapid deployment force, where we have been able to keep them up to strength in people, modern equipment, and sufficient NCO's to do the job. . . .

The reinforcing forces [fall] in the C to D category, with a few F's, particularly in the combat and combat service support area.

. . . our sustaining and mobilization capabilities . . . [get] the lowest grades at the present time because we do not have the . . . capability that is necessary to ensure that once we commit Soldiers into combat that we are able to sustain them for the period of time that we feel is necessary. . . .

## Hearing before the SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE Subcommittee on Defense On the FY 82 Posture of the Army and Department of the Army Budget Estimates

18 MARCH 1981

SENATOR GARN: The subcommittee will come to order. . . .

The amended fiscal year 1982 budget request for the Army is $52.6 billion. This is $9 billion over fiscal year 1981 and is a $7.6 billion increase over the January 1981 budget request. In addition, a fiscal year 1981 supplemental of $2.6 billion is requested. . . .

GENERAL MEYER: I would just make a few comments in opening.

First, I believe that we are truly at a watershed as far as our Armed Forces are concerned: now is the time when we have to decide what role the Armed Forces are to play and how they're to be structured right into the 21st century. . . .

So this is a critical period for the military, the civilian leadership and the Congress. We must have a clear vision of where we're going so that we can go there together; and we must understand that we have to have a long term commitment to whatever we decide to do.



★ ★ ★ ★

The Army can be designed many different ways at this critical instance in history. We're just now in the beginning of a massive modernization program, a program delayed as a result of Vietnam, and delayed as a result of our research and development We have the opportunity now to design the type of Army this country needs for the decade ahead, and we're ready to do that.

I think we often forget when we define the Army as "hollow," as I did last year, that we truly have strengths in that Army. We have forward deployed forces today which are up to strength and are able, at least initially, to go into combat.

Our elements in the Rapid Deployment Force—our ranger units, our airborne units, our air assault units, our infantry and mechanized units are all up to strength and have been given high priority.

We've got a strong cadre of dedicated noncommissioned officers and officers. There is an acceptance now in the Defense Department, that you don't need an Army armed solely with tanks that are going to grind up the earth in Central Europe; that there has to be a flexible capability in land forces. That acceptance provides great opportunities for us. . . .

As a result of World War II, we learned that unity and cohesion evolve from people staying together for long periods of time.

We're about to change our personnel system from a system which moves individual people around to a system in which we will form units and keep those units together for extended periods of time. This budget begins that program of trying to develop cohesion and unity within our organizations.

In our statement I outlined what this budget does and does not do. I did that for couple of reasons but principally because we need to have a constancy of purpose. If we just have a perturbation for a year or two, we're going to waste money. We're going to have money up front that isn't continued on out, and when that happens we're going to have to winnow down on the plans, and we're going to waste money. There has to be a commitment over time, and that's particularly critical at this point. Now, the Army has some things that it has to do well. We have to turn out trained, disciplined, physically fit soldiers who are able to work together as units. Our efforts in this budget are focused on doing that.

Since the rest of society will not receive the increased resources that we will next year, we realize that someone is going to look at everything we spend. How we go about spending those dollars and efficiently using those resources is an immense responsibility. We're ready to accept that responsibility. And we can talk about contracting and some of the other proposals which we think make sense in this area.

I will just leave you with the thought that this truly is an Army in transition at this instance in history. And with the Congress we intend to transition it into the right kind of Army for the decades ahead—so that we can deter war. . . .

That's all, Mr. Chairman.

SENATOR GARN: Thank you, General.

Looking back over the last 10 years, it would appear to me, and particularly the last 6 as I've been involved in military budgets, one of the things you just touched on has been incredibly serious, and that is, the stop and go nature, the overall budget reductions over the last 10 years have been harmful.

But would you agree that even possibly more harmful is the fact that there's been no consistency?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: Absolutely, it delays the introduction of weapons systems. But it's our fault as well as others. I mean, the Army has been equally as culpable in laying out requirements and then changing those requirements. We've been equally as culpable as industry, as the different administrations, and as the Congress where special interests have come up. And that's why I think it's so important, right now, that we get an agreement between the Congress, the administration, and the military on where we're going, and then insist on some constancy. You'll get more defense for the dollar if you do that.

SENATOR SCHMITT: On the modernization of equipment issue you are quite right. There is

a great need to get modern equipment down to the Guard and Reserves, and that has not been done in the past. There will be some, and I emphasize some, improvement of that in fiscal year 1980, but that is an area of great need.

GENERAL MEYER: Yes. Let me talk specifically about the New Mexico National Guard.

SENATOR SCHMITT: I only bring it up as an example.

GENERAL MEYER: No, I understand. But it's one of the prime examples, because, with the 40-millimeter air defense system which they have is the most obsolete unit we have in the Army today, as it turns out. And that happens to be so because of the overall lack of air defense equipment that's been brought into the Army.

We just literally have been operating since World War II in an environment in which we have not provided air defense over the battlefield. What you have in New Mexico are the weapons systems that came out of the Korean War and that's all there is. And, unfortunately that's not much different than it is in the Active force, although in the forward deployed units in Europe we do have the Hawk and other newer systems. . . .

Last year we put together a coherent air defense program. And we have finally pushed it through. We got full funding support for it from the Congress last year and we got full support from the administration for it for the first time this year.

Now, I don't know when I'm going to be able to provide those "duster" battalions down in New Mexico with new or at least once-phased-out equipment; but we're coming up with a program to train them on the equipment down at Fort Bliss. . . .

What we do is just what we do with the Active; we give first priority to those units we think will have to go to war first, and a lower priority to the others. . . .

SENATOR HUDDLESTON: With regard to NATO and the Rapid Deployment Force, is it contemplated that we can maintain the current personnel strength in Europe and at the same time provide adequate personnel for an effective Rapid Deployment Force?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, that's a very hard question to answer honestly. I don't mean, honestly. It's easy tp answer honestly, but it's a hard question to answer.

SENATOR HUDDLESTON: I wouldn't expect you to answer any other way.

GENERAL MEYER: No, I know that. That's why I changed that wording very quickly. We currently have inadequate total land forces, counting both the Army and Marines—I always look at the total land forces, to include Active and Reserve. They're inadequate to respond to contingencies all around the world.

The forces that we have today in the United States to reinforce NATO are the same forces we have to commit to the Middle East or the Persian Gulf, or anywhere else the Rapid Deployment Force should have to go. This includes many of the Reserve component forces that we've talked about which are required to provide early combat support and combat service support to NATO if we go to war there. . . . We have just drawn down in Europe, and are keeping it at about 98 to 100 percent of its authorized strength—they were overstrength. We did that so that we could increase the capability of the Rapid Deployment Force, particularly with NCO's. . . .

We haven't yet said "OK, if the United States is only going to have an Army of 780,000 and a Marine Corps of less than 300,000—that is 19 Active divisions and 9 Reserve divisions—are we able to maintain our overseas committment at its current level"?

In the Army, for example, we have 43 percent of our operating forces overseas. . . .Now, whether we can continue that for much longer, I'm not sure. That's why I say it's so involved—in politics, as to what takes place in Europe, the signals we send and everything else. But we're now operating right at the margin as to whether or not we can keep our base here and also keep those high force levels overseas.

SENATOR HUDDLESTON: Is there any suggestion that by beefing up our nuclear capability

in Europe that that would reduce the personnel requirement there?

GENERAL MEYER: We've never looked at it, if you mean reducing the conventional requirement there.

SENATOR HUDDLESTON: Right.

GENERAL MEYER: We have to be consistent with the NATO strategy, which is conventional defense first, then tactical nuclear, and then strategic. So at the present time that would be inconsistent with the strategy, but it is something that I'm sure needs to be looked at as part of this debate. . . .

SENATOR ANDREWS: In the *Washington Post* on March 3 there was a big article about Elmer Staats, whom we've all known for a long time, his retirement, and he had some remarks he made in this article about the Pentagon and Pentagon waste. And it isn't that this is atypical; the trouble is it is typical. We keep hearing more and more about Pentagon waste. . . .

One paragraph that caught my eye is the paragraph that pointed out where he said in 1972 you got started on your supertank, the M-1. The cost was to be $507,000 a copy. By January 1980 when the GAO report warned that the tank's reliability was uncertain, the unit cost had more than tripled to $1,651,000. Now the estimated unit cost has shot up to $2,549,000. Meanwhile, the GAO is still reviewing the reliability and other aspects of the M1.

This kind of article coming from a credible source has a devastating effect on people all over the country. Could you briefly touch on this but mainly expand on it for the record so that we have some answers when we go to the floor with this bill?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: I'm just going to give you a brief summary. . . .

The original cost estimates were made in 1972 dollars. If you bought something in 1972 for $1, as a consumer, it's going to cost about $4.61 in 1988. Since the year 1988 is what they're talking about, the 1988 cost—purely from inflation of the original 1977 cost estimate—would be $2.4 million. So there is a difference of only about $600,000 which is attributable to changes and variations over time in the numbers we were going to buy and the way we were going to buy them. And those changes were driven by us, by the administration, and by the Congress. . . .

The original estimates made in 1972 were mainly based, as you know, on inflation indices predicted at that point in time, and they were just off by that much. So—you can tell your constituents, of that added amount, all but $600,000 is inflation. And that $600,000 is due to adding things we needed to add, plus some inefficiencies as a result of the stretchouts. . . .

SENATOR SCHMITT: That describes the programmatic management changes overall in your R&D program. . . And speaking of that, it's been said, and I'd like your comments, that the way this country can neutralize large numbers of vehicles and other types of equipment, even manpower, that the Soviets and their allies might employ against us is through the use of lower cost vehicle destruction systems. If you can destroy 1,000 tanks with low cost systems, you don't need 1,000 tanks to go up against them. How do you react to that and what is the Army doing, if anything, to implement that?

GENERAL MEYER: There are low cost solutions to vehicle destruction. Most of them are in the area of scatterable mines, and in the area of certain kinds of precision guided munitions, but they may not be considered cheap as you go into procurement.

SENATOR SCHMITT: No, but they are cheaper than a tank.

GENERAL MEYER: They're cheaper than a tank. But what a tank provides you is not just a means of killing another tank. It's the ability to move firepower around on a battlefield—

SENATOR SCHMITT: No, I'm not arguing. I think you need a strong tank force, more than you have asked for, as a matter of fact.

GENERAL MEYER: Right. My concern has been that proponents of the line you postulate, without thinking it through, are pushing more cheap, dirty weapons that don't work. All I want

is to ensure that the Soldier gets the right weapon, and that it works. I believe we need to go for lower-cost systems that do the job, and can be mixed in, but they need to work. . . .What we give the Soldier has to be adequate to the task. . . .

SENATOR GARN: What kind of military support from our NATO allies is assumed in the budget request? Are we really going to insist on the 3 percent real increase for our NATO allies.

GENERAL MEYER: The administration has been using different terms to identify whether or not we support the 3 percent. I believe there will be efforts to hold their feet to the fire on a meaningful link. I hope it's at the 3 percent. Let me talk to some of the significant . . . things that are very important to us now. . . . we rely very heavily on host nation support by the Germans to be able to fight in Europe. You heard me say before that one of our biggest shortfalls is combat support and combat service support: the wrench-turners, the ammo carriers, and the petroleum, oil and lubricants carriers. There is support in this budget for some 90,000 host nation support personnel that will actually be organized by the Germans be made available to support both the Army and the Air force in the areas that I've outlined. . . .

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Focus

18 March 1981

In several past. . .letters, I have stated and restated my concern with focusing on training and maintaining. I have indicated my discouragement that training has not been the centerpiece of your programs, as I believe it must be if we are to improve the Army's state of readiness. . . .But I continue to come up against situations in which it is quite clear that either you don't believe me or you haven't been able to get the word down to the brigade and battalion commanders so that they believe us.

Attached is one example, a list of topics and criteria one colonel commander intended to use to evaluate his subordinate commanders. Nowhere is training even addressed, except in the most oblique terms. A list such as this subverts the whole system we are trying to establish . . . no wonder that captains, lieutenants and sergeants don't believe we know what we are doing. If we preach training, maintaining and getting ready to go to war, and then publish lists upon which subordinates are to be evaluated that focus on everything but, then we clearly are two-faced.

Additionally, such a list is likely to force pressures on our officers to be dishonest—a situation we cannot tolerate.

Those of you who *touch* Soldiers and civilians are the only ones who can ensure that we focus properly on the critical factors essential for success on future battlefields.

## Hearing Before the HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

Subcommittee on Defense
On the FY 82 DOD Appropriation: Army Posture
1 APRIL 1981

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .You will find in the posture statement, which the Secretary and I jointly sent to you, no big ships, no big new airplanes, no big strategic systems. The things that we have in there are the solid things that are necessary to improve the readiness of the Army to provide a solid base. . . .

Our program is designed to provide a firm base for 1981 and 1982, so that as this administration takes a look at what it wants its armed forces to do in the next two decades, that the Army can launch from a solid base instead of a hollow one.

That is what the 1981 Supplemental and the 1982 Amended budgets do as far as the Army is concerned. . . .

MR. MURTHA: . . . .But you are satisfied that your proportion is adequate?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .in general, the Army would say that the program is adequate. I continue to be concerned personally, however, that we have not equipped the Reserve, and we see no near-term solution to manning the Guard and Reserve. Those problems are not solved by this budget. . . .we could use additional dollars to begin to solve some of those problems.

So, while it may be a fair share of the budget, I continue to be more impatient, I guess, than the Army Staff on how quickly we can fill the holes.

MR. MURTHA: General Meyer, what do you think about a need for the draft in the Army?

GENERAL MEYER: I believe that it is possible, with the GI Bill, to get enough volunteers—and you could change the pay structure along the lines you have outlined so that you don't pay the incoming young person as much as the careerist, because he would get the difference in deferred payment through the GI Bill. So if you change the compensation package to focus on the middle-grade leader and less on the new people, I believe it is possible to get the cross-section for the Active Component, along the lines Mr. Marsh has proposed.

But that will not solve the total force requirement. I don't see a near-term solution to the total force requirement short of some form of conscription. . . .

MR. EDWARDS: . . . That leads me into this eternal question of readiness. . . What is the ideal situation in the Army?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .in a perfect world—and if you thought you were going to war at any instant—you would want to keep all of your units at C-1. However, in my judgment, that would be very wasteful in manpower and in other areas. What we try to do is to decide how ready we think the units have to be, whether they might have to go to war in a week or two weeks or three weeks. Simply, that is how we determine what resources they get. If it is a late deploying Guard or Reserve unit that might have five or six weeks to prepare, they need not be as ready, either in equipment or in manpower as a unit which is [forward deployed and expected to] fill the gap immediately.

So, the answer to the question is basically that the units should be at a readiness condition equal to what we expect them to be able to do, based on the equipment and the manpower we give them. That works out to high readiness for some units—like Rangers, counterterrorist units, some of the Rapid Deployment Forces, the strategic forces. . . .

MR. ROBINSON: May I . . . ask whether or not you place as much credence on high school graduate[s] as other Chiefs do?

GENERAL MEYER: . I place more. As a matter of fact, I can tell you that when I became Chief of Staff, I wrote to the Governor of every state and asked that they permit our counselors access to the high schools. At that time, they were only permitted into 50 percent of them. We now are able to get into all but a few.

We have gone to all the counselors and explained to them why it is unfair at a job fair in a high school, for example, to have the Health, Education and Welfare people come in and talk about loans, and not permit us to be there and at least explain to young people what the opportunities are in the military.

So, do I want high school graduates? Yes, and I believe we have been out front trying to break the doors down. The other services haven't had to get in like that because they have attracted the high school graduates without it. It just happens to be a nicer life living on an airfield than it is down in the mud. . . .

I am going to knock on wood here, because I don't know if it is a function of the economy or our own labors, but so far, we are well up into 70

percent this year on recruiting high school graduates. I hope it is through our efforts, but I am sure there is a combination of economic factors there as well.

I have said that if we are not able to get what I consider to be an adequate number of quality soldiers to man the force, I will go to the Secretary and recommend that we reduce the end strength to whatever it is we are able to get.

As for the careerist, we have much less of an NCO shortage than the Navy, which is short about 20,000 petty officers. We still have a shortage of about 3,000 to 4,000 NCOs. . . .We will still be about 3,000 short, even with this budget, and they are the critical infantry, artillery, air defense, and armored NCO's.

MR. ROBINSON: . . . .In your opinion, do the M60A3 sales, the FMS sales, have an adverse impact on the readiness of U.S. troops?

GENERAL MEYER: . We have been called upon to give M60A3s to . . . two countries where it had an adverse impact upon our readiness. In each case, it was a decision made by the Secretary of Defense. . . .

. . . however, in general, requests for foreign military sales—FMS—for the M60A3s, have a good impact on our overall capability because they keep the production line running. If it were nor for foreign military sales, our M60 line would have closed already. . . .

MR. MURTHA: . . . in Europe, . . . you have the communications systems . . . close to the front. We have so few defense missiles and fighters compared to their attack aircraft. If you knock out the communications systems, which seems so vulnerable to me . . . and then you go after the POMCUS system, with either chemicals or any kind of a weapon, we have lost supplies for 100,000 troops.

GENERAL MEYER: That is a very critical point. Pre-positioned sets of equipment don't make much sense once the war starts. The only role they play is the ability to increase our capability prior to the war. Once the war starts—and each of you has to make judgment as to how much warning time you think we are going to have—it's almost too late to fall in on it and get it out. If you cannot do it prior [to] that time, it doesn't make much sense. That is how I put the upper limit on how much to POMCUS. That is also why I say the Army ought not to station equipment over there if there is inadequate lift to get the people there to get it out within—and this is my personal judgment [deleted]. If you cannot do it [deleted] after your start to mobilize, then it doesn't make much sense.

MR. MURTHA: All right then, tie the two together, tie the SL-7s into the pre-positioned question.

GENERAL MEYER: The SL-7s are . . . an option to pre-positioning for they permit you to get x number of divisions over there in the same amount of time as with POMCUS, or they provide you the capability to add additional divisions over and above what you get with POMCUS. . . .

MR. MURTHA: What I am thinking about is how much equipment and supplies do we have pre-positioned right now?

GENERAL MEYER: . Right now we are in the process of filling up four division sets of equipment. . . .

MR. MURTHA: How does the SL-7 fit into the POMCUS for four divisions? Would they take troops over?

GENERAL MEYER: Everything with POMCUS goes by air. Troops go by air because all their equipment is there, with the exception of a few items. Then they fall in on the tanks and the other equipment, load them up, put ammo aboard them, and move them out to the general assembly area. We made a commitment to NATO that we would be able to get ten divisions there by mobilization (M) day [deleted]. The SL-7s will permit us to do that—if we have four pre-positioned sets for four divisions already there, and two divisions that can move [deleted] SL-7s, then we can get ten divisions over there. . . .So, it provides an alternative to additional POMCUS. It says you could meet your NATO commitment in [deleted] without pre-positioning two additional sets. . . .

MR. MURTHA: Okay. So instead of pre-positioning—

GENERAL MEYER: . Instead of sets five and six you could do it with SL-7s. That is an alternative.

MR. EDWARDS: A good alternative?

GENERAL MEYER: We are committed to NATO to pre-position sets five and six. . . .We are committed to those sets in our long-term development plan to NATO, so you have to look at it from both the military aspects and from the political.

The part that is bad militarily, is that if the equipment is there but you cannot get the people over to fall in on it in time, then you are making a mistake.

Right now we have it out of sync. We have most of the equipment over there, but we don't have the aircraft to get us over in the [deleted]. . . .That is why I say what you decide to do with airlift, what you decide to do with sealift, what you decide to do with pre-positioning all has to [fit]. . . .You cannot have us ahead in pre-positioning without the capability to lift the people.

MR. MURTHA: Aren't you also talking about much more flexibility with sealift? Not only Europe. It seems to me the Middle East is the area we have to be concerned about. Because of the command structure and the problems you have in Europe, it just seems more logical to me as an alternative to go to the sealift rather than putting these other two POMCUS supply divisions, or divisions supplied for.

GENERAL MEYER: The answer again is, if you had all of the equipment you needed, we wouldn't even be discussing this. We would have enough equipment to put into war reserves, enough to put in pre-positioning, and enough back here for that division to go wherever it needed to go by sealift. So, what you are talking about is an interim solution. What I am saying is that the interim solution is to go with sealift. . . .

MR. YOUNG: . . . We had been talking about the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force—pre-positioning, the assignment of not only forces but materiel. You said there were contingency plans that you would prefer to discuss in the closed session. Would you be willing to discuss those plans at this point?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir. Today we have designed a corps force of about 120,000 troops. It consists of the 82nd Airborne Division; the 24th Mechanized Division, which is at Fort Stewart; the 101st Airborne Divison (Airmobile), which is at Fort Campbell; the 194th Armored Brigade, which is at Fort Knox; and several others, to include a corps support command and corps headquarters both, from Fort Bragg.

Those units . . . along with some Guard and Reserve units needed to round them out are provided to General Kelley for planning. It gives him a capability of heavy forces, of airborne forces, of air assault forces or any combination thereof. So, it gives him a broad capability to plan for whatever contingency arises, whether it be countering the Soviets or whether it be instability within one of the countries in Southwest Asia. So, it provides him with that breadth of capability. . . .

We are also charged with supporting the Marine elements, about a brigade of which has been committed to the RDF. . . .

The questions of whether or not we have forward facilities, and where they are to go, and what is to go in those facilities, are still issues, which . . . have to be clearly identified . . . by this new Administration. They must decide what our goals and objectives are for Southwest Asia. I hope that as a result of General Haig's visit to Southwest Asia next week, that we will begin to develop the outline of what we want to do there. . . .

MR. YOUNG: Excuse me. You say they do have pre-positioned supplies there?

GENERAL MEYER: No, there is none there. That is another issue that needs to be addressed. At the present time there is nothing pre-positioned over there.

MR. YOUNG: Except aboard the ships.

GENERAL MEYER: Except aboard the ships. . . .

MR. YOUNG: . . . .units that are dedicated for Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force . . . include Reserve units, National Guard units?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir.

MR. YOUNG: What is the state of readiness of those Reserve or National Guard units?

GENERAL MEYER: The Guard units are not at the state of readiness that I want them. We have dollars in this budget to improve the readiness of early deploying Reserve Component units with such things as repair parts, chemical defense, binoculars, tool sets, trucks, generators, water trailers, communications equipment—the basic things that they need.

For example, you see forklifts in the budget. The kinds of units we are talking about are principally support type units. So they need the kinds of things that will permit them to offload ships for the Marines and those kinds of things.

The Reserve port units, for example, are in excellent shape. We are able to maintain a high state of readiness in our port units. On the other hand, the units that do [deleted] are in a poor state of readiness. We are working on those trying to build them up. But the bottom line is that the Reserve Component units are sort of a smorgasbord—some are in good shape; some in not such good shape.

MR. YOUNG: What would be the drill, then, if RDJTF were missioned this afternoon, and your officers who are dedicated to that, would they be able to deploy with those Reserves or would they have to deploy without them as of today?

GENERAL MEYER: Today, they would be able to deploy with most of the Reserves because we could invoke the 100,000 [man] call-up, and we could bring in some additional Reserve units to round out, if you will, some of those that are short. Our Forces Command Commander has a plan to do that. So until we are able to build up these units to their full strength, we will have to do it through a jerry-rigged sort of way by using all the resources we have.

MR. YOUNG: . . . .But someone has to make a decision on what the relative command structure is going to be in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. I am personally interested in your viewpoint, your opinion as to how much fragmentation there can be in the force of this type and still have successful operating units.

GENERAL MEYER: I want to assure you first that the JCS did make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense some six or seven weeks ago on a proposal for that organization. So now it is being determined at that level. . . .

Let me tell you the factors that have to be taken into account in making the decision.

One is geography. You have to look at the map and determine what area of the world you want to focus on; that is, do you want this Rapid Deployment Force to be able to respond in Africa, in Latin America, or do we need a force solely dedicated towards Southwest Asia because of its criticality for the next five years. I happen to personally believe in the latter. So that leads you in one direction. . . .

A second factor which you have to take into account, after geography, is the command and control mechanisms—who is in charge of that area? At the present time, our European Command has responsibility for all contingency plans in Southwest Asia. They are responsible for that. So you have to look at that. . . .

Then you have to look at the most critical part of it and that is how is it going to be supported. You have to look at the support responsibilities and from where the bulk of the support will come from for the air, land and sea forces that we deploy.

In this instance, some of it will flow from Europe, and some of it will flow from the Pacific. So, we are at that juncture in terms of support.

Finally, you have to take a look at where the forces are going to come from. The bulk of the Rapid Deployment Forces are going to come from the United States. . . .

So, those are the factors that you need to take into account [to] come up with a decision. I believe . . . that the ideal solution is a separate unified command for that area. That ought to be

our goal, our ultimate objective. The problem with that is there is no place to put the command over there at the present time. . . .Putting them on board a ship isn't going to work because you have to take the people off every 30 to 60 days. You need something continually focused on the area. So, I think the ultimate objective we ought to be working towards is a separate unified command.

In the interim, it seems to me that one of the existing Commanders-in-Chief—CINCs—ought to be given command responsibility and have the Rapid Deployment Force here in the States work for him, assigned that geographical area for training, or for execution if needed.

MR. YOUNG: Do you have a recommendation of which CINC it should be?

GENERAL MEYER: I do. i made it to the Secretary of Defense. The Chiefs have avoided saying which. But those are factors I took into account as I made my recommendation to the Secretary, and since I have made it to him—until he makes up his mind, I really feel I would be preempting him.

MR. PRESTON: . . . .In your statement, you make reference to the Army's role in counterterrorism. Could you tell the committee what you feel the Army's role to be, and specifically what Army forces or units are dedicated to that role, what part of the Army's budget is dedicated to that role, and how you see the Army's role developing in this area.

GENERAL MEYER: This is a very sensitive area. Therefore, I will answer only generally, and then if the committee has a few people that it would like to have more knowledgeable on the matter, I think the Defense Department can arrange it. . . .

First, we have developed an Army element for a counterterrorist force. We created it two-and-a-half years ago, right after Entebbe. We created it out of an existing [deleted].

This information is very close-hold. I don't even know if I should cover any of it in here, since it so very close hold. I will ask the chairman how he wants to handle it—perhaps we should go off the record. . . .

. . . Just let me say in general that we have created a capability to assist as part of a joint task force. There has been an announcement that there is a joint task force which addresses counterterrorism. We have an element of that force. I guess that is the better way to answer for now. . . .

The Army's role in counterterrorism, as is the role of all the services, at the present time is proscribed by law to be extraterritorial, that we cannot operate within the United States except by the President waiving the *posse comitatus* law.

If terrorism expands, and unfortunately, I believe it will in the future, then there may be a point in time when it becomes prudent to take a look at whether or not the existing military counterterrorist force [deleted].

That needs to be addressed and we are doing so in an interagency agreement.

MR. PRESTON: It is done that way in many countries of the world today.

GENERAL MEYER: It is done in almost every country except our own [deleted]. . . .

# Address to the
# GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL ROTC AWARDS CONFERENCE
## Virginia Military Institute

Lexington, Virginia
15 April 1981

This is an exciting time to be in the United States Army. Part of that excitement came to me on Inauguration Day, the 21st of January, as I was standing there as the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Commander-in-Chief was standing beside me as we reviewed Army troops passing by. We had a National Guard unit from South Carolina, an Army Reserve unit from the Washington-Maryland area, an Active Army unit from the 82nd Airborne Division—wearing maroon berets, incidentally. As I stood there, I listened to the band playing the Army Song and here, beside me, was the President of the United States singing all the words to the "Caissons Go Rolling Along." I want to tell you that that does something for an Army heart, particularly after having the previous five presidents always singing "Anchors Away" when the Army Chief of Staff stood beside them. Things are looking up. . . .

I thought I would talk a little about the Army, today and tomorrow—focusing on what you can expect to happen to you in your career in the Army.

Remember, this is 1981, and most of you, on December 31, 1999, as we enter the twenty-first century, will be thirty-nine years old—just exactly my age! You need to think through the next nineteen or twenty years. . . .

Having read the syllabus of what is being covered this week, I know that you are all experts on national security and strategy, and all the broader issues that have to be considered. If you came away with the conclusion that the next ten or twenty years are going to be a period of challenge and continuing change, a period of crisis and confrontation, you have the right view. The dominant area of all of these—change, challenge, confrontation, and crisis—will be the change. It is going to have a continual impact on your life, on the Army and our nation. . . .

If you look back on history, you realize that we used to identify change, to title it by eras, by ages, such as the Age of Industrial Revolution or the Ice Age. Later we began to think in terms of centuries. When we published a White Paper on the Army, outlining where we wanted to go, we spoke in terms of a decade. But I am not sure you can even think in those terms . . . because the half-life of technology, the half-life of other social, political, and economic factors that have an impact upon the type of Army and society we are going to have, is going to be compressed more and more. . .

Change is going to dominate most of what we do within the Army. . . .

First of all, we are going to be going through major organizational changes that take into account the introduction of new equipment. These changes will not be limited to the unit that you are in, but will also occur in the units on your right and your left, the units in the Guard, in the Reserve, and in allied armies as well. . . .There will be changes in the way which these units are doctrinally and tactically employed that will require a tremendous amount of continuing study by each and every one of you—far more than was necessary for these rather senior people sitting up in the front rows here. When we were handed a rifle in our first platoon, our tasks were relatively simple. The rifle really has not changed, but if you look at what an infantryman is likely to have to master today, with lasers and other things, it is far more complex than when Lt. Meyer joined his unit in 1951.

The complexity extends beyond the number of major items in our units today. Whether you are going to a tank battalion or an artillery unit, you are first going to have to find out what kind of tank it has, and what kind of an artillery piece it has, because units are going to be differently equip-

ped during this time-frame. We will be transitioning to the Abrams tank through the rest of this century, but at any one time there will be at least five markedly different main battle tanks in the inventory. . . .That is going to have an impact on the way in which we train. It will have an impact on the demands we place on individual soldiers and individual leaders, to ensure that we are able to train units with different pieces of equipment in a way that they are able to interact with one another on the battlefied. This is a far more complex training challenge than we have had to contend with in the past.

In the area of combat support, . . . you will see an increase in the requirements and demands of maintenance. The more sophisticated equipment will require revised maintenance routines, changing many of the ways in which we go about handling parts resupply, maintenance techniques and standards. If you are a maintenance officer in a direct support or general support battalion, there will be periods of time when you will be working with many different pieces of equipment requiring different mechanical skills and training levels. We will have to orchestrate the equipment, the tactics, and the training of our people properly. It is going to be both difficult and challenging.

While we are doing that, we will have to look carefully into the broader area of mobilization—an area in which I would have to say the Army today is well ahead of most of the other elements of government. Here again, we have to look at not just the mobilization of the United States, but also at the mobilization capacity of other closely allied nations of the world.

I just came back from Argentina, and I found down there an outstanding plant that is producing tanks. If we were to go to war tomorrow, they have the kind of tank that I would be happy to hand to one of you, to take off and do business. We have to know where those war resources are, and how we would go about mobilizing all the assets of the Free World—know how to interact with them, not ignore them—not rely solely upon the industrial base of the United States. This is particularly so today, considering the condition in which we find the production base here in our country.

Let me mention very quickly one key issue in the personnel area, that of man-machine interface. We are going to have to go through a period of trial and error to determine whether or not the people that we are able to bring into the force are able to perform with the new equiment. In my judgment, we will be successful, but that is something we have to work our way through. You will have to help us with that, as we introduce new equipment into the force, because you are the ones who are going to grapple very directly with making our technology work for us. You are going to be involved in its deployment, in the development of our tactics and doctrine, and most importantly, with the impact of the various programs on our people.

[Intertwined] with all of this change, one area that we are focusing on is the development of an American-style regimental system that can provide us stabilization—an ingredient vital to the creation of cohesiveness within our units. In spite of the changes that we are going to experience, if the individuals in our units can have a sense of belonging, a sense of awareness and understanding of the needs of their fellow Soldiers within the squad, platoon, and company, then we have a better chance of coping successfully with change. . . .

What I paint for you is an Army in transition, an Army facing dramatic change. . . .it is going to be an exciting period, one in which innovation will only be restricted by you at the level at which you operate. Remember, you are going to be working at platoon, company, and battalion levels during that period of time. Some of you may get up to brigade or regimental level in nineteen years, but . . . at any level you are operating, you will have great impact upon the Army. That is the outline of the challenge that I envision.

Let me talk [to] some of the basic qualities that are going to be essential in that environment. . . .We have been criticized in the area of values and ethics . . . of being rudderless in the area of values. I believe that a professional ethic . . . must be internalized individually by each of us. We must possess a set of values that instinctively guide our decisions. It is not good enough to have a checklist. . . .

As we examine the life of George Marshall, it is clear that he had ingrained in him a very deep sense of values. He had an understanding of the importance of selfless service. He epitomized

loyalty to the organization and the unit, and he exuded personal responsibility for his actions. In trying to outline why I believe those four particular values are essential as we attempt to internalize our own standards, I will use a couple of vignettes from George Marshall's life to illustrate them.

As far as loyalty to one's organization is concerned, . . . part of that responsibility is to speak up when we think there are problems within that organization that need to be corrected.

One of the vignettes that Forrest Pogue includes in the middle book of his trilogy on General Marshall has to do with the time he confronted President Roosevelt. Those of you who have followed President Reagan's efforts with the new economic proposals realize that a President has a great deal of influence—either logical persuasion or sheer power—at hand when he begins to push a particular project or program. Franklin Roosevelt was a master of that particular aspect of politicing. On one occasion, all of the various persons who had gone over to the White House to debate their budget had been told that they really did not understand what was necessary, that there was not enough money to go around. The President had all the answers he cared to hear. That was essentially what Franklin Roosevelt told his close advisors. The then Secretary of War indicated to President Roosevelt that he would like to have General Marshall explain the Army's critical needs. President Roosevelt said, "I know what he needs and I do not have time to listen to him." Well, that angered General Marshall. He walked directly to the desk of the President, and looking down, said, "Mr. President, I want three minutes of your time." The President calmed down and said, "Very well, General Marshall." Seething inside, General Marshall laid out the full dimensions of the Army's problems at that particular instance in history, just prior to World War II; its needs for people, for equipment, for a mobilization capability, for industrial capacity and everything else. He concluded by telling President Roosevelt that if this was not done, that both President Roosevelt and he, General Marshall, would rue the day because of the great damage it would do to our nation.

The courage it took to stand up to the President, in the face of the kind of vitriol that was flowing at that particular instance, is a vivid example of the kind of loyalty to. . .nation that is essential if we are to ensure that we are able to respond to the challenges ahead. That does not mean that every time your company commander tells you something, you have to argue it all the way down the tape. . . .It means that up to the point of decision, you have the right, indeed, the obligation, to lay out your views clearly. Once the decision is taken, you have the responsibility either to salute or to leave. That is loyalty to the organization.

The second attribute that I feel is essential for us in uniform is loyalty to the unit; the responsibility that we have to our soldiers. It has to do as much with ensuring that everything we do within that organization is honest and straightforward, as it does with the way in which we take care of our soldiers. It does not mean that we have to molly-coddle them. It can be just as it was in another vignette from General Marshall's life, during the period when he was in the Philippines. While on patrol on one of the islands, about to cross a river, the detail he was in charge of saw a horse being mauled by a crocodile. Shortly the patrol began to cross the river. About half-way across, one of the troops in the squad yelled "crocodile." Those of you who have been in Ranger camp would understand this. The troops ran ashore, knocking Lieutenant Marshall into the mud. He got up, looked at this crew, and decided that he was going to have to take charge. He called them to attention, put them at right shoulder arms, and said, "Follow me." He marched them back across the river, got them to the other side, commanded about face, and marched back across again. He did not yell or curse them, and he never brought the issue up with them thereafter. What he displayed was that element of positive discipline that is essential in any unit. It is the essential mark of a leader's loyalty to his unit. . . .

In the area of selflessness, I cannot help but be reminded of one of General Marshall's great acts of selfless service. I want you to think about General Marshall at the time when the question of command of the invasion of Europe came up for decision in World War II. So great was the esteem in which he was held by both countrymen and allies, that had he said, "I want the job," he could have had it. Remember, he came from the loins of VMI, where command is something that every cadet aspires to. Yet he was willing to put aside the opportunity to command that great Army in Europe, to stay back and be the one who

ran the war in Washington, while General Eisenhower assumed command [in the field]. It took a great deal of selflessness on his part.

In the brief eulogy delivered by Father Sampson at the Funeral of General Omar Bradley, I was reminded of similiar selflessness which General Bradley evidenced. I do not know how many of you saw the Washington Star of 14 April 1981, but it had a great one-picture summary of General Bradley. It was a cartoon by Bill Mauldin, in which he had General Bradley sitting in the front seat of a jeep. Of course, there were his famous Soldier characters, Willie and Joe, who Mauldin used to convey very fundamental things about what soldiering was all about. He did it very well. In this cartoon, he had General Bradley sitting in the front seat of the jeep, with four stars on the license plate. Willie is saying to Joe, "he can't be a general." He said, "please." That is Willie and Joe, but it also tells you a bit about the way in which some people operate, the selfless service of leaders who are more concerned about the organization and its people than about themselves or their own personal perquisites.

Personal responsibility means that each one of you has to be responsible not only for what you do, but also for what your troops do. There are many examples of how General Marshall expressed that particular value, how he accepted the total responsibility for everything that took place. One [illustration] was the way in which he ran his training of infantry officers at Fort Benning. General Marshall was willing to let anyone who had ideas try them out. He would never say, that is a bad idea. He would say, let that idea be tried. He would let people try and he would take the responsibility if it failed. The opportunity to try and to fail, as well as to succeed, was something that he reinforced in everything he did.

As our Army goes through this period of change I have talked about, as our country goes through this period of change, it is going to require an internalized ethic incorporating these basic values to help us govern how we do our soldiering business, or how you go about doing whatever profession you might pursue in this changing world. Your behavior, your actions, are going to influence how this country looks on the 31st of December, 1999. America needs professionals in every walk of life. It needs strong professional Soldiers as its leaders who have internalized [a set of] values, who understand that loyalty to the organization, loyalty to the unit, personal responsibility and selfless service are attributes that are truly essential, not only if they are to succeed, but if our nation is to succeed.

I again congratulate you on your selection for this award, and for the opportunity to gather with your peers; but more important, I tell you that there is a challenge for you out there. There is a chance that you can influence, and an opportunity to do it in a value-oriented sense. I look forward to that future; I look forward to those changes with confidence and the opportunity to work them with you.

## Address to the
## ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION SPRING SYMPOSIUM

Arlington, Virginia
21 April 1981

John Naisbett, a futurist of note, has provided a thoughtful treatise, which, right or wrong, had enough meat in it to give each of us sufficient cause to reflect on our purpose and direction in the coming decades. The industry of which your companies are a part occupies a central role in the view he projects. He cautions America not to dwell on the past in today's global economy—"yesterday is over"—but instead, urges us to get on with the new technological adventures where we possess natural advantage: in our bio-industry, in the development of alternate energy resources, in seabed mining, and, not surprisingly, in electronics.

Others have laid out the thesis that America is moving into a post-industrial age. Naisbett quantifies it in dramatic terms. He cites, interestingly, the fact that—assuming his numbers are legitimate—in 1900 the industrial sector of our workforce accounted for 35-percent of the total workforce. By 1950, that percentage had grown to 65—a quantification that is compatible with my perception of the kind of manufacturing colossus our nation had grown to during World War II and the expansive economy following that conflict. The startling feature, however, is that 30-years later, *today*, the workforce dedicated to the industrial effort has dropped to only 30-percent of the total workforce!

In the same timeframe Naisbett claims that the fields dealing with information—its creation, processing, and distribution—grew from about 15 percent in 1950, to become the dominant sector of employment today: 55-percent. That is rather astounding. Now for you, that's meat and potatoes. For me it's a little unnerving, because I am concerned about the national means for war production, weapons, heavy manufacturing, and the like—should conflict arise. . . .

Some concerned persons do, from time to time, lecture us on the compositon of our forces. Pedantic use of the teeth-to-tail ratio generates a lot of smoke and even some heat, without proving anything in particular. It's in peacetime simulations which reflect the synergism of all branches in battle, or the cumulative effect of all components in combat itself, where the full effectiveness of the distribution of our people to specific missions proves itself.

To a large degree, the way we structure ourselves for battle reflects the sophistication of our society. And that's healthy, so long as not carried to an extreme. If advantages can be found through technology, we must use them. Many would say that is the principal leverage we must count on in future conflicts. General Sir John Hacketts' celebrated fictional account, *The Third World War*, credits the West's massive lead in electronic technology—one borne of commercial competition vice state collectives—as the single most important element which NATO needed to be the victor in his postulation of that conflict (p. 318). He forecasts a world increasingly dominated by electronics. I don't doubt that at all.

The Army has certainly turned to electronics' potential to economize our critical manpower asset, to achieve enhanced technical capability in individual systems, and to seek an advantage in our ability to react more rapidly than our opponent—to "get inside the adversary's observation-orientation-decision action time cycle," as John Boyd describes it.

As to our success in economizing on manpower, I was startled just after taking office as the Chief of Staff to find that my communications and automation people were presenting me a bill for about 40,000 new manpower spaces as a result of efforts which at least partially were prompted, articulated, and promoted on the basis of saving manpower! Somehow I'd had the impression the sophisticated material we were in the process of accumulating was intended to help us economize on manpower! But it seems that's like saving money by allowing one's wife complete freedom to spend at a sale. We must avoid that kind of "investment."

That concern is one of the reasons I wanted to accept your invitation to come visit today. You need to understand that we can't afford an Army if the battlefield complements eat up the ability to hone the fighting edge.

As some of you may know, we just convened the Army Science Board for their summer study, which this year is targeted on "Equipping The Army in The 1990-2000 Timeframe." We've got some pretty good minds working the issue. Both General Keith and I addressed the group's inaugural session, and I thought it might be interesting to revisit some of the same issues with you today, discussing ways in which you can help the Army in the years ahead. I'm certain you're also interested so that you can define a productive role for your companies—areas in which you can make real contributions to a continuing strong national defense.

Regardless of whether or not our military strategy is offensive—the seizure and control of a land area—or defensive—to prevent seizure and control of a land area—the functioning of an Army requires that we have the ability to destroy or disrupt the opposing force: his Soldiers, equipment, and organizations; and that we also have

the ability to survive the enemy's attempts to inflict the same fate on our own forces.

That's pretty fundamental. To do this we must exercise sure real-time control over maneuver forces, so that we can continuously occupy advantageous positions from which we can destroy or disrupt enemy organizations. The destructive means can be the maneuver itself—in the sense of an offensive turning movement which threatens something vital and forces his withdrawal, *or* nondestructive means which disrupt or disable his organization, or the application of more traditional weapons systems to destroy. These are all aspects of the *tactical* Army, of how the Army will fight.

There are three areas which will decide the shape of our Army: national direction, environment—which includes the threat, and technology.

*National Direction.* From an overall design aspect, we need to ask a very fundamental question: just what is it we expect our Armed Forces to do in the future? That is a question this Administration is gearing up to answer now. The FY 81 Budget Supplement and FY 82 Amendment were structured to meet deficiencies of today's Army, regardless of what the long range force design might be. However, the basic issue still remains what roles are our Armed Forces to play in the national security equation? The more directly that issue is addressed, the more certain we will be of attaining balance horizontally, across the services. That's particularly critical for the Army, which is so dependent on the Air Force and the Navy for deployment. A clear determination of our nation's interests and their extention into the future is one of the factors which will guide us in constructing the force that will exist for the rest of this century.

A second factor in the design equation is the environment we can expect for the next decade. An essential element of this environment is the threat we expect. That environment will be one of great change, of challenge, of crisis, of confrontation, and potentially one of conflict across all dimensions of our well-being: economic, political, technological, etc. Are there flashpoints visible, or trends evident, which could jeopardize achievement of our national objectives? Are there constraints looming—such as the quantity and quality of our domestic manpower pool—which will prevent us from accomplishing all the tasks ahead of us? Are there critical geographic locations where continued access is essential because they provide sources for raw materials, or communications/transportation modes, as targets of opportunity for manipulation by a hostile force?

Finally, there are the dynamics of *technological advance*—very broad based, and not easy to scope in advance. What breakthrough—equivalent to the laser, fiberoptics and micro-miniaturization—will occur in the decade ahead? And how rapidly will such breakthroughs be evident? And who will be the first to take advantage of them?

If we look out to the future and see the very dim intersection of these three considerations—national direction, environment, and technology—then we will capture the essence of what it is you and I need to set about doing.

Today, the Army's vision is correctable to 20-20 out to the middle of this decade. It's focused on making the most of today's technology through the architecture laid out in our Army 86 studies: Division 86, or the objective heavy division; Corps 86, the refocusing of effort on tomorrow's integrated battlefield; Echelons above Corps, the conceptional support linkages for continental warfare; and Infantry Divison 86, an effort of immense potential, being realized today in the high technology test bed of the 9th Infantry Division out at Fort Lewis.

. . . And while we reduce our best answers annually into programs which reflect achievement [of an] Army created to focus on the FY 86 threat, our movement toward that goal merely establishes a necessary benchmark for future transition, a foundation to build on in the future.

Clearly we saw a significant modification of our future mid-way in the Carter Administration. The initial signals to the Army constituted an almost exclusive focus on NATO. The thrust was OK, it was the extreme [nature to which it was carried] that caused me trouble. We now have a task force oriented on the Caribbean, and another oriented on the Middle East. At the same time we have decided to maintain our commitment in

Korea. The need for greater flexibility was evident, and the knots which bound the Army to a single-scenario orientaton were cut.

The advantage of a single-focus scenario to the budgeteer is that a solution can be fashioned which is thrifty. With everything geared to one event, some optimization is possible. Flexibility on the other hand is more costly, because it means we've got to be prepared for multiple scenarios, each with its specific requirements. Yet in this changing and unpredictable world I see *flexibility* as the essential ingredient in all that we fashion.

So as we look at a hypothetical conflict in Europe, and fashion tools which give a combat battalion a certain capability when fighting as part of a Corps, we need to ensure that the same capability is present when we pull that battalion out and employ it in a single battalion operation in some non-European scenario.

The menu of scenarios is very broad indeed. It could be one of [maintaining] domestic stability in the throes of a nuclear attack; it could be operations in any one of the worst congested urban areas of the world; it could invoive use of force to ensure the free world's access to critical resources; it could involve military response to terrorist activity, or nuclear threat from a nation not yet a member of the world's atomic club.

The opportunity for industry to be creative participants in the future of this nation's security lies in the degree to which you are able to help us advance our force for the future through technical applications.

We are not likely to be able to buy hardware in quantities equal to those of the Soviets. Consequently, we need advantages in the equipment itself, and in the means and methods of its employment. The gunners need a second or two advantage in their encounters so that they are the killers not the killed. The battalions need minutes of advantage so that they can preempt anticipated tactical maneuvers of the opposing force. The senior commanders need hours of advantage to better weight the attack and assure our strength at the decisive point. The logistics planners need real time awareness of the critical bits of information available among the minutiae so that they can initiate timely action to move supplies where they are needed.

That is where the advantage postulated in General Hackett's book becomes real to our Soldiers.

The last item I'll bring to you is this—let's have a generous spirit of "truth in advertising." Don't run out and rename your existing "Command and Control System" the "new, quick-reaction, flexible Command and Control System", looking for a bonanza of sales. Some recent actions might clearly indicate to you and to me that this administration looks to reward or penalize performance, as appropriate. So let's be frank and candid about our products. I've told the military everywhere that we must prove to the American people, to Congress, the administration, and ourselves that we can spend money wisely and prudently; that we can operate in concert with industry to provide a military force that is responsive in the environment of the future to counter the threat. The Army intends to be tougher as we negotiate our contracts for the future. . . .

## Address to the NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE

Phoenix, Arizona
4 May 1981

Governor Babbitt, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Coming up on the flight from Sierra Vista this morning I had a chance to browse through a really splendid new map produced by the National Geographic. The commentary on the back described the area as . . . "water gurgling into citrus groves, lettuce fields, and swimming pools around Phoenix. . . " All that kind of descriptive material reminded me of a story once told to me about a couple who had been married 50 years. The wife was a spiritualist; the husband believed



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in reincarnation. The husband died, and the wife began attending even more seances in hopes of contacting her beloved. Finally, one night, his voice came through loud and clear. She was overjoyed, but at the same time was unable to keep an I-told-you-so tone out of her voice. What's it like there?" she purred.

"Really," he said, "you wouldn't believe it. The sky is beautiful, the water clear blue, and the place is full of willing young creatures with the loveliest, big brown eyes."

"Well!" she replied, a bit chagrined. "I never thought heaven would be anything like that."

"Heaven!" he answered. "Who said anything about heaven? I'm a bull in Arizona!"

You really do have a magnificent state, Governor. And I'm mighty proud to be here.

My subject, I'm told, the Army and Civil Defense—a topic which encompasses emergencies of many varieties.

Before leaving Washington, an officer on my staff resurrected the Army's basic national policy guidance of twenty-five years ago. In part, it stated the following as one objective of the National Military Program:

> "A continental defense system, including both active and passive measures, strong enough to prevent an enemy from delivering a crippling blow to the continental United States."

For a variety of reasons, you will find no similar mission guidance to the Army today. In 1956, however, the Army was very deeply involved in the *active* defense of American air space. Hundreds of Nike air defense batteries dotted the landscape of metropolitan and industrial America. With the advent of the ballistic missile, continued maintenance of that system—targeted as it was on manned bombers—was ruled to be economically unwise, and so we left that race, content that the deterrent posed by a national policy of "massive retaliation" would keep us safe from nuclear attack. For a time prior to the ABM treaty, we pursued an anti-ballistic missile system, but full fielding of that program was set aside following the 1972 ABM treaty. Nevertheless, the Army has continued developmental work on a ballistic missile defense system (BMD), as permitted by the treaty—primarily as a hedge against Russian perfidy. Army efforts have been such that some quarters see great merit in a marriage of our BMD with the MX. Certainly that is a feasible option.

As for *passive* defense measures, it's not clear that we have ever had a coherent program, consistently pursued on a national level. John Collins devoted but a few sentences to the topic in his 700-page 1980 assessment of the U. S.-Soviet military balance, stating merely:

> "Civil defense measures lost momentum rapidly after the Cuban missile crisis. Interest evaporated in most official circles. Public apathy is still evident."

I'm not certain the prognosis regarding the consequences of a nuclear war has changed much over the years. In 1958, the RAND Corporation concluded that with no non-military defense (passive) measures, up to 90 percent of the population might be killed. At the same time, RAND held that the nation could live through the disaster of a nuclear war, with casualties reduced to around 25 million, if an adequate warning and shelter program were pursued. While a national warning system keyed to the SAGE network was effectively in place by 1962, there was no pursuit of a shelter program. So RAND's 1958 projections aren't much different than Dr. Edward Teller's warnings from the Hoover Institute in June of 1980:

> "I can tell you that in a full-scale war probably more than half the Americans will die and probably 5 million Russians. The great difference is that the Soviets have civil defense and we don't."

Now I am not trying to scare anybody into a massive shelter program. The responsibility for that kind of decision was laid out by President Eisenhower in 1959, when he said that:

> "The responsibility for civil defense in this nation rests squarely on regularly constituted government at local, state, and Federal levels, and upon people. . . .civil

defense is a joint responsibility of the Federal, State, and local governments; no one level of government can do the whole job. . . ."

We know where we've come thus far in civil defense. The Carter Administration broke with the traditional—but politically and economically unsalable—solution of sheltering, by looking to an alternative which envisioned "crisis relocation of the urbans populations." This proposal remains the government's philosophy until the new Administration comes on line with its own ideas regarding civil defense. Presently, there are some $162 million in the budget to test the viability of crisis relocation, targeted on 62 communities. There are also some dollars for water containerization and ventiliation systems.

That is about the extent of the remarks I intend to make on the specific subject of "The Army and Civil Defense," which is the topic listed in your program. I believe there is a much broader spectrum of common interests among us: interests common to those in federal agencies with mandated responsibilities to industry, to State and local governments, and to the Army. We have particular favorites, I'm sure, under the charter of our individual offices. So let me describe the spectrum and then focus in on some particulars.

If we consider civil defense and programs for recuperation and reconstitution following a nuclear exchange at one end of the spectrum, a journey to the other end of the spectrum would take us through consideration of the following menu:

- Mobilization for general war; which must include such things as manpower and materiel allocation, industrial preparedness, economic controls, transportation, construction assets, organizational concepts and the like.

- National actions in the event of a more limited contingency

- Civil distrubance

- Terrorism

- Disaster Relief, and

- Other Emergency Assistance

Let me focus briefly on the last two, disaster relief and other emergency assistance. As history will illustrate, the Army has shown its good faith toward the states by being a prime instrument of federal response in disaster relief. My plea will be to seek a commensurate level of support from you in preparing for our national mission of being able to go to war if forced into it.

The Army has been a very active federal partner in responding to local and state needs under, and sometimes predating, the law. Early on, we were there simply because there was not other federal means: in the Chicago Fire of 1871, in the Dakota/Colorado Famine of 1875, in the Johnston Flood of 1889; and, with the other services, at the San Francisco earthquake and fire in 1906. There, 600 soldiers fed a quarter of a million people daily for two weeks.

Currently, each month finds Active Army, National Guard, or Army Reserve elements pitching in to help—be it delivery of supplies to flood-beleagured Arizona Indians in March 1978—4th Mech Division troops—helicopter and engineer support at Mount St. Helen's in 1980, or the delivery of 25 tons of lead brick, communications, and medical supplies to Three Mile Island. The Army, as DOD's executive agent for disaster assistance through FEMA, stands ready and has responded consistently.

I know you understand this mission and the mechanisms by which we respond. Of course, in any situation of imminent danger to human life, or to prevent human suffering, or to mitigate great property damage, any Army commander can act unilaterally—even prior to declararation of a disaster. Calls in the middle of the night from governors in Massachusetts and Rhode Island are not unfamiliar occurences at Quarters One at Fort Myer.

Other authorized programs include:

- The provision of supplies, equipment and services to the American Red Cross on a reimbursable basis.

- Our Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) program, initated in law in November 1973 after a period of testing which

began at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and which included a test right here at Luke AFB. In the life of this program, more than 24-thousand patients have been assisted, either by interhospital transfer, by on-site recovery, or by the emergency delivery of blood, human organs for transplant, or equipment.

We have also helped the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency in some difficult, hazardous waste situations. Here in Arizona, you'll recall the temporary storage of 36 drums of tritium gas vials at Navajo Army Depot—as requested by FEMA—prior to eventual transport and deprocessing.

We want those actions in the interest of American citizens to be carried out well and faithfully. But you must understand that we do them chiefly because our preparation for a larger mission causes us to possess equipment fungible in some circumstances to these emergency purposes. If you wanted to tailor the Army specifically for the kinds of disaster missions we are called on to do, we'd obviously look much different than we do today. Nonetheless, it's clear we have a great deal of that quality I value very highly, flexibility. I need much more of that than I have at present, I assure you; read my White Paper.

There are other forms of assistance rendered by the Army too:

- Under certain circumstances, the intervention statues permit our employment to put down insurrection, civil violence, and obstruction of the law. Such involvement, you know, requires a Presidential Proclamation and an Executive Order. By and large, the national tradition—stemming from our colonial distrust of a standing Army, theirs or ours— dictates minimal involvement by the Active force structure. Where equipment loans will serve the purpose, that is favored.

- The Posse Commitatus Act clearly forbids our direct entry into many law enforcement roles. Hence equipment loans, training and the like are the allowable extent of our support to the narcotics interdiction programs of the U. S. Customs Service and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

- We also have a role in counterterrorism, fully responsive to the FBI and the National Command Authority.

As I pointed out just a minute ago, these tasks, too, are ancillary to our major purpose, which is to be a national tool to deter or to fight a war involving sustained land combat. Historically, we've done rather well once the domestic scene cranked up—industrially, technically, emotionally, and materially. But the historic advantage of time to prepare—once a certainty because of ocean barriers and allies capable of going it alone for awhile—is no longer there. And the limits our great dissuader—nuclear superiority—once posed to hostile adventurism has eroded markedly. So that today we must seek a demonstrable capacity to respond rapidly with conventional military means across a very broad spectrum of military scenarios.

We have been remarkable slow in adapting to the new realities of a heightened threat and a vanished geographic advantage—probably because we don't yet as a people recognize fully the burden of leadership thrust upon us, or the fragility of the blessed life we as Americans too often accept as rightfully ours. As a democratic state, we are in the decided minority. There are but a handful of nations that possess the freedoms we possess. These are lessons we need to pass on to a population which is concerned about the shadow of Vietnam, but which has forgotten the lessons of World War II. Sixty-eight percent of today's electorate was not alive during that struggle.

No Army, in and of itself, possesses the

means to act responsively in defense of the nation. War and its avoidance are dependent upon a national effort. And here I can see some awakening. In 1976, the Army sponsored a mobilization exercise which made abundantly clear the magnitude of the problem facing us. In 1978, this was expanded into a broadened reexamination—MOBEX 78/Nifty Nugget—involving, in addition to the military services, many key civilian federal agencies. Again this past October, in MOBEX 80/Proud Spirit/Rex 80-Bravo, we revisited the issues, this time with healthy participation by industry. Again, the lessons of half-hearted contingency planning were all too evident.

The optimist can take heart that some progress is evident. The pessimist will bury his head. In this morning's paper it said that there is a macabre joke going around—gallows humor. The optimist says we will lose WW III; the pessimist thinks we have already lost it. The realist will say merely that the Nation must decide openly and explicitly what level of preparedness it desires. Attainment of that level requires balanced government application, as in President Eisenhower's description of the joint governmental responsibility for civil defense—federal, state, and local. It won't, for example, do the national effort any good if at the federal level we sort out the manpower needs, but fail to integrate those needs with those of industry, or those of the state, or those of the local community to sustain itself.

We have been successful, thus far, in broadening the involvement in each biennial mobilization exercise. It may be that the next progression ought to involve state and local governments, at least on some limited basis, beyond the state military structure. As you know, state and local governments are triple the size of the federal government. The impact of mobilization will place heavy demands on the state and local governments; we ought to find out in peacetime how to do it, so that we can more realistically address the complete process of mobilization and not have to learn through chaotic efforts when we are called upon to mobilize.

Your association is, after all, a management association. I believe it was Peter Drucker who said management's objective is to get three people to do the work of three people. In the absence of your full participation, from a soldier's point of view, we may be trying to manage the mobilization problem by getting two people to do a three-people job, and that simply won't cut it.

Thank you for your kind attention.

## A Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Maintenance Training

6 May 1981

Sometimes we forget that the key to good maintenance is training. When I talk to new brigade and battalion commanders at the precommand course, I tell them that the investment with highest potential return is time spent by supply and maintenance supervisors in appropriate schools. The two or three months' sacrifice of doing without that supervisor will benefit both the unit and the Army. Commanders who complain about how little their junior mechanics or supply clerks know upon joining the unit from the TRADOC initial entry schools fail to realize that the great majority of soldiers' skills are developed in the unit, on the job, by qualified supervisors.

Another key contributor to effective maintenance is proper use of soldiers by MOS. I continue to find units where soldiers with specialized training, such as mechanics, are working in the orderly room or elsewhere.

I have constantly stressed the two "glass balls"—training and maintenance. Some maintenance problems are systemic and need to be addressed by the Army Staff. The concerns I have outlined above, however, fall squarely within the purview of command. We must do better in this critical area.

# Address to the
# COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
# CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
7 May 1981

General Johnson, General Richardson, members of the Staff and Faculty, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and gentlemen.

This is the first time in my "speaking visits" to Fort Leavenworth that the members of the Staff exceed the number of the students in the audience. And that's as it should be because this evening I want to talk to the institution—about its destiny and about its future forward to the next 100 years of service to the Army, to the profession of arms and to the nation.

I would like to believe it possible that this college and its purpose could be abolished sometime during the next century. That would be an ambition worthy of the idealism of most Americans. Realistically, however, I'm afraid that's most unlikely. The empirical evidence of mankind's last 3000 years suggests that less than one year in ten will be conflict-free on this globe. While the character and intensity of conflict has varied dramatically over the years, man's periodic resort to conflict is one feature which can be forecast with some certainty.

Given a reasonable projection of a continuing mission for the College to prepare the professionals of tomorrow's Army to lead our units on the battlefields chosen by national authority, we must then ask: "What will be the most significant feature of that future?"

My response is change!, all-encompassing, ever-occurring, top-to-bottom change!!!

It was Johnathan Swift, clergyman and satirist, who said it better than I: "There is nothing in the world constant, but inconstancy." Change.

Obviously there are times when man seeks to cause change himself; and he can, but not unnaturally or irrationally—painting an elephant with spots won't give us a leopard. We can effect change—creatively and in harmony with the realm of the possible. We only find out what's possible by trying. The other side of the coin is that we will more frequently find it necessary to *adapt to change* not of our own making or to seek to impede the progress of change, especially when we perceive it to be in our interest to do so. We may not always be successful—for example—the elephant may in the next century become extinct, despite our best efforts.

Change is Leavenworth's primary challenge in its next century. And having digested, understood, and reacted to change, Leavenworth's task is to instill into the regimental leadership of our Army the principles which will ensure the enlightened and professional leadership necessary for success on future battlefields.

When General Sherman directed creation of what we have come to know as the Command and General Staff College, he was aware of all of this. In his report to the Secretary of War he stated:

> 'Heretofore the officers of the cavalry and infantry have been doomed to everlasting service in the very remotest parts of what was known as the "West", always in advance of civilization. No sooner than the settlements reached their post . . . they had to pull up stakes, move two or three hundred miles ahead, 'til the same game was repeated . . . , but now this . . . is changed".

As the West was opened the role of our Army had to change. General Sherman's concern was for the Army of the future. He directed that those officers "would receive instruction in the military art", then return to their regiments, "so that in time the whole Army will . . . be enabled to keep up with the rapid progress in the science and practice of war.", and "that no matter how sudden war may come on us, we will be prepared for it. . . "

Without question General Sherman viewed adaptation to change as essential to a viable Army. I won't review the results of his efforts or the undeniable contribution which Leavenworth and its graduates have made to our success on battlefields of the past, for I know General Johnson covered that aspect of history much better than I could. But I think it's worthwhile noting that Leavenworth was inaugurated at a time when

| *we had:* | *. . .and today we have:* |
|---|---|
| -infantry. . .only recently emerged from the era of massed formation and musketing at 100 paces | . . .Soldiers armed with automatic weapons, carried into battle in IFV's, helicopters, and Air Force Jet Aircraft |
| -cavalry. . .horse mounted dragoons, armed with the Spencer repeating rifle | Cobras, AAH's, CFV's, sensors, and tanks which can make a 1st kill at 3000 meters |
| -artillery. . .rifled cannon capable of direct fire | . . .indirect fire and massing techniques, rockets and missiles |
| -commo. . .the semaphore | . . .the radio, satellite, computers |

. . only a few indications of change. And the chronology of technical advancement leads me to believe that [future] change [will be] ex-potential rather than linear in nature, which makes the challenge of Leavenworth's next century even greater.

The burdens this implies for tomorrow's professionals—the regimental officers—are considerable. That is why the Army looks to Leavenworth for development of a professional officer corps that will permit the Army in the field to be equal to its future challenges. That's one of the reasons we are taking steps to open the doors of Leavenworth more widely to the officer corps. No officer is unimportant to our Army's success on the future battlefield. The professional veneer of the officer corps needs to be deeper than it is today.

The young cadets I've talked to at Lexington and at West Point are intelligent, spirited, and eager to learn. From a professional point of view, though, they are novitiates to the profession. From a technical point of view, they are merely apprentices.

With the help of good NCO's, with concerned company grade and regimental leadership which is willing and able to teach, they will soon progress to the journeyman level. However, only Leavenworth and full exposure to the broad issues of fighting the combined arms of the division can polish their technical skills to the level of artisan, and admit them with some certainty to the professional levels of the Army. We also need officers who are professionals in supporting the regimental officers. But that professional veneer is, and always has been thin. It is the small, hard-core of the Army that the nation holds responsible for making the *entire* Army professional in performance—including newly recruited PVT Smith from Olathe, Kansas, who only joined the Army because his girl returned his pin at the Christmas Prom, and the pay seemed OK.

Since the veneer is thin, the effort is that much more critical. *The job is yours, Leavenworth*—to continue molding the professional officer to a level of excellence that will ensure success as we face the changes that will influence land warfare. That will require the breeding of flexible and creative minds while reverifying the principles against which those minds can evaluate their ideas.

At the same time we need to continually encourage the search for a better idea. Jacque Barzum, Professor Emeritus at Columbia, critiqued the professions several years back in *Harpers,* and his critique must be kept in mind as Leavenworth begins its next century of service.

First, he indicated that "professions exhibited a fatal tendency toward routine." That's absolutely deadly in a world where change is the only routine. Unfortunately, we have all seen instances where tactical procedures applicable to one scenario were aplied indiscriminately to another vastly changed situation.

Second, he charged that "the modern professions have enjoyed this monopoly for so long that they have forgotten that it is a privilege given in exchange for a public benefit." Let me just say that there is a reciprocity due in the privilege of attending CGSC -the privilege of service. That responsibility must be reflected in the quality of faculty preparation and the quality of the students efforts.

Third, the professor cautioned the professions that they could expect no hope of survival with anything like their present freedom without the recovery of both mental *and moral* force. No profession can live and flourish on just one of the two. His is a rather all encompassing critique. And though it was not directed at the military, it strikes home nonetheless, providing a focus for this institution in the following century. The changes he makes are ones which we can and *must* have an effect upon.

Beyond these, we will largely be reactive to change. I would like to think of such things as Army 86 and the High-Technology Division as change we have initiated. That's not entirely true. They are reactions to technical advancement, to new political realities, to economic upheaval. The question is can we make our initiatives, in reaction to change, real and timely? The creative professional will sense change early enough to ensure that the reaction to that change can be thoroughly established prior to the next battle. That is the crux of developmental work. That is the crux of strategic and tactical success.

I will not belabor you with my forecasts of the future. Most of them would be wrong, and many of them—especially on strategy—might get me into trouble.

Let me merely recount that when George Orwell's "1984" was published in 1949—32 years ago—it was generally viewed as a brilliant fantasy modeled on the authoritarian regimes of Hitler and Stalin. Within its pages were some 137 predictions concerning technical, scientific, political and social areas. If you were to tick them off you'd find that over 100 of Orwell's predictions are now reality. Within that 32 year span, we have biomedical devices, lenses in space, data banks, cruise missiles, and on and on.

Creative change requires vision. It has been the strength of Leavenworth in its first hundred years. America'a future demands an even greater performance in the second hundred.

## A Letter to a RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL OF THE ARMY 14 May 1981

I have delayed answering your final active duty letter because I wanted to think more fully about some of the views you related. Over the intervening months, particularly at those times when my conscience has had to deal with issues especially critical to the future of the Army, I have valued its counsel. The observations come from a Soldier whose contributions I have always admired, whose actions have displayed that characteristic so critically short in our ranks, the fingertip-feeling of the art of war. . . .

You know my feelings on "Positive Leap." We've got to scrub our minds of the Fulda Gap Syndrome [and] arrest the deterioration evident in our planning skills. I've personally gotten into the teacher role with stateside division commanders. That's being extended, and I hope for trickle-down. CAS[3] may help on the lower end, broadening the base. I also have a new effort on at Carlisle to see if we can clone your *Fingerspitzengefuehl!*

Regarding professionalism, our ad campaigns have been revised to stress professionalism and service to country rather than learning job skills. But the need is deeper than that. Infusion of a military ethic is essential; a deeply imbedded concept of loyalty to the institution, loyalty to the unit, selfless service, and personal responsibility. The mold of careerism, hopefully, is cracked, if not broken. Lengthened command

tours are going to set new and less predictable patterns for progression. Excellence, not comformity, will count.

The most compelling message must be carried persuasively to the nation. It must go well beyond the portrayal of urgent manpower needs for mobilization, which I have carried to the Congress. Whether our elected leaders choose to take us into conscription or not is a national issue which only they can decide. But we must, with or without conscription, make Americans realize that in any circumstance *an Army does not fight a war, a nation does.* Hence Americans have an immense stake in their Army. We cannot be shunted aside, presumed to be effective in an emergency without their full support in peacetime, and under the right circumstances, their active participation.

One area where we diverge is in proponency for aviation. It has been a difficult journey for me, but I've come to the view that the Army would be better served by a separate aviation component. I am convinced that the air mobile concept offers us the most significant opportunity for transformation of tactics in recent years. If we are to capitalize on its tremendous potential, I am convinced that we must focus aviation doctrine in one location where synergism of ideas will allow innovation to flourish. Furthermore, I sense that we've been kidding ourselves by considering aviation as a second specialty for our officers. In ultimately recognizing aviation as a combat arm, we'll allow our aviators to develop technically and professionally as other branches do, still maintaining their close association with other combat arms.

Notwithstanding, we're kindred souls in our mutual love and concern for this great Army. You know I will always be open to your advice.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On the New Manning System

20 May 1981

Last September I announced a number of initiatives to enhance readiness for the Army of the 80's. A principal objective of those initatives was to foster a stable environment in which cohesion can flourish. I have now approved the concept for moving to a manning system that will be focused on the unit rather than on the individual. This October the detailed plan will be presented.

We are moving to a system in which unit replacement will be the norm. We will replace individuals when we can't replace units—not vice versa. Many concurrent actions in force development, manpower, and personnel management will occur. Shortly, selected company-sized infantry, armor and field artillery units will be realigned for future unit rotation. The COHORT companies will be the first step toward rotating units overseas.

A part of the architecture for a new manning system is an American Regimental System that will enable affiliated units to train, deploy, and return to "home" posts together. . . .

Your support is a must if we are to effect these changes in our manning system smoothly and are to achieve the goals we have set for ourselves.

# Address to the
# GRADUATES OF SUSQUEHANNA UNIVERSITY

Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania
23 May 1981

I flew in today from my 30th Reunion at the college at which I received my undergraduate degree. And while I was there I joined with nearly 200 of my classmates in what was also a happy event. We reminisced about the past 30 years, and what has happened to each of us, to our families, and to our country during that time I was struck by the need many expressed to determine whether we were successes—as individuals, as a group. So I thought I might speak for a few minutes today about your 20th Reunion—in the year 2001, at the very beginning of a new century. Most of you will be transitioning into you 40's then—or holding 39, Jack Benny's magical age. I recently celebrated my 39th birthday—again

What can you expect in those next 20 years, and what measures can you use to evaluate whether you as an individual have been a success, or whether you as a class will have been a success when you return for your twentieth reunion?

I have some benchmarks I would like to suggest that you use on that day in 2001. . . .

I would like to comfort you, and say you are well prepared for the future. After all, Francis Bacon told us that "knowledge is power," and assuredly the well-earned diploma you will receive indicates that you have demonstrated some measurable distinction in gaining knowledge. Let me caution you though, that data or knowledge—which is not synonymous with wisdom—is increasing exponentially, and therefore the current base of facts you possess will become dated rapidly. The education you have completed here at Susquehanna is most meaningful if it has imparted an ability to be comfortable with what's new—an ability to accept, test, classify, and reason from new bits and pieces of information. I would agree with one noted psychologist who concluded that tomorrow's illiterate will not be the man who can't read he will be the man who has not learned how to learn.

The need to stay abreast will be compelling as you move toward your 20th reunion. It will involve the need to make a concerted effort at continuing education, both in your specific professional field, and in the broader disciplines which help us relate to one another and the world around us. How you stay abreast will influence how you individually, you collectively and we assist the world in controlling change.

Note that I said we would be acting to control change. None of us can afford to be mere passengers if we hope to serve ourselves, our families, our nation, and our God with any distinction. But to become active, to seek to control change, to affect where we are going, requires that we have some set of standards, some values to help guide us through the complexities of future change; a compass, if you will, to point us in the right direction as our personal ships of life are buffeted and tossed by the storms of change.

I'm confident that in your time here at Susquehanna—in the midst of your thinking, your learning, your playing—that the growing process, consciously or not, has involved a firming-up of your values, giving you a more solid base by which to measure the impact of change, and to consider the adaptive processes you might pursue.

The military as an institution is trying to cope with the same issue that will dominate your future—change. And a point of departure for us has been a very conscious reexamination of our institutional ethic, our value set. For the activity of organizations, as well as that of individuals, must be value-based. We have seen situations to the contrary. The cardinal lesson of the national trauma we experienced only a few years ago was summed up succintly by Archibald Cox, who said:

> ". . . in our enormously complex society . . . the moral precepts which have a dominant share in begetting a civilized society require steadfast attention."

Let me the values which I've come to believe are critical to the health of the Army, and draw from them benchmarks for judging your success at that reunion of yours, twenty years from now.

The Army, as a servant of the nation, must demonstrate loyalty to the nation and to its institutions. No Soldier can act outside the Constitution, our laws, or the orders of our civilian leaders. But loyalty upward is more than simply obedience. It is honesty and the willingness to speak up when in disagreement. It is commitment—to the full spirit of our oath of allegiance.

There is a parallel relationship for you to consider. In your lives, you will enjoy formal relationships with many people and with many organizations. You have, for example, an obligation to be a good citizen—to obey the law; but also to express your honest disagreement or agreement through the vote, through your representatives, or through the courts. You also have an obligation to your employers—which means that you will serve them honestly, but not blindly. The valued employee speaks up when things can be done better. That's the basis on which America has grown great—through a better idea.

The benchmark I would draw from this, for your consideration twenty years from now, is the question: *Have I Contributed to the Preservation of the Nation, its Institutions, and its Values?*

Next in the Army ethic, we recognize that loyalty is a two way street. Soldiers must honor and respect their comrades and their subordinates. Units, in addition to being well equipped, depend for their strength on the skills of their members, on their well-being, on the assurance that the unit will be better if individuals can contribute to their full potential.

In many ways, with your family, and with your friends, there are clear parallels in whatever situation you may face. As a child and as a young adult, you were nourished and assisted in growing. You were given responsibilities, and you were given shelter—as appropriate—from the harshness of life's situations. Now you are about to have an opportunity to interact much more independently. This gives rise to the second benchmark I would suggest for your consideration twenty years hence: *Have I Contributed to the Well-Being of my Fellow Man?*

The Army charges every Soldier with specific tasks. It also seeks to instill a sense of personal responsibility into every member, which is much broader. Soldiers do what they must, regardless of their formal job description; and initiative—but more importantly, personal responsibility for actions—is valued.

In your future endeavors, much the same will be true. Some obligations are clearly yours contractually through personal decisions to obligate yourselves—in a marriage, in a job. . . .Let me tell you now that the obligations for fulfillment are not always enumerated or enumerable. You must look well beyond the bare-bones of your relationships to give them richness, completeness, and meaning. And in this regard, don't forget that you have a responsibility to yourself to grow. As I mentioned before, you've only learned how to learn here at Susquehanna. There are many personal dimensions you must continue to develop.

The benchmark I would suggest from the personal responsibility value for your consideration at that 20th reunion is: *Have I Contributed to my own Personal Growth—Seeking to Develop my Full Potential Physically, Mentally, Spiritually, and Socially?*

I'm not here to recruit but you may have seen the advertising we use to attract volunteers; it goes: "Be All That You Can Be." That's good advice, in or out of uniform.

The final element of the Army Ethic I would draw on to lay out a benchmark for you, is the component of selfless service. For the soldier that translates into a variety of interpretations.

It's adherrence to service that gives significance to routine activities. At the far end of the scale, it's this concept which underwrites the Soldier's willingness to risk death or injury. Selflessness and commitment are hallmarks of the Soldier.

Now there are agreeable limits as we extend this concept into your lives. But there will be ample opportunity to serve—and for the right

reasons. Only you can answer the degree to which you will submerge considerations of "self". Each of us, however, will be asked to act in accordance with our conscience, in keeping with our religious faiths, in keeping with our moral beliefs. Sometimes that can have painful effect; criticism, ridicule, even ostracism. . . .This final benchmark can be put in a number of ways: I choose to state it: *Have I Contributed to Furthering God's Work Here on Earth?*

So those are my thoughts for you; a success-oriented checklist of considerations by which you and your classmates can judge the adequacy, the completeness of your lives as you seek to measure them early in the Twenty-First Century.

. . . Whether you judge yourself an immense success against this list may not be as important as the fact that you will have tried. Consider the virtues of mighty Rome—propelled to its zenith by adherrence to the virtues of familia, patria, pietas, gravitas; or more familiarly, family, country, dignity, and responsibility. Those values waned when Romans displayed a reluctance to personally defend them. Then Rome waned.

My prayer is that at your 20th reunion you can again enjoy a happy day and look back and see a nation with its freedoms and values not only intact, but enhanced. And if you have contributed to that continued state of well-being through your personal and collective service in managing change, then you will be able to join your classmates here, at your 20th reunion—one year into the new century—and proclaim with them *"We have succeeded."*

I wish each of you well in that. Good luck and God bless you.

## Address to the ASSOCIATED PRESS BROADCASTERS

Washington, D.C.
4 June 1981

I just wanted to say at the start that this has been an exciting time since the Inauguration for the defense establishment. . . .[It is] also a challenging time for us . . . to ensure that the resources we are getting and manpower we're getting are being used truthfully, and are being perceived as being used truthfully by the American public. That is the challenge to us as other agencies of government see their funds shrink.

It is also a dangerous time as we look at the qualitative and quantitative disparities between us and the Warsaw Pact and some of our enemies around the world. I thought I might talk a bit about what has changed as far as this Administration's policies are concerned. . . .First, there has been a change in approach . . . this Administration's focus is on [creating] more global forces. . . .

Second, this Administration has declared . . . that there will be the capability. . . to respond as long as the Soviets can respond. So this provides the opportunity for increased sustainability for the forces in being.

[Third] . . . the President has stated . . . the need for improving the industrial capacity of this nation. . . .

. . . finally, [they have directed improvements to] our strategic [forces] . . . and our ability to respond in a time of warning.

There is, was, and will be for some time a mismatch between strategy [and] . . . the forces available and [their] capabilities to meet the articulated strategies. We are in a position where we do not have the resources within the military to respond to that strategy. . . .It is going to take time to redress that issue. What we have done in the near-term is to fix the things that are broken most seriously—manpower, trying to retain our middle-grade leaders, the accession of high school graduates so we're able to get the quality and quantity of young men and women that we need to man the force with the kind of equipment we're likely to need in the decades ahead and to ensure we have a better capability in our National Guard, Army Reserve and our civilian manpower.

Let me tell you basically at the start that everything is not bad because it's not. Our overseas deployed forces, among all the Services, basically are in good shape. It's that forward crust that's forward deployed in Europe, Korea, Panama, around the globe—that is in reasonably good shape. It's back in our ability to support those forces where we have weaknesses. It's our inability to sustain those forward deployed forces, both in manpower and materiel, that causes me the greatest concern.

. . . we're about to convert . . . to a technical Army that is capable of responding to the challenges ahead. it's going to be one of the biggest changes any army has ever gone through. . . .

Now there are three syndromes which affect the view of many Americans on the Army. The first is the *Lee Marvin syndrome*. . .that all it takes is a few good infantrymen out there. Well, that's not the way wars are won. Wars are won by the support those few good infantrymen receive. . . .

The second syndrome I talk about is *Bill Mauldin's revenge*. Those of you who remember Bill Mauldin from World War II recall Willy and Joe were always shown with a rifle in their hand, a can opener used to open C Rations and with that rifle and can of C Rations and that can opener. [With that] they were somehow able to get through World War II. That is not adequate today. It's not adequate today because we aren't the ones who decide what kind of equipment we need. The ones who decide what kind of equipment we need are those who design the equipment in the Kremlin. Our equipment has to be able to respond. . . .I do not believe we should be passing on to soldiers, sailors, airmen today, inadequate equipment. So those who talk in terms of a rifle have to understand the equation has been changed. The Soviets have improved the quality of their equipment, we have to ensure we stay abreast of that quality or get ahead. One of the biggest challenges that you read of in the newspapers, or hear on radio/TV, is the rising cost of weapons systems. Part of that rising cost is to ensure we have the kind of weapons systems that are responsive to the needs of the future. I must say that—I'm sounding a bit defensive here on this issue—it troubles me when I see the facts not put in perspective. For example, in the case of the Army's new tank, we estimated it would cost $508,000 in 1972 dollars. At the present time, if you went back to 1972 constant dollars, [today's cost is] $530,000. We project that out through 1988 that same tank is going up to $2.2 million [in 1988 dollars]. Well, 88 percent of that is inflation—it is no different than a Dodge car that ran $2700 in that time frame and now is $8000, or a Hershey bar at 10-15¢ and now is 25-30¢.

So all I would ask you as you look at these things, try to relate the figures in an objective manner. . . .That doesn't mean we've done a good job across the board. There are areas where I would just have to tell you our management has just not been as good as it should be and we/you have not gotten total defense out of the dollars spent. That is the area I spoke about at the first, [which] we are focusing on now because we understand that as resources are [funneled into] defense, we will be under more observation than Caesar's wife. We will ensure that we are using the resources we are given truthfully and effectively.

The third syndrome I would like to talk about is the *Fulda Gap syndrome*. . .the belief that every army prepares to fight the last war instead of looking ahead to fight the future war. I can merely tell you that just as we have the need for a more global capability to respond to challenges, that it is [equally] demanding of all of us [to pursue] a flexibility in our strategy, a flexibility in our doctrine, a flexibility in our thinking such that we come up with, the kind of forces that will be needed for the next war—so that hopefuliy the next war won't occur. . . .

Our pledge is to use the resources prudently, and I believe if we do that . . . that we've got the opportunity . . . to create the kind of Army . . . that is perceived as being adequate to the task [of] preserv[ing] the peace. . . .

# Address to the
# ARMED FORCES COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS ASSOCIATION

Washington, DC
17 June 1981

Late this year, in the fall, the Army will join the nation in celebrating the final military act of our Bicentennial, the conclusive land/sea victory of our forces at Yorktown. Considering that word of mouth or, at best, mounted or seaborne messengers—another version of word of mouth—constituted the extent of the communications system available to the Franco-American commanders, Yorktown was a remarkable campaign, to say the least. It involved the closure of forces from three widely separated geographic areas to that tip of the Virginia Peninsula.

-From the South, American forces under Lafayette shadowed Cornwallis, the British commander, into that place where capitulation eventually occurred. These forces were drawn from as far away as Charleston, 300 miles to the south.

-From the north, Washington feigned attack on New York City, holding Clinton in place for 10 critical days—more importantly holding the British fleet under Graves in place for 10 critical days—and managed to march his unpaid, potentially mutinous Army southward 450 miles.

-Finally, the French Admiral de Grasse—with 1,700 guns and 19,000 seamen, and later deBarris with clinching naval power—sailed over a thousand miles from the West Indies to reinforce the allied land forces and seal any possible escape route for the British.

Now that's a considerable achievement under any circumstances, even today. A successful multi-nation, multi-service effort spanning thousands of miles. Today we would consider a comparable feat impossible without the wares your association's members provide us.

Looking at the American role, we can see that success depended heavily on the strength and personal leadership of the Commander in Chief, George Washington.

-He had no electronic spectrum to play with to help him put into effect a deception plan. As the Army was preparing to leave New York City, Washington himself stopped an old Tory farmer and questioned him about Staten Island, and then, as if he had let something slip, said quickly that "these are just casual queries, not to be taken seriously. . . "

-Washington had no communications links to help him coordinate his moves with the French naval forces. For better than three weeks he based his actions on faith in a single message that the Chesapeake was the destination of de Grasse's naval forces.

-Lastly, Washington had no tactical radio net to coordinate his operations on the field at Yorktown. During attacks on the British redoubts, Washington frequently found it essential to be present at the point of attack. On one occasion, mistaken for a staff aide, the Colonel in charge advised the unknown figure: ". . . you are too much exposed here. Had you not better step a little back?" "Colonel Cobb," Washington replied, "if you are afraid, you have liberty to step back."

At sea, there were some aids to communication—signal flags with precoded meanings. As you equipment designers ponder the question of how complex your wares can be for today's Soldier, consider how elemental the concept of signal flags was in the naval engagement at Yorktown. There a white flag meant: "get into line—maintain formation," while a checkered blue and white flag meant, essentially, "charge the enemy; forget the formation."

Illustrating "Murphy's Law," the British fleet commander in the the Battle of the Capes hoisted both flags simultaneously, which gave voice to a variety of interpretations by subordinate commanders. Ultimately this error spelled their ruination. So never mind the contemporary concerns

about man-machine interface which key on the quality of today's Soldier—keep in mind the quality of commanders and their limitations under fire as well!

Let me contrast the situation faced by George Washington's forces with that faced by the military today.

In 1781, the Continental Army fought on familiar ground, among a population largely friendly, with a relatively established domestic infrastructure, using interior lines, and in concert with allies who were increasingly committed to the outcome.

In 1981, The U.S. Armed Forces face some predictable situations where many of these characteristics are present—NATO, for example.

But the world offers an increasingly complex menu of situations, where few, if any, of these conditions exist; situations rooted in a world of change so furious in its pace as to be incomprehendable to our forefathers. Change will be the dominant factor on our platter through the rest of this century, and how we manage change will be the ultimate determinant as to whether we will succeed or fail—our efforts to preserve peace and to retain our values intact.

Change necessarily introduces challenge, either proactive or reactive, especially as it affects our national well-being. And in those challenges are borne some seeds which presage confrontation, the potential for crisis, and the possibility of conflict.

The essential role of the military is to be the backdrop which prevents emotional issues from flaring into immediate conflict, thus permitting challenges that arise to be settled amicably, to the mutual benefit of all concerned.

In brief, we have a recipe today which demands global attentiveness to our interests; a global attentiveness which necessitates some fundamental rethinking of the military forces we must have in being if we are to be responsive to the priorities now being laid out by this administration.

The Army has not been trailing along on this issue. We have long recognized that the implied commitments are much broader than those which the explicit programming charter has permitted us to prepare for over the past 10 years. But even with the constraints relaxed, you and I know that this is a very costly business. Hence it is necessary for us to induce the greatest kind of flexibility into our force design if we are to both stand by our treaty obligations and concurrently provide the capability for rapid response to any one of several contingencies worldwide.

The watch word today, as it was in my White Paper in February 1980, is: to develop the capability to react worldwide without jeopardy to our commitment to the CentralEuropean scenario.

What are the immediate goals then?

First, before becoming parochial, I must at least tip one of my other hats to several very real command and control issues. As a member of the JCS, I continue to be concerned with the survivability and responsiveness of the $C^3$ systems of our strategic nuclear forces. If we are to survive the next several decades without lowering even more the nuclear threshold, we must focus on the responsiveness of our nuclear command and control. Another area in which I have concerns wearing my joint hat is in the need for closer interface among the Services on communications and electronics requirements and the need to ensure that we are getting the most for our limited resources. Discipline across Services in the C&E area is essential if we are to get the most for our defense dollar. . . .

In a more parochial vein, let me talk about the needs of the Army in communications and electronics. Our first priority is to replace aging equipment in the field as rapidly as possible. Our current combat net radios and transmission systems are old, based on 1950's technology. In fact, the most outdated equipment in NATO is too frequently that of United States Soldiers. Many Reserve units do not have their basic communications needs, and much of what they have is not directly inoperable with our first-line equipment. Further, there is the issue of interoperability with our allies.

I think it's clear that we need to place continuing emphasis on the establishment of of our automation/communications networks; coming to grips with such problem areas as mobility, range, security, and immunity to electronic countermeasures. SINCGARs, SATCOM, TRI-TAC VIABLE and DAS-3 programs are a step forward, but will not solve all our problems. Each will provide in some sense a specific suboptimal solution. Our objective, however, is to link each in a logical way to provide a command and control system that will give us the time advantage required on the battlefield to win.

The Army is critically dependent on a survivable Army command and control system to . . . allow commanders at all levels to command their forces; and staff officers at all levels to assist them effectively—in peace, in transition to war, and in war itself.

To meet urgent needs of operating forces we place heavy emphasis on:

-New combat net radios: the SINCGARS family of radios for tactical communications within the division—IOC: early 1987?

-TRI-TAC: a secure, reliable, and responsive digital switching system which ties the division efforts into larger force operations, and

-Increased emphasis on satellites and mobile stations which can support deployed Army forces globally.

This modernization program is extremely expensive, and it needs to be intelligently pursued. A TRI-TAC switch, for example, costs $3 to 4 million. Our future efforts must focus on eliminating uneconomical buys, so often a result of our trying to swallow a little bit of everything that's available. We must achieve a procurement program that makes sense. Clearly one reason that communications readiness has not been up to snuff in the past has been because too much effort went into the pursuit of esoteric hardware across the board. This led to many ills—ills so well described in the recent past by General Jack Stoner. Examining eight tactical communications systems, he found that our procurement appetite, coupled with limited resources, resulted in an acquisition strategy that spread funding over such a lengthy period that it took us 19 years to field the initial quantity of VRC-12 radios, for example. Looking at the life cycle of technology, that meant that by the time the Army's TOE needs were met, the technology was 29 years old—given that the R&D phase covers about 10 years preceding type classification.

Now that's not all bad. I know some generals, perpetually 39 years old, that are still holding their own. We age well, but in equipment, there are incredible readiness implications.

-For the logistician, such a procurement strategy means he must maintain multiple generation technologies over at least a 20-year span of the fielded life of any piece of equipment—paying premium prices for repair parts and assuring technological block obsolescence for the Army. And, I might add, this kind of burden was being assumed by DARCOM in a time through 1979 when there was little sympathy for maintaining the strength of our civilian work force in the critical depots and maintenance facilities. Hopefully, that will be changing.

-For the trainer, this strategy requires the maintenance either of long and expensive courses—a year in length is not at all unusual where imbedded computer technology is concerned—or resort to the inefficiency of on-the-job training geared to the particular generation of equipment in the outfit.

-For the commander in the field, it means he must cope with equipment incompatibity with adjacent units or even internal incompatibility as combat losses are replaced from war stocks a generation old.

-For the planner, such acquisition strategies adversely affect the pace of achievable modernization, greatly affecting our ability to transition to improved force structures fully responsive to the threat.

These kinds of considerations lead me to some rather simple conclusions:

-First, we cannot afford to focus on the frontiers of technology, when that focus jeopardizes the near-term introduction of urgently needed

common equipment, such as radios. "The best is often the enemy of the good," the quote goes.

-Second, we must focus on readily achievable requirements, fielding them in a timely manner, and subsequently product improve, as necessary.

-Third, we need to seek mutually beneficial means for the mass production of equipment. Greater economy through multi-year contracting is one means often quoted.

So this is one outlook I hope we can make part and parcel of the way the Army and industry approach future modernization.

There is another area which needs your thoughtful consideration as well, and that is in the assumptions that underwrite our conceptual approach to weapons design.

Preparations for war in NATO involve one set of considerations; e.g.,

-Firm allies
-Knowledge of the geographical environment
-Existence of a sophisticated domestic infrastructure
-Practiced plans, and -Insights about the threat, and so forth

But the most likely military contingency of the future, in my estimate, will spring spontaneously from a situation where most or all of these assumptions are invalid. Our critical communications nodes cannot depend on large, fixed stations in that future. Instead they must conform to whatever we can shove into a plane and paradrop into a hostile zone. The equipment must be small, rugged, and easily maintained. Early on, we'll have no sophisticated logistics or maintenance infrastructure. So the equipment must be simple, reliable, and easily repaired. We'll also find that there will not be redundant commercial backup. These systems must also possess the range to reach around the globe. And as access to and use of land lines will be unlikely, what we take in must be secure.

To this point, I've only spoken of communications and automation as the means of effectively coordinating the firepower and maneuverability of an Army employed in any of a number of scenarios around the globe. I haven't mentioned the use of the electron as a weapon, and I want to tell you how critical I think that is.

We already know that the Soviets are well rehearsed in the application of a variety of electronic means as an integral part of their offensive operations. We need to turn that "electronic weapon" around. We're in the process of doing that now in the creation of units structured for integration of electronic warfare into the commander's battle schemes. Electronic warfare can give us the tool to disarm the Soviets by intercepting their means to control maneuvers and destroying their ability to shift firepower. There's no question in my mind that dramatic results are possible, and we need to aggressively pursue the options which our technology can give us. We can take away any flexibility they may possess beyond which is preplanned.

Even more to our advantage, potentially, are situations beyond Europe, where the Soviets have not had an opportunity for extensive preplanning. These situations provide exceptional EW opportunities.

A contingency operation, which is put together quickly, is highly dependent on voice communications. Here, intelligent planning and use of our EW assets can create a more decisive force multiplier than [may be possible] in set piece situations. With demands placed on our [mobility assets] to support adequately deployed forces, we have a capability in EW that is readily transportable and can provide a significent force multiplier.

So those are the kinds of features we must insist on. It's a more diverse world from the Army's perspective. What heretofore has been nice-to-have, if possible, is today essential.

To achieve all this will require innovative thinking on all our parts. But we've become accustomed to more than the ordinary from you—the members of AFCEA. In fact, the extraordinary becomes ordinary soon in your line of work. Now the challenge is to think extraordinarily about the ordinary, so that we will be capable of taking the field tomorrow, on call, fully equipped, on behalf of this great nation of ours.



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Your vital role in this task cannot be overemphasized. Some fix quite falsely on the wrong element for success in combat. I think even in this unbiased group we can find "modest" agreement with Alfred Mahan's contention that:

> "Communications dominate war; broadly considered they are the most important single element in strategy, political or military."

Thank you for letting me join you this evening.

## Address to the ANNUAL COMMAND CHAPLAINS CONFERENCE

Rosslyn, Virginia
21 July 1981

I appreciate the opportunity to join you this morning as you prepare yourself to set about this second day of your annual planning conference. Throughout these days, I hope you'll keep in mind the admonition of Dwight Eisenhower in an address to a group of farmers in Peoria, Illinois, in 1956:

> "Farming looks mighty easy when your plow is a pencil, and you're a thousand miles from the cornfield."

Expressing that a different way, those of you from out of town help bring greater realism to a conference of this sort and its issues. Don't surrender your insights to the kinds of experiences developed here in Washington. While we think we know the issues out there, you're closer to the field and to our product. You can discriminate between weed and plan, in areas where are too prone to generalize; seeing the fields we're cultivating in one hue, either all green—things good and problem free—or all brown—problem laden and discouraging.

Periodically, some of us do have the opportunity to get to the far pastures. Just a week ago I returned from an extended visit to our forces in Europe; half my time with allies, the balance with our own forces. I want to tell you I was tremendously impressed with what I saw—especially the quality of the enlisted leadership—the noncommissioned officer. Up to now I've generally cavaeted my remarks about the NCO corps—paying due credit to the senior NCO's, but frankly being generous, in my view, by silence about the more junior leaders. There's no need to be reticent any longer in speaking out about their capabilities. I'm . . . very pleased about what I saw.

Now I've used a reference to farming, and crops, and fields deliberately. On my first Sunday back in Washington from Europe, the Gospel was Matthew's recounting of Christ's first parable—the sower in the field. I thought about that parable and about what I saw in Europe. Here, so much of our time is spent on considerations regarding the quality of the young Soldier we bring into the Army—the basic seed we procure to sustain the Army. Surely, that's important. But of even greater importance is *the quality of the soil in which we plant and raise that seed.*

I don't know how you interpret your mission—the mission of the Army Chaplains Corps—but your responsibilities toward the nourishment of that seed, I would think, are best carried by a focus and concern for the soil in which we expose the seed—the environment, tone, and quality of the Army. That's merely a practical conclusion, for you individually cannot hope to nourish each Soldier on a one-on-one basis. A simple calculation which divides the Army's total strength by the authorized number of chaplains yields about one chaplain per battalion's worth of soldiers, or 550 Soldiers per authorized chaplain. If we include family members

and others in a dependent status, then each chaplain's fair share is a sizable community of about 1400—a reasonably large group.

Your numbers are not adequate to that task, and your time is limited. So what do you focus on?

I'll suggest that if you limit your involvement with the Army to the self-selection of denominational identity, you will not in all likelihood meaningfully touch a significant proportion of your fair share. Your denominational responsibilities carry you directly into nourishment of some of the seeds. What about the others? How do you affect them?

Your obligation to our Soldiers and their families, your contribution to shaping the ethical dimension of leadership, command practices, environments—implanting the "oughtness" of life—is the larger, more difficult dimension of your calling. You've got to provide the right kind of nutrients to the soil if you hope to affect the lives of those who don't come knocking at your door. And that task ought to involve a goodly amount of your time, your thinking, your creativity, your action.

The nutrients include care and concern for the human and worldly needs of our Soldiers and their families. I understand that Dr. Hamilton McCubbin, who was a valued participant in our first Army Family Symposium last October, will talk to you tomorrow. So I won't dwell on the family itself, except to remind you of two factors:

-First, good or bad, we are increasingly a married Army; hence, the commitment—or the disaffection—of our Soldiers to the service is increasingly a family decision.

-Second, those outside our service tend to react to our welfare only in feast or famine spasms. It is our lasting responsibility as officers to compensate for these fluctuations by demonstration of a continuing concern; testifying by our actions the worth of our profession, and the value of being a part of that profession.

In this regard, the chaplain plays an important role as a vital team member toward the health of the Soldier's mental, physical and social development. This is an obvious complement to your spiritual vocation. I would re-word Ambrose Bierce's cynical definition of a clergyman: "a man who undertakes the management of others' spiritual affairs as a method of bettering his temporal ones"—especially in view of a chaplain's limited temporal rewards—to portray a chaplain, instead, as: "one who undertakes the management of Soldiers' temporal affairs as a method of bettering his and their spiritual ones."

So the first nutrient you need to focus on is your denominational responsibility; the second is your concern for the Soldier and the family, and the third, I would say, is your activism in helping to build and maintain a strong moral framework within our profession.

Many of you know that recently we've gone to press with a new FM 100-1, the basic document describing fundamentals about the Army and our profession. I was especially eager to include in the re-do a description of the basic ethic underwriting our profession. Ethic—a set of values—not ethics, or morals, which are even more fundamental.

Without a grounding in ethics and morality, I recognize that the Army ethic—loyalty to unit, loyalty to the Nation, selfless service, personal responsibility—can be carried to extremes disfunctional to the Army and to the Nation. In the same light that the West Point motto - Duty, Honor, Country - is underwritten by a moral code that a cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal, the Army ethic needs a moral foundation.

You'll recall the best seller of a few years ago, "*Once An Eagle.*" Two soldiers mature in that saga. One of them, Sam Damon, lives the Army ethic and applies it in judgments which spring from tested moral convictions. The other, Courtney Massengale, postures to the Army ethic, citing it appropriately for his own purposes according to a distorted sense of right and wrong--sparing nothing to protect himself, breaking his word to subordinates, falsifying messages, etc.

Certainly, the characterizations of the two men are almost caricatures of moral opposites.

Moral challenge is likely to be less obviously portrayed in your lives and mine.

A real classroom of ethical and moral conflict is depicted in an Australian film currently showing in this metropolitan area, *Breaker Morant*—based on the real event of a courts-martial of three colonial soldiers for the murder of Boer prisoners. Here we can see the high command seeking a conviction based on a loyalty to the "better interests of the Nation," while at the same time it is clear that the same high command shares culpability in the deed. The conflicts are ready-made for a stop action class in moral dilemma, indicative of those which can occur in wartime, and I recommend you see it as refreshingly different from normal cinema fare.

Now these are fiction—or almost so. Do such things really trouble us today? One great Soldier said it like this in 1948:

> "The world has achieved brilliance without conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants."

That was General Omar Bradley on Armistice Day. I was a plebe at West Point. In the intervening 33 years, there is no room for optimism about heightened ethical standards in our larger society. Consequently, our internal sensitivities need sharpening, for they are too easily dulled by the influences prevailing about us. For example, what are the moral implications of tasks assigned, but undersourced—in peace, or in war?

My charge to the Chaplains Corps in this era of change is to condition the soil out there so that it can withstand corrupt influence, germinate seeds into healthy plants, and buttress the Army as an effective bedrock for the Republic, its health and continued safety.

Thank you.

## Address to the NEW SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE CANDIDATES VIA TELEPHONE

Washington, DC
28 July 1981

Good morning ladies and gentlemen--

I'm delighted to have a chance to speak to you this morning—even if via Ma Bell.

On behalf of all the men and women of the Army—your counterparts, military and civilian alike—I'd like to extend congratulations! Your selection to the SES Candidate Development Program emphasizes your individual abilities and potential. . . .

The measure of how important our civilian work force is to the Army is no longer a matter of conjecture. I've said to various forums, most recently the Congress, that the quickest way for the Army to improve its readiness, its "right-now, go-to-war" capability, is to increase the size of our civilian work force so that we can put Soldiers back to doing the tasks of Soldiers. I'm happy to report that the Congress apparently agrees and our new budget request provides for an increase in our civilian strength.

But what about you as individual members of that civilian work force? Well, I would have to say that your individual professional competence and overall importance to the Army mission have been critically underscored by the selection process you've just gone through. You are all that remain of over 400 extremely well qualified men and women who applied for entry into the SES program. To me, then, you are my future civilian general officer equivalents. My problem is to get that idea across to all my "Green Suiters." Once we have the Total Army more attuned to the importance of the civilian employee—not just SES but also the GS-9's and GS-5's—then we can put

to rest things like a newspaper cartoon I saw recently. The picture show a civilian worker at his desk in Washington and on the wall behind him a plaque which read, "Gone unnoticed for over 18 years." Hopefully, there will be no more testimonials such as that in the future—from any quarter.

. . . the problems that we have created and perpetuated ourselves—internal to the institution—concern me. . . .Many surfaced, as you may know, in a recent attitude survey of the military and civilian members of the Army staff. . . .the "person-to-person" problems that stem from the interactions of people. . . .are most injurious to the well-being of an institution—any institution!

Some of the more serious charges of the attitude survey that top management doesn't care about the civilian employee, military supervisors exhibit a lack of knowledge and interest in civilian career progression, and that military action officers—rather than civilian—are given the key projects. These lead me to believe we need to weld the military/civilian link more firmly. The situation goes beyond the walls of the Pentagon and it is something [we] need to redress—and we're doing that.

We're going to be looking at solving some problems that are organizational in nature within the SES program. . . .that detract from efficient management.

One such detractor is job stagnation—the failure of the system to provide job mobility worldwide by exercising the mobility features we do possess. We do no one any good by failing to capitalize on the broadening experience of assignment to differing positions within a career field. I'm not advocating wholesale reassignments every two or three years; first, because that's counter to the kind of stability I've been working toward, even among my general officers, and, second, because the continuity and stability provided by senior civilian managers is one of the most important aspects of the shared military-civilian management structure. I do think, however, there is much to be gained, on both sides, from a well-grounded mobility program.

Another area that concerns me is the high vacancy rate that exists under our present system. Perhaps an answer lies in having a single agency/functional chief responsible for filling vacant positions.

. . . though we do have problems, I want you to know that we are attempting to solve them, and your views on possible solutions would be appreciated. . . .

In closing, again, congratulations on your selection. As I've said to many different audiences, this is an exciting time to be associated with the Army. The need for professionals such as yourselves is greater now than at any time in the past. You can be assured that you are needed and looked to as vital contributors to the Total Army.

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS

On Failure
29 July 1981

One of the consistent characteristics of a healthy command climate is the assurance that an honest mistake does not lead to drastic career consequences. Leaders/trainers must be confident that they can learn, experiment and innovate without fear of retribution if their ideas fail.

However, many company and battalion commanders perceive the annual general inspection, maintenance evaluations, operational, logistical and training readiness evaluations, reenlistment/AWOL rates, etc., to be do or die tests. They go from test to test to test with a "we must suc-

ceed at all costs" attitude that hinders the important coach/pupil-teacher/student relationships that must exist if we are to train the Army for the battlefield of the future.

We must win on the battlefield in the next war, but we do not have to win every day as we train our Soldiers. Winning every day implies to most officers and sergeants that they cannot make a mistake, that there is no opportunity for trying new ideas. While there are some officers who understand that it is not necessary to win every day to be successful and who do profit through their own mistakes, this group does not represent the vast bulk of the Army's officers or NCO's. Therefore, I believe that pushing people over one more hurdle which requires them to have the best of this or the best of that in a total Army context is not a good idea.

Being the best squad in the platoon or best company in a battalion or being best against the high standards you have set for yourself is far more important in developing an Army than competition which identifies everybody who is not first as a failure or loser. I don't believe in that philosophy. Nor do I think it is healthy for the Army.

Every unit must be physically and psychologically fit to fight. Continual testing and high pressure competitions are not the way to achieve and maintain this fitness. A healthy attitude that allows our Soldiers and junior leaders to exercise initiatives, learn as they are doing, and profit from their mistakes will reap benefits and improve their fighting capability. While most of us may sincerely believe we have created a healthy command climate, many of us are just kidding ourselves. I ask that each of you examine your programs critically and those that directly or indirectly handicap training be eliminated right now.

## Address to the ARMY WAR COLLEGE CLASS OF 82

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
4 August 1981

I want to welcome all of you, the 65th class at the Army War College. You have to think about that. . .the Army War College. You're here to learn about the Army. You're here to learn about the way the Army operates in the AirLand battle. . . .we're going to focus your attention here on the Army aspects, the ground aspects of that battle. . . .you're here to learn about *war*. You're not here to learn about managing. You'll learn a little bit about that, but it's all in the context of how to ensure that this nation can, in fact, go to war, and that the Army can go to war. That's what you're here to learn. [It's] not a peace college, not a defense university, but a war college. Because as it says on the entrance out there, if we're able to go to war, it's a lot less likely that we'll have to go to war.

And that's the [third] aspect of the Army War College—it is a college. You're not here to learn a handy-dandy checklist like you did at Leavenworth or like you did at your basic courses. You're here to learn principles. You're here to learn about the ways and means and methods of going about applying those principles—those principles of war, those principles of management, those principles of leadership, those principles of commandership to the various tasks that we have ahead of us in the future. So that's what you're here for, and that's why this is the Army War College. And that's the challenge that's laid out to you.

. . . I think each of you at the start should take a great sense of pride in the fact that your background has prepared you well enough to be selected to come here. And that you've produced well enough in the past to be selected to come here. Now you haven't done that alone. There may be a few of you officers who are here in spite of

your spouses, but I doubt that very much. Most of you who have been successful, most of you have done that as a team effort, as part of a family, and so I think it's important that, as you share this experience here at the Army War College with your peers, you also have the opportunity to share it with your families. Your families have been a part and parcel of why you're here, part and parcel of how you got here, and should be a part and parcel of your year here as you and they grow in the dimensions that I'll talk about in a bit. . . .

I also want to welcome the International Fellows who are here, because you bring a unique blend of background and experience. . .We no longer have nations which are not dependent upon one another. We have an interdependence throughout the world that demands—yes, demands—that we understand one another's needs, that we're able to operate as a world, that we're able to understand what happens elsewhere in the world, and what its impact is upon us. You bring to this class something that each one of your classmates in the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard or civilian component will gain from. So we're delighted that you're here. . . .

This is the third class that I've addressed as the Chief of Staff of the Army. . . .I've spent the last year on the Chautauqua circuit speaking about the future and about the set of values that are essential if we're to have the kind of Army we need to respond to the challenges that face our Nation in this very difficult era ahead. So I had to think a bit about what I might speak to you about today. I thought what I would do as you begin this year. . .is talk a bit about the Army and its role, a bit about the nation, a bit about the international climate, and what those three together portend for the military and for the Army. [Finally, I'll] tell you what I hope you and the Army will get out of this year here at Carlisle, because I think that it's important that as you start your course, that you and I see eye to eye on what we expect while you're here.

. . . When I was here as the Deputy Commandant, I had [a] call from General Abrams . . . who said, "How about having the students at the War College write in 50 words or less, "Why an Army." Well, I had all kinds of stuff come in from your predecessors . . . on "Why an Army". Remember the environment in 1973? We were just coming out of Vietnam. There were efforts at that point in time to have withdrawals of our forces in Europe. . . .The very basic challenge rampant throughout the nation was whether or not we needed an Army and General Abrams was concerned about articulating the need for an Army at that particular point in time. As I look to what the challenges are for us as we decide what we're going to do about the Army, what comes to mind, first of all, is what it's made of, who holds it together, and finally why it's different.

Now the Army is different. All of the services are different from a normal job and a normal role in civilian life. I was over in Europe in June and early July, visiting some of the troops over there, as well the German Army, the British Army and the French Chief of Staff. And I had the opportunity to speak to each of those elements, and when I finished I had a series of questions from some of the reporters from *Stars and Stripes*. They asked some questions about why the Army couldn't have various elements of society in it the way the rest of society had. And it became clear to me at that point in time that there are still those out there who think the Army is merely an extension of society, merely an extension of the civilian element. It isn't. . . .

It's made of people held together by values, and it's different because of the unique mission it's called upon to perform. So those of you who wear [uniforms] out there, have a unique heritage, unique background, and [the unique] responsibility that goes with it.

Let me talk about the nation for just a few moments, because as you get all of these very brilliant scholars who are going to come in and lay the Nation out for you and dissect it and cut it up into 37 different pieces of meat, you have to be able to put that in some sort of context. Let me talk about our Nation today as I've watched it evolve under the new Administration. . . .

First of all, we have a nation today. At the top of the list there is concern about the military. . . .We have support in Congress at this point in time. It's going to be important, as I've told all of our major commanders everywhere, that for the next year and a half that we're absolutely

scrupulous in ensuring that the way in which we go about utilizing the resources we have is proper and prudent. . .

The most important changes in our Nation as far as our national security policy relate to a change by this Administration for a more global approach, . . . a broader view of the areas in which armed forces might have to be used. That has a portent for all of the armed forces. It also has a portent for our relationships, not just with the NATO nations and our Asian allies in Northeast Asia, but also for our allies and friends in Latin America, in Southeast Asia, in Africa, and so on. So that particular equation will be changed significantly. . . .

The other aspect of change is a willingness to begin to develop an armed force that can in fact continue to fight as long as it has to. . . .Those are major changes in the way we have [gone] about doing business in the Defense establishment for about the past 8 to 10 years.

. . . we have to look at what impact those changes have on our Army and on our Armed Forces.

The structure of the Army in the current proposals that we have made to the new Administration includes increases in the numbers of divisions, to include both the Active Component and the Reserve Component. It includes increases in the roles and interchange and affiliation and roundout of the Guard and Reserve. . . .The improvements include increased combat support and combat service support to make sure that we have a balanced force. In my discussions with the leaders in Europe, one of their principal concerns is the [current imbalance] between our combat service support to make sure that we have a balanced force over there. So from a structural point of view, we are looking at increasing the size—the numbers of divisions within the Army—and increasing the support structure within the Army to ensure that we have increased flexibility to respond across the varying demands that might occur in the future under the umbrella of the doctrine which has been enunciated of a more global approach. . .

. . .to man that structure is going to require that we increase the Active Component somewhere in the neighborhood of up to 100,000. It's also going to require that we increase the National Guard and the Army Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, or bring it up to strength and increase it by about 80-100,000. With the shortages that already exist there, that's an increase of 300,000 over the near term. . . .At the same time you're talking about increases in the Navy, increases in the Marine Corps, increases in the Air Force—all under the current volunteer system. So that challenge is before us and hopefully will be resolved. . . .

Equipping that force clearly will be dependent upon the resources which we receive. . . .We're in an instance now where we have the opportunity to make coherent and what I believe to be valued judgments on the [equipment] mix that we need. . . .

. . training [is] an area where I believe we can make some of the most immediate improvements. I just had General Collins go out to survey the entire training community. . .The basic questions he raises are those which we all are confronted with, and that's the ability to train the individual up to the equipment that we have for the future, and that's something that we have to do iteratively. . .we're attempting to enure that, as equipment is developed, that is easier to handle, easier to manage, easier to take of. . .However, it means that there's a greater demand of the careerist. So you see it all links back to our decision on the way we mature the force so we have more people around who are able to be there for long periods of time and able to provide the kind of support that's necessary.

The soldierization of individuals within the Army, as most of you know from my past statements, has been inadequate. . . .I've already increased our basic training; we're increasing AIT, and we're looking at increasing it even more. That is first priority of General Julius Becton, who not only is the Deputy Commanding General for TRADOC and responsible for training, but he's also my personal inspector general. He reports directly to me [on] the interface of individual training and the training base and the training out in the units to make sure that that linkage is bonded more closely than it has been in the past.

You've heard me talk, probably ad nauseum, on mobilization and sustainability. [If there's one] area where I feel that the Army does not have to feel like the Lone Ranger, it's in the area of mobilization and sustainability. We now have both congressional and administration support for improving the industrial base. Funds are going in now to ensure that we're able to modernize many of our industrial facilities and, while I still feel we have a long, long way to go there, I must say that I do not feel, as I believe the Army had a right to feel 4 or 5 years ago, that no one was interested in the way in which we mobilize and go to war. We are probably 20 miles down a 100-mile road, but we've at least started down that road to improve our mobilization potential. In May we had 25 of the top executive officers and chairmen of the board of companies, both defense and non-defense related, and we were able at that time to also bring in members of the new Administration and Congress to discuss not only the problems which we had uncovered last October, but also to begin some of the programs which you see today, [such as] tax benefits to improve the capacity [of our nation's industrial base].

Those are some of the areas which I think will be in the forefront as far as the Army's concerned.

This year will be the pivotal year because this is the year in which most fundamental decisions have to be [made] which will influence the Army that you're going to lead in the future. . . .

Now, let me ask the basic question, and that is about your role here at the Army War College, and why the Army War College is important to what I've talked about. . . .

For 65 years, Carlisle has been turning out men and women who are selfless in their dedication to the cause of ensuring that we have an Army that can go to war. . . .The educational system we have within the Army permits us to stretch the minds and the attitudes of our future leaders to the utmost. . . .

I know that you were given a series of readings before you arrived. The first week will focus on war, on principles of war, on the Army's role in war. I asked General Merritt to [concentrate] on that from the very beginning so you have an appreciation and an understanding of how all the other pieces of your curricula fit into that basic thesis. . . .It gives you up front what it's all about. I think that's the proper way to go about it.

I've found in my traveling around throughout the Army—and I will be equally as critical of the rest of the services out here—that there was very little understanding and appreciation of the application of military power in contingency plans, in the way in which the total application of power could be projected through strategic mobility, through firepower, through maneuver, through all the other basic principles that we've learned so well in the past. I came away shaken when I visited the first rapid deployment joint task force CPX, shaken at the ineptitude of many of our military in contingency planning. Shaken in the fact that the senior leaders weren't teaching. Shaken in the fact that somehow we had forgotten many of the principles. [Shaken that we] had become so focused on specifics that we weren't able to apply principles. As a result we've attempted to reshape the course here at Carlisle, to focus on the broader issues and principles that will stand you in good stead regardless of whether or not the enemy attacks frontally in the Fulda Gap or whether the attack comes elsewhere as might be more likely. . . .

So for the Army, the War College is important because it provides us with a bed in which we can provide the various nurturing that you need, so that you're able to develop your full potential in thinking about how the Army would go to war. For you, it's an opportunity to learn about that in a broad sense. It's also an opportunity to learn something about yourself. And I say that because, as a result of my experience here as the Deputy Commandant, I learned that you have this year to assess yourself, your strengths, your weaknesses, your relationships with your family, and your relationships with your personal values. And as a consequence you're able to establish for yourself a platform which provides you—in my judgment if it's properly done—a springboard for your future careers. And that's important because the better the base, the sounder the values upon which your personal decisions are based, the better decisions you're going to make, and the more comfortable and confident you're going to be in making those

decisions. That's important, because as I said this decade ahead, this period out to the 21st century is going to be one full of change, of challenge, of crisis, of confrontation and quite likely conflict; and how you react to those changes—how you help to manage those changes—is going to determine whether or not our Nation and its values are intact at the end of this period. . . .

## Letter to a Friend
## CONCERNING CRITICISM OF THE ARMY

10 August 1981

. . . . I sometimes wish we were empowered and staffed to run a "truth squad," [but] the facts are that we are not. . . .[we] must acknowledge that [the author you refer to] is professionally skillful. . . .As the book makes clear, he collects and uses anecdotes with effectiveness.

A problem is, of course, that anecdotes, unanswered can stoke a hundred smaller fires of misunderstanding and that is one aspect that leaves me fearful. . . .anecdotes can breed an aura of sophomoric comprehension in which the "general reader" internalizes convictions potentially very damaging to the kind of support we need to sustain for future Army programs.

But you did not write to ask that I take you through a dreary rebuttal of every such anecdote, offending or otherwise. There are larger fish in his skillet. Suffice to say the overall characterization of the mosaic portrayed by this anecdotal stream is on balance hardly complimentary. But when fused to the more serious allegations that DOD treats funding levels and technology as ends in themselves, we have a caricature of devastating impropriety laid out for the reader; this at a time when the crying need is for constancy of effort in pursuit of necessary national means for achievement of our goals.

It's on the resource and technology issue, then, that I differ most substantially. . . .Dollars are frequently used as surrogate measures of level of effort, and with some justification. While I would agree wholeheartedly with the contention that more dollars don't necessarily ensure better national security, there is assuredly affixed to any cited sum of money a quantifiable output of some maximum dimension. When the effective level of defense resources shrivels (as it did consistently from 1973 to 1979), there is unquestionably a decline in the potential quantity, or quality, or both, of the resulting force. Better ideas, better strategies, better judgments can compensate for resources to some extent. Ideas, strategies and judgments certainly affect the skeleton of the force we desire. By no means are they capable of putting flesh on those bones! . . . fewer dollars cannot assure a better defense

Similarly, [he] contends we are too enamored with technology for its own sake; technology as the end product. But technology is not our goal, capability is. We have tremendous technology on our drawing boards, while the Russians have it in the field. That technology does us no good. The problem, as often as not, for this situation is the lack of constancy in national willingness to support defense, a willingness expressed in resource levels. Stops and starts, delays and stretchouts—all derivative of those levels of effort—have played a large part in where we are today. But I digress. Technology is the means, often the catalyst which permits the mind to rethink or reevaluate options. Sometimes it is the hurdle we cannot overcome in striving for an enhanced capability. Canceled programs such as the Cheyenne, the IMMAWS, the Roland are examples where we have backed off of continued futile or expensive efforts to field technology not yet ready for application. Many programs are "nailed" early on these bases, well before their names become household words. We don't pursue technology without purpose. It is not the primary object of our concern!

These two issues are the key objections in my mind to [the] presentation. I think it most unwise if broad credence is somehow accorded to a gospel which alleges that markedly cheaper, less sophisticated solutions are self-evident if on-

ly we could somehow correct the managerial and technocratic mind set of inbred military leadership. That's too simple.

[The author] asks why, when such modern phenomenon as the calculator has demonstrated dramatic cost reductions, are we not taking advantage of comparable economies. There are appropriate comparisons to our situation in the civilian world, but the calculator, which [he] identifies as having plummeted to a tenth of its 1971 cost, is not a correct one. The afficianado, who 10 years ago found the capability of the $80 calculator sufficient to his needs, and still finds that capability adequate, can keep what he has or avail himself of a replacement calculator for $8-10. But more likely, today he will demand the greatly enhanced benefits of a home computer: more expensive, more complicated—but immensely more capable. The cost for this new capability has risen many-fold, primarily because the desired capability has increased many-fold as well.

The business world offers another similar situation. Thirty years ago the mechanical typewriter was the norm in most offices, replaced by the electric typewriter, and today in many forward-looking firms by electronic word processors where the image is massaged on a cathode ray tube. The technology is more complex, and the cost too—from a hundred or so dollars in 1950, to many thousands of dollars today. But the increased cost and technology are tolerable because the capability to the user is commensurately greater. That capability may provide an important edge in business competition.

[The author] doesn't talk much about our competitors—except to discount our national estimates of Soviet military spending, allege a continual inflation on our part about comparable weapons inventories, and cite one misassessment of Soviet technology . . . . Frankly, I don't care what the comparable expenditures are. But I do care greatly about existing weapons inventories, production capability, and the related quality of fielded weapons. The figures today (which I do believe) are frightening. We cannot ignore very real deficiencies here. As much as I'm an advocate of our ability to improve many aspects of our approach to defense, the quantitative and qualitative asymmetries cannot be wished away.

[The author] examines many of the softer areas as well: the quality of leadership, "careerism," attention to the intangibles of armies and warfare, friction on the battlefield, tactics, information flow, command and control—and by and large he touches accurately or sympathetically on many issues I feel keenly about, and whch we are pursuing daily with a lot of energy and tangible results:

-Lengthened and toughened training
-A focus on the unit, its training and its cohesion; movement to an American Regimental System
-An improved "school of the NCO," both formal and informal
-A focused attention on officer growth: his values, his development, his aspirations and potential contributions (we've got to give him room to fail, and get his mind out of the straight jacket of a prescribed NATO War).
-Innovative tactics: in our high technology light division test bed, in the field through activation of electronic warfare units, in our development command using the Army 86 studies, and in the Pentagon by grappling with organizations incorporating high-low mixes of equipment.

. . . .I acknowledge to you, that in some areas we have a way to go, but we know where we need to go and the die is cast to get there as fast as we can. The resolution is in our hands.

The only point I would take major issue with is his contention that our Army is *attrition oriented.* That's patently an oversimplifcation I cannot let stand. Most critics begin their proof . . . by pointing to Vietnam's body count as a clear attribute of an attrition-oriented mentality in the U. S. Army. I'll agree with that indicator as saying something about how we fought that war. But the helicopter and the tactics its capability provided us, the vast advantage our access to sea allowed, were all geared to warfare of unprecedented mobility. . . .I'll let you be the judge as to whether the environment within which we operated (politically, culturally, and otherwise) permitted the forged weapon free play.



*The Army is made of people held together by values, and it's different because of the unique mission it's called upon to perform. So those of you who wear the uniform have a unique heritage, unique background, and the unique responsibility that goes with that...*

*From address at*
*Carlisle, August 1981*

Vietnam is not the case today, but I'd suggest that neither firepower nor maneuver are answers of themselves in an environment of sanctuary warfare and internal subversion.

Europe today is another matter; it involves neither sanctuary nor subversion. There, our forces are tailored to a mode of warfare coupling fire and maneuver. As my paragraph on the threat made clear, we couldn't fight an attrition war if we wanted to today. We'd be the first attritted!

As with the "more resources do not equal more security," and the "too much technology" arguments, the "attrition" issue is an oversimplificaton, a clarion call to a simpler answer which simply doesn't exist. . . .

## Address to the WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL

Boston, Massachusetts
24 September 1981

I notice that the agenda you have here is very similar to one for a military operation.

First, you have a meeting engagement which takes place back in the corner back there where everybody sort of feels one another out over drinks, and you try to decide who you're going to soften up, or butter up prior to the luncheon.

. . . what follows next, which is where we are now, is sort of the central battle. For those of us who are in the military business, that can be either offensive or defensive. In the military arena that's based primarily on intentions. Today, it's dependent upon the invited speaker, and that's me, so I'll try to make sure it's not too offensive.

Finally, there's the exploitation phase of the combat, and that's the period in which hopefully we're able to succeed. I would hope that the question and answer period here offers a similar opportunity for exploitation. At that point in time, there might be subjects of interest which I haven't covered in which you may be interested—noncontroversial items like the drafting of women, the morality of war, enhanced radiation warheads, the AWACS, European pacifism, cost escalation, volunteer Army, and a couple of other low key issues like that—which you might like to discuss.

What differs here from the battlefield is that, hopefully at the end, there aren't any losers, that I have been able to fill a gap for you or provide you with some food for thought. Similarly, I hope I'm able to gather in your ideas of where it is we are and where we're going.

One of my illustrious predecessors indicated that generals should never pass up the opportunity to remain silent. Well, I'm not going to follow that advice because it came at a period of time when there was an element of self-inflicted wounds on the part of many generals, and it was also a period of time in which, as a result of Vietnam, it may have been inappropriate for generals to be speaking on many issues. But I feel that I have a responsibility as a custodian of your resources, and as a custodian of national power,



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to speak out, to report on the stewardship of those of us who are developing our military forces for the future, and to assure you that we are using the discretionary federal funding provided us responsibly.

It is not necessary for me to review with this particular group the background or the rationale which underwrites the need for military forces. The mandate that came from our [electorate] last fall is an indication of the support and need felt for adequate military forces. I believe the Armed Forces in their role of providing disciplined, trained and ready units are a fundamental prerequisite for the continued existence of this nation, particularly if we want to ensure that our freedoms and our liberties are kept intact.

Now that's not to say that there aren't differences of views as to what that Army should look like and what that military force should look like. There are, in fact, honest differences about how much is enough. Is this the right strategy? Is this the right tactic? Are these the right weapons? But the fundamental rationale for the maintenance of military power doesn't need to be explained to this audience.

Military power is not—nor should it be—the only arrow in the quiver of our national security means. But it is an arrow which we must have. And it needs to be straight, it needs to be sharp, and it needs to be immediately available. If this premise is not acceptable, then neither is the contemporary priority accorded to defense.

I want to talk about a few things. One is change. Another involves multiple gaps I see existing at the present time. And I'd like to offer a few observations on these areas.

We truly are going through a period of change. I don't care what particular business you are in, or what particular background you're from, change is all about us, and the way in which we go about managing change over the next decade or two will determine whether or not we arrive on the 31st of December 1999 with our Nation's values intact.

In the case of the military, we are in a truly complicated era, one in which the nuclear genie is no longer in a bottle that's stamped "USA only," in which there are a lot of little bottles that are likely to be standing aside that other big bottle. Our industries are no longer self-contained or even contiguously located in this hemisphere. Even if they were, we no longer possess all of the resources, the wealth of raw materials, to give us the same sort of self-sufficiency in production that we had in the past. Our air, land and sea forces no longer hold an undeniable qualitative and quantitative edge. More seriously, and less tractable as far as I'm concerned, is the fact that new generations are coming of age within our alliance framework who do not appreciate the nature of yesterday's threat and today's threat. And the issue is equally serious among those of us who fail to comprehend what has changed in the last 15 years.

Now just let me take one small area of the world to illustrate the point. Take what's happened in Southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf—or whatever you choose to call that area of the world—and look at it in the context of a recent paper by Albert Wolstetter. It's a paper I've both discussed and worked with him on in which he talks about the Soviet ability to project power into that area of the world. If you go back some 15 or 20 years ago into the era of the Cold War, the only way in which they were able to project power into that area of the world was by going all the way around the northern flank of Norway, into the Atlantic, and around the Cape of Africa, into the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean and so on. Today, they have vastly increased access to that area as a result of the political and military changes in northern tier states of the Persian Gulf area, as a result of the capability of their armed forces to be able to project themselves into the area, and as a result of their proxies operating in and throughout that area.

What's happened to us in the same timeframe? At the time when they had to come all the way around, we had a base structure on six continents from which we could project power. We have a much reduced capability to be able to do that today. So as you look at that one small area of the world, our capabilities and the capabilities of the Soviets have seemingly reversed. And that's happened around the world. That's one thing that we have to take into account as we go about ensuring that we have the right kinds of forces in the future.

. . . comparable changes have occurred in many sectors. Their cumulative effect has been the opening of what I call multiple gaps in our defense programs, gaps which need to be closed or bridged expeditiously in the national interest.

Let me talk about five of them, if I may.

First, there's the strategy-force mismatch, a gap between what our military forces in being are able to do and the enunciated national strategies. Second, there's a gap between our existing capabilities, both quantity and quality, and those of the Soviet Union. Third, there's a gap between what we have today and what we believe we need tomorrow. It's what I call the future gap. And we need to bridge that to ensure that we have the right kind of equipment tomorrow and the right kind of training, and the right kind of tactics, so that our forces can respond to tomorrow's threat and not that of World War II. Fourth, and of current interest because of what you're reading in the newspapers, is the gap between what prudent military advisors recommend as important to our worldwide interests and what prudent economic advisors believe practical and attainable. It's what I call the resource gap. And then the fifth gap, and perhaps the one of most enduring concern to me, is the gap of un-gauged dimension between the Army and society, or between the Army and the other services and the society which they are pledged to defend. Some believe that it is a nonexistent gap. But others see it as quite wide and widening. I believe that close bonds and a special relationship must endure between the military and society if we're to be an effective instrument of national power.

I'd like to talk to each of these gaps just very briefly as I see them.

*First, the strategy force mismatch.* Those of you who have followed the national security debate over the years realize that we've had all sorts of different shibboleths regarding the strategy of our nation—whether it be a two-and-a-half war strategy or a one-and-a-half war strategy, or whatever else it was alleged to be. The enunciated strategies have changed over time. As we've worked to develop a supportive defense establishment, arguments have been made as to whether or not the strategy involved a simultaneity of contingencies, or whether or not the principal threats were independent, sequenced-type actions. Nonetheless there has, and was, and continues to be a differential between the strategy we've announced for the nation and the capabilities of the forces we have to respond to that strategy.

Now what's different between the Reagan administration strategy and the Carter administration strategy as far as the poor old Soldier is concerned in what he has to do?

First of all, the Reagan administration strategy proposes a more global approach to our responsibilities. Secondly, it envisions the need for a capability to engage in a war of more indeterminate length rather than just one of a short and violent exchange. And third, it accepts the need to take action under periods of tension, which gives you an opportunity to use your Reserve Components—your Guard, and your United States Army Reserve—as effective components of the nation's total deterrent power. This framework obviously requires that you have adequately sized forces ready across the full spectrum of warfare from counter-terrorism all the way through strategic nuclear exchange. That key linkage between our force capabilities—the forces in being—and the strategy is one of very real concern, and is one that must be brought into order. Otherwise, we will have the President and the leadership of our Nation proposing ways in which they will go about national security without the miltary strength—as one of those arrows in the quiver of national security means—to back it up.

*Gap two is the gap that has to do with our current capabilities and those of our likely adversaries.* It's the issue of our comparative strength—in quantity and quality. In the past, we have spoken time and again of the clear fact that the Soviets had improved numerically over us. Today it's not just an issue of numbers, but also of quality. We must close that qualitative gap because there's no way, in my judgment, that we will be able to compete on man-for-man or system-for-system basis. What we need to do is to be able to use the technological capability of this nation, the inventive ability of this nation, to get us out in front in those areas where we can have advantage so that we aren't using resources merely to create a mirror image force. In the long run such a mirror image force would not be the right kind of force for us to respond with, simply because our political, social, and geographical posture is so different.

Why does the gap exist? What happened, in the case of the Army, is that the resources made available in the 1960's and early 1970's were resources that were consumed in Vietnam. The 1970's were, for us, an era of development. At this point in time the United States Army is in a position where it has the opportunity to make a

qualitative leap forward to ensure that we have the kind and type of land combat equipment that we urgently need.

Now, if I read the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Wall Street Journal* and everything else [correctly], the biggest criticism cited is that we're goldplating. I'd like to talk about goldplating for a minute if I might because I think that's a rightful concern of every American citizen. It's also a rightful concern for the Chief of Staff of the whole United States Army, and I am concerned about it. If it were possible to buy cheap, dirty weapons that worked, I would buy cheap, dirty weapons that work. But I always reflect on my experience in the 40th Division when we were sent into Korea for the first time and came up against a Chinese tank. Now first of all, you've got to remember that a soldier, an infantryman, doesn't have any armor on. He's just got a little epidermis there. And by the time he decides that he has enough courage to stand up and aim a rocket launcher at a tank, he's already used up most of his courage. At that point in time, as many of you will recall, we had a 2.36-inch rocket launcher. For those of us who finally got enough courage to stand up and fire, we saw the rocket bounce off the front of that Chinese tank. Most of your muscles tightened up very, very quickly, I'll tell you that. So I would tell you that the difference between a 2.36 and 3.5-inch rocket launcher—that 1.14 inches which gave that weapon on the battlefield the capability of being successful against the threat—is hard for me to characterize as goldplating. It was absolutely essential.

My position is that I am not going to send American Soldiers off to war with equipment that's inadequate to the task. Now you may therefore flail me for goldplating or whatever term you choose, but the determinant of what kind of equipment we use is not based on anything other than what the threat is and what that then dictates we must give the Soldier to respond with. So that's the task that we have today regarding the qualitative-quantitative gap.

Gap three is the need for a [future] force that's more flexible. From the very beginning of time, armies have been criticized for preparing for the last war, and then not being prepared to fight whatever war was at hand or being unable to respond to the needs of the national authorities. Well, I will tell you that, at times in the past the Army had its own fleet—I mean one belonging to the Army. We were able to be moved around from square A to square B by telling ships to line up out here, and we got aboard them and we were able to get from one place or the other. Today that's not true. And our fields of employment are projected afar. . . .

That force must rely on the Air Force for rapid airlift, and the Navy for rapid sealift in order to get where it is that we must go. And for the future if you go back to the [strategic] concept that is being pronounced . . . that means that we must have larger and more responsive strategic mobility, both air and sea. And that must be a high priority. The resource envelopes, therefore, are going to demand that some hard choices be made to ensure that the forces we have are able to get somewhere to do something to respond to the challenges.

Now that's not all that needs to be done. The Army must make certain that what we ask them to lift is minimized as much as possible in weight so that we minimize the demands made for mobility resources, and we're doing that. At Fort Lewis we've created a test division where we're taking the kind of technology that many of the companies in this area produce, and trying them out to see what we can do to make the forces lighter, more flexible, and better trained to boot. We're doing that at Fort Lewis so we can export what we learn there throughout the entire Army. It will hopefully yield more flexible forces which can respond not just in central Europe, not just in Northeast Asia, not just in Southwest Asia, but around the world. And that's essential for the force of the future. The flexibility gap, in part a function of our having [previously] focused [all major] force decisions on Europe, must be closed. Our forces must be more flexible if they're to be able to respond across the full spectrum of warfare. That is a serious deficiency that must be corrected.

The fourth gap is *the resource gap,* and that's one that all of us face—I don't care what you're business is, whether you're just running the checkbook or whether I'm trying to decide whether I can pay for my daughter's education at a university or whatever else it happens to be—there is always going to be a resource gap. Some of you around here may not have those problems, but there aren't many that fit into that category.

Week before last, we had our own resource gap exposed. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Management and Budget took the

defense spending issues to the President for resolution. The basic decision at that point in time was that there would be a continued real growth in defense expenditures of about 7 percent over the next 5 years. I believe that if we can sustain that kind of stability in the defense program, we can save the American people resources in the long run. We can give the American people more defense for the dollar.

The problem we have had in the past has been that every new administration every year politicizes the budget [by] zigging and zagging here and there on a multitude of critical ingredients. What needs to happen is for us to get on with an agreed program that will provide us some real stability. We've muddled through under the worst of situations [for] too many years past and that's not in the taxpayer's interest.

Is there a gap between what I'd like to have and what we expect? Sure, but those are the kind of choices that I get paid for making and it doesn't trouble me. The basic choice that we've made in the Army this year is to continue filling in the deficiencies that led me to characterize our Army two years ago as hollow. Those needs cannot be met by rhetoric. Consequently, we are going to forego increasing the size of the Army to focus on bringing in the modern equipment and other materiel we need to provide the Soldier.

Let me just talk briefly to national security in a broader context. The role that our military and the role of every other element that contributes to national security—our economic base, our technological base—are going to play in securing our national policies has to be articulated among all of the elements of government. National security has an impact on the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, and so on. Let me tell you one way in which such an orchestration might occur. In February of 1969, there was a review among all elements of government as to alternative forces which might be capable of carrying out alternative strategies. In that process the Department of Labor was able to indicate whether or not the manpower was adequate to support two alternative strategies, what it meant as far as Treasury was concerned over time, and so [on. Subsequently the] President was able to take a look at the cost of the various options and the alternative forces accompanying each. I think that's a very critical issue, because each one of us as citizens needs to consider our relationship to the problem.

*Too often, the average citizen does not see himself part of the broader issue.* They may ask: what kind of creatures do we have out there in the organizations which comprise our defense establishment? Well, George Will has said in several articles that we're markedly different from the greater American society. If you believe that, you might be persuaded to believe that somehow we're developing an Army that is a foreign mercenary band, separate and apart from the people; that it's unguided, and I suppose in some cases misguided on occasion. I hope that's not so, and I don't believe it is because the Army cannot exist as an entity unto itself. The Army and the American people and the other services are one.

Perhaps you'll recall . . . when some of the American officers were talking to North Vietnamese counterparts near the end of that war; an Army officer told his Vietnamese counterpart, "You should remember that North Vietnam never defeated the American Army on the field of battle." And his Vietnamese counterpart said, "That may be so, but it's also irrelevant." North Vietnam was not just fighting the United States Army, it was fighting the United States.

This remark highlights the too often forgotten fact that when the United States Army—which is genuinely a people's army—is committed, that the American people themselves are committed. And that when the American people drop that commitment, then the Army cannot remain committed. Our Army does not exist to serve itself, but it exists to serve the American people. That's important for us to understand at this instance in history. It's easy for people to be patriotic when the enemy hits you aside of the head with a 2x4, or there's a bombing of Pearl Harbor, but it's more difficult to feel the need for sacrifice in more ambivalent circumstances. Too many sophisticates expect that in the absence of their participation we can really expect that our preparedness and capabilities are going to be equal to the threat at that instance in history when the danger becomes unmistakably clear to all.

I was talking earlier to Ambassador Lodge about General Marshall's tenure as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1941. You realize that in September of 1941, with the war already going on in Europe, with the winds of war blowing very strong from the west, that we still had difficulty getting the authority to maintain the Guard and Reserve. The draft passed by just one vote—203 to 202. History

demonstrates that nations are not able to [prepare] successfully at the last instant. *Preparedness requires the involvement of the military with the American society throughout, so that at critical transition in history there's no last gasp attempt to close that gap.*

I'm proud of the American soldiers, the sailors and airmen who have joined on a volunteer basis to man our forces today. I'm also proud of our young Americans who are serving in other capacities—in VISTA, in the Peace Corps, community programs and all the forms of personal and institutional programs we have—and the way in which they're able to show their American idealism through such outreach.

If I were king, I'd broaden that ethic of service. So that to the degree that this ethic of service exists, I don't see any gap between the things that motivate our Soldiers and the goals and ideals of American society. However, if only a few are willing to take their place on the ramparts at that particular critical instance in history when our ideals are at stake, then we have a gap of potentially critical dimension in that concern.

Those are the gaps that I wanted to talk about that I see must be filled. That's the strategy force gap, the quantity-quality gap, the what-kind-of-force-we-need-for-the future gap, the resource gap, and the Army-society gap. Now all of those are being worked on, and decisions on closing one gap--for example, the strategy gap, wherein we might alter the strategy to close the gap—would have an impact across many of those other gaps as well. They're interdependent. Closing them will be at the center of the efforts of those who are dedicated to ensuring that the military arrow in the national quiver is responsive to the challenge of a changing future. This is all with the purpose of helping this nation manage change, instead of being managed by change, in this very difficult decade ahead.

That's all I have to say, and I'll be glad to take any questions now if you like.

QUESTION: We have been demoralized of course during the Vietnamese war, and what happened was that programs such as ROTC and the like showed a falloff in participation. How do we stand in that area today, and below that echelon, what are your concerns about registration?

GENERAL MEYER: First of all, let me talk about the basic success of the volunteer force—I guess that's the real issue. As far as the quality of the Soldiers that we're able to attract into the active component Army at the present time, about 50 percent of our nonprior service [volunteers] coming in were high school graduates in 1980. This year 80 percent are high school graduates—a higher percentage of high school graduates than we've had in the past. That's in the Active Component. It is possible with the educational incentives [and bonuses] that are currently ongoing to bring in, in my judgment, both the quantity and quality of soldier that you need [to man] a restricted size Army of 780,000. If you expand the size of the Army to meet the global needs that the Reagan administration has proposed, and if you expand the Army to ensure that you have the base here so that you don't have such a large percentage of your Soldiers overseas, and you are going to be able to retain your key middle grade leaders, noncommissioned officers and officers, then I don't see any solution if the Army goes above about 800,000 in end strength to be able to do that purely through monetary means.

The three areas in which the volunteer force has been a failure are manning the Guard, manning the United States Army Reserve and in providing a trained, manpower pool. Seven years ago we had a million trained young men and women in a manpower pool that was available if we went off to war. Today, we have 200,000. So the gap that exists in the Guard and the Reserve, and the trained manpower pool is the real gap as far as the adequacy.

On the question, are they smart enough to be able to handle the equipment, the answer is clearly yes. The equipment is being made simpler instead of more difficult. You remember when you got your first color television and you had all those dials over there where you had to get the hue and the tint and the color and all those kinds of things? Today I can punch a button and get the picture to come out right.

The real problem gets back to the maintenance of that equipment, the maintenance of it in the rear. That's where we need quality NCOs and quality military leaders. That's where the focus has to be. To get back to Meyer's basic premise, it doesn't matter whether you have a conscript or a volunteer force, if you don't have the critical NCOs and officers to lead it—that cadre—you can't have an army. We can solve the other problems at the last minute. Our country can solve the problem. But you can't solve the problem

of keeping the middle grade leader, so that's where we're trying to focus our responses.

QUESTION: Are the critics of the MI tank fair?

GENERAL MEYER: No. Absolutely unfair. First of all, the two basic issues are cost overruns and operational readiness. . . .let's just talk about two simple things like that; you know—something like a $1-1/2 million overrun per copy and the fact that the big hunk of junk won't do its job . Those are the kinds of challenges that you have to respond to. First, in the kind of industry that you're talking about, there's a higher inflation rate than experienced throughout society. So a large portion of the increase is pure inflation as far as the price on the tank is concerned. It's actually gone up only about $30,000 if you went back to constant dollars. I challenge anybody in industry here to compare any costs from '72 with '86—a Hershey bar went from 10¢ to 25¢—you know, the same size Hershey bar. It's hard to be able to compare those kinds of things. But that's the answer.

As far as the capability of the system itself, don't believe me, believe the sergeants. . . And the sergeants who are manning the MI say that's it's the finest tank they've ever been in, that it is easier to maintain than in the past. The Israelis who've been down there, the Germans who've been there, the French who've been down there, the British who've been down there, all of those who look at it say it's the best tank they've ever seen. So I just refuse to accept that criticism—I accept the criticism because I have to, but it's invalid.

QUESTION: About the neutron warhead, if I were in Germany, I think I'd just rather have neutron warheads seeing the Russian tanks at my back. I hear that Russia has allocated $700 million propaganda to keep us from deploying them. Why don't we go on a counter-propaganda war . . . and win the political battle so we can act freely?

GENERAL MEYER: I think the point you raise, whether you're for or against the enhanced radiation weapon, is valid as far as the Soviets are concerned. There are times when you know you're getting their attention because immediately propaganda begins to go out. It happened 2-1/2 years ago when the enhanced radiation weapon first came out, and it's happening profoundly now in the way in which they're influencing public opinion in Germany and elsewhere.

I think the other point that you raise is correct, and that we've just had the first shot in that response, sending declassified facts on the Soviet threat to NATO. I think it is being sent to our allies so that they could begin that kind of a discussion. It's hard to talk to this threat when you don't understand or appreciate its dimensions.

QUESTION: General, in trying to maintain military readiness, is chemical warfare getting much attention from the Army today?

GENERAL MEYER: The defensive aspect of chemical warfare is getting more attention than it has in the past. We began a 5-year program in the development of defensive overgarments, new gas masks, and all of that. Hopefully, we'll never have to go to war or ever have to use chemicals. But one thing that you have to know is that the Soviets have large amounts of chemical weaponry. These create a hazard to us and, without an equivalent threat in our hands, permit them to operate in a manner that they are not restricted by having to wear chemical overgarments—which reduces your effectiveness to the point that you're about one-fourth to one-fifth as effective. It creates a tremendous imbalance. So we need not only to have the defensive means to be able to operate in the chemical environment but, in my judgment, we need to have a retaliatory chemical capability so that they can't operate freely either. So that just from a pure military capability point of view, if neither side uses them, then both sides have been restricted by having offsetting deterrents. I just don't see giving them a free ride in that area. I think we need a chemical retaliatory capability.

QUESTION: General, would you tell me if there has been a story in the newspaper about combat readiness and how it's impacted by drug usage? Would you discuss that?

GENERAL MEYER: Sure, be glad to. First of all, the biggest impact on readiness is alcohol and not other hard drugs. Alcohol is the larger of the two problems. Alcohol decreases the capability of the soldier to be able to do his job, and has the biggest impact on the number of days away from work. I'm sure it's true in industry as well.

The best statistics we have show that there is a large instance of soft drug use—marijuana, hashish--up in the 35 to 40 percent area of once-a-month or greater use. In the area of hard drugs, it shows up somewhere between 5 percent and 8 percent. Statistics are difficult to substantiate. . . .I'm reminded of the days that Dick Kattai and I were in the First Cav together, when we

were beginning to have incidents of drug use in Vietnam. The drug problems we experienced were not the readiness problem, the alcohol was. The surgeons would come to me and say, "It's not the drugs that are causing the short rounds, it the use of alcohol. . . ."[Both areas have our attention.]

QUESTION: Would you comment, General Meyer, on what makes the Russians react so strongly to the neutron bomb, because they seem to be reacting to this more than most of the weapons systems?

GENERAL MEYER: I think it's one of the few weapons systems that permits rapid redressal of the imbalance in the numbers of tanks. They know that it's one weapon system that redresses that imbalance very quickly.

QUESTION: In December, when draft registration expires, do you think the President should renew it and do you think he will?

GENERAL MEYER: It doesn't expire, as it turns out. He has to take a conscious step not to have it continue. I know there is a belief that it expires, but it's not a question of it expiring. He must make a conscious decision not to have it extended. He has the opportunity to stop it at that time. I absolutely do not believe he should stop registration at that time, and I'll tell you very simply why. It's back to the basic concept of [the] relationship between citizen and state. From a social point of view, from a readiness of the force point of view, it makes the difference in the early days of a war of 108 days. There's a 108-day advantage if you have registration, so you can more quickly bring in people and have them available. I've already said we're short in the trained manpower pool. We went from a million to 200,000. We're short in the Guard. We're short in the Reserves. We have inadequate Active forces at the present time. To do away with registration now would be absolutely stupid.

I don't feel strongly about it.

## Article in the INAUGURAL ISSUE OF ARMY TRAINER MAGAZINE

1 October 1981

. . . Of all the balls that commanders have to juggle, only two are made of glass—training and maintaining. By sharing our success (and our failures) we open the door to improved training (and maintenance) in the Army.

The primary responsibility for the quality of training falls squarely on the shoulders of our sergeants. They are the primary link in the leadership chain. No member of the chain of command has greater day-to-day influence on the Soldier's life, his skills, his attitudes toward the Army, or his performance in battle. By conducting training personally, sergeants develop credibility with their Soldiers that makes their other leadership tasks easier, forming a foundation on which trust and confidence are built.

As Soldiers learn their individual and team skills, others in the chain of command play an influential role. . . .Mission training is often too complex or requires too many resources for one leader to handle. Thus, early on, training becomes the responsibility of the whole chain of command.

That chain of command must back up the first-line leaders who conduct training. This is done in many ways: by allocating time, resources and clear guidance based on a logical plan; by diagnosing and solving problems beforehand; by eliminating detractors; and by creating an environment supportive of good training. The efficent use of time and other training assets dictates that we must aggressively search for creative training approaches and opportunities. Our actions must display to all that there is nothing more important—and, if we do it right, nothing more interesting—than training.

The chain of command must also exhibit tolerance. Mistakes are inevitable during training. It is training, not testing. Soldiers are there to learn, not to make leaders look good. The responsibility is to teach. We must encourage an environment in which trainers have the freedom to experiment, to make mistakes, correct and learn from those experiences.

Equally important, the chain of command must develop the training leadership skills of those leaders who actually conduct training. I look to the lowest echelon with a staff to handle these important responsibilities. In most cases, that is the battalion. Echelons above battalion must set

goals, clear the air of detractors, and provide support that is beyond the capabilities of battalion size units. The situation is simply this: the whole chain of command must work together as a team to plan, conduct, and support good training. This means—

-Trainers must be proficient in the tasks to be trained. I look to the battalion officers to teach the NCOs and civilian supervisors, who shoulder the bulk of the training burden. Lieutenants and captains must be able to do everything their sergeants are expected to do.

-They must know how to train soldiers, a basic task of the chain of command. . . .

-Soldiers must be motivated to learn. This is everyone's responsibility. Commanders set goals and policies and staffs provide the support needed to insure that those goals and policies are met. Our NCOs and first-line civilian supervisors actually conduct most training, and execute their other responsibilities in a manner which motivates the Soldier or the civilian operator to achieve the goals of the organization.

-Commanders must create an environment that encourages training. Trainers must communicate their requirements so that the environment adequately provides for their needs. . . .

Good training is the key to good units and the basis for success in war. Let's get on with it.

## Hearing before the HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE Subcommittee on Defense On the FY 82 DOD Appropriation: Army Update

7 October 1981

GENERAL MEYER: Mr. Chairman, since I had to submit my prepared statement last Wednesday and since some of the decisions were [only] announced last Friday, which I wasn't able to put into the statement, I would like to taik a bit about the strategic decisions and a few of the specific budget decisions that I think are important to lay out for you at the beginning. As you properly pointed out, we were directed to take a cut of $1.76 billion in the current budget that we submitted to you. That represents an increase over what we had in the Carter submission of $4.7 billion. So, it is still a significant increase as far as the Army's total obligational authority (TOA)—is concerned. It will provide real growth from 1981 to 1982 of about 11.5 percent. So although all of the decrements will have an impact, our position today as compared to last year's budget will be better. The strategic decisions outlined by the President will affect Army programs. The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program is the major program that will be affected. . . .Until last Friday we were oriented on the Multiple Protected Shelter (MPS)-MX option. We are now involved in a complete re-examination of the BMD program with a view toward restructuring our R&D effort to support the new direction . . . for a fixed missile site. . . .

I would like to say that improvements in the ballistic missile defense and the other services' strategic programs cannot be allowed to detract from modernizing, equipping and maintaining the conventional force. We have to have a balance between strategic and conventional [forces]. That is very critical, as far as the Army is concerned. The Army, as you know, for some period of time has been behind the other services in modernizing, in equipping, and in giving [the] Soldier a piece of equipment that will give him the opportunity to survive on the battlefield.

. . . in order to address that problem when we were told to take the $1.8 billion [reduction] in 1982 plus additional reductions in the outyears, we [made the] decision to cut end strength . . . so that we will have a smaller Army, [though one] which is better equipped and better manned. That is the basic thrust of our whole program. That meant holding military end strength in 1982 at a 780,000 level and not increasing. That also involved extending the M1 tank program to take into account what I consider to be realities in the production capabilities. The Roland program is terminated primarily as the result of an affordability crunch. The Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) Program is being reduced $36 million, which will stretch the program two years. The Patriot Air Defense System is reduced in fiscal year 1982. This responds to Congressional and other concerns about the speed with which the program has been moving. The commercial cargo and utility vehicle program has been reduced because we weren't able to get the contract out before the

middle of next year. That will not have any long-term impact.

The adjustments we are proposing will do the following things: they are going to delay the fielding of equipment that we need now, they are going to increase the cost per item or reduce the quantity that we procure, and we will be less capable of fighting than we would have been with the additional resources.

But we need to get on with equipping the force—the Active Force, the Guard, and the Reserve. For too long we have been behind our prospective enemies both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our Soldiers need the equipment that is adequate to the threat now. That is what we believe the program does despite the cuts that are included which do have an impact on how quickly we can get that program. . . .

MR. ADDABBO: Thank you, General. Were the items which are now being deleted in the original budget submission of the Carter Administration or in the Reagan amendments of last March?

GENERAL MEYER: Some were, some were not. The Roland was not. We were able to put that back . . . [in with] the additional dollars that came in the amendment. . . .

The Patriot Air Defense System was in there at a lower rate. The RPV was in at a lower rate. The M1 tank was in a lower rate in the Carter budget than it is in the current revised budget that you are proposing.

So, in general, these were in there at lower rates. . . .

MR. ADDABBO: You speak of increases for strategic programs. Yet we notice that the 7th Infantry Division is being downgraded to a cadre position. It would appear that the people that believe that the Army should reduce from 16 undermanned to 14 or 15 fully manned Active divisions will not be pleased because you aren't really deleting a division from the force structure. You are still keeping the basic cadre. Secondly, there are those who believe the Army should keep as many divisions around as possible, even if somewhat undermanned, and they will not be happy because you are reducing the 7th Division to such a state it would take months to flesh it out before it could be deployed. Finally, there are those base closures to save money. You aren't really going to close Fort Ord, are you?

GENERAL MEYER: No.

MR. ADDABBO: Therefore, there are no real savings in base operations. General, I hate to put you on the spot, but do you wholeheartedly endorse this downgrading of the 7th Division?

GENERAL MEYER: No. I would prefer not to have to reduce . . . our [original] proposal . . . proposed increasing the Army itself. But when I think of the two choices we were given with a $1.8 billion decrement, then the reduction in force structure and in end strength for three years is the right direction to go, or we would not be able to equip the Army. It is an issue of people for equipment. I believe we have to equip the Army. We have been coming to you year after year after year. Programs are stretched out. They are rising in cost. We have to try to firm up those programs.

The 7th Division . . . decision . . . will permit us to retain the base, will permit us—if we went to war—to round it out with Guard and Reserve brigades, if we had to, until three years from now, when hopefully, the TOA will be available to begin to reconstitute the 7th Division to its total strength. So, it is that kind of an interim solution that we are taking. . . .

MR. EDWARDS: . . . I heard somewhere—maybe I picked upon the wrong thing but ABM is moving more toward being airborne or air-based rather than ground-based; that is to say, orbiting systems of one kind or the other. Is that part of your present R&D?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: . . . The antiballistic missiles systems which could go up into satellites, which would incorporate either laser beams or other methods, are things which our advanced technology people are looking at on into the outyears. . . . [The] Defense Science Board and the Army Science Board, which looked at that, said you are talking about [deleted] before you are able to do that kind of thing. There are other contractors who think you can do it more quickly. . . .

MR. EDWARDS: I guess the biggest argument that one hears about the ABM is that it is a system that never really will be used because of the fear, at least at present, that you will just rain debris down on your own people. What is a quick answer to that?

GENERAL MEYER: My answer. . .is that it is the only system which permits us to break out of the spiraling increase in strategic nuclear delivery systems. Otherwise, . . . [that is] just going to continue. The Soviets are going to increase delivery vehicles; we are going to increase delivery vehicles.

The only way I believe we are going to change that thrust is by re-introducing the defensive systems with the strategic offensive systems. The ballistic missile defense ... provides us a chance, if we do it right, to put a cap on the total number of strategic delivery vehicles.

You know, the vehicles are going to be coming in on your country and detonating. The question is whether that is worse or whether debris coming down is worse or whether you should drive down the total number of delivery vehicles, which is what we ought to want to do.

I honestly do not see anything else that will skew that decision except somehow getting the defensive aspects back in. Otherwise, you will just keep buying offensive systems.

MR. ADDABBO: General, if one side has an ABM system, then the answer by the other side is more missiles, not fewer. How does the ABM cause a cap?

GENERAL MEYER: ... if you could protect a specific number of delivery systems ... to the satisfaction of your leaders and passed that indication to the Soviet leaders, that that could give an incentive to both sides to begin the reduction. I accept there are those who say all it is going to do is drive [the procurement of] additional delivery systems. ...I just say that is going to happen without an ABM. The only chance you have of driving the systems down is by introducing the ABM. I firmly believe that. ...

MR. EDWARDS: ... There has been a lot of feeling that with the production rate of the M1, the cost of the M1, the needs that we have in the Army, that we really ought not to discontinue the M60A3 line. ...I wonder is you would address that point.

GENERAL MEYER: First, ... the new tanks ... the Army is totally behind that. We will continue to push that. We feel it is absolutely essential. ...If it is not as quick as we would like it or you would like it, it is a question of dollars, not a question of being high priority. On the M60A3 line in Detroit, the longer we keep that line open, the better I will feel, personally, because that provides us a fall-back if ... war starts tomorrow. ...That is why we need to keep that line open with FMS as long as possible. ...In addition to the Egyptian sales ... there are maybe a couple of hundred additional [orders] still coming which would permit us to keep that line open at about 30 per month out in Detroit, probably into 1984. ...

MR. EDWARDS: I don't think anybody on this side questions that the M1 is a heck of a tank but I wonder if it is fair to ask if there are not many situations where the M60A3 is totally sufficient for needs?

GENERAL MEYER: We need a combination of M1s and A3s. I think with the A3s that we will currently have, if we are able to continue to product improve those over time, it will give us the proper high/low mix with the M1s to do the kinds of things you are talking about.

I mentioned before that ... clearly we are not going to be able to have all the M1s we would like to have because of the resources available.

It means the M60A3s we have today are going to have to be product improved as we go along so they provide an alternative both to the Guard, Reserve, and the Active Forces.

MR. EDWARDS: So you don't envision requesting anymore new A3s for the Army?

GENERAL MEYER: We have no intent of doing that.

MR. EDWARDS: You would be delighted to see the line stay open to take care of foreign sales?

GENERAL MEYER: Right, because I believe the M60A3 is going to be the coin of the realm in foreign military sales for a long period of time. Anything we can do to keep it open and stretch it out is worthwhile. ..

MR. EDWARDS: ...Do you believe it is necessary to eventually upgrade all of the 1s to 3s?

GENERAL MEYER: My guess is along the line I have just talked about that ... that we probably will have to do that. ...The A3 will do an awful lot out on the battlefield. The M1 will do a lot more. There are places that the A3 will be adequate. It makes it more difficult for your commanders in the field, because they are going to have to be better tacticians and better able to decide where they want to put the faster, more maneuverable, more survivable tank as opposed to the one which is not as fast, not as survivable, but still adequate for certain tasks.

It is not as good an Army as if you had all M1s out there, but it is adequate. That is what we are working on right now—trying to get that balance. ...

MR. ADDABBO: ...Does ...a Viper gunner. ..have to be overrun by. ..tanks before he can kill them because his weapon is only effective from the side or rear?

GENERAL MEYER: Certainly not. Tactical employment of a weapon such as Viper emphasizes attack at the tanks most vulnerable aspects—the side and rear. Tactical training and employment places the Soldier on the ground in a position to take maximum advantage of terrain to channelize armor and provide flank and rear shots. The battlefield utility of a lightweight antitank weapon does not come from one on one engagements but from the totality of several engagements utilizing pair, volley and sequence firing techniques. . . .

## Address to the ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Washington, DC
21 October 1981

This has been an exciting year for the Army, and if there are those of you out there who are past the stage where you can stand excitement, let me rephrase that introduction and say this has been a great year for the United States Army.

Last year at this time as the Association met, we were about two weeks from the national election. There was a lot of uncertainty about support for the military—in fact, there were even questions as to what those of us in uniform could say for fear of politicizing the positions which we held at that point in time. And if you think back over what's happened in the year since then, you can understand why I say it's been an exciting year—a great year—for our Army.

. . .We have an Army today that's off of its backside and moving out smartly.

Moving beside us are many others who are not in uniform; a firm civilian leadership, a supportive Congress, and a concerned public. There's a renewed respect today for the fact that in these dangerous times, the nation must have a strong, reliable military as a part of its total approach to national security. There's renewed trust as well in the advice of a great Soldier, who we're going to honor later today by naming the infantry fighting vehicle after him. He said back in 1948 that:

> "Peace is not won by war, but it can be lost by timid world leadership and by the premature abandonment of our armed strength."

General Bradley's words have renewed prominence in today's scheme of national purpose. Yesterday at Yorktown, as the President addressed the assemblage there, he rededicated himself to that same purpose.

A year ago, the budget that we now have before Congress was still being deliberated within the Defense establishment. It was a budget built with some recognition that a viable defense establishment was needed in the face of a broadening global threat. And that required commitment to some sustained growth. The growth projected was in an amount sufficient to continue our effort toward balanced improvement, but it was inadequate to address many critical deficiencies. Additionally, there was no commitment—from the people or from Congress.

The enumeration of unmet needs was laid out in the Posture Statement which Secretary Marsh and I submitted to Congress last January. That document was a somber appraisal of tasks completed, tasks initiated, and tasks that had been ignored. Some called it lackluster in tone—I wasn't aware that it was in competition for the Pulitzer Prize. We sought a simple elaboration of the facts, and got it.

That was 10 months ago, as a new Administration was coming into office. [The Administration's] impact on the military over the past year has been three-fold:

First, there has been *an immediate infusion of up-front resources* this year to permit us to rapidly improve the most serious deficiencies as early as possible. We targeted those resources largely on readiness—on people readiness and equipment readiness.

Second, some *dramatic changes occurred in our national security policy*. . .the need for us to be prepared to react globally, to be restructured for simultaneous engagements, and to be prepared to fight wars of indeterminate length, rather than presuming only short wars. All of this has immense implications on our Army and the

resources that are essential for us to translate words into some sort of viable capability.

Third, there was *a commitment to sustain real growth* of a magnitude sufficient to ensure that the military balance with the Soviets could be redressed.

Now, if you read the newspapers lately, there's been a large amount of discussion and review as to how much that amounts to. And there have been concerns expressed about reductions to the military budget. The truth of the matter is that the Army in 1981 and 1982 will receive $9 billion more than we would have under the past Administration, and over the next 6 years an additional $60 billion over and above its proposed program.

This represents an average increase of 7 percent.

With that decision, which was a tough one for your President, I believe we have the basis for making the tough choices that will put us on a path toward the kind of Army that we'll need today and tomorrow.

Now that path calls for a focus on readiness—the equipping and sustaining of the existing force. I wouldn't want to be charged with perpetuating or extending a hollow Army, especially at a time when it appears that the very worst vestiges of that characterization are beginning to be filled.

It's my hope that we have the will as a nation to carry the program out, for we are in difficult and dangerous times. Our inability to sustain defense investment in the past, our historic lack of constancy in carrying out defense programs, are hurtful both internally—costing the American people more money for less defense—and externally, because we send to our friends, allies and potential enemies a confusing signal; a signal of hesitant commitment to stand by our interests, and a signal that we're not prepared to wear the mantle of a great power.

Despite the bullish signals, we dare not let our fellow citizens mistake budget talk for genuine progress. Too much remains undone. When talk is translated into dollars, and dollars result in actual delivery of the equipment, and the equipment and materiel are turned into units that are capable of going to war, then we'll have a proper union of national will and Soldier professionalism. That union is essential if we are to provide a tangible land power deterrent to see us through this decade.

What kind of an Army is it that we're proposing to the American people for their consideration?

Well, in simplest terms, it's. . .a disciplined and well trained force, capable of being tailored to meet the full variety of military contingencies possible on the horizon. It will be smaller than we might wish. It will be flexibly structured and postured for combat all the way from the lower end of the spectrum—counterinsurgency, terrorism—all the way up to mechanized warfare on a nuclear, chemical and electronic battlefield in Central Europe.

The rationale for that force stems from a few basic precepts.

First—these are Meyer's precepts—in the spectrum of violence, nuclear war is the least likely event.

Second, the Soviets are a continental nation with continental forces and surrogates that are entrenched in both the northern and southern hemispheres.

Third, the need for responsive, conventional forces has moved to the fore.

Fourth, land forces are the element of conventional force that fill the key role of guaranteeing territory. The ability to effectively carry out the AirLand battle in conjunction with our allies is central to that precept.

Our allies are interested in the security of their homelands, and in such a continental strategy, land power plays a central role. While I would be accused by many of some parochialism for these views, I intend to argue for the balance of conventional land, air and sea forces that's essential if we're going to meet the most likely challenge ahead.

You'll undoubtedly find critics of the force we're putting together; critics who contend that we're equipping a force with weapons that are too

sophisticated, critics who contend that we're creating a force with a "modus operandi" that's poorly conceived, critics who contend that our minds are locked in to re-fighting the last war. The issues they raise are interesting, and they are somewhat productive in the sense that they challenge us to think and re-think the issues. But frankly they offer no panacea because no other Army faces the same challenges we do.

When I talk to my counterparts, I always tell them that I wish I had their problems of designing an Army uniquely for the central plains of Europe, uniquely for Norway, uniquely for the Middle East, uniquely for whatever area in the world they bear responsibility. For our Army—which maintains in excess of 43 percent of its operational strength overseas—all around the world—we have a challenge that no other Army has to face. For us it is much more complicated.

Weapons sophistication is another often expressed concern. Let me tell you, as I've told other Soldiers, that the arrival of the 3.5-inch rocket launcher in Korea to replace the 2.36-inch rocket launchers allowed us during that war to kill T-34 tanks—tanks which previously had been immune to the 2.36-inch anti-tank weapon. Now if that 1.14-inch of improvement is indicative of goldplating, then I just want to tell you I'm all for goldplating, because we have to be clear that the criteria for weapons development in the Army is to provide the Soldier battle equipment that will permit his unit to whip the opposing forces. The Soldier's going to be the only judge of what's goldplating.

I remember when I was a company officer how excited we were about the new equipment that was coming in—whether it be a new combat vehicle, a new anti-tank system, or whether it was the new personnel carrier to replace the half-track. In the days ahead each of us is going to have to share a very heavy professional burden in ensuring that we're able to integrate large amounts of new equipment coming into our Army. We need to plan well. We need to ensure good tactical, operational and maintenance procedures to demonstrate that we can handle the task. American citizens aren't giving this equipment to us because our nation has excess dollars. On the contrary, they are giving it to us because they believe that their security is important. We need to be equal to the trust placed in us.

I have great confidence that each member of the Total Army team, military and civilian, will do what's expected and do it well because, clearly, we have a fragile consensus in support of our defense efforts. We must show the American people that we're worthy of their support so we can maintain the effort.

As I said at the start, this has been a good year for the Army—it really has. You don't have to look very far today and see things happening that augur well for today's Army and for the future.

You saw—as the Association's President, Norm Augustine, asked the Sergeants Major to stand—the fine young Soldiers and outstanding NCO's from various units. In the leadership and manning of the Army we have a Noncommissioned Officer Corps which is 15,000 greater in numbers than it was in 1979, and daily growing stronger in skill, determination, and qualification.

As I visit the field, the one thing that I come away with is that sense of tremendous improvement in those critical middle grade leaders that will make it all possible. It doesn't matter whether I travel to Europe, which I visited this summer, or elsewhere--the one impression that came through so vividly was that the Noncommissioned Officer Corps was in charge of the things that noncommissioned officers should be in charge of! It's visible in discipline, in training, in all those visible areas when noncommissoned officers take charge of those elements of the Army for which they're responsible.

We have a Total Army that has met its strength objectives. I could say that and stop there, but the important part is that we've exceeded the quality measures as well that we set for ourselves last year. This past year our recruiters were able to recruit 81 percent high school graduates. Now, you have to think about that because last year we were 54 percent across the board. That's a record unmatched in the volunteer era. That's a tribute, not just to the Recruiting Command and the recruiters, but to the whole Army because it really has been a Total Army effort. That represents a higher percentage of high school graduates than two of the other Services, and that's the first time that that's ever happened. So that's a tribute to the efforts of the Recruiting Command and the rest of you here who have worked that important challenge for us.

In the equipping of the Army, we're beginning to see they physical product of expanding production lines. The flow is going to result in measured physical improvement for Active, National Guard and Reserve units around the country. Our motor pools and supply rooms are being filled with Abrams tanks, new mortars, Stinger—and in the "meat and potatoes" area, we are seeing quantities of 155 [millimeter] howitzers, trucks and trailers for ammo and fuel, secure communications equipment and night vision sights going into the National Guard and Army Reserve units.

In the readiness area, we've made strides to toughen the Soldier's training environment, both in TRADOC's institutional training and in our units, particularly in Reserve Components. In the future we hope to go even further in that direction. We're reaping benefits through better training, and that's evident both in major unit performances as judged by critiques of such exercises as Reforger and Bright Star—whatever exercise you look at—and also in selected team performances in international competitions, such as first place in Boselager competition in NATO for mechanized infantry, much improved tank gunnery performance in the Canadian Cup competition, first and second place in International Marksmanship contests, and our world helicopter championship. Those are examples of what your Soldiers are doing on a day-to-day basis in competition. And there are others as well.

We're going to continue to put forward a good effort in these events. If on occasion we best our allies, that's good. If on occasion we're bettered, that's okay too—so long as the overall performance indicates the high professional standards we demand. However, our real concern has to rest on the performance of the total force, not just for a winning squad or a winning tank platoon because they can't do it alone. Our focus is on an Army of ready units, not just one or two exceptional squads.

That focus on units was the principal reason we recently set in motion a plan to train Soldiers coming into the Army as company teams. . . .Yesterday at Yorktown, we swore in two COHORT units—a mechanized infantry company and an artillery battery. All together, twenty such companies have been—or will be—formed and trained. They have already demonstrated tangible benefits of putting people together and keeping them together. . . .this project holds considerable promise for improving our combat readiness by reducing personnel turbulence, by generating greater stability within the Army worldwide, and by laying the fundamental basis for strong and cohesive bonds—which those of us who have been in combat know are the basis for success on the battlefield.

In the sustaining area we have the CAPSTONE program in FORSCOM, which is in place and working. Full time manning . . . has put thousands of Active Soldiers or full-time Guardsmen and Reservists side-by-side with our citizen Soldiers to ease the small unit task of maintaining their preparation for war.

. . . this has been a good year for our Army. . . .

But my point at this annual review is not to issue as a part of the new battle dress uniform a pair of rose-colored glasses. Far from it. I recognize, as do those here on the podium, that we must continue to fight for corrective action in the many areas where serious deficiencies continue to exist. Much of our self-criticism and that of civilian pundits which aims to correct legitimate deficiencies, instead targets unfairly the Soldier who's doing his damnedest with what he's been provided—and in the past that's been too little.

I want to be certain we speak honestly to the part of the Army that remains empty—the trained manpower pool, which is totally inadequate for mobilization; the National Guard and Reserve units that have only a fraction of their weapons; the Active support units, which are not there; the sustaining stocks that are inadequate; the old equipment which is too prevalent; and the insufficient strategic lift assets in our national inventory. These are voids that must be filled.

But let no Soldier who is part of a disciplined, well motivated and well trained unit mistake such criticism as aimed his or her way. Today's Soldiers are creating proud and capable organizations which in my judgment are more often than not better than the nation's past investment in them warrants.

We've seen and we're seeing considerable progress. Much remains to be done. . . .[but] we are in a position today which justifies a sense of confidence. We now have what I call a chance—you only get a few chances. We have a genuine chance to provide our nation with the kind of Army that each citizen can be proud of, the kind of Army which other nations must take into account as the future unfolds before us.

. . . Together, we must take advantage of that chance. . . .

## Letter to the
## WARRANT OFFICER ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE

23 October 1981

. . . I urge you to examine carefully your professional roles, for I am convinced that the contribution of the Warrant Officer to the discipline, training and performance of units throughout the Army is disproportional to your numbers. Each of you must first be an officer in the broadest sense, as conferred by your appointment. Here you have far-reaching impact on the tone, the spirit and the attitude of the whole Army. Second, you must be the technical expert par excellence in a chosen technical field. In this increasingly complex Army, your competence and resourcefulness will spell the difference between a unit ready for war, and one incapable of performing its mission.

Do not mistake the quiet and order of your meeting-place with the real turbulence out there that could, at an instant, call the Army to its war mission. . . .

## Address to the
## XIV CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN ARMIES

Washington, DC
5 November 1981

Distinguished delegates and observers. . . .

Today brings to a close the Fourteenth Conference of American Armies.

In our formal deliberations—and in our informal gatherings as well—we, the collective military leaders of half of this planet, have reinforced our friendships and enhanced the mutual understanding and respect vital to hemispheric partnership. Throughout all the sessions, we experienced a generous spirit of openness and cooperation. The agreements and resolutions which we have inaugurated give firm support to our collective effort to enhance this hemisphere's security against the threat of Cuba-/Soviet terrorist actions, subversive movements and armed insurgency.

In addressing the hemisphere's military question, we have, through our committees, explored many aspects of the Cuban/Soviet threat, the tactics they employ, and cooperative approaches and effective methods we might use to counter them. I think the question we have to ask ourselves is: what can we now collectively do better as a result of the interactions we have had during this Fourteenth Conference?

I would say, first, that we have developed a clear consensus through meaningful resolutions—and of special significance—a mechanism to convert these resolutions into concrete actions through the establishment of a permanent mechanism to ensure that we don't have to start all over again in Bolivia in 1983. Second-

ly, we know that our strength lies in the solidarity and mutual support we can provide to each other—support by various forms, be that words or actions, be it military or economic, or supportive help in the evaluation of our political or social processes. . .

Your efforts over these past three days have been long and taxing, and I appreciate your patience, your honesty, and your consideration in the course of this endeavor. You have, by all of you, actions, justified the high regard which you are accorded by your countrymen. And today, I believe your countrymen have increased reason to regard your devotion to their interests with kindly affection. . . .

On behalf of your host, the United States Army, I wish to thank all of you for your participation. I hope the conference has been as beneficial for each of you as it has been for me. And, if we succeed in what we have proposed, the Fourteenth Conference will have been a resounding success.

Again, I want to thank the Secretariat for their efforts and the country of Bolivia for offering to host the next Conference, the XV Conference of American Armies. I would also say before I close that God has smiled on us with beautiful weather for your visit. I would pray that he smiles on us equally in our future efforts to solve our problems.

Thank you.

## Article in the DEFENSE 82 MAGAZINE - FEBRUARY ISSUE "THE UNIT"

1 February 1982

### THE UNIT

Historians tend to personalize history, especially military history, through emphasis on the principal political and military figures involved; those who in times of national peril came to dominate the decision-making or leadership processes. Joshua, not the Israelites, fought the battle of Jericho. Julius Caesar, not the Legion XX, invaded Britain. Jackson, not the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah Valley, paralyzed the Union's action in the East. Patton, not the Third Army, broke out at Normandy.

On the other end of the scale, the individual Soldier is a frequent and justifiable object of our attention, our admiration, our wonder—at his heroics and humanity—the stuff of much that is great in Western art and literature: Rudyard Kipling's tales of the exploited English "Tommy," the youth in the *Red Badge of Courage,* Paul in *All Quiet on the Western Front,* Hemingway's autobiographical experiences in *For Whom the Bell Tolls*; or, in the contemporary scene, Radar in M*A*S*H or Michael in *The Deer Hunter.*

Missed almost entirely in these portrayals of leaders and "led" is a credible presentation of that which Soldiers recognize as the focus of their professional lives and the fundamental basis for the forging of a nation's land weapon: *the unit.* It's in the context of the unit that leaders and "led" are brought into some meaningful relationship with material assets for the explicit purpose of waging war. And it is the quality of these units which in the end determine a nation's success on the battlefield.

Like people, Army units come in all sizes and shapes. Some of a unit's features are essentially foreordained—its size, its history, its human and material composition. Other features are also prescribed, but less predictable in their impact—the unit's mission, the capability of issued equipment, the background and education of individual unit members, the general viability of the "life support structure" (Army-wide logistic, administrative and personnel systems) and the unit's geographic location with its own social and political features.

Lastly, there are the aspects of each unit which are self-developed; those characteristics controlled most fully by the unit itself: its training, its discipline and its maintenance, among the qualities routinely examined and reported on.

The interaction of all these, we hope, is the creation of quality units; which will fight well and survive in battle.

The record will show, however, that the performance of nearly identical units will vary markedly in combat—even when the duration and severity of fighting are similar. The table below depicts the record of four committed divisions in the European theater in World War II in terms of relative casualty rates, both total combat losses and losses due to neuro-psychiatric causes. The latter category, termed stress casualties in contemporary parlance, represents battle loss which occurs from incapacitation other than as a result of direct physical harm to a combatant. The time frame in each instance is seven weeks. The severity of combat in each instance is not identical—the level of combat casualties reflects this. One would suspect that the rate of stress casualties sustained in each division might occur proportionally as physical casualties are sustained.

| Division | Combat Casualties | Stress Casualties |
|---|---|---|
| A | Low | High |
| B | Moderate | Moderate |
| C | Moderate | Low |
| D | High | Negligible |

But in this illustration, that expectation is not borne out. Some units appear to offer extraordinary support to soldiers, permitting them to psychologically sustain intense levels of conflict.

Obviously, many factors enter into the calculus which produces such results, but the suggestion that some units exhibit greater durability in combat than others under similar, or even more difficult conditions is certainly valid. Units which exhibit the best of fighting qualities are likely to reflect strong cohesion throughout the entire organization, down to the smallest unit—the squad or section. Similarly, units which fracture under stress will first see this occur on the fringes of their organization—once again at the squad, the platoon, and the company level. The reason is simple: these are the levels where an army's social structure becomes real for the Soldier.

Janowitz and Shils bear this out in their seminal investigation of the German soldier's tenacity, even under the most frightful conditions in World War II:

> "[The] company was the only truly existent community. . .which allowed neither time for the soldier to rest, nor time for a personal life."
>
> "For the ordinary German soldier the decisive fact was that he was a member of a squad or section which maintained its social integrity and which coincided roughly with the social unit which satisfied some of his major primary needs. He was likely to go on fighting provided he had the necessary weapons, as long as the group possessed leadership with which he could identify himself, and as long as he gave attention to and received affection from the other members of his squad and platoon."

Similar conclusions were obtained in studies of the American soldier; this from the Tunisian campaign:

> ". . . What enabled [Soldiers] to attack, and attack, and attack week after week in mud, rain, dust, and heat until the enemy was smashed?. . . This drive was more a positive than a negative one. It was love more than hate. Love manifested by (I) regard for their comrades who shared the same dangers, (2) respect for their platoon leader or company commander who led them wisely and backed them with everything at his command, (3) concern for their reputation with their commander and leader, and (4) an urge to contribute to the task and success of the group and unit. . . .
>
> They seemed to be fighting for somebody rather than against somebody."

Yet another investigator (Whitehorn) put it this way: "Military morale is primarily a matter of emotional group solidarity and leadership, rather than catchwords, slogans, or neat rationalizations of why we have to fight."

In simplest terms these studies of effective units reduce to the following tenets: the need for a bonding process with one's fellow Soldiers, trust in one's leaders, support from home, and confidence in the unit's power. The fact that there is an undeniable linkage between performance in battle and a unit's cohesion is reinforced in subsequent examinations of all conflicts. S. L. A Marshall concluded from his study of the Korean conflict that:

> "... the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapon is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade. He... is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapon secondarily."

Similar results are documented in Israeli and Egyptian experiences, and in Vietnam. Hence, if success in battle is the objective of our efforts, cohesion is a clear and constant peacetime means for its achievement. General Marshall states the obvious:

> "... it is from the acquiring of the habit of working with the group and of feeling responsible to the group that [the Soldier's] thoughts are apt to turn ultimately to the welfare of the group when tactical disintegration occurs in battle."

But the potential in peace for improved wartime readiness also carries with it the opportunity for beneficial peacetime effects as well: improved discipline, satisfaction—and ultimately, greater economy through improved retention.

*Readiness:* Research in US field units in Europe concluded that there was a very high correlation between Soldier attitudes and the general level of performance in Skill Qualification Tests (SQTS), physical training, Army Training and Evaluation Programs, reenlistment, annual general inspections, etc.

*Satisfaction/Retention:* Several years ago a team of professionals conducted a systematic survey in one [Major Army command] of Soldiers departing the Army before the expiration of their terms of service. The following is an excerpt from their report. Read it, reflecting on how many of the factors of cohesion mentioned thus far are violated:

> "For the vast majority of those interviewed, basic combat training was the highlight of their service. Hours were reported to be long, and the drill instructors tough, but most said they liked the structure imposed, 'knowing what was expected of them every minute,' the organization and obvious good planning and use of their time, and the feelings of accomplishment and camaraderie they had felt. Another often mentioned [attribute] of basic training was the concern of the drill instructors that training be effective and that personal problems of the recruits receive immediate attention.
>
> Dissatisfaction mounted as structure and personal concern for individual troop welfare decreased through advanced individual training and training in garrison units. Inconvenience and hardship in the field were viewed as acceptable 'if there were some purpose,' but Soldiers bitterly resented 12 hours shifts of 'busy work,' which they found demeaning. 'It's like my time isn't worth anything.'"

Certainly, one can't argue that such a training environment is conducive to readiness or to individual satisfaction and retention. To the degree unit conditions violate the benchmarks of cohesive units, not only is battle performance jeopardized, but so too are the Soldier's personal satisfaction and the desire to remain in the Army. Unfortunately, the signals that were coming to the Army leadership indicated a decline in the general state of the Army's human readiness extending over a multi-year period.

*Discipline.* That same study went on to note that:

> "Socially, the respondents presented themselves as scared and alone. Few reported any positive identification with their units, and what friends they had were those carried over from earlier training or those from the same state or hometown."

Loneliness is directly related to poor discipline. Often, for example,

> "drug use ... is a way for soldiers—perfectly normal soldiers—to define group membership and achieve a sense of belonging in a very transient environment in which they are called upon to manage large blocks of time away from their homes, families and friends."

Achieving better cohesion in our units offers us a real opportunity to get at one of the root causes of drug use.

Admittedly, cohesion cannot be built from Washington. But it is incumbent on Defense leadership, nevertheless, to consciously promote environments—Service-wide—supportive of the necessary bonding processes. Equally important we may, by our attention, avoid deliberate or unthinking acts which tend to either destroy or degrade necessary supports for our units.

If we look back over the past 6-8 years, or longer, we haven't done very well in this regard. We've tolerated incredible personnel turbulence too long in our ranks; with 20 percent turnover *quarterly* not abnormal within CONUS divisions, with subordinate units occasionally experiencing 100 percent annually! Resolution of this issue is not easy. It is especially difficult with some 45 percent of the Army overseas. Deployed units rightfully deserve priority in the distribution of available assets, but the size of the deployment relative to the entire force guarantees disproportional fluctuations in the remainder of the force when strength shortfalls, skill imbalances, or NCO shortages occur. One year ago, we were in a strength distribution situation which caused us to zero out many units within CONUS.

There must be an alternative to avoid future gutting of the CONUS structure or assignment situations wherein key NCOs spend only a brief respite in CONUS between oversea tours. Some shortages may be unavoidable, but the effect of such shortages on individuals and units must be better controlled. *Greater stability within units is key in our search for improved readiness.*

Next we must look carefully at ways and means to help units bond together. So many of the tools once available to the company commander have disappeared....As one of my officers quipped to me:

> "Today we offer the Soldier an opportunity to enlist in a suburb—transient and impersonal. If we could offer a community, we'd have to beat volunteers away."

Clearly, new techniques of pulling Soldiers together are called for. The whole issue of stability and cohesion is so important to a viable Army that in September 1980 the Army publicized its concerns so that subsequent actions we might put into effect could be understood in context. Some grasped instantly the importance of what was said, while others just looked for "headline grabbers"—the contrived one being that our announced leveling of NCO leadership (to give the reinforcing units in CONUS the leadership stiffening they needed) was an apparently uncoordinated unilateral "withdrawal" of 6-7,000 NCOs from Europe. In fact it was no such thing. We simply curbed the permissible management latitude we'd been using up to that point in assigning NCOs to Europe. The September press conference was meant to say to all that we were beginning a process of attacking some very fundamental illnesses.

## Initial Efforts

Our early efforts in this direction were tentative, in respect that we knew they were correct, but the full architecture was not yet clear. Unquestionably, the first and most easily identified task was to ensure that all those who assumed command in the future understood that their assignment had but one focus: the unit. Rapid movement, in and out of command assignments—so characteristic of Vietnam—had become engraved into each officer expectation of what was essential for a "successful career." This notion needed to be turned around. We had to ensure that those posted to battalion and brigade command took the longer view toward developing

capable and well led small units. Of itself, extended command could not promise this result; but a slowing of the pace, a careful setting of unit goals and objectives, and a reduction in the instability which leadership personalities are prone to promote, were important beginnings.

Accompanying this effort, we acted to focus commander and noncommissioned leadership on the peculiar responsibilities incumbent on them in building and maintaining vibrant units: their obligation as role models, as teachers and trainers, as disciplinarians, and as concerned seniors—all the qualities so special in being a leader.

Three other efforts were begun early-on:

-First, through the Sergeant Major of the Army, we began to look at the entire *NCO-development* program in the Army; not merely the formal institutional schools controlled by TRADOC, but the attitude, organization, and responsibilities that the units themselves must adopt. It's long been true that the best way to learn is to teach others. The schooling of our Soldiers—officers, NCOs and junior enlisted—within the unit needed rejuvenation in most units.

-Second, we began at the MACOM level to investigate various means of promoting greater *standardization* within the Army's units. So long as an individual replacement system is part of the scene—either as the primary means of personnel replenishment or as an auxiliary system in wartime—it makes sense to facilitate the individual Soldier's assimilation into a new unit. Soldiers who have to relearn where to stow weapons on a fighting vehicle because it was done differently in our institutional training establishment or at their last unit cannot be expected to perform well until they learn the new unit's system. Certain small unit operations could also be standardized so that rudimentary tactics might become second nature regardless of location throughout the world.

-Lastly, we began a relook at *training unit packages*. These tests at Fort Jackson, initially platoon-sized, provided compelling evidence that in a volunteer environment unit replacements could offer us great advantage. . . .

## ARCOST

In May of 1980, a group of talented young officers were charged with a short term collective effort which was to be the catalyst for much of what we are currently implementing. This effort, the Army Cohesion and Stability Study (ARCOST), put together a broad range of feasible short and long term options for our consideration. These were discussed with the Army's major commands in July, and in September we announced our goals.

-The Army disavowed the practice of requiring units to be augmented by Soldiers from other units during field exercises. . . .

-We began the *elimination of directed overstrengths* for most units. The situation which existed had in effect created two armies: one in a semi-protected or "fenced" status where 3-year stabilization was more the rule than the exception; and the other in which rapid turnover continually acted to undermine stability and unit-building.

-We *narrowed* the *strength management windows* which [previously] gave our personnel distribution people the flexibility to maintain some units well above their authorized strength. This flexibility had permitted the attainment of 104 percent of NCO strength in Europe, while at the same time FORSCOM units were short 11,000 noncommissioned officers.

-We reviewed TDA organizations to get NCO's out of staff jobs and into unit structures.

-We decided to *extend tours of company commanders* to 18 months, (plus or minus 6 months) in CONUS and in all long-tour oversea areas to enhance the leadership climate at the company level. . . .

-We determined to *give* local *commanders* a greater hand in the promotion process. . . .

-We made the decision to *lengthen and toughen entry level training*. . . .

-We sought *incentives in pay and benefits to give increased importance to the NCO leadership* and better compensation for Soldiers with critical shortage skills.

-We adopted some important *uniform and accoutrement policies* to permit the individual better identification with the unit of assignment. . . .

-Lastly, we initiated an evaluation plan for *company replacement* and a commitment to move toward its expansion and absorption into *an American Regimental System.*

The tone of these changes, and the prospect of others in the same direction led one editorial to comment that:

> ". . . [their] general tone . . . seems to be that the time of social experimentation is past and that the Army is getting back into the real world. Problems . . . aren't going to be transformed in a space of a few months but the push, it appears, has started."

Amen!

## The Army Manning System

The company replacement program called Project COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training) became a reality on 25 March 1981 with formation of the first COHORT Package at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

First term soldiers assigned to that COHORT Package went through basic training as a group, and married up with cadre from the 4th Mech Division for Advanced Individual Training (AIT); after which they joined the division to fulfill 3 years of continuous service together. After 18 months in the United States, this company will deploy to Europe (in October 1982) for 18 months of service. Nineteen other COHORT companies will form between March 1981 and February 1982 for assignment into the 1st, 4th, and 7th Infantry Divisions. Eleven will deploy overseas, the last in FY 84.

In FY 82, the U.S. Army will begin to create its own unique version of a regimental system [to] permit individuals to associate throughout their service with a specific regiment. In its final form it will involve a home base in the United States for each regiment. . . .

The experience we gain from our initial efforts at creating and deploying cohesive units should provide us with insights as to how to ensure that this program can be made to work for our Army. This will require changing the current individual oriented personnel system to one oriented on the unit. Such a change requires modification of our entire system and policies—assignments, schooling, promotions, etc. But only through such changes can we ensure that we can benefit from the advantages that can accrue to stable environments within our small units—improved training, improved leadership and improved readiness.

The bottom line to all of this was summed up in a letter I received from General (Ret.) Andrew P. O'Meara:

> "Until we destroy the myths that a collection of men with appropriate military occupational specialties constitutes a military unit, the Army is in deep trouble. . . .Wars are won by units fighting as dedicated teams."



*"It is in the context of the unit that leaders and led are brought into some meaningful relationship with material assets for the explicit purpose of waging war."*

# Hearing before the
# HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
# On The FY 83 Defense Budget Request: Army Posture

8 February 1982

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, once again it is my responsibility to assist in your deliberations on the vital issue of national defense.

As the Secretary has made clear, the Department of the Army recognizes the full obligation incumbent on it as the custodian of the nation's land power. In that light, we believe that urgent need exists to shore up or improve significant aspects of this Nation's land forces so that the Army can fulfill its statutory charge to prepare for "prompt and sustained land combat."

Simultaneously, we understand—and the critical nature of this has been made manifest throughout all commands of the Army—that we must continue to do all that is within our power to ensure that hard-earned tax monies are expended prudently and for the purpose authorized and appropriated.

There are many who envision a future security posture devoid of a central role for land forces; or articulate a land force markedly different from that which Secretary Marsh and I espouse. Others seek economy through the gutting or major modification of one or another narrowly-defined component of our structure, jeopardizing the synergistic effect of the whole complex machinery which is an Army. This complexity was recognized by our first Commander-in-Chief, whose birthday we celebrate shortly:

"An Army is in many respects a machine; of which the displacement of any of the organs, if permitted to continue, injures its symmetry and energy and leads to disorder and weakness."

It is my professional view that what we seek in this budget is rational, that it has direction and that it is well conceived. It is the minimal requirement which, if funded with a degree of predictable constancy over the years ahead, will serve the nation well in what I foresee as a period of increased global lawlessness.

The international lawbreaker is the adversary who, by hostile action or threat, jeopardizes our sovereignty or our vital interests. Our national response must include air, land, and sea elements which can police our commercial routes and secure vital choke points, which can put vast areas of the globe under surveillance, and which, in an emergency, can deliver weapons or create a presence rapidly at any spot on earth. But I caution that if we are not prepared and predisposed to back our words with the physical presence of significant land forces—which by their nature are symbols of a less-than transient commitment—then we send signals which imply that we are not seriously interested in protecting either our own interests or the welfare of allied communities throughout the world.

What is the concept underlying the creation of our land force?

There is a prevalent shibboleth which depicts our tactical philosophy as skewed to attrition warfare. That seriously misrepresents the case. The land mobility inherent in our new family of weapons—the Abrams tank, the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the Black Hawk and the Apache—is in no way indicative of a throwback to a Maginot-Line mentality. A land force, like ours, with serious numerical deficiencies cannot adopt attrition as its governing philosophy. On the other hand, any presumption that a philosophy of maneuver will, of itself, compensate for unattended deficiencies, is equally fallacious.

The 1973 Middle East war, the so-called Yom Kippur War, is often depicted as a classic in maneuver warfare. Yet not since the 1943 Battle of Kursk has a comparable loss of tanks occurred in such a short period of time. If the loss rate experienced in 1973 were extrapolated to the Central European battlefield of tomorrow, the resulting losses would reach levels which the U.S. Army is not prepared to accept. We must orient on maneuver and the advantages it can bestow. However, one of the foremost practitioners of maneuver, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel,

acknowledged that "in motorized warfare, materiel attrition and the destruction of the organic cohesion of the opposing Army must be the immediate aim of all planning." This confirms my judgment that attrition and maneuver are copartners at the tactical level.

I suggest that the new edition of FM 100-5, our basic tactics document, and the conceptual framework of AirLand Battle 2000, more truly reflect the current mental preparation of our leadership for battle. It is my belief that we are and have been in a period of evolutionary military thinking that would be applauded by the foremost military tacticians and strategists of history.

What kind of a land force will result?

I don't mind telling you I do get a lot of external advise on this subject—"General, you should seek a smaller, more technical force; a larger, cheaper force; a smaller, cheaper force," and on and on. Some even suggest I should "give it to the Marines"!

Well, let me say that the potential scenarios I see could easily consume the total of both the Army and Marine capabilities—with room to spare. I believe General Barrow shares my view that such competition has no merit.

So what shall we look like?

Some would model us on the Germans, on the Israelis—superb mechanized forces, indeed—optimized to a single mission and operating on their home turf. The Norwegians are another superb example of a rapidly-expandable Army designed for their unique circumstances.

Unfortunately, our challenge is not so precisely definable. Our commitments are broader, linked to issues and agreements which are global in scope. The geographic and climatic conditions we may have to face are diverse, encompassing mountains, jungles, deserts and plains. The threats for us are multifaceted. They could stem directly from the massive continental forces of the Soviet Union or from well-equipped surrogate forces or indigeneous para-military forces and terrorists. The possible locales are quite distant in most cases. In brief, these facts portray a complex problem for us, one shared by the Army of no other democracy.

The solution lies in attaining the right mix of irreducible characteristics in our force. Four come instantly to mind: flexibility, technological competence, strategic deployability and tactical soundness.

The Army must have *flexible forces,* readily tailored to meet one or more simultaneous events on the spectrum of conflict. We cannot afford to give up light forces, because they are ideally suited to many environments. Neither can we give up existing heavy forces because they are essential to permit us to thrust, parry, and defeat the legions of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe—180 divisions large and 50,000 tanks strong. What we must seek, and what we do seek, is the evolution of a new force—light in weight, yet substantial in capability—the so-called high technology division which we are working on and hope to field initially in the mid-80's. It will not eliminate the need for specifically tailored forces, but it will yield us greater flexibility.

Second, our forces must be *techologically competent,* able to defeat today's and tomorrow's fielded weaponry. Where it is avoidable, I do not intend to commit soldiers with weapons that will not do the job, as was the case with the bazooka we initially took to Korea. Nor do I want the kind of extemporaneous action necessitated in North Africa where we pitted towed howitzers against Panzers because our tank guns were not up to the job.

Hence, the continued infusion of new weapons remains an urgent need. The pace of modernization will be governed by considerations of cost and an eye to avoiding a situation where "block obsolescence" could jeapordize the inventory's effectiveness. But it is critical that we sustain modernization at a prudent rate over time, integrating new and highly capable weapons in a high-low mix with the older, less effective equipment. We will seek the best advantage possible in this, as we always have. Some reorganization of our existing combat elements will help us to do that.

Modernization is equalled in importance by the existence of longstanding numerical deficiencies in equipment inventories. Today—right now—we are short not only adequate numbers of new weapons, but adequate numbers of weapons of any description, be they new, aged, or obsolete!

That has serious implications for the validity of the Total Force concept which places heavy reliance on the ready status of the reserve forces.

My comments relative to conventional armaments apply as well to our need to remain abreast of developments in defensive and retaliatory chemical means and theater nuclear weaponry.

The third essential characteristic we seek is *strategic deployability*, not just for our light forces, but for the heavy elements as well. We clearly need complementary enhancements of the air and sea mobility assets of the Navy and Air Force. It does the Nation little good to build an Army it can't deploy.

Not too many years ago I was intimately involved as a planner in the detailed examination of expeditionary force deployments to contingency areas. In those days I could, in many cases, be satisfied with relatively light and unsophisticated forces. That is not so today in as universal a sense as it once was. The massive infusion of modern weapons around the world has dramatically changed the capability of indigenous forces. The days when a major power could influence regional outcomes with a handful of Marines or a troop of cavalry dragoons is past. Today, early deploying light forces must have assurance that they can be reinforced quickly with the proper mix of light, heavy, and support forces.

In some areas the prepositioning of equipment is a sound and valid substitute for shortages in mobility assets. But this approach to improving our strategic mobility capability has economic, political and military costs, implications, and hence, limitations.

Lastly, the Army we build must be *tactically* sound. As I discussed earlier, I believe that to be the case. Our concepts must be valid in defense as well as attack. They must be supportable, and they must place the adversary at risk. In summary, today's Army is a formidable partner in this nation's defense scheme. It is a well conceived Army, with rational programs and firm direction. The tone within today's Army is positive. Our units improving daily in capability; our Soldiers proud to serve. We recognize that the challenges ahead are severe. Your committee has been a vital partner in the development of the Army of today. We believe that through our joint efforts, we can have the quality Army that his Nation needs.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

General, last year we were informed that both the Army and the Marine Corps favor the C-17 aircraft over the C-5. We were told at that time that the C-5A could not perform the intratheater lift that was required. Now the Department of Defense has informed us that it wants to buy the C-5 instead of the C-17, which was the winner in the development competition.

Have you changed your position like the Air Force or do you still favor the C-17?

GENERAL MEYER: Mr. Chairman, I still believe that we need an intratheater airlift aircraft to respond to the kinds of challenges that we face so that we can use the kind of flexible forces we are talking about. The C-5 does not respond to that intratheater requirement.

MR. BENNETT: . . . how do we go about getting an adequate Reserve?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: . . . there is an important point you must know. In the budget you are addressing, you are approving more Guardsmen and Reservists than we have had in the Army since 1961, total. That is a significant increase. . . .It will mean that from now on the critical shortage in the Guard and Reserve will be equipment rather than manpower. . . .

MR. NICHOLS: . . . General Meyer, this morning I. . .received about 1 hour, 1 1/2 hour briefing on this new strategy that the Army intends to use in the future which was reported in the Wall Street Journal a week or so ago.

My question is, if it is indeed the Army's intention to go into this so-called high-technology division of the late 1980s, what impact might that have on the capabilities of personnel the Army needs for recruiting and retention?

GENERAL MEYER: I think what it will demand is that we have increased quality of personnel within the Army, and it underscores the point the Secretary made, that a GI Bill which brings in the college-bound youth for a period of time and brings in people with improved capabilities over

time will ensure that we are able to employ the kind of tactics and doctrine we feel we need [in order] to get the most out of the technology we are talking about.

MR. NICHOLS: I presume, not putting any words into your mouth, that an educational . . . program is essential?

GENERAL MEYER: Is essential to doing that. . . .

MR. WHITEHURST: . . . The one question I have relates to something that was said last week when General Jones was here. He said that on leaving the Joint Chiefs he was going to recommend some far-reaching and thoroughgoing reforms in the Joint Chiefs system. I am curious to know if you have talked to him or if you have heard him express his views and what your own views are on this.

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir. Yes, I have spoken with him. I have not spoken to the Secretary of Defense, but I have a responsibility to express to you my personal views. So, these are my personal views.

I believe that the roles and responsibility of the Chiefs have become far more complex in the past 20 years than they were at the time the JCS were set up. . . .

. . .So, I believe there has to be an addressal of the departmental responsibilities of the Chief. . . .Perhaps it is time to look at a different organization for the JCS, where they truly are looking at strategic missions, strategic objectives, and the longer range ways in which we go about developing contingency forces. . . .

MR. DYSON: . . . I have taken a number of trips this past year around the country to a number of posts. Probably the issue of family housing is one of the most glaring at the moment, the most pressing.

My only question—it is rhetorical—is that enough?

GENERAL MEYER: The answer is no, it is not enough, but it is as much as we were able to get this year. It begins the process of . . . [correcting] some very serious flaws in family housing.

The bulk of that $1.1 billion goes for our Soldiers in Europe where the problem is far more critical than it is in the States, where you can still go to Kileen, Texas, or some of the local areas, and find reasonable housing; but the overseas housing is not that reasonable. . . .

MR. BYRON: . . . As far as the Pershing II is concerned, we have had some problems with program costs on this system that has been doubled in the last year and it has also undergone a stretchout at the current time. In addition, there seems to be a concern, really a growing opposition in Germany, to the deployment of this system once it is finally ready.

The Pershing II in that country is an issue that we have thought highly of and have developed along those lines, yet currently we have some negotiations going on with the Soviet Union on theater nuclear force issues which I think would probably directly affect the Pershing II.

Would you briefly explain what the probability will be if the costs continue to escalate on the Pershing II? Also, in view of the uncertainty about our potential deployment in Germany, is there an alternative to spending—I think we are talking about half a billion dollars on it this year and still be able to deploy it if the negotiations prohibit it?

GENERAL MEYER: Let me start with the opposition and then the theater nuclear force issues. First of all, I think the basic issue of the continuum of conventional forces, theater nuclear forces, and other forces, is elemental to deterrence.

I think we need to ensure that we have . . . theater nuclear forces there which assure the Soviets that any action on their part would not be unmet and therefore will prevent them from attacking. So I think that the Pershing performs a very vital role in deterrence.

I have no idea how the theater nuclear forces talks will come out. I believe that it is important in the discussion because the Pershing II really sort of interfaces with the SS-20. We are in the process of developing the Pershing II and it is important that we carry it to the point of deployment and see what happens in the negotiations.

My concern would be that if we were to

capitulate at this time and not get on with the P-II that the Soviets would have a distinct advantage. I just think that that imbalance in theater nuclear forces would not assist us in our deterrent mode.

On the cost, as I am sure you know, it is already one of the systems which has breached the Nunn Amendment requirement and we have submitted to you today an outline of the factors that are involved in that. . . .I believe that . . . the big factor involved is the cost stimulation, the same issue your colleagues have been making here.

That has been one in which I feel very, very uncomfortable. . . the fact we are going to stretch it out and some additional engineering changes . . . [have] created that.

MR. HUNTER: . . . I had a question that I think you have probably had to address in several different forms in the last couple of weeks. That is the question regarding the new attack helicopter. I understand that the helicopter is going up from about $10 million a copy to about $15 million. Of course, I think the other body had a hearing on it and there were some expressions of dismay that this first system that was being reviewed was one in which it appears that there are going to be substantial cost overruns. . . .

GENERAL MEYER: It would be difficult for me to look to the future of the Army and not see an attack helicopter in it.

MR. HUNTER: I agree.

GENERAL MEYER: It may be the light tank that everybody is looking for in the context of how to operate on the battlefield, but you raised a very serious question and that is at what point in time is the price such that you cannot afford something that is that vital?

It really is vital to the future of the Army. As you know, we are in cost negotiations right now with the contractor. We will have to wait and see how we can drive that down.

MR. MONTGOMERY: . . . As far as the Army Guard is concerned, I believe I am correct that the Senate has added $50 million in the appropriations bill last year for equipment and left it to the Army to designate where that equipment went. . . .

I notice in your request in 1983 you don't include any equipment for the National Guard. This looks to me like it might be in violation of what was in the law, in the report that there should be some funds in these for equipment for the National Guard.

. . . .General Meyer, do you have a comment on that?

GENERAL MEYER: What we are trying to do, is to try to take a look at the total requirement of equipment for the Guard, the Active, and the Reserve and try to spread that equipment around to the highest priority unit, whether it be an Active unit, a Guard unit, or a Reserve unit.

I appreciate, very clearly the overtone that you outlined there, which is: what if there is a violation? If there is, I will have to change the way I am doing business.

We cannot be in violation of either the law or the intent of Congress.

The rationale benind it, essentially, is to ensure that we take a look at the total system and when we go to war we know where all the equipment is and we are able to do it.

We do have equipment, specifically, that will be distributed to the Reserve components in fiscal year 1983. I have a list of that here which is confidential, which I will give you, which is very significant. But again, it is some of the equipment which had been programmed for the Active Component which is now available.

It includes M-60A3's, for example, some of the attack helicopters, and artillery. . . .

MR. MONTGOMERY: . . . I am still concerned that if we are going to keep talking about the Individual Ready Reserve, that we ought to do something about it, General Meyer. . . .What plans do we have about the Individual Ready Reserve?

. . . We either ought to eliminate it and let these Guard units, Reserve units, know they might be dismantled in case we got into a combat situation [and] used as replacements—which I hope they would never have to [do] if they are trained

as a unit. I would like to use them as a unit.

GENERAL MEYER: ... We have been directed by OSD to look at direct enlistments into the Individual Ready Reserve this year, bonuses ... to [retain people] in the Individual Ready Reserve, and an 8-year commitment for an individual when he comes into the Army as opposed to the 6-year commitment. This means you would have him for two additional years in the Individual Ready Reserve.

None of those will solve the Individual Ready Reserve problem in the time-frame that we are talking about. There will still be a shortfall in the Individual Ready Reserve on out into the late 1980's, even with the kinds of corrections that we are proposing.

I think the basic issue you raise is ... the basic issue as to whether or not we can man the total force in the context of a volunteer environment.

I think that is a very basic issue which Congress has to address. [The] American people have to look at the ... linkage between citizen and State.

I think that should be the basis upon which the argument is addressed rather than other bases. That is, do we want our young citizenry not to have the responsibility for defense of the Nation ... that is the elemental issue, in my personal view.

## Hearing before the SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE On the FY 83 DOD Appropriation: Army Posture

10 February 1982

In the statement I prepared I tried to lay out clearly for each of you the purpose of the land forces and the reason that we have the Army designed and headed in the direction that we are heading it. ...

The basic question that I believe I answer in that statement is the kind of Army that we believe we need to develop. ...

I, personally believe that we are moving more slowly than I think is necessary. I just believe we are going too slowly, but this budget provides steps toward a quality Army. ...

I had to make a decision when everyone else was coming in for additions ... as to whether or not we would try to add force structure—additional divisions which are clearly needed if you look at the totality of the Soviet force—or whether we would try to improve the quality of the Army we have. ...

We chose to focus on quality—[the] quality of people, ... of training, of equipment and ... of maintenance ... both in the Active, the National Guard, the Army Reserve and among our civilian manpower force.

We have delayed enlarging the Army, [though] we do intend in the late-mid-1980's to add two National Guard divisions. ...

The pace and direction of modernization ... the manpower situation, [and] the adequacy of our civilian manpower are critical. ...

SECRETARY MARSH: ... General Meyer may also want to speak to ... the continuing resolution of recent vintage [which] has cost us money. It has delayed contracting and it has delayed the beginning of starts that had been authorized. I think close to 190 contracts have been affected, if I am not mistaken. ...

GENERAL MEYER: I would ... reinforce what the Secretary has said. ...we can identify at least a $30 million cost [because of] ... the CRA this past year. Secondly, it meant that we could not begin the production of new starts; and, third, and equally troublesome, are the bonuses and other things which are part of this program that

we were not able to implement, so, we lost good people—sergeants [we are] trying to maintain.

SENATOR COHEN: . . . I would like to draw your attention, General Meyer, to an article by Edward Luttwak in this month's issue of *Commentary* magazine. The title is intriguing, "More Fraud, Waste, and Mismanagement in the Defense Department." I suspect his is probably a minority view of one in making that recommendation, but he does have two essential points that he tries to make: he believes that we place too much emphasis upon cost efficiency . . . and too little emphasis on [the] effectiveness of our weapon systems; that we are, in fact, sacrificing warfighting, war-winning capability in trying to measure up to the cost-efficiency standards that have been imposed by Congress and by the Department of Defense itself.

That is the first point.

Second, he tries to deal with the issue of the so-called reform movement up here on the Hill, the kind of opposition that has been encountered by the Department of Defense—as one general calls this movement, an assault on the military. He tries to deal with this question of how you balance high technology with numbers, how you get enough numbers into the system to be effective.

One suggestion he makes is that we ought to do what we do best. That is, let the United States produce the high technology items and simply demand that our allies, who are failing to measure up to their responsibilities, pick up the balance and produce the so-called low ends of that scale.

What would be your reaction to both of those suggestions?

GENERAL MEYER: First, on the emphasis on cost efficiency of weapon systems as opposed to the effectiveness in the way they are used in warfighting, I generally agree with that. That has been driven by systems analysis?

What we are trying to do to break that circle is to put out in the 9th Division a high-technology test bed; not just the concept of looking at new equipment, but also looking at how you can use equipment . . . more efficiently and effectively. We are thus able to look at tactics and doctrine that will maximize the capability of either present systems or the kinds of future systems we are looking at.

I would like to say, while Ed and I have areas of disagreement, that is an area I agree with.

On the issue of high tech versus numbers, that proposal has been made many times in the NATO arena. It is called *specialization* as opposed to standardization. It says everybody should do the things they do best, and from an economic point of view it will work out well, anyhow, because everybody will do what they do best.

I think from the philosophical point of view it would optimize the totality of any alliance, but I guess my problem with it is that the way international business has become so intertwined . . . there are few foreign companies [today] that are not also here and our companies that are there. Whether or not you could ever get a country in Europe to agree not to develop their own—take Italy, for example, which has a very good helicopter—systems or not is questionable.

From a very practical point of view, those are things to consider if you want to optimize the totality of alliance commitment. I think when Senator Nunn went over to Europe in 1975, one of the things [he] looked at then was that whole issue of how you could get focus on each nation doing better what they need to do, so that the totality of what the alliance does is increased.

SENATOR COHEN: Right now, we seem to be in a position of our doing almost everything. There will be a debate in the coming year, in the next two years, on the whole issue of burden-sharing. That word has dropped out of the lexicon. I was in Germany following the invasion of Afghanistan. The key words at that time were, "Let us have more burden-sharing." I have not heard that for two years now. I think it is an approach. Every approach has its time.

GENERAL MEYER: It is one of those that you might look at. It is the practical obstacles I see; it is not only Germany but also every country in the world.

SENATOR COHEN: Do you feel we should be in the position of saying that, "If the United States

has to bear the burden of defending Europe and defending the Persian Gulf and defending the Caribbean and other areas of the world, then we simply can't afford to fund all of these programs in which you have as much vital interest as we do. Therefore, you are either going to pick up some manpower costs or the shipping or whatever it might be, or you give us a check. You will just have to make out a check in Deutsche Marks or whatever and send it to us to help us pay for the cost."

It seems to me we will reach that point, because I can tell you that the sentiment will be that we either reduce our force structure in Europe and redeploy it elsewhere, or we ask them to help pay the cost.

I have talked to a number of Arab nations about this. You are smiling in anticipation. This is not a loaded question. Would you agree that from an Arab point of view it is likely that we are not going to have much of a physical presence in the area?

GENERAL MEYER: I think in the near term it will be very difficult for us to get the kind of presence—if not presence, at least the access—that I think is essential.

SENATOR COHEN: That will leave us with the dilemma of how we get from here to there?

GENERAL MEYER: Right.

SENATOR COHEN: As you point out, we don't have a great deal of strategic capability, no excess of it, certainly, and we are going to have difficulty getting from here to there fast enough with enough force . . . Does that leave us with an alternative perhaps that we may do more to allow those Arab nations to build their own defense capability rather than predicating the Rapid Deployment Force on the notion we are going to fly our people from here to there not with CX aircraft but C-5s or whatever?

GENERAL MEYER: I think that is one of the potentials. Let us take a program that everybody is aware of—and some of you have put your reputation on the line for—that is, the air defense of Saudi Arabia. Everything they can do as far as air defense of their own area against the Soviet threat means that there are many fewer weapons or that many fewer aircraft, or that much less equipment that we have to put over there as part of it. It is that kind of building block that I think provides some potential in that area. It is still a very hazy mosaic that needs to be filled in.

SENATOR NUNN: . . . .General Meyer, while I am throwing out accolades, I will say I am pleased to hear about the fresh thinking going on in the Army now. I think you described it in your statement as an evolutionary process. I am sure that is accurate. I have had a chance to be briefed by TRADOC the other day about the thinking going on. A great deal of that at least has evolved under your tenure. I think that is a real breath of fresh air in terms of Army strategy and relating it to the real threat that we have now and to some of the problems that I have felt were almost unsolvable if we continue along the past thinking.

Could you tell us a little bit about that new Army concept? I don't know whether you would call it new or evolutionary, but whatever you choose to say, I would like to have a little bit on the record.

GENERAL MEYER: As we look to the future and realize that we are going to have to have forces that are . . . able to operate across the full spectrum of warfare, from counterterrorism all the way to our involvement in the strategic environment . . . in all kinds of terrain . . . with allies all over the world, it indicates that the key . . . is to be flexible. . . .

That requires that we develop tactics and doctrine that put the focus on greater decentralization of authority, the opportunity for gaining the spirit of the offensive . . . to take a new technology and instead of trying to kill tanks on the frontline and keep stacking up and having to continually operate in the environment of attrition, solely, that we look at those areas in his rear which we know . . . are weak, such as his command and control. We need the ability to disrupt, delay, and deceive in those areas, and we must develop tactics, equipment, and doctrine and the ability to get the folks there so that the Army in the future will be able to keep the enemy at hostage instead of ourselves. . .

SENATOR NUNN: Would it be fair to summarize it by saying you are giving more attention to the disruption of second echelon forces now

than before, and that you are also giving more attention to exploiting by maneuver the windows of vulnerability that may appear when they appear on the basis of the disruption of second echelons?

GENERAL MEYER: Exactly. That is what I am talking about, tackling key weaknesses. . .in the second echelon. . .To be able to attack deep prevents us from getting into the kind of attrition-type battles that we have been in in the past. . .

SENATOR NUNN: Attrition has the connotation of a sort of stand-in-place-and-slug-it-out kind of thing, and there is nothing incompatible with attrition and maneuver?

GENERAL MEYER: There is not. Traditionally, you start at the squad. On the squad level you call it fire and movement; above that, firepower and maneuver. As you go above that, you talk about the strategic aspect of maneuver.

SENATOR NUNN: . . . .what are you doing in regard to procurement to make sure that over the next five years it fits in with the strategy that has evolved.

GENERAL MEYER: What I am trying to do to short circuit procurement time is to buy off the shelf, identify the kinds and. . .test new concepts of deployment, tactics and doctrine. We have plugged in elements of the procurement community to attempt to. . .overcome a traditionalism which is very difficult to offset.

SENATOR NUNN: Shifting the subject, you mentioned in your statement there are many who envision a future security posture devoid of a central role for land forces. This gets to the question, I suppose, directly or indirectly, of the so-called maritime strategy, maritime supremacy and so forth. How do you see the Army's role in this new strategy, if it is a strategy and if it is part of the thrust of this defense budget we have before us?

GENERAL MEYER: I believe that if you carry maritime strategy and supremacy to its absurdity, then it would mean that you would not have forward deployed forces, your alliance would come apart and so on. I don't believe that those who talk about improving the capability of the Navy have that in mind. I hope they don't, because it would be dangerous for our Nation.

I believe that we need a balance with our continental strategy. The Soviets are a continental power. Winston Churchill said Russia is a "land animal". They don't have a PACOM and LANTCOM organization for oceans; their ocean areas are an extension of the land area. That is the way they operate, out from Kamchatka, out from some of the other areas. . . .

SENATOR NUNN: You are saying you would not want to get to the point where our strategy envisioned conceding the Soviets' ability, for instance, to completely take over the Middle East on land in exchange for sinking their navy?

GENERAL MEYER: Exactly, because then it means we have to project power back ashore after we have given it up, and I think that would be far more costly in the long run. It also is destabilizing. . . .

SENATOR QUAYLE: . . . .General, last year in the C3I area, if my memory is correct, DOD testified that our C3I was better than the Soviets' capability in peacetime. There was a question whether it was better than the Soviets in wartime, and I believe you have given the advantage to the Soviets. . . .

GENERAL MEYER: I believe the $C_3$ that was addressed in the past has been principally in the strategic nuclear area. In the conventional land battle area I believe that today we are also behind in communications.

One of the high priorities therefore is to improve the capability to operate in a more decentralized mode. To do so will require improvement in our communications to put that whole thing together. That is an area of high priority along the lines I discussued with Senator Nunn. This has to be done. . . .The better communications are, the better your ability to be able to recycle forces, the fewer forces you need. . .We will have to improve our communications, command and control, $C^3$. We have expedited a radio system that will help us. It is not as good as we want but we have to get it into the system.

SENATOR QUAYLE: . . . .Has there been any increased hostility toward our troops in the form of an anti-American movement, as well as an-

tinuclear protest?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: I would say if you look back from the end of World War II to today, there is a definite change because today the people with whom our soldiers are associated don't remember World War II; therefore, the youth have grown up in a different environment. They are the young men and women with whom our soldiers principally associate, so there is a different relationship than existed before. . .There are areas in Germany where I am sure some of our troops feel an element of increased hostility, in other parts, the German people go out of their way. . .to show them that they are wanted. . .

The Inspector General . . . just happened to come in with a report to me this morning on the impact of terrorism on our dependents over there. He indicated in this regard that it did not appear to be a serious problem at this time, but there are some inklings of concern. . .

SENATOR LEVIN: . . . .This morning you have been asked by a number of my collegues about the maritime strategy about which we are reading so much. I understand, General, that your answer was that you are not concerned about the TOA for fiscal year 1983 in terms of the proportions going to the Army, the Navy and the other services. Do I gather from that that you are concerned or you do have some fear that in the event the large defense spending increases in the outyears that are now being requested or said to be requested are not granted by the Congress, that it is the Army that could get gored in those outyears?

GENERAL MEYER: It goes beyond whether the Army gets gored. I am concerned from a national defense point of view that you will have an unbalanced force not able to carry out what I considered to be a necessary strategy.

SENATOR LEVIN: The reason for that would be that the commitment would be made this year pursuant to the so-called maritime strategy to certain big ticket items such as large deck nuclear carriers, and should defense resources become more scarce in the outyears than are now projected in the 5-year plan, that . . . the land force capability . . . would . . . get the short end of the budget stick?

GENERAL MEYER: I certainly have that fear, but may I give a very short lecture?

It is absolutely essential that we get some constancy in what we are doing with our defense establishment; that we establish the direction in which we are going and put some constancy of purpose to our efforts across the board. Until we do that, the perturbations and so on that we do in programming, budgeting, and execution every year, waste money for the American people and give us less defense. . . .

We have to get . . . an agreement among the administration, Congress, and the departments . . . because if we don't do that, we are going to continue to waste the dollars and get less defense than we need. . . .

SENATOR LEVIN: . . .We have a 5-year defense plan. I gather that you feel that the 1983 budget in that plan is relatively adequate. What about the budgets planned for 1984 and 1985?

GENERAL MEYER: Again, if we go into what we expect to get in 1985, 1986, and 1987, there are large additions in that timeframe to Army general-purpose forces. [But] . . . I am . . . a pragmatist and realize and understand that the bow wave continues to be pushed out. That is my concern. It is not that the program today doesn't have significant resources in those outyears.

SENATOR LEVIN: So the projected resources in the 5-Year plan, you feel, are adequate?

GENERAL MEYER: I have never said to Congress that any of the resources we have are adequate. I don't believe they are.

SENATOR LEVIN: . . . .On the maritime supremacy question, we now have a posture statement that says that we seek to achieve and maintain maritime supremacy. My question relates to land forces posture. Do we seek land forces supremacy?

GENERAL MEYER: I don't believe that that is a stated national position as far as land force supremacy.

SENATOR LEVIN: Should we?

GENERAL MEYER: I believe that in conjunction with our allies that we ought to ensure that

around the world we have sufficient land force. I suppose in the abstract the answer is simply yes. We ought to have a totality of land power supremacy around the world, but we have not made that kind of statement.

SENATOR LEVIN: How would you phrase that goal?

GENERAL MEYER: Our goal is that in conjunction with our allies that our land power forward deployed and deployable under mobilization scenarios [be] adequate to deter and then through reinforcement to be able to defeat any enemy including the Soviets.

SENATOR NUNN: . . . .Do you consider . . . [the Joint Strategic Planning Document] . . . a "wish list" by the Service Chiefs? Is that the best description of it?

GENERAL MEYER: I don't consider it a wish list, if you believe the defense of the Nation is important. . . .If you define it in the context of is that total requirement going to be procured or be supported, I don't think there is anybody who believes that they are ever going to get all that money. It is our responsibility to say what we think is necessary for the defense of the Nation.

SENATOR NUNN: One of the witnesses testified that this document was looked at for 30 seconds by the Defense Resources Board and put aside as more or less a wish list. How much input goes into the document? If it is not given any more consideration than that, are we wasting a lot of valuable time and effort in producing such a document?

GENERAL MEYER: One, I think we, by law, have a responsibility for stating what we believe the requirements are.

Two, I think it should receive more attention than it does.

Three, even if it does not receive the attention at this instant in time, if we started to mobilize tomorrow it would provide [us] with the only available check list against which [we] could start to tick off the kinds of priority things you had to do in order to get on with prosecuting the war effort.

SENATOR NUNN: So you view that as a serious document and serious effort by the Joint Chiefs.?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir, I do.

SENATOR NUNN: Now, looking at that document as a serious effort and looking at the gap and at the 5-year budget we have before us, even though it is a very, very large budget growth and it is under fire now as being too large by a lot of forces, what does this tell us? Is there a message here that we had better take a look at our strategy, we had better take another look at what we define as our vital interests, or is there a message that this huge gap can be filled in a reasonable timeframe if we do get into a conflict? What is the message coming out of that gap?

GENERAL MEYER: I think the message that comes from the gap is that we are now accepting tremendous risks with the size of forces that we currently have to do what we have pledged to do. . . .

SENATOR NUNN: You are saying we either have to recognize that we are taking a very, very large risk—you said a huge risk, I guess—or we have to take another look at our strategy or a combination of the two?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir.

# Address to the
# WASHINGTON's BIRTHDAY DINNER OF THE
# VIRGINIA SONS OF THE REVOLUTION

Richmond, Virginia
22 FEBRUARY 1982

. . . I had a letter from one of your members, Lou Fields, who is now our American Ambassador in Geneva. His letter reminded me that when asked to speak at gatherings such as this: first, you should speak up if you hope to be heard; second, you should speak clearly if you hope to be understood; and third, you should speak briefly if you have any hope of being appreciated. Three sensible rules I'll try to abide by.

The distinguished American jurist, Thurman Arnold once wrote:

> "No Nation, no social institution, ever acquired coherence without some sort of fight. Out of the fight come its myths and its heroes."

We Americans have a penchant for making our heroes appear larger than life. We are also capable of disemboweling them at the drop of a hat. The true heroes are few, indeed. To them we attach *monumental* significance, for they become the embodiment of the ideals and characteristics of an era.

One such man was George Washington.

During the 1940's and 1950's, every February 22, the late newspaper columnist Frederick C. Othman used to visit the Smithsonian—the old red castle on the Mall—to view a specific piece of statuary. Suitably refreshed, he'd then reprint in his column a piece he had written some years before. It went like this:

> "I regret to report that the father of his country looks as goose-pimply as ever--all eleven feet, four inches of him--with a sheet around his middle, a laurel wreath on his brow and his bare toes in the breeze. I guess you might call him the result of Congress's sorriest experience with the Arts.
>
> It began in 1833 when Horatio Greenough was paid $5,000 to sculpt a heroic statue of George Washington for the Capitol's rotunda. Horatio went to Florence, emerged several years later with a 20-ton marble statue. When longshoremen started to hoist the statue onto a boat, the rope broke and George sank in the mud. The U.S. Navy sent a battleship to Italy, fished George out and took him to New York.
>
> "Because railroad tunnels between there and Washington weren't big enough they took him to New Orleans and forwarded him by devious routes, without tunnels, to Washington. This artistic enterprise by now had cost some $26,000."

—Note: maybe we're not doing so badly today—that's a cost overrun of 520-percent!—

> "When the statue proved too heavy for the rotunda, it was quickly moved to the Capitol lawn, where the unveiling came on George's birthday, 1843. The Navy band tootled, lawmakers made speeches, the Speaker of the House pulled the string, and good-gosh-amighty—there was George Washington, twice as big as life, scantily clad as a Roman senator! Over Capitol Hill rose a horrified gasp. After weeks of bitter debate Congress decided to build a wooden shed for $1,600 to hide the statue.
>
> By 1908 the shed was so weatherbeaten, and the lawmakers so mortified, that they appropriated a final $5,000 to tear it down and haul the semi-naked Washington—in the dead of night--to the Smithsonian. There you will find him today, in the West Wing of the main building, along with a row of antique presses."

So, after cost overruns of 800 percent, that statue sits today in the Smithsonian's Museum of American History—no longer midst the presses, but on the main floor near the Stars and Stripes which flew over Fort McHenry. Where it sits and how much his statue costs is unimportant. What is important is an appreciation that. . .the reputation enjoyed by General Washington or, more rightly, Greenough's interpretation of that reputation, resulted in a colossal piece of statuary whose height was exceeded only by its weight. Its classical beauty, however, failed to capture Washington as perceived in the eyes of his countrymen.

Why?

Well, for one thing, he was a man just like us. Not averse to a wager, he bet on the horses in Alexandria, reputedly losing more than he won. He loved his wines—and he enjoyed the company of the ladies. The General would have been the first, I think, to point out his human frailties.

So any real perspective of this man, the Father of our Country, is difficult to immortalize in a statue. He was not a statue; he was instead a man who established what the American personality can be—what it should be—what it must be—if we are to survive—prevail—grow in our hard-won freedoms—and pass them on intact for succeeding generations.

By example and the sheer dominance of his leadership, decency, and selfless dedication to the service of his country, General George Washington struggled against hardship, privation and dissent—both internal and external to his forces—to remove our Nation from its colonial status. His strength of character inspired his fellow colonists to create for all of the peoples of the world documentary evidence in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of a Nation founded on the most lofty ideals.

Napoleon, in exile on St. Helena, lamented, "They wanted me to be another Washington." But he recognized the incongruous bent of their respective natures. The reputation of the conqueror who left ruin in his wake throughout Europe is greatly at odds with the reputation of America's first "First Soldier" whose legacy was a new nation. One, a man crowned Emperor at the height of his power; the other, the Builder of a Nation, retired—or wanted to retire—to the life of an ordinary citizen.

When called to serve again, Washington displayed his full understanding of the value of reputation. In his first year as President, he told the Pennsylvania Legislature that

> "The virtue, moderation and patriotism which marked the steps of the American people in. . . carrying into effect our present system of Government [has] excited the admiration of Nations;
>
> . . . it only now remains. . . to act up to those principles. . . that we may gain respect abroad and ensure happiness and safety to ourselves and to our posterity."

Heady words from a man who was expected to protect and defend his Nation, its interests, and its citizens with a defense structure that consisted of an Army of 7/8 men armed with muskets!

Today's Defense establishment is, clearly, larger: numbering 3.1 million military and civilian employees and a fiscal year budget of $214 billion in 1982. And its arms are a bit more sophisticated than muskets. That's not to say that Washington wouldn't have sought to improve the equipment he had. There was always the hazard that had he sought a musket with a covered flint so his troops could defend themselves in foul weather, the Congress would have accused him of "gold-plating". As it was each winter the Continental Army had to hole up or disperse—it was the only way in those days to "keep your powder dry."

Your Army today keeps its powder dry, and stands ready year round to defend our national interests in every climate and every variety of geography around the world. We are a complex organization, with thousands of separate units located at over 400 major installations worldwide. Fifty-six percent of our active combat strength is located overseas. We cost each citizen about $200 each year, and I believe we are faithful stewards of the trust and obligation this represents. Lastly, the Army is deeply involved in the central issues of U. S. national security.

Some would argue that these issues which face us today make the tasks and responsibilities

which faced Washington pale by comparison. But "compared to what?" is the question.

Sometimes in the complexity of our daily schedule, when my wife feels especially exasperated, she sometimes remarks, "Wouldn't it be great if we could just go back to simpler times?" I always agree—and she brightens up considerably—until I casually remind her that if we did go back to simpler times, most probably "Ronald MacDonald" would be the name of a Scottish immigrant—and a "quarter-pounder" would be a very small cannon.

Certainly, viewing the past from the vantage point of the present, it's easy to presume that Washington's world was "simple." Just look at "Meyer's World"—the one that this Nation, and your Armed Forces, must be prepared to face on a daily basis. Boiled down it's a world in which:

- Our potential adversaries are all around us. Attack of our vital interests worldwide could come at many locales—sudden and unexpected.

- Our ocean borders, considered for so long by many a natural barrier, no longer afford a buffer.

- The land, air and sea arms of our adversaries are large, modern, well equipped and growing.

- At center stage is an empire-oriented superpower with global reach, bristling with weaponry, unabashed to use political and economic coercion, and deft in the employment of surrogates who actively foment unrest and disorder. The power projection capability of our adversaries is growing and becoming quite sophisticated.

- Terrorism, possibly funded, but surely supported by our enemies, is rampant and could indeed be the flash-point triggering a larger conflict.

By contrast, look at Washington's quieter, more "simple" days:

-His Army was confronted by potential adversaries that were all around them; not limited to the European continent, but on the American continent as well. Attack could come from any quarter.

-The average citizen—who had endured an arduous ocean voyage to reach America—tended to view the ocean as a protective moat. Washington's skepticism showed in a letter to his comrade Rochambeau: "America may think herself happy in having the Atlantic for a barrier." He knew the contrary was true, of course. For the British the sea was a natural highway, which they exploited with brilliance on occasion.

-In Washington's time, the armies and navies of potential adversaries were large and very well equipped—modern by any standard of the day in weaponry and tactics, and capable of projecting their power throughout the known world, using the "ocean barrier."

- One superpower dominated the world scene, empire-building through coercion and attack, and employing its surrogates for the same end when need be.

- On the American frontier, soldiers and citizenry alike were subject to terrorism and attack by Indians.

Simpler? Quieter? I submit that the ambience of the national security climate was as severe as technology and spirit of the age could endure. Thank God they didn't have "60 Minutes" or the *Washington Post* to make them more aware of the full dimensions of their environment. Can't you see the headlines?

*CRITICS SAY 60-THOUSAND POUNDS MUCH FOR DEFENSE!*

*or*

*"WHITES OF EYES" STRATEGY FAULTED AS ATTRITION ORIENTED BY CIVILIAN DEFENSE ANALYSTS!!*

*or*

*VALLEY FORGE CAMPSITE TERMED ECOLOGICAL DISASTER!!*

*or*

*BRITISH COMING —REVERE NAMED LEAK!!*

With that kind of treatment, or something like it, the Army and the Continental Congress might have despaired. Fortunately, they didn't. By their acts, their fortune, their lives, they put teeth to the

philosophy exquisitely expressed by General Washington:

> If we desire to avoid insult, we must be ready to repel it; if we desire to secure peace. . . it must be known that we are at all times ready for war."

But despite the similarities, were Washington with us today, he would have to accommodate some marked distinctions between his times and ours! Four come readily to mind.

-First, in his day large, professional armies weren't needed. The skills required of an 18th century army were skills common to the population. Beginning with a nucleus of trained professionals, enlistment and conscription in times of national peril could raise an army equal to the task. Today, it's a very different story—our basic infantryman must be able to perform over 130 separate battlefield tasks. That's a far cry from grabbing the old musket—the same one used to shoot the Thanksgiving turkey—and not firing "till you see the whites of their eyes." Nowadays, with our advances in training, tactics, and weaponry, our infantrymen can find the "whites of their eyes" in the dark!

-Second, today technology advances have led to weapon sophistication. The muskets of George Washington's Continental Army didn't go out of date after Yorktown; they were the primary personal arm for almost 70 years, until shortly before the beginning of the Civil War. Today, weapons change with the wind—advances in improving existing generic types, but more importantly, the periodic and unpredictable emergence of the "smart" weapons, sensors, communications, etc. We must learn to employ these intelligently. For us, the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle—a weapon type incorporated long ago in many European and Soviet Bloc countries—has finally made its debut. That is going to cause us to rethink the employment of infantry. And the training of infantry too. Remember that infantryman and his 130 tasks? Well you can add one more:the Bradley and its capabilities. Other weapons, like the Abrams tank and the Apache, our attack helicopter, offer dramatic new capabilities far in excess of what we already possess.

-Third, today the consequences of unpreparedness are much more severe. In Washington's time a lack of military preparedness would have resulted in the snuffing out of a new Nation. That would, then, have been tragic—but as a British colony there was still the likelihood of increasing democratization—realized today within the ideals of the Commonwealth. But the consequences of military unpreparedness right now, today. offer no such comfort. The flame of freedom and democracy that lights the path of the world's democracies over an oft-times dark and hostile planet could be extinguished forever. That cannot be allowed to happen. To Those Who Say Our Preparedness Costs Too Much, I say The Price Of Not Being Prepared Is Too High To Pay.

-Fourth, defense of our Nation is everybody's business. The Revolutionary War was fought and won by 25 percent of our population together with some French allies and a handful of "Tories." The strength and vitality of our Nation is based on the principle of participation, and it has been preserved by fighters and doers—not talkers. If we are called upon to defend our interests today, the burden would be too great if, as Washington said, "the Congress, Army & citizenry" were not united "in one cause, in one interest; acting on the same principle and to the same end."

In the past, as a Nation, we were able to fashion strength from those distinctions as the need arose and as time permitted. We ensured our rank among the world's nations through a physical and material strength that sometimes belied the moral (ethical), mental, and spiritual strengths inherent in our national character.

The Nation's Armed Forces—your Armed Forces—are part of the legacy of General Washington. They are comprised of men and women who serve selflessly at posts worldwide. They give life and international stature to the words strength and reputation. The benchmark of their service is founded in the words of General Washington to the 10th and 91st Regiments of the Virginia Militia:

> "When injuries and Insults have been heaped upon us, and when the Sovereignty and independence of our Country are threatned, it is, in my opinion, no longer in the option of a good Citizen to withhold his Services from the Public.

Upon this ground I have accepted my Commission; and upon this ground I trust that every true American will be prepared to defend his Country against foreign encroachments; and to perpetuate the blessings which he enjoys under his own Government."

## Hearing before the HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE Subcommittee on Defense On the FY 83 DOD Appropriation: Army Posture

2 MARCH 1982

MR. DICKS: . . . It seems to me, trying to come up with some way to reform the procurement process is absolutely of the highest priority. When you start seeing articles stating new [deleted] weapons that the Soviets have overtaken the development of the tank, because of the length of time it took—the 20-year period of developing the tank—then you have to start asking serious questions about whether we have to design a new tank now?

Clearly the experience on these three weapons systems and others indicates there has to be some fundamental reform in the procurement process. . . .What are we going to do to come to grips with this problem?

GENERAL MEYER: May I comment, please. . . .I think that is a very important point. The Soviets do product improve all of their equipment. We believe that it is the way to go for the future.

The reason we have not gone that way in the past is because of the problem of coming to Congress and saying that you have a system and as soon as you have it, or before you even have it, that it will have to be improved in five or six years. There is a reluctance to come over and say that.

MR. DICKS: Why is that?

GENERAL MEYER: Because, as soon as you do that, there will be people in Congress who say, don't buy it. Wait for the new model. . . .that is a fact. I get advised all the time by my people with congressional liaison, don't flash the changes now because it is going to cause currents over on the Hill that will defeat the system. What we are trying to do now is lay out clearly the need to upgrade as the Soviets improve. That is what is happening with the M1. . . .To take that system and start thinking about what is going to happen in 1990 and 1995 and start thinking about it in a conceptual way to product improve that system instead of starting a brand new system.

MR. DICKS: . . . .Does this lack of candor—which is what I would call it—and we may be just as responsible. Congress may be a big part of this problem. I am trying to solve the problem. If we have to take the heat for it, that is fine. When it comes down here and we talk about the Army failing to complete tests in controversial M-2 Bradley armored personnel carriers—

GENERAL MEYER: That is blatantly untrue.

MR. DICKS: Going ahead with the purchase of hundreds of vehicles.

GENERAL MEYER: That is blatantly untrue. I can prove to you that that is untrue. The question then is the truth of the issue.

MR. DICKS: Listen, I am willing to take your word for it.

GENERAL MEYER: You don't have to. I am not asking that. I will lay all the facts out. I can give you a point counterpoint addressal of all of that article.

MR. DICKS: Wouldn't it be the height of foolishness to not test a weapons system because you are afraid of the results?

GENERAL MEYER: There is no way we would ever do that. That is absurd. We have the same interests you do, which is to put a Soldier in equipment that will save his life and permit him to win on the battlefield. That is the final determinant of whether or not we buy a weapons system. . . .

## Address to the UNION LEAGUE OF CHICAGO

Chicago, Illinois
15 March 1982

. . . In the summer 1980, I went before our Congress and testified that we had a hollow Army. . .We were in a condition in which very few of our divisions except those stationed overseas were ready to carry out the types of missions that we should be able to do in peace time. . .to convince an enemy that he ought not to play with the United States of America. Well, I noticed Jack Anderson used that same speech that I made two years ago in an article he wrote in Parade about two weeks ago. I wish he'd call and ask for an up-to-date status. . .Since he didn't do that, I'll give you one. . .Today all 16 active divisions, with the exception of one where I have some shortfalls in noncommissioned officers—I have people identified to round that out—are in a readiness condition where they could go off to war if they were required to.

But that isn't the issue. The issue isn't how much better are we today than we were in 1980. . .One thing I've found to be very, very useless is to try to compare today's Army with any period in the past, because that's the wrong comparison. The comparison must be with today and tomorrow, to decide whether or not it is good enough for this period . . . responsive to the challenges that are going to face our Nation between now and the 21st Century. . .

Now my personal estimate of that period is that there is a low likelihood that we will have a contingency or a war or a conflict involving a direct confrontation of the Soviets and NATO. I think that's the least likely. I think it's more likely that conflict will begin as a result of inadvertence somewhere in the world . . . but . . . it will be very difficult to constrain . . . a conflict in any region. . . ..

Now that means that we have certain interlocking needs, and I'd like to talk about those. When I talk to the Army, I grade them. I tell them how we stand in each area; manning, training, mobilizing, equipping and modernizing the force, and in sustaining the force.

In manning, we are, on a scale of one to one hundred, [at about] 70. Our biggest problem is turbulence. Today a division-sized unit, 16,000 people plus backup, turns over once every year and a half. It means that in a small unit out there, every quarter there is about a 13 to 15 percent turnover. That means that [we're] not able therefore to maintain the capability of that company or that battery, that small unit. . . .

As I said earlier we've been very successful in bringing in qualified young people. We've been successful in our Reserve Officer Training Programs in bringing young people into the officer training cadre, but our big problems today in manning continue to be our large overseas commitments and our need to be able to retain the noncommissiioned officers and key leaders that we need.

In the force structure, we will not be able to have the size force that I believe is prudent to meet the challenge. That means therefore that we have to have a force that's able to operate across the broader spectrum and is more flexible. We're

short in support forces, but one thing that has happened . . . is that our National Guard and our Army Reserve are beginning to fill up in strength. As we're able to provide them with the resources to equip them . . . that will provide us with a rapid mobilization reinforcement that will permit us to have the smaller, more quality Active Army. That interrelationship between a quality Active Army, and an improved and more capable Reserve Component has to be first and foremost in what we're doing today. . . .

In the training area, I would give us about a 60 percent. Again, you have to remember I'm a hard grader because we have to be rated against perfection. We've been down in training, and the reason again is that armies do not run without noncommissioned officers, and as we were short noncommissioned officers, the training out in the organizations was not as good as it should be. As we've been able to build up our noncommissioned officer corps, we've been able to improve our training. We've developed out in California a National Training Center where all of the brigades of the Army go once every other year; where they have the opportunity to operate in an extended combat environment with free-firing under electronic warfare conditions, which permits them to be able to do things that we've not been able to do in the past. It's had a tremendous impact upon the readiness of the forces that have been there. Today, some 10,000 Soldiers are operating in an exercise with Korean units. We have forces operating all around the world in training exercises so that people are able to get away from their post and do the kind of training that not only makes them more ready, but also convinces them that they're in the Army to do Army business—and to learn to be Soldiers.

The mobilization area is an area that I rate about 55 to 60 percent. Seven years ago, it was 5 percent. There's been tremendous interest placed on mobilization in the past seven years. We had an exercise last week in which the President played where we went through the various mobilization procedures we need to be accomplished in to ensure that we're able to go to war, all the way from the development of bases, the expansion of the manpower, the industrial base—which is a very real concern, and one of the reasons that I have to cut way back on my estimate of our mobilization potential. The planning phases are going well but our ability to do the kinds of things that I had hoped we would be able to do—to incentivize industry to improve the mobilization surge capability out there—I don't see those being possible as a result of the current state of the economy. So that's something we have to hold off on. But that's absolutely essential if we're to have the mobilization potential that is necessary.

The two biggest shortfalls we have are in equipping/modernizing the force, and I use the two words together because I've told you that we do not have equipment in hand which is adequate to the task. We have many Guard and Reserve units that have no equipment at all. I'm not just talking about the more esoteric weapon systems, I'm talking about trucks, materials handling equipment and those kinds of things without which the various fighting units cannot be supported. So the biggest shortfall we have at the present time is in the area of equipping, modernizing, and sustaining.

The approach we've taken as a strategy for the Army is to fix what's broken—to make sure we're taking care of near-term readiness. And while we're doing that, to try to take the leap that we must take if we are to be technologically equal and hopefully superior to the Soviets on any future battlefield.

Now I can just assure you that the efforts that we've taken to date in [these] areas . . are ones which take into account the realization that there are limited resources available—that particularly with the economy the way it is, that we have to prove to you and to the American people that we are able to handle the resources that we're given efficiently and effectively, and that you're getting a dollar's worth of defense for every dollar you spend. That will be a prime effort within the Army. . . .

So in summary, we are an Army in transition from many of the problems that came about as a result of Vietnam, which came about as a result of our losing the very core of our Army—our noncommissioned officer corps. It's in the process of being rebuilt. We're an Army in transition as far as tactics and doctrine are concerned. We're an Army in transition as far as equipping the force is concerned, and one thing that we need —one thing I believe all of the Defense Department needs—is constancy of effort. . . .

# Hearing Before The SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE Subcommittee on Defense On the FY 83 Budget Overview

23 March 1982

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .I think it is important that as you start to take a look at the . . . Army [that] instead of looking at it in the context of systems and . . . machines and . . . specific line items, that you look at it in the context of why we need an Army and what kind of an Army we need.

Very often you are caught up with the same problem I am; where you are forced to look at a tank, or a truck, or aircraft or whatever else it happens to be. I have tried to lay out in my statement a rationale for the kind of Army that I believe this nation needs in the decade ahead to respond to the challenges, and . . . [that are] four basic characteristics.

One is, it has to be flexible. We can't be satisfied with an Army which can only go to Germany and sit in one area over there and not be able to respond elsewhere. We need flexible forces which are able to respond across the full spectrum of warfare, [from] counter terrorism . . . through the role that the Army has to play in the strategic nuclear mission, particularly in the defensive area.

A subject which gets a lot of press today is technological competence. I will not recommend to you weapons systems that are going to be inadequate to the challenge on the battlefield. We have to have weapons systems . . . today and tomorrow that are at least equal if not better than what the prospective enemy has, and that is, as far as I am concerned, a bottom line as far as what we provide the Soldiers.

The force that we have has to be strategically deployable. It doesn't do any good to have an Army and Marine corps sitting here in the U. S. that can't go anywhere or do anything.

So we need to do two things. One, we need to improve our strategic mobility through air and sea lift, and two, we need to make our own Army forces lighter.

. . . out near your state, out at Fort Lewis we are experimenting with the 9th Division to develop a high technology light division which can . . . give us the capability to respond more quickly in a strategically deployable manner.

Finally, we have to have an Army that is tactically and doctrinally sound. We can't develop an Army that is effective for the last war. We have to be looking for an Army effective on the battlefield today and tomorrow.

Those are the principles upon which we develop the Army, the principles upon which we developed this budget to support that kind of an Army that can meet those essential characteristics.

I will never be satisfied until we have a perfect Army. Therefore, I would have to tell you that I personally believe that the things that we are doing are going much more slowly than I believe they must. But they are major steps toward a quality Army.

As the Secretary pointed out very clearly we made a conscious decision last summer not to add more divisions and not add more brigades, and not to add more battalions, but to . . . improve the quality of people and to improve the quality of equipment.

I think the great success story with the help of Congress has been turning around the Army manpower situation to the point that the quality of . . . manpower we have today has improved tremendously and last week we went over 400,000 in National Guard [strength] for the first time in almost eight years. . . .With their FY 83 budget we will end up with a larger Guard and Reserve than we have had since 1961. That is a major step forward in the development of the total force.

The biggest shortfall we have in having the kind of Army that you are charging us with rais-

ing . . . is in equipping that Army—equipping the Active, the Guard and the Reserve . . . with systems that are going to give them a chance to survive on the battlefield and to win. . . .[This] budget heads us in the direction of doing [that]. . . .

SENATOR KASTEN: When you are employing the Leopard 2 what about the bulldozer and the ACE? That is not a part of their program, that is right. That is an additional cost?

SECRETARY MARSH: . . . .the ACE or Armored Combat Earthmover's principal purpose is not to dig in a tank. It is for creating road blocks and doing bulldozing, and if it is necessary, to assist an armored unit in digging in. But that is not its principal purpose.

GENERAL MEYER: In all armies of the world, there are engineer vehicles, and I think the Secretary outlined it very well. . . .There is a need for an engineer vehicle because mobility and counter mobility is how you maximize the capability of your forces on the battlefield, by preventing the enemy from moving or making it easier for you to move.

If you want wars of maneuver and you want the opportunity to be able to do the kind of things that we have to do on the battlefield, you need to clear that battlefield of rubble and debris, and so it takes an engineer vehicle. . . .

. . . it is unfair to charge [the cost of the ACE] to the M1. That is like charging the costs of a carrier to the costs of an M1 because you have to protect the M1 as it transits the Atlantic Ocean.

SENATOR KASTEN: That is just the kind of information you have to make available to the public, but I want to make sure. The inference or the implication is that the M60 can operate relatively easily without one of those earthmoving vehicles, and the M1 needs it to operate effectively.

GENERAL MEYER: That is comparing apples and oranges and any other kind of fruit you want to throw into the fruit salad. They aren't even facts. . . .

SENATOR KASTEN: . . . the *Wall Street Journal* reports say the Bradley carries six infantrymen while I understand the Army says it carries nine. Now, is that correct or how does this happen?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: . . . It carries nine. The reporters elected to merely talk about the six who get out of the infantry fighting vehicle and leave the other three to do the firing and directing the vehicle. . . .

SENATOR KASTEN: How long did it take to develop that vehicle, when did we begin?

GENERAL MEYER: . . .[at] least 11 to 12 years.

SENATOR KASTEN: Were the delays caused by funding problems which we, the Congress, were responsible for or were they design changes or what?

GENERAL MEYER: It is a combination of both. If there is any fault it is on the part of the Army in getting exactly what we wanted, and it has been of some concern on the part of Congress whether that is what we really ought to have. As a result of that things got stretched out over a time, but I can't point my finger at any one person.

SENATOR KASTEN: When I was reading that article, it was about the same time that General Jones was talking about the competition that he felt was more and more counterproductive, Service by Service. And it was several years ago, when Admiral Zumwalt made a couple of speeches when he was talking about in order to get to his position as the leader of the Navy, he had to fight if a submariner got to the top, and if an aviator got to the top.

He fought for those, and if there was a surface ship person, he fought for those people. In reading through that Bradley interview, one group wanted to go certain miles per hour and the other wanted it to go over water, and it seemed to me that we got one heck of a lot of inter-Service competition and within a Service, branch competition which is counterproductive.

From the kind of smiles I have been getting from all three of you, obviously it is something that you all have been talking about.

Number one, is General Jones right, and is Admiral Zumwalt right and in the infantry fighting

vehicle and these other things do we have a real problem with the various branches and the groups within the Service, and if we do, what are you doing to solve this problem?

GENERAL MEYER: First, I think in the broader context, it is unrealistic to believe that Service Chiefs [won't] come to you and explain to you what their shortfalls are and where they believe there are legitimate shortfalls.

I am coming to you and telling you that your Army is not equipped to the degree you ought to feel confident of going back to the folks in Wisconsin and saying that their young men and women are given equipment that is equal to the task.

So it is not logical for me to go then into JCS when there is a restriction on resources and to not push that need in the JCS. So I believe as you look at joint forces that that clearly happens.

I agree with General Jones completely on that, and I don't know how . . . in the current system [you] will get away from that relationship.

I have some ideas for changes, but it is not for this session. Within the Army the way we have attempted to overcome that particular problem. . . .Very candidly, until the past two years we have been directed not internally by the Army, but externally by Defense to develop a very, very heavy force which was responsive only to the demands of Central Europe. We have been fighting that . . . to have the capability of responding more flexibly across the full spectrum of requirements. So I would say that internally that is what we try to do.

The reason I started to smile is because I am an infantryman, and I am proud of it and that is a rationale for having an infantry fighting vehicle, but an infantry fighting vehicle is an essential element of the mechanized Army.

SENATOR KASTEN: I appreciate your candor and honesty and I am not satisfied with the first part of your answer, in that you feel that it is your responsibility to go in that meeting and fight for the Army.

I think that the people representing the Navy and the people representing the Air Force and people representing all of the different branches feel at this particular moment, based on the last several years of undersupplying defense, we are all in trouble.

I believe, sir, it is your responsibility to try and say, "Okay, how can we handle the overall air support problem, and can the Air Force do a little more here and maybe we could shift some resources out of the Army, because we are not so concerned about having our Army people in that."

That would be switching airplanes between the Navy and Air Force rather than saying we have to have a different plane. I think for you to go in and fight for just the Army would be a mistake, and maybe I misunderstood you.

GENERAL MEYER: I think you did . . . the Army is and must be the most joint of all Services. I say that totally parochially, but I say it because it is essential.

The Army can't go to war without the Navy and the Air Force to move it, and we can't go to the war without the Air Force providing air support. The Navy can go to sea without needing that support, and the Air Force can fly out without it.

So I would just assure you in this that the Army probably looks more closely at that and is supportive as you will read in my testimony on other Service systems that contribute to the total. But I will merely tell you that when you are talking about dollars and resources and everybody is short, it is difficult to do the kind of prioritization that we are talking about, and we don't have a mechanism for doing that. . . .

SENATOR STEVENS: In view of the increased cost can we afford the Apache?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: The basic concept of that attack helicopter is that it will provide something that can fight day and night. We don't have that today. It also provides a survivable aircraft for our pilots. We don't have that today. Clearly there is a cost point at which we have to decide whether or not it is worth that, and that is what we are looking at right now. . .

My own view is if we do not get this attack helicopter, I am going to have to take a look at how to redesign the Army. It has been central to

the way we have looked at having a force that can fight in Europe. It gives us flexible fire power in the Middle East or Persian Gulf. It can do a lot of things . . . [which in its absence we] have to have some substitute for.

Clearly as you point out, there is a cost at which [we] have to decide whether or not [we] can afford it. We are in . . . negotiations right now, and I can't answer that question until we get that response. But it would mean a different kind of Army for the future without that helicopter.

SENATOR STEVENS: Has the cost given you any indication of change in your force structure to limit the number that you would acquire at that cost?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir, we have had to do that already. We have decided we would not be able to put them into some of our cavalry units and some other kinds of units. We have had to cut back by 90 [aircraft] on a cost basis.

SENATOR KASTEN: . . . .I noted the M1 tank is not currently equipped to filter our atmospheric chemicals. If my memory is correct some of the Russian tanks. I don't know exactly which ones they would have been, but some of the ones we were able to capture after one the mideastern conflicts, even back then were equipped with different kinds of filtration systems. They could operate in a chemical or a biological atmosphere.

So what are we doing for our people? Am I right about the Russian tanks and what are we doing specifically about our M1 tanks and the M60s that would be remodeled?

GENERAL MEYER: Let me talk to the broader issue—what we are doing in the chemical arena. . . .[It is] an area where we found we were far behind. About six or seven years ago, . . . we reinstituted the Chemical Corps . . . We are adding . . . chemical units to our divisions and to our separate brigades, so [that] we have the expertise out there to work the chemical area. We have been in the process of bringing in decontamination apparatus, individual protective items, alarms and collective shelters . . We are in the process of making up for years of neglect in the defensive area and . . . I think we could show reasonable progress.

Let me talk about the tank thing—how you fight a tank. The Soviets have elected to fight their tanks with the hatch closed, which limits your ability to pick up targets. . . .Our tanks and tanks of other armies of the world—exclusive of the Soviet's—generally operate with the tank open, so people can see. They have a centralized filtration system on the Soviet tanks and what we have are individual systems where the individual wears a protective garment plus he has a helmet and mask which provide him with filtrated air so that he is protected that way.

We are looking at a follow-on to the M1 tank to decide if in a follow-on we can afford the additional space that it takes up in there to go to a cover for it. One of the concerns that we have, very candidly, is that no system is air tight. The concern is, regardless of people, you are going to have infiltration of chemicals through cracks or whatever it happens to be. . . .

# Article in the
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# "The JCS · How Much Reform in Needed?"

1 April 1982

## The JCS · How Much Reform is Needed?

. . . Fortunately, we now appear to be beginning a serious reexamination of the role, organization and functioning of the JCS. In the process, we should examine the even broader issue of whether the nation's civilian leaders receive the best possible advice from their military experts. The challenges our Nation faces today and the prospects for more demanding challenges in the critical years ahead require that the reforms we finally adopt cure the ills of the system. Strong medicine is needed. Various inadequacies in the National Security Act of 1947 have been addressed but were not fully corrected by a series of amendments over subsequent years. We now have a 35-year patchwork of law, custom and shibboleth.

My own professional judgment is that the changes urged by General Jones, while headed in the right direction, do not go far enough to correct what ails the JCS. I believe that we must consider the feasibility of changes beyond the one proposed by General Jones creating a stronger Chairman and Joint Staff. We must find a way to provide better balanced, sounder and more timely advice from senior service professionals in addition to strengthening the Chairman and the Joint Staff.

## The Experience of War

The historical context of the problem goes back much farther than 1947, to the Civil War when President Lincoln brought into being the "unified command" which eventually won the war. Since then reformers have tried every twenty or thirty years to institutionalize a better mechanism for planning and directing the military establishment. None fully succeeded. What is notable is that each wave of reform followed the trauma of war and each sought to prevent in the future the troubles—sometimes disasters—encountered in devising and executing national strategy. Thus, the turn of the century reforms were the product of the planning debacle of the Spanish-American War; the 1920 reforms reflected our World War I experience.

Today, war is too devastating, the cost of war-making machinery too expensive, the likely warning time too short for us to await another lesson. We must not delay until after World War III to create the command structure needed to fight it, nor can we defer any longer those reforms which if in existence today are likely to help prevent war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff dates back to the committee of heads of services we adopted in 1942, emulating the British. The bureaucratic latticework of the 20's and 30's erected a facade of cooperation over well-protected Service prerogatives, which quickly gave way under pressures of wartime reality. With all out war facing the President, he began to pay close attention to the committee of Chiefs. The continuous dialogue between the White House and the Chiefs resulted in sound military directives from on high so indispensable to victory. The key to this system was frequent access by the military to the decision-making bodies of government, both executive and legislative. That access was a matter of necessity, for the experience of war demonstrated anew the need for combined cross-service planning. There is little doubt that the Chiefs established their credibility as trusted military advisors in World War II.

It is important to remember, however, that the times and the circumstances of the 40's are not those of the 80's. The geographical separability and remoteness of the combat theaters, coupled with limited overlap in the technologies employed

by each Service, allowed the national leadership to parcel out theater responsibilities using traditional Service roles. Resource constraints such as we face today were of minimal consideration at the national level: American industry concentrated on war production; conscription provided manpower for 90 Army and 6 Marine divisions, an 8200 ship Navy (including 98 carriers) and 79,000 aircraft (roughly equivalent to 1097 tactical wings today). Defense was allotted more than one-third of the Gross National Product (GNP). Such abundance obviated the kind of interservice competition for scarce resources we know today, with the draft on stand-by, with defense allocations one-twentieth of the GNP and with many disincentives for industry's participation in defense.

## Post-War Challenges and Legislation

After World War II, the urgencies which had supported whole-hearted joint prosecution of the war at the top disappeared. What remained were underlying sources of wartime inter-theater, intra-theater and interservice disputes: Nimitz versus MacArthur, Navy versus Army, Pacific versus Europe. Additionally, our post-war alliances generated new requirements for different environments of threat and geography. New technological developments offered weapons systems whose capabilities blurred the accepted boundaries among Service roles and missions. Renewed interest in domestic programs greatly reduced defense resources. It was hardly an environment supportive of interservice harmony. President Eisenhower's message to Congress in 1958 pointed out the path to pursue:

> "... Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparation and organizational activity must conform to this fact."

## An Imperfect Law

The first effort toward a more integrated defense establishment was the creation of the Department of Defense in the National Security Act of 1947. That act also formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a council of advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense on military policy, organization, strategy and plans. At the same time, members of that council, the Service Chiefs, were told to retain their departmental responsibilities to organize, equip and train their forces. Foremost of these, for the Chief of Staff of the Army, is his direct responsibility "... to the Secretary of the Army for the efficiency of the Army, its preparedness for military operations, and plans...."

It should not therefore be surprising that the four Service Chiefs found it somewhat difficult to sit down three times a week and act as a corporate body against some of the very remedies they individually were seeking to apply within their respective Services. Nor were the oft made criticisms of their deliberations without a strong element of unfairness. Given budgets which provide for less than minimum defense needs, the Chiefs often found themselves unable to act responsibly in their Joint role except to the detriment of legitimate service requirements. This "dual-hatting," dictated by law, confers real power with the Service Chief hat and little ability to influence policy, programming and budget issues with the joint hat. It is the root cause of the ills which so many distinguished officers have addressed these past 35 years.

The Act of 1947 has been successively amended to grant increased authority to the Secretary of Defense and to build up the Joint Staff and the Chairman of the JCS. But while centralized civilian control over the process of determining defense resources materialized, structural changes for the JCS were minor, largely cosmetic. *The JCS, while charged with the responsibility to conceive, plan and organize a defense founded on a unified command structure, have never been provided the means to realize these plans. In particular, they continue to lack real linkages with the resource allocation process.*

The 1947 legislation, as amended in 1958, might have worked if the only threat to our national values was a Soviet invasion of Europe. The planning world, however, is far more complex: in conjunction with our allies we must be able to respond to legitimate national interests in many regions of the world. The central problem for a coherent defense program is funding the right balance of mutually supporting Service forces to

meet the full array of likely contingencies. As currently worked in the resource allocation process today, we do not make a true horizontal examination. Rather, we focus on single Services or on functions—vertical slices—which in aggregate yield less than what might otherwise be attainable. Solid linkages must be forged between likely contingencies and resources if we are to minimize risk in the future.

All of this accounts for a long thread of continuity in the critiques of Generals Bradley, Gavin, Taylor and Jones. They are not alone. Almost from its inception the JCS has been a magnet for critical studies. There have been at least nine such efforts during the past 12 years alone. As General Jones notes, each new Administration customarily revisits the national security apparatus and its decision-making process. Unfortunately, only evolutionary adjustments occurred in the wake of these efforts, and change targeted at fundamental shortcomings of the JCS has been absent.

On the other hand, the resource management process within DOD has been a favorite area for structural change as in the case of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), Zero Base Budgeting, and the current Defense Resources Board. Evidently the motivation has been stronger toward efficient management rather than the development of effective military planning. The latter could only result from much greater interplay between the joint military and civilian leadership. Simply put, the basic issue of aligning Service programming and expenditures to the requirements of unified command planning has been inadequately treated.

## Criteria for Change

The key to the effectiveness of the current JCS structure, or any other we might examine, lies in how well it serves the President, the Defense establishment and the Congress with timely and thoughtful advice on issues regarding:

- Policy: objectives, goals, restraints, insights
- Strategy: concepts, global interrelationships, direction, warnings
- Planning: force development, options, and range of realistic alternatives together with risks
- Assessments: key national security issues, arms control, security assistance, regional defense policies and the like
- Priorities: based on operational needs; discipline the PPBS; and
- Resources: money, men, materiel of war in a joint or unified context

Against these criteria, how is the current system judged? Criticism from civilians *within Defense* comes from many directions:

> "We badly need, and have not had, a coherent overall military view about such matters as strategy and forces. Partly as a result, a gaggle of kibitzers has formed throughout government on these questions. . . .The individual military services have clear stands on many of these issues, but an overall coherent military view has been conspicuous by its absence.
>
> . . . for years the only central voice in defense has been provided by the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense. Lacking military expertise it has, largely, failed.
>
> - JAMES WOOLSEY, 1982

> "There is certainly a lot of commentary available from people who have been involved. . . who say that the plans are not what they want them to be. . . .The Chiefs and the joint staff can rightfully respond that frequently they get no guidance at all in the preparation of plans, that the key decisions in formulating plans for various contingencies are often political decisions. . . "
>
> - JOHN KESTER, APRIL 1980

Criticism comes from civilians *outside Defense* as well. It takes this tone:

"In fact, during the last decade the Chiefs have gradually lost influence both in the Pentagon and in wider interagency debates. In part, their declining clout reflects the rise of the civilian defense intellectual . . . who entered the Pentagon as experts in the arcane world of nuclear weapons and arms control and challenged the traditional notion that 'wars should be left to the generals.' "

- RICHARD BURT, JUNE 1979

"If the Congress perceives shortcomings in the work of the chiefs, it is perhaps because their present organizational structure forces them to wear two hats simultaneously. .

What we in Congress desperately need from the Joint Chiefs are military judgments and recommendations. . . free from service bias. Then we can make informed judgments about cutting or adding to a budget."

-SENATOR JOHN CULVER, 1978

The thrust of these statements is clear: when advice on Joint military issues is required, sources other than JCS are increasingly sought. What verdict is rendered about the credibility of the system when it becomes desirable to create a new cell embedded within the National Defense University to provide alternative military strategies?

## What Kind of Fix Is Needed?

It is surprising that the system works at all in light of its serious organizational, conceptual and functional flaws. When it does work, it is principally due to the exceptional officers assigned to the Joint Staff who labor mightily to make the creaking machinery turn. It is their diligence and dedication which get us through operational crises and find paths through planning and staffing obstacles.

It is possible, of course, to jury-rig an unofficial arrangement to answer at least some criticisms of the current organization. But we are in a time when that solution is increasingly unattractive. Today, the Services are working to implant at their operational and tactical levels a military command structure capable of reacting faster than any opponent. The rapid pace of global change and the need for competent advice on short notice argue instead for a comparable capability at the strategic level. Though the pace of decision in peacetime may not routinely demand this, most contingencies we face in the future will require us to go to war with whatever peacetime military structure is in place. *Adhocracy* is not the answer.

What, then, are the options?

## The Jones Proposal

General Jones' proposal is intended to make the joint system more responsive and effective than it is now. As a first priority he urges development of a stronger Chairman, an essential ingredient of any reform. The JCS would still be composed of the Chiefs of Service, but the joint role of the latter in operational planning and risk assessment of the individual Service programs and budgets would decrease appreciably and would remain to be defined. As a consequence, their role in the policy aspects of joint military planning would be changed. The Chairman's role would be stronger in the development of contingency plans, in directing the unified and specified commanders in conducting military operations, and in providing an independent assessment of the operational risks associated with consolidated Service programs.

Additionally, the Jones proposal would establish a new position of *Vice Chairman* to provide continuity in directing the joint process in the absence of the Chairman. The creation of this position could result in more effective coordination between the JCS and the National Security Council, the President, and the unified and specified commands on a routine basis because one of the same two men would be at all the key meetings. However, the addition of this Vice Chairman would degrade the position of the Service Chiefs and change their roles in still undetermined ways.

Accompanying these policy and structural changes would be an important procedural change. The Joint Staff would work for the Chair-

man, not the JCS corporately. The extent of Service staff participation in the development of joint positions and papers would be limited to providing factual inputs and advice on fewer issues selected by the Chairman. The Joint Chiefs would meet to consider proposals from an improved Joint Staff.

Unchanged, or as yet unclarified in the Jones' proposal, are the relationships between the various agencies within and without the Defense Department most affected by changes in military structure. Will some functions of OSD be subsumed by an invigorated Joint Staff? Will an enhanced voice for the Chairman affect the ability of the Services to make Service views known to the Secretary of Defense and Congress? These and other relationships need to be laid out clearly before the full impact of the Chairman's proposal can be understood.

## Is There A Better Way To Go?

General Jones' proposal clearly moves us beyond the current system and well along the path of reform. Yet, even with adoption—a process which will require some legislative action—an opportunity for further building exists. Three major problems still need to be solved. *First* is the divided loyalty we currently demand of the Service Chiefs. "Dual Hatting," however refined, will continue to impair the ability of these top military authorities to provide sound, usable and timely military advice to our civilian leadership. *Second,* while the Chairman's proposal clearly promises to improve the Joint Staff's performance in peacetime, there may be a better way to provide a structure which can transition rapidly to war.

-It is likely the process of Joint strategic direction in wartime will totally consume the Chiefs' time. Simultaneously, immense issues of internal Service prioritization and direction will erupt, making equally large demands. Some will say that two relatively major wars have been fought satisfactorily with the current system. But today we face the most formidable force ever assembled in the history of the world, an opponent with the means to seize the initiative globally, in unanticipated ways, using an arsenal of great variety. Additionally, we must be prepared to respond to lesser yet equally critical contingencies which if not quickly contained could provide the flash point for World War III. The pace of future war is key, and having the right structure in place to keep up with that pace is vital.

-The other aspect of transitioning to war involves the creation of solid relationships in peace which do not have to be abruptly (perhaps chaotically) rewickered in crisis. I believe that the driving factor in war is the ability to sustain effective theater operations which are fully responsive to the grand design of national political objectives. Similarly, the driving element in wartime resource distribution is the operationally derived requirements of the theater commanders. However, we operate in a peacetime mode which accords highest priority to cost effectiveness: the best defense at or under cost. This is a worthy objective. But we should arrive at it by a process which at the outset subordinates cost with acceptable risk to the intended capability of the Commanders-in-Chief. Resource allocation must be tied to operational planning directly, not *ex post facto.* This requires not only a strengthening of the Joint Staff, but redirection as well.

*Third,* we need to increase the role of the CINC's even more than General Jones has proposed in order to involve them more fully in the defense decision-making process.

These fundamental problems of the Joint system lead me to believe that we have a situation in which major surgery may be necessary.

## A Council

One clear option is the creation of a body of full-time military advisors to the President and Secretary of Defense, thus ending the dual hatting which has proved so troublesome.

The new body would consist of distinguished four star rank officers, not charged with any Service responsibilities, who would never return to their respective Services. Each member would possess a varied background with extensive joint Service experience. Additionally, individual members would be sought who had particular expertise in areas of special importance to the Joint arena; e.g., strategic nuclear policy, unconventional as well as conventional warfare, command, control and communication. One of the council members could be appointed Vice Chairman for continuity purposes.

Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense, this body of military advisors would ex-

amine military alternatives and recommend strategic scenarios to govern how the military departments are to organize, equip and prepare their forces for war. The group might be called the National Military Advisory Council (NMAC), as Senator Symington suggested in 1960.

## The Chairman

The Chairman's position would remain in the new Council but with a greatly enhanced role and increased influence. He would no longer be the first among equals, dependent upon consensus to shape his advice. Instead he would direct planning and operations and be able to speak his own mind as well as disagree with the opinion of the Council. Thus, more than one view and well conceived strategic alternatives would emerge. The real or perceived obsession with unanimity, with an accompanying tendency for a lowest common denominator solution would end.

The Chairman alone would direct the Joint Staff. He would determine the issues for study and initiate staff actions through the Director of the Joint Staff. Throughout, he would remain sensitive to the concerns of the Council. To fulfill the enhanced responsibilities of the Chairman and the Council, the Staff would be strengthened. One particular area of emphasis would be the development of an effective programming and budgeting capability. Other technical and administrative support would be increased to permit the Joint Staff to support the proposed role of the Chairman and the Council.

The Council's method of operation would be somewhat akin to that of a judicial body, its members sitting as an experienced body of military professionals to decide matters of Joint military importance. The authenticity and credibility of their judgments would be based not only on decades of first hand experience, but also by the continuous opportunity to review requirements of the unified commands and their reported readiness. The Councilors would be able to arrive at recommendations in a reflective atmosphere, focused on how best to flesh out the means to achieve the national objectives. Opinions would be freely given by all members and presented as majority and minority views. The recommendations would be timely and objective; as the developers of the prime military input to the President and the Secretary of Defense, their views would be hard to dismiss.

Experience clearly shows that the more *trusted* and professional the advice, the more *willing* civilian authorities are to seek it. Simply eliminating the dual hats raises the expectation of heightened objectivity in the proferred advice of this body. Over time, its credibility verified, the Council could assume an increasingly influential role in formulating defense policy. Additionally, and of equal importance, the direct formal link between the Secretary of Defense and the Council would serve to encourage a greater degree of civil-military interaction and dialogue which in turn could strengthen the bond between the Secretary and his military advisors. The dangers of today's world and the new dimensions to the national security problem clearly require full-time joint military advisors. Greater interaction and dialogue would provide the civilian leadership with a deeper understanding of the complexities involved in military planning and operations. Clearly, a better civilian perspective would be invaluable in unexpected crises which demand sound and rapid policy decisions.

## Advantages of Full-Scale Reform

The Council would remove the conflicting "dual hat" roles of the Service Chiefs. In peacetime the clear division between military authorities responsible for providing advice on Service and joint matters should result in a major improvement in the timeliness and value of military advice. In wartime, the division of responsibilities between the Council and the Chiefs should permit both bodies to better engage the greatly increased decision making demanded during a crisis.

Removal of direct Service involvement in the relationship of the Chairman and the Council to the Commanders-in-Chief would free the latter to become more visible participants in the development of defense policy and joint programs. The Commanders-in-Chief would give the Council their views on the development of feasible and affordable military courses of action for the near-term, as well as the near-term fixes which would improve their force capabilities. Coupled with an improved Joint Staff, the Commanders-in-Chief input would influence the "front end" formulation of military strategy instead of the Commanders-in-Chief remaining in a reactive mode to established policy in the Defense Guidance.

## Relationships

The manner in which these improvements would operate is summarized by viewing how relationships and lines of authority would shift in the several proposals. In the Defense decision-making hierarchy, the Council, led by the Chairman, would be directly responsible for translating top-down policy guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the President into strategic and cross-service programming direction to the Services. The Council might best fulfill its responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense by analyzing strategic alternatives for cost and risk implications. As part of its role, the Council would suggest allocations among the Services as well as a distribution of major combat forces designed to meet strategic objectives.

Unlike some similar proposals of past years, the Services would be closely involved with the Council in the development of strategic alternatives, and would help a strengthened Joint Staff provide the individual land, sea and air perspectives necessary for effective Joint planning and analysis. Periodically throughout the analytic process, the Services, represented by the Service Secretaries and Chiefs, would meet as a collective "board of directors" to comment on, or to disagree with the Council's position on key issues.

Armed with the Council's recommended strategies and programs, together with any dissenting views from the Services, the Secretary of Defense and the President would be equipped to make fundamental decisions on the specific course of defense planning and programming.

The close Service affiliation with the Council might at first glance appear to focus the Council too narrowly on tactical and administrative detail and not enough on what the President needs. However, past experience has shown that continuous Service involvement is essential in the development of grand strategy to ensure that the product reflects the latest, most imaginative and dynamic aspects of individual Service doctrine and technological development, as well as a clear appreciation of what is feasible.

For this process to be successful, the Service Chiefs would undertake to sponsor visits by the Council to the commands, to update the members on doctrinal developments, new weapons systems and readiness of the forces. Indeed, it ought to be easier for a four star to learn about the joint system and study in depth developments taking place in other Services once he is freed from the daily pressures of a high level service assignment.

Once approved by the Secretary of Defense, the strategic recommendations of the Council would become directive in nature and would shape the general outline of each Service program. Consequently, the Services would have less of a voice than at present in resolving cross-cutting resource issues and determining the composition of their major forces. However, by narrowing the focus to internal Service concerns, the Chiefs and the Service Secretaries would be given more freedom to concentrate on long range Service planning and the discrete service aspects of doctrinal, tactical and technological innovation.

The streamlined relationship between the Commanders-in-Chief, the Council and the Secretary of Defense would have a beneficial effect on how we plan for war. The new relationship between the Secretary and his military advisors would lead to more clearly defined "top-down" guidance from civilian leaders. The Council, now fully committed to joint matters and familiar with requirements from the Commanders-in-Chief, would then translate that policy into strategic guidance for the field commanders. Last, the Commanders-in-Chief, in turn, would send more useful feedback from the field to civilian policymakers, thus completing the repetitive dialogue so essential for solid contingency planning. The Council would also decentralize the planning process by focusing primarily on the larger issues of global integration of strategies and regional planning guidance. As a result, the Commanders-in-Chief would be freed to determine details of force composition, force employment, deployment, and support.

The Council would also better assist Congress in discharging its important role. At present, Congressional committees debate at length the specifics of Service programs without full insight into how these programs fit into an overall strategic context. Because of its cross-Service perspective, the Council would be able to provide Congress with a much-needed horizontal ap-

praisal of individual Service programs divorced from Service advocacy of weapons systems. The Council view would present the administration's programs to Congress. The format would be cast in terms of the capabilities provided by the combined budgets of the Services to the operating forces in relation to the near- and long-term threat. Congress would thus have an opportunity to probe for the genuine goals of military policy and would be better able to isolate less essential and redundant programs. The position of the Council in relation to the Services would give them a central role in the congressional budget review.

## The Arguments Against

No solution which seeks fundamental reform is without potential drawbacks. At first glance it might appear that the influence of the Service Chiefs might be severely diminished by the loss of their JCS responsibilities. It is true that the role of the Chiefs would change. My belief is that the additional time available to the heads of Services by being relieved of time-consuming JCS duties would permit them to concentrate on the more meaningful aspects of Service roles in Joint and combined operations. Relinquishing routine JCS duties would be a small price to pay to achieve this end. The Council would also relieve the Chiefs of the need to continually justify and defend to Congress the size of Service budgets and the composition of major Service forces to meet the national strategy. These issues would be developed and explained to Congress and the President by the Council.

A particularly emotional issue might be the creation of four new general officers. Why add another layer of military bureaucracy when other government agencies are being pared to the bone? It is important to observe that the Council would not be another staff layer but would, in fact, consist of four-stars who, because of their backgrounds and seniority, would otherwise continue to be influential in national security affairs regardless of their official position. Since they would in effect be merely extended on active duty before final retirement, the members would not disturb internal Service command arrangements. Moreover, the efficiency with which the advisors could provide advice and make decisions would greatly diminish the need for the redundant joint and service staff work now necessary with the Service Chief wearing two hats. While the Joint Staff would grow moderately, the total number of officers now engaged directly or indirectly in joint work either on the Joint Staff or in the Service would decrease.

Another criticism might be that such senior officers would be unable to rise above their Service biases. I believe this to be unwarranted since the officers would have had past joint experience and therefore access to other Service experiences. Moreover, the officers would be representing Joint interests and would not be returning to their Services upon completion of their appointment to the council.

Reform as sweeping as this would require legislative change to the National Security Act of 1947. New relationships as outlined above would have to be fully defined, understood and accepted by Congress—a process complicated by a historical reluctance to accept any change which might suggest creation of a "General Staff" from which a military elite might emerge. This has been a recurring theme in opposition to reform of our highest military body since first suggested during World War II. It is important to emphasize that all reforms suggested since the war have clearly accepted military subordination to civilian authority. Contrary to popular belief, the German General Staff was an *Army* Staff; not a *Joint* Staff. In fact, it was the Germany's lack of an effective Joint Staff apparatus and a corresponding failure in both world wars to establish a unified control over three separate services that contributed significantly to final defeat. One of the most telling indictments of this lack of coordination was made by General Zimmerman of the German Army:

> "It is a matter of irony that Eisenhower, the servant of the great democracies, was given full powers of command over an armed force consisting of all three services. With us, living under a dictatorship where unity of command might have been taken for granted, each of the services fought its own battle.
>
> Neither Rundstedt nor Rommel, try though they might, succeeded in changing this state of affairs in creating a unified command. The result was that the German Army fought singlehanded against all the armed forces of the Allies."

## Conclusion

Since the end of World War II the correlation of forces has shifted dramatically. The shift demands that our national security policy be buttressed by better and faster planning mechanisms. It also demands that the roles of the civilian and military leaders charged with this vital responsibility be clearly defined so that we provide our citizens the defense posture necessary to ensure their freedoms.

The prerequisites for organizational changes include:

First & Foremost - To ensure for civilian leaders the best and most usable military advice possible. Above all this advice must be relevant and timely.

Second - To ensure that the organization will work in wartime; and, where possible, that it focuses in peacetime on the same issues with which it will be seized in wartime.

Third - To ensure that the Commanders-in-Chief are given sufficient guidance and resources to do meaningful planning, are permitted to do such planning and remain intimately involved in near-term issues relating to the capabilities and readiness of their forces.

If these three prerequisites are used as the basis for evaluating organizational changes we should be able to come up with an organization which:

- Provides clear, concise and timely military advice.
- Permits the Chairman to shape internal discussions.
- Gives Commanders-in-Chief the ability to influence in peacetime what they are expected to implement in wartime.
- Focuses the Service Secretaries and Chiefs on the current readiness and the future of their Services.
- Directs the OSD staff toward implementation of the Defense Department's critical functions in peace and war.
- Provides to the President, the Congress, and the American people a clear indication of how much more secure they are as a result of the dollars spent on defense.

Reform of the mechanism which provides military advice and counsel to our civilian leadership is long overdue. Tinkering with the mechanism will not suffice. Only by addressing the issues which have been considered to be too tough to cope with in the past do we have a chance of instituting the reforms necessary to develop the smooth running machinery required to see our nation through to the 21st Century with our freedoms and national values intact.



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# Article in the
# DEFENSE 82 MAGAZINE, APRIL EDITION
# "Today's Army and its Progress"

1 April 1982

## Todays Army and Its Progress

The United States Army is a professional and formidable force. It is *large*, encompassing a community of more than 3.3 million Soldiers, civilians, and family members. It is *complex*, involving thousands of separate units and organizations operating from over 200 military installations in the United States, and an equal number overseas. It is *expensive*, costing each citizen about $200 per year. And, lastly, it is *deeply involved* in the central issues of national security.

Never before has the peacetime Army had so many varied and far-ranging tasks—tasks which portend our vital contributions to the nation's well-being. Forty-three percent of the Active Army strength is already deployed overseas. including 52 percent of its active combat formations. The dispatch of 4,000 paratroopers and mechanized infantrymen to middle eastern nations as part of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force exercise "Bright Star" reflects one aspect of the continuing call to new responsibilities. The deployment of 1,200 Soldiers to the Sinai this month (April 1982), as part of the Multi-national Force and Observers (MFO) called for by the Camp David accords, reflects another. Short term assignments of Army Mobile Training Teams to friendly nations in Latin America, Asia and Africa are indicative of other growing obligations, all additive to commitments long recognized and planned for, such as NATO or Korea.

The pace of change prevalent today threatens to outstrip a nation's capacity to cope, unless the tools to deal effectively with change—be they economic, political, or military in nature—are refurbished and maintained at the ready In its quest for global accord, the United States must maintain effective national means to meet challenges which arise naturally from change, or risk inexorable passage to unnecessary and undesirable confrontations, crises, and even conflict.

Of special concern is the catalytic effect of the Soviet Union, which presides over an ideological empire continentally laagered astride the world's largest land mass. That nation has shown itself willing and increasingly able to exploit global weaknesses in an extended program of ideological aggrandizement. Afghanistan today feels the heel of a belligerent Soviet Union, and surrogate nations in both hemispheres mimic its performance. In concert, these nations welcome an environment of rapid change—so long as it occurs beyond their borders.

The challenge to America today is to develop the capability and to exhibit the will to respond to acts which threaten its interests and those of its allies—hopefully in non-military fashion, but ultimately in kind, if need be.

In tradition and practice, the Soviet Union relies on the Red Army as the linchpin of its power. Directly or through clients and surrogates, it threatens U. S. and allied interests in many diverse geographic settings. It has a demonstrated capability to effect violence ranging from terrorism to nuclear war. Its continental force of over 180 active divisions, supplemented by 53 non-Soviet Warsaw Pact divisions, and backed by a full range of air and sea formations, is its final arbitor. This massive force, in being today, is best deterred from adventurism on land by the existence of efficient ground and air forces whose capabilities can preclude the necessity of early resort to escalatory nuclear action. In an era of strategic parity, the philosophy of a trip-wire land force is invalid. Consequently, effective conventional options are not only prudent, they are absolutely essential. Likely contingencies demand conventional forces capable of defeating aggression, not inviting escalation.

Land forces provide the nation a means to demonstrate unmistakably our commitment in peacetime as well as a reservoir of meaningful options to respond in kind in time of crisis—options not attainable by other means.

An Army that is not bred to fight is not an Army. Hence, the first order of business for the United States Army is to prepare itself for war, in hopes that its evident capabilities will dissuade others of the utility of war, but in confidence that if war comes, victory is attainable.

There are, of course, many ways to examine an organization as complex as the United States Army, whose component functions run a gamut from bayonet training at Fort Benning to baby-sitting by Army Community Services at Fort Myer; from complex war games at Fort Leavenworth to airfield construction in the Sinai. With warfighting the key, I've chosen to cover only four aspects of the Army posture for FY 83:

-The size and structure of our combat elements

-Our efforts to support and sustain them in battle

-Our weapons

-And finally, some observations on our Soldiers, their integration into units, and their training.

**Forces.** The cutting edge of U.S. land power takes shape in the twenty-four divisions of the Total Army and the three divisions of the United States Marine Corps. Four of the active Army divisions have National Guard brigades integral to them, an organizational concept which yields great economy without eroding total capability. In addition, there are 27 separate Active, National Guard and United States Army Reserve brigades, seven Special Forces Groups (more than half of which are Reserve) and two Ranger battalions. These forces provide effective means for national response across the full spectrum of potential military threat.

Accompanying the growth in our missions was recognition that as the tasks grew, so too must the size of the force if, in fact, no degradation to existing capability was intended. Hence, expansion of the force structure was an early goal of the Army this budget year. But even with the anticipated growth in defense allocations, fundamental choices were necessary. It makes little sense, for example, to expand the size of the force further if fundamental deficiencies remained in the basic structure. Consequently, the Army decided to give priority in the near term to the objectives of readiness, sustainability and equipping of the existing force. The pooling of maximum resources toward these efforts required a number of difficult short-term decisions. One of these was not to increase the size of our Army in the near term but rather to increase our Active strength in later years, adding new Active units which, coupled with the creation of two Reserve divisions in the program years, will yield a more prudent force for the times.

We will also begin in the FY 83 time frame to transform our current tactical organizations to make better use of the capabilities of new weapon systems which begin to enter the force in quantity. Reorganizations long under consideration will occur within our armor and mechanized infantry battalions in anticipation of the arrival of the Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle. Ten tank, cavalry, and mechanized infantry battalions will receive these modern weapons in 1983.

Meanwhile, the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis will continue its test activities in developing new operational concepts for light divisions so that in the future we can move our light divisions more rapidly than is now possible, and expect them to stand credibly against a sophisticated heavy threat in many geographical settings. Light divisions already have intrinsic value in many locales, so that even were we unable to convert them into more fungible assets, they would retain value for the forseeable future. The experimentation on-going at Fort Lewis is an especially valuable initiative to help compensate for our inability to simultaneously mechanize a sufficiently large portion of the force and provide for its global transportability in a timely and effective manner. As full funding of strategic mobility requirements—wide-bodied aircraft and fast sealift—is an enormous expense only partially met in the FY 83 Defense budget, the Army sees no alternative but to seek greater flexibility in the utility of its forces through such efforts as the High Technology Division. This effort is progressing well.

**Support.** While fighting units are the cutting edge of a modern land force, even the best units rapidly become ineffective without adequate support. In this regard, we had hoped to achieve a better balance of Active Component combat support and combat service support for our deployed forces and for those earmarked for high risk contingency operations. This objective is also delayed until we can again afford to move to higher Active manpower strengths.

Nonetheless, many specific actions are included in the budget for FY 83 which will measurably enhance our ability to support the combat elements, such as:

- The confirmation of host support agreements with our allies,

- The procurement of petroleum and water distribution systems for the rapid deployment forces,

- The initial construction of facilities in the Middle East, and,

- The addition of another 3,000 civilian employees in FY 83, most of whom will release unit Soldiers to mission related tasks, but some of whom will enter the logistics base to upgrade its operational posture.

This budget also reflects a more realistic assessment of the duration of potential conventional conflicts. No longer do we presume the inevitability of a short war, thereby foreclosing the conventional option once paltry stockage levels are consumed. More realistic ammunition, spare part, and major end item inventories are a major element of the FY 83 budget. These expenditures in support areas will play a major role in increasing both the readiness and sustainability of the force. They are essential complements to well-equipped and fully-manned combat elements.

The latter issues—manning and equipping the force—have commanded considerable public attention, and each deserves some extended discussion.

**Equipment.** I have described, and will continue to describe equipping the force as the most difficult challenge facing the Army in this decade. It has two distinct aspects. First, there is the need to place adequate quantities of combat materiel in the hands of our Soldiers. Second, there is the need for this materiel to be qualitatively responsive to the threat.

Numbers-wise, our existing weapons inventories do not compare favorably with those available to Soviet authorities. This is a long-standing fact, one we have accommodated on the assumption of superiority in predicted performance—through better imbedded technology and the expectation of higher team performance levels from Soldiers accustomed to innovation. But before the validity of our assumption can be tested, it would be well if weapons inventories were "more" equal—not to the levels possessed by the Soviets, but certainly to the levels called for in our authorization documents—to meet the needs of our existing, albeit constrained force. These deficiencies are made manifest in current projections that at the end of FY 82, we will still be short 24 percent of our tank requirement, 38 percent of our armored personnel carrier/infantry fighting vehicle requirement, and 40 percent of our attack helicopter needs. Drawdowns to meet pre-positioned equipment stockage overseas, and diversions to meet foreign military assistance commitments have each played a role in creating this situation. But these causes are overshadowed by the plain and simple fact that for years we neglected the necessary investments in conventional land weapons. During Vietnam our procurement funds were consumed by the war effort. In the 70's, one or another new development, advisory study, or efficiency excursion provided convenient excuse to delay major procurements. Today, with minor exception, our major land systems are ready to come on line—modern, lethal, and capable of once again returning the technological edge to the American Soldier on the battlefield. . . as a result of the FY 83 budget. Production is on the upswing in most categories.

Some of these weapons are entirely new to our inventory, not merely quantum improvements to existing generic types. The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the Multiple Launch Rocket System—weapons types incorporated long ago in many European and Soviet Bloc armies—make their overdue American debuts. Other weapons, like the Abrams and the Apache, offer dramatic new capabilities which will be integrated into our force in a hi-low mix with other more aged, less capable, but still useful equipment.

Other developments are being aggressively pursued in antitank artillery technology, and in counter-mobility (mine), electronic and chemical warfare means. The latter is especially significant. We must not only possess an appropriate defense against the possible use of chemical weapons on the battlefield, but a credible chemical deterrent as well in the form of a retaliatory stockpile. The Soviets currently possess immense chemical warfare capabilities, a crucial advantage in combat, even when properly defended against. The Soviets must be persuaded never to use these weapons against us. . . .

**Personnel.** Of course, none of these systems can be effective without dedicated Soldiers and civilians, well trained to operate, maintain and fight the materiel in concert on the battlefield.

The fiscal year which ended on 30 September 1981 was a good recruiting year for the Total Army. The Active Army exceeded its enlisted recruiting goals, both quantitatively and qualitatively, as did the Reserve Components against established peacetime strength objectives. The task in FY 83 is even more stringent, especially when considering that the pool of well-qualified eligibles is in decline. Success in future years calls for maintenance of a recruiting package appropriate to the aspirations of young America. Educational incentives are a key ingredient which must be retained and enhanced. The Ultra Veterans Educational Assistance Program (Ultra VEAP) is expected to fill this important role. In the Army's view, however, the monthly contribution by the service member to realize maximum benefit is a disincentive which we would like to see eliminated and replaced by a GI Bill.

An examination of peacetime recruiting and retention looks at the personnel picture in a rather narrow perspective, however. A macro-view of the Total Army's strength measured against wartime requirements is less reassuring. The Active Army is managed in peacetime at a constrained personnel strength, somewhat below the wartime requirement. This is tolerable and desirable given adequate and timely individual replacements as a national emergency develops. The progress of the Reserve Components—the Army National Guard and the U. S. Army Reserve—are deemed successful today by virtue of their having met recruiting and retention goals in FY 81, as they climb more closely to wartime strength over the next five years. Here the shortfall is more substantial, and progress much slower.

A continued deficiency in the pool of trained individual Soldiers, a pool sized to bring peacetime units to their full wartime complement and to replace casualties in the initial stages of a conflict, remains a major concern. This pool, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), is short several hundred thousand at the current time. In mobilization, this condition could lead to a situation which could only be accommodated by the dismantling of units to meet the most urgent needs as they arise. This entails many risks, not all of which are predictable.

The risk associated with these manpower shortages under conditions of mobilization is key to our wartime planning efforts. With the tools at hand we are endeavoring to eliminate the shortages as rapidly as possible. The implementation of peacetime registration helps greatly to give some boundary to the duration of residual risk at any point in the future by providing us greater confidence of the time when mobilization assets from the nation as a whole would come into play. Our priority at the current time is to bring the units of the selected Reserve to their required strength as rapidly as possible.

Throughout the Army, the first priority for commanders in the years ahead will be to weld trained personnel and equipment into disciplined, skilled and ready units. The gradual introduction of a new Army manning system . . . will be of some help to unit commanders by reducing turbulence and creating an environment wherein unit skills do not have to be continually relearned. Other actions designed to assist commanders in their task include continued effort to improve the initial qualification of Soldiers in the training base, the acquisition of additional training areas, and the infusion of improved training devices like the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES).

The tasks associated with modernization impose an awesome challenge to commanders; adapting to new weapons, developing new tactics to incorporate the high-low mix of weaponry to best advantage, and adjusting to the new and evolving requirements of multiple scenarios. VIP's arriving at Army installations today who, in the past, by custom, prescribed their itineraries, are

apt to find that the officers who have the lead role in shaping the quality of our companies, batteries and troops have scheduled their units for other activities. Commanders at battalion and brigade level know personally from me that there are very few occasions when I would expect them to revise well thought out training programs to accommodate short-notice, non-operational requirements levied on them from any echelon. If we expect our officers and noncommissioned officers to perform well in conflict, we owe them no less, so that they may prepare their units well.

"It is not the big armies that win battles; it is the good ones."

- Maurice de Saxe
Marshal of France

## Address to the
## GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL ROTC AWARDS CONFERENCE

Virginia Military Institute
Lexington, Virginia
15 April 1982

From everything I've heard, from the people who have participated in the conference so far this week, I understand that we have in the Marshall awardees a very well read group, who understand the intricacies of the various aspects of our national defense and they are capable of viewing the big picture as well as understanding how the Army fits into it. From my own personal experience, some ROTC cadets are too well read and too attentive to pictures. I received a letter from an ROTC cadet around the first of the year, and it reads like this: "While reading the 25 January issue of Army Times, several of the cadets at Bowling Green State University noticed that you were without a name tag on your sweater. You are out of uniform, sir. Enclosed, then, please find an official Bowling Green State University ROTC name tag, and we trust that from now on you will be in uniform." Well, I want to tell everybody tonight that I was going to get in uniform. I hope that you'll let me wear this tonight—it is from Cadet Stephan and the rest of the ROTC cadets at Bowling Green, and I will let this be my official ROTC name tag. I assure you that I will wear it, maybe not in the Pentagon because they might look a little oddly at me there. . . .

# Hearing before the HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE Subcommittee on Investigations JCS Reorganization

21 April 1982

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .in an April edition of the Armed Forces Journal I laid out my views on two things. One is the need for reorganization of the JCS and secondly, my proposal as to how we should reorganize. . . .I would [note] . . . that I have had a bit of Joint experience . . . on the Joint Staff, . . . on the Joint Staff of SHAPE Headquarters and . . . prior to the past three years as Chief of Staff, having been the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations where I was an operational member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mechanism. I don't feel I need take second seat to anyone as far as credentials are concerned. . . .

I have listed in my statement what I consider to be the three criteria against which all of the proposals that you listen to ought to be evaluated.

First . . . how are we going to ensure that we provide to the civilian leaders here in Congress, the President and the Secretary of Defense the best and most usable military advice possible. . . .

Second, [how do] we . . . organize in peacetime . . . a defense mechanism that will operate in wartime. . . .

Finally, . . . [how do we get] the Commanders-in-Chief of the forces out in the field . . . better guidance [and] resources, so that they can do meaningful planning, . . . [for] the execution of those plans. . . .

I think that as you go through your deliberations, you [should] use those three criteria as a basis for evaluating . . . change[s] but I believe that . . . the relationships between Congress, the President and the Defense Department and the military need to be defined and understood and accepted and I believe it is long overdue. . . .tinkering will not suffice. Only by taking on . . . the issues which in the past have been put in the box which says, "Too tough to handle," are we going to be able to have the kind of operational advice . . . that the next two decades out to the 21st Century are going to demand.

. . . I feel so strongly about it . . . [because] I consider the way in which we develop our forces and the way in which we provide the advice . . . to be a very elemental issue.

MR. WHITE: . . . Do you find presently there is a certain advocacy on the part of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, . . . a certain parochial interest in the organization from whence they come?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes. . . .We have very real needs within each of our services. For us then to go as individuals into a composite group in the JCS and put aside those concerns and somehow look at the broader issues, is, in my judgment, more than you can expect. . . .

MR. BRINKLEY: . . . I think that the goal that you enunciate very well is to separate one's responsibilities when serving on that Council from the responsibilities that the individual had had earlier, whether Air Force, Navy, the Army, et cetera. I think that is a fine goal, but I wonder if the result might be more cosmetic than you would wish.

For example, after having served in the Army for 30 years, would it be really possible to become even-handed among all the services without having a khaki heart, so to speak?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . I don't think you will ever get away from someone having service ties. Those are things I would hope we would never do away with. We ought to be proud of those aspects. I believe the kind of person you would select for this job would be the type of person who has already served in a Unified Command. If you are talking about Army Generals, today, who would be qualified for this job, you would include people like General Wickham, who has commanded the United Nations Command in Korea; or General Starry, who commands the Readiness Command; or General Rogers who commands U.S. the Euro-

pean Command. These men have had to deal with Unified Command problems and joint problems so they understand those kinds of issues. An ex-Chief of Staff could also go into this Advisory Council.

I think the problem of service bias is present, but I honestly believe that my proposed system would provide the kind of advice necessary. . . .There are several examples where . . . people have come to look at the way the Joint Chiefs of Staff operate. In each case, we brought in retired Army, Navy, Marine Corps, four-star Generals, who have had some experience with the Joint Staff. In every case, they have provided what I consider to be non-parochial and unbiased views. So I think from these experiences where we tried to do something, in an *ad hoc* way, rather than in an organizational way, the people have risen to that challenge. I don't believe that would be a problem, sir. . . .

MR. WHITE: You made a statement you feel that there should be less civilian control in certain aspects at lower echelons. Would you please explain your background on that.

GENERAL MEYER: Surely. The issue is military advice. I just believe, as a result of the way the system works today, that the military is not able to provide timely, responsive military advice. If the system were redefined the way it was in World War II, I believe that when the Secretary of Defense or the President—I am not talking about the present Secretary of Defense or this President—needed military advice, they would prefer to go to an experienced council instead of to some civilian strategist who hasn't spent his whole lifetime studying and working in the field with military capabilities.

MR. WHITE: What about in the area of development of weapons system, research and development? Would this be affected at all by your restructuring or would you still maintain a similar structure to what we have at the present time?

GENERAL MEYER: The broad rationale behind the various weapons systems would be developed by the Chairman and the National Military Advisory Council. . . .[A] dialogue would take place between the Service Chief and the Secretary of Defense and the Council to focus on implementation.

You would find Service Chiefs, Service Secretaries and representatives of the Defense Department focusing more on implementation—how the resources are used, how they are ensuring that people are better trained—instead of the two jobs that they are now asked to do which I don't believe they do well.

MR. WHITE: One last question. You said there should be an increased role for Commanders-in-Chief. . . .Would you give us some kind of an evolvement of that thought?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir.

Today in the development of the Army program—and when I design the Army program and form my views of what the Army should look at—I get advice and counsel from the Army Commander in Europe and others.

I believe that the Commander-in-Chief in Europe ought to be looking at the Joint interface. Let's just take air defense. It is a good subject because it cuts across both the Army and the Air Force. Command and control also cut across the Army and Air Force.

. . . .I am saying that . . . we don't have a mechanism for being able to explain clearly across the board what we are trying to do, and I think [that if] the Congress understood that . . . [through] this National Military Advisory Council, they would be more willing to put longer term direction to the things we do.

We need that kind of dialogue up front.

MR. NELLIGAN: Would you say that you are spending more time on PPBE, planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation than you are on readiness and how we are going to win wars and plan, et cetera.

GENERAL MEYER: I would say I am spending at least as much, if not more time on PPBE because my job as the Chief of Service is to ensure that I am able to get the resources to ensure that we have the kind of trained manpower that we need. The way I get resources is in programming and budgeting, and in coming over here to try to convince you that I need them. That is where I have to spend my time to get the resources for my Service. . . .

MR. NELLIGAN: Mr. Chairman, I don't know quite how to respond to that. I think it's devastating that a military leader has to be an accountant before he can be a military leader. He has to be a financier before he can be a military leader. Then I don't know quite what the solution is.

I want to compliment the Chairman of this subcommittee for holding these investigations and perhaps that is the area we must zero in on, to make changes so you fellows can do what you have to do. . . .

MR. MITCHELL: Have we made changes as a result of . . . [earlier] . . . studies or have we just studied the problem?

GENERAL MEYER: Generally, we have studied. Where we have changed [it] has always been in the way in which we went about programming and budgeting and not in the basic issue of how we go about providing military advice to the civilian leadership. . . .

MR. MITCHELL: What has been our reluctance to change?

GENERAL MEYER: I think one reluctance to change—which exists in everyone—is satisfaction with the status quo—a view that this system got us through the Korean War; it got us through the Vietnam War, and each of us has to draw our own conclusions on that since this was not the system in effect in World War II. And then again an unwillingness of people within, until General Jones spoke out, to state that there was an internal problem. . . .

## INSERT FOR THE RECORD · JCS REORGANIZATION

QUESTION: You state that a reorganized system should focus "the Service Secretaries and Chiefs on the current readiness and the future of their services." Does this mean they are not spending enough time on these areas now? Are the Services too heavily involved in joint warfare matters?

GENERAL MEYER: As the Army Chief, I cannot spend enough time on service matters because my attention must—by law—be divided between Army affairs and Joint matters. Both responsibilities are important, but requiring Service Chiefs to fulfill both means that neither receives the attention it deserves.

If I were relieved of my responsibilities in the Joint arena, I would devote much more attention to Army initiatives such as the Air-Land Battle doctrine, implementation of the modernized division structure, and a host of other efforts to make the Army a more efficient and combat-ready force. But as long as my legal obligations prevent me from devoting my full attention to organizing, equipping and training the Army, the current readiness and future plans of my Service will be less than the best possible.

In wartime, I could ill afford to divide my attention between Joint and Service matters because Joint Strategic direction of the armed forces will totally consume each Chief's time. But weighty service issues of prioritization and direction will also demand attention. The current JCS system will force the Chiefs to divide their attention in peace and during wartime, and we can ill-afford this split.



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# Address to the 1st and 2nd CLASSES of the UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

West Point, New York
22 April 1982

I thought I would remind you of a line from one of your other readings. It starts out: . . . "It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen." Now, I know that all of you recognize that as the opening line of George Orwell's classic novel, "1984", written some thirty-three years ago. Today we are only about two years away from the time setting of Orwell's novel. You will recall that it was about one individual's struggle to break free from a futuristic totalitarian society.

We also should recall in Orwell's novel that there were 137 predictions, and of those 137 predictions that he made thirty-three years ago, 100 have come true so far. They have included sensors in space, the ability to monitor heartbeats and all of the other aspects of the body's functions, and we now have extensive computer data bases reaching into our homes and affecting the way in which we go about our basic business. Orwell talked about solar collecting stations in space, about two-way television, cruise missiles and attack helicopters and a host of other things we have today. The fact is that it is amazing that anyone was able to predict the future like that, given the incredible change that has taken place in the relatively short period of three decades.

Now he was wrong in several areas. He predicted that we would at this point in time be a tri-polar world: the United States, Russia, and China and other elements of Asia. But when one takes a look at what has happened, it has probably been even more traumatic than if he had been correct, for in that period of time we have had an increase of some 80 additional states. If we look back into the recorded history of the last two thousand years, it's [believable] that we might have some 140 nation-states, but to realize that 80 of those came in the past thirty years is in itself amazing. That is an incredible pace of political change.

It is therefore not difficult to see why, as we look to the future, we do so with a sense of great uncertainty because we have no special capabilities that way. We are not as well gifted as Orwell, Jules Verne, or as some of the other great visionaries. As a natural result of our uncertainty about the future, fears arise which motivate a search for security through stability. Sometimes that drive is misplaced, as in Orwell's book, leading to an existence based on universal homogeneity. Eventually, that kind of stagnation, if not the end of civilization, is certainly a stopover on the path to total decay.

I once saw a diagram of a cycle describing the evolution of a society's progress. It started from the initial position of bondage to one in which people have some sort of spiritual faith. The society progresses from spiritual faith to courage, from courage to liberty, from liberty to abundance, from abundance to selfishness, from selfishness to complacency, from complacency to apathy, from apathy to dependency, and finally, from dependency back to bondage. Now with a little effort, we can probably place the various nations of the world today at distinct points along that circular scale. It is not so much the scale itself that is important, but what it represents as a portent of irresistible change. Many different causes can be cited. . . .Orwell, for instance, would, hypothesize that technology is the driving force behind all change. I would say that technology is but the child of man. Man's spirit, man's inventiveness, are the genuine vehicles for changes that are going to have a long-term impact, for good or for evil, in our world.

Those who give us change which is detrimental are villains, while those who give us beneficial change deserve to be called heroes. And I would argue that a broadened definition of hero is justifiable, for heroes are not just those of titanic proportions like Anwar Sadat, Lech Walesa, Mother Theresa, or Martin Luther King. They include professors who kindle new ideas; politicians

who work conscientiously for their constituents' welfare; professionals of every variety (including Soldiers); and more common folk who keep the flow of a nation's life's blood pulsing—not in grandiloquent ways but to the best of their abilities, with excellence as their guide.

Change and excellence are the crux of life's adventure to become a contributor, to seek a responsible place under God's sun. My good friend General Sir John Hackett, who wrote *World War III,* spelled out the resulting obligation of military professionals this way:

> "... it is the business of those in responsible positions in our Armed Forces today to see that modification of structure to correspond to a *changing* pattern in society is facilitated, while careful attention is paid to the preservation of what is worth preserving."

I, of course, agree.

A look back at history is instructive as to the qualities you will need to carry into your future. Let us go back to September 1st, 1939—the date General George C. Marshall, became Chief of Staff. Now *he* was a titan!

Some of the lustre of that day for General Marshall wore thin, for September first was also the date Germany invaded Poland, the date Europeans cite as the beginning of World War II. For most Americans it was a far-away event—an uncertain, and not immediate threat—because of the ocean between us. President Roosevelt calmed our fears. But General Marshall viewed America's future differently and saw a clear threat facing this nation. He judged that the manpower and the equipment at our disposal were inadequate by any measure.

We ranked seventeenth among the world's armies, our active force numbering only 190,000. Of the nine divisions that we said we had, only three approached true divisional organizations—the other six were simply understrength brigades. Our equipment was largely of World War I vintage. . . .

In two years General Marshall's vigorous articulation of our needs resulted in significant progress toward manning and equipping the Army. Yet within four months of Pearl Harbor, the nation's preparatory efforts were still judged a failure. Shortages were widespread, and production capability was lacking. Soldiers trained with wooden sticks for guns and threw sacks of flour to simulate grenades. Silhouettes of tanks were attached to trucks for mechanized maneuvers. No effective national manpower planning had been accomplished; no planning for transport, no prioritization of effort of any significance.

Recognizing the imperfect nature of his Army, General Marshall told the first Officer Candidate School graduating class at Fort Benning, in September 1941, to remember:

> "... the truly great leader overcomes all difficulties, and campaigns and battles are nothing but a long series of difficulties to overcome. The lack of equipment, the lack of food, the lack of this or that are only excuses; the real leader displays his qualities in his triumph over adversity, however great it may be."

We know today that *the nation, those OCS graduates and General Marshall proved equal to the challenges facing them.*

I have not looked into the specific achievements of the members of that first OCS class, but it is likely they were platoon leaders and company commanders in our first deploying divisions—with Patton in North Africa and MacArthur in New Guinea. As for General Marshall, we know he molded, trained, and equipped an Army of massive proportions—ninety divisions, and more than a thousand wings of tactical aircraft. By the spring of 1945 he had built a force of over eight million, battle-tested, victorious American soldiers.

If there is one parallel to be drawn between the future General Marshall and the Army faced in 1939 and the future we face today, I would say it is the opportunity to influence change. The time is not far off that you of the Class of 1982 will be commissioned. For the Class of '83, a year passes quickly. As in the days of General Marshall, your future too will be filled with unpredictable change and diverse challenges. Hopefully you will prove equal to the challenges ahead, helping to steer the nation around the resultant crises, confrontations and conflicts. If we succeed--as we can—it will be the foresight and initiative we bring

to those future situations, large and small, that will make the difference.

I am sure you have developed some ideas concerning the issues facing our nation throughout the rest of this century. Your lecture series, readings, classes give you a good basis. No one has a perfect crystal ball, not even me. As a matter of fact Orwell batted 75 percent.

Nonetheless the political, economic, military and other factors influencing the future portend great change and challenge throughout the decades ahead—challenges that will affect each and every one of us. None of us can escape the uncertainties of the future. Despite those uncertainties I would contend that our nation's first order of business must be to ensure the security of our citizens and to preserve our national values. And I hope that you, as members of the profession of arms, will see to it that in the years ahead, the United States Army is able to meet those challenges by being an Army bred to fight.

So above all, the Army you are about to enter will be going through an era of change—internally and externally.

The Army you are joining is a huge organization. It is much more than the twenty-four Active and National Guard divisions. Our Army consists of the 3.3 million Active, National Guard, and Reserve Soldiers, our civilian employees, and their family members that make up the Total Army team. And each has a job to do. It does not matter whether it is as an Infantry platoon leader in the Second Division in Korea, a drill sergeant at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, a budget analyst in the Pentagon, or a volunteer worker with Army Community Services at Fort Sill—the important thing is that any task undone jeopardizes the Army mission.

Upon your commissioning, each of you will be given tasks to perform. You could be presented with an overabundance of resources with which to perform your job—or, more likely, an underabundance. Just remember the dictum of General Marshall to "triumph over adversity" rather than look for excuses in whatever shortages you face. Barabara Tuchman once chided officers in our profession by saying: "Nothing so comforts the military mind as the maxim of a great but dead general."

Well, that may be true when we are digging for locker room pep talks, but I believe there is unassailable truth in many sayings, like the words of Napoleon that "There are no bad regiments; there are only bad colonels." I believe that translates all the way down into companies, batteries, platoons, and sections.

I can guarantee you challenge. The responsibilities we give to lieutenants far exceed what you can expect in any civilian enterprise until you are considerable more senior. Of course, if you do not want responsibility, you can always, in the words that Frank McCarthy had George Scott speak as Patton, go "shovel something—somewhere—for someone—for the duration."

In performing your tasks, I expect you to be what I call "Islands of Competence." It does not matter where you are, your efforts at each post, camp or station around the world must be geared to the same end—to take care of the Soldier, to train and maintain your unit, and to be prepared for war. It is no more complex than that.

You will be judged by your Soldiers, by your peers and by your superiors against these criteria. You can fool your superiors, but you can not fool your peers or your troops. And the ultimate judgment could well be how well you do on the battlefield—there is no room for sham on the battlefield.

So your challenge is to be a professional at the art of war -- an island of competence in a sea of change.

And how will the Army be changing during your formative years? The answer is across the full spectrum of activities. Our Army has established a series of goals to ensure that the efforts of three million people are orchestrated.

For the Army, *readiness* will continue to be our number one goal. I believe that equates to excellence in "training and maintaining"—the mainstays of any unit. They are not exclusive of one another; they go hand-in-hand. The difficulty of achieving excellence will be more complicated for you than it was for me because of the infusion of so many new weapons systems into the Army. During this decade, as platoon leaders and company commanders, your challenge will be to acquire and sustain proficiency in many systems.

For example, those of you who intend to be tankers could work with five different main battle tanks. You can expect to serve all around the world—in the Sinai, Latin America, Southeast Asia.

It will not be easy, any of it, but my advice to you is to become technically competent—that is essential if you are to lead—and focus on fundamentals, setting standards for your people, and then meeting those standards. The botton line for you to remember in applying oil to the readiness gear of the Army is that the battlefield will belong not to the biggest Army, it will belong to the best Army.

In our efforts to attain the *human* goal, we have been successful of late, but it requires continual attention. We must continue to attract good people who have the potential to become quality Soldiers. More importantly, we must retain the best ones. The climate you create in your unit will determine the kind of Army we will have in the year 2000. I hope that through your efforts it will be an Army that people want to be a part of. We're embarking this year on a unit versus an individual personnel system and will begin our uniquely American experiment with a regimental system. It is going to be very exciting—recruiting, training and moving people by units, and getting away from pretending that anything but cohesive units win wars. All designed to make individuals able to reach their full potential.

The *leadership* goal and the *management* goal occasionally become confused in the minds of our officers. In an effort to simplify the difference let me say that your success will be a function of your ability to lead people and manage resources.

Leadership in the Army must be well grounded in the Army ethic:

-Loyalty to institution
-Loyalty to unit
-Personal responsibility
-Selfless service

If you do not possess a solid ethical base and do not continue to build upon it, you tend to sway from pillar to post and go with the breezes to attempt to accommodate, when accommodation is not in the best interests of your Soldiers or the country. Throughout your Army career you must work from an internalized set of values.

You will also be judged by how well you manage the resources you are assigned. The American people—quite properly—will expect you to use their resources prudently.

Our *materiel goal* requires that we develop a Total Army equipped and sustained to win any land battle. I have said to other audiences, and will continue to say, that equipping the force is the most difficult challenge facing the Army in this decade.

It's a double-edged problem. First, we need to put adequate equipment into your hands; and second, the equipment must be better thanthat of the enemy. We will continue to be at a numerical disadvantage—so we must make up for it with quality.

The major new land combat systems that will return the technological edge to the American Soldier in the 80's and the 90's are ready for fielding. We have some 583 new items programmed to come into the force in the next decade; 44 of these are major new systems. Some, like the Abrams tanks, are already on line. Contrary to much of what you may have read, it is a superb tank, very much appreciated by the Soldiers who operate it. The biggest complaint I have heard from Soldiers here in the States and overseas is that the tank goes too fast. The sergeants whom I have talked with tell me that the biggest problem they have to adjust to is mental—thinking fast enough to take maximum advantage of the Abrams. The Bradley Infantry Fight Vehicle will enter the Army this year, and the Black Hawk helicopter will be used in increasing numbers. Other new weapons are now in production, or soon will be—the Multiple Launch Rocket System, Patriot missile system, the Apache Attack Helicopter, and the DIVAD Air Defense system to name a few.

The massive modernization of the force will have far-reaching effect. It will affect how you will fight, how you will communicate and even how you will eat. No corner of the Army will remain untouched.

The challenge to you is two-fold. First, you must meet head-on the problems presented by the

technological infusion of entirely new weapon systems, such as the Bradley and the MLRS, as well as the quantum jump improvements in our generic systems like the Abrams and the Apache. Second, you must, at the same time, remain adaptable to the problems of the integrating their performance with other older, less capable, but still useful equipment—a formidable task.

Our *future development* goal will involve most of you. As many of you know we will field the first High Technology Light Division in FY 85. But that is merely an interim solution as we look at light armored vehicles, lasers, and any other technology that will give us an advantage on the battlefield. We're looking for more capable, lighter forces because at the present time the taxi service—be that air or water—is not all we would like it to be. As we strive to meet our *strategic deployment* goal we will be supporting and prodding our sister services in the effort to increase the airlift and sealift we need to respond to the global challenges we are likely to face. Viewing the two weeks or so it is taking a small British force to move to the Falkland Islands, you realize the importance of being able to project power rapidly around the world to protect our vital interests.

These then are some of the areas that will have an impact on both you and the Army—areas in which you will have the opportunity to influence events. It takes little foresight perhaps to see that the last years of this century will be filled with changes and challenges. What we need is the foresight to break the link that joins change and challenge to confrontation, crisis and, where unavoidable—conflict.

General Marshall was facing much the same situation in 1939 as we face now. A week after he became Chief of Staff he visited his hometown in Pennsylvania and, foreseeing the crisis shortly to befall his Nation and the world, he said:

> "I will not trouble you with the perplexities, the problems and requirements for the defense of this country, except to say that the importance of this matter is so great and the cost, unfortunately, is bound to be so high, that all that we do should be planned and executed in a businesslike manner, without emotional hysteria, demagogic speeches, or other unfortunate methods which will befog the issue and might mislead our efforts. Finally, it comes to me that we should daily thank the good Lord that we live where we do, think as we do, and enjoy blessings that are becoming rare privileges on this earth."

That's still the foremost challenge we face: to live up to our heritage--to ensure that we enter the 21st century with our Nation's values and freedoms intact. That is a worthwhile challenge for each and every one of us. And I look forward to meeting that challenge with you.

# Address to the ARMY VIA VIDEOTAPE

On Modernization
27 April 1982

. . . Our new doctrine, the AirLand Battle, envisions a new pace of battle, one in which we must think and act faster than our opponent.

It envisions tactics of great flexibility which require the infantry and the artillery to keep up with the pace of armored attack—or to react rapidly in defense to actions occurring on our flanks or in our rear.

Recently a retired general officer asked me why we need a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle as capable as those we seek in the Abrams and the Bradley. Why do we need such acceleration? Why do we need such speed? I replied that *from a tactical point of view* rapid acceleration is critical. It is no longer a question of two opponents visible to one another slugging it out, the outcome dependent on superior gunnery. On tomorrow's battlefield either opponent is fully capable of a kill with a single shot. So success is more dependent than ever on our crew's ability to gain positional advantage in smoke, in available cover, in speedy lateral movements.

*On an operational basis,* I'll simply relate that the responsiveness of an Abrams-equipped battalion in one field exercise resulted in it traversing an entire corps sector to arrive at a threatened seam in such a responsive nature that it got there before the armed helicopters which were called at the same time. Now that's a real advantage—and one that's only exploitable when our equipment possesses the speed and acceleration of these new vehicles.

So I just want to illustrate that the new weaponry supports our doctrine. . . .

*People/personnel are the key to the modernization process!* First, we need to be sure we manage the talents we have in our ranks so that the right people are in the right place on time—which means that everyone from the DA DCSPER down to the Personnel Assistance Center must stay on their toes, anticipating and solving problems. So that the system supports our effort.

At the same time we need to work hard to stay informed on the facts of the issues, to keep our own attitudes positive, so that individually we give wholehearted support to the equipping effort.

That's not an easy task. Certainly there's been reams of bad information out on many of the new equipment items—the Abrams for example, emphasizing all the negatives. Fundamentally I believe the criticism is rooted in the costs involved, which are high—no question about that.

But remember the cost of my Chevy station wagon in 1961—I couldn't touch it for $10K today. Inflation has affected everyone and everything; and we're not immune.

Some of the criticism is decidedly unfair. Take for example the oft cited fact that the Abrams burns 3.5 gallons of fuel per mile. If you compare that to an economy car, that's pretty bad mileage. But if you compare it to a comparably sized piece of civilian machinery—like a Caterpillar wheel-tractor scraper which weighs 70 tons, which burns 33.1 gallons of gas per hour and goes nowhere fast, it's not bad. Both machines have fuel capacities designed to carry them through a normal day's expected activity. They do what they're designed to do, and that's what's important!

The result of press criticism could be to erode confidence in what's coming down the pike. I've heard some say they don't want the new equipment; they hear it's no good. The facts are in sharp contrast to the sensational press coverage you read.

For example, troops in Europe like the M60A3—especially its fire control equipment. That's nothing but technology borrowed from the

M1! So I say, if you like the A3, you'll love the M1!

Some recognize the high fog factor in criticism; Senator Goldwater held a hearing on the M1 tank, and supports it. He published a point/counterpoint in the *Congressional Record* on M1 disinformation.

The users in the 3-64th Armor in Europe speak glowingly of M1 as did the testing unit, the 25th Cav at Fort Hood.

We all have some real challenges ahead, at every organizational level, integrating the new systems: M1 with the APC/IFV/Arty/Commo, etc. We'll be looking at new ARTEPs, new "How to Train" manuals, new "How to Fight" manuals. And we'll be learning and correcting together.

Many of you will become involved in the introductory process with New Equipment Training Teams, like that which transitioned individual tank companies of the 3-64 Armor to the Abrams. It was a tight, intense 42-day transition for each company—covering everything from equipment issue, crew familiarization, transition gunnery tables (VII and VIII), and concluding with a 3-day company training exercise at Hohenfels.

We've got to be sharp in the transition process, not allowing proficiency to lag, or the readiness of the force to suffer.

The problems will be different for each unit; different for each component, and the specific circumstances of its mission and assignment. For instance, a Battalion of the 48th National Guard got the M60A3 before a Battalion in the 24th Division. . . .

## Address to the AIRLAND BATTLE 2000 SYMPOSIUM

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
10 May, 1982

Let me reinforce each of these points at the outset

*First*, I would hope you are convinced with me that land forces—adequately sized and technologically competent—are an imperative for this nation.

We have tried often as a people to sanitize war, because we recognize its results can be so horrible. In the late 40's the advent of nuclear weapons was seen by many as the clear signal that the last of extended land campaigns had passed. I, for one, do believe that our solitary possession of the weapon, and our later dominance in that field for many years, did act as an international restraint for those who felt they had too much at stake to challenge us directly. But that has not precluded the occurrence of two massive land conflicts involving this nation—thermonuclear era or not!

Today, with our heretofore one-sided dominance of nuclear weapons shattered, we are in an altogether new juncture in history. Nuclear weapons may still deter nuclear weapons, but the evidence is clear that their existence is no bar to lesser forms of conflict. Some may believe that we can again attempt to sanitize war, this time by exporting it to sea. But I can tell you that there is little possibility of making war neat, tidy and devoid of the tough and unpleasant aspects of conflict on land. Personally, I see no future contingency which does not place a demand on us for the early and full involvement of appropriately sized U. S. land forces.

Certainly in the event of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, in any region of the world, it seems to me that ultimate resolution will occur in ways and in geographic areas where the Soviets are capable of exerting maximum leverage—on the Eurasian continent and its

periphery—be that against Europe, or against Western energy resources in the Middle East. The reason is, as Winston Churchill opined, the Soviet Union is fundamentally a land animal. Both its nature and that of its surrogates are focused on land. Should we fight them at sea, we are selecting an environment where only our interests are at stake. To persuade them that their interests are at risk, we must be ready to fight on land—to carry out a continental strategy.

The second point I would hope you carry away from this symposium is the clear notion that the design of tomorrow's land forces to meet the forecasted threat is well thought out. It must be, because air-land warfare today is very sophisticated. Consider the dimensions of the problem.

The challenge in applying effective military power in combat is how to orchestrate maneuver forces comprised of over 10,000 ground maneuver elements, several thousand additional fire support, combat support, and service units working behind those maneuver elements and additionally several thousand air support units. Each of these roughly squad-sized elements is about the size of a football team, and the composite force manuevers on and over physical areas immense in size and diverse in geography and climate. Compare this to the control of a Navy with its "hundreds" of surface combatants. The technical problem of deriving excellence in modern air-land combat is difficult for the occassional dabbler to comprehend.

On the last point I hope you will carry away from this symposium an understanding that achievement of the kind of land capability we need for the balance of this century and the early decades of the next requires the efforts of *most* Americans:

-Some in uniform, either active or part time—the ARNG and USAR

-Some like you, in industry with creative rninds and the facilities for production

-A few concerned and dedicated civilian leaders—in the Executive Branch and in the Congress—persuaded of the need for land forces and dedicated to its maintenance, and finally

-The consistent support of the American people.

The support of the American people is my greatest concern, for our support base is fragile, to say the least. And it is the one area I am least able to do a great deal about. It's certainly not that Defense hasn't gotten its share of attention lately. Quite the contrary. But it's been a little like the three-year-old at the TV set—the channel portraying the great need for national defense grows tiresome, so some are switching to another channel, either one which portrays defense as unaffordable or one of the many other channels critical of specific defense initiatives. Only a few months ago, concern about deficiencies in defense had achieved a consensus—'til we found there was a heavy cost associated with it.

Many of those alternate "channels" play very well today—and some do deserve attention because of their thoughtful nature. Many, however, are the voices of those charlatans, shallow and ill-versed in military affairs, who parrot old and discredited wares which were either unjustified at the outset, or were once justified but are no longer, or are justifiable goals but unattainable—for example, the perennial search for the elixir of the modern defense establishment, the cheap effective weapon. These same critics wouldn't think of buying a standard size black and white TV, a vacuum tube radio, a wooden-hulled sailboat, a zoot suit, slide rule, mini-skirt, or padded jacket.

Times have changed. Tastes have changed. Technology has changed. The threat has changed.

That's not to say government shouldn't seek reasonable products at reasonable prices. We seek capability, not technology for technology's sake, nor cost for the sake of bloated budgets.

Now I'm not naive enough to believe that the concept-based requirements system you have walked through today will be the final and only arbiter of what tomorrow's Army will look like. There are clearly many other pressures that work to shape the Army of the future. These include:

-Our mission, the foundation in statute for our existence, which tells us that our task is to prepare "for prompt and sustained land combat." That's consistent with our doctrine.

-And, of course, there's the declared national policy— and I would hope we're consistent there too; seeking a force capable of global response, sized for simultaneous conflict, stocked for a prolonged engagement, and able to place the attacker at risk. Certainly there's no disconnect here, in theory.

-There are international commitments as well, like NATO, or bilateral agreements with Japan and Korea, or regional agreements and interests. These proclaim more what we must do, generally, than how we must do it. But if constraints are implicit in the political documentation regarding how we must fight—as could well be the case within an alliance framework—then we have no choice but to bend the practice of our doctrine.

-Domestic politics, too, play a role; the search for directed efficiencies, preferential status by Congress for plants in Congressional districts, environmental issues, nuclear issues and so forth.

-Economics, of course, is a pressure of first magnitude. One study done for me concluded that ". . . in the end the Army is driven by resource availability." Certainly the armies that will result from two distinct budget levels will be as different as the two budget levels themselves. Both can be rational however. A condition which is very apt to yield an irrational army is that which is achieved by arbitrary reductions to an Army based on a higher budget level. Should the Congress, for example, eliminate a weapon as central to our fighting doctrine as the attack helicopter, the resulting structure would be markedly worse than had we constructed an army from whole cloth at that lower budget level. We must redesign the entire force in response to distinct resource levels.

-Social environment, too, is an important pressure affecting how we build an army. Attitudes toward service or views on pollution have much to do with how far our resources will stretch.

-Technology is an understandable pressure, which you know very well. And military threat, which we've discussed today. Finally, tradition, experience, and judgment play their own significant role.

Many outside the Army, immune to these pressures, give us lots of help in laying out alternative options. Some of the advice is thoughtful, and I think you will see evidence of that in what you have heard today. Other advice is simplistic in tone and insulting in innuendo. Very candidly some critics worship the ground their heads are buried.

One oft stated external criticism paints the Army as stubbornly adhering to an attrition-oriented philosophy. That's patently an oversimplification. We couldn't fight an attrition war if we wanted to today. We'd be the first attrited! On the other hand, warfare isn't a pirouette in which there is no contact or no danger—where it's possible as in the child's game of "tag" to maneuver to a win without violence.

I suppose that if a "hero" of maneuver warfare were sought, certainly Edwin Rommel would be in the parthenon of maneuver warfare. Yet even this innovative soldier concluded that:

> "In motorized warfare, materiel attrition and the destruction of the organic cohesion of the opposing Army must be the immediate aim of all planning."

With the evolution of our thinking in the AirLand Battle, and its division into three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—it's easy to envision maneuver being conducted at one level, the operational, with attrition the focus of some tactical unit under that commander. But it's not that simple for even in the direct conflict of two opposing mechanized battalions bent on one another's destruction, survival and victory will go to the force that achieves positional advantage for a flank shot, or which secures a defile to split an opposing force for defeat in detail, or which cuts the opponents' resupply route, etc.

Mindful of these kinds of pressures, these kinds of diverse opinions, today's Army seeks some constancy, some objective goal of what we must become. We believe we have that vision of the contemporary battlefied well captured in the AirLand Battle concept. This is and will be the basis for the future of the Army. The tactics, organization, and technology will flow from this.

We have to make people believe in our ability to shape our future, for like it or not, land

warfare—increasingly of the sophisticated variety thanks to comtemporary weapons proliferation—is here to stay. We've got a long way to go to catch up. With your help in specific functional areas and with your help in creating greater understanding of the land warfare challenge, I believe we can close the gap. We've embarked on a journey now to do just that. It won't occur overnight. It won't occur in an aura of fogged misrepresentation and amateuristic oversimplification that makes for clever headlines. It must be hammered out deliberately, and I count on the full support of American industry to achieve it as a cooperative effort, not overnight but as quickly as possible. . . .

## Address at the JOINT ROTC COMMISSIONING CEREMONY, NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY

South Bend, Indiana
15 MAY 1982

. . . . Each graduating class, each newly commissioned officer, faces a slightly different world. When I graduated and was commissioned in 1951, the Korean War was the "hot item on campus." If there was one thing certain at my commissioning, it was that each member of my graduating class knew that within six months of graduation he would be in combat. For us, it was easy to focus on the essentials as we became members of the profession of arms.

But each class faces a different world. During the past year, world leaders and statesmen have been assaulted and even taken from us before their life's work was completed. There has been upheaval of populations through nationalistic fervor or by martial law and—not last by any means—armed conflict at points around the globe. This admittedly shortened menu portrays today's "red alert" situations—the names and places will change tomorrow. For you, entering this turbulent environment, more now as a participant than observer, what . . . will bring your service into focus?. . . .

As with any profession you choose, staying abreast of and anticipating its changing nature remains the fundamental measure of your ability to contribute. Continuous study of your profession is a must. As Army, Navy, Marines Corps, and Air Force officers, a major part of your professional responsibility is to keep current in the profession of arms, reading and studying subjects which will make you more professional. And so I commend to you the writings of the great captains, and a sound grasp of history and geography. That does not mean that you can forsake all other readings, because clearly you will need to be well versed in all disciplines that will have an impact upon the future and the military's role in that future. In short: read, study and learn about today—tomorrow—and yesterday. Under that criteria the best investment you could make—or gift you could receive—would be a *reading lamp*. . . .

The second piece of equipment which I hope you use is *a "compass"—to do what's right*. As newly commissioned officers in your respective services you will be asked to perform tasks you may feel are more difficult than any of the "labors" Hercules undertook. Some might be!

. . . .one [question] you will ask yourself often is, "How can I be sure that I am on the proper heading in a sea of change?". . .

The north-pointing arrow on the compass of life is rooted in a set of values. Notre Dame is an institution of value-based education, so I have no doubt of your continuous exposure to values—though few of you probably majored in such as discipline. I hope you have each internalized a set of values to the point that they are second nature to your character. The military professison, too, is a value-based institution. In the Army, we speak

of our Army ethic—a set of values—as consisting of four principles that I beleive apply as well to the whole of the Armed Services. It's your loyalty to the institution, loyalty to unit, personal responsibility, and selfless service. . . .

If you accept these values as obligations upon your commissioning, they can form the "mother lode" that keeps the needle of your compass pointing in the right direction. Without a steady and firm pull exerted on the needle it will swing undirected—pointing out neither the right direction nor the landmarks by which you can gain your bearings to influence change. Without a compass, you are going to be lost. . . .

## Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Excellence

26 May 1982

. . . In my visits I am continually struck by one fact that contrasts strongly with a world often described by shoddy workmanship, indifference, or personal aggrandizement. What I see—and frequently—is that excellence and the pursuit of excellence are alive and well today in the United States Army.

It is not universal, nor has it borne full fruit, yet, everywhere. But there are many examples around us of which we should be justifiably proud. The extension of excellence to the entire Army is, of course, the aim and responsibility of all General Officers.

That is one reason why I recommend your consideration of the enclosed article by Dr. Peter Vaill, who coined the term "high performing systems." Dr. Vaill's thesis is that in such organizations the definition and clarification of organizational *purpose*—which he verbalizes as "purposing"—is the leadership's fundamental contribution. He defines "proposing" as a:

> ". . . continuous stream of actions by an organization's formal leadership which have the effect of inducing clarity, consensus, and commitment about the organization's basic purposes."

Vaill goes on to identify three prominent characteristics of leaders of high performing organizations. They generally put in extraordinary amounts of *time*, have very strong *feelings* about achieving the organization's purposes, and *focus* on key issues and variables. He advises the would-be leader to:

> "seek constantly to do what is right and what is needed in the organization (Focus). Do it all out in terms of your energy (Time). Put your whole psyche into it (Feelings)."

It is a simple prescription, yet profound. It is my experience that where excellence is found in the Army, there, too, you find leaders who give unselfishly of themselves and who motivate the organization with great clarity of purpose.

These are ideas worth being concerned with. . . .

# Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On AirLand Battle

2 June 1982

Three considerations bear most heavily on our freedom of action in shaping the Army of today, and the Army for the future. These are:

·*Threat:* the hazard we face,

·*Technology:* what's feasible, and

·*Doctrine:* our view of what we must be able to do, not only today, but in the future.

Of the three considerations, two are largely beyond our control. We can influence and help to interpret the threat, but we do not create it. Similarly, we use, adapt, and react to technology and, while some portions of the Army contribute to its fundamental advancement, by and large it is a determinant beyond our control. Doctrine, alone, is our intrinsic professional responsibility.

Is doctrine important?

Only if you want a sound Army.

For any who view doctrine as too esoteric, or perhaps in practice irrelevant—after all, aren't we the generation brought up on "CONARC school solution" and the oft-quoted definition of tactics as the opinion of the senior officer present—I would merely remind you of the Soviet example.

From Stalin's purges in 1937, up until the removal of Khrushchev in the early 1960s, the Soviet effort to postulate a viable doctrinal framework for the prosecution of land warfare was essentially moribund. Creative minds were either eliminated or suppressed. What capability they had flowed from their abundant mass. Their frontal air assets were defensive. Their artillery, while adept at break-through, was unable to follow. Their means for air defense were primitive. There was, in short, no orchestration of the various arms.

But in the sixties, their preoccupation with the rocket forces yielded to a recognition that more balanced capabilities were needed. The theories of men like Tukhachevskiy, who laid the foundation for concepts like "daring thrust" as far back as 1927, were resurrected and laid out in coherent fashion.

Observers in the West saw much of early Soviet doctrine as a fabrication, a fairy tale—so great was the gap between what they preached and what we could see deployed in their land formations. Now, a decade and a half later, there is no snickering. There is great congruence between what they laid out long ago as doctrinal imperatives and the capabilities of their sophisticated force today.

We have no need to hang our head in this regard, for happy circumstances place us well along the path to a force attuned to the future. Our early doctrinal efforts under TRADOC were probably too influenced by a conscious effort to turn deliberately from the often detached product of Combat Developments Command. We needed something more useful. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War certainly caught our attention, perhaps refocusing us too much on the immediate problem of contemporary weapons' lethality. But what critics contend to have been faulty, I would characterize as having been searching—and in the process spawning many sound concepts of both contemporary and long-range import.

These take root today under the doctrinal umbrella termed AirLand Battle. [I am forwarding with this letter] a series of articles dealing with AirLand Battle—the credenda that "purpose" us. These are not stagnant, but dynamic ideas. They call for your understanding—they call for your involvement—they call for your participation. Improved and sustained and supported, they will be the heritage we give to generations of future Soldiers.



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# Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS On Skill Qualification Training

2 June 1982

Despite important changes which have occurred to the SQT process since its first fielding in 1977, several aspects of the program have proven to be detractors to the training mission. Consequently, I have approved some modifications.

-While we can all speak to the undeniable value of performance oriented evaluation, our insistence upon standardized, hands-on testing of skills across the entire Army has imposed a massive administrative burden. To alleviate that burden I have decided to decentralize the hands-on component of the SQT to its proper role as a normal function of command; a diagnostic tool to be used in conjunction with unit training programs to evaluate and enhance the skills laid out for our Soldiers in the Soldier's Manual. . . .

-Second, the proficiency test of fundamental survival and combat skills will be taken by all Soldiers on an annual basis.

-Third, an objective written, MOS-specific test tied to EPMS [the Enlisted Personnel Management System] for all skill levels will be retained. While the results of this test normally do not become significant until the Soldier is eligible for promotion to grade E5, I want Soldiers who have worked hard, and who have demonstrated their abilities, to have some means readily at hand in the record jackets to indicate their qualifications to a gaining command.

It is my belief that these changes will improve our training process. However, unless they are carried out with a full understanding of the training philosophy which lies behind them, we will be unable to benefit fully from their potential.

# Address to the ARMY SENIOR CONFERENCE

West Point, New York
4 June 1982

Since the focus of this exercise is on ways in which we might pursue directing our defense establishment from now until the end of this century, I thought I would talk a little bit about what I call filters that we might productively put our ideas through. I thought that would be more useful than if I were to tell you what I thought the Army ought to look like, or what I thought the defense establishment ought to look like, because I'm sure that everyone here has their own view of what those establishments ought to be.

I put my own ideas through some filters, which you might usefully apply to your ideas. . . .

I'd like to start by addressing changes in the Army in the perspective of my own career. That's the last thirty years. I know you recognize that in that period of time, the Army and the defense establishment have gone through great periods of tumult and change. We've increased the size of the Army—doubled it, twice, from 750,000 to a million and a half Soldiers. In the twenty-four years preceding 1973, we experienced sixteen years of declining strength and eight years of growth. In the early stages of the 50's we focused on conventional war in central Europe. The advent of tactical nuc's caused us to rethink the tactics of land warfare, and we adopted a new organizational structure labeled "pentomic." Our attention, however, was soon shifted to the nature of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. We fought in Vietnam. At the same time, within the NATO alliance, we adopted a new strategy for central Europe called "flexible response." After the war in Vietnam, our full energies turned again to NATO. While I was stationed as the G-3 of the 7th Army in Heidelberg, we had to take a hard look at the lessons of the Arab/Israeli '73 conflict. That year also brought us to the advent of a volunteer force.

Since 1973 we have had stable strength, but we have had what I call an unstable environment. We've had changes in technology, changes in threat, changes in national interest, and changes in resource levels—all of which have had an impact upon the way in which we go about doing business. You can add to these. Many of you here have been involved in processes which relate to what we have done in Europe regarding the ratio between our combat and support strengths over there; what we have done in long range planning, what we have done in conjunction with our allies; what happened on 26 December 1979 when the Soviets moved into Afghanistan, and the impact that had. There was sudden interest then in creating a force that could go somewhere and do something, and everybody had a different idea of what it should do and where it should go. We have seen a great interest develop in our national military capabilities. The last two years have been a period in which budgets are up and budgets are down; budgets are weaned and budgets are expanded. We are in the process now where the problems of getting a bill through Congress for a budget continue to be difficult, for very good and valid reasons.

So those are the kinds of things that have happened to the military establishment from my view over the past thirty years.

Now let me go over to the other side of the house—to the reformists. Everyone in this audience knows that the GAO [Government Accounting Office], the grand-daddy of reform ideas, was established back in June, 1921. In the interval since then we have seen a series of papers for various senators by various people on various defense issues. We've reached the point today where we have a considerable stable of advocates across the full spectrum of military interests representing a great variety of competence in the topics selected. I will identify a few categories for you. We have story tellers who readily sensationalize the costs of weapons or readiness or quality, or whatever it happens to be—largely based on anecdotal evidence. We have some zealots; and finally we have concerned, honest critics.



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Now I'm not going to ask anybody in here to categorize themselves, or the guy next to them, because everybody views themselves differently. I just point out that we have had this rather dramatic growth of multiple advocates.

But all of this is past, and really prologue to where we are today. Now I suppose we could, in fact, rewrite history or reinterpret history any way we choose. The piece that Colonel Trevor DePuy did on interpretation of history was right in many respects. I think that it provided a good basis for how some of us, to suit our own purposes—including myself—use our own interpretation of history.

. . . one result of this confluence of what's happened to the Army and what's happening on the reform side is that as Chief of Staff for the United States Army, I've gotten an awful lot of advice. Some of it has been pursuasive. Some of it has paralleled my own views. Some of it has echoed things already ongoing in the Army such as our focus on professionalism, our emphasis on the unit, and the utility of light forces. Some of the advice has been pejorative—offensive, in fact. I learned long ago that if you don't have thick skin, there's no sense in being in this business. But the habitual disparagement of soldiers and intentionally misleading observations about their performance are the kinds of things that have been especially painful, and not of much help. Then there are other bits of advice that state the obvious—such things as the increasing cost of weapons systems—without providing realistic or viable alternatives. I'm not pointing fingers in any direction, I'm just stating the kinds of advice that I have received.

One of the points that many critics and reformists ignore is the diverse pressure that comes into play when you're trying to create an armed force, be that the Marine, Army, Air Force or Navy segment. *Having a good idea is only the point of departure.* There are many other factors that have to be taken into account as you take a look at what we can and cannot do. We have a statutory mission which tells us, by law, what we are required to do. There are declared national policies. There is defense strategy which represents a direction I cannot ignore, regardless of your viewpoint on that strategy. . . .Our political commitments, our alliances and treaties, domestic policies, the decision to go to a volunteer force, social pressures, economics, environmental issues, technology, threat, and tradition—which is an important element in any army—are factors that must be taken into account. They are pressures that need to be understood as we look at how we go about designing the Army, for they have an impact on the kind of armed forces we design and on the way in which we organize, equip and man that force.

I must observe in passing that the wherewithal to make the changes you or I may feel necessary is not altogether in the hands of the service itself. Evaluate the readiness of the Army today any way you want to—50 percent, 60 percent—you name your percent—I don't care what it is. I'm talking about force readiness, the total readiness of the force, to include sustainability. There are things that the Army can do to fix the unready portion—with good planning, with commitment, with solid initiatives. But there are other things that are beyond the Army's means to fix, though we can influence them; such things as national will, defense policies, and the available resources to remedy particular deficiencies.

So those are some of the factors that need to be taken into account.

Since I've been the recipient of barbs from some of you here, you may wonder why I came this evening. Frankly, I believe that everyone here, despite different approaches and different views about the issues, is genuinely concerned about improving the defense of the nation. I think that's important, and it is important too that we take the opportunity to look at alternative views and debate them in context as honestly as we can. Many in this room have made distinct contributions in the defense arena, and we need your continued and informed participation.

So what I thought I would do this evening is to give you some *filters* which I think you ought to be putting your ideas through to determine whether or not your idea is one which will be useful as a basis for developing our nation's defense establishment during the balance of the century.

There are four filters I use as I look at alternatives. I call them my "to do what," "to do when," "to be done by whom," and "to do how" filters.

I came across the need to use them when I was at Brookings in the early 70's. For a lot of reasons I was asked to do the segments on foreign policy, general purpose, and tactical nuclear forces in their book, "Setting National Priorities." Of course, I'd believed for a long time that we needed to have tactical nuclear forces with longer range, amenable to better command and control arrangements that wouldn't get them involved in the forward battle area quite as quickly. Such systems would provide us with greater opportunities to ensure the continuum of deterrence from conventional through tactical nuclear to strategic forces. I wrote what I thought was a reasonably good article on that. Later, as the DCSOPS, and as the Chief of Staff, I continued to believe that those ideas represented a correct direction to pursue.

Now, as you put those views through the filters I mentioned, when you talk about "who," you have to look at what happens to allies if you disinvolve them from the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons. Who is going to fire the nuclear weapons? Are our allies going to be meaningfully involved? When do you pull weapons out? If you do, does that have an impact on our interests? Would that have an impact on the Soviets? Could we defend our interests without them today? How? Would we substitute battalions of conventional [artillery] for them or would we substitute other means—some other technology, or a changed strategy?

So those are the kinds of questions that impact upon one's ideas. You must run ideas, in my judgment, through an appropriate set of filters to judge their acceptability. If you ignore them and the understanding which their use can generate, you will surely "attrit" yourself by bumping into walls. But, if you're sensitive to the filters, you can finesse your way more skillfully. That's "rnaneuver"! So I'd like to talk about each filter quickly, so that you have a better understanding of how I believe they come into play.

The *"to do what" filter* is the filter that I use at the very start, as new ideas, new concepts arise. You have to get down to fundamentals. What do you really want that to do? What is the purpose of armed forces or the purpose of that particular aspect of armed force?

Though this filter applies equally to broader issues, I'll use a very short paradigm to discuss it. Just take a look at the things that we're called upon to do today. Armed forces exist—to do what? To deter nuclear attack on the United States? To deter military attack on NATO? Conventionally? To deter the USSR in the Middle East? Deny Soviet-Cuban presence in Latir America? Maintain a balance of power in Asia and the Pacific? Inhibit coercion of U. S. and allies? Respond to low-level threats?

Those are some of the things which we are charged with doing. Now my "to do what" filter says that given these many potential tasks, we have to derive some greater focus, some strategy which makes my job easier, which narrows the task down to more comfortable dimensions. But my prognosis is that that won't happen. As an industrial president told me: "Important people make their decisions when they have to, not beforehand, and often late." The real world rule is that politicians, too, want maximum flexibility. They want a delayed choice. I can give you examples of that; the current budget debate or the President's decision on the MX. Those are the kinds of things that are facts of life, and you and I have to understand that reality.

As a consequence, we will have a larger number of tasks that we expect our forces to prepare for. Some say too much risk evolves from that. But there is always risk. I'm sure that the British didn't plan for a war in the South Atlantic. Critics say rationalize, be specific, minimize the risk. When I look at that, I see that there are two clear choices. One is to come up with explicit direction, with limited focus which will also give us minimal risk. That's one option we can look at.

If we do that, everything else is a give up. You can take a look at our declaratory policy in 1951 as far as Korea was concerned.

Or we can have some deliberate ambiguity by defining a broader umbrella—with accompanying risks that are more substantial. That creates uncertainty for us as to whether or not we can really do what we say we must. But that creates heightened uncertainty for the Soviets, too.

In effect, this filter, the "to do what" filter, would urge some critics to do in peace what they urge that we do in warfare and that is to

maneuver. That is, keep the opponent off-balance and play on his mind. Many of you would want perfect solutions, and so would a conservative military person considering the "to do what" filter. But the filter in vogue for some time now in reality has been one which has let a lot through, which accepts risks and uncertainty as commonplace. Now when you think about it, if you disagree with our current direction, the question is: from which region do you decouple? Europe? (Some of you urge that.) The Middle East? Latin America?

As a result of this filter, when I look at the "to do what" filter, I conclude a couple of things as far as the design of the Army is concerned. We need far greater flexibility in our design. A narrow perspective of what is sufficient may be absolutely right for today's situation, but absolutely wrong tomorrow. We need to be able to create a force with sufficient flexibility to respond to the wide spectrum of scenarios derived by looking through the "to do what" filter.

That leads to my second filter, the *"to do when" filter.* Perhaps you've heard the statement before which describes the time dimension of readiness: "Readiness is like fresh bread; you've got to buy it fresh every day." That says quite a bit about the "when" of force readiness, namely that we have to be ready to go to war every day. It means that if we tried to make a major revolutionary change within any service, in time of crisis we might get caught with one foot on one side of the river and one foot on the other, with the part of the body in between split very uncomfortably. So we can't afford to get caught in that particular predicament. We have to be sure that we are ready every day, and we can't mortgage the future by peaking today's readiness. It must be a continuous process.

The "when" filter cautions me that I have to be able to chart corrective paths that are minimally disruptive to the readiness of forces in being. There are times when you see quite clearly where you want to go. I know absolutely and positively that the right way for the Army to go is to unit-based rotations and a unit-based personnel system. We are going to go that way. But the process of getting there, as Max Thurman will tell you as a result of the work we've been doing, shows us that that will take a bit of work. To get the entire organization—which has been headed in a different direction for so long—takes time. I'd liken it to trying to transition from squad's right drill to battalion mass in the middle of a cadet parade. It's about like that with people going in different directions. To change basic policies, to do it properly, and to avoid rejection over time dictates measured progress and patience.

I contend nonetheless that there is always a right time to do the right thing. If the idea is right, the time is right to do it. But often it can't be done immediately. For those of us who are impatient, for those of us who want to see things done overnight, as I do, that's a great lesson to be learned. I merely caution you on that.

The other aspect of the "to do when" filter is that you must ensure that your planning and ideas for the future are somehow linked with today. We have forces in being today. That's the way they are. We used to have a Combat Developments Command which dreamed ideas of people leaping around with backpacks that flitted them around in the sky. There was no linkage between those ideas and the Army that was in the field and the Army of today.

We have to be sure that we have plotted through how we get from where we are to where it is we say we need to go. That's a terribly important aspect, because there's no way that you can just take what you have and push it off into the Potomac, or push it off out into the Atlantic Ocean because it's going to be there and we have to understand that.

The *"to be done by whom"* filter is the third filter we need to take into account.

One of the challenges that arises parochially within my service is who should be taking on some of the new requirements? Which branch within the Army? Aviation? Armor? Infantry? With its tank killing capability, artillery? Who should be taking on the mission? That gets complicated as you actually parcel out jobs. Having talked to many of you in this room I know some of your views on the issues.

In a broader context, do you want to give a new task to a specific service? Or do you want to accomplish it by dividing the implied tasks geographically? By dominant environment? By theater? By function? Do you want to fund it in strict accord with an expressed priority to NATO?

Southwest Asia? Northeast Asia? Or do you want to fund proportionally by service priority, understanding that the separate priorities across the services often have no common contextual basis.

As many of you know I have urged, as I have looked through this "to be done by whom" filter, that we give greater attention to theater needs; that we focus more on understanding what the commanders in the field need, and that we look more carefully at the objectives we have set and capabilities to do that that exist in the field. Then we can isolate what I call the near-term "warstoppers" and perhaps take a look at the kinds of things that might permit us to be able to change the whole way in which future warfare might be handled in a particular theater. In my judgment, if we look at our problems by theater, we can achieve greater horizontal consistency—which does not exist today among the services. I feel very strongly that we must revamp the claimants by working more closely through the unified commands. It also means to me that we have to reorganize the JCS so that it is a responsive and responsible body of joint advisors, with vision and ability to do the kind of horizontal interface that I believe is essential. So that's my "to be done by whom" filter.

Last, there's my *"to do how" filter.* Here's where every one of us has the opportunity to be innovative, to dream, and to come up with ideas. Because the "to do how" filter is one which permits us to look at new situations and come up with creative approaches.

To do so, we must know our weaknesses. We have to know the strength of our enemies. But more importantly we have to know the weaknesses of the enemies and our own strengths and capitalize on those. I've said before that we don't all need to be quarterbacks. We need blockers and tacklers as well. Soccer buffs would say we don't need all strikers and wings. We also need goalies and fullbacks. There is no call for all people to aspire to do exactly the same thing.

I raise this because, as we take a look at "to do how" and "to be done by whom" filters we have to understand that we deal, particularly in wartime, with very ordinary people. So what we expect them to do must be simple enough for them to do in the context of a very stressful situation. While I can grab well trained competent leaders, put them in the field, ask them to take charge and feel very comfortable that they will succeed, we must remember that there is the other 90 percent who may not be quite as brilliant or talented, and who have less experience, less skill, and who might, as a result, have a bit more trouble. Experience tells us that the leadership is normally the first to go in war. The commander of the parabattalion in the Falkland Islands was lost because he was up front doing the kind of tasks that leaders must do. So people that you'd counted on are gone, and then their tasks fall upon others. How we train those "others" is consequently a great challenge for each and every one of us. We must guard ourselves to be certain we don't create extremely clever solutions, whose degree of sophistication overly complicates the likelihood of success.

The "to do how" filter opens some great opportunities for creativity and initiative within the Army. Among the goals we have set for ourselves is one we call our "future development" goal. We have to take what we're doing today on AirLand Battle and make it a reality, and then get on with the next steps of addressing the high and low ends of the spectrum of conflict. I personally believe that we have a lot more to do in the low end than we do in the high. We have to focus on the logistics function, an area of tremendous consequence. It's great to talk about how you move folks around on the battlefield, but the larger issue is how you support and sustain those forces. The man who solves that problem is likely to have a bigger impact on the battlefield of the future than anyone because that's the thing that constrains you in every instance: how you're going to support them.

The force structure of the future provides great opportunities for smart weapons and the innovative use of Reserve Components. In manning, we can be looking at robotics to ease the competition between the available manpower resources and national needs. And we're going to have to look for increased simulation in training and improved standardization of unit packages.

We've established two other goals, on regarding our human resources and another focusing on our leadership talent. The human goal provides great potential. I'm talking here again about the

"to do how" filter. If we can truly break mind sets and see man's potential as essentially unlimited, we can move from what some folks call an existence state to a level of high performance—individually and organizationally—which can accomplish very great things for us in the future.

Finally, the leadership goal. Here we're trying to shift our emphasis away from the individual to the unit and away from the individual to the unit, and away from formal schools to training in units. . .so that we goat a better linkage between the leader and the lead.

There is much to do. As we look to the future we must maintain a vision of the kind of armed forces we need. But we need to take that vision and run it through some filters, those I've outlined. I know there are those of you are sitting out there and saying that If you take your idea and run it through all those filters and other things, nothing will come out the other end. That's exactly what's wrong with the military today."

I don't believe that. I believe that's misapplication of the filters. It merely means that in order to get those ideas through you need to understand the issues those filters develop, so that you're better able to get your ideas. . . understood and accepted. That can permit us to have the right kind of direction in the defense establishment for the remainder of the century—the kind of national security that will permit us to retain our national values intact.

One thing that I would ask you to do is to understand that you just can't put your ideas through one isolated and favorable filter. You end up then with your focus off on a tangent, or find yourself working the wrong problem or find your worthwhile thrust unworkable. You need to put your ideas through the full series.

I've used the full set of filters, and I've been led to my own personal view of the Army and its future. I'll give you a very quick capsulization.

On the "to do what" filter I conclude. and not just for the Army but for all the armed services, that we must retain flexibility in the forces we design. There is great uncertainty in the future as to what our armed forces are going to be called upon to do. and consequently flexibility is imperative.

The "to do when" filter means that we must make the breakthroughs which can ensure that we're ahead in the future. We must get on with new ideas that can make us more effective on the future battlefield. But we have to be sure that we do it without diminishing force readiness between now and that time. We have to have the near-term capability to respond effectively if called upon to go to war tomorrow.

The "to be done by whom" filter makes clear to me the absolute essentiality of combined operations which capitalize on the unique contribution of each service. As I look to the future, I do not see how we can disconnect the current system and define a separate little piece for everyone and still be able to do all the other things that we're charged with doing.

The "to do how" filter, it seems to me, requires that we take advantage of our own strengths and focus our efforts on attacking the weaknesses of the enemy. Our innovativeness and our technology can permit us. if we're smart enough, to design a force adequate to the challenge ahead.

Those are just a few thoughts that I jotted down last Sunday sitting on my veranda about the kind of filters that I put my ideas through. I become frustrated when my own ideas don't get through them as quickly or as easily as I think they should; or when I'm told, "No, you can't do that," by the DCSPER or by the folks down on the Joint Staff.

Nonetheless I believe it is important, as we look to a debate on reform, or as we look to debate within our services,. . .that we take those filt· ' into account. I believe by doing that, with an honest interest on the part of participants to improve the capability of our nation's defenses, that we have the opportunity of coming up with answers to the question which is joined here at this forum. That is, how do we come up with the best defense establishment for the remainder of the century? Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Sir, Bill Taylor, Georgetown CSIS:. . . in terms of your four filters, I'd like to ask a tough question that was posed at one of the round tables today. And that is: How will you approach a Vietnam situation, given that scenario, in terms of your four filters?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, do you want me to talk all night on that one subject? I will if you want, Bill.

As far as the four filters are concerned, first of all we must have a clear definition of all that's implied by the "to do what" filter. We should take the lessons learned in Harry Summers' book and some of the other books that have been written and identify the issues that need to be joined before we get into that type of situation. We need to decide what the mission is, what our goals and objectives ought to be so that we have a clear campaign plan capable of achieving the national objective. That's how I would answer the "to do what" issue.

The "to do when" is not in this instance to be determined by us. That would be determined again by the enemy, so that I'd have to say we'd act as quickly as possible. But I would want to do it in the context of a clear identification of "to do what."

The "to be done by whom" filter will have to take recognition of existing capabilities. At present it would have to be done initially by the special operations forces of all the services. Again, based on what the specifics are that we derive in looking at the "to do what" filter; and provided you've decided to send forces in, we'd look across the full spectrum of the forces in being at the time, optimize their capabilities, identify the specific areas of responsibility, determine who's in charge, and set up the command and control mechanism.

Finally, the "to do how" filter would hopefully be a spinoff from the lessons we learned as a result of what we did wrong and what we did well in the Vietnam war. So that would be how I would apply those filters to that specific task. That's very hasty to avoid spending the whole night on it.

QUESTION: Sir, I didn't make a career of the Navy, but I was in it 43 years. I listened to your reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I went to all the wars since 1925, which is a long time ago. Nothing that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever did or ever directed ever influenced what went on in the wars I went to. Your reorganization doesn't make sense to me because if you think reorganization is progress, you're wrong. Since we started with the Department of Defense, we haven't yet won a war. And your reorganization isn't going to win a war. I'd like your comment on where we are going with this reorganization. That's just shifting the pieces again.

GENERAL MEYER: Well, of course I don't agree that it's shifting the pieces. I think that it's putting us back to a situation we were in during World War II when we did win the war. I mean, I'm entitled to my view, if you're entitled to yours, Chick. (Laughter)

Let me go back to World War II. At that time we had a Strategic Survey Group, which provided the two senior military leaders—Navy and Army—a broad view of how to apply the resources to the various theaters of operation. They looked at it in a broad context and provided advice of a broad nature to the leaders, Marshall and King, and that was how the resources were allocated.

When we created the JCS we did away with our capability to look across the application of different service capabilities—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—by theater. In World War II we sent to the Pacific and to Europe a balanced bag of equipment for the commander to operate with. This was based on an allocation of resources coming out of a coordinated central approach by the senior strategic group. Since we reorganized the defense department, we haven't, as you very properly point out, done that. We have not had that kind of a look across the full spectrum of all-service capability. All I'm proposing is that we go back to that so that we have people who are able to provide similar advice to the Secretary of Defense today. We need that kind of military advice. We do not have it today. The Navy looks at it their way, the Army looks at it its way, the Air Force looks at it its way, the Marine Corps looks at it their way—and that is an absolute guarantee of disaster should we go to war. Everytime I sit there, I can tell you we just are not organized to go to war. I want to be ready to go to war. We've been fiddling around with little things, but when the big one happens, I don't want to go through reorganization. That's why I feel so strongly about it, sir.

QUESTION: General, my name is Jim Fallows, from the *Atlantic Monthly*, and I'd like to continue with Bill Taylor's question because the next question from our panel was: suppose the Chiefs were presented with another situation like

1965, where a president had made a commitment of forces but was not willing to pay the political price, in terms of mobilizing the reserves, or increasing taxes, or whatever. What would the Chiefs now do? Would any of them resign; would they resign en masse? What do you think would be the current outcome?

GENERAL MEYER: I'd have to say I don't know the answer to that. But let me go back to 1965, since I happened to be in the Pentagon at that particular point in time.

Since I was the staff officer who wrote the paper, I happen to know that the Chief of Staff of the Army made a specific point of going to the President to explain to him the impact of not mobilizing if we were to commit forces to Vietnam—its long term impact of de-linkaging our country from the forces that we asked to go off to war. I know that presentation took place, and I know that presentation was made personally by the Army Chief of Staff to the then President.

Were it to happen today, I can only assure you that the current Chief of Staff would make an even stronger presentation which I hope would be more persuasive—because I now have history on my side to support my contention.

There are two issues over which I would resign. One is when I could not carry out my constitutional responsibility of providing advice and counsel. The other is when I felt that, either in the majority of issues or on a major issue of moral principal, I was at odds with the administration.

Those are the ones that I would use for criteria. If it got to that point, then you and I would have to talk through the scenario to decide how far it went before I'd be ready to say, "I'd rather go back to St. Marys, Pennsylvania, and hunt and fish." And I like that.

QUESTION: General, Jack Mayer, from the Congressional Budget Office. I was particularly interested in your comments about supportability and sustainability on the battlefield of the future. We've heard much in the past few years about the procurement bow-wave that the Army is facing now and in the future. But there is some recent concern about the O and M bow-wave that the Army may face in the future. Do you think that this is a valid concern and are you content with the resources that are now being considered for the future to be able to handle this bow-wave?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, it's a valid concern and no, I'm not content. Therefore, what we have done within the Army to help ourselves is to identify in each instance what the total operation and support costs are out into the future. In the budget that we're putting together now, we've tried to tie that together. As we push out into that future, there are some hard decisions which we're going to have to make based on whatever resources are made available by the Congress. I believe that the guy who develops a system has to tie it to what the operations and support costs are, or else you have the camel's nose under the tent. So the answer is, yes, I believe that has to take place. An adequate support package ought to be an up-front part of the service presentation to Congress and be understood by OMB and Defense at the same time.

QUESTION: I'd like to raise an issue tonight with you that I've raised a number of times through the course of the conference. I think it's a central one to the conference's ability to produce something. I think with the new AirLand Battle briefing that we saw here, the new FM100-5, and a number of other changes, the potential exists for a qualitative change in the relationship between the Army and the reformers; a change, I think, for the better. The change to the sort of working relationship that the reformers have had for some time with the Marine Corps. I stress that this is on reform issues which is somewhat different, for example, from issues of strategy or grand strategy, those are different categories. But I'd like to ask for your thoughts on what mechanisms we might be able to come up with, and perhaps recommend out of this conference, that might be able to set up a new, much more cooperative relationship between the Army and the reformers. Do you have any thoughts on that?

GENERAL MEYER: Again, let me just say, Bill, that despite the comment you've made, I have found the relationship between the Army and most of the reformists has been reasonably open—with Newt Gingrich, with Bill Whitehurst, with Jeff Record, or, you name the person—even with yourself, Bill. You've been out to Fort Leavenworth.

This interface which has been an open one, I believe, does hold some concern for me. As you know from this meeting, people come at issues from many directions. The only concern that I have ever had about, quote, "the reform group"—because I am always looking for ideas from wherever they can come—is that it can create an opportunity for indiscipline within the service itself.

I continue to look for what I call the vertical flow of information up and down, to free what I call vertical discrimination, as opposed to horizontal discrimination—that there is a free flow of information up and down.

As long as reformists are dealing across the full spectrum with everyone, I'm perfectly willing to be able to do that. As they deal with, as many would claim, only "the juniors," antibodies can be created within the system that can be disruptive to the organization itself. That part of it concerns me because I believe very strongly in loyalty within the organization, but I also feel that loyalty requires me to protect the guy down in the bowels—who has a different idea than I do—against the other people in the organization who think that there is only one way to go. I would try to create that environment within the Army so that there is the opportunity for free flow of information up and down. I know that's not true across the board. I know there are always baffles everywhere. I would contend that you would find those even in Congress or in industry. I say that is the only caution I have ever had as far as the interface is concerned.

The question is how to create a better interface. I guess the best way I could answer that, Bill, would be to identify who the spokesman is, or the spokesmen are, for the military reform union. In other words, I don't know who all claim they're members of the military reform caucus or the military reform debate. We deal with Jim Wooisey—he calls me on issues. Jeff calls me on issues. So there are a whole host of figures. Maybe you think that the military caucus and the military reform group are more coherent than I see it. I'm just telling you as I look at it, I see it coming from many different directions. Therefore it's far more complex. The best way I would see would be to identify the coterie, or the group or clique that's going to speak, or wants to interface and we'll figure out how to do that. I guess that's the best way that I could answer your question.

QUESTION: Edwin Deagle, Rockefeller Foundation. General Meyer . . . everyone thinks you have had an extraordinary amount of personal courage in the stance you've taken with respect to. . . reorganization. I wonder if you'd share with us a little bit of just two things. One is what s happening as a result of that, what your sense is. . . .We are, I think, all quite aware of the fact that that never happened before. And also whether you think that those groups that are quite disparate, and I think you know who they are, might do to support or help that in the general trend?

GENERAL MEYER: What's happened so far is that externally, as most of you know, we've had the opportunity for the presentation of distinct and personal views to Dick White's committee over in the House. I think most of that has been helpful because it has permitted us to lay out the breadth of alternatives and views. Some would say there are so many views that it will be difficult for the committee to come to grips with them. What is the likelihood of it being accepted? It seems to me that the views of Mr. Weinberger and Jack Vessey will be pivotal. Mr. Weinberger has continually said that he will wait until the new Chiefs are in before sitting down and discussing it. I would hope that within six weeks to two months after General Vessey is installed, and Charlie Gabriel and Jim Watkins are in, then those three, myself and Bob Barrow will be able to sit down and look at it. I know there will be different views. But I believe that we will get a general consensus toward change. Then we'll have to see how articulate we are in presenting those views to Mr. Weinberger.

To the degree you choose to look at this issue, through whatever forum you have, I hope you will not attack the men and women who people the current system, but the problems that exist with the system's construct. We do not now look at how the armed forces go to war as armed forces. We look vertically at how things go. The people are not the problem. The system is.

QUESTION: You said something earlier, but before I get into this, let me repeat what Ed just said. On the Hill, your courage, I think, struck a real chord. I know it took a lot of guts, and I know you probably also wish we gave you more money and less compliments. I want to testify, as I said last night when you weren't here, that I think you



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have been an intellectual, and you've shown great courage on a number of issues. I also want to report to you that we could have passed a budget last week, but it would have cost us about ten billion dollars in defense spending. You said earlier and I think accurately that speaking of the JCS current organization, quote, "In a war that's absolutely disastrous," and "we are just not organized to go to war." I want to use that as a reference. I appreciate the many doors you've opened for me in the Army and wandering around and, I think, learning a little bit in the last couple of years. Basically, there are three quick points I'd like you to respond to: (a) It seems to me that there are three layers and we get confused trying to solve them. One layer is the military services. If in fact you're not organized, if your doctrine isn't right, if there isn't the right structure, we're in big trouble. The second layer, however, is the government at large and the national establishment because if we don't have proper strategies, no matter how good our doctrines are, we end up as the Wehrmacht, and lose even if we did all the right things inside the military. The third layer is society at large. If you go back to the Prussian reforms you see reforms based on the society back to the military, not based on the military and then into the society. My first question is: As difficult as your job is internally as Chief of Staff, what advice do you have to all of us on those three layers, and how do we as a nation—because we clearly aren't very good at it yet—learn to be much better at survival with all three layers working? My second question is: All right—I think these are central and I think it would help with what we're doing here tomorrow. If there are central ideas, what somebody once referred to prime inference, a concept so fundamental that a lot of other things flow from them. Somehow it seems to me, as an observer, we have to learn to test those, rather than to argue over them. I'd just like to throw out to you the notion that there may be ideas so central, whether it's nuclear carriers and submarines, or whether it's maneuver warfare versus attrition, whatever that means. It'd have to be codified and tested. Finally, to pick up a little bit on where Bill Lind was, I'm grateful that I can call you or Donn Starry, or Glen Otis, or a whole bunch of folks, and after tonight probably twenty-five more people—that's wonderful. In terms of the access points for my ideas randomly, the U. S. Army may well be the most open institution in America. But as a public official looking at the long run, I'm really eager to find systematic mechanisms to allow us to define specific ideas or questions which over time we can measure the study of, and the debate over, more carefully. For example, I think you've got a tremendous project going on in the 9th Infantry. I don't sense that we have very good mechanisms yet for us—and I know I can get briefed on all that as a single congressman—but we're not very good yet at learning how I as a congressman can track that, and then come back and say, here are three things I think need to be pursued, without having to bother the Chief of Staff. There are no routine mechanisms for allowing us to filter our ideas back so that professionals rather than amateurs then run them through the four filters that you describe.

GENERAL MEYER: Well, let me start with the last point. I think the answer is I'll just have to work out how to do that. I have to be the heatshield for Bob Elton, just as I ask others to be heatshields for people elsewhere in the Army. I intend to do that because he has a big job out there. For every three suggestions you send him, I probably send him ten. He has all of these coming in. So I need to come up with a way to do that and I will do that. I'll just tell you, if everybody came in with all their ideas, we'd send you post cards and poor old Elton would be answering the mail, and he's not going to be able to test or do the kinds of things he must do. I have a responsibility to protect him and I'll do that, but I'll look at a way to get those queries to people.

On the central ideas, the concepts that are so fundamental, and that needed to be tested, rather than argued, I think that's a valid observation. I think we are trying to do that.

Let's go to your first question, which is your three layers and how do we improve the three layers of military service, the government at large, and society at large.

I think you hit upon what is the elemental issue and that is how to explain to the body politic the need for forces, the rationale behind spending what many consider to be an exorbitant amount on forces to the exclusion of what they need in the cities or what they need for other services. I don't know the answer to that, needless to say. Unfortunately, there is not a way within our government at the present time to do that. I believe, very strongly, that the solution lies in the

leadership—from the President on down, with the support of Congress. I believe there has to be perceived in the nation a strong linkage between the Commander-in-Chief, the President, and Congress, that they are marching in unison in a given direction. Barring that, there is no way that you are going to link together society at large, government and the military services. If you have an opportunity, talk to Les Gelb about the book he's writing now on the presidency over time, and what has happened to the ability of the President to be able to set up the kinds of goals and to bring people into line to do those kinds of things. In his book, he contends that the last President able to do that was Eisenhower. He gives Kennedy credit for the time he was there, but isn't sure what would have happened. Since then, he contends, because of the pressures of politics and so on, Presidents have not been able to provide that same kind of leadership, and to draw people with them. To look at it in any less form than that, I think, would take you to a level where you would be tinkering, rather than addressing central issues. You have to pray that that kind of congealing occurs again, because if it doesn't, we will just continue to spiral ourselves into the ground.

. . . I said earlier, despite the fact that some of us in this room have different views on issues and so on, I honestly believe that everybody here is joined in a common purpose and that is ensuring that we have the best defense for the dollar. . . .When I go out and speak to graduating classes, I tell them that on the 31st of December 1999—that's only eighteen years from now—they're going to look back, and the way they can evaluate whether they're successes or failures is whether or not our values are still intact as we transition to the 21st century. So, what we're joined into now is not just an intellectual exercise, it's an exercise which has to do with the very survival of the ideals upon which this nation is founded. To me it's a very important venture and it's one which is deserving of all the thoughts and ideas which exist here.

Thanks to all of you for participating and thanks for letting me join you.

## Address to the SUSQUEHANNA CHAPTER, AUSA

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
21 June 1982

As I listened to the band this evening I was reminded that my wife always says that the Army Band is a better spokesman for the Army than you are, so you just ought to go ahead and let them play and you don't have to do anything. . . .

I don't know if you know that the Army Band was created 60 years ago in 1922 by John Pershing when he was Chief of Staff of the Army. The world was a lot simpler then. General Pershing turned to his Adjutant General and said, "You will organize and equip the Army Band." That was all there was to the message. Two weeks later, we had an Army Band. Now I want to tell you what would happen if I were to write an order right now. By the time it got through all of the civilians around, by the time it got through the Office of Management and Budget and they had an environmental protective session to see whether the tubas created too much of an environment in the atmosphere, by the time we got it over before the congressional committees and attempted to defend it, we'd end up probably with two piccolos, a drum and a nuclear submarine. I'm glad that John Pershing was smart enough to decide that we needed a band 60 years [ago]. . . .

Today I had the great good fortune of being in the Rose Garden as our President, the Commander-in-Chief, swore in a Soldier as our new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—a great day for our country and a great day for our Army. The charge the President gave to General Vessey was a simple one, and that is the charge to ensure that we have strong and ready armed forces. . . .

But the focus I can tell you is on quality—on quality in people, quality in training, quality in equipment, quality in the environment—and that is what I believe is essential if we're going to have the kind of Army, that good Army, that quality Army that will be able to deter the war.

Today you have the opportunity to take a look at a lot of different armies. You can look at the PLO, Syrian, Israeli, Lebanese, British, the Argentine, the Iraqi, the Irani, and a whole lot of armies. . . .There's a couple of absolutes to come out of it. One is that you're going to need ground forces. Two is you're going to need good ground forces, good Soldiers, good equipment and a good Army. Now let me tell you—and I'll give you this gratis—but I say it very seriously—very often there are comparisons made. I've never made a comparison with yesterday's Army and today's Army because people who make those comparisons don't understand what's going on. It doesn't matter how this Army compares with the Army of 20 years ago, 30 years, or 10 years ago. The important thing is, is this Army good enought to do what's it has been charged with doing today. . . .

## Address to the
## EMPIRE STATE MILITARY ACADEMY GRADUATION

Peekskill, New York
25 June 1982

This is the 100th year of Camp Smith's service as a training ground for the organized militia of New York. While it didn't begin as Camp Smith—the name used to be the State Camp of Instruction—I can't think of a more appropriate man than former New York governor "Al" Smith to have this installation named for. Franklin Roosevelt used to call Al Smith "the Happy Warrior," and of course that term pretty well captures the essence of my goals for the Army:

-We want Soldiers who are warriors—competent in their skills and ready to go to war if need be at an instant's notice.

-And we want Soldiers who are happy—satisfied with the opportunities the Army offers to develop fully as individuals in a supporting environment. So in the ideal world, the Army I would want would be comprised of happy warriors!

Since this is a graduation, I have to assume that it is a happy occasion, and that this is a multi-company formation of happy warriors! This day marks a time when a lot of hard work concludes. It is a benchmark you will be able to look back on in years to come—the time when you came of age as leaders with an important job to do in a vital national institution, the United States Army. I know that you have pride in your membership in the New York National Guard and the U. S. Army Reserve, but I consider you as an integral and indispensable element of the Total Army. It's against the potential missions assigned to you and your units in your Federal role that I judge your full worth to the taxpayer.

The key role of land forces has been continually laid before our citizens in these recent months. It would have been difficult indeed to ignore the critical role played by many armies of many nations in many different geographic areas. Hardly a day has gone by since Christmas of 1979—the invasion of Afghanistan—without armed conflict in some guise reported on the front pages of the *New York Times*. In those newspaper columns which have greeted you in the newspapers at breakfast has been a continuous recitation of the feats—good or bad—by Soldiers from many armies: Soviet, Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, Afghan, Lebanese, Israeli, British, Argentine. Where there has been success, it has been due to one overriding feature more than any other—because all of these armies except the Afghan have had access to adequate numbers of men and relatively modern, lethal weaponry. That one

feature which has distinguished the most successful armies has consistently been teamwork born of superb training—superb preparation. Where that is present, success has followed rather quickly. Where it has been absent, no decision, or worse—failure—has followed.

Teamwork isn't something I can isssue from Washington. Teamwork is born of leadership, the kind taught here at Camp Smith to officers like those of you graduating today, and to noncommissioned officers who just graduated, or who are still in training.

People often ask me about the quality of today's Soldiers. And I tell them that by all the statistical measures we're doing great! Numbers are up. AFQT [Armed Forces Qualification Test] scores are up. The Guard has exceeded 400,000 in strength for the first time since 1975. In the active Army we're actually turning away people—only the best are permitted to enlist or reenlist. Now that's progress. I have to conclude that I'm well pleased with today's Soldier.

The question is, can we match the quality of the new Soldier with the quality junior leaders these Soldier deserve? And here, I have to look into the heart of each of you in formation and ask you if you think you're ready to lead. Will you be the man who plans ahead wisely, so that you don't waste Soldiers' time—planning ahead on how to load equipment, deploy units, assault a hill, maintain your vehicles, set and maintain the highest standards? Soldiers expect you to be professional and to lead by example.

There's another side of your job that's important—in both war and in peace. While Soldiers entrusted to you will care about what you know, they will also certainly know by your actions whether or not you care about them. In fact, their continued association with the Army, will depend on their knowing that they count as individuals.

Enough said about Soldiers and about the obligations of leaders toward those Soldiers. Let me turn to the third key to ready units—equipment. I've got to be honest that I'm disappointed with the pace of modernization. The fact of the matter is that the problem is more severe than just modernizing the force. You and I know that we're short considerable amounts of equipment of any sort. Consequently, a great deal of ingenuity is often required by leaders in order to train their units well. All I can promise you is that the equipment distribution plan I talked about to the National Guard Convention in Indianapolis almost three years ago today is still valid, that is equipment [will be distributed] based on deployment [scenarios with provision to provide enough to] train on. The Army is abiding by that fielding plan to the best of its ability. I know that this doesn't make anyone here feel better necessarily, but in Georgia the units of the 48th Mech Brigade of the Georgia National Guard a roundout brigade of the 24th Infantry Division, are getting M60A3 tanks concurrently with the active units. The 48th has already received its TOW vehicles—51 of them. This is real progress I want to tell you! Here in New York I can't paint as bright a picture. It's coming, but more slowly. If any of you are from the 134th Maintenance Company in Rochester, I know you're anticipating delivery in December of your new Automated Service Support System. Of course, receipt of this tactical system is going to bring with it a new task: managing the repair parts supply system for all of New York State!

The message is that the units of the Army—the Total Army—will continue to receive full complements of their required equipment in accordance with their planned deployment time overseas within a major war scenario. It seems to me that that is the only rational way to go about it. . . .

# Letter to a Student on THE ARMY AS A CAREER

17 July 1982

Your letter of 30 June posed many thoughtful questions. Some I feel very well qualified to answer. On others I have viewpoints, though I recognize that my experiences represent merely a fragment of what is needed for the proper assessment which only history will judge. Perhaps in 30 years you can go back and see how well some of my hypotheses held up.

## The Army a Career

To begin with, I do not subscribe to the view that the military, as embodied in the U. S. Army officer corps, is a discredited profession. But even if I did, based on some interpretation . . . of events that have "transpired over the last two decades," I would still urge your continued pursuit of a commission *because* the nation's compelling need for an effective defense establishment is not erased by allegations of corrupted leadership. If the worst of [deleted] claims were true, then that should constitute a challenge of immense magnitude—exactly the outlet for the high-minded, competent public service your letter implies you are capable of—instead of heightened reservations on your part.

Your basic decision to pursue West Point should hang on the importance of the effort to which you will devote your life, not on the impeccable credentials that might fall your way by achieving membership in any particular group. The credentials of any profession are in the hands of its members. Frankly, our professional image is up for grabs every day. We are only as good as the best we attract. Hence, we invite no passive members. Reward, satisfaction and personal image on the basis of professional association come only with hard work, effort and dedication.

So, to answer your question: "Is the Army a desirable career. . . ?" I don't believe the appeal of the military profession is suddenly undone by criticism, warranted or otherwise. *One:* our task, defense, is probably not intrinsically desirable, but it is certainly absolutely necessary. *Two:* a defense establishment is only as capable as the sum of human talent and national treasury devoted to it permits it to be. *Three:* a commission conveys no automatic honor or privilege; rather a life of obligation and responsibility. *Four:* the challenges that face today's officers are greater than ever before in our Republic's history. If these challenges turn you on, then *the Army is a desirable career!*

## Vietnam Lessons Learned

Next, you inquire if the lessons of the Vietnam War have been absorbed and understood by today's military? One hopes that we've been astute enough to correctly identify the key issues and appropriate (or best) solutions. Often that's difficult. The Russians, you'll recall, during the Russo-Japanese War, found that neither their forts nor their cavalry could stand up to the advanced firepower fielded by the Japanese. The post-war Tsarist solution proposed (1) larger, stronger fortifications and (2) removal of the cavalry's firearms, on the basis that possession of a carbine caused faintheartedness which could be "cured" only by forcing the horse soldiers to rely on sabers alone!

Of course, both of these "lessons learned" were inappropriate ones. Two modes of warfare had in fact been challenged, their obsolescence clearly foreordained. It took more bloodshed on Europe's battlefields to drive the correct lessons home.

I'm certain we've yet to draw all of the right "lessons" from Vietnam. Some of our early national verdicts were frightfully wrong. For instance:

- Some who viewed Vietnam as an inappropriate application of American power were quick to conclude that the application of American military power anywhere was inappropriate! We've had to relearn that.

- Others, believing that military measures employed in Vietnam were ineffective, pursued ways and means to improve our military capacity, of and in itself, exclusive of the need to orchestrate its application with other national means or in concert with allies. We continue to think too much in terms of independent action within a world that is increasingly interdependent.

In other areas we have drawn clear and valid verdicts. For example, the nation's attempt to carry on a major military effort in Vietnam without mobilization was a major error. Certainly that will not be repeated. Indeed, we are structured today in such a way that, except for the most modest contingency, a callup of Reserves is an absolute necessity.

We have also derived much food for thought and action in operational, tactical and administrative matters. We have learned a great deal about the application (and limitation) of air power and the potentials of maneuver embodied in airmobile concepts. And we have begun important changes in the way we assign commanders and in the manner which we will sustain the integrity of combat units. . . .

*American units for the most part fought well, and were undefeated on the battlefield.* The North Vietnamese acknowledge this, but believe it is essentially irrelevant because nations, not armies, fight wars. Vietnam was a national defeat. The reasons for that defeat cannot be laid in the lap of our ground forces. The nation must search elsewhere for a more comprehensive explanation. That assessment will take time.

## Vietnam's Leadership Challenge

Certainly Vietnam was not an easy war for our soldiers. Very unique pressures operated on them, and they contributed very directly to the incident rates . . . such abhorrent, but not uncommon, battlefield events (historically) as combat refusals, assassination of leaders, desertion, etc. No military campaign has ever been devoid of these. Braxton Bragg, as a young officer, found a fuzed 8-inch shell under his bed in 1843. The French Army mutinied on the western front in 1917. It has not been shown to my satisfaction that these despised events occurred at rates in Vietnam which were extraordinarily different from historical experiences until the later years of the war, 1970-72, at which point many very difficult and largely unpredictable circumstances impacted simultaneously on our committed units and their commanders. Let's name only a few:

- By 1970 it was clear to serious observers that the United States was embarked on a program of withdrawal under fire, with the objective of attaining a political settlement, not military resolution.

- Large segments of the combat elements were drawn by conscription from a youth which had been exposed continuously since 1965 to the drumbeat that this war was a stupid and fruitless venture.

- Those who did serve increasingly saw themselves as the "disenfranchised."

  —Selective deferments for college allowed those fortunate enough to attend college to avoid service: unbound from service yet free to protest in the streets and on the campuses.

  —Those motivated to serve found their participation abjured by fellow citizens and peers. Returning to hometowns and campuses, they necessarily shed any identification with their Vietnam experience—hid it!

—There were few community welcomes for returning veterans.

- Minority soldiers in particular felt the sting of disproportional hazard. Unanswered ethnic frustrations were expressed in organizational activism and civil disturbance in many cities throughout the United States in 1968. Many carried with them into service in Vietnam their double doubts about America and its future.

- Coupled with these already extreme pressures was a new attitude about drugs—readily available in Vietnam— and the mores and values of a young society inordinately embarked on "doing one's own thing."



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- And there was an activist underground press, which in early 1968 numbered in the teens. By 1971, it had expanded 10-fold, inciting soldier dissent and political action. Once the administration's intent became clear regarding conduct of the ground war, this GI press proved remarkably adept at retargeting much of its effort on personnel in the Air Force whose weapons were the administration's main "stick" in the negotiating process.

These were activities over which the Army and the other services had no control and little ability to influence directly. Our leaders, adept at tactics and accustomed to the American soldier, who has never been a figure to be trifled with by unwarranted or dubious abruptness (recall Von Steuben's praise of this characteristic), found themselves in an overload situation. For committed combat leaders, the tactical problem was difficult enough. This litany of pressures added a burden which in the later years resulted in a friction increasingly expressed in indiscipline which, while numerically small, increased to levels three to four times the expected rate. (It was still measured in the fractions of one percent.)

In the aftermath of Vietnam it was clear to many that we had tolerated some dumb practices which detracted markedly from the unit's ability to cope with these difficulties. It was a mistake to rotate a unit's officer leadership on a set schedule. It was a mistake to focus on extending equity to the individual to the detriment of unit integrity and long-term soldier-to-soldier associations. You can imagine the chaotic situation of trying to assure equitable hazard to individuals while pursuing a long series of unit drawdowns publicly announced by the President. We soon arrived at situations in those final months where the residual combat units were no more than transient collections of those whose time in-country was shortest.

The philosophy which created that kind of chaos is being rooted out now. . . .

Now to my last point, John—the state of today's Army. [The critic you cited], whose book bears not a single reference more current than two years ago, is hardly a source for a contemporary critique of today's Army.

. . . content-wise, [it] dates to a time when the Army was short in meeting its recruiting goals, when quality standards were bad (the standards *themselves* were faulty), when we drew in large numbers of people who tested poorly against even those standards. We were short people—and short the tools to draw good people into our ranks. The last several years have seen a dramatic turnabout. All components of the Army—Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve—have met their recruiting goals, numerically as well as qualitatively. This year the Army will bring in over 100,000 high school diploma graduates -- in excess of 80 percent of our intake. We are in a position to accept the best applicants, not only on the input side, but in admission to career status. Those who don't meet rigid quality standards are prohibited from reenlistment. Coupled with a new emphasis on units, our ambitions for incorporating an American Regimental System, our toughened entry-level training and the administrative means to eliminate ill-motivated or troublesome types not amenable to disciplined service, I foresee a bright future for the Army. Our professional development courses, both officer and noncommissioned officer, have been rigorously reviewed and revamped.

These events augur well for a healthy Army, which today is in transition to the quality force it must be for the years ahead. It is an Army concerned with discipline and competence and values—with interest in the latter visibly expanded in all our professional journals, in our schools, and in our units as well. It is not a perfect Army, but it is an Army that owes apologies to no one.

In closing, John, let me call your attention to the discussion of the profession of arms in our primer, FM 100-1. Note that a professional ethic of service is laid out—not over-elaborate in verbalization, but certainly profound in its simplicity and direction.

It's my hope that this letter touches major concerns of your very pertinent inquiry. I wish you well as you approach the personal decisions that lie ahead.

## Letter to an
## ARMY OFFICER ON THE ARMY ETHIC AND TRAINING

29 August 1982

. . . [Our] ethic—embodying loyalty, self-sacrifice, and personal responsibility—may be easily subscribed to by a few new trainees, but much of it runs counter to many of society's prevailing attitudes. So I would expect it to be grasped only in stages during one's professional life. If that occurs early, all the better; but I suspect that while we can train to explicit standards in military skills and behavior (discipline) during IET [initial entry training], the best we can expect for the vast majority of trainees is a modest shaping (or reshaping) of their personal value sets so that these are not in conflict with the Army ethic.

During IET, we seek to develop a disciplined, highly motivated Soldier who is qualified in his basic weapon, physically conditioned, and skilled in the fundamentals of soldiering. During the "soldierization" process which is a part of IET, we seek to effect basic attitudinal and behavioral changes. Those who reject discipline, or who exhibit an obvious lack of motivation or ability are quickly eliminated. We know through evaluation that most trainees upon completion of training—in spite of problems and complaints—finish IET with high morale, a vastly improved attitude about themselves and the Army, an appreciation of the importance of mutual support within a unit, and an awareness that their survival in combat is dependent upon well developed individual and team skills. Assuredly this is a good start in shaping individual notions regarding personal responsibility, loyalty and self-sacrifice.

As you are probably aware, the resources we devote to training are subjected annually to the most rigorous scrutiny. Over the years we have been continuously challenged to justify the time, money and personnel required to achieve specific levels of competence in measurable military skills. Values are intangible in this setting, and consequently overlooked by most critics. Yet they may be the most important product of our training programs. To the degree that you are able through your research to shed light on what is desirable (and achievable) in fostering value changes during initial training, you will be making a valuable contribution to your profession. . . .

## Videotape Message on Modernization
## AT THE ANNUAL AUSA CONVENTION

Washington, DC
16 September 1982

### Challenge of the 80's

Our Army has underway the most extensive modernization effort since World War II. . . .

Modernization has two important and inseparable objectives. The first is the strengthening of our conventional deterrent through the fielding of quality equipment to give our forward deployed and early deploying forces a measure of technical and operational advantage. The second objective is the full fleshing out of a sustaining capability so that once battle is joined, field commanders can turn with confidence to later deploying fully equipped units—units which today are plagued by substantial equipment shortages. These two objectives of modernizing and equipping the force are inseparable in the determination of force readiness.

The challenge today and in the years ahead—for this cannot be a short term program—isn't easy, but it is one at which Soldiers and civilians throughout the Army are showing themselves increasingly adept. I'm very proud of their effort, and the efforts of American industry to field a quality Army.



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**Article in**
**ARMY MAGAZINE, 1982-83 GREEN BOOK ISSUE**
1 October 1982

## A Time of Transition—A Focus on Quality

One of the points often misunderstood when discussing modernization is that it is not a replacement program—driving in a new machine and washing the older one out of the system. Instead, we are driving in a new machine and moving the other one over to be used by a unit that currently has no machines at all. In some cases we are moving in a new piece of equipment where none exists today. So the modernization process accomplishes two things: it upgrades the general capability of the inventory, and it helps us remedy overall equipment shortages in the Total Army—significant shortages in many critical categories.

These shortages are felt most seriously, but not exclusively, in later-deploying Reserve Component units where, in many cases we are only able to provide minimal quantities for training purposes. The solution to this long-standing problem does not lie in forcing some scheme of uniform distribution on the Total Army. Such a scheme would degrade, not enhance, both our deterrent and warfighting postures. . . .The Army is abiding by its fielding plan to the best of its ability. Nonetheless, the problem of equipment shortages is serious and continuing. Progress in correcting it depends on steady adherence to a long-term program of investment in land force materiel. That is, and will remain, our number one management challenge in this decade. . . .

The Army's future health depends fully on continuation of the modernization process—in doctrine, in force structure, in equipment, and in the transformation away from the worst effects of overcentralized management.

Successful modernization is our only assurance that, over time, we will be prepared for the many diverse tasks we may be called upon to accomplish. We chose quality over size so that we could focus our full attention on the most essential tasks during the challenging period of transition that we are in today.

Success demands the utmost of each of us—every Active Soldier, every Guardsman, every Reservist, every civilian member of the Total Army team.

The goal we have set is the right one. It is based on man's 5,500 years of recorded history and some 14,500 conflicts occurring during that time—namely, that it is the quality force which best deters conflict, or succeeds in battle when deterrence fails.

It is quality that fosters respect and restraint on the part of potential foes. It is quality that nourishes a favorable kinship with allies. It is quality that helps to maintain a supportive attitude in the public eye. And it is the recognition of quality that stirs Soldiers to a healthy self-image of themselves, their units and the Army.

The attainment of a quality Army requires three ingredients: a sense of direction, willing and able participants, and assets sufficient to the intended task. A lack in any of these, especially for an organization as vital and as challenged as the Army, invites stagnation, frustration, and even regression in the maintenance of necessary skills, capabilities, and self-image.

A lack in all three categories can be disastrous. Yet, that is the situation the U. S. Army had to struggle through for much of the decade following the Vietnam War: external perspectives defining too narrowly its future role, shortcuts and imposed economies which restricted its ability to attract and cultivate human competence in its ranks, and investments far too restricted to refurbish aging equipment and a deteriorating physical plant.

Today, most of this is changing for the better. It's a new and refreshing situation. And while the perfection we all seek is still distant, we are in an exciting time of transition: our direction clear, our people good, and long-term programs for correcting deficiencies set into place.

Three years ago we could compute real budgetary growth at only a fraction above the one percent mark. Today—despite the dollar shrinkage mentioned—we have experienced three consecutive years in which our growth has averaged 10 percent!

With prudent and responsible action on our part, and wisdom and constancy of effort by the national authorities, we have a chance to sustain the progress evident today in virtually every sector of the Army, progress which is absolutely essential for our nation's well-being and security.

Without selling short the magnitude of the effort that lies ahead, I nonetheless believe it is terribly important for us to recognize that a great deal of hard work at every level of the Army has resulted in very positive accomplishments in which every Soldier can take great pride.

Some of this positive improvement is physically evident and discretely measurable. We know, for example, that in *the human dimension* our strength levels, for both the Active and the Reserve Components, are on target; that the quality of new recruits is high; that many voids in grade and skill have been filled; and that at the unit level we are measurably improving the quality of the career force through toughened reenlistment standards set against rigidly controlled skill and grade requirements.

Lt. Gen. Maxwell R. Thurman's article forcefully addresses our efforts to put the power in the hands of unit commanders ("power down") so that we power up the Army. Equally important are the perceptible gains indicated by field trips and surveys, which tell us that our Army's self-image is indeed on the upswing.

- In increasing numbers, company grade officers express their intention of making the Army a career. Similar trends are evident for all categories of enlisted personnel. Of course, the recent pay increases and the state of the economy play a role in this, but the number one factor cited in the decision of first-term Soldiers to remain is not economic—it's job satisfaction.

- Surveys indicate very clearly that today's Soldiers believe they are doing important work (and most believe that all Americans should share in that work by serving their country in some capacity).

- Officers of all grades today increasingly view the mission and welfare of their Soldiers ahead of their career interests. (These conclusions are drawn from the same surveys which not too many years ago reflected some worrisome inversions in attitudes about motivation toward service.)

- These same officers (some 4,000 of them) rate the morale, discipline, and trainability of today's Soldiers much improved over the past three years.

While these kinds of observations are consistent with my own in visiting Army units, I agree that they can only be truly validated by the men and women serving throughout the service. I would hope that their views are consistent. If not, I hope they attempt to judge why not, and seek to instigate corrective action.

For me, the signs do seem positive, and if validated, I would hope to have them echoed by those who are responsible—the officers, NCO's and civilian leaders—instead of the drumbeat of internal self-flagellation which the outside world has grown too accustomed to hearing from our ranks. The news is good—not perfect, but good. We need to share that good news!

Surely, any objective observer cannot ignore the many exciting ventures underway throughout the Army today. One significant example is the current effort to revamp our personnel system, from one heretofore focused (civilian-style) on efficiency in the management of individuals, to a new manning system centered (military-style) on the creation and maintenance of effective units.

The energy, enthusiasm and innovativeness with which all sectors of the Army are approaching this very difficult task are nothing short of superb. Many in the past have come to the same conclusion we have today: that the features we are designing into this new system—regimental affiliation, home-basing, and unit rotations—are the right way to go. But the inordinate difficulty of constructing a workable solution has, time and again, put it in the "too tough"

box. At the same time, we all know that so long as turbulence reigns, our best efforts to maintain ready units will evaporate.

The solution, unfortunately, must be radical. I see no alternative. No longer can we delay the issue by emphasizing the "why not's." With proper caution we must continue to explore the "how to's."

Our course has been one of progressive experimentation, evaluation, and expansion. It began in late 1979 when we had an opportunity to observe the beneficial effects of the platoon train-and-retrain program. Our interest was sustained by the inability of the current system to stem the tide of turbulence, which is the number one enemy of readiness.

That led us in May of 1981 to begin a three-year evaluation program termed COHORT, in which we created 20 company-size packages with the intent of seeing them through full cycles of training, stateside assignment, and overseas deployment. The first of those companies is now in its mid-life, and has deployed to Germany.

One of the key findings—which should not have been a surprise—is that the Army's current management system has buried within it all varieties of obstacles which prevent us from keeping a unit together. These obstacles are being identified, and will be rooted out because the results thus far leave little doubt that a unit-based system is the correct way to go. The Army is now committed to the adoption of a new manning system based on units.

We are in the process now of expanding our program to a level which encompasses about 10 percent of our combat arms companies. Expansion beyond that level would be unwise at this time because we do not want to overburden our divisions which already must contend with two major modernization activities: conversion to "Division 86" configuration in 1984 and the continuous infusion of new materiel.

Once we are through the "Division 86" transition "window," I anticipate an even more rapid expansion of the unit-based program Army-wide. That will largely remedy the Soldier- turbulence problem in the organizations in which it has the greatest readiness impact.

At the same time, we have considered how best to recreate an Army community—with solid traditions, sure teamwork, close friendships, and geographic orientations. As a result, we are in a period of tough decisions regarding the limits and dimensions of an American Regimental System.

I can tell you this much now: the regiment will be a nontactical grouping of like battalions overseas paired with like battalions in the continental United States; the regiment will have a home base, a regimental commander and adjutant; the regiment's headquarters will be the custodian of its colors and traditions, and perhaps eventually enter fully into the assignment of its officers and NCO's—who will serve repetitive tours in that regiment.

I expect that the regiment will in many ways do for the professional Soldier what the company package has already proved it can do for the Soldier; serve as an environment to foster closer bonds of loyalty, competence, and fulfilling service.

The designation of these regiments will undoubtedly involve some controversy because the current system of vesting regimental lineage in battalions permits many more flags than can be sustained under the regimental system we are now scrutinizing.

I can only assure you that I will be guided throughout this process by the advice of one very distinguished retired officer: "Tell the Chief to drive on and do what's good for the Army."

That I'll do!

These comments illustrate a few of the exciting tools we are developing for the long haul to sustain a Total Army of competent military and civilian professionals to serve their nation loyally in war and peace. But at the same time, despite these programs and our recent successes in recruiting, all must remain sensitive to the very basic issue of sustaining the force in future periods when economic conditions or demographics are not as favorable as today.

Today, however, as the theme of this year's edition of the Army *Green Book*—the management of modernization—highlights, equipping the Army poses the greatest continuing challenge for

us. It is the issue of securing modern arms. It is the issue of adequate equipment levels throughout the Army. It is the issue of sustainability. It is a multifaceted problem which directly impacts upon unit and force readiness.

First, we must successfully sustain an efficient long-term procurement program. Then we have to synchronize a myriad of details to assure that new equipment is delivered and issued in a maintainable and sustainable environment. Simultaneously, we need to reorganize units and teach them tactics which can put these new weapons to best use.

Last, we need to redistribute displaced systems in a combat-ready condition to other units, because for many years into the future we will be in a high-low mix of equipment, and with rather substantial quantities on the low side of the capabilities scale.

All of this means that we must continue to approach the entire process with the greatest care, fully mindful of the enormous consequences of waste or mismanagement. If this were a program that involved only a few new items, we might take it in stride easily. But the fact is that we are looking at a process which involves the infusion of 583 new systems! The complexity of the task is guaranteed to tax the imagination, innovation and patience of the entire Army.

Thus far, we can look with pride at a number of real success stories like the under-cost and on-time delivery of modified CH-47 "Chinook" helicopters, or the successful introduction of the Abrams tank to Europe—the culmination of a long and immensely complicated process of systematic checks and balances and organizational integration.

On occasion we've stumbled. There was the case of the priority shipment of computers to one overseas location. The computers arrived, and their newly trained personnel (who earned their proficiency in a crash commercial program), and the software was there, and the supporting structure—but inexplicably, the requisite tail of spare parts did not arrive.

The command measured the risks of conversion to the new system in the absence of guarantees of sustained operational capability, and found them too great. Consequently, the computers sat idle, and the personnel, trained and shipped with great urgency and cost, were temporarily assigned elsewhere. Hence, the time and investment of many were wasted by incomplete work.

But, despite the occasional snafus, praise is due to many. This dedication is today being reflected in the accelerating schedule of actual and planned new equipment arriving in unit motor pools and supply rooms. The M60A3 and the M198 howitzers entered operational status in units in 1979 and 1980, respectively. In 1981 the Abrams, the AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder and the Stinger were fielded. This year, Copperhead becomes operational. And as a result of the budget now before Congress, the improved TOW, the VIPER, the MLRS, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the Patriot and Pershing II missiles will enter the fighting inventory soon.

Quality materiel in the hands of quality units is a reality today, and in the years ahead, as production swings into gear, this fact will be increasingly evident to all elements of the Total Army.

One of the most prevalent complaints I have heard from Soldiers in the field has less to do with the status of fighting vehicles and weapons than with the availability and maintainability of supporting vehicles—such things as trucks, trailers and forklifts.

When you understand for example, that the 38,000 5-ton trucks in our inventory date back to initial production in 1951, based on a 1948 design, you can begin to understand why. The logjam on new 5-ton production has been broken; new vehicles are beginning to arrive in Europe to support systems like TACFIRE, and the M198 howitzer; and eventually Patriot and the division air-defense gun as those systems are introduced.

So the thrust of modernization is broad-based, affecting support as well as direct combat functions. Successfully accomplished, modernization will impact very directly and beneficially on our readiness. Full benefit, however, will only come when all components of the Army are fully tuned to support it; when the positive influence of solid institutional and unit training programs, the pertinence and rigor of our maintenance systems, and the sustainability of our support structure are brought into full play.

The reports in this book by our field commanders should give you a good flavor of the impact of modernization on training throughout the Army. Rather than elaborate on these, I want to remark on the dominant impression I have gleaned from my worldwide travel to units. That is that the NCO Corps is back, and clearly in charge. And that's good news, because good discipline, good training and good maintenance begin with them.

In some locales training is still spotty—and battle drills and standardization not in universal evidence. But in general, I'm pleased with and proud to be associated with the corps of noncommissioned leaders who are working hard, and succeeding, in generating and sustaining improved professional performance throughout the Army. Their professionalism gives me confidence in our ability to undertake the massive equipping program, for they will be at the cutting edge of this entire effort.

Maintenance is the other task I lay on commanders at all levels as a matter of the utmost importance. In general, I'm not happy with where we are today. But leaders can only go so far in compensating for the laborious, paper-intensive system that is in place today.

Consequently, the Deputy for Logistics on the Army Staff, the Logistics Center at Fort Lee, Virginia, and the 24th Infantry Division at the field level have been charged with making the Army's maintenance system more responsive to the true operational needs.

We need effective units much more than we need overly elaborate logbooks and clogged requisition streams stretching back to the depots. Your good ideas are solicited for trial. Any system which is not easily workable at the lowest level subverts the true purpose of maintenance.

The final ingredient of our readiness dimension is sustainability. The guidance we have received from the Secretary of Defense is quite specific here, providing a refreshing change to the guidance we labored under heretofore. It says simply that we must be able to sustain combat for as long as necessary, period.

Clearly there is an obvious affordability constraint which becomes self-regulating. What is important is that scenarios which generate our requirements are not artificially constrained. This results in achieving a much more realistic idea about our true needs in stockpiles and in support units.

It also provides us the basis for developing an industrial base that will be responsive in wartime.

No single item better illustrates the kind of rapid progress we have been able to make in the area of sustainability than our effort to develop adequate water resources for deployed forces in a contingency.

Our in-house assets at the time of the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force consisted largely of refurbished material of World War II design, barely adequate to the climatic extremes of the Middle East.

We realized that major investments in state-of-the-art water extraction, purification, storage, distribution, and cooling techniques were urgently needed.

It was our number one problem insofar as contingency operations were concerned—some gauged it more critical than ammunition as a potential "war-stopper."

The recent "Bright Star 82" exercise proved that we have made significant progress in eliminating water as a planning constraint in operations. Some substantial purchases are still necessary, but the deep concern and furrowed brows have eased.

This is the measure of today's Army—steady progress and transition to a quality force capable of sustaining itself in combat.

In closing, I would be remiss not to mention the special obligation we all have of sustaining the special qualities of *a supportive Army community,* both for the Soldier and for his family. Early this month, the third Army Family Symposium met in Washington, DC, resulting in another fruitful opportunity to exchange ideas and map out local programs in response to many different needs.

These vary by location, but span the spectrum of child care, family support, life extension

and employment opportunity programs. We recognize that concerned hearts and generous hands creatively joined can compensate for much in our special way of life, but they do need material assistance.

Substantial programs of construction and refurbishment directed at barracks, family housing, medical facilities, schools, and recreational facilities are forthcoming. Indeed, substantial programs are already in evidence worldwide.

I hope I have given you some flavor of the direction in which today's Army is headed: toward a quality Army—well trained, disciplined and combat-ready. I also hope you have some feel of the sense of accomplishment and challenges evident in today's Army.

. . . Years hence, I want each of you to be able to look back with pride at what the Army was able to accomplish together. It's a great time to be a Soldier.

## Adress to the ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY Washington, DC

12 October 1982

Through visits I've formed a view of today's Army—the substance of which is that we are a good Army. And there's ample evidence, wherever one turns, that this good Army of ours is daily getting better. . .[The] yardstick is not today's Army versus the U.S. Army of the 40's the 50's, the 60's or the 70's. Our Army can only be measured against the challenges are broad in nature, continue to grow and are likely to be unforgiving of failure.

We cannot, in preparing for those tasks, mirror others. That is not possible. Nor is that necessary. For if war should come I am convinced that the biggest Army will not necessarily be the victor. The best Army will be.

The concomitant of that thesis is that it is also the *best* Army that can underwrite our role as peacemaker and permit us to deter war. Today we shouider the unavoidable distinction of helping to set the tone and tenor of global events in which the values, the interests, the very existence of the democratioc states themselves are at risk. We must be the best!

All about us today—on Army posts, in our arsenals and depots—you can see the signs of evident improvement toward that goal. But I caution you that we have a long way to go. . . .

Let us make no mistake about the vastly increased importance of conventional land power today. That *importance is suggested* by contemporary incidents, *supported* by historical study, *confirmed* in this Administration's defense philosophy, and finally and happily for all of us *ratified* by its selection of a Soldier steeped in AirLand war as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff!

I applaud you with the selection of General Jack Vessey as the nation's senior military officer. it is a wise choice. General Vessey can put profound truth in simple and explicit language about as well as any professional I know.

There's no need to bolster my views on the importance of land warfare by reciting the litany of contemporary events whose central features and eventual outcomes have been dependent upon the existence of competent land forces.

Certainly the Soviet Union—our principal antagonist—has long placed faith in land power. The continuing growth of this last great colonial power, from a small parcel of land around

Moscow to its present continental dimension, has not sprung from the innate appeal of its ideology. It has occurred and is perpetuated by strength of arms. . .the Soviet style of war—heavily land oriented—is imbedded today in both hemispheres—on virtually every continent.

What it portends for us is the likelihood of increasing instances of ill-conceived adventurism, which in many situations will directly threaten U.S. and allied interests. We must maintain adequate means to respond—in cooperation with responsible governments and trusted allies—when such circumstances arise.

The defense of Europe today is clearly one instance of successful coalition planning. And while there is some disproportionality in national contributions, and some periodic disharmony evident as well, the fundamental issues germane to our coalition are being pursued collegially toward an accommodation which all parties recognize is in their fundamental self-interest.

While in the Sinai two weeks ago, I had an opportunity to spend time observing the operations of the MFO [Multination Force and Observers], under command of General Bull-Hansen—a splendid professional. I think his presence as a Norwegian in this distant region underscore the increasing importance European nations give to their long term interests being defined in places other than Europe. The willing cooperation of Italy and France in Lebanon and the involvement of others in diverse regions of the world are reflections of the fact that the future of nations which share our values is intertwined.

Today we are wisely embarked on programs to support the development of regionally oriented coalitions—reflected in the development of regional forces, bolstered by enhanced security assistance programs, and set in motion through coalition strategies with partner nations throughout the world.

This is not only the sensible way to go; it is the only way to go—if we seek seriously to meet threats outside of Europe without compromising that vital theater.

Now I've told you why we must strive to be the best Army. I can also define for you what that best Army must be.

- *It must be a flexible Army,* capable of engaging in mechanized warfare on a grand scale, but not so thoroughly wrapped in armor plate and clanking hardware that it is either (1) unable to transit oceans, or (2) so mentally overstructured for the European contingency that it is incapable of responding to operations which require greater finesse in other areas of the world and across the full spectrum of warfare.

- *It must be a technologically competent Army,* proficient in the diverse environments which combatants can reasonably expect to encounter today: conventional as well as chemical, electronic, nuclear—and adept at seeking advantage in technologies which offer a reasonable means to exploit the vulnerabilities of potential enemies. Needless to say, what we adopt must be affordable. Of necessity, we must learn to live with the fact that affordability will continuously drive us into a position of having to know how to employ and maintain a high-low mix of weapons.

- *It must be a strategically deployable Army.* No matter how good we are, if we can't get to a conflict, then the nation's investment in us is wasted. In this light we need to think constantly in terms of lightening the force, in terms of prepositioning equipment where that is practicable and advantageous, and we need to think in terms of more actively speaking out for strategic lift improvements—both air and sea.

- *Last, it must be a tactically sound Army*—with a balanced capability to attack or defend, with a careful balance between combat and support elements so that when committed we can sustain conflict. And we must be an Army with a developed judgment that instinctively employs maneuver and firepower to best advantage to place the attacker at risk. . . .

These, then, are the imperatives of what our Army must become.

How do we accomplish this? How can we transition into this "best" Army that Meyer says

we need to be? For surely we are an Army in transition—in doctrine, in tactics, in organization, in equipment, in manning, and in supporting.

We can transition by developing a constancy of purpose in the direction we are now headed and by ensuring that the resources necessary are available to permit that constancy—hopefully at an accelerated pace! We will not do it by losing perspective and overemphasizing one aspect of the Army at the expense of another.

As we transition we must ensure that we have a whole Army -- physically strong, mentally attuned to the world, with tight bonds of human affection, and a sturdy ethical base which can withstand the buffeting of internal and external pressures.

We have shaped and set in motion a great number of specific programs targeted on accomplishing these things. In some cases the salutary effects are already visible. In others, we have just begun to scratch the surface of what's possible and desirable.

*Mentally*, we've been working on measures that affect every segment of the Army, from general officer to private. At the senior officer level, we're giving heightened attention to the development of strategic thinking, to the primacy of the planning in the planning, programming and budgeting system; to interservice planning, and to continued innovation in doctrinal development. We must continue to pursue these directions.

We must continue to transition our development cycle to a process which moves deliberately from doctrinal concept to capability; reversing what has for too long been a rejiggering of convenient concepts to justify what technology has brought to our doorstep. And once set in place, if it rings true, we need to hold fast our resolve to bring that doctrine to reality.

The AirLand Battle, our current doctrine, is a case in point. Critics will say that we cannot fight that way today; that we do not have the means at hand to strike deep, to interdict the enemy's information flow, to conduct the fluid offense/defense we believe necessary. And some of that is true -- although we have more capability than many realize. Doctrine is not history. Doctrine is the future. The objectives we have laid out in AirLand Battle set the pace for supportive technological and tactical adaptations, which when fully implemented, will save us from the bankruptcy which failure to adapt would otherwise bring. We must have the fortitude and the patience to build our Army, its tactics, and its equipment to support the AirLand mode of warfare. And if we hold to that steady course, we will in this decade have that ability.

Mental preparation for war is not limited to our headquarters and senior schools. The mental preparation of our Soldiers, our leaders, our units for war has received a great deal of attention, and much progress has been made, but it bears continual watching. . . .

Performance in combat depends equally on our *physical preparation*—not just in terms of adequate types and numbers of equipment but in terms of organizational structures which make the best use of that equipment, and Soldiers physically fit and able to make the new equipment effective.

For the Army, modernization and equipping the force are inextricably linked; they go hand in glove. The Army today is in a posture of serious materiel deficiency. The acquisition of new ground equipment permits us to migrate older, still capable equipment to later deploying forces which in some circumstances today are critically short, or into war reserve stocks which also need filling. These deficiencies must be filled, or our dual objectives of a viable deterrent and a sustainable combat force will be unmet.

Our efforts to organize the Army into more effective combat formations is probably best illustrated by our ongoing conversion of our heavy divisions in 1984 and our efforts with the 9th Division as a test bed for future light divisions.

The major unmet organizational need is the lack of balance in our logistic forces. Ways and means to overcome this must be attended to. Among the options we are examining is even greater Reserve augmentation of the Active force.

The third ingredient for this "best Army" is continued attention to *the human demands* of combat. My views on the direction we must pursue are laid out in this year's Green Book and other journals, and I won't pursue them fully here.

I would like to comment, however, on a recent letter in *Army* magazine which suggests that the Army's current focus on units is misplaced and ought to be secondary to the maintenance of an effective individual replacement system—which the writer implies can be effective in war only if practiced in peace. This intimates that the best way to fight a war is with individual replacements.

-Neglected by the author is an understanding that our first mission is deterrence of war, and that deterrence is best accomplished by a ready peacetime force. These past 30 years offer evidence enough that we must root out the turbulence endemic to a peacetime individual replacement system if we hope to have a chance of creating and maintaining that ready force.

-Neglected too by the author is an appreciation that the commitment of equally sized forces to combat—differing only in the cohesion extant in their ranks—will result in predictably different combat capability and combat effectiveness. *Team training is key.* What can be expected of units made up of amalgams of individuals direct from the training base? On the day of battle Soldiers will fight only as well or as poorly as they were trained as units beforehand. Also, the concept of unit replacement in wartime has much to support it from an historical perspective.

Clearly I feel strongly about the ongoing efforts to infuse a new unit-oriented manning system. The demonstrated benefits of stability in our COHORT test units tells me that we are on the right path. The conversion is difficult. It involves wrenching changes. But it is the right way to go.

Additionally, i believe that the strengthened traditions and loyalties which we can derive from adoption of a regimental system make that course the proper one for the years ahead.

Lastly, with regard to the human side of this "best Army," we must continue to give generous consideration to the quality of family life in the service—a most critical aspect of the Army's future health. The family symposium we held here in Washington this past weekend reminded me again of the tremendous resources available in our Army families and the need to be sensitive to the fact that the Army family is also in transition.

The Army's concern with the human element—evident in the kinds of actions I have just discussed—has been reflected over the years by our openness in helping to set motivated and capable Americans, otherwise blocked in the broader society, on a path toward personal improvement and individual self-fulfillment. We must continue . . . to set the standard for the nation in ensuring that racial and sexual barriers are truly eliminated. Our recent review of the role of women in uniform is a case in point. Many of our policies here-to-date ensured that women would fail. That needed to be changed. Clearly women have earned the right to be partners in uniform. We plan on clearing the air on how that can best be accomplished.

Last of all, we must continue our efforts to be an *Army morally and spiritually prepared* for the challenges that lie ahead. This means that we must underscore those values included in the oaths that we take upon entering service. We understand that we serve the nation, not ouselves, when we don the uniform. We understand that our focus cannot be on self. We must understand that service is not governed by the clock, but by our obligation to achieve excellence. And we must understand that promotion brings with it not only some added remuneration but, more importantly, the obligation of improved professionalism and increased attentiveness to the development and well-being of subordinates under our charge. Today more than ever, those of us in leadership positions—from the corporal on #1 gun "Charlie" battery, 38th Field Artillery at Camp Stanley, Korea, to the Chief of Staff himself, here in Washington, DC—must have a purpose. We both must know that it is *immoral* not to be professional at our jobs.

When the corporal leaves the motor park, and walks up the hill to billets, he does so knowing that his section is ready to go to war. It's my confidence that responsible behavior like that is replayed in countless locations daily—in fact is prevalent throughout the Army—which leads me to conclude that we are a good Army today, and getting better, in transition to the excellence which ensures that we are the best!

Anytime latent worries about this transition bubble to the surface they immediately go away as I look at the leadership that's there to assist me, both military and civilian. As you look at the

leadership here on the dais—you see Sergeant Major of the Army Bill Connelly—you see the sergeants major that are here—the Soldiers that are here—the civilian support we have in the civilian secretariat—the support of everyone here. This occasion provides me the opportunity to thank all of you, because I believe that with your support we truly can have the best Army, and that's the Army that all of us want. Thank you very much.

## Address to the ARMY WAR COLLEGE CLASS

On Leadership*
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
29 October 1982

Unsure of what you wanted to talk to me about or what I should talk to you about either, I looked at two possibilities. One was to give you a wiring diagram and discussion—I'm the Chief of staff, and that there's a Vice Chief of Staff, and a Director of Army Staff. I've got some deputies down there, and there's all thos other folks out there that do other things. Since many of you know that I don't believe in wiring diagrams—I believe in islands of competence— that blows that particular approach.

Then, I thought about [discussing] the theory of leadership and management, but I decided that wouldn't be very useful either because you continually have all the leading proponents of theory walking across this stage. They've never had to manage or lead anything, but they've had plenty of opportunity to focus on theory. They come up and they tell you about management by objectives and about how you go about doing participatory management and all those other high-sounding management [and] leadership terms.

I decided the most useful thing I could do, and the easiest for me, would be if I talked to you a bit about how I have gone about leading and managing the Army during my time as the Chief of Staff. I told my wife that I was going to talk to you about *how* I had led and managed the Army during this period of time I'd been the Chief of Staff. She said, "I can help you; I'll give you the answer—poorly!" She said, "If you ask the students how you've done, they can give you that answer; you can turn them loose and they'll have the rest of the morning off, and they'll be very happy, and that'll be good leadership." I always knew I married a woman who was smarter than I was. That's true of most of us.

If I'm going to talk about my approach to my role, I need to caution you that I'm going to have to use the vertical pronoun frequently. I don't intend that egotistically, but in the very basic sense of ego, if I'm going to talk about how I do something, it's going to be about certain things that I've done. So, for those back there counting how many times I use the term "I", it's intentional today.

This is the first time I've tried to do this. . . .In the process of preparing I realized that it's appropriate that I discuss this subject here at the War College because it played a very important part in my becoming Chief of Staff. . . .

First, I have to tell you—and I have told others this before—that I never, never, never wanted to be Chief of Staff of the Army. I really mean it—for many, many reasons. It's a lot more fun to be out running USAREUR, TRADOC or a brigade—or anything else—than it is to be holding this position as Chief of Staff of the United States Army. I never wanted it.

*The full outline of this talk is more clearly laid out in General Meyer's CSIS talk on leadership, 14 December 1982.



★ ★ ★ ★

As most of you know, I was on orders to go to Heidelberg in 1979 to be Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces in Europe. My orders were already published. We had already sent off one household shipment and the packers were there to get the rest. I already knew who the next Chief of Staff of the Army was going to be.

I got a call on Friday afternoon from Harold Brown saying, "The President would like to talk to you tomorrow morning." That would be a Saturday morning. I said, "Gee, Harold, I'm sorry, but I'm going up to my Dad's 80th birthday." (We were going to celebrate my father's 80th birthday up in St. Marys, Pennsylvania, before I left for Europe, and all my brothers and sisters were coming in for the event.) He said, "Well, I think it's important to go over and see the President." I said, "Well, I allow as how you're right." He didn't tell me what it was about.

So I went over to see the President. I thought he wanted to talk to me about what a great choice he'd made in sending me off to Heidelberg. I was going to reinforce that and tell him about all the great things I was going to do in Europe. He started to talk about the Far East, Korea, and a lot of areas like that. Then he said to me, "What are your ambitions?" I thought, here I am, a young punk 50 years old, I've been selected for four-star rank, I'm going off to command in Europe. I said, "Well, I'll tell you Mr. President,"—and this is a true story—"when I was a young lieutenant down in Fort Benning, I used to walk along Baltsell Avenue, right across from the Fort Benning Golf Course. My ambition always was to be a colonel of infantry and live on Baltsell Avenue, across from the golf course, and train young infantrymen down at the infantry school" And he said, "that's not what I had in mind, General." He said, "What are your ambitions—what do you hope to do when you come back from Heidelberg?" I said, "I really hadn't thought about it. I'd like to go into the training business, or something like that." And the President said, "well, what about being Chief of Staff?" I told him I never really wanted to be Chief of Staff. And he said, "well, what if you were to be Chief of Staff right now?" Then I gave him all the reasons why I should not be Chief of Staff right now—you know: age and a whole host of reasons like that. And he said, "well, I'll call you back next week."

So I got in my car and drove up to St. Marys for my Dad's birthday celebration, and after that I came back down here to Carlisle. I got in here on Sunday night, and was going through all this mental trauma of "what if?" I had to come here in my role as DCSOPS to look over the new curriculum and a few other things before driving back to Washington on Monday night. And while here, I got this call from Harold Brown saying, "the President says you're going to be Chief of Staff." That's a very big mantle to have thrown on very narrow shoulders all of a sudden, and you wonder what you can do. Fortunately, between here and Washington, there's Mother Seton's in Emmitsburg and Mount St. Mary's up the side of the hill, so I stopped in there and went up into the grotto and walked around awhile and I thought about that. And it sort of came to me - O. K., look, if they are going to tell me to do it, I'll go ahead and do it, but I'm not going to do it alone, and I'm going to share all that I can with a whole bunch of other people. As long as everybody does their share, even I can look good doing it. So that's sort of the basic philosophy I've tried to apply as far as the overall leadership's concerned.

I had to go back, and then I wasn't allowed to tell my wife. The next day the packers were continuing their job when she heard on the radio that I wasn't going to Europe, and she had to stop packing. There's still a bit of sensitivity there in the family.

So, as I say, this is a good place for me to talk about it, because it kind of started right here.

One of the things I had to do at the start, and I think it's true of leaders anywhere in the Army, is assess how others have done the job. I'd had opportunities in the past, as a major and lieutenant colonel in the Coordination and Analysis branch of the Chief's office, to watch very closely General Wheeler and General Johnson. And again as a major general and lieutenant general while I was the ADCSOPS and the DCSOPS I had the opportunity to observe General Weyand and General Rogers. So I had an opportunity to view how others had done it and to make my own assessment of various things that needed to be done. . . .

One of the great things that happened when I took this job was that when I asked Jack Vessey if he would come back to be the Vice Chief of

Staff, he said, "yes." That was our good fortune. Some selections are not that easy. Making the right selection out of 420 generals—trying to pick the right guy to go to the right place so that you are able to influence the internal Army—becomes very complicated. . . .

The way to influence the DOD leadership is to focus on broad issues which they can understand. I don't mean that derogatorily; I mean that's a fact of life. There's no sense wasting your time trying to give them a long dissertation on issues that they do not understand. You must jolt them in big gulps. . . also, when dealing with DOD and the Army Secretariat, and others within the interagencies, you have to know who is influential. In the past administration there were probably three people in DOD who ran [the system]. They are in totally different positions now in DOD. Not the same at all. So you have to know who has influence—who makes the final decision because otherwise you are just wasting a lot of your time. . . .

By law we are charged by being the principal advisers not just to the President, but also to Congress. That means very often our views can be different when we present our views with regard to issues to Congress from what we've said to the President where we have been overruled—*if* they ask for our professional advice. You must understand that. You must be very clear in your mind as you go over to do that. I was told by General Weyand when he left that "the biggest mistake I made as Chief of Staff was going over and saying that within the framewwork of the resources which were allocated, the budget which we received is adequate." He said that gives Congress a way out—if a senior leader comes over and says the budget is adequate. So if you look in Meyer's statements you'll never see any statement that the budget is adequate. Not just because I am following his advice, but also because I don't believe that it is [adequate] . . . and I need to keep pressure on Congress in that area.

And the second best advice is to be absolutely honest and open with Congress. . . .As soon as your credibility is gone with Congress, you've lost your ability to influence. And again of all the areas where it is difficult to explain land combat. Congress again is in that same category. There is an air power subcommittee, a sea power subcommittee—but nobody addresses land power. Sort of lost over here in a readiness subcommittee in the SASC. We are in the process and we are pretty well along and I think John Tower will have a land power subcommitee and I think we will get one over in HASC as well; but the point is that again the problem of explaining what land forces do is far more complex than it comes to mind and that is why it is very important if you deal with them that you deal honestly.

The next way to influence Congress that I found was that you have to put some of your very, very best people in OCLL [Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison]. Again, remember that the Chief of Staff is responsible for getting resources; resources come from Congress. So you have to have some of your very, very best people in Congress. I had a policy when I was in DCSOPS that anybody the OCLL wanted, he could have. . . .

Then the other way to influence Congress is to get them out to see Soldiers. Soldiers have a better impact on congressmen than you or I will ever have . . . a lot of people remember the Army years ago in Vietnam and don't know the Army of today. . . .

The White Paper came as a result from one of my exchange visits to Sweden. I knew that I had to put out a paper but I wasn't quite sure how to do it. The Swedes had a paper that they had put out that sort of laid out their five-year program and I said, "well, nobody's ever done that." And I said, "yeah, that's a good reason". . . .

How do you influence ensuring that that change takes place? You have to attack . . . when the paper is blank. The time you strike hardest is between changes of administrations when there are a lot of people coming in with a lot of blank sheets. You put people in to help them write that portion which relates to global strategy versus other and you put people in these positions where you are able to influence that. You do the same thing in the joint arena by ensuring that the words are put into the joint strategic planning document, the data that supports the broad concept and vision that you have. . . .you influence people by being there at that point in time when they are looking for the idea and seeing that you have someone there to plug that idea in. And that takes the right kind of people in those particular jobs.

In that [vein] I can tell you very candidly the genesis of the high technology test bed. I was sitting up around the table up in OSD. The Army was headed in the direction of mechanizing the 9th Division next year, and all the PA&Eers—all those guys who couldn't make it anywhere else—who were down there counting beans were there and they were helping us out and they were explaining why you had to have more heavy divisions and everything else. I've been thinking about this a little bit. But I said, "that's too bad that we are going to do that to the 9th Division because I planned on making that a high technology test bed where we could try new technologies and everything else." I turned to the DDR&E [Director of Defense Research and Evaluation] and said, "don't you think that's a great idea?" And he said, "yeah, that's a great idea." That's really why we turned that one around. I am just telling you it's knowing who is influential—not that I did it that way, but I am saying it is having the concept of where you want to go and that every time being sure that you are able to plug in.

I think in the case of the Army in the future that that's something that had to be pushed from the top; but also if I had said that we were going to go that way, it would probably have failed; it had to come up from the bottom as well. It had to come up from the various organizations that were working on it and I think that's important. That's sort of this power down-power up approach. . . .

The biggest problem [ahead] is the credibility of the Army and its ability to be able to handle new equipment. Cost overruns—all of that—is part of the problem we face. Once we have gotten over the obstacle explaining why we need the piece of equipment, the next biggest obstacle is whether we are smart enough to bring it in without it costing too much and be able to support it when it comes in. So we have to have approaches to attack that image and that's part of why we've used various outside agencies to do it as well as internally. We've used the Association of United States Army with their fact sheets; we used a lot of other agencies to be able to explain the real facts, but also to try to be as absolutely straight forward as we can. Admit the fact that we have had problems. [We have] called in outside experts to assist us in the development of programs to improve our procurement exercises.

In the modernizing and equipping area, a major problem is that with the current state of readiness of all forces—Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines—there is a great desire to improve readiness; and if you start to list a sequence of prioritization of how you are going to apply your resources it says readiness is #1, sustainability is #2, modernization is #3 and increased force structure is #4. If you put it in that sequence, the Army will never get better . . . to me, readiness is improved by having better equipment, and equipping the force is our problem. We tried to stress that to get off the sequence which makes sense for some of the other services, but doesn't make sense for the Army. . . .there isn't one single way of looking at all services. . . .

I told you the last one of those four things I wanted to influence was the personnel system and I also told you I was scared when I looked at it because everyone told me it is too complicated. A great thing happened to me on the way to the personnel system; nobody could explain the personnel system to me because we didn't have one. We had a series of personnel policies, but we had no system. We had no system that started from the time we went out to get people until the time we buried them. We just had a series of policies that had grown over time, I'm just telling you that's a fact. That is how you . . . are still being managed . . . by the personnel process. That understanding made it easier for me to put the IG to work on a special analysis so that he could lay that out and it didn't look like I was casting the first stone. The IG always casts the first stone and then you come along and pour some oil on the ripples that are running around the Pentagon. . . .once you start to sort the problems out, then people understand that you are truly interested in developing a system.

The second [catalyst was] the continued turbulence of personnel in units—the biggest obstacle to readiness. It still is. The question is how do you put people together and keep them together. And that's the genesis of the cohesion studies and other studies. I got groups together to look at that, grabbed [some] to fly on a trip I was making to Europe and then again to Korea, and on the airplane going and coming we spent the whole time laying out generally the outline of what we wanted to do in the area of the cohesion program and the regimental system. . . .

Through no fault of their own, my two predecessors were two-year Chiefs of Staff and it is very important that leadership . . . have stability. Right or wrong, you got me for four years and that's a fact and it is very important that the direction stays reasonably the same for a period of time instead of perturbations up and down. You're better off going 80 percent the right way than 100 percent different ways every two years. So stability is important. . . .the way that I will assess [my stewardship] when I get done will be based on the attitude and the spirit and the professionalism of the Soldiers and the civilians and the rest of that inner family. That's the way, I think, you have to assess what you have done—not based on near-term, short-term, quantifiable assessments.

Gentlemen, that's as good as your Chief of Staff could do in trying to understand what it was you wanted to know about how the Army is led. I'll be glad to take your questions after a break. Thank you very much. . . .

QUESTION: Reference to your comments on personnel system, what are your perceptions as to the advantages and disadvantages of the extended command tour length for both battalion and brigade commanders?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, the advantages are that it assures that an individual is going to be there long enough to see what happens. It gets back to the basic comment I made about stability. . . .When General Cavazos was Corps Commander, he said you can tell the difference when a brigade or battalion commander comes in . . . with a long-term approach rather than to try to run 100 miles an hour. It puts him in a teaching mode as opposed to in a directive mode. I believe that's very critical . . . because you have to develop subordinates . . . [that] is our principal responsibility. . . .

Reports back from those in command and from others that have been positive. In the early stages the biggest objections to it were not [from] the officers in command, but their wives. . . .in some cases officers obviously put so much pressure on their wives that they really believed they had to produce at that same rate the the officers thought they had to produce for 18 months. I hope [the new policy] has permitted people out in the field to take a longer term view of it.

The down side of it is the same down side that it was when I started and that is there are a lot of very qualified, very good people who won't get command . . . it's a disincentive. But the . . . bottom line has to be what's best for the Soldier and what's best for the Army. What's best for the Army is having stability of command. Now that's not best for each individual, particularly the individual who does not get command who really wants it and always had it as an incentive when he came into the Army. That's the down side of it.

QUESTION: . . . .will the American people buy the force modernization we want? My feeling is that we are not going to get the dollars . . . do we have a fall-back position where we can transition all these multiple systems, if we don't get everything we plan to get?

GENERAL MEYER . . . We finished up our Commanders Conference and we ended our last OE [organizational effectiveness] session with the Army Secretariat and the Army Staff right at the bottom line: how do we explain to the American people the issues. The three key [ones that] will have an influence are resources for defense as opposed to other [needs], the nuclear freeze issue and then the human rights issue. Those three are issues which everyone . . . of you has to be knowledgeable enough to speak intelligibly about . . . and you can't just say, "well, they're a bunch of Communists," because they're not. I mean they are very serious people who have a very serious view of nuclear war and nuclear freeze and a whole host of other things and you just have to be knowledgeable and sensitive on that. The War College here is doing some things to assist us . . . to address them a little more intelligibly because it is hard to stand up when somebody says, "I'm for peace" and you say, "well, so what else is new and so am I?" In fact, I start most of my speeches [by saying] that we are peacemakers. Of course, I believe that. It says that on the entry way here to Carlisle Barracks that your purpose for being here is not to promote war, but to preserve peace. So, I think that's a part of it.

My own guess is that as far as resources are concerned for conventional forces, the issue will hinge primarily on the strategic versus conventional balance. I think that the conventional side has the opportunity to stay about where it is because I think the cuts that will come will come principally in the strategic arena—I am just giv-

ing you my personal view on it. . . .if that happens, we will have our programs in place. That is point 1.

Point 2, there is a fall-back position and I have the Army staff working on now. And that is to take the extant systems that we have and to try to upgrade them through research—figure out how to make a 106 millimeter recoilless rifle effective against tanks by improving the warhead. The infrastructure is there around the world. Every army in the world has 106-or 90-millimeter [anti-tank guns]. And yet we're not putting a dime into figuring out how to make those systems out there more effective. If we believe in coalition warfare, which we do; if we believe in the importance of our allies; if we believe in the importance of trying to make the forces we have more capable against the threat, then that's a very high-leverage, low-cost approach we can do in a very short period of time. So that's Myers' fall-back position. As a matter of fact, I think it is one that has to go forward as an adjunct rather than just a fall-back. . . .

QUESTION: In the German Army we have had some development towards bureaucracy and I think that's typical for peacetime Army in a long peacetime period. Commanders tend to be more logical—not so much leaders—and they want to do all things 100 percent perfect and they forget the Soldier, the human being. . . .So my question is, is there a similar development in your Army and what is your advice to overcome it?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .I think that's a very serious issue, the issue of leadership versus managership and versus perfection and it's part of the [reason] . . . why I believe you need to put commanders out there and keep them there. Yet in your Army you do put people out there in battalion command and brigade command for several years. . . .Let me try to explain it the way I explain it to battalion and brigade commanders when I speak to them, and that is that they have to take the role of teacher. You're right at the heart of my big concern today and why I started working values. . . .Commanders must take the role of the teacher as opposed to the director. The director ensures that everything is 100 percent correct. He checks everything down the line and he manages it and he has charts and he can tell you everything is 100 percent correct. The teacher understands that everybody out there doesn't know everything, that the greatest impact he can have upon that unit is teaching everybody and recognizing that people are going to fail. They are going to make mistakes. By doing that they are going to learn. Two months or three months from now that whole unit will be better. That's the climate I believe we need to create. That's the climate that I preach. I have to admit that the application is still spotty, but I think that is the major shift that has to take place. . . .it gets back to that concern for the individual as opposed to the concern for self, which says I can manage it because I have a chart that tells me I have X number of this doing that today and so everything is O.K. That's sort of how I see that and how we are trying to work it in our Army. Some of your battalion commander friends here would be able to give you a better view of how well it is working than I can.

QUESTION: What are your views on the morality of nuclear deterrence in national strategy?

GENERAL MEYER: Well, I believe that this is a three-hour dissertation. I'll give it to you very quickly. One, war is evil. Two, it would be preferable if there were no threats in the world. Three, there are threats in the world; therefore, it is not possible to do away with the need for armies, policemen or firemen; so there is requirement for people to deter or to be able to respond. That's a requirement. Most theologians and most leaders in most churches accept that.

The next step is the firebreak between conventional and nuclear. And there again the moral issue of whether or not to wage nucelar war is a different issue than the deterrent aspect of having nuclear weapons. . . i don't have any problem with the morality of having nuclear weapons in an imperfect world in which there is evil and there is a need to counter that evil in order to protect your own people. In most instances in most theologies that's accepted. It's being challenged now. . . .

QUESTION: Sir, the Army has been criticized for certain aspects of its leadership in the reserve components; namely the layering of the ARCOMS [Army Reserve Commands], the ARMRs [Army Readiness and Mobilization Regions]—are you familiar with that problem? You've been asked to respond, I think, by 1 December to Congress with your plan for the new structure. I'm not going to ask you to let the cat out of the bag early,

but as a problem in contemporary leadership, how are you approaching it, what are the most important things that you have given to your staff to look into so that when they come back with their solution you have got something to work with?

GENERAL MEYER: I'm glad you raised that because the interface between the Active, the Guard and the Reserve is very important. . . .We started about seven years ago when we created FORSCOM [Forces Command] focusing on the readiness of individual units. That wasn't enough; what we needed to do was focus on the ability of the Army to mobilize and go to war. That meant that we had to have greater integration of Active, Guard and Reserve: integration in full-time manning; integration in round-out units; integration in the way in which we use our readiness regions and readiness groups and to assist in training. Just a whole host of issues to assist us in being able to ensure that there was a cohesive whole—a Total Army. We have been now in a position for about two years where the mobilization function has rested in the readiness regions. . . .As a result, [our progress] in mobilization function has been dramatic, because when you start from almost zero, it is bound to be dramatic at the start. They are talking about the right kinds of issues with the [State Adjutant Generals] and with the Reserve units in their region. My personal view is that . . . it is dumb to tamper with the Active, Guard, Reserve interface now. I believe that we need stability out there as we go through Capstone, . . . stability so that we are able to identify more clearly the mobilization role for the ARCOMS and the other Reserve units that are out there. So my personal preference would be that we not touch that for another year or so because I don't believe we understand fully how best to get the capability out of our current program. That's not going to satisfy people who do not understand why the Army interface is different than the Air Force . . . they have a totally different problem. The Air Force must go to war in the first 30 days or they are not effective. The Army provides—remember what our mission is?—the capacity for sustained land warfare. That means we have to have units . . . to sustain. That's a different requirement. It doesn't mean that everybody has to be in the same state of readiness on day one. . . .Right now the general direction we're heading is to test an interim fix which would make some changes in a certain area for a couple of years and to look at that and leave the rest of the thing work along the way it is going and try to get the maximum out of it. But very clearly again, that is one of those accommodations you have to make as a leader in order to get over a hump. . . .

QUESTION: Sir, . . . I am impressed with the role Congress plays in national military strategy formulation. You alluded twice in your earlier remarks to Congress. Could you elaborate a bit on your perception of the role of the Chief of Staff as an adviser to Congress and how that differs [from your] role as adviser to the President. Second, could you tell us more about the process you've gone through to try to create this land power subcommittee?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . the Chiefs are charged by law with providing military advice to both the President and to Congress. . . .That occurs in two ways with Congress, in the context of hearings and in the context of personal calls. . . .I get called very often by heads of subcommittees or committees to go over and talk about just the kinds of issues that you are talking about. . . .I go over and give my views to them and come back and tell OSD what I've said so that there isn't any question. . . .I have that responsibility. . . .

Let me give you a very short view of that whole issue and Congress' role. One of the reasons that there is such a state of disarray, if you will, where Congress is making foreign policy . . . is because there is not agreement on who does what in Washington. There just is no agreement. [Further,] there is a lack of trust and confidence among the various agencies, [concern whether the] other agency really knows how to do the job or cares about doing it well. Case in point—the reorganization of the JCS. I don't know if you recall the chart in that article. It says how the roles of the different elements need to [be defined]. . . .You can't change just the JCS if mother OSD continues the way she is where she goes to . . . this hierarchy of civilians doing the kinds of things that the senior military ought to be doing . . . how the Defense Department does business is the right question to ask . . . how [the Secretary of Defense] does business and how we help him be better, and how the JCS are better able to provide military advice. . . .we need to get that sorted out in our own house, . . . and ultimately some kind of an agreement between the administration and Congress. It probably can't happen with the current relationships that exist

between the Administration and Congress—a general agreement about the basic strategy and direction of the country. If we go over there, everyone of those Congressmen has their own view of the strategic forces, the conventional forces and everything else. [If that continues,] I guarantee you we will waste more money and have less defense than the American people are entitled to. . . .

The country was founded upon the basis of Congress raising and equipping the Army. . . .Today they are not raising and equipping it, they are managing, ordering and directing it and deciding which one of those little screws you put on the end of whatever it is you need. That system is guaranteed to cost the American people money. It's dumb. It's ignorant and it has got to be changed. And so to me that is at the heart of the problem. The JCS reorganization is just a piece of it. . . .

QUESTION: . . . Would you elaborate on some of your reservations about [an aviation] branch in the Army?

GENERAL MEYER: All right. We talked about the aviation branch at the recent Commanders Conference. Just so you know where I come out, I have always been for an aviation branch. Me personally, but again, you go back to leadership and leadership doesn't order something down on the Army that's dumb. Or we don't have the support generally of people—you know, a lot of my ideas are dumb. I accept that. They need to run through the sieve so all the rest of the folks have a chance to take a look at it. I believe in an aviation branch, personally. I haven't made a decision on it. This is one I have been careful about because [many senior officers I respect] disagree with me. . . .My view is that the aircraft we are getting today with the attack helicopter, with the capabilities of the Blackhawk, with what we expect the Delta model to do, with what we are going to do with some of our new observation helicopters and so on—the nature of the battlefield today and so on—it is going to take a full-time guy in the cockpit just to be able to be technically proficient, to be able to maximize the capability of those systems. So that's one reason.

The second reason is that I [believe] that an aviator who is flying an attack helicopter . . . has to know more about artillery fire, air defense, land combat, and maneuver than an infantryman who is in a much tighter environment down on the ground. So I believe he has to learn the combined arms [very well]. An argument against [the aviation branch] is he won't know what is going on in the rest of the Army. I don't believe that to be true. I have found we are not doing a good job of teaching Army aviation in its role in any of the service schools. We are correcting that. We are looking at putting doctrine and development directly under the Aviation Center for all of aviation. I believe that has to be done whether or not we have a separate specialty for aviation or not.

The basic arguments to stay the way we are: One, that everybody should be in a combat arm or something else and that if they don't, they can't perform aviation well, and two, if you set aviation aside it will do two things: it will do like the Air Force did and will go off on its own or the Air Force will take it. I don't believe that's possible—any more than it was possible for the artillery to go off by itself. You know they are part and parcel of the combined arms division; they are integrated into the division and to me that is just old time thinking. But, those are very serious views held by very serious senior people on the issue.

I'm going to bite the bullet by the end of the year because that is one issue I want to settle before I leave. It needs to be settled. I very honestly have not made up my mind. I just told you my bias. . . .

# Letter to a Friend on NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MORALITY

3 November 1982

You and I both agree, I'm sure, with C.S. Lewis that:

> "...only liberal societies tolerate Pacifists. In the liberal society, the number of Pacifists will either be enough to cripple the state as a belligerent, or not. If not, you have done nothing. If it is large enough, then you have handed over the state which does tolerate pacifism to its totalitarian neighbor who does not. Pacifism of this kind is taking the straight road to a world in which there will be no Pacifists."

The participants of today's movement need to understand, regardless of [their] posturing above the milieu of nations and national issues, that nations do have distinct attributes which are relevant and important. Our nation permits open debate and dissent. It is the embodiment of shared values—some good, some unfortunately bad. But this nation permits a freer exercise of personal conscience than any other on this globe.

As a nation, we need to be reminded that what we have is not replicated globally, and on this fact, people-to-people programs founder. Typical of the Soviet Union and the CPSU's approach to political activism is the following, from page 3 of the 1 November 1982 *New York Times:*

> "The forcible breakup of the planned news conference was typical of the rough measures authorities have taken since 11 Muscovite intellectuals announced formation of the 'Group for the Establishment of Mutual Trust between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R.' in early June, the first pacifist organization to buck the powerful official Soviet 'peace' apparatus."

Given this kind of "tolerance," it seems evident to me that adoption of new moral standards depends on nation-to-nation bargaining, which ought not to be deliberately injured.

At the same time, it is vital that we, by our actions, not contribute to another polarization of our citizenry. Most of the current participants in the various freeze movements are earnestly trying to exercise their conscience. Any claim that they are dupes, being manipulated by evil forces, can only serve to hasten their sturdier allegiance to positions of ignorance.

....we [do not] have all the answers....We are charged with security, and we know how to wield the weapons we have. But General Bradley's words of a decade ago paint the dilemma posed for us ... by these weapons:

> "With the monstrous weapons man already has, humanity is in danger of being trapped in this world by its moral adolescence....We have grasped the mystery of the atom and rejected the Sermon on the Mount. Man is stumbling blindly through a spiritual darkness while toying with the precarious secrets of life and death."
>
> 'The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living."

How do we approach this dilemma?

Wolfhart Pannenberg, a theology professor in Munich, has written incisively about the experience of the German Evangelical Church.

> "In the fifties, conflicting opinions about how the churches should respond to the new threat of nuclear weapons to the survival of humankind almost jeopardized the unity of some churches, including the German Evangelical Church (EKD). *The conflict occurred, as it does now, between two different ethical attitudes: an ethics of*

*conviction that adheres to the purity of moral principles, and an ethics of responsibility that feels obliged to consider the consequences that might follow from the decision embraced.* In 1958, the synod of the EKD resolved that the two parties, while the conflict of their opinions could not be overcome, should respect each other in their Christian integrity as representing complementary courses toward the same end, the attainment of peace. . . .

"The sad truth, of course, is that precisely this was the political vision of the detente strategy that now seems to have failed, because Western hopes for cooperation, and Western restraint, have not been honored by the other side, but have been exploited for achieving political gains as well as for stepping up Eastern armaments. This experience does not mean that the vision of replacing military confrontation by political cooperation was wrong in itself. To the contrary, it enshrines the only hope for lasting peace. But apparently it takes more patience and must be followed through with more realism than idealistic enthusiasm sometimes expected."

It seems to me that the pastoral letter of the Episcopal Bishops accepts "complementary courses toward the same end, the attainment of peace. . . " in the same vein as Germany's EKD:

"The earth, for all its wonder and beauty, offers no abiding peace. Christians are here as pilgrims. . . with first fealty to the crucified and risen Christ. Holding that identity clearly and firmly, Christians may still disagree on the means of peace. We need not disagree, however, on our need for a dedicated military. We recognize that devoted Christians serve in our armed forces, which forces we need lest the United States signal irresolution."

Thereafter three issues are raised for all morally serious people to consider:

-The "policy of deterrence that intends the use of nuclear weapons in a massive first strike against whole cities and land areas" (This is in error, of course—note the contradiction between deterrence and first strike.)

-The magnitude of weapons expenditures

-The damaging impact of the weapons race on the personality structure of a whole generation, engendering "a pervasive sense of fear, menace, cynicism, sadness and helplessness." Your [Episcopalian] Bishops then urge that the United States take the bold initiative in nuclear disarmament—without specification such as "freeze," "no first use," etc.

I think those are grounds for serious, not panicky, deliberation—entirely within the groundwork of concern expressed by General Bradley.

My fears are not that we are getting into issues too tender for consideration, but that we might preemptorily cut the ground out from under those whose positions impose an "ethic of responsibility" as we deal with the real and dangerous issues of war. . . .

# An Interview in
# SOLDIERS MAGAZINE · DECEMBER ISSUE

1 December 1982

QUESTION: You have equipment and you have people. What's the key to putting them together?

GENERAL MEYER: The people who put it together are the noncommissioned officers and unit leaders. It has always been and it always will be. The key will be how well the noncommissioned officer is able to instill a sense of pride, a sense of discipline, a sense of well-being in his squad or section. It's how well the platoon leader and the company commander are able to work the platoon and company or battery. . . .

I'm convinced the noncommissioned officer corps has the capability of being the best that it's ever been, the best that it has to be if it's going to compete on the battlefield.

QUESTION: Do you feel that leaders at the Pentagon are forgetting about people issues and concentrating on equipment?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . I believe there are those who see a larger percentage of the budget going into modernization than in the past. Therefore, they think this represents a shift of concern [away] from people. But I would argue against that.

First, we're ensuring that the Soldier has a piece of equipment adequate to the task is really concern for people.

Second, we have programs which focus on ensuring that the Soldier is provided the kind of leadership he deserves. . . .Invariably when a Soldier has a problem, it's his first-line supervisor or first-line leaders who determine whether the Soldier thinks the Army cares. So we need to ensure that there is the training to develop the people. . . .

We need to assure the Soldiers that we're focusing on housing, day-care centers—and on the motor pool, because the motor pool is also a part of quality of life. We need to ensure that not just the Soldier, but also his family, is being cared for.

QUESTION: Sergeant Major of the Army William A. Connelly says he hears fewer comments about personal things and more about spare parts and job-related issues. What does that mean?

GENERAL MEYER: It means that many of the personal things are being handled better. The Soldiers now understand the importance of their mission better than a few years ago and are less willing to put up with the inadequacies of the system. They want to be sure they're able to do the job as well as they think they should.

That's a very useful attitude and one that helps us force the system to respond.

QUESTION: What about the role of women in the Army?

GENERAL MEYER: We started to get signals from the Army several years ago when we had a very serious problem in the way we were handling our female Soldiers—the incidents of sexual harassment, the high migration of female Soldiers from skills for which they enlisted to other skills and the poor use of female Soldiers. There was a large hue and cry coming not just from men, not just from commanders, but also from the women themselves.

So we tried to improve the Army so that every Soldier had a better opportunity to succeed—gender-free. We took a look at every job and determined what mental and physical requirements were needed for each job.

We will now try to put people with those mental and physical capabilities into jobs for which they are qualified. By doing that, the Army has provided a young man or woman a better chance to succeed.



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Women are absolutely essential to what we're going to do in the Army. They played a very important role in the past. There's no reduction of the importance of women.

All we're trying to do is be sure that they're able to have a chance to succeed and operate in an area where their skills are better put to use. That will help us put down much of the bad-mouthing of women that takes place in the Army. When a woman, through no fault of her own, is put in a job she can't do, some other Soldier says "look at women" and uses that as an example.

QUESTION: What is the regimental system?

QUESTION: There are two systems we're working on right now that are related to our No. 1 readiness problem. Our No. 1 readiness problem is turbulence—the turnover that takes place within units. The first program (COHORT) is putting units together and keeping them together. We've expanded that program this year by some 80 additional companies. We'll continue to do that and have already begun moving those units overseas.

The next higher-level, broader program is the association of each individual with a regiment throughout his career. That program is absolutely essential from a stability and readiness point of view. The regimental system will not only assign a person to the 5th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, Texas, for example.

When the individual is not assigned to his regiment, he will be in the Texas area as an advisor to the National Guard or the Army Reserve, or on a ROTC or recruiting assignment. He'll be in that local area. He can go back to his regiment and associate with the people on a regular basis. It will keep him abreast of the changes that take place in the Army. He'll be known in that regiment.

If Soldiers associate with one another over a long period of time, they get to understand how one another acts and reacts under pressure.

Therefore, under battlefield conditions there's not going to be any question about how the squad would act, the platoon would act, the company would act, the battalion would act. They would already have a common set of understandings.

The regimental system also provides the opportunity for the noncommissioned officers and officers to pick an area where they can put their money into a home. They know they'll be reassigned in that area. It simplifies the problem of the careerist in schooling his children and making the decision as to whether to take the family on rotations.

My only problem with the regimental system right now is that there are so many great regiments in the Army today. There will have to be a fewer number of regiments. Deciding which ones will stay on the Active rolls will be very tough.

QUESTION: Why is physical fitness important to the Army?

GENERAL MEYER: It's very important from two points of view. First of all, Soldiers who are physically fit are going to enjoy their lives more. They're going to be able to do their jobs better. They're going to have less sick time, which helps them and the Army.

From a very selfish point of view, I feel that good Soldiers who are physically fit are going to be around longer. They are much less likely to be susceptible to diseases that can kill, such as heart attacks and strokes. We know exercise will assist, but won't necessarily give total prevention.

The second view is that if we are to have a quality Army, how Soldiers appear to one another, how they appear to the American people, how they appear to the Soviets is important. So the appearance of the Army, whether you like it or not, is important. And big guts on people who can't move around don't present a good picture of an Army. . . .

# Letter to the ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS

On the New Manning System
1 December 1982

During my tenure as the Army Chief of Staff, I have become convinced that a major philosphical change in the way we man the force is needed. Consistent reports from the field and several formal studies have led me to the conclusion that piecemeal modifications to our personnel policies and procedures would be an insufficient response to the problem. We need a new *system*.

The problem is personnel turbulence. Our management procedures focus on ensuring that units are "filled" with their prescribed allocations of personnel on any given day. The Army does that well. We also do a good job ensuring that those personnel are of the right grade and skill, and are properly trained. But maintaining a good Morning Report status is not enough to assure optimum combat effectiveness if those statistics mask a situation of severe personnel turbulence. That has been the case, and it remains so despite considerable tweakings of the individual replacement processes.

The constant flow of individual personnel replacements in and out of a unit deprives the commander of the opportunity to reach unit goals of combat readiness. Units need far greater stability in order to become a team. People are not interchangeable like spare parts. There is a break-in period required to coalesce the group's ability to function as one.

Accordingly, a New Manning System, made up of a Unit Replacement System and a U. S. Army Regimental System, is being implemented. The objective is to enhance combat effectiveness by deliberately keeping Soldiers and their leaders together longer.

Under this system, Soldiers will be trained and assigned together for a definitive unit life-cycle, a portion of which will be overseas. Supplemented by the current Individual Replacement System, the unit based system will be our principal means of meeting overseas requirements in combat arms units. It is expected that these new procedures will dramatically reduce personnel turbulence and increase cohesion.

The U. S. Army Regimental System will extend the benefits of unit affiliation beyond one cycle. Throughout their service, Soldiers who are selected for retention or career status can expect to receive recurring assignments to the same group of battalions within a regiment. The current system of organizing battalions tactically under divisions and brigades will remain unchanged. Regiments will consist of paired battalions in the United States and overseas so that overseas commitments can be met by the Unit Replacement System. For the Soldiers, more predictability in assignments will follow, with all the benefits that can produce. . . .

## Letter to the
## ARMY's GENERAL OFFICERS

On Standardization
8 December 1982

Everyone is aware of the complex challenge we face over the coming years in organizational restructuring, equipment modernization and implementation of the new manning system. The magnitude of change our Soldiers are already being asked to accommodate is severe. Therefore, it is necessary to stabilize, standardize and simplify wherever possible. This, in part, is the rationale behind my insistence on programs of standardized practice—in battle drills, in loading plans, in ADMIN/LOG procedures, in approaches to physical fitness. The other, larger reason is combat readiness.

Individuals are not the only Army ingredient that require standardization. Our management processes, if they are to be effective in helping us meet the major challenges that lie ahead, need this normalized rigor too. Off-line management of the data base through frequent and recurring changes in unit MTOE's is especially inimical to "rational" decisions regarding force structure and asset distribution. The positive effect of long lead-time decisions can be meaningless and ineffective if the supporting data base is in a constant state of flux.

Consequently, it is imperative that we achieve worldwide standardization among our like-type MTOE units; with subsequent changes permitted only in that circumstance where MACOM consensus, TRADOC concurrence of doctrinal acceptability and enhanced war mission capability converge. Our MTOE process needs discipline if we are to avoid chaos. . . .

## Address to the U. S. Contingent
## MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO)

Fort Bragg, North Carolina
7 February 1983

. . . I wanted to come down here to bid you farewell today as you depart on this important national mission—a job of international peacekeeping in the finest tradition of the Army's service to country.

Repeatedly over the centuries, the piece of terrain you will be going to has been a battleground. The Egyptians, the Turks, the Crusaders from Europe, the British, the Germans . . . countless nations have waged war over that very rugged, very dry peninsula. You may very well ask why? The answer simply is that the Sinai is the land highway between three continents—Asia, Europe, and Africa—which come together in the region we know today as the Middle East.

You will see the remnants of more recent battles when you arrive there—the dead hulks of armored vehicles. And there will be unseen remnants as well which constitute a very direct hazard to your health and welfare—mines, dud munitions, and the like.

Given the undesirable nature of the terrain and the dangers of duty there, why would the United States government send a battalion of its finest soldiers?

. . . .Your predecessors were always sent to wage war. You, on the other hand, are being sent to wage peace—to help two nations friendly to the United States reach full agreement on the peace proposals begun by President Carter at Camp David, and continued and strengthened by President Reagan. Your presence represents our assurance that the United States will underwrite the security of both Egypt and Israel on their na-

tional borders with the Sinai. You must understand that the relationship between these two nations has its roots in deep passions: partly religious, partly political, partly economic. They have fought three major wars since Israel's independence in 1948. Each war has extracted increasing costs. Each has threatened to erupt into more broad conflict. The direct costs to them have been very heavy. The costs of a future conflict would not be limited to their peoples. It could call into question the security of the entire region, the West's access to oil, and undercut development of democratic principles throughout the region. Hence, your mission is of tremendous importance to the welfare of the entire Free World.

You will be joining the forces from ten other nations who, like us, believe that the maintenance of peace is of great importance: Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Colombia, Uruguay, Norway, UK, Italy, France, and Holland. The 2/508th will be the third battalion to serve our united purpose. The records of the 1/505 and [more recently] the 1/502, whom you will replace, have been proud ones. I want you to build on the lessons they have learned and work to establish new standards. . . .

It will not be easy duty. But I was tremendously impressed with what I saw of the Screaming Eagles when I visited them this past September. Proud men, often working rather isolated in squad sized positions, but confident of their purpose, and learning to cope and profit from such an assignment.

I expect that when I visit both your units in April of this year that wherever I may see you--at Ras Nasrani, or at El Gorah, or at one of the outposts—that I will be no less impressed with the conduct and performance of the Red Devils from the All American Division.

Let me wish each of you good fortune, as you go out to represent the United States. I'll be listening to hear from LTG Bull Hansen that the American contingent is living up to the high reputation we enjoy.

God Bless each of you.

## Responses to Questions Submitted BY A NEWSPAPER REPORTER

8 February 1983

QUESTION: When did political support for the Army's planned modernization program emerge—following Afghanistan/Iran, or at the beginning of the Reagan administration? Was there a National Security Council memorandum mandating an increase in conventional force capabilities, and if so, when was it issued and what did it say?

GENERAL MEYER: The catalyst for change came on 26 December 1979 when for the first time since WWII, Soviet forces were employed outside their borders. The attack on Afghanistan, coupled with the activities on-going in Iran, served to refocus DOD and the nation on the broader need for military forces. Up to that point in time DOD had generally been riveted on a NATO-only scenario for land forces. With the election (in 1980) we began to explore with the transition team the likely national security goals of the new Administration and the realm of what was possible. The Reagan administration directed through national security directives and policy statements early in 1981 that the role of conventional forces would play an increasingly important role through the remainder of this century. They also directed that in developing those forces we should take a more global view of the role of our armed forces, should focus on coalition warfare, and should develop the capability to fight for as long as necessary in a conventional mode rather than just a "short conventional war" then revert to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Their first order of business was a rapid infusion of additional 1980 and 1981 monies to remedy the most immediate shortcomings of conventional forces to fill the

principal elements of hollowness in the Hollow Army I spoke of in early 1980. In 1981, the Administration made it perfectly clear that it was serious about accelerating and maintaining a steady growth in defense investments. That was the year we embarked on what I hoped would be a constant course directed at filling as a matter of urgency the hollow Army.

QUESTION: Are you concerned that current budget trends emphasize weapons procurement over manpower, training and other nonhardware accounts? Given that there has to be a balance between weapons and manpower, do you agree with the current trend?

GENERAL MEYER: I am concerned—but I believe that it is a calculated risk which we must take. The Army is so far behind in equipping the force—active, National Guard and Army Reserve—that I do not believe we have any other choice if we are to be able to win on the battlefields of today and tomorrow. It is a trend which commanders at every level must understand and be looking for better ways to train at lower cost—simulators, etc.,—while we equip the Army.

QUESTION: Until the deep-strike weapons, such as Assault Breaker, are in inventory, doesn't success of AirLand Battle depend on early use of battlefield nuclear weapons?

GENERAL MEYER: I don't believe so. The AirLand Battle concept promises a more productive use of conventional resources than the concept which it replaces, but it does not preclude the use of nuclear or chemical weapons. On the contrary, we recognize explicitly that nuclear and chemical weapons remain an essential feature of our tactical arsenal and, by their availability, may deter enemy use of them and thereby influence the enemy's conduct of operations. The AirLand Battle concept is consistent with agreed NATO and U. S. strategy. There are ways to see deep and to strike deep today with conventional capabilities that will enable us to do more on the AirLand battlefield than many appreciate. We intend to continue to improve those capabilities so that the nuclear threshold is raised even higher.

QUESTION: Doesn't AirLand Battle depend on our ability to perfect deep strike/interdiction technology—on our ability to perfect and procure those weapons? Given the Defense Department's track record on procurement, what gives you confidence that current cost estimates are realistic and that the procurement program can be realized in the face of rising deficits and a crumbling of the "national consensus" on defense spending?

GENERAL MEYER: Some critics say that we can't fight that way today, that we do not have the means at hand to strike deep, to interdict the enemy's information flow, to conduct the fluid offense and defense we believe necessary. And some of that is true. But doctrine is not history. Doctrine is the future. The objectives we have laid out in AirLand Battle set the pace for supportive technological and tactical adaptations which when fully implemented will save us from the bankruptcy which failure to adapt would otherwise bring. We must have the fortitude and the patience to build our Army, its tactics, and its equipment to support the AirLand mode of warfare. And if we hold to that steady course, we will in this decade have a greater ability to fight that battle than we have today. In February 1983, the 16 active Component Division Commanders from all over the world met at Carlisle Barracks, PA. We war-gamed airland concepts for several days. The conclusion was that we have a capability today, there are some quick fixes which will provide near term improvement, and there are programs on the board which will ensure that we have a near total capability by the end of the decade. To develop a perfect Army that would be adequate to the job, would probably cost, over the next seven or eight years, something like $200 billion more than what the administration is currently planning to spend. Clearly, that is out of the question. There must, therefore, be tradeoffs. We must identify those areas which will provide significant leverage. I believe that by doing two things—one—showing the American people that we can control costs and—two—showing the American people that they are getting more defense for every dollar spent that we can sustain support for sufficient resources to ensure that we have the quality Army I consider essential for the future. The problem we have had in the past has been the budget zigging and zagging here and there on a multitude of critical ingredients. What needs to happen is for us to get on with a program, agreed upon by Congress and the Administration, that will provide some real stability. We've muddled through under the worst of situations in too many years past and that's not in the taxpayer's interest.

QUESTION: Doesn't the success of AirLand Battle depend on integration of strategy and weapons with NATO? What gives you confidence that this can be achieved, given the past history of NATO foot-dragging and lack of progress on inter-operability?

GENERAL MEYER: The U. S. and its NATO partners must counter the continuing growth in Warsaw Pact capabilities or else the Soviets will not perceive that they are challenged sufficiently by NATO's defensive strengths and military posture. This need not necessarily be done by matching tank for tank, helicopter for helicopter, or man for man, but it certainly will require all the skills and resources that we collectively can muster. In essence, the AirLand Battle concept describes how tactical effort must be distributed to significantly improve combat effectiveness. It asserts that in mid-high-intensity combat, we will face an opponent who is equipped with sophisticated weapons and equipment and who outnumbers us. In such a conflict, American and allied land forces cannot afford to fight as if war were nothing more than a series of collisions along a shallow front, with the timing and location of battles dictated by the capabilities and preference of the enemy. The AirLand Battle concept, then, is both less and more than some have claimed it to be. It is not a strategic panacea, which unqualifiedly assures success on tomorrow's battlefield. On the other hand, it is significantly more than a simple restatement of long-standing tactical principles. The concept is predicated on the fact that because of evolving technology, tomorrow's battlefield will offer new opportunities and create new vulnerabilities. The land power which best takes advantage of the changed environment will most likely emerge the victor. The recent elections in the Federal Republic of Germany are signs of a maturing approach toward defense issues. How far can we go in meaningful progress in coalition warfare is a function of how successful we can be politically, economically and militarily. If the economies recover, if our leaders can focus the nations clearly on the threat and if we can show that the professional military are seeking ways to improve the total capabilities of the Alliance through innovation we can—I believe—make the progress we must.

## Opening Statement to the HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE On the Posture of the Army and Department of the Army Budget Estimates for FY 84

15 February 1983

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

Once again it is my responsibility to appear before this body and assist in deliberations concerning our national defense. I welcome this opportunity to present my views regarding the Total Army's capability to fulfill its responsibilities for national defense.

In his remarks, Secretary Marsh indicated that our land forces are no longer the "hollow Army" which I first described to you in May of 1980. In the past three budgets, you—the Congress—have provided the Army with $153 billion. I believe the American people have gotten their money's worth. Neither you--nor the Army—has any reason to be apologetic. The resources you provided have permitted us to create a healthy base upon which to build the Army required by this Nation for the remainder of the twentieth century.

The Army is embarked on one of the most ambitious transformations it has ever attempted in peacetime. The Army is managing this transition toward the future with forward-looking programs in the areas of doctrine, manning, training and equipping which, when taken together, provide force multipliers that will provide more capability than anticipated from the resources which we have been given.



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The first of these force multipliers is our evolving concept of how to fight on the modern battlefield. It recognizes that we cannot successfully confront an enemy who can outnumber us along a shallow line of contact at places and times of his choosing. If, however, we can anticipate his movements and wrench control of events from him before he commits his forces to the frontal battle, we can influence the tactical situation in our favor. We call this the AirLand Battle—a way of thinking and combining Army assets with those of the Air Force to disrupt an enemy advance by striking his reinforcing elements to create opportunities for us to use our maneuver elements. In doing so, we gain battlefield leverage we have not heretofore possessed. By adding depth to the battlefield, we can also address the importance of being able to ensure the security of our rear areas.

The second force multiplier is the far more capable equipment we are now either fielding or developing. A few years ago, we made the fundamental decision not to increase our force structure and to concentrate the resources we were given toward investment in more capable equipment. This was a correct decision. You have supported the major items of equipment we are developing and procuring—items that can provide a quantum increase in battlefield effectiveness.

Our third force multiplier is our investment in good units and good Soldiers. The quality of our force has improved dramatically over the past several years. Our recruits have more ability and are staying with us longer. We are keeping them together longer in their early training, and have adopted a new manning system for our combat units to ensure greater unit stability and cohesion by fostering the long-term association of Soldiers with the same unit both at home and abroad. Commanders remain in command longer, become more proficient at their "go to war" skills, and provide better leadership for their Soldiers. These measures have enhanced morale, training and readiness.

As our more effective tactics, more modern equipment, and better soldiers have begun forging a more capable Army, we have turned our attention to a fourth force multiplier, strategic mobility. This is the capability to deploy our forces when and where they are needed overseas. The Army depends largely on our sister services for strategic mobility, but we believe we can contribute to strategic mobility by making our forces less demanding of airlift and sealift assets. At Fort Lewis, with our 9th Division, we are creating versatile, rapidly deployable light but hard-hitting forces for world-wide use. If, however, we are to capitalize on this potential, we need your support for essential financing procedures to capitalize on newly identified, high priority areas which have the potential to achieve significant combat capability improvement quickly. I specifically urge your support of our present High Technology Light Division effort and similar initiatives which can improve the strategic mobility of our forces.

Another way of gaining leverage is to work more closely with our allies. Collective security and Security Assistance, a fifth force multiplier, have long been hallmarks of our policies worldwide. This force multiplier is working, but it needs your specific attention and support. Increased financial help to our friends and allies through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) continue to prove their value in offsetting the strategy-force mismatch inherent in America's global posture. Security Assistance provides the means for our friends to improve their own defensive postures, thereby lessening our own burden.

The final force multiplier I will highlight exists in our rapidly improving Special Operations Forces. These forces have been remarkably effective in providing the small unit training and assistance that many Third World governments need. Beyond their Security Assistance roles, these forces provide an essential capability to conduct operations in low-intensity conflict environments marked by terrorism, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. They can keep major conflict from erupting and help us and our friends by countering threats before they mature into greater concerns.

These are among the major themes that the Army has emphasized as we transition to an Army of excellence. They are low-cost, high-leverage approaches to national security that merit your support.

But this is an Army in transition. Much remains to be done. The budget before you will permit us to continue in our path toward excellence Two areas in the budget—manning and equipping—merit particular attention.

We now have programs in being which attract and retain quality soldiers. Protect them!

We now have weapons systems and support systems coming into the Army which will permit our soldiers, Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve, to win on the battlefields of the future.

Another lever which you have continually expressed interest in is the effective integration of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve into true partnership with the Active Component. I am pleased to tell you that this budget will help us continue the progress begun in 1979, when for the first time since 1971, we saw stabilization and growth occur in the strength of all components. This budget continues that growth in strength and quality, increasing full-time manning by 7,000. It also funds improved school and special training. Not evident in the Reserve appropriations request is the Total Army distribution of modern equipment into Guard and Reserve inventories. This flow occurs in accordance with our long-standing rationale of giving it to those who will be called on to fight first. Almost $1 billion of this year's Army procurement account is projected to be distributed to the Reserve Components in future years. This year, as a result of earlier appropriations, some $750 million worth of newly procured equipment will be delivered into Guard and Reserve units. This equipment covers all categories, combat and support. Typical of the items to be delivered are the new M1 tank, the M60A3 tank, lightweight company mortars, improved TOW vehicles and command carriers, Roland and Chaparral air defense systems, trucks, forklifts, and expandable medical shelters. We have a long way to go, but genuine progress is being felt.

Arguments range about what is readiness, what is modernization, what is sustainability. The argument is moot where we still have soldiers without equipment. The new equipment will provide improved readiness because, in addition to better capability, it will also provide improved reliability, easier maintenance and better man-machine interface. We need your support for a stable procurement program which will provide enormous benefits and cost savings.

I continue to believe, as I indicated in last year's testimony, that there are better ways for our Nation to go about managing defense business. I say our Nation because it is not just the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Service Departments that are involved. It is you—the Congress—the OMB and the agencies of the Defense Department that must come to grips with how we can come together as a group to ensure more and better defense for the dollars we spend.

I am proud of our Army, the people in it and the dedication they have toward the defense of our Nation. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy since 1956, wrote: "There have virtually been no pure land and no pure sea wars, one principle remaining unchanged: the results of a victory in a campaign or in a war as a whole can be consolidated only by the land forces capable by their actual presence of asserting its reality." All the conflicts of the past year have again reemphasized the importance of well-trained, well-equipped and well-led ground forces. Our ability to deter wars in the future and our ability to win wars if deterrence fails will not be decided by how big our Army is—but by how good it is! We have the chance to have an Army of excellence. The approval of this budget will go a long way toward ensuring that we have that Army—today and tomorrow.



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# Hearing Before the HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE On the Military Posture And FY 84 Defense Authorization: Army Posture

15 February 1983

. . . . There are a few particular concerns that I would ask the members of this committee to look at very carefully as you listen to testimony concerning the Army. First are people issues. We now have a good Army. The people problems that you railed me with three or four years ago are now reasonably well solved. [Those] who want to tinker with our personnel system had better understand what they are doing so that we don't disrupt the flow of quality Soldiers that we are bringing into the Army at the present time. The second area of concern is the effort to ensure that we get equipment in the hands of the troops that will give them a chance to win on the battlefield. We need equipment not just for the Active component, but for the Guard and Reserves as well. Full equipping of the force is essential. As Secretary Marsh indicated, we did not increase the size of the Army so we could seize the opportunity to modernize and equip our force and make it a good Army.

The third area that I believe you should look at is one which is somewhat beyond my purview, but I have not feared to step in where others have failed to trod in the past. My concern here is our approach to defense business. It includes how we decide how much money goes for what. I have already testified here regarding proposals to reorganize the JCS. The problem is bigger than the JCS and reorganizing the JCS without looking at how we go about doing business—here in Congress, at OMB, in the Defense Department, in the JCS, and within the separate service departments—requires major addressal. There is an opportunity to get more out of the defense dollar by looking at the system itself. Part of the solution is how we might provide stability to programs and the way we go about doing other business.

These are the three areas of concern that I believe can have the biggest impact upon the Army in this year. I will close by saying that I am proud of our Army today. We have an Army that has the capability, with proper support from you, to be the Army of excellence of which the Secretary spoke.

MR. BENNETT: . . . .General, I have been reading a lot about the Joint chiefs of Staff, not only General Jones' proposals but in other areas about criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It has been my observation through life, generally, that you can have a good government if you have good people, able people to administer the government, regardless of how the structure is.

What gets me about this is, why isn't the Joint Chiefs of Staff capable of making any corrections that are needed to be made? Why do you have to have a new structure?. . . you have a big staff, what is the problem?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . The problem is that the JCS, as they are currently organized, face too many internal conflicts. On the one hand, too many individuals within the Department of Defense provide military advice. At the same time, there is no clear identification of how the best military advice is channeled to the Secretary of Defense and others.

MR. BENNETT: You've got two agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. I often wonder why you needed both.

In fact, I have a bill to abolish the latter because of the lack of candor when they come up with military objectives before Congress. I have had people from the National Security Council tell me things that I thought lacked candor.

GENERAL MEYER: Are you suggesting that the military lacks candor?

MR. BENNETT: . . . the National Security Council . . . lacked candor in some things they brought to me overriding the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MEYER: The National Security Council, Mr. Chairman—as you know—has a

broader area of responsiblity than purely military matters because they have to meld the military, political, economic and other factors together.

MR. BENNETT: Basically the President, if he doesn't get what he wants from the Joint Chiefs, can ask the National Security Council to reverse them in a way which would imply to me that the military authorities really approve the course of action which they didn't really approve. . . .I want to know what it is you feel that you can't do under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL MEYER: I will talk about some of the specifics. You should know that the Chiefs have made recommendations to change the current system to the Secretary of Defense and he will decide. My concerns are these.

First, I believe that there is in the current system unclear identification as to who is charged with the responsiblity of providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense. Many people do that. Who is the senior military adviser?. . .

My second concern is that we should be organized in peacetime to go to war. Today, we are organized principally to respond to peacetime requirements efficiently and do not have an organization that is postured to respond in periods of crisis or than can transition to war. That is a result of the JCS having traditionally and predominantly been cast in the role of allocating resources among services. However, the JCS have no authority to allocate resources, nor does the Chairman, so that doesn't happen well either.

I think these shortcomings need to be corrected. Whether or not they need to be corrected through reorganization of the JCS—which I happen to believe needs to occur—or through other means needs to be addressed.

But let me caution you that you can do all you want to the JCS and that won't change anything if you don't change the system itself. You must examine how the JCS interact with the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Department.

MR. BENNETT: . . . .to go on to another question. . . . what do you think about the pay situation with regard to the military in 1983? You know there are various thoughts about this as to whether or not we should curtail . . . it because of the fiscal situation. What impact would that have?

GENERAL MEYER: I believe the pay freeze will have some impact, principally in the area of career decisions. If the freeze lasts only for one year, and if it is perceived as the Army and the other services sharing a national burden with all others, then I believe that the Army will understand and accept it. But if it is seen as a continuing trend in which the Soldier is once again treated as a second-class citizen, then it will have a devastating impact.

MR. SPENCE: . . . .What about the long-range capability of our sealift? We don't have much in the way of a merchant marine anymore, how do you feel about that?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . .We have been working with the Navy—and Secretary Marsh may want to comment on this because he has been out front speaking up for an improved Merchant Marine and other improvements in the capabilities of Navy lift forces. If we can't get there in time, and it gets back to the issue of flexibility, then our capability to be able to respond to crises in regions around the world is severely limited. That is why we feel that adequate strategic sealift is so critical.

MR. NICHOLS: . . . last fall, with a good many other members of the committee, we visited with our troops in Germany and some in England. We had occasion in at least three instances to sit down with what I chose to call the "grunts" in the service—no colonels at the table, no captains, no shavetails, in fact, not any senior noncommissioned officers, really. And we had lunch and we rapped with them.

We were talking about three stripers and four stripers, people who have been in the . . . Army for eight years, perhaps, second-hitch people.

And members of the committee made inquiries. How do you like the Army?

Fine.

How about the pay?

It's adequate.

What about the food?

Food is good.

What gripes do you have, Soldier?

Universally, everywhere we went, we got a common thread that ran through the course of our conversation, and that is the word "discipline."

And on every occasion, I would ask these Soldiers, well, where do you think this starts? And the response was that they felt that in basic training, perhaps, the very rudiments of discipline were not being instilled in the Soldiers. It was manifest after they got to the various units.

Now, as an old Soldier, I am sure you will agree with me that if you don't have discipline, you don't have an Army. I just wondered what your observations might be in this particular aspect.

Do you see a need for more discipline in the Army? And, if so, what specific programs might be under way or are being considered that would increase discipline?...

GENERAL MEYER: I believe that quality begins in the training center. It starts with the drill sergeant. If the drill sergeant doesn't instill discipline, then you have created a problem for unit first sergeants.

We were directed to reduce the amount of time which Soldiers spend in basic training. There is no way that such reductions enhance our ability to create the discipline which I believe is necessary for our Soldiers.

Last year, we extended basic training by some 90 hours to focus on fundamental soldiering skills such as physical training, the wearing of the uniform, discipline, and other basic skills because some of the same signals that you got from those sergeants we were getting from Soldiers themselves.

We must also concentrate on maintaining standards. Standards have to be universal in the Army. Soldiers have to understand what the standards are and know that those standards will be evenly applied. I had all of the commanders of our 16 Active divisions at Carlisle Barracks this past weekend for a seminar on tactics and other issues. We spent an entire morning discussion this issue of standards and their enforcement.

Another initiative that helps discipline in the field is clarity about authority. In the past—for very, very good reasons—the issue of individual rights through the legal system got to the point where commanders and first sergeants were unsure of their authority to make corrections. That situation has been changing over the past six months. We are not there yet, but I believe we have taken the steps that will get us there.

I also would say I am delighted to hear that our Soldiers believe that discipline is important. If the sergeants believe it is important, and if we give them the authority to institute it, then we have a real opportunity for improvement....

MR. DANIEL: Let me go to another point on strategic mobility requirements. I think, as someone said, the Falklands war demonstrated again how desperately important this is.

I believe it is true to say that it doesn't make any difference how well-drawn your plans are, how well-designed the equipment. Success always depends on the next shipment of supplies, in my judgment.

Where do we stand with our strategic mobility, both air and sea?...

GENERAL MEYER: Of course, as you realize very well, sir, the basic lift requirements flow from JCS plans, so I will respond wearing my JCS hat, pointing out how they relate to the Army in particular.

The JCS, through the Secretary of Defense, have sent you a congressionally mandated mobility study. It makes clear that we have a shortfall today of strategic airlift and strategic sealift which affects our ability to carry out the early stages of both the NATO contingency and the Southwest Asia contingency plans.

There are ongoing programs to improve our strategic mobility capability. I discussed earlier ...the SL7s which are being converted—four in 1982 and four in 1984—and which we will receive in 1984 and 1986 respectively. These will give us about half the capability we need in fast sealift. That is only for the Army; it doesn't relate to the

requirements for the rest of the services, which is about twenty additional SL7's.

I would also add the need for additional Merchant Marine capacity. The cheapest way we can get strategic lift is to use civilian shipping or civilian air assets, mobilizing it when we need it. However, we need some strategic airlift assets immediately and these are in the current strategic airlift program.

A shortfall that particularly concerns the Army is coming up with a follow-on to the C-130 and C-141 aircraft. These are intra-theatre aircraft which permit us to move people rapidly around the continent of Europe or Eurasia and enable us to be more flexible in the way we supply them. That is another area in which we are extremely weak. . . .

MRS. SCHROEDER. . . . .I know in your statement you admit that there still are a lot of problems here. You keep reading that it takes three times as many Americans as it does Soviets to deploy one Army division, and I know you mentioned in there that the tooth-to-tail thing is a constant battle that you are working on. Is there anything further? I don't see any specifics as to what you are going to do to deal with that issue.

GENERAL MEYER: I think the answer to the question, Mrs. Schroeder, lies in geography. We have to project power from the United States, and therefore have to send folks to support them, whereas, the Soviet Union is able to rely upon not only their own quasi-military economy to support them directly, but they also use the economies of the Warsaw Pact to provide support. That is a luxury we don't have.

What we have done, as I believe you know, is attempt to offset the Soviet advantage by relying upon host nation support—our allies—to fill that void. We look at the total support requirement and try to get our allies to provide as much of the kind of support we need that is lacking in our own structure.

I think you know about the proposals in Central Europe. There are similar dramatic opportunities in Korea as well as in Japan and it also is part of our contingency planning for other areas of the world.

MRS. SCHROEDER: I guess I wanted to say I am glad you were open and said it is still a problem. The 300-percent difference between ours and the Soviets is a real concern, and I think anything we can do to lower that is important.

Have we increased the Army troops in Europe in the last five years? Are we planning to do it in the next five because of Pershing II, or because of new commitments here?

GENERAL MEYER: We have increased Army troop strength in Europe in the past five years by about 9,000 - 10,000 soldiers. There is no significant increase in end strength planned for Europe in the immediate future. What we intend to do, as we introduce Patriot and other weapons in Europe, is to take out other systems. We are trying to keep our end-strength constant. . . .

MR DAVIS: Let me ask my other question. Are you working with Secretary Weinberger on some recommended cuts that you are going to present to the Senate Budget Committee? It is my understanding he indicated reluctantly he would prepare a list in the event that Congress does cut, he is working on a list, and are you?

SECRETARY MARSH: I am not familiar with any requests from Mr. Weinberger for any inputs from the Army on that Mr. Davis. Are you, General Meyer?

GENERAL MEYER: No, I am not. Were it so, that would get back to one of my major concerns; once you start to slice things out piece by piece, you end up taking away the coherence of the defense program. If somebody, is going to propose any defense cuts, then some decisions must be made as to what we are not going to do. Someone would have to go through functional areas and say we are going to accept readiness degradation or do something else as a guideline.

We haven't received any sort of instructions to date. I am sure that Defense would make a conscious decision along functional lines before they would tell us to cut this or that. . . .

MR. KRAMER: Mr. Secretary and General Meyer, I for one am not an expert. I can tell you that I do feel much more comfortable with where our Army is today based on the leadership that both of you have provided, and I say that very

sincerely. I would like to ask a series of questions and, if I could do that first, and then turn the answers over to you.

One follow-up to Representative Skelton's question, General Meyer, you would comment on it if you feel comfortable with the consensus that all of the Chiefs have reached on the reform proposal and I recognize your difficulty in commenting now, but once Secretary Weinberger has made his decision, it would be appreciated if at the time you could provide this committee with your recommendations that were originally made, because I got the impression the other day that when Secretary Weinberger testified he was not particularly enthusiastic about widespread changes in the way the JCS works. Perhaps I am incorrect about that.

Secondly, if I am not reading too much between the lines, you seem to have placed some emphasis in your written testimony on Special Operations Forces and to the extent that you can comment in open session and perhaps later in closed session, could you tell us what that means in terms of our involvement in Central and South America today.

Thirdly, I have been following the Scowcroft Commission very closely and have been in touch with Secretary Hubel and Secretary Ambrose is coming to talk to me, I think next week—I would like your assessment of whether or not the Army would be prepared to be able to defend any intercontinental ballistic missile option that the Scowcroft Commission might come up with in a non-nuclear mode by the time such ICBM was operational and your assessment of what would be needed in order to do that if you wouldn't have that capability today.

GENERAL MEYER: I will provide my views on the consensus reform proposal after the Secretary announces his decision and it is appropriate to do so.

Regarding our Special Operation Forces, it is public knowledge that we had a battalion from El Savador trained at Fort Bragg. It is also public knowledge that we trained Lieutenants or subalterns at our OCS—Officer Candidate School—at Fort Benning, Georgia. Additionally, it is public knowledge that we have trainers down there, some of whom come from the kinds of forces we are talking about—Special Operations Forces—while others are merely mechanics who are training them how to maintain helicopters. The composition of our training effort is across the spectrum.

Information concerning the additional involvement of any forces over and above what I've described will be provided for the record by area in order to avoid discussion of classified information.

With regard to our ability to defend whatever MX option is chosen by the President by using a non-nuclear ballistic missile defense, I will just give you a broad answer and then provide specific responses to any questions.

The closer the MX missiles are together, the easier they are to defend. We have the capability today of establishing a nuclear, but not a non-nuclear, defense. It would take too long to deploy a non-nuclear mode unless the IOC for the MX is extended as a result of current debate. I don't think you could provide a non-nuclear mode initially.

As you examine some of the other basing options which put more distance between missiles, defense becomes more difficult and would require addressal of the ABM Treaty—Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—in order to provide the kind of defense needed.

There are, however, opportunities in the exoatmosphere and there are technical opportunities that would permit us to attack strategic systems as they launch. We should seriously look at these capabilities.

That is a general response, Mr. Kramer. Was there a specific question that I missed?

MR. KRAMER: Yes, could you perhaps elaborate on that last point that you made, the exoatmospheric launch, are you talking about a ground-based system?

GENERAL MEYER: It could be either. It could be homing overlay, which is a system we have tested very recently. By working in the exoatmosphere, we achieve the capability of seeing out for thousands of miles. When you get up into what is essentially a no atmosphere situation, there are

other exploitable alternatives. I believe we will develop technology which will permit us to attack Soviet missiles even closer to their launch sites. There are options in outer space that we should look at.

MR. SPRATT: . . . .The Congressional Budget Office this past weekend or just a few days ago came out with an extensive study on how the structural deficit, the deficit in the outyears can be reduced, and in focusing on the defense budget in the outyears, this year also, the CBO recommended some vertical cuts, some program deletions or eliminations as I read the chapter only hurriedly because I just got the report.

Two Army weapon systems focused upon were the DIVAD and the Scout helicopter. . . .Would you comment . . . on the need, the essentiality of these two programs, the shortcomings or problems that have been experienced with these and whether or not basically on the need for these and what the Army would do if the programs are eliminated?

SECRETARY MARSH: Let me start, and General Meyer can add to it.

First, the Scout helicopter you mentioned is the Army Helicopter Improvement Program. The Scout helicopter is essential on the battlefield from the standpoint of providing target identification and designation. It will be used in concert with the attack helicopter to assist in locating targets and in making laser designations, in order to bring fire on selected targets.

It provides a smaller, very mobile vehicle that can move around the battlefield for reconnaissance, patrol, and target designation. It is a very critical component in the overall air assets that the Army needs.

Secondly, the DIVAD is an air defense system that has been developed in recent years. That system provides the necessary air defense to protect the infantry division and its assets from the type of aircraft attacks that are likely to occur in a battlefield situation.

GENERAL MEYER: I just have to smile politely because we were directed by Congress to develop the DIVAD over a short period of time. We did it, and brought it in very close to cost. It is able to meet our requirements. As you look at today's battlefield, you see increased numbers of Soviet helicopters. That problem didn't exist before, and now they pose a threat to us. The DIVAD fills a defensive void. So, I smile politely at that particular question.

The Scout helicopter program is an upgrade of an existing system. Instead of going out and buying a brand new system, we are taking old helicopters and upgrading them so that they can perform a particular mission. By having a cheaper, older system doing the scouting—with upgraded day and night capability, it conserves those new systems because they don't have to be exposed as often while they engage and kill enemy tanks.

Those two systems, which happen to be ones brought in under cost, are increasingly important on the battlefield of the future. I have to smile politely.

MR. SPRATT: The CBO report says that the DIVAD is vulnerable because it can be detected and be taken out by standoff Soviet systems. Is that a correct assessment?

GENERAL MEYER: That is only correct if the DIVAD is used improperly—that is, if it is continually transmitting, which is not how it should be employed. It is designed to be employed in a passive mode until it gets a report from either the Air Force or through a large radar that we have in our air defense system that tells it there are threats coming into the area. Only then does DIVAD come up and start to transmit—then or when it sees threats with its own radar. Otherwise DIVAD is on only for the period of time when it is told that there are enemy high-performance aircraft in its area or when it is directed toward enemy helicopters. So, it is an operational issue rather than a technical issue.

MR. KASICH: . . . .General Meyer . . . there is without question a perception among the general public, including people who have been strong supporters of the military, that our Defense budget is bloated. . . .

In reviewing . . . your statements, obviously that isn't true. The question I have is what . . . [the] strategy is going to be for assuming the offense in terms of explaining to the American public the situation that exists.

It just seems as though everyone is on the defensive . . . I think there are reductions that can be made, I think most of the people on the committee feel there are areas where there can be reductions, but the key question is not to the levels that most people think, and secondly, what are we doing to . . . counter this general perception out there?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: . . . Let me respond with three positive suggestions. I believe we need to communicate with the public in ways that you have outlined. First, we have to have a better statement in an unclassified mode of just what the threat is. . . .

Second, we have to do better in showing you and the people in Pittsburgh or Ohio that we are using the money we are given prudently and that we are not wasting it. We have programs to do this—to get that message out.

Third, we have to do a better job using our National Guard and Army Reservists who are out there in direct contact with the citizenry to help explain what we are doing because they belong to the Rotary Clubs and other social and service organizations.

MR. SKELTON: . . . .I have one quick question, I will address it to you, General, if I may. Compared to this time last year, what is our readiness picture?

GENERAL MEYER: Compared to last year at this time, our readiness picture is improved from both a personnel and an equipment point of view. More important, the capability of our forces—which is how well they would do if they had to face an enemy anywhere around the world—is significantly improved as a result of improved unit stability and the introduction of new equipment.

MR. FORD: . . . .General Meyer, you said your order of priorities were people, equipment, and how Defense does business. I wonder if we could ask you to expand on the third point, what you mean by how Defense does business and what you think has to be done.

GENERAL MEYER: That has to do with the basic way in which our government is organized to provide for defense. If I were to ask all of the Congressmen who are sitting here to explain to me what they believe our defense is for—where we had it and what its purpose is—I am not sure that I would get a common answer across the board. And I am sure if I expanded this inquiry beyond the House Armed Services Committee to the rest of Congress, I would get many different views on why we have military forces. The need to have a clear understanding of the purpose behind our forces is to me paramount before we go about designing and providing them to the nation.

Now I can accept the fact that there may be divergent views, but there has to be a general agreement between the Congress of the United States and the administration as to what the purpose of those forces . . . [is] and a general agreement as to how they are going to provide for the national defense. . . .

Second, I personally believe that at the highest level, by having annual budgets, we adopt a position where we do just the opposite of what Mrs. Byron and several others here have suggested. That is, we do away with stability in our programs. The continuous addition and subtraction associated with an annual budget guarantees that our programs will be very unstable. Consequently, we don't get programs with any continuity in them.

This is an area that needs to be addressed. How do we introduce more stability? Perhaps doing away with the annual budget is not the answer. But some method of bringing greater stability to our programs is necessary because the better stability we have in programs, the more economical rate we achieve and the more this Nation gets for its money.

I believe there has to be agreement between Congress, the administration, and the Defense Department which leads to a clear prioritization of how resources are to be used and for what purposes.

JCS have to provide the dominant military advice within this system. The members of the Defense Department, supporting the Secretary of Defense, should have as their principal role execution of the budget program rather than the planning and policy aspects which ought to occur between the Secretary, the military leaders, and a few of the key top grade civilian defense people. We,

the military, have to be responsive to civilian authority.

The balance of the civilian leadership, and my own Secretary and me—the leaders of the Department of the Army—should be charged with execution of the budget program. We should have our feet held to the fire for execution of a program designed for us in part by the Defense Department, to bring together strategic mobility, command and control, and all of the other aspects of how we go about fighting wars.

As I say, this is a very hasty overview . . . of what I believe needs to take place. It is much broader than just reorganizing the JCS.

MR. SKELTON: . . . .I appreciate your comments and I am sure there is a great deal of frustration in the military on this very role because the role is not always clear. We know what the Constitution says about the role of Congress. We raise and maintain, and where do you see Congress can do a better job? That is the question that I would like to ask of you.

GENERAL MEYER: I believe there are areas in which Congress can do a better job. It is hard to tell this to people who have been in Congress a long time, but I don't mind doing that. I think Congress could do a better job in reaching an agreement which provides greater stability to our programs. There must be a general agreement about the direction we are going.

I come over here every year and somebody doesn't like this program and somebody doesn't like that program, and so this program is winnowed down or that program is added. I respect Congress' responsibility to do that, but over time somebody has got to be in charge of putting the whole thing together. If there were more policy decisions and broader directives. then our feet could be held to the fire to do the job. Get rid of me if I can't come to you next year and tell you that the United States Army is this much more capable of carrying out those contingencies for which you told me to prepare and which we agreed should be carried out.

## Hearing Before The
## HOUSE APPROPRIATION COMMITTEE
## SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE
## FY84 DOD Appropriation: Army Budget Overview

16 February 1983

Mr. EDWARDS: . . . Mr. Secretary, the President has proposed in his budget an increase of about 37,000 troops in the military. How much of that will be for the Army?

SECRETARY MARSH: i can furnish you a precise figure on that but I think it is relatively small. The Army has opted to to with a relatively stable strength. Our increase is only 2600 Soldiers.

MR. EDWARDS: What will you do primarily with that increase?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . The bulk of the increase goes to Special Forces, chemical defense, and electronic warfare units.

MR. EDWARDS: They are new jobs that you haven't filled in the past?

GENERAL MEYER: In the case of chemical and electronic warfare, that is correct. In the case of Special Forces, it is an expansion of our Special Forces capability to take care of training requirements—demands that we have in the Americas, in Africa and in Asia.

Mr. EDWARDS: The President has also called for about 28,000 increase in Selected Reserve. How much of that will be Army?

GENERAL MEYER: About 8000 of that is Army. It would have been possible, Mr. Edwards, to have added more to the Selected Reserve this

year, but we decided in conjunction with our Guard and Reserve leaders to try to focus on quality this year, and also on equipping. As we are short of equipment in the Guard and Reserve, to add more people without the equipment didn't make sense to us.

Mr. EDWARDS: And will these be fleshing out units or will these be as in the regular Army people coming in for special kinds of work?

GENERAL MEYER: In the case of the Reserve and Guard, the increase will flesh out existing units and bring them up to a higher degree of readiness. There will be one division [National Guard] created in this budget, but it will be formed from existing brigades.

MR. EDWARDS: . . . I want to ask you a few questions about antitank weapons. I notice as I look down at the staff's work, that they have got whole pages of questions on many of these systems, but I would like to talk more in general terms for the time being. We will get to specifics later.

I was just running down the staff's list here. You have got the M1 tank, the Apache, Hellfire, Copperhead, the Viper, and the SMAW—Shoulder Fired, Multi-Purpose, Assault Weapon—which I guess could be considered an antitank weapon. Then, of course, there are others. We had the Air Force in yesterday. They talked about their IR Maverick and their GAU-8 gun. The impression is that there has been an awful lot of antitank weapons come on the scene. How about talking in general terms with me where we are going?. . . Or whether we are going overboard. The Copperhead, for example, you have got back in your budget, and we terminated it. We have given you sort of special instruction. We don't know what to do about the Viper and the competing systems. Tell me where we are going antitank wise.

GENERAL MEYER: Let me talk about the battlefield so you can get a feel for the integration of the Army and the Air Force efforts. I will do it very hastily. This past weekend we had the 16 Active Component division commanders from all over the world at Carlisle Barracks. We spent all day Saturday and Sunday on this specific issue, looking and fighting the battle with today's systems, and then examining the systems that are coming in that will provide us leverage in the future.

There are two aspects to the battlefield. There is the near-in battle, that is, right in the forward area, and then there is the battle in depth. The battle in depth is one in which you need to get information about the enemy. It requires either sensors, or it requires people on the ground—one of the two—to give us the capability to see what is happening.

In the near term, we are going to have to put people on the ground. That is the only way we can solve the near-term problem—people on the ground to direct Air Force aircraft or to direct any of our deep capabilities, such as infiltration of our helicopters, if it is not too sophisticated a situation.

So out beyond about 35 to 50 kilometers, it is really an Army-Air Force mix of systems, principally those systems that can penetrate the sophisticated environment in Central Europe. They don't have to be quite so sophisticated in the rest of the world, which is where the other systems become involved.

Their mission is not just killing tanks. Their mission is also making certain that the reinforcing armored formations are either slowed or destroyed, and I say slowed, because slowed is equally important. If you are up in the front lines fighting and if you can keep the enemy from closing all of his forces on you at the same time, that is important to you. We can use mines and all of those kinds of things that can knock out bridges or channelize and slow the enemy's movement. They are equally as important as the more sophisticated stuff that kills individual tanks. We have pushed for the cheaper stuff which keeps the enemy from getting to the forward battle area, so we can defeat them piecemeal.

At the front lines we have the mixture of weapons systems that you are talking about. We have the hand-held antitank systems. Now, in this budget there is no money in there for Rattler, a follow-on to the Dragon. That has been cut. . . .There is no money for Viper. . . .That is cut. The Copperhead runs out—

MR. EDWARDS: That assumes a competition?

GENERAL MEYER: That is because we are going through the competition and then we will have to decide. I am just telling you the systems that aren't there. We are about to buy out the Copperhead principally for contingency plans where we need some long-range type antitank systems. We will do that mission in other ways in Central Europe if we have to.

The other systems that you talked about are the tank, the attack helicopter and the fighting vehicle. That threesome provides the capability of having maneuver and offense on the battlefield. Everything else we have talked about until now is basically defensive. A land force must have an offensive capability. The tank, the fighting vehicle and the attack helicopter give us that. I believe if we are smart enough, the M1, the M2 and the Apache helicopter can give us the same capability in war that the Stuka and the tank gave the Germans in the early stages of World War II. It provides that kind of opportunity for attack.

MR EDWARDS:. Do you include the AHIP in that combination?

GENERAL MEYER: I include the AHIP. The AHIP is more important in the defensive phase because there you are trying to see without jeopardizing big ticket items. This is what we are doing right now, to answer your question—and you asked a very important question. That is why I went up to Carlisle this week to sit down and be sure we are not doing something dumb in this whole area.

We and the Air Force are sitting down and sorting out what we need to do in this area. I have an ongoing study at our Infantry School to assure that each new piece we bring in makes sense, and it is not duplicating something that the Air Force is doing. I think at the present time we are all right but it is the new equipment coming in that we have to be careful about, . . . because there is not enough money to permit duplication. . . .

MR ADDABBO: . . . General Meyer, in your professional opinion, is the Army portion of the budget a "fair share" of the Defense budget?

GENERAL MEYER: I have said before that one of the areas in which I felt I had been a failure as Chief of Staff of the Army has been my inability to articulate more clearly the need for resources for the Army. The fact that the Army's share of the defense budget continues to go down while I have been Chief of Staff of the Army has been one of my failures.

MR. ADDABBO: Do you feel that these fiscal constraints—and this committee has been raising this question with the Secretary of Defense; we raised it with Mr. Stockman and the rest relative to the Defense budget—that we will face the so-called bow wave in the future as a result of which there will have to be fiscal constraints. Have we in fact reached that bow wave as far as the Army is concerned and therefore you are forced into these fiscal constraints?

GENERAL MEYER: Thanks to the money that you provided us over the past three years, we have eaten well into the bow wave. We are rather efficient at production rates in most of the systems now.

There has to be a philosophy of how you control a bow wave. I don't believe there will ever be enough money to do all the things that need to be done, so you have to cut systems, stretch their procurement out, prioritize where you are willing to accept risk.

I don't think you will ever get rid of the bow wave. If, for example, you bought everything today for everybody, you would invite wholesale obsolescence in two or three years. You would have all this equipment on the shelf, and new equipment coming in and be in a continual period of change. Having a bow wave is okay if you control it, and if it does not have an impact on near-term readiness from a procurement point of view. How you manage the bow wave is the critical factor. . . .

MR. ROBINSON: . . . Things certainly seem to be moving in the right direction as far as procurement is concerned, but we can't help but notice that between 1983 and 1984, the Reserve shows a decrease of 6 percent, and the Guard a decrease of 5 percent in O&M. It seems that every year nearly we have to add money in order to compensate for these requested decreases in O&M. And this time, why in addition to having a decrease that is about 10 percent in real terms, because of inflation, you have to take that into consideration, you are asking for troop strength increase of 8,500. What is the answer?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: The answer on the O&M decrease is that last year you injected dollars into that account, creating a bubble in there to respond to some of the specific needs for bringing in some new systems. In this budget, we have tried to smooth out the funding bubble for the Guard and Reserve in FY 84. So, while it looks like a decrease, I will have to show you the numbers because I have that laid out—the specific systems and the specific rationale which created that bubble in 1983. If I am wrong on that I will correct it. But I have the data on that.

MR. ADDABBO: You bubble it again?

GENERAL MEYER: You bubble it again, that is right. You went into specific requirements. You brought in C-12's and things like that as backups, so they were in there as bubbles. They went directly to the Guard or Reserve units and the O&M came in to support those Reserve units in FY 83. Some of those things are not in there in FY 84 so that the resources aren't there in the O&M flow either.

MR. ROBINSON: How did the O&M get in there with it, because it is not our recollection that we added O&M money?

GENERAL MEYER: We had to put O&M money in there to ensure that the systems that came in were supported. We didn't know they were coming and at the last minute we had to throw money in there to accept them. If you tell us to take C-12's we have to put money in there to provide the maintenance package that goes with it. We were told to do that, and I was not happy with it. We ought to be able to have the same kind of increase in O&M there as we have elsewhere . . .

MR. DICKS: . . . has the Army commissioned a study similar to the Air Force's affordable acquisition approach?

SECRETARY MARSH: . . . I established a committee called the Cost Discipline Advisory Committee. They . . . gave us a report in December 1981 . . . It has been very helpful in correcting a number of things that have needed to be done.

MR. DICKS: Does it go back and really look at the reasons for the cost growth in the various systems?

SECRETARY MARSH: Yes, it does. . . .

MR. DICKS: As you know the Army's record on cost growth has been unfortunately even worse than the other services in the past. According to figures in the September 20, 1982 Selected Acquisition Report, over $50 billion of the $80 billion total cost of system in the report for the Army is actual and projected escalation. This calculates to 62 percent of total system cost and it is significantly above the 54 to 55 percent figure of the other offices which are pretty dismal themselves. . . .

The Army experienced $306 million in cost growth [in the last quarter], a much higher rate than either of your sister services. . . .How much of this apparent progress is due to the revised inflation rates imposed by the Administration?. . .

SECRETARY MARSH: I cannot say that inflation rates do not impact on it, but I can tell you . . . of the twelve major systems we have been able to track for four years—and you are dealing with programs totalling $80 billions—the cost growth . . . from 1981 to 1982 is only $169 million. . . .

MR. DICKS: . . . What action is the Army taking to formulate more realistic cost estimates and to tie them to likely future funding availability?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: Let me make one comment, I would just say that the Army has been, as you pointed out, the worst example of cost overruns. That is a statement of fact and you very properly stated it.

When the Secretary came in we already had started an effort with Jack Vessey that found that as a result of all the time we spend over here on budgets and the time we spend over on the other side of the river on budgets and programs, that there is no "E" in the planning, programming, and budgeting system. That "E" is execution. We simply were not focused on execution, here and out in the commodity commands.

Now we are working the execution side of it so the Program Managers' feet are held to the fire, so that there is a visibility for the Secretary and for me every month on specified programs. We know where the problems are, something that we didn't track routinely two years ago. . . .

MR. YOUNG: General, could you discuss the survivability of the M1 and anything you learned about its weak points during REFORGER [Return of Forces to Germany]?

GENERAL MEYER: Of course, survivability was not stressed in REFORGER because we were not firing live rounds at it. . . .But let me talk about what we learned about tank survivability as a result of the Lebanon experience. . . .The importance of having the kinds of protections that we have in that tank, I think, become apparent on any battlefield. We can draw important lessons from Lebanon on the importance of the survivability we have built in the M1.

The lesson learned as far as --

MR. YOUNG: Did you have M1 tanks in Lebanon?

GENERAL MEYER: No, but we can draw conclusions based on the kinds of survivability that were built into the tanks that were there. You can extrapolate from those the survivability of turrets, of the Soviet T62s, . . or the M60s, or the Israeli Merckava tank. We can translate that into survivability of the M1. Clearly, it tells us that the survivability of the M1 is very important in combat and will help save Soldiers' lives.

On the operational aspects, . . . it is going to provide us new opportunities on the battlefield to be able to go places and do things quickly.

It also provides a capability to fight at night. Tanks have never been able to fight at night because you can't see. The Soldiers over there said, gee, we can see at night. Our ability to use those new weapons is going to have a tremendous impact as far as tactics and deployme.t a e concerned. . . .

MR. DICKS: . . . Please provide us with an update of the High Technology Light Division activities.

GENERAL MEYER: We just had an in-process review at Fort Lewis in January attended by all the senior leadership. The High Technology Light Division is currently in the process of testing all the operational concepts they have developed and the new equipment they have bought off the shelf, particularly the electronic warfare, intelligence gathering, and command and control, as well as some very interesting things relating to the JVX issue which was raised, which we can discuss in closed session.

The concepts [developed over the past two years] will be tested out on the battlefield at Yakima in 1983 and 1984 and on the battlefield at Fort Bliss in 1985. . . .

The greatest thing that has happened is that the "not invented here" syndrome which exists in many laboratories is disappearing. That is when somebody at Sandia has an idea and they won't share it with anybody else. We are starting to break through those barriers. One guy is tapping all these people and they are competing to see who can produce.

So the word is getting out. It used to be everybody had their secret little cells where they did their research. Now we have one guy who can take some shortcuts. That is very healthy for the system.

MR. DICKS: So the Army continues to be satisfied with its progress thus far?

GENERAL MEYER: Oh, yes, sir.

MR. DICKS: And the real test comes when you get out on the battlefield?

GENERAL MEYER: That is right. And there is no doubt that the direction we are heading is the correct one. If we had done it any other way, it would be 10 years before we saw comparable results. . . .

MR. EDWARDS: Since you speak of PFC Marne, let me ask you about the ability to repair components locally or in the field. Does PFC Marne, does he have the ability or equipment at this stage of the game to do major component repair?

GENERAL MEYER: No. We don't ask him to do that.

MR. EDWARDS: Where do you do that?

GENERAL MEYER: We take the part out and component repair is done by a maintenance support element. Of course, ensuring we are able to

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get and retain technicians is a major problem. That is why I made the plea to be careful with changes to personnel programs that might cause NCOs to get out of the Army.

PFC Marne who knows that a box is dead because the red indicator light tells him, takes it off and puts a new one in. But, if you lose NCO's maintenance personnel, and specialists, no one will be back there to repair the box and next time the tank won't move.

MR. EDWARDS: In the perfect world of tankology is that the way it should work? That PFC Marne knows when that red light comes on, he knows how to take it out and send it back and you got a Sergeant or somebody back there who knows what to do with it?

GENERAL MEYER. Yes.

MR. EDWARDS. And the perfect world would not call for doing that work up front?

GENERAL MEYER: We have a repair forward system. In the past, tanks had to go 30 or 40 miles to the rear. Now we send maintenance people forward to assist but they are able to get back behind a hill where they are protected.

The Army has had what we call organizational support, that is what the guy does with a wrench. We have had direct support, that is what the guy with a little more skill does. They will pack a wheel or something like that. Then you have general support where your more skilled mechanics repair major components.

You don't have time in combat. Systems must run simply, because if we go to war we won't have time to train a bunch of geniuses to do all this maintenance in the forward combat areas. We need geniuses in the rear able to repair major components. I don't mean geniuses as a pejorative. . . .

MR. ROBINSON: . . . General, you mentioned that there had been a conscious move on the part of the Army to hold down end strength in order to be able to afford, as I gather, things you wouldn't otherwise be able to afford. But it was only two or three years ago that we were talking about the Army getting up to maybe a strength of about 850,000 from where it was then. That was—the Army has grown less of course than any of the other Services in a time when the other Services have grown an 84,000 increase; the Army increased only 5000.

Now, has the overall plan changed? Where is the Army going in terms of end strength as it is now perceived?

GENERAL MEYER: I believe the Army will have to stay for the next 4 or 5 years at about 780,000, maybe a few thousand more. The increase will have to be in the Guard and Reserve. We will have to take greater advantage of their capability to do things. That is what we need to do. I believe that is the direction to go.

MR. ROBINSON: So the plan as it is now perceived would keep—

GENERAL MEYER: In the program you will see it goes up some in the out years. My view is that it will not be able to go up in the out years, but that it is going to stay at about 780,000 for another four years. . . .I just believe we will have to stay there and that is not bad because you can have a quality Army. That is important. I believe you need a good Army. You don't need a big Army, you need a good Army.

MR. WILSON: Are the Guard and Reserve up to strength?

GENERAL MEYER: You have to define "strength."

MR. WILSON: Are they whe[illegible]m?

GENERAL MEYER: No, but in [illegible]s, we have more men in the Guard and Reserve today than we have had since 1963. . . .

That is not enough because we are asking the Guard and Reserve to do more today than we did in 1963. In 1963, we had a bigger Active force and didn't ask the Guard and Reserve to do as much as we do today. The Guard and Reserve have an increased role. . . .

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD. . . . you have been instrumental in implementing a regimental system of unit rotation in the Army. Could you please describe in detail how the system will work and where we stand today on it? Are the results of the system meeting your expectations?

GENERAL MEYER: I believe you are referring to what we call the New Manning System. The New Manning System is an innovative management process which will increase combat effectiveness in the Army by enhancing cohesion in small combat units and developing a greater sense of esprit and belonging among all Soldiers. The concept is based on the precepts of personnel stabilization and unit replacement, operating within the framework of a new US Army Regimental System. Let me discuss each precept.

Under *the COHORT concept*, companies are formed by organizing a cadre around a specifically recruited group of first term Soldiers who are then stabilized for a three year unit life cycle. The unit serves a portion of its life cycle in the continental United States and then deploys overseas. To meet long-tour overseas requirements, units will spend 18 months in the United States and 18 months overseas—Europe, Panama, Alaska, Hawaii. Korea-bound units will spend 24 months in the United States and 12 months in Korea. Stateside and overseas battalions are linked for the purpose of deploying COHORT companies from the stateside battalion to its linked overseas battalion on a recurring schedule. At the end of a COHORT unit's life cycle overseas it is replaced by another unit. COHORT units are not additions to the force structure. They are existing units which are stabilized and deployed under New Manning System policies.

The US Army Regimental System provides for career-long affiliation of a Soldier with a specific regiment. The goal is to enable a combat arms Soldier to serve his troop duty in one of the units of the regiment. When the Soldier is not serving in his regiment, he will perform duty in a variety of other non-tactical assignments such as ROTC Instructor, Drill Sergeant, Recruiter, or Staff duty, just as he does today. A regiment is defined as a grouping of usually four battalions with like organizations and equipment. The Regimental System is then overlaid on the COHORT system by redesignating battalions so that the COHORT-linked units in the grouping of battalions bear the same regimental color. Soldiers then will receive recurring stabilized assignments to units of their regiment. The Regimental System is a grouping of existing battalions with a common designation and will not change the existing brigade-based tactical force structure.

The New Manning System is currently being implemented in conjunction with a fix-as-you-go evaluation focused on sustainability, affordability, manageability and troop acceptability. Presently there are 37 company-sized COHORT units in existence, five of which have already been deployed to Europe. By FY 85 the number will grow to approximately 80 units. While it is too early to assess the effects of the Regimental System, initial results of the COHORT concept appear favorable.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD: . . . your statement notes that for this system to work you must maximize the personnel available for service in combat related units and supporting activities. To accomplish this you are attempting a civilian hire substitution program to allow military personnel to be available for purely military tasks. But you also note that civilian personnel ceilings are hampering your efforts in this regard. Last year, the Committee accepted my amendment to delete civilian ceilings from industrially funded activities, and the conference language specifically states that this action is not to be used to reduce ceilings in other areas. In your professional judgment would your unit rotation system be improved if civilian personnel ceilings were entirely eliminated and you were tasked to perform the mission as best you could within financial constraints?

GENERAL MEYER: . . . civilian ceilings do hamper the unit rotation system as well as other Army readiness initiatives. The Army fully supports the elimination of civilian end strength ceilings as a means to effectively manage the size and structure of the civilian workforce and thus, to more effectively use the civilian resources. Currently, civilian ceilings often require reductions in the wrong activity and in the wrong category of personnel. Ceilings have contributed to the requirement to borrow Soldiers to perform essential work which should be accomplished by civilians. Ceilings also lead to inefficiency since they cannot be readily adjusted to unprogrammed workloads through the use of temporary hire personnel. Your amendment provided the first real management flexibility in the management of industrially funded workloads. This initiative will contribute to a more efficient use of resources to support civilians since they will increase and decrease relative to workload requirements rather than to end strength ceilings. Simultaneous man-

power and fiscal controls are doubly inefficient. Using only fiscal controls would increase flexibility and more efficiently use the civilian workforce.

MR. CONTE: . . . I would like . . . you to address in some detail the doctrine that supports the Soldier. In looking through your statement I see over and over again references to AirLand Battle. On several occasions Army briefing teams have come to Congress with what is called "AirLand Battle 2000" and there seems to be, or at least some perceive, a problem between the two AirLand Battles. On the one hand we are buying heavy divisions with new tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and air defense guns which are armor-protected, while "AirLand Battle 2000" talks about agile, "high-tech" approaches to combat. I think it would be helpful in dispelling any misperceptions, if you would clarify how your present and future doctrine is related with respect to the equipment we are buying.

GENERAL MEYER: Our present doctrine, the AirLand Battle is designed to counter Soviet style threats anywhere in the world. This requires us to have modern heavy divisions equipped with the Abrams tank, Bradley fighting vehicle, Sergeant York Air Defense Gun, and Armored Combat Earthmover. These divisions must be able to survive the lethal high-intensity battlefield that we envision as the greatest risk to our national security today.

AirLand Battle 2000, on the other hand, is our future concept. It describes the world environment during 1995-2015 and examines the implications of this environment for the Army. AirLand Battle 2000 is more a vision of where the Army expects to be twenty years hence than a specific doctrine to which we must adhere. This is an evolutionary process and we are constantly reevaluating our vision of the future to insure that we take in account new trends and technologies. We use AirLand Battle 2000 to drive training, force structure, doctrinal, and most importantly, materiel requirements for the future. AirLand Battle 2000 sees future battlefields becoming more fluid, shorter in duration, and more difficult for the commander to control. Because our forces will require greater firepower and mobility on this battlefield, we expect to develop weapons based on the application of current high-technology and the new capabilities of other emerging technologies. With AirLand Battle 2000 we are using our concept of the future to develop and procure the equipment we will need early in the next century.

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD: General Meyer, the phrase "the hollow Army" has been attributed to you and describes the problems that the Army has been facing in terms of the quality and quantity of your manpower. According to your statement, the qualitative aspects appear to be going well—quality of recruits is up; retention is up; the unit rotation program is helping morale, etc. Are you reasonably satisfied with the quality trends of the force?

GENERAL MEYER. Yes. While general economic conditions have been in our favor, a number of other factors have contributed to the Army's success in the last two years. These include the pay increase, increased recruiting and retention resources, better recruiting and retention management, a variety of training and assignment options, enhanced educational benefits such as the Army College Fund, and the continuing support of the American public for young men and women in uniform.

Looking to the future, the Army should be able to recruit and retain quality volunteers if we continue to receive the support of Congress and the American people. Examples of this support include continued pay comparability, requested recruiting and retention funds, continuation of educational incentives for enlistment, and the quality of life improvements needed to allow the Army to remain competitive with the civilian sector.

# Hearing Before The HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE

On the FY 84 Defense Budget
17 February 1983

In May of 1980 I told a subcommittee of the House of Representatives that we had a "hollow" Army. . . We still have units out there that are not equipped. It isn't a question of modernizing. It is an issue of equipping the Active, the Guard and Reserve—not just with items such as tanks and helicopters that you read about in *The Washington Post* or *The Washington Times* or elsewhere—but trucks and materiels-handling equipment and all those things that permit us to do a total job.

The other area where we still have major gaps or hollowness to fill, is in the quality of life that we provide our soldiers and their families. That is particularly true overseas. We have a debt to them that we must pay if we want to retain the good, young people that the Army needs for the future. . . .

THE CHAIRMAN: Let me ask General Meyer . . . are you determining your requirements any differently under a defense policy of "worldwide contingency" then you did or then the military did when the scenario was one-and-a-half or two-and-a half or three wars?

GENERAL MEYER: In the case of the Army, the answer is yes. In the year following Vietnam the focus was predominantly on Central Europe. As a result the Army's forces were designed in conjunction with those of our allies in NATO to respond solely to the Central European threat—a mechanized threat.

In the late stages of the Carter Administration, as a result of what took place in the Middle East, we were given the additional responsibility of having forces ready to respond in the Middle East. That meant, as you will recall, consideration of withdrawing our land forces from Korea.

With the current administration, we have been asked, in addition to Europe and the Middle East, to carry our share of the load in the Pacific.

Now, how do you do that? First, you decide in conjunction with your allies, and in concert with the Air Force, the Marines, and the Navy, what the force requirements are in each of those separate theaters. If you total those up you will find that there is no way you could get there from here. There simply aren't enough forces to go around. The Service Chiefs then assess those areas where they are willing to take risks—"we will do so much here, so much there". Since this is an open session I won't be specific but I will go through the process.

The question then, once you have gone through that assessment, is what kind of forces are needed, [and] how they differ from what you currently have. For example, what is different about the Army we believe we need today based on a contemporary assessment versus what we thought we needed four years ago? I think that is at the heart of the issue.

Four years ago the prescribed force was almost totally a heavy force focused solely on Central Europe, with little concern about its ability to respond elsewhere. You might reasonably ask how we intend to make an Army which is no larger, more capable of meeting a much larger mission—especially if the sums of money you have given us have been focused on filling up the hollowness which existed in that Europe-focused Army of three years ago? How are we going to be abie to respond to the additional requirements.

The answer lies in four basic approaches toward force structuring. First, we are consciously developing forces that are flexible enough to respond across a wider spectrum of warfare. If we have forces that can operate in the Middle East or Pacific or Central Europe rather than just one location, that increases the credibility of our military posture. So we need flexible forces.

Secondly, you need to figure out how you get leverage out of tactics and learning how to fight.



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We have redesigned our tactics to take maximum advantage of the Air Force and of one another's capabilities.

Third, you have to look at technology to see what it can do to give you additional advantages, so that the soldier who goes on the battlefield has equipment that is at least equal to that of the enemy. This isn't the case across the board today.

Finally, the force must be strategically mobile and backed by a reliable command and control system. If you don't have enough lift capability, then how do you deploy? In the absence of adequate command and control, how do those forces respond operationally or gain the leverage possible through better reaction to available intelligence?

That is how you try to build more capability with less to respond to a larger number of scenarios.

When the war really starts, there are then decisions that take place. I have to remind some folks we aren't necessarily designing the Army to have to go to war. What we hope we are doing is designing an Army that won't have to go to war—an Army which can deter war. To do that, it has to be perceived around the world as being a quality Army—able to respond—and that will be what deters.

MR. DOWNEY: I wanted to ask you, General Meyer, we may not screw up the manpower. Some of us don't want to see a freeze on the pay. I do not want to see a freeze on pay. I want to save a lot of money in defense. What concerns me a little bit is you have all painted a very rosy personnel picture for the services. To what extent do you attribute the fact that 11 percent of the people of this country are unemployed to the fact that you have good recruitment, and to what extent has improvement in pay given you this better picture of the future?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: I believe very clearly that one of the major elements in our current ability to bring in fine young men and women has been the economy. I think that is absolutely correct.

MR. DOWNEY: Can you give us a percentage?

GENERAL MEYER: As you know from your days in the House Armed Services Committee, Manpower Subcommittee, we don't have the ability to be able to determine those kinds of things directly. I don't know what that figure might be. One of the things that I am hopeful will permit us to carry on with high quality input in the future is my belief that quality builds quality. By having good, young people who serve and then go home and acknowledge that a tour in the Army was worthwhile, that is going to be a better recruiting for us than almost all the "be all you can be" messages that we have on TV.

MR DOWNEY: I am delighted that you are all advertising together now as opposed to separately. Do you have your retention number the same quality?

GENERAL MEYER: Although the Marines might not have had the same problem in reenlistment that the Army did, I am sure General Kelley would agree that we are in a new era. In days gone by, young captains or lieutenants were given a reenlistment quota which frequently meant they had to take their company and lock them in the day room until they had cajoled enough "volunteers". Today we have boards that are deciding who will be permitted to reenlist. We have never been in that very selective kind of situation. . . .

MR. PANETTA: . . . Let me ask [about] the procurement area which is . . . an area that . . . we in the Budget Committee particularly pay attention to that because it involves the cost overruns that concern us in terms of setting a budget and then trying to stick to it.

The record is not a very good one. If you look at the cost profiles of programs and where they are, and you are as familiar with those problems as anybody, just looking at things like the M1 tank . . . or any of the other systems, there has been a three or four times cost increase in many of those. . . .

I guess the question I would ask is recognizing the problems that are out there on procurement, what is being done to try to have some control in this area?. . .

GENERAL MEYER: Let me start, if I may, and I will ask that a chart that I have . . . be entered

into the record because I think it displays the problem . . . clearly. . . .

Management systems in the Army, and I believe that it has been true of the Defense Department as a whole, have focus on planning, programming and budgeting, but principally on the latter two: programming and budgeting. We in the Army were not focusing on execution. That didn't happen to be part of the planning, programming, and budgeting system; consequently the feedback loops were not as well exercised as they might have been. This was reflected in the fact that cost overruns weren't really being brought to the leadership in time to make the kinds of management decisions that should have been made.

Two-and-a-half years ago when General Vessey was my Vice Chief of Staff, he started a program to look at their "execution phase". The new Secretary, Mr. Marsh brought in a large group of consultants soon after he took office to focus on how we did business in execution. They examined our problems and then laid out a corrective program. The chart indicates that . . . from 1979 to 1980, for the major programs that we have to report to OSD we had about a $19 billion cost escalation. . . .From 1980 to 1981, it was about $8 billion. But from December 1981 to December 1982 for those same programs, the increase was only $168 million.

Now, if you did that well in business you would get kudos. You don't get anything from Congress and the American people. You mentioned the tank. The M1 tank is up in that year, about $800 million, but the Pershing is down, and the Bradley fighting vehicle that is made out near your area is down over $1.6 billion. DIVAD is down, Black Hawk is down, and the AH-64 is down. Those are systems that are down as a result of our stringent effort to focus on this problem of overruns. That is one of the major reasons, Mr. Panetta and Mr. Chairman, that I really worry now if we do something dumb this year. All of that success is going to go right down the drain as far as management is concerned, if we do something dumb in how we take cuts. . . .

MR. DERRICK: . . . when [General Jones] was before this committee, [he] mentioned his support for the reorganization . . . of the Joint Chiefs. I wonder if some of you might comment on that if you have given it any great amount of thought.

THE CHAIRMAN: . . . General Meyer might since he was credited this morning as being more militant than General Jones on that subject.

GENERAL MEYER: I am to the right of Genghis Khan on everything as far as issues like this are concerned and very positive in my views. I wrote in the *Armed Forces Journal* a year ago exactly how I believed the JCS should be reorganized and the kinds of changes that should be made, and I addressed part of this interservice rivalry that has existed over time.

There is and has been interservice rivalry and there will be as long as there are limited resources. Somebody has to sort through from the top down to ensure that the whole organization is headed in the right direction. That has to come from the Chiefs. They must have a dominant role in direction-setting.

The Chiefs as a corporate body have presented the Secretary of Defense a proposal which we believe would strengthen the role of military advice, strengthen our ability to transition to war operations and permit us to do some of the kinds of things on a routine basis that we are having to do ad hoc at the present time—[like] the memorandum of agreement between General Gabriel and myself, or between Admiral Watkins and General Gabriel.

But that alone will not solve the problem. The problem is bigger than realigning the JCS. It is far broader than that. It is the issue of how our government goes about its defense business. The fact that you are having a hearing in this committee on Defense business is an indication to me that something is the matter in Congress, something is the matter in the relationship between Congress and the Administration, and something is the matter in the relationship between OMB and the Defense Department that you have to have a hearing on the defense issues to the degree you do.

I believe there are some systemic things which take place that force us to get less defense for the same amount of dollars that we spend. I think that those are the kinds of things that need to be corrected. It is not just the JCS that needs to be changed, but the way the Department does business internally, its interface with OMB, and the interface between the Administration and Congress.



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Most prominent among the things that need correcting is the infusion of stability to what we are doing. The perturbations up and down, in my judgment, are causing the American people, of whom I am one, to pay more for less defense. . . .

MR. FAZIO: . . . I would like to ask . . . General Meyer . . . to comment on the memo that was aired this week from the Army's perspective as to whether the C17 is a viable alternative for the future. . .

GENERAL MEYER: I will try to answer quickly on the C17 issue. You are quoting from the *Defense Week* February 14th article. I give my Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations an 'unsat' on form and an 'unsat' on choice of words, but I also give *Defense Week* and "unsat" for inaccurate reporting.

They failed to include the letter which I sent forward to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, which says, "Dear Charlie,"—I call him by his first name, Gabe, usually, except when I am angry. I really pointed out that we support the C17 and that the C17 is essential to what we are doing; but that we believe that we have to look corporately at what the long term requirements are out into the future. Now is the time to get on with that. That is the sum and substance of it.

We have to have the C17, because it is an outsized, short take-off and landing, intratheater as well as intertheater type of aircraft, so I am and have supported it. I have supported it before congressional committees, and that is all I can add to that issue. . . .

MR. MACK: General Meyer, this morning we heard . . . Bob Komer. . . .One of the comments that he made . . . related to strategic mobility, and indicated that we really have more troops than we are capable of moving into position in time. Would you respond to that.

GENERAL MEYER: . . . that is clearly true at the present time. As we look around the world, we see . . . there is insufficient airlift, sealift or amphibious lift to move land forces—Army and Marine forces. We chiefs have identified individually and as a corporate body one of the great faults today being strategic mobility.

## Hearing Before The SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE Subcommittee on Defense On the FY 84 Army Budget Overview

24 February 1983

SENATOR STEVENS: . . . General, our figures show that you have a 3.7 percent real growth overall whereas the Air Force and the Navy, 13 percent real growth. This is a period [comparing 83 to 82]. . .

GENERAL MEYER: I understand. I believe that reflects a focus on some of the strategic programs which have been directed. I have said before that one of the most difficult things to explain within the halls of the Pentagon or anywhere is how critical trucks are, how critical are the very mundane things that it takes to run an Army.

That is why we have tried to be sure that in our program we are able to take care of the basic things as well as the more sophisticated items.

I share your concern. As I have said before, one of the great failures I have had is an inability to explain better the needs of the Army. . . .

SENATOR PROXMIRE: . . . Mr. Secretary, I notice in your statement for the record that you discuss the Army's strategic mobility requirement. . . .This includes airlift and sealift as well as the need for additional prepositioned equipment in Europe.

Would you comment on the adequacy of the current budget in fulfilling these requirements?

SECRETARY MARSH: . . . There are two principal areas of concern.

One is . . . fast sealift Currently, the Navy has eight SL-7's to be converted to roll-on/roll-of configurations. . . .That number of ships will not be enough, though, to meet the basic criteria which is to deploy overseas two divisions and all of their equipment within a specified time.

Secondly, with regard to airlift, we seem to focus on intertheater, that is being able to move from the U. S. to some other continent or to another theater. A major problem is that we have in airlift from an Army point of view is intratheater lift. This is now being performed by the C-130 aircraft in the Air Force. It is an outstanding aircraft —but it is aging. It is also is limited in what it can carry from the standpoint of what we would refer to as outsize equipment. We need intratheater lift.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: You need what?

SECRETARY MARSH: Intratheater lift—the ability to move inside the theater.

GENERAL MEYER: On the sealift side of it, first of all, we will have four SL-7s being completed in 1984 [and] four in 1986. That will give use about half the fast sealift the JCS believe is needed to get us where we need to go in the required time.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: What does that mean?

GENERAL MEYER: That means instead of the eight SL-7s we will have, you need somewhere between 16 and 18 of those same kind of roll-on/roll-off type ships.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: If you had adequate budget, you would have twice as many?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes. That . . . would [give us] greater flexibility and more independence of overseas bases. If you don't have enough forces to go around, you need flexibility —in command and control and strategic mobility. Strategic mobility is critical. That is why the Army has been strong proponents.

The JCS indicated in the Congressionally Mandated Mobility study provided to you that there is a 100,000 short-tons shortfall beyond what is currently planned to do what we believe is necessary.

I would reiterate what Secretary Marsh said about the need for a follow-on to the C-130 and C-141. There is nothing on line to do that. They are old birds and that means they can't get into austere landing fields. . . .

There are two other areas that impact on strategic mobility.

One is prepositioning. You don't have to have as much lift capability if you preposition. Because we are short of strategic mobility, we are prepositioning. If we had more strategic mobility, you would not have to do quite as much prepositioning. So, if you don't have sufficient lift capability, you have to cut down how long it takes to respond to crises by putting equipment on ships at Diego Garcia or depots in Europe.

The other is our effort to make our forces lighter without reducing their competency. This can can reduce the strategic mobility requirements. . . .

SENATOR PROXMIRE: . . . Mr. Secretary, how many women are now in the Army and what are your plans for increasing the percentage in the coming year?

SECRETARY MARSH: . . .We have about 65,000 enlisted women at this time with roughly 9,000 officers that you could add to that. The Secretary of Defense has indicated that our enlisted women strength should be allowed to increase to 70,000, but that was not to be considered as either a cap or a ceiling on the enlisted strength.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Just in sheer numbers, that is encouraging. Is there any other Army in the world that has that high a percentage of women.

SECRETARY MARSH: I don't think so.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: I commend you on that. I think that is a great improvement for many reasons. Press accounts give the impression that

the Army reduced its goal for women in uniform and it has excluded them from more occupational specialities, MOSs. What restrictions have you imposed on women in uniform?

SECRETARY MARSH: I think we have sought to actually maximize opportunities for women in the Army. General Meyer might want to amplify.

GENERAL MEYER: Previously, the Army had a personnel system which virtually ensured women soldiers would fail. We were ordered to take in a whole bunch of women, and we put them in jobs where they really had no opportunity to succeed. There was never a platoon of women in basic training that won "Best Platoon". So they felt ill of themselves. The males felt they were not pulling their fair share of the load when we put them all together. From a physical point of view, we put women into jobs which they weren't able to carry out. The men thought the women were not doing their job, so we had harassment occurring.

We looked at the system and said all right, if we are going to have women in the Army, how can we give them an opportunity to be successful? We looked at it two ways.

One was physical and we did it gender free. It was the first time in history any Army has looked at every job to see what the physical requirements were. We identified those jobs and the physical capabilities needed by people to handle them. . . .It turned out we had many women in very heavy duty type jobs. Consequently, women in those jobs were leaving the Army, before their first term ended at the rate of 55 to 60 percent, compared to a rate of 25 percent for the average person who was physically able to carry out their duties.

There were clear indications we had placed women in the wrong jobs. What we did was look at jobs where women could succeed and give them that opportunity.

We also had concerns about women being in positions too far forward in combat. Initially, we had not identified where we wanted them. Later we did that. . . .and we are putting them in those jobs where they are skilled—but not as a rifleman. We were very careful to exclude them from the combat arms—the rifleman, tanker, artilleryman—those skills that have traditionally been male. You know, it is an issue—

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Of changing attitude, especially attitude that is as deeply ingrained as gender attitude.

It would seem to me that you can greatly benefit from overcoming these prejudices because I would think that in view of the fact that some of the jobs in the military are non-combat, so many of the jobs that are combat don't require any upper body strength which is about the only difference you can really establish between men and women, I just can't understand why risking your life in a dangerous forward position would make any difference whether you are a man or women.

GENERAL MEYER: First, as far as the jobs are concerned, 83 percent are open to women across the board. The issue is whether or not you should risk women—these are Congressional words—as far as combat is concerned. They say they will not be in combat. Congress tells us that. That is coming from Congress. That direction says women will not be in combat. Therefore, we had to define combat areas. We defined it as leniently as we could so that we could take maximum advantage of their skills.

The Israelis send their women back when the war starts. They are not in tanks. That is a conscious decision.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: No question about it, you can't do much about what Congress does and you are undoubtedly right about that, it is a Congressional decision.

On the other hand, it seems to me that you folks have the greatest experience with combat and the record that the women have made in the military has been a very good one.

GENERAL MEYER: It has been superb in many areas where they had the opportunity to succeed.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Then you are barring women from certain jobs as a result of inherent lack of upper body strength.

Do you also test men for upper body strength?

GENERAL MEYER: We are planning on doing that,

as soon as we finish our analysis of which instruments can be used to best measure strength and stamina.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: In combat, isn't the issue who gets the job done best—not gender, color, age or religion?

GENERAL MEYER: Military effectiveness is the best test. All I can say is the Army is traditional. I will say we have never had a squad of women in combat.

I am not sure that the American Army that goes off to war ought to be the first one that has a squad of women as infantrymen fighting. I am not sure how that would work from a social point of view. I would not recommend that to Congress.

SENATOR PROXMIRE: Do you think women should be barred from risky jobs?

GENERAL MEYER: No. I have always said women will have risky jobs in the Army in the future because the war is not going to be limited just to the forward area. . . .

SENATOR STEVENS: . . . I notice in *Defense Week*, General, that the Army Operations Chief of Staff says he is tired of the Air Force's C17. He charges the Air Force obsession with the C17 cargo plane may adversely affect the Pentagon's ability to deliver the proper mix of forces to prospective world trouble spots. I wish they were obsessed with the C-17.

What is the story behind that memo?

GENERAL MEYER: I gave him an unsatisfactory on English, an unsatisfactory on logic, and an unsatisfactory on conclusion, because the memo that I have sent to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force indicated we wanted them to get on with this intratheater lift and that is the C17. We believe we need it. . . .

## Hearing Before the SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE On the FY 84 DOD Authorization Request: Army Programs

25 February 1983

GENERAL MEYER: I laid out in my statement the basis for the Army along the lines you alluded to in your opening comments, Mr. Chairman. That is, we don't decide independently what the Army ought to do. We are doing things in response to national requirements, in response to treaties, in response to agreements, and in response to the threat.

Our requirements have grown. Just in the past year we have been asked to send some 1,200 additional soldiers into the Sinai. We have been asked to take on responsibilities in our new Central Command. We are also trying to enhance the way in which we play a role in the Pacific, countering that threat as it has grown.

We don't determine our tasks. Our job is to field the units that can respond to those tasks in conjunction with the rest of the Services—the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

If I started to add up whether or not there are enough land forces to do the job in the Army—and Marine Corps, you would have to conclude no, there are not. So we have to figure out how to better do with those forces available.

I got into a bit of trouble for saying we had a hollow Army. All I can say is that the $153 billion that the Congress has given us in the past three years has permitted us to take steps to provide a solid base on which to build the Army of the future.

CHAIRMAN TOWER: May I say, General, you did not get into trouble with this Committee. You got our attention.

GENERAL MEYER: I think the nation got its money's worth because we have been able to deter war and we have a solid base on which to build.

As I said, there are not enough land forces to go around. We have learned once again from the Falkland Islands and other battles in the near past that soldiers continue to be important. We have to figure out how to get leverage, how to be able to do more with the resources you give us. . . .

. . . There is still a lot that we have not done. I would say if I had to make a plea to all the members of this Committee, there are three areas I would ask you to look at very carefully as you address the Army budget.

The first is the people issue. We now are getting good people and we are keeping good people. In anything that we do at this time, we have to be very sensitive to what we do to people. So, I would plead with you, as you address our budget request, do not do something that puts us back into a position where we get poorer quality soldiers and are not able to keep the middle skill level NCOs that are absolutely essential if we are going to have the Army that we need.

The second area is equipping. Soldiers have to have something that will permit them to win on the battlefield, not just something they can carry on the battlefield. I think that is an essential point as we go through this modernization process.

The third area just happens to be—since I have a chance to lecture the Armed Services Committee, I will—that I honestly believe we have to come up with a better way of doing Defense business. You know I have commented and written on the process within the JCS. But I don't think that is the entire problem.

If you only reorganize the JCS, and don't change the interface between the military and civilians in the Defense Department, the administration, and, in my judgment, the way we do business with Congress nothing will happen. I believe there are changes that need to be made in the way in which we do business. . . .

CHAIRMAN TOWER: . . . General Meyer, it has been charged by some that we are robbing readiness and sustainability to fund modernization. Now, assuming that we have finite dollars to work with, do you feel that we should make any reductions in spending on modernization programs to more fully fund readiness and sustainability?

GENERAL MEYER: First of all, I believe those who make that argument make a false argument. Much of the new equipment adds to readiness.

A new M1 tank battalion at Fort Hood or in the Third Division adds to readiness. It also adds to sustainability because it is more easily maintained by the Soldier. The approach of trying to separate readiness, sustainability and modernization is a specious argument as far as the Army is concerned.

What you have to do is to be smart enough to ensure that new equipment coming in provides increased capability. Otherwise you end up with the Army becoming obsolete at some point in its history leaving the Soldier with the wrong kind of equipment for the battle he will have to fight.

CHAIRMAN TOWER: . . . .There has been another suggestion made that we are spending too much on heavy equipment, that we ought to provide our Army with light, highly mobile equipment and in effect resort simply to what is called maneuver warfare, that is to say, lightly equipped soldiers that are highly mobile and quickly maneuverable.

GENERAL MEYER: The issue tends to become confused because the two leading proponents of maneuver warfare in this century, if you took a poll, would be Rommel and Patton. Each of them focused not just on maneuver to confuse people, but they both indicated that you also had to kill somebody as well. Their focus was maneuvering so that you were in a position to be able to destroy the enemy.

My point is you can't just out-maneuver and confuse the enemy. At some time the Soldier has to take out his bayonet or rifle, or the aircraft has to fire, or the sailor has to shoot at the enemy. He has to be held hostage and you have to take him on.

The important part from our point of view is that this "heavy equipment", as you have very properly pointed out—the M1 in the REFORGER ex-

ercise, the M2 which is an infantry carrier that will keep the soldiers up with tanks, and a helicopter which can stay up with them—will introduce on the battlefield a new capability. If we are smart enough to use it, and I think we can, we will develop the same capability of maneuver with heavy equipment that the Germans used at the start of World War II with the Stuka and with the tank.

So, you have to have maneuver capability with both heavy and light forces, and the maneuver agrument should not be confused with the type force discussed.

My second point is that we do need a mixture of heavy and light forces and we will always have to have a mixture of heavy and light forces. Unlike our counterparts in other Armies—the German Army knows where it is going to operate, the Israeli Army knows where it is going to operate, the Norwegian Army knows where it is going to operate—we don't know where we will be called upon to go.

We have to have an Army that is more flexible than others, that can respond to different terrain and different environments and across a wider spectrum of warfare...

SENATOR JACKSON: Mr. Chairman, I am going to be very brief. I have just one question and that is, we all know that over half of the Defense dollar goes to people on active duty in various supporting roles.

I want to ask the Secretary in connection with your statement, and I refer to the statement that you just made, you say in your statement that we have reached the point where it is no longer viable to shift Army missions and units from the active force to Reserve components. You also say that any reduction in our Active duty end strength would have to be made in our forward deployed forces.

Now, if you were to transfer more units and missions to the Reserves, why would these transfers have to be made out of forward deployed units? Why, for example, couldn't we expand the current roundout program for a division based in the United States in which one brigade of an Active division is in the Reserve Component?

SECRETARY MARSH: Senator, I think we can do a number of those things. Let me make several points in reference to continuing to transfer some of the missions of the Active forces to the Guard and Reserve.

There will be a continued expansion of missions for the Guard and Reserve. But if we continue to take Active force missions and try to transfer those to the Guard and Reserve, we will reach the point where that will cause problems in the Active force.

For example, there are already very significant shortages of combat support units and combat service support units that will be absolutely essential if we were to have a major deployment.

The roundout concept is an excellent one... in the three divisions where we have used the roundout concept, we have had remarkable results. It has been a very promising program and it is one that we are going to expand.

It should be noted, however, that a roundout unit, although affiliated as a part of an Active unit, is not an organic part of the Active unit. It would not necessarily deploy with the active unit in the event of a mobilization wherein the active unit would deploy.

GENERAL MEYER: There is one other aspect of it that you asked. That is why cut overseas and not cut back here....The answer to that is very simple.

Fifty-three percent of the Army's combat force is overseas today. That means that artillerymen, tankers and others—and especially the middle grade NCOs—keep rotating back and forth and it creates tremendous turbulence and instability back in the rear. It also provides an incentive for those soldiers to say, "I am not sure I want to keep going back and forth overseas."

Normally what you try to maintain is about two to one base to overseas commitment. We have not been able to do that. We are right at margin now. [Consequently] I would not come to you and recommend that any reduction in end strength come out of units in the States. They are going to have to come from overseas.

As I said earlier, one of the things you need

to be very careful in tampering with is the people issue. Reductions in strength would mean that critical NCOs would start to leave, in my judgment, more than they do today and they are the ones that are important.

We are increasing, as the Secretary said, the numbers in the Guard and Reserve units to compensate for our conscious decision to hold the Active strength constant. That process is ongoing—we must do more and more of that. . . .

SENATOR GOLDWATER: General Meyer, you talked about needed changes. I want to ask you if you feel that we have in our armed forces under the Joint Chiefs a strategic plan?

Do we operate under one plan with the tactics being developed as the need is seen, tactics in different possible theaters?

I am thinking, for example, of the Soviet general strategy of allowing politics and economics to pretty much determine what they are going to do with their forces. I don't believe we have any central plan where the four forces work around the two.

GENERAL MEYER: . . . [so as] to do this without getting into security matters. I will be a little bit general. Because of the many contingencies which our nation is called upon to respond to—Northeast Asia, the Greenland-Iceland-U. K. Gap, the Middle East, Central Europe, Central America, and so on—we have guidance which goes out to commanders in each one of those areas which gives many specific missions which we expect them to be able to carry out. It tells them what forces are available and gives them certain assumptions as far as how the war will start and how much mobilization time there might be. From that they then develop a plan and come back and brief us and we critique that plan as to whether we consider it to be adequate or not. That is done by region.

When we try to put all of those together in a grand master plan, that is not done as well as it should be. . . .

SENATOR KENNEDY: . . . General Meyer talked . . . about percentages that are overseas, home, morale issues and other issues involved and obviously there are trade-offs that have to be made. Perhaps it is difficult this morning to do so, but I would be interested in your own areas of priority, what if you were just making the recommendation, yourself, what priority you would give that issue versus some of the other items that are being requested.

I don't know whether you want to be specific or you would want to give that more thought.

GENERAL MEYER: I will provide an answer for the record, but the thing that I would plead as we go through this again is, don't salami slice it.

In other words, you need to take a look at what those functions are. If you decide you are going to reduce the budget, let somebody decide the functional areas that need to be reduced as opposed to just going in and attacking a single program. Otherwise, you will end up with less than you think.

Every time you go down and take one of those programs out vertically, you have a magnifying effect on the Army's total readiness and capability. . . .

SENATOR KENNEDY: . . . One of the things you have been interested in is the future of the Army, what it is going to look like in 10 or 20 years from now. . . .One of the questions raised is the question about the Army's Scout helicopter OH-58 improvement program. CBO says it will cost a billion-eight in the next five years. Yet the Army is planning a new helicopter for the nineties.

I will be interested in what you have to say about a particular weapon system, but I am interested in your own view about the general problem we are going to be facing over the period and that is as you see the role of the Army changing over a period of time, the guidance you can give us about what ought to be expended in terms of major outlays for equipment which may be obsolete or may not be in the relatively short period of time.

GENERAL MEYER: The helicopter issue is an issue that I think Congress should be proud of and so should the Army. It is taking an existing system—nothing new—but taking an existing system and upgrading it instead of going out and buying new equipment.

At some point in time out in the future, when you get remotely piloted vehicles, the effectiveness of these kinds of helicopter systems will be enhanced. In the meantime, if we go to war tomorrow or the next day, Soldiers will have to go to war and win. We have to have something on the battlefield to do that.

What we need to do in the future is to really push technology to give us the opportunity to make breakthroughs.

I will also tell you that the M-60 tank will be on the battlefield in the year 2000. . . .

SENATOR WARNER: Again going back to research, in 1980 this Committee and others enacted legislation which tried to restore the comparability pay gap. I think it is essential we maintain the progress that we have achieved. That is why I am strong on maintaining the pay.

In earlier years you raised the hollow Army concept. Now that has been pretty well taken care of. Am I correct on that?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes.

SENATOR WARNER: The point I wish to make is that if we have cured the hollow Army concept in a two-year period and if we are compelled to take cuts now, would it not be more advisable to take those in terms of Active personnel strength rather than modernization, recognizing that most of your procurement programs are five to ten years in duration?

If they are canceled, there are cancellation costs and other things that minimize the impact on budgetary savings. So I point out it seems to me we could recover from a reduction in personnel more quickly in the outyears than we could from slashing away at the procurement account and modernization.

GENERAL MEYER: Your thesis--that you could recover more quickly in the outyears—I believe is correct. But in the near term, you would be contributing to hollowness because of the turbulence in moving folks around. The impact on near-term readiness would be significant.

SENATOR WARNER: I recognize that. You have to look at the overall threat. The point being if we have two unpleasant options, cutting back on modernization and cutting back on Active personnel, it seems to me we can recover more quickly from the personnel impact than we can from substantial reductions in the modernization program and the Army . . . is further behind in modernization than is the Navy and the Air Force.

Am I not correct in that?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir, we are further behind in modernization.

SENATOR WARNER: So it is your answer that given the choice, the personnel would have to take the brunt of this cut as opposed to Army modernization?

GENERAL MEYER: I don't believe the Army should have to take any of the cuts.

SENATOR WARNER: I think that is clear.

GENERAL MEYER: We got less than the other services to start with. The thing I am concerned about is the tremendous turbulence this will cause at a very critical time in history.

SENATOR EXON: . . . Gentlemen . . . I would like to follow up on some of the previous questions that have been asked with regard to the pay freeze on the military that many of us on this Committee are very much concerned about.

It is my understanding that the proposed pay freeze that the administration has come forth with was not recommended or even enforced by the uniform Chiefs, but I recognize that you are basically going along with your Commander in Chief.

If something is done in this area as I expect it might be done by the Congress, if we decide that we cannot go along with the freeze—I would ask this of every one of you—would you think if we are going to have some kind of increase, it would be better to have a percentage across-the-board increase or do you think, since we are limited in funds, it might make more sense to target that in certain areas?

If you are for targeting, what sectors of the enlisted and officer personnel should we particularly concentrate on in regard to targeting?



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SECRETARY MARSH: Senator, let me make a comment.

One, I support the pay freeze. I think that is very clear from what I have said.

In reference . . . the concept of targeting pay . . . that the Army has taken a position in favor of targeting and I have favored targeting.

I would have to think about how I would answer that question if you have a pay freeze and were to have a very small percentage increase like you are talking about. I think that could have some impact on how I might feel about targeting.

But I generally feel that some targeting toward the higher ranks, particularly the higher enlisted ranks, gives you the greatest benefit. But if you have a freeze, then I might have a different view. I would have to give that some thought and consideration.

SENATOR EXON: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Could I have comments from the General?

GENERAL MEYER: I favor targeting. I also have the same concerns now. We would have to go back and look at it.

For the young Soldier who decides to come into the Army at the private or private first class level, I don't believe it will make much difference to him—the $12 or $13 more he is not going to get.

It is at the middle grade NCO level that I think the targeting should be focused. We should also look at one of the areas we have been ignoring—the warrant officer area. We have a similar problem there.

We use warrant officers because of their skill to do a lot of things. We have never spoken out for that warrant officer group. It is a group that, if I had a choice of targeting, I would target in the center and not out at the extreme end. Those of us who have been in the Army 25 to 30 years, I think, could tighten our belts a little bit.

The brand new people coming in, I think, would look at it that way. I think that the middle grade crew will be so critical to us in the future. That is where I would target. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: . . . .in your testimony you emphasized that three years ago you described the condition of the Army as being hollow. You called it a hollow Army.

In referring to your statement of three years ago, are you saying the Army is no longer hollow?

GENERAL MEYER: I am saying in General Cavazos' command where three years ago we had zeroed out platoons and zeroed out squads, where we had equipment that was not there, where our National Guard and Army Reserve were significantly under strength in all their organizations, where we were short 10,000 non-commissioned officers, those basic problems have been corrected.

There are still elements of hollowness and those . re the ones I identified—especially the equipping of the Army. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Some of the hollowness has been filled in, but some remains, is that correct?

GENERAL MEYER: That is correct.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: By what date will we have filled the hollowness?

GENERAL MEYER: You will never fill the total hollowness to my satisfication. I think you ought to get rid of me if we did, because I am always trying to ensure we become better and better.

If we are able to get stability in the five-year program—stability of procurement in a five-year program—and it continues the way we are heading today, we will have not only the new equipment but also the sustainability—that is essential to support us throughout that five-year program.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Your statement of three years ago was alarming. In my view, it was accurate and it helped to shape events, I think, such that we have made some real progress. We have increased real spending for the Army and the other Services and that real increase in spending has bought us real improvement according to your testimony.

That is a success story that I don't think is widely appreciated or even known among the

public. As you know, gentlemen, the support for the President's defense program has deteriorated from two or three years ago. I think part of the problem is the people don't realize the improvements that have been purchased with these real increases in spending.

GENERAL MEYER: As I said at the start, I believe the American people have gotten their money's worth out of the $153 billion we have received in the last three years.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: You were understrength three years ago when you called the Army hollow. Are you understrength today?

GENERAL MEYER: We are not understrength compared to what we are authorized. We are still understrength, as has been pointed out, in the National Guard and Army Reserve against their wartime requirements.

We are understrength against what I would consider Active force wartime needs. We have attempted to avoid having units over there that are understrength. Instead, we have taken cuts in total numbers of units.

General Cavazos [Commander, Forces Command] can tell you, first of all, that he is last in resource priority for a lot of reasons—primarily because we try to maintain our overseas forces at highest priority. . . When you make a cut, it is made in his organization because we try to retain our overseas forces at the the highest readiness capability, and that is what you would expect. . . .

SENATOR HUMPHREY: So, you have made substantial improvements in the area of force levels. Is that correct, in strength?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: What about three years ago when you called the Army hollow? You had a critical shortage of NCOs. What is the situation today?

GENERAL MEYER: We expect to have the NCO shortfall eliminated by the end of this calendar year except for a few critical special slots such as cryptologists and intelligence people.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: So the critical shortage of NCOs is almost cured?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: Will be cured?

GENERAL MEYER: Except for some MOSs.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: You were short of equipment, of all kinds three years ago when you called the Army hollow. How are you doing in that area?

GENERAL MEYER: We still have a long way to go in the equipping area. The equipping area is the area we have to improve. We still have Soldiers out there who have trucks that are older than they are—Soldiers in the Active Army, the Guard and the Reserve. It is a Total Army problem, it is not just an Active force problem.

SENATOR HUMPHREY: How about equipment not in the major items category?

GENERAL MEYER: We are doing better there. We have put a significant amount of resources into trucks, materiel handling equipment, and into the things that don't have visibility. . . .In one area we still have a major shortage, and that is FM radios. That is the kind of small item that if you go out in the field today and visit soldiers, they will tell you is one of the highest priorities—a better radio. . . .

SENATOR LEVIN: Did I understand you to answer Senator Kennedy that you would provide for the record a list of items which you would consider lower priority than pay increase?

GENERAL MEYER: No, sir, I don't believe I said that. What I tried to say was I think that is the wrong way to cut the budget. I believe somebody has to look functionally at what we should do at the Defense Department and not get into a particular Service until that is done.

I believe you should be looking at what we are trying to do with our armed forces and decide the functional area you are going to cut. Look at functional areas as opposed to going in and saying, General Meyer, what do you want to swap for this or that. . . .

SENATOR LEVIN: General Meyer, according to Secretary Weinberger last August, the Army continues to lag behind the other Services in

modernization of mission equipment. Would you agree with that?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir, I would.

SENATOR LEVIN: Yet despite that fact, the Army's share of Defense spending, and here we are talking about the share vis-a-vis other Services, has declined from '82 to '83 and from '83 to '84. Is that correct?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes, sir.

SENATOR LEVIN: How do you explain that?

GENERAL MEYER: To be honest, I am a failure. I am serious.

SENATOR LEVIN: You don't come across as a failure.

GENERAL MEYER: One of my greatest failures is not to have been able to articulate more clearly what the Army needs to be able to do the things that it is charged with doing.

SENATOR LEVIN: So as far as you are concerned then, the overall allocation between the Services is not reflective of their various modernization needs, where they are coming from and what they need?

GENERAL MEYER: That is my personal view. yes. . . .

SENATOR QUAYLE: . . . Mr. Secretary and General, I first would like to join in the accolade made to you, General Meyer. You are not a failure. I think we will all miss you when you leave in June.

I notice on page 8 at the conclusion of your testimony you said there are better ways for a nation to go about managing Defense business.

Could you specify one particular thing we might do to better manage our Defense business?

GENERAL MEYER: The biggest thing we should do to improve the way we do Defense business is to provide stability to the program.

First of all, if I went around and asked each Senator at this table what their view was of the role for the Armed Services, everybody would have slightly different ones, I am sure, as far as strategy and the purpose of those armed forces. There isn't any common agreement on what the armed forces are supposed to do. Everybody sort of looks at it differently.

I think we need to have a consensus or an agreement between the Congress and the administration as far as the basic purpose behind the armed forces—the general direction they are going—and then provide stability to the programs that exist.

SENATOR QUAYLE: How are we going to get this consensus? What should we or the Department of Defense be doing that they are not doing right now?

GENERAL MEYER: I think there are several things that have to occur.

First, I believe there has to be a better appreciation between the two of us as far as the strategy itself is concerned—the basic strategy. That is a common problem. It is one we have to address. For example, I believe this Committee should be the Committee which is really charged with laying out the rationale behind the armed forces—the broad policy that our nation should pursue with our forces.

SENATOR QUAYLE: Over your years of service, do you feel that there is a decline in the consensus of what the strategy is going to be?

GENERAL MEYER: Absolutely.

SENATOR QUAYLE: Do you think we are at a worse point today in really appreciating and understanding and having a consensus?

GENERAL MEYER: Yes.

SENATOR QUAYLE: Why is that?

GENERAL MEYER: Because it was easy before. Before it was easy everywhere. We had strategic nuclear preponderance. Therefore, our conventional forces were able to operate freely. We had economic capability so that resources were available to do most of the things that we needed to do. We had in Congress the ability of the various Committees . . . to be dominant in specific issues.

Today—I am just telling you this from my last eight years in Washington—authority is spread so much that Committees are impinging on each other's area of responsibility. As a result, everybody and their brother has a different view on who is charged with what, and all this is giving the American people less defense for the dollar.

CHAIRMAN TOWER: You broke the code, General.

(Laughter)

SENATOR QUAYLE: There are no Russians in this room, Mr. Chairman.

Let me try to get a consensus of not a strategy, but what the functional areas of the overall Department of Defense are.

Could you define the three or four functional areas on a priority basis, what you understand to be the defense posture for our country?

GENERAL MEYER: First, there is the basic strategic issue, that is, ensuring we have adequate capability so that we are not held hostage and our allies are not held hostage by some other nation with their strategic capability.

Second, that we have in the broadest terms adequate conventional forces which are able, in conjunction with our allies, to prevent the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and others who would seek to impose their will on others from being able to do that.

Let me break the conventional force issue down into some of the functional areas. I believe then you have to decide what you need in the way of conventional forces. You need in being forces—those are Air forces, Army forces, Navy forces, Marine Corps forces, and Coast Guard forces—that are unique to many of the specific challenges.

You need strategic mobility to be able to move them around quickly. You need command and control—both for communications and because of the way we are organized—in order to ensure that they are able to respond effectively.

Then you need a sustaining base which permits us—and particularly this nation which has to project power across seas and through the air as no other nation has to do—to have that sustaining base from which can flow men and equipment.

Those are just some of the functional areas you need to take a look at in relation to whatever policy or stratgey we are charged with doing.

It is not military that decides this strategy. The decision to do this or that is in every instance decided by you, hopefully in conjunction with the administration. Our responsibility is to come back with the kinds of forces that give us the best capability to do that. That is an area you asked about earlier—how can we do a better job.

I think every year we should be charged to come over to you and say how much more capable we are of carrying out the national strategy with the resources you gave us the last year, and how much more capability we are going to have with these resources next year. This way, you start to get into a meaningful dialogue instead of talking about specific hunks of equipment.

SENATOR QUAYLE: Under the breakdown of functional area under the conventional, I think you have force structure, basically force structure first and then mobility, command and control, and then sustaining bases of operation.

What category would you put pay under?

GENERAL MEYER: That cuts across all of them. It is basic to taking care of the people. You can call that sustainability.

SENATOR QUAYLE: The way you broke that down you have that last.

GENERAL MEYER: I don't have it last. I just broke down strategic and conventional.

SENATOR QUAYLE: Is there any order of ranking?

GENERAL MEYER: I did not try to rank them. I don't think you can. I think every one is important.

SENATOR QUAYLE: That is the problem. As we try to develop this consensus, it really is a problem for us who are groping with this fundamen-

tal problem of what we should be doing, to have a full appreciation of what the strategy is, having a full understanding of where you are coming from and where others are coming from because of their reluctance to sort of prioritize for us. If we can't get that information, it makes our job more difficult.

GENERAL MEYER: Senator, it is not easy to prioritize among those categories for reduced resources. It seems to me that instead of trying to prioritize among those categories, if there are basic disagreements on policy issues, then you must identify those most critical policies. And if you decide there are only X amount of dollars, you direct us which policies to execute.

That is a better way to do it than your sitting over here trying to determine between two or three of those kinds of categories—which you are not qualified to do.

I don't mean this derogatorily. It is not something for which you have a background to do. We are charged with doing that for you. I am charged . . . to come over and explain to you the best way to do this with the piece of that pie.

## Address to the NORWICH UNIVERSITY COMMENCEMENT

Northfield, Vermont
21 May 1983

I'm happy to be here to share in this moment—a happy occasion for all: family—faculty—and for the graduating class.

You the families are happy for many reasons. This instant represents a moment of fulfillment. You've done what you can to prepare your youngsters—now adults—as well as you can for life. The bread-winner is happy because the "wallet muscle" now gets a chance to relax. Having sent four children through college, with one more to go, I can empathize.

You, the faculty, are happy—perhaps because your pace will change now for a few months—but, more important, because in the profession you have chosen, the students are the focus. You have watched this graduating class develop and mature, and you can take pride in the growth you have inspired. (There may even be a few students you are just happy to get rid of!)

And you—the graduates—though I understand it's been a spring of skiing at Tuckerman Ravine—you have a right to be happy today because this event represents the attainment of a goal you set some time ago. This graduation is a measure of your personal success thus far in your life. For nearly one half of you—another goal—a commission in the Armed Forces has been achieved. That commissioning exercise this morning should gratify us all—the fact that talented and principled young men and women continue to underwrite the continuing linkage that must exist between a free society and its military institutions. This is the proud heritage of Norwich, the oldest private military college in the United States.

When, 20 years hence, the Norwich Class of 1983 gathers in Northfield for its 20th reunion, the year will be 2003—three years into the twenty-first century! And what will be the most significant feature of those twenty years? My response would have to be—change—all encompassing, ever-present change.

Change is not new to our time. The satirist and clergyman Johnathan Swift said, "There is nothing in the world constant but inconstancy." The difference today, is the pace and dimension of change.

In his book, *The Third Wave*, Toffler postulated that the "first wave", the agricultural era of man, took 2000 years to spread across what we regard as the civilized world. Toffler says that the "third wave", the information age, is with us

now and will take only 20 years—two decades—your generation's two decades—to have the same all-encompassing effect on the fundamental characteristics of man's life that in an earlier era took 100 generations!

To illustrate this in terms we can all understand, my generation and that of your parents is fundamentally computer illiterate. Your generation is computer literate. Your children's generation will be computer sophisticated—well versed and comfortable with its promises and perils.

That's only one of the changes you may anticipate. The May 9th edition of *US New and World Report* focused on what the next 50-years could bring in a very up-beat and optimistic assessment.

·There could be "miracles" in science and technology that change reaction of our bodies to illness and aging.

·In information processing there is likely to be artificial intelligence embedded into computers and robots that can "think", analyze and talk to their operators—taking over routine human chores.

·Lifestyles could be substantially modified/improved; our homes smaller but "smarter", resembling today's dwellings but containing technology which regulates lighting, heating and cooling, security, plans menus, defrosts and cooks dinners.

·A soaring economy could produce a "new country" which infused with high-technology, could produce in 50 years a total renewal of the private sector.

·Technology-spawned jobs will create entirely new fields of endeavor. Career changes will be more frequent. Training and retraining will be lifelong.

Whether all of these changes occur exactly as predicted is not important. What is important is that change is inevitable. It will dominate all our activities. Therefore it is critical that we understand that the natural consequence of change is challenge—challenge can lead to confrontation and crisis—and if not checked, to conflict.

The promise and the potential which lie ahead must weather the challenges of political ambitions evident in the military preparations of many nations. The Libyan aircraft recently impounded by Brazil exposes a willingness by Libya to act as an intermediary on a continent far removed from its natural sphere of interests. Cuba unabashedly exploits every opportunity in our own hemisphere. And of course the potential for confrontations anywhere on the globe to escalate is greatly affected by the growing power projection capabilities of the Soviet Union. In my view the question as to whether or not our republic will survive with all of our values and freedoms intact will be decided in the next 20 years.

I must also tell you that, unfortunately, man is either a great success at conflict, or a huge failure at peace, as the 14,500 wars in recorded human history attest.

And so we must, as we look optimistically to the future, realistically assess the state of world affairs and make prudent national preparations. This is substantially the same judgment the founder of this great institution, Captain Alden Partridge, voiced many years ago, that:

> "... history forces upon my mind a conviction that mankind is doomed to suffer the evils of war and bloodshed, and that consequently that state which intends to maintain its independence, free from the encroachments of avarice and ambition, must be prepared to repel force by force."

Our national purpose is, of course, not war, but the concerted effort to avoid war by interrupting the chain of events which link change to conflict. Whether facing technological advances, political realities or economic upheaval our actions must be accurate and timely, sensing change early enough to provide a clear and desirable course from the status quo. Above all, harnessing the forces of uncertainty will require flexible, creative minds continually searching for and adapting the better idea.

During your time at this university you've had many ideas thrown at you. Some you've discarded out of hand. Others you've stored away for further study. Some you have lived with and practiced daily. Three stand out in my mind that may help you weather the force of change and help in achieving a better world in keeping with the potential I talked about earlier.

First there is the idea of "professionalism." Whatever you choose as your life's work, staying abreast of and anticipating the changing nature of that work will remain the fundamental measure of your ability to contribute. In this regard, you have at Norwich, hopefully, learned how to study. Your current inventory of knowledge is woefully dated—remember Toffler? The burden is yours now to remain constantly so knowledgeable in your field that you know where the right lever is to influence change beneficially—not be driven by its uncertainties or fearful of its results. This university and faculty have given you a basic grounding in "professionalism", what it means, what it stands for. It's now up to you to continue the process they've begun—to be equal to the tasks ahead, to do your part in helping to guide the nation through dangerous and uncertain times ahead.

This brings me to the second idea, that of "values." Norwich has given you a value-based education, though few of you probably majored in ethics as a discipline. It's my hope that you have each internalized a set of values to the point where they are second nature to your character.

In the Army, we speak of our Army Ethic—a set of four values that apply equally to the whole of the profession of Arms. It is a Soldier's:

-Loyalty to the Institution: the Nation and its heritage. It takes its form in words from our Oath: "... to support and defend the Constitution" ...

-Loyalty to the Unit: to fellow Soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines.

-Third, the sense of Personal Responsibility. In its highest form it is competency. It is, I think, immoral to be incompetent. And finally,

-The value of Selfless Service: a Soldier's suppression of personal ambition and material achievement to give freely—sacrificially if need be—to the Nation.

You've gained an insight into these values during your years at Norwich. Perhaps they are part of your internalized value set, pertinent to your chosen profession—the fulcrum for your instinctive sense of what is right. I caution you that without a value-set or an ethic, the judgments you will be called upon to make in your profession will be undirected.

The third "idea" is that of commitment—specifically, a "commitment to excellence". As professions age and as change takes place around them, they chart one of two courses for themselves—as do the people within them. Either they continue to live in the reflected glow of their past success and ultimately wither, or they grow—reaching forward to new horizons.

When, how and if professions do this is totally dependent on the vision and spirit of their members. If their's is one of contentment, then the profession becomes lazy—inactive. If the vision and spirit is focused on a quest for excellence then the profession remains viable—forecasting and assimilating the changing environment and ensuring the continued effectiveness of the profession.

The achievement of excellence in a very complex world is predicated on three things (1) trying; (2) perservance and, (3) adherence to standards.

The heart and soul of excellence is trying. Not trying because of a fear of failure means a loss of opportunity to learn, to grow, to profit.

In your quest for excellence perseverance will be essential. It's the ability to withstand discouragement, to tolerate criticism, to face up to uncertainty and its stress.

And, finally, excellence demands an adherence to standards. The standards I'm speaking of are by and large self-imposed and only infrequently policed by the larger society. Yet, they are the foundation of excellence. It means living by the moral code that I spoke of earlier—because your actions will impact on others—you are not the only one who has to live with your decisions.

Collectively applied, the dedication to grow in your profession, your steadfast adherance to high moral standards, and the maturity and spirit to try in a personal quest for excellence can forge the hammer by which we break the link which joins change and challenge to crisis, to confrontation, and to conflict.

There are wonderful opportunities ahead. And while each of you will be challenged, I am confident that on that day in the year 2003 when you gather to reflect on your lives, your children, and your stewardship—you will be able to say

with some measure of confidence that you fulfilled St. Paul's challenge to Timothy:

"O Timothy, guard what has been intrusted to you."

My days on guard are about over. I intrust that task to you. I wish each of you well in that. Good luck and God bless you.

## Article in the
## WASHINGTON QUARTERLY · JUNE EDITION
## "My Way. . ."

1 June 1983

More than a year ago, CSIS began a thoughtful dialogue on the question of American Leadership. Was it stultified by managerial, careerist, status-quo, or efficiency mind-sets? Was it complacent in the face of environmental change and external challenge? Was it visionary? Was it principled?. . . Was it rescuable?

The tone of these questions leaves not much to the imagination regarding the group's consensus about the contemporary state of American leadership. The military, and the Army in particular, took its hard knocks. Whether by virtue of the happy circumstances described in the Winter issue of *TWQ* by Bill Taylor, or as a case study in the continuing demise of our affairs, I was asked to discuss leadership and management of the Army before this group—focusing on my approach to the stewardship of this key American institution.

"Do you lead or manage the Army?" I was asked. I'll let the reader decide.

Shortly after I became the Army Chief of Staff, I happened to be leafing through the message traffic that I routinely see each morning, when I came across one announcing that the Army was going to have a conference on the management of leadership. Well, I must admit that having been sensitized by much criticism directed at the Army, and the other services, and industry—that we are turning into a group of managers as opposed to leaders—that I reacted rather heatedly. I dispatched a second message countermanding the first. Within the hour the conference was cancelled. We weren't going to manage leadership on my watch!

Now maybe I overreacted, but it did serve to bring focus to the issues of leadership and management—sometimes separate functions, sometimes thoroughly intertwined. Certainly in the Army, the qualities expected of an infantry commander in battle are sharply distinct from those of an officer tasked with running a weapons acquisition program, and distinct again from the qualities required to deal with the creation and wedding of strategy and forces.

One distinction is reflected in the institutional goals which the Secretary of the Army and I approved in December 1981 on the heels of a series of secluded performance reviews involving all key members of the Army Staff and Secretariat. Large, diversified and highly decentralized organizations need some sense of constant purpose and direction. The Army certainly qualifies, with a budget exceeding 60-billion dollars, an enormous physical plant, and more than 2-million members. Our prior goals had encompassed most of the principal elements important to a fighting Army: readiness, people, equipment, future development, and strategic deployment. Management was included, but not leadership; and this was viewed as a serious deficiency. It is included today—focused on ethics, professionalism, mission accomplishment, and concern for people. Our management goal, on the other hand, centers on the efficient and effective stewardship of resources.

This merely underscores leadership and management are definitionally separate. It does

not answer the oft posed question of whether in practice they are finite and distinct—and I think my approach underscores that they are not. Now I began in office in June 1979, before this revision to our goals, so I must have had some feel already about how I would pursue my tasks. That began with my personal definition of *leadership* as

> "... influencing people to do things which either they didn't want to do, or which they hadn't thought about doing."

That implies that when people are on track doing the expected that leaders aren't necessary. That's perhaps a bit too pat. The fact is that every job at every level demands a complement of leadership and management skills. In some instances one tends to dominate, and in others that one is less important ... marginal.

## WHO?

The central focus of the Chief of Staff's job and what unavoidably consumes the bulk of his time is this demand to influence affairs relating to the Army's land combat mission. He has to influence the internal Army, with its many components: the Active force, the National Guard and Reserves, its civilians, its military families, and its retirees. He also has to influence the deliberation of his peers on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and advises the civilian leaders of the Department. He must speak forthrightly about land issues within the Department of Defense, influence interagency thinking, the Department of State, the NSC and, of course, he must act as a key advisor to the President as Commander-in-Chief.

He has to influence the Congress, too. When much more junior, I once (perhaps inappropriately for my grade) assessed for an earlier Chief of Staff my perception of his role. I characterized it as not unlike that of the head of a major university, who is charged with setting the vision and securing the resources which permit the university to operate; while the deans of the various colleges run the programs, develop the curriculum, mix with the students, etc. I'm not sure that this distinguished general officer found that a flattering comparison, but the fact is that the Chief of Staff is the principal spokesman of land warfare to the Congress and fulfills a vital obligation in assisting its membership in their constitutional role of raising armies. So it's unavoidable that the Chief be immersed in clarifying the issues set before the various committees regarding the Army. One old saying describes generals as "the visible custodians of a nation's power," and in that sense—as the most visible general in the Army—the Chief of Staff certainly influences public perceptions about his service. That is not a light responsibility. It would do disservice to the quality of the Army to represent it poorly. It would be improper not to speak to any interested audience about the Army when invited. After all, we exist because of and for the citizenry, and they deserve to know as much as they care about us. This takes time.

The Chief also interacts to a considerable degree with key military leaders of allied nations. He certainly hopes to influence both their perceptions of the United States and our central philosophy of building viable and enduring ties with the other nations of the world that share our interests.

I suspect there is a final audience that is influenced by the Chief of Staff, namely, parties around the world who are hostile toward us and who seek to glean insights about American intent and capability. Hopefully they are not misled.

That's a relatively complete list of the audiences I believe the Chief of Staff must be prepared to influence.

## TO DO WHAT?

People are usually kind enough to listen to me describe the Army, its status, its mission, and its needs; but in the final measure, nothing speaks like deeds. In other words, it's how good the Army is that ultimately influences people—friend and foe alike. So my major task has centered on doing all I could internally to improve the Army because success there would improve all the external dialogues and most certainly affect the Soviet perception of U. S. capability and will.

You may recall that the year 1979 was not a good one for the services, the Army in particular. We were unable to recruit our authorized strength, falling short some 15,000 volunteers. Over the next six months that translated into troop shortages in units exceeding 30,000. Conditions were such

that there was a very serious exodus of qualified young leaders, both non-commissioned and officer. The modernization of our material was going slowly, a bow wave of procurement we interminably put off to some distant future. And there was some evidence of low professional self-esteem, the tailings of Vietnam I suspect.

Part of the problem was our own. But a larger part of the problem was a decided lack of national investment in land forces. An Army is, after all, not an uncostly organization, and real expenditures had been declining steadily for a decade. So an early task for me was to define those key issues which would likely need my attention over my full term of office. The "to do what" listing, which I scratched on butcher paper in my office, paralleled my concept of the "whole man," in that it had mental, physical, social and spiritual components. The counterparts for the "whole Army" were these:

Mentally: we needed a continuing focus on military tactics and doctrine, the conceptual bases which assure its ability to fight successfully. Also, we needed to invest more effort in professional education

Physically: we needed good men and good machines, and sound and rigorous training to join them.

Socially: we needed to look at how we treated people, because our current methods seemed capable only of perpetuating turbulence in unit environments to the point where commanders were never able to train their units to full readiness standards.

Spiritually: we needed to review our professional purposes and principles, making certain that our ethic of service was understood, lived by and perpetuated.

So that was my framework, my "to do what" list as I looked inside the Army.

## HOW?

Having the Rosetta Stone posted in your office may be comforting, but it doesn't do much for the organization. How do you go about making it happen? How do you influence others to do it?

It may be well to pause for a moment and consider the magnitude of that problem. You can't call the Army into your office and say, "Look here—." First, it won't fit, and second, many of its important components don't work directly for you—those assigned directly to a unified commander, or the National Guard (in peace), or retirees (who retain a strong and justifiable interest in their Army), or military families. Second, so much of what we do is very carefully and very deliberately folded into regulations and manuals to assure predictable day-to-day performance. So if what is proposed represents a marked change, then it takes the conscientious efforts of a great many people to root out the old encumbrances which underwrite old ways. Lastly, the Army is an organization of people, most of whom could stay busy even if the office of the Chief of Staff remained vacant for an extended period. Each subelement already understands its existing task and the way they are currently charged to accomplish that task. If you want change, you've got to get their attention!

Some of the very finest Chiefs of Staff have expressed disappointment that they were unable in their time to make major institutional adjustments. On occasion, some service Chiefs forced their programs, only to have them rejected once they leave. That's certainly not desirable. The Army can't afford to waste time spinning wheels, and the public shouldn't be asked to pay for such activities. I won't claim to have succeeded where anyone before me failed. It's endemic to any large organization that each Chief leave a legacy of unfinished business, and I will be no exception. But one hopes, and I'm no exception, that in his time—through the concerted effort of the entire organization--that beneficial directions have been set which will spawn further progress in the years ahead. You hope that those who follow will build on your work just as you built on others.

Keep in mind that there is no one perfect solution. The times change continually, demanding continuous adaptation if an organization is to remain pertient and effective. I believed I had scoped the problem and issues for the decade. Now, what tools for change were available?

There were some particularly important to me: the "HOW" to get "WHO" to do "WHAT."

Early on I wrote a White Paper, rather short and not overly prescriptive. In general terms it contained the directions I thought we needed to go; touching on major readiness-related functional areas like doctrine, tactical organization, people, training and materiel. The underlying need was loud and clear (and somewhat at variance with our former direction), namely: to build a force able to respond to contingencies world-wide without compromising NATO. This demanded a balance in our forces which many outside the Army had strenuously opposed.

The White Paper was one vision, not necessarily prophetic nor intended that way. It was a start, a way to excite people, to get them up and thinking—even if ill—about your ideas. Broadened participation is a critical intermediate goal because only when the vision becomes a shared one does it have a chance of becoming a reality. Leaders and shapers of action throughout the Army, at every level, need to be brought into the process, and the White Paper was a start.

Then you need to look for and use any means which helps break down the vertical discrimination endemic to heirarchical organizations. Organizational layers, which serve useful purposes in one sense, also act to inhibit the free flow of ideas and information throughout an organization, and that constitutes a major blockage to the development of a shared vision Unless this blockage is consciously addressed, one of a number of predictable consequences result: (1) good ideas are missed, (2) goals are unintentionally misunderstood, (3) or the most frightening of all, deliberate failure can occur: half-hearted trials borne of a lack of belief or misunderstanding, virtually certain to "fail positively," to disprove the germ of a good idea.

Of course, its important to keep a positive attitude—and a thick skin is helpful, too, because criticism is invited by the very nature of broadened participation. And it's beneficial. One caution, of course, is to keep the focus by insisting on relative simplicity—both in terms of the number of issues pursued, and by expounding them in as jargon-free a way as possible. A former Vice Chief of the Army once concluded that he could dream up enough ideas in one evening to keep the Army Staff busy for months. I believe that's true. So as not to dilute the effort, one must be selective, keep the issues fundamental and eliminate the slang.

The selection of key subordinates is an invaluable tool to influence affairs. Obviously one tries in the selection process to match each individual's skills [to] the leadership and management demands of [each] position. Some tasks are more clearly leadership-intensive; though as I hope I made clear earlier, most of those positions which require great expertise in management also require a heavy dose of leadership—the knack of influencing others to get the job done in the most effective fashion.

This selection process ought to respect the fact that especially in these turbulent times where we have been asking so many people to adapt to so many new ideas, that we try to keep elements of stability in place so that there are some well-recognized and visible points of reference. I've tried to do this by giving as much stability as possible to people I've assigned in key positions. . . certainly in all command levels from Division Commander down through Company Commander. If we want people to figure out how to do it better, then once we have selected our leaders, we ought to keep them aboard long enough so that they can see the action through.

Finally, it is absolutely essential to get out to see as much as possible of the organization and to talk to as much of the Army as you can. It has been my policy to seek in particular to talk personally to those audiences which grant me the greatest leverage—to talk to the Sergeants Major Academy, the War College, each new group of battalion and brigade commanders; because through them I can reach a much larger percentage of the Army in a very personal way: "the Chief told me. . . ."

There are effective devices for working with each of the audiences I have described. Together they constitute a tool kit to select from and use

as appropriate to each audience, each situation. I've used them all over these past four years.

## A CASE IN POINT

I was not certain, when I composed that initial list of objectives for my tour that I really wanted, or was adequately equipped, to tackle the personnel system. Having been in operations most of my service, it was not my strong suit. I'd complained a lot about personnel in the past. I was also aware of a lot of spears stuck in its carcass without effect over the years. The listing of failed ventures to resuscitate the individual replacement system was impressive. Still the net result added up to excessive and debilitating soldier turbulence which precluded our units, especially in the strategic reserve in the continental U S., from achieving desired readiness standards.

The several variants of unit rotation attempted in the past argued, too, against adoption of a unit-based system. Was there no option?

Looking back now, we didn't know when the White Paper was written what the answer should be. The goal was set, without proscription. Under the manning section I wrote:

> "Cohesion is a product of policy and actions at all levels to establish strong interpersonal bonds which mold a unit into a cohesive team. . . .We must focus on team work at the lowest level in our organizations where cohesion is most essential. . . Developing cohesive units over time must be the central focus of [our manning] efforts."

And under the training section the following was included:

> "The cohesion that matters on the battlefield is that which is developed at the company, platoon, and squad levels. We cannot afford to place the burden of adjusting to "brush fires" on those fragile organizations. They must be protected by higher echelons fulfilling their coordinating role. . . "

And so the goal was set.

Interestingly, as I was still in the fog of adjusting my personal vision to the magnitude of the tasks which lay ahead for me, the seed which suggested how we might do this was being planted, not by our personnel managers, but within our training base. The Recruiting Command had some fortuitous production months in the fall of 1979, untypical of what had been happening most of the year. The result was that for a brief period we found ourselves swamped with an influx of volunteers beyond the capacity of our training base. And so, temporarily, we adopted platoon training packages (groups of 30 soldiers) as one way to make the best use of available facilities. And we found, not surprisingly, in the process some happy results—the natural bonding and allegiance we all knew stability could create. Troops trained in basic within a platoon, when offered the opportunity to continue on with that platoon, elected to stay. In several circumstances they passed up options to a more highly paid and elite status with an airborne unit. The intangible had been rediscovered in a unit-based system.

This clearly affected the kinds of ideas being considered by a brain trust of young officers I had commissioned. (A study group would have given me a study. These guys gave me ideas!) The result was to bolster the legitimate and compelling advantage of a unit based personnel system.

The subject was aired in a free give and take of Army Staff principals, and in other scheduled sessions with the Army's major commanders. We brought senior retired officers on-board, and received their encouragement. We used the external media as well to announce our intent to consider radical change.

Finally, in March 1981, we initiated a well-thought out test program which involved the full judgment and consideration of the key commands in the United States. And soon after the new Administration took office, my staff and I met with the new civilian Secretariat in the goal-setting session I mentioned earlier and ratified our commitment to proceed with major changes in the way we handled people.

Then began the period of wrenching change—that time in which a staged expansion away from an individual to a unit-based system began to flush out all the imbedded impediments to change. It became clearer that one of the ma-

jor reasons earlier unit-based schemes had failed was that they had never been considered as more than a temporary appendage to an individual personnel system. One of the two had to be dominant, and so long as the Army's perception remained unchanged about which would endure, all of the detailed changes necessary to sustain a unit system went undone.

This was a period of teaching. A period of learning. It was also a time when key selectees of mine were put into place to sustain the effort.

Today we are at a point where we can clearly see our way to extending the unit-based concept to an 80-company level. That's still relatively modest. I suspect strongly that by the time we reach that level we will have identified the administrative changes needed to expand the concept to all of the combat arms—Army wide. And I suspect we will have evidence in hand to fully justify what many now take on faith.

Major changes like these do not occur magically. They require a deliberate extension of one's influence through a wide swath of a very large organization. Some may think that the power associated with the four stars of this office is sufficient to do what the incumbent pleases. Certainly there is power to effect certain things. It can replace people, discipline them, approve or disapprove recommendations, even set a disciplined and well-trained Army into combat. But if it hasn't convinced its membership that the course directed is the right one, it can also be rejected—perhaps with penalties, but rejected nonetheless. This should come as no surprise to Americans steeped in our American tradition of rugged individualism. Von Steuben voiced his observations of it to a friend in the course of the American Revolution:

The genius of this nation is not in the least to be compared with that of the Prussians, Austrians, or French. You say to your soldiers, 'Do this,' and he doeth it; but I am obliged to say 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and then he does it."

That same quality of influencing behavior is intrinsic to leadership and management of today's Army. It has been my way as well.



*"Sergeant Major, you are about to end more than 30 years service. You know the privilage of being a Soldier."*

*Ft. Meyer*
*June 1983*

# Address at the
# RETIREMENT CEREMONY FOR SERGEANT MAJOR OF THE ARMY WILLIAM ARTHUR CONNELLY

Fort Myer, Virginia
17 June 1983

## A Soldier's Manifesto

Sergeant Major. You are about to end more than thirty years' service. You know the privilege of being a Soldier. Attempting to summarize what that means to you. for your many friends here who have not been soldiers is difficult. How do you capsulize into a few brief moments the people and the places; the fear and frustration, the elation, the sense of accomplishment and the satisfaction that our way of life offers. Your service record, beginning with your enlistment into the National Guard in Americus, Georgia, only skims the surface of your contributions. And yet, there is a common thread to your Service to which all Soldiers subscribe. It is what has sustained you, and what has sustained me. I'll call it the Soldier's Manifesto.

I'll caution you that it may only confirm the worst suspicions some not in uniform have about us. But, hopefully it will give civilians gathered here today greater confidence that Soldiers are motivated by a deep concern and love for this country of ours and that that love of nation ensures our citizens that Soldiers are not likely to pursue courses of action which might do harm to our nation or to the well-being of our families and loved ones.

That does not mean, that Soldiers walk away from danger. In fact we walk in its face every day. We practice the skills of war. and study all its dimensions with great care. We have an entire education system to breed combat leaders. We stock munitions and purchase machines of war. We scrutinize our potential enemies and plan on how we might combat their forces. We make enormous demands on the public treasury—but we make even grater demands on every Soldier who wears our uniform.

For some, these military preparations seem unnecessary—why all this training in a time of "peace?" A Soldier would respond that the peace we enjoy hasn't come cheaply. You know as Sergeant Major that Soldiers have died on duty during your 4-year tenure as Sergeant Major of the Army—in Korea, in Iran, in Pakistan, in Germany, in the Sinai, in France—"all in a time of peace." Their lives are the downpayment on our continuing security, given freely by fellow citizens in uniform who subscribed to the Soldier's Manifesto that some things are worth more than life itself—

-the safety and security of our families,

-the safety and security of our friends, and

- the idea that man can only aspire to the full use of

his talents in a free environment.

Philosophies alien to ours which threaten those values, do exist in the world today. Our nation can not view that world from the perspective of a disinterested observer.

Our nation must remain in the forefront of the world's scene—pushing the basic values of freedom with justice upon which our nation was founded.

But neither should we Americans become so obsessed with the threat that we see nothing but ill in the world. That is not an accurate picture either, Sergeant Major, for at heart—through your efforts and those of thousands of other Soldiers—it is still an exciting world about us to-



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day which continues to offer to us and to our children a hearty life of wonder and fulfillment.

But our ability to select our roles—our freedom to abide by an inner vision, our opportunity to meet some personal challenge—is entirely dependent upon our nation remaining free.

The Soldier is not a prophet. He is not blessed with any more foresight than the average citizen. But he is a remarkably good accountant. And he routinely catalogues the military capabilities of others. When weapons inventories grow, it triggers alarm—not because of some knowledge that attack is immediately forthcoming, but because increased weapons' inventories lend credibility to the reality of increased military capabilities. We Soldiers dwell in the world of dealing with capability, not the world of political judgment regarding intent. I do not know what the Russians intend. I do know what they are capable of.

Some hold that the response to larger weapons holdings should be smaller weapons holdings—to set the tone and temper for reciprocal behavior. We've tried that after every war. We've dismantled our arsenal of democracy. But if you look around the world its clear that those who endanger our values have not reciprocated. The threat—as measured by capability—is large and growing.

Yet, when we try to answer this capability—to maintain the diplomatic and military options available to us and to our alliance partners—the public implication is that it is us who are acting warlike. The disarmament crowds are in the streets of Germany—West not East! In the squares of Belgium, not Bulgaria. In the villages of Holland, not Hungary.

Why? Because the iron fist of a closed society does not permit public assembly for those purposes.

The Soldier does not resent the demonstrations in the West. He grieves for the fact that they cannot occur in the East, and does not want to see that shadow of repression fall over the people and things he loves.

Many of those demonstrators—perhaps most—are intelligent and loving human beings. Their actions grow from fear.

Not just civilians know fear. A Soldier knows fear. It is part of all of us. "Fear," as the Roman Rufus wrote in the 2d Century, "Makes men ready to believe the worst." Mencken concluded in the 20's that "what man wants beyond everything else is safety." He posited that the lesser the man, the more he craves safety.

That is not what motivated those extraordinary men who founded our nation. They swore their fortunes, their sacred honor—their very lives—for the sake of an idea. They in effect swore out their death warrants. Fear probably infected all of them. It did not find expression in taking the safe way of servility. It did find expression in determination and defiance.

What troubles the Soldier is that fear could cause us to lose the necessary sense of public conviction about the importance of maintaining our national values.

I hope, Sergeant Major, that our Soldiers deployed around the world are not a mere facade that will crumble with the first strong wind from the East because our citizens are unwilling to join collectively to take the steps necessary to preserve our freedom.

The nation will have to decide these things—whether there are indeed higher loyalties which deserve support—if, in fact, there are things worth dying for.

The Soldier believes that is the case. It is part of his manifesto.

It has been your manifesto, Sergeant Major—evident in all that you have done. Your outstanding service as a Sergeant of Armor, your enduring efforts to speak up for the Soldier and his family, your success in breathing fire and smoke into the professional noncommissioned officer Corps—your proudest achievement—were always rooted in the manifesto that elevates the individual Soldier to a height well above that which any single Soldier could attain. I thank you for your service, and through you I thank the American Soldier—for you are the embodiment of what we all want that Soldier to be. Farewell, and Godspeed Bill Connelly. Soldier. Farewell, and Godspeed Bennie Connelly. Soldier. Carol and I personally say thanks and for the entire Army thanks and God Bless to both of you.

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