


**ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
RESERVE FORCES
POLICY BOARD
FISCAL YEAR 1983**



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

14 NOV 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board
for Fiscal Year 1983

Forwarded herewith is the Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 133(c)(3).

The Reserve Forces Policy Board is by statute (Title 10 USC 175) the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve Components.

On several occasions over the past year, I have met with the Board Chairman, Mr. Louis J. Conti, to discuss and review vital issues related to Reserve Component policy and readiness matters. While significant progress continues to be made in our conventional Total Force readiness and sustainability posture, the Board identifies areas where additional resources will bring our Reserve Components to a higher level of combat readiness.

The Board's contribution and assistance to me and the Department have been both significant and appreciated. Our mutual concern is for a strong and ready defense posture for this nation.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Seyo".

Attachment



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

14 NOV 1984

Honorable George Bush
President of the U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

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
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Sincerely yours,

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

14 NOV 1964

Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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The Board's contribution and assistance to me and the Department have been both significant and appreciated. Our mutual concern is for a strong and ready defense posture for this nation.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "James M. McInerney".

Attachment

RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD

FISCAL YEAR 1983 ANNUAL REPORT

This report represents the views of the members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States government.

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, D.C. 20301**

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INTRODUCTION

The Reserve Forces Policy Board is the statutory "principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" (10 USC 175). This Annual Report, as required by law (10 USC 133(c)(3)), sets forth the Board's independent evaluation, review and comment on Department of Defense policies and programs as they relate to the Reserve Components.

It was once written that "readership is a passing parade." It is certainly no exception that the readership of the various reports prepared by the Reserve Forces Policy Board varies from year to year. It is, therefore, no accident that we have repeated pertinent material published in past reports, since such material not only tells the story to a new group of readers, but also reinforces what was said earlier to past readers.

Content of Fiscal Year 1983 Annual Report :

The report is organized into seven major sections:

- Importance of the Reserve Components to the Total Force
- Readiness and Mobilization of the Reserve Components
- Equipment
- Manpower
- Training
- Other Key Issues
- Board Activities for Fiscal Year 1983,

IMPORTANCE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS TO THE TOTAL FORCE

Composition of the Total Force

Reserve Component Forces continue to represent a significant portion of the total military strength of the United States. On September 30, 1983, the Reserve Component Forces in the Selected Reserve numbered 1,004,547 individuals versus 2,123,349 serving in the Active Component Forces; thus, a little over 32% of the immediately available Armed Forces of the United States is composed of members of the Reserve Components. In addition to these forces, another 416,010 individuals are members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING). The Ready Reserve makes up a total of 1,420,557, thereby constituting 40.1% of the military strength of this nation.

The total force is defined as:


Active Component Forces and Reserve Component Forces including the Selected Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, Inactive National Guard, and the Standby Reserve.

Table 1 illustrates the composition of the Total Force. The table reflects, on an overlay basis, strength levels as projected for Fiscal Years 1981-1987, 1982-1988, and 1983-1989. When comparing the data from previous reporting periods, the programmed rate of growth in the Active Forces is projected to remain relatively stable as compared to earlier projections. At the same time, Selected Reserve strength is projected to show substantial increases while the strengths of the IRR/ING and Standby Reserve are projected to decrease. It is apparent that current projections reflect a greater reliance on the Reserve Forces as compared to the Active Forces in the total force mix.

The variation among the three different planning periods reflects changing defense guidance and the realities of Federal budget deficits which preclude extensive expansion of the Active Components.

Tables 2 through 6 provide examples of contributions of the Selected Reserve and Active Component Forces for each individual Service.

TABLE 1
Composition of the Total Force, 1975-1989




Sources:

Actual: *Military Manpower Statistics*, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense, Sept. 1983; *Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics*, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) FY 1983 Summary.
Projected: *Five-Year Defense Program, Program Objective Memorandum (FY 1985-1989)*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Army Reserve Components


Together, the Selected Reserve of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve constitute 47% of the total Army's strength.

In general, the Army National Guard provides the Army with Combat units, and the Army Reserve contains Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. Examples of the contribution of the Army Reserve Components are illustrated in Table 2.




Naval Reserve

The Selected Naval Reserve contains 16% of the strength of the total Navy. In terms of units, the Naval Reserve augments Active Naval Forces with similar types of units and special mission units unique to the Naval Reserve. Examples of the contribution of the Selected Naval Reserve are highlighted in Table 3.



Marine Corps Reserve


The Marine Corps Ready Reserve contains 33% of the manpower of the total Marine Corps. Table 4 illustrates that contribution and is expanded from the FY 1982 report to include additional categories.



Air Reserve Forces

The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve together provide 22% of the total Air Force strength. Examples for the Air Force Selected Reserve are depicted in Table 5.

TABLE 5
Comparison of Air Reserve Force Components to Total Air Force




Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, Fiscal Year 1983*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., March 1984.

Coast Guard Reserve

The Coast Guard Selected Reserve contributes 25% of the strength of the total Coast Guard. Examples of the Coast Guard Reserve's contribution are shown on Table 6.

TABLE 6
Comparison of Coast Guard Reserve to Total Coast Guard



*Figures Are Approximate. The Exact Size of the Peacetime Base is Difficult to Determine Because of the Multi-Mission Nature of Most Operating Units.

Source: Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, Fiscal Year 1983*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., March 1984.

Summary

General

The Reserve Components are an indispensable and integral part of the Total Force defending this nation. The "ideal Total Force" is one which is balanced to a degree that the forces of all components are a synergistic blending together into an efficient, integrated team—each dependent on the other, each building on the strength of the other. When used together, the combined force of all components is greater than the sum of the components.

It must be the goal of the leadership in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services to demand and achieve equal professional performance in the Active Component and Reserve Component Forces.

There can be no question that the Guard and Reserve will reinforce the Active Components. To do so, however, the Reserve Components must be provided the equipment, materiel, resources, and full-time support to achieve the highest level of readiness possible.

Some of the inherent differences between the Active and Reserve Components are shown in Table 7.

Mix of Active and Reserve Component Forces

As the result of Congressional direction, the Department of Defense has undertaken a major study to determine the mix and distribution of units between Active and Reserve Component Forces and the institutional process used to reach force structure decisions. Congress has expressed the view, based on various General Accounting Office studies, that for less cost the Reserve Components can perform certain missions as well as their Active Component counterparts.

Congress has directed that the Department of Defense examine this issue and prepare a report which is to address how Guard and Reserve Forces can best be used in order to achieve our national defense objectives. The study is also to assess various mission categories to determine if the present division of responsibilities achieves the goal of the Total Force Policy. The Reserve Forces Policy Board was subsequently tasked by the Congress and the Secretary of Defense to prepare an independent analysis of the Department of Defense study.

The Board will continue to provide its findings and views to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress on this most important aspect of force structure and mix.

TABLE 7
Active and Reserve Force Differences

--	--

READINESS AND MOBILIZATION OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

Readiness Assessment

Each year the Board completes a comprehensive analysis of the readiness of the Reserve Components. This report examines in depth the status of the Reserve Components of the individual Services. The Board's *Fiscal Year 1981 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* was expanded from previous efforts in order to serve as a benchmark for future planning and to monitor the improvement or degradation in the readiness levels of the Guard and Reserve.

In the Board's *Fiscal Year 1982 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* the Board was able to examine Reserve Component readiness in greater depth than in prior years and was able to prepare a composite report on readiness.

This year, the Board's *Fiscal Year 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* was expanded further to include a limited examination of both Full-Time Manning within the Reserve Components, and medical issues and their respective impact on readiness. The report also permitted for the first time some realistic comparisons to past years.

The readiness reports for 1983 show a decline in the percentage of units rated "marginally ready" or better, when compared to the ratings in 1982. Although the Board believes that these ratings are technically correct, the ratings do not reflect the real increases in *capability* that have occurred in the last year in all Reserve Components.

The technical declines in readiness reports result from the introduction of more and more modern weapons systems and equipment into Reserve Component units. These new materiel authorizations and deliveries create a temporary situation of "unreadiness" because unit personnel are not fully trained on the new equipment, spares arrive later than the item itself, and new units are being formed.

On balance, the Board believes that the Reserve Component capability has increased substantially in the year reported and is encouraged that this trend appears to be continuing into 1984. The Board also notes that it is in the area of inadequate or obsolete equipment that most readiness deficiencies occur.

Information on the readiness levels of the Reserve Components has been published as Table 3.1C in

the *Classified Annex* (SECRET) to the Board's FY 1983 Readiness Assessment Report. This annex is available to authorized recipients upon written request to the Board. Table 3.1C(S) is a comparison of Reserve Component Unit Readiness based on May 1983 reports from the Services.

The Board recognizes that the present Unit Status Report is not a complete measure of the combat capabilities of a unit. The report is important, however, as it gives an indication of the resources a unit has on hand compared to an established standard. It also serves as a measurement tool by which the Services can allocate resources among units to achieve a given level of readiness.

An examination of Table 3.1C *Classified Annex* (SECRET) and Table 8 reveals a number of significant observations concerning Reserve Component readiness for FY 1983.

- Currently, 88% of all Department of Defense Reserve Component units are required to submit Unit Status Reports.
- Forty-nine percent (49%) of the Department of Defense units which submit Unit Status Reports are rated as combat ready—that is C-3, or better. This represents an overall decline in Reserve Force readiness of 7% from that reported in the Board's FY 1982 readiness assessment report. Of these units, 13% were fully ready (C-1), 17% substantially ready (C-2), and 19% marginally ready (C-3).
- Much of the "overall decline" in readiness has been due to the increased infusion of modern equipment into the Reserve Components. During periods of transition, readiness will be "down" until individuals in the units become proficient with the new equipment.
- The two most critical factors limiting the readiness of the Reserve Components are the lack of equipment on hand and deficiencies in individual skill qualifications.

The Board is pleased with the reported plans and programs by individual Services which include substantial increases in programmed equipment and support for the Guard and Reserve. At the same time, the Board is concerned with suggestions that the Reserve Components might be less prepared

today than they were previously. Statistically, "readiness" may be down for the reasons stated. In terms of "capability," the Reserve Components are far better than ever before.

The Board's *FY 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* examines Reserve Component readiness in some detail. This report is available upon written request to the Board.

TABLE 8
Critical Factors Limiting Overall
Readiness of the Reserve Components —
Fiscal Year 1983

COMPONENT	Factor 1	Factor 2
Army National Guard		
Combat Units		
Combat Support Units		
Combat Service Support		
Army Reserve		
Combat Units		
Combat Support Units		
Combat Service Support		
Navy Reserve		
Commissioned Units		
Reinforcing Units		
Marine Corps Reserve		
4th Marine Division		
4th Marine Air Wing		
Air National Guard		
Combat Units		
Combat Support Units		
Combat Service Support		
Air Force Reserve		
Combat Units		
Combat Support Units		
Coast Guard Reserve		
Combat Units		
Combat Support Units		
Overall DoD		

prescribe differing requirements and formats within the parameters of that guidance which meet their specific needs. Not all units within specific Reserve Components are required to report readiness. It appears that there is a greater propensity for units deploying outside CONUS to report readiness than for those which do not deploy.

There is no uniform requirement or standard regarding the classification of readiness reporting. The Board made a dedicated effort during the summer of 1982 to develop and prescribe a format of readiness information that would be unclassified. After much coordination, a consensus was reached on the format. When the information was actually reported in a draft of the FY 1982 readiness assessment report, however, the Air Force reversed the coordinated position and determined that the report was classified. This year, the Marine Corps Reserve made the same determination.

There needs to be a method to uniformly portray the readiness of the Reserve Components, be it in the use of percentages or some other unit of measure, which will permit discussion of readiness issues in an unclassified manner.

There is often a lack of comparability between similar units in a Service's Active and Reserve Components. These dissimilarities are often *both* quantitative and qualitative and are most easily seen when comparing flying units.

Reserve Component flying units are generally organized with fewer "required" aircraft and with older, less combat capable aircraft, as compared to their Active Component counterpart. Although both components within a Service may report readiness of their flying units to be C-1 "fully combat ready," using identical reporting criteria, it is clear that these similar units do not have the same combat capability. An Active Component squadron with 24 primary aircraft "required" and on hand, for example, might have a sister squadron in its Reserve Component with 18 primary aircraft "required" and on hand. Both squadrons report 100% "equipment on hand" levels—or "C-1."

There also remains a serious qualitative difference. Aircraft in the Reserve Components, for example, are often older models which have not been upgraded to the same standards as those in the Active Component. The result is a severe constraint in the type and quantity of aircraft which are deployable in a combat zone. The problem places a severe strain on the maintenance and supply systems. Yet, based on the reporting criteria and even with the sub-

Readiness Reporting System— A Glaring Deficiency

Examination of the data prepared by the Services and forwarded to the Board for analysis and subsequent inclusion in the FY 1983 readiness assessment report and this annual report continues to reflect a deficiency in the readiness reporting process.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 6, Vol II, Section 6 provides uniform guidance to the Services for reporting unit readiness. The Services, however,

stantial differences between the units, similar units may both report C-1 even though the mission capability of these units is vastly dissimilar.

These examples are not unique to any one Service but are uniform in their application within all Services. The Board has taken a strong position against dissimilar organizational structures between Active and Reserve Components as it masks true readiness. The Board remains convinced that the only way to get new, modern equipment in the Reserve Components and to assure total integration and interoperability is to identify the shortfalls from wartime requirements.

To a great degree the problems outlined here are a by-product of an incomplete readiness reporting system. Each Service applies different standards and criteria to measure its "readiness."

Various reports required by the Services, such as the Unit Status and Identification Report (UNITREP), sometimes referred to as "the Unit Status Report" (USR), are designed to measure certain select elements of a military force such as people, equipment and training. These are not all inclusive elements. The reports are used principally for the prioritization of resource allocations based upon the requirements of the Service. They are not designed to contain all information needed for a comprehensive evaluation of the broader aspects of readiness of the entire force.

Through these reports, which use different reporting standards, assumptions and mechanisms, each Service reports a condition which is not, in reality, its state of readiness but the degree of capability its units have to perform their mission.

The Board has developed and supported a series of observations and recommendations which address the above issues.

- First, the Board believes that *all* Reserve Component units should be required to report their readiness regardless of their wartime mission, so that their readiness condition can be measured.
- The Board remains convinced that the Secretary of Defense must redefine the purpose of the current "readiness reports" and direct a specific set of standards to be contained therein. The reports must be uniform, address the same criteria, and include applicable uniform assumptions and considerations, in order that all Services report their "readiness" on the same standardized basis.

United States Coast Guard— A Continuing Concern

The Board remains concerned about the manning levels of the Coast Guard, both Active and Selected Reserve, and the continuing trend toward reduction of Coast Guard funding and operational capabilities. The Board believes that the Coast Guard manning levels are far below those required by wartime tasking expectations for adequate safety and security of our ports and waterways. The Board also believes that the gradual reduction of inland waterway protection has been a serious mistake.

Increased emphasis by the Administration in stopping sealand drug traffic has had a direct impact on the Coast Guard by placing increased demands on the Service at a time when resources are being reduced. Our reliance on the Coast Guard is increasing while funding, manpower, and resourcing are declining.

The Board again recommends that the Coast Guard manning levels be increased and its funding be restored. Congress must protect this valuable and critical element of our nation's defense for our own self protection. The nation can not afford an obstruction of a port or inland waterway, or the destruction of major waterfront facilities.

EQUIPMENT

General

In 1980, the Reserve Forces Policy Board prepared three reports which were published the following year: *The Reserve Forces in the 1990's, Volume 1, Executive Report on Technology and Demography*; the *Fiscal Year 1980 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components*; and a *Special Report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board—Proud Spirit 80, Report on Observations During Mobilization Exercise MOBEX-80/REX BRAVO-80*. All three of these reports identified "equipment" as the most critical element of readiness. Equipment shortfalls not only limit Reserve Component readiness but also constrain the deployment, employment and sustainability of Reserve Component Units in a theater of operations. Further, the reports reinforced the Board's long-standing position that many of the equipment shortfalls in the Guard and Reserve are also prevalent in the Active Components.

Following publication of the aforementioned reports, the Board's conclusions were highly disputed. In order to better define and quantify the equipment issues, the Board formed two study teams in 1981 which, proceeding independently, produced two additional substantiating reports. The first report, entitled *The Reserve Forces in the 1990's, Volume 3, Equipment Acquisition/Allocation Policies and the Guard/Reserve*, was a policy level examination of the weapons acquisition and allocation processes within DoD. The second report, entitled *Fiscal Year 1981 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components*, was greatly expanded and quantified the readiness assessment of the Guard and Reserve. Included in the latter report was a detailed comparison of wartime equipment requirements against equipment levels on-hand. Once again, the data and conclusions were disputed. Upon detailed examination and review, however, the Board's assessments were acknowledged to be correct by both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services.

The Board's *FY 1982* and *FY 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* continued to examine readiness factors in detail. Both reports again found "equipment" as the most limiting factor affecting the readiness of the Reserve Components.

Equipment Shortages— The Major Obstacle to Readiness

In order to appreciate the severity of the equip-

ment shortfall in the Reserve Components, one must first understand that many Guard and Reserve units will be required to mobilize or deploy before numerous Active Component units. Mobilization Day is too late to design fiscal strategies and policies for equipment procurement, modernization and distribution.

Exacerbating the problem is the fact that much of the equipment currently in the Guard and Reserve inventory is obsolete or incompatible with that used by the Active Components. This has been the principal driving force toward equipment modernization efforts in the Guard and Reserve. Today, however, the Reserve Components are frequently equipped with items that are neither mission capable nor compatible with the equipment found in the Active Components. Due to age and spare part shortages, some Reserve Component equipment is not sustainable; therefore, the equipment is not deployable. This has a direct adverse impact on readiness and force utilization.

Thus, not only is there a significant lack of equipment for the Reserve Components, but equipment differences between the Active and Reserve Components have dysfunctional consequences on the capability, interoperability, supportability, and sustainability of Reserve Component units when deployed in conjunction with the Active Components.


Because of mission constraining differences between Reserve and Active Component equipment, the Board continues to recommend strongly that equipment issued to the Reserve Components be both fully mission capable and compatible with equipment issued to the Active Components.

The impact of obsolete or non-deployable equipment is a diminished return on investment. It leads to a much less effective and viable force than would otherwise be the case. Obsolete equipment also creates severe training problems. Individuals who join the Guard and Reserve after serving on active duty or who are school-trained find themselves faced with using older equipment with which they are not skilled.

Equipment demands to support a training base and the ability to conduct sustained combat operations, coupled with the long lead time required by our industrial base to retool for defense production, led the Board to conclude and recommend that equipment acquisition must receive a much greater priority.

Equipment On-Hand Versus Wartime Requirements

When the equipment on-hand in the Reserve Components is compared to wartime requirements, significant shortfalls are noted. The level of equipment on hand remains far below that required for war. Overall, there is approximately a \$24.3 billion shortfall between the equipment required for wartime and that currently assigned to the Guard and Reserve. The Reserve Components have approximately 58% of their wartime level of equipment on-hand. This level does not take into account obsolete or incompatible equipment currently on-hand which is included in the 58%. This data is shown on Table 9.




The dollar value of the equipment on hand versus wartime requirement represents a significant *decline* from that reported last year and in previous years. The dynamics of the change in equipment status is reflected on Tables 10 through 16.

As can be seen in Table 10, wartime requirements for equipment and equipment on-hand levels closely parallel each other although there is a \$24.3 billion separation. The authorized equipment levels continue to compound on a near straight-line basis.

Many of the changes are unexplainable. Some of


the changes, such as in the case of the Army Reserve Components, are reported to be the result of a shift in pricing policies. The result is that wartime equipment requirements and equipment authorized costs have increased dramatically as compared with the equipment on hand. Analysis of the actual dollar amounts reflect wartime equipment requirements which have increased faster than the equipment on-hand in the Reserve Components. Equipment authorized increased even more rapidly than equipment on-hand. Thus, when compared to either equipment wartime requirements or equipment authorizations, the percentage of equipment on-hand dropped significantly from FY 1982 to FY 1983.



Tables 11 through 16 examine each Reserve Component individually and compare the equipment status reported last year (FY 1982) with that reported this year (FY 1983) in the Board's readiness assessment report. All data shown is provided by each Service for its respective Reserve Component.


The ability of the Guard and Reserve to mobilize, deploy and be employed effectively has been proven. The question which remains is what are they to fight with and how can they be sustained. The wartime requirements of our Guard and Reserve Forces must be validated and the equipment inventory to support the wartime requirements must be identified.

TABLE 11
A Comparison of Equipment Status
in the Army National Guard
FY 82-FY 83




Source: RFPB, FY '83 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, March 1984.

TABLE 13
A Comparison of Equipment Status
in the Naval Reserve
FY 82-FY 83




Source: RFPB, FY '83 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, March 1984.

TABLE 12
A Comparison of Equipment Status
in the Army Reserve
FY 82 - FY 83




Source: RFPB, FY '83 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, March 1984.

TABLE 14
A Comparison of Equipment Status
in the Marine Corps Reserve
FY82 - FY83




Source: RFPB, FY '83 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, March 1984.

TABLE 15
A Comparison of Equipment Status
in the Air National Guard
FY82 - FY83



Source: RFPB, FY '83 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, March 1984.

TABLE 16
A Comparison of Equipment Status
in the Air Force Reserve
FY82 - FY83



Source: RFPB, FY '83 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components, March 1984.

Equipping the Reserve Components

The Board notes renewed Congressional interest in equipping the Reserve Components. The specific appropriations for procurement of equipment for Guard and Reserve elements have enhanced the readiness status of the units receiving the equipment. Indeed, some of the new and modern equipment received by the Guard and Reserve has resulted from direct action by the Congress—not because of actions by the Services.

In discussing resource allocations for the Guard and Reserve, the Board is aware that substantial contributions are made by the Services in support of their Reserve Components. At issue, however, is whether programs are *identified* or *exist* which will correct the serious equipment (and thus readiness) deficiencies in our Guard and Reserve.

The Board acknowledges that:

- In most cases, a given Service's budget is reported to include funding for research, development, and equipment acquisition for both Active and Reserve Components, although the Reserve Component portion is not specifically identified.
- There are cases where newly acquired equipment will come directly to the Reserve Components from the Services. There have also been cases during the last several years where visible equipment shortfalls in the Guard or Reserve have resulted in the Congress providing separate procurement appropriations.

Although analysis of the current Five Year Defense Plan reveals no evidence of any significant increase in budget appropriations for Reserve Component equipment, internal Service documents do reflect substantial sums of money directed toward Guard and Reserve Force equipment procurement, modernization and redistribution.

In the 15-year period from FY 1975 through FY 1989, total Defense appropriations are expected to increase 439%, while Guard and Reserve appropriations are forecast to grow 284%.

Guard and Reserve appropriations have grown significantly since 1975, and are programmed to increase during the FY 1983 through FY 1989 period. During the 15-year period (FY 1975 through FY 1989), however, the Reserve Components' *share* of the Defense budget is forecast to decrease from 5.6% in FY 1975 to 4.0% in FY 1989.

Looking at the current 7-year period, FY 1983 through FY 1989, and deleting all procurement funding from consideration, the projected Reserve

Component *share* of the Defense budget continues to remain stagnant. It does not, in the view of the Board, provide the funds necessary to correct the deficiencies discussed in this report, provide for projected growth, or provide for enhanced combat capability for the Guard and Reserve.

The Board's Position on Equipment

It is the Board's position and recommendation that steps be taken to program on-hand equipment levels to full wartime requirement for the Active and Reserve Components. This program should include the requirements of the expanded training base to meet the demands of full mobilization.

It is the Board's position that sufficient equipment should be issued to Guard and Reserve units for training with the balance of equipment to be positioned in depots or equipment sites/pools where it would be immediately available to provide 100% equipment fill to wartime levels upon mobilization.

The Board is aware of the difficult decisions and fiscal reality associated with such a program, and is convinced this deficiency can not be resolved on a hit-or-miss basis. The present shortages must be recognized, acknowledged, and a specific plan developed to eliminate the deficiencies over a specific period of time.

On June 21, 1982, the Secretary of Defense issued a policy memorandum addressing the distribution of equipment for the Total Force. It states, in part, that . . . *units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component*. During this past year, the Board has been briefed by all of the Services with regard to this issue and is pleased to report that the Services have responded by redirecting their priorities based upon the policy guidance. Contrary to the Board's previous studies of Reserve Component equipment issues, the Board now finds that most of the Services have programmed sizable transfers of equipment from the Active Components to the Reserve Components during the remainder of the 1980s.

Congressional Interest in Equipping the Reserve Components

Equipping the Reserve Components is increasingly becoming an area of Congressional involvement. Historically, the Services have not always budget-

ed or allocated the funds required to equip Guard and Reserve elements of the Total Force. Failure on the Services' part to fully implement Secretary of Defense policy, Department of Defense directives and Service Secretarial policies directing equipping of the Guard and Reserve has resulted in Congress taking action to correct the problem. This action has resulted in Congress being accused of micromanagement. The Board believes that the continued Congressional action in support of the Guard and Reserve which was necessitated as a result of inaction by the Services sets a serious and significant precedent. It conceivably could spell not only the end of an integrated Total Force but also invites direct Congressional involvement in other areas which should clearly be the purview of the Services.

The annual requirement for the Services to report to Congress the status of their Guard and Reserve Component equipment will allow the Board to examine how closely the Services are following the Secretary of Defense's policy memorandum of June 21, 1982, which states in part:

. . . units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component.

If the Services comply with both the word *and intent* of this policy, it will not be necessary to budget separately for Guard and Reserve procurement, as their priority will be well established. Further, there would be little need for the Congress to pass separate procurement appropriations for the Guard and Reserve. History, however, demonstrates that the Services have often neglected their Reserve Components, thus Congress has repeatedly appropriated funds to support the Guard and Reserve.

The solution remains with the Services. It is incumbent on the Services to include Guard and Reserve equipment needs early in the procurement cycle and to provide equipment on the basis of Secretary Weinberger's June 1982 memorandum.

Impact of Military Assistance Programs/ Foreign Military Sales

The Board continues to express its concern with equipment drawdowns in the Total Force (especially those impacting on the Reserve Components) to satisfy requirements of Military Assistance Programs and Foreign Military Sales. Equipment short-

ages created by withdrawals from existing Reserve Component inventories or by the diversion of equipment to satisfy Military Assistance or Foreign Sales programs exacerbate already serious shortfalls. Equipment reductions or diversions have even greater impact when they are directed with no consideration given to replacement.

The Board appreciates the value of Military Assistance Programs, Foreign Military Sales and the diplomatic and industrial necessity for them. The Board's intent is not to question the validity of the requirements but rather to insure that any potentially adverse impact on Guard and Reserve equipment readiness is not overlooked as a balancing factor in the decision-making process. The danger of inadvertent adverse impact is especially acute in this area because decisions can be made without prior consultation with any DoD representative, a systemic weakness which should be reviewed and changed.

It is the considered opinion of this Board that equipping U.S. Active and Reserve Components must receive top priority, in order to prevent a decremental effect on readiness.

Impact of POMCUS

For some years, DoD, in consonance with the NATO allies, has implemented plans and programs to fill two additional sets of POMCUS (Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets) known as sets 5 and 6. The Reserve Forces Policy Board has traditionally supported the POMCUS concept. The requirement to fill POMCUS generally takes priority over all except deployed forces. In the past, filling POMCUS by drawdown has impacted both the Active and Reserve Components, but often more heavily on the Reserve side because of their lower equipment allowances and lower priority to obtain replacement items. The Board has stated in the past and continues to believe that POMCUS fill should be accomplished from new procurement. In 1981, the Army instituted a policy, supported by OSD, that equipment needed for POMCUS will *not* be taken from Reserve Component units. This policy certainly mitigates the Board's past criticism.

The Board recommends that, in addition to POMCUS sets 5 and 6, serious consideration be given to improving the POMCUS concept. The use of SL-7 Roll-On Roll-Off (Ro Ro) vessels and the careful prepositioning of equipment within the United States at depots or sites near major ports

would solve many of the strategic war reserve problems and provide responsive materiel support worldwide, rather than just in Europe. There are several major reasons for the Board's recommendation:

- The high degree of mobility and the rapid on/off load capability of the SL-7 "Ro Ro" makes the transport of materiel resources to Europe in several days possible. This was not the case when POMCUS was first conceived. The Board recognizes that it would take years of planning and acquisition to accomplish this.
- Both POMCUS and fast sealift are vulnerable but the vulnerabilities are affected by different factors. Both are dependent on a political decision to deploy our forces early in a period of heightening tensions, but POMCUS requires coordination with our allies, whereas fast sealift could get underway unilaterally.
- CONUS based POMCUS at depots would provide secure and responsive sets of unit equipment for worldwide deployment. No foreign government would need to be consulted to withdraw stocks of equipment (such as occurred in the 1973 mideast war).
- SL-7 Ro Ro will provide for resupply and the enhanced sustainability of deployed forces, removing considerable strain from airlift mobility.
- The serious shortfalls in the merchant marine fleet and sealift capabilities need immediate attention. The continued acquisition of SL-7 Ro Ro ships would help rebuild our diminished sealift capability and, at the same time, provide an immediate strategic advantage and flexibility on force utilization/deployment.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board's Position on Modernization

Over the past several years, the Board has expressed its concern regarding future resources available for readiness and sustainability. The Board's position may be perceived by some as a position against modernization. This is not the case.

The Board recognizes the requirement for equipment modernization in the Services and fully supports it.

The Board has not and does not attempt to suggest that the priorities for readiness, sustainability and essential modernization should change from the present Defense Guidance priorities.

The Board believes, however, that the present modernization program being committed for the outyears will, in fact, slow down required readiness and sustainability improvements. History shows that the defense budget has never shown substantial real growth for more than a few years in a row. Furthermore, history also shows that when new weapons

systems are committed in the budget projections and the costs go up or the budget is subsequently reduced, or both, it is readiness and sustainability that suffer.

The Board supports modernization efforts as long as those efforts are balanced and do not occur at the expense of the less glamorous but vital expenditures that promote readiness and sustainability (i.e., training, exercises, spare parts, incentive bonuses, conventional ammunition, supplies, full-time manning/AGR positions, etc.).

MANPOWER

General

The area of military manpower continues to be of major importance to the Board. We cannot have a sustainable, credible Armed Force without having adequate skilled manpower to provide immediate fill to deploying units and sufficient replacements for casualties until induction and the training base can deliver new accessions.

The Board's consideration of manpower issues may be categorized into nine major areas:

- Strength
- Pretrained Individual Manpower
- Use of Reservists on Active Duty
- Skills
- Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)
- Full-Time Support
- Health Care Professionals
- Bonuses and Incentives

Strength

The Board has given considerable attention to the strength of both the Selected Reserve and the Individual Ready Reserve. The Board's FY 1981, FY 1982 and FY 1983 Readiness Assessment reports reflect that the strength in the Selected Reserve has improved dramatically since 1979 and, during this past year, once again reached its Congressionally authorized strength. The Board recommends, however, that the Selected Reserve be programmed to attain wartime strength levels sooner than now scheduled, particularly in the Army and Navy Reserve Components.

Unfortunately, the strength in the IRR remains far below the required levels and the Standby Reserve has all but been abolished.

Table 17 shows the overall Selected Reserve strength trends from FY 1969 through projected levels in FY 1989. Table 18 reflects the continuing shortfall of trained unit strength in the Selected Reserve as compared to Wartime Strength Requirements. This table is provided to reinforce the need to have the Selected Reserve authorized strength levels exceed wartime requirements as there is always a certain percentage of the force in the training base and therefore unavailable for mobilization. Trained unit strength is the actual force available.

TABLE 17
Strength Trends
in the
Selected Reserve — Individual Ready Reserve/
Inactive National Guard — Standby Reserve
as of September 30, 1983





TABLE 18
Comparison of Wartime-Trained Unit
Strength Requirements to
Actual/Programmed Strength in the
Selected Reserve



Source: Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

Note: Selected reserve strength and projection, when compared to wartime requirement, is actual or programmed unit strength and does not include training pipeline.

Pretrained Individual Manpower— A Serious Mobilization Shortfall

The Board continues to be concerned over the gap between the available manpower in the Active Components, the Reserve Components and military Retirees versus wartime requirements. The low strength of the Individual Ready Reserve continues to limit the ability of this nation to sustain a major military conflict from M-day until inductees can be trained and deployed. This also threatens to decimate our Selected Reserve units if they must provide the needed fillers and combat casualty replacements.

As a means of finding a lasting solution to the critical Reserve Components manpower problem of inadequate strength, the Board went on record in its 1978 and 1979 studies, *Report on Reserve Manpower for the All Volunteer Force and for Mobilization*, and in its 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982 readiness assessment reports favoring a modified draft—mandatory service. It was the intent of these recommendations to stimulate a review of the process and to focus attention on the serious manpower shortfalls which existed then, and some of which continue to exist today, particularly in pretrained individual manpower.

The IRR continues to be the weakest link in the Total Force. The decline in strength in the IRR is shown graphically on Table 17. Programs to correct the strength problem in the IRR have not met with success. This is an area of continued concern to the Board as it feels that there is more reliance on the response of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard (ING) than can be warranted.

The strength levels in the IRR must be increased substantially if it is to meet its wartime mission. A reduction of any kind to Active Component accessions will have a long-term adverse effect on IRR accessions, thereby increasing an already serious manpower problem.

Strength in the IRR is a direct result of "throughput." As a service member completes his active duty or active reserve obligation, but has a remainder of

time to serve as part of his Military Service Obligation (MSO), the service member will be assigned to the IRR. Although the MSO has been recently increased to eight years, the effects of that increased MSO will not be seen in the IRR end-strength until 1990.

Failure to resolve the deficient IRR strength problem in the near term, may force a decision for some type of mandatory service designed to bring the strength of pretrained individual manpower in the IRR to sufficient levels so that the manpower requirements for the first 180 days of sustained combat can be met.

The advent of the philosophy which includes Guard and Reserve Retirees among the pretrained mobilization assets created the necessity of knowing where to reach them at all times. Within the category of Guard and Reserve Retirees is a rather special group which consists of individuals who have completed 20 or more years service but are not yet eligible to draw retired pay because they have not reached age sixty. In some instances, individuals remain in this group for a period of time up to 23 years during which they may not, although required, keep their Service apprised of their current address and state of health.

In an attempt to overcome this potentially serious problem, the Board recommended a proposal this year to offer Post Exchange, and "Space Available" travel privileges, together with an appropriate ID card, valid for two years, in exchange for the member informing his Service biannually of his current address and providing a signed statement on his physical health. The ID card would be renewed biannually as the update information is received.

The Board strongly advocates Department of Defense support of this proposal.

The Board also is fully supportive of the proposed program, currently being selectively tested, which will permit commissary access by Selected Reservists on a year-round basis instead of only annually during their 15-day annual training period. This is an important benefit long overdue to members of the Guard and Reserve.

Use of Reservists on Active Duty

Mission Contributions

It is the opinion of the Board that today's Reserve Component Force is not a force "in Reserve," but rather an integral part of the Total Force performing "real world," everyday missions together with the Active Components—indeed, "a force in being."

There are many "real world" recurring missions which Reserve Component Forces can perform as well as Active Component Forces, and on a more cost effective basis.

In fact, over the past year, Reservists have performed duty in hostile areas as volunteers. The desire of our Reserve Component members to serve their country and their overwhelming response to the call to serve is indicative of the dedication and loyalty of the Reserve Component membership.

As the Total Force policy implies, Guard and Reserve Forces will be integrated and used as required in any contingency. In recent months, however, a serious concern has come to light with regard to the selective use of Reservists.

Mission Contribution Concerns

There are some serious concerns when either increasing the number of missions; the "combat" exposure; or, alternatively, the amount of time required by individual Reservists. Following are a series of questions which need to be reviewed.

- Are individuals protected (in case of death or injury) while serving on Inactive Duty for Training (IDT), Annual Training (AT), or "short tours" less than 30-days? What benefits are Reservists entitled to? Are these the same benefits as active duty personnel? What happens, for example, if a married Naval Reservist with dependents, serving on the U.S.S. New Jersey as a volunteer for 21 days were to be killed or injured, or become Missing in Action (MIA), or a Prisoner of War (POW) in the line of duty? It is our understanding that there are some differences in survivor benefits.
- The same question applies to an Air Force Reserve C-141 crew flying a resupply mission into a hostile or combat zone, such as Grenada. Are their survivors protected to the same extent as a member of the Active Forces in the event of death, injury, POW or MIA status? From our preliminary investigation, there are still some differences.

In fact, Reservists used on any basis, unless they have been ordered to active duty *for more than 30* continuous days, are *not* protected on the same basis—nor are their dependents or survivors entitled to the same compensation, benefits, treatment or rights as active duty personnel (and their dependents) even though they may be performing the same job in the same environment.

Full entitlements should be extended to the survivors of Reservists killed or injured in any status. The fact that a Reservist may be in an *Inactive Duty for Training (IDT)* status does not lessen the loss or the financial burden for his/her survivors. The same philosophy applies to Reservists or Guardsmen who are MIA or POW's.

The Board urges the Department of Defense or Congress to introduce appropriate legislation to correct this injustice.

The Board recommends that the entitlements for members of the Reserve Components and their dependents, in the event of death, injury, POW status or MIA status of the service member while serving in *any federal paid status*, and regardless of the number of days of duty involved, *be on an equal basis*—identical in all respects—to those afforded to the Active Component membership.

Skills

In 1981, the Board noted its concern with the level of individual skill qualifications together with the critical shortfall of some skills in the Reserve Components. FY 1982 and FY 1983 data reflect some changes and improvement in this area, particularly in the Active Components.

While slight improvement was noted in the Reserve Components, there remains a sizable shortfall of critical skills versus requirements. This is particularly true in the health services fields.

There is a definite need to program funds for school and on-the-job training to reduce the skill qualification deficiencies in the Guard and Reserve.

As the economy of the nation recovers from the recession, we may once again see a reversal in the ease of recruiting and retaining high caliber people which may impact adversely on both Active and Reserve Component elements of the Total Force. For this reason, incentives targeted specifically at critical skill shortfalls should be further developed and targeted to enhance recruitment in the Reserve Components.

Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)

During Fiscal Year 1983, Dr. Edward J. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), with the ROPMA Steering Committee, completed a draft legislative proposal to provide a Reserve Officer Management System that complemented the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).

The ROPMA Steering Committee consisted of Active and Reserve Component general and flag officers and the Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Reserve Affairs of the Military Departments. Dr. Philbin and the Committee worked diligently on the development of a credible ROPMA legislative package. Significant progress has been made since our report last year. As of this writing, however, a coordinated legislative proposal has yet to be forwarded to the Congress.

One member of the Board, the Military Executive, held membership on the ROPMA Steering Committee. The intent of that group was to provide a product compatible with DOPMA in most areas, while recognizing the uniqueness of the Guard and Reserve. During briefings this year, the Board expressed its concern that some of the ROPMA provisions are too closely linked to DOPMA and will not be equitable for members of the Guard and Reserve.

Although we reported last year that the ROPMA legislative package should be completed and ready for submission to the Congress in 1983, it now appears that the proposal may not be forwarded to the Congress until late 1984. A series of meetings has been held with Active, Guard and Reserve representatives from all services to seek practical solutions in response to comments provided by the Military Departments during formal coordination of the proposal. A revised draft proposal is now undergoing final review. Once received, the Services' comments will be incorporated, as appropriate, into the final proposal. It is anticipated that the proposal will be forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the fall of 1984.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board, through its ROPMA Committee, has been closely monitoring the progress of the ROPMA legislative proposals. In this regard, the Board has requested an opportunity to review the final proposed legislation prior to its submission to Congress.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board has statutory responsibility for monitoring the Reserve Officer

Personnel Act (ROPA) and takes this role very seriously.

Full-Time Support to the Guard and Reserve

It is a proven fact that there is a direct relationship between enhanced wartime readiness of the Reserve Components and the degree of full-time support available. Full-time support is an essential element of force readiness.

In Fiscal Year 1981, the Board recommended that each Service be allowed to establish its own mix of Active Component, Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) personnel and Military Technicians (MT's) to staff full-time support positions in the Reserve Components.

Reserve Components were authorized 128,263 full-time support personnel DoD-wide in 1983. These support personnel work full-time in organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, training, and performing maintenance and supply functions for the Reserve Components. The authorized level represented an *overall* 13% ratio between full-time support personnel and the end-strength of the Selected Reserve. The ratio varies dramatically between the various Reserve Components from a low of 8% in the Army Reserve to a high of 29% in the Air National Guard.

The Services have found full-time support at the unit level to be especially important to assure that unit personnel optimize their training time rather than spend their time performing day to day functions during training drills.

Full-time support at the end of FY 1989 is projected to be 202,705, approximately 17% of the end-strength of the Selected Reserve.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board continues to support this concept and recommends that full-time support be expanded. The Board continues to support the belief that each Service should be allowed to establish its own mix of full-time support personnel which is best suited for them.

After review of the programs as they now exist, the Board is convinced that the following areas need to be examined and provided for:

- Career packages to permit programmed progression need to be more clearly defined. Once guidelines are established, it is the Board's belief that senior commands should be permitted more latitude to manage career progression as compared to some centralized program.

- The Board remains concerned over the lack of a coherent career management program for Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Full-Time Support personnel.
- Grade structure for AGR personnel should be determined by organizational documents.
- Additional money and increases in strength ceilings for the Services' full-time support programs are needed.
- There needs to be greater latitude granted to senior commanders which permits flexibility in the assignment of full-time support manpower, rather than blanket management from the Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, or the Services centralized in Washington. Stating that each Army unit, for example, will have a certain position filled may or may not be where the need is. If positions are allocated to senior commanders, however, they can assure that available manpower is placed to fill the most pressing need within local commands.

Selective Service

The Board is pleased that the Congress resisted attempts last year to terminate Selective Service registration. The Board is also pleased with the many legislative steps undertaken by the Congress to support the registration process through a reduction of Federal benefits for those who refuse to register. The passage of Public Law 97-251, Section 1113, denying student financial aid to nonregistrants, is an excellent piece of legislation.

Fiscal Year 1983 was a year marked with progress for the Selective Service System. In addition to the Congressional reaffirmation of its support for peacetime registration, registration compliance rates improved with a registration rate of draft-eligibles (ages 20-23) over 98% and an overall-compliance rate for all age groups of 96%.

Careful analysis of the available data fully supports the continuation of registration and the expansion of the registration process to include selected critical skills such as licensed health care professionals.

In its FY 1980 readiness assessment report, the Board recommended a change in the penalty structure for failure to register for the Selective Service from the present maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and/or \$10,000 fine to a process

which would *automatically* preclude or prevent the individual from qualifying for federal benefits, including any federal or federally backed loans; employment by the Government or any agency or civilian concern employed or contracted by the U. S. Government; unemployment benefits; and suspension of all other government benefits or services which are not protected by the Constitution or law. This penalty would remove the unfavorable publicity of prosecution and would shift the burden of responsibility for failure to register to the individual instead of the Federal Government. The Board considers these federal benefits to be privileges and not Constitutional rights.

The Board reaffirms its recommendation that the penalty for non-registration be expanded to automatically include penalties such as those cited above and is pleased to see movement in that direction.

Of most serious concern to the Board is the critical shortage of health care personnel. These shortages are across-the-board in all fields today.

A study of this area for the Board's FY 1982 and FY 1983 readiness assessment report convinced the Board that steps must be taken now to prepare for the medical demand which will result from a mobilization. In the report, the Board recommends to the Secretary of Defense that Selective Service registration of physicians and other health care providers in critical categories be required.

There is no provision in existing law for the registration of health care personnel. Further, there is no central master file on individuals in most health care occupations.

The Board recommends that the following steps be taken immediately to correct a serious deficiency:

- Enact legislation which requires members of health care occupations to register with the Selective Service System. Such legislation would include specific categories of physicians, surgeons, skilled medical technicians, and other such credentialed classifications as determined by the Services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. As part of this process, it is further recommended that the Director of Selective Service be empowered to cross check the registration process with various governmental license issuing or governing agencies.
- Create a master file of health care personnel which categorizes such personnel according to specialty (e.g., General Surgeon, Dermatologist, Laboratory Technologist, etc.).

- Design legislation to provide incentives for members of the health care occupations to volunteer for service in lieu of being inducted.
- Develop incentives to encourage qualified health care personnel to voluntarily join the Active and Reserve Components. Among programs which could be considered would be financial grants and periods of active duty to attend in-service schools and other professional programs.
- Establish an Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program for medical personnel which includes funding for "continued health education" in military related subjects in return for the individual's immediate availability in the event of a mobilization.

After extensive study, the Selective Service estimated that registering health care personnel at this time will reduce induction response time by as much as two months. This estimate may be conservative depending on how many categories of health care personnel should be identified and included in the resource pools.

The Selective Service System has a number of Reserve officers assigned within their regions who are charged with administrative and training responsibilities of the system. These commissioned officers provide a vital service. In order to permit a more cohesive management program, the Board supports programs to increase the number of Selected Reserve officers serving tours of duty with the Selective Service System. In addition, the Board encourages the authorization for general officers in key positions in national and regional offices.

Health Care Professionals in the Selected Reserve

For the past two years, the Board has examined medical readiness as part of its FY 1982 and FY 1983 readiness assessment reports. Although there have been quantitative inconsistencies, the overwhelming fact is that there are serious shortfalls and deficiencies in the availability of trained medical professionals, hospitals, and medical equipment to meet the demands of war. From the Board's perspective, the problems are paramount in the following areas:

- There are substantial shortfalls in trained medical personnel in nearly all classifications. Coupled with these deficiencies, there is an overwhelming dependence on Retirees and members of the IRR to meet the demand,

without the necessary systems in place to assure these personnel will report if called.

- The high show rate projected for the IRR and Retirees has not been substantiated. Therefore, dependence on these figures is ill-advised as they may project a favorable trained manpower position which does not exist.
- There is no system in place requiring the registration of health professionals including females (see Selective Service section of this report).
- Since the FY 1982 report, there have been substantial increases in the number of health professionals shown as a wartime requirement. In several instances, the increased medical manpower requirement was arbitrarily allocated to the Reserve Components while either decreasing or maintaining Active Component requirements at approximately the same level. For many of the Services, this greater reliance and responsibility on the Reserve Components has not been matched with commensurate increases in their authorized manning levels or other resources.
- There are serious shortfalls in medical equipment, to include surgical suites, mobile hospitals, instruments, x-ray equipment, and other critical items. These shortages have not been addressed in the budget cycles or in increased troop structure. With the long lead-time required for much of this equipment, it places our Armed Forces in the potential position of being unable to care for their early battle casualties.

This is not a new problem. It has been addressed by this Board since 1978 following mobilization exercise "NIFTY NUGGET." Little action has been taken, however, to correct these deficiencies.

Bonuses and Incentives

In this and former reports, the Board has outlined the need to address "critical manpower" issues: the strength of the IRR is low; Selected Reserve strength should be at wartime levels or greater; recruiting and retention of quality personnel are essential; and so forth. We have not been alone in these concerns and the Congress has been supportive by providing various bonus and incentive money to assist the Guard and Reserve in meeting their manning re-

quirements.

There are a number of bonus and incentive programs in place today, each addressing various aspects of the problem, but none which are all-inclusive in their scope or design. Some programs were not successful, such as the direct enlistment program into the IRR. Others were too specific or not workable.

The Board believes that the time has come for a thorough evaluation of the various incentive and bonus programs for the Reserve Components—specifically those relating to recruiting and retention of Guard and Reserve membership—to determine the effectiveness of each incentive. If the incentives produce results they should be continued. If not, they should be eliminated and the resources reallocated.

As a further recommendation, the Board believes that now may be the time to view recruiting and retention bonuses and incentives for the Reserve

Components from a totally different perspective. Reduction or elimination of pinpoint bonus programs and redirection of those dollars into a thorough Reserve Component Force G.I. Bill should be considered. This G.I. Bill would encompass all incentives directed toward the attainment and maintenance of strength, as well as an improved quality force. If properly structured with educational benefits, it is the Board's belief that such a program could be far more effective than the various programs which now exist.

With new equipment and new technology being introduced into our Armed Forces at an accelerated rate, there will be increased demand for more technically proficient and more highly educated personnel. The Board believes a program such as the one outlined above will not only better serve our defense requirements, but will also be of immeasurable benefit to the members of our Reserve Components.

TRAINING

General

Training readiness is directly influenced by personnel strength, skill qualification, and the availability and readiness of assigned equipment. The level of training readiness is also significantly influenced by the amount of training funds available.

In the last several years, constrained training funds have severely impacted on training readiness. These constrained funds include "personnel school funds," "manday spaces," "short active duty tour" money, and "O&M" (Operation and Maintenance) money. The shortage of funds impacts on the full spectrum of Reserve Component training—from sending enlisted or officer personnel to service school, to movement of equipment and personnel to annual training sites.

The problem, in part, has been created by several factors.

- The high visibility of personnel and O&M money and the natural desire to cut defense spending by reducing these funds during the budget and review cycles within the Department and Congress.
- As contrasted to funds allocated for procurement or other contract services, the "discretionary" nature of personnel and O&M funds, which make them easier to cut.
- The use of a continuing resolution until late in a fiscal year resulting in the inability to properly plan the use and expenditure of funds.
- The Reserve Components success in attracting and retaining personnel which increases the demand on the limited funds available.

Limited training funds have been reflected in such actions as reducing school quotas, limiting the length of annual training periods in some services, eliminating special active duty tours, and restricting staff assistance visits and other activities which involve personnel payments.

Use of Simulators

The use of simulation continues to enhance Reserve Component readiness while conserving training funds. Heavy weapons sub-caliber simulators, mini-target substitutes, and other training devices have enhanced training readiness while reducing the

expenditure of costly and limited training ammunition. However, the growing complexity and cost of these training simulators are limiting their use to primarily Active Component installations.

The Board wishes to highlight the need which exists for these devices in the Reserve Components. Their use is not exclusive to any one Service. They enhance training and allow better use of available time. Most importantly, better individual awareness and, therefore, better individual combat readiness has been demonstrated time and again in the evaluation and comments from training installations. Additionally, significant savings in repair parts and petroleum products result from the use of training simulators.

The Board is convinced that the purchase and distribution of simulators and other electronic training aids is the most cost effective way to take advantage of and to make better use of available training time. Examples of enhanced performance by individuals and units exposed to the use of these devices are numerous. There is an outspoken enthusiasm for the use of these devices by the personnel exposed to them who know from experience there is a direct correlation between retention rates of personnel in the Selected Reserve and the dynamics of their training experiences.

Training Observations

The Board's observations of training during the year lead to the following general comments and recommendations:

- Increased resources must be provided for joint and combined exercises between Active and Reserve Component Forces. Not only do these exercises provide excellent training, they also serve to build confidence in the Total Force.
- The use of combined arms and air/ground supporting fire must be utilized to the maximum extent possible, in order to train under realistic conditions.
- The Air Force is the leader in integrated training and support of the Active and Reserve Components.
- There needs to be increased emphasis included in the curricula at the Service Academies and the Staff and Senior Service College regarding the role, importance, and capability of the Guard and Reserve and their relationship to (and with) the Total Force.

- The Board strongly recommends that funding for simulators and electronic training aids be expanded.

Overall, increased funding for Guard and Reserve training to include training aids and travel is urgently required. Individual skill qualification is the second most limiting factor to Guard and Reserve readiness. Restraints on funding for schools, field exercises, overseas exercises and training aids are severe inhibitors to readiness.

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger said it best in a speech before the Congress of the Inter-allied Confederation of Reserve Officers on August 9, 1982:

Without thorough and systematic training, reservists cannot maintain the skills of military professionals and on today's battlefield professionalism would provide the cutting edge of victory.

OTHER KEY ISSUES

General

The following are areas of interest and concern for the Board and ones which will continue to be monitored closely.

Coast Guard Selected Reserve

For the past three years, the Board has expressed concern with Coast Guard funding and manning levels. Once again, the Board must voice its concern to Congress about the impact on mobilization readiness created by the failure of the Coast Guard Reserve to grow to needed levels. Although the Coast Guard Reserve total requirement is small relative to the other Reserve Components, its role in mobilization is critical.

The primary mission of the Coast Guard Reserve on mobilization is to provide port security forces. Such forces must be trained and immediately available for assignment to the nation's key ports. These ports are essential to strategic mobility of deploying military forces, their resupply, and to the continuation of essential maritime commerce for the nation's industrial and economic base. The fact is that the current Coast Guard Reserve manning level of 12,000 is only just over half of the stated total required Coast Guard Reserve force. Expressed another way, unless higher manning levels are approved and funded, many essential ports, commercial or industrial waterways and waterfront facilities may be unprotected and thus vulnerable to accidental or intentional disruption of operations during a mobilization crisis.

The Board supports legislation to authorize an increase in the manning levels of the Coast Guard Reserve to wartime levels and to direct funding for these increases.

General and Flag Officer Accountability

An extensive study has been made by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) of the overall issue of General Officer accountability against numerical ceilings. The Guard and Reserve are drawn into this by virtue of those few active duty positions presently occupied by Reserve Component General and Flag Officers. For the most part, these positions have been created by Congress in order to permit the Reserve Components to administer and manage

their own components.

Part of the OSD recommendation was the elimination of Congressionally mandated minimum grades applying to these Reserve Component statutory positions and to authorize the Secretary of Defense to determine the appropriate grade. This provision carries with it the possibility that a Secretary of Defense could reduce the rank level below that now mandated by law. This provision deeply concerned many in the Reserve community in general and the various Guard and Reserve associations in particular, many of whom joined to vigorously oppose the OSD proposal.

On the positive side, the OSD proposal would make the few active duty Reserve General and Flag Officer positions nonaccountable against the active duty list. Reserve Officers below General and Flag Officer rank on active duty are not accountable under the new DOPMA law. Legislation was proposed late in the 97th Congress to resolve this issue but there was insufficient time for the proposed legislation to be considered. Thus far, there has been no action on this issue.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board urges that the Congress immediately pass legislation (separate legislation, if necessary) calling for the removal of all Reserve Component General and Flag Officers and positions from Active Component General Officer accountability. The "grade issue" can be dealt with at a later date as part of an overall, comprehensive General Officer legislative package. It is the belief of the Board that if Reserve Component General and Flag Officers are removed from the Active Component accountability, there would be less incentive to eliminate Guard and Reserve statutory minimum grades and minimum grade might become a non-issue.

Congress was specific in its intent that the Reserve Component officers assigned to the specified statutory positions be of a grade which is comparable to their Active Component counterparts. This provision has been met. Increased grade levels for Reserve Component Officers is not the issue—the issue is accountability. Reserve Component General and Flag Officer positions should not be counted within the Active Component and/or against the total General Officer complement on active duty.

Equipment Storage

As more equipment is brought into the Reserve Components, there will be increased demands for

adequate and secure storage facilities. This problem will become most acute in the Army Reserve Components.

Most armories and training centers in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve were designed and built in the 1950's and 1960's, before the Total Force policy was instituted. In those days, units were organized under an entirely different structure with most units manned and equipped at 50% levels. The armories and training centers were not, for the most part, designed with the storage space required to accommodate the types of units now in the force structure or the equipment levels which must be maintained.

Armories and Training Centers

With the exception of the National Guard, most reserve training centers are 100% funded by the Federal Government to include land, construction

and maintenance. Because of the types of missions assigned to Air National Guard units, substantial federal funding is also the rule. This is not the case with Army National Guard armories which must have the land donated or free and clear, and must be financed on a 25% state, 75% federal basis. Continued financial constraints within the states on available funds and an increased need for space to accommodate not only the equipment but units to be formed have created a serious problem which will be exacerbated in the years to come.

The Board recommends that the federal share of armory construction cost in the Army National Guard be increased from the present 75%-25% split to a 90%-10% split. Further, the Board recommends that a provision be made to allow 100% federal funding for storage facilities or other facilities needed to accommodate the enhanced equipment situation. A change to 10 USC 2236(b) is necessary. The federal construction contribution percentage should be increased from 75% to 90%.

BOARD ACTIVITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983

General

In 1983, the Board commemorated thirty-one years of dedicated service to the Secretary of Defense, the Congress and the Nation. Tracing its origin back to President Truman's Executive Order 10007 of October 15, 1947, the Board has been variously designated as The Committee on Civilian Components in 1947, the Civilian Components Policy Board in 1949, and, finally, The Reserve Forces Policy Board when established by statute in 1952.

Organizationally, the Reserve Forces Policy Board melds the expertise of the non-active duty members of the Reserve Components with that of the civilian appointees having responsibility for Reserve matters and representatives of the Regular forces. The twenty-one member Board consists of a civilian chairman appointed by the Secretary of Defense; an Assistant Secretary from the Army, Navy and Air Force whose responsibilities encompass Reserve affairs; one Regular general or flag officer from each of the three military departments; two general or flag officers from each of the six Department of Defense Reserve Components; one flag officer from the Coast Guard; and one Guard or Reserve general or flag officer who serves, without vote, on active duty as military advisor to the Chairman and as executive officer of the Board.

The entire Board meets in formal session for three or more days each calendar quarter as determined by the business at hand or by the scope of trips to the field to view training or exercises. Frequently, standing and special committees of the Board will meet as required to receive briefings germane to their specific areas of interest, to observe exercises, to view training, to conduct studies, or to exercise oversight of policy level groups within the Department of Defense in anticipation of policy level decisions impacting on the Reserve Components. In this manner, the Board as the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve Components, conducts its business, independently of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services, but with due regard for their statutory responsibilities. Additionally, the Board meets with Defense policy makers, Congressional leaders, leaders from executive departments and agencies, and leaders from the private sector.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board in its advisory

role to the Secretary of Defense, the President and the Congress is unique. The Board membership represents, in addition to nationwide geographic dispersion, a broad variety of civilian and military background experience. This Board is the means by which the Secretary of Defense brings into consultation the entire range of National Guard and Reserve expertise. The Board, although created to be independent by statute, functions as part of the Secretary of Defense in-house team offering advice and counsel on a broad area of policy issues affecting the Reserve Components.

Committees

During Fiscal Year 1983, the Board utilized the following committees to study and formulate recommendations on issues relating to the Guard and Reserve and to the Total Force:

Standing Committees

Personnel and
Manpower
Mobilization and
Deployment

Special Committees

1990's Study
ROPMA
Force Mix Study Group

Meetings with Defense Policy Makers and Congressional Leaders

The Chairman and Board met frequently this year with key Defense policy makers, senior military commanders from the Services and with Congressional leaders. These persons included:

- Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger.
- United States Senator Roger W. Jepsen, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel.
- United States Senator John W. Warner, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces.
- Congressman William Nichols, Chairman, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation.
- Congressman Samuel S. Stratton, Chairman, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Procurement and Nuclear Systems.
- Honorable Edwin Meese, III, Counsellor to the President of the United States of America.

- Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer.
- General Paul X. Kelley, Commandant and Chief of Staff, United States Marine Corps.
- Ambassador Alesandro Orfila, Secretary General of the Organization of American States.
- Ambassador J. William Middendorf, Permanent United States Representative to the Organization of American States.
- Honorable Thomas K. Turnage, Director, Selective Service System.
- Honorable Louis O. Giuffrida, Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
- Honorable Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics).
- Dr. John F. Beary, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs).
- Honorable James R. Ambrose, Under Secretary of the Army.
- General Richard E. Cavazos, Commander, United States Army Forces Command.
- General Jerome F. O'Malley, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.
- General John A. Wickham, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army.
- Lieutenant General C. E. McKnight, Commander, United States Army Communications Command.
- Vice Admiral Kent J. Carroll, Commander, Military Sealift Command.
- Vice Admiral Thomas J. Kilcline, Commander, Naval Air Forces, United States Atlantic Fleet.
- Vice Admiral James R. Sanderson, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
- Vice Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, Director, Navy Program Planning.
- Vice Admiral Sir David Halifax, KBE, United Kingdom, Deputy Supreme Commander, Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT).
- Mr. Jerry Calhoun, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics).
- Honorable Edward J. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).
- Mr. Charles Groover, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Integration).
- Ms. Karen R. Keesling, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations).
- Rear Admiral Richard C. Berry, Commander, Cruiser/Destroyer Group Eight.
- Major General William C. Moore, Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army.
- Major General Edward Huycke (MC), Deputy Surgeon General, United States Army.
- Major General Stuart Sherman, USAF, Director, Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation.
- Rear Admiral Edward K. Walker, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT).
- Rear Admiral Neil Smith, Deputy Vice Commander, Service Group Two.
- Rear Admiral William A. Kearns, Commander, Amphibious Group Two.
- Rear Admiral Robert Dunn, Chief of Naval Reserve.
- Major General Vincent E. Falter, USA, Director, Army Force Modernization Coordination.
- Commodore Tommie F. Rinard, Deputy Commander, Naval Air Reserve Forces.
- Brigadier General Harry D. Penzler, USA, Deputy Director for Operational Plans and Capabilities, OJCS.
- Mr. Gilbert Turner, Chairman, National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve.
- Mr. William K. Brehm, Chief, Evaluation Team for Mobilization Exercise "PROUD SABER."
- Mr. John Schank, RAND Corporation.
- Mr. Donald Srull, Vice President, Logistics Management Institute (LMI).

Field Visitations

During FY 1983, the Board collectively or individually continued to attend meetings, visit specific field sites, and observe exercises and activities relating to various Board and Committee responsibilities and special areas of interest to the Board.

Board visitations and meetings included:

- State Department, Washington, D.C.

- Organization of American States, Washington, D.C.
- U.S.S. Carl Vinson (CVN 70).
- Headquarters, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), Norfolk, Virginia.
- Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.
- U.S.S. McCandless (FF-1084), Norfolk, Virginia.
- Fleet Intelligence Center Europe Atlantic (FICEURLANT), Norfolk, Virginia.
- Headquarters, United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Atlanta, Georgia.
- Headquarters, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart, Georgia.
- Headquarters, Sixth United States Army, Presidio of San Francisco, California.

Reports and Publications

- *Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Fiscal Year 1982.*
- *Fiscal Year 1982 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components*

Comments on Board Activities


Questions and comments regarding the Board's FY 1983 Annual Report are welcome and encouraged. In addition, the *Fiscal Year 1983 Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* is being published concurrently with this Annual Report and is available upon request. Address your comments to:


The Reserve Forces Policy Board
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Room 3B260 — The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-7300


MEMBERS OF THE RESERVE FORCES
POLICY BOARD


LOUIS J. CONTI
Chairman


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY



HONORABLE DELBERT L. SPURLOCK
Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)


FRED K. MAHAFFEY
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA



ROBERT W. TEATER
MAJOR GENERAL, ARNGUS



CHARLES M. KIEFNER
MAJOR GENERAL, ARNGUS



HENRY W. MEETZE
MAJOR GENERAL, USAR



BERWYN FRAGNER
MAJOR GENERAL, USAR


DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY



HONORABLE CHAPMAN B. COX
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)


STEPHEN G. OLMSTEAD
MAJOR GENERAL, USMC


JOHN W. CRONIN, JR.
REAR ADMIRAL, USNR


LEMUEL O. WARFIELD
REAR ADMIRAL, USNR


WILLIAM C. GROENIGER, III
MAJOR GENERAL, USMCR


JOHN B. HIRT
MAJOR GENERAL, USMCR

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE



HONORABLE TIDAL W. MCCOY
Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs
and Installations)



ROBERT C. OAKS
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF



RAYMOND A. MATERA
MAJOR GENERAL, ANGUS



DARROLL G. SCHROEDER
MAJOR GENERAL, ANGUS



JAMES W. TAYLOR
MAJOR GENERAL, USAFR




DONALD A. MCGANN
MAJOR GENERAL, USAFR

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD



JAMES C. IRWIN
REAR ADMIRAL, USCG

MILITARY EXECUTIVE



LAVERN E. WEBER
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1983, is a reflection of the consensus of the 21 member Board. Although most recommendations and policy changes had unanimous support, neither this report nor the signature of the Members purport to indicate that the Military Departments, Services or signers concur with each and every recommended action.